G.R. No.
147703 April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out
becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the
judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking
for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the
accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried
in one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioner’s appeal from the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss
is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED."4
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was
found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine
(9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages
as follows:
‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of
₱25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for
one year at ₱2,500.00 a month, ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for
the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of
₱300,000.00 as moral damages;
‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of
₱237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for
three years at ₱45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of
₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages and ₱200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees[;]
‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of ₱22,838.00
as funeral expenses, the sum of ₱20,544.94 as medical
expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at ₱1,000.00 per
month, and the further sum of ₱100,000.00 for moral
damages;
‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of ₱229,654.00 as
hospital expenses, doctor’s fees of ₱170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, ₱22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least ₱150,000.00 to cover future
correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in
the amount of ₱1,000,000.00;
 ‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of ₱3,561.46 as medical
expenses, ₱2,000.00 as loss of income, and ₱25,000.00 as
moral damages;
‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of ₱19,800.47
as medical expenses, ₱800.00 for loss of income, and
₱25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of ₱580.81 as medical
expenses, ₱4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings
of ₱1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of
₱10,000.00;
‘h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of ₱12,473.82 as
hospital expenses, ₱14,530.00 as doctor’s fees, ₱1,000.00 for
medicines and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of ₱155.00 for
medical expenses, ₱87.00 for medicines, ₱1,710.00 as actual
damages and ₱5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of ₱1,395.00 for
hospital bills, ₱500.00 for medicine, ₱2,100.00 as actual
damages, ₱1,200.00 for loss of income and ₱5,000.00 as
moral damages;
‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of
the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of ₱250,000.00 as actual
damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the
owner of the jeepney, the amount of ₱22,698.38 as actual
damages;’
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the
insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final
and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is
worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel
for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a
notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the
denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of
appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the
trial court gave due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On
December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998,
the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s]
brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents’] brief on the ground that the OSG’s authority to
represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion
was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March
2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to
dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also
of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-
employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employer’s
subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158
SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant
case."8
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-
employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states
thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but
the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in
double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground
that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.10 On the other
hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their
right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of
conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much
of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.11
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may,
upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the
accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal."12
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction,
they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.13
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during
the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment
and during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the
promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed,
since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed
by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days
from notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large, they cannot seek
relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.16
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7
of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.17
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
innkeepers, as follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by them or their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or
for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by
the innkeeper’s employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to
Article 103 which reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged
in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue
raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has
clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
"x x x xxx x x x"
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes
it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by
execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.19
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent
civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions.
Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623 of the
Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such
revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not
deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action
arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring
such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more
than once for the same act or omission.24
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even
if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of
the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.25
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which
states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." 26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal
case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently,
petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical
conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the
criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with
the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be
applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s employer did not
interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which
the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is
not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect, they have an
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on
their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of
his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These
intentions are apparent from its Appellant’s Brief29 filed with the CA and from
its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial court’s finding of guilt
"is not supported by competent evidence."31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a
sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse,
affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the
penalty it imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-
employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than
that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy,
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without
his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively
waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner
may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail
and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having been a
fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his
right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court
in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even
by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This
right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of
it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted
to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right
to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x."37
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court
and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In
the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render
the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is intolerable and does
not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses
to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal
case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right
to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner
argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab,
Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case,
because it has followed the Court’s directive to the employers in these cases to
take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the
defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the
undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability,
petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an
employer’s liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is
subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable
for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s
insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability
-- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases
to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision,
the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability,
but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.49
Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be
adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the
convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry;
(3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their
duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due
to insolvency.50
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But
the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and
the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in
the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil,
has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due
notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-
employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability
remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability.
The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s conviction has attained
finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality
of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused
for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-
employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-
employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal
case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and
civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to
the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is
dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly
contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate
that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and
dependent upon the employee’s criminal negligence. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the
employee and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employer’s
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part
of due process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy
that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law
authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly
complied with.55
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as
merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.56 Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed
by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those
cases.58
was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was
not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the
accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven
that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner
that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger
bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioner’s driver, Napoleon
Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x."61 Neither does
petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused
while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the resolution of the case.59

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated

in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer
G.R. No. 200444
SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. and FELIX Q.
RUZ, Petitioners
vs.
ANTONIO SAN ANDRES, Respondent
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply
to the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code. Such actions may be filed at anytime, provided the plaintiff does not
recover twice upon the same act or omission.
The Case
Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc. and Felix Q. Ruz hereby assail
the decision promulgated on January 27, 2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. T- 2240 on November
24, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco City dismissing their
counterclaim on the ground that to allow their counterclaim was tantamount
to double recovery of damages, considering that the same was not prosecuted
in the criminal action against the respondent's driver.2
Antecedents
The relevant factual background was summarized by the CA thusly:
On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning, Ernesto Belchez was
driving a passenger bus, Mabel Tours Bus with body number 1896-C and plate
Number TB EBJ (old)/TB EVL-648 (new), owned by [respondent] Antonio
San Andres, along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Malabanban Norte,
Candelaria, Quezon, going towards the direction of Manila. While traversing
Maharlika Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was
overtaking. The Mabel Tours Bus immediately swerved to the left lane but in
the process, it hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and registered in the name
of [petitioner] Supreme Bus Transportation Line, Inc., and driven by
[petitioner] Felix G. Ruz, that was negotiating in the opposite lane. Because of
the strong impact of the incident, the Supreme Bus was pushed to the side of
the road and the Mabel Tour Bus continuously moved until it hit a passenger
jeepney that was parked on the side of the road which later on fell on the canal.
Nobody died but all the vehicles were damaged.
Investigation of the incident and photographs of the damaged buses as well as
the other two (2) vehicles were conducted and undertaken by SPO1 Rafael
Ausa of Candelaria, Municipal Police Station.
[Respondent] then brought the Mabel Tours Bus to the RMB Assembler and
Body Builder to have it repaired. The cost of repair was estimated in the
amount of One Hundred Forty Four Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos
(Phpl44,500.00).
On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the Court a quo was
instituted by [respondent] Antonio San Andres against [petitioners] alleging
actual damage to Mabel Tours Bus and unrealized profits for the non-use of
the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs in the amount of
₱144,500.00 and ₱150,000.00, respectively. Claims for attorney's fees of
₱30,000.00, appearance fee of ₱l,000.00, litigation expenses of ₱20,000.00 and
cost of the suit were also lodged in the complaint.
xxxx
Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with Counterclaim. They alleged
among others that plaintiff has no cause of action against them; the proximate
cause of the vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the [respondent's]
driver, Ernesto Belchez operated the Mabel Tours Bus recklessly and in
violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another
vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming
from the opposite direction resulting to head on collision on the lane of
defendant Supreme Bus and, at the time of the accident, [respondent] operated
the Mabel Tours Bus outside his franchise and without a registered plate.
