Atty suspended for demanding bribes

DANTE LA JIMENEZ LOZANO v. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.
Adm. Case No. 8108July 15, 2014
Facts:
Brodett and Tecson, the “Alabang Boys”, were accused in cases filed by PDEA for Illegal
sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a joint resolution, the charges were dropped for lack of
probable cause.
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during
the evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up"
allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House Committee on
Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing
that respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.
The complainants Jimenez and Vizconde sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno. They stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had
thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no
authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of
the bar.
Atty. Verano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law
and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official,
even though the latter was not a government prosecutor.
The defense of the respondent is that the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges
against his clients for lack of probable cause ordered for the immediate release of his client and
that he believes in sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause that
prompted him to prepare and draft the release order. That if the secretary signs the papers then
everything may be expedited, and as it was without any sign it is a mere scrap of paper with no
effect at all.
The investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the
same or any similar action.
The IBP Board of Governors found the respondent liable for improper and inappropriate
conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of influence upon a public official.
Recommendation was adopted by the IBP.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Felisberto can be held administratively liable for the preparation of
the draft release order with stationery in order to expedite the release of his clients
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent is administratively liable. He violated Canon 13 of the CPR. We

believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of
BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON
influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice
sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.
Statements made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he

personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before
the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ
stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of "expediting the case."
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To
that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable,
fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of
the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an
attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short
of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist
that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTY of
violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately.
This also serves as an emphatic WARNING that repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.

FERNANDO W. CHU v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.
A.C. No. 10573 , January 13, 2015
Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle his company’s labor disputes. After a
decision was rendered adversely to Chu’s company, Atty. Guico asked Chu to prepare a
substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling his appeal to
insure a favourable decision. Chu delivered P300,000.00 to Atty. Guico, who then gave him a
copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favour of his company.
Atty. Guico told Chu to raise another P300,000 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to
issue the decision; however, Chu could only produce P280,000.00. Atty. Guico’s assistant
received said amount without issuance of a receipt. Chu followed up on the status of the case
but was told to wait. He was assured that should the NLRC Commissioner not accept the money,
Atty. Guico would return it.
The NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to Chu’s company, prompting Atty. Guico to file
for a motion of reconsideration and an appeal which were denied. Chu then terminated Atty.
Guico as his legal counsel and filed a disbarment complaint against him due to alleged gross
misconduct.
Atty. Guico denied Chu’s allegations. However, the IBP found that Atty. Guico had violated
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended three
years suspension.
ISSUE:
Whether Guico violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 , Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to guarantee a
favourable decision from the NLRC.
RULING:
YES. In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:
x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution

and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x delay no man for money or malice x
x x.
The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:.
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain
membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not render
any service or give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very laws that he was
bound to uphold and obey, for he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and
thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession. Verily, he or she must act and
comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the Legal Profession. Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her
privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the
large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated
the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually using said
illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his
own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant
breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for money or
malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the
faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In
doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave
misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment.” There is no question that any gross misconduct by an
attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others,
and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good
moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the
continuance of such privilege.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.

GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. His name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

MELVYN G. GARCIA vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457
February 3, 2015
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H.
Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were
consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
FACTS:
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the
time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35
years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and
Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against
him.
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for
disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law
despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the
facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the
practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of
the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the
same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the
phrase “with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued
that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the
term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral
turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith,
and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
RULING
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.
While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes
mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not
exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which
are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion
or exclusion as the cases are reached.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment. In this case, the executive clemency merely “commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbreno.
Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
liability. The penalty for Sesbreno’ s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or
reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final
Release and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the
law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbreno has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that
shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral character. 20 A violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty
against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.
Wherefore, Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.

ANTONINA S. SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA
A.C. No. 8776. March 22, 2015
FACTS: On July 28, 2006, Antonia Sosa extended a loan of P500,000.00 to Atty. Mendoza at an
interest of P25,000.00 to be paid not later than September 25, 2006. They agreed that a penalty
or collection charge of 10% per month shall accrue in case of default. To ensure the payment of
the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note and issued a postdated check for
P500,000.00.
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to pay, he
requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check. She acceded and deferred the deposit of
the check based on Atty. Mendoza’s promise that he would later pay. The check was
subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it sometime in October 2006;
it was “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.”
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Ms. Sosa, thru her lawyer Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera, sent a letter to Atty. Mendoza demanding
payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored the demand
letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. Likewise,
he did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay. In view of the
repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for disbarment or
suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. This Rule states that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.”
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Atty. Mendoza admitted the existence of the loan and that it is a valid obligation. However, he
alleged that he only received One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz
(Elenita), a friend of the complainant. Atty. Mendoza did not attach an affidavit from Elenita nor
any evidence proving that he only received P100,000.00.
IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION:

The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only administratively but also
civilly. The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner ruling that the respondent is guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a just and
valid debt thus, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6
months and Ordered to Return the amount of P500,000.00 to the complainant with legal interest.
ISSUES:

1) WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. MENDOZA SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE?
2) WHETHER THE COMPLAINANT CAN COLLECT THE AMOUNT OF THE OBLIGATION OF
THE LOAN IN A DISBARMENT CASE?
RULING:
1) YES.
“Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity is a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential
qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law. Any wrongdoing, whether
professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary
action.”
Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: “[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong conduct as the
failure to pay the loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error
in judgment.
It is undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of P500,000.00. He signed the
promissory note and acknowledgement receipt showing he received P500,000.00.19 Although he
initially denied getting this amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not
present any evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without
qualification as to the amount. Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the
amount due upon maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing
the postdated check upon Atty. Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he would
pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check – when
finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.
Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing with the IBP
Investigating Officer. He allegedly failed to deliver the amount to Ms. Sosa or her counsel
because he arrived late. The Court found that Atty. Mendoza’s excuse to be flimsy. It could have
been very easy for him to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had the real intention to pay.
Atty. Mendoza was also not candid with the IBP Investigating Officer when he claimed he had
P600,000.00 and that he was ready to pay his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation
remains outstanding after all these years.
Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his obligation,
Atty. Mendoza also failed to explain why he failed to pay despite his admission of a just and valid
loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may be, dire financial condition does not justify non-
payment of debt.
The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza’s failure to live up to his
duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only his personal integrity but his
profession as well. To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and
deceitful conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty. Mendoza’s act of interjecting
flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and just debt
2) No.
The SC differ with the IBP’s recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the
loan plus legal interest because the instant case is solely an administrative complaint for
disbarment and is not a civil action for collection of a sum of money.

The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases alone prevents the court from agreeing
with the IBP’s order to pay; the administrative complaint only requires substantial evidence to
justify a finding of liability, while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of
preponderance of evidence.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare. In the recent case of Heenan v. Atty. Espejo (A.C. No. 10050, December 3,
2013, 711 SCRA 290), The SC En Banc did not agree with the IBP’s recommendation to order the
erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from the complainant, to wit:
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination
of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial
action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money
that should be returned to the complainant.
DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ vs .ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG

AC 5816 MARCH 10, 2015
FACTS:
Dr Perez and Atty Catindig had a relationship while Atty. Catindig’s marriage with Lily
Gomez still subsists. Both have been friends during the mid 1960s, lost contact and after 23
years, they meet again. It was all the while known to Dr. Perez that Atty. Catindig is still married
however, Atty Catindig claims that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant and he
don’t want her to make any scandal about the pregnancy. Atty. Catindig and Gomez agreed to
have their divorce and it took place at Dominican Republic. Thereafter, after securing the Divorce
Decree and confirming with Dr. Perez that it was lawful, they exchanged their vows in the US and
they begot 1 child. Years passed and Dr. Perez learned that the status of her marriage with Atty
Catindig remains invalid because Philippine Law does not recognize the divorce decree obtained
from Dominican Republic. Atty Catindig made promises with Dr Perez that he will legalize their
unions but eventually there were sudden change of events. Their relationship turned sour and
Dr. Perez found out that Atty Catindig is having an affair with a certain Atty. Baydo who was also
employed in his law firm. Soon after, Atty Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and made promise to
Atty Baydo that he will marry her. Atty Baydo on the other hand, denied their steaming affair.
The case was referred to the IBP for investigation. The IBP investigating commissioner
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR. The IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation of
the IBP Investigating Commissioner. Atty. Catindig, claiming that the Investigating
Commissioner relied only on Dr. Perez allegations and not substantiated with factual pieces of
evidence. Moreover, he claims that he never concealed his marriage to anyone and he had been
transparent to Gomez and Dr. Perez. The IBP-BOG denied the motion.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Catindig committed gross immorality that would warrant disbarment?
RULING:
Yes. The court affirmed the recommendations of the IBP.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
The act must not only be immoral but it must be gross to warrant disbarment. In the case
at bar, Atty. Catindig’s marriage with Dr. Perez while his marriage with Gomez still subsists
manifest a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, which is protected
by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT

the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the
Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
PO1 JOSE CASPE vs. ATTY. AQUILINO MEJICA

A.C. No. 10679 March 10, 2015
FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by PO1 Jose B. Caspe against Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica for
alleged violation of Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) specifically Rules 1.03, 1.04, and
10.01.
Petitioner’s Contention:
Caspe alleged the controversy started when Atty. Mejica disregarded conflict of interest rules.
Caspe said that when he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Antonio Rodriguez, Jr.,
Atty. Mejica served as Caspe’s counsel. When Rodriguez, Jr. filed his counter-affidavit, it was
Atty. Mejica who counseled and represented him.
Caspe brought separate suits for damages and disbarment: one for conflict of interest and the
present complaint. Atty. Mejica tried to negotiate a settlement but Caspe refused. Atty. Mejica
allegedly then threatened Caspe that “he will help file cases after cases against the complainant
until he kneels before [him]. He will ‘put down’ complainant so much so that he will be removed
from the service.” From then on, Caspe alleged, Atty. Mejica maliciously encouraged the filing of
suits against him.
In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Romulo Gaduena, a
barangay tanod, harassed Jan Mark Busa and Marcelino Jataas with a gun. Caspe, who was on
duty, together with PO1 Onofre Lopeña responded. They recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver
which was turned over to the Can-avid Police station. The incident was recorded in the police
blotter. Gaduena evaded arrest with the help of barangay captain Prudencio Agda and other
barangay tanods who allegedly clobbered Caspe and took his gun. In the interest of peace and
harmony, the Chief of Police called and requested that Caspe desist from filing charges against
the barangay captain and tanods, specifically Gaduena. Caspe acceded.
However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint for serious slander by deed
against Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit of two barangay tanods. It was alleged
that Caspe kicked, collared and slapped Gaduena’s face. This prompted Caspe to disregard the
agreement with the Chief of Police and he filed cases against the tanods. Suspecting that Atty.
Mejica encouraged Gaduena to file the case against him, Caspe filed the cases for damages and
disbarment against Atty. Mejica before the IBP.
Atty. Mejica failed to appear at the Mandatory Conference. He filed manifestation that he never
received a copy of the complaints against him. He asked that the hearing be postponed and
rescheduled and that copies of the complaint be furnished to him. The hearing was thus
rescheduled to January 13, 2009 and a copy of the complaint was sent to him via a private
courier, LBC. It appeared however that he did not claim the mail.
On December 9, 2008, Atty. Mejica once more manifested that he did not receive any notice
from LBC of any mail to be claimed. He also expressed misgivings on the shift from registered
mail to the use of a private courier to send copies of the complaint. He requested that a copy of
the complaint be sent to him via registered mail.
Atty. Mejica failed to appear in the January 13, 2009 hearing. Again, Atty. Mejica failed to appear
for the February 3, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD ordered the case submitted for decision.
Respondent’s Contention:
Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that he received a Notice
of Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did not appear since he did not receive a
copy of the complaint and was not ordered to answer. For the scheduled February 3, 2009
Conference, Atty. Mejica reasoned that it was impossible for him to attend the meeting since he
received the Notice in the afternoon of February 3, 2009.33 Furthermore, he was not given the
opportunity to answer. Atty. Mejica also maintained that he never threatened Caspe because he
was not present during the preliminary conference where he allegedly uttered the threatening
words.
IBP Ruling and Recommendation:

The IBP CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR. It stated
that Atty. Mejica was corruptly motivated in encouraging the filing of suits against Caspe making
good his threat to file case upon case against the latter until he kneels before him. Notice was
taken that this was Atty. Mejica’s second infraction for a similar offense. In Baldado v. Mejica, he
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months. The IBP CBD thus
recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
The IBP BOG adopted the Report and Recommendation of the IBP CBD.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable?
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Mejica further violated Canon 1145 of the CPR which calls for a lawyer to observe and
give due respect to courts and judicial officers.
The Supreme Court adopts the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.
The IBP CBD concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the cases
against PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. The High Court agrees that the confluence of
circumstances points to Atty. Mejica’s corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing cases against
Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.
With respect to Atty. Mejica’s claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e., he was not able to
receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason for him not to have attended the
mandatory conference, This contention is untenable.
Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of
the Philippines provides that:
SEC. 5. Non-appearance of Parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings. a) Non-appearance

at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall be deemed a waiver of
right to participate in the proceeding. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted.
Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating
Commissioner.
Atty. Mejica during the course of these proceedings has missed all four scheduled hearings
supposedly since he was not furnished any copy of the complaint. Records suggest however that
a copy of the complaint was sent to him on August 25, 2008, a mail which he did not claim. He
submitted two manifestations in response to notices he received. He was thus placed on notice
that there was an action against him.
It is the Court’s opinion that Atty. Mejica’s attitude toward the proceedings before the IBP
indicates a lack of respect for the IBP’s rules and procedures. Respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica
is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES v. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ
AC. No. 10134, 2014-11-26
FACTS:
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was
submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention in
Iloilo City[2]; that during the
12th convention, an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of
National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March
31, 2007, the outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution
No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of P30,000.00 as term-end bonus for each PACE official
qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th convention; that
there was no turn over of monies... belonging to the association as a matter of procedure despite
a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;[3] and that the new set of PACE
officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president,... Rosita D. Amizola; and past
treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao
and Iloilo conventions.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez
recommended the dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz offered
documentary evidence to show that she was able to submit the liquidation reports for the two...
aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that Atty. Rafael herself acknowledged
the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao City convention.
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, and
dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz.
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,[16] dated June 21, 2013,
granting the complainant's motion for reconsideration. It reversed and set aside its earlier
resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for one (1) year.
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz' liquidation of PACE
funds; (ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii) her
entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer working in the Judiciary,
constituted... a "triple - whammy" of questionable actions committed by Atty. Diaz in
contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
RULING:
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution.
Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good
moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers
must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their...
clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession
which society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he
or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its demand for
integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are always expected to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission...
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of this noble profession.
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election,
including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of
candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval... or
passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including herself even though she
was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There
was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon

1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

PAULINO LIM v. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA
A.C. No. 12156, June 20, 2018
FACTS
Complainant alleged that he met respondent sometime in June 2014 in the hallway of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then inquiring about
the status of a case. The two (2) became acquainted after striking a conversation with each
other. The following month, or in July 2014, respondent borrowed from complainant the amount
of P75,000.00, which the former needed immediately. Complainant did not think twice in lending
money to respondent and issuing in his favor BDO Check No. 0356555 dated July 3, 2014 for
P75,000.00, especially since the latter issued a guarantee check (Union Bank Check No.
0003405780 dated July 19, 2014) to ensure payment of the loan. Subsequently, respondent
made several other loans in the amounts of P150,000.00, P10,000.00, and another P10,000.00,
for which he no longer issued any guarantee checks. Complainant claimed to have been taken by
respondent's sweet talk and promises of payment considering the millions he expects to receive
as contingent fee in one (1) of his cases.
However, when complainant deposited Union Bank Check No. 0003405780, it was
dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would not take or return
complainant's calls nor respond to the latter's text messages. He completely avoided
complainant. Consequently, complainant's lawyer wrote a demand letter dated October 15, 2014
for the payment of respondent's indebtedness in the aggregate amount of P245,000.00, but to
no avail. Thus, complainant was constrained to file an administrative case before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In an Order dated April 17, 2015, the IBP directed respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of said Order, failing which the case
shall be heard ex parte. However, respondent filed no answer. Subsequently, a Notice of
Mandatory Conference/ Hearing scheduled on November 13, 2015 was sent to respondent on
October 20, 2015, during which the latter did not appear.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[14] dated November 14, 2016, the IBP Investigating

Commissioner (IC) found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that
he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and be ordered
to return to complainant the amount of P75,000.00 with legal interest reckoned from July 19,
2014.[15] The other loans alleged by complainant were not duly proven. [16]
The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires that "a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Citing the case of Foronda v.
Alvarez, Jr., the IBP IC held that the issuance of a check that was later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him and hence, constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.The penalty of one (1)-
year suspension from the practice of law was based on the case of Lao v. Medel, where the Court
meted the same penalty for gross misconduct committed by deliberately failing to pay just debts
and issuing worthless checks.
ISSUES
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for the issuance of a worthless check in violation of the CPR.
RULING:
After a judicious perusal of the records showing the existence of the loan obligation
incurred by respondent as evidenced by complainant's BDO Check No. 0356555 dated July 3,
2014, as well as Union Bank Check No. 0003405780 dated July 19, 2014 issued by respondent to
guarantee the payment of said loan but which was dishonored upon presentment for the reason
"Account Closed," the Court concurs with the findings and adopts the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors, except for the return to complainant of the amount of P75,000.00 with legal
interest.
The Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross misconduct
that a lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private capacity.
Good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law.
Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the
profession justifies disciplinary action, as in this case.
It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from complainant for which he issued a
post-dated check that was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his obligation despite
repeated demands. It has been consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay just
debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so
that the peoples' faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that
reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility." Thus, the IBP IC correctly ruled that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check
was a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which explicitly states:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's Oath, and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year to commence immediately from
the receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.
LEAH B. TADAY v. ATTY. DIONISIO B. APOYA, JR.

A.C. 11981, July 03, 2018
FACTS:
Complainant Leah Taday, an OFW in Norway asked her parents who were then living in the
Philippines to seek legal services for the nullification of her marriage. Her parents contracted the
legal services of herein respondent.
The respondent was informed that the complainantis living abroad but assured them that he
can find ways to push for the resolution of the casedespite her absence.Respondent drafted
the Petition for annulment, notarized it and sent it to the RTC. Whilepetitioner was on a vacation
on the Philippines she payed the respondent and a decision was delivered granting the
annulment. Complainant was suspicious as the decision came from a different branch presided
by a different judge where the case was originally filed.
Complainant’s family became skeptical as the said decision seemed to come to soon and was

poorly crafted. They did discovered that the court which rendered the decision did not exist.
Respondent denied delivering any decision relative to the annulment case of complainant. He
asserted that the said decision was only a product of her imagination. Respondent likewise
denied that he filed an urgent motion to withdraw the petition in the RTC, Branch 131. He
claimed that he merely drafted the said motion and gave it to complainant’s parents but he
never signed it.
Then, after the parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was submitted for
decision. The IBP recommended that was guilty for violation of the code of professional
responsibility. Respondent filed a motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Then a second
motion for reconsideration which was also denied
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
RULING:
YES. The Court finds that complainant has established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence that: (1) respondent notarized the verification and certification of non forum shopping
of the petition without the personal presence of complainant; (2) respondent is the author of the
fake decision to deceive complainant that her petition for annulment of marriage was granted;
and (3) respondent retaliated against complainant for confronting him with the fake decision by
withdrawing the petition in the court, resulting into the dropping of the case from the civil docket
of the court. These acts constitute violations of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code, to
wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
Respondent also violated Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which states
that:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
In this case, respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct, and
lessened the confidence of the public in the legal system. Instead of being an advocate of justice,
he became a perpetrator of injustice. His reprehensible acts do not merit him to remain in the
rolls of the legal profession. Thus, the ultimate penalty of disbarment must be imposed upon
him.
WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors and finds Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
HDI HOLDINGS v. ATTY. EMMANUEL CRUZ

A.C. No. 11724 (Formerly CBD No. 14-4109), July 31, 2018
FACTS:
HDI retained the services of Atty. Cruz as its in-house corporate counsel and corporate secretary.
HDI’s directors and officers were pleased with Atty. Cruz’s performance, thus, in time, he earned
their trust and confidence that he was eventually tasked to handle the corporation’s important
and confidential matters.
However, HDI averred that through Atty. Cruz’s deception and machinations, he managed to
misappropriate a total of Forty-One Million Three Hundred Seventeen Thousand One Hundred
Sixty-Seven and Eighteen Centavos (P41,317,167.18).
Atty. Cruz converted the money that belonged to HDI for his personal use.
However, even after several demand letters, Atty. Cruz failed to return the misappropriated
money.
HDI alleged that Atty. Cruz failed to live up to the standards expected of a lawyer, thus, he
should be disbarred from the practice of law.
The IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that Atty. Cruz be disbarred from
the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Cruz is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct.
RULING:
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of

evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge. Preponderance of evidence means
that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than
that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
compared to the presented contrary evidence.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Good moral character is necessary for a lawyer to practice the profession. An attorney is
expected not only to be professionally competent, but to also have moral integrity. 34 Deceit and
lack of accountability and integrity reflect on his ability to perform his functions as a lawyer, who
is always expected to act and appear to act lawfully and honestly, and must uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. Atty. Cruz failed in these respects as a lawyer.
In the instant case, considering all the above-cited infractions, it is beyond dispute that Atty.
Cruz is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose as in cash for
biddings and purchase of properties, as in this case, he should promptly account to the client
how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize constitutes a blatant disregard
of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Cruz’s failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by the client.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL CRUZ, guilty of

gross misconduct by violating the Canon of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct, and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name stricken off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
OLIVER FABUGAIS v. ATTY. BERARDO C. FAUNDO JR.

A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018
FACTS:
Oliver Fabugais filed a complaint against Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. for gross misconduct
and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for having allegedly engaged in illicit and immoral relations
with his wife, Annaliza Lizel B. Fabugais.
It was alleged that then 10-year old girl Marie Nicole Fabugais, daughter of Oliver, saw
Atty Faundo (whom Marie Nicole call as “Tito Attorney”) in the same bed with her and her
mother, Annaliza, and that she saw the lawyer embracing her mother while they were sleeping
during their stay at his house.

Marie Nicole further recounted that the next morning, while she was watching television
along with her mother, Ate Mimi and Ate Ada, Atty. Faundo who just had a shower, and clad only
in a towel or “tapis,” suddenly entered the room; that she (Marie Nicole) along with her Ate Mimi
and her Ate Ada, were told to step outside the room, while her mother and Atty. Faundo
remained inside the room.
Atty. Faundo denied that he had had any immoral relations with Annaliza. He insisted that
he was incapable of committing the misconduct imputed to him for three simple reasons to wit:
because he is a good father to his three children, because he is a respected civic leader, and
because he had never been the subject even of a complaint with the police. He claimed that
complainant tiled the instant complaint simply “to harass him from practicing his legitimate
profession, and for no other reason.”
IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa found Atty. Faundo guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-Board of Governors, in its Resolution, adopted and approved the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Meanwhile, complaint’s counsel Atty. Mario Frez filed a Notice, Manifestation, and Motion
for Withdrawal from this case, stating that complaint had passed away.
ISSUES:
A) Whether the case will still proceed despite the death of death of the complainant.
B) Did Atty. Faundo in fact commit acts that are grossly immoral, or acts that amount to serious
moral
depravity, that would warrant or call for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law?
C) Whether Atty. Faundo should be held administratively liable.
RULING:
A) It bears stressing that this case can proceed in spite of complainant’s death and the
apparent lack of interest on the part of complainant’s heirs. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis in nature: they are intended and undertaken primarily to look into
the conduct or behavior of lawyers, to determine whether they are still fit to exercise the
privileges of the legal profession, and to hold them accountable for any misconduct or
misbehavior which deviates from the mandated norms and standards of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, all of which are needful and necessary to the preservation of the integrity of the
legal profession.
B) Going by the eyewitness testimony of complainant’s daughter Marie Nicole, raw or explicit
sexual immorality between Atty. Faundo and complainant’s wife was not established as a
matter of fact.
“Immoral conduct” has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as
to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. This
Court has held that for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly
immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”

It is not easy to stale with accuracy what constitutes “grossly immoral conduct,” let alone
what constitutes the moral delinquency and obliquity that renders a lawyer unfit or unworthy to
continue as a member of the bar in good standing.
C) Yes. It can in no wise or manner be argued that Atty. Faundo’s behavior was par for the
course for members or the legal profession. Lawyers are mandated to do honor to the bar at all
times and to help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession under all
circumstances. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 of the Code or Professional Responsibility further provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life.
As officers of the court, lawyers must in fact and in truth be of good moral character. They
must moreover also be seen or appear to be of good moral character; and be seen or appear to –
live a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
The acts complained or in this case might not be grossly or starkly immoral in its rawness
or coarseness, but they were without doubt condemnable. Atty. Faundo who made avowals to
being a respectable father to three children, and also to being a respected leader of his
community apparently had no qualms or scruples about being seen sleeping in his own bed with
another man’s wife, his arms entwined in tender embrace with the latter. Atty. Faundo’s claim
that he was inspired by nothing but the best of intentions in inviting another married man’s wife
and her 10-ycar old daughter to sleep with him in the same bed so that the three of them could
enjoy a good night’s rest in his air conditioned chamber, reeks with racy, ribald humor.
And in aggravation of the aforementioned unseemly behavior, Atty. Faundo apparently

experienced neither qualms nor scruples at all about exploding into the room occupied by n
married man’s wife and her 10-year old daughter and their two other women companions clad
with nothing else but a “tapis” or a towel. His scanty trappings gave him no license to intrude
into a small room full of women. Atty. Faundo could have simply asked everyone in the room to
step outside for a little while. Or he could have donned his clothing elsewhere. But these things
seemed to have been totally lost to Atty. Faundo’s density. Indeed, Atty. Faundo seemed to have
forgotten that there are rules other men – decent men, – live by.
Atty. Faundo’s defense that he was a “respectable father with three children” and that he
was “respected civic leader” to boot, flies in the face of a young girl’s perception of his
diminished deportment. It does not escape this Court’s attention that the 10-year old Marie
Nicole called Atty. Faundo “Tito Attorney.” Indeed, by calling Atty. Faundo as “Tito Attorney”
Marie Nicole effectively proclaimed her avuncular affection for him, plus her recognition of his
being a member of the legal profession. We believe that Marie Nicole must have been a bit
disappointed with what she saw and observed about the manners, predilections and propensities
of her ”Tito Attorney.” In fact, a close examine of Marie Nicole’s testimony cannot fail to show
that in Marie Nicole’s young mind, it was clearly not right, appropriate or proper for her “Tito
Attorney” to be sharing the same bed with her and her· mother, and for her mother to remain
alone in the same room with her “Tito Attorney,” while this “Tito Attorney” was dressing up. In all
these happenings, a modicum of decency should have impelled this “Tito Attorney” to behave
more discreetly mid more sensitively, as he could not have been unaware that Marie Nicole was
observing him closely and that she could be forming her impressions of lawyers and the legal
profession by the actions and the behavior of this, her “Tito Attorney.”
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Faundo Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, reckoned from receipt of a
copy of this Decision. He is hereby WARNED to be more careful and more circumspect in all his
actions, and to be mindful of the kind of example he holds up, especially to impressionable
young people, lest he brings upon himself a direr fate the second time around.”
JILDO A. GUBATON v. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR

A.C. No. 8962, July 09, 2018
FACTS
Complainant alleged that respondent, a former Assistant Prosecutor at the City
Prosecutor's Office in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, was having an illicit romantic relationship with
his wife, Ma. Bernadette R. Tenorio-Gubaton (Bernadette), since 2005 up to the present.

He averred that it was in the early part of 2008, while working in the United States of
America (USA), when he discovered the illicit relationship. Complainant and Bernadette's house
helper informed him through a phone call that a man whom she knows to be "Fiscal Amador"
often visits Bernadette. The house helper also told him that respondent spends nights at their
house and stays with Bernadette in their bedroom. When complainant called Bernadette's dental
clinic to verify the information, it was the secretary who took his call. Upon inquiry, the latter
confirmed that respondent and Bernadette have been carrying on an illicit affair.
Sometime in August 2009, complainant returned to the country. On his first night home,
despite his pleas, Bernadette refused to lie and sleep with him; instead, she demanded that he
sleep in another room, to which he acceded in order to avoid any argument. Since then,
Bernadette has refused to sleep with him. Further, complainant discovered some birth-control
pills and condoms in their house, in Bernadette's dental clinic, and in her handbag. When he
confronted her about it, she merely denied ownership thereof. He also alleged that Bernadette
wrote love letters/notes to respondent, as in fact, one of these letters had the word "fiscal" on it.
Complainant likewise alleged that he personally saw respondent and Bernadette together
in various places in Malaybalay City. At one instance, he saw them kissing while inside a vehicle;
when he approached to confront them, respondent ran away.
The illicit affair of respondent and Bernadette was known to other people as well.
Complainant's sister, Nila Canoy, told him about it during phone calls while he was still in the
USA, as narrated in her affidavit. Likewise, Carlos Delgado (Delgado), Chief of Barangay Public
Safety Office in Poblacion, Malaybalay City, and one Edgar Navarez (Navarez), an employee of
the Bureau of lnternal Revenue (BIR) and a resident of Casisang, Malaybalay City, knew of the
affair and executed their respective affidavits relative thereto.
In defense, respondent denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that he was
merely acquainted with Bernadette and they would only see each other on various occasions and
social gatherings. He also denied the incident where complainant allegedly saw him and
Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not substantial evidence exist to hold respondent administratively for gross
immorality.
RULING
The Court concurs with the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent
should be held administratively liable with modification, however, as regards the penalty to be
imposed.
It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise.
In this case, substantial evidence exists to prove complainant's claim that respondent had
illicit affairs with Bernadette and hence, should be adjudged guilty of gross immorality.
Complainant's statements were corroborated by the affidavit executed by Navarez, who works in
BIR, Malaybalay City as a messenger and therefore, goes around the city in relation to his work.
Navarez categorically stated that respondent and Bernadette have been carrying on an illicit
affair while complainant was in the USA, and further averred that he had seen them together on
different intimate occasions. He even saw them kissing each other at one instance. 23 Notably, it
must be highlighted that Navarez is a neutral and disinterested witness and hence, his
declarations deserve ample consideration.
Moreover, complainant's sister, Nila, described to complainant, while the latter was in the USA,
how respondent would often visit Bernadette and spend the night in their residence, while she
was still living with Bernadette and their children thereat, the two would often have lunch in the
house and thereafter, respondent would even spend some time with Bernadette inside the
latter's bedroom. Nila likewise recounted that whenever the two of them arrived home in one
vehicle, they would kiss each other before alighting therefrom.
In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out that complainant offered in evidence love
letters/notes supposedly written by Bernadette to respondent to prove the existence of their
illicit relationship. The authenticity of these love letters/notes, although not expressly shown to
be written by Bernadette or received by respondent, were not refuted. Consequently, they lend
credibility to complainant's claim.
Finally, it should be clarified that while the information supplied by complainant and Bernadette's
house helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary about the alleged illicit affair constitute hearsay,
the same should not be completely disregarded. Under the doctrine of independently relevant
statements, only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity
thereof is immaterial. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is
circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.
Based on jurisprudence, extramarital affairs of lawyers are regarded as offensive to the sanctity
of marriage, the family, and the community. When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships
that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension
from the practice of law, if not disbarment. This is because possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment,
depending on the circumstances of the case. In case of suspension, the period would range from
one year to indefinite suspension. Under the given circumstances, the Court sees fit to impose on
respondent a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty of gross immorality.

Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JANICE MONTERO
vs. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK
A.C. NO. 11385, March 14, 2017
FACTS:
Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land located in
Ortigas Avenue Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-126797
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal (property).
The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2012, Atty. Tumulak,
accompanied by uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered
and took control of the entrance and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the incident,
Atty. Tumulak had furnished several documents to the complainant, including the deed of
assignment executed by one Henry F. Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late
Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez designating Atty. Tumulak as an assignee. The documents
furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to the intestate proceedings of the Estate of the late
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34,
in Iriga City (RTC), which involved the claim of the heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez
to several parcels of land situated all over the country, including the Provinces of Rizal, Quezon,
and Bulacan, and Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, Antipolo City, Muntinlupa City,
Parañaque City, Marikina City, Baguio City, Angeles City, San Fernando City and Tagaytay City.
The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to
have coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible intrusion.
[3]
The complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his
principal in the property was barred by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title
under its name. Accordingly, his conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving
of sanction.
Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards of Nationwide
Security Agency entered the complainant's property. He insists that the allegations against him
were pure hearsay because Ms. Montero, the representative of the complainant, had no personal
knowledge of the incident; that the documents he had furnished to the complainant included
records of the intestate proceedings in the RTC involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez; that he had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did
not himself enter the property; and that the entry into the property was effected by the sheriff
pursuant to a writ of execution.
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Atty.
Tumulak to have violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty. Tumulak from the
practice of law for two years.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and
the entry into the complainant's property?
RULING:
Atty. Tumulak deserves to be severely sanctioned for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish
a) title can no longer be cited as legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February
1976 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892;

Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to the Bar in 1971), is presumed

to know that the Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically addressing
the fake titles arising from spurious "Deed of Assignment" of the supposed Estate
of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the 2005 case of Evangelista, et al. vs.
b) Santiago [G.R. No. 157447; April 29, 2005] where the same modus as the one
adopted by respondent lawyer, was used by an "assignee" in claiming properties
located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Cavitc, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig,
Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal, allegedly
as part of the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;

We find respondent's actions highly questionable and contrary to legal protocol; (i) the court
documents were issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it "affects" a property located in
Pasig City; (iii) respondent lawyer became the "assignee" of a Pasig City property; (iv) no
taxes were paid for the "assignment"; (v) assistance of the Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted
by respondent, instead, he enlists the help of the Sheriff of Manila; (vi) all that the Sheriff of
Manila did was to deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34 court documents to complainant but with a
twist; the Sheriff and respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx of security guards; (vii)
the uniformed guards, obviously upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the gates of
OPDC offices with attendant force and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's claimed innocence
cannot prevail over these illegalities of which he, or his agents, had a hand.
With the above highly questionable acts totally irreconcilable with a seasoned practitioner
like respondent lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for violation of Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof.
Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion
into the property just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at
the time. In fact, such physical participation was not even necessary in order to properly
implicate him in personal responsibility for the intrusion after he admitted having furnished to
the complainant the deed of assignment and other documents as the source of his authority.
Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since the time of the
execution of the deed of assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that he had been in charge
of doing all the actions necessary to enforce the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010,
and that the forcible intrusion complained about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than
two years from the execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably
presumed to have coordinated all the actions leading to the intrusion.
Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was valid and enforceable, Atty.

Tumulak could not legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest of the assignor.
The more appropriate action for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title
instead of forcibly entering the property with the aid of armed security personnel.
Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding
settled rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed his
Lawyer's Oath "to support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law, and to
avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal deference to the law not
only speaks of his or her commendable character but also inspires in the public a becoming
respect and obedience to the law.[15]
The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility to respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition
for retaining membership in the Legal Profession. The lawyer must act and comport himself or
herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal
Profession.[16] Members of the Bar are reminded, therefore, that their first duty is to comply with
the rules of procedure, rather than to seek exceptions as loopholes. [17] A lawyer who assists a
client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act that warrants
disciplinary action against him or her.
The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of a lawyer is justified if he or she
proves unworthy of the trust and confidence imposed by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found
to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the
performance of their professional duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S.

TUMULAK guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of TWO(2) YEARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with the STERN WARNING that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS vs ATTY. JAIME S. LINSANGAN
A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017
FACTS:
The parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntilupa City and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 139061 with an area of 12,331 square meters was previously owned by the
Spouses Felix and Felipa Carlos. Their son, Teofilo Carlos (Teofilo), convinced them to transfer
said title to his name with a promise to distribute the same to his brothers and sisters. Teofilo
delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the title to his brother, Juan. However, Teofilo sold the
entire property to Pedro Balbanero (Pedro). Pedro, however, failed to pay the agreed installment
payments.
Atty. Linsangan acted as counsel for their late father in several cases, one of which
involving the recovery of a parcel of land. Complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan forced them
to sign pleadings and documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City in cahoots
with complainants' estranged mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he divided his
share in the subject property as his supposed attorney's fees to his wife and children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating his lawyer's oath.
RULING:
After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court finds that respondent committed
acts in violation of his oath as an attorney thereby warranting the Court's exercise of its
disciplinary power.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. Whether or not a lawyer is still entitled to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold
a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. The avowed purpose of
suspending or disbarring an attorney is not to punish the lawyer, but to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those
charged with the administration of justice. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and its
violation is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
These acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code which forbids
lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of
litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of the old
Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that " the lawyer should not purchase any interests in
the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," is no longer reproduced in the new
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription still applies considering that Canon I
of the CPR is clear in requiring that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" and Rule 138, Sec. 3 which
requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein." Here, the law transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is
Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, in violation of his lawyer's oath.
Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely waiving portions of the subject property in favor of
his wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with persons who are not licensed to
practice law in contravention of Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR.
Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his act of selling the entire 12,331
square meters property and making it appear that he was specifically authorized to do so by
complainants as well as by the other persons to whom portions of the property had been
previously adjudicated. However, a perusal of the supposed Special Power of Attorney attached
to the Deed of Absolute Sale, save for that executed by his wife and children, only authorizes
Atty. Linsangan to represent complainants in the litigation of cases involving Juan's properties.
Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney authorizes Atty. Linsangan to sell the entire property
including complainants' undivided share therein.
Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the downpayment for the property
from Helen. Atty. Linsangan does not also deny failing to give complainants' share for the reason
that he applied said payment as his share in the property. In so doing, Atty. Linsangan
determined all by himself that the downpayment accrues to him and immediately appropriated
the same, without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. Such act constitutes a breach
of his client's trust and a violation of Canon 16 of the CPR. Indeed, a lawyer is not entitled to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him
attorney’s fees. The failure of an attorney to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to
the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of
the general morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money
belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
The relationship of attorney and client has consistently been treated as one of special
trust and confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost good faith and fairness in all
his relationship with his client. Measured against this standard, respondent's act clearly fell short
and had, in fact, placed his personal interest above that of his clients. Considering the foregoing
violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon
16 of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon respondent the penalty of six (6)
months suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's oath,
Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) months
effective from the date of his receipt of this Decision. Let copies of this Decision be circulated to
all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of
Atty. Linsangan.

RONALDO C. FACTURAN vs. PROSECUTOR ALFREDO L. BARCELONA, JR.
A.C. No. 11069, June 08, 2016
FACTS
Complainant alleged that on June 4, 2004, he filed a complaint for qualified theft against
Pilar Mendoza (Mendoza), Jose Sarcon @ Jo (Sarcon), Elezar Barcelona (Elezar), Rodrigo Arro
(Arro), and Joseph Montero (Montero; collectively, Mendoza, et al.) before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Alabel, Sarangani Province. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-211 and
assigned for preliminary investigation to Prosecutor Faisal D. Amerkhan (Prosecutor Amerkhan).
On October 26, 2004, Prosecutor Amerkhan forwarded the records of the case, together
with his Resolution recommending the prosecution of Mendoza, et al. and the corresponding
Information, to respondent for his approval and signature. However, respondent neither
approved nor signed the resolution. Instead, he removed the case records from the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor and brought them to his residence, where they were kept in his custody. It
appears that the respondents in I.S. No. 04-211 were personally known to respondent, as Elezar
is his cousin, while Mendoza, Sarcon, Arro, and Montero are his close friends.
Aggrieved, complainant sought the intervention of then Department of Justice (DOJ)

Secretary Raul Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales), who, through then Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño (Chief State Prosecutor Zuño), endorsed complainant's concerns to State
Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote (State Prosecutor Pinote). Unfortunately, State Prosecutor Pinote
could not take appropriate action on I.S. No. 04-211 as the case records were still in the
possession of respondent who failed to turn them over despite the directive to do so.
In his defense, respondent claimed that the "alleged malicious 'delaying' or the perceived
concealment of the case record[s] was neither intentional nor due to favoritism," as he had
inhibited himself from I.S. No. 04-211, which was the reason why this case was assigned to
Prosecutor Amerkhan
The IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report dated March 20, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP,
through Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid), found respondent to
have violated Canons 18 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period ranging from six (6)
months to two (2) years upon the discretion of the IBP Governing Board.
ISSUE
Whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable.
RULING
The Court concurs with the IBP's factual findings and recommendation to hold respondent
administratively liable, but not for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, but instead, of Rule
6.02, Canon 6 of the same Code. The pertinent rules provide:
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE

DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined
by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer.[31] In this regard, Rule 6.02 above-quoted is particularly directed to lawyers in
the government service, enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public
duties.
WHEREFORE, respondent Prosecutor Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating

Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

RE: CA-G.R. CV NO. 96282 (SPOUSES BAYANI AND MYRNA M. PARTOZA VS. LILIAN* B.
MONTANO AND AMELIA SOLOMON) v. ATTY. CLARO JORDAN M. SANTAMARIA
A.C. No. 11173 (Formerly CBD No. 13-3968), June 11, 2018
FACTS
A civil action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, Reconveyance of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-710729 and Damages [2] was filed by the spouses Bayani and
Myrna M. Partoza (spouses Partoza) against Lilia B. Montano and Amelia T. Solomon.
The case was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court.
On November 25, 2010, a Notice of Appeal was filed by the counsel on record, Atty.
Samson D. Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva). The appeal was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 96282 and
in a Notice dated March 25, 2011, the CA required the submission of the Appellant's Brief
pursuant to Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
On April 27, 2011, however, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal of Appearance;
subsequently, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant's Brief dated May 19, 2011, was
also filed. Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of Appearance carried the conformity of the appellant's
attorney-in-fact, Honnie M. Partoza (Honnie) who, on the same occasion, also acknowledged
receipt of the entire records of the case from Atty. Villanueva.
Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria (respondent) submitted an

Appellant's Brief dated July 4, 2011.
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2011, the CA directed Atty. Villanueva to submit proof of

authority of Honnie to represent appellants as their attorney-in-fact and the latter's conformity to
Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of Appearance; in the san1e resolution, the CA also required
respondent to submit his formal Entry of Appearance, viz. :
CA G.R. CV No. Sps. BAYANI P. PARTOZA and MYRNA M. PARTOZA vs. LILIA B. MONTANO and
96282 AMELIA T. SOLOMON

Before acting on the counsel for appellant's Withdrawal of Appearance, [Atty. Villanueva]
is directed to submit within five (5) days from notice the proof of authority of Honnie M. Partoza
to represent the appellants and to signify his conformity to the Withdrawal of Appearance. In the
meantime, the Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellants' Brief is granted in the interest of
justice.
Respondent is directed to submit within five (5) days from notice his formal Entry of
Appearance as counsel for appellants and to secure and submit to this Court also within the
same period the written conformity of his clients to his appearance as their counsel. Likewise,
said counsel is also directed to furnish this Court the assailed RTC Decision that should have
been appended to the Appellant's Brief also within the same period.
Atty. Villanueva then filed a Manifestation with Motion dated August 31, 2011 explaining
that he communicated with Ronnie and with appellants as well, but was informed that appellants
were residing abroad (in Germany at the time). He then requested for a period of 15 days, or
until September 15, 2011, to comply with the CA's Resolution.
On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution granting the Manifestation and Motion filed
by Atty. Villanueva, and ordered the latter to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why he
should not be cited in contempt for his failure to comply with the CA's Resolution of August 4,
2011; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by respondent should not be expunged from the rollo of
the case and the appeal dismissed for his failure to comply with the August 4, 2011 Resolution.
On September 5, 2012 the CA, in another Resolution, [11] declared that: 1) as shown by the
Registry Return Receipt dated April 4, 2012, respondent received the copy of its March 20, 2012
Resolution; 2) on June 19, 2012, the Judicial Records Division reported that no compliance with
the March 20, 2012 Resolution had been filed by respondent; and 3) respondent was, for the last
time, directed to comply with the March 20, 2012 Resolution within five days from notice and to
show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to comply with the CA's
Resolutions, dated August 4, 2011 and March 20, 2012; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by
him should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be dismissed.
All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent.
Thus, in a Resolution dated October 25, 2012, the CA cited respondent in contempt of
court and imposed on him a fine of P5,000.00. In the same Resolution, the CA once again
directed respondent: (1) to comply with requirements of a valid substitution of counsel and to file
his formal Entry of Appearance within five days from notice; and (2) to show cause, within the
same period, why the Appellant's Brief filed should not be expunged from the rollo of the case
and the appeal be dismissed for his failure to comply with the Rules of Court.
Ultimately, in a Resolution dated April 11, 2013, the CA ordered the Appellant's Brief filed
by respondent expunged from the rollo and dismissed the appeal. More than that, the CA
directed respondent to explain why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for
willful disobedience to the orders of the court.
Respondent paid no heed to this Resolution.
So it was that the CA, in a Resolution dated September 17, 2013, referred the unlawyerly
acts of respondent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Report and Recommendation the Investigating Commissioner
In his Answer of November 13, 2013, respondent contended: (1) that the spouses Partoza
sought his opinion regarding their case and later on requested that he handle their appeal before
the CA; (2) that he advised the spouses Partoza to inform Atty. Villanueva of their decision to
engage the services of a new counsel; (3) that he relied on the Withdrawal of Appearance filed
by Atty. Villanueva and then prepared the Appellant's Brief; (4) that he was not aware of the
authority of Honnie to represent spouses Panoza as well as of Honnie's conformity to the
Withdrawal of Appearance by Atty. Villanueva; (5) that he believed that he had no personality to
represent the spouses Partoza in the case, and to address the problems/compliances pertaining
to appellant's appeal; and (6) that it was still Atty. Villanueva who should have continued to
represent the spouses Partoza.
The Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan (Investigating Commissioner) found

respondent liable for willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the CA and recommended that
he be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The Investigating, Commissioner gave
the reasons for the said recommendation in his Report and Recommendation, viz.:
The act of respondent in not filing any of the compliances required of him in the 4 August
2011, 20 March 2012, 5 September 2012, and 25 October 2012 Resolutions of the [CA] despite
due notice, emphasized his contempt and total disregard of the legal proceedings, for which he
should be held liable.
Granting that he was not aware of the problem between Atty. Villanueva and [Honnie], he
could have explained this fact by complying with the court resolutions and not just ignored them
on the premise that he has no personality to represent the [spouses Partoza]. The compliances
required of the respondent by the [CA] are provided under the rules for a valid substitution of
counsel and validity of the appeal and may not be disregarded.
The nonchalant attitude of the respondent cannot be left unsanctioned. Clearly, his acts
constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the [CA], which under Section 27. Rule 138
of the Rules of Court is a sufficient case for suspension.
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
In its Report dated March 18, 2016, the Office of the Bar Confidant informed this Court
that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration has been filed by either party. Thus,
pursuant to Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this case is now before us for final
action.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.
RULING

