Parody of Provrem

PROVESIONAL REMEDIES CASE DIGESTS - PRELIM COVERAGE 1
G.R. No. 93262 DECEMBER 29, 1991
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and
Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The application was granted, and an
attachment bond was paid.
The summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of attachment and a copy of the attachment bond, were served on
defendants Queensland and Adarna.
Defendants Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at
the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial Court
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the defendants.
The trial court issued an order denying the motion to discharge. Queensland, by virtue of a special civil action for certiorari with the
CA, obtained a favorable decision, reversed the order of the trial court and had the write of attachment discharged.
Hence this petition from Davao Light.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of
the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the Court's authority
HELD: YES.
It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been commenced and jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff
has been vested in the court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, nothing can be validly done
by the plaintiff or the court.
It is wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during this period should be defendant on, or held in suspension until, the actual
obtention of jurisdiction over the defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
one thing; quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the subject-matter or nature of the
action, or the res or object hereof.
The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of routine are well known. After the complaint is filed, summons issues
to the defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the sheriff, and finally, service of the summons is effected on the defendant
in any of the ways authorized by the Rules of Court.
There is thus ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of the filing of the complaint and the day of service of
summons of the defendant. During this period, different acts may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court, which are
unquestionable validity and propriety. Among these, for example, are the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the grant of
authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, the amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of
right without leave of court, etc. Among these is the availment of provisional remedies under the Rules of Court.
Service of all such documents is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also
upon considerations of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him, of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment and the grounds therefor and thus accord him the opportunity to prevent attachment of his property by the posting of a
counterbond in an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim
Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter." The phase, "at
the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the
date that marks "the commencement of the action;" and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the
defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced — by
the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either
ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts:
for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading
(counter-claim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action
if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and substance.
G.R. No. L-252 MARCH 30, 1946
TRANQUILINO CALO and DOROTEO SAN JOSE v. ARSENIO C. ROLDAN
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Regino Relova and Teodula Bartolome alleged they were owners and the possessors of parcels of land
in Pila, Laguna. They filed a civil case against petitioners herein for allegedly through force, destroying their the madre-cacao fencer,
and barbed wires built on the northwestern portion of the their land to their damage and prejudice in the amount of at least P200.
Respondents allege that petitioners were intending to enter, work, and harvest whatever existing fruits is within their parcel of land.
Hence, respondent prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction ex-parte to restrain and enjoin petitioners from doing the
alleged acts. An answer by petitioners, alleging that they are owners of the land and have actual possession thereof.
Court of First Instance of Laguna: Denied the petition on the ground that petitioners Calo and San Jose were in actual possession of
said lands.
Respondents immediately filed an urgent motion for reconsideration for the issuance of the injunction, and for the appointment
of a receiver of the properties described in the complaint, on the ground that
(a) they have an interest in the properties in question, and the fruits thereof were in danger of being lost unless a
receiver was appointed; and that
(b) the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering and or
disposing of the properties in litigation which included their fruits.
Respondent Judge Roldan decided that the court would consider the motion for reconsideration in due time, and granted the
petition for appointment of and appointed a receiver in the case. Hence, petitioners sought recourse with the SC through a writ of
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order
appointing a receiver for certain ands and fruits
HELD: YES. Respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order appointing a receiver in the case at hand.
Respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing a receiver in case No. 7951 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.
The provisional remedies denominated attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and delivery of personal property,
provided in Rules 59, 60, 61, and 62 of the Rules of Court, respectively, are remedies to which parties litigant may resort for the
preservation or protection of their rights or interest, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. If an
action, by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, said remedies can not be applied for and granted. To each
kind of action or actions a proper provisional remedy is provided for by law. The Rules of Court clearly specify the case in which they

may be properly granted. .
A receiver may be appointed to take charge of personal or real property which is the subject of an ordinary civil action, when it
appears that the party applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of the
action or litigation, and that such property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured unless a receiver is
appointed to guard and preserve it (section 1 [b], Rule 61); or when it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering or disposing of the property in litigation (section 1 [e] of said Rule). The
property or fund must, therefore be in litigation according to the allegations of the complaint, and the object of appointing a
receiver is to secure and preserve the property or thing in controversy pending the litigation. Of course, if it is not in litigation and
is in actual possession of the plaintiff, the latter can not apply for and obtain the appointment of a receiver thereof, for there would
be no reason for such appointment.
Appointment of a receiver is not proper or does not lie in an action of injunction such as the one filed by the plaintiff. The petition
for appointment of a receiver filed by the plaintiffs is based on the ground that it is the most convenient and feasible means of
preserving, administering and disposing of the properties in litigation; and according to plaintiffs' theory or allegations in their
complaint, neither the lands nor the palay harvested therein, are in litigation.
The litigation or issue raised by plaintiffs in their complaint is not the ownership or possession of the lands and their fruits. It is
whether or not defendants intend or were intending to enter or work or harvest whatever existing fruits could then be found in
the lands described in the complaint, alleged to be the exclusive property and in the actual possession of the plaintiffs. It is a
matter not only of law but of plain common sense that a plaintiff will not and legally can not ask for the appointment or receiver of
property which he alleges to belong to him and to be actually in his possession. For the owner and possessor of a property is more
interested than persons in preserving and administering it.
Undoubtedly, according to law, the provisional remedy proper to plaintiffs' action of injunction is a preliminary prohibitory
injunction, if plaintiff's theory, as set forth in the complaint, that he is the owner and in actual possession of the premises is correct.
But as the lower court found at the hearing of the said petition for preliminary injunction that the defendants were in possession of
the lands, the lower court acted in accordance with law in denying the petition.
G.R. No. L-48756 SEPTEMBER 11, 1982
K.O. GLASS CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. v. THE HONORABLE MANUEL VALENZUELA
FACTS: Antonio D. Pinzon instituted an action to recover from Kenneth O. Glass the sum of P37,190.00, alleged to be the agreed
rentals of his truck, as well as the value of spare parts which have not been returned to him upon termination of the lease.
The plaintiff asked for an attachment against the property of the defendant consisting of collectibles and payables with the
Philippine Geothermal, Inc., on the grounds that the defendant is a foreigner; that he has sufficient cause of action against the said
defendant; and that there is no sufficient security for his claim against the defendant in the event a judgment is rendered in his
favor. The respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against the properties of the defendant upon the
plaintiff's filing of a bond.
The defendant Kenneth O. Glass moved to quash the writ of attachment, alleging there is no ground for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment as defendant Kenneth O. Glass never intended to leave the Philippines, and even if he does, plaintiff can not
be prejudiced thereby because his claims are against a corporation which has sufficient funds and property to satisfy his claim; and
that the money being garnished belongs to the K.O. Glass Corporation Co., Inc. and not to defendant Kenneth O. Glass.
By reason thereof, Pinzon amended his complaint to include K.O. Glass Construction Co., Inc. as co-defendant of Kenneth O. Glass.

The defendants therein filed a supplementary motion to discharge and/or dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment upon the
ground that the affidavit filed in support of the motion for preliminary attachment was not sufficient or wanting in law.
The defendants therein filed a bond in the amount of P37,190.00 and asked the court for the release of the same amount deposited
with the Clerk of Court, but, the respondent Judge did not order the release of the money deposited. Hence this petition for
certiorari to set aside the writ of preliminary attachment and for the release of the amount deposited by defendant-petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was properly done?
HELD: NO. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment and in not ordering the
release of the money which had been deposited with the Clerk of Court for the following reasons:
First, there was no ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. In the case at hand, the writ of attachment was
issued because the defendant was a foreigner who, at any time, may depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud this
creditors.
However, plaintiff Pinzon did not allege such allegation in his complaint or in his amended complaint. There being no
showing, much less an allegation, that the defendants are about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud their creditor,
or that they are non-resident aliens, the attachment of their properties is not justified.
Second, the affidavit submitted by Pinzon does not comply with the Rules.
While Pinzon may have stated in his affidavit that a sufficient cause of action exists against the defendant Kenneth O. Glass,
he did not state therein that "the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 hereof; that there is no other sufficient security for the
claim sought to be enforced by the action; and that the amount due to the applicant is as much as the sum for which the order
granted above all legal counter-claims." It has been held that the failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites prescribed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, renders the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the property of the
defendant fatally defective, and the judge issuing it is deemed to have acted in excess of his jurisdiction.
Finally, it appears that the petitioner has filed a counterbond in the amount of P37,190.00 to answer for any judgment that may be
rendered against the defendant.
Upon the receipt of the counter-bond by the respondent Judge, he should have discharged the attachment pursuant to
Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the counter-bond will serve the purpose of preserving the defendant's
property and at the same time give the plaintiff security for any judgment that may be obtained against the defendant.
G.R. No. 175587 SEPTEMBER 21, 2007
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO
FACTS: PCIB filed against respondent a complaint for sum of money with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Petitioner alleged that respondent Joseph Anthony Alejandro, who was a resident of Hong Kong, executed a promissory note.
In view of the fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates which resulted in the insufficiency of the deposits
assigned by respondent as security for the loan, petitioner requested the latter to put up additional security for the loan.
Respondent, however, sought a reconsideration of said request pointing out petitioner’s alleged mishandling of his account
due to its failure to carry out his instruction to close his account as early as April 1997, when the prevailing rate of exchange
of the US Dollar to Japanese yen was US$1.00:JPY127.50. It appears that the amount of ₱249,828,588.90 was the
consolidated amount of a series of yen loans granted by petitioner to respondent during the months of February and April
1997.

Petitioner, in praying for the issuance of the writ, alleged that (1) respondent fraudulently withdrew his unassigned deposits
notwithstanding his verbal promise to PCIB Assistant Vice President Corazon B. Nepomuceno not to withdraw the same prior to
their assignment as security for the loan; and (2) that respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. The application for the
issuance of a writ was supported with the affidavit of Nepomuceno.
(1) is based par. E of the rules, on defrauding his creditors; (2) was based on par. F, that it is an action against a
party who resides outside the Philippines.
Trial court granted the application for the writ, to which petitioner posted a bond. Hence, respondent’s bank deposit on Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) were garnished.
Respondent filed a motion to quash, contending that the withdrawal of his unassigned deposits were not fraudulent, as it was
approved by petitioner. He also alleges that petitioner knew he maintains a permanent residence at Quezon City, and an office
address in Makati City.
The writ was quashed. The trial court issued an order quashing the writ and holding that the withdrawal of respondent’s unassigned
deposits was not intended to defraud petitioner. Upon appeal to the CA and even the SC, petitioner failed to prove the trial court
abused its discretion.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a claim for damages amounting to P25 Million on account of the wrongful garnishment of his deposits
in his RCBC account, to which the trial court granted.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the trial court, however, the amount of damages
granted was reduced from P25 Million to P7 Million, with P1 Million for attorney’s fees. Both parties moved for reconsideration,
hence this petition.
ISSUE (1): Whether or not petitioner was entitled to a writ of preliminary attachment
HELD (2): NO. Respondent is a resident of the Philippines and that his act of withdrawing his deposits with petitioner was without
intent to defraud, can no longer be passed upon by this Court. More importantly, the conclusions of the court that petitioner bank
misrepresented that respondent was residing out of the Philippines and suppressed the fact that respondent has a permanent
residence in Metro Manila where he may be served with summons, are now beyond the power of this Court to review having been
the subject of a final and executory order.
ISSUE (2): Whether or not petitioner bank is liable for damages for the improper issuance of the writ of attachment against
respondent
HELD (2): YES. Records of the first case reveal that petitioner personally transacted with defendant mainly through defendant’s
permanent residence in METRO-MANILA, either in defendant’s home address in Quezon City or his main business address at the
Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & Delos Angeles in MAKATI and while at times follow ups were made through defendant’s
temporary home and business addresses in Hongkong. It is therefore clear that plaintiff could not deny their personal and official
knowledge that defendant’s permanent and official residence for purposes of service of summons is in the Philippines.
Hence, it is is obvious that plaintiff already knew from the beginning the deficiency of its second ground for attachment [i.e.,]
disposing properties with intent to defraud his creditors, and therefore plaintiff had to resort to this misrepresentation that
defendant was residing out of the
Philippines and suppressed the fact that defendant’s permanent residence is in METRO MANILA where he could be served with
summons, so that it may avail of par (f) as a ground.
The purposes of preliminary attachment are: (1) to seize the property of the debtor in advance of final judgment and to hold it for
purposes of satisfying said judgment, as in the grounds stated in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; or
(2) to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or
substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected, as in paragraph (f) of the same provision.

In actions in personam, such as the instant case for collection of sum of money, summons must be served by personal or substituted
service, otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. In case the defendant does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines (and hence personal and substituted service cannot be effected), the remedy of the plaintiff in order for the court
to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of
the defendant. Thus, in order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in personam where defendant resides out of and is not found in the
Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for the court to convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching
the defendant’s property. The service of summons in this case (which may be by publication coupled with the sending by registered
mail of the copy of the summons and the court order to the last known address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of
acquiring jurisdiction but for compliance with the requirements of due process.
Considering petitioner’s bad faith in securing the writ of attachment, we sustain the award of exemplary damages by way of
example or correction for public good. This should deter parties in litigations from resorting to baseless and preposterous
allegations to obtain writs of attachments. While as a general rule, the liability on the attachment bond is limited to actual (or in
some cases, temperate or nominal) damages, exemplary damages may be recovered where the attachment was established to be
maliciously sued out.
However, all damages sought were reduced to a total of P50,000 as nominal damages, P500,000 as moral damages, and P500,000
as exemplary damages, with P200,000 as attorney’s fees
G.R. No. L-894 JULY 30, 1947
LUIS F. GENERAL v. JOSE R. DE VENECIA
FACTS: A complaint was filed against petitioner Luis F. General to recover the value of a promissory note. The promissory note was
worded as follows:
For value received, I promise to pay Mr. Gregorio Ruedas the amount of four thousand pesos (P4,000), in Philippine
currency within six (6) months after peace has been declared and government established in the Philippines.
Naga, Camarines Sur, September 25, 1944.
It prayed additionally for preliminary attachment of defendant's property, upon the allegation that the latter was about to dispose
of his assets to defraud creditors. Two days later, the writ of attachment was issued upon the filing of a suitable bond.
Petitioner prayed that the complaint be dismissed, and the writ be dissolved. He claimed that it was premature in view of the
provisions of the debt moratorium order by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of attachment was validly issued?
HELD: NO. Inasmuch as the commitment of Luis F. General has not as yet become demandable, there existed no cause of action
against him, and the complaint should have been dismissed and the attachment lifted.
The general rule is that, unless the statute expressly so provides, the remedy by attachment is not available in respect to a demand
which is not due and payable, and if an attachment is issued upon such a demand without statutory authority it is void.
Firstly, the promissory note has yet to become due and demandable. It is to be noted that the promissory note reads "within six
months after peace has been declared." It being a matter of contemporary history that the peace treaty between the United States
and Japan has not even been drafted, and that no competent official has formally declared the advent of peace, it is obvious that

the six-month period has not begun; and Luis F. General has at present and in June, 1946, no demandable duty to make payment to
plaintiffs, independently of the moratorium directive.
Secondly, there indeed is a debt moratorium issued by the executive branch of the government. It is our view that, upon objection by
the debtor, no court may now proceed to hear a complaint that seeks to compel payment of a monetary obligation coming within
the purview of the moratorium. And the issuance of a writ of attachment upon such complaint may not, of course, be allowed. Such
levy is necessarily one step in the enforcement of the obligation, enforcement which, as stated in the order, is suspended
temporarily, pending action by the Government.
G.R. No. L-67715 JULY 11, 1986
WILLIAM MIAILHE v. ELAINE M. DE LENCQUESAING and HERVE DE LENCQUESAING
FACTS: Petitioner William Alain Miailhe, his sisters Monique Miailhe Sichere, Elaine Miailhe de Lencquesaing and their mother,
Madame Victoria D. Miailhe are co-owners of several registered real properties located in Metro Manila. By common consent of the
said co-owners, petitioner William Alain has been administering said properties since 1960.
Upon examination of the petitioner-administrator’s account, respondent Elaine filed a motion praying that the sum of P203,167.36
which allegedly appeared as a cash balance in her favor as of December 31, 1982, be ordered delivered to her.
Meanwhile, respondent Elaine filed a criminal complaint for estafa against petitioner William Alain, with the office of the City Fiscal
of Manila, alleging in her supporting affidavit that on the face of the very account submitted by him as Administrator, he had
misappropriated considerable amounts, which should have been turned over to her as her share in the net rentals of the common
properties.
Due to the filing of the complaint, an extensive news item about it appeared prominently in the Bulletin Today, March 4, 1983 issue,
stating substantially that Alain Miailhe, a consul of the Philippines in the Republic of France, had been charged with Estafa of several
million pesos by his own sister with the office of the City Fiscal of Manila.
Hence, petitioner Alain filed a verified complaint against respondent Elaine, for Damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P250,000.00 allegedly sustained by him by reason of the filing by respondent (then defendant) of a criminal
complaint for estafa, solely for the purpose of embarrassing petitioner (then plaintiff) and besmirching his honor and reputation as a
private person and as an Honorary Consul of the Republic of the Philippine's in the City of Bordeaux, France. Petitioner also prayed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment of the properties of respondent consisting of 1/6 undivided interests in certain
real properties in the City of Manila on the ground that "respondent-defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines".
Judge Barbers granted petitioner's application for preliminary attachment upon filing of a bond. Respondent thru counsel filed a
motion to lift or dissolve the writ of attachment on the ground that the complaint did not comply with the provisions of Sec. 3 of
Rule 57, Rules of Court and that petitioner's claim was for unliquidated damages. The writ was declared null and void, with the IAC
holding:
We find, therefore, and so hold that respondent court had exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the writ of
attachment on a claim based on an action for damages arising from delict and quasi delict the amount of which is uncertain
and had not been reduced to judgment just because the defendant is not a resident of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment can only be applied for in cases of liquidated amounts, even under Sec. 1
Par (f)?
HELD: YES. We agree with the pronouncement of the IAC

Section 1 of Rule 57 par. f of the Rules of Court provides —
(f) In an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by
publication.
While it is true that from the aforequoted provision attachment may issue "in an action against a party who resides out of the
Philippines, " irrespective of the nature of the action or suit, and while it is also true that in the case of Cu Unjieng, et al vs. Albert,
58 Phil. 495, it was held that "each of the six grounds treated ante is independent of the others," still it is imperative that the
amount sought be liquidated.
G. R. No. 123638 JUNE 15, 2005

INSULAR SAVINGS BANK v. CA
FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Company instituted a case against Insular Savings Bank before the Arbitration Committee of the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation [PCHC]. The dispute between the parties involved three checks that were drawn against Far
East and were presented to Insular for clearing. Far East returned the bank beyond the reglementary period but after Insular had
already the account was already credited with the amount of the check.
Insular refused to refund the money to Far East. While the dispute between the parties was pending, Far East filed a civil case
before the RTC of Makati and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The RTC of Makati issued an order
granting the said application for preliminary attachment.
During the hearing before the Arbitration Committee of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, both banks agreed to
temporarily divide between them the disputed amount while the dispute has not yet been resolved.
Insular filed a motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond for half the disputed amount. The RTC judge denied the motion to
discharge attachment by counterbond.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to discharge the preliminary attachment
by counterbond in the amount that is half the amount being claimed
HELD: Yes. The denial was improper.
Rule 57 (Preliminary Attachment) of the Rules of Court under which the appellate court issued its assailed decision and resolution,
provides:
“SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counter-bond.—At any time after an order of attachment has been granted, the party
whose property has been attached, . . . may upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order or to
the judge of the court which the action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given.
The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the
attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made in an
amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the
attaching creditor may recover in the action. x x x. Should such counter-bond for any reason be found to be, or become insufficient,
and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of
attachment”
As may be noted, the amount of the counter-attachment bond is, under the terms of the aforequoted Section 12, to be measured
against the value of the attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching
creditor may recover in the action. Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section and without necessarily diminishing the sound
discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond approval, there can be no serious objection, in turn, to the proposition that the

attached property—and logically the counter-bond necessary to discharge the lien on such property—should as much as possible
correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching creditor’s principal claim. Else, excessive attachment, which ought to
be avoided at all times, shall ensue.
However, in this case, when both banks agreed to equally divide among themselves the disputed amount, Far East’s claim was
effectively pruned down to half of the disputed amount. The trial court was fully aware of this. Accordingly, it should have allowed a
total discharge of the attachment on a counter-bond based on the reduced claim of Far East. A counter-bond is intended to secure
the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the main action. Simple common sense, if not consideration of
fair play, however, dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been preemptively satisfied or secured need not be
covered by the counter-bond.
GR No. 43721 JUNE 15, 1935

ISIDRO TAN (alias TAN LIT) v. FRANCISCO ZANDUETA
FACTS: Tiu Chay sued Isidro Tan before the RTC of Manila for the recovery of the amount (P22,500) the latter owned to him. He
alleged that the said amount corresponds to half of the prize they won in the last drawing of sweepstakes Simultaneously with his
complaint, Tiu Chay (alias Tan Kia) asked and obtained from the respondent judge the attachment of the property of the Isidro Tan
(alias Tan Lit) upon filing a bond in the amount of P5,000.
Isidro Tan (alias Tan Lit) succeeded in dissolving the attachment by filing, in turn, a counter bond in the same amount as that filed by
Tiu Chay (alias Tan Kia) to secure said attachment; and as soon as he obtained the order to that effect and filed the required
counterbond, he withdrew from the Philippine National Bank his deposit in the amount of P23,500 the greater part of which was
attached days before pursuant to the order of the respondent judge.
Three days after Tan’s withdrawal of the aforesaid amount from the Philippine National Bank, the respondent Tiu Chay (alias Tan
Kia) asked and obtained an order from the respondent judge requiring the Tan to file an additional counter bond.
The time given to Tan to file an additional counter bond expired without being heeded. Tan’s explanations for the failure to do so
was claimed to be unsatisfactory by the respondent judge and he was declared in contempt.
ISSUE: Whether the writ of preliminary attachment was irregular and illegal
HELD: No. The SC found that the writ of preliminary attachment was issued in strict conformity to the law.
The complaint wherein the said attachment was issued alleged that Tan, after collecting the prize of a ticket in the last sweepstakes,
consisting of the amount of P50,000, belonging to the two, appropriated the entire prize exclusively for himself, in complete
disregard of said Tiu Chay (alias Tan Kia), knowing that one-half thereof did not belong to him but to said respondent; that he was
merely a depository or agent of the latter as to said half, and that the petitioner acted in the manner stated notwithstanding the
fact that he was required to turn over to the respondent the part of the prize won corresponding to the latter. The allegations to
this effect are found in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint of said Tiu Chay (alias Tan Kia).
Petitioner's contention, in view of his motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment, on the ground that the allegations of
the complaint of the respondent Tiu Chay (alias Tan Kia) were not true, said attachment should have been dissolved without any
condition, is without force.
The respondent judge had discretionary power, according to section 441 of Act No. 190, to dissolve or to leave in force the said
attachment, and it was precisely in the exercise of this power, after hearing the parties, as may be deduced from the orders issued
and now of record, that he decided to dissolve the attachment but conditioned on petitioner's filing a counter bond for P5,000; and
this was voluntarily done by the petitioner, thereby enabling him to withdraw, as in fact he did withdraw, the amount he had on

deposit in the Philippine National Bank which was a part of the money won in the last sweepstakes. On this sole ground, therefore,
the writ of certiorari will not lie.
GR No. 23237 NOVEMBER 14, 1925

WALTER E. OLSEN & Co. v. WALTER E. OLSEN
FACTS: This case was an appeal by Walter Olsen from a judgment of the RTC of Manila sentencing him to pay plaintiff corporation
the sum of P66,207.62 with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint,
until full payment, and the costs, and dismissing the cross-complaint and counterclaim set up by him. He claims that the trial court
erred when the defendant-appellant contracted fraudulently the debt which the plaintiff-appellee seeks to recover in its complaint;
and it failed to set aside the writ of preliminary attachment issued by it ex parte
ISSUES: (1) Whether an order denying a motion for annulment of the writ of preliminary attachment may be reviewed through an
appeal.
(2) Whether the trial court committed error in denying the motion for the annulment of the preliminary attachment levied upon the
property of the defendant-appellant.
HELD: (1) No. A writ of preliminary attachment has an incidental and interlocutory character and cannot be subject of an appeal
independent of the principal action. But such order may be reviewed in an appeal taken from a final judgment rendered in the
principal case.
The preliminary attachment is an auxiliary remedy the granting of which lies within the sound discretion of the judge taking
cognizance of the principal case upon whose existence it depends. The order of the judge denying a motion for the annulment of a
writ of preliminary attachment, being of an incidental or interlocutory and auxiliary character, cannot be the subject of an appeal
independently from the principal case, because our procedural law now in force authorizes an appeal only from a final judgment
which gives an end to the litigation. (Section 143, Act No. 190; 3 C. J., 549, par. 389.) This lack of ordinary remedy through an appeal
does not mean, however, that any excess a lower court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is without remedy; because
there are the especial remedies, such as certiorari, for the purpose. (Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182.)
While it is true that an order denying a motion for the annulment of a preliminary attachment is not subject to review through an
appeal independently from the principal case, it not constituting a final order, yet when the writ of preliminary attachment becomes
final by virtue of a final judgment rendered in the principal case, said writ is subject to review jointly with the judgment rendered in
the principal case through an ordinary appeal. The appellate court has the power to revoke or confirm said order, in like manner
as a judgment on the merits; because it is a ruling to which an exception may be taken, and therefore is subject to review in an
appeal by bill of exceptions. (Secs. 141-143, Act No. 190.) The fact that section 441 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not provide
any remedy against the granting or denial of a motion for the annulment of a writ of preliminary attachment, except in case of
excess of jurisdiction, does not confer upon said order a final and irrevocable character, taking it out from the general provisions as
to appeal and review, for a special provision is necessary for that purpose.
(2) No. The denial of the said motion was proper.
Walter Olsen admitted that he is indebted to the corporation but denied that such was contracted fraudulently.
Walter was president-treasurer and general manager of the plaintiff appellee corporation and exercised direct and almost exclusive
supervision over its function, funds and books of account until about the month of August, 1921. During that time he has been
taking money of the corporation without being duly authorized to do so either by the board of directors or by the by-laws, the
money taken by him having amounted to a considerable sum.
Having, as he had, absolute and almost exclusive control over the function of the corporation and its funds by virtue of his triple
capacity as president, treasurer and general manager, the defendant-appellant should have been more scrupulous in the application
of the funds of said corporation to his own use. As a trustee of said corporation, it was his duty to see by all legal means possible
that the interests of the stockholders were protected, and should not abuse the extraordinary opportunity which his triple position

offered him to dispose of the funds of the corporation.
The conduct of the defendant-appellant in connection with the funds of the corporation he represented was more than an
irregularity; and while it is not sufficiently serious to constitute a criminal fraud, it is undoubtedly a fraud of a civil character,
because it is an abuse of confidence to the damage of the corporation and its stockholders, and constitutes one of the grounds
enumerated in section 424, in connection with section 412, of the Code of Civil Procedure for the issuance of a preliminary
attachment, and the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, denying the motion for the annulment of the injunction in
question, is in accordance with law.
G.R. No. 31163 NOVEMBER 6, 1929

URBANO SANTOS v. JOSE C. BERNABE ET AL.
FACTS: On March 20, 1928, Urbano Santos deposited by Jose Bernabe’s warehouse 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay and by Pablo
Tiongson 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of the same grain.
At that same time, Tiongson filed with the RTC of Bulacan a complaint against Bernabe to recover from the latter the 1,026 cavans
and 9 kilos of palay deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At such time, his application for a writ of attachment was granted, and
the attachable property of Jose C. Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were
attached, sold at public auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered to Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.
Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing the proper bond, the sheriff proceeded
with the attachment, giving rise to the present complaint. It does not appear that the sacks of palay of Urbano Santos and those of
Pablo Tiongson, deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, bore any marks or signs, nor were they separated one from the other.
Urbano Santos contends that Pablo Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay attached by the defendant sheriff
as part of those deposited by him in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, because, in asking for the attachment thereof, he impliedly
acknowledged that the same belonged to Jose C. Bernabe and not to him.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions on preliminary attachment should be liberally construed.
HELD: In the complaint filed by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe, he claimed for the return of those items or the value
thereof, which were deposited in the Bernabe’s warehouse. Upon filing said complaint, the plaintiff applied for a preliminary writ of
attachment of the defendant's property, which was accordingly issued.
It will be seen that the action brought by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe is that provided in section ,262 of the Code of Civil
Procedure for the delivery of personal property. Although it is true that the plaintiff and his attorney did not follow strictly the
procedure provided in said section for claiming the delivery of said personal property, nevertheless, the procedure followed by him
may be construed as equivalent thereto, considering the provisions of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that "the
provisions of this Code, and the proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed, in order to promote its object and assist the
parties in obtaining speedy justice."
Liberally construing, therefore, the above cited provisions of section 262 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the writ of attachment
applied for by Pablo Tiongson against the property of Jose C. Bernabe may be construed as a claim for the delivery of the sacks of
palay deposited by the former with the latter.
The 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay belonging to Urbano Santos, having been mixed belonging to Pablo Tiongson in Bernabe's
warehouse and there being no means of separating from said 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay belonging to Urbano Santos and
those be longing to Pablo Tiongson, the following rule prescribed ii article 381 of the Civil Code for cases of this nature, is applicable:
"ART. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if

in the latter case the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the
part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or com mingled."
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the SC held that it will take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of
palay which were attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 thereof and Pablo Tiongson,
who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51 or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.
GR No. L-82446 JULY 29,1988

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On September 30 and October 31,1977, Pedro O. Valdez and Rudy H. Sales executed two Comprehensive Surety Agreements
to secure any and all loans of P.O. Valdez, Inc. from the State Investment House, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in quasi
banking.
At the time the loan agreement was executed, PO Valdez Inc was required to provide collateral security for the loan. And pursuant
thereto, PO Valdez Inc turned over various certificates of stock of several corporations which it possess and even executed a Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of the State Investment covering two (2) parcels of land. It was also made made to execute Deeds of Sale
covering the proceeds of postdated checks and a deed of assignment covering P.O. Valdez, Inc.'s construction receivables from the
Development Academy of the Philippines.
When Pedro Valdez' two checks were deposited by State Investment upon maturity, they bounced for insufficient funds. Despite
demands, respondent corporation failed to pay its obligations. State Investment foreclosed its real estate mortgage on the two lots.
But because the proceeds of the foreclosure were insufficient to satisfy the debt, petitioner also filed a collection suit, with a prayer
for preliminary attachment.
P.O. Valdez, Inc. and Pedro Valdez filed a motion to discharge the attachment on the ground that there was no fraud in contracting
the loans, and if any fraud existed, it was in the performance of the obligations. The motion was initially denied but during the MR,
such was granted and the RTC judge discharged the preliminary attachment on the properties of Pedro and Remedios Valdez.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely abused discretion in lifting the preliminary attachment on the respondent’s property
HELD: The main thrust of the prayer for preliminary attachment is the alleged misrepre-sentation of the debtor P.O. Valdez, Inc. in
the Agreement for Discounting Receivables and in the deeds of sale of said receivables. That the two checks or "receivables" issued
by Pedro Valdez were payment for "actual sales of its merchandise and/or personalities made to its customers or otherwise arising
from its other legitimate business transactions" (par. a) and "that the receivables x x x were genuine, valid and subsisting and
represent hona fide sales of merchandise and/or personalities made in the ordinary course of business"
However, it can hardly be doubted that those representations in State Investment’s printed deeds of sale were false. But false
though they were, State Investment cannot claim to have been deceived or deluded by them because it knew, or should have
known, that the issuer of the checks, Pedro O. Valdez, was not a "buyer" of the "merchandise and personalities made in the
ordinary course of business" by P.O. Valdez, Inc. of which he was the president.
Since State Investment failed to prove during the hearing of private respondents' motion to lift the preliminary writ of attachment,
that P.O. Valdez, Inc. received from it independent consideration for the "sale" of Pedro Valdez' checks to it, apart from the loans
previously extended to the corporation, then the SC claims that they are constrained to affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals
that Valdez's checks are "mere evidence of the outstanding obligation of P.O. Valdez, Inc. "to the petitioner." The petition was not
defrauded by their issuance because the loans had been contracted and released to P.O. Valdez, Inc. long before the checks were
issued.

G.R. No. L-35990 JUNE 17, 1981

ABOITIZ & COMPANY, INC. v. COTABATO BUS COMPANY, INC.
FACTS: A writ of preliminary attachment was issued ex-parte by the Court of First Instance of Davao (Branch 1) on the strength of an
affidavit of merit attached to the verified complaint filed by petitioner herein, Aboitiz & Co., Inc., in Civil Case No. 7329, for the
collection of money in the sum of P 155,739.41, which Cotabato Bus Co., owed the said petitioner. The ground for the issuance of
the writ is, as alleged in the complaint and the affidavit of merit executed by the Assistant Manager of petitioner, that the defendant
"has removed or disposed of its properties or assets, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud its creditors." By virtue of the writ
of preliminary attachment, the provincial sheriff attached personal properties of the defendant bus company consisting of some
buses, machinery and equipment.
Respondent company filed in the lower court an "Urgent Motion to Dissolve or Quash Writ of Attachment". The lower court denied
the said motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the defendant bus company but the lower court denied it. Hence, the defendant went to
the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of herein respondent Judge, Hon.
Vicente R. Cusi Jr. The Court of Appeals declared "null and void the order/writ of attachment and ordered the release of the
attached properties. Hence this appeal by petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the writ of attachment was properly issued upon a showing that defendant is on the verge of insolvency and may
no longer satisfy its just debts without issuing the writ.
HELD: NO, the writ of attachment was not properly issued.
First. The Court stated that insolvency is not a proper ground for issuance of a writ of attachment.
Second. The facts of this case do not warrant issuance of the writ of attachment.
Aside from the reference petitioner had made to respondent company's "nil" bank account, as if to show removal of company's
funds, petitioner also cited the alleged non-payment of its other creditors, including secured creditors like the DBP to which all its
buses have been mortgaged, despite its daily income averaging P12,000.00, and the rescue and removal of five attached buses.
It is an undisputed fact that, as averred by petitioner itself, the several buses attached are nearly junks. However, upon permission
by the sheriff, five of them were repaired, but they were substituted with five buses which were also in the same condition as the
five repaired ones before the repair. This cannot be the removal intended as ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment under
section 1 (e), Rule 57, of the Rules of Court. The repair of the five buses was evidently motivated by a desire to serve the interest of
the riding public, clearly not to defraud its creditors, as there is no showing that they were not put on the run after their repairs, as
was the obvious purpose of their substitution to be placed in running condition.
Moreover, as the buses were mortgaged to the DBP, their removal or disposal as alleged by petitioner to provide the basis for its
prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment should be very remote, if not nil. If removal of the buses had in fact been committed,
which seems to exist only in petitioner's apprehensive imagination, the DBP should not have failed to take proper court action, both
civil and criminal, which apparently has not been done.
The dwindling of respondent's bank account despite its daily income of from P10,000.00 to P14,000.00 is easily explained by its
having to meet heavy operating expenses, which include salaries and wages of employees and workers. If, indeed the income of the
company were sufficiently profitable, it should not allow its buses to fall into disuse by lack of repairs. It should also maintain a good
credit standing with its suppliers of equipment, and other needs of the company to keep its business a going concern. Petitioner is
only one of the suppliers.
It is, indeed, extremely hard to remove the buses, machinery and other equipments which respondent company have to own and

keep to be able to engage and continue in the operation of its transportation business. The sale or other form of disposition of any
of this kind of property is not difficult of detection or discovery, and strangely, petitioner, has adduced no proof of any sale or
transfer of any of them, which should have been easily obtainable.
G.R. No. L-29280 AUGUST 11, 1988

PEOPLE'S BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v.SYVEL'S INCORPORATED, ANTONIO Y. SYYAP and ANGEL Y SYYAP
FACTS: Chattel mortgage was executed in favor of plaintiff People’s Bank by defendant Syvel’s Incorporated on its stocks of goods,
personal properties and other materials owned by it. It was in connection with a credit commercial line in the amount of
P900,000.00 granted to Syvel’s Incorporated. Defendants Antonio V. Syyap and Angel Y. Syyap executed an undertaking in favor of
the plaintiff whereby they both agreed to guarantee absolutely and unconditionally and without the benefit of excussion the full
and prompt payment of any indebtedness to be incurred on account of the said credit line.
In view of the failure of the defendant corporation to make payment thereof, the plaintiff started to foreclose extrajudicially the
chattel mortgage. As no payment had been paid, an action for foreclosure of chattel mortgage was eventually filed in the CFI.
Included in the petition of the plaintiff were affidavits executed by Mr. Leopoldo R. Rivera, Assistant Vice President of the plaintiff
bank and Atty. Eduardo J. Berenguer, to the effect that the defendants are disposing of their properties with intent to defraud their
creditors, particularly the plaintiff herein.
Thereafter, a preliminary writ of attachment was issued. As a consequence of the issuance of the writ of attachment, the
defendants, in their answer to the complaint set up a compulsory counterclaim for damages.
Appellants contend that the affidavits of Messrs. Rivera and Berenguer on which the lower court based the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment relied on the reports of credit investigators sent to the field and not on the personal knowledge of the
affiants.
ISSUE: Whether the writ of attachment was properly issued.
HELD: YES.
In the determination of the legality of the writ of attachment by the Court of First Instance of Manila, it is a well-established rule
that the grant or denial of a writ of attachment rests upon the sound discretion of the court. Records are bereft of any evidence that
grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent judge in the issuance of the writ of attachment.
Evidence adduced during the trial strongly shows that the witnesses have personal knowledge of the facts stated in their affidavits
in support of the application for the writ. They testified that Syvel's Inc. had disposed of all the articles covered by the chattel
mortgage but had not remitted the proceeds to appellee bank; that the Syvel's Stores at the Escolta, Rizal Avenue and Morayta
Street were no longer operated by appellants and that the latter were disposing of their properties to defraud appellee bank. Such

testimonies and circumstances were given full credit by the trial court in its decision . Hence, the attachment sought on the ground
of actual removal of property is justified where there is physical removal thereof by the debtor, as shown by the records.
Besides, the actuations of appellants were clearly seen by the witnesses who "saw a Fiat Bantam Car-Fiat Car, a small car and about
three or four persons hurrying; they were carrying goods coming from the back portion of this store of Syvels at the Escolta,
between 5:30 and 6:00 o'clock in the evening." Therefore, "the act of debtor (appellant) in taking his stock of goods from the rear of
his store at night, is sufficient to support an attachment upon the ground of the fraudulent concealment of property for the purpose
of delaying and defrauding creditors."
In any case, intent to defraud may be and usually is inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case; it can rarely be proved by
direct evidence. It may be gleaned also from the statements and conduct of the debtor, and in this connection, the principle may be
applied that every person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts In fact the trial court is impressed "that not
only has the plaintiff acted in perfect good faith but also on facts sufficient in themselves to convince an ordinary man that the
defendants were obviously trying to spirit away a portion of the stocks of Syvel's Incorporated in order to render ineffectual at least
partially any judgment that may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff."
Appellants having failed to adduce evidence of bad faith or malice on the part of appellee in the procurement of the writ of
preliminary attachment, the claim of the former for damages is evidently negated. In fact, the allegations in the appellee's complaint
more than justify the issuance of the writ of attachment.
G.R. Nos. 65957-58 JULY 5, 1994

ELEAZAR V. ADLAWAN and ELENA S. ADLAWAN v. Hon. Judge RAMON AM. TORRES
FACTS: Respondent Aboitiz filed against petitioners two complaints for collection of sums of money with prayers for the issuance of
writs of attachment in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
presided by respondent Judge Ramon Am. Torres. The respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment upon
respondent Aboitiz' filing of a bond.
Petitioners then filed urgent motions to hold in abeyance the enforcement of the writs of attachments. Respondent Aboitiz averred
that the issuance of the writ of attachment was justified because petitioners were intending to defraud respondent Aboitiz by
mortgaging 11 parcels of land to the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) in consideration of the loan of P1,100,000.00,
thereby making PCIB a preferred creditor to the prejudice of respondent Aboitiz, which had an exposure amounting to
P13,430,259.14.
Respondent Judge issued an order directing the sheriffs of Cebu, Davao and Metro Manila "to proceed with the enforcement and
implementation of the writs of preliminary attachment." Respondent Judge ruled that the writs of attachment were issued on the
basis of the supporting affidavits alleging that petitioner had removed or disposed of their property with intent to defraud
respondent Aboitiz.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus. They alleged that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion

in ordering the issuance of the writs of preliminary attachment inasmuch as the real estate mortgage executed by them in favor of
PCIB did not constitute fraudulent removal, concealment or disposition of property. They argued that granting the mortgage
constituted removal or disposition of property, it was not per se a ground for attachment lacking proof of intent to defraud the
creditors of the defendant.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of attachment was proper.
HELD: NO.
The affidavit submitted by respondent Aboitiz in support of its prayer for the writ of attachment does not meet the requirements
of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court regarding the allegations on impending fraudulent removal, concealment and disposition
of defendant's property. To justify a preliminary attachment, the removal or disposal must have been made with intent to defraud
defendant's creditors. Proof of fraud is mandated by paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court on
the grounds upon which attachment may issue. Thus, the factual basis on defendant's intent to defraud must be clearly alleged in
the affidavit in support of the prayer for the writ of attachment if not so specifically alleged in the verified complaint.
The affidavit submitted by respondent Aboitiz states:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CITY OF CEBU ...............) S.S.
I, ROMAN S. RONQUILLO, of legal age, married and a resident of Cebu City, after being sworn in accordance with law,
hereby depose and say:That I am the Vice-President of the plaintiff corporation in the above-entitled case;
That a sufficient cause of action exists against the defendants named therein because the said defendants are indebted to
the plaintiffs in the amount of P13,430,259.14 exclusive of interests thereon and damages claimed;
That the defendants have removed or disposed of their properties with intent to defraud the plaintiff, their creditor,
because on May 27, 1982 they executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) covering eleven (11) of their fifteen (15) parcels of land in Cebu to secure a P1,000,000.00 loan with the same bank;
That this action is one of those specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, whereby a writ
preliminary attachment may lawfully issue because the action therein is one against parties who have removed or disposed
of their properties with intent to defraud their creditor, plaintiff herein;
That there is no sufficient security for the claims sought to be enforced by the present action;
That the total amount due to the plaintiff in the above-entitled case is P13,430,259.14, excluding interests and claim for
damages and is as much the sum for which an order of attachment is herein sought to be granted; above all legal counter-
claims on the part of the defendants.
It is evident from said affidavit that the prayer for attachment rests on the mortgage by petitioners of 11 parcels of land in Cebu,
which encumbrance respondent Aboitiz considered as fraudulent concealment of property to its prejudice. However, there is no
factual allegation which may constitute as a valid basis for the contention that the mortgage was in fraud of respondent Aboitiz. The
general rule is that the affidavit is the foundation of the writ, and if none be filed or one be filed which wholly fails to set out some
facts required by law to be stated therein, there is no jurisdiction and the proceedings are null and void.
Bare allegation that an encumbrance of a property is in fraud of the creditor does not suffice. Factual bases for such conclusion must
be clearly averred.
The execution of a mortgage in favor of another creditor is not conceived by the Rules as one of the means of fraudulently disposing
of one's property. By mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted with.
Furthermore, the inability to pay one's creditors is not necessarily synonymous with fraudulent intent not to honor an obligation.
Consequently, when petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of the writ of attachment,
respondent Judge should have considered it as a motion for the discharge of the attachment and should have conducted a hearing
or required submission of counter-affidavits from the petitioners, if only to gather facts in support of the allegation of fraud. This is
what Section 13 of Rule 57 mandates.
This procedure should be followed because, as the Court has time and again said, attachment is a harsh, extraordinary and summary
remedy and the rules governing its issuance must be construed strictly against the applicant. Verily, a writ of attachment can only be

granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting perfunctorily the words of the Rules.
The judge before whom the application is made exercises full discretion in considering the supporting evidence proffered by the
applicant. One overriding consideration is that a writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at
the beginning, instead of at the termination of the suit.
G.R. No. L-37682 NOVEMBER 26, 1932

CLAUDE NEON LIGHTS, FEDERAL INC., U. S. A. v. PHILIPPINE ADVERTISING CORPORATION
FACTS: The respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation filed suit against the petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
claiming P300,000 as damages for alleged breach of the agency contract existing between the said respondent and the petitioner. At
the same time, said respondent filed in said court an application for writ of attachment duly verified in which it is stated that the
defendant (petitioner herein) is a foreign corporation having its principal place of business in the City of Washington, District of
Columbia. The only statutory ground relied upon in the court below and in this court for the issuance of the writ of attachment
against the petitioner is paragraph 2 of section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that plaintiff may have the
property of the defendant attached "in an action against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.
The respondent judge issued the writ of attachment, and the sheriff has attached all the properties of the petitioner in the
Philippine Islands. On the same date, on the ex parte petition and nomination of the respondent, the respondent judge appointed
Manuel C. Grey receiver of said properties of the petitioner.
Motions to dissolve said writ of attachment and receivership were filed in the court below. The court denied said motions to vacate
the attachment and receivership, declaring that the writ of attachment conforms to section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not paragraph 2 of section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the petitioner (or whether the
issuance of the writ of attachment was proper)
HELD: NO.
Section 242 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which the petitioner's property was attached, reads as follows:
Attachment. — A plaintiff may, at the commencement of his action, or at any time afterwards, have the property of the
defendant attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered, unless the defendant gives
security to pay such judgment, in the manner hereinafter provided, in the following cases.
1. In all the cases mentioned in section four hundred and twelve, providing for the arrest of a defendant. But the plaintiff
must make an election as to whether he will ask for an order of arrest or an order of attachment; he shall not be entitled to
both orders;
2. In an action against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.
Paragraph 2 of section 424, supra does not apply to a domestic corporation. Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to
assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic corporations. It would be entirely out of
line with this policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property to
the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of law made especially of foreign
corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of domestic corporations.
In the present instance, a particularly monstrous result has followed as a consequence of the granting of the writ attaching all of the
property of the petitioner on the sole allegation that it "is not residing in the Philippine Islands". As the petitioner's business was a
going concern, which the sheriff, who levied the writ, obviously could not manage, it became necessary on the same day for the
court to appoint a receiver. This receiver, as the demurrer admits, "was and is an employee working under the president of the
respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation, so that to all intents and purposes, all the property of the petitioner in the Philippine

Islands was seized and delivered into the hands of the respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation."
G.R. Nos. 79926-27 OCTOBER 17, 1991

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. and STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC. v. CA
FACTS: The foreign banks involved in the controversy are Bank of America NT and SA, Citibank N.A. and Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation. They jointly filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for involuntary insolvency of Consolidated
Mines, Inc. (CMI). The petition was opposed by State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) and State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI).
Petitioners claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for insolvency because petitioners are not
resident creditors of CMI in contemplation of the Insolvency Law.
SIHI and SFCI then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment “on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate CMI
insolvent since the respondent foreign banks are not 'resident creditors' of CMI as required under the Insolvency Law." The Regional
Trial Court found merit in the motion for summary judgment and rendered “summary judgment dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court's Order and remanded the case to it for further proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not foreign banks licensed to do business in the Philippines, may be considered "residents of the Philippine
Islands"
HELD: YES.
The Supreme Court itself has already had occasion to hold that a foreign corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which
is a defendant in a civil suit, may not be considered a non-resident within the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment
against a defendant "not residing in the Philippine Islands;" in other words, a preliminary attachment may not be applied for and
granted solely on the asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the Philippines -- and is
consequently and necessarily, "a party who resides out of the Philippines." Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party not
residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides out of the country, then, logically, it must be considered a party who does
reside in the Philippines, who is a resident of the country.
Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business here to the status of
domestic corporations. It would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign
corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only
with every requirement of law made specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of
domestic corporations.
Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations authorized to do business in the Philippines "to the status of domestic
corporations," subsumes their being found and operating as corporations, hence, residing, in the country.
The same principle is recognized in American law: that the "residence of a corporation, if it can be said to have a residence, is
necessarily where it exercises corporate functions **;" that it is considered as dwelling "in the place where its business is done **,"
as being “located where its franchises are exercised **," and as being "present where it is engaged in the prosecution of the
corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign corporation licensed to do business in a state is a resident of any country where it maintains
an office or agent for transaction of its usual and customary business for venue purposes;” and that the "necessary element in its
signification is locality of existence." Courts have held that "a domestic corporation is regarded as having a residence within the
state at any place where it is engaged in the particulars of the corporate enterprise, and not only at its chief place or home office;"
that "a corporation may be domiciled in one state and resident in another; its legal domicile in the state of its creation presents no
impediment to its residence in a real and practical sense in the state of its business activities.''

The foregoing propositions are in accord with the dictionary concept of residence as applied to juridical persons, a term which
appears to comprehend permanent as well as temporary residence.
The Court cannot thus accept the petitioners' theory that corporations may not have a residence (i.e., the place where they operate
and transact business) separate from their domicile (i.e., the state of their formation or organization), and that they may be
considered by other states as residents only for limited and exclusive purposes. Of course, as petitioners correctly aver, it is not
really the grant of a license to a foreign corporation to do business in this country that makes it a resident; the license merely gives
legitimacy to its doing business here. What effectively makes such a foreign corporation a resident corporation in the Philippines is
its actually being in the Philippines and licitly doing business here, "locality of existence" being, to repeat, the "necessary element in
the signification" of the term, resident corporation.
G.R. No. 84034 DECEMBER 22, 1988
ALBERTO SIEVERT v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ARTEMON D. LUNA
FACTS: On 18 May 1988 petitioner Alberto Sievert a citizen and resident of the Philippines received by mail a Petition for Issuance of
a Preliminary Attachment filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 88-44346. Petitioner alleged that
had not previously received any summons and any copy of a complaint against him in said civil case.
In the hearing for the petition for the writ, petitioner prayed for its denial for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
upon the ground that since no summons had been served upon him in the main case, no jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner had been acquired by the trial court.
RTC: The trial court denied the petitioner's objection.
CA: Petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 13 July 1988, the respondent appellate court rendered a
decision, notable principally for its brevity, dismissing the Petition.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether a court which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the main case, may bind such
defendant or his property by issuing a writ of preliminary attachment
HELD: NO. There is no question that a writ of preliminary attachment may be applied for a plaintiff "at the commencement of the
action or at any time thereafter" in the cases enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The critical time which must be identified is when the trial court acquires authority under law to act coercively against the
defendant or his property in a proceeding in attachment. We believe and so hold that critical time is the time of the vesting of
jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant in the main case.
Ordinarily, the prayer in a petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied or incorporated in the main complaint itself as
one of the forms of relief sought in such complaint. Thus, valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint will in such case
vest jurisdiction in the court over the defendant both for purposes of the main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of
attachment. In such case, notice of the main case is at the same time notice of the auxiliary proceeding in attachment.
Where, however, the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied in a discrete pleading, such petition must be served
either simultaneously with service of summons and a copy of the main complaint, or after jurisdiction over the defendant has
already been acquired by such service of summons. Notice of the separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action. Put
a little differently, jurisdiction whether ratione personae or ratione materiae in an attachment proceeding is ancillary to jurisdiction

ratione personae or ratione materiae in the main action against the defendant. If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or over the person of the defendant in the principal action, it simply has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary attachment
against the defendant or his property.
In the case at bar, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court to proceed in the main case against the defendant is quite clear . It is
not disputed that neither service of summons with a copy of the complaint nor voluntary appearance of petitioner Sievert was had
in this case.
G.R. No. 102448 AUGUST 5, 1992

RICARDO CUARTERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On August 20, 1990, petitioner Ricardo Cuartero filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against the
private respondents, Evangelista spouses, for a sum of money plus damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.
On August 24, 1990, the lower court issued an order granting ex-parte the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment.
On September 19, 1990, the writ of preliminary attachment was issued and on the same day, the summons for the spouses
Evangelista were likewise prepared.
The following day, a copy of the writ of preliminary attachment, the order dated August 24, 1990, the summons and the complaint
were all simultaneously served upon the private respondents at their residence. Immediately thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Ernesto L.
Sula levied, attached and pulled out the properties in compliance with the court's directive to attach all the properties of private
respondents not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the petitioner's principal claim in the
amount of P2,171,794.91.
Subsequently, the spouses Evangelista filed motion to set aside the order dated August 24, 1990 and discharge the writ of
preliminary attachment for having been irregularly and improperly issued. Another point which the private respondents raised in
their comment is the alleged violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process when the writ was issued without
notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Was the writ of Preliminary Attachment properly issued and served?
HELD: Yes. Under section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the only requisites for the issuance of the writ are the affidavit and bond
of the applicant. As has been expressly ruled in BF Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 262 (1990), citing Mindanao Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480 (1989), no notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application is
required inasmuch as the time which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property before a writ of attachment issues.
In such a case, a hearing would render nugatory the purpose of this provisional remedy. The ruling remains good law. There is, thus,

no merit in the private respondents' claim of violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
It is clear from the pronouncements of the Supreme Court that a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons is
served upon the defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until jurisdiction
over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore, it is required that when the proper officer commences implementation of the writ
of attachment, service of summons should be simultaneously made.
May a writ be dissolved by a showing of irregular or improper issuance?
NO. An attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the
same time the applicant's cause of action in the main case since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the main case
would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion
When can a writ of preliminary attachment be applied for?
The writ of preliminary attachment can be applied for and granted at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter
(Section 1, Rule 57, Rules of Court). In Davao Light and Power, Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra, the phrase "at the
commencement of the action" is interpreted as referring to the date of the filing of the complaint which is a time before summons
is served on the defendant or even before summons issues.
G.R. No. 112573 FEBRUARY 9, 1995

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, INC.
FACTS: Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Minnesota, USA. It sought for the
enforcement of a civil case in the RTC of Manila. The judgment was rendered in its favor by a Japanese Court against C.F. Sharp &
Company, Inc., a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws.
The facts of the said case are as follows: Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its Japan branch, entered
into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, where the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets.
C.F Sharp and Company (it’s Japan branch) was unable to remit the proceeds of ticket sales made in behalf of Northweses which
prompted the latter to sue CF Sharp in Tokyo, Japan for the collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales with claim for
damages.
Writ of summons were issued by the District Court of Japan at the defendant’s office, then to the head of office in Manila and even
through diplomatic channels to the defendant’s head office in Manila. However, despite receipt of such summons, the defendant
failed to appear on the scheduled hearings. Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the complaint and rendered judgment
ordering the defendants to pay the amount of unremitted proceeds plus damages for delay.
The defendant received a copy of the judgment and since it was not appealed, it became final and executory. But Northwest Orient
Airlines was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of judgment before the RTC of Manila.
The defendants filed an answer averring that judgment on a Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice to the defendant and/or with collusion or
fraud and/or upon a clear mistake of law and fact.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals rendered a decision that:
"The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant considering that this is an action in personam; the Japanese Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant because jurisprudence requires that the defendant be served with summons in Japan in order for the Japanese Court to
acquire jurisdiction over it, the process of the Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot
confer jurisdiction over the defendant in the case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar. xxx

This Court agrees that if the defendant in a foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign court such court could acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant but it must be served upon the defendant in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign
court. Such is not the case here because the defendant was served with summons in the Philippines and not in Japan."
The CA added that "the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the
defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state." And that to confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary.
ISSUE: Whether a Japanese Court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine Corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons
through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in
Japan had failed
HELD: Yes, a foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It
is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having
jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party
challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In
an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the
Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed
by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law is a question of fact, not of law. It
may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then
incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and
the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so called
processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine
law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its
resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect, or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan. This
silence could only mean, or at least create an impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the designated government official or
on any of SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be availed of.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at its head
office in the Philippines after the two attempts of service had failed. The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan
to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of
Japan sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn,
forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now
Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila.
This service is equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to

Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine laws
holds no water.
Moreover, the domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was incorporated. In a strict technical sense, such domicile as
a corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation can have only one domicile which is the state of its creation.
Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one state may, for certain purposes, be regarded a resident in another state in which it has
offices and transacts business. This is the rule in our jurisdiction and apropos thereto as stated in State Investment House, Inc. vs.
Citibank.
Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time the collection
suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such,
was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of
serving process.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual
presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
G.R. No. L-46009 MAY 14, 1979

RICARDO T. SALAS and MARIA SALAS v. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL
FACTS: On September 10, 1976, respondents Rosita Bedro and Benita Yu filed a civil action against herein petitioners Ricardo T.
Salas and Maria Salas to annul the deed of sale of Lot No. 5 executed by administrators of the Hodges Estate in favor of the Spouses
Ricardo T. Salas and Maria Salas and for damages. The action for annulment was predicated upon the averment that Lot No. 5, being
a subdivision road, is intend for public use and cannot be sold or disposed of by the Hodges Estate.
The Salas spouses denied the material allegations in the complaint and stated that Lot No. 5 had been registered in the name of the
C. N. Hodges as their exclusive private property and was never subjected to any servitude or easement of right of way in favor of
any person.
In a motion dated May 12, 1977, private respondents filed a Motion for Attachment which respondent Judge issued ex-parte a Writ
of Attachment "against the properties of the defendants upon the plaintiffs filing a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 subject to
the approval of the Court.
Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said Writ of Attachment, petitioners filed the present
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Is certiorari proper to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment?
HELD: No. In certiorari proceedings, the cardinal rule is that the court must be given the opportunity to correct itself, Thus, for the
special civil action of certiorari to prosper, there must be no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Petitioners, therefore, must exhaust all available remedies in the lower court before filing a petition for certiorari,
otherwise the petition shall be held to be premature.
In the instant case, it appears that petitioners have adequate remedy under the law. They could have filed an application with the
court a quo for the discharge of the attachment for improper or irregular issuance under section 13, Rule 57, of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides the following
SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. — The party whose property has been attached may

also, at any time either before or after the release of the attached property, or before any attachment shall have been
actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who Salas vs. Adil granted the order, or
to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the ground that the
same was improperly or irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the party whose property has
been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or other evidence in
addition to that on which the attachment was made. After hearing, the judge shall order the discharge of the attachment if
it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is not cured forthwith.
Considering that petitioners have not availed of this remedy, the instant petition is premature.
What is the nature or preliminary attachment?
We deem it necessary, however, for the guidance of respondent Court and of the parties, to stress herein the nature of attachment
As an extraordinary provisional remedy, a preliminary attachment is a rigorous remedy, which exposes the debtor to humiliation
and annoyance, such it should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice. It is, therefore, the duty of the court, before issuing
the writ, to ensure that all the requisites of the law have been complied with; otherwise the judge acts in excess of his jurisdiction
and the so issued shall be null and void.
G.R. No. 40054 SEPTEMBER 14, 1933

LA GRANJA, INC. v.FELIX SAMSON
FACTS: On July 5, 1932, the petitioner herein, La Granja, Inc., filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, against
Chua Bian, Chua Yu Lee and Chua Ki, for the recovery of the sum of P2,418.18 with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum, which case was docketed as civil case No. 1888.
The plaintiff at the same time, also prayed for the issuance of an order of attachment against the aforementioned defendants'
property and accompanied said complaint with an affidavit of the manager of the aforesaid petitioner, La Granja, Inc., wherein it
was alleged among other essential things, that the said defendants have disposed or are disposing of their properties in favor of the
Asiatic Petroleum Co., with intent to defraud their creditors.
The respondent judge, wishing to ascertain or convince himself of the truth of the alleged disposal, required the petitioner herein to
present evidence to substantiate its allegation, before granting its petition. Inasmuch as the petitioner refused to comply with the
court's requirement, alleging as its ground that was not obliged to do so, the respondent judge dismissed said petition for an order
of attachment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere filing of an affidavit executed in due form is sufficient to compel a judge to issue an order of
attachment.