By way of counterclaim, [petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc.
alleged that it suffered damages in the aggregate amount of ₱500,000.00 and
another ₱l00,000.00 for the medical expenses of its employees and passengers.
The unwarranted filing of the case forced them to secure the services of a
counsel for ₱50,000.00 plus appearance fee of ₱5,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of ₱3,000.00 including traveling expenses.
xxxx
After all the issues have been joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference
wherein the parties, in an effort to amicably settle the case, referred the case to
conciliation. The parties, however, failed to hammer out an amicable
settlement. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
[The parties] presented oral and documentary evidence to support their claims
and contentions. [Respondent] presented himself and Ernesto Belchez who
later became a hostile witness. On the part of [petitioner and Ruz], Felix Ruz,
SPOl Rafael B. Ausa and Assistant for Operations of [petitioner] Supreme
Transportation Liner, Inc., Jessi Alvarez, were presented.
In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez stated that he filed a criminal complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property against Ernesto Belchez
before the Court in Candelaria, Quezon. The case is now terminated and the
accused was convicted because of his admission of the crime charged. In the
said criminal complaint, he did not reserve their civil claim or asked (sic) the
fiscal to reserve it, which, if itemized, would also be the amount of their
counterclaim in the present civil action filed by [respondent]. He added that
they did not receive any compensation for the civil aspect of the criminal case,
and although the Supreme Bus was covered by insurance, they did not claim
for any reimbursement in connection with the subject incident.3
Judgment of the RTC
On November 24, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the
respondent's complaint as well as the petitioners' counterclaim,4 decreeing:
From the foregoing, the instant complaint for damages filed by the plaintiff is
hereby dismissed for having failed to prove liability on the part of the
defendant. The counterclaim that was filed by the defendants hereof is also
dismissed for failure to adhere to procedural requirements.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC opined that the respondent was not able to prove the petitioners'
liability;6 and that the petitioners' counterclaim should also be dismissed
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,7 whose pertinent portions
the RTC quoted in its judgment as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institute the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
xxxx
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.8
The RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute
a separate civil action precluded their right to recover damages from the
respondent through their counterclaim.9
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed, submitting that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE
COUNTERCLAIM.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COUNTERCLAIM
BECAUSE NO RESERVATION WAS MADE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
02-253 FILED AGAINST PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S DRIVER ERNESTO
BELCHEZ.10
Decision of the CA
In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27, 2011,11 the CA dismissed
the petitioners' appeal, stating that the RTC had correctly ruled that the
counterclaim could not prosper because their recourse was limited to the
enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary liability under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code;12 that "to allow the counterclaim of [petitioners] is
tantamount to double recovery of damages, a prohibition under Article 2177
of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the Rules;"13 and that their
failure to reserve the separate civil action meant that their right to recover
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was deemed instituted with the criminal
action.14
The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the
resolution promulgated on January 26, 2012.15
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
The Court is called upon to decide whether or not the petitioners' counterclaim
was correctly denied by the RTC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed
by the RTC and the CA despite their failure to reserve the right to file a separate
civil action in the criminal case they had brought against respondent's driver.
However, whether or not they could recover damages upon their counterclaim
presents a different story, as they should first show that they will not recover
damages twice for the same incident.
1.
Petitioners' counterclaim, being in the
nature of an independent civil action,
required no prior reservation
As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of action should be
limited to the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by virtue of their having
initiated against the respondent's driver the criminal complaint for criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was seemingly
of the opinion that the petitioners' recourse against the respondent was limited
to recovering from him, as the driver's employer, his subsidiary liability under
and pursuant to Article 10316 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the CA
pointed out that the petitioners' failure to reserve the civil aspect of the criminal
case proscribed them from instituting a separate civil action based on Article
2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Corollary, appellants should have reserved the civil aspect of the criminal case
they have filed. Without so doing, they were deemed to have elected to recover
damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. Therefore, the right of
appellants to institute a separate civil case to recover liability from appellee
based under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. Evidently, appellant's cause of action against appellee will be
limited to the recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. x x x17
The CA thereby erred. It incorrectly appreciated the nature of the petitioners'
cause of action as presented in their counterclaim.
We only need to look at the facts alleged in the petitioners' counterclaim to
determine the correct nature of their cause of action.18 The purpose of an
action or suit and the law to govern the suit are to be determined not by the
claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather
by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.19
The counterclaim relevantly reads:
xxxx
5. That the proximate cause of the subject vehicular accident is the reckless
imprudence of the plaintiffs driver, one ERNESTO BELCHEZ, by operating
said Mabel Tours bus recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and regulations
in negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle without regards (sic) to the
rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite direction
resulting to head on collision (sic) on the lane of defendant's SUPREME bus;
6. That at the time of the accident, plaintiff operated the subject Mabel Tour
bus outside his franchise, hence, in violation of his franchise and allied rules
and regulations; operated the same without registered plate and using the route
of another franchise holder; and
COUNTERCLAIM
7. Defendants replead the proceedings (sic) paragraphs as they may be relevant;
8. That as a result of plaintiffs violation of his franchise and gross negligence
of his driver, the defendant's SUPREME bus suffered damage in the aggregate
amount of ₱500,000.00; medical expenses for its employee and passengers in
the amount of ₱100,000.00;20
xxxx
Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the petitioners' cause of action
was upon a quasi-delict. As such, their counterclaim against the respondent
was based on Article 2184,21 in relation to Article 218022 and Article 2176,23 all
of the Civil Code. It is relevant to state that even the RTC itself acknowledged
that the counterclaim was upon a quasi-delict, as its ratiocination bears out, to
wit:
The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private
respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against the plaintiff
under the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-
quoted provisions is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
However, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while
reiterating that a civil action under the above quoted provisions of the New
Civil Code may be brought separately from the criminal action, provides that
the right to bring it must be reserved.24
Yet, the RTC likewise erred on its outcome because its ratiocination was
founded on the obsolete version of the Rules of Court. By the time when the
RTC rendered judgment on November 24, 2008, the revised relevant rule of
procedure had already been promulgated and taken effect,25 and it had
specifically deleted the erstwhile reservation requirement vis-a-vis the
independent civil actions, as follows:
Section 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions. - (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary dan1ages without specifying
the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefore
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint
or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for
actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (la)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party
shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved,
which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint
or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on
the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of
both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.1awp++i1
The error committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take into
consideration that the omission of the driver in violation of Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code could give rise not only to the obligation ex delicto,26 but
also to the obligation based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Under the factual antecedents herein, both obligations rested on the
common element of negligence. Article 217727 of the Civil Code and Section
3,28 Rule 111 of the Rules of Court allow the injured party to prosecute both
criminal and civil actions simultaneously. As clarified in Casupanan v. Laroya:29
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime
or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action.
