G.R. No.

152662               June 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia
C. Malolos."

The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.3

Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six
Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which
were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and
effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of
Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil
action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings
pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of
City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of
₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of ₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges
involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however,
dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent
Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000
Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by
the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The
criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with
the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is
hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153. 4

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review 5 on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.

In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.

On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to comment
on the petition.

In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City,
thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had
already prescribed.

In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed
to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the
private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had
elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until
the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court.

The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.

xxx

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court.
Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326,
as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 9

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1âwphi1 According to the OSG, while it admits that
Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the
period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or
with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. 10 It submits that the
filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case
of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 11 that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial
proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, 12 the CA allegedly failed to
consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.

Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, 13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal’s
Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of
the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years
within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed
outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision
of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that
the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered
by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably
a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made
between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.

The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of
prescription of such offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true
copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the
record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also
observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by
respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law applicable
to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years; (c) xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The
running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, 16 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case
on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. 17 when it
held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense.

Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is
no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of
the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v.
Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 22 cases involving special
laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al., 23 the Court
even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to
the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City
Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was
notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the
MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting
followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question".
The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were
filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on
her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the
requisite complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169588               October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative
Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City,
BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed
and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City.

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the
parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City
Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. 1

According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to
the filing of the Informations are the following:

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel
Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S
No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to
the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then
illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which
was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00 for illegal parking and the
declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.

In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car
with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the
prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly
removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is
₱26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were not paid by the
respondents.2

The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two
cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint
against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified
as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May
23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case
charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave
Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.

In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto
Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car
since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he
removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using
the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the
Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4

In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario
Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case
of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of
Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the
existence of the crime.

xxxx

We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars
involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance
No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they
should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or
Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner
of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the
corresponding informations against them in Court.6

Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003,
stating:

That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by
such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice
of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth ₱26,250.00 and
other consequential damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW,

San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7

The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January
20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought
the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to
prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on
respondents with more than one offense.

In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:

1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.

2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the
crime.

3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."

4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be
seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2,
2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the
accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed. 9

In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order 11 to argue
among other points that:

6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have
been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003,
well within the prescribed period.12

Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.

The respondent judge released a Resolution 15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to
Quash. The Resolution held that:

For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion to
quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.

These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.

Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date
the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).

In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO
ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).

Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was
raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the
prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the
Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:

x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of
the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the
criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in
special laws."17

Petitioner contended further that:

the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal
information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in these
cases had prescribed.

xxxx

The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a City
Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper
for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the
new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These criminal cases
cannot be commenced in any other way.

Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply in this
case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been
filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case
Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by
information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the
running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.

In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion. They held that
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. 20 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes 21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the
commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed
with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.

In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F.
Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be
interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judge’s Order
dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an
August 15, 2005 Order.

Hence, this Petition.

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,
2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John
Does," and "Peter Does."

Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not
apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any
case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in
Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.

In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on
prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely,
that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense, were
sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the
Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was
contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago 23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the civil
aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.

In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, since
the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not
specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service
in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may
file a verified petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing the
prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law
provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that
Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive
period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City
Ordinance 003-2000.

The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day.
These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction:

xxxx

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint
or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:

SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria
established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component
cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An
independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands
that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, 29 this Court
recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio
City.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period
where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in
Zaldivia v. Reyes.

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with
the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30,
1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled
that:

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal
or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not
prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation.
This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not
on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act
No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5)
of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 30

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the
Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v.
Pangilinan31 categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan
referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of
special laws but not to ordinances.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the
Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had
two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial
Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the
violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing
that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which
to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:

SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.

The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –

a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;

b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof;

c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and

d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:

SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the crime charged
was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation
of the provision of the Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is
necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."

Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:

SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:

a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the
Ombudsman; or

b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on
its merits.

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only by the
filing of the complaint or information in court.

xxxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the
commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or
information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1âwphi1

Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and established Regional State
Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions where the
Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San
Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities
of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.

The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the Information within the
two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1âwphi1

The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case
against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription
period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say
concerning the effects of its ruling:

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is
too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as
reasonably deduced from their plain language.