HELD: No. Section 426 of the Code of Civil procedure provides the following:
SEC. 426. Granting order of attachment. — A judge or justice of the peace shall grant an order of attachment when it is
made to appear to the judge or justice of the peace by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or of some other person who knows the
facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, and that the case is one of those mentioned in section four hundred and
twenty-four, and that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the
amount due to the plaintiff above all legal set-offs or counterclaims is as much as the sum for which the order is granted.
It will be seen that the legal provision just cited orders the granting of a writ of attachment when it has been made to appear by
affidavit that the facts mentioned by law as sufficient to warrant the issuance thereof, exist. Although the law requires nothing more
than the affidavit as a means of establishing the existence of such facts, nevertheless, such affidavit must be sufficient to convince
the court of their existence, the court being justified in rejecting the affidavit if it does not serve this purpose and in denying the
petition for an order of attachment.
The affidavit filed by the petitioner, La Granja, Inc., must not have satisfied the respondent judge inasmuch as he desired to
ascertain or convince himself of the truth of the facts alleged therein by requiring evidence to substantiate them. The sufficiency or
insufficiency of an affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given it by the judge, and its acceptance or rejection, upon his sound
discretion.
Hence, the respondent judge, in requiring the presentation of evidence to establish the truth of the allegation of the affidavit that
the defendants had disposed or were disposing of their property to defraud their creditors, has done nothing more than exercise his
sound discretion in determining the sufficiency of the affidavit.
G.R. No. 55272 APRIL 10, 1989

JARDINE-MANILA FINANCE, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On September 28, 1979, petitioner Jardine-Manila Finance, Inc. (JARDINE) filed a complaint in the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal,... against private respondents Impact Corporation (IMPACT),... Ricardo de Leon and Eduardo de Leon, to
collect various sums of money allegedly due from therein defendant IMPACT under a credit accommodation by way of a discounting
line agreement.
It was alleged that IMPACT assigned its receivables to JARDINE on the condition that IMPACT was to collect them on their due dates
from their issuers and remit the collected amounts to JARDINE and/or repurchase the assigned... receivables... but despite the fact
that IMPACT had collected the amounts due on said receivables, it failed or refused to turn over the amounts so collected to
JARDINE.
JARDINE thus demanded payment of P1,000,212.64, the total amount due under said various deeds of assignment, plus interest...
and... attorney's fees, exemplary damages and other expenses of litigation.
Likewise contained in said complaint is petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary attachment against private respondents.
The allegations in support of said petition for a writ of preliminary attachment are:
The defendant corporation at the time of the execution of the aforesaid deeds of assignment had reservation not to remit to
plaintiff the proceeds of the receivables assigned to plaintiff as confirmed by their refusal to remit the same to... plaintiff although
the issuers of the receivables assigned to plaintiff had already paid to defendant corporation their obligations on said receivables to
the latter.
Defendants Ricardo de Leon and Eduardo de Leon who are likewise officers of defendant corporation in order to elicit plaintiff's
approval to enter into said deeds of assignment with defendant corporation, executed the... aforesaid surety agreement... with
reservation in their minds not to honor their obligations under the same as what they actually did when they refused to pay the
obligations of defendant corporation to plaintiff pursuant... to the provisions of said surety agreement.

Defendant corporation, Ricardo de Leon and Eduardo de Leon have no visible other sufficient security for the claim sought to be
enforced by this action of plaintiff other than... their real and personal properties which are located in Metro Manila and in the
province of Rizal, Province of
Nueva Ecija or elsewhere.
Plaintiff's action against defendant corporation is based upon documents and therefrom a sufficient cause of action exists.
On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the lower court granted JARDINE's petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.
Defendants filed a motion to set aside the writ of preliminary attachment. They also submitted to the court a quo a memorandum
in support of their motion to dissolve the attachment contending that the... grounds alleged by the plaintiff in its application for a
writ of attachment are not among the grounds specified under Section 1 of Rule 57; that the defendants have other sufficient
security; that there was no affidavit of merit to support the application for attachment as... required by Section 3 of Rule 57 and that
the verification of the complaint was defective as it did not state that the amount due to the plaintiff above all legal setups or
counterclaims is as much as the sum for which the order is sought.
JARDINE opposed said motion arguing that the mental reservation of defendants at the time of the execution of the deeds of
assignment constituted fraud; that such fraud was further confirmed by the fact that defendants actually failed to remit the
proceeds of the... collection of receivables assigned by them; that defendants failed to disclose to the plaintiff the fact that they had
already collected the receivables assigned by them; that the amounts collected by defendant corporation were received by
defendants in trust for plaintiff and... defendant corporation appropriated for itself said collection.
On November 7, 1979, the trial court denied defendants' motion to annul the writ of preliminary attachment. Thereupon,
defendant Impact Corporation went to the appellate court on a petition for certiorari seeking to annul said... writ.
The grounds alleged by plaintiff, the herein private respondent, to support its application for preliminary attachment are among
those enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 57 as grounds upon which an attachment may be issued, we are constrained... nonetheless
to rule against the regularity or legality of the attachment issued by respondent Court because there was no allegation made by
plaintiff in its application for the issuance of a writ of attachment to the effect 'that there is no sufficient security for the claim...
sought to be enforced, by the action, and the amount due to the applicant or the value of the property on the basis of which is
entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims,' a requirement for the
granting of an order of... attachment under Section 3 of Rule 57.
The Court of Appeals annulled the assailed writ of attachment for having been issued improperly and irregularly
ISSUE: whether or not noncompliance with the formal requirements invalidate the writ of attachment.
HELD: Yes. Section 3, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the issuance of a writ of attachment, to wit:
"Sec. 3. Affidavit and bond required. - An order of attachment shall be granted only when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the
applicant or some other person who personally knows of the facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, that... the case is one of
those mentioned in section 1 hereof, that there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that
the amount due to applicant or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover is as much as the... sum
for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims."
The stringent conditions for the issuance of the writ... wherein... the writ of preliminary attachment issued was annulled and set
aside on the findings that while the plaintiff... may have stated in his affidavit that a sufficient cause of action exists against the
defendant, he did not state therein that the case is one of those... mentioned in Section 1 hereof; that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and that the amount due to the applicant is as much as the sum for which
the order is granted above all legal counterclaims.
More specifically, it has been held that the failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites prescribed for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment, renders the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the property of the defendant fatally defective,
and the... judge issuing it is deemed to have acted in excess of his jurisdiction.
In fact, in such cases, the defect cannot even be cured by amendment.

Since the attachment is a harsh and rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, the rule authorizing
its issuance must be strictly construed in favor of defendant. It is the duty of the court before issuing the writ... to ensure that all
the requisites of the law have been complied with.[28] Otherwise, a judge acquires no jurisdiction to issue the writ.
The general rule is that the affidavit is the foundation of the writ, and if none be filed or one be filed which wholly fails to set out
some facts required by law to be stated therein, there is no jurisdiction and the proceedings are null and... void. Thus, while not
unmindful of the fact that the property seized under the writ and brought into court is what the court finally exercises jurisdiction
over, the court cannot subscribe to the proposition that the steps pointed out by statutes to obtain... such writ are inconsequential,
and in no sense jurisdictional.
Considering that petitioner's application for the subject writ of preliminary attachment did not fully comply with the requisites
prescribed by law, said writ is, as it is hereby declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
G.R. No. 61754 AUGUST 17, 1989

ROBERTO TING and DOLORES TING v. HON. AUGUSTO E. VILLARIN
FACTS: On September 17, 1981, private respondent Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter “Consolidated Bank”) filed a
complaint1 for a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against Perlon Textile Mills and its directors.
Roberto Ting, a director, was impleaded with his wife Dolores Lim Ting. The complaint recites that the wife was impleaded as a party
defendant in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains which allegedly benefitted from the transactions subject of the
complaint. The spouses Ting are the present petitioners.
Consolidated Bank actually sued on two (2) causes of action. The first was targetted at recovering on several promissory notes the
amount of P2,972,955.51, allegedly obtained for the defendant corporation by its duly authorized officers Lu Cheng Peng, Teng See,
and Roberto Ting. These officers allegedly signed the promissory notes in their personal and official capacities thereby binding
themselves jointly and severally to Consolidated Bank for the payment of the promissory notes.
The second cause of action dwells on several violations of trust receipt agreements which the defendant corporation executed in
favor of Consolidated Bank. The defendant corporation’s faithful compliance with the trust receipt agreements appears to have
been secured by the continuing guaranty of defendants Liu Suy Lin, Angelo Leonar, and Lu Cheng Peng.
In support of the application for preliminary attachment, Consolidated Bank averred the ground of “fraud in contracting an
obligation” thus—
16. Defendants are guilty of fraud in contracting their obligations more specifically illustrated by their violation of
the trust receipt agreement which is a ground defined under Sec. 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment.
ISSUE: Whether or not an order of attachment can be issued on a general averment such as one ceremoniously quoting from a
pertinent rule
HELD: No. It is not enough for the complaint to ritualistically cite, as here, that the defendants are “guilty of fraud in contracting an
obligation.” An order of attachment cannot be issued on a general averment, such as one ceremoniously quoting from a pertinent
rule. The need for a recitation of factual circumstances that support the application becomes more compelling here considering that
the ground relied upon is “fraud in contracting an obligation.” The complaint did not provide for a sufficient basis for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment.The complaint utterly failed to even give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was
perpetrated. Fraud cannot be presumed.

The respondent judge thus failed in his duty to ensure that, before issuing the writ of preliminary attachment, all the requisites of
the law have been complied with. He acted in excess of his jurisdiction and the writ he so issued is thus null and void.
G.R. No. 135830 SEPTEMBER 30, 2005

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS v. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, et.al.
FACTS: In his Complaint before the RTC, Carlos asserted that he was the sole surviving compulsory heir of his parents who had
acquired during their marriage, six parcels of land (subject properties). His brother, Teofilo, died intestate in 1992. At the time of his
death, Teofilo was apparently married to Sandoval. Nonetheless, Carlos alleged in his Complaint that Teofilo and Sandoval were not
validly married as they had not obtained any marriage license.
Carlos also claimed that Teofilo, prior to their father’s death in 1963, developed a scheme to save the estate from inheritance taxes.
Under the scheme, the properties of the father would be transferred to Teofilo who would see to it that the shares of the legal heirs
are protected and delivered to them. Felix assented to the plan, and the subject properties were transferred in the name of Teofilo.
After Teofilo’s death, Carlos entered into certain agreements with Sandoval in connection with the subject properties. Carlos did so,
believing that the latter was the lawful wife of his brother Teofilo.
Carlos now sought to nullify these agreements with Sandoval for want of consideration, and prayed of the RTC to declare the
alleged marriage between Teofilo and Sandoval void ab initio, order that new titles covering the subject properties be issued in the
name of Carlos, and require Sandoval to restitute Carlos in the amount of ₱18,924,800.00.
Carlos likewise prayed for the issuance of the provisional relief of preliminary attachment. The RTC granted the prayer for
preliminary attachment, and the writ was issued. Carlos posted a bond for ₱20,000,000.00 issued by herein petitioner SIDDCOR
Insurance Corporation (SIDDCOR).
Shortly thereafter, a Notice of Garnishment was served upon the Philippine National Bank (PNB) over the deposit accounts
maintained by respondents.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment, which the RTC denied. This caused respondents to file a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
CA 2nd Division granted the Pet. For Certiorari, ordering the dissolution and discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment as
well as the garnishment.
Upon Motion for Summary Judgment of both parties, RTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of Carlos, declaring Teofilo and
Sandoval’s marriage void ab initio, ordering Sandoval to pay the sum, and declaring Carlos as the sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land.
Carlos moved for execution pending appeal, which the RTC granted and it issued a writ of execution.
Respondents filed an MR to the RTC Summary Judgment, which was denied. They appealed to the CA. Meanwhile, Sandoval filed a
Petition for Certiorari, question the allowance of the execution pending appeal.
Respondents also filed a Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond in the CA, arguing that the Writ of Preliminary

Attachment issued by the RTC was improperly granted, and such was affirmed by the SC, attaining finality. Because such improper
grant, respondents argue that they were entitled to damages under Sec. 20, R57, which governs damages on account of unlawful
attachment, as the garnishment has already caused PNB to deliver said amount to the Sheriff.
CA Special 4th Division issued a Resolution, certifying that all the necessary pleadings have been filed, and that the case may
already be referred to the Raffle Committee for assignment to a ponente.
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing that under the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(RIRCA), the case may be re-raffled only after there is a resolution that the case is deemed submitted for decision. They pointed out
that re-raffle could not yet be effected, as there were still pending incidents, the Motion for Judgment on Attachment Bond.
CA Special 4th Division issued a Resolution, agreeing with respondents that it was necessary to resolve pending incidents first. Hence,
such CA Division resolve the Motion for Judgment on Attachment Bond , holding that respondents are entitled to damages. It held
that it was not necessary for the determination of such damages on the attachment bond to await the decision on appeal . Hence,
Carlos and SIDDCOR was ordered to pay Sandoval, et. al. for damages resulting from the unlawful attachment.
Carlos and SIDDCOR filed their MRs, while respondents filed a Motion for Immediate Execution. CA denied the MRs and granted
respondents’ Motion.
Hence, these consolidated petitions. Carlos filed an Appeal by Certiorari with Prayer for TRO/Preliminary Injunction, arguing, among
others, that CA 4th Div. could not have resolved Motion for Judgment on Attachment Bond as the case had not yet been re-raffled
under the two-raffle system for study and report, and that there was no hearing conducted.
SIDDCOR filed a Petition for Review, arguing that the motion for damages could not be ruled upon unless there is already a
judgment in the main case; that even if damages may be awarded, these should encompass only damaged incurred during
pendency of appeal; and that there was no hearing conducted.
ISSUE # 1: Whether or not the judgment on the attachment bond could have been rendered prior to the adjudication of the main
case
HELD # 1: Generally, no. But this case is exceptional.

Section 20, R57 essentially allows the application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes executory. It should be filed
in the same case that is the main action, and cannot be instituted separately. It should be filed with the court having jurisdiction
over the case at the time of the application.
Under Sec. 20, R57, there must be first a judgment on the action before damages can be claimed by such party. However, the Court
clarified that under the rule, "recovery for damages may be had by the party thus prejudiced by the wrongful attachment, even if
the judgment be adverse to him."
The language used in the Rules of Court leaves no doubt that even a party who loses the action in main but is able to establish a
right to damages by reason of improper or excessive attachment may be entitled to damages. This bolsters the notion that the claim
for damages arising from such wrongful attachment may arise and be decided separately from the merits of the main action.
It is clear that the award for damages need not be resolved before the case is submitted for decision, but should instead be
resolved and included in the judgment on the main case, or, in this case, the decision on the Appeal by Certiorari filed by the
respondents. Hence, the CA was incorrect in resolving the application for damages even before the main judgment does not
conform to Sec. 20, R57. However, the special particular circumstances in this case does not make the error mortal to the award of
damages.
It is noted that the award for damages was made after a proper hearing, and such relief of damages has been conclusively affirmed
by the SC. Being already ruled upon by the highest court of the land, it is obvious that said right is already made viable by such final
judgment.
Also, the argument that the case must be re-raffled first before deciding on the damages is correct. However, it does not outweigh
the fact that there was already a final determination that the attachment was wrongful.

ISSUE # 2: Whether or not the CA complied with the hearing requirement under Sec. 20, Rule 57 prior to its judgment on the
attachment bond –
HELD #2: Yes. The “proper hearing” requirement was met
The hearing requirement ties with the indispensable demand of procedural due process. Due notice to the adverse party and its
surety setting forth the facts supporting the applicant's right to damages and the amount thereof under the bond is essential.
According to Paramount Insurance v CA, what is necessary only is for the attaching party and his surety or sureties to be duly
notified and given the opportunity to be heard.
In this case, both Carlos and SIDDCOR were duly notified by the appellate court of the Motion for Judgment on the Attachment
Bond and were required to file their respective comments thereto. Clearly, all the relevant parties had been afforded the bare right
to be heard on the matter. Plainly, there is no express requirement under the rule that the hearing be done in open court, or that
the parties be allowed to confront adverse witnesses to the claim of damages on the bond.
In fine, the due process guarantee has been satisfied in this case. To impose as mandatory on the CA or SC to hear the application
for damages through full-blown hearings in open court is unwise and beyond the demands of Section 20, Rule 57. The effect would
be unduly disruptive on the daily workflow of appellate courts which rarely conduct open court hearings.
G.R. No. 106989 MAY 10, 1994

H.B. ZACHRY v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: 17 Jul ’87: VBC entered into a written Subcontract Agreement with Zachry, a foreign corporation. Zachry had been engaged
by the United States Navy to design and construct 264 Family Housing Units at the US Naval Base at Subic, Zambales. Under the
agreement, specifically under Section 3 on Payment, VBC was to perform all the construction work on the housing project and
would be paid "for the performance of the work the sum of $6,468,000, subject to additions and deductions for changes.
When VBC had almost completed the project, Zachry complained of the quality of work, making it a reason for its decision to take
over the management of the project. However, prior to such take-over, the parties executed on 18 December 1989 a Supplemental
Agreement.
VBC submitted to Zachry on 10 Jan 1990 a detailed computation of the cost to complete the subcontract on the housing project.
According to VBC's computation, there remains a balance of $1,103,000 due in its favor as of 18 Jan 1990.
Zachry, however, not only refused to acknowledge the indebtedness but continually failed to submit to VBC a statement of
accumulated costs, as a result of which VBC was prevented from checking the accuracy of the said costs.
20 Mar ’90: VBC filed a Complaint with the RTC of Makati against Zachry for the collection of the payments due it with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary attachment over Zachry's bank account in Subic Base and over the remaining thirty-one undelivered housing
units which were to be turned over to the US Navy by Zachry on 30 Mar 1990. Complaint alleges that Zachry "is a foreign
corporation with address at 527 Longwood Street, San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. and has some of its officers working at U.S. Naval Base,
Subic Bay, Zambales where it may be served with summons.
21 Mar: TC granted the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment and fixed the attachment bond at
P24,266,000. VBC put up the required bond and on 26 March 1990, the trial court issued the writ of attachment, which was served,
together with the summons, a copy of the complaint with annexes, the bond, and a copy of the order of attachment, on 27 March
1990 in the manner described in the Sheriff's Partial Return: “upon defendant H.B. Zachry Company (International) at its field office
in U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Zambales thru Ruby Apostol who acknowledged receipt thereof. Mr. James M. Cupit, defendant's
authorized officer was in their Manila office at the time of service.”

Also further states: “That on March 28, 1990, the undersigned sheriff went to the office of defendant H. B. Zachry Company
(International) at c/o A.M. Oreta & Co. at 5th Floor, Ermita Building, Arquiza corner Alhambra streets, Ermita, Manila to serve the
Court's processes but was informed by Atty. Felix Lobiro of A.M. Oreta & Co., that defendant H.B. Zachry Company has its own office
at Room 600, 6th Floor of the same building (Ermita Building). However, said defendant's office was closed and Zachry only holds
office during Mondays and Tuesdays of the week as per information gathered from the adjacent office.”
6 Apr ’90: Zachry filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person because the summons
was not validly served on it. Alleged that it is a foreign corporation duly licensed on 13 Nov 1989 by the SEC to do business in the
Philippines and, pursuant to Section 128 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, had appointed Atty. Lucas Nunag as its resident
agent on whom any summons and legal processes against it may be served.
Summons and a copy of the Amended Complaint were served on 24 April 1990 on Zachry through Atty. Nunag. VBC filed a
Manifestation to inform the court of the above service of summons on Zachry which it claimed rendered moot and academic the
MTD.
Zachry filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over its person since the subsequent service of
summons did not cure the jurisdictional defect it earlier pointed out and (b) to dissolve the writ of attachment of 26 March 1990
"for having been issued without jurisdiction, having been issued prior to the service of summons."
CA’s decision: Dissolved the writ. Summons was served on Zachry only on 24 April 1990; hence, applying Sievert vs. Court of
Appeals, the trial court "had no authority yet to act coercively against the defendant" when it issued the writ of attachment on 21
March 1990.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment prior to the service of summons and a copy of the amended
complaint on the respondent is valid
HELD: Yes. It was error for the CA to declare, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the nullity of the writ of attachment. In the
first place, the writ was in fact issued only on 26 March 1990 and served, together with the summons, copy of the complaint, the
Order of 21 March 1990, and the bond, on 27 March 1990 on Zachry at its field office in Subic Bay, Zambales, through one Ruby
Apostol. What the CA referred to as having been issued on 21 March 1990 is the order granting the application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment upon the posting of a bond of P24,266,000. In the second place, even granting arguendo that the CA
had indeed in mind the 26 March 1990 writ of attachment, its issuance, as well as the issuance of the 21 March 1990 Order, did not
suffer from any procedural or jurisdictional defect; the trial court could validly issue both.
However, the writ of attachment cannot be validly enforced through the levy of Zachry's property before the court had acquired
jurisdiction over Zachry's person either through its voluntary appearance or the valid service of summons upon it. To put it in
another way, a distinction should be made between the issuance and the enforcement of the writ. The trial court has unlimited
power to issue the writ upon the commencement of the action even before it acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but enforcement thereof can only be validly done after it shall have acquired such jurisdiction.
The validity then of the order granting the application for a writ of preliminary attachment on 21 March 1990 and of the issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment on 26 March 1990 is beyond dispute. However, the enforcement of the preliminary attachment
on 27 March 1990, although simultaneous with the service of the summons and a copy of the complaint, did not bind Zachry
because the service of the summons was not validly made. When a foreign corporation has designated a person to receive service of
summons pursuant to the Corporation Code, that designation is exclusive and service of summons on any other person is
inefficacious. The valid service of summons and a copy of the amended complaint was only made upon it on 24 April 1990, and it
was only then that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Zachry's person. Accordingly, the levy on attachment made by the sheriff
on 27 April 1990 was invalid. However, the writ of preliminary attachment may be validly served anew.
H. R. No. L-13281 AUGUST 31 1960

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v. FILEMON LUCASAN
FACTS: On January 30, 1952, the court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte rendered decision ordering Lucasan to deliver to
Siari Valley Estates the cattle inside the former’s pasture or to pay its value amounting to Php 40,000 and damages in another sum
of Php 40,000. The decision was affirmed by the SC and when the same became final and executor, a writ of execution was issued.
The sheriff proceeded to levy on certain parcels of land belonging to Lucasan. These lands were sold at public auction to the
corporation as the highest bidder. The judgement debtor having failed to redeem the land within the period of one year, tge sheriff
issued in favour of the purchaser the final certificate of sale, a copy of which was registered in the office of the register of deeds of
Zamboanga. The corporation petition for a writ of possession, directing the sheriff to place said corporation in possession thereof.
However, the corporation failed to take possession of the lands, hence it filed a motion reiterating its petition that it be placed in
their possession.
Lucasan filed an opposition alleging that he was in possession of one lands sold at the public auction on which he extra judicially
constituted as a family home. The court however overruled the opposition and issued an order directing the sheriff to place the
corporation in possession of the lands sold to it. Hence, Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration. The court amended its previous
ruling. The court ruled that the corporation would have possession of all the lands, with the exception of parcel 1 on which the
family home of Lucasan was constituted. The court held that the levy and sale made by the sheriff with regards to said parcel were
not in accordance with law and so is null and void. The evidence shows that when this property was levied on execution b the
sheriff, the notice of levy merely described the property as unregistered land. It also appears that the notice of sale of the property
was merely described according to the boundaries and area appearing in the tax declaration and not according to what appears in
the certificate of title.
ISSUE: W/N the levy and sale of the parcel of land in question is null and void.
HELD:YES.
The rule provides that real property shall "be levied on in like manner and with like effect as under an order of attachment" (Section
14, Rule 39), and the provision regarding attachment of real property postulates that the attachment shall be made "by filing with
the register of deeds a copy of the order, together with the description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached,
and by leaving a copy of said order, description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if any there be," and that "Where the
property has been brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, the notice shall contain a reference to the number of
the certificate of title and the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered" (Section 7 [a], Rule 59)aw
library
These provisions should be strictly construed if their purpose has to be accomplished. The requirement that the notice of levy
should contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in the registration book where the
certificate is registered is made in order that the debtor as well as a third person may be properly informed of the particular land or
property that is under the custody of the court. This can only be accomplished by making a reference to the certificate of title
covering the property.
In the Instance case, the notice of levy made by the sheriff as regards parcel number 1 which is a registered land contains no
reference to the number of its certificate of title and the volume and page in the registry book where the title is registered, it
follows that said notice is legally ineffective and as such did not have the effect of binding the property for purposes of execution.
Consequently, the sale carried out by virtue of said levy is also invalid and of no legal effect.

G.R. No. L-34657 OCTOBER 23, 1979
RAVANERA v. IMPERIAL
FACTS: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres filed an action for Rescission of Contract and Recovery of Possession against Imperial.
RTC decided the case in favour of Roman Catholic Archbishop.
Archbishop filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Archbishop posted the required bond of P20,000.00 and a writ of
execution was issued. Said writ was not enforced upon instance of the counsel for plaintiff as an amicable settlement was proposed.
Sheriff made a return. Upon request of counsel for the plaintiff let this writ be returned and an alias writ be issued for the proposed
amicable settlement abovestated failed to materialize.
Clerk of Court of the respondent Court, issued an alias writ of execution. The alias writ was personally served by the Sheriff upon the
petitioner. the public auction sale was held, and the Ravanera being the highest bidder a Provisional Deed of Sale was issued in her
favor. Within the one-year period of redemption, the petitioner redeemed some of the properties bought at auction sale, but he
failed to redeem some others on account of which at the end of the redemption period, the Sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale
of said unredeemed properties in the name of Ravanera.
Ravanera filed a motion for a writ of possession of the properties covered by the Definite Deed of Sale, to which motion petitioner
filed his opposition alleging that the notice of levy was null and void and hence the provisional as well as the definite deed of sale
were likewise void, and that respondent Ravanera had no personality in the case, she not being a party thereto.
ISSUE: 1. WON there was a valid levy upon the properties of Imperial?
2. WON the requirements under Rule 57 Section 7 that XXX the nonce shall contain a reference to the number of the
certificate of title and the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered XXX ?
HELD: 1.Yes. It appears in this case that the notice of levy was registered with the Register of Deeds on September 29, 1969. From a
certification of the Postmaster at Naga City, it also appears that registered letter No. 13681 containing the notice of levy and the
notice of auction sale addressed to respondent Felipe Imperial was delivered on October 15, 1969 to Pelaguia Comba, member of
the household of the addressee. Respondent Imperial was, therefore, notified by registered mail of the levy and the auction sale
long before November 3, 1969, the date of the auction sale. What is required is that the judgment debtor must be notified of the
auction sale before the actual date of sale which was done in the case at bar.
It cannot be gainsaid that if it were only to afford an opportunity to respondent Imperial to avoid the auction sale, he had ample
opportunity to file his objection to such sale because the auction sale took place on November 3, 1969. The respondent had
nineteen days after he received the notice of levy and the notice of auction sale on October 15, 1969 and thirty-nine (39) days from
September 25, 1969 when he was served personally by the Sheriff a copy of the writ of execution to avoid the sale had he wanted
to. Moreover, he had exactly one year from November 27, 1969 when the provisional Deed of Sale executed in favor of the
petitioner was registered with the Register of Deeds to redeem the property.
Were the requirements under Rule 57 Section 7 that XXX the nonce shall contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title
and the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered XXX ?
2. Yes. Section 7 (paragraph a) of Rule 57 is so explicit that only as to property which has been brought under the operation of the
Land Registration Act should the notice of levy contain the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is
registered, impliedly, the requirement does not apply to property not registered under the said Act. It is enough that the notice of

levy upon unregistered land be registered under Act 3344, as was done in this case.
From the records of the case, the notice of levy made by the sheriff as regards the registered land contains reference to the number
of its certificate of title but not to the volume and page in the registry book where the title is registered. Nevertheless from what
was stated in the case of Siari Valley Estate vs. Lucasan, supra, it would seem that the purpose of the requirement of Section 7(a),
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court is substantially complied with.
From the fact that respondent Imperial was able to exercise his right of redemption with reference to three registered parcels of
land, it can be easily deduced that insofar as respondent Imperial is concerned, the purpose of the requirement of reference having
to be made to the number of the certificate of title, and also the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is
registered, has been fully served or attained.
It may also be pertinent to note that in the Siari Valley case, heavily relied upon by the respondent court in voiding the notice of levy
in the instant case, the land involved which was actually registered with OCT No. 2492 was described in the notice of levy
as unregistered land, which was thus a misleading information.
We, therefore, find no substantial defect in the notice of levy on all the properties levied upon and sold to petitioners in the auction
sale that should be a basis, as the respondent court deemed it to be, for annulling the sale made pursuant to the levy.
G.R. No. 78635 APRIAL 27, 1989

LEONORA OBAÑA v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Atty. Rafael G. Suntay was the former counsel of Liberty H. Dizon and her minor children in an intestate proceeding and
petition for guardianship. Atty. Suntay filed a 'Motion to Order the Guardian to Pay the Attorney's Fees,' with prayer that the
guardian be ordered to pay immediately out of the ward's guardianship estate.
Acting upon said motion the JDRC (Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court) issued an order requiring Dizon to show proof of
payment of attorney’s fees, failing which, she shall be declared in contempt of court.
Dizon did not comply with the said order, thus, Atty. Suntay filed with the CFI of Bulacan an action for collection of sum of money
against Dizon. In connection with said complaint, Atty. Suntay moved for the issuance of an order of attachment upon a certain
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 173792 together with the improvements belonging to Liberty H. Dizon and her wards. On
December 1, 1972, by virtue of the Writ of Attachment issued, a levy was made on said property, which levy was annotated at the
back of TCT No. 173792 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
Due to the failure of the sheriff to serve the summonses for the reason that Mrs. Dizon and her wards no longer resided at the last
known address and that their present address cannot be ascertained, summons were served, with leave of court, to Mrs. Dizon and
her wards through publication.
Meanwhile, pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 16, 1973 executed by and between Liberty H. Dizon, et al., and Leonora
Obaña involving the attached property the register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled TCT No. 173792 in the name of Liberty H.
Dizon and her wards, and, in lieu thereof, executed in favor of Leonora Obaña a new TCT No. 191069 necessarily transferring in the
process the encumbrance consisting of notice of levy in favor of appellant.
Consequently, pursuant to the complaint filed by Atty. Suntay, a writ of execution was issued, followed by a Notice of Levy on
Execution dated August 7, 1974, issued by the sheriff of Quezon City. Thereafter, a certificate of sale over the subject property (now
in the name of Obaña) was issued in favor of Atty. Suntay, being the highest bidder.
For failure of Mrs. Dizon and her wards or by Leonora Obaña to redeem the property on or before October 15, 1975, a 'Sheriffs Final

Deed of Sale' was issued in favor of appellant. Both certificates of sale were registered in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
was annotated at the back of TCT No. 191059.
Atty. Suntay then filed a petition before the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City, for the cancellation; of TCT No. 191059 which was opposed by
Leonora Obaña. On April 28, 1977, said CFI of Quezon City in LRC-750 issued an order cancelling TCT No. 191059 and directing the
Register of Deeds of Quezon to issue a new title covering the subject land in the name of Rafael G. Suntay married to Victoria J.
Suntay.
Leonora Obaña filed an action for annulment of judgment.
Obaña’s contention: that the CFI of Bulacan is null and void for the reason that said court did not acquire jurisdiction over Liberty H.
Dizon and her wards, since they were not properly served with summons. That the proceedings before the sheriff were defective in
that the sheriff failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements on the manner of service of notice in the New Rules of Court
thus rendering the proceedings void ab initio.
Atty. Suntay’s contention: res judicata, that plaintiffs recourse under Rule 38 has long prescribed; that insofar as the plaintiff is
concerned, when she bought the property in question and title was transferred to her on July 2, 1973, she is charged with
knowledge of the pendency of the case thru the annotation at the back of TCT No. 173792 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
and that there was no-extrinsic fraud committed by defendant-appellant that may constitute a ground to nullify the judgment.
CFI: ruled in favor of Obaña. Since the action being strictly in personam, summons by publication is insufficient; and that no valid
attachment and levy were made by the sheriff as no personal service of the copy of the notice to the occupant of the property was
made.
CA: dismissed Obaña's complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action and res judicata.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid attachment of the real property.
HELD: NO
It should be noted that Section 7 of Rule 57 requires that in attaching real property a copy of the order, description, and notice must
be served on the occupant, in this case the occupant at 48 Damortiz Street, Damar Village, Quezon City. The trial court in the
annulment case ruled that the attachment was void from the beginning. The action in personam which required personal service
was never converted into an action in rem where service by publication would have been valid.
Respondent Suntay cannot claim ignorance of the sale to petitioner Obaña as a ground for not bringing her into the picture. As
stressed by the petitioner, Liberty Dizon filed her motion for the approval of the sale of the disputed house and lot in the
guardianship case through her counsel, herein private respondent Suntay. He could not have been unaware that the house and lot
he was attaching had been sold to Obaña because the sale of the Dalmar property was authorized by the guardianship court in the
case where he was counsel for the guardian.
Considering all the foregoing circumstances, the order in Land Registration Case which is based on irregular proceedings in the prior
case and which directed the cancellation of Obaña's transfer certificate of title cannot assume finality. The respondent court
committed reversible error in using it as a basis for res judicata.
G. R. No. 156580 JUNE 14, 2004

LUZ DU v. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE Promulgated: CO., INC.
FACTS: January 1989- Aurora de Leon, the registered owner of subject property, sold the property to Luz Du under a ‘Conditional

Deed of Sale.
April 28, 1989- She sold [the] same property to Sps Caliwag without prior notice to Luz Du. As a result, the old TCT was cancelled
and a new TCT was issued in favor of the Sps. Caliwag
Stronghold Insurance Corp., Inc. commenced a Civil Case against Sps. Caliwag et al. and the action was accompanied by a prayer for
a writ of preliminary attachment duly annotated at the back of the new TCT on August 7, 1990.
December 21, 1990- Du initiated Civil Case against Aurora de Leon and the Sps. Caliwag for the annulment of the sale
January 3, 1991- She caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens at the back of the new TCT.
"On February 11, 1991, the decision was handed down in favor of Stronghold,
When the decision became final and executory, on March 12, 1991, a notice of levy on execution was annotated on the new TCT
and the attached property was sold in a public auction.
August 5, 1991- the certificate of sale and the final Deed of Sale in favor of Stronghold were inscribed and annotated leading to the
cancellation of the new TCT, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 6444 was issued in the name of Stronghold.
On August 5, 1992, Luz Du too was able to secure a favorable judgment and which became final and executory sometime in 1993, as
well.
Luz Du commenced the present case (docketed as Civil Case No. 64645) to cancel TCT No. 6444 in the name of Stronghold with
damages claiming priority rights over the property by virtue of her Notice Of Lis Pendens under Entry No. 13305 and inscribed on
January 3, 1991, and the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 60319 she filed against spouses Enrique and Rosita Caliwag.
DU’S CONTENTION:
1. Despite her said notice of lis pendens annotated, Stronghold still proceeded with the execution of the decision in Civil Case
No. 90-1848 against the subject lot and ultimately the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6444 in its (Stronghold’s)
name."6
2. Her unregistered right over the property by way of a prior conditional sale in 1989 enjoys preference over the lien of
Stronghold -- a lien that was created by the registration of respondent’s levy on attachment in 1990.
TRIAL COURT’S RULING: Stronghold had superior rights over the property because of the prior registration of the latter’s notice of
levy on attachment.
CA’S RULING: Stronghold’s notice of levy on attachment had been registered almost five (5) months before petitioner’s notice of lis
pendens. Hence, respondent enjoyed priority in time. Such registration constituted constructive notice to petitioner and all third
persons from the time of Stronghold’s entry, as provided under the Land Registration Act -- now the Property Registration Decree.
ISSUE: Whether a Notice of Levy on Attachment on the property is a superior lien over that of the unregistered right of a buyer of a
property in possession pursuant to a Deed of Conditional Sale.
HELD: YES.
Superiority of Rights
The preference given to a duly registered levy on attachment or execution over a prior unregistered sale is well-settled in our
jurisdiction.

An attachment that is duly annotated on a certificate of title is superior to the right of a prior but unregistered buyer ( Gomez v. Levy
Hermanos).
Indeed, the subsequent sale of the property to the attaching creditor must, of necessity, retroact to the date of the levy.
Otherwise, the preference created by the levy would be meaningless and illusory (Defensor vs. Brillo)
The Court has steadfastly adhered to the governing principle set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529: 13
"SEC. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease,
charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages,
leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration.
"The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in
all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city
where the land lies.
"SEC. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. - Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for
the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing or entering."(Italics supplied)
As the property in this case was covered by the torrens system, the registration of Stronghold’s attachment was the operative act
that gave validity to the transfer and created a lien upon the land in favor of respondent.
Capistrano Ruling Correctly Applied
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. That was
the import of Capistrano v. PNB which held that precedence should be given to a levy on attachment or execution, whose
registration was before that of the prior sale.
In Capistrano, the sale of the land in question -- though made as far back as 1946 -- was registered only in 1953, after the property
had already been subjected to a levy on execution by the Philippine National Bank. The present case is not much different. The
stipulation of facts shows that Stronghold had already registered its levy on attachment before petitioner annotated her notice of lis
pendens. As in Capistrano, she invokes the alleged superior right of a prior unregistered buyer to overcome respondent’s lien.
If either the third-party claim or the subsequent registration of the prior sale was insufficient to defeat the previously registered
attachment lien, as ruled by the Court in Capistrano, it follows that a notice of lis pendens is likewise insufficient for the same
purpose. Such notice does not establish a lien or an encumbrance on the property affected. 18 As the name suggests, a notice of lis
pendens with respect to a disputed property is intended merely to inform third persons that any of their transactions in connection
therewith -- if entered into subsequent to the notation -- would be subject to the result of the suit.

G.R. No. 133303 FEBRUARY 17, 2005

VALDEVIESO v. DAMALERIO
FACTS: Petitoner bought from spouses Uy a parcel of land in GenSan. The deed of sale was not registered nor was the title of the
land transferred to petitioner.
On dec 1995 the said property was declared by the petitioner for taxation purposes.
On april 1996 respondent filed with the RTC of GenSan a complaint for sum of money against Sps. Uy with application for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The RTC issued a preliminary attachment by virtue of which the property, then still in
the name of the Sps. Uy but which had already been sold to petitioner, was levied.
On june 1996 the TCT in the name of Lorenzo Uy was cancelled and in lieu thereof a new TCT was issued in the name of the
Petitioner. This new TCT carried with it the attachment in favor of the respondent.
On aug 1996 petitioner filed a third-psrty complaint to discharge or annul the attachment levied on the property on the ground that
the said property belongs to him and no longer to the Sps Uy.
CA: it declared that an attcahment or levy of execution, though posterior to the sale but if registered before the sale is registered
takes precedence over the sale. The writ of attachment in favor of the respondent being recorded ahead of the sale to petitioner
will therefore take precedence.
ISSUE: WON a registered writ of attachment on the land is a superior lien over that of an earlier unregistered sale.
HELD: YES.
The law applicable to the facts of this case is Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529. Said Section provides:
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or
otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other
voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting
to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between
the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases
under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
It is to be noted that though the subject land was deeded to petitioner as early as 05 December 1995, it was not until 06 June 1996
that the conveyance was registered, and, during that interregnum, the land was subjected to a levy on attachment. It should also be
observed that, at the time of the attachment of the property on 23 April 1996, the spouses Uy were still the registered owners of
said property. Under the cited law, the execution of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner was not enough as a succeeding step had
to be taken, which was the registration of the sale from the spouses Uy to him. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly
transfers or conveys a persons interest in real property is the registration of the deed. Thus, when petitioner bought the property on
05 December 1995, it was, at that point, no more than a private transaction between him and the spouses Uy. It needed to be
registered before it could bind third parties, including respondents. When the registration finally took place on 06 June 1996, it was
already too late because, by then, the levy in favor of respondents, pursuant to the preliminary attachment ordered by the General
Santos City RTC, had already been annotated on the title.
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale.[17] This result is a
necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the
fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.

The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so
because an attachment is a proceeding in rem.[19] It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The
attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very
dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.[20] Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing
and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt.[21] The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution
issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by
law.
Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the nature of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase
recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien.
Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of his title in the register, and the right of ownership
which he inscribed was not absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondents, a right which is preferred
and superior to that of petitioner.[22]
G.R. No. L-5534 DECEMBER 23, 1909

WALKER v. MCMICKING
FACTS: The plaintiff, Walker, was the owner of a Filipino carriage factory. The building in which the factory was operated and its
contents were, on the 30th of June, 1908, sold to a partnership known as "Arenas & Co.," by plaintiff,
The contract was evidenced by a writing (Exhibit A), from which it appears that the said company was to pay for the said factory and
its contents the sum of P3,200, P600 of which was paid at the time of the sale (June 30, 1908) and the balance was to be paid in
three installments, due, respectively, P600 on the 15th of July, 1908, P1,000 due on the 15th of September, 1908, and P1,000 due
on the 31st of December, 1908. The said company paid the installment due on the 15th of July, 1908, but failed to pay said
installments due in September and December. Paragraph 4 of said contract (Exhibit A) contains the following provision:
That, should the said firm of Arenas & Co. not pay me the amounts agreed to on the dates stated in the previous paragraph or
within the thirty days following any of said terms,the present sale shall be rescinded, and I, Herbert S. Walker, shall be entitled to
take possession of the building as well as of the business and all the goods constituting the same.
The said company having failed to pay the second and third installments due respectively in September and December, as above
indicated, the plaintiff Walker, early in the month of January, 1909, by virtue of the said provision of the contract, rescinded said
sale and took possession of said factory with its contents. The factory was located upon land belonging to the plaintiff Rohde. The
said company had failed for some months to pay the rent for the land. The plaintiff Rohde claimed that by virtue of the provisions of
paragraph 7 of article 1922 of the Civil Code that he had a preferred claim against the said factory and its contents for the payment
of the rent. The plaintiff Rohde, acting for himself and for the plaintiff Walker, took possession of said factory and its contents, on or
about the first of January, 1909. Mr. Rohde testified that at the time he took possession of said factory, representing himself and
the said Walker, there was no one in possession of said property except the said Arenas & Co., and that Arenas & Co. turned said
property over to him without any objection whatever, in fact, that the delivery was made by mutual consent and agreement.
It appears, however, that on or about the 16th of December, 1908, the defendant, acting as sheriff of the city of Manila, levied an
attachment upon the said factory and its contents, by virtue of a judgment theretofore rendered against the said Arenas & Co. The
record does not disclose fully just what was done in effecting said attachment. It appears, however, by an indorsement upon said
alleged writ of attachment, or perhaps by a stipulation between the parties (to the attachment), that the goods attached "shall
remain in the possession of the same defendants, relieving the sheriff of all responsibility as regards the care and custody thereof.
The plaintiffs contend that the attachment was void for the reason that the defendant, as sheriff, did not comply with the law in
levying the said attachment.
The lower court, basing his conclusions upon the provisions of section 428 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, held that the
attachment was null for the reason that the defendant did not comply with said section. Section 428 provides that -
The order of attachment shall be served by the officer of the court by attaching and safely keeping all the movable property of the
defendant in the Philippine Islands, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's demands, unless the defendants
gives security by obligation to the plaintiff, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge who granted the order of attachment,
in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demands besides costs, . . . . The property so attached shall be held to await final judgment in
execution, unless released as provided in this section or section four hundred and forty.

ISSUE: WON the Attachment was valid.
HELD: NO.
It will be noted, even admitting that the defendant is here sued as sheriff, and that his responsibility in this action is as sheriff, that
he did not comply with said section 428, in making said attachment. He did not attach and safely keep the movable property
attached. A verbal declaration of seizure of service of a writ of attachment is not sufficient. There must be an actual taking of
possession and placing the attached property under the control of the officer or someone representing him.
We believe that under said section 428 to constitute a valid levy of an attachment, the officer levying it must take actual possession
of the property attached as far as under the circumstances is practicable. He must put himself in position to, and must assert and, in
fact, enforce a dominion over the property adverse to and exclusive of the attachment debtor, and such property must be in
substantial presence and possession. Of course, this does not mean that the attaching officer may not, under an arrangement
satisfactory to himself, put anyone in possession of the property for the purpose of guarding it, but he can not in this way relieve
himself from liability to the parties interested in said attachment.
Section 428 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires: "The order of attachment shall be served by the officer of the court by
attaching, and safely keeping all the movable property of the defendant."
It will be seem from the recitals above quoted that the sheriff never claims to have taken into his "keeping" the articles in
controversy, but, on the contrary, left them with the attachment defendants, expressly relieving himself of all responsibility. This is
clearly not a compliance with the statute and did not effect a valid attachment. A mere verbal declaration of seizure or service of
writ is insufficient. There must be actual assumption of control. This is not saying that a defendant may not be custodian; but the
possession and responsibility must be the sheriff's and not the defendant's.
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the attachment was not properly made in accordance with the provisions of the Code of the
Procedure in Civil Actions. There is no pretension, however, in record, on the part of the defendant, that he attached said property
and held the same by virtue of such attachment. Even thought this defense had been made by the defendant, which is only made by
his attorney, it would be an admission of the principal facts alleged by the plaintiffs in their complaint - to wit, that he had taken
possession of personal property belonging to them. The defense made by the defendant is new matter to which no reference
whatever was made in the pleadings, and it is, therefore, upon the whole, inadmissible. Facts not alleged in the pleadings but
offered as evidence, which admit the facts alleged, but tend to confess and avoid the facts alleged are not admissible in evidence.
A.M. No. P-96-1184 MARCH 24, 1997

NBI v. TULIAO
FACTS: Complainant Salvador bought a passenger jeep from Lito G. Ignacio to be paid in monthly installments of P7,000.00 with a
down payment of P50,000.00. After remitting the down payment, complainant diligently paid all monthly amortizations until March
1994 when, in the absence of Ignacio, the complainant was forced to pay to an unnamed brother of the seller the amounts due for
the months of April and May 1994. However, the brother failed to remit said amount to the seller; thus, the latter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20[9] a suit for collection,
Subsequently, an order was issued by the RTC directing respondent sheriff to attach the passenger jeep. Complainant, through
counsel, filed a motion to discharge attachment upon filing of a counterbond for the release of the vehicle in his favor. Due to some
defects in the aforementioned motion, a second motion with counterbond was filed. On July 13, 1994, the trial court issued an
order, the decretal portion of which reads, to wit:
Respondent refused to comply with the said order. Instead, he released the passenger jeep to Ignacio after the latter had executed
a receipt therefor together with an undertaking that he would produce the jeep whenever required by the court. Respondent

justified such release by saying that the court had no storage building that would protect the jeep from damage or loss.
Despite the pendency of a motion for contempt filed by complainant against respondent, the case was dismissed on August 31,
1994 because jurisdiction over the case had been transferred to the municipal trial court as mandated by Republic Act No. 7691
which expanded said courts jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether respondent sheriff is administratively liable for failing to release the property under custodia legis to the
complainant in accordance with the order of the regional trial court.
HELD: YES
This Court finds respondent sheriffs manner of attachment irregular and his reason therefor totally unacceptable.
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Manner of attaching property.-- The officer executing the order shall without delay attach, to await judgment and execution
in the action, all the properties of the party against whom the order is issued in the province, x x x.
Sec. 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording thereof.--Properties shall be attached by the officer executing the order
in the following manner:
(c) Personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping it in his capacity, after issuing the corresponding
receipt therefor;
Clearly, respondents act of leaving the passenger jeep in the possession and control of the creditor did not satisfy the foregoing
requirements of the Rules; neither did it conform to the plainly worded RTC order. The note in the receipt that imposed on Ignacio
the obligation to produce the same whenever required by the court was no compliance either, because it did not establish that the
property was in respondent sheriffs substantial presence and possession. Respondent fell short of his obligation to take and safely
keep the attached property in his capacity. He cannot feign ignorance of this duty as he himself correctly cited an early decision of
this Court explaining a sheriffs duty in attachment, as follows:
x x x A verbal declaration of seizure or service of a writ of attachment is not sufficient. There must be an actual taking of possession
and placing of the attached property under the control of the officer or someone representing him. We believe that x x x to
constitute a valid levy of an attachment, the officer levying it must take actual possession of the property attached as far as x x x
practicable (under the circumstances). He must put himself in (a) position to, and must assert and, in fact, enforce a dominion over
the property adverse to and exclusive of the attachment debtor, and such property must be in his substantial presence and
possession. (Corniff vs. Cook, 95 Ga., 61, 51 Am. St. Rep., 55, 61.) Of course, this does not mean that the attaching officer may not,
under an arrangement satisfactory to himself, put anyone in possession of the property for the purpose of guarding it, but he can
not in this way relieve himself from liability to the parties interested in said attachment.
That Ignacio was able to move the passenger jeep to an unknown location is further proof that respondent sheriff had not taken and
safely kept it in his substantial presence, possession and control.
His claim that the regional trial court did not have any storage facility to house said property is no justification. He could have
deposited it in a bonded warehouse.
Contrary to respondent sheriffs contention, compelling the attaching creditor to release the property in question was not in order,
because the proper remedy provided by the Rules of Court was for the party whose property had been attached to apply for the
discharge of the attachment by filing a counterbond. The effect of this remedy is the delivery of possession of the attached property
to the party giving the counterbond. The attaching creditor was not authorized to have possession of the attached property,
contrary to the insistence of respondent sheriff.