This Court adopts the findings of fact of, and the penalty recommended by, the IBP Board
of Governors.
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five Resolutions of the CA. His
actions were definitely contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with
the CA resolutions, respondent displayed not only reprehensible conduct but showed an utter
lack of respect for the CA and its orders. Respondent ought to know that a resolution issued by
the CA, or any court for that matter, is not mere request that may be complied with partially or
selectively.
Lawyers duty are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. In particular,
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that it "is the duty of an attorney to observe
and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." In addition, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Also, Canon 11 provides
that a "lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others."
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for six (6) months effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA v. ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO V. CALAYAN

A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018
FACTS:
A counter complaint is filed by Ret. Judge Alpajora against Atty Calayan, which originated
from an administrative complaint filed by the latter against the former before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for ignorance of the law and/or issuance of undue order. The
administrative complaint against Judge Alpajora was dismissed by the Court in a Resolution,
dated March 2, 2009, on the ground that the matters raised therein were judicial in nature.
An intra-corporate case docketed as Civil Case No. 2007-10 and entitled "Calayan

Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI), Dr. Arminda Calayan, Dr. Bernardita Calayan-Brion and Dr.
Manuel Calayan vs. Atty. Ronalda A.V. Calayan, Susan S. Calayan and Deanna
Rachelle S. Calayan, " was filed before the RTC of Lucena City designated as commercial court
and presided by Judge Adolfo Encomienda. Respondent was President and Chairman of the Board
of Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for himself. Court
proceedings ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the case was re-raffled until it
was finally re-raffled to complainant. Thereafter, complainant issued an Omnibus Order, dated
July 11, 2008 for the creation of a management committee and the appointment of its members.
That Order prompted the filing of the administrative case against the Judge Alpajora.
Complainant asserted that respondent committed the following: (1) serious and gross
misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself; (2) violated his oath as lawyer for [a] his failure
to observe and maintain respect to the courts (Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by his
abuse of judicial process thru maintaining actions or proceedings inconsistent with truth and
honor and his acts to mislead the judge by false statements (Section 20(d), Rule 138); (3)
repeatedly violated the rules of procedures governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously
misused the same to defeat the ends of justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule against the
filing of multiple actions arising from the same cause of action.
Respondent stressed that because no disciplinary measures were levelled on him by the
OCA as an outcome of his complaint, charges for malpractice, malice or bad faith were entirely
ruled out; more so, his disbarment was decidedly eliminated. Respondent argued that the
doctrine of res judicata was embedded in the OCA's finding that his complaint was judicial in
nature. He likewise averred that the conversion of the administrative complaint against a judge
into a disbarment complaint against him, the complaining witness, was hideously adopted to
deflect the charges away from complainant. Respondent insisted that the counter-complaint was
not sanctioned by the Rules of Court on disbarment and the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Respondent also claimed that the counter-complaint was unverified and thus, without
complainant's own personal knowledge; instead, it is incontrovertible proof of his lack of courtesy
and obedience toward proper authorities and fairness to a fellow lawyer.
Based on the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that
respondent violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rules 8.01, 10.01 to 10.03,
11.03, 11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR and, thus, recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years for the following reasons:
First, respondent did not deny having filed four cases against the counsel involved in the intra-
corporate case from which the subject administrative cases stemmed, and nine criminal cases
against the opposing parties, their lawyers, and the receiver before the Office of the Prosecutor
of Lucena City - all of which were subject of judicial notice.
Second, respondent committed misrepresentation when he cited a quote from former

Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as a thesis when, in fact, it was a dissenting opinion.
Third, respondent grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by the filing of
multiple actions concerning the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief.
Fourth, respondent violated Canon 11 of the CPR by attributing to complainant ill-motives that
were not supported by the record or had no materiality to the case.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent is guilty of violating The Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility
RULING
The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession
Harassing tactics against opposing counsel

As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing several cases,
both civil and criminal, against opposing parties and their counsels. In his motion for
reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution, he again admitted such acts but
expressed that it was not ill-willed.
Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by
the record or have no materiality to the case.
Failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before the court; failure to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice
It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has
the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation.
Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal cases, and
even administrative cases against different trial court judges relating to controversies involving
CEFI, in fact, runs counter to the speedy disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of
justice. It degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts.
A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he pleases.
Limitations can be inferred from the following rules:
1. Rules of Court
a. Rule 71, Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and Hearing. - After charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
2. Code of Professional Responsibility
a. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
b. Canon 10, Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
c. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
d. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 -A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
Judgment or misuse Court processes.
For having violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath, respondent's conduct should be meted
with a commensurate penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines - Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly, Atty. Ronaldo
Antonio V. Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The Lawyer's Oath and The Code of Professional
Responsibility and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
MANUEL B. TROVELA v. MICHAEL B. ROBLES +

AC. No. 11550, Jun 04, 2018
FACTS:
On May 25, 2011, the complainant criminally charged Katigbak, Salonga and Reyes
with estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant stated that he became the Employee Relation
Director of Sky Cable on November 1, 2004; that he later on received a termination letter dated
July 6, 2006 signed by Salonga informing him of his relief from work and of his compensation
being paid until the effective date of his termination; that his payslips for the periods from July
16, 2006 to July 31, 2006 and from August 1, 2006 to August 15, 2006 still reflected deductions
of his savings contributions to the Meralco Employees Savings and Loan Association (MESALA)
amounting to P2,520.00 per payday period; that withholding taxes of P4,509.45 and P4,235.70,
respectively, were also deducted from his compensation; that he discovered that such
deductions were not remitted to MESALA when he closed his account on September 6, 2006; and
that Sky Cable did not reimburse the amounts of his unremitted deductions despite demand. [1]
In his resolution dated September 29, 2011, [2] Robles recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Obuñgen and Ang approved the recommendation of dismissal on October 11, 2011.

The complainant filed his petition for review dated November 3, 2011 to appeal the
dismissal of his complaint.
On February 12, 2013, Arellano issued his resolution finding no reversible error in the
September 29, 2011 resolution of Robles, hence, affirming the dismissal of the complaint. [4]
The complainant moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by Secretary De
Lima on April 21, 2015.
Consequently, the complainant initiated disbarment proceedings against the respondents,

insisting thusly:
I. The premises considered by the OPCP in not finding probable cause in the case
are very much contrary to long standing jurisprudence holding that demand is
not a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement which may
be established by other proof and that failure to account, upon demand, for funds
or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
II. But while the application of these rulings has been consistently, repeatedly and
unequivocably made in more recent cases, in acting on my 3 november
2011 petition for review and on my 13 march 2013 motion for
reconsideration,respectively,respondents ARELLANO AND DE
LIMA still sustained the wrong presumptions made by the OPCP, one way or the
other.
III. Together with such omissions, the inordinate delays on the part of

respondents arellano and de lima in coming out with their separate resolutions that
are merely anchored on the grossly erroneous findings of the opcp negate their
allegations that they actually examined the records of the case and the evidence that i
have presented and indicated their lack of resolve to see that justice is done.
IV. while the presence of the prima facie evidence of corruption and

other anomalous circumstances in the perjury and unjust judgment cases,
the manipulative schemes employed by sky cable in certain of its pleadings (sic) and
the inordinate delays in all the related cases are very obvious, respondent de
lima, despite being the secretary of justice then, totally ignored the same.
V. Above all, respondent de lima took action on the estafa case ahead of the other

cases without consolidating them despite the fact that all indications clearly point to
such consolidation.
VI. That said, it is quite obvious that all of the respondents had not only reneged on
their sworn duty to uphold the laws of the land, basically as lawyers and as
prosecutors or dispensers of justice, which compromised the efficient
administration of justice, but they also committed gross violations of certain laws
themselves.
ISSUE
Should the respondents be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of the

complainant

RULING
We dismiss the administrative case against the respondents for lack of jurisdiction.
In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant has posited that Robles, Obuñgen and Ang
committed grave errors of facts and law that require an inquiry into their mental and moral
fitness as members of the Bar; and that Arellano and Secretary De Lima be declared guilty of
dereliction of duty or gross inexcusable negligence for belatedly resolving his petition for review
and motion for reconsideration. He specifically prays that the Court grants the following reliefs,
namely:
1. Finding prima facie cases against them for violation of Art. 208 of the RPC and R.A. No.
3019, as amended, a.k.a. the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and referring the matter to
the appropriate governmental agency for the prosecution thereof;
2. Imposing appropriate disciplinary action against them, including

their disbarment and/or removal from office, for gross violation of the canons of the legal
profession or for unprofessional conduct that casts serious doubt upon their mental and moral
fitness as members of the Bar and as prosecutors;
3. Awarding costs of suit hereof in such amounts as may be commensurate with the extent and
degree of misconduct committed by each of them and recommending that I be awarded
corresponding actual, as well as moral, exemplary and compensatory damages; and
4. Providing such other reliefs as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the
premises.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint filed against all the

respondents for lack of jurisdiction.
ACHERNAR B. TABUZO v. ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS

A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018
FACTS
Before the Court is a Verified Complaint filed by Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo (complainant) against
Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (respondent) who was then a Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), for allegedly committing the following acts:
Violation of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Rules of Procedure of the
2.1 Commission on Bar Discipline, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Republic Act 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
Violation of Canon[s] 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Guidelines for
2.2
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions of the Commission on Bar Discipline;
2.3 Nonfeasance in deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action for serious violations of
duties owed to the Courts and the Legal Profession committed by a lawyer, despite repeated
notice, and contrary to the mandate of his office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
2.4 Gross Ignorance of the Law;
All the foregoing were aggravated by: a) pattern of misconduct; b) multiple offenses; [c)]
2.5 substantial experience in the practice of law; and [d)] betrayal of the trust of his office as
Commissioner of the Honorable Commission on Bar Discipline.
On August 15, 2014, the respondent issued a Report and Recommendation recommending

that complainant be reprimanded for the impropriety of talking to Sillo, without her counsel, prior
to the calling of their case for mediation conference, and for the abusive, offensive or improper
language used in the pleadings she filed in the said case.
Complainant alleged that respondent violated the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of
the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission), Rule 139-B of the Rules Court and Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713[6] when he failed to act on her pleadings with dispatch and for issuing his
report and recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174 days from the submission of the last
pleading.[7]
Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and heartless to an inexperienced
lawyer when he mutilated statements made in her pleadings in CBD Case No. 12-3457; and that
he maliciously cropped and pasted portions of complainant's statement in her position paper to
give the wrong impression before the IBP-Board of Governors (Board) that the introductory
heading was an act of name calling against respondent, thereby violating Rules 1.01 [8] and
1.02[9] of Canon 1 and Rules 3.01,[10] 3.02,[11] and 3.04[12] of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Complainant asserted that respondent committed nonfeasance for deliberately refusing to

institute disciplinary action against a lawyer for serious violation of duties owed to the Court and
the legal profession despite several notices. She alleged that as early as December 2013,
respondent was aware that Atty. Alan R. Bulawan committed forum shopping and other grave
malpractices but respondent refused to institute disciplinary action reasoning that there should
first be a verified complaint before he could act on it. Complainant claimed that
respondent's inaction was a violation of Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Sec.
13 of the IBP's By-Laws.
Complainant asserted that respondent committed nonfeasance for deliberately refusing to

institute disciplinary action against a lawyer for serious violation of duties owed to the Court and
the legal profession despite several notices. She alleged that as early as December 2013,
respondent was aware that Atty. Alan R. Bulawan committed forum shopping and other grave
malpractices but respondent refused to institute disciplinary action reasoning that there should
first be a verified complaint before he could act on it. Complainant claimed that respondent's
inaction was a violation of Section 1,[14] Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Sec. 13 [15] of the
IBP's By-Laws.[16]
Lastly, complainant posited that respondent was grossly ignorant of the rules on privileged
communication, on evidence, on the crime of perjury, and on forum shopping when he failed to

dismiss the present administrative case outright because it had no merit and when he ignored
the perjury and forum shopping committed by Sillo.
Respondent denied the allegations and contended that they were not only false and an
unfortunate misappreciation of the laws, facts and circumstances but also an act of harassment.
He countered that it was complainant who caused the delay of the resolution of the case
because of the numerous motions and pleadings she filed. Also, the report and recommendation
was based on facts, law and jurisprudence which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board. If
complainant felt aggrieved by the report and recommendation, she could have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Board's January 31, 2015 Resolution.
Complainant claimed that the only proof that the report and recommendation was adopted
and approved by the Board was the Notice of Resolution; and when she asked for a copy of the
transcript and resolution of the case, she was informed by the head of the records section that it
was confidential and that she should file a manifestation to secure a copy. Furthermore,
complainant argued that it was respondent who was guilty of singling her out when he
reprimanded her for alleged belligerence in her pleadings and papers, and maintained that
respondent was grossly ignorant, inefficient and had no regard for due process of law.
In its Report and Recommendation, the Commission recommended the dismissal of the

complaint for lack of merit. The Commission stated that it would be irregular and improper to
review such findings because it would be tantamount to reopening matters and issues that have
been passed upon and approved by the IBP Board. The Commission agreed with the respondent
that if complainant felt aggrieved by such findings, her option would have been to file a motion
for reconsideration or some other appropriate remedy, but not an administrative case against
the investigating commissioner.
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent, as an

investigating commissioner, has an accountability to the legal profession separate and distinct
from that of the IBP Board and such accountability is not a mere administrative matter inside the
IBP-Commission. Complainant insisted that respondent could be held accountable independently
of the Board or the staff assigned to him when he issued a late report and recommendation and
issued it without the mandatory conference being held, and with no actual admissions or
stipulations of facts and no definition of issues. Complainant averred that respondent cannot
choose his deadline for submitting a report and recommendation, and his failure to decide a case
within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency
On February 23, 2017, respondent filed his Comment stating that the complainant's
motion for reconsideration was a mere rehash of the arguments raised in her complaint and
position paper. Respondent reiterated that he immediately acted on the administrative case filed
against complainant as soon as he received the records of the case; and that the cause of delay
was due to the several motions filed by complainant instead of just filing the required position
paper. The respondent emphasized that the report and recommendation was a product of a
conscientious study of all the pleadings submitted by the parties and application of the law and
jurisprudence.
ISSUES:

