Magno vs.

CA

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop operational, approached
Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that
Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide
him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but
Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

RTC Ruling:

finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing
the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to
complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)

It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-
appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents
showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has
interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have
gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her
possession the checks that "bounced".

No

Ratio:
To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it
having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in
question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials
and employees of LS Finance.

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely
applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to
put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey
Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S.
Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Rogelio vs roque

ROGELIO ROQUE vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Petitioner Rogelio Roque was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide. When arraigned on March 23, 2003,
petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”The prosecution averred that day while brothers Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and
Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio
dela Cruz and shouted to him to join them. At that instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle.
Believing that Rodolfo’s shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo
apologized for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers
that something bad would happen to them if they continue to perturb him. Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of
Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao to ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Then Reynaldo just proceeded to
petitioner’s house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioner’s residence,
Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he
came out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner then
shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the nape. Fortunately, Reynaldo’s parents arrived and took him to
a local hospital for emergency medical treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila.
Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that day, the petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a
tricycle to fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated.
Petitioner ignored the two and just went home. Later, however, the brothers appeared in front of his house still
shouting invectives against him. Petitioner requested Tayao tos top and pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm down
and instead fired his gun.

Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice. On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84, rendered its Decision2 finding petitioner guilty as charged

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order4 dated August 16, 2007. Undaunted,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision dated February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the
RTC’s Decision, Hence, the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration thereto was likewise denied in a Resolution dated
July 30, 2010. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courtwhere petitioner imputes
upon the CA the following errors all pertain to “appreciation of evidence” or factual errors.

ISSUE
Whether or not the SC can entertain petition for certiorari wherein the issues imputed pertains to “appreciation of
evidence” or factual errors?

HELD:

NO. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a decision in
a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by
petition for review on certiorari. A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of
Court, explicitly so provides

De Guzman vs Perez

FACTS

Ruling:

 RTC found Alfredo guilty beyond unreasonable reason in the crime of FRUSTATED
HOMICIDE and was sentenced 6 MONTHS AND 1 DAY of PRISION CORRECTION as
MINIMUM and6 YEARS AND ONE DAY of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM and pay the
private complainant compensatory damages in amount of P14,170.35
 CA dismissed the instant appeal and hereby affirmed the RTC’s decision.
 The SC affirmed the decision promulgated finding Alexander GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and was sentenced 4 YEARS of
PRISION CORRECTIONAL as MINIMUM and 8 YEARS AND ONE DAY of PRISION
MAYOR as MAXIMUM and orders the petitioner to pay Alexander P30,000 (CIVIL
INDEMITY), P30,000 (MORAL DAMAGES) and P14,170.35 plus interest 6% annum
(COMPENSATORY DAMAGES)
Important Details:

 On the evening of Dec. 24, 1997, Alexander Fojo was fetching water below his
rented house in Mandaluyong City when he was suddenly hit on the nape by
Alfredo De Guzman, brother of Alexander’s land lady, Lucila Bautista.
 Alexander informed Lucila about what happened and she apologized on behalf of
Alejandro and told the latter to just go up.
 Later on, at around 12:00 to 12:15 pm, he went down and continued fetch water.
While pouring water, Alfredo suddenly appeared and stabbed him on left face and
chest
 Cirilino Bantaya, son-in-law of Alexander, saw the victim bleeding and begging for
help. Alexander told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him.
 Cirilino brought and rushed him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.
Alexander two (2) stabbed wounds, one in zygoma (FACE), left part and one in the
upper left chest which was fatal. The attending physician, Francisco Obmerga,
stated that the second wound could have caused Alexander’s death if he did not
get rushed to the hospital.
  Alfredo appealed to the CA, contending that his intent to kill (CRITICAL ELEMENT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED) was not established, and that any person could have
inflicted the wounds.
 Petitioner also insisted that he should be guilty of slight physical injuries, not
frustrated homicide.
Felony/Infraction/Omission:

 FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE – as ruled by RTC, CA

ISSUE

 Whether or not the INTENT TO KILL, which is a criminal element of the crime
charged, is established in the case. (RELATED TO ARTICLE 3, INTENT)
HELD

 YES. The wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuff-marks inflicted in the
heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and
used a knife in his assault on Alexander. There is also to be no doubt about the wound
on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely
medical intervention. (ARTICLE 3, INTENT)
INTENT TO KILL is determined by the ff. factors:

1. Nature and number of the weapon used by the offender in the commission of the
crime – STABBED THE VICTIM USING A KNIFE
2. Nature, number and location of wounds inflicted/sustained by the victim – 2
wounds: One in the ZYGOMA (left side), one in the upper left chest
3. The manner of committing the crime – Alfredo stabbed him 2 times
4. Acts, deeds or words stated by the offender before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime – Alejandro was hit on the nape by Alfredo
5. Evidence of the motive (before or after but NOT during the commission of the
crime – direct evidence is not available)
Note:

Specific Criminal Intent – it must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable

doubt since the VICTIM did not die in this case. If the VICTIM died, the intent to kill
becomes a GENERAL CRIMINAL INTENT which is presumed by law.