The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the
right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of
the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are
separate, distinct and independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the
criminal action. (Bold emphasis supplied)
The foregoing notwithstanding, the petitioners as the injured parties have to
choose the remedy by which to enforce their claim in the event of favorable
decisions in both actions. This is because Article 2177 of the Civil Code bars
them from recovering damages twice upon the same act or omission. As ruled
in Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco:30
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., ( 1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right
to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article
33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or
under both causes.
As can be seen, the latest iteration of Rule III, unlike the predecessor, no longer
includes the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code as requiring prior reservation to be made in a previously instituted
criminal action. Had it been cautious and circumspect, the RTC could have
avoided the error.
2.
Petitioners should first show that
they would not recover damages
twice from the same act or omission.
Nonetheless, we are constrained not to award outright the damages prayed for
by the petitioners in their counterclaim.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of Section 3, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, which is the applicable rule of procedure, expressly prohibit
double recovery of damages arising from the same act or omission. The
petitioners' allegation that they had not yet recovered damages from the
respondent was not controlling considering that the criminal case against the
respondent's driver had already been concluded. It remains for the petitioners
to still demonstrate that the RTC as the trial court did not award civil damages
in the criminal case. Consequently, Civil Case No. T-2240 should be remanded
to the RTC for further proceedings, if only to afford to the petitioners the
opportunity to present evidence on their counterclaim subject to the
prohibition against double recovery of damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 27, 2011; and REMANDS Civil
Case No. T-2240 to the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco City for further
proceedings to allow the petitioners to present evidence on their counterclaim,
subject to the foregoing clarifications.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139655 July 27, 2000
FIRST PRODUCERS HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
LUIS CO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A criminal proceeding, as a rule, may be suspended upon a showing that a
prejudicial question determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused is
the very issue to be decided in a civil case pending in another tribunal.
However, such suspension cannot be allowed if it is apparent that the civil
action was filed as an afterthought for the purpose of delaying the ongoing
criminal action. This exception applies especially in cases in which the trial
court trying the criminal action has authority to decide such issue, and the civil
action was instituted merely to delay the criminal proceeding and thereby
multiply suits and vex the court system with unnecessary cases. Procedural
rules should be construed to promote substantial justice, not to frustrate or
delay its delivery.
Statement of the Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking a reversal of the May 10, 1999 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49701. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Orders dated February 27, 1998
and October 9, 1998 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and
respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED TO SUSPEND the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 97-734 to await the outcome of Civil Case No. 97-2663."4
The February 27, 1998 Order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was
set aside by the CA disposed as follows:
"The MOTION TO SUSPEND on grounds of prejudicial question and to
reset arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack of merit."6
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On March 13, 1997, x x x Armand M. Luna filed a criminal complaint
for estafa and perjury against [herein respondent] Luis L. Co in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, docketed as I.S. No. 97-
10892. Pertinent portion of the complaint is hereby quoted as follows:
‘2.....On November 25, 1997, in the regular meeting of the Board of
Directors of the Producers Bank of the Philippines held at Manhattan
Bldg. Nueva Street, Manila, a resolution was adopted authorizing the
corporation to purchase three (3) proprietary shares of Manila Polo
Club to be placed in the names of Messrs. Co Bun Chun, Henry Co
and Luis Co to be held by them on behalf of the corporation which is
evidenced by the attached ANNEX 'C':
‘3. In accordance with said resolution, the corporation purchased said
proprietary shares in the name of the nominees, one of which was
placed in the name of Mr. Luis L. Co as evidenced by Proprietary
Membership Certificate No. 203 dated July 2, 1979, hereto attached as
ANNEX D;
‘4. On March 17, 1994, after the separation from the service of Mr.
Luis L. Co, Ms. Amelita F. Bautista demanded from him the transfer
of the subject certificate in the name of the corporation as evidenced
by a letter dated March 16, 1994 attached hereto as ANNEX 'E';
‘5. Despite his duty to assign the certificate back to the corporation
and the subject demand, Mr. LUIS L. CO, on April 26, 1994, instead
registered the loss of the said proprietary share with Manila Polo Club
Inc. by executing a false Affidavit of Loss and subsequently, he was
able to secure a replacement certificate No. 4454 in his name after
allegedly complying with the legal requirements for the replacement of
lost certificates. This is evidenced by the letter dated September 5,
1996 signed by Ramon B. Salazar, General Manager of Manila Polo
Club, Inc., hereto attached as ANNEX 'F';
‘6. In so doing, Mr. Luis L. Co misrepresented himself to be the
legitimate owner of subject share and by executing a false affidavit, he
made it appear that Certificate No. 203 was lost despite the fact that
said certificate is existing and remains in possession of the
corporation;
‘7. That on February 06, 1997, another demand was made upon Mr.
Luis L. Co to deliver to us the newly issued Manila Polo Club
Certificate No. 4454 and to execute a Deed of Assignment in favor of
a new nominee. Said demand is evidenced by the attached letter dated
February 6, 1997 signed by Atty. Pedro M. Malabanan, ANNEX 'G'
hereof;
‘8. That the value of said certificate is FIVE MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P5,650,000.00) as of
April 1996 as evidenced by a certification dated Oct. 03, 1996 hereto
attached as ANNEX 'H';
‘9. Despite subject demand, Mr. Luis L. Co failed and [has]
continuously fail[ed] to deliver the subject certificate to the
corporation and to execute a Deed of Assignment in favor of the
nominee of the corporation to the damage and prejudice of the latter;
’10. That said act of Mr. Luis Co constitutes misappropriation or
conversion of something given to him in trust to the prejudice of the
bank;’
"After the filing of [Co’s] counter affidavit and after consideration of necessary
pleadings appended thereto, [the] City Prosecutor recommended the filing of
estafa and perjury against [him]. Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed
[an] information for estafa against [him] in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-734 and another information for perjury was
filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati.
"Unsatisfied, [Co] appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the
Department of Justice but was dismissed by the latter in a[n] order dated
October 2, 1997.
"On November 16, 1997, during the pendency of the criminal case, [Co] filed
an action for damages against Armand Luna and First Producers Holdings
(complainant in the criminal case filed) with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
and was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2663. In the said complaint, [he]
claimed ownership over questioned Manila Polo Club Proprietary Share No.
203.
"On December 10, 1997, [Co] filed a motion for suspension of the case and
his arraignment thereon but was denied by [the trial court] in an order dated
February 27, 1998."7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals explained that "a prejudicial question is a question which
arise[s] in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal."8 And based on the above definition, it ruled that the requisites for
the existence of a prejudicial question were present in the case at bar. Should
the ownership of the share in question be decided in favor of Luis Co, there
would be no basis for the charge of estafa against him. The CA added that
respondent’s belated filing of the civil case did not detract from the correctness
of his cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action based on the
pendency of a prejudicial action may be filed at any time before the prosecution
rests.