The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to
be corrected.33

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160355             May 16, 2005

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78149 affirming the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 743-C(’93) convicting the accused Ernesto Ancheta of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

The Antecedents

Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as driver of one of its passenger buses.
On July 23, 1993, an Information was filed with the RTC of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, charging Ancheta with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:

That on November 23, 1992 at around 11:50 o’clock (sic) in the morning, at Brgy. Dolores, Municipality of Capas,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then
the driver and person-in-charge of a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Plate No. CVE-707 with MVRR No. 63044987,
registered in the name of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. of Tarlac, Tarlac, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with reckless imprudence and managed the said Philippine Rabbit Bus at Brgy.
Dolores, Capas, Tarlac, in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without due regard to laws, regulations,
ordinances and traffic code and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to persons and
damage to property and in violation of the Land Transportation Laws, said bus driven by the accused while
cruising the MacArthur Highway towards the south direction, bumped the left rear side of a Toyota jeep with Plate
No. TAB 929 with MVRR No. 64284647 owned by Zenaida B. Dizon of 193 M. Santos St., Pasay City, Metro
Manila, and driven by Eduardo Mangawang towards the north direction, and as a result thereof said Eduardo
Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he was then driving sustained damages of an undetermined amount, to
the damage and prejudice of the deceased and the owner thereof.

Contrary to law.3
The accused was assisted by Atty. Crispiniano Lamorena, Jr., whom the PRBLI assigned as counsel de parte. Atty.
Andres Pangilinan entered his appearance as private prosecutor.

The trial court rendered judgment on November 12, 1999, convicting the accused of the crime charged. The fallo of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, ERNESTO ANCHETA,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.

Accordingly, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional in its minimum period as minimum to six (6) years of prision
correccional in its maximum period as maximum.

For the civil liability of the accused, Ernesto Ancheta is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Eduardo
Mangawang the amounts of P28,600.00 as actual or compensatory damages and P1,436,466.30 representing
loss of earning capacity. The accused is similarly ordered to pay the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of
indemnification for the death of Eduardo Mangawang and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.4

The accused appealed the decision to the CA. On November 10, 2000, the appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing
the appeal due to Ancheta’s failure to file his brief as accused-appellant. 5 The resolution of the CA dismissing the appeal
became final and executory, thus, entry of judgment was made of record on December 7, 2000. After the transmission of
the records to the RTC, it issued an Order on June 5, 2001 for the arrest of the accused. 6

On June 29, 2001, the PRBLI, as Ancheta’s employer, filed a Notice of Appeal of the decision of the RTC. On July 18,
2001, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal, on its finding that the notice was filed long
after the judgment of the RTC had become final and executory. 7 The PRBLI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
order, claiming that it was not served with a copy of the decision of the RTC convicting the accused of the crime charged;
hence, could not have appealed the same. On August 1, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying the said motion.
The PRBLI filed an urgent motion, this time for clarification of the said order, which the trial court denied in an Order dated
August 31, 2001. Undaunted, the PRBLI filed a manifestation with motion, citing the ruling of this Court in Ozoa v. Vda. de
Madula.8 On October 17, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, this time, granting the motion and giving due course to the
appeal of the PRBLI. The trial court, likewise, ordered the records to be transmitted to the CA for the consideration of the
appeal, where the latter made the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ATTRIBUTING SUPPOSED NEGLIGENCE AND LACK OF
FORESIGHT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED ANCHETA.

III

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SO GENEROUSLY AWARDING UNCONSCIONABLE AMOUNTS

IN SUPPOSED DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG. 9

On October 10, 2003, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the RTC. The  fallo of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 12, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 743-C(’93) is hereby AFFIRMED with the correction that the
actual damages to be awarded should only be P5,000.00. All other respects remain. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.10
The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision of the RTC had long become final and executory
when the PRBLI appealed the decision. It ruled that the PRBLI was bound by the said decision against the accused
therein.11 Nevertheless, the appellate court resolved the appeal on its merits and affirmed the decision of the RTC, but
with modification.12

The PRBLI forthwith filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision of the CA on the following
grounds:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED HAS
ATTAINED FINALITY AS AGAINST PETITIONER.

B.