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518 JANUARY 25, 2004

VILLANUEVA-FABELLA v. LEE
FACTS: The complainants are counsels for the defendants for Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment.
A printing machine was levied and delivered to the plaintiffs warehouse, although there was an offer by the defendants to pay right
there and then, the amount fixed in the order of attachment, but the plaintiff denied the defendants plea not to attach the machine,
saying that [it] had already set [its] mind on attaching the same.
Atty. Fabella, asked the sheriff to levy on a less expensive machine but to no avail. She then told the sheriff that he [would]
unnecessarily levy on the machinery because a cash deposit to discharge the attachment could be filed that same afternoon but he
just dismissed the same, saying that it takes time before the court could approve the counterbond.
The complainants claim[ed] that Sheriff Dela Cruz violated x x x Rule 57, Section 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provide[d]
that in the attachment of personal property capable of manual delivery, [the property should] be taken and safely kept in the
sheriffs custody. The machinery, according to complainants, [was] brought to [the] plaintiffs warehouse in San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City. The foregoing show[ed] that the implementation of the writ of attachment was marred by excessiveness, irregularity
and oppressiveness.
On 3 July 2002, Judge Lee granted the defendants Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment filed 19 June 2002. Thereafter, on 9 July
2002, an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit was filed, without notice to the defendants and despite failure of the
plaintiff to set such litigious motion for hearing and contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence. Judge Lee granted the same in his
Order of 17 July 2002. Defendants only learned of the withdrawal when they received a copy of the said Order.
Respondent judge admitted that he had committed a procedural error when he released the counter-bond[5] to the plaintiff in the
said civil case. However, when the defendants therein, through their Motion for Reconsideration, called his attention to the mistake,
he immediately ordered[6] the return[7] of the counter-bond to the custody of the Office of the Clerk of Court.
In his Comment,[8] respondent sheriff claimed that after receiving the Writ of Preliminary Attachment, he sought its
implementation through the assistance of the clerk of court of the MTC-Makati, Sheriff Ernesto Adan, and the Makati police. He
allowed the parties in the civil case to negotiate for a settlement, but when the negotiations bogged down, he attached a printing
machine that was not in use at the time.
He denied that there was abuse in the levy, claiming that the machine was an old 1970 model. Moreover, he said that, contrary to
complainants allegation that the machine was valuable, no receipt to prove its true value was ever shown.
Respondent sheriff added that it was in his own belief and best judgment to temporarily place the delicate printing machine in the
warehouse of the plaintiff for safekeeping. The machine was eventually returned to the defendants by virtue of the Order
discharging the Writ. In fact, one of the complainants personally acknowledged receipt of the machine.
ISSUE: WON Judge Ralph S. Lee of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City (Branch 38) with manifest partiality,
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law; NO and Sheriff Justiniano C. de la Cruz Jr. of the same MeTC, with unjust, oppressive,
irregular and excessive enforcement of a writ of attachment. YES
HELD: With respect to the charges against respondent judge, we find that his grant of the withdrawal of the cash deposit -- an Order
he later reversed by ruling that the deposit be returned to the clerk of court -- was a mere error of judgment, not an act revealing
gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
Attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the outcome of a trial -- specifically, the satisfaction of a pecuniary
obligation. Such order is enforced through a writ that may be issued at the commencement of an action, commanding the sheriff to
attach property, rights, credits or effects of a defendant to satisfy the plaintiffs demand. Hence, the property of a defendant, when
taken, is put in custodia legis.
In order to prevent the sheriff from levying an attachment on property, the defendant (also called the adverse party) may make a
deposit or give a counter-bond in an amount equal to that fixed in the order of attachment. Such deposit or counter-bound is
intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the plaintiff (also called the attaching party or the applicant to the writ) may

recover in the action. After a writ has been enforced, however, the adverse party may still move for the discharge of the
attachment, wholly or in part, by also making a deposit or giving a counter-bond to secure the payment of any judgment the
attaching party may recover in the action. The property attached shall then be released and delivered to the adverse party; and the
money deposited shall be applied under the direction of the court to the satisfaction of any judgment that may be rendered in favor
of the prevailing party.
In the instant case, respondent judge had ordered[ the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the defendant and released it in favor of
the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered.This action was clearly in violation of the Rules mandating that after the discharge
of an attachment, the money deposited shall stand in place of the property released. However, the inadvertence of respondent
judge was not gross enough to merit sanction
We find that the charges against respondent sheriff have bases. Verily, he blatantly violated Section 7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court when he deposited the machine in the warehouse of the plaintiff. In enforcing a writ of attachment, a sheriff who takes
personal property capable of manual delivery shall safely keep it in custody after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.
Respondent sheriff failed to do so.
To constitute a valid levy of attachment, the officer levying it must have actual possession of the property attached. He must put
himself in a position to, and must assert and, in fact, enforce a dominion over the property adverse to and exclusive of the
attachment debtor. To this rule we add that the officer cannot even deliver the property to the attachment creditor, as the parties
must await the judgment in the action. The levied property must be in the substantial presence and possession of the levying
officer, who cannot act as special deputy sheriff of any party litigant. The officer may put someone in possession of the property for
the purpose of guarding it, but the former cannot be relieve[d] x x x from liability to the parties interested in said attachment.
Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who prepare and submit returns
of their proceedings. They also keep custody of attached properties. As officers of the court, they must discharge their duties with
great care and diligence. They have to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon [them] and show at all times a high
degree of professionalism in the performance of [their] duties.
The duty of sheriffs to execute a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial, not discretionary. Clearly, they must keep the levied
property safely in their custody, not in that of any of the parties. They exercise no discretion in this regard, for attachment is harsh,
extraordinary and summary in nature -- a rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. Contrary to the
claim of respondent sheriff, his unusual zeal and precipitate decision to give possession of the machine to the plaintiff effectively
destroys, the presumption of regularity in his performance of official duties. Any method of execution falling short of the
requirement of the law deserves reproach and should not be countenanced.
In implementing the Writ, respondent sheriff cannot afford to err without adversely affecting the proper dispensation of justice.
As a public officer who is a repository of public trust, respondent sheriff has the obligation to perform the duties of his office
honestly, faithfully and to the best of his ability. He must be circumspect and proper in his behavior. Reasonable skill and diligence
he must use in the performance of official duties, especially when the rights of individuals may be jeopardized by neglect.
Sheriffs must always hold inviolate and invigorate the tenet that a public office is a public trust. As court personnel, their conduct
must be beyond reproach and free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. In view of their exalted position as keepers of
public faith, court personnel are indeed saddled with a heavy burden of responsibility to the public. Hence, they must thoroughly
avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official duties.
A.M. No. P-91-549 JULY 5, 1993

SEBATIAN v. VALINO
FACTS: A complaint for gross abuse of authority committed in connection with the implementation of the writ issued by the RTC,

Makati, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 89-3368 and refusal to enforce the trial court's for the return of the seized items was filed by
Marblecraft, Inc., against Alberto A. Valino, Senior Deputy Sheriff, Office of the Regional Sheriff, Pasig, Metro Manila
The Complainant alleges that on March 3, 1989, Private Devt Corp. of the Phil. (PDCP) filed a replevin suit against Marblecraft, Inc.,
in order to foreclose the chattels mortgaged by Marblecraft.
A writ of seizure directed against Marblecraft covering the chattels sought to be replevined was issued by the RTC Makati.
The enforcement of the writ of seizure was delayed because of the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining PDCP from proceeding
with the foreclosure sale issued by the RTC Pasig in Civil Case No. 58006. It was only on October 31,1990, when the RTC Pasig,
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.
On November 9, 1990, respondent, accompanied by several policemen and PDCP employees, went to the office of Marblecraft at
Barrio Santolan, Pasig, to implement the writ of seizure. Respondent and his companions forcibly opened the lockers and desk
drawers of the employees of complainant and took their personal belongings, as well as some office equipment issued to them. The
employees filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal two criminal complaints for robbery against respondent and his
companions.
Respondent only showed to complainant's counsel a copy of the writ but did not furnish him with a copy of the application for the
writ, the supporting affidavit and the bond.
In the course of the implementation of the writ, several pieces of machinery and equipment were destroyed or taken away by
respondent.
The seized articles were turned over to PCDP’s counsel and the items were stored in PDCP's warehouse in Taguig.
Complainant posted a counter bond. RTC of Makati approved the bond and directed the immediate return of the seized items.
PDCP's motion to set aside was denied and the TC reiterated its directive for the return of the seized items. Respondent did not
implement the orders. MR denied.
Respondent-case was pure harassment after he had refused to defer the implementation of the writ of seizure. He said that if he did
not implement the writ, he would have been accused by PDCP of non-performance of his duties as a sheriff. He pointed out that the
criminal complaints for theft filed against him by the employees of complainant were dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal.
Admin. Complaint (J. Villarama, RTC Pasig) found respondent guilty of partiality when he immediately turned over the seized items
to PDCP, and of willful refusal to enforce the November 14, 26 and December 11, 1990 Orders of the RTC Makati.
ISSUE: WON the property seized under a writ of replevin is required to be immediately delivered to the plaintiff.
HELD: Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the
plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the case,
requires its return and files a counterbond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court).
In violation of said Rule, respondent immediately turned over the seized articles to PDCP. His claim that the Office of the Regional
Sheriff did not have a place to store the seized items, cannot justify his violation of the Rule. As aptly noted by the Investigating
Judge, the articles could have been deposited in a bonded warehouse.
Respondent must serve on Marblecraft not only a copy of the order of seizure but also a copy of the application, affidavit and bond
(Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). Respondent did not furnish defendant with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond. By
his own admission, he only served it with a copy of the order of seizure.
The sheriff’s refusal to implement the order of the RTC Makati for him to return to complainant the articles seized pursuant to the
writ of seizure dated March 30, 1990 was a serious infraction committed by him.
The only action taken by respondent to implement the Order dated December 11, 1990 was to write a letter on December 12, 1990,

addressed to the counsel of PDCP, requesting the turnover of seized articles. As expected, PDCP's counsel refused to part with the
possession of the seized articles and to issue a letter of authorization to withdraw the same from the warehouse. Instead of taking
possession of the articles, respondent merely reported to the RTC that “it is now clear that the undersigned cannot implement the
Court order dated December 11, 1990 by reason of the refusal of PDCP to accept or to honor said Court order".
A.M. No. P-94-1108 AUGUST 23, 1995
MARIANETTE VILLAREAL v. ROLANDO T. RARAMA ET AL.
FACTS: An action for collection of a sum of money was filed by the Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City against the spouses
Marianette, Roy Villareal, Lito Lacorda and Felimon Cangrejo. Summons were served upon Cangrejo, but the latter failed to file an
answer and was declared in default.
A judgment was rendered against him in favor of the plaintiff bank without prejudice to his right to proceed against his co-debtors.
Subsequently, an alias writ of execution was issued by the trial court against Cangrejo.
Complainant Villareal alleges that, one day, respondent Rarama arrived at her house in Digos, Davao del Sur, together with the
other respondents and three employees of the Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc., including one Vic Belo who is a collector
of the bank, in order to enforce the alias writ of execution. Villareal objected thereto, claiming that the same was not addressed to
her but to Felimon Cangrejo and that the writ was being served after more than five years from the date the decision was rendered.
Despite her pleas, several of their properties were attached. This prompted complainant spouses to go to the bank, and settle her
account in order to have their attached properties released.
Respondent Ramara controvert the claims of complainant that they forcibly entered her house and took possession of her personal
properties without her consent. As to the other three respondents, they allege they, Madrazo, Casuyon and del Campo, upon
learning that Rarama's group was going to Digos where they all lived, decided to join the group so they could get a free ride.
Executive Judge Augusto B. Breva of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City recommended that respondent sheriff Rolando T. Rarama
be declared guilty of an administrative offense and that he be suspended for three months, with a stern warning that a repetition of
a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. He further recommended that the three other respondents be exonerated.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent sheriff had authority to levy complainant’s property despite the writ being directed to
complainant’s co-defendant only?
HELD: NO. The alias writ of execution was directed only against complainant’s co-defendant, Felimon Cangrejo. Hence the said
writ of execution cannot be enforced against complainant Villareal.
While indeed the evidence shows that it is Marianette Villareal is the principal debtor while Felimon Cangrejo is merely a co-maker,
the fact remains that Cangrejo was the sole debtor adjuged liable for the loan obtained from the Cooperative Rural Bank of
Davao City, Inc. and the alias writ of execution was directed only against him. Hence, respondent Rarama had no authority to
implement the same against herein complainant considering that, although she was named as a defendant in the collection case,
there was no judgment against her as of the date of the incident.
The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must necessarily be circumspect and
proper in his behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. Thus, when a writ is placed in the hands of
a sheriff it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute it according to its mandate. He is to execute the directives of the court therein strictly in accordance with the letter thereof
and without any deviation therefrom.
Hence, a sheriff has no authority to levy on execution upon the property of any person other than that of the judgment debtor. If he
does so, the writ of execution affords him no justification, for such act is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ. As long as the

sheriff confines his acts to the authority of the process, he is not liable, but all of his acts which are not justified by the writ are
without authority of law. This is so because if an execution against one man would excuse the sheriff for taking the property of
another, every citizen would be at his mercy and none could call his estate his own.
Respondent Rarama's improvidence in enforcing a judgment against complainant who is not the judgment debtor in the case calls
for disciplinary action. Considering the ministerial nature of his duty in enforcing writs of execution, it is incumbent upon him to
ensure that only that part of a decision ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion should be the subject of execution, no more
and no less.
That the title of the case specifically names complainant as one of the defendants is of no moment as execution must conform to
that which is directed in the dispositive portion and not what appears in the title of the case.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-853 MARCH 14, 1995
DOMINGO BALANTES v. JUDGE JULIAN OCAMPO III
A.M. No. P-94-1013 MARCH 14, 1995
DOMINGO BALANTES v. LILIA S. BUENA
FACTS: Complainant is the defendant in an ejectment case filed by plaintiff Roberto Roco but which was decided by respondent
judge against complainant. Complainant appealed the adverse decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff-appellee Roberto, the
RTC issued a Writ of Execution and Demolition pending appeal, ordering the removal of one-half (1/2) portion of complainant's
residential house found to be built inside the titled property of the plaintiff.
It further appears that on August 19, 1992, a second writ of demolition was issued by the respondent Judge, followed by a third one
dated February 3, 1993.
Complainant Balantes alleges that respondent judge issued the orders granting plaintiff's motion for issuance of writ of demolition
with precipitate haste, hence, he was deprived of his right to oppose the same, that the effect of these writs of demolition is to
demolish complainant's entire house, notwithstanding that the appellate court's writ of execution and demolition issued pending
appeal ordered the demolition only of the half portion of his house found standing on plaintiff's land.
Complainant also alleges respondent Clerk of Court immediately proceeded to implement the writs of demolition without giving him
a chance to move for a reconsideration of the order granting issuance thereof.
Respondent Judge argues that a writ of demolition, being merely incidental to the execution of a final judgment, is immediately
enforceable after hearing the arguments of both parties.
ISSUE (1): Whether or not respondent judge Ocampo grossly abused his authority in issuing the questioned writs of execution
HELD (1): YES.

Records show that previous to the issuance of the writ of execution and demolition pending appeal, said judge ordered the deputy
sheriff with the assistance of a geodetic engineer to determine the metes and bounds of the plaintiff's property. The Sheriff's Return
clearly showed that two (2) meters of plaintiff's property had been more or less encroached upon by complainant's house while it
occupied three (3) meters, more or less, of the legal easement formed by accretion. The writ of demolition thus issued by the
appellate court contained specifications in accordance with such findings and was returned fully satisfied on January 20, 1990.
Moreover, the decision of the RTC, Branch 23, Naga City which incorporated such findings was successively affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Respondent Judge, therefore, was fully aware of the previous delineation of the property of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, when the
records were remanded to him and upon motion of the plaintiff's counsel, he issued another writ of demolition which sought to
demolish the remaining portion of the defendant's house which, as already found by the appellate court(s), was standing upon a
public property.
In fact, the order of demolition dated November 20, 1991 which respondent judge issued, was the subject of a petition for certiorari
before the same RTC, Branch 23, Naga City where Judge Gregorio A. Manio declared said order of demolition and the writ issued
pursuant thereto as null and void.
Despite this directive, respondent Judge exhibited a defiant attitude by issuing another writ of demolition dated August 19, 1992.
This writ was, again, subject to a certiorari/prohibition, to which it was ordered that the implementation of the writ be restrained.
ISSUE (2): Whether or not crespondent Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sherrif Buena may be held liable?
HELD (2): NO.
As regards the charge against respondent Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Lilia S. Buena, the same is dismissed, it appearing
from the certification she issued that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the RTC, Branch 27, Naga City was received by her
on September 2, 1992 at 2:15 p.m., after the demolition had been completely effected and the premises delivered to the plaintiff at
1:30 p.m. of same date.
It appears that respondent Buena was not aware of the existing TRO which she received within the hour after the demolition had
taken place, thus rendering said restraining order a fait accompli. The rule is that when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is
his duty, in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.
He may not apply his discretion as to whether to execute it or not
A.M. No. P-94-1068 FEBRUARY 13, 1995
VICTOR ELIPE v. HONESTO FABRE
FACTS: MTCC, Branch 3, at Cagayan de Oro issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of a barangay agreement for collection of
unpaid rentals and construction materials amounting to P100,000.00.
Complainant Elipe testified that on June 25, 1992, at nine o'clock in the morning, respondent Sherrif served the writ for judgment
debtors Michael dela Cerna and his wife but the respondent was able to levy only upon a dilapidated vehicle and an old piano. Elipe
also narrates that:
● At ten o'clock in the evening of the same day, the judgment debtors surreptitiously removed several pieces of furniture
from the house which they rented.
● On June 26 and 30 and again on July 4, 11, 38 and 19, 1992, judgement debtors removed appliances and other personal
properties and destroyed building fixtures on the property owned by complainant.

On these occasions, according to the complainant, respondent did not make any effort to prevent the judgment debtors from
removing leviable properties to implement the writ, despite the fact that he had been told by complainant of the judgment debtors'
activities.
Respondent Fabre denied the complainant's allegation. He claimed that he levied on several properties of the judgment debtors,
but unfortunately the bid price paid for them at the public auction was only P10,000.00. He justified his action in levying only on the
personal properties which he found at the business establishment and in desisting from enforcing the writ with respect to
properties on the second floor of the residence of the judgment debtors on two grounds: (1) the judgment debtors refused to let
him in; and (2) he did not have any order from the MTCC to force open the door which had been locked.
Records show that respondent sheriff sold to the complainant, through public auction, the various attached and levied properties of
judgement debtors, but the result is that the judgement debt of P100,000.00 was only partially satisfied to the extent of P27,007.00.
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad found that, because of respondent's inaction and lack of diligence in enforcing the
writ of execution, the judgment debtors were able to cart away properties which he could have levied upon execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent sheriff should be subject to disciplinary action do to his lack of diligence and inaction in
performing his duties?
HELD: YES.
A sheriff, to whom a valid writ or process is delivered to be levied upon a property within his jurisdiction, is liable to the person in
whose favor the process or writ runs if he fails to make a levy upon property owned by the judgment debtor within his jurisdiction
and by reason thereof the judgment creditor is injured. It is omission not dependent upon intentional wrong or negligent omission
to seize property of judgment debtor.
In the case at bar, it is not that respondent did not know what he should do, given the problem that he was confronted with. In his
answer respondent tried to excuse himself from what was his duty, claiming that he did not force his way into the second floor
where the judgment debtors resided because a special court order was needed to enable him to do this. Knowing this to be the
case, it was his duty to see to it that such an order was secured from the court.
The fact is that he has shown himself to be less than energetic and zealous in the performance of his duty. His lackadaisical attitude
betrays his inefficiency and incompetence which in accordance with sec. 46(b)(8) of the Civil Service Law is a ground for disciplinary
action.
SC held that there is merit in Deputy Court Administrator’s findings. The memorandum held:
(Added this just in case)
Respondent Deputy Sheriff correctly argued that he was not directed by any Judge by court orders to stop the carting away
of properties or the demolition of the fixtures. But respondent Sheriff should understand that by virtue of the writ of
execution issued in favor of herein complainant, he (respondent Sheriff) was mandated to levy upon properties of judgment
debtor to satisfy an obligation amounting to P100,000.00. However, in disregard of this Order, respondent Sheriff chose to
levy the properties of the judgment debtor which amounted only to P27,000.00.
If indeed respondent Sheriff is dedicated in his work, respondent Sheriff could have chosen to stop the carting away of the
valuable properties of judgment debtor for the very purpose of levying it and for the purpose of complying with the Order.
If the arguments of respondent Sheriff will be sustained, all judgment debtors can easily circumvent the orders of the court
by carting away their properties thinking that sheriffs have no authority to stop them. This line of thinking and reasoning
will create chaos and instability in the administration of justice.
Furthermore, respondent Sheriff exhibited an utter disregard of what is incumbent upon him when he failed to inform the
complainant that in order to levy properties of the defendant on the second floor of the establishment, a special order of
the court is necessary to force or break-open the closed door in accordance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The respondent Sheriff's duty was apparent but he did not comply with it as he should have. The attack on the
complainant's moral character was not necessary in this case, as it would not justify the non-performance of his duties.

G.R. No. L-42594 OCTOBER 18, 1979

ELIGIO ROQUE and RODRIGO G. MALONJAO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Associated Banking Corporation instituted an action in CFI Manila against Fil-Eastern Wood Industries, Inc. for recovery of a
sum of money. Upon ex-parte application by the bank for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment, an Order of Attachment
commanding the Sheriff to attach the estate, real and personal, of Fil-Eastern. On February 7, 1974, levy was made on a sea vessel
or barge named Fil-Eastern V. Prior to the issuance of said Writ of Attachment, Fil-Eastern had delivered the barge to the
Cotabato Visayan Development Corporation sometime in April, 1973, for repair. The job was completed in June 1973, but Fil-Eastern
failed to pay the cost of repairs of P261,190.59. Pursuant to a mechanic’s lien, Cotabato Visayan Development Corporation
proceeded before Notary Public to the sale of said barge. On April 24, 1974 In the public auction sale, Roque acquired the barge as
the highest bidder, and was accordingly issued a Certificate of Sale by the Notary Public. On March 7, 1975 respondent Judge issued
a Writ of Execution and ordered the sale of the barge at public auction. Roque is now the new owner of the barge having acquired
the same at a public auction sale arising from a mechanic's lien.
ISSUE: WON there was proper levy in favor of Associated Banking Corporation?
HELD: Yes. It is a fact that respondent Sheriff could not effect seizure immediately, first, because the barge could nowhere be found
in this vicinity, and subsequently when found, because petitioners would not deliver possession to the Sheriff. It was not until the
trial Court granted the Sheriff's Motion praying for an Order directing petitioners or their agents to surrender the barge to the
custody of the Court, that the Sheriff was able to take physical custody. As a general rule, however, a levy of an attachment upon
personal property may be either actual or constructive. In this case, levy had been constructively made by the registration of the
same with the Philippine Coast Guard on February 7, 1974. Constructive possession should be held sufficient where actual
possession is not feasible, particularly when it was followed up by the actual seizure of the property as soon as that could possibly
take effect.
G.R. No. L-60038 MARCH 18, 1985

SUMMIT TRADING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. JUDGE HERMINIO A. AVENDANO
FACTS: Segundo Pilipinia and Edgardo Mindo in 1973 acquired under Land Authority Administrative Order No. 4 two registered lots
located at San Pedro, Laguna. The titles of the lots contain the annotation that should Pilipinia and Mindo sell the same, they have
the right to redeem the lots within five years from the date of the sale.
Pilipinia and Mindo sold the lots for P16,000 and P12,000 to Gavino Ortega on February 14 and April 19, 1977. They have retained
possession of the lots which are ricelands. They became tenants thereof.
Ortega resold the two lots on November 14, 1979 for P16,000 and P11,000 to Summit Trading through its president, Virgilio P.
Balaguer.
Well within the five-year period, Pilipinia and Mindo filed a complaint against Ortega and Summit Trading for the redemption or
repurchase of the two lots. Ortega was duly summoned. He failed to answer the complaint. He was declared in default. Summit
Trading was also declared in default.

In his judgment by default dated October 29, 1981, Judge Avendano (the same judge who ordered the cancellation of the
annotation) gave plaintiffs Pilipinia and Mindo 15 days from notice within which to redeem the lots for P16,000 and P12,000 and
ordered Summit Trading to execute the corresponding deeds of sale and surrender the Torrens titles. If it failed to do so, the clerk of
court was directed to perform that task. The register of deeds was ordered to issue new titles to Pilipinia and Mindo.
The default judgment was rendered on the assumption that Summit Trading was duly summoned through Marina Saquilayan as
secretary of Summit Trading.
ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdiction was acquired over petitioner corporation?
HELD: YES. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership.-If the defendant is a corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
It is true that Saquilayan is not among the persons mentioned in section 13. However, she, being under the control of Summit
Trading, has not explained what she has done with the summons and complaint. The logical assumption is that she delivered it to
her boss, the president of Summit Trading. As already stated, she received a copy of the decision and Summit Trading became
aware of it. Summit Trading's motion for reconsideration was denied.
While Summit Trading is technically correct in contending that there was no strict compliance with section 13, we cannot close our
eyes to the realities of the situation. Under the facts of this case, Saquilayan, being the secretary of the president (whose contact
with the outside world is normally through his secretary), may be regarded as an "agent" within the meaning of section 13.
Hence summons was validly served upon Summit Trading. Its negligence in not answering the complaint was inexcusable. In fact, up
to this time, Summit Trading has not bothered to state its defenses to the action nor stated whether it has a meritorious case
warranting the setting aside of the default judgment.
In the instant case, service was made on the president's secretary who could have easily notified the president that an action was
filed against the corporation just as she had apprised him of the judgment in this case.
HOWEVER, We are not saying that service on such a secretary is always proper. Generally, it is improper. The president himself must
be served personally with the summons if it is desired to effect the service on that particular officer. But, as already stated, under the
facts of this case, the president's secretary may be regarded as the "agent" within the meaning of section 13 since service upon her
of the judgment itself came to the notice of Summit Trading.
G.R. Nos. 112438-39 DECEMBER 12, 1995
CHEMPHIL EXPORT & IMPORT CORPORATION (CEIC) v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Dynetics, Inc. and Antonio M. Garcia filed a complaint for declaratory relief and/or injunction against the PISO, BPI, LBP, PCIB
and RCBC or the consortium with the Regional Trial Court seeking judicial declaration, construction and interpretation of the validity
of the surety agreement that Dynetics and Garcia had entered into with the consortium and to perpetually enjoin the latter from
claiming, collecting and enforcing any purported obligations which Dynetics and Garcia might have undertaken in said agreement.
The consortium filed their respective answers with counterclaims alleging that the surety agreement in question was valid and
binding and that Dynetics and Garcia were liable under the terms of the said agreement. A notice of garnishment covering Garcia's
shares in CIP/Chemphil (including the disputed shares) was served on Chemphil through its then President. The notice of
garnishment was duly annotated in the stock and transfer books of Chemphil on the same date.The trial court denied the
application of Dynetics and Garcia for preliminary injunction and instead granted the consortium's prayer for a consolidated writ of
preliminary attachment.

Hence, after the consortium had filed the required bond, a writ of attachment was issued andvarious real and personal properties of
Dynetics and Garcia were garnished, including the disputed shares.
This garnishment, however, was not annotated in Chemphil's stock and transfer book. The Court holds that the CONSORTIUM has
admitted that the writ of attachment/garnishment issued on the shares of stock belonging to plaintiff Antonio M. Garcia was not
annotated and registered in the stock and transfer books of CHEMPHIL. On the other hand, the prior attachment issued in favor of
SBTC against the same CHEMPHIL shares of Antonio M. Garcia,was duly registered and annotated in the stock and transfer books of
CHEMPHIL.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of attachment over the shares is null and void because it was improperly served upon the
designated officers?
HELD: NO. CEIC is incorrect when it arguds that the consortium's writ of attachment over the disputed shares of Chemphil is null
and void, insisting as it does, that the notice of garnishment was not validly served on the designated officers on 19 July 1985.
To support its contention, CEIC presented the sheriff's notice of garnishment dated 19 July 1985 which showed on its face that said
notice was received by one Thelly Ruiz who was neither the president nor managing agent of Chemphil. It makes no difference, CEIC
further avers, that Thelly Ruiz was the secretary of the President of Chemphil, for under the above-quoted provision she is not
among the officers so authorized or designated to be served with the notice of garnishment.
We cannot subscribe to such a narrow view of the rule on proper service of writs of attachment.
A secretary's major function is to assist his or her superior. He/she is in effect an extension of the latter. Obviously, as such, one of
her duties is to receive letters and notices for and in behalf of her superior, as in the case at bench. The notice of garnishment was
addressed to and was actually received by Chemphil's president through his secretary who formally received it for him.Thus, in one
case,we ruled that the secretary of the president may be considered an "agent"of the corporation and held that service of summons
on him is binding on the corporation.Moreover, the service and receipt of the notice of garnishment was duly acknowledged and
confirmed by the corporate secretary of Chemphil, Rolando Navarro and his successor Avelino Cruz through their respective
certifications. We rule, therefore, that there was substantial compliance with Sec. 7 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. L-39596 MARCH 23, 1934

GOTAUCO v. REGISTRY OF DEEDS
FACTS: On August 12, 1932, when Exhibits A and B were presented to the register, by which a levy of execution against the
judgment debtor, Rafael Vilar was made on fifteen contracts of land and registered in the name of Florentino Vilar, the register
properly denied the inscription of said levy of execution because the title to the lands was in the name of Florentino Vilar and no
evidence was submitted that Rafael Vilar had any present or possible future interest in the land.
On September 17, 1932, there was presented to him a copy of a petition filed in CFI of the province, entitled, "Intestado del Finado
Florentino Vilar", from which he could properly infer that Florentino Vilar was dead and that the judgment debtor Rafael Vilar is one
of the heirs of the deceased Florentino Vilar.
ISSUE: Whether Rafael Vilar can attach his interests and shares as an heir to the Estate of Florentino Vilar.
HELD: Yes. Although the value of the participation of Rafael Vilar in the estate of Florentino Vilar was indeterminable before the
final liquidation of the estate, nevertheless, the right of participation in the estate and the lands thereof may be attached and sold.
The real test was laid down by this court in the case of Reyes vs. Grey, namely: Does the judgment debtor hold such a beneficial
interest in the property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? Nothing appears in this record to indicate that Rafael
Vilar could not dispose of his interest or share as heir in the estate of Florentina Vilar. Having this right, he could by a conveyance

defeat to such extent the provisions of section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus deprive the judgment creditor of the
benefit of a lawful execution.
G.R. No. L-34589 JUNE 29, 1988

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION INCORPORATED v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-34656 JUNE 29, 1988

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
FACTS: On August 29, 1968, Engineering Construction Inc. (ECI) filed a complaint for damages against NPC, alleging that it suffered
damages to its facilities and equipment due to the inundation of its campsite in Ipo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, as a direct result of the
improper and careless opening by NPC of the spillway gates of Angat Dam at the height of typhoon "Welming".
RTC found NPC guilty of gross negligence. NPC filed a notice of appeal from that decision but before it could perfect its appeal, ECI
moved for and was granted execution pending appeal upon posting a covering bond of P200k which it later increased to P1.109M to
fully answer for whatever damages NPC might incur by reason of the premature execution of the lower court's decision. Court
granted said motion for the exceptional writ.
Subsequently, Deputy Sheriff Restituto R. Quemada who was assigned to enforce the writ of execution, garnished in favor of ECI all
amounts due and payable to NPC which were then in possession of MERALCO and sufficient to cover the judgment sum of
P1,108,985.31.
NPC filed a petition for certiorari with CA. CA granted the petition and nullified the execution pending appeal of the judgment
rendered by the trial court, as well as all issued writs and processes in connection with the execution.
MERALCO sought from the CA a clarification and reconsideration of the aforesaid decision on the ground, among others, that the
decision was being used by NPC to compel MERALCO to return the amount of P1,114,545.23 (inclusive of sheriff's fees) in two
checks which it had already entrusted to the deputy sheriff on February 23, 1971, who then indorsed and delivered the same to ECI.
CA held the sheriff, MERALCO and ECI liable to restore to NPC the amount due to NPC which MERALCO had earlier turned over to
the sheriff for payment to ECI.
ISSUE: WON the garnishee (MERALCO) is liable when the notice of garnishment was lifted for having been proved futile
HELD: No. We are sanctioning in this particular instance the execution pending appeal of actual but not consequential and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees which must necessarily depend on the final resolution of the main cases, the direct
consequence would be to authorize NPC to proceed against the covering bond filed by ECI but only to the extent of the difference
between the amount finally adjudicated by this Court in the main cases [P724,985.31] and the amount originally decreed by the trial
court relating to the consequential and exemplary damages and attorney's fees [P1,108.985.31]. In other words, ECIs bond is held
answerable to NPC for P384,000.
But while partial restitution is warranted in favor of NPC, we find that the CA erred in not absolving MERALCO, the garnishee, from
its obligations to NPC with respect to the payment to ECI of P1,114,543.23, thus in effect subjecting MERALCO to double liability.
MERALCO should not have been faulted for its prompt obedience to a writ of garnishment. Unless there are compelling reasons
such as: a defect on the face of the writ or actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of the
garnisher, it is not incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself whether or not the order for the advance execution
of a judgment is valid.
Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides,

Effect of attachment of debts and credits.-All persons having in their possession or under their control any credits or other
similar personal property belonging to the party against whom attachment is issued, or owing any debts to the same, at the
time of service upon them of a copy of the order of attachment and notice as provided in the last preceding section, shall
be liable to the applicant for the amount of such credits, debts or other property, until the attachment be discharged, or
any judgment recovered by him be satisfied, unless such property be delivered or transferred, or such debts be paid, to the
clerk, sheriff or other proper officer of the court issuing the attachment.
Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a
stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee [the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the
proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts from liability the person having in his possession or under his control any
credits or other personal property be, longing to the defendant, ..., if such property be delivered or transferred, ..., to the clerk,
sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action is pending."
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, MERALCO, as garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay the amount of the
judgment represented by funds in its possession belonging to the judgment debtor or NPC, should be released from all
responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof to the sheriff. The reason for the rule is self-evident. To expose garnishees
to risks for obeying court orders and processes would only undermine the administration of justice.
G.R. No. L-34548 NOVEMBER 29, 1988
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. THE HONORABLE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO and PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION
FACTS: In Civil Case No. Q-12785, which was an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries, an Order (Partial Judgment) was
issuedby the Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, then Presiding Judge, ordering the defendants therein to pay jointly and severally, the
plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc.
BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of Execution of the said Partial Judgment which was granted on the same day by
the herein respondent judge who acted in place of the Hon. Judge San Diego who had just been elevated as a Justice of the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day, issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff
Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment addressed to the General Manager and/or Cashier ofRCBC who was
requesting a reply within five (5) days to said garnishment as to any property which the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration.
Upon an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated January 27, 1970 filed by BADOC, the respondent Judge issued an Order granting the Ex-
Parte Motion and directing the herein petitioner "to deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriffs.
Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26,1970 which was granted in an Order dated April 6,1970,
setting aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ of Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC "to restore,
jointly and severally, the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same condition and state it was before the issuance of the
aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the PVTA. This is without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to move for the execution of the partial
judgment pending appeal in case the motion for reconsideration is denied and appeal is taken from the said partial judgment."
MR was denied which was within the period for perfecting an appeal, the herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of
Appeals from the said Orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the Special
Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued pursuant to the Order/Partial Judgment
HELD: NO. The bank was in no position to question the legality of the garnishment since it was not even a party to the case. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it had neither the personality nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of

respondent Judge. It had no choice but to obey the same inasmuch as it had no standing at all to impugn the validity of the partial
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff or of the processes issued in execution of such judgment. RCBC cannot therefore be
compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone was responsible for the issuance of the Writ
of Execution and Order of Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of a subsequent annulment of such
court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA.
G.R. No. 104133 APRIL 18, 1995

SPOUSES EMILIO ABINUJAR and MILAGROS M. LANA v. THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioners Sps. Abinujar executed a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of private respondents Sps. Ramiro,
involving a residential house located at Sampaloc, Manila. Due to serious financial and business reverses, petitioners were not able
to redeem the property within four months as agreed upon which prompted sps. Ramiro filing a complaint for ejectment in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of the City of Manila against sps Abinujar. However, the parties, settled on a compromise agreement. The
MTC approved the compromise agreement which states that the sps. Abinujar agree to pay sps. Ramiro in the amounts and on the
dates specifically indicated in the agreement and that the failure on the part of the sps. Abinujar to pay three (3) consecutive
payments, sps. Ramiro will be entitled to a writ of execution, unless the parties agree to extend the period of entitlement to a writ
of execution in writing to be submitted and/or approved by this Honorable Court.
Thereafter, sps. Ramiro filed a motion for execution on the ground that petitioners failed to pay the first three installments
stipulated in the compromise agreement. Sps. Abinujar filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration and/or Correct Order
of this Court" calling attention to a typographical error in the Order dated March 15, 1990, and asking that the amount of
P10.000.00 payable on September 30, 1990 be corrected and changed to the agreed amount of P50,000 which was granted by the
MTC.
Sps Ramiro opposed the ex-parte motion and stated that they would not renew the compromise agreement with petitioners.
However it was denied by the MTC
This promted the sps Ramiro to file a petition for mandamus and in turn, referred the case to the Executive Judge of the RTC,
Manila. The RTC issued the assailed resolution commanding the MTC to issue a writ of execution of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. The Metropolitan Trial Court complied by issuing a writ of execution to enforce the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties. A "Sheriffs' Notice to Voluntarily Vacate the Premises" was served on sps. Abinujar.
Sps. Abinujar then filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
injunction with the Court of Appeals, however, it dismissed the petition.
The sps. Abinujar assails the validity of the issuance by the Deputy Sheriff of the notice to voluntarily vacate the premises by way of
enforcing the decision approving the compromise agreement. They maintain that their obligation is monetary in nature and the
applicable rule should have been Section 15, Rule 39 and not Section 13, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the sps Abinujar’s obligation in the compromise agreement was monetary in nature.
HELD: Yes. When the parties entered into a compromise agreement, the original action for ejectment was set aside and the action
was changed to a monetary obligation.

A perusal of the compromise agreement signed by the parties and approved by the inferior court merely provided that in case the
defendants (petitioners herein) failed to pay three monthly installments, the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) would be
entitled to a writ of execution, without specifying what the subject of execution would be. Said agreement did not state that
petitioners would be evicted from the premises subject of the suit in case of any default in complying with their obligation
thereunder. This was the result of the careless drafting thereof for which only private respondents were to be blamed.
A judgment is the foundation of a writ of execution which draws its vitality therefrom. An officer issuing a writ of execution is
required to look to the judgment for his immediate authority. An execution must conform to and be warranted by the judgment on
which it was issued. There should not be a substantial variance between the judgment and the writ of execution. Thus, an execution
is fatally defective if the judgment was for a sum of money and the writ of execution was for the sale of mortgaged property.
As petitioners' obligation under the compromise agreement as approved by the court was monetary in nature, private respondents
can avail only of the writ of execution provided in Section 15, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court , and not that provided in Section
13.
Section 15, Rule 39 provides:
Execution of money judgments. — The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by levying on all the property, real
and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt
from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such property, if there be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment
creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and
accruing costs must be delivered to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court. When
there is more property of the judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs, within the view of the
officer, he must levy only on such part of the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be
levied on in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
On the other hand, Section 13, Rule 39 provides:
How execution for the delivery or restitution of property enforced. — The officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or
restitution of property by ousting therefrom the person against whom the judgment is rendered and placing the judgment creditor in
possession of such property, and by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of the judgment debtor as will
satisfy the amount of the judgment and costs included in the writ of execution.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Sheriff is directed to enforce the
execution only of the money judgment in accordance with Section 15, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 76879 OCTOBER 3, 1990

BF HOMES, INCORPORATED v. CA, ROSALINDA R. ROA and VICENTE MENDOZA
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation previously engaged in the business of developing and selling residential lots and
houses and other related realty matters.
On 1984, BF contracted a loan from Roa and Mendoza in the amount of P250,000.00 with interest at the rate of 33% per annum
payable after 32 days. The obligation was embodied in a promissory note and secured by two post-dated checks issued by BF in
favor of the lenders.
Subsequently, BF filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for a Declaration in a State of Suspension of Payments with a prayer that

upon the filing of the petition and in the meantime, all claims against it for any and all accounts or indebtedness be suspended,
but allowing petitioner to continue with its normal operations. It also asked for the approval of the proposed rehabilitation plan.
On October 1984, Roa and Mendoza filed a complaint against BF with the RTC of Quezon City, for the recovery of the loan of
P250,000.00, with interest and attorney's fees. The complaint also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of BF.
BF moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, or at least for its suspension in view of the pendency of SEC Case
No. 002693. it also asked for the lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment.
The SEC issued an order creating a management committee and suspending all actions for claims against BF pending before any
court, tribunal or board. Subsequently on 1988, the SEC issued an order approving the proposed revised rehabilitation plan and
dissolving the management committee earlier created. Atty. Orendain was appointed rehabilitation receiver.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver defeats a prior preliminary attachment which was made on
record (NO)
HELD: No. The appointment of a rehabilitation receiver who took control and custody of BF has not necessarily secured the claims
of Roa and Mendoza. In the event that the receivership is terminated with such claims not having been satisfied, the creditors
may also find themselves without security therefor in the civil action because of the dissolution of the attachment. This should not
be permitted. Having previously obtained the issuance of the writ in good faith, they should not be deprived of its protection if
the rehabilitation plan does not succeed and the civil action is resumed.
Coming now to the writ of preliminary attachment, we find that it must stand despite the suspension of the proceedings in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The writ was issued prior to the creation of the management committee and so should not be
regarded as an undue advantage of Mendoza and Roa over the other creditors of BF.
Under the Rules of Court, a writ of attachment may be dissolved only upon the filing of a counter-bond or upon proof of its
improper or irregular issuance. Neither ground has been established in the case at bar to warrant the discharge of the writ. No
counter-bond has been given.
As for the contention that the writ was improperly issued for lack of notice to BF on the application for the writ, the only
requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court are the affidavit and
bond of the applicant.
G.R. No. 111174 MARCH 9, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. BERNARDO V. SALUDARES
FACTS: On April 2, 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a writ of sequestration over the
properties owned by Lianga Bay Logging Company, Inc. (LBLC). The writ of sequestration was based on the ground that the shares of
stocks in LBLC owned by Peter A. Sabido formed part of "illegally acquired wealth."
On July 27, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General filed before the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Peter A. Sabido.
On August 12, 1991, Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the Writs of Sequestration before the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan
granted the motion. On December 11, 1991, PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of Sandiganbayan praying for
the nullification of the order which lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC.
In the meantime, on February 11, 1993, private respondent Hung Ming Kuk filed a complaint for sum of money against LBLC, with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The PCGG was not

impleaded by Hung Ming Kuk as party-defendant nor was the sequestration case referred to the RTC's proceedings.
On February 15, 1993, Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of PCGG. On February 17, 1993, the trial court granted
the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Hung Ming Kuk. RTC ruled in favor of Hung Ming Kuk and ordered LBLC to pay the
former.
On March 29, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court. On
January 23, 1995, the Supreme Court en banc nullified the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that lifted the writ of sequestration of
LBLC properties. Hence, the Court effectively confirmed the validity of the writ of sequestration over said properties.
Petitioner contends that the RTC of Lianga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case inasmuch as the same are under
sequestration by the PCGG. Petitioner asserts that the sequestered assets have been placed under custodia legis of the PCGG
pending the final determination by the Sandiganbayan that said assets are in fact ill-gotten. Hence, the RTC has no jurisdiction to
order the attachment of said sequestered properties.
Private respondent claims that the attachment order of the trial court was issued after the Sandiganbayan had lifted the writ of
sequestration against LBLC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional remedy of attachment issued by the trial court in favor of the private respondent is valid.
HELD: NO.
The disputed properties of LBLC were already under custodia legis by virtue of a valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG on
April 2, 1986, when respondent Judge Saludares issued the assailed writ of attachment in favor of private respondent Hung Ming
Kuk. At that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was subsisting. Said writ of the PCGG could not be
interfered with by the RTC of Lianga, because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body. The PCGG had acquired by operation of
law the right of redemption over the property until after the final determination of the case or until its dissolution.
It bears recalling that when the Sandiganbayan ordered that the writ of sequestration be lifted, PCGG filed a special civil action for
certiorari to contest that order. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of PCGG when it granted the latter's petition to declare the lifting
of the writ of sequestration by the Sandiganbayan null and void.
In the same en banc Resolution, the Court observed:
"II. Provisional Remedies in Pursuance of Policy
Special adjective tools or devices were provided by the Revolutionary Government for the recovery of that "ill-
gotten wealth." These took the form of provisional remedies akin to preliminary attachment (Rule 57), writ of seizure of
personalty (Rule 60) and receivership (Rule 59). They were (a) sequestration and (b) freeze orders, as regards "unearthed
instance of "ill-gotten wealth; and (c) provisional takeover, as regards business enterprises and properties taken over by
the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos."
A. Executive Orders Re Sequestration, Freezing and Takeover
These special remedies were prescribed and defined in Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President
Corazon C. Aquino in March, 1986. Their validity and propriety were sustained by this Court on May 27, 1987, against
claims that they were unconstitutional as being bills of attainder, or as violative of the right against self-incrimination and
the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the same case, the Court also set the parameters for and
restrictions on the proper exercise of the remedies."
Sequestration is defined as the process, which may be employed as a conservatory writ whenever the right of the property is
involved, to preserve, pending litigation, specific property subject to conflicting claims of ownership or liens and privileges.
The Court also noted the relationship between attachment and receivership, on one hand, and sequestration, freeze order and
provisional takeover on the other. The latter there are ancillary remedies in prosecuting the ill-gotten wealth of the previous Marcos

regime. The Court observed that sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment or receivership.
By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand as security for the satisfaction
of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or lost intentionally, or otherwise, pending the action.
When a writ of attachment has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor, the levy
creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution. This well-settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of sequestration.
Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. It is against a particular property of a debtor. The attaching creditor thereby
acquires a specific lien upon the attached property which ripens into a judgment against the res when the order of sale is made.
Such a proceeding is in effect a finding that the property attached is an indebted thing and results in its virtual condemnation to pay
for the owner's debt. The law does not provide the length of time during which an attachment lien shall continue after the rendition
of the judgment, and it must therefore continue until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued in the judgment, or until
the judgment is satisfied, or the statement discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
G.R. No. 107282 MARCH 16, 1994

THE MANILA REMNANT CO., INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner MRCI owned parcels of land in Quezon City which became the subject of its agreement with A.U. Valencia and Co.,
Inc., (AUVCI) by virtue of which the latter was to act as the petitioner's agent in the development and sale of the property. For a
stipulated fee, AUVCI was to convert the lands into a subdivision, manage the sale of the lots, execute contracts and issue official
receipts to the lot buyers. At the time of the agreement, the president of both MRCI and AUVCI was Artemio U. Valencia.
AUVCI executed two contracts to sell covering Lots 1 and 2, Block 17, in favor of spouses Oscar C. Ventanilla and Carmen Gloria Diaz.
After ten days and without the knowledge of the Ventanilla couple, Valencia, as president of MRCI, resold the same parcels to Carlos
Crisostomo, one of his sales agents, without any consideration.
The Ventanilla spouses, having learned of the supposed sale of their lots to Crisostomo, commenced an action for specific
performance, annulment of deeds, and damages against Manila Remnant Co., Inc., A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc., and Carlos
Crisostomo.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the contracts to sell in favor of the Ventanillas valid and subsisting, and annulling the
contract to sell in favor of Crisostomo. It ordered the MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas, Damages
and attorney's fees were also awarded to the Ventanillas for which the MRCI, AUVCI, and Crisostomo were held solidarily liable.
The spouses Ventanilla filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ was issued on and served
upon MRCI.
MRCI alleged that the subject properties could not be delivered to the Ventanillas because they had already been sold to Samuel
Marquez on while their petition was pending in this Court. Nevertheless, MRCI offered to reimburse the amount paid by the
respondents, including legal interest plus the aforestated damages. MRCI also prayed that its tender of payment be accepted and all
garnishments on their accounts lifted.
The Ventanillas accepted the amount of P210,000.00 as damages and attorney's fees but opposed the reimbursement offered by
MRCI in lieu of the execution of the absolute deed of sale. They contended that the alleged sale to Samuel Marquez was void,

fraudulent, and in contempt of court and that no claim of ownership over the properties in question had ever been made by
Marquez.
The Judge issued an order wherein the garnishment made by the Sheriff upon the bank account of Manila Remnant may be lifted
only upon the deposit to the Court of the amount of P500,000.00 in cash.
MRCI then filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration praying that it be ordered to reimburse the Ventanillas in the
amount of P263,074.10 and that the garnishment of its bank deposit be lifted.
The petitioner contends that the trial court may not enforce it garnishment order after the monetary judgment for damages had
already been satisfied and the amount for reimbursement had already been deposited with the sheriff. It is also averred that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion when it arbitrarily fixed the amount of the cash bond for the lifting of the garnishment order
at P500,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether the garnishment order must be lifted on account of partial execution of judgement (in this case, the payment of
damages)
HELD: NO.
While the petitioners have readily complied with the order of the trial court for the payment of damages to the Ventanillas, they
have, however, refused to execute the absolute deed of sale. It was for the purpose of ensuring their compliance with this portion
of the judgment that the trial court issued the garnishment order which by its term could be lifted only upon the filling of a cash
bond of P500,000.00.
The petitioner questions the propriety of this order on the ground that it has already partially complied with the judgment and that
it has always expressed its willingness to reimburse the amount paid by the respondents. It says that there is no need for a
garnishment order because it is willing to reimburse the Ventanillas in lieu of execution of the absolute deed of sale.
The alternative judgment of reimbursement is applicable only if the conveyance of the lots is not possible, but it has not been
shown that there is an obstacle to such conveyance. As the main obligation of the petitioner is to execute the absolute deed of sale
in favor of the Ventanillas, its unjustified refusal to do so warranted the issuance of the garnishment order.
Garnishment is a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to
the litigation. It is an attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands
of a third person or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rules on attachment also apply to
garnishment proceedings.
A garnishment order shall be lifted if it established that:

(a) the party whose accounts have been garnished has posted a counterbond or has made the requisite cash deposit;
(b) the order was improperly or irregularly issued as where there is no ground for garnishment or the affidavit and/or bond
filed therefor are defective or insufficient;
(c) the property attached is exempt from execution, hence exempt from preliminary attachment or
(d) the judgment is rendered against the attaching or garnishing creditor.
Partial execution of the judgment is not included in the above enumeration of the legal grounds for the discharge of a
garnishment order. Neither does the petitioner's willingness to reimburse render the garnishment order unnecessary. As for the
counterbond, the lower court did not err when it fixed the same at P500,000.00. As correctly pointed out by the respondent court,
that amount corresponds to the current fair market value of the property in litigation and was a reasonable basis for determining
the amount of the counterbond.

G.R. 123638 JUNE 15, 2005

INSULAR SAVINGS BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Respondent Bank [Far East Bank and Trust Company] instituted Arbitration Case against petitioner [Insular Savings Bank]
before the Arbitration Committee of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation [PCHC]. The dispute between the parties involved
three [unfunded] checks with a total value of P25,200,000.00.
While the dispute was pending arbitration, on January 17, 1992, respondent Bank instituted Civil Case in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Branch 133 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an
Order granting the application for preliminary attachment upon posting by respondent Bank of an attachment bond in the amount
of P6,000,000.00.
On January 27, 1992, Branch 133 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued a writ of preliminary attachment for the amount of
P25,200,000.00.
During the hearing before the Arbitration Committee of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, petitioner and respondent Bank
agreed to temporarily divide between them the disputed amount of P25,200,000.00 while the dispute has not yet been resolved. As
a result, the sum of P12,600,000.00 is in the possession of respondent Bank.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond in the amount of P12,600,000.00. Respondent judge
denied the motion and issued an Order of June 13, 1994 that the counter-bond should be in the amount of P27,237,700.00".
Respondent Judge factored in, in arriving at such amount, unliquidated claim items, such as actual and exemplary damages, legal
interest, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari ascribing on the trial court the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The CA denied due course to and dismissed the petition. According to the appellate
court, the RTC's order may be defended by, among others, the provision of Section 12 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. The CA
added that, assuming that the RTC erred on the matter of computing the amount of the discharging counter-bond, its error does not
amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Petitoner argues that the starting point in computing the amount of counter-bond is the amount of the respondent's demand or
claim only, in this case P25,200,000.00, excluding contingent expenses and unliquidated amount of damages. And since there was a
mutual agreement between the parties to temporarily, but equally, divide between themselves the said amount pending and
subject to the final outcome of the arbitration, the amount of P12,600,000.00 should, so petitioner argues, be the basis for
computing the amount of the counter-bond.
ISSUE: Should the attachment be discharged by counter-bond in the amount of P12,600,000.00?
HELD: Yes. Section 12 of Rule 57 provides that the court shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant " makes a cash
deposit, or files a counter-bond . . . in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs."
As may be noted, the amount of the counter-attachment bond is, under the terms of the aforequoted Section 12, to be measured
against the value of the attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching
creditor may recover in the action. Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section and without necessarily diminishing the sound
discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond approval, there can be no serious objection, in turn, to the proposition that the
attached property - and logically the counter-bond necessary to discharge the lien on such property - should as much as possible
correspond in value to, or approximately match the attaching creditor's principal claim. Else, excessive attachment, which ought to
be avoided at all times, shall ensue.
The sheriff is required to attach only so much of the property of the party against whom the order is issued as may be sufficient to
satisfy the applicant's demand, the amount of which is stated in the order, unless a deposit is made or a counter-bond is given
equal to said amount. However, if the value of the property to be attached is less than the amount of the demand, the amount of
the applicant's bond may be equal to the value of said property, and the amount of the adverse party's deposit or counter-bond
may be equal to the applicant's bond. The writ of preliminary attachment is issued upon approval of the requisite bond". [Herrera,
REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. VII, 1997 ed., p. 61]

In the case at bar, respondent's principal claim against petitioner immediately prior to the filing of the motion to discharge
attachment has effectively been pruned down to P12,600,000.00. Accordingly, it should have allowed a total discharge of the
attachment on a counter-bond based on the reduced claim of respondent. If a portion of the claim is already secured, there is no
justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject of counter-bond. It may be that a counter-bond is intended to secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the main action. Simple common sense, if not consideration of fair
play, however, dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been preemptively satisfied or secured need not be
covered by the counter-bond.
The trial court, in requiring petitioner to post a counter-bond in the amount of P27,237,700.00, obviously glossed over one certain
fundamental. We refer to the fact that the attachment respondent applied for and the corresponding writ issued was only for the
amount of P25.2 Million. Respondent, it bears to stress, did not pray for attachment on its other claims, contingent and unliquidated
as they were. Then, too, the attaching writ rightly excluded such claims. Jurisprudence teaches that a writ of attachment cannot be
issued for moral and exemplary damages, and other unliquidated or contingent claim. It was simply unjust for the trial court to base
the amount of the counter-bond on a figure beyond the P25,200,000.00 threshold, as later reduced toP12,600,200.00.
The trial court, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to discharge attachment by
counter-bond in the amount of P12,600,000.00, an amount more than double the attachment bond required of, and given by,
respondent. As a necessary consequence, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it dismissed petitioner's recourse
thereto.
G. R. No. 74696 NOVEMBER 11, 1987

JOSE CALDERON v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
FACTS: Jose Calderon purchased Luzon Brokerage Corp. and its 5 affiliate companies from George Schulze, et. al. 21 days after,
Bureau of Customs suspended the operations of LBC for failure to pay customs taxes and duties incurred prior to the sale.
Calderon filed complaint against private respondents to recover amount of P1,475,840 with damages by reason of breach of
warranty. Also prayed for preliminary attachment alleging that private respondents had deliberately and willfully concealed from his
knowledge such staggering liability of LBC for the purpose of misleading him into buying the 6 companies; and that Schulze is about
to depart from the Philippines in order to defraud his creditors.
To support the petition for preliminary attachment, Calderon posted a surety bond of P1,475,840. Trial Court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment, whereupon properties of the private respondents were attached and their bank deposits were garnished.
Subsequently, Calderon filed an amended complaint, alleging that while the liabilities of LBC are reflected in its books, the aforesaid
amount was fraudulently withdrawn and misappropriated by Schulze.
Private respondents filed a counterbond, whereupon the trial court issued an order directing the sheriff to return all real and
personal properties already levied upon and to lift the notices of garnishment issued in connection with the said attachment.
After trial, court dismissed the complaint, holding Calderon and his surety jointly and severally liable to pay damages.
ISSUE: WON the writ of attachment was validly issued
HELD: No. That Calderon was clearly in bad faith when he asked for the attachment is indicated by the fact that he failed to appear
in court to support his charge of misappropriation by Schulze, and in effect, preventing his being cross-examined, no document on
the charges was presented by him. Indeed, the CA found that Calderon failed to produce any evidence in support of his sworn
charge that Schulze had deliberately and willfully concealed the liabilities of LBC. But even though Calderon failed to prove his
serious charges of fraud, malice and bad faith, Schulze et. al. took it upon themselves to show that they did not conceal or withhold
from Calderon’s knowledge the deposits made by Philippine Refining Co., Inc. with LBC and that they did not withdraw and
misappropriate the deposits made by Philippine Refining Co., Inc. with LBC.

It is evident from the foregoing that the attachment was maliciously sued out and that as already pointed out, Schulze was not in
bad faith.
While as a general rule, the liability on the attachment bond is limited to actual damages, moral and exemplary damages may be
recovered where the attachment was alleged to be maliciously sued out and established to be so.
Calderon’s contention: the dissolution of the attachment extinguishes its obligation under the bond, for the basis of its liability,
which is wrongful attachment no longer exists, the attachment bond having been rendered void & ineffective, by virtue of Sec. 12,
Rule 57.
Untenable. While Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides that upon the filing of a counterbond, the attachment is
discharged or dissolved, nowhere is it provided that the attachment bond is rendered void and ineffective upon the filing of
counterbond.
The liability of the attachment bond is defined in Section 4, Rule 57. It is clear from Sec. 4 that the responsibility of the surety
arises "if the court shall finally adjudge that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto."
Liability attaches if the plaintiff is not entitled to the attachment because the requirements entitling him to the writ are wanting,
or if the plaintiff has no right to the attachment because the facts stated in his affidavit, or some of them, are untrue. It is, therefore,
evident that upon the dismissal of an attachment wrongfully issued, the surety is liable for damages as a direct result of said
attachment.
Surety’s contention: by filing a counterbond, private respondents waived any defect or flaw in the issuance of the attachment
writ, for they could have sought, without need of filing any counterbond, the discharge of the attachment if the same was
improperly or irregularly issued.
Untenable. Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the 2 ways indicated in the law, i.e., by filing a counterbond or by
showing that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued, the liability of the surety on the attachment bond
subsists because the final reckoning is when "the Court shall finally adjudge that the attaching creditor was not entitled" to the
issuance of the attachment writ in the first place.
The attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing
himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. Moreover, the filing of a counterbond is a speedier way
of discharging the attachment writ maliciously sought out by the attaching creditor instead of the other way, which, in most
instances like in the present case, would require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot easily be
settled in a pending incident of the case.
G.R. No. 144740 AUGUST 31, 2005

SECURITY PACIFIC ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. THE HON. AMELIA TRIA-INFANTE
FACTS: Reynaldo Anzures filed a complaint in RTC against Teresita Villaluz for BP 22. Anzures filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Preliminary Attachment, praying that pending the hearing on the merits of the case, a WPA is to be issued ordering the sheriff to
attach the properties of Villaluz in accordance with the Rules.
RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment upon complainant’s (Anzures) posting of a bond (P2.1M). Sheriff attached certain
properties of Villaluz and were duly annotated on the corresponding certificates of title. RTC acquitted Villaluz of the crime charged
(BP22) but held her civilly liable. Villaluz appealed but decision was affirmed.
The case was elevated to the SC and during it’s pendency, Villaluz posted a counter-bond of P2.5M issued by Security Pacific
Assurance Corporation, as well as filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment. SC affirmed CA; Anzures moved for execution of
judgment.
Pursuant to a writ of execution issued, Sheriff Reynaldo R. Buazon tried to serve the writ of execution upon Villaluz, but the latter no
longer resided in her given address. Sheriff sent a Notice of Garnishment to Security Pacific Assurance Corporation’s office in Makati

City, by virtue of the counter-bond posted by Villaluz with said insurance corporation in the amount of P2.5M but refused to assume
it’s obligation on the counter-bond it posted for the discharge of the attachment made by Villaluz on the ground that the bond was
not approved by SC and that the condition by which the bond was issued, did not happen.
ISSUES: Was the mere act of posting the counter-bond was sufficient to discharge the attachment on the property (attachment on
the property of Villaluz was discharged without need of court approval of the counter-bond) - YES
HELD: YES, the discharge of attachment without need of court approval is correct.There are two (2) ways to secure the discharge of
an attachment.
First, the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on his behalf may post a security.
Second, said party may show that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued.
The first applies in the instant case. Section 12, Rule 57 provides:
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counter-bond. After a writ of attachment has been enforced, the party
whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may move for the discharge of the attachment
wholly or in part on the security given. The court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment
if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court
where the application is made, in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs.
But if the attachment is sought to be discharged with respect to a particular property, the counter-bond shall be equal to
the value of that property as determined by the court. In either case, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. A notice of the deposit shall forthwith be
served on the attaching party. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section, the
property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the
counter-bond, or to the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the
property so released. Should such counter-bond for any reason be found to be or become insufficient, and the party
furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of attachment.
The filing of the counter-attachment bond by petitioner Villaluz has discharged the attachment on the properties and made the
petitioner corporation liable on the counter-attachment bond.
This can be gleaned from the DEFENDANTS BOND FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF ATTACHMENT, which states that Security Pacific
Assurance Corporation, as surety, in consideration of the dissolution of the said attachment jointly and severally, binds itself with
petitioner Villaluz for any judgment that may be recovered by private respondent Anzures against petitioner Villaluz.
The contract of surety is only between petitioner Villaluz and petitioner corporation. The petitioner corporation cannot escape
liability by stating that a court approval is needed before it can be made liable. This defense can only be availed by petitioner
corporation against petitioner Villaluz but not against third persons who are not parties to the contract of surety. The petitioners
hold themselves out as jointly and severally liable without any conditions in the counter-attachment bond. The petitioner
corporation cannot impose requisites before it can be made liable.
G.R. No. 71535 SEPTEMBER 15, 1987

HELENA Z. T. BENITEZ v. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: December 6, 1984: Casa Filipina Development Corporation (Casa Filipina for brevity) filed a complaint against herein
petitioner Helena T. Benitez for recission of contract, plus damages, with a prayer for preliminary attachment.
The complaint alleged that sometime on April 16, 1983, the plaintiff Casa Filipina, a real estate corporation, represented by Renato
P. Dragon, and defendant Benitez (the petitioner herein), entered into a verbal contract whereby Benitez allegedly agreed to
undertake to purchase/convey land for Casa Filipina in the total value of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) within the period of four
(4) months from receipt of the total amount.
The four-month period allegedly elapsed without Benitez having purchased nor conveyed any real estate in the total value of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in favor of Casa Filipina, but instead Benitez converted the entrusted money for her own personal use

in violation of her fiduciary relationship with plaintiff and that despite repeated demands for the refund or return of the
aforementioned amount, Benitez chose to ignore the same. Praying for a writ of preliminary attachment, Casa Filipina submitted
with its complaint, the affidavit of one Nestor P. Borromeo, the corporate secretary and acting treasurer of the corporation.
The writ of attachment was granted by respondent court exparte in an order dated December 11, 1985.
Clerk of Court issued a writ of preliminary attachment, by virtue of which the respondent Sheriff served notices of garnishment.
Benitez filed an answer with counterclaim and opposition to the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and
Urgent Motion to Discharge Writ of Preliminary Attachment under Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that the
same was improperly or irregularly issued. He alleged that Casa Filipina was not able to comply with the obligation to pay the
balance of P500,000.00 despite repeated demands and instead filed the present action for recission.
He attached to his Urgent Motion the affidavit of her technical assistant and attorney-in-fact by the name of Virginia Real, who
alleged. among other things, that she knows for a fact that the transaction between Benitez and Dragon for Casa Filipina, was one of
purchase and sale; that a copy of TCT No. 9833 covering the land to be purchased was furnished the office of Mr. Dragon on
February 28, 1984; that petitioner is willing and able to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Casa Filipina upon full payment of
the balance of P500,000.00.
The said motion was set for hearing on January 25, 1985 but the private respondent and its counsel failed to appear despite notice.
Consequently, the motion was deemed submitted for resolution.
On January 31, 1985, respondent Court denied petitioner's motion to discharge writ of preliminary attachment stating that the issue
cannot be determined without adducing evidence at the same time going into the merits of the case which in the opinion of the
Court could not be done at this stage of the proceedings.
Considering that the writ of preliminary attachment was issued after having satisfied the requirements of the rules, the same may
not be lifted or discharged without the defendant filing a counterbond.
Petitioner filed a MR which was likewise denied.
ISSUE: whether or not a hearing was necessary in determining the propriety of an issuance of an attachment
HELD: Yes.
The petitioner's Urgent Motion to Discharge Writ of Preliminary Attachment was filed under Section 13, Rule 57. The last sentence
of said provision indicates that a hearing must be conducted by the judge for the purpose of determining whether or not there
really was a defect in the issuance of the attachment.
It appears from the records that no hearing was conducted by the lower court. Indeed, when the case was called for hearing, the
plaintiff (private respondent herein), failed to appear and the petitioner's motion was considered submitted for resolution.
It was grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Rosario Veloso to deny petitioner's Urgent Motion to Discharge
Writ of Preliminary Attachment, without conducting a hearing and requiring the plaintiff to substantiate its allegation of fraud.
Neither can respondent Judge avoid deciding the issue raised in petitioner's urgent motion by ruling that "the issue cannot be
determined without adducing evidence at the same time going into the merits of the case." Having issued the writ of preliminary
attachment ex parte, it was incumbent on the respondent court, upon proper challenge of its order, to determine whether or not
the same was improvidently issued. A preliminary attachment is a rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and
annoyance, such that it should not be abused to cause unnecessary prejudice and, if wrongfully issued on the basis of false
allegation, should at once be corrected.
We agree with petitioner that a writ of attachment may be discharged pursuant to Section 13, Rule 57, without the necessity of
filing a cash deposit or counterbond. The provisions of the aforesaid section grants an aggrieved party relief from baseless and
unjustifiable attachments procured, among others, upon false allegations, without having to file any cash deposit or counterbond.