Hence, this Petition.9
Issues
Petitioner attributes to the CA the following errors:
"A.....The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in
finding that a prejudicial question exists with respondent’s filing of
Civil Case No. 97-2663.
B.....The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in
directing the suspension of Criminal Case No. 97-734 pending
resolution of Civil Case No. 97-2663."10
In the main, the Court will resolve the propriety of the suspension of the
criminal proceedings based on the alleged prejudicial question.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Existence of a Prejudicial Question
Echoing the appellate court’s position, respondent maintains that the issue of
ownership of the Manila Polo Club share, which was raised in the civil action,
constitutes a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the criminal
case for estafa. He argues that his guilt or innocence may be determined only
after the issue of ownership has been resolved. He further contends that the
prejudicial question was seasonably raised because the Rules provide that it
may be made "at any time before the prosecution rests."
Prejudicial questions are regulated by Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as
follows:
"SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. -- The two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed."
"SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. -- A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests."
True, the Motion to Suspend the criminal case on the ground that a prejudicial
question existed was raised "before the prosecution rest[ed]."11 However, the
peculiar circumstances of this case clearly show that it was merely a ploy to
delay the resolution of the criminal case and vex the already overloaded court
system with an unnecessary case.
Civil Case Clearly Dilatory
The criminal action for estafa had been lodged with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on March 13, 1997. Yet, respondent filed the civil case only eight
months later, on November 18, 1997. Indeed, as early as 1994, a written
demand had already been served on him to return the said share.12 He did not
contest petitioner’s claim; in fact, he filed the present civil action several
months after the institution of the criminal charge. Verily, it is apparent that
the civil action was instituted only as an afterthought to delay the proceedings
in the criminal case.
The dilatory character of the strategy of respondent is apparent from the fact
that he could have raised the issue of ownership in the criminal case. He
himself admits that the issue of ownership may be raised in the estafa case.
Yet, he resorts to subterfuge, arguing:
"x x x. The resolution of the issue of ownership in Criminal Case No. 97-734
would only be for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the
respondent. The said issue may not be resolved with finality in the same
criminal proceedings, since the court a quo would be bound by what appears
on the face of the Manila Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No.
203. Considering that the subject Membership Certificate clearly shows that
the same is registered in the name of the respondent, the same is conclusive
evidence of his ownership."13
This argument is bereft of merit. We find no sufficient reason why the trial
court hearing the criminal case cannot resolve the question of ownership.
Significantly, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the filing of the criminal action.14 Hence, respondent may invoke all
defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action. In fact, there is
no law or rule prohibiting him from airing exhaustively the question of
ownership. After all, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the said defense.
The rules of evidence and procedure for the recovery of civil liabilities are the
same in both criminal and civil cases.15
Equally unmeritorious is respondent’s theory that the trial court trying the
criminal case would be bound by the Membership Certificate, which was
registered in his name and would thus be "conclusive evidence of his
ownership."16
If the trial court would indeed consider the Certificate as conclusive proof of
his ownership, then such ruling would in fact be favorable to him and give him
no reason to file the civil suit. It would be up to petitioner, then, to disprove
during the criminal proceedings his alleged ownership.
Ownership Is Not Necessarily An Element of Estafa
In any event, the issue of ownership is not a necessary element of estafa, as
held by the Court in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, which we quote:
"Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime of estafa x x x. In estafa,
the person prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the
owner of the goods. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
‘Any person who shall defraud another (it does not say ‘owner’) by any means
mentioned is that the loss should have fallen on someone other than the
perpetrators of the crime. x x x"17
Furthermore, to allow respondent’s stance is to open the floodgates, as it were,
to similar dilatory tactics.1âwphi1 In this light, we reiterate hereunder our earlier
pronouncement:
"Were we to sanction the theory advanced by the respondents x x x, there
would hardly be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it being the
easiest thing for the accused to block the proceedings by the simple expedient
of filing an independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the
issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been
misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a matter of defense to be
interposed by the party charged in the criminal proceedings."18
The foregoing principle applies with equal force in this case. Indeed, the rules
of procedure, including the rule on prejudicial questions, were conceived to
afford parties an expeditious and just disposition of cases. This Court will not
countenance their misuse and abuse to frustrate or delay the delivery of
justice.19 In this light, the civil action may in fact give rise to the evils of forum
shopping.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 97-734 with all
deliberate dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Purisima, J., no part.
G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with
a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a
civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage
on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent
then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial
question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend
the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent
should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism
pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a
civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3 It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must appear not only that
the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an
issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action
and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed.6 Its two essential elements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of
the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information
in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who
raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all
the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single
evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of
the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal
suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration
of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is
that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity
or invalidity of the marriage.8 Whether or not the first marriage was void for
lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It
should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided
all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the
material time of the first marriage.9
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment
to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40
of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite
- usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that
the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions
on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:10
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for
lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her
marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license.
More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already
attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years.11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a
prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the
first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under
which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law
or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds."12 [] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the
nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination
of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can
it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the
absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted
to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which
only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case
the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held
that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question.15 This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse.16 The contracting of a marriage knowing that
the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage
is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal
Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is
presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial
declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should
he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his
criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the
law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a
matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the
criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the
second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a matter
that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be
stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a
prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower
court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover,
when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two
marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by
petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely
resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose
of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed
above, this cannot be done.1awphi1
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said
to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. 19 The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal
intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner.20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into
a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against
him.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and the Resolution dated
October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil
rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage
although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private
respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting
her.3
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting,
petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella
(Santella).4
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in
June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an
information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.5 This case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an
action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground
that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed
her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and
Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of
their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With
respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still
single.8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner
filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial
court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel during the hearings of said case.
The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated
November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because
the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the
accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal
basis.10
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C.
Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s
[motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing
of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate
guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in
a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an
accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.11
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC
Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering
license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of
the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private
respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively
of the RTC of Quezon City.12 When the Board denied the said motion in its
Order dated July 16, 1991,13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another
petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in:
(1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the
outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the
continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory
petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy
against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32
of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding
before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative
proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in
other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
26178.14
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the
same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the
assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the
RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any
concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had
prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to
suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord
with law.15 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the
demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive
grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to
adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy.16
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the
administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court
held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil
case.17
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals but the same was denied.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL
ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A
QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.19
The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the
propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of
petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the
Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding
and controlling precepts and rules.20
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,
it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined.21 The rationale behind the
principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.22
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil
case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent
did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal
case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted.23 Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his
marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before
the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their
marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal
liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza24 and People vs.
Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The
prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in
effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September
1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not
be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which
is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists.28
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment
of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial
question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their
marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension
of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above,
the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have
previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrative and the other is civil.29
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides
that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended
notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the
respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an
administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered
professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to
be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the
latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the
case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision
of the courts or quasi-judicial body.