(1) whether respondent may be held administratively liable in the same manner as judges and
other government officials
(2) whether respondent may be held administratively liable for rendering an alleged adverse
judgment in his capacity as an investigating commissioner of the IBP.
RULING:
Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal profession and even their non-
lawyer adversaries with utmost candor, respect and dignity. More importantly, the primary
purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings against delinquent lawyers is to uphold the
law and to prevent the ranks of the legal profession from being corrupted by unscrupulous
practices—not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego. Such is the reason why lawyers should always
set a good example in not using the law and the rules as weapons or tools of malicious
vindication during petty squabbles as it degrades the credibility of the legal profession and
tarnishes its integrity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court AGREES with the Report and
Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Committee on Bar Discipline adopted
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Board of Governors, and DISMISSES the administrative
complaint filed against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos.
Furthermore, the Court STERNLY WARNS Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo and her collaborating
counsel Atty. Gaudencio A. Barboza, Jr. to REFRAIN from abusing the disciplinary proceedings
thru filing and maintaining frivolous administrative complaints against fellow members of the
Bar. A repetition of the same or commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Principles:
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 181[29] was enacted formally creating the IBP and vesting it with corporate personality. Sec. 2 of the
law states: Section 2. The Integrated Bar shall have perpetual succession and shall have all legal powers appertaining to a juridical
person, particularly the power to sue and be sued; to contract and be contracted with; to hold real and personal property as may be
necessary for corporate purposes; to mortgage, lease, sell, transfer, convey and otherwise dispose of the same; to solicit and receive
public and private donations and contributions; to accept and receive real and personal property by gift, devise or bequest; to levy
and collect membership dues and special assessments from its members; to adopt a seal and to alter the same at pleasure; to have
offices and conduct its affairs in the Greater Manila Area and elsewhere; to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not
inconsistent with the laws of the Philippines or the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 139-A thereof; and generally to do all such acts
and things as may be necessary or proper to carry into effect and promote the purposes for which it was organized.
ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN vs. ATTY. ROLANDO V. ZUBIRI

A.C. No. 11600, June 19, 2017
FACTS
Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro in the May 2013 elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa), filed an election
protest against him before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46
(RTC). After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the RTC issued an Order dated January 15, 2014 (January
15, 2014 Order), granting his motion for execution pending appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is GRANTED.

The OIC-Branch Clerk of Court [(COC)] is hereby directed to issue a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal after the lapse of twenty (20) working days to be counted from the time [complainant's]
counsel receives a copy of this Special Order, if no restraining order or status quo order is issued
pursuant to Section 11 (b), Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07- 4-15-SC. (Emphasis supplied)
Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC), seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal. In an Order dated February 13, 2014, the COMELEC issued a TRO,
directing Hon. Gay Marie F. Lubigan-Rafael (RTC Judge), in her official capacity as Presiding Judge of
the RTC, to cease and desist from enforcing the January 15, 2014 Order, effective
immediately. Accordingly, the RTC issued another Order dated February 25, 2014 (February 25,
10
2014 Order), pertinent portion of which reads:
In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in
accordance with the [January 15, 2014] Order until further notice. Despite the TRO and the RTC's
11
February 25, 2014 Order, respondent, as counsel of Villarosa, filed five (5) manifestations addressed
12
to the COC insisting on the writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these manifestations
to the other party.
In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's January 15,
2014 Order on January 18, 2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on
February 12, 2014. Since the COMELEC only issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer
had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO was addressed only to the RTC Judge, and
not to the COC; therefore, the COC is not bound by the TRO. For these reasons, respondent insisted
that the COC could legally issue the writ of execution pending appeal.
The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the sheriff.
However, complainant only found out about respondent's manifestations when the sheriff attempted
to serve the writ on him. Soon thereafter, complainant filed the disbarment complaint.
In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled and
induced the COC to defy lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's February 25,
2014 Order. As a result, respondent allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.
In his answer, respondent claimed that, first, since the case records had been transmitted to the
COMELEC on January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case; therefore, it had no
more power to issue the February 25, 2014 Order. Respondent put forward the same reason for filing
the five manifestations with the COC instead of the RTC Judge. Second, the manifestations contained
no misleading statements or factual deviations. He merely stated in his manifestations his honest
belief that the twenty-day period had already lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no
longer had any binding effect. He explained that the filing of manifestations to highlight his position
did not violate any rule. Third, he allegedly filed those manifestations pursuant to his duty under
Canon 18 of the CPR to represent his client with competence and diligence.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated September 1, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner

recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. He
observed that by filing manifestations instead of motions, respondent was able to disregard the rule
that motions shall be served on the other party and shall contain a notice of hearing. In this regard,
the Investigating Commissioner noted that a manifestation merely informs the court about a certain
matter involving the case, and does not require affirmative action by the court. In the present case,
however, the manifestations filed by respondent were actually motions as these contained arguments
to support his prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner also held that respondent acted in bad faith when he convinced the COC
to disregard the COMELEC's TRO. He pointed out that when the TRO enjoins the court, it includes the
judge and all officers and employees of the court, including the clerk of court. Hence, respondent was
unfair to the other party and employed deceit when he filed the manifestations. As a result, the other
party was not afforded due process by being deprived of an opportunity to oppose the
manifestations.
ISSUE
The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the
acts complained of.
RULING
After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent should be
held administratively liable for his violations of the CPR. However, the Court finds it proper to impose
a lower penalty.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal
processes. Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR require lawyers to conduct
themselves with fairness towards their professional colleagues, to observe procedural rules, and not
to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. These provisions read thus:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAW OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL A VOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.
xxxx
CANON 10 -A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
xxxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
Contrary to these edicts, respondent improperly filed the five (5) motions as "manifestations" to
sidestep the requirement of notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he violated his professional
obligations to respect and observe procedural rules, not to misuse the rules to cause injustice, and to
exhibit fairness towards his professional colleagues.
He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely represented his client with competence and
diligence. However, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically bound not only to serve
his client but also the court, his colleagues, and society. His obligation to represent his client is not
without limits, but must be "within the bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR.

Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair and honest means to attain their clients'
objectives.
The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, it may to
impose a less severe punishment if such penalty would achieve the desired end of reforming the errant lawyer. In
light of the foregoing discussion, the Court deems that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months is sufficient and commensurate with respondent's infractions.
As a final note, the Court stresses that a lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
Any conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this
obligation. Indeed, a lawyer must champion his client's cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot invoke
this as an excuse for his failure to exhibit courtesy and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal processes
designed to afford due process to all stakeholders.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Canon 8,

and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months effective from the finality of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
LITO V. BUENVIAJE v. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO

A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141], August 23, 2017
NATURE OF THE CASE

An Administrative Complaint filed by Lito Buenviaje(Buenviaje) against respondent
Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo (Atty. Magdamo), for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

FACTS
Buenviaje alleged that he was married to the late Fe Gonzalo-Buenviaje.
Meanwhile, Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo, who filed
a criminal case for bigamy against Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was married to a
certain Amalia Ventura Atty. Magdamo sent a Notice of Death of Depositor to the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI)-Dagupan Branch where Buenviaje and Fe appeared to have a joint
account. The pertinent portion of said Notice reads as follows:
1.) FE SOLIS GONZALO was formerly an Overseas Filipina Worker (OFW) Nurse in Switzerland
whose lifetime savings is now in an account in BPI-Dagupan. While she was terminally ill and
while residing in Manila so as to be near Saint Luke's Hospital, a clever swindler by the name
of LITO BUENVIAJE made it appear on spurious documents that he is the husband of
Fe Gonzalo when in truth and in fact LITO BUENVIAJE is married to AMALIA VALERA.
2.) Moreover, ever since 24 August 2007, LITO V. BUENVIAJE has been a fugitive from
justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the Philippines versus
Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in the City of Manila.
3.) Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life. x x x" (Emphasis ours) Buenviaje
discovered the existence of the notice when he inquired about the remaining balance of his joint
account with Fe. He lamented that he was shocked upon reading the letter and felt humiliated at
the words written against him as the bank might have really thought that he was a swindler and
a fugitive from justice.
Buenviaje denied Atty. Magdamo's allegation that Fe was never married as they were in fact
married in a public civil rights in the presence of many relatives of Fe.
However, Buenviaje admitted that he had extramarital relationship with her and that they had
two (2) sons. When they separated and he subsequently worked overseas, it did not stop him
from fulfilling his responsibilities as a father to his sons. He was then advised to remit money to
Amalia but he was told that he needed a marriage contract to be able to do so, thus, he asked
someone to make a marriage contract for remittance purposes and that he was told that there
would be no record of it. Buenviaje claimed that at that time, he really believed that no valid
marriage took place between him and Amalia and that he was single up to the time he married
Fe.
Buenviaje prays that considering Atty. Magdamo's actuations, he should be disbarred or

suspended from the practice of law.
RECOMMENDATORY RULING
The IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. Magdamo be reprimanded for his
unethical actuations.
The IBP-Board of Governors approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP-CBD, and instead suspend Atty. Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3) months.
The motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Magdamo was then denied by the IBP Board
of Governors.
ISSUES

Whether or not Atty. Magdamo shall be suspended for for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING
YES.
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against the opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
The records show that he referred to Buenviaje as a "swindler". He made this imputation with
pure malice for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is committing swindling activities.
Atty. Magdamo's malicious imputation against Buenviaje is further aggravated by the fact that
said imputation was made in a forum which is not a party to the legal dispute between Fe's
siblings and Buenviaje. He could have just informed BPI Dagupan of the death of its client and
that there is a pending litigation regarding their client's estate.
Atty. Magdamo is likewise out of line when he made inference to the marriage documents of
Buenviaje and Fe as "spurious" as well as his conclusion that "Fe never had a husband or child in
her entire life". He should know better that without the courts' pronouncement to this effect, he
is in no position to draw conclusions as to the validity of the marriage of Buenviaje and Fe. At the
very least, Atty. Magdamo's actuations are blatant violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal
or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Equally incredulous is Atty. Magdamo's statement in the Notice that "Lito V. Buenviaje has been
a fugitive from justice as he has been hiding from a criminal charge. Upon review, it appears that
such case is the same bigamy case which Fe's siblings filed against Buenviaje before the
Prosecutor's Office of Manila. At the time Atty. Magdamo made the subjects statement in the
Notice to BPI-Dagupan, he knew that there was no final resolution yet from the prosecutor's
office, no case has yet to be filed in the courts, there was no warrant of arrest against Buenviaje,
and more importantly, there was no evidence that Buenviaje had any intent to flee
prosecution as he even filed the instant case and participated in the proceedings hereto. A mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the October 10, 2014 and May 28, 2016 Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Melchor G.
Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon his receipt of this
Decision.
ADELPHA E. MALABED v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PENA

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016
FACTS
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant against the respondent for dishonesty
and grave misconduct.
Complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for the following:

1. Complainant claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by Atty. De la
Pena refers to a different complaint. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action which is
required for the filing of a civil action;
2. Respondent did not furnish complainant’s counsel with a copy of the free patent title but
respondent forwarded a copy to the CA; and
3. Respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the lot
owned by complainant’s family, who previously donated a parcel to the Roman Catholic Church
which deed of donation was notarized by Atty. De la Pena; Complainant further accused
respondent of conniving with a RTC judge.
Lastly, complainant charged respondent of grave misconduct when he defied the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
GOCCs. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology
(NIT) - University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law which is a government institution.
Respondent basically denied the charges against him. He alleged that the Certificate to File
Action he used was the certification of Lupon Chairman issued on May 9, 2001. Also, he claimed
that the free patent title was attached to the records and the notarization of the deed of
donation had no relation to the case.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct, he admitted that he accepted the position but
claimed that it was only temporary and that he even furnished the OBC, MCLE Office, and the
complainant in the dismissal case a copy of the designation, and since there was no objections,
he proceeded to perform the functions.
In the pleadings submitted by the respondent before the IBP, his use of foul language was noted
when he called the complainant’s counsel as “silahis” and accused complainant of “cohabiting
with a married man xxx before the wife of that married man died”.
IBP Commissioner found him guilty of the charges and recommended a suspension from the
practice of law for one year which was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. De la Pena is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
RULING
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for:
(1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file action issued by the Lupon
Tagapamaya on May 9, 2001 when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil
action of his client on October 18, 2000. Respondent violated

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he misled, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02- A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper.
(2) using improper language in his pleadings Respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states:
Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
(3) defying willfully the Court’s prohibition on reemployment in any government office as
accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. The prohibition does not distinguish between
permanent or temporary appointments. Also, the furnishing of copy to the OBC, MCLE Office and
to the complainant in that case does not extinguish the disqualification in any way.
Gross Misconduct is defined as “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of an established

and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.” The failure to furnish the complainant’s
counsel a copy of the free patent title does
not constitute dishonesty. Also, there is no conflict of interest because notarization is different
from representation and the serious accusations of connivance with a judge are bare allegations
with no proof.
In view of respondent’s repeated gross misconduct, the Court increased the IBP’s recommended
penalty to suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and

accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

FRANCISCO BINAY-AN, et al. vs. ATANACIO ADDOG
A.C No. 10449, 28 July 2014
FACTS:
Complainants herein, who happened to be the heirs of Barot Binay-an, are the plaintiffs in a civil
case for the Annulment of Documents against defendants Angeline Damaso and the Cordillera
Small Business Assistance Center, Inc. before the National Commission on Indigenous People
(NCIP). Complainants are represented by Atty. Jerome Selmo while the defendants are
represented by respondent Atty. Atanacio Addog.
From the allegations of the complainants, on Feb. 8, 2008, Damaso, who is the constituted
representative of the heirs of Barot Binay-an, called for a meeting in Mandarin Restaurant. This
meeting was attended by the respondent as well as Paul Palos and Bienvenido Palos, both of
which are also heirs of Barot Binay-an. There, Paul and Bienvenido were convinced by the
respondent and by Damaso to execute separate Affidavits of Desistance, which was later
notarized by the respondent. This notarized affidavits were then submitted by respondent to the
NCIP, which denied the same. The NCIP Hearing Officer cautioned the respondent on the ethical
consideration in having the affidavits submitted. The respondent later withdrew his
representation for the defendants. Thus, a complaint for misconduct was filed against the
respondent before the IBP.
On his part, respondent, while admitting that he was present in Mandarin Restaurant and
notarized the affidavits of desistance, denied the complainants’ charge. He also denied lawyering
for Paul and Bienvenido. According to him, he submitted the said affidavits in behalf of his clients
and not in behalf of the complainants.
The IBP Board of Governors, adopting with modifications the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, recommends that respondent be suspended for a period of six (6)
months. The respondent filed his MR but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct
RULING:
YES. Respondent, despite knowing that the Complainants Palos were not represented by a
counsel during that meeting they had with defendant Angeline Damaso, communicated with the
Palos and in fact indications are ripe that it was he who convinced them to execute their
affidavits of desistance in exchange for monetary consideration. This presumption is strongly
supported by the fact that the affidavits were prepared and notarized by him during the said
meeting. Significantly, he did not take it upon himself to inform Atty. Jerome W. Selmo about the
act of his clients. He too failed to advise the Palos to first consult their counsel about it. In fact he
showed that he needed the affidavits badly as in fact he went on to present the same to the NCIP
Hearing Officer to prove that the Palos had clearly wanted to withdraw their complaint against
the defendants. The affidavits of desistance [were], however, rejected by the NCIP Hearing
Officer.
Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it
is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.”