The ELEMENTS of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE are:

(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault;

(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and

(3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is present.
Title: Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326

Subject Matter: Attempted v. Frustrated Murder, Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his
wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of words ensued. In the following day,
when Ruben and his three year old daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo together with his brother
Esmeraldo and Ismael Rivera emerged from their house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben
with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. The
Rivera brothers fled when policemen came. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the
victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened.

Issues:

(1) WON there was intent to kill.

(2) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder.

(3) WON the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.

Held:

(1) Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows, while
Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by the victim were merely
superficial and could not have produced his death, intent to kill is presumed.

(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

(3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity for the victim to repel
it or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden attack to the victim caused him to be overwhelmed and had no
chance to defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.

RTC:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal
injury on his head and on the different parts of his body, the accused thus commenced the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason
of some causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran (sic) away
and the timely response of the policemen, to his damage and prejudice.SO ORDERED.

CA: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is MODIFIED in that the appellants
are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as
minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[9]

SC:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2)
years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor
in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

U.S. vs Ah Chong

Facts:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the Officers’

quarters at Fort McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was thedeceased, Pascual
Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy. There had been severalrobberies in Fort McKinley prior to the incident
thus prompting the defendant and his roommateto reinforce the flimsy hook used to lock the door of their room by
placing a chair against it. Thedefendant and the deceased had an understanding that when either returned at night, he
shouldknock on the door and say his name. On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who was alonein his room, was
awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. Thedefendant called out twice, asking the identity of
the person but heard no answer. Fearing thatthe intruder was a robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he
would kill the intruder if hetried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and the defendant was struck
firstabove the knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the darkness of the room, the defendantthought he was being
hit by the intruder and tried to defend himself by striking wildly at theintruder using a common kitchen knife which he
kept under his pillow. It turned out that the saidintruder was actually the defendant’s roommate, Pascual Gualberto. The
roommate wasbrought to the military hospital where he died from the effects of the wound the following day.

Issue:

WON the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony.

Held:

Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated.In order for mistake of fact to be held as a valid defense, there has
to be several requisites.One, that the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believedthem
to be. Two, that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful, andlastly, that the mistake must be
without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.In the case at bar, had the intruder been a robber as the
defendant believed him to be, then AhChong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, and would have
been whollyexempt from criminal liability and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence orrecklessness

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio.
So ordered.
Yapyucu vs Sandiganbayan

CASE OF CALL OF DUTY

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y G.R. Nos. 120744-46

ENRIQUEZ,
Petitioner,
 
- versus -
 
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

FACTS:

The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva).
Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto
Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in
San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of
Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra),
Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David
(David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in
Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted
murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 16612:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then
policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their
office, did then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing
directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot
wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and
immediate death of the latter.

On the same day, and with the same intent to take life and attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera,
Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican also, Noel C. Villanueva boarded on the same colored green Toyota
Tamaraw by using firing weapons; although three are all same criminal cases, they were filed directly to the
above-named accused. The criminal cases numbers; 16613 and 16614.

Yapyuco who was then allegedly adversed entered individual pleas of not guilty. A month later, Yapyuco
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a negative plea. In the
meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for
Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612. On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case
No. 16612. Yapyuco likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21,
1991. Pamintuan, same as Pabalan who died earlier; died on November 21, 1992, and accordingly, the charges
against him were dismissed.

The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican
and Licup (victims) were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00
and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had
passed. As they were all intoxicated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully
and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his
companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly,
Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.

In open court, Flores executed a sketch depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the
residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road right
after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen
Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how
many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were
wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of
Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be employees
of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan corrected them for not stopping when flagged. At this point,
he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva)
and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he
observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to
be taken to the hospital. This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased,
two armed men, together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney
and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.