It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before
the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage
contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral
conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private
respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without
the benefit of marriage.30 The existence of these other charges justified the
continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial
court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy,
arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first
and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the
original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was
not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was
no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He
alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and
Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was
adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second
marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place.31
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.32 In this case, the
Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the
prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and
second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the
grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a
special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in
advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.33 In view of the trial court’s finding that
a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce
evidence in his defense.34
The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by
denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case
against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is
liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the
order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits
but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to
determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the
case.35 The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner
only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain
its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless
petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the
conclusion.36 Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a
pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding
that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present
evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the
evidence adduced by both parties.
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal
Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited
partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner
manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion
was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration
had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he
had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the
judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required
said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third,
when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence,
the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny
the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards
petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of
his motion to inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against
Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had
prejudged the case.37 In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,38 this Court
held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for
the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary
rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should
be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are
not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion
of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and
deciding the case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in
denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety
of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and
impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited
antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive
him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of
petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to
evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything
unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical
certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him
unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon
petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered
by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to
disposing of the court’s business promptly.41
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 141297 October 8, 2001
DOMINGO R. MANALO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division) and PAIC
SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks the review of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 50341 promulgated December 23, 1999, which
affirmed an Order issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
in Civil Case No. 9011 dated December 9, 1998.
On July 19, 1983, S. Villanueva Enterprises, represented by its president,
Therese Villanueva Vargas, obtained a loan of three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00) and one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) from the respondent
PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank and the Philippine American Investments
Corporation (PAIC), respectively. To secure payment of both debts, Vargas
executed in favor of the respondent and PAIC a Joint First Mortgage 1 over
two parcels of land registered under her name. One of the lots, located in Pasay
City with an area of nine hundred nineteen square meters (919 sq. m.) and
covered by TCT No. 6076, is the subject of the present case. Section 2 of the
mortgage contract states that "the properties mortgaged therein shall include
all buildings and improvements existing on the mortgaged property at the time
of the execution of the mortgage contract and thereafter."2
S. Villanueva Enterprises defaulted in paying the amortizations due. Despite
repeated demands from the respondent, it failed to settle its loan obligation.
Accordingly, respondent instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over
the mortgaged lots. On August 22, 1984, the Pasay City property was sold at a
public auction to the respondent itself, after tendering the highest bid. The
respondent then caused the annotation of the corresponding Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale3 on the title of the land on December 4, 1984. After the lapse
of one year, or the statutory period extended by law to a mortgagor to exercise
his/her right of redemption, title was consolidated in respondent's name for
failure of Vargas to redeem.
On October 29, 1986, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a Petition 4 for
assistance in the liquidation of the respondent with the Regional Trial Court.
The petition was given due course in an Order5 dated May 19, 1987.
It appears that from the years 1986 to 1991, Vargas negotiated with the
respondent (through its then liquidator, the Central Bank) for the repurchase
of the foreclosed property. The negotiations, however, fizzled out as Vargas
cannot afford the repurchase price fixed by the respondent based on the
appraised value of the land at that time. On October 4, 1991, Vargas filed a
case for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale before
Branch 116 of the Pasay City Regional Trial Court. On July 22, 1993, the court
rendered a decision6 dismissing the complaint and upholding the validity of the
mortgage and foreclosure sale. On appeal, the appellate court upheld the
assailed judgment and declared the said mortgage and foreclosure proceedings
to be in accord with law.7 This decision of the Court of Appeals subsequently
became final and executory when we summarily dismissed Vargas' Petition for
Review on Certiorari for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.8
In the meantime, on June 22, 1992, respondent petitioned the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 112, of Pasay City, herein court a quo, for the issuance of a writ
of possession for the subject property in Civil Case No. 9011. This is in view
of the consolidation of its ownership over the same as mentioned earlier.
Vargas and S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc. filed their opposition thereto. After
which, trial ensued.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 9011 (for the issuance of a writ of
possession), Vargas, on December 23, 1992, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale9 selling, transferring, and conveying ownership of the disputed lot in favor
of a certain Armando Angsico. Notwithstanding this sale, Vargas, still
representing herself to be the lawful owner of the property, leased the same to
petitioner Domingo R. Manalo on August 25, 1994. Pertinent provisions of
the lease agreement10 state:
"3. (a) The lease is for a period of ten year lease (sic), involving 450
square meters, a portion of the above 919 square meter property.
x x x (d) The LESSEE has to introduce into the said 450 square meter
premises improvements thereon (sic) consisting of one story building
to house a Karaoke Music Restaurant Business, which improvements
constructed thereof (sic), upon the termination of the lease contract,
by said LESSEE be surrendered in favor of the LESSOR (sic).''11
Later, on June 29, 1997, Armando Angsico, as buyer of the property, assigned
his rights therein to petitioner.12
On April 21, 1998, the court a quo granted the petition for the issuance of the
Writ of Possession.13 The writ was subsequently issued on April 24, 1998, the
pertinent portion of which reads:14
"NOW THEREFORE you are hereby commanded that you cause
oppositors THERESE VILLANUEVA VARGAS and S.
VILLANUEVA ENTERPRISES, INC. and any and all persons
claiming rights or title under them, to forthwith vacate and surrender
the possession of subject premises in question known as that parcel of
land and improvements covered by TCT No. 6076 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City; you are hereby further ordered to take possession
and deliver to the petitioner PAIC SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE
BANK the subject parcel of land and improvements."
Shortly, on May 8, 1998, S. Villanueva Enterprises and Vargas moved for its
quashal.15 Thereafter on June 25, 1998, petitioner, on the strength of the lease
contract and Deed of Assignment made in his favor, submitted a Permission
to File an Ex-parte Motion to Intervene.16 It bears mentioning, however, that
before petitioner sought intervention in the present case, he had separately
instituted a Complaint for Mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0868
before another branch17 of the Pasay City RTC to compel PAIC Bank to allow
him to repurchase the subject property.
On October 7, 1998, the court a quo denied the Motion to Quash and Motion
to Intervene filed respectively by Vargas and petitioner.18 A Motion for
Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration were filed by
the petitioner which, however, were similarly denied on December 9, 1998.
Petitioner then sought relief with the Court of Appeals, filing therein a Petition
for Certiorari. While this was awaiting resolution, he entered into another lease
agreement,19 this time with the respondent, represented by its liquidator, over
the same 450 sq. m. portion of the lot. The contract fixed a period of one
month beginning January 28, 1999, renewable for another month at the
exclusive option of the lessor, respondent PAIC Bank.