In this case, the respondent knew that Paul and Bienvenido were represented by counsel, Atty.
Selmo. His act of preparing the affidavit of desistance, even assuming that it was only the joint
affidavit of Paul, Isabela Daniel and Romana which he drafted and notarized was true,
nonetheless encroached upon the legal functions of Atty. Selmo. Worse, the respondent even
disclosed that the affidavits of desistance were executed by the affiants in exchange for a certain
sum of money.
It was unscrupulous of the respondent to compel some of the complainants in Civil Case No. 005-
CAR-07 to execute the affidavit of desistance sans the knowledge and agreement of Atty. Selmo.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly
to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should
not undertake to advise him as to the law.
Similarly, in this case, the respondent's acts clearly violated the ethical tenets of the legal
profession and must, therefore, be disciplined. "Such acts constituting malpractice and grave
misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the
legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained."
WHEREFORE, Atty. Atanacio D. Addog is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Resolution, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL,
BALANGA CITY, BATAAN vs. ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY
A.C. No. 8103, December 3, 2014
FACTS
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio
2
C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr.
(Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay
(respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the country from March 13,
2008 to April 8, 2008. The notarized documents were as follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C. Macalinao and Trisha
Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret L. Sese, notarized on
March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to Eduardo Samson and
Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen,
notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy
Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia Francisco and Violeta
Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita Padlan, notarized on
April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona Limcumpao, notarized on March
27, 2008;
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad Bacricio and Carlos
Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna
Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on
April 2, 2008;
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta,
notarized on March 18, 2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development Corporation, notarized on
March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda Ramos and Sps.
Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps.
Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and Dominador M. Manalansan
notarized on March 14, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had information that
they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico.
The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a
common statement that they did not see respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who
signed them or the documents came out of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of
Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and
returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the
letter.
3
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter endorsed the same to the IBP
National Office for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint, the
latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not intended to be a
formal complaint but rather "a report on, and endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of
the country," and that any advice on how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.
4
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
appropriate action.5
This Court, in its Resolution, dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated
6
September 30,2008, and require respondent to comment on the said letter. In his comment, dated 27 March 2009,
7
respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were documents notarized using his name while he was out of
the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the import of the notarization
act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that he had terminated the employment of his
secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. When the case was
called for mandatory conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a
manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that his attendance be excused. The mandatory
8
conference was terminated and the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. Only respondent
submitted a position paper, to which he added that for 21 years that he had been practicing law, he acted as a
9
notary public without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III)as Investigating Commissioner
10
found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the attachments were
not authenticated photocopies and that the comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III,
however, observed that respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in
most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office secretary.He
admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed
by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established
that by his negligence in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records
especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the
standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his office secretary the
opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
immediate revocation of respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as
such for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its Resolution, dated September
11
28, 2013.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of the IBP but IBP Board of Governors denied
the motion for reconsideration of respondent.
ISSUE
Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the
country constituted negligence.
RULING
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents
were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country.
This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his
secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers
to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s
secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not
authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned
as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years
that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and this was his
first and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard and could
have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents
were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act
towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial
commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is
appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public
not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the
integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held
liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Where the notary
public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn
oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Respondent
violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his
behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his office
open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his
secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his
office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted
therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead,
they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any
force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant

responsibility. It is a
privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest.
As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that
those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the
courts, and the administrative offices in general.
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public
instruments would be undermined.
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take
lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the
Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as
notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar
violation will be dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court
to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER
A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013
Facts:
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration.
The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied
that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia
showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name
as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit
to attest to such fact.
The Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit denying that he falsified the signature of his
former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit by Richard A.
Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted
Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document for
insufficiency of evidence. The administrative case for dishonesty was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence.
Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty.
Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment
Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only
one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report by the PNP Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-
complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and
the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is administratively liable
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Canon 9: A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED

PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. Jarder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

EDGARDO AREOLA vs. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA
A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014
FACTS:
This refers to the administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a. Muhammad
Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney s Office
(PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Areola stated that he was filing a complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron
Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23,
2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees
with pending cases before the RTC where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola
claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana
kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera
ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay
kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should
prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their
cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their transcript of
stenographic notes.
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and
filing motions before the RTC Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the latter
was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Act in the
latter’s criminal case for rape. She got angrier when Seronda retorted that he allowed Areola to
file the motion for him since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant and alleged that
the respondent asked for ₱2,000.00 to represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead Guilty
to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded Mirador and
discredited Areola.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Areola is the proper complainant
2. Whether or not Areola is allowed to give legal advice and file pleadings
3. Whether or not Atty. Mendoza violated Canon 1 and Canon 15 of the CPR
RULING:
First Issue:
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint on
behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no
document was submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated
this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the
pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO clients of Atty. Mendoza.
Second Issue:
It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no matter how good
he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings
by himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by
cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other
government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent
and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her.
Third Issue:
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and
plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one
of Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza—that she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear
that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in
order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible
advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states
that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system.
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.

It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving
improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
NEMESIO FLORAN AND CARIDAD FLORAN v. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA
A.C. No. 5325, February 09, 2016
FACTS
Atty. Ediza's liability stemmed from a Complaint/Affidavit 1 dated 8 September 2000 filed by the
spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran (complainants). The subject of the complaint was a 3.5525
hectare parcel of unregistered land located in San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, which
was covered by a tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal, a relative, who gave the property
to complainants.
The Court found that Atty. Ediza deceived complainants when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed
of sale transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of complainants' land pushed through,
Atty. Ediza received half of the amount of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled complainants
into thinking that he would register, using the same proceeds, the remaining portion of their land. These
actions, which deprived complainants of their property, showed Atty. Ediza's behavior as unbecoming a
member of the legal profession.
The Court, in its Decision dated 19 October 2011, (1) suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of law for six
months, effective upon receipt of the Decision; (2) directed him to return to complainants the two sets of
documents that he misled them and Sartiga Epal into signing; and (3) ordered Atty. Ediza to pay
complainants the amount of P125,463.38, representing the amount he deceived them into paying him,
with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until fully paid. The Court further warned Atty. Ediza that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Thereafter, Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court for lack of
substantial merit.
Atty. Ediza then filed a Manifestation of Compliance (On the Order of Suspension) through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, attached a sworn statement attesting that he desisted from the practice of law for six
months from receipt of the decision.
The Court deferred action on the Manifestation of Compliance and adopted the recommendations of the
Office of the Bar Confidant that Atty. Ediza be required to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local
Chapter where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge where he practices his profession,
both stating that he had desisted from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29 May 2012; and
(2) show proof of payment to complainants of P125,463.38 plus legal interest, and the return of the two
sets of documents that Atty. Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to sign. The Court also required
complainants to manifest whether Atty. Ediza had already paid the said amount and returned the said
documents.
In an undated letter written in the vernacular, complainants wrote the Court that Atty. Ediza had yet to
comply with the Court's Decision and asked the Court's assistance in implementing the same. Later, in a

Verified Compliance with Manifestation executed with the assistance of the Public Attorney's Office,
complainants informed the Court that as of 17 October 2012, Atty. Ediza had not paid any single centavo
and neither had he returned the required documents.
In a Resolution dated 25 February 2013, the Court noted the manifestations and further ordered Atty.
Ediza to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or be held in contempt and to comply
with the Decision.
In response to the letters of the complainants, the Court kept on ordering Ediza to return the documents
and the money. Despite repeated orders of the court, he still failed to deliver the documents and the
money. Some of the reasons provided by Ediza every time he was asked to show cause include: (1)
vagueness of the description on the documents that should be returned; (2) finding new evidence to
reopen the case and support his defense; and (3) demanding that he should not be ordered to return the
same for already complying with the suspension.
The Court issued numerous Resolutions dated 3 September 2012, 25 February 2013, 15 July 2013, 4 June
2014, and 12 November 2014, requiring Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision and
show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or be held in contempt for his failure to abide by
the Court's orders. However, Atty. Ediza repeatedly and blatantly disregarded and obstinately defied these
orders from the Court. Instead, Atty. Ediza responded by (1) claiming ignorance over the documents stated
in the Decision, and worse, adjudged that the documents were fictional; (2) alleging newly discovered
evidence; (3) demanding to stay the execution of the Decision; and (4) reporting that he has complied with
the order of suspension without submitting any required certifications from the IBP and the Office of the
Executive Judge.
The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders is a great disrespect to the Court
which cannot be tolerated. Atty. Ediza willfully left unheeded all the warnings imposed upon him, despite
the earlier six-month suspension that was meted out to him for his administrative liability.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ediza should be disbarred
RULING
As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the orders and processes of this
Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 12
A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.
Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and was
suspended from the practice of law for six months. Despite the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again
demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to stay in the legal profession for failing to protect the
interests of his clients but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has administrative
supervision over him.
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over members
of the Bar. Reinforcing the execution of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court which gives this Court the power to remove or suspend a lawyer from the practice of law. The

provision states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of

the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State - the
administration of justice - as an officer of the court. To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must
adhere to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and faithfully
comply with the rules of the legal profession. Clearly, Atty. Ediza's conduct has made him unfit to remain in
the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza, having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
IN RE: G.R. NO. 157659 "ELIGIO P. MALLARI V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM AND
THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA."
A.C. No. 11111, January 10, 2018
In 1968, respondent obtained two loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the total
amount of P34,000. These loans were secured by mortgages over two parcels of land registered under his
and his wife's names. Eventually, respondent was unable to meet his obligations to the GSIS, which
prompted the latter to remind him to settle his account.
On March 21, 1984, the GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage due to respondent's
failure to settle his account. Respondent, however, was able to stall this by requesting for a final
computation of his outstanding account and persuading the Sheriff to hold the publication of the
foreclosure notice in abeyance. On December 13, 1984, the GSIS responded to his request and rendered a
detailed explanation of the account. On May 30, 1985, it sent another updated statement of account. For
failing to settle his account, the GSIS finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on
respondent's mortgaged properties on July 21, 1986.
On August 22, 1986, respondent filed a complaint for injunction with application for preliminary injunction
against the GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in
San Fernando, Pampanga. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 7802. 6 The RTC ultimately decided Civil
Case No. 7802 in his favor. Upon appeal by the GSIS, the CA reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996. This
Court, in G.R. No. 124468, denied respondent's petition for review on certiorari on September 16, 1996, as
well as his motion for reconsideration on January 15, 1997. As a result, the CA Decision dated March 27,
1996 became final and executory, rendering unassailable the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale
held on September 22, 1986, and the issuance of titles in the name of the GSIS.
On September 2, 1999, the GSIS filed an ex parte motion for execution and/or a writ of possession. The
RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession on October 21, 1999, ordering the Sheriff to place
the GSIS in possession of the properties. The Sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because of
respondent's request for an extension of time within which to vacate the properties. Respondent, however,
instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution on March 27, 2000.
Respondent also filed a case for consignation with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order against the GSIS and the provincial Sheriff in the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga. This
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 12053, was dismissed by the RTC on November 10, 2000 on the ground
of res judicata, impelling respondent to appeal the dismissal to the CA.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 7802, respondent filed: (1) a motion dated April 5, 2000 to hold the GSIS, et
al. in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution; and (2) a motion dated April 17, 2000 to hold the
GSIS and its local manager Arnulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court for ordering the electric company to
cut off electric services to the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or
quash the writ of execution.
Eventually, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge denied the motions
for contempt of court on July 30, 2001 and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-
implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21, 1999. Respondent
sought reconsideration but this was denied on February 11, 2002.
Respondent assailed the orders denying his motions for contempt, the order causing the re-
implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and the denial of his motion for
reconsideration with the CA. The CA, however, denied his petition for certiorari.
Respondent brought the matter before us in G.R. No. 157659, where we affirmed the CA's Decision. We
held that the issuance of the writ of possession in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is purely ministerial. We
further stressed that respondent, as a lawyer, should have known that, as a non-redeeming mortgagor, he
had no more right to challenge the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession upon the ex
parte application of the GSIS, especially after the consolidation of ownership of the properties in the GSIS.
Thus, his actions can only be tainted by bad faith. This Court further agreed with the CA's observation that
the petition before it is "part of the dilatory tactics x x x to stall the execution of a final and executory
decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest
tribunal of the land." Thus, we deemed it proper to direct the IBP-CBD to conduct an investigation on
respondent, the pertinent portion of which we quote:
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is directed to investigate the
petitioner for what appear to be (a) his deliberate disregard of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence
pertinent to the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as amended;
and (b) his witting violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD, in their Report and Recommendation, found that the means employed by respondent are
dilatory moves to delay the execution of the judgment in favor of the GSIS. In the process, he violated his
Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.3, Canon 10 of the CPR. The IBP-CBD thus recommended that respondent be
meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for at least one year.
ISSUES
Whether or not the respondent violate the Lawyer's Oath; Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
RULING
We adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on respondent's unethical conduct, but modify the
penalty in accord with recent jurisprudence.
A lawyer must never be blinded by the cause of his client at the expense of justice, even if the latter
turned out to be himself. He must never overlook that as officer of the court, he is primarily called upon to
assist in the administration of justice. Often designated as vanguards of our legal system, lawyers are
called upon to protect and uphold truth and the rule of law.They are obliged to observe the rules of
procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
In this case, the judgment in favor of the GSIS concerning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings had long became final and executory in G.R. No. 124468.
His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he was
enjoined as a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice." By his dilatory moves, he further breached and dishonored his Lawyer's Oath, particularly:
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients
The same holds true with regard to respondent's reliance on Article 429 of the Civil Code. His refuge, if at
all, under the article is tainted with bad faith since he knew that the issue on ownership of the properties
has long been settled in G.R. No. 124468. Such action on his part only affirms his misplaced zealousness
and malicious intent to reopen the case in the hopes of gaining a favorable judgment. He demonstrates his
propensity to abuse and misuse court processes to the detriment of the winning party and ultimately, the
administration of justice. As such, he violated Canon 10 and Rule 10.03 of the CPR:
Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.
Moreover, the filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine
of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the CPR, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Respondent's act of filing
Civil Case No. 12053 (which was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of res judicata) further indicates his
proclivity to muddle the issues of the case in order to delay the execution of judgment in Civil Case No.
7802. By his conduct, respondent violated not only the lawyer's mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice," but also Rules 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR:
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.
In sum, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP-CBD holding respondent guilty of violating the Lawyer's
Oath; Canons 10 and 12; and Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of the CPR. However, we deem it proper to
increase the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one (1) year to two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Eligio P. Mallari is hereby found GUILTY of violating
the Lawyer's Oath; Canons 10 and 12; and Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. JEROME B. BANTIYAN, Clerk of Court VI and
ERLINDA G. CAMILO, former OIC/Court Interpreter, both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34,
Banaue, Ifugao
A.M. No. P-15-3335, June 28, 2017
FACTS
This administrative case stemmed from a Financial Audit conducted by the Financial Monitoring
Division (FMD), Court Management Office (CMO), Office of the Court Administrator (OAS) on the
books of accounts of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Banaue, Ifugao (RTC).
The audit was conducted due to the failure of Atty. Jerome B. Bantiyan (Atty. Bantiyan), Clerk of Court
VI, RTC, to update his financial reports in violation of Circular No. 50-95. The audit covered the period
of accountability of Erlinda G. Camilo (Camilo), former Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court from April 1,
2011 to February 9, 2012 and of Atty. Bantiyan from February 10, 2012 to November 8, 2013.
The Report of the audit team disclosed that both Camilo and Atty. Bantiyan incurred shortages in the
various funds of the court. An examination of the Fiduciary Fund (FF) revealed that Atty. Bantiyan
incurred a shortage amounting to ₱211,000.00, thus, depriving the Court of unearned interest in the
amount of ₱9,215.84. On the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), it was found that both Atty. Bantiyan
and Camilo incurred shortages in the amounts of ₱7,140.25 and ₱580.00, respectively, due to
over/under remittances. With respect to the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF), Atty.
Bantiyan and Camilo sustained deficiencies amounting to ₱11,437.40 and ₱760.00, respectively, due
to under remittances. Lastly, on the Mediation Fund (MF), Atty. Bantiyan incurred a shortage of
₱l,976.00 as a result of over and under remittances of his collections, while Camilo's shortage
amounting to ₱2,000.00 was due to unremitted collections for the months of June 2011 and February
2012 amounting to ₱500.00 and ₱l,500.00, respectively.