Flores claimed that all the accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for
Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the
other accused for that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. He claimed the bullet holes on
the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any
other portion of the vehicle.

Yapyuco only took stand for defense, narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men were
investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police assistance from David,
who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in
Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time
no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their
uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.

Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that he had
earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly
intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of
armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later,
Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle
of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As
the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and
Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the
jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan
and Puno, to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at
the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons house
directly at the subject jeepney.

Yapyuco recalled that Flores, exclaimed that they were employees of San Miguel Corporation. Holding their
fire, they searched the vehicle and found no firearms but two injured men whom they loaded them to jeep and
brought to hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the
people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.

That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and
Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team
headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed. He denied that
they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have
been killed. He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or
from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch
as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled.

Issue: Whether or not Yapyuco and his men and the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right.

Whether or not they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.

Held: The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful
performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as members
of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11
(5) of the Revised Penal Code:

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL

LIABILITY

Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as
co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged
in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of
frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all
of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and
Calma.

The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty
or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The
justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as
guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. Where invoked,
this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has
committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or
offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or
office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or
duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.

We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this
case.

The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law enforcement operation.
No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them – who were either police and barangay
officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order – were bound to, as they did,
respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. While, it may certainly be argued that
rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were
acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more
telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety
of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the
accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense.

But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether or not they were at
the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the
prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations of
these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the
legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must
be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he
should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without
danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work
requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to
other government officers or agencies.

The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating
the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their
co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners
affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored
the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later on conceded
to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once
reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that
the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He
also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against members of law
enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the
incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency
of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years
and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum.

(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount
of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of
P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

(Inclusion: Justifying circumstance; lawful exercise of right. The availability of the justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on
proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office,
and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The justification is based on the complete absence of intent
and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with
criminal intent or with fault or negligence.

Loney vs. PeopleG.R. No. 152644, Feb. 10, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are the Pres.and CEO, Senior Manager, and
Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque.Marcopper had been storing tailings (mine waste) from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac andMakulapnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end.On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s
end. In a few days, Mt. Tapianpit had discharged millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.In
August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,Marinduque with violation of Art. 91 (B),
subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067 or theWater code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 984 or the National Pollution
Decree of 1976, Sec.108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act of 1995, and Art. 365 of the RPC for
RecklessImprudence Resulting to Damage to Property.In the Consolidated Order of MTC, granting partial reconsideration
to its Joint Orderquashing the information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained theInformations for
violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently fileda petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing
that the portion of the Consolidated Ordermaintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and the petition was
raffled to Br. 94while public respondent’s appeal assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashingthe Info. for
violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was consolidated withpetitioners petition.MTC Br. 94 granted the
public respondent’s appeal but denied petitioner’s petition.Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging that Br. 94 acted withgrave abuse of discretion because 1.the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984,
RA7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC “proceeded from are based on a single act or incident of polluting the rivers thru
dumping of mine tailings, and the charge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element
of “lack of necessary or adequateprotection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence” is common among them, 2.
theduplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova. The Courtof Appeals affirmed the
Br. 94 ruling.

Issue:

1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one should bequashed for duplicity of charges and only
the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting inDamage to Property should stand2. whether or not Br. 94’s ruling, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenesPeople v. Relova.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges morethan one
offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. As early asthe start of the last century, the court
ruled that a single act or incident might offend againsttwo or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus
justifying the prosecutionof the accused for more than one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional
prohibitionthat no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishing for the same offense. In People vs.Doriquez, the
court held that two or more offenses arising form the same act are not thesame. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue
because not all its elements are present.On petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365 of the RPC
“absorbs”the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in sefelony (such as
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property) cannot absorb malaprohibita crimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984 and RA 7942). What makes theformer felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) and what makes
the lattercrimes are the special laws enacting them.Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution
contravenes ruling inPeople vs. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the court’s statement in Relova that the lawseeks to
prevent harassment of the accused by “multiple prosecutions for offenses whichthough different from one another are
nonetheless each constituted by a common set oroverlapping sets of technical elements. Thus, Relova is no authority for
petitioners’ claimagainst multiple prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is
not an issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners arebeing prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by anordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall under
the first sentence of Sec. 21, Art. III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as inRelova, for
offenses arising from the same incident

484 SCRA 617 – Criminal Law – Felonies – Mala In Se vs Mala Prohibita Crimes – Defense of Good Faith

In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the senatorial elections.