On December 23, 1999, the appellate court rendered the impugned Decision,
dismissing the petition, thus:
"All told, WE find the Order, subject of the instant Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, to be not without rational bases and we
observe that the court a quo, in issuing its questioned Order,
committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed December 9, 1998 Order is
AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED."20
Hence, this appeal, where petitioner raises and argues the following legal issues:
"I. Whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and/or was patently in error when it affirmed the denial
of petitioner's motion for intervention, despite the fact that he has a
legal interest, being a lessee and an assignee of the property subject
matter of this case.
II. Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion when it held that what are required to be instituted before
the liquidation court are those claims against the insolvent banks only
considering that the private respondent bank is legally dead due to
insolvency and considering further that there is already a liquidation
court (Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, docketed as Spec.
Pro. No. M-1280) which is exclusively vested with jurisdiction to hear
all matters and incidents on liquidation pursuant to Section 29,
Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as The Central Bank Act, as
amended.
III. Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion and/or was patently in error in affirming the ruling of the
trial court, totally disregarding the arguments raised in petitioner's
supplemental motion for reconsideration only through a minute order
and without taking into consideration the fact that there is a pending
action in another court (RTC, Pasay City, Branch 231 ) which presents
a prejudicial question to the case at bar.
IV. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from questioning private
respondent's ownership when it entered into a contract of lease
involving the property in question."21
We will first resolve the jurisdictional and procedural questions raised by the
petitioner.
I.
Petitioner postulates that the lower court should have dismissed respondent's
"Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession" in Civil Case No. P-
9011 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. The power
to hear the same, he insists, exclusively vests with the Liquidation Court
pursuant to Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as The
Central Bank Act.22 He then cites our decision in Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals,23 where we held that "if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent
bank, all claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding."
For going to another court, the respondent, he accuses, is guilty of forum
shopping.
These contentions can not pass judicial muster. The pertinent portion of
Section 29 states:
"x x x The liquidator designated as hereunder provided shall, by the
Solicitor General, file a petition in the Regional Trial Court reciting
the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of
the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have
 jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions and the enforcement of individual liabilities of the
stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such
institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the
Monetary Board, x x x"24 (emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner apparently failed to appreciate the correct meaning and import of
the above-quoted law. The legal provision only finds operation in cases where
there are claims against an insolvent bank. In fine, the exclusive jurisdiction of
the liquidation court pertains only to the adjudication of claims against the bank. It
does not cover the reverse situation where it is the bank which files a claim
against another person or legal entity.
This interpretation of Section 29 becomes more obvious in the light of its
intent. The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the
liquidation proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent
multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and designed to establish due
process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the
proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness.25 The
lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if
possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the
liquidation court should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his
operations.26
It then ought to follow that petitioner's reliance on Section 29 and
the Valenzuela case is misplaced. The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession in Civil Case No. 9011 is not in the nature of a disputed claim
against the bank. On the contrary, it is an action instituted by the respondent
bank itself for the preservation of its asset and protection of its property. It was
filed upon the instance of the respondent's liquidator in order to take
possession of a tract of land over which it has ownership claims.
To be sure, the liquidator took the proper course of action when it applied for
a writ in the Pasay City RTC. Act 3135,27 entitled An Act to Regulate the Sale
of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed To Real Estate
Mortgages, mandates that jurisdiction over a Petition for Writ of Possession
lies with the court of the province, city, or municipality where the property
subject thereof is situated. This is sanctioned by Section 7 of the said Act, thus:
"SECTION 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the
purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where
the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during
the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to
the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify
the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating
the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act
x x x"28 (emphasis supplied)
Since the land subject of this controversy is located in Pasay City, then the city's
RTC should rightly take cognizance of the case, to the exclusion of other
courts.
Anent petitioner's auxiliary contention that respondent should be held guilty
of forum shopping for not filing the case in the liquidation court, suffice it to
state here that the doctrine only ponders situations where two (or more) cases
are pending before different tribunals.29 Well to point, we have laid down the
yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping
as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other.30 Inasmuch as the case at bar
is the only one filed by the respondent for the issuance of a writ of possession
over the subject property, there is no occasion for the doctrine to apply.
Petitioner next casts doubt on the capacity of the respondent to continue
litigating the petition for the issuance of the writ. He asserts that, being under
liquidation, respondent bank is already a "dead" corporation that cannot
maintain the suit in the RTC. Hence, no writ may be issued in its favor.
The argument is devoid of merit. A bank which had been ordered closed by
the monetary board retains its juridical personality which can sue and be sued
through its liquidator. The only limitation being that the prosecution or defense
of the action must be done through the liquidator.31 Otherwise, no suit for or
against an insolvent entity would prosper. In such situation, banks in
liquidation would lose what justly belongs to them through a mere
technicality.32
That the law allows a bank under liquidation to participate in an action
can be clearly inferred from the third paragraph of the same Section
29 of The Central Bank Act earlier quoted, which authorizes or
empowers a liquidator to institute actions, thus: "x x x and he
(liquidator) may in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and with the
assistance of counsel as he may retain, institute such actions as may be
necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and
assets of such institution or defend any action filed against the
institution."33 (emphasis supplied.)
It is therefore beyond dispute that respondent was legally capacitated to
petition the court a quo for the issuance of the writ.
II.
Petitioner likewise proffers one other procedural obstacle, which is the
pendency of Civil Case No. 98-0868 in Branch 231 of Pasay City RTC. The
said action is the complaint he filed against the respondent for the latter to
receive and accept the redemption price of eighteen million pesos for the
subject property. He argues that the primary issue therein constitutes a
prejudicial question in relation to the present case in that if the Court therein
will grant petitioner's prayer, then this will necessarily negate the possessory
writ issued by the court a quo.
Again, we are not persuaded. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.34 It generally
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 35
Here, aside from the fact that Civil Case No. 98-0868 and the present one are
both civil in nature and therefore no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of the two actions,36 it is apparent that the former action was
instituted merely to frustrate the Court's ruling in the case at bar granting the
respondent the right to possess the subject property. It is but a canny and
preemptive maneuver on the part of the petitioner to delay, if not prevent, the
execution of a judgment adverse to his interests. It bears stressing that the
complaint for mandamus was filed only on May 7, 1998, sixteen days after the
lower court granted respondent's petition and thirteen days after it issued the
writ. It cannot then possibly prejudice a decided case.
At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-
0868 must be considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in
the former is whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to have the property repurchased
or resold to a mortgagor's successor-in-interest (petitioner): while that in the
latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession after the statutory
period for redemption has expired. The two cases, assuming both are pending,
can proceed separately and take their own direction independent of each other.
III.
Having disposed of the jurisdictional and procedural issues, we now come to
the merits of the case. Petitioner seeks intervention in this case by virtue of the
lease agreement and the deed of assignment executed in his favor by the
mortgagor (Vargas) and an alleged buyer (Angsico) of the land, respectively.