The shortages were immediately restituted by Atty. Bantiyan and Camilo as shown by the Land Bank
Deposit Slips, dated November 12 and 13, 2013. The shortages incurred by Atty. Bantiyan and Camilo
were summarized as follows:
Restitutions
Fund Shortages Balance
Date Amount
Respondent Bantiyan
FF 211,000.00 11/12/13 211,000.00 0.00
JDF 7,140.25 11/12/13 8,202.05 (1,061.80)
SAJF 11,437.40 11/12/13 5,415.97
11/13/13 6,021.43 0.00
MF 1,976.00 11/12/13 8,530.00 (6,554.00)
VCF 125.00 11/12/13 70.00
11/13/13 55.00 0.00
LRF 3
2,280.00 11/12/13 2,350.00 (70.00)
Total 233,958.65 241,644.45 (7,685.80)
Respondent Camilo
JDF 580.00 11/13/13 580.00 0.00
SAJF 760.00 11/13/13 760.00 0.00
MF 2,000.00 11/13/13 2,000.00 0.00
LRF 1,167.10 11.13.13 1,168.10 (0.90)
Total 4,507.10 4,508.10 (0.90)
The audit team claimed that Atty. Bantiyan may have misappropriated his judiciary collections for his
personal use because when the audit team required him to produce the total shortage of
₱233,958.65, he presented only the amount of ₱650.00.
The audit likewise disclosed that Camilo and Atty. Bantiyan had been remiss in the submission of the
Monthly Reports and they had not been updating entries in the official cashbooks of each fund.
Further, the audit team discovered that the RTC had no collection for the Sheriffs Trust Fund (STF) as
certified by Atty. Bantiyan, a violation of Section 10 of the Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-
2004.
Thus, in a Resolution, dated July 15, 2015, the Court, upon the recommendation of the OCA, ordered
as follows:
1. DOCKET this report as a regular administrative matter against Atty. Jerome B. Bantiyan and Ms.
Erlinda G. Camilo, Clerk of Court VI and former OIC/Court Interpreter, both of the RTC, Banaue, Ifugao
for violation of OCA Circular No. 50-95, Circular No. 32-93, Administrative Circular No. 3-2000, OCA
Circular No. 113-2004, and Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004;
2. DIRECT Atty. Jerome B. Bantiyan, Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Banaue, Ifugao to EXPLAIN the following
findings:
a. Failure to present during the cash examination on 11 November 2013 the

undeposited collections totaling ₱233,958.65;

b. Non-remittances and/or delayed remittances of the following judiciary collections:
Fund Shortages
FF 211,000.00
JDF 7,140.25
SAJF 11,437.40
MF 1,976.00
VCF 125.00
LRF 2,280.00
Total 233,958.65
c. Non-Submission of Monthly Reports and failure to update the Official Cash Book which
is a clear violation of Circular No. 32-93 and OCA Circular No. 113-2004;
Fund Deficient Reports

Fiduciary Fund No reports
Judiciary Development Fund December 2012 - October 2013
Mediation Fund No reports
d. Failure to collect the required One Thousand Pesos (₱1,ooo.oo) Sheriffs Trust Fund for
every civil case filed in court pursuant to Section 10 of the Amended Administrative
Circular No. 35-2004.
3. DIRECT Ms. Erlinda G. Camilo, former OIC/Court Interpreter, RTC, Banaue, Ifugao, to COMMENT on
the following audit findings:
a. Non-remittances and/or delayed remittances of the following judiciary collections:
Fund Shortages
JDF 580.00
SAJF 760.00
MF 2,000.00
LRF 1,167.10
Total 4,507.10
b. Non-submission of Monthly Reports and failure to update the Official Cash Book which
is a clear violation of Circular No. 32-93 and OCA Circular No. 113-2004.
Fund Deficient Reports

Fiduciary Fund No reports

Mediation Fund No reports
4. DIRECT Mr. Jonathan D. Nasdoman, Clerk II and designated financial accountable officer, RTC,
Banaue, Ifugao to:
a. COLLECT the mandatory One Thousand Pesos (₱1,ooo.oo) Sheriff's Trust Fund for
every civil case filed in court pursuant to Section 10 of the Amended Administrative
Circular No. 3s-2004 and STRICLTY ADHERE with the procedural guidelines in the
handling of the Sheriffs Trust Fund;
b. OPEN a separate account for the Sheriffs Trust Fund in line with the OCA Circular No.
99-2014 dated 31 July 2014, Re: Reduction of Initial/Opening Deposit and Maintaining
Balance of Regular Savings Account from ₱10,ooo.oo to ₱1,ooo.oo for the Fiduciary and
Sheriffs Trust Fund Accounts;
c. UPDATE regularly the recording of financial transactions for each fund in the official
cashbooks and CERTIFY at the end of every month the correctness of entries therein;
and
d. STERNLY ADHERE and FOLLOW the issuances of the Court on the proper handling and
reporting of judiciary funds, particularly the prescribed period within which to remit
court collections as well as the proper collection and allocation of [filing] fees; and
5. DIRECT Hon. Ester P. Flor to MONITOR the financial transactions of the RTC, Banaue, Ifugao, to
ensure strict observance of the issuances of the Court in order to avoid any irregularity in the
collections, deposits and withdrawals/disbursements of court funds.
Explanation of Camilo
In a Letter, dated January 15, 2016, Camilo explained that her shortages in the JDF, SAJF, MF, and
Legal Research Fund (LRF) were due to oversight and miscalculation. She explained that she
computed the collections based on the official receipts issued for the current month and collected
from the issuer without reference to the previous reports; that the funds were not re-calculated
because she presumed that the amounts she received were exact for deposits; and, that the LRF
receipted collections were not included in the computation because she thought that the collections
were less than ₱100.00.
On her failure to update the cashbook, Camilo averred that the cashbooks were not monitored
because she confidently relied on Jonathan Nasdoman (Nasdoman) who was in charge of the entries
during the time of Atty. Dennis Dimalnat. She stated that the entries in the cashbooks were
completed just after the conclusion of the audit.
On the failure to submit the monthly reports, Camilo alleged that she had submitted the reports by
mail to the OCA and even showed to the audit team the office files which they used as basis for
comparison with the official receipts issued monthly. She attached a machine copy of the registry
receipts to prove that the reports were actually mailed to the proper office.
Explanation of Atty. Bantiyan

For his part, Atty. Bantiyan narrated that when he assumed office in January 2012, the staff was
uncooperative, unruly and resistant, making it hard for him to attend with dispatch to the clerical
aspect of a financial accountable officer. Further, Nasdoman, who was in-charge of the financial
matters, begged to be relieved of the financial responsibility because of health reasons. Thus, Atty.
Bantiyan had no choice but to assume the bulk of the work as no one in the staff was willing to help.
It was then that he discovered that Nasdoman was not preparing the financial reports and updating
the cashbooks. According to him, he immediately instructed Camilo and Nasdoman to accomplish the
reports and update the cashbooks, but they were not able to comply soon enough so he decided to
update the cashbooks and draft the reports himself.
On his failure to present the undeposited collections totaling ₱233,958.65, Atty. Bantiyan denied that
he misappropriated the said amount. He explained that during the audit, he readily admitted to the
audit team leader that the collection was in his possession. He also informed the audit team leader
that it was not his practice to keep a large amount of money in the office because the safety vault
therein was being utilized to store the object evidence submitted in court and it was usually full.
When the new cabinet with safety vault was delivered in 2012, the key attached on its top was
missing. Atty. Bantiyan further explained that he was not able to get the money from Lagawe and
present it to the audit team leader because he could not leave the office as he was busy attending to
the audit team. He averred that he no longer brought the money to the court the following day as he
opted to deposit the same with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and he just presented the
deposit slips to the audit team.
Atty. Bantiyan asserted that daily deposit with the bank was not possible because the court was
understaffed; that the LBP-Lagawe branch was an hour away; and that it usually took thirty (30)
minutes to one (1) hour of waiting before a public utility vehicle would be available. He added that
the Lagawe-Banaue road was not safe due to the incidents of highway robberies, and, in fact, the
municipal treasurer of Banaue was robbed of ₱800,00.00 while on his way to the court to pay the
salaries of the LGU staff. Thus, he devised a way to keep the money safe until it was deposited in the
LBP.
On the failure to collect the ₱l,000.00 STF, Atty. Bantiyan averred that he was made aware of it only
during the Orientation Seminar for Clerks of Court; and that when he assumed office in January 2012,
there was no record of such STF being collected because the court was created only in 1995. He said
that when he found out about the STF, he talked to the Presiding Judge, but he was told that the court
did not have the required amount of ₱10,000.00 to open a STF account and that he could not use the
other funds of the court for that purpose. Nonetheless, when the initial deposit to open a STF account
was reduced to ₱l,000.00, the court immediately opened a STF account and transferred the STF
collections from the FF account.
Atty. Bantiyan explained that he encountered difficulties in preparing the financial reports because he
was new to the court and he had been discharging most of the work. He further averred that the
situation was aggravated by the lack of cooperation from the staff. Atty. Bantiyan offered his apology
and promised to be more committed to his work. 8
The OCA Recommendation
In a Memorandum, dated October 24, 2016, the OCA found Camilo guilty of simple neglect of duty
9
and recommended that she be fined in the amount of Pl0,000.00. With respect to Atty. Bantiyan, the
OCA found him guilty of gross neglect of duty but recommended that the penalty be reduced to one
(1) month suspension, considering that he immediately restituted the shortages and that it was his
first offense.
ISSUE

Whether or not the respondents are guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty
RULING
Liability of Atty. Bantiyan
Without a quibble, Atty. Bantiyan failed to perform with utmost diligence his financial and administrative
responsibilities. Records show that he was remiss in his duties of depositing the court collections on time,
updating the entries in the official cashbooks, and regularly submitting his monthly reports.
Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the
Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the authorized
government depository bank.
In the case at bench, Atty. Bantiyan readily admitted his failure to deposit the court collections on time and
offered several excuses for his omission among which are the safety of the personnel and the distance of the
court from the bank which is located in Lagawe. Nevertheless, his mandate was clear. He is not allowed to keep
funds in his custody as the same should be immediately deposited in the nearest LBP branch. In case daily
deposits of cash collections are not possible, the deposit shall be made at the end of every month. But if the
collection exceeds ₱500.00, the deposit shall be made immediately. Notwithstanding the guidelines, Atty.
Bantiyan failed to make the necessary deposit for the fiduciary fund for the months of February, April, August,
and September 2013, which amounted to ₱l5,000.00, ₱26,000.00, ₱90,000.00, and ₱80,000.00, respectively. If
there was indeed a problem with the transportation, the matter should have been brought to the attention of the
court. 11 Moreover, if Atty. Bantiyan was truly scared to make the daily deposit on account of distance and safety
issues, why did he keep the money in his house in Lagawe, the same place where the LBP was located.
Atty. Bantiyan was equally remiss in the keeping of the official cashbooks and in his obligation to send the
required reports of deposits and withdrawals to the OCA. From the time he assumed office in January 2012, the
audit team discovered that the official cashbooks had not been updated and that Atty. Bantiyan failed to submit
a single report to the OCA.
Atty. Bantiyan explained that his shortcomings were due to his being new to the court, lack of cooperation from
the staff and heavy workload. These excuses, however, are not acceptable. Atty. Bantiyan could not hide behind
the incompetence of his subordinates. For failing to keep proper records of all collections and remittances and to
submit the monthly reports, he should not shift the blame to the staff in-charge. As the clerk of court, he has
general supervision over all court personnel and it is his duty to see to it that his subordinates have been
faithfully performing their duties and responsibilities to ensure full compliance with circulars issued by the
Court. 12 It is incumbent upon him to personally attend to the collection of the fees, the safekeeping of the
money collected, the making of the proper entries thereof in the corresponding book of accounts, and the
deposit of the same in the offices concemed.13 In the case of OCA v. Bernardino, 14 the Court held:
Again, we state that good faith and lack of malice are not excuses for failure to comply with the mandatory
provisions of circulars regarding the remittances of court funds.
Unfamiliarity with procedures because he is new to the job will likewise not exempt respondent from liability. As
a Clerk of Court, she is expected to keep abreast of all applicable laws, jurisprudence and administrative
circulars pertinent to her office. Being new to her job, she should have been more diligent in the performance of
her duties. 15
Evidently, Atty. Bantiyan failed to perform his duties with the degree of diligence and competence expected of
him. His apparent good faith, his admission of the infractions and immediate restitution of the cash shortages,
though mitigating, cannot exculpate him from liability. The Court has to enforce what is mandated by the law
and to impose a reasonable punishment for violations thereof.
In determining the applicable penalty, the Court had, in a number of cases, mitigated the administrative
penalties imposed on erring judicial officers and employees.17 In this case, considering that the shortage
amounting to ₱233,958.65 was accounted for and was immediately restituted in full in November 2013, as
evidenced by the deposit slips submitted by Atty. Bantiyan, and taking into account that this is his first offense,
the OCA recommended that Atty. Bantiyan be meted the penalty of suspension for one (1) month. Under the
circumstances, the Court believes that a fine of ₱20,000.00 would be more appropriate.
Liability of Camilo
As for Camilo, the OCA's recommendation is well-taken.
Camilo failed to monitor the entries in the official cashbooks because she relied heavily on Nadosman who was
assigned by the Presiding Judge to perform such duty since the tenure of the former Clerk of Court. Though the
updating of the court's cashbooks was delegated to Nasdoman, it was her responsibility, being the OIC-Clerk of
Court, to oversee the work of her subordinate. As the court's administrative officer, Camilo must ensure that her
subordinates are performing their tasks properly, promptly and efficiently.
Camilo likewise incurred shortages in the various funds of the court amounting ₱4,407.10 as a result of over-
remittances and delayed remittances. These shortages, as found by the OCA, were the results of an honest
mistake in the computation of collections and were all accounted for in the Court's financial records. Time and
again, the Court has stressed that safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to an orderly administration
of justice, and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars· designed to
promote full accountability for government funds. 18 Camilo's failure to exercise diligence in the performance of
her duty deserves administrative sanction.
Delay in the remittances of collections constitutes neglect of duty on the ground that failure to remit the court
collections on time deprives the court of interest that may be earned if the amounts are deposited in a
bank. 19 Shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the years of delay in the actual remittance constitute
neglect of duty for which the respondent shall be administratively liable.20 Under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 21 simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by
suspension of one month and one day to six months, even for the first offense.
Although unintentional mistake and good faith are not valid defenses, the fact that Camilo readily acknowledged
her transgression, sought forgiveness and rectified her error, and considering further that this is also her first
infraction, the Court finds the recommended penalty of fine in the amount of ₱l0,000.00 in order.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to declare Atty. Jerome B. Bantiyan, Clerk of Court VI, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 34, Banaue, Ifugao, GUILTY of Gross Neglect of Duty for which he is FINED in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000,00), with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely. Respondent Erlinda G. Camilo, former Officer-in-Charge/Court Interpreter, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 34, Banaue, Ifugao, is found GUILTY of Neglect of Duty and FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, ET AL vs. ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN

A.C. No. 10758, December 7, 2015
CBD Case No. 11-3215 is a complaint for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed
against Atty. Dalangin by the following complainants: (1) Atty. Torres; (2) Felicidad O. Samatra
(Samatra); (3) Alvaro; (4) Mary DF. Noveras (Noveras); and (5) Generosa S. Camacho (Camacho).
The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches of his duties as a lawyer. First, it was
alleged that Atty. Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer groundless
suits, which were merely prompted by his loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence as
counsel. By his acts, Atty. Dalangin committed gross misconduct, and breached Rule 18.03, Canon
18, Rules 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Canon 11 of the CPR.

It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-3215, a complaint for disbannent was filed
against Atty. Torres by Apolonia Marzan (Marzan) and 1V1elody Valdez (Valdez), who were clients of
Atty. Dalangin and the losing parties in an unlawful detainer case decided by Presiding Judge Efren B.
Mallare (Judge Mallare) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Marzan and
Valdez later disclosed to Atty. Torres that the filing of the disbarment case was orchestrated by Atty.
Dalangin, who prepared the affidavit and instructed them to sign it even without explaining the
contents and tenor of the document.
When Marzan and Valdez eventually realized that their affidavit was used to file a disbarment
complaint with the IBP against Atty. Torres, they decided to terminate the services of Atty. Dalangin.
By their new counsel's advice, Marzan and Valdez stopped attending the disbarment hearings, and
the case was eventually dismissed by the IBP. Atty. Dalangin also caused Marzan and Valdez's filing
of administrative cases against Judge Mallare and Noveras, as the Clerk of Court of the MTC, which
complaints were nonetheless likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court upon the IBP’s
recommendation.
Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual
(Pascual), a clerk at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin
previously worked as district public attorney. After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he retained Pascual as
his private secretary, who still remained to be employed with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a
daughter whom they named Julienne, even when each of them had existing marriages with some
other persons. The affair between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual, and the paternity of Julienne, were
known to the community, especially the courts. Julienne was nonetheless entered in the civil registry
as Pascual and her legal husband's own child so as to conceal the fact that Atty. Dalangin was the
real father. The foregoing acts allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
CPR.
Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts that dated back to his prior employment
with PAO. He allegedly collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants who sought his assistance, like
complainant Camacho from whom he demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When Camacho
explained that he could only produce ₱3,000.00, Atty. Dalangin threw the case records on a table and
retorted, "Mabubuhay ba naman ang abogado [ditto]." Without prior authority from his superiors,
Atty. Dalangin also willfully appeared in areas outside his jurisdiction as a district public attorney.
Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases.
It was claimed that Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court, which act
constituted a breach of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR. In a case for robbery filed by Samatra
against Pascual, Atty. Dalangin also wielded his influence and prepared perjured statements from
supposed witnesses, a clear violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR. Finally, Atty. Dalangin
violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR when he submitted in a civil case fraudulent and misleading
evidence, particularly a certificate of title without the page reflecting the annotations pertinent to the
case.
Atty. Dalangin filed his Answer and refuted all charges. He denied having a hand in the preparation of
the disbarment complaint against Atty. Torres, as he argued that neither his name nor his signature
appeared in the records thereof. His relationship with Pascual, on the other hand, was only
maliciously misinterpreted. He was only a close friend of the Pascuals, and some of Pascual’s
children, including Julienne, were his godchildren. 14
Atty. Dalangin likewise denied the claim that he collected attorney's fees while he worked as a PAO
lawyer. Although he admitted appearing as a public attorney in an area that was beyond his
jurisdiction, the appearance 1 was with the Regional Public Attorney's verbal authority, claimed by
Atty. Dalangin to be sufficient under office practice. Finally, the alleged mistakes that he committed
as counsel in specific cases' presentation of evidence had been rectified in court.

RULING
Gross Immorality
Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for
three years was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even
when their marriages with their respective spouses subsisted.
Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child Julienne, who was believed to be Atty. Dalangin’s
daughter even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that could prove the child's true filiation. 51
In his report, the Investigative Commissioner specifically referred to the following evidence to support his finding of
an immoral relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual:
2. That Complainant Alvaro who executed an affidavit regarding the illicit and immoral relation of [Atty. Dalangin]
with [Pascual] for the reason that she was formerly [close] to [Pascual] and the latter confided to her that she
(Pascual) [did] not love her husband anymore and the child called [Atty. Dalangin] "Papa attorney" (Affidavit of
Alvaro as Exh. "F").
3. That Ligaya Agrave[,] a neighbor of [Pascual,] likewise executed an affidavit that the child ["Julienne"] is the
daughter of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual], that she used to see [Atty. Dalangin] taking care of [Julienne] when she
was still a baby and when she grew up already, [Atty. Dalangin] used to accompany the child in their school tour and
also her graduation. That the child as she grew older is a look[-]alike of [Atty. Dalangin]. (Affidavit of Ligaya Agrave
marked as Exh. "G").
4. That the illicit affair of [Atty. Dalangin] with his former Clerk in the PAO, Talavera, Nueva Ecija was well known in
Talavera, in the entire judiciary in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and even in the community of Sto. Domingo, Nueva
[E]cija[.] [(L]etter to the Ombudsman dated Aug. 18, 2011 of Felicidad Sumatra is marked as Exh. "H").
5. That [Atty. Dalangin] refused when challenged for a DNA test.
6. Complainants submitted xxx pictures of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual] together with their daughter [Julienne] taken
in far away Puerto Prinsesa marked as Exh. I and I-1.
7. That [Atty. Dalangin] continued to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife shows his
lack of good moral character. 52
Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the
family, and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and
53
morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds no sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair
with Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not adequately proved.
The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The Court explained in Saladaga v. Astorga: 54
Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, such as
the ones at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 55

In Reyes v. Nieva, the Court reiterated this rule on the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings, as it held:
56
Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, which was promulgated just this
June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that
'amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. x x x.
Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the
proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.
The rule is taken in light of other settled principles that apply for a proper disposition of administrative cases.
In Advincula v. Macabata, the Court emphasized:
57
The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of
its disciplinary power. Thus, the adage that he who asserts not he who denies, must prove. xxx. 58
Further, the Court emphasized in Cabas v. Sususco the oft-repeated rule that "mere allegation is not evidence and
59
is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence." 60
With careful consideration of the foregoing tenets, the Court's perusal of the records reveals an insufficiency of
evidence that could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of law.
To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality
harped only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship
between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant
and unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's
birth certificate, a public document, expressly indicated the girl’s father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty.
Dalangin. Julienne’s baptismal certificate also provided such fact, along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s
61 62
defense on his closeness to Julienne for being her godfather.
It would be unfair to Atty. Dalangin, more so for the child whose filiation is in a way needlessly dragged into this
case, for the Court to affirm the assertions in the complaint and the IBP's findings and conclusions on the basis of
the available evidence. The alleged similarities in the physical appearances of Atty. Dalangin and Julienne were but
lame and dismal validations of the complainants’ vehement claim of paternity. Even the photographs of Atty.
63
Dalangin, Pascual and Julienne in what appeared to be a trip to Pue1io Princesa, Palawan were insufficient to
support a conclusion on the unlawful relations. The lone photo where Atty. Dalangin appeared with Pascual and
Julienne, who were apparently merely waiting for boarding in an airport terminal, utterly failed to manifest any
romantic or filial bond among them. It was also explained through an affidavit executed by spouses Dante
64
Capindian and Timotea Jamito that Atty. Dalangin was a principal sponsor, while Pascual’s family were guests, in
their wedding which was held on August 6, 2011 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Apparently, the photos were taken
during the said trip. Pascual’s husband, Edgardo, was also present for the occasion.
The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied any
romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the latter's family, including her
children. It was such display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful
relationship and belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent
and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual
were both married. "As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community." As keepers of public faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and,
65
hence, must handle their personal affairs with great caution." 66

The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should
suffice under the circumstances. The following pronouncement in Advincula v. Macabata is pertinent:
67
While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever
be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from
the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the
public.
x x x Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts
which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are
of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. x x x 68
Gross Misconduct and

Malpractice
Atty. Dalangin was also charged, and recommended for suspension from the practice of law, for several other acts
involving use of misleading evidence in court and preparation of affidavits with pe1jured statements to support
cases and complaints for disbarment. When he still served as a public attorney, he likewise allegedly demanded
acceptance fees from indigent clients, and appeared in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction. Even these charges,
however, were not supported by evidence that could warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension. And while there were
several other charges included in the complaint against Atty. Dalangin, the accusations were actually for actions that
should be attributed not to him, but to other individuals like Pascual.
Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the affidavit
that supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the Court takes note of the fact that the alleged failure to
explain did not necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein made. It refers to the joint affidavit executed by
Marzan and Valdez, and which was attached to the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215, whereby affiants merely
alleged that they signed the affidavit even when they were not fully apprised of its contents. It was not alleged that
69
they were fraudulently lured or tricked by Atty. Dalangin into signing the complaint, and that the charges therein
hurled against Atty. Torres were absolutely false. Thus, the claim that Atty. Dalangin knowingly brought a
groundless suit against a fellow lawyer had no leg to stand on.
The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed demand for attorney's fees while he still worked as a PAO
lawyer also remained unsubstantiated by evidence. Such serious imputation could not have been adequately
1âwphi1
established by an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a lone person, Camacho, from whom the demand for
₱8,000.00 was allegedly made in 2001. Similarly, while Atty. Dalangin admitted to have appeared in courts beyond
70
his area of jurisdiction as public attorney, he claimed to have obtained permission therefor from the Regional Public
Attorney, a defense which the complainants failed to refute. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption
that the respondent regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath shall prevail, especially as the Court
71
considers it highly improbable for the courts where appearances were made to fail to notice such patent irregularity,
if Atty. Dalangin was indeed not authorized to perform his acts before their courts as a public attorney.
Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336-SD(04)AF pending
with the RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National Bank, it has been
explained that the error had been corrected at once during the pre-trial conference. 72
Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his
misquote of jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC, Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No. 1564-05
entitled Bangko Luzon v. Diaz. It was narrated in the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215 that:
14. x x x [T]he cited jurisprudence is hereto quoted:

"If a court of competent jurisdiction annulled the foreclosure sale of the property in question, the issuance of a writ of
possession ceases to be ministerial."
15. In the said case of BPI vs. Tampipi, there is nothing mentioned about the cessation of the ministerial function of
the court but instead what is clearly stated in the decision are the following:
"Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of
a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court."
73
Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling. As counsel and officer of the court,
74
however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was
remiss in the discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10.02 thereof provides:
"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of the
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved."
The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court
detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited
jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate.
A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty.
Dalangin’s own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the statement was
intended to mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine
that was embodied in the jurisprudence's original text.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:
(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent
and cautious in handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN
WARNING that any repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely;

Atty suspended for demanding bribes

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DANTE LA JIMENEZ LOZANO v. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.

Adm. Case No. 8108July 15, 2014

Yes, the respondent is administratively liable. He violated Canon 13 of the CPR. We

Statements made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

Wherefore, Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

IBP FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION:

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ vs .ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

Yes. The court affirmed the recommendations of the IBP.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT

PO1 JOSE CASPE vs. ATTY. AQUILINO MEJICA

IBP Ruling and Recommendation:

SEC. 5. Non-appearance of Parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings. a) Non-appearance

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation[14] dated November 14, 2016, the IBP Investigating

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,

LEAH B. TADAY v. ATTY. DIONISIO B. APOYA, JR.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

HDI HOLDINGS v. ATTY. EMMANUEL CRUZ

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL CRUZ, guilty of

OLIVER FABUGAIS v. ATTY. BERARDO C. FAUNDO JR.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

C) Whether Atty. Faundo should be held administratively liable.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

Rule 7.03 of the Code or Professional Responsibility further provides:

And in aggravation of the aforementioned unseemly behavior, Atty. Faundo apparently

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Faundo Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. is

JILDO A. GUBATON v. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty of gross immorality.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to the Bar in 1971), is presumed

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S.

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

Aggrieved, complainant sought the intervention of then Department of Justice (DOJ)

The IBP Report and Recommendation

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE

WHEREFORE, respondent Prosecutor Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

The case was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court.

Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria (respondent) submitted an

In a Resolution dated August 4, 2011, the CA directed Atty. Villanueva to submit proof of

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS | JENNIE GUERZON

All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent.

Respondent paid no heed to this Resolution.

The Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan (Investigating Commissioner) found

Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors