Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
(J. Bersamin)
Facts: Petitioner Jocelyn De Leon, filed a disbarment case or suspension from the
practice of law against the respondent Atty. Pedrena. The petitioner alleged that the
respondent is her counsel for her case against his husband. When the respondent asked
the petitioner to ride with him, the petitioner acceded to his request. Inside the car, the
respondent rubbed her leg with his hand, tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed
hand, grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it in his cotch area and pressed his finger
against her private part.
Held: The petitioner was able to prove her case against the respondent. During the
clarificatory hearing, she was straightforward and spontaneous in answering questions
propounded on her. The court ruled that the possession of good moral character is both
a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar
and to retain membership to the legal profession. Members of the bar are clearly duty-
bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to safeguard the
reputation of the bar. In the instant case, immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal cat, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency.
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Ruling: Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or
matters filed after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts. Thereby, the Constitution mandates all justices and
judges to be efficient and speedy in the disposition of the cases or matters pending in
their courts. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to "devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include the
performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions and to "perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.” These judicial canons
directly demand efficiency from the judges in obvious recognition of the right of the
public to the speedy disposition of their cases. In such context, the saying justice
delayed is justice denied becomes a true encapsulation of the felt need for efficiency and
promptness among judges. All judges should be mindful of the duty to decide
promptly, knowing that the public’s faith and confidence in the Judiciary are no less at
stake if they should ignore such duty.
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Facts: The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield),
sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, insisting that “it is gross ignorance of the
law for [the Court of Tax Appeals] to have held that it has no jurisdiction over [their]
petition; the grossness of [the Court of Tax Appeals’] ignorance of the law is matched
only by the unequivocal expression of this [the Court of Tax Appeals’] jurisdiction over
the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine
of stare decisis.” The Court of Tax Appeals finds the statements of petitioner’s counsel
as derogatory, offensive and disrespectful.
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Ruling: The Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The
New Code of Judicial Conduct reiterates the prohibition from engaging in the private
practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside
his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official
is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Being a subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private
life should be above suspicion.
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Held: A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional
or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility
exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
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Facts: Complainants engaged in the legal services of respondent Atty. Orro to handle a
case in which they were defendants seeking the declaration of nullity of title to a parcel
of land in Isabela. Respondent received P10, 000 acceptance fee from them and handled
the trial of their case until RTC decided in their favor. Plaintiff’s appeals to the CA to
which the respondent requested from the complainants an additional P30, 000 for the
preparation and submission of their appellee’s brief in the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC but the respondent did not inform the complainants. They had
trouble communicating with respondent. When they finally reached him, he requested
for an additional P7, 000 as fee for filing a motion for reconsideration which he did not
file. Complainants lost their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth
of P3, 391,600.
Ruling: The Court believes that the respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath which
contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 17 and Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18. CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 –
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's
request for information. The relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued
with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship
commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and
to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. To accord with this
highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of
the former’s cause and to be diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs. As an
essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic
and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case.
He failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and discretion and with
all good fidelity to his clients and his unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him
by the IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his conduct
revealed his irresponsibility and disrespect for the IBP.
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Facts: Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and
breach of trust. Bayonla alleged that she and Alfredo had engaged the legal services of
Atty. Reyes to collect their share in the expropriation compensation from the Air
Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro City agreeing to her attorney’s fees of
10% of whatever amount would be collected; Atty. Reyes had collected P1 million from
the ATO; that Bayonla’s share, after deducting Atty. Reyes attorney’s fees, would
be P75,000.00, but Atty. Reyes had delivered to her only P23,000.00, and had failed to
deliver the balance of P52,000.00 despite repeated demands.
Held: The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a lawyer
and her client is highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity
and good faith. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of her client that may come into her
possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03 of Canon
16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the funds, or the lawyers option to
apply so much of the funds as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the client.
By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the
aforestated canons. The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was
unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to the client. The
unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client warrants the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer. Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to immediately
account for and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit, for it signified that she
had converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed
in her. It constituted gross misconduct for which the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law became justified pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
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Facts: The Court received a letter from Engr. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board and CEO
of the FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative (FH-GYMN). The
letter included a complaint-affidavit, whereby Ongjoco charged the CA’s Sixth Division
composed of Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (as Chairman), Associate Justice
Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino as Members for rendering
an arbitrary and baseless decision, Ongjoco maintained that respondent members of the
CA’s Sixth Division violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not
specifically stating the facts and the law on which the denial of the petition for review
was based.
Held: The Court found that the administrative complaint against respondent Justices of
the Court of Appeals baseless and utterly devoid of legal and factual merit, and
outrightly dismiss it. In administrative cases involving judicial officers, the
complainants always carried on their shoulders the burden of proof to substantiate their
allegations through substantial evidence.
A judge’s failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold him
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position
doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one
called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal liability should
be visited on him only when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is
committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the
standards and norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of
procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence.
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Facts: Respondents sued NPC for the recovery of damages and of the property alleging
that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC
traversed their land. NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to
compensation. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents.