He posits that as a lessee and assignee in possession of the foreclosed real
estate, he automatically acquires interest over the subject matter of the
litigation. This interest is coupled with the fact that he introduced
improvements thereon, consisting of a one-storey building which houses a
karaoke-music restaurant, allegedly to the tune of fifteen million pesos
(P15,000,000.00). Enforcing the writ, he adds, without hearing his side would
be an injustice to him.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceeding, becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a
right or interest which may be affected by such proceeding.37 The pertinent
provision is stated in Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
thus:
"SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding."38
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts only
when the statutory conditions for the right to intervene is shown.39 Thus, the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court.40 In determining the propriety of letting a party
intervene in a case, the tribunal should not limit itself to inquiring whether "a
person (1) has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of
either of the parties; (3) or an interest against both; (4) or when is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof."41 Just as important, as we
have stated in Big Country Ranch Corporation v. Court of Appeals,42 is the function
to consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2,
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:
"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be
filed at any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court, x
x x"
After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is because,
basically, intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and
supplemental to an existing litigation.43
Taking into account these fundamental precepts, we rule that the petitioner
may not properly intervene in the case at bar. His insistence to participate in
the proceeding is an unfortunate case of too little, too late.
In the first place, petitioner's Ex-parte Permission to File a Motion to Intervene
was submitted to the RTC only on June 25, 1998. At that stage, the lower court
had already granted respondent's petition for the writ in an Order dated April
21, 1998. It had issued the Writ of Possession on April 24, 1998. Petitioner's
motion then was clearly out of time, having been filed only at the execution
stage. For that reason alone, it must meet the consequence of denial. While it
is true that on May 8, 1998, Vargas and S. Villanueva Enterprises moved to
quash the writ, that did not in any way affect the nature of the RTC's Order as
an adjudication on the merits. The issuance of the Order is in essence a
rendition of judgment within the purview of Section 2, Rule 19.
Allowing petitioner to intervene, furthermore, will serve no other purpose but
to unduly delay the execution of the writ, to the prejudice of the respondent.
This cannot be countenanced considering that after the consolidation of title
in the buyer's name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right.44 Its issuance to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.45 As such, the court
neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.46 If only to stress the
writ's ministerial character, we have, in previous cases, disallowed injunction to
prohibit its issuance,47 just as we have held that issuance of the same may not
be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure 231 of the Pasay City RTC. There, he can ventilate his side to a fuller extent as
itself.48 that would be the more appropriate venue for elucidating whatever legal basis
he alleges in compelling the respondent to sell to him the currently disputed
Even if he anchors his intervention on the purported interest he has over the land.
land and the improvements thereon, petitioner, still, should not be allowed to
do so. He admits that he is a mere lessee and assignee. Whatever possessory IV.
rights he holds only emanate from that of Vargas, from whom he leased the
lot, and from whom his assignor/predecessor-in-interest bought it. Therein lies This brings us to petitioner's final point. He briefly asserts that his act of
the precariousness of his title. Petitioner cannot validly predicate his supposed entering into a lease contract with the respondent should not affect his right to
interest over the property in litigation on that of Vargas, for the simple reason redeem the subject property.
that as early as December 4, 1985, the latter has already been stripped of all her
rights over the land when she, as mortgagor, failed to redeem it. A mortgagor The possible legal implication of the lease on the petitioner's act of trying to
has only one year within which to redeem her foreclosed real estate.49 After redeem the disputed lot is a question which, in our opinion, can best be
that period, she loses all her interests over it. This is in consonance with Section resolved in the mandamus complaint. Whether the agreement must be
78 of the General Banking Act, 50 viz.: construed as a waiver on his part of exercising his purported right of
redemption is an issue best left for the court therein to decide. Whether by
"x x x In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, acknowledging the legality of the respondent's claim and title over the land at
of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan granted the time of the execution of the contract, he likewise perpetually barred himself
before the passage of this Act or the provisions of this Act, the from redeeming the same is a matter which can be addressed most aptly in that
mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold at public pending action. Hence, there is presently no need for us to squarely rule on
auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the full or partial payment of this ultimate point.
an obligation to any bank, banking or credit institution, within the
purview of this Act shall have the right, within one year after the sale of the real IN VIEW WHEREOF, finding no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
estate mortgage as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the Decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order or
execution x x x"51 (emphasis supplied.) SO ORDERED.
Being herself bereft of valid title and rights, Vargas can not legitimately convey Davide, Jr., C.J., Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
any to some other person. She could not have lawfully sold the land to Angsico Kapunan, J., on official leave.
nor leased it to petitioner for her own account. It is axiomatic that one can not
transmit what one does not have.52 It ought to follow that petitioner could not
G.R. No. 148193 January 16, 2003
have acquired any right or interest from Vargas.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
Withal, all is not lost for the petitioner. He can still fully protect his rights in
vs.
Civil Case No. 98-0868 or the complaint for mandamus he filed before Branch
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the May 31, 2001 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63712, which reversed and set aside the January 23, 2001 order 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-
00 denying respondent's motion for deferment of arraignment.
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, 4 represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they
are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus,
Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of
Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which
was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po
Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother, PBI
purchased the questioned lot.
In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a
valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and
Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and that TCT
No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file with the
Register of Deeds.
In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by
Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands,
respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79
alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 68, an action for "Injunctive Relief" docketed as Civil Case No. SCA
1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires,
Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does. 5 Respondent
sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other
defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.
On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint
for "Damages and Attachment," docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with
Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 6 Respondent filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No.
SCA 1759. 7
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother
with the RTC of Imus, Cavite. 8
On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground of prejudicial question, i. e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759
and 99-95381. 9 On January 27, 2000, the trial court denied respondent's
motion.
A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27,
2001. 10
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the
Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa
through falsification case. 11 The Court of Appeals granted respondent's prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a resolution dated March
19, 2001. 12
On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000
order of the, trial court and permanently enjoining it from proceeding with the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the civil cases for Injunctive
Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been finally decided.
Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed
the instant petition seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil
Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and
Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document, filed against the respondent.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For
a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil
action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 13
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question
would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It
must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will
not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action
based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case
does not involve a prejudicial question. 14
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No.
SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely acted as
an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381,
for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the
purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of
his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot
be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held
liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of
the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI's right to be paid damages and the purchase
price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the
respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of
the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent
should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated
differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid
the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of
liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal
laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. 15 Under
Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, 16 the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for
violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel
mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without consent of
the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for
termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of which
consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous
chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground
that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was
necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court
denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial
question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:
. . . the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on
the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation
that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said
CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar"
Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and
encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability of the accused
in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (i) That, even granting for
the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case,
the fact remains that both the crime charged in the information in the
criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based
upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed
independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil
Code which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (j)
That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders
referred to in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of
discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on
account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling
the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with the
arraignment and trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
G.R. No. 183788 April 5, 2010
KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 66 of the RTC of Makati City, and FANNIE
TORRES-TY, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated August 23,
20072 and July 14, 20083 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by petitioner seeking the reversal of the November 16, 2006 and March 9, 2007
Orders4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, which
found that there was no prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the
criminal actions against petitioner.