PETITIONER MUST BE AFFORDED THE STANDING AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION THE
ACCUSED’S CONVICTION.13

The petitioner submits the ruling of this Court in Pajarito v. Seneris14 and Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,15 that
"the decision of the trial court convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to
the civil liability but also, with regard to its amount," should not apply to it. It avers that unlike in  Pajarito  and Miranda, the
counsel of the accused therein was given ample opportunity to defend the accused during the trial and on appeal in the
CA. The petitioner laments that in this case, the counsel it provided to defend the accused was remiss in the performance
of his duties and failed to notify it of the RTC decision, the November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA, as well as the June
5, 2001 Order of the RTC; consequently, it was not apprised of its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased, thus depriving
the petitioner of its right to due process. It avers that it was only on account of its own diligence that it discovered the
decision of the RTC, the November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA and the June 5, 2001 Order of the RTC.

The petitioner further avers that it was not furnished with a copy of the said CA Resolution, and of the Arrest Order of the
RTC dated June 5, 2001. The petitioner posits that until it is furnished with such copies, the period within which to assail
the decision of the RTC on its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased had not commenced to run.

The petitioner submits that it is unjust and unreasonable for the CA to deprive it of its right to question its civil liability to
the heirs of the deceased, considering the gross negligence of the counsel that it had provided the accused.

By way of comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the decision of the RTC
convicting Ancheta of the crime charged had become final and executory, following the dismissal of his appeal before the
CA. The decision of the RTC was conclusive on the petitioner, not only with regard to its civil liability but also as to the
amount thereof, absent any collusion between the accused-employee and the private complainant. The petitioner was not
a direct party in the criminal case; hence, was not entitled to a copy of the decision of the RTC or to appeal therefrom; it
was, likewise, not entitled to be furnished a copy of the CA Resolution dated November 10, 2000 and the Order of the
RTC dated June 5, 2001. Hence, according to the OSG, it cannot complain of denial of its right to due process. The OSG
further asserts that the petition at bar is premature, considering that no writ of execution has yet been issued by the RTC,
and cites the ruling of this Court in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People16 to buttress its stance.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

The ruling of the CA dismissing the petitioner’s appeal of the RTC decision convicting Ancheta of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide is correct. However, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the decision of the RTC.

The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from the said decision because, in the first
place, it was not a party in the said case. While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance and, in effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a
copy of the decision of the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.

Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual participation in the defense of its employee,
Ancheta, by providing him with counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his own fate because his failure is its failure. 17 The
petitioner, as the employer of the accused, would thereby be apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome
thereof from time to time through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the petitioner of the progress of
the case is thus not equivalent to lack of due process. The pronouncement of the Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage &
Taxicab, Inc. 18 is instructive on this score:

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee but
in substance and, in effect, he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his concern, as
well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation
in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also his. And if because
of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later
be heard to complain, if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his
day in court. It was not without purpose that this Court sounded the following stern warning:

"It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and
deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a
result of the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and,
consequently, doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American
rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied." (Martinez v. Barredo, supra.)19

In Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula,20 the Court explained the effect of a judgment of conviction against the employee on the
subsidiary liability of the employer, as follows:

To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a quo cannot be gainsaid. A person
criminally liable is also civilly liable; and upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the recovery
of the civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly instituted unless waived, or the filing of a separate action
therefor is reserved. The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated civil liability ex delicto of his
employee in the event of the latter’s insolvency; and the judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the
employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of that liability but also
as to its amount.21

Since the petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal of its employee (Ancheta), the petitioner
cannot justifiably claim that it was deprived of its right to due process. As explained by this Court in Martinez v. Barredo:22

The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not one
wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which
enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver’s criminal negligence
which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the employer
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver’s conviction and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the
same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee’s primary civil liability but also his employer’s subsidiary
liability for such criminal negligence. (Almeida, et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476; 54 Law ed.,
1116; Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur v.
Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.) 23

Besides, as gleaned from the brief of the petitioner, as appellant in the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 78149, it sought the
reversal of the decision of the RTC and the acquittal of its employee. In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People,24 this
Court held that such an appeal would be impermissible for the following reasons:

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. This is the risk
involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power
to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.

If the present appeal is given [due] course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to
review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be
meted out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment
against him could become subject to modification without his consent. 25

Indeed, to allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal case via an appeal from the decision of the RTC
would be to annul, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. 26
The Court cannot second guess whether Ancheta’s failure to file his brief as appellant in the CA was through the
negligence of his counsel or because of the belief that, indeed, he was guilty of the crime charged and it was purposeless
and futile for him to still file such brief.

We agree with the contention of the OSG that the right of the petitioner as the employer of the accused to due process
occurs during the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, on the basis of the sheriff’s return
that the writ of execution issued by the court for the enforcement of its decision on the civil liability of the accused was not
satisfied because of the latter’s insolvency, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in the name of the accused.
Such return is prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.27

During the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, the prosecution must prove that (a) the
petitioner PRBLI was the employer of the accused; (b) it was engaged in some kind of industry; (c) the crime was
committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and (d) execution against the employee is unsatisfied. 28 The
prosecution may offer in evidence the sheriff’s return as prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.

The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, may adduce evidence on questions which may be involved in the
execution since the trial court which rendered the decision has a general supervisory control over the process of
execution.29

From a ruling adverse to the employer, it may appeal by writ of error on questions of facts, or mixed questions of facts and
of law, or by certiorari on questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the trial court, thus:

It goes without saying that the determination thus made as regards the employer’s subsidiary civil liability is not
conclusive in the sense of being non-reviewable by higher judicial authority. It may be appealed to a higher court
at the instance of the aggrieved party – either the offended party or the employer – by writ of error seeking review
of questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, or through a petition for review on certiorari, limited to a
consideration only of questions of law. Or review may be sought by the institution of a special civil action
of certiorari, upon the theory that the determination was made by the trial court without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.30

Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the decision of the RTC which had long become final and executory. A
final and executory decision, even if erroneous, can no longer be modified.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the appeal of the petitioner is AFFIRMED. However, that portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated November 12, 1999, is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 216920

GIRLIE M. QUISAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution 3 dated
January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968, which affirmed the denial of petitioner Girlie M.
Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to Quash before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144 (RTC).

The Facts

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a  Pasiya4 or Resolution
finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, 5 otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid
Sakdal6 or Information was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.

On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the
person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her motion, petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the
OCP-Makati was penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior
Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal  was penned by ACP De La Cruz,
without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard, petitioner claimed that nothing in
the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal  would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As such, the
Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured. 7

In its Comment and Opposition, 8 the OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor, SACP Hirang, was authorized to
approve the Pasiya pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32.9 Further, it maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed
with the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information itself. 10

The RTC Ruling

In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It found the Certification
attached to the Pabatid Sakdal  to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires
the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations. 12

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied in an Order14 dated July 10, 2013. Aggrieved,
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via  a petition for certiorari.15

The CA Ruling

In a Decision16 dated October 10, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that pursuant to Section 9 of RA
10071,17 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 201 O," as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, the City
Prosecutor of Makati authorized SACP Hirang to approve the issuance of, inter alia,  resolutions finding probable cause
and the filing of Informations before the courts. As such, SACP Hirang may, on behalf of the City Prosecutor, approve
the Pasiya  which found probable cause to indict petitioner of violation of Section 10 of RA 7610. 18

Further, it held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Pabatid Sakdal  clearly indicated that the same was
filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and with the prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor. In
this regard, the CA opined that such Certification enjoys the presumption of regularity accorded to a public officer's
performance of official functions, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. 19

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,20 but was denied in a Resolution21 dated January 30, 2015; hence, this
petition.
 The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the R TC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion to quash.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information
requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed
before the courts, viz.:

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.  - If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he,
or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there
is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity
to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan  in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action.1âwphi1

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval of
the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d),
Rule 11 7 of the same Rules, to wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this relation, People v. Garfin22 firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority
to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by
express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. 23

In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor
ofMakati may delegate its authority to approve the filing of the Pabatid Sakdal  pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well
as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32; and (b)  the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before the
RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.

The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City Prosecutor the power to
"[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made
and filed against the persons accused," 24 he may indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as he may deem
necessary in the interest of the prosecution service. The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this
provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs or review
prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance, other action, and any information
recommended by any prosecutor for approval," 25 without necessarily diminishing the City Prosecutor's authority to act
directly in appropriate cases.26 By virtue of the foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang,
Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review
prosecutors for the OCP-Makati.27

In this light, the Pasiya  or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as
it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his
signature therein.

Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal  or Information filed before the RTC, as there was no
showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCPMakati' s division chiefs or review
prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others, that "DAGDAG KO
PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng
Panlunsod na Taga-Usig"28 - which translates to "and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and
approval of the City Prosecutor."

In the cases of People v. Garfin,29 Turingan v. Garfin,30 and Tolentino v. Paqueo,31 the Court had already rejected
similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was
shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior
written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file
the Pabatid Sakdal  or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor
of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division
chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought the
approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing
the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya  approved by
designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid Sakdal  approved by the same person or any
other authorized officer in the OCP-Makati.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence
of any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own;
or (b) did seek the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information before the RTC.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the  Pabatid Sakdal or
Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to do
so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal  must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of
the Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all
litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the Govemment." 32

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated January 30,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102,
Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for
recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that
his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the
Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating
the above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and
well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107,
NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111,
RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
 II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such
indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice
Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito  and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent
citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our
own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject
of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito  or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code.
It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
 nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this
case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might
not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If
we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished
by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified
only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for
lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the
more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that
of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights
because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed
by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621,
73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia
that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited,
but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act.
Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations
"which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification,
"not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter
of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And
so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it
is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable
by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new
code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto  shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice
Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability,
it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article
2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for  quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of
Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with
their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that
such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be
done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal
standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the
tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39
Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured
person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989

EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.

Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.

Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in
lznart Street, Iloilo City" 1 The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a quo  that the said
vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along
said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a
consequence. 2

Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve
his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private
prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".5

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the same subject matter and
act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and
affirmative detenses that the private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latter's cause of action,
if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the
civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in
the criminal case. 8

Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial,
with the suggestion that "(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to the
Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to review the ruling of the court". 9

On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as
G.R. No. L-40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the
Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a
resolution of October 28, 1975. 11

After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering
herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other
actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and costs. 12

On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision of the lower court except as to the award for
moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent
court on September 18, 1987. 14

The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the private respondent, who was the complainant
in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without
reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising
from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and
no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the respondent court for refusing to resolve an
assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had been passed upon by this
Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is petitioner's position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court
in said case, the first dismissing the petition and the second denying the motion for reconsideration, do not constitute the
"law of the case' which would control the subsequent proceed ings in this controversy.

1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.

The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid posture of the proceedings when the two
resolutions were handed down. While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of the issues which
were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically, its order denying
therein defendants motion to dismiss. This Court, without rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the legal and
factual bases on which its two resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil action on that incident for
lack of merit. It may very well be that such resolution was premised on the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the
basis of the facts then presented, did not consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that action, no law of
the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court's refusal to consider
petitioner's claim that his former acquittal barred the separate action.

'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court (21 C.J.S. 330). (Emphasis supplied). 16

It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal
questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that
particular case . . . (Emphasis supplied). 17

It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the case on
the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the
appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a
second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same
 as those on which the first question rested and, according to some authorities, provided the decision is on
the merits . . . 18

2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal plaint of petitioner.

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of
private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability  ex delicto and civil
liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort,
either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. 19

We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., 20 it was held that where the offended party
elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as a private
prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same
cause. It is meet, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious oral
defamation which, while within the contemplation of an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code,
constitutes only a penal omen and cannot otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in
the later case of Azucena vs. Potenciano, et al., 21 this time involving damage to property through negligence as to make
out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced since the
therein plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano. The citation of  Roa  in the
later case of Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter  and affords no comfort to petitioner.

These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil actions
arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion on the statutory aspects for another case
and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the doctrinal developments on this issue.

In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt,
it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the accused 23 and the complainant could file a petition
for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24

Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of
the Civil Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. 25 that:

In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that  'his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action
to recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-
settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'. (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in
People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code
which provides:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ... 26

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to
have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to
determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. 27

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer
that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such circumstances,
the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal
element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based
thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of
evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action
for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.

The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict
committed by the petitioner, thus:

3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at about 7:00 o'clock, the plaintiff crossed Iznart
Street from his restaurant situated at 220 lznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a
meeting of the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and while he was standing
on the middle of the street as there were vehicles coming from the Provincial Building
towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car
with plate No. B-2508 W which was on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial
Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was being driven by the defendant in a reckless and
negligent manner, at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the provisions of the
Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing city ordinances, and by reason of his
inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to act with due negligence and by failing to
take into consideration (sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the
place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other conditions of lznart Street; 29

Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case
and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.  30 The Court
has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that —

... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also
actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused . . .

The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually the same factual situation. The
Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to
reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing
a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal
case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was
based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and
resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court aside, We hold that on the issues decisive
of this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
without costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166836               September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G.
BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON,
CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of
the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical
antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

Antecedents

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty.
Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of
44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of ₱106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three separate
deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel
Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under
the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of ₱39,122,627.00,
were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third
deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being
meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. 4

BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a
complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging respondent directors
and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-
082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.

In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256, 7 respondent directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San
Miguel Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim was not legally demandable because
Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF
Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for
being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under
receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to
enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly
hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending
receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.

On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, 8 citing the
pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to
suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San
Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw
the sought suspension of proceedings due to the intervening termination of the receivership. 9

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution, 10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without
leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957
exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the
suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by
the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there
appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.

On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration filed on November
28, 2000, holding that BF Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under
Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal
liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver the titles. 11

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ
Secretary denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor concerned.

There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the Housing and
Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific performance where the HLURB is called upon to
inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty.
Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.

As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had ruled that the HLURB
has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices under PD 957. This is reiterated in the
subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres
Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.

The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions involving the lands
in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions, there is as
yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject land titles. In other words, complainant
cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on the validity
of the transactions involving the lots in question.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration. 13

Ruling of the CA

Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 73008), contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their appeal and in
refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel
Properties submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial question
that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.

In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008, 14 the CA dismissed San Miguel
Properties’ petition, holding and ruling as follows:

From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question generally applies to civil and
criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case, an issue in
an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which, consequently,
warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative proceedings.

Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the rule on prejudicial
question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on prejudicial question when it
directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation should the demolition of private respondents’ building
proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.

City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary dispute was considered a
prejudicial question which must be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the
affected areas.

In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order, courts can suspend
action in one case pending determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.

It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he applied the rule on
prejudicial question to the instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale transactions x x x by x
x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private
respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the titles of the parcels of land
included in the questioned conveyance.

All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative of the criminal
liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB
finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to
pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are not under any
legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the government as represented by
herein public respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal
information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has
been established by the complaining party.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The
Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 15

The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005. 16

Issues

Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and resolution, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED
PETITIONER’S CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO
INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:

THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID

LOTS IS MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED
THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27 JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF
HOMES, INC.".

A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE SUBJECT
TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE
MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.

IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT
CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE
INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO
THE PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.
IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA PROHIBITA
NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT
FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE HLURB’S RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.

NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT
PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED. 17

It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and damages that San Miguel
Properties instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.
957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the proceedings until the
SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes’ behalf, because the final
resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the
HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
affirmed the HLURB Arbiter’s decision, holding that although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one
case was civil and the other administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases pending the final
outcome of the administrative proceeding in the interest of good order. 18

Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP), arguing that the
HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the HLURB Board’s ruling, holding
thusly:

The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the Presidential Decree (PD) 957 –
"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective."

As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as successor agency of the
National Housing Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344, the real estate trade, with
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases "involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots … against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman," the HLURB, in
the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the
parties under these contracts and award[s] damages whenever appropriate."

Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for some forum to decide – if ever one is forthcoming –
the issue on the authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily resolves the basic complaint is
unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and the respective position papers and the evidence of the parties
having been submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual dispatch, the right and obligation of
the parties in line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile
Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions. 19

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631), raising as
issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of Atty. Orendain’s authority
to enter into the transaction with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes’ behalf, and rule on the rights and obligations of the
parties to the contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB properly suspended the proceedings until the SEC resolved
with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.

The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631, 20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had jurisdiction
over San Miguel Properties’ complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and ordered the remand of the case to the HLURB for
further proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within the HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:

[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts
between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply
with its contractual and statutory obligations.

Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint because it pertains to matters within the HLURB’s
competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB should not be suspended.

While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is in recognition of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take under the circumstances is to remand the
case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of evidence. 21
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San Miguel Properties’
criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial
question?

The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a
reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No.
957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

1.

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF
Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must
first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is
correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of
the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. 23 The essential
elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’
submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question
arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to
suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25 24 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted
elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. 25

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether
the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the
criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former
would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved
is thus necessary.

An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in
which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it. 26 Evidently, before the
remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract. 27 The remedy has its roots in
Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As presently
worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the
former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such
that a party’s breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to rescission. The
present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to
pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages
in either case.28
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in
view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers
have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and
amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, 29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles
free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the
registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as
well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in
case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.

Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San
Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would
decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution
of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled
to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to
his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order
to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have
rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a
question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. 30

2.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a court of law,
was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be
brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a
proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on
the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one
thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts are
no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts. 31

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special competence
of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that
requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some administrative board or commission
because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction
of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its
suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined. 32

To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a
question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special
competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended
pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve
a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the
latter, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and
a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or
dismissal of the action is proper.33

3.

Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted

It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’ directors and officers by the mere failure
to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension unsustainable. 34 The mere fact that an act or omission was malum
prohibitum did not do away with the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by means of rendering a
reasonable interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always be given a
reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its application. 35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing
prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable
consequences.

San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason to
suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the action for specific
performance or the criminal action.1âwphi1 It contends that the defense of a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a
related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related case.

The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the
defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to
distinguish.36

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44627 December 14, 1978

LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. SEÑERIS, Presiding Judge of Branch II, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga; JOSELITO
AIZON, and FELIPE AIZON, respondents.

Geronimo Pajarito for petitioner.

Dominador L. Natividad for private respondents,

ANTONIO,  J.:

Original special civil action for certiorari.

Private respondent Joselito Aizon was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch 11
(respondent Judge Alberto V. Seneris, presiding), with Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence or a violation of
Section 48 of Republic Act No. 4136. The pertinent portion of the Information reads as follows:

That on or about May 9, 1975, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the driver of an Isuzu Passenger Bus bearing
Plate No. SB-511 owned and operated by FELIPE AIZON, operating on the public road, and without
taking the necessary precautions, considering the width, traffic, visibility, grades, crossing, curvatures,
and other conditions of the road, so as to avoid accident to persons or damage to properties, did then and
there, through reckless and fast driving, caused the said Isuzu Passenger Bus to turn turtle, as a result of
which, the persons of MYRNA PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSA BARING, both passengers on board
the said Isuzu passenger bus sustained injuries on their persons which caused their death. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Upon arraignment, said respondent entered a plea of guilty. In view of said plea, the court rendered judgment convicting
him of the offense charged and sentencing him "to indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis the amount
of P12,000.00 ... ."
After the judgment had become final and executory, a Writ of Execution was issued against Joselito Aizon for the
indemnity of P12,000.00, but the same was returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency. Whereupon, petitioner Lucia
S. Pajarito, mother of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis, filed with the court a quo a motion for the issuance of
Subsidiary Writ of Execution and served a copy thereof to private respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of Joselito Aizon as
alleged in the Information. Felipe Aizon opposed the motion on the grounds, to wit: (1) that he is not the employer of
Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in question having been sold already to Isaac Aizon, father of Joselito, but that the deed of
transfer has not been executed because the full price has not yet been paid; and (2) that in case of insolvency, Joselito
has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the judgment insofar as the indemnity is concerned.

The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground that Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of
Joselito, was not a party in the aforesaid criminal case. Said the court:

It is therefore, the well considered opinion of this Court that a separate civil action must be filed by movant
Lucia S. Pajarito against Felipe Aizon in order to enforce the subsidiary liability of the latter under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the enforcement of tile subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
filled under the same criminal case, under which the subsidiary liability was granted; that respondent Felipe Aizon, alleged
employer of Joselito Aizon, was given his day in court, as he was furnished a copy of the motion for issuance of the
Subsidiary Writ of Execution, to which he filed his opposition; and that, although not made a party in the criminal case, the
employer, Felipe Aizon, should have taken active participation in the defense of his employee, Joselito Aizon.

On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment to the petition which We consider their Answer, maintain that to
enforce the subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a separate civil action must be
filed against the employer because under our present judicial system, before one could be held subsidiary liable, he
should be made a party defendant to the action, which in this case is not legally feasible because respondent Felipe Aizon
was not accused together with Joselito Aizon in Criminal Case No. 512 (1313) for Double Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence.

Obviously, the question to be considered here is whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or in a separate civil
action. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. As a
consequence, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom, except
when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the part of the complainant. As explained in Ramcar,
Incorporated v. De Leon:  1 "When no civil action is expressly instituted, according to subsection (a) of section 1 of Rule
107, it shall be impliedly jointly instituted with the criminal action.' That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins,
each one complete with the same completeness as any of the two normal persons composing a twin. It means that the
civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by law."

Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary liable for the
employee's civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability.  2 The
subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case.
In Martinez v. Barredo, 3 this Court ruled that a judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an
indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer
in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability.

... The stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and implications mere civil liability. Common
sense dictates that a finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary, should not be nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance of evidence to
support a judgment, unless those who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a
civil case will operate to automatically set aside the verdict against the defendant in the criminal case. It is
anomalous, to say the least, to suppose that the driver, excelling 'Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde', could be guilty
of reckless negligence in so far as his obligation to pay indemnity is concerned, and at the same time
could be free from any blame when said indemnity is sought to be collected mom his employer, although
the right to the indemnity arose from and was based on one and the same act of the driver.
 The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is
not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in
which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's
criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other
words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of
the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil
liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almelda et al. vs. Abaroa,
8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S., 476, 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320;
Francisco us. Onrubia, 46 Phil., 327; Province of Ilocos Sur us. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829;
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403)

It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and
deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a
result of the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and
consequently doing away with the practice of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American
rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied. (At pp. 3-4)

In Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 4 this Court further amplified the rule that the decision convicting the
employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer, "not only with regard to (the latter's) civil liability but also with
regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee. That is
why the law says that his liability is subsidiary (Article 103, Revised Penal Code). To allow an employer to dispute the civil
liability fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
And this Court, in Miranda, further explained that the employer is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case,
considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law.

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his
employee, but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by
law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal
case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate
because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted
and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court, for the
enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court . (At p. 675. Emphasis
supplied.)

The conclusiveness upon the employer of the judgment of conviction sentencing the employee to pay civil indemnity, for
the enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 was again reiterated in Manalo and Salvador
v. Robles Transportation Company, Inc., 5 where the Court ruled that the sheriff's return submitted in evidence in the
action against the employer, Robles Transportation Company, Inc., showing that the two writs of execution were not
satisfied because of the insolvency of the driver, is a prima facie evidence of the employee's insolvency. Similarly, this
Court ruled that the defendant's insolvency may be proven by the certificate of the Director of Prisons that the employee is
serving subsidiary imprisonment; 6 or by the certificate of the sheriff that the employee has not satisfied his pecuniary
liability and that no properties have been found registered in his name. 7

Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity under Articles 102 and
103 of the Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the latter's civil liability but also
with regard to its amount, this Court stated in Rotea, 8 that in the action to enforce the employer's subsidiary liability, the
court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no
power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision.

In view of the foregoing principles, and considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered operator of
the bus but only claims now that he sold the bus to the father of the accused, it would serve no important purpose to
require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary civil liability. Under the circumstances, it would not only prolong the litigation but would require the heirs of the
deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil
liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has
been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit.  9 There is no
question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and
this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.

The validity of the claim of Felipe Aizon that he is no longer the owner and operator of the in fated bus as he sold it
already to Isaac Aizon, father of the accused Joselito Aizon, is a matter that could be litigated and resolved in the same
criminal case. In support of his opposition to the motion of the complainant, served upon him, for the purpose of the
enforcement of his subsidiary liability Felipe Aizon may adduce all the evidence necessary for that purpose. Indeed, the
enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability may be conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because
the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral part of the case itself. This would certainly facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties. "The purpose of procedure", observed this Court in Manila Railroad
Co. v. Attorney General, 10 "is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims
of the contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice."
In proceedings to apply justice, it is the duty of the courts "to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination" of their rival claims. Thus, the Rules require that they should be liberally construed "to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 11

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Court in Criminal Case No. 512 (1313) dated July 27, 1976 and August 14, 1976
are hereby set aside. The Court  a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the
alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. Costs against private respondents.

Fernando (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur, but to make matters clearer, I must add that the only issues open at the hearing to be held by the court a
quo are: (1) whether or not Felipe Aizon was the owner of the vehicle driven by the convicted accused, Joselito Aizon, or,
whether or not he was the employer of said accused at the time of the commission of the offense on May 9, 1975, and (2)
whether or not said Joselito Aizon is insolvent. As stated in the main opinion, the judgment in the criminal case is
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to his civil liability but also with regard to its amount which is that found
in the judgment of conviction. In other words, what is to be decided by the trial court is not strictly speaking the subsidiary
liability of the employer, Felipe Aizon, for the judgment in the criminal case is deemed to include that liability, but only the
two issues related to it that I have mentioned.