H. R. No. 92813 JULY 31, 1991

PEROXIDE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, EASTMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, INC. V.HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On December 6, 1982, herein private respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) sued herein petitioners Peroxide
Philippines Corporation (Peroxide), Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc. (Eastman), and the spouses Edmund O. Mapua and Rose U.
Mapua (Mapuas) in Civil Case No. 48849 of the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila for the collection of an
indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman and the Mapuas bound themselves to be solidarily liable.
Upon the filing of said action, the trial court, then presided over by Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment which was actually done on January 7, 1983 after BPI filed an attachment bond in the amount of
P32,700,000.00. Petitioners' properties were accordingly attached by the sheriff.
On November 28, 1983, Judge Reyes issued an order with an explicit finding that the attachment against the properties of Eastman
and the Mapuas was proper on the ground that they had disposed of their properties in fraud of BPI. It also directed the sheriff to
implement the writ of attachment upon the finality of said order.
After a motion for partial reconsideration by BPI and some exchanges between the parties, on December 17, 1984 the trial court,
this time with Judge Eficio B. Acosta presiding, issued an order granting BPI's motion for partial reconsideration by finding, inter alia,
that "(c)onsidering the lapse of more than a year since the Order of November 28, 1983 and the nature and purpose of attachment,
the writ of attachment revived in the Order of November 28, 1983 and hereby re-affirmed may be executed and implemented
immediately," and directing the sheriff to execute said writ which "is hereby declared immediately executory.
Contending that said order of December 17, 1984 was rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
petitioners sought the annulment thereof in a petition for certiorari and prohibition in AC-G.R. SP No. 05043 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, wherein a temporary restraining order was issued. This restraining order was lifted when said court rendered its
decision.
Petitioners then sought the review of said decision by this Court in G.R. No. 74558, but no temporary restraining order was granted
therein. In the meantime, on May 29, 1986, Judge Acosta issued an order6 suspending the writ of preliminary attachment in the
aforesaid Civil Case No. 48849 pursuant to an ex parte motion filed by herein petitioners.
On July 30, 1987, BPI filed a motion to order Bataan Pulp and Paper Mills, Inc. (Bataan), jointly and severally with petitioners, to
deliver to the sheriff the cash dividends declared on the garnished shares of stock of said petitioners with said paper company, and
to cite for contempt the officers of Bataan for releasing and/or paying the dividends to petitioners in disregard of the notice of
garnishment.
In an exhaustive order dated December 16, 1987,10 the trial court, now presided over by Judge Fernando L. Gerona, Jr. and wherein
Civil Case No. 48849 was then pending, addressing all the issues raised by the parties, granted BPI's motion for delivery of the
dividends. Judge Gerona sustained the position of BPI that dividends are but incidents or mere fruits of the shares of stock and as
such the attachment of the stock necessarily included the dividends declared thereon if they were declared subsequent to the
notice of garnishment.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for the reason that the order of May 29, 1986 of Judge Acosta was
based on an ex parte motion without reasonable notice, hence a patent nullity for lack of due process. Accordingly, the aforesaid
order of December 16, 1987 held that the writ of attachment continued to be effective.
Then, resolving the pending incidents before it, the court a quo issued the disputed order of August 23, 1988, which states, inter alia
that:
THIS Court thru Judge Gerona had arrived at the correct conclusion that the contempt charge against the Officers of the Garnishee
Corporation (BPI) cannot be sustained, for the reason that they relied on the Order of the Court thru Judge Acosta under date of
May 29, 1986 suspending the Writ of Attachment and since said order was not then set aside, there was no order or writ violated by

said officers. It follows a fortiori that the release of the cash dividends was valid, legal and not contemptuous. Consequently, there is
no reason to justify or deserve the return of cash dividends prayed for by the plaintiff.
Besides, the propriety of the attachment of the properties of the defendant Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc., and defendant
Mapua Spouses should still be determined by this Court as a question of fact, pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution dated
November 23, 1987. Meanwhile, it is only fair that the properties of the Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc. and the defendants
Mapua spouses should not, pending such proper determination, be attached as to give life and meaning to the Supreme Court
resolution of November 23, 1987.
BPI asserts that the discharge is illegal and void because the order lifting the same is violative of Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court which requires, among others, a prior hearing before the judge may order the discharge of the attachment upon proof
adduced therein of the impropriety or irregularity in the issuance of the writ and the defect is not cured forthwith. We may mention
in this regard that if the petition for the discharge of the writ violates the requirements of the law, the trial judge does not acquire
jurisdiction to act thereon
ISSUE: Was the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment valid?
HELD: No. When the attachment is challenged for having been illegally or improperly issued, there must be a hearing with the
burden of proof to sustain the writ being on the attaching creditor.18 That hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence
but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and meet them. The right to submit arguments implies
that opportunity, otherwise the right would be a barren one. It means a fair and open hearing.19 And, as provided by the aforecited
Section 13 of Rule 57, the attaching creditor should be allowed to oppose the application for the discharge of the attachment by
counter-affidavit or other evidence, in addition to that on which the attachment was made.
Respondent court was, therefore, correct in holding that, on the above-stated premises, the attachment of the properties of
Eastman and the Mapuas remained valid from its issuance since the judgment had not been satisfied, nor has the writ been validly
discharged either by the filing of a counterbond or for improper or irregular issuance.
The court likewise affirmed the findings and conclusion of respondent court that the order of Judge Acosta, dated May 29, 1986,
suspending the writ of attachment was in essence a lifting of said writ which order, having likewise been issued ex parte and without
notice and hearing in disregard of Section 13 of Rule 57, could not have resulted in the discharge of the attachment. Said
attachment continued unaffected by the so-called order or suspension and could not have been deemed inefficacious until and only
by reason of its supposed restoration in the order of December 16, 1987 of Judge Gerona. Under the facts of this case, the ex parte
discharge or suspension of the attachment is a disservice to the orderly administration of justice and nullifies the underlying role
and purpose of preliminary attachment in preserving the rights of the parties pendente lite as an ancillary remedy.
The court therefore sustained the position of BPI that the Court of Appeals, in its judgment presently under challenge, did not err in
upholding the continuing and uninterrupted validity and enforceability of the writ of preliminary attachment issued in Civil Case No.
48849 since the order of discharge and, later, the order of suspension of the trial court were void and could not have created the
operational lacuna in its effectivity as claimed by petitioners. Further, the cancellation of the annotations regarding the levy on
attachment of petitioners' properties, procured by the sheriff pursuant to the aforesaid invalid orders, is likewise a nullity and
another levy thereon is not required. We observe, however, that the records do not disclose the lifting of the levy on the Bataan
shares of Eastman and the Mapuas and on their real properties in Caloocan City.
Thus, as correctly posited by BPI, before the determination of the liability of Eastman and the Mapuas after trial on the merits, the
writ of preliminary attachment may properly issue. Even assuming that when Eastman and the Mapuas asked for the lifting of the
attachment they presented evidence that they were guarantors and not sureties of Peroxide, the trial court could not have admitted
such evidence or ruled upon that issue since the same could be entertained only after a full-blown trial and not before then.27
Otherwise, we would have the procedural absurdity wherein the trial court would be forced to decide in advance and preempt in an
auxiliary proceeding an issue which can and should be determined only in a trial on the merits.
The proceeding in the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, as a mere provisional remedy, is ancillary to an action
commenced at or before the time when the attachment is sued out. Accordingly the attachment does not affect the decision of the
case on the merits, the right to recover judgment on the alleged indebtedness and the right to attach the property of the debtor
being entirely separate and distinct. As a rule, the judgment in the main action neither changes the nature nor determines the
validity of the attachment.28 At any rate, whether said petitioners are guarantors or sureties, there exists a valid cause of action

against them and their properties were properly attached on the basis of that indubitable circumstance.
G.R. No. L-50378 SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA
FACTS: On August 2, 1977, Filinvest Credit Corporation (hereinafter referred to as FILINVEST) filed a complaint in the lower court
against defendants Rallye Motor Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as RALLYE) and Emesto Salazar for the collection of a sum of
money with damages and preliminary writ of attachment.
The specific provision adverted to in the Affidavit of one Gil Mananghaya presented by Filinvest is Section 1(d) of Rule 57 which
includes "an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the
action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for the taking, detention or conversion of which the action is
brought" as one of the cases in which a "plaintiff or any proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered."
Judge Jorge R. Coquia (now Justice of the Court of Appeals), then presiding Judge of the lower court, granted the prayer for a writ of
attachment in an Order dated August 17, 1977.
More than a year later, in an Urgent Motion dated December 11, 1978, defendant Salazar prayed that the writ of preliminary
attachment issued ex parte and implemented solely against his property be recalled and/or quashed. He argued that when he
signed the promissory note and chattel mortgage on May 5, 1977 in favor of RALLYE, FILINVEST was hot vet his creditor or obligee,
therefore, he could not be said to have committed fraud when he contracted the obligation on May 5, 1977. Salazar added that as
the motor vehicle which was the object of the chattel mortgage and the consideration for the promissory note had admittedly not
been delivered to him by RALLYE, his repudiation of the loan and mortgage is more justifiable.
FILINVEST filed an Opposition, but on February 2, 1979, the court a quo, this time presided over by herein respondent Judge,
ordered the dissolution and setting aside of the writ of preliminary attachment issued on August 17, 1977 and the return to
defendant Salazar of all his properties attached by the Sheriff by virtue of the said writ.
FILINVEST filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order, and was subsequently allowed to adduce evidence to prove that
Salazar committed fraud as alleged in the affidavit of Gil Mananghaya earlier quoted. This notwithstanding, respondent Judge
denied the Motion in an Order dated April 4, 1979
On appeal, petitioner contends that the court below should not have issued the Orders dated February 2, 1979 and April 4, 1979 for
failure of private respondent Salazar to make a cash deposit or to file a counter-bond.
On the other hand, private respondent counters that the subject writ of preliminary attachment was improperly or irregularly issued
in the first place, in that it was issued ex parte without notice to him and without hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment already enforced by the Sheriff of Manila without Salazar's posting a
counter-replevin bond as required by Rule 57, Section 12 should be discharged for lack of due process
HELD: No. Nothing in the Rules of Court makes notice and hearing indispensable and mandatory requisites for the issuance of a writ
of attachment. The statement in the case of Blue Green Waters, Inc. vs. Hon. Sundiam and Tan 9 cited by private respondent, to the

effect that the order of attachment issued without notice to therein petitioner Blue Green Waters, Inc. and without giving it a
chance to prove that it was not fraudulently disposing of its properties is irregular, gives the wrong implication.
As clarified in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee in the same cited case, 10 a writ of attachment may be issued ex
parte. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 57, merely require that an applicant for an order of attachment file an affidavit and a bond: the
affidavit to be executed by the applicant himself or some other person who personally knows the facts and to show that
(1) there is a sufficient cause of action,

(2) the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 57,
(3) there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced, and
(4) the amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims; and the
bond to be "executed to the adverse party in an amount fixed by the judge, not exceeding the applicant's claim, conditioned that the
latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
We agree, however, with private respondents contention that a writ of attachment may be discharged without the necessity of
filing the cash deposit or counter-bond required by Section 12, Rule 57, cited by petitioner. The following provision of the same Rule
allows it:
Sec. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance.—The party whose property has been attached may also, at
any time either before or after the release of the attached property, or before any attachment shall have been actually levied, upon
reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the
action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued. If the
motion be made on affidavits on the part of the party whose property has been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor
may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or other evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was made. After hearing,
the judge shall order the discharge of the attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is not
cured forthwith."(Emphasis supplied)
The last sentence of the said provision, however, indicates that a hearing must be conducted by the judge for the purpose of
determining whether or not there reality was a defect in the issuance of the attachment. The question is: At this hearing, on whom
does the burden of proof lie? Under the circumstances of the present case, We sustain the ruling of the court a quo in its
questioned Order dated February 2, 1979 that it should be the plaintiff (attaching creditor), who should prove his allegation of
fraud.
G.R. No. 43461 DECEMBER 16, 1937

J. UY KIMPANG & Co.v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS On December 20, 1925 the plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Antique a verified complaint in which it alleged
among other things that the defendants were indebted to it in the sum of P9,352 plus interest from May, 1918, at the rate of 12 per
cent per annum; that the defendants were disposing or about to dispose of their properties with intent to defraud their creditors
and the plaintiff; that in order to secure plaintiff's rights, it was necessary to attach the properties of said defendants, unless they
were willing to execute an obligation as a guaranty for their solvency; and that to obtain such remedy, it was ready to execute the
requisite obligation. Four days later, or on December 24, 1925, the plaintiff filed a motion in which, after reiterating the allegations
of its complaint, it was prayed that a writ of attachment be issued against the defendants. The justice of the peace of the capital of
Antique, acting in the place of the Judge of the Court of First Instance of said province, ruled favorably on the plaintiff's motion.
After the plaintiff had executed the obligation in the sum of P9,500 as required in this order, the clerk, under the authority of said
order, issued on December 29, 1925 the writ of attachment in question, notwithstanding the fact that the aforesaid obligation
was not yet approved.

The provincial sheriff, upon receipt of the writ, attached the properties belonging to the defendants and enumerated in the sheriff's
return, the assessed value of which was noted at the bottom of said return.
On the same day, December 29, 1925, the defendants executed a counterobligation in the sum of P9,500 with a view to
dissolving the attachment levied upon their properties. Said counterbond, which was approved on the same date by the justice of
the peace who issued the order of attachment, was signed by all the defendants and their sureties Juan Autajay and Severino
Magbanua who bound themselves jointly and severally thereunder.
On March 29, 1926, Juan Autajay prayed that he be permitted to withdraw from his obligation as surety of the defendants.
Trial court denied the motion in its order
Two other similar motions were filed by Autajay and by the surety Magbanua on November 21 and December 17, 1927, but they
were not acted upon by the court for lack of prosecution. On January 31, 1930 , Autajay filed another motion for the same purpose.
To this last motion, the plaintiff objected; but the trial court granted the same under the conditions expressed: "said defendants
are given sixty days within which to submit to the court for approval another obligation in substitution for the one to be rendered
ineffective by the withdrawal of the surety Juan Autajay."
ISSUE # 1: Whether or not the justice of the peace of the capital acting "in the absence of the Judge of First Instance" has the power
to issue an order of attachment in spite of the fact that the amount litigated is in excess of that fixed by law for his ordinary
jurisdiction.
HELD # 1: Yes. Section 1, paragraph 4, of Act No. 2131 which was in force on December 24, 1925, the date of the attachment,
provides that the justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act, in the absence of
the judge of the province, may exercise within the province like interlocutory jurisdiction as that of the said judge, including the
appointment of receivers and the issuance of all other orders which are not final and do not involve, as the attachment under
consideration, a decision of the case on its merits.
The defendants failed to prove that the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Antique was then holding sessions in said province;
and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the legal presumption being that official duty has been regularly performed (sec. 334,
No. 14, Act No. 190), it must be held that said judge was absent from his district on December 24, 1925. It must follow that the
justice of the peace of the capital acted in full conformity with the law in issuing the aforesaid order.
ISSUE # 2:
Whether or not the writ was properly issued since it was not signed by the judge who authorized its issuance
HELD # 2: Yes. There is no doubt that, under the provisions of sections 425, 426 and 427 of Act No. 190, only the justices, judges of
First Instance, and justices of the peace or municipal judges may issue an order of attachment when prayed for, provided the legal
requisites are present. In the case at bar all the requirements of the law were complied with. Inasmuch as the order of December
24, 1925 under which the questioned writ of attachment was issued, was entered by a competent judge, it cannot be alleged that
said writ was a mere capricious act of the clerk. On the contrary, it may and should be inferred that the writ was issued in strict
compliance with a perfectly valid order given to him. The law does not provide or state that the writs of attachment must be issued
by the very justice or judge who is to authorize it; it simply determines the judicial authority who shall have the power to grant an
attachment. Even supposing that the writ in dispute is defective because it was not signed by the judge who authorized its issuance,
it is now too late to raise the question after the same was accepted and believed to be valid not only by the defendants but by their
sureties. It is noteworthy that in their counter-obligation they made it understood that they were aware of the issuance of a writ of
attachment against the defendants; that the properties of the latter had been attached by the sheriff; that all wanted or at least
prayed that said attachment be discharged; and that they offered to execute, as in fact they immediately did execute, the counter -
obligation required. The general rule is that "irregularities and defects in attachment or garnishment proceedings which render the
attachment merely voidable and not void, are deemed to be waived unless promptly taken advantage of by appropriate mode of
raising objection thereto."
Inasmuch as both the defendants and the sureties appellees, by executing the counter-obligation required by law for the discharge
of the attachment, had accepted the obligation filed by the plaintiff with the justice of the peace of the capital for the issuance of

the writ of attachment against the defendants, it is now too late and futile to allege that the said obligation is invalid for lack of
approval by the judge. They are estopped from doing so by their own acts, inasmuch as their failure to question the said obligation
at the proper time constitutes a waiver of their right. One who has any objection to the sufficiency or validity of an obligation in
attachment proceedings, should record the same before executing the counter-obligation required for the discharge of the
attachment; otherwise, it will be understood that he does not question, or that he renounces his right to question, the sufficiency or
validity of the said obligation.
G.R. No. 124642 FEBRUARY 23, 2004

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION.
FACTS: The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21,
1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the
₱12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo
Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.
In its application for a writ of preliminary attachment, the ABC averred that the "defendants are guilty of fraud in incurring the
obligations upon which the present action is brought in that they falsely represented themselves to be in a financial position to pay
their obligation upon maturity thereof." Its supporting affidavit stated, inter alia, that the "[d]efendants have removed or disposed
of their properties, or [are] ABOUT to do so, with intent to defraud their creditors."
On July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the
name of Alfredo Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband
during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974.
Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner
Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She, likewise, alleged that being
the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties.
RTC: Lifting the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to return the said stocks to the
petitioners.
CA: rendered judgment granting the petition and setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court contending that the petitioner
Encarnacion T. Ching was not a party in the trial court; hence, she had no right of action to have the levy annulled with a motion for
that purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not third parties can file motion to quash the writ of preliminary attachment.
HELD: YES. ENCARNACION CHING had the (1) right to file the motion to set aside the writ, although she was not a party in the Civil
Case.
In Ong v. Tating, the SC held that the sheriff may attach only those properties of the defendant against whom a writ of attachment
has been issued by the court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the property of a third person in which
the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution may be invoked
by the aggrieved third person in the same case.
Upon application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff
has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment, more specifically if he has
indeed levied on attachment and taken hold of property not belonging to the plaintiff.

The aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the (2) remedy of "terceria" by executing an affidavit of his title or right of
possession over the property levied on attachment and serving the same to the office making the levy and the adverse party.
Such party may also file (3) an action to nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful levy and seizure, which should be
a totally separate and distinct action from the former case.
The above-mentioned remedies (Motion to Set Aside, “Terceria”, and Action to nullify the levy with Damages) are cumulative and
any one of them may be resorted to by one third-party claimant without availing of the other remedies.
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of
petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband
under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for
said relief.
G.R. No. 83897 NOVEMBER 9,1990

UY v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On March 24, 1982, Esteban B. Uy, Jr. (herein petitioner) filed a complaint against Sy Yuk Tat for sum of money, damages,
with preliminary attachment. On the same day, upon plaintiff filing a bond of P232,780.00 said court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment and appointed Deputy Sheriff Nilo S. Cabang (co-petitioner herein) as Special Sheriff to implement the writ. On the
following day, April 7, 1982, petitioner Cabang began to implement the writ of preliminary attachment .
On April 12, 1982, a third party claim was filed by Wilson Ting and Yu Hon (private respondents herein) in the same Civil Case,
addressed to petitioner Cabang asserting ownership over the properties attached. The third party claimants and Yu filed a motion to
dissolve the aforementioned writ of preliminary attachment in the same Civil Case No. Q-34782, alleging among others, that being
the absolute owners of the personal properties listed in their third party claim which were illegally seized from them they were
willing to file a counterbond for the return thereof. Such motion was opposed by plaintiff Uy.
Meanwhile, in the first case, plaintiff Uy on June 7, 1982, filed an ex-parte motion for writ of execution which was granted the
following day, June 8, 1982.
On the same day (June 7, 1982) plaintiff Uy filed his exparte motion for writ of execution he and Cabang filed a motion to quash or
dissolve status quo order in the case a quo as defendants therein on the ground that the court "has no jurisdiction to interfere with
properties under custodia legis on orders of a court of co-equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction" and that plaintiffs' complaint is not for
recovery of properties in question.
On August 23, 1982, plaintiffs Ting and Yu Hon filed a motion for preliminary attachment. Acting on such motion the court a quo, on
August 24, 1982, issued the disputed order granting the writ of preliminary attachment prayed for by the plaintiffs. Defendant Uy
filed an urgent motion to quash and/or dissolve preliminary attachment which motion was opposed by plaintiffs Ting and Yu Hon.
ISSUE: W/N the properties levied and seized by virtue of a writ of attachment and later by a writ of execution, were under custodia
legis and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of another co-equal court where a third party claimant claimed ownership of the
same properties.
HELD: The issue has long been laid to rest in the case of Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. v. Ramos where the Court filed that while
it is true that property in custody of the law may not be interfered with, without the permission of the proper court, this rule is
confined to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interests. But when
the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not apply and interference with his

custody is not interference with another court's order of attachment.

The power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment
debtor.
The levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority of the court
only when the property levied upon belongs to the defendant. If he attaches properties other than those of the defendant, he acts
beyond the limits of this authority. The court issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce its authority only over properties of
the judgment debtor. Should a third party appear to claim the property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down by the
Rules is that such claim should be the subject of a separate and independent action.
The sale of the disputed properties at the public auction, in satisfaction of a judgment of a co-equal court does not render the case
moot and academic. The undeviating ruling of this Court in such cases is that attachment and sale of properties belonging to a third
person is void because such properties cannot be attached and sold at public auction for the purpose of enforcing a judgment
against the judgment debtor.
GR NO. 49188 JANUARY 30 1990

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Amelia Tan commenced a complaint for damages before the Court of First instance against PAL. The court rendered a
judgement in favour of Amelia Tan.
PAL filed its appeal with the CA, and the court affirmed the judgement of the lower court with the modification that PAL is
condemned to pay the sum of P25,000 for damages and P5,000 for attorney’s fee.
Judgment became final and executory and was correspondingly entered in the case, which was remanded to the trial court for
execution. The trial court upon the motion of Amelia Tan issued an order of execution with the corresponding writ in favor of the
respondent. Said writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Reyes for enforcement.
Four months later, Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, stating that the judgment rendered by the lower
court, and affirmed with modification by the CA, remained unsatisfied. PAL opposed the motion, stating that it had already fully paid
its obligation to plaintiff through the issuance of checks payable to the deputy sheriff who later did not appear with his return and
instead absconded.
The CA denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature. After two months the CA granted her an alias writ of execution for
the full satisfaction of the judgment rendered, when she filed another motion. Deputy Sheriff del Rosario is appointed special sheriff
for enforcement thereof.PAL filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no return of the writ had as yet
been made by Deputy Sheriff Reyes and that judgment debt had already been fully satisfied by the former as evidenced by the cash
vouchers signed and received by the executing sheriff. Deputy Sheriff del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the depository
bank of PAL, through its manager and garnished the latter’s deposit. Hence, PAL brought the case to the Supreme Court and filed a
petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: 1. W/N an alias writ of execution can be issued without prior return of the original writ by the implementing officer.
2. W/N payment made in checks to the sheriff and under his name is a valid payment to extinguish judgment of debt.
HELD: 1. YES. technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for execution is the fruit and end of the
suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. A judgment cannot be rendered nugatory by the unreasonable application of a strict
rule of procedure. Vested rights were never intended to rest on the requirement of a return, the office of which is merely to inform
the court and the parties, of any and all actions taken under the writ of execution. Where such information can be established in

some other manner, the absence of an executing officer's return will not preclude a judgment from being treated as discharged or
being executed through an alias writ of execution as the case may be. More so, as in the case at bar. Where the return cannot be
expected to be forthcoming, to require the same would be to compel the enforcement of rights under a judgment to rest on an
impossibility, thereby allowing the total avoidance of judgment debts. So long as a judgment is not satisfied, a plaintiff is entitled to
other writs of execution. It is a well known legal maxim that he who cannot prosecute his judgment with effect, sues his case vainly.
The issuance of the questioned alias writ of execution under the circumstances here obtaining is justified because even with the
absence of a Sheriffs return on the original writ, the unalterable fact remains that such a return is incapable of being obtained (sic)
because the officer who is to make the said return has absconded and cannot be brought to the Court despite the earlier order of
the court for him to appear for this purpose. (Order of Feb. 21, 1978, Annex C, Petition). Obviously, taking cognizance of this
circumstance, the order of May 11, 1978 directing the issuance of an alias writ was therefore issued. (Annex D. Petition). The need
for such a return as a condition precedent for the issuance of an alias writ was justifiably dispensed with by the court below and its
action in this regard meets with our concurrence. A contrary view will produce an abhorent situation whereby the mischief of an
erring officer of the court could be utilized to impede indefinitely the undisputed and awarded rights which a prevailing party
rightfully deserves to obtain and with dispatch. The final judgment in this case should not indeed be permitted to become illusory or
incapable of execution for an indefinite and over extended period, as had already transpired.
2. NO. The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks. The checks were
not payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press but to the absconding sheriff.In the absence of an agreement, either express or
implied, payment means the discharge of a debt or obligation in money and unless the parties so agree, a debtor has no rights,
except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of payment of his debt. Strictly speaking, the acceptance
by the sheriff of the petitioner’s checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt. The check
as a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself,
operate as payment. A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment
of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not
discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by
commercial document is actually realized
G.R. No. L-26449 MAY 15, 1969
LUZON STEEL CORPORATION v. JOSE O. SIA AND TIMES SURETY CO AND INSURANCE
FACTS: Luzon Steel Corporation has sued Metal Manufacturing of the Philippines and Jose O. Sia, the former's manager, for breach
of contract and damages. It obtained a writ of preliminary attachment of the properties of the defendants, but the attachment was
lifted upon a P25,000.00 counterbond executed by the defendant Sia, as principal, and the Times Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
(hereinafter designated as the surety), as solidary guarantor, in the following terms:
WHEREFORE, we JOSE O. SIA, as principal and the TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., as Surety, in consideration of the

dissolution of attachment, hereby jointly and severally bind ourselves in the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00), Philippine Currency, to answer for the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment it may recover in the action in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court. (pp. 32, 45, Rec. on Appeal.)
Issues having been joined, plaintiff and defendant (without intervention of the surety) entered into a compromise whereby
defendant Sia agreed to settle the plaintiff's claim in the following manner:
1. That the defendant shall settle with the Plaintiff the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS, in the
following manner: FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS, monthly for the first six (6) months to be paid at the end of every
month and to commence in January, 1965, and within one month after paying the last installment of P500.00, the balance
of P22,000.00 shall be paid in lump sum, without interest. It is understood that failure of the Defendant to pay one or any
installment will make the whole obligation immediately due and demandable and that a writ of execution will be issued
immediately against Defendants bond. The defendant failed to pay and plaintiff moved for the execution of the writ.
The compromise was submitted to the court and the latter approved it, rendered judgment in conformity therewith, and directed
the parties to comply with the same
ISSUES: (1) whether the judgment upon the compromise discharged the surety from its obligation under its attachment
counterbond NO; and
(2) whether the writ of execution could be issued against the surety without previous exhaustion of the debtor's properties YES
HELD: 1. Under section 12, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court, the bond filed, as in this case, for the discharge of an attachment is "to
secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released".
It follows that the order of cancellation issued by the respondent judge is erroneous. Indeed, judgment had already been rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No. 11748, sentencing Benjamin Aguilar to pay the sum of P3,500.00 to the
petitioner; and it is not pretended that said judgment is a nullity. There is no point in the contention of the respondent Surety
Company that the compromise was entered into without its knowledge and consent, thus becoming as to it essentially fraudulent.
The Surety is not a party to civil case No. 11748 and, therefore, need not be served with notice of the petition for judgment. As
against the conjecture of said respondent that the parties may easily connive by means of a compromise to prejudice it, there is also
the likelihood that the same end may be attained by parties acting in bad faith through a simulated trial. At any rate, it is within the
power of the Surety Company to protect itself against a risk of the kind.
Wherefore, the order of the respondent Judge cancelling the bond in question is set aside. So ordered with costs against the
respondent Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
The lower court and the appellee herein appear to have relied on doctrines of this Court concerning the liability of sureties in bonds
filed by a plaintiff for the issuance of writs of attachment, without discriminating between such bonds and those filed by a
defendant for the lifting of writs of attachment already issued and levied. This confusion is hardly excusable considering that this
Court has already called attention to the difference between these kinds of bonds. Thus, in Cajefe vs. Judge Fernandez, et al., L-
15709, 19 October 1960, this Court pointed out that —
The diverse rule in section 17 of Rule 59 for counterbonds posted to obtain the lifting of a writ of attachment is due to
these bonds being security for the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may obtain; they are thus mere
replacements of the property formerly attached, and just as the latter may be levied upon after final judgment in the case
in order to realize the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the countersureties ascertainable after the judgment has
become final. This situation does not obtain in the case of injunction counterbonds, since the sureties in the latter case
merely undertake "to pay all damages that the plaintiff may suffer by reason of the continuance ... of the acts complained
of" (Rule 60, section 6) and not to secure payment of the judgment recovered.
2. The surety's contention is untenable. The counterbond contemplated in the rule is evidently an ordinary guaranty where the
sureties assume a subsidiary liability. This is not the case here, because the surety in the present case bound itself "jointly and
severally" (in solidum) with the defendant; and it is prescribed in Article 2059, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code of the Philippines
that excusion (previous exhaustion of the property of the debtor) shall not take place "if he (the guarantor) has bound himself

solidarily with the debtor". The rule heretofore quoted cannot be construed as requiring that an execution against the debtor be
first returned unsatisfied even if the bond were a solidary one; for a procedural rule may not amend the substantive law expressed
in the Civil Code, and further would nullify the express stipulation of the parties that the surety's obligation should be solidary with
that of the defendant.
A second reason against the stand of the surety and of the court below is that even if the surety's undertaking were not solidary
with that of the principal debtor, still he may not demand exhaustion of the property of the latter, unless he can point out sufficient
leviable property of the debtor within Philippine territory. There is no record that the appellee surety has done so. Says Article 2060
of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the creditor
upon the latter's demand for payment from him, and point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within
Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.
A third reason against the thesis of appellee is that, under the rule and its own terms, the counter-bond is only conditioned upon
the rendition of the judgment. Payment under the bond is not made to depend upon the delivery or availability of the property
previously attached, as it was under Section 440 of the old Code of Civil Procedure. Where under the rule and the bond the
undertaking is to pay the judgment, the liability of the surety or sureties attaches upon the rendition of the judgment, and the issue
of an execution and its return nulla bona is not, and should not be, a condition to the right to resort to the bond.
G.R. No. 155868 FEBRUARY 6, 2007

SPOUSES GREGORIO and JOSEFA YU v. NGO YET TE
FACTS: Spouses Yu purchased from Te bars of detergent soap worth ₱594,240.00, and issued to the latter three postdated checks as
payment of the purchase price. When Te presented the checks at maturity for encashment, said checks were returned dishonored
and stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED". Te demanded payment from Spouses Yu but the latter did not heed her demands. Acting through
her son and attorney-in-fact, Charry Sy (Sy), Te filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Valenzuela, Metro manila, a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment.
In support of her prayer for preliminary attachment, Te attached to her Complaint an Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were
guilty of fraud in entering into the purchase agreement for they never intended to pay the contract price, and that, based on
reliable information, they were about to move or dispose of their properties to defraud their creditors.
Upon Te’s posting of an attachment bond, the RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levydated March 29, 1993 on the basis of which
Sheriff Alimurung of RTC, Cebu City levied and attached Spouses Yu’s properties in Cebu City consisting of one parcel of land (known
as Lot No. 11)and four units of motor vehicle.
Spouses Yu: filed an answer with counterclaimfor damages arising from the wrongful attachment of their properties, They also filed
an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
The RTC discharge from attachment the Toyota Ford Fierra, jeep, and Canter delivery van on humanitarian grounds, but maintained
custody of Lot No. 11 and the passenger bus. Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied.
Dissatisfied, they filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, which rendered decision lifting the RTC Order of Attachment on their
remaining properties, on the ground that the Complaint and Affidavit only contains general averments and failed to state
particularly how fraud was committed by petitioners.
It appears that the order of attachment was upheld because of the admitted financial reverses the petitioner is undergoing.
Insolvency is not a ground for attachment especially when defendant has not been shown to have committed any act intended to

defraud its creditors x x
For lack of factual basis to justify its issuance, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the respondent court was improvidently
issued and should be discharged.
Te filed with us a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC, but was denied for having been filed late and failure to show that
CA committed error. Thus, the finding of the CA on the wrongfulness of the attachment/levy of the properties of Spouses Yu
became conclusive and binding.
The RTC, however, apparently not informed of SCs decision, ruled in favor of herein respondents. On their appeal with CA, Spouses
Yu questioned only that portion of the July 20, 1994 Decision where the RTC declined to rule on their counterclaim for damages.
However, Spouses Yu did not dispute the specific monetary awards granted to respondent Te; and therefore, the same have
become final and executory. The CA, while affirming RTCs decision in toto, made a ruling on the counterclaim of Spouses Yu by
declaring that the latter had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of their entitlement to damages. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages for wrongful attachment is proper.
HELD: NO
Spouses Yu contended that they are entitled to their counterclaim for damages as a matter of right after Te wrongfully caused the
attachment of the properties as it suggested that Te acted with malice.
The SC ruled that the counterclaim disputed therein was not for moral damages and therefore, there was no need to prove malice.
In Lazatin v. Twaño, the Court laid down the rule that where there is wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant may recover
actual damages even without proof that the attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in obtaining the attachment. However, if it is
alleged and established that the attachment was not merely wrongful but also malicious, the attachment defendant may recover
moral damages and exemplary damages as well. Either way, the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic
award of damages to the attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of the
loss or injury incurred by reason of the wrongful attachment.
The Court also held that petitioners are not relieved of the burden of proving the basis of their counterclaim for damages. To merit
an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant must prove, with the best evidence
obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only
capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. As to its amount, the same must be measurable
based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits,
the amount of unrealized profits must be established and supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business
undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.
The SC also affirmed CAs finding that spouses Yu failed to prove their counterclaim of actual damages by relying mainly on
submission of used and unused ticket stubs and ticket sales for five (5) days. Thus, Spouses Yu cannot complain that they were
unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger bus by reason of the subsequent wrongful attachment. Nor can they also
attribute to the wrongful attachment their failure to earn income or profit from the operation of the passenger bus. The submitted
basis is too speculative and conjectural. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of profitability necessary
to prove the amount of actual damages were presented.
As to moral and exemplary damages, to merit an award thereof, it must be shown that the wrongful attachment was obtained by
the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad faith, such as by appending a false affidavit to his application. The SC did not grant moral
and exemplary damages. Based on the foregoing testimony, it is not difficult to understand why Te concluded that Spouses Yu never
intended to pay their obligation for they had available funds in their bank but chose to transfer said funds instead of cover the
checks they issued.
Petitioners were, however, awarded temperate or moderate damages of P50,000 for pecuniary loss when their properties were
wrongfully seized.

G.R. No. 84979 NOVEMBER 6, 1989

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO. INC. V. CA ET. AL
FACTS: In a complaint filed against private respondent Jose Orosa, therein plaintiff FCP Credit Corporation prayed that a writ of
replevin be issued against private respondent Jose Orosa ordering the seizure of the motor vehicle covered by a chattel mortgage
executed in favor of said plaintiff. Upon the filing of an affidavit of merit and a replevin bond put up by petitioner Stronghold
Insurance Co., Inc. in the amount of P210,000.00, a writ of replevin was issued by the court a quo. However, the trial court ruled
against plaintiff and rendered a decision in favor of private respondent Orosa.
An application for judgment on the bond was thereafter filed by private respondent Orosa. The hearing on the application was
scheduled on April 29, 1988, but the herein private respondent Orosa and his counsel failed to appear therein. Consequently,
petitioner’s counsel orally moved for the denial of said application for judgment on the bond, but the court below denied said
motion and declared all incidents submitted for resolution.
The trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal upon respondent Orosa’s filing of a bond in the amount of
P500,000.00. The special reasons cited by the court for said immediate execution are (1) "defendant’s willingness to file a required
bond to answer for damages in the case of reversal of the judgment" and (2) "the plaintiff is in imminent danger of insolvency or
dissolution."
Respondent Deputy Sheriff Jaime Del Rosario, by virtue of the order of execution pending appeal, levied upon the properties of
petitioner and garnished its funds with Far East Bank and United Coconut Planters Bank.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. Eventually, the application
for a writ of injunction referred to by petitioner was granted by the Court of Appeals on August 26, 1988. Nevertheless, the same
writ was lifted and set aside when the petition for certiorari was dismissed in a decision promulgated by respondent court in
another case.
ISSUE (1): Whether or not private respondent’s application for judgement on bond was proper?
HELD (1): YES. The rule is clear that where the judgment in an action is in favor of the party against whom the writ of replevin was
issued, he may recover damages resulting therefrom and the replevin bond required under Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court
may be held to answer for this purpose. The procedure to hold the surety liable upon the replevin bond is provided for under
Section 10 of the same rule in relation to Section 20 of Rule 57. Compliance with the following requisites is essential:
". . . (1) the filing of an application therefor with the Court having jurisdiction of the action; (2) the presentation
thereof before the judgment becomes executory (or before the trial or before appeal is perfected); (3) the statement in
said application of the facts showing the applicant’s right to damages and the amount thereof; (4) the giving of due notice
of the application to the attaching creditor and his surety or sureties and (5) the holding of a proper hearing at which the
attaching creditor and sureties may be heard on the application. These requisites apply not only in cases of seizure or
delivery under Rule 60, but also in cases of preliminary injunctions under Rule 58, and receiverships under Rule 59."
To avoid multiplicity of suits, all incidents arising from the same controversy must be settled in the same court having jurisdiction of
the main action. Thus, the application for damages must be filed in the court which took cognizance of the case, with due notice to
the other parties.
The timeliness of the application for judgment on the bond in this case, as well as the motion for immediate execution, is apparent
because it was filed before the appeal was perfected. The fact that one of the parties had filed a notice of appeal does not perfect
such appeal. An appeal is perfected upon the lapse of the last day for all parties to appeal.
It should also be noted that the filing of the application for judgment on the bond by private respondent Orosa was in the nature of

a motion for reconsideration under Section 1 (c), Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, which consequently had the effect of interrupting
the period to appeal. This being so, the order holding in abeyance plaintiff’s notice of appeal was not even necessary and was an
apparent superfluity.
Petitioner nevertheless claims that there was failure to hold a proper hearing. Such requirement, however, has been held to mean
that "the hearing will be summary and will be limited to such new defenses, not previously set up by the principal, as the surety may
allege and offer to prove. The oral proof of damages already adduced by the claimant may be reproduced without the necessity of
retaking the testimony, but the surety should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or witnesses if he so desires." In
the present case, as respondent court correctly pointed out, petitioner did not allege and offer to prove any new defense not
previously set up by the principal.
ISSUE (2): Whether the execution pending appeal was proper?
HELD (2): NO. We cannot, however, sanction the execution pending appeal which was authorized in this case. The order for advance
execution must be struck down for lack of the requisite good reasons therefor. It is already settled that the mere filing of a bond
does not warrant execution pending appeal. To consider the mere filing of a bond a good reason would precisely make immediate
execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception.
The alleged imminent danger of insolvency of plaintiff FCP Credit Corporation does not also constitute a good reason for immediate
execution.
G.R. No. 74696 NOVEMBER 11, 1987
JOSE D. CALDERON v. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G. R. No. 73916 NOVEMBER 11, 1987
FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: Petitioner Calderon purchased from the private respondents the following: the Luzon Brokerage Corporation (LBC for
brevity) and its five (5) affiliate companies.
Twenty one (21) days after the purchase, the Bureau of Customs suspended the operations of LBC for failure to pay the amount of
P1,475,840.00 representing customs taxes and duties incurred prior to the execution of the sale. In order to lift the suspension
Calderon paid the sum of P606,430.00 to the Bureau of Customs.
Hence, Calderon filed a complaint against private respondents to recover said amount of P1,475,840.00, with damages by reason of
breach of warranty. In the same complaint, the petitioner prayed for a preliminary attachment, alleging: that private respondents
had deliberately and willfully concealed from his knowledge such staggering liability of the LBC for the purpose of misleading him
into buying the six aforesaid companies; and that private respondent Schulze is about to depart from the Philippines in order to
defraud his creditors.
He further alleged that while the liabilities of LBC are reflected in its books, the aforesaid amount was fraudulently withdrawn and
misappropriated by private respondent Schulze.
To support the petition for preliminary attachment, the petitioner posted a surety bond of P1,475,840.00. The trial court issued a

writ of preliminary attachment, whereupon properties of the private respondents were attached and their bank deposits were
garnished.
Respondent argues that these deposit payments were properly recorded in the books of the corporation and existing as part of the
corporate funds; that from the first week of June, 1976 up to October 30, 1976, private respondent Schulze fully disclose and
explained to Calderon that these customer's advanced deposit payments (including those of the PRC) are to be paid to the Bureau
of Customs when their corresponding customs taxes and duties become due; and that Calderon had the chance to examine the
corporate books.
Trial Court: After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding Calderon and his surety First integrated Bonding and
Insurance Co., Inc., jointly and severally liable to pay the damages prayed for by the private respondents.
Court of Appeals: Said decision was affirmed on appeal, although slightly modified in the sense that the award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of private respondents Schulze and Amor was reduced.
ISSUE (1): Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was issued maliciously?
HELD (1): YES. Whether or not the amount of P1,475,840.00 was duly disclosed as an outstanding liability of LBC or was
misappropriated by private respondent Schulze is purely a factual issue. That Calderon was clearly in bad faith when he asked for
the attachment is indicated by the fact that he failed to appear in court to support his charge of misappropriation by Schulze, and in
effect, preventing his being cross-examined, no document on the charges was presented by him. The SC stressed the findings of the
CA:
The record shows that appellant Calderon failed to produce any evidence in support of his sworn charge that
appellee Schulze had deliberately and willfully concealed the liabilities of Luzon Brokerage Corporation. Neither did
appellant Calderon prove his sworn charges that appellee Schulze had maliciously and fraudulently withdrawn and
misappropriated the amount of Pl,475,840.00 and that an the defendants had maliciously and fraudulently concealed and
withheld from him this alleged liability of Luzon Brokerage Corporation in breach of the contract-warranty that said
corporation had no obligations or liabilities except those appearing in the books and records of the said corporation.
But even though appellant Calderon failed to prove his serious charges of fraud, malice and bad faith, the
appellees took it upon themselves to show that they did not conceal or withhold from appellant's knowledge the deposits
made by Philippine Refining Co., Inc. with Luzon Brokerage Corporation and that they did not withdraw and misappropriate
the deposits made by Philippine Refining Co., Inc. with Luzon Brokerage Corporation.
It is evident from the foregoing that the attachment was maliciously sued out and that as already pointed out Schulze was not in bad
faith.
ISSUE (2): Whether or not private respondents are entitled to damages by virtue of the malicious attachment?
HELD (2): YES. While as a general rule, the liability on the attachment bond is limited to actual damages, moral and exemplary
damages may be recovered where the attachment was alleged to be maliciously sued out and established to be so.
We believe, however, that in the light of the factual situation in this case, the damages awarded by the Intermediate Appellate
Court are rather excessive. They must be reduced.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of said Appellate Court is hereby modified as follows: Both petitioner Calderon and petitioner
First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc. are hereby ordered to give jointly and severally:
1. Respondent George Schulze, P250,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
3. Respondent Antonio C. Amor, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE (3): Whether or not the filing of a counterbond signifies a waiver of the defect or flaw in the issuance of the writ of
attachment?

HELD (3): NO. Specifically, petitioner surety contends that the dissolution of the attachment extinguishes its obligation under the
bond, for the basis of its liability, which is wrongful attachment, no longer exists, the attachment bond having been rendered void
and ineffective, by virtue of Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. (p. 5, Petition)
While Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides that upon the filing of a counterbond, the attachment is discharged or
dissolved, nowhere is it provided that the attachment bond is rendered void and ineffective upon the filing of counterbond.
Equally untenable is the Surety's contention that by filing a counterbond, private respondents waived any defect or flaw in the
issuance of the attachment writ, for they could have sought, without need of filing any counterbond, the discharge of the
attachment if the same was improperly or irregularly issued, as provided in Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two (2) ways indicated in the law, i.e., by filing a counterbond or by
showing that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued, the liability of the surety on the attachment bond
subsists because the final reckoning is when "the Court shall finally adjudge that the attaching creditor was not entitled" to the
issuance of the attachment writ in the first place.
The attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing
himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. Moreover, the filing of a counterbond is a speedier way
of discharging the attachment writ maliciously sought out by the attaching creditor instead of the other way, which, in most
instances like in the present case, would require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot easily be
settled in a pending incident of the case.
G.R. No. L-57957, 29 DECEMBER 29 1982

ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: William Murphy filed a suit for collection of a sum of money against Mejorada. He likewise prayed for a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment which was granted by the Trial Court upon a bond of P250,000.00 issued by Zenith Insurance Corp (ZIC, for brevity) in
favor of Murphy. The Court decided in favor of Mejorada and ordered Murphy and ZIC to pay the former jointly and severally
damages against the attachment bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision subject to partial execution in the sum of
P115,680.55 granted pending appeal. Mejorada proceeded against and collected the balance of the bond. Later on, Mejorada
moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution to enforce the judgment award beyond the amount of the attachment bond,
which the Trial Court initially denied. But subsequently, upon Motion for Reconsideration holding that the surety’s liability is not
limited to the amount of the bond but includes all the actual and consequential damages suffered by Mejorada because of ZIC’s
malice and bad faith. CA upheld the Alias Writ of Execution. Reconsideration having been denied, ZIC filed the instant petition
claiming that its liability cannot exceed the amount of the attachment bond.
ISSUE: whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the Alias Writ of Execution making ZIC
solidarily liable for all costs and damages, or, for more than the amount of its bond.
HELD: ZIC’s liability is limited only to the amount of the bond (P250,000.00) because a guaranty is not presumed, it must be express
and cannot extend to more than what is stipulated therein (Art. 2055 Civil Code). When a surety executes a bond, it does not
guarantee that the plaintiff’s cause of action is meritorious, and that it will be responsible for all the costs that may be adjudicated
against Its principal in case the action fails (Rocco v. Meads, 96 Phil. 884 [1955]). The extent of a surety’s liability is determined only
by the clause of the contract of suretyship (Republic v. Umali, 22 SCRA 922 [1968]). It cannot be extended by implication, beyond
the terms of the contract (Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 18 SCRA 967 [1966]; Jao v. Royal Financing Corporation, 4 SCRA 1210
[1962]).

The phrase “all damages” in the pronouncement that ZIC is "equally liable with its principal for all damages sustained resulting from
the wrongful issuance of the Writ (of Preliminary Attachment)" refers to those resulting from the undertaking itself. It does not
mean that the surety is answerable for all costs and damages that may be adjudged against its principal, as it would be
unreasonable to expand ZIC’s liability for any and all amounts arising from the case as if it were a "solidary judgment debtor." When
a surety executes a bond, it does not guarantee that the plaintiff’s cause of action is meritorious, and that it will be responsible for
all the costs that may be adjudicated against principal in case the action fails. The extent of a surety’s liability is determined only by
the clause of the contract suretyship. It cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract.
G.R. No. 110086 JULY 19, 1999
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION
FACTS: McADORE and DECORP entered into a contract whereby DECORP shall provide electric power to McADORE's Hotel. During
the term of their contract for power service, DECORP noticed discrepancies between the actual monthly billings and the estimated
monthly billings of McADORE. Upon inspection, it was discovered that the terminal in the transformers connected to the meter had
been interchanged resulting in the slow rotation of the meter. Consequently, DECORP issued a corrected bill but McADORE refused
to pay. As a result of McADORE's failure and continued refusal to pay the corrected electric bills, DECORP disconnected power
supply to the hotel on November 27, 1978.
Aggrieved, McADORE commenced a suit against DECORP for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. McADORE
posted injunction bonds from several sureties, one of which was herein petitioner PARAMOUNT, which issued an injunction bond on
July 7, 1980 with a face amount of P500,000.00. Accordingly, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued wherein DECORP was
ordered to continue supplying electric power to the hotel and restrained from further disconnecting it.
After due hearing, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, renderedjudgment in favor of DECORP , rescinding the
service contract between the parties, and ordering McAdore to pay.
McADORE did not appeal the decision. PARAMOUNT, however, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
PARAMOUNT contended that it was not given its day in court because it was not notified by DECORP of its intention to present
evidence of damages against its injunction bond, as mandated by Sec. 9 of Rule 58, in relation to Sec. 20 of Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals was not convinced with petitioner's contentions. On April 30, 1993, it affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation was denied due process when the trial court found the
injunction bond it issued in favor of McADORE liable to DECORP.
HELD: NO. Injunction is an extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve the status quo of things and to prevent actual or threatened
acts violative of the rules of equity and good conscience as would consequently afford an injured party a cause of action resulting
from the failure of the law to provide for an adequate or complete relief. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of
an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. 7 Its sole purpose is not to correct a wrong of the past, in the sense of redress for injury already sustained, but
to prevent further injury. 8
A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when, among others, the applicant, unless exempted
by the court, files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an

amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. At the trial, the amount of damages to be
awarded to either party, upon the bond of the adverse party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure
prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 57.
Rule 57, Section 20, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is similarly applicable to preliminary injunction, pertinently provides:
Sec. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment. — An application for damages on account of
improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching obligee or his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to
damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment
on the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages
sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court with notice to the party in whose favor
the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate
court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued from recovering in the same action the
damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching obligee not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given
by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award. ( mutatis mutandis ).
In the case at bench, the trial court dismissed McADORE's action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and
eventually adjudged the payment of actual, moral, and exemplary damages against plaintiff-applicant. Consequently, private
respondent DECORP can proceed against the injunction bond posted by plaintiff-applicant to recover the damages occasioned by
the issuance by the trial court of the writ of injunction.
In order for the injunction bond to become answerable for the above-described damages, the following requisites must concur: 11
1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued;
2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and
3. After hearing with notice to the surety.
The records of this case reveal thatAtty. Nonito Cordero appeared as counsel for petitioner. PARAMOUNT as well as the other
sureties were properly notified of the hearing and given their day in court. Specifically, notice was sent to Atty. Cordero of the
hearing on April 27, 1985, which was set for the purpose of determining the liability of the sureties. The counterclaims for damages
of DECORP were proven at the trial and yet PARAMOUNT did not exert any effort to controvert the evidence presented by DECORP.
Given these circumstances, PARAMOUNT cannot hide under the cloak of non-liability on its injunction bond on the mere expediency
that it was deprived of due process.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

PARAMOUNT has only itself to blame when it did not make any opposition or objection during the hearing for the reception of
DECORP's evidence. Having manifested its desire to cancel its bond, it should have asked for a deferment of hearing on DECORP's
evidence but PARAMOUNT did not do anything of this sort. Only when an adverse judgment was rendered by the trial court against
its principal McAdore did it whimper a denial of procedural due process.
Contrary to petitioner's thesis, it is neither mandatory nor fatal that there should be a separate hearing in order that damages upon
the bond can be claimed, ascertained and awarded, as can be gleaned from a cursory reading of the provisions of Rule 57, Section
20.

Jurisprudential findings laid down the doctrine that a final adjudication that the applicant is not entitled to the injunction does not
suffice to make the surety liable. It is necessary, in addition, that the surety be accorded due process, that is, that it be given an
opportunity to be heard on the question of its solidary liability for damages arising from a wrongful injunction order. Withal, the fact
that the matter of damages was among the issues tried during the hearings on the merits will not render unnecessary or
superfluous a summary hearing to determine the extent of a surety's liability unless of course, the surety had been impleaded as a
party, or otherwise earlier notified and given opportunity to be present and ventilate its side on the matter during the trial.
The exception under the doctrinal ruling above noted is extant in the case at bar.
PARAMOUNT also argues that assuming it is liable on its injunction bond, its liability should be limited only to the amount of
damages accruing from the time the injunction bond was issued until the termination of the case, and not from the time the suit
was commenced. In short, it claims that the injunction bond is prospective and not retroactive in application.
This Court does not agree. Rule 58, Section 4(b), provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction.
PARAMOUNT further maintains that it is liable to pay actual damages only. However, Rule 58, Section 4(b), clearly provides that the
injunction bond is answerable for all damages. "The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no
ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be dissolved. Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to
account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all: (1) such damages; (2) costs and damages; (3) costs, damages and reasonable
attorney's fees as shall be incurred or sustained by the person enjoined in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully
issued."Thus, PARAMOUNT is liable, jointly and severally, for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and costs of the suit, to the extent of the amount of the bond.
The posting of a bond in connection with a preliminary injunction (or attachment under Rule 57, or receivership under Rule 59, or
seizure or delivery of personal property under Rule 60) does not operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from any and
all responsibility for the damages that the writ may thereby cause. It merely gives additional protection to the party against whom
the injunction is directed. It gives the latter a right of recourse against either the applicant or his surety, or against both.
In the same manner, when petitioner PARAMOUNT issued the bond in favor of its principal, it undertook to assume all the damages
that may be suffered after finding that the principal is not entitled to the relief being sought.