Meanwhile, in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Arsenia Garcia was one of the designated election officers. Garcia was accused by
Pimentel of violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. Pimentel alleged that Garcia decreased Pimentel’s vote by
5,000 votes.

The trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, Garcia invoked that the trial court erred in ruling that her defense of good
faith was not properly appreciated. She averred that due to the workload given to her during said elections, she got
fatigued and that caused the error in the tabulation of Pimentel’s votes.

Pimentel argued that the Electoral Reforms Law is a special law hence it is a malum prohibitum law and therefore, good
faith is not a defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of Garcia of the Electoral Reforms Law is a malum prohibitum.
HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to those felonies in violation of the Revised Penal Code. However, it must
be noted that mala in se are crimes which are inherently immoral. Hence, even if the crime is punished by a special law,
if it is inherently immoral, then it is still a crime mala in se.

In this case, the said violation of the Electoral Reforms Law is a mala in se crime because it is inherently immoral to
decrease the vote of a candidate. Note also that what is being punished is the intentional decreasing of a candidate’s
votes and not those arising from errors and mistakes. Since a violation of this special law is a malum in se, good faith can
be raised as a defense.

However, Garcia’s defense of good faith was not proven. Facts show that the decreasing of Pimentel’s vote was not due
to error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly handled certain duties which were not supposed to be hers to
perform. That’s a clear sign that she facilitated the erroneous entry.

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24547[1] that affirmed the
conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court[2] of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section
27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.[3]

n a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner
who was convicted as follows:

x x x5. And finally, on the person of ARSENIA B. GARCIA, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt,
of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of
5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced
to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the
minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused ARSENIA B. GARCIA is not
entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of
her right of suffrage.

The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to
the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, thus,

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the
minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Case Digest: Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171951 28 August 2009

FACTS:

The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down to which Garcia
commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him. Two days later, the group
decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to come out of his house and upon being
summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him. Chy continued to parry the blows and when he found an opportunity to
escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling. He also complained of difficulty in
breathing. He was found later unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to
have caused the death of Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide. The autopsy doctor confirms that the
boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the
heart attack if the victim’s heart is healthy. What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning
the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:

Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should be appreciated

RULING:

The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from
criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in
accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour
of the petitioner. The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically
caused the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good condition.

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion
temporal in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court properly imposed upon
petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544
affirming the Decision2 dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found
petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the appellate court’s
Resolution3 dated March 13, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K.
Chy, inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated December 20, 2005, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.11

Urbano v. IAC

Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened,
and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the
canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the
bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses
of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor
found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following
day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the
deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus
that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to
do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs
de oficio.

SO ORDERED

People of the Philippines vs Orlito Villacorta

657 SCRA 270 – Criminal Law – Criminal Liability – Proximate Cause – Efficient Intervening Cause

On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere, Orlito Villacorta appeared and
thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled.

Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he was treated as out-patient. He was
discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the stabbing incident, he returned to the same
hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus. The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report
states that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.

HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done by Villacorta upon Cruz. There was an
efficient intervening cause which appeared between the time of the stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz.

In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus (the kind of tetanus which
causes immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or less. In this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could
not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already lapsed from the time of the stabbing until the date of death of
Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other than the stabbing – in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less
before February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.

The court explained further:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz]
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of attempted nor frustrated
murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.

People of the Philippines vs Adriano

On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles and P02 Alejandro Santos, in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp
Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road. While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding
blue Toyota Corolla with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV with
plate no. CTL 957. When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused the CRV to
swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the
CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray
bullet. The four armed men hurried back to the Corolla and immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos followed the Corolla but
lost track of the latter. Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced dead on arrival due to three (3)
gunshot wounds on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head. During the investigation, the police learned that
the Corolla was registered under the name of Antonio V. Rivera. Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the
Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. RTC convicted Adriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, and guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

RELEVANT TOPICS:

1. Murder by ambush

2. Aberratio Ictus

3. Aberratio Ictus qualified by Treachery

RULINGS:

First, in case of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:

1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.

4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the
positive identification of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating circumstance and
use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as generic aggravating circumstances.

For the death of Cabiedes, the present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure that the victim is killed and at
the same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim—ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery. Paragraph 16
of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against
persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.  The
"essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself." Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as Adriano, together with the other
accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along the national highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes.

Second, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes
criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been
Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct
consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural: Criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el
que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

Finally, although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora, where the
Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of
two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the lower
penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. WHEREFORE, the
appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the CA is affrmed with modifications, Adriano is guilty of Murder for the death of Cabiedes and Bulanan.

