The Defence of Kahun

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THE
DEFENCE OF KAHUN.
A Forgotten Episode of the First Afghan War.
BEING A NARRATIVE COMPILED FROM A JOURNAL KEPT
DURING THE SIEGE, AND FROM ORIGINAL LETTERS,
BY
CHARLES REYNOLDS WILLIAMS.

mums. or “som: rnoFEssxonAL mccouxcnons." ‘
(Reprinted from “THE ARMY AND NAVY MAGAZINE," April 1886.)
LONDON:
W. H. ALLEN 8c 00., 13 WATERLOO PLACE,
PALL MALL. s.w.
1886.
(All Rights Reserved.)

LONDON:
PRINTED BY w. H. ALLEN AND 00., 13 WATERLOO PLACE. s.w.
Am/
D5563
.n/s’x
CONTENTS.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
CHAPTER II. 15
CHAPTER III. 25
CHAPTER IV. 32
CHAPTER V.
CHAPTER VI. 59
CHAPTER VII. 68
CHAPTER VIII. 78
SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER . 90
u
jc/z easev
THE DEFENCE OE KAHUN.
CHAPTER I.
IT may be as well to face the fact at the outset that

forty-five years have elapsed since the occurrence of the
events now about to be narrated. I hope this may not
be considered a fatal objection, or that the narrative
will, for that reason alone, be laid aside as stale and
unprofitable. I know from my own experience that in
these stirring, restless, and money-making times men
are too busy with the present to care much about events
which happened so long ago. ‘With most of us, the
appetite for news, the news of the day,vappears to be
all-devouring, and palls on things of the past. The
present age has not, in this respect, improved on the
Athenians of old, and many, I fear, still spend their
time in'nothing else but either to tell or to hear some
new thing. And as for literature—tbe Times newspaper,
and the thousand and one publications of the hour, sup
ply the majority of the public with sufiicient food in the
way of mental nourishment.
1
7/‘
2 THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN.
Without doubt it is true that the last half-century

has been so crowded with great events, following quickly
one upon the other, that the last great event is all
absorbing, and effaces the impressions of its predecessor.
The wonderful story of the Retreat from Gabul, and of
the Defence of Jellalabad, made way for the hard-fought
battles of the Crimea and the Siege of Sebastopol.
The recollections of these have, in their turn, been sup
planted by the heart-rending scenes of Cawnpore, and
the glorious achievements and heroic episodes of the
Indian Mutiny. More recently men’s minds have been
fastened on a still more memorable siege, one in which
the central figure, by reason of its pure yet dazzling
lustre, has riveted upon it the eyes of the whole civilized
world; I mean, of course, the siege of Khartoum.
And yet all these striking events and many others of
varied significance in diiferent quarters of the world,
have happened within the memory of many of us who
are still living, and are associated with our own
times. But—shall I venture to say it ?— Gabul,
Jellalabad, Sebastopol, the Indian Mutiny, have nearly
passed away from our recollection, and even Khar
team is fast fading into the dim and distant region
of History.
Nevertheless, it can never be too late, nor out of
place, to look back and bring into notice, for instruction
or example, any tale of heroism, especially if there be
reason to believe that justice has never before been
done to it Do not the heroes of olden times still live
THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN. 3
amongst us, and excite our enthusiasm in modern

ballads as well as in ancient history ?
Still is the story told

How well Horatins kept the bridge
In the brave days of old.
And I cannot but think that the following record of