The following facts are established:
Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary), the sister
of petitioner’s late father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration of the estate of her mother, Bella Torres (Bella),
before the RTC of Pasig City.5 Petitioner initially opposed6 Rosemary’s
petition, but they eventually reached an amicable settlement and entered into a
compromise agreement which they submitted to the RTC for approval.7 In a
Decision8 dated November 19, 2002, the RTC approved the compromise
agreement.
Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemary’s alleged siblings, Peter Torres Ty (Peter)
and Catherine Torres Ty-Chavez (Catherine), filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition to Annul Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.9 Peter and Catherine claimed that they are also
biological children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate in the
settlement of the latter’s estate. Later, private respondent Fannie Torres-Ty
(Fannie), who likewise claimed to be a biological child of the late Bella and
therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a petition-in-intervention in the
action for annulment of judgment.10
Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella, they held a
number of discussions pertaining to the settlement of the latter’s estate.
Rosemary, their elder sister, promised to take care of the processing of papers
so that the estate may be divided among them in the manner provided by law.
However, in subsequent discussions, Rosemary made known to them her
intention to get a disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not
agree. No agreement was reached and as far as they know, no progress was
made towards the settlement of Bella’s estate. They were not aware that
Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and
that a judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC of Pasig
City. Rosemary had falsely averred that aside from herself, petitioner, who was
her niece, was the only other heir of Bella. In petitioner’s opposition, it was
likewise averred that petitioner and Rosemary were the only heirs of Bella. The
subsequent compromise agreement contained similar averments, and it was not
disclosed that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bella’s heirs. It was only
sometime in June 2004 that they came to know of the decision by compromise
agreement of the Pasig City RTC.
Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers11 to the petition for annulment of
judgment and the petition-in-intervention. They raised similar defenses. They
denied that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were heirs of Bella for, as far as they
knew, the three (3) were literally purchased from third persons who
represented to Bella and the latter’s common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that
they were abandoned children. Bella and Alejandro took pity on the three (3)
and brought them up as their own. This was known within the family circle,
but was not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and Fannie in order to protect them
from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children. However, Alejandro
and Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were never conferred the
rights of legitimate children.
While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of
Appeals, Fannie filed a complaint12 for falsification and perjury against
petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that petitioner and Rosemary falsely
and maliciously stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig
City that the late Bella had only two (2) heirs, namely the two (2) of them.
Petitioner and Rosemary forthwith filed a joint motion to suspend the
preliminary investigation on the ground of a pending prejudicial question
before the Court of Appeals.13 They argued that the issue of whether Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter
was pending before the Court of Appeals. The investigating prosecutor denied
the joint motion and found probable cause against petitioner and Rosemary
for two (2) counts each of falsification of public documents.14 The prosecutor
held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the
compromise agreement which is not determinative of the criminal case which
involves the liability of petitioner and Rosemary for falsification, allegedly for
willfully making the false statements in the opposition to the petition for letters
of administration and in the subsequent compromise agreement filed before
the RTC of Pasig City.
On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations15 against petitioner and
Rosemary were thus filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati
City, Branch 61.
Petitioner filed a petition for review16 with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and a motion to defer proceedings17 before the MeTC on the ground of the
pending appeal before the DOJ. Also, petitioner and Rosemary filed with the
MeTC separate motions to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial
question.18 However, petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the DOJ,19 while her
motions before the MeTC were denied by the said court.20 The MeTC agreed
with the prosecutor that the issue before the Court of Appeals in the action for
annulment of judgment is the validity of the compromise agreement while the
criminal case involves their liability for falsification of public documents. The
MeTC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.21
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition 22 with the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 66. In an Order23 dated November 16, 2006, the
RTC denied the petition on the ground that there was no prejudicial question;
hence, the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings. The RTC held that there was no
prejudicial question as the quantum of evidence in the civil action for
annulment of judgment differs from the quantum of evidence required in the
criminal action for falsification of public documents. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration24 was also denied by the RTC in its Order25 dated March 9,
2007.1avvphi1
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals assailing the RTC’s orders. In its August 23, 2007
Resolution,26 the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the
certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by petitioner’s counsel
and not by petitioner herself. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also
denied in the July 14, 2008 Resolution27 of the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner alleges that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND
THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WAS
SIGNED BY COUNSEL ALLEGEDLY IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 3,
RULE 46, IN RELATION TO SEC. 1 RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
NULLIFYING THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT
JOSELITO VILLAROSA ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.28
The petition is meritorious.
Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.29 The primary question that has to be
resolved in this case is whether the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent
compliance.30
Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of a certification of
non-forum shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first
instance.31 A certification of the plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice for the
reason that it is the petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best position
to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition. 32 A
certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defective
certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement and
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.33
However, there are instances when we treated compliance with the rule with
relative liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling
reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.34
In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,35 while we said
that, strictly, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective
certification, the verification, signed by petitioner’s counsel in said case, is
substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of
informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving
the same issues. We then explained that procedural rules are instruments in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice which should be used to achieve
such end and not to derail it.36
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,37 we categorically stated that while the petition
was flawed as the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by
counsel and not by the party, such procedural lapse may be overlooked in the
interest of substantial justice.38 Finally, the Court has also on occasion held that
the party need not sign the verification; a party’s representative, lawyer or any
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may
sign the verification.39
Here, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by
petitioner’s counsel. Upon receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing her petition for non-compliance with the rules, petitioner
submitted, together with her motion for reconsideration, a verification and
certification signed by her in compliance with the said rule.40 We deem this to
be sufficient compliance especially in view of the merits of the case, which may
be considered as a special circumstance or a compelling reason that would
justify tempering the hard consequence of the procedural requirement on non-
forum shopping.41
On the second assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in denying
petitioner’s prayer for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, we likewise find for
petitioner.
Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a
criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question
in a civil action, to wit:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must
appear not only that said civil case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined.42 The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of
the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.43
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or
there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up
the criminal case," the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.44 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal hereby ordered SUSPENDED until the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No.
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.45 87222.

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on No costs.

the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised
in the pleadings in the civil case are so related with the issues raised in the SO ORDERED.
criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would also
determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-
G.R. SP No. 87222 pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the
determination of the validity of the compromise agreement which did not
include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and
Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of
Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814
before the MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner committed
falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful
statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella.

It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or
guilt of the petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents.
The criminal cases arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that
they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that
they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled
to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the
criminal cases against petitioner who could not have committed falsification in
her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements
regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially
settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August

23, 2007 and July 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal proceedings against
petitioner Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui in Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to
343814 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 are