VERDICT: GUILTY; TWO COUNTS OF MURDER

People of the Philippines v. Noel Sales

father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and
inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,[13] the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that
appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the
Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in
his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The
dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt,
he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in
Crim. Case No. RTC03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium
period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code. Considering
that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the
time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[15] which was given due course in an Order[16] dated September 21, 2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
Decision[17] reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case
Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the
Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.[18]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the
Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and
RTC03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is
imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

INTOD VS. CA
FACTS:Ponente: Justice Campos, JR. 1992Petitioner:

Sulpicio IntodRespondent

:Court of AppealsVictim:

Bernardina PalangpanganAccessories:Pangasian,Tubio,Daligdig

MandayaEvents:

Intod, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig went to Mandaya’s house

and asked the latter to comewith them in killing Palangpangan or else he would also be killed

Intod wanted to kill Palangpangan because of a land dispute between them.

10:00pm of that same day, Petitioner, together with his accessories, commenced in performingtheir planned crime.
Mandaya pointed to the room of Palangpangan and petitioner andcompany fired at the said room.

It turned out that Palangpangan was in another city, no one was in the room when the accusedfired shots, and no one
was hit by the gun fire.Filling of the Case:

Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of Attempted Murder.

The decision of RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.ISSUES:

Intod filed a petition for review of the affirmation made by the Court of Appeals of the decisionheld by the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioner seeks from this court a modification of judgment byholding him liable only for an impossible crime.

W/N the act committed by Intod and his accomplices constitutes an Impossible Crime.

RULING:

Intod’s

petition was granted, the crime committed by Intod was modified from AttemptedMurder to an Impossible Crime.

Article 4 Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code States:Criminal Liability shall be incurred:b. By a person committing an act
which would be an offense against persons or property, were itnot for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment,
or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

The case at far constitutes an inherent impossibility to perform the act due to factual or physicalimpossibility, that is,
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor beyond his controlprevent the consummation of the intended crime.

Impossible Crime is recognized and punished here in the Philippines, as compared to, UnitedStates, thus, judgment
rendered by the US in similar nature with the case at bar should notapplied.

Impossible Crimes constitutes a criminal liability, in order to, punish the criminal intent

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO,
Petitionervs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RespondentPERALTA,

A petition for review on

certiorari

filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appealsaffirming petitioner's
conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Facts:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check
waspayment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of
MegaFoam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of
Mega Foam.Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of
Land Bank,who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO
checkdeposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through
accusedAnita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but
theycould be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega
Foam.Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquinoto replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally
intofour: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega
Foam'saccountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco
talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handedpetitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as
payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino furthertestified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the
phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. Verificationfrom company records showed that petitioner never remitted
the subject check to Mega Foam. However, BabyAquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as
replacement for the dishonored check.Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapmentoperation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked
and dusted withfluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to
pretend that shewas going along with Valencia's plan.Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino'sfactory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises
of Baby Aquino, pretending that shewas getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out
from the premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the
money and uponreturning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valencia werearrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.A case was filed against the three accused,
Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC rendered its Decisionfinding them

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced eachimprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,as minimum, to SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS,as
maximum.The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial court was

MODIFIED
, in that:(a) thesentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia
isreduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. Hence,the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,

Issue:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

Held:

As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,the personal property subject of
thetheft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gainfrom the thing stolen This isfurther bolstered by
Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused isdependent on the value of the
thing stolen.In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparentlywithout value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified
theftwas actually produced. The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

People Vs Lamahang

FACTS:

 The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is  on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempted robber
y.
 At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado a
nd C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe accused in the act of making an opening with a
n iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street.
 At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
 The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, w
hen the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

ISSUE:

WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:

YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilty of attempted tres
pass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances an
d sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor.

RATIONALE:

It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natu
ral course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will 
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offend
er clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to an
other. In the instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter b
y means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering t
he store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in t
he record to justify a concrete finding.

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is want
ing, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be infer
red from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio).  The relation existing between the facts submitted f
or appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be as
certained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice.

Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion  that the fact under consideration does 
not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. Against the accused must be taken into con
sideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows 
that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitiga
ting circumstance of lack of instruction.