G.R. No. L-48820 MAY 25, 1979
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. v. HON. EMILIO V. SALAS
FACTS: This case is about the surety company's liability on its replevin bond which was not included in the final judgment against the
principal in the bond. In 1970 Makati Motor Sales, Inc., as vendor mortgagee, sued Rosendo Fernando for the recovery of four diesel
trucks and the connection of the balance of his obligation plus damages.
To obtain immediate possession of the trucks pending trial, Makati Motors Sales, Inc. posted a replevin bond executed by the
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. In that bond the surety bound itself to pay P362,775.92 "for the return of the property to the
defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum as may in the cause be recovered against the
plaintiff ". Pursuant to the order of the court, the sheriff seized the four trucks. Later, two of the trucks were returned to Fernando.
RTC: Rendered judgment ordering Makati Motor Sales, Inc. to return to Fernando the other two trucks and to pay him for the
seizure of each of them, damages in the sum of three hundred pesos daily from September 25 and 26, 1970 (or six hundred pesos
for the two trucks from the latter date) until their return to Fernando plus P26,000 as actual and moral damages. In turn, Fernando
was ordered to pay Makati Motor Sales, Inc. the sum of P66,998.34, as the balance of the price of the two trucks, with twelve
percent interest from February 28, 1969 until fully paid and the further sum of P15,730.20 as the cost of the repair with six percent
interest from September 11, 1970 until fully paid.
CA: Makati Motor Sales, Inc. appealed but CA affirmed the lower court's judgment.
Before the elevation of the record to the Court of Appeals, Fernando filed in the trial court an application for damages against the
replevin bond. It was opposed by the surety on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case because of the
perfection of the appeal.
RTC: Denied the application.
Fernando filed in the Court of Appeals his claim for damages against the replevin bond. He prayed that the same be included in the
judgment. The surety, which was furnished with a copy of the claim, filed an opposition to it.
CA: Ordered that his claim against Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. "be heard before the trial court".
After the remand of the record to the trial court, Fernando filed a motion to set for hearing his application for damages against the
surety on its replevin bond. The application was heard with notice to Makati Motor Sales, Inc. and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc
RTC: It directed Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. to pay Fernando the damages which it had adjudged against Makati Motor Sales, Inc.
The surety company appealed from that order to this Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction for claim for damages on account of illegal attachment.
HELD: YES.
Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that in replevin cases, as in receivership and injunction cases, the damages "to be
awarded to either party upon any bond filed by the other" "shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted" in accordance with section
20 of Rule 57 which reads:
SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of illegal attachment. — If the judgment on the action be in favor of the
party against whom attachment was issued, he may recover, upon the bond given or deposit made by the
attaching creditor, any damages resulting from the attachment. Such damages may be awarded only upon
application and after proper hearing, and shall be included in the final judgment. The application must be filed
before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the
attaching creditor and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount

thereof.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was issued, he must
claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court
becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court.
Under section 20, in order to recover damages on a replevin bond (or on a bond for preliminary attachment, injunction or
receivership) it is necessary (1) that the defendant-claimant has secured a favorable judgment in the main action, meaning that the
plaintiff has no cause of action and was not, therefore, entitled to the provisional remedy of replevin; (2) that the application for
damages, showing claimant's right thereto and the amount thereof, be filed in the same action before trial or before appeal is
perfected or before the judgment becomes executory; (3) that due notice be given to the other party and his surety or sureties,
notice to the principal not being sufficient and (4) that there should be a proper hearing and the award for damages should be
included in the final judgment.
In this appeal, Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. contends that the trial court's judgment against it is not warranted under section 20 of
Rule 57. It assails the trial court's competence to render judgment against the surety after the decision of the Court of Appeals
against the surety's principal had become final and executory.
We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to pass upon Fernando's application for the recovery of damages on the surety's
replevin bond. The reason is that Fernando seasonably filed his application for damages in the Court of Appeals. It was not his fault
that the damages claimed by him against the surety were not included in the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court's award of damages to Fernando payable by the principal in the replevin bond. The peculiar factual situation of this case
makes it an exception to the settled rule that the surety's liability for damages should be included in the final judgment to prevent
duplicity of suits or proceedings.
As may be gathered from section 20 of Rule 57, the application for damages against the surety must be filed (with notice to the
surety) in the Court of First Instance before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory.
If an appeal is taken, the application must be filed in the appellate court but always before the judgment of that court becomes
executory so that the award may be included in its judgment.
But it is not always mandatory that the appellate court should include in its judgment the award of damages against the surety.
Thus, it was held that where the application for damages against the surety is seasonably made in the appellate court, "the latter
must either proceed to hear and decide the application or refer "it" to the trial court and allow it to hear and decide the same".
We have stated earlier that in the instant case Fernando in 1974 made a timely claim in the Court of Appeals for an award of
damages against Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. enforceable against its replevin bond. The surety was notified of that application. It
registered an opposition to the claim. The Court of Appeals did not resolve the claim immediately but in its 1977 decision it directed
the trial court to hear that claim.
Obviously, the lower court has no choice but to implement that directive which is the law of the case.
However, the trial court's implementation of that directive was incorrect. It set the claim for hearing but the surety assailed its
jurisdiction and did not consider itself bound by the mandate of the appellate court. The merits of the claim for damages were not
threshed out at the hearing because the surety stood pat on its contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction to allow the claim
in view of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
This Court has held that, if the surety was not given notice when the claim for damages against the principal in the replevin bond
was heard, then as a matter of procedural due process the surety is entitled to be heard when the judgment for damages against
the principal is sought to be enforced against the surety's replevin bond.
The hearing will be summary and will be limited to such new defense, not previously set up by the principal, as the surety may

allege and offer to prove. The oral proof of damages already adduced by the claimant may be reproduced without the necessity of
retaking the testimony, but the surety should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or witnesses if it so desires."
That procedure would forestall the perpetration of fraud or collusion against the surety.
Inasmuch as in this case appellant Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. was not given the summary hearing during which it could contest the
reality or reasonableness of Fernando's claim for damages, we have to set aside the trial court's order awarding damages against it
and, in the interest of justice, give it another opportunity to be heard on the merits of Fernando's claim for damages.
Note that under the second paragraph of section 20, Rule 57 of the present Rules of Court, the damages suffered during the
pendency of an appeal in a case where the writs of attachment, injunction and replevin or an order of receivership were issued
should be claimed in the appellate court.
The damages are recoverable on the theory that an actionable wrong was committed by the losing party. The recovery is limited to
the amount of the bond.
The usual procedure is to file an application for damages with due notice to the other party and his sureties. The other part may
answer the application. Upon the issues thus being Joined, the matter will be tried and determined. A court order declaring the
bond confiscated without adhering to that procedure is void.
Section 20 of Rule 57 contemplates one judgment for damages against the principal and the surety in the injunction, replevin,
attachment and receivership bonds. Since the judicial bondsman has no right to demand the exhaustion of the property of the
principal debtor, there is no justification for entering separate judgments against them. The claim for damages against the surety
should be made before entry of judgment.
The procedure in section 20 of Rule 57 should not be confounded with the procedure in section 17 of the same rule regarding the
surety's liability on the counterbond for the lifting of the preliminary attachment. Under section 17, the surety may be held liable
after notice and summary hearing conducted after the judgment had become executory and the execution was returned unsatisfied.
It should be underscored that in the instant case, although the surety's liability was not included in the final judgment, which
became executory, nevertheless, there was a timely application for damages in the Court of Appeals which in its decision ordered
the trial court to hear defendant-appellee Fernando's claim for damages against the surety. That feature of the case removes it from
the coverage of the rule that the surety should be heard before the judgment becomes executory and that his liability should be
included in the final judgment.
G.R. No. L-27923 JULY 14, 1988

ZARAGOZA v. FIDELINO
FACTS: Fidelino failed to pay the sum of the purchase price of the car that she bought from Antonio Zaragoza. For failure to pay,
Zaragoza filed an action for replevin for the car. A surety bond was posted by Mabini Insurance & Fidelity Co., Inc. (Mabini) with the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the release of the car of Fidelino. The court ruled in favour of Zaragoza. Within the
reglementary period, Zaragoza moved for the amendment of the decision to include Mabini as party solidarily liable with Fidelino
for the payment of the sums awarded in the judgment. Copies of the motion and notice of hearing was duly furnished to Fidelino
and Mabini but both failed to file any opposition or appeared at the hearing. Thus, the court ruled, again, in favour of Zaragoza.
Mabini filed a motion for reconsideration with the CFI of Quezon City contending, among others, that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over it since no summons was ever served on it and the filing of a counter-bond is not equivalent to voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction. CFI of Quezon City denied the motion, thus the present appeal.

ISSUE: WON the CFI of Quezon City acquired jurisdiction over Mabini.
HELD: Yes, jurisdiction was acquired over Mabini.
The Court held that the terms of the counter-bond voluntarily filed by it in Fidelino’s behalf levae no doubt of its assent to be bound
by the Court’s judgment of defendant’s liability, ie, its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction. It implicitly prayed for affirmative
relief; the release of the seized car, in consideration of which it explicitly bound itself solidarily with Fidelino to answer for the
delivery of the car if such delivery is adjudged, ie commanded by the Court’s judgment, or for the payment of such sum as may be
recovered against Fidelino and the cost of the action, he reference to a possible future judgment against Fidelino, and necessarily
against itself.
The enforcement of a surety’s liability is governed by Sec. 17, Rule 57 and not by Sec. 10, Rule 60, in relation to Sec. 20, Rule 57. Sec.
17, Rule 57 reads as follows:
“Sec. 17. Where execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond.-If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or
in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of the
judgment shall become charged on such counter-bond, and bound to pay to the judgment creditor upon demand, the amount due
under the judgment, which amont may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same
action.”
Notice and hearing was substantially complied with and that neither Fidelino nor Mabini filed their opposition nor appeared on the
date of the hearing.
Thus, the Court acquired jurisdiction over Mabini and that it is jointly and severally liable with Fidelino.
G. R. NO. 155868. February 6, 2007

SPOUSES GREGORIO AND JOSEFA YU v. NGO YET TE
FACTS: Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu) purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent soap worth P594,240.00,
and issued to the latter three postdated checks as payment of the purchase price. The said checks were returned dishonored and
stamped ACCOUNT CLOSED. Te demanded payment from Spouses Yu but the latter did not heed her demands. Acting through her
son and attorney-in-fact, Charry Sy (Sy), Te filed with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment.
In support of her prayer for preliminary attachment, Te attached to her Complaint an Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were
guilty of fraud in entering into the purchase agreement for they never intended to pay the contract price, and that, based on
reliable information, they were about to move or dispose of their properties to defraud their creditors. Upon Te’s posting of an
attachment bond, the RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy on the basis of which Sheriff Constancio Alimurung levied and
attached Spouses Yus properties in Cebu City. Spouses Yu filed an Answer with counterclaim for damages arising from the wrongful
attachment of their properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in refusing to award actual, moral and exemplary damages after it was established
by final judgment that the writ of attachment was procured with no true ground for its issuance.
HELD:NO.

Spouses Yu contended that they are entitled to their counterclaim for damages as a matter of right after Te wrongfully caused the
attachment of the properties as it suggested that Te acted with malice. The SC ruled that the counterclaim disputed therein was not
for moral damages and therefore, there was no need to prove malice. In Lazatin v. Twaño, the Court laid down the rule that where
there is wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant may recover actual damages even without proof that the attachment
plaintiff acted in bad faith in obtaining the attachment. However, if it is alleged and established that the attachment was not merely
wrongful but also malicious, the attachment defendant may recover moral damages and exemplary damages as well. Either way,
the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of damages to the attachment defendant; the latter
must first discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of the loss or injury incurred by reason of the wrongful
attachment.
In fine, the CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful did not relieve Spouses Yu of the burden of
proving the factual basis of their counterclaim for damages.
The SC also affirmed CAs finding that spouses Yu failed to prove their counterclaim of actual damages by relying mainly on
submission of used and unused ticket stubs and ticket sales for five (5) days. Thus, Spouses Yu cannot complain that they were
unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger bus by reason of the subsequent wrongful attachment issued in Civil Case No.
4061-V-93. Nor can they also attribute to the wrongful attachment their failure to earn income or profit from the operation of the
passenger bus. The submitted basis is too speculative and conjectural. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other
evidence of profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented.
To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant must prove, with the best
evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not
only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. As to its amount, the same must be
measurable based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the claim for actual damages covers
unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be estalished and supported by independent evidence of the mean income
of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.
As to moral and exemplary damages, to merit an award thereof, it must be shown that the wrongful attachment was obtained by
the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad faith, such as by appending a false affidavit to his application. The SC did not grant moral
and exemplary damages. Based on the foregoing testimony, it is not difficult to understand why Te concluded that Spouses Yu never
intended to pay their obligation for they had available funds in their bank but chose to transfer said funds instead of cover the
checks they issued.
Petitioners were, however, awarded temperate or moderate damages of P50,000 for pecuniary loss when their properties were
wrongfully seized.
G.R. No. 193821 NOVEMBER 23, 2015

PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING CENTER v. RCJ LINES AND ROLANDO ABADILLA, JR.
FACTS: Petitioner Phil-Air sold to respondent RCJ Lines four Carrier Paris 240 air-conditioning units for buses. RCJ Lines paid
P400,000.00, leaving a balance of P840,000.00. RCJ Lines issued three post-dated checks in favor of Phil-Air to partly cover the
unpaid balance. All the post-dated checks were dishonored when Phil-Air subsequently presented them for payment.

In view of the failure of RCJ Lines to pay the balance despite demand, Phil-Air filed for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment.
The RTC granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment after Phil-Air. Two buses of RCJ Lines were
attached pursuant to the writ. The attachment, however, was later lifted when the RTC granted RCJ Lines' urgent motion to
discharge the writ of attachment. RCJ Lines posted a counter-bond in the same amount as the attachment bond.
Ruling on the merits after trial, the RTC found that Phil-Air was guilty of laches and estopped from pursuing its claim. It also
sustained the allegation that Phil-Air had breached its warranty. RTC directed the plaintiff to pay P82,274.00 as refund of the
premium for defendant's counter-bond for the release of the two buses which were attached per Writ of Attachment of this Court.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE: Whether Phil-Air should reimburse RCJ Lines for the counter- bond premium and its alleged unrealized profits.
HELD: NO. Phil-Air is not directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ Lines' alleged unrealized profits.
The CA and the RTC erred when it held Phil-Air directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ Lines' alleged unrealized
profits. Granting that RCJ Lines suffered losses, the judgment award should have been first executed on the attachment bond. Only
if the attachment bond is insufficient to cover the judgment award can Phil-Air be held liable.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the
property or properties of the defendant. The property is held by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment
that might be secured by the attaching party against the defendant.
The grant of the writ is conditioned not only on the finding of the court that there exists a valid ground for its issuance.The Rules
also require the applicant to post a bond.
Section 4 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) provides that "the party applying for the order must...give a bond
executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court, in its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the
latter will pay all the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages that he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
The enforcement of the writ notwithstanding, the party whose property is attached is afforded relief to have the attachment lifted.
There are various modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.:
(1) by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond under Section 12;
(2) by proving that the attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is insufficient
under Section 13;
(3) by showing that the attachment is excessive under Section 13; and
(4) by claiming that the property is exempt from execution under Section 2.
RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by posting a counter-bond. Under the first mode, the court will order the discharge of the
attachment after (1) the movant makes a cash deposit or posts a counter-bond and (2) the court hears the motion to discharge the
attachment with due notice to the adverse party.
The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond must be equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of
costs. The cash deposit or counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the
action.
The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the attachment applies when there has already been a seizure of property by the sheriff
and all that is entailed is the presentation of a motion to the proper court, seeking approval of a cash or surety bond in an amount
equivalent to the value of the property seized and the lifting of the attachment on the basis thereof. The counter-bond stands in
place of the property so released.
To be clear, the discharge of the attachment by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond under Section 12 should not be confused
with the discharge sanctioned under Section 13. Section 13 speaks of discharge on the ground that the writ was improperly or

irregularly issued or enforced, or that the attachment bond is insufficient, or that the attachment is excessive.
To reiterate, the discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon posting of a counter-bond or depositing cash, and after hearing to
determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or counter-bond. On the other hand, the discharge under Section 13 takes effect only
upon showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is insufficient. The
discharge of the attachment under Section 13 must be made only after hearing.
These differences notwithstanding, the discharge of the preliminary attachment either through Section 12 or Section 13 has no
effect on and does not discharge the attachment bond. The dissolution of the preliminary attachment does not result in the
dissolution of the attachment bond.
The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon security given [Section 12], or a showing of its irregular or improper issuance
[Section 13], does not of course operate to discharge the sureties on plaintiffs own attachment bond. The reason is simple. That
bond is executed to the adverse party,. . . conditioned that the ... (applicant) will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the
adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant
was not entitled thereto." Hence, until that determination is made, as to the applicant's entitlement to the attachment, his bond
must stand and cannot be withdrawn.
It is patent that under the Rules, the attachment bond answers for all damages incurred by the party against whom the
attachment was issued.
Thus, Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the costs adjudged to and the damages sustained by RCJ Lines because of the
attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57 positively lays down the rule that the attachment bond will pay "all the costs which may be
adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally
adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
The RTC, instead of declaring Phil-Air liable for the alleged unrealized profits and counter-bond premium, should have ordered the
execution of the judgment award on the attachment bond. To impose direct liability to Phil-Air would defeat the purpose of the
attachment bond, which was not dissolved despite the lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment.
The order to refund the counter-bond premium is likewise erroneous. The premium payment may be deemed a cost incurred by RCJ
Lines to lift the attachment. Such cost may be charged against the attachment bond.
G.R. No. 181721 SEPTEMBER 09, 2015

WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENT, ROSARIO E. RAÑOA v. ALFRED RAYMOND WOLFE
FACTS: Watercraft hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a British national and resident of Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager. During his empolyment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull, within Watercraft’s boat storage
facilities, but never paid for the storage fees.
Watercraft terminated the employment of Wolfe. Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's storage facilities after signing a
Boat Pull-Out Clearance where he allegedly acknowledged the outstanding obligation of US$16,324.82 representing unpaid boat
storage fees for the period of June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay the said amount.
Watercraft filed against Wolfe a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages with an Application for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Finding Watercraft's ex-parte application for writ of preliminary attachment sufficient in form and
in substance pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the RTC granted the same.
The Writ of Attachment and the Notice of Attachment were issued, and Wolfe's two vehicles were levied upon. Wolfe's accounts at
the Bank of the Philippine Islands were also garnished.
Wolfe filed a Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment, arguing that Watercraft failed to show the existence of fraud and that the
mere failure to pay or perform an obligation does not amount to fraud. He also claimed that he is not a flight risk.

RTC denied Wolfe's Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment. Aggrieved, Wolfe filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA
granted Wolfe's petition. CA ruled that the act of issuing the writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte constitutes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the writ of attachment was properly issued by the RTC.
HELD: NO.
Watercraft failed to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court, and that Wolfe's mere failure to pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily amount to fraud, absent any showing that
such failure was due to insidious machinations and intent on his part to defraud Watercraft of the amount due it.
To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting
it, the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. "The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must
have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given."
The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because
fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The
particulars of such circumstances necessarily include the time, persons, places and specific acts of fraud committed. An affidavit
which does not contain concrete and specific grounds is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such writ.
In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific allegations of other factual circumstances to
show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Neither can it be
inferred from such affidavit the particulars of why he was guilty of fraud in the performance of such obligation. To be specific,
Watercraft's following allegation is unsupported by any particular averment of circumstances that will show why or how such
inference or conclusion was arrived at, to wit: "
16. For failing to pay for the use [of] facilities and services - in the form of boat storage facilities - duly enjoyed by him and for failing
and refusing to fulfill his promise to pay for the said boat storage fees, the Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud x x x.
It is not an allegation of essential facts constituting Watercraft's causes of action, but a mere conclusion of law.
With respect to Section 1 (a), Rule 57, the other ground invoked by Watercraft for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment, the Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the CA's exhaustive ruling to the effect that such writ is
unnecessary because Wolfe is not a flight risk, thus:
As to the allegation that Wolfe is a (light risk, thereby warranting the issuance of the writ, the same lacks merit. The mere
fact that Wolfe is a British national does not automatically mean that he would leave the country at will. As Wolfe avers, he
and his family had been staying in the Philippines since 1997, with his daughters studying at a local school. He also claims to
be an existing stockholder and officer of Wolfe Marine Corporation, a SEC - registered corporation, as well as a consultant
of projects in the Subic Area, a member of the Multipartite Committee for the new port development in Subic, and a
member of the Subic Chamber of Commerce. More importantly, Wolfe has a pending labor case against Watercraft - a fact
which the company glaringly failed to mention in its complaint - which Wolfe claims to want to prosecute until its very end.
The said circumstances, as well as the existence of said labor case where Wolfe stands not only to be vindicated for his
alleged illegal dismissal, but also to receive recompense, should have convinced the trial court that Wolfe would not want
to leave the country at will just because a suit for the collection of the alleged unpaid boat storage fees has been filed
against him by Watercraft.
Neither should the fact that Wolfe's Special Working Visa expired in April 2005 lead automatically to the conclusion that he
would leave the country. It is worth noting that all visas issued by the government to foreigner staying in the Philippines
have expiration periods. These visas, however, may be renewed, subject to the requirements of the law. In Wolfe's case, he
indeed renewed his visa, as shown by Special Working Visa No. 05-WV-0124P issued by the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority Visa Processing Office on April 25, 2005, and with validity of two (2) years therefrom. Moreover, his Alien
Certificate of Registration was valid up to May 11, 2006.
When Wolfe filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment, he did not offer to show the falsity of the factual

averments in Watercraft's application and affidavit on which the writ was based. Instead, he sought the discharge of the writ on the
ground that Watercraft failed to particularly allege any circumstance amounting to fraud. No trial on the merits of the action at a
mere hearing of such motion will be had since only the sufficiency of the factual averments in the application and affidavit of merit
will be examined in order to find out whether or not Wolfe was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
Furthermore, the other ground upon which the writ of preliminary attachment was issued by the RTC is not at the same time the
applicant's cause of action. Assuming arguendo that the RTC was correct in issuing such writ on the ground that Watercraft's
complaint involves an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages against a party, like Wolfe, who is about
to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors, the Court stresses that the circumstances cited in support
thereof are merely allegations in support of its application for such writ. Such circumstances, however, are neither the core of
Watercraft's complaint for collection of sum of money and damages, nor one of its three (3) causes of action therein.
All told, Watercraft failed to meet one of the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, i.e., that the case is one
of those mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 57, and that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in improvidently issuing such writ.
Watercraft failed to particularly state in its affidavit of merit the circumstances constituting intent to defraud creditors on the part
of Wolfe in contracting or in the performance of his purported obligation to pay boat storage fees, as well as to establish that he is a
flight risk. Indeed, if all the requisites for granting such writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts in excess of its
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 212025 JULY 01, 2015

EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL, INC. v. VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION, AND FAR EASTERN SURETY & INSURANCE
CO., INC.
FACTS: On March 26, 1996, petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. (petitioner), then represented by Max L.F. Ying (Ying), Vice-
President for Productions, and Alfiero R. Orden, Treasurer, entered into a contract with Multi-Rich Builders ( Multi-Rich), a single
proprietorship, represented by Wilson G. Chua, its President and General Manager, for the construction of a garment factory within
the Cavite Philippine Economic Zone Authority (CPEZA). The duration of the project was for a maximum period of five (5) months or
150 consecutive calendar days. Included in the contract was an Arbitration Clause in case of dispute.
On November 27, 1996, the construction of the factory building was completed. On February 20, 1997, Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc.
(Win Multi-Rich) was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On January 26, 2004, Win Multi-Rich filed a
complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner and Ying before the RTC. 5 It also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attachment, claiming that Ying was about to abscond and that petitioner had an impending closure.
Win Multi-Rich then secured the necessary bond in the amount of P8,634,448.20 from respondent Visayan Surety and Insurance
Corporation (Visayan Surety)6 In the Order,7 dated February 2, 2004, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Win
Multi-Rich.
To prevent the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment on its equipment and machinery, petitioner issued Equitable PCI
Bank Check No. 160149,8 dated February 16, 2004, in the amount of P8,634,448.20 payable to the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
On February 19, 2004, petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion, 9 seeking to discharge the attachment. Petitioner also questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC due to the presence of the Arbitration Clause in the contract. The motion, however, was denied by the RTC in
its Order, dated April 12, 2004, because the issues of the case could be resolved after a full blown trial.
On April 26, 2004, petitioner filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim before the RTC. It denied the material allegation of the
complaint and sought the immediate lifting of the writ of attachment. It also prayed that the bond filed by Win Multi-Rich to support
its application for attachment be held to satisfy petitioner's claim for damages due to the improper issuance of such writ.

On April 29, 2004, the RTC issued another order directing the deposit of the garnished funds of petitioner to the cashier of the Clerk
of Court of the RTC. Win Multi-Rich then filed a motion, dated April 29, 2004, to release petitioner's cash deposit to it. Notably, the
motion was granted by the RTC in the Order, 14 dated May 3, 2004. Subsequently, on May 7, 2004, Win Multi-Rich posted Surety
Bond No. 1019815 issued by respondent Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (FESICO) for the amount of P9,000,000.00, to
secure the withdrawal of the cash deposited by petitioner. Thus, Win Multi-Rich was able to receive the funds of petitioner even
before the trial began.
On June 18, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. The
petition sought to. annul and set aside the April 12, 2004 and April 29, 2004 Orders of the RTC. Petitioner then filed its Supplemental
Manifestation and Motion, asserting that its cash deposit with the RTC was turned over to Win Multi-Rich.
On February 10, 2009, in G.R. No. 175048, the Court promulgated a decision 21 in favor of petitioner and thus moved for execution
thereof, praying for the return of its cash deposit and, in the event of refusal of Win Multi-Rich to comply, to hold Visayan Surety
and FESICO liable under their respective bonds.
On October 15, 2009, Win Multi-Rich opposed the motion for execution because the cash deposit awarded to it by the RTC had
been paid to suppliers and the said amount was long overdue and demandable.
The RTC granted the motion for execution in an Order, 30 dated October 19, 2009, and issued a writ of execution. 31 Visayan Surety
and FESICO separately moved for reconsideration of the RTC order.
Petitioner contends that Visayan Surety and FESICO could be held liable because the Court, in G.R. No. 175048, ruled that it cannot
allow Win Multi-Rich to retain the garnished amount turned over by the RTC, which had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned writ
of attachment. Petitioner argues that if Win Multi-Rich fails or refuses to refund or return the cash deposit, then Visayan Surety and
FESICO must be held liable under their respective bonds. Also, petitioner claims that the surety bond of FESICO is not covered by
Section 20, Rule 57 because it did not pertain to the writ of attachment itself, but on the withdrawal of the cash deposit.
Visayan Surety asserted that no application for damages was filed before the Court in G.R. No. 175048. Thus, there was no occasion
to direct the RTC to hear and decide the claim for damages, which constituted a violation of its right to due process. Also, Visayan
Surety contended that Section 20, Rule 57 provided a mandatory rule that an application for damages must be filed before the
judgment becomes final and executory.
FESICO on the other hand averred that petitioner failed to comply with Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court because the hearing
on the motion for execution was conducted after the decision in G.R. No. 175048 had already become final and executor.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Visayan Surety is liable

2. Whether or not FESICO is liable
HELD: 1. No. The current provision of Section 20, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure covers application for damages against
improper attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, and replevin. 43 Consequently, jurisprudence concerning application for
damages against preliminary injunction, receivership and replevin bonds can be equally applied in the present case.
In a catena of cases, 44 the Court has cited the requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 in order to claim damages against the bond, as
follows:
1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued;
2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and
3. After hearing with notice to the surety.
The first and second requisites, as stated above, relate to the application for damages against the bond. An application for damages
must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued, either (a) before the trial or (b) before the appeal is perfected or (c)
before the judgment becomes executory. The usual procedure is to file an application for damages with due notice to the other
party and his sureties. The other method would be to incorporate the application in the answer with compulsory counterclaim.
The purpose of requiring the application for damages to be filed in the same proceeding is to avoid the multiplicity of suit and forum

shopping. It is also required to file the application against the bond before the finality of the decision to prevent the alteration of the
immutable judgment.
The next requisite that must be satisfied by petitioner to hold Visayan Surety liable would be that the judgment against the wrongful
attachment was promulgated after the hearing with notice to the surety. Certainly, the surety must be given prior notice and an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the application for damages before the finality of the judgment. The Court rules that
petitioner did not satisfy this crucial element.
Section 20, Rule 57 specifically requires that the application for damages against the wrongful attachment, whether filed before the
trial court or appellate court, must be with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties. Such damages may be
awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case.
Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the applicant's right to damages and the amount
thereof under the bond is indispensable. The surety should be given an opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness
of the damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of the writ. In the absence of due notice to the surety, therefore, no judgment
for damages may be entered and executed against it
In the present case, petitioner's answer with compulsory counterclaim, which contained the application for damages, was not
served on Visayan Surety. Also, a perusal of the records60 revealed that Visayan Surety was not furnished any copies of the
pleadings, motions, processes, and judgments concerned with the application for damages against the surety bond. Visayan Surety
was only notified of the application when the motion for execution was filed by petitioner on June 29, 2009, after the judgment in
G.R. No. 175048 had become final and executory on June 2, 2009.
Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 because Visayan Surety was not given due notice
on the application for damages before the finality of judgment. The subsequent motion for execution, which sought to implicate
Visayan Surety, cannot alter the immutable judgment anymore.
2. Yes. While Visayan Surety could not be held liable under Section 20, Rule 57, the same cannot be said of FESICO. In the case at
bench, to forestall the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner issued Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 160149,
dated February 16, 2004, in the amount of P8,634,448.20 payable to the Clerk of Court of the RTC. Pursuant to the RTC Order, dated
April 29, 2004, the garnished funds of petitioner were deposited to the cashier of the Clerk of Court of the RTC. The procedure to
discharge the writ of preliminary attachment is stated in Section 12, Rule 57, to wit:
Sec. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. After a writ of attachment has been enforced, the party whose
property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may move for the discharge of the attachment wholly or
in part on the security given. The court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the
movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court where
the application is made, in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. But
if the attachment is sought to be discharged with respect to a particular property, the counter-bond shall be equal to the
value of that property as determined by the court. In either case, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. A notice of the deposit shall forthwith be
served on the attaching party. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section, the
property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the
counter-bond, or to the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the
property so released. Should such counter-bond for any reason to be found to be or become insufficient, and the party
furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of attachment.
FESICO cannot simply escape liability by invoking that it was not a party in G.R. No. 175048. From the moment that FESICO issued
Surety Bond No. 10198 to Win Multi-Rich and the same was posted before the RTC, the court has acquired jurisdiction over the
surety, and the provisions of Sections 12 and 17 of Rule 57 became operational. Thus, the Court holds that FESICO is solidarity liable
under its surety bond with its principal in Multi-Rich.

G.R. No. 190028 FEBRUARY 26, 2014

LETICIA P. LIGON v. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
FACTS: Petitioner Ligon filed before the QC RTC a complaint for the collection of a sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment against the Sps. Baladjay, a certain Olivia Marasigan (Marasigan), Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc.
(Polished Arrow), and its incorporators. The complaint alleges among others that the spouses Baladjay enticed her to extend a
short-term loan secured by a PDC which bounced upon presentment, and that the subject property was transferred to respondent
Polished Arrow allegedly defendants’ dummy corporation to defraud creditors. The application for the writ was granted so the
subject property was levied upon by annotating the writ on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273.
While the case was pending, a similar complaint for the sum of money damages, and cancellation of title with prayer for issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before the RTC Makati by the Sps Vicente against the same respondents. During the
proceedings therein, a writ of preliminary attachment also against the subject property was issued and annotated on the dorsal
portion of TCT No. 9273.
While the case is still pending in QC, the Makati RTC rendered a decision rescinding the transfer of the subject property to Polished
Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors. Consequently, the Makati City RTC directed the Register of
Deeds of Muntinlupa City to: (a) cancel TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished Arrow; and (b) restore TCT No. 8502 “in its previous
condition” in the name of Rosario Baladjay. In the subsequent execution proceedings, the property was sold at a public auction to
respondent Ting.
The RTC Makati then ordered the RD under pain of contempt to issue a new certificate in favor of Ting free from any liens and
encumbrances.
Meanwhile the QC RTC ruled in favor of Ligon who sought its execution and discovered the earlier attachment annotation in her
favor has been deleted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Makati RTC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the deletion of Ligon’s attachment lien
HELD: YES. Case law instructs that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable
against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the
property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt.
The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or
the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior registration of an attachment lien creates a
preference, such that when an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment
takes the property subject to the said attachment.42 As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of
constructive notice to all.
Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT No. 9273 due to the Makati City RTC’s December 9, 2004 Decision rescinding
the transfer of the subject property from Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of
creditors, Ligon’s attachment lien over the subject property continued to subsist since the attachment she had earlier secured binds
the property itself, and, hence, continues until the judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to Ligon as adjudged in the Quezon City Case is
satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
The grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Ting (i.e.,
TCT No. 19756),47 free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment
lien and, also, defies the legal characterization of attachment proceedings. It bears noting that Ligon’s claim, secured by the
aforesaid attachment, is against Sps. Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property had been effectively restored in view of
the RTC’s rescission of the property’s previous sale to Polished Arrow. Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment lien against Sps. Baladjay as

well as their successors-in-interest should have been preserved, and the annotation thereof carried over to any subsequent
certificate of title,49 the most recent of which as it appears on record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico, without prejudice to
the latter’s right to protect his own ownership interest over the subject property.
G.R. No. 164548 SEPTEMBER 27, 2006

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. RJ VENTURES REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RAJAH BROADCASTING NETWORK,
INC.
Main action: Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by RJ Ventures Realty
& Dev’t Corporation (RJVRD) and Rajah Broadcasting Network (RBN)
FACTS: RJRVD is the assignee of the rights to a deed of sale between First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC) and PNB involving
the Buendia Property. To finance the payment of the balance of the purchase price (Php 3.64B), an arrangement was agreed upon
where PNB would lend an amount equivalent to 10% of the purchase price to RBN, the latter being an affiliate company of RJVRD,
which amount will be available for relending to RJVRD.
To secure the loan, RBN assigned in favor of PNB all its rights and interest over radio and television frequencies issued by the
Nationall Telecommunications Commission. RBN and RJVVRD failed to fulfil their respective obligations in the contract of loan and of
sale, respectively, despite demands from PNB.
As a consequence, the Buendia property was extrajudicially sold at public auction for the amount of Php2.8B. Meanwhile, RBN
received a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale from PNB, specifying therein that its radio facilities in Baguio will be foreclosed and taken over
by PNB.
In support of its Application for the Issuance of a TRO and a WPI, respondents allege that RJVRD and RNB would suffer great and
irreparable injury by the extrajudicial foreclosure of the property and the take over of RBN’s radio facilities in Baguio.
On 27 May 99, the WPI was granted by the RTC. It was later lifted on 28 July 99, and rectified on 29 July 99.
ISSUE: Whether or not RJVRD and RBN are entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
HELD: YES.
As to purpose of the writ:

The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is an
order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the
final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary
situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the
writ is concerned.
Requisites:
For a WPI to issue, the ff requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The very foundation of the

jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy of pecuniary estimation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits.
Merits of the case:
Respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject collaterals. As owner of the
subject collaterals that stand to be extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the possession and protection thereof.
Further, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. The term irreparable injury has a definite meaning
in law. It does not have reference to the amount of damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring the
damages inflicted.
The direct and inevitable result would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents’ radio stations, consequently, losing its
listenership, and tarnishing the image that it has built over time. It does not stretch one’s imagination to see that the cost of a
destroyed image is significantly the loss of its good name and reputation. The value of a radio station’s image and reputation are not
quantifiable in terms of monetary value.
G.R. No. 144499 FEBRUARY 19, 2002

FIRST GLOBAL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CHRISTOPHER SAN AGUSTIN:
Main action: Rescission of Sale, Annulment of Dacion en Pago and cancellation of title and issuance of a new title with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of injunction filed by respondent against petitioner.
FACTS:The subject matter is a parcel of land, including a house built thereon, covered by a TCT issued in the name of respondent’s
mother, Lilian San Agustin, who, together with his parents, brothers and sisters have been in possession of the same since 1967 up
to the resolution of the instant case.
Respondent intended to sell the subject property to the Camacho spouses for Php2.5M. The couple initially paid Php 100K, with the
agreement that the balance would be paid when they would have secured a loan using the property as collateral. To facilitate their
procurement of a loan, the title of the property was transferred to them.
Using the property as collateral, the Camachos were able to obtain a loan of Php1.19M from petitioner. Upon the former’s failure to
pay the loan, petitioner sought to foreclose the mortgage. Before foreclosure, the parties agreed on a dacion en pago, in which the
spouses ceded ownership of the property in favor of petitioner in consideration of the payment of the loan.
Petitioner then demanded the payment of rentals from respondent, whose family was still in possession of the property. Because

respondents did not heed the demand of petitioner, the latter filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession before Branch 143
Makati. Respondent filed the instant action (Branch 141) to enjoin petitioner from taking possession of the subject property. The
RTC denied the application, but the CCA reversed and granted the same on 28 April 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to the possession of the property while the main case for rescission is pending in the
RTC.
HELD: YES.
On status quo ante:
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests during the pendency of an action. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante – the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested
status that preceded the actual controversy. Injunction is an extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve the status quo of things
and to prevent actual or threatened acts violative of the rules of equity and good conscience as would consequently afford an
injured party a cause of action resulting from the failure of the law to provide for an adequate or complete relief. Its sole purpose is
not to correct a wrong of the part, in the sense of redress for injury already sustained, but to prevent further injury.
Merits of the case:
Respondent was able to show a prima facie right to the relief demanded. The Camachos’ non-payment of the purchase price agreed
upon and the irregularities surrounding the dacion en pago are serious enough to allow him to possess the property pendente lite.
To allow petitioner to take immediate possession of the property would result in grave injustice. Respondent has been in possession
of the premises during all this time – prior to and during the institution of the complaint. He and his family have long owned,
possessed and occupied it as their family home since 1967. To dispossess him of it now would definitely alter the status quo to their
detriment.
G.R. No. 169304 MARCH 13, 2007

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC
Main action: Injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO filed by
respondent against DOH.
FACTS: Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying
pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines.
On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27,3 Series of
1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products.
A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10,4 Series of 2000, providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers
aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH).
On May 9, 20006 and May 29, 2000,7 respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its
list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided by petitioner
DOH, it appears that processing of and release of the result of respondent’s request were due on September 2000, the last month of
the quarter following the date of its filing.8
Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and

awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids9 for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G
Benzathine contract).
Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of
accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on October
11, 2000, only two companies participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid at ₱82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS
Laboratories’ (YSS) bid of ₱95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent’s Penicillin G Benzathine
product, the contract was awarded to YSS.
Respondent thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia, that the trial court
"nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract (IFB No. 2000-10-11 [14]) to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct defendant
DOH, defendant Romualdez, defendant Galon and defendant Lopez to declare plaintiff Pharmawealth as the lowest complying
responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company" and "adjudge
defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff, for [the therein specified damages]."11
Petitioner DOH argued for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit in view of the express reservation made by petitioner DOH
to accept or reject any or all bids without incurring liability to the bidders, they positing that government agencies have such full
discretion.
Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion13 (motion to dismiss) praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint
based on the doctrine of state immunity. Additionally, they alleged that respondent’s representative was not duly authorized by its
board of directors to file the complaint.
To petitioners’ motion to dismiss, respondent filed its comment/opposition14 contending, in the main, that the doctrine of state
immunity is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being sued both in their official and personal capacities, hence,
they, not the state, would be liable for damages.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss contending immunity from suit. RTC and CA denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not DOH is entitled to immunity from suit.
HELD: NO. The defense of immunity from suit will not avail petitioner DOH since the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction may be directed
against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action
which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.
As regards individual petitioners’ suability for damages
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of the land.25
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.26 The suit is
regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a
positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them.27
The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in
his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of
illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract
[which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law"31 is permissible, in

consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the
plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.
It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately foregoing paragraph in no way reflect a ruling on the actual
liability of petitioners to respondent. The mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his personal capacity does not
automatically remove the same from the protection of the doctrine of state immunity. Neither, upon the other hand, does the mere
invocation of official character suffice to insulate such official from suability and liability for an act committed without or in excess of
his or her authority.33 These are matters of evidence which should be presented and proven at the trial.
GR. No. 138900 SEPTEMBER 20, 2005

LEVI STRAUSS & CO., & LEVI STRAUSS (PHILS.), INC. v. CLINTON APPARELLE, INC.
FACTS: LEVI STRAUSS & CO., & LEVI STRAUSS (PHILS.), INC. filed a complaint for Trademark Infringement, TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Clinton Apparelle, Inc. together with an alternative defendant, Olympian Garments, Inc.
(Olympian Garments), before the Regional Trial Court after they discovered the presence in the local market of jeans under the
brand name "Paddocks" which they alleged, using a device which is substantially, if not exactly, similar to the "Dockers and Design"
trademark owned by and registered in the name of LS & Co., without its consent.
TRO was issued which was neither attended during the hearing by Clinton Apparelle nor Olympian Garments and which Clinton
Apparelle claimed that it was not notified of such hearing and that only Olympian Garments allegedlyhad been issued with
summons.
he RTC then issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction which was opposed by Clinton Apparelle by filing a Motion to
Dismiss and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction which was subsequently denied
by the RTC.
Clinton Apparelle filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which was granted by the CA.
The CA said that the TRO had been improperly issued and that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is questionable.
With the denial of Motion for Reconsideration, LS & Co. and LSPI filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court was proper as regards to the alleged
infringement of "Dockers and Design" trademark owned and registered by LS & Co.
HELD: NO. Supreme Court found that there was scant justification for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted
as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only
upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or
maintain the status quo of things andis generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be
heard. It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose
during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences,
which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special recourse before the main case can be heard in due course of proceedings.
The grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction under Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court provide that a clear and
positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent,
abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does

not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right. In this case, the
court finds scant justification for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The petitioners anchor their legal right to the “Dockers and Design” trademark on the Certificate of Registration issued in their favor
by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, as well as under Republic Act No. 8293 Section 147.1. This grants
the owner of the registered mark the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the
course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the
trademark is registered if such use results in a likelihood of confusion. However, attention should be given to the fact that the
petitioners’ registered trademark consists of two elements: (1) the word mark “Dockers” and (2) the wing-shaped design or logo.
Notably, there is only one registration for both features of the trademark giving the impression that the two should be considered
as a single unit. Clinton Apparelle’s trademark, on the other hand, uses the “Paddocks” word mark on top of a logo which according
to the petitioners is a slavish imitation of the “Dockers” design. The two trademarks apparently differ in their word marks
(“Dockers” and “Paddocks”), but again according to the petitioners, they employ similar or identical logos. It could thus be said that
the respondent only “appropriates” the petitioners’ logo and not the word mark “Dockers”; it uses only a portion of the registered
trademark and not the whole.
Given the single registration of the trademark “Dockers and Design” and considering that the respondent only uses the assailed
device but a different word mark, the right to prevent the latter from using the challenged “Paddocks” device is far from clear. It is
also unclear whether the use without the owner’s consent of a portion of a trademark registered in its entirety constitutes material
or substantial invasion of the owner’s right. It is likewise not settled whether the wing-shaped logo, as opposed to the word mark, is
the dominant or central feature of the petitioners’ trademark—the feature that prevails or is retained in the minds of the public—an
imitation of which creates the likelihood of deceiving the public and constitutes trademark infringement. In sum, there are vital
matters, which have yet and may only be established through a full-blown trial.
The Court finds that the petitioners’ right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. The right has yet
to be determined. The petitioners also failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of their right to warrant
the issuance of an injunctive writ. Neither were they able to show any urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
The fact that the petitioners had suffered or continue to suffer may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration. The issued
injunctive writ, if allowed, would dispose of the case on the merits as it would effectively enjoin the use of the “Paddocks” device
without proof that there is basis for such action. The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. There would be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal
of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863. October 22, 2004

ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO PRIVATE EDUCATION (FAPE) v. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG
FACTS:On February 26, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum filed Special Civil Action for mandamus with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction against FAPE. He alleged that FAPE was required by law to pay subsidy to Pacasum College, Inc. under the
Educational Service Program of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS); that although the DECS has already
released to FAPE the total amount of P746,000,000.00 for payment to different participating schools, FAPE refused to release to
Pacasum College, Inc. the sum of P1,845,040.00 which represented the remaining unpaid collectible of the said institution for the
school year 2000-2001; that the continued refusal by FAPE to release the said amount has caused the school tofail in its obligation
to pay the salaries of its teachers for 3 months.
On the same day the petition was filed, respondent judge granted the application for preliminary mandatory injunction upon the
posting by the petitioner of a surety or property bond in the amount of P200,000.00.

On February 28, 2001, the respondent judge issued another order directing the president of FAPE, Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, “to
prepare and issue a check for P1,845,040.00 representing the payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. x x x payable to its president
and chairman Saripada Ali Pacasum, the petitioner herein.” On the same day, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto served upon FAPE, through
its president, summons and a copy of the petition.
On March 5, 2001, FAPE filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, challenging the Orders, both
dated February 26, 2001, issued by the respondent judge. It argued that a pending ownership dispute between Sultan Sabdulah Ali
Pacasum and Saripada Ali Pacasum over the shares of the Pacasum College before the Securities and Exchange Commission
precludes the release of the remaining balance of the subsidy to Pacasum College under the ESC Program, which requires that any
dispute must be settled first before the release could be made.
The petition further stated that the RTC of Marawi City has no jurisdiction to enforce the writs of mandamus and preliminary
injunction to FAPE, in its principal office in Makati City, since the place is outside the 12th judicial region where it belongs. FAPE
also prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Saripada Ali Pacasum and his agents who have been harassing its employees with
hourly calls and threats of bodily harm.
On March 9, 2001, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto and Saripada Ali Pacasum served an Order dated March 7, 2001, which was allegedly
issued on a mere ex-parte motion by Saripada Ali Pacasum, reiterating the Orders of February 26, 2001 with a warning that
“failure to comply would be under pain of contempt of court. On March 13, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum together with a Makati
policeman served warrant of arrest upon Dr. Borromeo.
On March 12, 2001, Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum filed a letter complaint before the OCA charging the respondent judge with gross
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.
On March 22, 2001, a similar letter-complaint was filed by Atty. Jose Gomos on the same ground that the respondent judge
violated the hearing, notice and jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court in issuing the questioned orders of February 26
and 28, 2001.
In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that he took cognizance of Special Civil Action after it was raffled to his court. He found
that the pleadings were in order; that after a careful examination of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner, he saw an extreme
necessity to resolve the case expeditiously.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of preliminary injunction is valid
HELD: No. Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is very explicit that the writ of preliminary injunction may
issue only after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse party.
In this case, Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacasum’s application for preliminary mandatory injunction on the very same
day the Special Civil Action No. 690-01 was filed on February 26, 2001. In issuing the subject writ on the very same day the
application was filed and considering that the person against whom the same was to be served was located in Makati, summons
could not have been served upon them or a hearing conducted in evident disregard of the due process requirements of the Rules of
Court.
Respondent judge’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated by his total inattention to the parameters of his
jurisdiction. As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of
his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as explained in
Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, is “that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
acts being performed or about to be performed outside its territorial jurisdiction.”
The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure
is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the

law.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross
ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension for
more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857 NOVEMBER 23, 2004

GABRIEL DELA PAZ v. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG
FACTS: Pacasum College, Inc., represented by Saripada Ali Pacasum, filed with the RTC, a petition for mandamus with application for
a preliminary mandatory injunction, against FAPE, represented by Roberto T. Borromeo, Secretary Raul S. Roco, Ramon C. Bacani
and Carolina C. Porio. respondent judge issued an Order granting the same petition. FAPE, through counsel, filed an omnibus
motion set aside orders and to dismiss the case. In its motion, FAPE claimed that it was not served with summons; that t he writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction which was intended to be enforced in Makati is outside the jurisdiction of the Twelfth Judicial
Region of RTC Marawi City; that Section 21 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC has jurisdiction
to issue writ of injunction which may be enforced in any part of its respective regions; that the writ was granted without hearing
and notice; neither was there a showing of an affidavit that would establish that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard nor was there a showing that a bond had been filed.
In his letter-complaint, dela Paz claims as follows: Respondents issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was in
glaring disregard and defiance of Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129 which limits the authority of RTCs to issue writs of mandamus within
their respective regions. The issuance of the writ was in disregard of the notice and hearing requirements under Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court.
Respondent explains in his second indorsement that he had ordered the dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 813-02 per his
resolution dated June 21, 2002 and that he had recalled and set aside his questioned orders dated March 4 and 5, 2002. He submits
that with the dismissal of the said case, the herein complaint has become moot and academic and should no longer be given due
course. The Court Administrator submitted his Report finding respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of law and grave abuse of
authority and recommending that he be meted with the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6) months without pay
with a warning that the commission of a similar act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper
HELD: No. The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that the same can only be granted upon a
verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party
or person enjoined. It is also provided that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party
or person sought to be enjoined unless shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be
heard on notice; that a temporary restraining order may be issued effective for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the
party sought to be enjoined.
A perusal of the Order dated March 4, 2002 failed to show that respondent conducted a hearing before the injunction was granted
or that complainant was given prior notice thereof. In fact, complainant stressed that FAPE was not at all served with summons
before the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. It was not also shown whether the applicant posted a bond and the
same was approved before the order granting the preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. A bond is required unless
exempted by the court. The Order merely stated that the petition was sufficient in form and substance without even stating the
facts which would support the granting of the injunction.
Respondents court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial region. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued by respondent requiring FAPE, which is holding office in Makati City, and its officials who have their residences in Metro
Manila, to issue a check in the amount of P4,000,000.00 payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the territorial jurisdiction

of respondents court. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent is void considering that his
authority to issue an injunction is limited only to and operative only within his respective provinces or districts.
Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff of Makati and Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as the respondent can only enforce his orders within the territorial
jurisdiction of his court.
Likewise, respondent has also shown abuse of his authority in issuing his Order dated April 22, 2002 in Corporate Case No. 010
requiring FAPE, a non-party to the case, to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in Special Civil Action
No. 813-02. Notably, respondent in his Order dated November 21, 2001 inhibited himself from hearing the corporate case and
forwarded the entire records to the OCA for further assignment to other designated corporate courts of the RTC in Lanao and
Cagayan de Oro City. Despite this pending matter, respondent acted on a motion to set aside his Order of inhibition citing the fact
that the records of the case which he forwarded to the OCA were returned to his court for further proceedings. He then concluded
that there exists no legal impediment to the enforcement of the previous orders of this Court particularly a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction issued in Special Civil Action No. 813-02 dated March 4, 2002 directing the respondent FAPE to release to the
petitioner the sum of P4,000,000.00 representing the petitioners entitlement for the School Year 2001-2002. Although the
respondent in Corporate Case No. 010 is the petitioner in Special Civil Action No. 813-02, (where the subject preliminary mandatory
injunction was issued and now the basis of this administrative complaint) FAPE, however, was not a party in the Corporate Case.
G.R. No L-30070 AUGUST 29 1980

FEDERICO DECANO v. ROMEO F. EDU
FACTS: The Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications issued to Federico Decano (Decano) a temporary appointment to
the position of janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office. The appointment having been approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service,
the said appointee assumed office and served therein for almost four years when Cipriano Posadas (Posadas), as Acting Registrar,
Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City, received a telegram from Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as Acting
Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decano's) services effective as of the close of business on
that day.
Thereafter, Decano filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" claiming that the
aforementioned officials of the LTC acted without power and in excess of authority in removing him from the service. A writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court at the commencement of the proceedings commanding respondents "to
desist and refrain from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting the petitioner from his position as janitor in the Land
Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency, and to pay the petitioner his corresponding salary from the date of notice of
said preliminary injunction, until further orders from the Court."
In seeking reversal of the trial court’s decision, respondents make capital of the fact that the petition for mandamus with injunction
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan while respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City which, they claim, is beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the said court. Respondents cite the long line of cases from the 1960 case of Acosta vs. Alvendia where
this Court, pursuant to sec. 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act, jointly or alternatively with sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and/or section
2 of Rule 58, ruled that a court of first instance has no jurisdiction to require or control the execution of an act committed beyond
the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acted within its jurisdiction as the petition for mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan while respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City
HELD: Yes. Contrary to the claim of respondent, the Acosta ruling of non-jurisdiction does not apply to the facts and circumstances
at bar.

Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order issued by respondent Edu, mandamus and injunction being
then merely corollary remedies to the main relief sought, and what is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by
preliminary injunction, is the implementation of the termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of dismissal
was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in Dagupan City by his subordinate officer, respondent Acting Registrar
of the LTC stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as respondent Edu is concerned, the order terminating the services of
respondent was a fait accompli and this he had done without authority. The injunction is question consequently, must be taken only
to restrain the implementation of respondent Edu’s order by his co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the
territorial boundaries of the trial court’s jurisdictional district.
Thus, in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen, et al.,in which the acts sought to be controlled by “Injunction
with Preliminary Injunction” were relative to the establishment of a local telephone system being done within the territorial
boundaries of the judicial district of the Court of First Instance of Roxas, the Court similarly upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Roxas over the petition, although two of the respondents named therein—the Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, and the Regional Superintendent of Region IV of the Bureau of Telecommunications—had their official
stations at Manila and Iloilo City, respectively, as follows:
“x x x In the instant case, the acts relative to the establishment of a local telephone system by petitioners were being done
within the territorial boundaries of the province or district of respondent Court, and so said Court had jurisdiction to restrain them
by injunction. It does not matter that some of the respondents in the trial court, against whom the injunction order was issued had
their official residence outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
As held by the Court in the 1965 case of Gayacao vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary etc., et al., where the main issue is the
correctness of a national official’s decision, the provincial courts of first instance have equal jurisdiction with the Manila Courts to
review decisions of national officials as otherwise litigants of limited means would practically be denied access to the courts of the
localities where they reside and where the questioned acts are sought to be enforced.
G.R. No. L-49510 JANUARY 28, 1980

DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ISABELITA L. LLAMES, PRIMO C. NARVAEZ and JOSE T. APIGO v. THE HONORABLE ERNANI
CRUZ PANO
FACTS: DECORP is a domestic corporation with a principal office in Quezon City, although its generating plant is located in
Pangasinan. MC Adore is also a domestic corporation with office in Cubao, Quezon City. MC Adore owns and operates the MC Adore
Int’l Palace Hotel at Dagupan City. MC Adore entered into a contract for power service with DECORP. DECORP rendered full power
services. MC Adore Int’l Palace Hotel failed to pay its September and October 1978 bills to Dagupan Electric Corp. Due to this,
DECORP served a Notice of Disconnection that unless payment is made within the usual period of 48 hours, the disconnection
service will be made. Indeed, DECORP disconnected the electrical services of MC Adore.
December 6, 1978: MC Adore filed a complaint for damages with writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against DECORP in CFI
Rizal. On the same day, Judge issued an ex parte order for a preliminary injunction, commanding DECORP as well as its agents in
Dagupan City to "restore immediately not later than 5-M p.m., December 7, 1978, the electrical power of the MC Adore
International Palace Hotel and resume the electrical supply of and the electrical services and facilities to said hotel to enable it to
operate it fully, under pain of contempt.
December 8, 1978: MC Adore also moved that its "cash bond in the sum of P50k represented by Check No. 12100 of the BPI payable
to the clerk of court" be substituted by a surety bond. For failure of DECORP and its agents in Dagupan City to comply with the
aforesaid preliminary mandatory injunction, MC Adore filed a petition to declare DECORP and its corporate officers in contempt of
court, also on the same day. The judge issued an order, stating: “DECORP’s corporate officers, except Atty. Leonardo Baro may be
held in custody until the order is complied, as the Court finds no valid justification for this contumacious disobedience. Defendant
Corporation has its head offices in Quezon City, and although the plant is in Dagupan City, the plant can only act upon orders of the

Quezon City head office.”
December 11, 1978: On the hearing for preliminary mandatory injunction, DECORP appeared and moved for reconsideration of the
orders for want of jurisdiction or GAD.
December 19, 1978: The MR was denied. Judge ordered the enforcement of the preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court issued
a resolution temporarily restraining DECORP from enforcing or continuing to enforce the orders of 6 and 12 of December 1978.
March 21, 1979: MC Adore manifested that it had filed a counterbond of P225k.
May 21, 1979: DECORP filed an urgent supplemental motion reiterating their prayer that they be allowed to redisconnect the
electric power from the hotel of MC Adore on the ground that MC Adore had failed and refused to pay its electric power
consumption based on the actual meter readings as directed by the Court. Granted.
MC Adore filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the compliance with the resolution on the ground that the current monthly
bills being presented by DECORP to MC Adore are the result of readings taken from the electric meter which was tampered and
asked that it be allowed to continue depositing the regular payment in the amount of P35k per month with the court until such time
that the issue on the tampered meter and questionable bins shall have been finally resolved. Granted.
DECORP’s contention: CFI Rizal at Quezon City has no jurisdiction over the case because the act of disconnecting the power to the
hotel of the MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. took place in Dagupan City, outside the Province of Rizal and Quezon City.
MC Adore’s contention: The act of disconnection was the result of an order issued by DECORP from its business office in Quezon
City.
ISSUE: WON Judge Paño acted with GAD in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction ordering DECORP to restore the connection of
the electric power of MC Adore in Dagupan City
HELD: No. Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City has jurisdiction. DECORP has its principal office in Quezon City where the
business of the corporation is managed by the Board of Directors. Decisions of the said corporation are made in Quezon City. The
employees of DECORP in Dagupan City merely carry out the orders issued by the officials of said corporation in Quezon City. Hence
the acts sought to be restrained are being committed in Quezon City. Judge Pano did not commit GAD in issuing the questioned
order directing DECORP to restore the connection of the electric power to the hotel owned by MC Adore. The record shows that
Judge Pano conducted hearings and gave the parties full opportunity to present their evidence before issuing the orders sought to
be set aside.
Judge Pano’s findings: On the question of jurisdiction, both parties are residents of Quezon City, as they have their principal offices
in Quezon City. The disconnection order was initiated and had its life and source in Quezon City. The mandatory injunction is
addressed to the corporation in Quezon City. The Dagupan plant acts only upon order of its officers in Quezon City. In the cases
where the Supreme Court ruled that the district court has improperly issued the writ, no private right of ownership was involved.
Rather they involved licenses or privileges granted by government agencies with offices located beyond the district court's territorial
jurisdiction. Where private rights are involved, the Supreme Court had upheld the issuance of the writ. Here we have a case of the
interference of plaintiff's property rights, with situs in Quezon City by a corporation with situs in Quezon City. The exercise of will by
defendant had its origin in Quezon City. This Court can grant relief when that exercise of will causes irreparable prejudice. It is clear
from the foregoing order that Judge Pano did not act capriciously or whimsically in ordering DECORP to restore the connection of
the electric power to the hotel in Dagupan City of the MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc.. The various incidents regarding the
correctness of the monthly bill presented by DECORP to the MC Adore can be better heard and resolved by Judge Pano. The correct
amounts due prior to June 1979 shall be resolved by Judge Pano after hearing the parties.
G. R. NO. 15929 FEBRUARY 10, 2006

ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC. v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.

FACTS: November 19, 1996: Asian Appraisal Holdings, Inc. obtained a loan amounting to P442.5M from Solidbank Corp. for the
construction of Asian Star Building, a 20-storey commercial condominium built on lots located at Filinvest Corporate City, Alabang,
Muntinlupa City. As security for the loan, AAHI executed a security agreement or real estate mortgage dated November 19, 1996
over its property consisting of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967 and 205969 and the condominium built thereon including all
units, parking slots, common areas and other improvements, machineries and equipment. The REM was registered with the ROD on
19 Nov ‘96 and duly annotated on the individual Condominium Certificates of Title on even date.
November 17, 1999: AAHI entered into a contract to sell with Allgemeine for the purchase of Units 1004 and 1005 and the right to
the exclusive use of 4 parking slots for a total purchase price of P23,571,280.
December 22, 1999: the parties executed an addendum to the contract to sell whereby AAHI assigned to Allgemeine the right to the
exclusive use of parking slot P504 covered by CTC No. 54975 for a consideration of P600k, which Allgemeine paid on even date.
March 23, 2000: AAHI and Solidbank informed Allgemeine of the real estate mortgage forged by them and was advised to remit its
monthly amortizations for the units and parking slots it purchased to Solidbank. Allgemeine was also requested to inform Solidbank
of the total installments it had paid for these units and parking slots and the balance still due thereon.
October 2001: Allgemeine fully settled its obligation to AAHI in the total amount of P26,588,409.30.
October 21, 2001: AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation. Metrobank filed before RTC Muntinlupa a petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure of the REM. 30 Oct: AAHI also filed a complaint against Solidbank for specific performance with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the foreclosure of the REM before RTC Muntinlupa.
October 31, 2001: The mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to Metrobank, to which the banking operations of
Solidbank were integrated.
January 24, 2002: Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession of the properties subject of the
foreclosed mortgage which was granted.
April 9, 2002: Allgemeine filed a motion for intervention in AAHI’s complaint against Solidbank, with prayer for the annulment of the
extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining Metrobank to consolidate its title and to take possession of its properties.
April 15, 2002: Court Sheriff issued a notice to vacate which was served on 16 May 2002 upon all building occupants who were
advised to make the necessary arrangements with Metrobank regarding their occupancy. AAHI filed MR but was Denied.
June 18, 2002: Allgemeine filed a separate petition for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction with the appellate
court, and also to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession issued by Muntinlupa RTC. It alleged that its complaint-in-
intervention is its principal action but as the said court could not enjoin Branch 276 from implementing the writ of possession, both
courts being of equal jurisdiction, it had no choice but to file the petition with the appellate court. CA denied the prayer.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed grave and palpable error in denying its prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
HELD: No. It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of a court, are the allegations of
the complaint and the character of the relief sought. What Allgemeine filed with the CA was an original action for preliminary
injunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. An original action for injunction is outside
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however. Under BP 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for
annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court’s
jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to actions or proceedings pending before it, as Section 2 of Rule 58. In
the case at bar, Allgemeine’s complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 was pending before Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa
RTC, not with the appellate court. It’s petition before the appellate court does not show, naye allege, that in issuing the writ of
possession, the Muntinlupa RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for it to be treated as
either one for certiorari or prohibition.