Held: The recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that
prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services
of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the
attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation
for the effort in pursuing the client's cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing
the amount of legal fees. In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the
attorney and his client, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination
requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of
the services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof.
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Facts: DMAP commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of EO 213 and MC 153. CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition. DMAP appealed to the Court which was subsequently
denied. In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the
occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its
President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea
Transport Update. Petitioners filed a special civil action for contempt against the
respondents.
Held: Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed
in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice;
and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the
lawful process or order of the court. The test for criticizing a judge's decision is, whether
or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport
Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt
of court.
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Facts: GSIS charged respondent RTC Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum, the then Executive
Judge of the RTC in Mandaluyong City, with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the
law, and violation of the Rules of Court. The charges against the respondents were both
based on the non- raffling of a Civil Case.
Held: The Court have always regarded as a fundamental precept that an administrative
complaint against a judge is inappropriate as a remedy for the correction of an act or
omission complained of where the remedy of appeal or certiorari is a recourse available
to an aggrieved party. Two reasons underlie this fundamental precept, namely: (a) to
hold otherwise is to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment; and (b) to follow a different rule can mean a deluge of complaints, legitimate
or otherwise, and our judges will then be immersed in and be ceaselessly occupied with
answering charges brought against them instead of performing their judicial functions.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty and corruption.
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Held: The sins of Judge Costales consisted of omissions. To start with, he failed to act on
some cases from the time of their receipt at Branch 45 until the period of the audit. And,
secondly, he did not properly supervise the court personnel, as borne by the records of
some cases either not containing the latest court actions and court processes taken, or
not showing the actions taken from the time of their filing, or not being set for further
hearing or action, or revealing the delayed issuances of summonses and alias
summonses despite the corresponding orders towards that end, or by inaction on cases
set for ex parte reception of evidence.
Judge Costales uncharacteristically ignored that he discharged judicial and
administrative duties as the Presiding Judge of Branch 45. He seemingly forgot that his
responsibility of efficiently and systematically managing his caseload was the
inseparable twin to his responsibility of justly and speedily deciding the cases assigned
to his court. He should have remembered all too easily that he had
assumed both responsibilities upon entering into office as Presiding Judge, and that he
was bound to competently and capably discharge them from then on until his
compulsory retirement. His failure to discharge them properly by organizing and
supervising his court personnel with the end in view of bringing them to the prompt
dispatch of the courts business in anticipation of his forced retirement reflected his
inefficiency and breached his obligation to observe at all times the high standards of
public service and fidelity.
In this regard, Judge Costales could not deflect the blame to Atty. Pascua as his Branch
Clerk of Court. The responsibility of organizing and coordinating the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient performance of the courts business was direct and
primary for him as the judge. Truly, the duty to devise an efficient recording and filing
system that would have enabled himself and his personnel to monitor the flow of cases
and to manage their speedy and timely disposition pertained to him first and foremost.
Moreover, he should know that his subordinates were not the guardians of his
responsibilities as the judge. Being in legal contemplation the head of his branch, he
was the master of his own domain who should be ready and willing to take the
responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects, as well as to be ultimately responsible for
order and efficiency in his court. He could not hide behind the inefficiency or the
incompetence of any of his subordinates.
As with Judge Costales, omissions made up Atty. Pascuas myriad faults. Atty. Pascua
bore the responsibility for the non-issuance of summonses or alias summonses in some
cases, for the failure to indicate the dates of receipt of case records by Branch 45, for the
failure to receive evidence ex parte despite the orders to that effect, for the failure to
prepare and submit (or cause the submission of) the monthly inventories, and for the
failure to report and update the records of the cases of the branch. Such omissions
involved matters that he should have routinely and regularly performed. His duty as
the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 45 required him to receive and file all pleadings
and other papers properly presented to the branch, endorsing on each such paper the
time when it was filed.
Atty. Pascua was equally accountable with Judge Costales for the inefficient handling of
the court records of Branch 45. His being the Branch Clerk of Court made him the
custodian of such records (i.e., pleadings, papers, files, exhibits, and the public
properties pertaining to the branch and committed to his charge) with the sworn
obligation of safely keeping all of them. Like his Presiding Judge, he carried on his
shoulders the burden to see to the orderly and proper keeping and management of the
court records, by which he was required to exercise close supervision of the court
personnel directly charged with the handling of court records. His position of Branch
Clerk of Court rendered him an essential and ranking officer of the judicial system
performing delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice. Alas, he failed to so perform.
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Finding the negligence of the petitioners’ former counsel being matched by their own
neglect (of not inquiring about the status of the case from their former counsel and not
even taking any action against said counsel for neglecting their case), the CA denied the
motion to recall entry of judgment.
Held: The gross negligence of counsel alone would not even warrant a deviation from
the principle of finality of judgment, for the client must have to show that such
negligence resulted in the denial of due process to the client. When the counsel’s
mistake is so great and so serious that the client is prejudiced and is denied his day in
court, or when the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s
deprivation of his property without due process of law, the client is not concluded by
his counsel’s mistakes and the case can be reopened in order to give the client another
chance to present his case. As such, the test herein is whether their former counsel’s
negligence deprived the petitioners of due process of law.
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Facts: Daniel G. Sevilla charged Hon. Francisco S. Lindo, with delay in the disposition
of Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260 (a prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 [BP 22] entitled People v. Nestor Leynes).
Sevilla asserted that Judge Lindo thereby violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which requires that a judge should administer justice impartially and
without delay; that Judge Lindo also violated Section 1, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court,
which mandates that justice be impartially administered without unnecessary delay;
that Judge Lindo’s unreasonable resetting of the hearings 12 times rendered
inconsequential his right to the speedy disposition of his case; and that such resettings
were made upon the instance of Judge Lindo, not upon motion of the parties.
Held: Judge Lindo is held liable for delay in the disposition of his cases that was
tantamount to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of his official duties.
Judge Lindo made or allowed too many unreasonable postponements that inevitably
delayed the proceedings and prevented the prompt disposition of Criminal Case No. J-
L00-4260 out of manifest bias in favor of the accused, to the prejudice of Sevilla as the
complainant in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260. Thus, he flagrantly violated the letter and
spirit both of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to
administer justice impartially and without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, which required him as a trial judge "to be prompt in disposing of all
matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied."
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Facts: Benigno B. Reas, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, in Cebu
City charged in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Carlos M. Relacion, Clerk
III of the RTC, Branch 15, in Cebu City with gross dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Reas alleged in his complaint that by prior arrangement, the Clerk of Court of the RTC
(COC) delivered to the Cebu CFI Community Cooperative (Cooperative) the salary
checks of court personnel with outstanding obligations with the Cooperative to pay for
their loans; that his salary check for the period of September 1 to 15, 2004 in the amount
of P4,280.00 was delivered by the COC to the Cooperative for that purpose; that when
he asked for the receipt corresponding to his payment, the Cooperative informed him
that his salary check had been "inadvertently surrendered" to Relacion after the latter
had harassed the Cooperative "to a point of violence" to release his (Relacion) own
check for that period; that Relacion did not return the salary check to the Cooperative
despite repeated demands; that when he confronted Relacion, the latter admitted taking
his salary check; that Relacion mauled him when he refused Relacion’s offer to pay his
salary check with Relacion’s Judicial Development Fund (JDF) check; and that it was
only after the Cooperative confronted Relacion that the latter paid his salary check.
Held: Respondent Relacion was guilty of Simple Misconduct. The Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel requires that the officials and employees of the Judiciary serve as
sentinels of justice, and declares that any act of impropriety on their part affects the
dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s faith in the Judiciary. Thus, the court personnel
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of
their official duties, but also in their private dealings with their co-employees and with
the public. Their professional and personal conduct must be free from any whiff of
impropriety.
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Facts: Ulaso initiated this proceeding against the respondent on March 2, 2005, praying
for the latter’s disbarment due to her act of signing the amended verification and affidavit
of non-forum shopping attached to the amended complaint of Bides and notarizing the
document sans the signature of Bides and despite the non-appearance of Bides before
her.
Held: The respondent’s notarizing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping in the absence of Bides as the affiant constituted a clear breach of the notarial
protocol and was highly censurable.
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TAN VS. HERNANDO
A.M. No. P-08-2501, 28 August 2009
Court personnel; Failure to pay debt
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Held: A client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer; otherwise, there would
never be an end to litigation as long as a new counsel could be employed, and who
could then allege and show that the preceding counsel had not been sufficiently diligent
or experienced or learned. The legal profession demands of a lawyer that degree of
vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family; such lawyer should adopt
the norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. Moreover, a lawyer owes it to
himself and to his clients to adopt an efficient and orderly system of keeping track of
the developments in his cases, and should be knowledgeable of the remedies
appropriate to his cases.
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Held: Respondent Judge failed in his duty to promptly and expeditiously dispose of
complainant’s case. Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason
to interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was previously
heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the
full period of ninety (90) days for the completion of the transcripts within which to
decide the same. The respondent should have forthwith issued the order directing the
stenographers to submit the TSNs after the complainant had manifested that the
defendants had not filed their memorandum. A judge cannot by himself choose to
prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Respondent Judge
could have easily sought additional time by requesting an extension from the Court.
Without an order of extension granted by the Court, his failure to decide within the
required period constituted gross inefficiency that merited administrative sanction.
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Held: Judge Herrera’s failure to decide his cases with dispatch constituted gross
inefficiency and warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions upon him. Judge
Herrera’s plea of heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, poor health, and physical
impossibility could not excuse him. Such circumstances were not justifications for the
delay or non-performance, given that he could have easily requested the Court for the
extension of his time to resolve the cases. No judge can choose to prolong, on his own,
the period for deciding cases beyond the period authorized by the law. Without an
order of extension granted by the Court, a failure to decide even a single case within the
required period rightly constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative
sanction.
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A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not misrepresent that defendants
were still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the pleadings that
the defendants were already deceased. The fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of
wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling
is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored. A lawyer’s
reputation is a very fragile object. The Court must shield such fragility from mindless
assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting
down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding
good faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is
insulated from intimidation and harassment is encouraged to be courageous and
fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper
administration of justice.
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