Baleros vs People

ARTICLE 6 and 7 – Consummated, Frustrated and Attempted Felonies

BALEROS, JR. VS. PEOPLE 483 SCRA 10

Parties Involved
Renato “Chito” Baleros, Jr. as petitioner
People as respondent

Facts
Early morning of Dec. 13, 1991, Malou was awakened by a smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled to
break free but his attacker was pinning her down, holding her tightly. When her right hand finally got free, she grabbed and
squeezed the sex organ of his attacker. The man let her go, enabling Marilou to seek help from her maid and classmates living
nearby.

An investigation was conducted in which the evidences pointed to Chito as the attacker. The RTC thus found Chito guilty for
attempted rape and ordered him to suffer an indeterminate sentence (from prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as
maximum) and to pay Malou PHP 50,000.

Chito made an appeal to the CA only to be denied. He moved for a reconsideration but to no avail. He thus made an appeal to the SC
arguing that:
1. There was not enough evidence to find him guilty of the crime
2. Prosecution failed to satisfy all requisites for conviction
3. Circumstances relied on to convict him were unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
4. There was no motive.
5. The awarding of damages to complainant was improper and unjustified.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favour the constitutional presumption of innocence and that moral certainty has not been met,
he should be acquitted on the basis that the offense charged has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues
1. Whether the evidence adduced by prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the
crime of attempted rape
2. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted rape

Held
1. No. The court’s decision was merely based on speculations.
2. Yes. SC reversed and modifies the decision of the CA, acquitting Chito of attempted rape. He is adjudged guilty of light
coercion and is ordered to serve 30 days of arresto mayor and pay PHP 200.
Doctrine/Ratio
Art. 335 of the RPC, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation
2. When woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
3. When woman is under 12 years of age or demented

Art. 6 of the RPC defines attempted rape when offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.

The attempt which RPC punishes is the act that has logical connection to the crime that should it have been successful, the attempt
would lead to the consummation of rape. However, there was no carnal knowledge in the case. The pressing of a chemical-soaked
cloth while on top of Malou did not necessarily constitute an overt act of rape. Moreover, the petitioner did not commence any act
that was indicative of an intent to rape Malou. The petitioner was fully clothed; there was no attempt to neither undress her nor
touch her private part.

In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential requisite. Therefore for an attempted rape, accused must have commenced the act
of penetrating but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration was not completed. Thus
petitioner’s act of lying on top of her, embracing and kissing her or touching her private part do not constitute rape or attempted
rape.

Peopple vs Lizada

Doctrine: The spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal liability for the intended
crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his desistance.

FACTS: In August 1998, the petitioner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force, violence and intimidation Analia Orillosa, his stepdaughter, by embracing, kissing, and touching her
private parts. He then proceeded with carnal knowedge to remove her skirt and panty and placed himself on top
of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. This allegation was repeated four times in a different
occasions.

However, medical examination revealed that Analia’s hymen was intact, and the other parts of her vagina was
not injured due to an insertion of average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection.

The testimony of Rossel, Analia’s sister, also proved that no insertion of penis happened because the petitioner
stopped after he saw her.

Hence, petitioner was charged for four counts of qualified rape under four separate information. RTC accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him and sentenced to Death Penalty in each and
every case as provided for in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

However, petitioner averred in his brief that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and that the testimony of Rossel was not taken into consideration in the decision.

ISSUE: WON Lizada is guilty of acts of lasciviousness only.

RULING: NO. Accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commencesthe commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

2. He does not performall the acts of execution which should producethe felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneousdesistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of executionwas due to causeor accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his spontaneous desistance, he is not
guilty of an attempted felony.The law does not punish him for his attempt to commit a felony.

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the appellant
can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission of rape by removing his clothes,
undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victims brother. Thus, his penis merely touched Mary Joys private
organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on
him should be an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum.

People vs Abella

Facts:
On October 7, 1998, petitioner-accused Fe Perpetua Abella, a farmer, baker and trisicad driver, was charged with
frustrated homicide after he hacked one, BENIGNO ABELLA y PERPETUA, with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s
neck thereby inflicting the following injuries: (1) hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and (2) incised wound left hand
dorsal aspect. After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only arrested by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002. During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial
and trial thus proceeded.

The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching
television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring
trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro Tayrus and a certain Dionisio
Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and along
the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.

Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived bringing with him two scythes, one in
each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away. The petitioner wanted to enter Alejandro’s
house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked him not to proceed. The petitioner then pointed the scythe, which he held
in his left hand, in the direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right hand was used to hack the latter’s neck
once. Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to the hospital while the petitioner ran to chase
Alejandro. Benigno incurred an expense of more than P10,000.00 for hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills. He
further claimed that after the hacking incident, he could no longer move his left hand and was thus deprived of his
capacity to earn a living as a carpenter.