G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO,
EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO
FACTS: Respondents claim that they are the absolute owner of a parcel of land in paranaque city. Said land was an accretion of cut-
cut creek. Respondents asserts that the original occupant and possessor of the said land was their great grand father. Sometime in
1930 jose gave the land to his son pedro. From then on pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said land.
Later Ebio married pedro’s daughter. Pedro executed a notarized transfer of rights ceding his claim over the parcel of land in favor
of Ebio.
On march 1999 the office of the Sangguniang Barangay passed a resolution no. 9 for the construction of an access road along the cut
cut creek.
On march 2005 City Admin Aldip sent a letter to the respondents to vacate the area within 30 days.
Threatened being evicted respondents went to the RTC and applied for WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION against the petitioners.
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[20] denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents
were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for
confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision
in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE: 1. whether the State is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for prohibitory injunction - NO
2. whether the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of
prohibitory injunction. – YES (main issue)
HELD: 1. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the
banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
While it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect
his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the
proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made
in their absence without affecting them.
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Parañaque from proceeding with its
implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no
positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be
an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
2. A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she
possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may
never arise.

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot
as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of
their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the
property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of
Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Parañaque.
For more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private
capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the
subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title
over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the
registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring
ownership.37 A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
G.R. No. 169802 JUNE 8, 2007
OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION v. ATTY. CESAR L. CHAVEZ
FACTS: OWWA traces its beginnings to 1 May 1977, when the Welfare and Training Fund for Overseas Workers in the DOLE was
created by virtue of Letter of Instructions No. 537, with the main objective, inter alia, of providing social and welfare services to
OFW, including insurance coverage, social work, legal and placement assistance, cultural and remittances services, and the
like. On 1 May 1980, PD 1694 was signed into law, formalizing the operations of a comprehensive Welfare Fund (Welfund), as
authorized and created under Letter of Instructions No. 537. On 16 January 1981, PD 1809 was promulgated, amending certain
provisions of PD 1694. Subsequently, EO 126 was passed renaming the Welfare Fund as the OWWA.
January 9, 2004, as there was yet no formal OWWA structure duly approved by the DBM and CSC, the OWWA Board of Trustees
passed Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004, bearing the title “Approving the Structure of the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration,” and depicting the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA.
March 24, 2004, DBM Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin approved the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA. In her
approval thereof, she stated that the total funding requirements for the revised organizational structure shall be P107,546,379 for
400 positions.
May 31, 2004, OWWA Administrator Virgilio R. Angelo issued Advisory No. 01, advising the officials and employees of the OWWA
that the DBM had recently approved OWWA’s organizational chart, functional statements, and the staffing pattern. Advisory No. 01
also announced that a Placement Committee will be created to evaluate and recommend placement of all regular/permanent
incumbents of OWWA in the new organizational chart and staffing pattern.
June 3, 2004, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas issued Administrative Order No. 171 creating a Placement Committee to evaluate
qualifications of employees, and to recommend their appropriate placement in the new organizational chart, functional statements
and staffing pattern of the OWWA.
June 18, 2004, DOLE Acting Secretary Imson issued Administrative Order No. 186, Series of 2004, prescribing the guidelines on the
placement of personnel in the new staffing pattern of the OWWA.
June 29, 2004, herein respondents filed with the RTC, a Complaint for Annulment of the Organizational Structure of the OWWA, as
approved by OWWA Board Resolution No. 001, Series of 2004, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against herein petitioner OWWA and its Board of Trustees to prevent the implementation of the said Board
Resolution. According to the respondents, the resulting decrease in the number of employees due to Organizational Structure will
result in the constructive dismissal of at least 110 employees. Meanwhile, the deployment of the regular central office personnel to
the regional offices will displace the said employees, as well as their families. Respondents challenged the validity of the new
organizational structure of the OWWA. In fine, they contended that the same is null and void; hence, its implementation should be

prohibited.
RTC granted respondents’ prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner, thru OSG filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CA dismissed the petition. It declared that it was
proper for the RTC to restrain, for the meantime, the implementation of OWWA’s reorganization to prevent injury until after the
main case is heard and decided. Petitioner, thru OSG filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Was the CA wrong in affirming the RTC in its grant of the assailed writ of preliminary injunction?
HELD: YES.
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It persists until it is
dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. To be entitled to an injunctive writ,
petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. In fact, the
evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or
complete.
Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome, the sole objective
of which is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo usually preserved by a
preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. The status quo
ante litem is the state of affairs which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. The trial court must not make use of its
injunctive power to alter such status.
In the case at bar, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction because it did not maintain
the status quo when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rather, it effectively restored the situation prior to the status
quo, in effect, disposing the issue of the main case without trial on the merits. What was preserved by the RTC was the state of
affairs before the issuance of Resolution No. 001, which approved the structure of the OWWA, and the subsequent administrative
orders pursuant to its passing. The RTC forgot that what is imperative in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ cannot be
effectuated to establish new relations between the parties.
Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. In this case,
the RTC also did not maintain the status quo but restored the landscape before the implementation of OWWA’s reorganization. In
thus issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the substantive issues of the main case were resolved by the trial court. What was
done by the RTC was quite simply a disposition of the case without trial. This is an error in law and an exercise of grave abuse of
discretion. The RTC pre-judged the validity of the issuances released by the OWWA Board of Trustees, as well as the other
governmental bodies (i.e., DBM, DOLE), which approved the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA.

This Court is not convinced that respondents were able to show a clear and unmistakable legal right to warrant their entitlement to
the writ. A mere blanket allegation that they are all officers and employees of the OWWA without a showing of how they stand to
be directly injured by the implementation of its questioned organizational structure does not suffice to prove a right in esse. There
was no showing that Respondents are the employees who are in grave danger of being displaced due to the reorganization.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect aright
not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an action which did not give rise to a cause of action.
The question as to the validity of the OWWA reorganization remains the subject in the main case pending before the trial court. Its
annulment is outside the realm of the instant Petition.

G. R. No. 118249 FEBRUARY 14, 2003

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: K service began providing porters for the domestic passenger terminal of MIAA under a provisional permit. K services
continued as porterage contractor despite non-renewal of contract.
Feb 1987: MIAA notified k services of their termination

In response, K services filed a petition for injunction with rtc. The rtc ruled therein that MIAA can terminate its contract with k
services at any time. K services appealed but it was dismissed. its mr was also denied. the decision became final and executory.For
this matter, the issue of whether MIAA could terminate the contract with k services became res judicata.
Shortly after, k services received a letter from MIAA asking the former to continue their services until further notice expanding to
operation of porterage the Domestic Terminal II. Despite their hesitation, k services continued to provide porters upon the alleged
verbal assurances of MIAA that k services will not be replaced.
However, on December 1992, K services received notice to "wind up" its operations as "Management has decided to take over the
aforecited services at the Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II."
K Services opposed the takeover. It filed on December 18, 1992 a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order9with the Regional Trial Court.
The rtc issued a tro against MIAA.
January 20 1993: rtc granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by K Services.
The OSG filed a motion to dismiss against k services.
At the time MIAA filed the instant petition before the Court, this motion to dismiss, opposed by K Services, was pending
consideration by the trial court.
OSG filed an Omnibus Motion11 which mainly alleged that: (1) the injunctive writ lacked legal and factual basis; and (2) K Services
was using the injunction as a shield to violate the terms of the porterage agreement by charging fees in excess of the amount
authorized by the contract. The Omnibus Motion prayed for reconsideration of the order of January 20, 1993 and for the lifting of
the injunction.
The trial court denied the Omnubus Motion.
The OSG, on MIAA’s behalf, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s orders of
January 20, 1993 and August 5, 1993.
CA: set aside the questioned orders of the trial court for lack of sufficient basis.
While the motion for reconsideration filed by K Services before the Court of Appeals was pending, MIAA attempted to oust K
Services based on the appellate court’s decision. Upon motion of K Services, the trial court issued an order to preserve the status
quo ante by reinstating K Services as the porterage contractor of Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the trial court from implementing the status quo ante order. The Court of Appeals denied MIAA’s motion in its Resolution of
March 10, 1994.
On December 2, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision reversing its earlier decision of December 22, 1993
and dismissing MIAA’s petition for certiorari. Citing "misapprehensions of fact"
ISSUE: Whether K Services was entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the trial court.
HELD: No.

On Laches:
K Services contends that MIAA’s right to question the trial court’s order of January 20, 1993 is barred by laches. K Services points out
that eight months had elapsed between the receipt by MIAA of the order of January 20, 1993 and the filing of the petition for
certiorari questioning the order before the Court of Appeals.
K Services’ argument is incorrect.
Laches is the failure, or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. 15 We have held that, in establishing laches, what
should be considered is the interval after the rendition of the last order sought to be set aside. 16
Thus, what matters is the intervening period after the trial court’s order of August 5, 1993 – the last order MIAA assailed in its
petition for certiorari – to the time the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals. The records show that some seventy-seven
days elapsed from MIAA’s receipt on August 6, 1993 of the order of August 5, 1993 before MIAA’s petition for certiorari was filed
with the Court of Appeals on October 22, 1993.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court prevailing at the time did not fix a specific period for filing a special civil action for certiorari.
Jurisprudence then simply required that petitions for certiorari should be filed within a reasonable time from receipt of the
questioned judgment or order.17 The Court then found three months to be reasonable, although courts were not precluded from
entertaining petitions filed beyond the three-month period if warranted by the demands of justice and provided laches had not set
in.18
As the period of seventy-seven days in this instance was well within the three-month period regarded as reasonable by
jurisprudence then, MIAA’s petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals could not be considered as barred by laches.
The Omnibus Motion may be regarded as akin to a memorandum assailing the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to issue the injunctive
writ, which may be ruled on, considering that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time. 19 Alternatively, the Omnibus
Motion may be treated as a motion for dissolution of the preliminary injunction authorized under Section 6, Rule 58 of the old Rules
of Court,20 which may be raised at any stage prior to final judgment.
On the grant of Preliminary Injunction filed by K Services with the RTC:
We find for MIAA.
Section 3, Rule 58, of the old Rules of Court, which was applicable at the time, prescribed that a preliminary injunction could be
granted provided:
"(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-performance thereof
would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in
violation of the plaintiff’s rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual."
The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right
that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 21 The duty of the court
taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of
an injunction are present in the case before it.

In the instant case, however, the trial court’s order of January 20, 1993 was, on its face, bereft of basis for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction. There were no findings of fact or law in the assailed order indicating that any of the elements essential for
the grant of a preliminary injunction existed. The trial court alluded to hearings during which the parties marked their respective
exhibits and the trial court heard the oral arguments of opposing counsels. However, it cannot be ascertained what evidence was
formally offered and presented by the parties and given weight and credence by the trial court. The basis for the trial court’s
conclusion that K Services was entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction is unclear.
In its order of August 5, 1993, the trial court stated that it issued the injunction to prevent irreparable loss that might be caused to K
Services. Once more, however, the trial court neglected to mention what right in esse of K Services, if any, was in danger of being
violated and required the protection of a preliminary injunction. The trial court stated merely that K Services was servicing MIAA as
a porterage contractor and that a notice of termination was sent to K Services. Absent a preliminary finding by the trial court that K
Services possessed the right to continue as MIAA’s concessionaire, MIAA’s termination of K Services’ was not sufficient in itself to
establish that there was an invasion of K Services’ right.
Considering the far-reaching effects of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court should have exercised more prudence and
judiciousness in its issuance of the injunction order. We remind trial courts that while generally the grant of a writ of preliminary
injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be observed in the
exercise of such discretion.22 The discretion of the court a quo to grant an injunctive writ must be exercised based on the grounds
and in the manner provided by law.
G.R. No. 119280 AUGUST 10, 2006

UNILEVER PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On August 24, 1994, Procter and Gamble Inc. filed a complaint for injunction with damages against Unilever alleging that
Unilever substantially and materially imitated the aforesaid "tac-tac" key visual in blatant disregard of its intellectual property rights.
This occurred when Unilever started airing a 60 second television commercial "TVC" of its "Breeze Powerwhite" laundry product
called "Porky” and the said commercial included stretching visual presentation and sound effects almost identical or substantially
similar to P&GP’s "tac-tac" key visual.
On August 26, 1994, Judge Gorospe issued an order granting a temporary restraining order and setting it for hearing on September
2, 1994 for Unilever to show cause why the writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued. On appeal, the CA rendered its
decision finding that Judge Gorospe did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order.
Unilever now argues that the writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court (and affirmed by the CA) without any
evidence of private respondent's clear and unmistakable right to the writ. Petitioner further contends that the preliminary
injunction issued against it already disposed of the main case without trial, thus denying petitioner of any opportunity to present
evidence on its behalf.
ISSUE: Is preliminary injunction proper to enjoin the airing of TV commercials? (YES)
HELD: Yes. There was extreme urgency for the court a quo to act on plaintiff’s application for preliminary injunction. The airing of TV
commercials is necessarily of limited duration only. Without such temporary relief, any permanent injunction against the infringing
TV advertisements of which P&GP may possibly succeed in getting after the main case is finally adjudicated could be illusory if by
then such advertisements are no longer used or aired by petitioner. It is therefore not difficult to perceive the possible irreparable
damage which P&GP may suffer if respondent Judge did not act promptly on its application for preliminary injunction.
Injunction is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under
any standard compensation. As correctly ruled by the CA, there was an extreme urgency to grant the preliminary injunction prayed
for by P&GP considering that TV commercials are aired for a limited period of time only. In fact, this Court takes note of the fact that
the TV commercial in issue ― the Kite TV advertisement ― is no longer aired today, more than 10 years after the injunction was
granted on September 16, 1994.

The sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. A
writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. Thus, it was impossible for the court a quo
to fully dispose of the case, as claimed by petitioner, without all the evidence needed for the full resolution of the same. To date,
the main case still has to be resolved by the trial court.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely on the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with except in
cases of manifest abuse. There was no such abuse in the case at bar, especially because petitioner was given all the opportunity to
oppose the application for injunction. The fact was, it failed to convince the court why the injunction should not be issued. Thus, in
Santos v. Court of Appeals, we held that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to a judge or body issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction where a party has not been deprived of its day in court as it was heard and it exhaustively presented all its
arguments and defenses.
G.R. No. 145328 MARCH 23, 2006
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
FACTS: NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support
overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the internet on the possible adverse effects that such a
structure could cause to their health and well-being. Petitioners got hold of published articles and studies linking the incidence of a
fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to leukemia.
They aired this growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings with them. Their meetings did not reach a
settlement.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR, harping on the hazardous effects of exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health
and safety to themselves and their families. The writ was granted, and was extended for 18 days after the lapse of 48 hours.
NAPOCOR, in turn, filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the
Court of Appeals assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts
from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development
Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government," particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the
case on the ground of lack jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining,
fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the
government, including among other public utilities for transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or continuing the execution
or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for
such execution, implementation or operation.
The trial court was of the view that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence proscribing injunctions against infrastructure
projects do not find application in the case at bar because of the health risks involved. The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR
from further preparing and installing high voltage cables to the steel pylons erected near petitioners’ homes and from energizing
and transmitting high voltage electric current through said cables while the case is pending final adjudication.

In light of the foregoing order of the trial court, the petition which NAPOCOR filed with the Court of Appeals was later amended to
include the prayer for the nullification and injunction of the trial court. Eventually, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
order. Hence, this petition from the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction
and operation of the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818?
HELD: YES. We find the petition to be imbued with merit.
Legislative history of PD 1818: Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting judges from
issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the importance of this decree,
this Tribunal had issued different circulars to implement this particular law.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against government infrastructure projects. In Garcia
v. Burgos, Presidential Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction against any infrastructure
project in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic
development effort of the nation.
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the implementation of projects and contracts on
infrastructure, natural resource development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are actually instances
when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application.
In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in
cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this
dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on
their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill consciousness among
them.
From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners’ constitutionally protected right to health and whether respondent
NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the affected communities are
veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As
such, these questions of law divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Furthermore, in relation to the grounds enunciated under Sec. 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, it merely requires that unless restrained, the act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to
render the judgment ineffectual.
Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and
safety of the petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction. [See the full text for the
long list of evidence presented by the petitioners]fa
Notes (Discussion of Preliminary Injunction)
A preliminary injunction is likewise justified prior to a final determination of the issues of whether or not NAPOCOR ignored safety
and consultation requirements in the questioned project. Indeed, the court could, nay should, grant the writ of preliminary
injunction if the purpose of the other party is to shield a wrongdoing. A ruling to the contrary would amount to an erosion of judicial
discretion.

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained of be in violation of the
rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different
from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.
More insights of the SC as to PD. 1818
In sum, what Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely frustration of government infrastructure projects,
particularly by provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of essential government projects
or frustrate the economic development effort of the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket
prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of a community guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land.
Lest we be misconstrued, this decision does not undermine the purpose of the NAPOCOR project which is aimed towards the
common good of the people. But, is the promotion of the general welfare at loggerheads with the preservation of the rule of law?
We submit that it is not.
In the present case, the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety should be the primordial concerns over presumed
economic benefits per se as alleged by the NAPOCOR.
After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained of be in violation of
the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of
the applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is
different from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent
injunction.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1814 MAY 26, 2005

UNIVERSAL MOTOR v. ROJAS
FACTS: Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC) ordered from complainant (UMC) Nissan vehicles and spare parts worth P5, 476,
500.00. The former issued several postdated checks in favor of complainant to pay for the purchases. The checks, however, were
dishonored due to insufficient funds. Complainant demanded payment from NSSC but the latter repeatedly failed to comply.
UMC filed a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and/or estafa against the officers of NSSC while NSSC filed a
civil case for breach of contract against complainant and its officers. Judge issued an order setting a summary hearing on the
propriety of the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
NSSC filed an amended complaint which respondent judge admitted in his order. The amended complaint inserted a prayer for
temporary restraining order which was not found in the original complaint. A hearing on the temporary restraining order was held
which resulted to its issuance enjoining them from continuing in selling, dealing and marketing all models of motor vehicles and
spare parts of Nissan, etc.
Next day, NSSC filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bond for Plaintiff/Applicant and Approve/Admit Defendant’s Counterbond with Prayer
to Lift Temporary Restraining Order but was denied by judge.
On April 1, 2002, respondent judge ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by the plaintiff of a bond in
the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00). The writ of preliminary injunction was issued on April 2, 2002 after NSSC filed its

bond.
It is worthy to note that public respondent issued an Order dated March 11, 2002 granting a temporary restraining order for a
period of 20 days without requiring private respondents to issue any bond at all notwithstanding Rule 58[,] Section 4 (b) of the Rules
of Court, and this compelled petitioners to file an Urgent motion to Fix Bond for Plaintiff/Applicant and Approve/Admit Defendant’s
Counterbond with Prayer to Lift TRO
ISSUE: Is bond required for the issuance of a TRO?
HELD: YES
First, respondent judge ordered a hearing on the issuance of a temporary restraining order although it was not prayed for in the
complaint. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining order may be issued only if it
appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. In addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is clear with regard
to the procedure to be followed in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order may be granted only when the application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded. NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need to issue a temporary restraining order to
prevent any great or irreparable injury that it might suffer while the preliminary injunction is being heard. In one case, the Court
penalized a judge who awarded reliefs to plaintiffs without any showing that such reliefs were applied for.
Second, respondent judge issued the temporary restraining order without requiring the plaintiff to post a bond.
Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. — A preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded;
and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such
party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall
be issued.
xxx
While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the discretion to require a bond before granting a temporary restraining
order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the prejudice of the defendant.
The bond under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the damages which the party or person against whom the temporary restraining order
or injunction is issued may sustain by reason thereof should the court finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
Hence, it follows that unless it appears that the enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the presiding judge must require the
applicant to post a bond, otherwise the courts could become instruments of oppression and harassment.
Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, no bond was required for the availment of a temporary restraining
order. However, the present Rules now regulate the issuance of temporary restraining orders, not only by requiring a hearing, but
also by imposing a bond on the applicant to prevent the abuse of this relief by litigants. As explained by Remedial Law expert
Justice Florenz D. Regalado: Under this amended section, a temporary restraining order has been elevated to the same level as a
preliminary injunction in the procedure, grounds and requirements for its obtention. Specifically on the matter of the requisite bond,
the present requirement therefor not only for a preliminary injunction but also for a restraining order, unless exempted therefrom by
the court, puts to rest a controversial policy which was either wittingly or unwittingly abused. Therefore, bond was required for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, except in labor cases brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari from a decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission where a monetary award was granted, in which case the policy of the Supreme Court was to
require a bond equivalent to the monetary award or benefits granted as a condition for the issuance of a temporary restraining

order. The exemption from bond in other cases, plus the fact that no hearing was required, made a temporary restraining order a
much sought relief for petitioners.
G.R. No. 111401 OCTOBER 17, 1996

ERIBERTO VALENCIA, substituted by his heirs v. CA, RICARDO BAGTAS, and MIGUEL BUNYE
FACTS: PETITIONER FILES COMPLAINT FOR RESCISSION IN RTC BULACAN: Bagtas and Bunye (respondents) were lessees of a 24-
hectare fishpond owned by Eriberto (petitioner as substituted by his heirs) and located in Bulacan. The lease was covered by a lease
contract which was to expire on March 1982. However, before said date, petitioner filed a complaint for the rescission of the lease
contract in the RTC of Bulacan.
CA ORDERS MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO: RTC Bulacan issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering respondents
to surrender possession of the fishpond. To which respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and to which the CA issued
a restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the injunction. At the hearing in the CA, the parties agreed to maintain status quo
and that the fishpond hut would still be utilized by respondents until resolution of the case.
BUT PETITIONER FILES MOTION LEADING TO RESPONDENTS’ BEING EJECTED FROM THE FISHPOND: However, despite this order,
petitioners filed an ex-parte motion for the designation of a member of the Philippine Constabulary to maintain order in the
place. The RTC granted this motion and petitioner, with the aid of PC men, was able to eject respondents from the main hut, dry up
a portion of the leased property where respondent previously scattered chemicals and fertilizer and as a result, no fish food grew
causing damage to respondents. Respondents were also prevented from transferring the bigger fish to a more spacious portion
resulting in the death to many fishes again causing damage to respondents. There was also another person who introduced himself
as the new lessee. Thus, the RTC ordered another order declaring that the fishes should remain as property of respondents subject
to their disposal. This order wasn’t honored by petitioner.
RESPONDENTS FILE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES IN RTC MANILA: Respondents now seek exemplary and moral damages, attorney’s
fees and costs of suit. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. This and the subsequent MR was denied. Respondents’ presented their
evidence but petitioners instead of doing the same, filed a second motion to dismiss which was denied.
PETITIONER FILES A MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN RTC MANILA; RTC RULES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS: Petitioners
state that the proceedings in RTC Manila should be suspended until after the case in Bulacan which was appealed to the CA has
been resolved. RTC denied this and gave petitioners time to file the necessary pleadings. Petitioner and his counsel didn’t appear at
the subsequent hearing so the court deemed petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and considered the case
submitted for decision. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
BOTH PARTIES APPEAL TO THE CA: Petitioner alleges litis pendentia and contests the award of damages while respondents contest
the RTC’s failure to award actual damages.
CA AFFIRMS RTC MANILA: According to the CA, there was no litis pendentia. The CA also denied petitioner’s MR.
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI: Petitioner alleges that the rule on litis pendentia bars the action for damages in Manila,
respondents committed forum shopping, respondents’ claim for damages should’ve been made through a compulsory counterclaim
in the same action for rescission, and lastly, the bond he posted for the issuance by the Bulacan RTC of the writ of preliminary
injunction could’ve answered for the damages claimed by respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the injunction bond was sufficient protection (NO)

(1) The bond petitioner posted was for the issuance by the Bulacan RTC of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. It
was only supposed to answer for damages arising from the issuance of the injunction and not for damages caused by
the actuations of petitioner.
(2) Purpose of the injunction bond is to protect defendant against loss/damage by reason of the injunction in case the
court finally decides that the plaintiff wasn’t entitled to it.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1904 FEBRUARY 18, 2005

BAGONG WEST KABULUSAN 1 NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. v. JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA
FACTS: CST Enterprises, Inc. filed before the Muntinlupa Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) thirty eight (38) complaints for ejectment
against 39 individuals (the defendants) who were occupying lots located at West Kabulusan, Barangay Cupang, Muntinlupa City. The
cases, which were raffled to Branch 80 of the MeTC.
Branch 80 of the Muntinlupa MeTC rendered a judgment in favor of CST Enterprises, Inc., ordering the defendants to vacate the lots
and surrender possession thereof to CST Enterprises, Inc. The judgment became final and executory following which writs of
execution were issued and served on the defendants on June 14, 2000.
The defendants, however, refused to vacate the lots. Thus, the MeTC made an order directing the defendants to demolish their
“respective structures” within 5 days from notice thereof. A writ of demolition dated November 9, 2000 was accordingly issued
directing the sheriff to remove and demolish the houses and improvements introduced by the defendants on the lots.
On December 11, 2000, Bagong West Kabulusan Neighborhood Association, Inc. (the Association), claiming to represent the
underprivileged and homeless residents of the lots, filed a Complaint against MeTC Sheriff Armando M. Camacho, for “Injunction
with Very Urgent Petition for the Issuance of Restraining Order to Preserve and Maintain the Status Quo.”
The Complaint for injunction alleged that under R.A. No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992), it is mandatory that
before demolition or eviction can be effected, adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent, be undertaken by the City of
Muntinlupa and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other concerned government agencies. It thus prayed that
service of the notice to vacate and demolish be held in abeyance until the provisions of R.A. 7279 have been complied with and that,
in the meantime, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued to preserve and maintain the status quo.
A date for the special raffle was set and it was raffled to Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC presided by respondent, Judge Alberto
Lerma. Summons were made to the Sheriff. Notice on setting a hearing for the TRO was issued and addressed to the Sheriff.

Judge Lerma, however, denied the Association’s prayer for a TRO, he finding that no great or irreparable injury would result if a TRO
is not issued immediately. Copies of the said order were issued. In the meantime, notice of hearing of the application for Preliminary
Injunction was issued.
On September 14, 2001, the Association filed a “Very Urgent Motion to Resolve Complaint for Injunction.” It alleged that
respondent, “with manifest bias and partiality and with gross ignorance of R.A. 7279 and gross neglect of duty, deliberately delayed
the resolution of the said civil case in order for the Sheriff (Camacho) to EFFECT THE DEMOLITION before the resolution of said case
so that it will be rendered moot and academic.”
In the main, respondent stressed that all these cases filed after a writ of demolition was issued by the MeTC were filed for the
purpose of restraining the sheriff from enforcing the notices to vacate and demolish, in violation of the rule against forum shopping
under Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, they involving the same parties, causes of action, and reliefs.
Respondent went on to stress that all his actions and findings in Civil Case No. 00-233 were in accordance with the Rules and the
Canons on Judicial Ethics, with cold judicial impartiality, and with no other objective but to uphold the rule and majesty of the law.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge is guilty of falsification of court records, gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, gross
neglect of duty, and gross ignorance of the law with manifest bias and partiality in connection with the issuance of the TRO.
HELD: No. Due to the insufficiency of evidence, the administrative complaint against respondent was dismissed.
Complainant faults respondent for violating Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-95 for failure to call for a hearing on its
application for a TRO within 24 hours after the case had been raffled to his sala on December 15, 2001, he having set the same for
hearing only on January 17, 2000. Upon the assumption that the appellate court’s Resolution granting a TRO had not yet come to
the notice of respondent at the time Civil Case No. 00-233 was raffled to him, what is mandatory in the circular is the giving of
notice and opportunity for the adverse party to be heard and interpose objections in a summary hearing, before a prayer for a TRO
is acted upon. The period within which to conduct a summary hearing is not 24 hours after the case has been raffled but 24 hours
after the records are transmitted to the branch to which it is raffled.
Pertinent paragraphs of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 are quoted hereunder:
1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or
any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the
adverse party and in the presence of such party or counsel.
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within
twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted
immediately after raffle.
This circular is now incorporated in the present Rules of Court as Rule 58, Section 4 as follows:
SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or restraining order.—A preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order may be granted only when: x x x
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or any
initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multi-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse
partyor the person sought to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by
service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon
the adverse party in the Philippines.
xxx
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty four (24) hours after the sheriff’s return of service and/or records are
received by the branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
Clearly, the circular and the Rules of Court seek to minimize the ex-parte, precipitate and improvident issuance of TROs.
Again, granting arguendo that respondent may have erred in not taking a more suitable course of action, given the circumstances
surrounding the case, not to mention the palpable intent of the defendants to trifle with judicial processes, any lapse on his part can
be seen as mere error of judgment, of which he may not be held administratively liable in the absence of a showing of bad faith,
malice, or corrupt purpose.

Whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the application only after all parties have been notified and heard in
a summary hearing, which may not be dispensed with; A judge’s failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95, in issuing a
TRO is grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. (Gustilo vs. Real, Sr.,
353 SCRA 1 [2001])
Administrative Circular No. 20-95 requires that an application for TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing, though, as an exception, a TRO may be issued ex parte by an executive judge in matters of extreme emergency, in
order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury. (Vda. De Sayson v. Zerna, 362 SCRA 409 [2001])
OCA I.P.I. No. 01-32-CA-J FEBRUARY 13, 2002

IN THE MATTER OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. ABESAMIS, ET AL.
FACTS: The petitioners were employees of members of Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc. and were members of the Year Jan Industries
of Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization-Kilusang Mayo Uno (ANGLO-KMU). The filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against their employer.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the reinstatement of the said employees to their former positions
along backwages, 13th month pay, vacation and sick leave pay. On appeal, the NLRC reaffirmed the LA’s decision.
Then, an alias writ of execution was issued against Year Jan Industries to collect the amount of backwages, 13th month pay, sick and
vacation leave pay. And a notice of garnishment was issued against the company’s account in RCBC.
Year Jan filed a “Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction” " to enjoin the
implementation of the writ of execution and the order of garnishment, and if the same has already been implemented, to restrain
RCBC from transferring the garnished amount to the NLRC Sheriff, or if the garnished amount has already been transferred, to
enjoin the NLRC from releasing the same to the petitioners.
The respondents, who were Justices of the CA, issued a temporary restraining order. The Company's application for preliminary
injunction was to be granted upon the filing of a bond. But the company, however, failed to post the required bond amount.
It filed another Urgent Motion for the Issuance of TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, this time, to enjoin the Labor Arbiter from
implementing the alias writ of execution dated September 19, 2000, for the collection of P8,401,103.36 representing additional
backwages/salaries of the petitioners. This was granted by respondents per resolution dated October 11, 2000.
Petitioners contend that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals deprived them of their right to be reinstated and to be
paid their lost income. They also assert that the issuance of the TRO without requiring the posting of the required surety bond and
without defining the period of its effectivity or duration transgresses Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and the Canon
of Judicial Ethics.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the TROs enjoined the reinstatement of the petitioners
(2) Whether the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.
HELD: (1) No. The petitioners in their writ of execution, moved only for the execution of the money judgment. In the restraining
orders issued by respondents, what was restrained and enjoined is the payment of the monetary claims adjudged by the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC and not the reinstatement of the petitioners to their former positions. Thus, with or without the restraining
orders, the judgment of the NLRC reinstating the petitioners is immediately executory pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code.
(2) Yes. The respondents, in issuing the assailed Resolution, acted within the confines and limits of the law and their authority.

The failure of the respondents to require the Company to post a bond did not violate the Rules of Court. Paragraph (b) of Section 4,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the court discretion to require such bond.The court may, in proper cases, exempt
the applicant from filing the bond normally required. In issuing the October 11, 2000 Resolution, respondents were merely
exercising a discretion granted them by law. And there was certainly no abuse of discretion, much less a grave or patent abuse of
judgment when they issued the assailed Order. It must be stressed however, that respondents in their Resolution dated February
29, 2000, required the Company to post a bond for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Unfortunately, the Company failed
to comply, hence, the writ was never issued.
DURATION OF THE TRO
The TRO dated October 11, 2000 was not issued for an indefinite time. Under Section 5, Paragraph 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a temporary restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the
party or person sought to be enjoined. It automatically terminates upon the expiration of the 60 day period without need of any
judicial declaration to that effect.
In the assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals ordered, among others, that "the public respondent NLRC is also restrained and
enjoined from surrendering or releasing the garnished amount to the private respondents, until further orders of this Court." As it is
clear under the Rules that the effectivity of a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals is only for a period of 60 days, it must be stressed
that the phrase"until further orders of this Court" embodied in said resolution should be understood in such manner that the Court
of Appeals may, in the exercise of its discretion, shorten the lifespan of the TRO when circumstances so warrant. Applying the
foregoing, we find petitioners' allegation that the questioned resolution transgresses the pertinent rules erroneous.
Lastly, the alleged complaint has already been passed upon and considered by the court in a separate case.
It must be recalled that after the issuance of the October 11, 2000 Resolution, petitioners filed a motion for inhibition grounded
mainly on the issuance of the aforesaid resolution and contending that the judicial action of respondents in issuing the assailed
Resolution impelled them "to believe that they could no longer obtain labor justice." The motion was denied by respondents on
January 30, 2001, hence, petitioners elevated the matter to the SC. On June 27, 2001, the SC issued a Resolution denying the
petition "for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged
resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." T he dismissal of the
petition, in effect, upholds the correctness of respondents' acts in issuing the restraining orders. The present administrative
complaint is nothing but an attempt on the part of the petitioners to re-ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed upon and
definitively resolved by this Court.
G.R. No. 167745 JUNE 26, 2007

MIGUEL M. LLAMZON v. ALMA FLORENCE LOGRONIO
FACTS: Petitioner Miguel Llamzon is an officer at the Industrial Relations Unit of Bataan Economic Zone. He was administratively
charged before the Philippine Economic Zone Authority Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation and Discipline.
While the investigation was pending, petitioner requested to allow the PNP Crime Lab to examine the written contracts of the
billings for overtime fees, by which he was charged. He was however denied.
Aggrieved, he filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial
court issued a TRO for 20 days.
Respondents moved to lift the TRO on the ground of non-holding of a summary hearing and failure of petitioner to show extreme
urgency. The trial however denied the motion.

Petitioner then filed a motion to maintain the status quo. The trial court granted the motion. Notably, the status quo order issued
was effective “until further order from this court”.
On appeal before the CA, the appellate court held that the trial court failed to observe Section 5 of Rule 58 concerning applications
for preliminary injunction and TRO. It held that the trial court granted a TRO for 20 days instead of only 72 hours, and he did not
conduct a summary hearing within 72 hours to determine whether the TRO should be extended. The status quo order was issued
also in violation of the aforementioned Rule, specifically the portion which provides that the TRO shall not exceed 20 days and is
deemed vacated if the application for preliminary injunction is not resolved within the 20-day period and that no court has the
authority to extend or renew the TRO on the same ground for which it was issued.
Now before the SC, petitioner argues that the TRO and the status quo order were properly issued. He claims that a 20-day TRO can
be issued without prior notice or hearing if it is shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant. He justifies the
status quo order by saying that it was issued on a ground different from that for which the earlier TRO was made.
The propriety of the issuance of the TRO was actually a non-issue as it was not raised before the CA, but was extensively discussed
in conjunction with the propriety of the issuance of the status quo order]
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20-day TRO and the subsequent status quo order were properly issued
HELD: NO. Section 5 of Rule 58 proscribes the grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought to be enjoined. However, the rule authorizes the court to which an application for preliminary injunction is made to issue a
TRO if it should appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, but only for a limited 72-hour period.
The rule thus holds that before a TRO may be issued, all parties must be heard in a summary hearing first, after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The only instance when a TRO may be issued ex parte is when the matter is of such
extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance, the
Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective for 72 hours only. The Executive Judge shall then summon the parties to a conference
during which the case should be raffled in their presence. Before the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case
was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until the
application for preliminary injunction can be heard, which period shall in no case exceed 20 days including the original 72 hours.
It thus becomes apparent that the trial court erred in issuing a TRO effective, not for 72 hours as prescribed by law in cases of
extreme urgency, but for the maximum period of 20 days; and he did so without conducting beforehand a summary hearing, and
without showing that it falls under the exceptional circumstances enumerated in Administrative Circular No. 20-95 (from which the
present rule is derived) where a TRO may be issued by the Executive Judge before assignment by raffle to a judge without first
conducting a summary hearing.
As to the status quo order, such was improperly issued by the trial court. It was, for all intents and purposes, a mere continuation of
the 20-day TRO erroneously issued. Indeed, a status quo ante order has the nature of a temporary restraining order. A TRO shall be
effective only for a period of 20 days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the judge
must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. If no action is taken by the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the TRO would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer
force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; in fact, as stated in the Order, the hearing on the propriety of the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is still pending, hence the TRO earlier issued, assuming arguendo that it was indeed
validly issued, automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court. The status quo order was, for all intents
and purposes, an indefinite extension of the first TRO, or a renewed or second temporary restraining order proscribed by the rule
and extant jurisprudence.
The status quo order is in fact, worse than a second TRO since unlike an ordinary TRO which has a lifetime of only 20 days, the trial
court directed the maintenance of the status quo for an indefinite period or until further order from this court. It was not a
preliminary injunction, because, as previously mentioned, the hearing on the application for the writ is still pending. Besides, in the
event of an injunctive writ, an injunction bond is required, unless exempted by the Court.

G.R. No. 157315 DECEMBER 1, 2010

CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN v. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC.
FACTS: In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its support
for her decision to deny the application for mayor’s permit of respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS),
and to eventually close down CBS’s radio station.
Plaza justified her decision by claiming that CBS operates its broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, in violation of
the city zoning ordinance. She forwarded the matter to the Sangguniang Panlungsod to solicit its resolution of support on the
matter.
Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-2002 "to strongly support the decision of the City Mayor to deny
the application of Consolidated Broadcasting System Development Corporation (Bombo Radyo-Butuan) for a Mayor’s Permit and
thereafter close the radio station." 3
CBS’s station manager was then issued a final/last notice of violation and demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a
warning that he would recommend the closure of its business in case of non-compliance.
Thus CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages against the petitioners in
the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC),4 with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge Rosarito P. Dabalos. However, Judge Dabalos
voluntarily inhibited and directed the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. He cited the
circumstances that might affect his objectivity and impartiality in resolving the controversy.
The Vice-Executive Judge who is the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33, could not also act on this case on the ground of 'delicadeza'
considering that defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza is his 'kumadre'.
Judge Victor Tomaneng, Presiding Judge of Branch 33, likewise inhibted himself from handling Civil Case No. 5193, and in his
capacity as Vice Executive Judge (in lieu of Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr., then on sick leave) directed the assignment of Civil
Case No. 5193 to Branch 5 without raffle.
Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, presided by Judge Augustus L. Calo, who also recused because his wife had been
recently appointed by Mayor Plaza to the City’s Legal Office. Judge Calo ordered the immediate return of the case to the Clerk of
Court for forwarding to Vice Executive Judge Tomaneng.
Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng formally returned Civil Case No. 5193 to Judge Dabalos, stating in his
letter that Judge Dabalos’ reason for inhibition did not amount to a plausible ground to inhibit. Judge Tomaneng instructed Judge
Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme Court approved the inhibition.
On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a TRO. As the Court cannot issue a seventy-two (72) hour Temporary Restraining
Order because of the incoming delay on Monday, February 25, 2002, a temporary restraining order is hereby issued effective for
twenty (20) days from issuance (Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure).
On February 25, 2002, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to lift or dissolve temporary restraining order in Branch 2 (sala of Judge
Dabalos).
On February 26, 2002, Judge Dabalos referred his order of inhibition in Civil Case No. 5193 to the Court Administrator for

consideration, with a request for the designation of another Judge not stationed in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte to handle the
case.
Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate another judge to hear its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the hearing of which Judge Tomaneng had set on March 11, 2002
During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBS’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, at which the
petitioners and their counsel did not appear, CBS’s counsel manifested that he was desisting from his earlier request with the Court
for the designation of another judge to hear Civil Case No. 5193. Judge Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction on March 12, 2002, to give the petitioners an opportunity to show cause why the writ prayed
for should not issue.
As the defendants did not introduce any evidence in spite of the order of the Court to show cause why no writ of preliminary
injunction be issued and the repeated directive of the court in open court for the defendants to present evidence which the
defendants firmly refused to do so on flimsy grounds, the Court resolves to issue a writ of preliminary injunction.
Following CBS’s posting of ₱200,000.00 as the required injunction bond, Branch 2 issued the writ of preliminary injunction on March
15, 2002,15 commanding and directing the provincial sheriff to enjoin the City Government of Butuan and the Hon. City Mayor
Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting upon the mayor's order
or instruction or under her authority to cease and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADIO BOMBO or from
preventing disturbing or molesting its business operations.
Thus, the petitioners commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction).
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBS’s application for preliminary injunction by not first requiring the
applicant to adduce evidence in support of the application.
HELD: No. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order
requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.23 Thus, a prohibitory
injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title
to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief
demanded in the complaint,26 which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in
the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are:
(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie;

(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a
right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause
of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute.
Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law.
While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was
nonetheless properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the Legislature, and
that the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayor’s permit and resulting closure of the radio station) were imminent and,
unless enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBS’s rights under the franchise. In this regard, worthy of mention is that even the
Vice Executive Judge, acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station suffer
closure, had issued ex parte the TRO.

It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge Dabalos
issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders of the petitioners , as the parties against whom the TRO was
issued, to show cause why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue,31 thus:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show
cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether
or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
xxx
In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present evidence why the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted. By their refusal to comply with the directive to show cause by presenting their evidence to that
effect, the petitioners could blame no one but themselves.
G.R. No. 175145 MARCH 28, 2008

SPOUSES ALFREDO and SHIRLEY YAP v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK
FACTS: As a result of a collection suit filed by iBank against Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy Go, a Writ of execution was implemented
against Looyuko, while the same writ was issued against Go. The sheriff of RTC 150 of Makati issued a notice of sale concerning real
properties allegedly owned by Go, but public auction did not push through.
On 13 June 2000, petitioner spouses filed a complaint for Injunction with Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction with RTC 158
of Pasig, alleging that the said properties subject of the notice of sheriff’s sale and about to be sold at public auction, are already
owned by them by virtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Jimmy Go in their favor; and that the sheriff disregarded their right
over the properties despite their execution of an affidavit of adverse claim over the properties.
The RTC 158 denied the application for WPI. The public auction finally pushed through on 22 Aug 2000 wherein the subject
properties were sold in favor of iBank, subject to third-party claims of petitioners.
Petitioners filed with RTC 264 of Pasig the instant complaint. On 18 July 2001, an Order was issued, after hearing, granting the said
application. On 13 Aug 2001, the WPI was issued. Respondents challenged the said orders up to the SC, but to no avail. An entry of
judgment was issued rendering as final the propriety of the issuance of the WPI.
Subsequently, respondents filed with RTC 264 of Pasig praying that the WPI previously issued be dissolved, emphasizing their
willingness to file a counter-bond to cover whatever damages petitioners may suffer. In an Order dated 29 Apr 2006, the trial court
recalled and dissolved the WPI, and ordered respondents to post a counter-bond amounting to Php10M.
As its basis, it explained that petitioners’ right or title to the property is doubtful or disputed, thus unclear, since the purported deed
of sale in their favor was not duly notarized. Such legal right can only therefore be threshed out in a full blown trial. Moreover,

consideration was taken of the fact that the respondents were willing to post a counter-bond.
ISSUE: May the trial court still order the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it previously issued?
HELD: Yes
Non-effectivity of dissolution: At the outset, it must be said that the WPI dated 13 August 2001 has not yet been actually dissolved
because respondents have not posted the required counter-bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The dissolution thereof is
primed on the filing of the counter-bond.
The Order of the trial court to recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction is subject to the filing and approval of the counter-bond
that it ordered. Failure to post the required counter-bond will necessarily lead to the non-dissolution of the preliminary injunction.
The Order of Dissolution cannot be implemented until and unless the required counter-bond has been posted.
On the merits; Distinction between issuance and dissolution:
The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its issuance is governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
As long as the party seeking the dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the grounds for its
dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Under Section 6, two conditions must concur:
First, the court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the
defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer;
Second, the defendant files a counter-bond. The Order of the trial court is based on this ground. It found that respondents duly
showed that they would suffer great and irreparable injury if the injunction shall continue to exist. As to the second condition, the
trial court likewise found that respondents were willing to post a counter-bond which could cover the damages that petitioners may
suffer in case the judgment.
G.R. No. 212025 JULY 1, 2015

EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL, INC. v. VISAYAN SURETY AND INSURANCE CORPORATION, AND FAR EASTERN SURETY AND
INSURANCE CO., INC.
FACTS: On March 26, 1996, petitioner, then represented by Max L.F. Ying, Vice-President for Productions, and Alfiero R. Orden,
Treasurer, entered into a contract with Multi-Rich Builders for the construction of a garment factory within the Cavite Philippine
Economic Zone Authority. The duration of the project was for a maximum period of 5 months or 150 consecutive calendar days.

Included in the contract was an Arbitration Clause in case of dispute. The construction of the factory building was completed on
November 27, 1996. Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc. was subsequently incorporated with the SEC.
On January 26, 2004, Win Multi-Rich filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner and Ying before the RTC,
and prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment, claiming that Ying was about to abscond and that petitioner had an impending
closure. Win Multi-Rich then secured the necessary bond in the amount of P8,634,448.20 from respondent Visayan Surety and
Insurance Corporation. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Win Multi-Rich.
To prevent the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment on its equipment and machinery, petitioner issued Equitable PCI
Bank Check No. 160149, dated February 16, 2004, in the amount of P8,634,448.20 payable to the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
The RTC issued another order directing the deposit of the garnished funds of petitioner to the cashier of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC. It was subsequently released to Win Multi-Rich through a motion filed by it before the trial began. This was subsequently
reversed by the CA. This was affirmed by the SC and ordered the return of the garnished amount to the petitioner.
Win Multi-Rich opposed the motion for execution because the cash deposit awarded to it by the RTC had been paid to suppliers,
and the said amount was long due and demandable; Surety Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC granted
and absolved them because the SC decision pertained to Multi-Rich Only.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling and held that petitioner failed to timely claim damages against the surety before the decision of
the SC became final and executory, plus petitioner failed to implead surety respondents in the previous case.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner sufficiently incorporated an application for damages against the wrongful attachment.
HELD: YES. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of the improper writ of attachment caused it actual damages in the amount of at
least P3,000,000.00. It added that the Equitable PCI Bank Check it issued to the RTC Clerk of Court, to lift the improper writ of
attachment, should be returned to it. Evidently, these allegations constitute petitioner's application for damages arising from the
wrongful attachment, and the said application was timely filed as it was filed before the finality of judgment.
Section 20, Rule 57 specifically requires that the application for damages against the wrongful attachment, whether filed before the
trial court or appellate court, must be with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties. Such damages may be
awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case.
Due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the applicant's right to damages and the amount
thereof under the bond is indispensable. The surety should be given an opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness
of the damages resulting from the wrongful issuance of the writ. In the absence of due notice to the surety, therefore, no judgment
for damages may be entered and executed against it.
However, while Visayan Surety could not be held liable under Section 20, Rule 57, the same cannot be said of FESICO. Strictly
speaking, the surety bond of FESICO is not covered by any of the provisions in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court because, in the first
place, Win Multi-Rich should not have filed its motion to release the cash deposit of petitioner and the RTC should not have granted
the same.
It is evident that a surety on a counter-bond given to secure the payment of a judgment becomes liable for the payment of the
amount due upon: (1) demand made upon the surety; and (2) notice and summary hearing on the same action. Noticeably, unlike
Section 20, Rule 57, which requires notice and hearing before the finality of the judgment in an application for damages, Section 17,
Rule 57 allows a party to claim damages on the surety bond after the judgment has become executory.
Under Section 20, Rule 57, in relation to Section 4 therein, 66 the surety bond shall answer for all the costs which may be adjudged to
the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment. In other words, the damages sought to be
enforced against the surety bond are unliquidated. Necessarily, a notice and hearing before the finality of judgment must be
undertaken to properly determine the amount of damages that was suffered by the defendant due to the improper attachment.
These damages to be imposed against the attaching party and his sureties are different from the principal case, and must be
included in the judgment.

On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, in relation to Section 12 therein, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure
the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. Stated differently, the damages sought to be
charged against the surety bond are liquidated. The final judgment had already determined the amount to be awarded to the
winning litigant on the main action. Thus, there is nothing left to do but to execute the judgment against the losing party, or in case
of insufficiency, against its sureties.
The Supreme Court is convinced that a demand against FESICO had been made, and that it was given due notice and an opportunity
to be heard on its defense. First, petitioner filed a motion for execution on June 29, 2009, a copy of which was furnished to FESICO;
second, petitioner filed a manifestation, that FESICO was duly served with the said motion and notified of the hearing on August 7,
2009; third, during the August 7, 2009 hearing on the motion for execution, the counsels for petitioner, Win Multi-Rich and FESICO
were all present; fourth, in an Order, dated September 16, 2009, FESICO was given 15 days to submit its comment or opposition to
the motion for execution;and lastly, FESICO filed its comment on the motion on October 1, 2009. Based on the foregoing, the
requirements under Section 17, Rule 57 have been more than satisfied.
Indeed, FESICO cannot escape liability on its surety bond issued in favor of petitioner. The purpose of FESICO's bond was to secure
the withdrawal of the cash deposit and to answer any damages that would be inflicted against petitioner in the course of the
proceedings. Also, the undertaking signed by FESICO stated that the duration of the effectivity of the bond shall be from its approval
by the court until the action is fully decided, resolved or terminated.
G.R. No. 157494 DECEMBER 10, 2004

BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT v. THE HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN
FACTS: Respondent City opposed the Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 published
by the petitioner. It alleged that the proposed water rates would violate due process as they were to be imposed without the
public hearing. Hence, it prayed that before the hearing of the main case, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction be issued.
Petitioner opposed to it and filed a motion to dismiss.
On June 17, 1999, Respondent City filed a motion to set hearing its application for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
mandatory injunction. It also alleged that petitioner had already effected the water rates increase and collection, hence, causing
irreparable injury to the public.
On February 18, 2000, respondent City filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order And[/]Or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction praying that the case be set for hearing on February 24, 2000.

On the same date requested, respondent court heard respondent’s application for temporary restraining order and issued an Order
commanding petitioner to stop, desist and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000 which were then
supposed to take effect on March 1, 2000.
On March 7, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order.
On April 6, 2000, respondent court issued an Order finding petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of
Temporary Restraining Order moot and academic considering petitioners compliance of said temporary restraining order.
On December 21, 2000, respondent court issued the assailed Decision granting the final injunction that allegedly confirmed the
previous preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision on January 11, 2001 asserting, among others, that the case
was not yet ripe for decision when the court granted the final injunction, the petitioner having had no opportunity to file its answer,
avail of the mandatory pre-trial conference and have the case tried on the merits. But was denied.
C.A. affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not preliminary injunction had been issued
HELD: No. The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the trial court make a clear conclusion that the Order
issued was a temporary restraining order and not a preliminary injunction.
Given the previous undeviating references to it as a temporary restraining order, respondents cannot now consider it as a
preliminary injunction to justify the validity of the assailed Decision. The attendant facts and circumstances clearly show that the
respondent trial court issued a temporary restraining order.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the
main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. ]
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except
only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks
a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction
is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by
the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would
automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary restraining order granted automatically expired
after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that respondent court merely ordered the respondent, its agents, representatives
or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which
will start on March 1, 2000 without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the temporary restraining order to a
preliminary injunction.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute
if issued by a regional trial court. The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary
restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day

period provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. It is
because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a
preliminary injunction. Respondent City cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent trial court.
G.R. No. 174569 SEPTEMBER 17, 2008

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v. BENJAMIN CO, ENGR. DALE OLEA and THREE KINGS CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CORPORATION
FACTS: China Banking Corporation (Chinabank) sold two parcels of land situated in Pampanga to Spouses Joey and Mary Jeannie
Castro (Spouses Castro) and Richard and Editha Nogoy (Spouses Nogoy). Bordering the lot was a residential property owned by
Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.
Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation for the development of the
Northwoods Estates, which included constructing a wall along the border of their property. Engineer Dale Olea, an independent
contractor, constructed a wall that blocked side access to the Spouses Nogoy‘s and Castro‘s property. Spouses Nogoy and Castro
communicated with Co, asking for a halt in the activities because the construction closed the only means of ingress and egress of
their property, and at the same time, caved in and impeded the ventilation and clearance due the Castro spouses’ residential house.
Co told the spouses that the construction could not be halted since the same was almost finished, and that the disputed
construction did not block the right of way of the two spouses‘ property. The spouses thus filed a writ of preliminary injunction to
temporarily stop the building activity. Before respondents filed their Answer,petitioners filed an Amended Complaint,alleging that
the construction of the perimeter wall was almost finished and thus modifying their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. After hearing petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, RTC
denied the same
ISSUE: Whether or not an injunction can be granted by mere claim of right of way
HELD: No. It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court, and the
exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which would effectively dispose of
the main case without trial.
In the case at bar, petitioners base their prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction on Section 44 of Act No. 496 (as amended by
Republic Act No. 440), Section 50 of Presidential Decree 1529, and their claim that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there
is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus
more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not
have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.
In this case, Spouses Nogoy and Castro failed to prove that they will be prejudiced by the construction of the wall. The spouses have
not clearly shown that their rights have been violated and that they are entitled to the relief prayed for and that irreparable damage
would be suffered by them if an injunction is not issued.
While the Spouses Nogoy and Castro correctly argue that certain requirements must be observed before encumbrances, in this case
the condition of the lot’s registration as being subject to the law, may be discharged and before road lots may be appropriated

gratuity assuming that the lot in question was indeed one, enjoy the presumption of regularity and the legal requirements for the
removal of the memorandum annotated on Co‘s lot are presumed to have been followed.
G.R. No. 144755 JUNE 8, 2005

SPOUSES ELISEO F. ESTARES and ROSENDA P. ESTARES v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: The spouses Estares secured a loan of P800,000 from Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) in 1998. To secure the
loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land. They however only received P637,000 as testified by Rosenda Estares in court. She did not
however question the discrepancy. At that time, her husband was in Algeria working. The loan eventually went due and the spouses
were unable to pay. So PLCC petitioned for an extrajudicial foreclosure. The property was eventually foreclosed. Now, the spouses
are questioning the validity of the loan as they alleged that they agreed to an 18% per annum interest rate but PLCC is now charging
them 3.5% interest rate per month; they also questioned the terms of the loan.
Accordingly, the Estares spouses sought to declare as null and void the promissory note and the real estate mortgage for not
reflecting their true agreement. In the interim, they prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the mortgaged property and proceeding with the extrajudicial sale scheduled on
July 13, 1999
On July 12, 1999, the trial court issued a TRO in favor of the Estares spouses.The parties subsequently agreed to maintain the status
quo until August 20, 1999.
PLCC argued that the spouses were properly apprised of the terms of the loan; it opposed the prayer for restraining order on the
ground that there is no factual and legal basis for its issuance since the Estares spouses’ fear of eviction is false.
At the hearing on the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction, they insisted that they have right to injunctive
relief. They claim that the promissory note, credit application, disbursement voucher, disclosure statement and real estate
mortgage are falsified; the promissory note is not reflective of the true amount of the loan, as well as the term, interest and charges
thereon; the P126,362.28 represent additional charges, not as part of the loan, that were not agreed upon prior to or before the
consummation of the loan; and the amount of the loan and rate of interest stated in the falsified promissory note are fictitious or
simulated.
On August 18, 1999, the trial court denied the Estares spouses’ application for a writ ofpreliminary injunction, holding that the latter
failed to establish the facts necessary for an injunction to issue.
On August 31, 1999, the Estares spouses filed a motion for reconsideration. During the hearing on the motion for reconsideration on
September 17, 1999, Eliseo P. Estares (Eliseo for brevity) moved that he be allowed to testify on the circumstances of the loan but
the trial court denied it. but was denied.
On December 7, 1999, the Estares spouses filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals ascribing grave
abuse ofdiscretion upon the trial court in issuing the Orders dated August 18, 1999 and October 1, 1999 which denied their prayer
for a writ ofpreliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction should have been granted to petitioner to prevent respondents from
foreclosing mortgage
HELD: No.
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself
but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue
the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the writ rests

upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order before the case can be regularly heard, and the
essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient
to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the
circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.
The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive
relief: (a) the existence of their right to be protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative
of such right. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable
right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be
resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation.
In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted to
PLCC but only question the amount thereof. Their property is by their own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the
nonpayment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
Rosenda’s testimony sealed the fate of the necessity of the writ of preliminary injunction. She admitted that: they did not question
PLCC in writing why they only received P637,000.00; they did not question the figures appearing in the Statement of Account when
they received it; and, when they received PLCC’s demand letter, they went to the former’s office not to question the loan’s terms
and conditions but merely to request for extension of three months to pay their obligation. She acknowledged that they only raised
the alleged discrepancy of the amount loaned and the amount received, as well as the blank documents which they allegedly
signed, after PLCC initiated the foreclosure proceedings.
It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve
findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. As such, a trial court’s decision to grant or to deny
injunctive relief will not be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court
abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination, relies
on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor,
relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.
It must be remembered that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The
evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a
“sampling” is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case
on the merits. We note that it was the Estares spouses’ choice to present only Rosenda to testify on the circumstances of the loan at
the hearing on their application for a writ of preliminary injunction and they cannot assert that Eliseo should have been accorded
that opportunity during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. What the law proscribes is the lack of
opportunity to be heard. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason
to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process. Eliseo cannot complain that he was
deprived of due process since he is given the full opportunity to testify on the circumstances of the loan during the trial of the main
case.
G.R. No. 177486 DECEMBER 21, 2009

PURISIMO BUYCO v. NELSON BARAQUIA
FACTS: Baraquia (respondent) filed a complaint before the RTC of Iloilo against the Buycos for the establishment of a permanent
right of way, injunction and damages with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin the Buycos from closing
off a private road within their property which was used by him to access his poultry farm from the public highway.
The petitioner, Buyco, substituted The Buycos during the pendency of the case (the original petitioners died).
RTC granted Baraquias application for preliminary injunction.
On February 14, 2007- RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to establish the requisites for right of way under Art. 649 and 650 of

the Civil Code, thus, the preliminary injunction was lifted.
A notice of appeal was filed by Baraquia, while Buyco filed a notice of partial appeal on the non-award of the prayer for damages.
Baraquia filed a motion to cite Buyco and his brother in contempt for closing the road which violated the writ of preliminary
injunction.
On March 13, 2007- RTC resolved the issue by saying that the writ of preliminary injunction remained to be valid, efficacious and
obligatory, when Buyco closed the road on March 1, which is an indirect contempt of court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration contending that a preliminary injunction, once quashed, ceases to exist, and that they cannot
be held guilty of indirect contempt by a mere motion.
On April 18, 2008- The trial court set aside the March 13 Resolution and granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration stating
that there must be a verified petition for them to be held in contempt.
On the lifetime of the preliminary injunction, the trial court held that the matter of whether a writ of preliminary injunction
remains valid until the decision annulling the same attains finality is not firmly entrenched in jurisprudence.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the dismissal of the complaint is immediately executory,
even if the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal..
HELD: Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts . It is merely a provisional
remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latters outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself . Being an ancillary or auxiliary
remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.
The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary
because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.
It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy
between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause
irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court upon respondents showing that he
and his poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject road. After trial, however, the lower court found that
respondent was not entitled to the easement of right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such
entitlement, hence, the writ was lifted.
The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed
lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding.
There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in respondents favor, the writ of preliminary injunction
issued on December 1, 1999 by the trial court was automatically dissolved upon the dismissal of Civil Case No. 26015.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated April 18, 2007 of the trial court is REVERSED. The writ of preliminary
injunction which Branch 39 of the Iloilo Regional Trial Court issued on December 1, 1999 was automatically dissolved upon its
dismissal by Decision of February 14, 2007 of Civil Case No. 26015.
G.R. Nos. 135180-81; 135425-26 AUGUST 16, 2000

HEIRS OF THE LATE JUSTICE JOSE B.L. REYES represented by ADORACION D. REYES, ET AL., v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Justice JBL Reyes and Dr. Edmundo Reyes (brothers) executed a contract leasing a parcel of land along Taft Aveue to Manila
Builders, subject to certain conditions. However, Manila Builders violated the conditions. And so, the Heirs of JBL Reyes and the
Heirs of Dr. Edmundo Reyes (“the Heirs”) sent notice to Manila Builders terminating the lease and demanding that they vacate and
surrender the premises.
The Heirs filed with the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer based on the breach of contract of lease. The MTC ruled in their
favor. The Heirs, then filed with the MTC a motion for execution of the judgment of eviction, which was granted..
Meanwhile, Manila Builders appealed to the RTC. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to file an appeal memorandum on
time. So, Manila Builders elevated the case to the CA.
The CA allowed the withdrawal of the appeal filed by Manila Builders. Simultaneously, Manila Builders filed with the RTC an action
for annulment of the ejectment judgment, with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/ or preliminary injunction, but this
was denied.
Manila Builders filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus questioning the RTC’s denial of its application for injunctive
relief. The CA issued a resolution restraining the enforcement of the writ of execution.
The RTC dismissed the action for annulment of judgment on the ground that Manila Builders’ remedy was appeal, which when
withdrawn, was effectively abandoned.
The CA promulgated a decision setting aside the decision of the MTC. Manila Builders filed an urgent ex-parte motion for execution
pending appeal.
The Heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the CA with the SC, and an urgent motion for execution, with
motion to defer consideration due to the pendency of their petition with the SC.
The CA granted the motion for execution, and issued a resolution appointing a special sheriff to execute the decision. The Heirs
were evicted from the premises and Manila Builders was restored to possession of the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly declared the Heirs of indirect contempt because they implemented the writ of
execution of trial court despite the order of court to elevate entire original records.
HELD: NO. CA erred in declaring the Heirs guilty of indirect contempt of court because they implemented the writ of execution of
the trial court despite the order of the court. This was because the TRO issued by the CA had lapsed after 60 days. No more
restraining order was in effect until the court decided the case on its merits. Hence, petitioners acted in good faith in the exercise of
their proprietary rights. There was no willful disobedience to a lawful order. The Heirs were not guilty of contempt. The salutary
rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective
and not retaliatory idea of punishment.The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. The court must
exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.
The Supreme Court further said that it was worse that the Court of Appeals immediately enforced its decision pending appeal
restoring respondent in possession of the leased premises and worst, appointed a special sheriff to carry out the writ of execution.
In the first place, the CA has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision. Discretionary execution
under Rule 39, Sec. 2 (a), is allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in
a special order after due hearing. A judgment of the CA cannot be executed pending appeal. Once final and executory, the
judgment must be remanded to the lower court, where a motion for its execution may be filed only after its entry.
In the second place, even in discretionary executions, the same must be firmly founded upon good reasons. The court must state in
a special order the "good reasons" justifying the issuance of the writ. The good reasons allowing execution pending appeal must
constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision
is reversed. Jurisprudence teaches us what are "good reasons" that justify a premature execution of judgment (ex. the deterioration
of commodities subject of litigation, or the deteriorating condition of a vessel)

In this case, the good reasons given by the CA to support the discretionary execution of its decision are:
(1) that MMB would be deprived of income from its business endeavors;
(2) that "it is of public knowledge" that the CA and the SC are clogged with cases and it may take some time before the
decision in the case may attain its finality; and
(3) that petitioners acted with bad faith and malice.
None of the cited reasons is "good" enough. The assertion that "it is of public knowledge" that the SC is clogged with cases that may
take time to decide mocks the integrity and derides the competence of this Court. Urgency resulting from years of delay in the
disposal of a case is not a good reason for premature execution of the decision.
In the third place, by the mere fact of the filing of the petition for review to the CA, the finality of the CA’s decision was stayed, and
there could be no entry of judgment therein, and, hence, no premature execution could be had. The CA adopted its resolution
granting execution pending appeal on after the petition for review was already filed in the SC. It thereby encroached on the
hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court. Worst of all, the CA has no authority to appoint a special sheriff. It appointed an employee
of the mailing section, who was not even bonded as required by law.
GR Nos. 69863-65 DECEMBER 10, 1990

LINO BROCKA v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
FACTS: Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District following the forcible and violent
dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization
(ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly in three criminal cases with Branch 108, Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Quezon City.
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended,
the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent
petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained in detention, respondents having
invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985. Neither the original, duplicate
original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them. Then, Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11,
1985 with Inciting to Sedition. The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka as sham in
character and that respondents have conspired to use the strong arm of the law and hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino
Broka et al the right to bail. Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for
enjoining their criminal prosecution.
ISSUE: WON criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined.
HELD: Yes. Under the general rule, criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
However, there are exemptions in the following cases:
(a) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

(b) Then necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
(j) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; and
(k) To prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners
Petitioners have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been
undertaken by state officials in bad faith. The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and non-operational PDA,
certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a
spurious and non-operational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors
intended to keep petitioners in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition'' could be facilitated and justified without
need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. Where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the
instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where a
sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
G.R. No. 140228 NOVEMBER 19, 2004
FRANCISCO MEDINA ET AL., v. GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: Petitioners are the grandchildren of Pedro Medina from two marriages. On June 5, 1962, Pedro, his brother Alberto Medina
and his niece Nazaria Cruz (Albertos daughter) executed a notarized Contract to Sell in favor of respondent Greenfield Development
Corporation over a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City, then in the Province of Rizal. A notarized Deed of Sale covering said
property was subsequently entered into on June 27, 1962, in favor of respondent, and this time signed by Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida,
Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz, as vendors. Thereafter, a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale with Mortgage was executed on September 4, 1964 in favor of respondent over Lot 90-B covered by TCT No. 100178.
Signing as vendors were Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria
Cruz. By virtue of these sales, respondent was able to register in its name the title to the two parcels of land. These properties were
consolidated with other lots and were eventually registered on July 19, 1995, in the name of respondent under TCT Nos. 202295,
202296 and 202297.
On November 6, 1998, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 98-233, an action for annulment of titles and deeds, reconveyance,
damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order, against respondent and the Register of Deeds of Makati.
Petitioners allege in their complaint that while the titles were registered in the names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio, Brigida and
Gregoria, all surnamed Medina, they alleged that they were recognized as co-owners thereof. In support of their case, petitioners
maintain that the deeds of sale on these properties were simulated and fictitious, and the signatures of the vendors therein were
fake. Despite the transfer of the title to respondent’s name, they remained in possession thereof and in fact, their caretaker, a
certain Santos Arevalo and his family still reside on a portion of the property. On July 13, 1998, petitioners caused an adverse claim
to be annotated on the titles.
After discovering the annotation, respondent constructed a fence on the property and posted security personnel, barring their
ingress and egress. Thus, petitioners sought, among others, the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining respondent and its agents and representatives from preventing petitioners to exercise their rights over the
properties.

On January 18, 1999, the trial court issued its resolution granting petitioners prayer for injunctive relief. However, the CA nullified
the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in granting petitioners’ prayer for injunctive relief.
HELD: Yes. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard fully. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites:
1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Hence, petitioners’ entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal right to the properties subject of the present
dispute. The Court notes that the present dispute is based solely on the parties’ allegations in their respective pleadings and the
documents attached thereto. We have on one hand, petitioners’ bare assertion or claim that they are co-owners of the properties
sold by their predecessors to respondent, and on the other, respondents claim of ownership supported by deeds of conveyances
and torrens titles in their favor.
From these alone, it is clear that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected. Where the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
G.R. No. 125008 JUNE 19, 1997

COMMODITIES v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In 1990, petitioner spouses Victor and Johannah Trinidad obtained a loan of P31,000,000.00 from respondent Far East Bank
& Trust Company to finance the purchase of the Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage. The loan was secured by a mortgage over the
ice plant and the land on which it stands. Petitioners failed to pay their loan. The bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and
the ice plant was sold by public bidding on March 22, 1993. Respondent bank was the highest bidder and it registered the certificate
of sale on September 22, 1993. Petitioner spouses filed a case against respondent bank for reformation of the loan agreement,
annulment of the foreclosure sale, and damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to pay the docket fees.
On October 28, 1994, another civil case was filed by petitioners for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period. An
“Urgent Petition for Receivership” was also filed on November 16, 1994. They prayed for the appointment to save the ice plant,
conduct its affairs and safeguard its records during the pendency of the case. The RTC assigned petitioner’s nominee as receiver. On
appeal, the order was annulled and set aside.
*Important part of the case* “Petitioners claim that the appointment of a receiver is justified under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59. They

argue that the ice plant which is the subject of the action was in danger of being lost, removed and materially injured because of the
following "imminent perils":
6.1 Danger to the lives, health and peace of mind of the inhabitants living near the Sta. Maria Ice Plant;
6.2 Drastic action or sanctions that could be brought against the plaintiff by affected third persons, including
workers who have claims against the plaintiff but could not be paid due to the numbing manner by which the
defendant took the Sta. Maria Ice Plant;
6.3 The rapid reduction of the Ice Plant into a scrap heap because of evident incompetence, neglect and
vandalism.”
ISSUE: WON the assignment of a receiver is justified.
HELD: NO.
[Requisite of petition for receivership under section 1 (b)]
A petition for receivership under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59 requires that the property or fund which is the subject of the action must
be in danger of loss, removal or material injury which necessitates protection or preservation. The guiding principle is the
prevention of imminent danger to the property. If an action by its nature, does not require such protection or reservation, said
remedy cannot be applied for and granted.
In the instant case, we do not find the necessity for the appointment of a receiver. Petitioners have not sufficiently shown that the
Sta. Maria Ice Plant is in danger of disappearing or being wasted and reduced to a "scrap heap." Neither have they proven that the
property has been materially injured which necessitates its protection and preservation. In fact, at the hearing on respondent bank's
motion to dismiss, respondent bank, through counsel, manifested in open court that the leak in the ice plant had already been
remedied and that no other leakages had been reported since. This statement has not been disputed by petitioners.
G.R. No. 155408 FEBRUARY 13, 2008

VIVARES v. REYES
FACTS: Severino Reyes was the father of respondent Jose Reyes and Torcuato Reyes. Upon the death of Severino, respondent and
Torcuato came upon their inheritance consisting of several properties. They had an oral partition of the properties and separately
appropriated to themselves said properties.
Petitioner Vivares was the designated executor of Torcuato’s last will and testament, while petitioner Ignaling was declared a lawful
heir of Torcuato.
Petitioners instituted an action for Partition and Recovery of Real Estate before the Camiguin RTC. What was being contested were
the properties that were still in the name of Severino.
On March 15, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Place Properties in Litigation under Receivership before the trial court alleging that
to their prejudice respondent had, without prior court approval and without petitioners’ knowledge, sold to third parties and
transferred in his own name several common properties. The petitioners prayed to place the entire disputed estate of Severino
under receivership. They nominated Lope Salantin to be appointed as receiver.
Respondent opposed the appointment of receivership and asserted that the transfer in his name of the said properties was a result
of oral partition.
On September 19, 2000, respondent filed for cancellation of the receivership and offered to pay a bond in an amount fixed by court.
Respondent also filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens on certain properties owned by Elena Unchuan.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the motion to cancel the receivership and lift the notice of lis pendens on the

properties allegedly owned by Elena.
CA reversed the ruling, cancelled the receivership and lifted the notice of lis pendens on the properties owned by Elena. The case
was then remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER WHEN
THERE IS A NEED TO SAFEGUARD THE PROPERTIES IN LITIGATION.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RECEIVERSHIP SHOULD BE CANCELLED WITH THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY BOND BY THE RESPONDENT.
HELD: The Court sustained the ruling of the CA with some modifications.
On the first issue: Petitioners failed to adduce clear, convincing, and hard evidence to show the alleged fraud in the transfers and
the antedating of said transfers. The fact that the transfers were dated prior to the demise of Torcuato on May 12, 1992 does not
necessarily mean the transfers were attended by fraud. He who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it. There was no sufficient
cause or reason to justify placing the disputed properties under receivership.
On the second issue: petitioner is willing to post a counterbond in the amount to be fixed by the court based on Sec. 3, Rule 59.
Anchored on this rule, the trial court should have dispensed with the services of the receiver, more so considering that the alleged
fraud put forward to justify the receivership was not at all established.
It is undisputed that respondent has actual possession over some of the disputed properties which are entitled to protection.
Between the possessor of a subject property and the party asserting contrary rights to the properties, the former is accorded better
rights.
G.R. No. 61508 MARCH 17, 1999

CITIBANK v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In considering for a loan obtained from Citibank, N.A., the defendant Douglas Anama executed a promissory note, dated
November 10, 1972, to pay the plaintiff bank the sum of P418,000.00 in sixty (60) equal successive monthly installments of
P8,722.25, starting on the 10th day of December 1972 and on the 10th of every month thereafter.
To secure payment of the loan, private respondent Anama also constituted a Chattel Mortgage of even date in favor of petitioner,
on various machineries and equipment located at No. 1302 Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City.
For failure and refusal of the private respondent to pay the monthly installment due under the said promissory note since January
despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a verified complaint against private respondent Anama for the collection of his unpaid
balance on the said promissory note, for the delivery and possession of the chattels covered by the Chattel Mortgage preparatory to
the foreclosure thereof
Anama submitted his Answer with Counterclaim, denying the material averments of the complaint, and averring, inter alia that the
remedy of replevin was improper and the writ of seizure should be vacated.

The trial court, upon proof of default of the private respondent in the payment of the said loan, issued an Order of Replevin. Despite
the issuance of the said order however, actual delivery of possession did not take place because of negotiations for an amicable
settlement. A pre-trial conference was held and the petitioner then took over private respondent’s business as receiver. But when
settlement failed, the lower court tried the case on the merits.
Petitioner then presented a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure, ordering the sheriff to seize and dispose of the
properties involved. Private respondent opposed the motion claiming, among others, (1) that Citibank’s P400,000 replevin bond to
answer for damages was grossly inadequate; (2) that he was never in default to justify the seizure; xxx (4) that his supposed
obligations with Citibank were fully secured and his mortgaged properties are more than sufficient to secure payment thereof; xxx
The trial court issued an Order granting the Motion for Alias Writ of Seizure. Private respondent moved for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order but the same was denied. As a consequence, the sheriff seized subject properties, dismantled and removed them
from the premises where they were installed, delivered them to petitioner’s possession and advertised them for sale at public
auction.
Private respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction. Finding that the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions, the CA granted the petition,
holding that the provisions of the Rules of Court on Replevin and Receivership have not been complied with, in that (1) there was no
Affidavit of Merit accompanying the Complaint for Replevin; (2) the bond posted by Citibank was insufficient; and (3) there was non-
compliance with the requirement of a receiver’s bond and oath of office. Hence the present petition for certiorari with TRO by
Citibank.
ISSUE: WON the respondent erred in finding that the petitioner did not comply with the provisions of sec. 5, rule 59 by failing to
post a receiver's bond.
HELD: No. CA found that the requirements of Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership were not complied with by the petitioner,
particularly the filing or posting of a bond and the taking of an oath. However, the old Rules of Court which was in effect at the time
this case was still at trial stage, a bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of the applicant, except when
the application was made ex parte. CA was right in finding a defect in such assumption of receivership in that the requirement of
taking an oath has not been complied with.
For erroneously issuing the alias writ of seizure without inquiring into the sufficiency of the replevin bond and for allowing petitioner
to assume receivership without the requisite oath, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dealing with the situation. Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be
delivered immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession and may not be
deprived of it without due process. Petition DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 111357 JUNE 17, 1997

TRADERS ROYAL BANK v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: In G.R. No. 63855, it was ruled that the deceased spouses Jose and Salvacion Tayengco, the lawful owners of the properties
under receivership.
In G.R. No. 60076, the validity of the appointment of petitioner Traders Royal Bank (TRB) as receiver pendente lite was affirmed.
In this case the receivership proceeding was duly terminated.
TRB rendered its final accounting of the funds under receivership wherein it retained the amount of P219, 016.24 as its receiver's
fee, instead of turning over the entire fund to the Tayengcos. The RTC approved the final accounting submitted by TRB, including the
deduction of its fee from the fund under receivership.
The Tayengcos assailed said order before the Court of Appeals, contending that TRB's compensation should have been charged
against the losing party and not from the funds under receivership.
The Court of Appeals ruled that TRB cannot deduct its fee from the funds under its receivership since this must be shouldered by the
losing party or equally apportioned among the parties-litigants. Consequently, TRB was ordered to return the P219,016.24 to the
Tayengcos, and the losing parties, Cu Bie, et al., were held solely liable for TRB's compensation.
TRB filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied.
ISSUES: a. WON the Court of Appeals decision barred by res judicata by virtue of the ruling in G.R. No. 60076 recognizing the
propriety of TRB's appointment as receiver
b. Who is responsible for TRB's receiver's fee?
HELD: a. No. The elements of res judicata are:
1. The previous judgment has become final;

2. the prior judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the matter and parties;
3. the first judgment was made on the merits; and
4. There was substantial identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action, as between the prior and
subsequent actions.
In G.R. No. 60076,the petition was for the annulment of the trial court's order requiring Tayengco to render and submit an
accounting of the rental of the buildings and apartments,while C.A. G.R. CV No. 21423 was an appeal questioning the order of the
trial court authorizing the deduction by TRB of its compensation from the receivership funds.There is clearly no identity of causes of
action here. Clearly, the last element of res judicata is absent in the case at bar.
b. The compensation of a receiver who has been properly appointed terminates,is to be charged against the defeated
party, or the prevailing litigant may be made to share the expense, as justice requires.
The trial court's order approving TRB's compensation to be charged solely against the funds under its receivership is
without legal justification; hence, it was correctly reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Section 8, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, explicitly provides for the manner in which it shall be paid for its services, to wit:
"SEC. 8. Termination of receivership; compensation of receiver. —

Whenever the court, of its own motion or on that of either party, shall determine that the necessity for a receiver no longer
exists, it shall, after due notice to all interested parties and hearing, settle the accounts of the receiver, direct the delivery
of the funds and other property in his hands to the persons adjudged entitled to receive them, and order the discharge of
the receiver from further duty as such. The court shall allow the receiver such reasonable compensation as the
circumstances of the case warrant,to be taxed as costs against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires ."

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
163 SCRA 153 JUNE 30, 1988

NATIONAL INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. JUDGE AQUINO
FACTS: 1. In 1965, the total indebtedness of Batjak amounted to P 11.9M. As security, Batjak had mortgaged its 3 coco-oil
processing mills in Davao City, Misamis and Leyte to Manila bank, Republic Bank and PCI Bank. Moreover, as it was necessary to
place additional capital to optimize the operation of the mills, Batjak obtained “financial assistance” from PNB.
2. Per Batjak’s agreement with PNB, the following happened:
a. NIDC (a PNB subsidiary) invested P 6.7M in Batjak in the form of preferred shares, convertible within 5yrs at par into
common stock.
b. The 3 mortgagee banks released in favor of PNB the mortgages they held; Batjak also executed first mortgages in favor
of PNB
c. PNB granted Batjak an export-advance line of P 3M, later increased to P 5M.
d. A voting trust agreement (VTA) was executed in favor of PNB by the stockholders representing 60% of the outstanding
paid-up and subscribed shares of Batjak. (The VTA was for a period of 5yrs, subject to renegotiation)
4. In 1965, as Batjak was insolvent, PNB / NIDC foreclosed on the 3 mills. Subsequently, ownership was consolidated in NIDC.
5. In 1970, Batjak wrote to NIDC inquiring if it was interested in a renegotiation. Having received no reply, it wrote another
letter informing NIDC that it (Batjak) would safely assume that NIDC was no longer interested. It then sent a third letter
asking for a complete accounting of the assets, properties, management and operation of Batjak, preparatory to the turn-
over and transfer of the shares covered by the VTA. NIDC replied and refused to comply.
6. NIDC replied and refused to comply.
7. Batjak sued for mandamus. Batjak also filed a petition for receivership of property / assets.
8. NIDC files a motion to dismiss; denied. Subsequently, the CFI judge granted the petition for receivership, appointing 3
receivers.
ISSUE: WON the grant of receivership was proper. NO.
HELD: Receivership improperly granted

1. When is receivership allowed: A receiver may be appointed when it appears that the party applying has an interest in the
subject property, ie, an interest that is present and existing.
- Here, NIDC is the owner of the mills
\ Batjak no longer has any right / interest
2. But Batjak offers the following theory: under the VTA, NIDC was constituted trustee of the assets, operations and
management of Batjak; accordingly, with the expiration of the VTA, NIDC should relinquish possession of the subject
properties (oil mills) in favor of Batjak.
3. SC refutes Batjak’s theory: Per paragraphs 1 and 9 of the VTA, what was assigned to NIDC was the power to vote the shares of
stock representing 60% shareholding in Batjak, included was the authority to execute any agreement that may be necessary
to express consent by the stockholders pertaining to said 60%. However, nowhere in said VTA does it appear that properties
were ceded to NIDC.
4. That no properties were ceded is buttressed by par.9 of the VTA (termination clause), which provides that on expiration, what
are to be returned to Batjak are only the certificates of stock representing 60% shareholding subject of the VTA.
5. In any event, per Sec. 59, par1 of the Corp.Code a voting trust transfers only voting or other rights pertaining to the shares
subject of the agreement, or control over the stock.
6. That PNB/NIDC ended up in possession of the mills is because of its capacity as foreclosing creditor and not as trustee per the
VTA.
Moreover, the prevention of imminent danger to property is the guiding principle that governs courts in the matter of appointing
receivers. Under Sec. 1 (b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, it is necessary in granting the relief of receivership that the property or
fired be in danger of loss, removal or material injury.
In the case at bar, Batjak in its petition for receivership, or in its amended petition therefore, failed to present any evidence, to
establish the requisite condition that the property is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured unless a receiver is
appointed to guard and preserve it.
G.R. No. 157911 SEPTEMBER 19, 2006

AGUILAR v. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION
FACTS: In this case, petitioner spouses obtain a loan from the Manila Banking Corporation in the amount of P600,000.00 which is
secured by a real estate mortgage. When the petitioners failed to settle the obligation, the bank extra judicially foreclosed the
properties and was sold in a public auction with respondent as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the petitioners filed before the RTC
a complaint for the annulment of the foreclose properties, but the case ended up in a Compromise Agreement whereby petitioners
obliged themselves to pay the purchase price of the property for P2, 548,000.00. The RTC adopted and approved the said
agreement on January 30, 1987. When petitioners failed to pay the balance, respondent bank proceeded to file a writ of execution
to enforce the said compromise agreement entered into by the parties.
Petitioners then argued that since the bank is under a receivership, its receivership is a supervening event that rendered execution
of the Decision dated January 30, 1987 impossible, if not unjust; that since a bank under receivership is relieved of its obligation to
pay interest on the deposits of its depositors, they (petitioners) are also not obliged to pay interest on a loan due it and interest
shall commence again only after respondent's resumption of banking operations.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are still liable to pay the interest on their obligation despite the bank being under a receivership?
HELD: YES. On the arguments relating to the effect of respondent's receivership, petitioners brought this matter for the first time in
RTC Branch 165 in their Omnibus Motion dated March 5, 2001, fourteen years after respondent was placed under receivership and

was ordered to close operation in 1987. The belated invocation of such circumstance speaks strongly of the staleness of their claim.
Besides, it would be absurd to adopt petitioners' position that they are not obliged to pay interest on their obligation when
respondent was placed under receivership.
When a bank is placed under receivership, it would only not be able to do new business, that is, to grant new loans or to accept new
deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets
of the bank. Thus, petitioners' obligation to pay interest subsists even when respondent was placed under receivership. The
respondent's receivership is an extraneous circumstance and has no effect on petitioners' obligation.
G.R. No. 135706 OCTOBER 1, 2004

LARROBIS v. PHIL. VETERANS BANK
FACTS: In this case, spouses Larrobis contracted a monetary loan with the respondent bank in the amount of P135, 000.00 as
evidence by a promissory note which is secured by a Real Estate Mortgage including improvements thereon. However, respondent
bank was placed under receivership/liquidation due to bankruptcy from April 25, 1985 until August 1992. On August 23, 1985, the
bank sent a letter to the petitioners asking for the payment of the insurance premiums advance by the bank over their mortgage
property. Then, more than fourteen (14) years from the time the obligation was contracted, the bank filed an extrajudicial
foreclosure of the property and was sold in a public auction. This prompts the spouses Larrobis to file a complaint before the RTC to
declare the subsequent foreclosure and sale null and void alleging that the foreclosure made was done beyond the prescriptive
period. Respondent, however, argues that the prescriptive period for foreclosure was interrupted when it was put under a
receivership and liquidation was a fortuitous event that halted the bank’s operations. Hence, the foreclosure was made within the
10 year prescriptive period when the bank resumes its operations, citing Article 1154 of the New Civil Code. Moreover, the fact that
it was put under a receivership, defendant bank was restrained from doing its business.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period was interrupted due to the fact that the bank was prevented from doing its business
when it was put under a receivership?
HELD: NO. When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under receivership, the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board,
determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or reorganization of the financially distressed bank. A receiver, who
concurrently represents the bank, then takes control and possession of its assets for the benefit of the bank’s creditors. A liquidator
meanwhile assumes the role of the receiver upon the determination by the Monetary Board that the bank can no longer resume
business. His task is to dispose of all the assets of the bank and effect partial payments of the bank’s obligations in accordance with
legal priority. In both receivership and liquidation proceedings, the bank retains its juridical personality notwithstanding the closure
of its business and may even be sued as its corporate existence is assumed by the receiver or liquidator. The receiver or liquidator
meanwhile acts not only for the benefit of the bank, but for its creditors as well. The receiver of the bank is in fact
obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the bank. The receiver must assemble the assets
and pay the obligation of the bank under receivership, and take steps to prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, the receiver
of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due to the bank, and in connection therewith, to foreclose mortgages securing
such debts.
A. Duties of a Receiver:
Section 29 of the Republic Act No. 265, as amended known as the Central Bank Act, provides that when a bank is forbidden to do
business in the Philippines and placed under receivership, the person designated as receiver shall immediately take charge of the
bank’s assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible, collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of
its creditors, and represent the bank personally or through counsel as he may retain in all actions or proceedings for or
against the institution, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing and foreclosing
mortgages in the name of the bank. This is consistent with the purpose of receivership proceedings, i.e., to receive collectibles and
preserve the assets of the bank in substitution of its former management, and prevent the dissipation of its assets to the detriment
of the creditors of the bank.
B. On the issue of fortuitous event:

Respondent’s claims that because of a fortuitous event, it was not able to exercise its right to foreclose the mortgage on petitioners’
property; and that since it was banned from pursuing its business and was placed under receivership from April 25, 1985 until

August 1992, it could not foreclose the mortgage on petitioners’ property within such period since foreclosure is embraced in the
phrase "doing business," are without merit. While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of "doing business," that
is:…a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements and contemplates to that extent, the performance of acts or words or
the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of the purpose and object of its
organization. it should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever banks are "prohibited from doing
business" during receivership and liquidation proceedings.
C. Application of Provident Ruling:

General Rule - Foreclosure of properties is part of a bank’s business activity. Hence, it is the duty of a receiver to foreclose
properties due to the bank for the satisfaction of its creditors.
Exception: Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals - It is true that we also held in said case that the period during which the
bank was placed under receivership was deemed fuerza mayor which validly interrupted the prescriptive period. This is being
invoked by the respondent and was used as basis by the trial court in its decision. Contrary to the position of the respondent and
court a quo however, such ruling does not find application in the case at bar.
A close scrutiny of the Provident case, shows that the Court arrived at said conclusion, which is an exception to the general rule, due
to the peculiar circumstances of Provident Savings Bank at the time. In said case, we stated that: Having arrived at the conclusion
that a foreclosure is part of a bank’s business activity which could not have been pursued by the receiver then because of the
circumstances discussed in the Central Bank case, we are thus convinced that the prescriptive period was legally interrupted by
fuerza mayor in 1972 on account of the prohibition imposed by the Monetary Board against petitioner from transacting business,
until the directive of the Board was nullified in 1981.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further examination of the Central Bank case reveals that the circumstances of Provident Savings Bank at the time were peculiar
because after the Monetary Board issued MB Resolution No. 1766 on September 15, 1972, prohibiting it from doing business in the
Philippines, the bank’s majority stockholders immediately went to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which prompted the trial
court to issue its judgment dated February 20, 1974, declaring null and void the resolution and ordering the Central Bank to desist
from liquidating Provident. The decision was appealed to and affirmed by this Court in 1981. Thus, the Superintendent of Banks,
which was instructed to take charge of the assets of the bank in the name of the Monetary Board, had no power to act as a receiver
of the bank and carry out the obligations specified in Sec. 29 of the Central Bank Act.
In this case, it is not disputed that Philippine Veterans Bank was placed under receivership by the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank by virtue of Resolution No. 364 on April 25, 1985, pursuant to Section 29 of the Central Bank Act on insolvency of banks. Unlike
Provident Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein respondent to deter its receiver and liquidator from
performing their obligations under the law. Thus, the ruling laid down in the Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar.
Moreover, in the present case, a liquidator was duly appointed for respondent bank and there was no judgment or court order that
would legally or physically hinder or prohibit it from foreclosing petitioners’ property; despite the absence of such legal or physical
hindrance, respondent bank’s receiver or liquidator failed to foreclose petitioners’ property and therefore such inaction should bind
respondent bank. D. Inaction of a receiver; consequences:
Settled is the principle that a bank is bound by the acts, or failure to act of its receiver. As we held in Philippine Veterans Bank vs.
NLRC, a labor case which also involved respondent bank, … all the acts of the receiver and liquidator pertain to petitioner, both
having assumed petitioner’s corporate existence. Petitioner cannot disclaim liability by arguing that the non-payment of MOLINA’s
just wages was committed by the liquidators during the liquidation period.36 However, the bank may go after the receiver who is
liable to it for any culpable or negligent failure to collect the assets of such bank and to safeguard its assets.
G.R. No. 168332 590 SCRA 49

KORUGA v. ARCENAS

FACTS: Koruga, a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, filed a complaint before the Makati RTC for the
alleged violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code which prohibit self-dealing and conflicts of interest of directors and
officers. She invoked her right to inspect the corporation’s records under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code and prayed for
Receivership and Creation of a Management Committee, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Securities
Regulation Code, the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the General Banking Law of 2000, and
the New Central Bank Act. She accused the directors and officers of Banco Filipino of engaging in unsafe, unsound, and fraudulent
banking practices, more particularly, acts that violate the prohibition on self-dealing. RTC issued a Notice of Pre-trial setting the case
for pre-trial. However, upon application of private respondents, the CA issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Hence, the present
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Unfortunately, the petition has become moot and academic. The writ of preliminary injunction
being questioned had effectively been dissolved by the CA’s July 20, 2005 Decision. Accordingly, there is no necessity to restrain the
implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA on April 18, 2005, since it no longer exists.
However, this Court finds that the CA erred in upholding the jurisdiction of, and remanding the case to the RTC. The resolution of
these petitions rests mainly on the determination of one fundamental issue: Which body has jurisdiction over the Koruga Complaint,
the RTC or the BSP?
ISSUE: Whether or not Koruga's complaint is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
HELD: NO. We hold that it is the BSP that has jurisdiction over the case.
It is clear that the acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino’s banking business. It is the Government’s
responsibility to see to it that the financial interests of those who deal with banks and banking institutions, as depositors or
otherwise, are protected. In this country, that task is delegated to the BSP, which pursuant to its Charter, is authorized to administer
the monetary, banking, and credit system of the Philippines. It is further authorized to take the necessary steps against any banking
institution if its continued operation would cause prejudice to its depositors, creditors and the general public as well.
Koruga alleges that "the dispute in the trial court involves the manner with which the Directors’ (sic) have handled the Bank’s
affairs, specifically the fraudulent loans and dacion en pago authorized by the Directors in favor of several dummy corporations
known to have close ties and are indirectly controlled by the Directors." Her allegations, then, call for the examination of the
allegedly questionable loans. Whether these loans are covered by the prohibition on self-dealing is a matter for the BSP to
determine. These are not ordinary intra-corporate matters; rather, they involve banking activities which are, by law, regulated and
supervised by the BSP. As the Court has previously held: It is well-settled in both law and jurisprudence that the Central Monetary
Authority, through the Monetary Board, is vested with exclusive authority to assess, evaluate and determine the condition of any
bank, and finding such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve a probable loss to its
depositors or creditors, forbid bank or non-bank financial institution to do business in the Philippines; and shall designate an official
of the BSP or other competent person as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities. Koruga also accused
Arcenas, et al. of violation of the Corporation Code’s provisions on self-dealing and conflict of interest. Koruga’s invocation of the
provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that: The Corporation Code,
however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and
other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special law, the latter shall
prevail – generalia specialibus non derogant.
Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies or Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on
Receivership, that would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank Act should be followed. On the
strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of
banks. Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision that says the "appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested
exclusively with the Monetary Board." The term "exclusively" connotes that only the Monetary Board can resolve the issue of
whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon an affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is
further affirmed by the fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action "summarily and without need for prior hearing."
And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides that "actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of
this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on a petition for certiorari on the
ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that seeks
to place Banco Filipino under receivership.
Finally, there is one other reason why Koruga’scomplaint before the RTC cannot prosper. Given her own admission – and the same

is likewise supported by evidence – that she is merely a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino, she would not have the standing to
question the MonetaryBoard’s action.
Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act provides:

The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten
(10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.
All the foregoing discussion yields the inevitable conclusion that the CA erred in upholding the jurisdiction of, and remanding the
case to, the RTC. Given that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, its refusal to dismiss the case on
that ground amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. NO. 203585 JULY 29, 2013

MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO AND ROSELLER CABOVERDE v. DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE
FACTS: Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano (Mila) and Roseller Caboverde (Roseller) are children of respondent Dominalda Espina-
Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of other respondents in this case, namely: Eve Caboverde-Yu (Eve), Fe Caboverde-Labrador (Fe),
and Josephine E. Caboverde (Josephine). Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners and
in possession of certain parcels of land, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and Dominalda Caboverde. The present
controversy started when respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court where they prayed for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring certain parcels of land from their parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of
petitioners Mila and Roseller and their other siblings, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand. During the pendency of the civil case, Maximo
died. Eve and Fe filed an Amended Complaint with Maximo substituted by his eight (8) children and his wife Dominalda.
Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the Regional Trial Court a Verified Urgent
Petition/Application to place the controverted parcels of land under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had a legal
interest in the controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income derived was solely
appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin. She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in the
income of these properties for her daily sustenance and medical expenses. Also, she insisted that unless a receiver is appointed by
the court, the income or produce from these properties is in grave danger of being totally dissipated, lost and entirely spent solely
by Mila and some of her selected kin.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver despite clear
showing that the reasons advanced by the applicant are not any of those enumerated by the rules; and
(2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Resolution of the RTC and ruling that the
receivership bond is not required prior to appointment despite clear dictates of the rules.
HELD: ISSUE #1 First, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for
the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted but
also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes
specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is justified under
Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in cases falling under such
provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the properties sought to be placed under
receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.
Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired and that placing
them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of them.
Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or
irremediable damage.

ISSUE #2: Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to
file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory
nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an
applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the
court.
G.R. No. 174356 JANUARY 20, 2010.

CHAVEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In this case, private respondent Fidela Vargas, a practicing lawyer owned a five hectares of land (mixed coconut land and rice
fields) in Sorsogon. While petitioner Chavez reside in the remote part of the land. The two then agreed to divide the gross sales of
all the products of the land between themselves, with private respondent entrusting her shares to Chavez for safekeeping. When
petitioner Chavez failed to remit Fidela’s share, the latter filed a complaint against the petitioners for the recovery of possession,
rent and damages with the prayer of an immediate appointment of a receivership before the RTC. The court a quo dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the subject matter involved an agrarian dispute. On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the
appointment of a receiver pointing out the necessity to preserve the property in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not a receiver is necessary in the case at bar?
HELD: NO. In any event, we hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the property in dispute in this case. For one thing, a
petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the
action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the
prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is
not receivership. Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. She does not
claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that
the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can
be granted only in extreme situations, Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed, in none of the other
cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her.
A. On the issue of forum shopping: By forum shopping, a party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals, grounded on the
same cause, trusting that one or the other tribunal would favorably dispose of the matter. The elements of forum shopping are the
same as inlitis pendentia where the final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of forum
shopping are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
Here, however, the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida involved different causes of action and sought different
reliefs. The present civil action that she filed with the RTC sought to recover possession of the property based on Evelina and Aida’s
failure to account for its fruits. The estafa cases she filed with the RTC accused the two of misappropriating and converting her share
in the harvests for their own benefit. Her complaint for dispossession under Republic Act 8048 with the DARAB sought to dispossess
the two for allegedly cutting coconut trees without the prior authority of Fidela or of the Philippine Coconut Authority. The above
cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all
of them. But receivership
is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose. Consequently, it cannot be said
that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to resjudicata on the merits of the other cases. The grant or denial of this
provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular action.

G.R. No. 169596 MARCH 28, 2007

SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and PEDRO BALUBAL
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its
buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and crashed into the radio room of
respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).
The bus was eventually turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own investigation of the incident. Because of
lack of adequate space, the bus was, on request of traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera (Lopera), towed by the PNCC patrol to its
compound where it was store.
Petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same, despite petitioner’s
undertaking to repair the damaged radio room.
Respondent Balubal instead demanded the sum of ₱40,000.00, or a collateral with the same value, representing respondent PNCC’s
estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the damaged radio room. By petitioner’s estimate, however, the damage amounted to
₱10,000.00 only.
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property (replevin) with damages against respondents PNCC and Balubal
with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon.
In view of its inability to put up the bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin, petitioner opted to forego the same and just wait for
the court’s final judgment.
RTC: The trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint. It also gave due course to the counterclaim of PNCC and ordered petitioner to
pay the latter.
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC. Held that the storage of the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the nature of a deposit,
hence, custody or authority over it remained with Lopera who ordered its safekeeping; and that Lopera acted as respondent PNCC’s
agent, hence, absent any instruction from him, respondent PNCC may not release the bus. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for replevin is proper?
HELD: YES. The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request, were unquestionably violative of "the right to be
let alone" by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Tillson v. Court of Appeals discusses the term replevin as follows:
The term replevin is popularly understood as "the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed
to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court and return the goods if
defeated in the action;" "the writ by or the common-law action in which goods and chattels are replevied," i.e., taken or
gotten back by a writ for replevin;" and to replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to take
possession of goods or chattels under a replevin order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as "a form of action
which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as)
the writ by virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described and transfer it
to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title, or return the chattels taken if
he fail so to do; the same authority states that the term, "to replevy" means " to re-deliver goods which have been
distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of replevin." The term therefore may refer
either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by
which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action .
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of
the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the
same.
The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures under Article 2, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The seizure and
impounding of petitioners bus, on Loperas request, were unquestionably violative of the right to be let alone by the authorities as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
G.R. No. 148132 JANUARY 28, 2008

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. REGINA M. ASTORGA
FACTS: Astorga was employed by Smart as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group of SMART. SMART
launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. Part of the reorganization was the outsourcing of the
marketing and sales force. Thus, SMART formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the
sales and marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorga’s division.
SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who would be recommended by SMART. Astorga landed last in the performance
evaluation, thus, she was not recommended by SMART. SMART, nonetheless, offered her a supervisory position in the Customer
Care Department, but she refused the offer because the position carried lower salary rank and rate.
Astorga continued reporting for work. SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on
ground of redundancy, Astorga filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits with prayer for
moral and exemplary damages against SMART.
In the meantime, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which
was given to her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition.

Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin before the RTC which was
subsequently denied.
Astorga filed a motion to dismiss in the replevin case, but said motion was denied. Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via
certiorari to the CA, which reversed the RTC ruling. Granting the petition and, consequently, dismissing the replevin case, the CA
held that the case is intertwined with Astorga’s complaint for illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor tribunal that has rightful
jurisdiction over the replevin suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the replevin suit over the car benefit in the employment contract?
HELD: YES. The RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to
dismiss.
SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil,
dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover
those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels.
It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or
detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional
remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained
during the pendency of the action.
Thus, the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC of Makati City for replevin was proper. Citing Basaya, Jr. v.
Militante, the Supreme Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein
is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to
adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said
property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of
specialization of Labor Arbiters.
xxxx
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each forum
can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an
Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the
petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with
petitioners’ right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the
Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess in
addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.
In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent
laws.
The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling and ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for
lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 148980 SEPTEMBER 21, 2007
PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC. v. SPOUSES GEORGE M. DAI and DIVINA DAI
FACTS: Respondents, spouses George and Divina Dai, obtained a loan from petitioner, PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., evidenced by a
promissory note for the sum of P3,352,892 payable in monthly installments of P152,265 starting.
The proceeds of the loan partly financed the purchase by respondents of a vessel-fishing boat which was named F/B Sea Doll. To
secure the payment of the loan, respondents executed a chattel mortgage over the vessel in favor of petitioner.
Both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage provided that, in case of failure to pay the installments or interest due thereon,
the entire amount remaining unpaid shall immediately become due and payable.
Respondents failed to pay the second and third installments which fell due, prompting petitioner to file before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint for replevin and damages.
In the meantime, petitioner foreclosed the chattel mortgage and bought the vessel at the public auction conducted for P2,000,000.
A Certificate of Sale of the vessel in favor of petitioner was subsequently issued. Hence, the complaint filed with the RTC’s merits
dealt only with the issues on damages.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent spouses. It held that it is not convinced that plaintiff PCI Leasing is entitled to recover from
defendants attorneys fees and liquidated damages. Said decision became final and executory.
More than a year and a half following the promulgation by the trial court of its decision in the previous case, petitioner filed another
complaint for deficiency judgment and/or collection of sum of money before the Cebu RTC.
In their answer, the respondent spouses pleaded bar by prior judgment. The RTC dismissed the second case filed by petitioners
upon this ground.
Upon appeal to the CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC, not on the ground of bar by prior judgement, but because of res judicata.
Hence, this petition.
For res jusdicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or
an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.
Petitioner denies the existence of identity of causes of action between the replevin case and the case for deficiency judgment or
collection of sum of money.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment in a replevin case and/or delivery of personal property would bar a subsequent action for
deficiency judgment?
HELD: YES. Section 49 of Rule 39 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which governed petitioners complaint for replevin filed on October 27,
1994, and which Section is reproduced as Section 47 of the present Rules, reads:
SEC. 49. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration
of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person
or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Paragraph (a) is the rule on res judicata in judgments in rem. Paragraph (b) is the rule on res judicata in judgments in personam.
Paragraph (c) is the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. But replevin is, as the above-cited BA Finance Corp. case holds, usually
described as a mixed action.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself,
i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional
remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is
primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described
as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in
personam as regards to damages involved. As an action in rem, the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain
possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein. (Citations
omitted, italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
Petitioners complaint for replevin was doubtless a mixed action in rem with respect to its prayer for the recovery of the vessel, and
in personam with respect to its claim for damages. And it was, with respect to its alternative prayer, clearly one in personam.
Hence, petitioner’s second complaint is barred by res judicata.
G.R. No. 165895 JUNE 5, 2009
TERLYNGRACE RIVERA v. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS
FACTS: Respondent Florencio Vargas (Vargas) filed a complaint against petitioner and several John Does before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for the recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. Vargas claims
ownership of the said equipment, having purchased and imported the same directly from Hyun Dae Trading Co., in Seoul, South
Korea.
The equipment was allegedly entrusted to petitioners husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died sometime in late 2002, as caretaker of
respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas. According to Vargas, petitioner failed to return the said equipment after
her husband’s death despite his repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action. The complaint was accompanied by a

prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and the necessary bond amounting to P2,400,000.00.
Summons dated February 24, 2003 was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary on April 28, 2003 at her residence in
Paraaque City. However, the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in
petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon on April 29, 2003, contrary to the sheriffs return stating that the writ was served upon
Rivera.
On May 8, 2003, Rivera filed her answer, manifestation, and motion for the acceptance of petitioners redelivery bond. On May 12,
2003, the RTC issued an Order disapproving petitioners redelivery bond application for failure to comply with the requirements
under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
Without directly saying so, the RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to file the application for redelivery bond within five (5) days
from the date of seizure as provided in the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was also denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This, too, was denied for lack of
merit. Hence this petition.
Petitioner argues that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her counterbond on the ground that it was filed out
of time. She contends that the mandatory five-day period did not even begin to run in this case due to the improper service of the
writ of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of the writ of replevin?
HELD: NO. There was an inconsistency as to the sheriff’s return and the actual service of the writ. The sheriff’s return provided that
said writ, along with the summons, were served both upon Rivera, but in truth, the writ was only served upon a certain Joseph
Rejumo, the guard on duty on the rock-crushing plant.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the
writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case)
together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to
the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with the courts order upon application by the other party, and
ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.
Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely
handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf,
the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The
service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no right to
seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon the security guard where the rock-crushing plant to be
seized was located. The signature of the receiving party indicates that the writ was received on April 29, 2003 by a certain Joseph
Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya, Quezon, where the property to be seized was located, and witnessed by Claudio
Palatino, respondents caretaker. The sheriffs’ return, however, peremptorily states that both the writ of replevin and the
summons were served upon Rivera.
On May 8, 2003, or nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint
accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for having been
filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. But since the writ was invalidly served,
petitioner is correct in contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to
run.
It is to be reminded that the writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to the
officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not only has the possession or custody of the
property involved but who is also a party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted

without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis
of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this case.
G.R. No. 166901 OCTOBER 27, 2006
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. HON. HELEN BAUTISTA-RICAFORT
FACTS: Private respondents Noel Tabuelog, Ernesto de Jesus, Norma Pondevida, Renato Claros, Ernesto M. Chua, Cecilia T. Saulog,
Jenelita S. Naprate, Rodolfo F. Mago, and Amalia C. Edamura are duly-licensed importers of vehicles.
Sometime in April and May 1998, they imported 72 secondhand right-hand drive buses from Japan. When the shipment arrived at
the South Harbor, Port of Manila, the District Collector of Customs impounded the vehicles and ordered them stored at the
warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), a customs-bonded warehouse under the custody of the Aviation and Cargo Regional
Division.
The District Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint against the shipment and set the sale at public auction, conformably
with Section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Section 1, Republic Act (RA) No. 8506, which took effect on February 22, 1998, provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to
import, cause the importation of, register, cause the registration of, use or operate any vehicle with its steering wheel right hand
side thereof in any highway, street or road, whether private or public, or at the national or local x x x.
In the meantime, the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 127, Series of 1998, stating that shipments of right hand wheel
vehicles loaded and exported at the port of origin before February 22, 1998 were not covered by RA No. 8506 unless the same were
loaded and imported after said date.
Hence, the importers, through their Attorney-in-Fact Samuel N. Rosete, filed a complaint with the RTC of Paraaque City, against the
Secretary of Finance, Customs Commissioner, and the Chief Executive of the Societe Generale de Surillee, for replevin with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages. The RTC granted the application for a writ of
replevin on a bond of P12,000,000.00.
The defendants Secretary of Finance, et.al,, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking the
reconsideration of the RTC Order granting plaintiff’s plea for a writ of replevin. It likewise prayed that the writ of replevin issued by
the court be quashed on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the vehicles subject of seizure and detention before the
Bureau of Customs. The OSG declared that the Bureau of Customs which had custody of the vehicles through ATI had exclusive
jurisdiction over said vehicles and on the issues of the seizure and detention thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to issue writs of replevin over the vehicles impounded by the Collector of Customs?
HELD: NO. As the Court ruled in Jao v. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere
with these proceedings.
It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming
cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
[The following are the statutes which authorize the Collector of Customs to facilitate the forfeiture proceedings; You can skip
these provisions] Section 602 of the TCC provides that the Bureau of Customs shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over seized and

forfeited cars. It is tasked to enforce tariff, and supervise and control customs law and all other laws, rules and regulations relating
to the tariff and customs administration; and to supervise and control all import and export cargoes, loaded or stored in piers,
terminal facilities, including container yards and freight stations, for the protection of government revenues. Under Section 2301 of
the TCC, the Collector of Customs is empowered to make a seizure of cargoes and issue a receipt for the detention thereof:
SEC. 2301. Warrant for Detention of Property-Cash Bond. Upon making any seizure, the Collector shall issue a warrant for
the detention of the property; and if the owner or importer desires to secure the release of the property for legitimate
use, the Collector shall, with the approval of the Commissioner of Customs, surrender it upon the filing of a cash bond, in
an amount to be fixed by him, conditioned upon the payment of the appraised value of the article and/or any fine,
expenses and costs which may be adjudged in the case: Provided, That such importation shall not be released under any
bond when there is a prima facie evidence of fraud in the importation of the article: Provided further, That articles the
importation of which is prohibited by law shall not be released under any circumstance whomsoever, Provided, finally, That
nothing in this section shall be construed as relieving the owner or importer from any criminal liability which may arise
from any violation of law committed in connection with the importation of the article. (emphasis supplied)
Section 2530 of the TCC enumerates the properties subject of seizure and forfeiture:
Section 2530. Property Subject of Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Laws. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, cargo,
article and objects shall, under the following conditions be subject to forfeiture:
xxxx
(f) Any article the importation or exportation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law, or any article of prohibited
importation or exportation, and all other articles which, in the opinion of the Collector, have been used, are or were
entered to be used as instruments in the importation or exportation of the former.
Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein, issue the writ of replevin and
order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and set the sale thereof at public auction. The RTC
should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the plea of respondents (plaintiffs below) for the seizure of
the vehicles and the transfer of custody to the court, the RTC acted without jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject
matter thereof. It bears stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau of Customs is a proceeding against the goods and
not against the owner. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, i.e., directed against the res or imported articles and entails a
determination of the legality of their importation. In this proceeding, it is, in legal contemplation, the property itself which commits
the violation and is treated as the offender, without reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner.
In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin and its implementation are void. While it is true that
the District Collector of Customs allowed the release of the vehicles and the transfer thereof to the custody of the RTC upon the
payment by the private respondents of the required taxes, duties and charges, he did not thereby lose jurisdiction over the vehicles;
neither did it vest jurisdiction on the RTC to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over the petition for replevin.
As very well explained by the Office of the Solicitor General, the District Collector of Customs agreed to transfer the vehicles to the
custody of the RTC since the latter had ordered the arrest of those who would obstruct the implementation of the writ. The District
Collector of Customs had yet to resolve whether to order the vehicles forfeited in favor of the government, in light of the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice that, under RA No. 8506, the importation was illegal.
G.R. No. 110048 NOVEMBER 19, 1999

SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On May 14, 1976, Leticia L. Laus of Quezon City purchased on credit a Colt Galant x x x from Fortune Motors (Phils.)
Corporation. She executed a promissory note for such purchase. It was agreed upon, among others, that in case of default in the
payment of any installment the total principal sum, together with the interest, shall become immediately due and payable.
As a security for the promissory note, a chattel mortgage was constituted over the said motor vehicle with a deed of assignment
incorporated therein such that the credit and mortgage rights were assigned by Fortune Motors Corp. in favor of Filinvest Credit
Corporation with the consent of the mortgagor-debtor Leticia Laus. The vehicle was then registered in the name of Leticia L. Laus
with the chattel mortgage annotated on said certificate.
On September 25, 1978, Filinvest Credit Corporation in turn assigned the credit in favor of Servicewide Specialists, Inc. transferring
unto the latter all its rights under the promissory note and the chattel mortgage with the corresponding notice of assignment sent
to the registered car owner.
Leticia Laus failed to pay the monthly instalments, hence, pursuant to the provisions of the promissory note, Servicewide demanded
payment of the entire outstanding balance. And despite formal demand, Laus still failed to pay all the monthly installments due.
As a result of the failure of Leticia Laus to settle her obligation, or at least to surrender possession of the motor vehicle for the
purpose of foreclosure, Servicewide instituted a complaint for replevin, impleading Hilda Tee and John Dee in whose custody the
vehicle was believed to be at the time of the filing of the suit.
Servicewide alleged that it had superior lien over the mortgaged vehicle; that it is lawfully entitled to the possession of the same
together with all its accessories and equipments; that Hilda Tee was wrongfully detaining the motor vehicle for the purpose of
defeating its mortgage lien; and that a sufficient bond had been filed in court.
The court approved the replevin bond.
Alberto Villafranca filed a third party claim contending that he is the absolute owner of the subject motor vehicle; that he acquired
such through a Deed of Sale and the same was free from all lien and encumbrances; and such was taken from his residence by the
Sheriff pursuant to the seizure order issued by the court. Alberto Villafranca moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that there is another action pending between the same parties in the RTC of Makati involving the seizure of subject motor vehicle
and the indemnity bond posted by Servicewide.
For failure to file his Answer as required by the court, Alberto Villafranca was declared in default and Servicewide’s evidence was
received ex parte. However, the court rendered a judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
On appeal, Servicewide claims that a suit for replevin aimed at the foreclosure of a chattel is an action quasi in rem, and does not
require the inclusion of the principal obligor in the Complaint.
ISSUE: Whether a case for replevin may be pursued against the defendant, Alberto Villafranca, without impleading the absconding
debtor-mortgagor
HELD: In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. A foreclosure under a chattel mortgage may properly be
commenced only once there is default on the part of the mortgagor of his obligation secured by the mortgage. The replevin in this
case has been resorted to in order to pave the way for the foreclosure of what is covered by the chattel mortgage. The conditions
essential for such foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the
mortgagor. These requirements must be shown because the validity of the plaintiff’s exercise of the right of foreclosure is inevitably
dependent thereon.
Since the mortgagee’s right of possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the
inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive
determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is
not only the existence of, but also the mortgagor’s default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold
the right to replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for such action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse
possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel
mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.

Leticia Laus, being an indispensable party, should have been impleaded in the complaint for replevin and damages. An indispensable
party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the
case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the
other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the Court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from
the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in
Court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely complete relief between him and those already parties to the action or
will simply avoid multiple litigation. Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment of a Court
cannot attain real finality.
That petitioner could not locate the mortgagor, Leticia Laus, is no excuse for resorting to a procedural shortcut. It could have
properly availed of substituted service of summons under the Revised Rules of Court. If it deemed such a mode to be unavailing, it
could have proceeded in accordance with Section 14 of the same Rule. Indeed, petitioner had other proper remedies, it could have
resorted to but failed to avail of. For instance, it could have properly impleaded the mortgagor. Such failure is fatal to petitioner’s
cause. With the foregoing disquisition and conclusion, the other issues raised by petitioner need not be passed upon.
G.R. No. 160191 JUNE 8, 2006

TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION v. RUFINA AND COMPANY
FACTS: Twin Ace Holdings Corporation is a private domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of rhum, wines and liquor
under the name and style “Tanduay Distillers.” It has registered its mark of ownership of its bottles with the Bureau of Patent,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer under Republic Act No. 623. In the conduct of its business, it sells its products to the public
excluding the bottles. It makes substantial investments in brand new bottles which it buys from glass factories and which they use
for about five times in order to recover the cost of acquisition. Twin Ace thus retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses
them over and over again as containers for its products.
Rufina and Company, on the other hand, is engaged in the production, extraction, fermentation and manufacture of patis and other
food seasonings and is engaged in the buying and selling of all kinds of foods, merchandise and products for domestic use or for
export to other countries. In producing patis and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as containers bottles owned by Twin Ace
without any authority or permission from the latter. In the process, Rufina is unduly benefited from the use of the bottles.
Twin Ace filed a Complaint for recovery of possession of personal property, permanent injunction and damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of replevin, temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against Rufina.
Upon the posting of Twin Ace of the required bond, the RTC of Manila granted the application for the issuance of replevin. And upon
implementation of the said writ, the sheriff was able to seize a total of 26,241 empty bottles marked “TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC.,”
at the address of Rufina.
Rufina filed a counter-application for a writ of preliminary injunction claiming that the marked bottles it used as containers for its
products were purchased from junk dealers; hence, it became the owner thereof.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a writ of replevin to Twin Ace was proper
HELD: No. Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a party praying for the recovery of possession of
personal property must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts that he is the owner

of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof. It must be borne in mind that replevin is
a possessory action the gist of which focuses on the right of possession that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not
infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be replevined. Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties
sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ
should not be issued. In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and
consequently there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation. As stated by the court in the earlier case of Twin Ace
Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
“Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Sec. 5 of RA No. 623 to support its claim of continuing ownership over the subject bottles. In
United States v. Manuel [7 Phil. 221 (1906)] the SC held that since the purchaser at his discretion could either retain or return the
bottles, the transaction must be regarded as a sale of the bottles when the purchaser actually exercised that discretion and decided
not to return them to the vendor. We also take judicial notice of the standard practice today that the cost of the container is
included in the selling price of the product such that the buyer of liquor or any such product from any store is not required to return
the bottle nor is the liquor placed in a plastic container that possession of the bottle is retained by the store.
G.R. No. 93540 DECEMBER 13, 1999

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On August 9, 1988, police officers of Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying 4,000 board
feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, Jesus Sy, and brought the
truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR
Office in Quezon City.
Upon investigation, it was discovered that, there were discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber being transported:
(included the list, just in case)
a. Documents declared narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber;
b. The plate number of truck that should have delivered the products are BAX 404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the Plate
Number of the truck apprehended is NVT-881
c. Since cargo is lumber, it should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and
not by a Certificate of Timber Origin, which merely covers only transport of logs and flitches;
d. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the seller and Bonamy
Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber and Hardware.”
Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
Thus, a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck were issued.
On January 20, 1989, Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the
confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
The confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on advertised to be
sold at public auction.
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of writs of replevin and preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck, and to enjoin the
planned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.
The petitioners claim that the confiscated lumber cannot be subject of a replevin; and that they are not compelled to criminally
prosecute private respondents but may only opt to confiscate lumber and the writ of replevin was issued in contravention of PD No,
605.

The trial court, however, granted the writ of replevin and directed the petitioners “to deliver the x x x narra lumber, original
documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representative x x x.”
The trial court, then issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith and prevented the Sheriff from
removing the subject properties from the DENR Compound. To avoid any unwarranted confrontation between them, the Sheriff just
agreed to a constructive possession of the properties in question.
The petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial court. The
CA granted a TRO which was later converted into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond.
On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that as the
complaint for replevin filed by private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Secs. 1 and 2 of
Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of replevin
HELD: First. A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the applicant’s filing of a bond and affidavit, as the
Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec.
2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin.
Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only
a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.
In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A
of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, to wit:
“SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation.— In all
cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and
all conveyances used either by land, water, or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”
As the petitioner Secretary’s administrative authority to confiscate is clearly provided by law, the taking of the subject properties is
not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by private respondents.
Second. Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No.
705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence,
beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing is in
official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it.
Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under
which the property was taken.
So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Sec. 2(c),
Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
“Affidavit and bond.—Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
“x x x x x x x x x;
“(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of
execution, or preliminary attachment or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or
custody; x x x
“x x x x x x x x x.”
Third. Petitioner Secretary’s authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct from and independent
of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Sec. 68-A was added precisely to supplant the inadequacies and supplement criminal enforcement of forestry laws.
Fourth. Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure
to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for
in Sec. 68, and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.
Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents’ allegation that their right to due process was violated as no investigation
was conducted prior to the confiscation of their properties. Moreover, the order of confiscation enjoys the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is even particularly
strong with respect to administrative agencies like the DENR which are vested with quasi-judicial powers in enforcing the laws
affecting their respective fields of activity, the proper regulation of which requires of them such technical mastery of all relevant
conditions obtaining in the nation.
Finally. The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus,
disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated was
valid and legal. Without a lawful order having been issued, no contempt of court could be committed.
G.R. No. 137705 AUGUST 22, 2000.

SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY v. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.
FACTS: “On February 13, 1998, PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money with an application for a writ of
replevin.
On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to
seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s factory, seized one machinery with word
that he would return for the other machineries.
On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order, invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of
its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing, on the ground that the properties were still personal and therefore still subject to seizure
and a writ of replevin.
“In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized were]immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil
Code, the parties’ agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be
prejudicial to innocent third parties. They further stated that PCI Leasing was estopped from treating these machineries as personal
because the contracts in which the alleged agreement were embodied were totally sham and farcical.
On April 6, 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. He was able
to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest.
On April 7, 1998, they went to the CA via an original action for certiorari.”
ISSUE: Whether the questioned properties are proper subjects of a writ of replevin

HELD: Yes. the subject machineries are proper subject of a writ of replevin. .
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC because
they were in fact real property. Serious policy considerations, they argue, militate against a contrary characterization.
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only.
Section 3 thereof reads:
“SEC. 3. Order.—Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall issue an order and the corresponding
writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take
such property into his custody.”
On the other hand, Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as follows:
ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

xxx xxx xxx
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works, which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on
their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each
of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry.” In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real,
not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
ALTHOUGH REAL PROPERTY, THEY ARE STILL PROPER SUBJECTS OF A WRIT OF SEIZURE, REASON
Be that as it may, the SC disagrees with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the
Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to
such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is
ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio the Court upheld the intention of the parties to treat a house as a personal property because it had
been made the subject of a chattel mortgage. The Court ruled:
x x x Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or
transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or
at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming
otherwise.”
Applying Tumalad, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills also held that the machinery used in a
factory and essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as
personal property in a contract. Pertinent portions of the Court’s ruling are reproduced hereunder:
“x x x If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for
purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be
prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying
the existence of the chattel mortgage.”
In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal
property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:
“12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part

thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon,
real property or a building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.”
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the
circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. It should be stressed, however, that the SC holds—that the
machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement—is good only insofar as the contracting parties
are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its
stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In any event, there is no showing that any specific third party would
be adversely affected.
A.M. No. P-98-1283 MAY 9, 2000

JOHNNY GOMEZ v. RODOLFO A. CONCEPCION
FACTS: On March 10, 1996, Sabino Ramos, while driving his owner-type jeep, figured in a vehicular accident. The vehicle was
bumped by a passenger jeepney, with Plate No. DLZ-588, causing damage to the jeep of Ramos and injuries to the passengers. The
offending vehicle, the passenger jeepney, turned out to be under the custody of respondent Sheriff. When required to comment on
the complaint, he averred that the passenger jeepney was carnapped in front of his residence on 10 March 1996, between 12:00
p.m. to 1:00 p.m., which incident he immediately reported to the Philippine National Police of Cabanatuan City.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in a memorandum, recommended for the suspension of the Sheriff and stated that
while it is true that there are no evidence to substantiate the allegation that respondent sheriff leased the passenger jeepney in
question to a third party for personal gain and that complainant Sabino Ramos clearly manifested his lack of interest to prosecute
this case, the case cannot be dismissed based on these grounds alone.
The OCA added, it is an undisputed fact that the aforesaid vehicle was under the custody of the law as shown by the respondent’s
report to the PNP of Cabanatuan City, when he stated that, ‘between the hour of 12:00 high noon and 1:00 P.M., 10 March 1996,
the Passenger Type Jeep with Plate No. DLZ-588, which was placed under his custody and parked in front his residence at
Sapiandante this City, was lost.’
“The undersigned cannot find a valid explanation why the passenger, jeepney under custodia legis should be placed in front of
respondent’s residence without taking into account the problem of safety and security. He unduly exposed the jeep to undesirable
elements, making it an ‘easy prey’ for thieves and carnappers.
ISSUE: Whether the suspension of the Sheriff was proper
HELD: Yes. “Section 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides: ‘x x x When the officer has taken property as herein provided, he must
keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for it and ultimately deliver it to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees
and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same.’
“Evidently, the respondent was remiss in the performance of his official duty and responsibility to safely secure the property in his
custody until its delivery to the party entitled to it, as mandated by the rules. The vehicle could have been deposited in the premises
of the court where it is secured, or, at any other place where required security is provided for and available. For after all, the
respondent should have known that his office could have charged the party entitled to it, allowable fees for storage, necessary in
safely keeping the property in custodia legis. But, for reasons only known to the respondent, he breached his official duty and
responsibility making him answerable for the consequences of his lapses.
“The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge
to the sheriff, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. This is especially true of sheriffs (Cunanan vs.
Tuazon, A.M. No. P-93-776, Oct. 7, 1994). As a sheriff, the respondent is bound to discharge his duties with prudence, caution and
attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs (Evangelista vs. Penserga, 242 SCRA 702).”
The SC agrees with the above findings and recommendations of the OCA.
In Gacho vs. Fuentes, Jr., the SC has said, that proceedings in administrative cases against public officers and employees should not

be made to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants who, verily, are to be deemed mere witnesses therein. Once the
Court has taken cognizance of an administrative case, a complaint cannot be withdrawn on just the “say-so” of the complainant. The
apparent lack of interest of herein complainant to pursue the matter will not be enough to warrant the dismissal of the case since
the records on hand could amply show the culpability of respondent for which he should be held administratively liable. Sheriffs
play an important role in the administration of justice, and being agents of the law and the courts, high standards are expected of
them. Respondent Sheriff did not proffer any explanation for parking the vehicle in his custody in front of his residence instead of
having it stored in a secure place.4 Respondent Sheriff has clearly been remiss in the performance of his assigned task.
A.M. No. P-00-1391. SEPTEMBER 28, 2001

LIBRADA D. TORRES v. NELSON C. CABESUELA
FACTS: Complainant Torres is one of the owners of San Antonio High School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Said school is the owner of
a Mitsubishi Pajero mortgaged to Philam Savings Bank, Inc. The school failed to pay its obligation so the bank filed a complaint for
replevin and damages. On September 6, 1996, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of MeTC, Branch 9, Manila, granted the bank's prayer for a
writ of replevin. Consequently, a writ of replevin addressed to respondent sheriff was issued.
On December 2, 1996, said vehicle was taken from complainant's residence by the members of the PNP, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija,
named herein. Later on, complainant filed a motion to amend the complaint to include herein sheriff as respondent in the complaint
since it was by virtue of the "Sheriff's Deputization" issued by respondent that respondent police officers were able to "implement"
the writ.
Respondent sheriff filed a motion to dismiss alleging that after Judge Fabros came out with the writ of seizure, he issued the
"Sheriffs Deputization" addressed to the Chief of Police of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija requesting for assistance in the implementation
of said writ. According to him, he "deputized" the police officers only after he attempted to implement the writ and found the
vehicle at a local motorshop undergoing repairs. Because of this, he opted to "constructively seize" the vehicle by serving copies of
the complaint, summons and bond to complainant and a certain Ignacio Gonzales.
ISSUE: Whether the act of respondent in issuing the Sheriffs Deputization was proper.
HELD: NO. The act of respondent in issuing the Sheriffs Deputization is without legal basis.
First, respondent should have known that under Administrative Circular No. 12 (5) it is provided that "No sheriff or deputy sheriff
shall execute a court writ outside his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing and seeking the assistance of, the sheriff
of the place where the execution shall take place".
Respondent's act of implementing the writ in Nueva Ecija when his territorial jurisdiction is confined only to Manila is a clear
violation of the law. The proper recourse would have been to seek the assistance of the sheriff of Nueva Ecija rather than deputizing

the police officer of said place.
Furthermore, under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, it is the personal duty and responsibility of the sheriff to
personally implement the writ and it constitutes serious misconduct and gross negligence for a sheriff to delegate his primary
role in implementing a writ of seizure. Respondent's absence during the seizure of the subject vehicle by the police officers falls
squarely within this prohibition for which he should be held liable.
Sheriffs are ministerial officers. Their office is to execute all writs returnable to the court, unless another is appointed, by special
order of the court, for the purpose.
As a ministerial officer, respondent sheriff should have known that it was his duty, in the absence of instructions, to faithfully
perform what was incumbent upon him to do. Administrative Circular No. 12 was promulgated in order to streamline the service
and execution of court writs and processes in the reorganized courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and to better serve the public
good and facilitate the administration of justice. Paragraph 5 of said Circular is clear and self-explanatory. "No sheriff or deputy
sheriff shall execute a court writ outside his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing, and seeking the assistance of the
sheriff of the place where the execution shall take place." Accordingly, as sheriff of the MeTC, Branch 9 of the City of Manila,
respondent sheriff of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, to enforce the subject writ instead of unlawfully deputizing the Chief of Police of San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Officers of the court and all court personnel are exhorted to be vigilant in the execution of the law. Sheriffs, as agents of the law, are
therefore called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence. They cannot afford to err in serving court writs
and processes and in implementing court orders lest they undermine the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of
justice.
A.M. No. P-04-1920 AUGUST 17, 2007

SPOUSES NORMANDY and RUTH BAUTISTA v. ERNESTO L. SULA
FACTS: Ruth B. Bautista borrowed ₱300,000 from Ceniza C. Glor. To secure the loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her
Honda CRV in favor of Glor.
Upon maturity of the loan, Glor repeatedly demanded payment from Ruth. Despite the repeated demands, Ruth refused to pay her
debt, or surrender possession of the vehicle. Thus, Glor filed with the Regional Trial Court a civil case for judicial foreclosure of

chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.
Thereafter, the trial court issued a writ of replevin directing Ernesto L. Sula (respondent), Sheriff IV of the trial court, to take
possession of the vehicle and keep it in his custody.
Respondent enforced the writ on 17 May 2004. On 20 May 2004, spouses Normandy R. Bautista and Ruth B. Bautista (complainants)
filed with the trial court an urgent motion for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond. On 21 May 2004,
complainants filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion, attaching thereto an omnibus motion for entry of appearance, urgent
setting of hearing, and redelivery of the vehicle to them. Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60, complainants required the return of the
vehicle to them by filing a counter-bond and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond.
Because the trial court failed to approve complainants’ counter-bond within the five-day period, Glor asked respondent to deliver
the vehicle to her. Complainants asked respondent not to deliver the vehicle to Glor because (1) pursuant to Section 5, they had
required the return of the vehicle to them and filed the corresponding counter-bond; (2) the vehicle’s delivery to Glor was not
justified under Section 6; and (3) there was no order from the trial court directing the delivery to Glor.
Complainants alleged that respondent approached them in the Quezon City Hall of Justice building asking them to wait for him by
the benches at the back of the second floor. There, respondent told them that he was willing to ignore Glor’s request in exchange
for ₱20,000. With a little hesitation, they offered him ₱3,000 and promised to give the balance on the following day. Respondent
agreed and immediately received the ₱3,000. On the next day, however, complainants did not give the balance. They asked
respondent if he could give them more time to raise the money. Respondent was irked by this.
On 27 May 2004, respondent filed a sheriff’s manifestation asking the trial court’s guidance on whether he should deliver the
vehicle to Glor or keep it in custodia legis.
Without waiting for the trial court’s instructions regarding the vehicle, respondent filed his sheriff’s return on 28 May 2004 stating
that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor.
Complainants filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), respectively, a joint affidavit-
complaint against respondent (for simple misconduct).
ISSUE: Whether respondent was wrong in delivering the vehicle to applicant/plaintiff Glor without waiting for the trial court’s
instructions on the matter.
HELD: YES. Respondent erred when he delivered the vehicle to Glor without waiting for the trial court’s instructions on the matter.
In this case, plaintiff/applicant had posted a replevin bond duly approved by the court. Nevertheless, one of the elements upon
which the property subject of replevin may be delivered to the plaintiff/applicant is lacking. There appears to be no court order
issued yet for the release of the aforementioned property to the plaintiff/applicant. The order dated 12 May 2004 issued by the
court only directed respondent to take into his custody the subject motor vehicle. Further, respondent filed a manifestation
seeking guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property. Hence, respondent’s justification that the release of the
seized property to the plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevin
bond to answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants may not be given weight.
It must be stressed that the prerogatives of Sheriffs do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled
to possession of the subject property. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the
instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his
Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning,
he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste
raised questions on his actions and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case.
Moreover, under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to
the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without due
process.

The purpose of the five (5) day period in Section 6, Rule 60 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of
the property by filing a counter-bond. Considering that there was no court order to release the property to the applicant/plaintiff
and the complainants were able to require the return of the property and file their counter-bond within the five (5) day period
required by the Rules, respondent should have been more circumspect in releasing the property to the plaintiff/applicant . By
hastily deciding to release the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant without waiting for the court’s order, respondent patently
abused his authority.
Indeed, respondent went beyond the call of his duties when he delivered the vehicle to Glor. The writ of replevin issued by the trial
court specifically stated that the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor subject to the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. Yet,
respondent opted to ignore these provisions.
Good faith on respondent’s part, or lack of it, would be of no moment for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer
of the court, his duty is to comply with the Rules.
Under Section 5, complainants may require the return of the vehicle by (1) posting a counter-bond in double the value of the vehicle
and (2) serving Glor with a copy of the counter-bond. Both requirements must be complied with before the vehicle is delivered to
Glor. Put differently:
If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five days from
such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both
requirements — as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned — being mandatory. x x x
Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing a redelivery
bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff’s affidavit within the period specified in
Sections 5 and 6.
Under Section 6, the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor only under the following instances:
1. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants do not object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or
sureties thereon;
2. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants object to the sufficiency of the bond and the trial court affirms its
approval of Glor’s bond or approves a new bond; or
3. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants require the return of the vehicle and their bond is objected to and
found insufficient and they do not forthwith file an approved bond.
In the instant case, complainants duly complied with all of the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 for the return of the vehicle.
Respondent took possession of the vehicle on 17 May 2004. On 20 May 2004, complainants filed their urgent motion for the return
of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond and, on 21 May 2004, they filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion and change
the same with an omnibus motion. Both the urgent motion and the omnibus motion were filed before the delivery of the vehicle to
Glor and before the expiration of the five-day period. Later, the trial court approved complainants’ counter-bond. Thus, respondent
committed an irregularity when he hastily delivered the vehicle to Glor.
Under the Rules of Court, the sheriff should not immediately deliver the property seized under a writ of replevin to the plaintiff. This
is because defendants have every right to be respected in their possession and may not be deprived of it without due process. The
purpose of the five-day period in Section 6 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property
by filing a counter-bond.
Respondent’s act of filing the manifestation seeking the trial court’s guidance virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004
then delivering the vehicle to Glor in the morning of 27 May 2004 is highly questionable.
The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will
release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court
virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning, he suddenly decided to release the car to the
plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste raised questions on his action and leaves doubts as
to his intent or interest in the case.

Since respondent had filed a manifestation seeking the trial court’s guidance, the most appropriate course of action should have
been for him to wait for the trial court’s instructions on what he should do with the vehicle. Assuming that the issue may have been
too technical for respondent to decide on the spot, it would have been prudent for him to let the trial court decide on the matter.
G.R. No. 164521 DECEMBER 18, 2008

ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC., AND MELBAROSE R. SASOT v. THE GOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: Allandale Sportsline, Inc. (ASI) obtained a loan of P204,000.00 from The Good Development Corp. (GDC) under a Promissory
Note signed by Melbarose R. Sasot and Allandale R. Sasot.
To provide additional security, ASI and Melbarose executed in favor of GDC a Deed of Mortgage. The properties subject of the
mortgage are: List A -- all the merchandise and stocks in trade found in the commercial establishment owned by ASI and Melbarose;
List B -- all the furniture, fixtures, appliances, equipment and other personal property found in said business establishment; List C --
one Toyota Corona 2DR and one Toyota Corolla 4DR.
GDC demanded that Melbarose pay the unpaid account of P179,000.00 or surrender the mortgaged chattels. When no payment
was made, GDC filed with the RTC a Complaint for Replevin and/or Sum of Money with Damages against petitioners. GDC prayed for
alternative reliefs wherein in the event that manual delivery of said chattels or personal property cannot be obtained for some
reason or another, judgment should be rendered ordering ASI to pay GDC.
The RTC issued a Writ of Replevin, and by virtue thereof, the Sheriff seized and delivered to GDC only one unit of Toyota Corona and
two appliances. GDC filed an Amended Complaint to include in its application for replevin the items under List A. RTC issued an Alias
Writ of Replevin over the items in List A, and, by virtue thereof, the Sheriff seized and delivered to GDC the assorted items
enumerated therein. A Second Alias Writ of Replevin was issued over one unit Toyota Corolla.
At the trial that ensued, GDC disclosed that after it obtained possession of the properties subject of the writs of replevin, it caused
the auction sale of some of them and realized proceeds amounting to P78,750.00.
Moreover, GDC presented to the RTC a Statement of Account, which indicated that the total outstanding balance of the loan
obligation of ASI and Melbarose was reduced to P191,111.82 after the proceeds of the auction sale in the amount of P78,750.00
was deducted from the earlier balance of P266,126.17.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Good Development Corporation against Melbarose Sasot, Allandale Sportsline Inc., and Ma.
Theresa Manipon ordering them to pay the GDC jointly and severally the amount of P269,611.82 plus legal interest thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the return of their properties pursuant to Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: NO. One of the effects of the election by respondent of the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure is the inapplicability of
Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 9. Judgment. – After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the right of possession to and the value
of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or
for its value in case delivery cannot be made and also for such damages as either party may prove, with costs.

The properties of petitioners which were seized by virtue of the Writs of Replevin were extra-judicially foreclosed and sold at public
auction by respondent in the exercise of its absolute right under the contract entered into by the parties, without need of prior
notice or demand to forthwith judicially or extra-judicially foreclose this mortgage and proceed against all or any of the mortgaged
rights, interests and properties for the full satisfaction of the mortgagors' entire obligation to the mortgagee.
Other discussions: The reliefs respondent prayed for in its Complaint and Amended Complaint are in the alternative: delivery of
the mortgaged properties preparatory to foreclosure or payment of the unpaid loan.
Moreover, after respondent acquired possession of the mortgaged properties through the writs of replevin, it caused the auction
sale of assorted sports outfits, one unit Sansio Karaoke, one unit Sony T.V. Set and one unit Toyota Corona, and earned proceeds
amounting to P78,750.00. While it appears that respondent failed to obtain the other personal properties covered by the Deed of
Mortgage and the writs of replevin, there is no doubt that it had effectively elected the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage security over the remedy of collection of the unpaid loan.
The RTC was aware that respondent had elected one remedy. In its Decision, it cited the fact that some of the mortgaged properties
which were delivered to respondent by means of the Writs of Replevin had been sold on auction, and acknowledged that the
proceeds from said auction sale should be deducted from the loan account of petitioners. Yet, it is curious that in the dispositive
portion of its Decision, the RTC granted respondent the remedy of collection of sum of money.
Not only is there no more reference to the conduct of the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, there is also no longer any
acknowledgment that the proceeds earned from the auction sale should be deducted from the total unpaid loan. This is a glaring
error. By causing the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, respondent effectively adopted and pursued the remedy of extra-
judicial foreclosure, using the writ of replevin as a tool to get hold of the mortgaged properties. As emphasized in Bachrach, one
effect of respondent’s election of the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure is its waiver of the remedy of collection of the unpaid
loan.
Therefore, there was no more legal basis for the RTC to grant respondent the relief of collecting from petitioners "the
amount of P269,611.82 plus legal interest thereon effective to date until the full amount is fully paid.
G.R. No. 73317 AUGUST 31, 1989

THOMAS YANG v. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO R. VALDEZ
FACTS: Respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante brought an action in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner Thomas
Yang and Manuel Yaphockun, to recover possession of two (2) Isuzu-cargo trucks. In their complaint, the Morante spouses alleged
that they had actual use and possession of the two (2) cargo trucks, having acquired them during the period from 1982 to 1984. The
trucks were, however, registered in the name of petitioner Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the Morante spouses' business of
buying and selling corn. The Morante spouses further alleged that they were deprived of possession of the vehicles in the morning
of 3 January 1985, when petitioner Yang had the vehicles taken from where they were parked, to the warehouse of Manuel
Yaphockun and there they were thereafter held. Despite repeated demands, the complaint alleged, petitioner Yang refused to
release the trucks to respondent spouses.
To obtain immediate possession of the Isuzu trucks, respondent spouses applied for a writ of replevin and put up a replevin bond of
P560,000.00 executed by respondent Milagros Morante and Atty. Bayani Calonzo (counsel for respondent spouses).
On 7 January 1985, the respondent judge issued an order of seizure directing the Provincial Sheriff of South Cotabato to take
immediate possession and custody of the vehicles involved. The Sheriff carried out the order.
On 10 January 1985, defendant Manuel Yaphockun filed a motion seeking repossession of the cargo trucks, and posted a replevin
counter-bond of P560,000.00 executed by himself and one Narciso Mirabueno. The respondent judge promptly required the
respondent spouses to comment on the counter-bond proffered.

The respondent spouses reacted by amending their complaint on 13 January 1985 by excluding Manuel Yaphockun as party-
defendant. The following day, i.e., 14 January 1985, the respondents submitted an opposition to Yaphockun's counter-bond,
contending that since Manuel Yaphockun was merely a nominal defendant, he had no standing to demand the return of the cargo
trucks. By an order dated 18 January 1985, the respondent judge disapproved the counter-bond filed by Manuel Yaphockun, since
the latter had been dropped as party-defendant and accordingly no longer had any personality to litigate in the replevin suit. The
trial court also ordered the immediate release and delivery of the cargo trucks to respondent spouses.
For his part, petitioner Yang moved, on 21 January 1985, for an extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file an answer to the
complaint for replevin. Four days later, on 25 January 1985, petitioner put up a counter-bond in the amount of P560,000.00 which
counter-bond was, however, rejected by the respondent judge for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner Yang now argues that, firstly, respondent judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in approving the replevin bond of respondent spouses. It is contended by petitioner that replevin bond was merely an
undertaking of the bondsmen Milagros Morante and Atty. Calonzo to pay the sum of P560,000.00, that no tangible security, such as
"cash, property or surety," was placed thereby at the disposal and custody of the court. It is argued, secondly, that the replevin
bond was defective considering that it had been filed by only one of the two (2) private respondents and that the bondsmen
thereon had failed by its terms to undertake to return the cargo trucks to petitioner should he (the petitioner) be adjudged lawful
owner thereof.
ISSUES: #1: Whether the replevin bond of respondent spouses was proper. – YES
#2: Whether the writ of replevin was properly issued even if respondent spouses are not the registered owners of the cargo trucks
involved. – YES
#3: Whether the counter-replevin bond of petitioner was filed out of time. – YES
RULING: #1: YES.

A bond that is required to be given by law is commonly understood to refer to an obligation or undertaking in writing that
is sufficiently secured. It is not indispensably necessary, however, that the obligation of the bond be secured or supported
by cash or personal property or real property or the obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond. Most
generally understood, a "bond" is an obligation reduced to writing binding the obligor to pay a sum of money to the obligee
under specified conditions. At common law, a bond was merely a written obligation under seal. A bond is often, as a
commercial matter, secured by a mortgage on real property; the mortgagee may be the obligee, although the mortgagee
may also be a third party surety whose personal credit is added to that of the principal obligor under the bond.
The sufficiency of a bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which must approve the bond. In the case
at bar, the replevin bond given by the respondent Morante spouses was properly secured by the sureties themselves who declared
their solvency and capacity to answer for the undertaking assumed, through an Affidavit of Justification
The said sworn declaration of solvency which was submitted to the judge together with the bond, in effect secured the replevin
bond. Also note that the sureties or bondsmen under the bond included not only Milagros Morante who was party-plaintiff below,
but also a third person, Atty. Bayani L. Calonzo who was not a party-litigant. Petitioner Yang never put in issue the financial
capability of these two (2) sureties. It follows that the approval of the replevin bond by respondent judge, before whom it was
presented and who was in a better position than this Court to appreciate the financial standing of the sureties, can scarely be
questioned as a grave abuse of discretion.
The other objections to the replevin bond are equally lacking in merit. The fact that the other respondent, Ricardo Morante, did not
act as surety on the same bond as his wife did, does not affect the validity or the sufficiency of that bond. It would appear to the
benefit of petitioner that Atty. Bayani L. Calonzo signed up as the other or second surety or bondsman on that bond, since petitioner
thereby acquired a right of recourse not only against the respondent spouses but also against a third person, not a party to the
replevin suit. Further, the failure of the replevin bond to state expressly that it was "conditioned for the return of the property to
the defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged," is not fatal to the validity of the replevin bond. The replevin bond put up by
Milagros Morante and Bayani L. Calonzo stated that it was given "under the condition that [they] will pay all the costs, which may be
adjudged to the said defendants and all damages which said defendants may sustain by reason of the order of replevin, if the court
shall finally adjudge that the plaintiffs were not entitled thereto." The condition of the bond given in this case substantially
complied with the requirement of Section 2, Rule 60. Moreover, the provisions of Rule 60, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court
under which the replevin bond was given may be regarded as having become part of the bond as having been imported thereunto.

All the particular conditions prescribed in Section 2, Rule 60, although not written in the bond in printer's ink, will be read into the
bond in determining the scope and content of the liability of the sureties or bondsmen under that bond.
#2: YES.
The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks immediate possession of the
property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin, he
is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the possession thereof." Therefore, it is immaterial that the respondent spouses
are not the registered owners of the cargo trucks involved.
#3: YES.
Petitioner received summons on the amended complaint on 25 January 1985 and on the same day, filed his counterbond. It is his
contention that his redelivery bond was not filed out of time, since he was served with summons only on 25 January 1985.
A defendant in a replevin suit may demand return of possession of the property replevied by filing a redelivery bond within the
periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60.
Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff" require the return of the property;
in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer." Both these periods are mandatory in
character. Thus, a lower court which approves a counter-bond filed beyond the statutory periods, acts in excess of its jurisdiction. In
the instant case, the cargo trucks were taken into custody by the Sheriff on 7 January 1985. Petitioner Yang's counter-replevin bond
was filed on 25 January 1985. The matter was treated at length in the trial court's order of 28 February 1985:
... It is also borne by the record that defendant, thru counsel, was served with copy 6f the amended complaint dropping defendant
Manuel Yap from the complaint on January 14, 1985 and hence, said receipt of the amended complaint was tantamount to a
summons issued to the defendant Thomas Yang. It is a truism that the primary purpose of summons is to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the parties, and jurisdiction can be acquired by the voluntary submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
Court. Hence, after defendant had been duly represented by counsel even at the inception of the service of summons and a copy of
the order of replevin on January 7, 1985, defendant Thomas Yang had already been duly served, especially so, when counsel
manifested in their comment to the opposition filed by plaintiffs that Manuel Yap has been duly authorized to represent Thomas
Yang. From then on defendant should have been on guard as to the provision of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court — re — the
five (5) days period within which to file the counter-replevin for the approval of the court, counted from the actual taking of the
property by the officer or the sheriff on January 7, 1985. It is honestly believed that the five-day period spoken of by the Rule begins
from the taking of the property by the sheriff and not from the service of summons to the defendant, for even if summons was
already duly served to the defendant but the property has not yet been taken by the sheriff, the provision above cited does not
apply. Hence, it is clear that the prescriptive period for filing a counter-replevin bond must be counted from the actual taking of the
property by the sheriff, subject of the replevin bond and in this particular case on January 7, 1985. True indeed, that defendant
Manuel Yap filed the counter-replevin bond on January 10, 1985, which was denied by this court, that was three (3) days after the
property was taken on January 7, 1985 but when the said defendant was dropped from the complaint on January 14, 1985,
defendant Thomas Yang should have immediately filed the proper counter-replevin bond after Manuel Yap has been dropped from
the complaint on January 14, 1985 considering that the counter-replevin bond filed on January 10, 1985 by Manuel Yap has become
obsolete on this date, January 14, 1985. The service of summons to Thomas Yang on January 25, 1985, has become an academic
formality because on January 21, 1985, counsel has already filed a motion for extension of time of fifteen (15) days within which to
file their responsive pleading counted from January 31, 1985, for the original period of fifteen (15) days for filing the corresponding
answer lapsed on January 31, 1985, which this court readily granted. Hence, irrespective of the order of this court dated January
18,1985, denying the counter-replevin bond filed, defendant Thomas Yang should and must have filed his counter replevin bond
within two (2) days from service of the amended complaint, the same must have been)'filed on January 18, 1985, to conform with
liberal interpretation of the rules and not on January 25, 1985, for then the counter replevin bond had been filed beyond the period
provided by the Rules. The decisional principle on the filing of counter replevin bond to entitle the defendant to the redelivery or
retaining possession of the property, is compliance with all the conditions precedent pursuant to the rules, and failure to comply
therewith entitles plaintiff to possession, and the initial steps in obtaining redelivery must be taken within the time limit provided
thereto.

A.M. No. P-05-1942 JANUARY 17, 2005

ALIBSAR ADOMA v. ROMEO GATCHECO, Sheriff III, and EUGENIO TAGUBA
FACTS: Complainant Alibsar Adoma claimed that a writ of replevin for the recovery of an L-300 van was issued in his favor. On the
same day, respondent sheriff Romeo Gatcheco implemented the writ. He was accompanied by respondent Eugenio Taguba, a
process server of Branch 2 of MTCC, Santiago City, who volunteered to assist respondent sheriff. After the two respondents seized
the vehicle, they demanded payment of P8,000.00, allegedly promised by complainant but the latter was able to give only P1,000.00
and another P1,000.00 the following day.
The writ of replevin stated that the vehicle will be delivered to complainant after 5 days from the implementation thereof. With the
vehicle still undelivered on the 7th day, complainant threatened to file an administrative case against respondent sheriff. Finally, the
latter was forced to release the vehicle to complainant. Respondents, however, continued to demand P6,000.00, hence complainant
filed the instant administrative case.
Respondents, on the other hand, denied soliciting and receiving any amount from the complainant. Respondent sheriff admitted,
however, that complainant promised to give him P10,000.00 if the vehicle will be sold.
ISSUE: Whether the procedure for execution of writ of replevin has been properly followed by respondents.
HELD: NO.
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the procedure for the execution of writs and other processes are:
first, the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him;
second, he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses;
third, the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and ex-oficio
sheriff;
fourth, the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and
fifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ. Any
amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which
renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.
In the instant case, respondent sheriff totally disregarded the aforecited procedure. He failed to make and submit estimate of the
sheriffs expenses. The amounts received and demanded by him are therefore unauthorized fees. His acts of accepting and soliciting
said monetary considerations make him liable not only for conduct unbecoming a court employee but also for grave misconduct and
dishonesty.
Indeed, respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place complainant in possession of the vehicle after five days from the
implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give the whole amount he promised. Since the adverse party did not object
to the complainants bond nor posted a redelivery bond to recover possession of the vehicle taken under the writ of replevin,
respondent sheriff is under obligation to deliver the van to complainant. However, it took respondent sheriff 13 days before he
released the vehicle to complainant, a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which

provides
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse
party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects
and the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the
return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond,
the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff
must return it to the adverse party.
G.R. No. 111107 JANUARY 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because
the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required
explanation.
The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of
the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case
before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative
seizure proceedings.
ISSUE: May an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture
proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705?
HELD: NO. A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course
of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of
the truck.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the
property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.39 "To detain" is
defined as to mean "to hold or keep in custody,"40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful
meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without
manual seizing of the property is sufficient.
Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is
entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention,
that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt
from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.
Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant
case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the
required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277.
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR
or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued
possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by
the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by
the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to
review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES
(1) when there is a violation of due process

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,16
(5) when there is irreparable injury
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
G.R. No. 61508 MARCH 17, 1999

CITIBANK v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In considering for a loan obtained from Citibank, N.A. (formerly First National City Bank), the defendant (private respondent
herein) Douglas Anama executed a promissory note, dated November 10, 1972, 2 to pay the plaintiff bank the sum of P418,000.00
in sixty (60) equal successive monthly installments of P8,722.25, starting on the 10th day of December 1972 and on the 10th of
every month thereafter.

To secure payment of the loan, private respondent Anama also constituted a Chattel Mortgage of even date in favor of petitioner,
on various machineries and equipment located at No. 1302 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City.
On November 25, 1974, for failure and refusal of the private respondent to pay the monthly installment due under the said
promissory note since January 1974, despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a verified complaint against private respondent
Anama for the collection of his unpaid balance of P405,820.52 on the said promissory note, for the delivery and possession of the
chattels covered by the Chattel Mortgage preparatory to the foreclosure thereof as provided under Section 14 of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, docketed as Civil Case No. 95991 before the then Court of First Instance of Manila.
On February 20, 1975, the defendant Anama submitted his Answer with Counterclaim, denying the material averments of the
complaint, and averring inter alia (1) that the remedy of replevin was improper and the writ of seizure should be vacated.
On December 2, 1974, the trial court upon proof of default of the private respondent in the payment of the said loan, issued an
Order of Replevin over the machineries and equipment covered by the Chattel Mortgage.
However, despite the issuance of the said order of seizure of subject chattels, actual delivery of possession thereof to petitioner did
not take place because negotiations for an amicable settlement between the parties were encouraged by the trial court.
On March 24, 1975, a pre-trial conference was held and the lower court issued an order for joint management by the petitioner and
the private respondent of the latter's business for ten (10) days, after which the former would appointed receiver for the said
business.
On April 1, 1975, the petitioner took over private respondent's business as receiver. When further proposals to settle the case
amicably failed, the lower court proceeded to try the case on the merits.
On January 29, 1977, petitioner presented a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure, ordering the sheriff to seize the
properties involved and dispose of them in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court. The lower court then gave private
respondent five (5) days to oppose the said motion and on February 22, 1977, he sent in his opposition thereto on the grounds: (1)
that Citibank's P400,000 replevin bond to answer for damages was grossly inadequate because the market value of the properties
involved is P1,710,000 and their replacement cost is P2,342,300.00 per the appraisal report of the Appraisal and Research Corp.
On February 28, 1977, acting on the said Motion and private respondent's opposition, the trial court issued an Order granting the
Motion for Alias Writ of Seizure. Private respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the same was denied by
the Resolution of March 18, 1977.
Accordingly, by virtue of the Alias writ of Seizure, petitioner took possession of the mortgaged chattels of private respondent. As a
consequence, the sheriff seized subject properties, dismantled and removed them from the premises where they were installed,
delivered them to petitioner's possession on March 17, 18 and 19, 1977 and advertised them for sale at public auction scheduled on
March 22, 1977.
On March 21, 1977, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 7 with Injunction to
set aside and annul the questioned resolution of the trial court on the ground that they were issued "in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion" because of the "lack of evidence and clear cut right to possession of First National City Bank (herein
petitioner)" top the machineries subject of the Chattel Mortgage.
On July 30, 1982, finding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolutions, the Court of Appeals granted petition, holding that the provision of the Rules of Court on Replevin
and Receivership have not been complied with, in that (1) there was no Affidavit of Merit accompanying the Complaint for Replevin;
(2) the bond posted by Citibank was insufficient; and (3) there was non-compliance with the requirement of a receiver's bond and
oath of office.
Therefrom, Citibank came to this Court via its present petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Court of
Appeals
ISSUES: I. WAS THERE JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS AGAINST CITIBANK WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS ORDERED THE RETURN OF

THE MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND ITS ACCESSORIES TO THEIR ORIGINAL AND RESPECTIVE PLACES AND POSITIONS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT CITIBANK COMPLIED WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 2, RULE 60 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE BOND POSTED BY CITIBANK IS QUESTIONABLE AND/OR INSUFFICIENT.
HELD: I. NO. In resolving the issue posed by the petition, the Court of Appeals limited its disposition to a determination of whether
or not the assailed order of seizure was issued in accordance with law, that is, whether the provisions of the Rules of Court on
delivery of personal property or replevin as a provisional remedy were followed. The Court of Appeals relied on Ruled 60 of the
Rules of Court, which prescribed the procedure for the recovery of possession of personal property, which Rule, provides:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and Bond. — Upon applying or such order the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person
who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to his best
of knowledge, information and belief;
(c) That it has nor been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law, or seized under an execution, or an attachment
against the property of the plaintiff, or is so seized, that is exempt from such seizure; and
(d) The actual value of the property.
The plaintiff must also give a bond, executed to the defendant in double of the value of the property as stated in the affidavit
aforementioned, for the property to the defendant of such sum as he may recover from the plaintiff in the action.
The Court of Appeals did not pass upon the issue of who, as between Douglas Anama and Citibank, is entitled to the possession of
subject machineries, as asserted by the latter. When it ordered the restoration of the said machineries to Douglas Anama (now the
private respondent), it merely defendant to the possession of his properties, since there was a finding that the issuance of the writ
was not in accordance with the specific rules of the Rules of Court.
II.
YES. Petitioner is correct insofar as it contends that substantial compliance with the affidavit requirement may be permissible. There
is substantial compliance with the rule requiring that an affidavit of merit to support the complaint for replevin if the complaint
itself contains a statements of every fact required to be stated in the affidavit of merit and the complaint is verified like an affidavit.
But, as correctly taken note of by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's complaint does not allege all the facts that should be set forth in
an affidavit of merit. Although the complaint alleges that petitioner is entitled to the possession of subject properties by virtue of
the chattel mortgage executed by the private respondent, upon the latter's default on its obligation, and the defendant's alleged
"wrongful detention" of the same, the said complaint does not state that subject properties were not taken by virtue of a tax
assessment or fine imposed pursuant to law or seized under execution or attachment or, if they were so seized, that they are
exempt from such seizure. Then too, petitioner stated the value of subject properties at a "probable value of P200,000.00, more or
less".
Pertinent rules require that the affidavit of merit should state the actual value of the property subject of a replevin suit and not
just its probable value. Actual value (or actual market value) means "the price which an article would command in the ordinary
course of business, that is to say, when offered for sale by one willing to sell, but not under compulsion to sell and purchased by
another who is willing to buy, but under no obligation to purchase it".
Petitioner alleged that the machineries and equipment involved are valued at P200,000.00 while respondent denies the same,
claiming that per the appraisal report, the market value of the said properties is P1,710,000.00 and their replacement cost is
P2,342,300.00. Petitioner's assertion is belied by the fact that upon taking possession of the aforesaid properties, it insured the
same for P610,593.74 and P450,000.00, separately.

It bears stressing that the actual value of the properties subject of a replevin is required to be in the affidavit because such actual
value will be the basis of the replevin bond required to be posted by the plaintiff. Therefore, when the petitioner failed to declare
the actual value of the machineries and equipment subject of the replevin suit, there was non-compliance with Section 2, Rule 60 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
It should be noted, however, that the private respondent interposed the defense of lack of affidavit of merit only in his Reply to the
Comment of Citibank on the Petition for Certiorari which respondent filed with the Court of Appeals.
Thus, although respondent's defense of lack of affidavit of merit is meritorious, procedurally, such a defense is no longer available
for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.
III
THE BOND IS INSUFFICIENT.
It should be noted that a replevin bond is intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer by reason of its
being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending trial of the action . The same may also be
answerable for damages if any when judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant or the party against whom a writ of replevin
was issued and such judgment includes the return of the property to him. Thus, the requirement that the bond be double the
actual value of the properties litigated upon. Such is the case because the bond will answer for the actual loss to the plaintiff, which
corresponds to the value of the properties sought to be recovered and for damages, if any.
Petitioner also maintains that, assuming for the sake of argument that its replevin bond was grossly inadequate or insufficient, the
recourse of the respondent should be to post a counterbound or a redelivery bond as provided under Section 5 of Rule 60.
Sec. 5 and 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, read:
Sec. 5. Return of property. — If the defendant objects to the sufficient of the plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he
cannot require the return of the property as in this section provided; but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the
delivery of the property to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudge, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered
against the defendant, and by serving a copy of such bond on the plaintiff or his attorney.
Sec. 6. Disposition of property by officer. — If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer, the defendant does
not object to the sufficiecy of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the property as provided in the
last preceding section; or if the defendant so objects, and the plaintiff's first or new bond is approved; or if the defendant so require,
and his bond is object to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to
the plaintiff, the officer must return it to the defendant.
The Court held in a prior case that the remedies provided under Section 5, Rule 60, are alternative remedies. ". . . If a defendant in a
replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should, within five days from such taking,
(1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and

(2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both requirements as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period
mentioned — being mandatory."
This course of action is available to the defendant for as long as he does not object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond.
Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing a redelivery
bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff's affidavit within the period specified in
Section 5 and 6.
Alternatively, "the defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon;" but if he
does so, "he cannot require the return of the property" by posting a counter-bond pursuant to Section 5 and 6. 18
In the case under consideration, the private respondent did not opt to cause redelivery of the properties to him by filing a

counter-bond precisely because he objected to the sufficiency of the bond posted by plaintiff. Therefore, he need not file a
counter-bond or redelivery bond. When such objection was not given due course in the court below — when, instead of requiring
the plaintiff to post a new bond, the court approved the bond in the amount of P400,000.00, claimed by respondent to be
insufficient, and ordered the seizure of the properties — recourse to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing
such order is proper under the circumstances.
G.R. No. 148132 JANUARY 28, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 151079 JANUARY 28, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 151372 JANUARY 28, 2008
REGINA M. ASTORGA v. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
FACTS: Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart Communications, Incorporated (SMART) on May 8, 1997 as
District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD). She was receiving a monthly
salary of P33,650.00. As District Sales Manager, Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, namely, annual performance incentive
equivalent to 30% of her annual gross salary, a group life and hospitalization insurance coverage, and a car plan in the amount of
P455,000.00.5
In February 1998, SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations and entered into a joint
venture agreement with NTT of Japan, and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the
sales and marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorga’s division.
SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who would be recommended by SMART however. Astorga landed last in the
performance evaluation, thus, she was not recommended. Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for
work. But on March 3, 1998, SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on ground of
redundancy, effective April 3, 1998.
The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other
benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART and Ann Margaret V. Santiago (Santiago). She claimed that
abolishing CSMG and, consequently, terminating her employment was illegal for it violated her right to security of tenure. She also
posited that it was illegal for an employer, like SMART, to contract out services which will displace the employees, especially if the
contractor is an in-house agency.
SMART responded that there was valid termination. It argued that Astorga was dismissed by reason of redundancy, which is an
authorized cause for termination of employment, and the dismissal was effected in accordance with the requirements of the Labor
Code. .

In the meantime, on May 18, 1998, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda
Civic Sedan which was given to her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper
disposition.11 Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati (RTC) on August 10, 1998. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1936 and was raffled to Branch 57.
Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of
(i) lack of jurisdiction;

(ii) failure to state a cause of action;
(iii) litis pendentia; and
(iv) forum-shopping.
Astorga posited that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit
arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts.
Pending resolution of Astorga’s motion to dismiss the replevin case, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring Astorga’s
dismissal from employment illegal.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order16 denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss the replevin case. Astorga filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via certiorari to the CA, which reversed the RTC ruling. Granting the petition and,
consequently, dismissing the replevin case, the CA held that the case is intertwined with Astorga’s complaint for illegal dismissal;
thus, it is the labor tribunal that has rightful jurisdiction over the complaint.
ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the replevin case?
HELD: Yes. Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those
goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed
to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property.
The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated
with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.
Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in
denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the
surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-
employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein
is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to
adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said
property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of
specialization of Labor Arbiters.
xxxx
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each forum
can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an
Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the petitioners
to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners’
right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the Vessel and
whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess in addressed to
the competence of Civil Courts.

In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.
The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling and ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for
lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 182963 JUNE 3, 2013

SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
FACTS: On February 15, 2001, petitioners spouses Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage
in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and an interest of 6% per month shall be
imposed for failure to pay each installment on or before the stated due date.
On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its rights, title and interests in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage to ABN
AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO), which, on May 31, 2002, likewise assigned the same to respondent BPI Family Savings Bank,
Inc.
For failure to pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002, respondent, through counsel, sent to
petitioners a demand letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring the entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay
Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter.6 As the demand was left unheeded,
respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).
A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was not seized.8 Trial on the merits ensued. On August 11, 2005, the
Manila RTC Br. 33 ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay the amount of Php576,664.04 plus
interest at the rate of 72% per annum from August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs of suit.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision and, subsequently,
denied the motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Is demand necessary before a writ of replevin may issue?
HELD: NO. A provision on waiver of notice or demand has been recognized as legal and valid in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Court of Appeals,13 wherein We held:
The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from the time the obligor demands the fulfillment of
the obligation from the obligee. However, the law expressly provides that demand is not necessary under certain circumstances,
and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly waive demand. Hence, since the co-signors expressly waived demand
in the promissory notes, demand was unnecessary for them to be in default.
The court ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there
is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property

before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.
Also, petitioners’ representation that they have not received a demand letter is completely inconsequential as the mere act of
sending it would suffice. Again, We look into the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which provides:
All correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas, or notifications of any
judicial or extrajudicial action shall be sent to the MORTGAGOR at the address indicated on this promissory note with
chattel mortgage or at the address that may hereafter be given in writing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE or
his/its assignee. The mere act of sending any correspondence by mail or by personal delivery to the said address shall be
valid and effective notice to the mortgagor for all legal purposes and the fact that any communication is not actually
received by the MORTGAGOR or that it has been returned unclaimed to the MORTGAGEE or that no person was found at
the address given, or that the address is fictitious or cannot be located shall not excuse or relieve the MORTGAGOR from
the effects of such notice.
The Court cannot yield to petitioners’ denial in receiving respondent’s demand letter.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant
to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit,
proof of non-payment is not needed for it is presumed. Respondent's possession of the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage
strongly buttresses its claim that the obligation has not been extinguished.
As held in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca:
x x x The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment. A
promissory note in the hands of the creditor is a proof of indebtedness rather than proof of payment. In an action for
replevin by a mortgagee, it is prima facie evidence that the promissory note has not been paid . Likewise, an uncanceled
mortgage in the possession of the mortgagee gives rise to the presumption that the mortgage debt is unpaid
OTHER ISSUE: Plaintiff also prays for such further reliefs as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the premises.
The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars the exercise of the others. This
limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy by virtue of Art. 1485. The condition
that the lessor has deprived the lessee of possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Art. 1485 was fulfilled in
this case by the filing by petitioner of the complaint for replevin to recover possession of movable property. By virtue of the writ of
seizure issued by the trial court, the deputy sheriff seized the vehicle on August 6, 1986 and thereby deprived private respondents
of its use. The car was not returned to private respondent until April 16, 1989, after two (2) years and eight (8) months, upon
issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of execution.
Petitioner prayed that private respondents be made to pay the sum of ₱39,054.86, the amount that they were supposed to pay as
of May 1986, plus interest at the legal rate. At the same time, it prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin or the delivery to it of
the motor vehicle "complete with accessories and equipment." In the event the car could not be delivered to petitioner, it was
prayed that private respondent Rolando Lantan be made to pay petitioner the amount of ₱60,000.00, the "estimated actual value"
of the car, "plus accrued monthly rentals thereof with interests at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum until fully paid."
This prayer of course cannot be granted, even assuming that private respondents have defaulted in the payment of their
obligation.

A.M. No. P-07-2384 JUNE18, 2008

KENNETH HAO v. ABE C. ANDRES
FACTS: Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin case entitled Zenaida Silver, doing trade and business
under the name and style ZHS Commercial v. Loreto Hao, Atty. Amado Cantos, Kenneth Hao and John Does, pending before the RTC
of Davao City, Branch 16.
On October 17, 2005, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles allegedly owned by the
complainant. On the strength of the said order, Andres was able to seize nine (9) vehicles.
Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to Zenaida Silver in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the nine
motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. He also averred that Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a
military vehicle which was excessive since there were no resistance from them. Hao also discovered that the compound where the
seized motor vehicles were placed is actually owned by Silver.
On October 21, 2005, in view of the approval of the complainants counter-replevin bond, Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio ordered Andres
to immediately cease and desist from further implementing the order of seizure, and to return the seized motor vehicles including
its accessories to their lawful owners.
However, on October 24, 2005, eight of the nine seized motor vehicles were reported missing. In his report, Andres stated that he
was shocked to find that the motor vehicles were already missing when he inspected it on October 22, 2005. He narrated that on
October 21, 2005, PO3 Rodrigo Despe, one of the policemen guarding the subject motor vehicles, reported to him that a certain
Nonoy entered the compound and caused the duplication of the vehicles keys.
Subsequently, Hao reported that three of the carnapped vehicles were recovered by the police. He then accused Andres of
conspiring and conniving with Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Silvers counsel) and the policemen in the carnapping of the motor
vehicles. Hao also accused Andres of concealing the depository receipts from them and pointed out that the depository receipts
show that Silver and Atty. Macadangdang were the ones who chose the policemen who will guard the motor vehicles.
Andres vehemently denied violating Rep. Act No. 3019 and committing gross neglect of duty.
OCA recommended that the matter be investigated and referred the case to Executive Judge Renato A. Fuentes who found Andres
guilty of serious negligence in the custody of the nine motor vehicles. Judge Fuentes found numerous irregularities in the
implementation of the writ of replevin/order of seizure, to wit:
1) at the time of the implementation of the writ, Andres knew that the vehicles to be seized were not in the names of any of
the parties to the case;
(2) one vehicle was taken without the knowledge of its owner, a certain Junard Escudero;
(3) Andres allowed Atty. Macadangdang to get a keymaster to duplicate the vehicles keys in order to take one motor
vehicle; and
(4) Andres admitted that prior to the implementation of the writ of seizure, he consulted Silver and Atty. Macadangdang
regarding the implementation of the writ and was accompanied by the latter in the course of the implementation.

Judge Fuentes observed that the motor vehicles were speedily seized without strictly observing fairness and regularity in its
implementation.
ISSUE: Was there proper implementation of the writ of replevin?
HELD: No. Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are well-defined steps provided in the Rules of Court
regarding the proper implementation of a writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure. The Rules, likewise, is explicit on the duty of
the sheriff in its implementation. To recapitulate what should be common knowledge to sheriffs, the pertinent provisions of Rule 60,
of the Rules of Court are quoted hereunder:
SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff. Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, together
with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the
adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or
enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be
broken open and take the property into his possession. After the sheriff has taken possession of the property as herein
provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto upon
receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse
party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects
and the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return
of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the
property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must
return it to the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied.)
First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. [22] In
accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to
object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing
a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.
Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005, four on October 18,
2005, and another three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the depository receipts, on October 18,
2005, Silver received from Andres six of the seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19, 2005.
Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already in possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after
seizure, or no more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of Section 6,
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with regard to the proper disposal of the property.
It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The
rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the
seized property for at least five days. [23] Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to
Silver for whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
In Pardo v. Velasco, this Court held that
Respondent as an officer of the Court is charged with certain ministerial duties which must be performed faithfully to the letter.
Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court has a specific reason or objective. In this case, the purpose of the five (5) days is to
give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety or sureties thereon or require the return of
the property by filing a counterbond. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sebastian v. Valino, this Court reiterated that
Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff .
The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case,
requires its return and files a counterbond. (Emphasis supplied.)

Second, it must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery in replevin is executed by taking possession of the property
specified therein, such property is in custodia legis. As legal custodian, it is Andres duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles.
Hence, when he passed his duty to safeguard the motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear neglect of duty.
Third, we are appalled that even after PO3 Despe reported the unauthorized duplication of the vehicles keys, Andres failed to take
extra precautionary measures to ensure the safety of the vehicles. It is obvious that the vehicles were put at risk by the
unauthorized duplication of the keys of the vehicles. Indeed, Andres failure to take the necessary precaution and proper monitoring
of the vehicles to ensure its safety constitutes plain negligence.
Fourth, despite the cease and desist order, Andres failed to return the motor vehicles to their lawful owners. Instead of returning
the motor vehicles immediately as directed, he opted to write Silver and demand that she put up an indemnity bond to secure the
third-party claims. Consequently, due to his delay, the eventual loss of the motor vehicles rendered the order to return the seized
vehicles ineffectual to the prejudice of the complaining owners.
It must be stressed that as court custodian, it was Andres responsibility to ensure that the motor vehicles were safely kept and that
the same were readily available upon order of the court or demand of the parties concerned. Specifically, sheriffs, being ranking
officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and implementing
court writs, as well as processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting adversely the proper
dispensation of justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law, high standards of
performance are expected of them. Hence, his failure to return the motor vehicles at the time when its return was still feasible
constitutes another instance of neglect of duty.

Parody of Provrem

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Parody of Provrem

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

PROVESIONAL REMEDIES CASE DIGESTS - PRELIM COVERAGE 1

G.R. No. 93262 DECEMBER 29, 1991

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS

Hence this petition from Davao Light.

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. L-252 MARCH 30, 1946

TRANQUILINO CALO and DOROTEO SAN JOSE v. ARSENIO C. ROLDAN

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

may be properly granted. .

G.R. No. L-48756 SEPTEMBER 11, 1982

K.O. GLASS CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. v. THE HONORABLE MANUEL VALENZUELA

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. 175587 SEPTEMBER 21, 2007

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. L-894 JULY 30, 1947

LUIS F. GENERAL v. JOSE R. DE VENECIA

Naga, Camarines Sur, September 25, 1944.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of attachment was validly issued?

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. L-67715 JULY 11, 1986

WILLIAM MIAILHE v. ELAINE M. DE LENCQUESAING and HERVE DE LENCQUESAING

HELD: YES. We agree with the pronouncement of the IAC

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

Section 1 of Rule 57 par. f of the Rules of Court provides —

G. R. No. 123638 JUNE 15, 2005

HELD: Yes. The denial was improper.

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

GR No. 43721 JUNE 15, 1935

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

GR No. 23237 NOVEMBER 14, 1925

(2) No. The denial of the said motion was proper.

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

offered him to dispose of the funds of the corporation.

G.R. No. 31163 NOVEMBER 6, 1929

ISSUE: Whether the provisions on preliminary attachment should be liberally construed.

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

GR No. L-82446 JULY 29,1988

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. L-35990 JUNE 17, 1981

HELD: NO, the writ of attachment was not properly issued.

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. L-29280 AUGUST 11, 1988

ISSUE: Whether the writ of attachment was properly issued.

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. Nos. 65957-58 JULY 5, 1994

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of attachment was proper.

The affidavit submitted by respondent Aboitiz states:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. L-37682 NOVEMBER 26, 1932

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. Nos. 79926-27 OCTOBER 17, 1991

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. 84034 DECEMBER 22, 1988

ALBERTO SIEVERT v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ARTEMON D. LUNA

RTC: The trial court denied the petitioner's objection.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW

G.R. No. 102448 AUGUST 5, 1992

ATTY. CARELL NARTATEZ-PENDATUN JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - LAW