Dr. Ardiente, a surgeon from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered medical
assistance to Benigno after the latter was hacked by the petitioner, testified that Benigno sustained the abovementioned
injuries. Benigno was initially confined in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and was discharged on September 23,
1998. The defense relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he
and his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking
incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando Fernandez, a friend of petitioner, testified that on
September 6, 1998, he saw the petitioner gathering woods to make a hut.  Later in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m.,
Urbano Cabag spotted the petitioner drinking tuba in the store of Clarita Perpetua.

RTC Ruling: The RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of Frustrated Homicide. Petitioner Fe Abella was sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to Ten
(10) years and One (1) day to Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The petitioner then filed an appeal  before
the CA primarily anchored on the claim that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on Benigno’s neck.

The CA Ruling: The CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction for frustrated homicide but modified the sentence to imprisonment
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.

The CA held that Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of consummated
homicide is reclusion temporal, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same
Code, the penalty for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated homicide is
punishable by prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from
the medium period of prision mayor. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor should be
reduced by one degree, which is prision correccional, with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The
minimum of the indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision correccional.

Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Issue: WON the RTC and the CA erred in rendering judgments which are not in accordance with law and applicable
jurisprudence and which if not corrected, will cause grave injustice and irreparable damage to the petitioner

Held: NO

To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the
acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical
intervention or attendance. In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s
life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.
And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and
number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.

The petitioner invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr. to argue that homicidal intent is absent, in Pentecostes, Jr.,
the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the body. The attending physician certified that the injury
would require medical attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged from the hospital the
following day. In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-cm long incised
wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to
have complications resulting from these injuries because the wounds were extensive and they were big and they were
open wounds, so there is a possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the instrument used was not
a sterile instrument contaminated with other things." No complications developed from Benigno’s wounds which could
have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days.

From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of a scythe against Benigno’s
neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require
imagination to figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a
person and leave him dead. While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s neck and
left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal considering the period of
his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.

This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is negated by the fact that he
pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already
delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by reason of a
timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will. All told, this Court finds
no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC’s conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged.

WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner, Fe Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY the offended party moral damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Further, the monetary awards for damages
shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

People vs Labiaga

In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag
(Demapanag), was charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an Information3 which reads:

The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case No.
2002-1777, under an Information4 which states:

ersion of the prosecution

The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his
two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio
stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their house.

Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called
Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other
accused were standing behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead," and the three fled the crime scene.

Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio made
a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.

Dr. Jeremiah Obañana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her death was caused by "cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot wound."5

Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident. He found that Gregorio sustained a
gunshot wound measuring one centimeter in diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma formation"
in his right shoulder.6

Version of the defense

Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23 December 2000. He claimed, however, that
he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant,
but the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired.
He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.

Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill, which is approximately 14 kilometers away
from the crime scene. This was corroborated by Frederick, Demapanag’s brother.

RTC

In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence. Appellant, however, was convicted
of murder and frustrated murder.

CA
Appellant impugned the RTC’s Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely erred in convicting the appellant of the
crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu, however,
upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder.

SC

Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that appellant is guilty of attempted murder and
not frustrated murder. We uphold appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify the civil
indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the award of moral and exemplary damages in both
cases.

We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and not frustrated murder in Criminal Case
No. 2002-1777.

In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely
medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the
victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not
frustrated murder.In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal

Valenzuela vs People

FACTS:

While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel
Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon,
was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent.
Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the cartons inside. As the taxi was about to leave, the security
guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of
consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of
frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage.

HELD:

No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that
there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. The Court held that theft is produced when there
is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the
owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or
consummated

Valenzuela vs People
FACTS:

While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel
Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon,
was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent.
Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the cartons inside. As the taxi was about to leave, the security
guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of
consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of
frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage.

HELD:

No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that
there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. The Court held that theft is produced when there
is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the
owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or
consummated

Canceran vs People

Facts:

was charged with "Frustrated Theft."

Damalito Ompoc (Ompoc), a security guard

(Arcenio), the Customer Relation Officer... on or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Caneeran approach one of
the counters in Ororama

Caneeran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1,423.00

Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had... been checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the
packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes
of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20

Caneeran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching... the Don Mariano gate, Caneeran stumbled as
he attempted to ride a jeepney

Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal... belongings were deposited in the office of Arcenio.
Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo merchandiser

On his way out, after buying medicine and mineral water, a male person of around 20... years of age requested
him to pay for the items in his cart at the cashier; that he did not know the name of this man who gave him
P1,440.00 for payment of two boxes labelled Magic Flakes... he obliged with the request of the unnamed person
because he was struck by his... conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of the said two boxes; that after
paying at the cashier, he went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney... consummated Theft i

The RTC wrote that Canceran's denial deserved scant consideration because it was not supported by sufficient
and convincing evidence and no disinterested witness was presented to corroborate his claims.

Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the issue of double jeopardy for the first time.

The CA affirmed

Issues:

whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the information... whether
there was double jeopardy.

Ruling:

The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.

A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged with "Frustrated
Theft" only.

As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge Canceran of
consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced. Instead, the
Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was... being charged with theft in its attempted stage
only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.

"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the complaint or
information and on which he was tried.

Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily
included in the information filed against him.

In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated Theft, he could be
convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming... evidence to convict him for
consummated Theft, because the Information did not charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do
so as the same would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him, as
he so protests.

the real nature of the criminal charge is determined,... but by the actual recital... of facts in the complaint or
information.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was qualified by the additional allegation, but, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason... of some cause independent of accused's will, that is, they were discovered by the
employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds
White Beauty Cream, x x x
This averment, which could also be... deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge nebulous.

There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the accused, Canceran, and holds that he
was not properly informed that the charge against him was consummated theft.

No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached

People of the Philippines vs pareja

The accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted
out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04–1556–CFM and 04–1557–CFM.2

On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape.

AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on three (3)
different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.

AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old9 ]. At the time of the commission of the aforementioned
crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting
with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.

The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s mother was not in the house and
was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on
top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of
[AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt,
AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house.

Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear that [Pareja]
might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident to anyone.

AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to AAA, [i]n
February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as
the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her half–siblings were asleep, [Pareja] again
laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted
his finger [i]n it.

With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother who saw [Pareja] in
the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought
AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had been
sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.

Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital
for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional Medico–Legal Report Number
2004–03–0091. Her medico–legal report stated the following conclusion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

After the results of the medico–legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s mother then filed a complaint
for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his defense. He
denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live–in partner and that they all stay in
the same house.

Contrary to AAA’s allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that the alleged incidents happened.
To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged
sexual abuses could have happened.

According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10) meters, and was so
small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their house is located was
thickly populated with houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her
siblings.

All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about with his plan
without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.

Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him by AAA. He contended
that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason
behind her parents’ separation.10

Ruling of the RTC

On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the crimes of
rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion
of the Decision11 reads as follows:

The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the prosecution’s
evidence as against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution
to present AAA’s mother to testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the
crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis
of AAA’s testimony for being hearsay evidence as she had no personal knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004
because she was sleeping at that time.

CA

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED.
The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in
Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04–1556 to 04–1557 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SC

This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from sucking her breasts,
Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to give a clear and convincing account of such
insertion during her testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts
were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on,
she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and
inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing
himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed
above, is included in the crime of rape.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 03794 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to two
(2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisión
correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral
damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Cruz vs People

FACTS:

The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims. The
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz guilty of both crimes charged, hence, this appeal.

Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic wares and glass wares in La Union.
Upon reaching the place, they set up their tents to have a place to sleep. Petitioner’s wife and their driver went back to
Manila to get more goods. While sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on top of her mashing her breast and touching
her private part. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she will be killed. AAA fought back and Norberto was not able to
pursue his lustful desires. AA left the tent to seek for help. When she returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching
the private parts of BBB. This prompted Norberto to leave the tent.

Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly do the acts imputed out in the open as
there were many people preparing for the “simbang gabi”. He further assails the credibility AAA for the crime of rape,
alleging that the complaints were filed only for the purpose of extorting money from him.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?

HELD:

NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal
knowledge is defined simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,” in other words, rape
is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In attempted
rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal
knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage
requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all
the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused
can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with
the female.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing
her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. Such circumstances
remained equivocal, or “susceptible of double interpretation,” such that it was not permissible to directly infer from
them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury.

The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
committed. Petitioner’s embracing and touching the victim’s vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie
with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of
her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. The
intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any,
unless he committed overt acts leading to rape.

Hence, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.