the bravery and fortitude of a group of gallant men of
our own time—gallant young men unknown to fame
will, notwithstanding the interval which has elapsed,
be acceptable to those who can find the leisure, or who
will take the trouble, to read it.
Besides, I am not aware that any book has been
published in England which gives a description of this
heroic episode, happening as it did in a very out-of
the-way corner of the world. Kaye in his History of
the War in Afghanistan seems to have considered it
outside his History altogether. Dealing, as he thinks,
with great men and great events, he dismisses Kahun
and its defenders in a few lines. I quote them here,
as follows: “ One oflicer, on his way from the fort of
Kahun with a convoy of camels, was overwhelmed and
destroyed by the Beloochees. Kahun was invested by
the Murrees. Qnetta was besieged by the Khaukurs.”
That is all; but he adds in a foot-note: “The defence
of the former place by Captain Lewis Brown, and of the
latter by Captain Bean, are among the most noticeable
incidents of the war, and deserve more extended notice
than I can give them in ‘this place. I am compelled to
1’
leave it to others to chronicle more minutely the progress

of events in Upper Scinde.”
It is my present purpose to endeavour to supply the
omission so far as it relates to the siege and defence of
Kahun.
To introduce the narrative it may be desirable, in
the first instance, to give a rapid glance at our political
position in the East during the two years 1838 and
1839.
Whilst Sir Alexander Burnes was in 1838 at Cabul,
on a mission from our Government to the Court of Dost
Mahomed, the Ameer of Afghanistan, the Persians were
besieging Herat, the Key to India from the West, with
the ultimate object of extending the influence of Persia
up to, and even beyond, the banks of the Indus. Rus
sian diplomatists and Russian engineers were in the
camp of the Persian army directing the operations of
the siege. The Ameer was suspected of intriguing with
v the Persian Court, in sympathy with Russia; and it was
thought by our Government that, so long as Cabul
remained under the dominion of the Ameer, the interests
of our Indian Empire would never be secure against the
encroachments of Russia. How often does History
repeat itself! The Chiefs of Candahar also declared
their adherence to the Persian, in other‘ words to the
Russian, policy. So avowedly hostile had this policy
become, and so fruitless were the remonstrances of Sir
Alexander Burnes, that he was compelled to leave
Cabul, having failed in his mission. In this crisis of‘
THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN- 5
affairs our Government felt the importance of taking

immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of
foreign intrigue and aggression.
With this object we espoused the cause of Shah
'Soojah, a former ruler of Afghanistan, of the Saduzai
Dynasty, and determined to reinstate him in the Sove
reignty of the Douranee Empire.
Accordingly we assembled a large army on the Indus.
Early in 1839 the Bengal column of the army joined
the Bombay column at Shikarpoor, the place of rendez
vous, and Sir John (afterwards Lord) Keane, then the
Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Presidency, assumed
the command of the whole force. The line of march
was from Shikarpoor, across the great Scinde desert
to Dadur, at the mouth of the celebrated Bolan pass,
thence through the pass to Quetta, and from Quetta,
through the Kojuck pass, to Candahar, and then on to
Cabul.
The distance across the desert, about 140 miles, was
accomplished in numerous most painful marches.
Though it was in February, a comparatively cool
month of the year, the army suffered great privations
from want of forage and water, and from want of car
riage also, the camels dropping down dead by scores
on the way. Candahar was reached without the oppo
sition anticipated; and Shah Soojah, entering the chief
city of Western Afghanistan at the head of the army,
was hailed as the restored Monarch of the Douranee
Empire.
But it was a hollow devotion, a subjection in name

only, not to be relied upon. The Ghilzees and other
wild tribes of Western Afghanistan were disinclined to
bend their necks to the Saduzai yoke, and regarded
the new monarch with distrust.
After a long halt at Candahar, the army resumed its
march, and on the 21st July encamped before the
famous fortress of Ghuznee. Sir John Keane had ad
vanced against it without any siege-guns; and had
therefore the alternative of leaving the fortress, with
its large garrison, in his rear, or of besieging it with
very inadequate means. From this perilous dilemma
he was relieved by his engineers. All the gates of the
fortress had been built up except the Cabul gate.
Under cover of a false night‘attack, Captain Thomson
of the Bengal Engineers,* fastened powder-bags to the
Cabul Gate. The gate was blown open, and the place
i‘ As these pages were going to press there appeared in the

obituary of the Times an announcement of the death “in Dublin, on
the 10th of February 1886, of Colonel George Thomson, C.B., late
Bengal Engineers.” The St. James’s Gazette of the 16th of February
contained the following paragraph amongst its occasional notes:
“Who would discover from the obituary notice of Colonel George
Thomson in the Times that the man in question was probably the
most eminent military engineer (as such) of the last generation?
Surely this may be said of the man who in 1838 bridged the Indus
at Sukkur, and whose project for capturing Ghazni by blowing‘in the
gates saved the objects of the expedition, and the credit of the
General (Sir John Keane), who had left his battering-guns behind
at Candahar. The General was rewarded with a peerage and pension
for two or three lives. The engineer was rewarded by being made
recruiting-officer at Cork. Malta diverse il guiderdon dull’ opre ! ”
was then carried by'assault in twenty-four hours. So

Ghuznee fell to the British army, and was made over
to the Saduzai King, striking terror into the heart of
Dost Mahomed, who deemed the fortress impregnable,
and who thereupon sought refuge in flight.
On the 6th August 1839 Shah Soojah and the
British army appeared before the walls of Cabul, and
entered the capital.
The object was now accomplished, and the time had
arrived for the withdrawal of the army. But Shah
Soojah had gained little hold over the affections of his
people. It was easy to restore him to the throne, but
not so easy to maintain him upon it. The British
army could not be wholly withdrawn. It was deemed
absolutely necessary, for the consolidation of the Empire
and in fact for the safety of the throne, to plant our
troops at certain posts, and to leave them there whilst
the main body of the army returned to India. It has
been remarked by competent critics that the policy of
planting small detachments in certain isolated positions
was one of the great errors which marked our military
occupation of Afghanistan. However, it was acted
upon. Sir William Macnaghten was established as our
envoy at Cabul, Sir Alexander Burnes accompanying
him, supported by a detachment of troops selected from
the Bengal column, another political agency was esta
blished at Ghuznee, and a third at Candahar. The
Bombay column returned to India by the Kojuck and
Bolan passes; leaving Captain Bean, with a detach
ment from that column, in charge of political functions

‘at Quetta.
But, notwithstanding these precautions, things went
wrong in Shah Soojah’s dominions. The whole country
was unsettled. The chiefs of Afghanistan who, it was
supposed, had been reduced to subjection, were in
rebellion, and were actively engaged. in raising the
tribes and cutting off our communications with Can
dahar and Cabul. Dost Mahomed himself was again in
arms. Many of Shah Soojah’s soldiers deserted and
flocked to the Ameer’s standard, and a strong national
feeling sprang up throughout the whole country against
the British, who had transplanted their habits, and it is
feared their vices also, into the capital of the Douranee
Empire.
Then followed, as is well-known, the outbreak at
Cabul, the murder of Sir Alexander Burnes by the in
furiated mob, the entire disorganisation of the garrison
owing to the incompetency of its commanding ofiicers,
the treacherous murder of our envoy, Sir William
Macnaghten, by the hand of Dost Mahomed’s son, and
the disastrous retreat and destruction of the whole
force, save one man only, Dr. Brydon, the solitary
white-faced horseman who, clinging to the neck of his
horse in the extremity of mortal weakness, alone escaped
to Jellalabad.
It was in the month of March, 1840, before this
final catastrophe, and whilst the disaffection which led
to it was seething, that Sir John Keane, on his return
to Bombay, thought it expedient to take and occupy

‘the walled town or fort of Kahun in Beloochistan.
Let the reader look in Keith Johnston’s, or any
other good map of Afghanistan, and, tracing the river
Indus from Kurrachee, at its mouth, up for about three
hundred miles, he will come upon the garrison town
Sukkur, situated on the right bank of the river. Then
leaving the river on the right, and, following the road
almost in a due northerly direction, he will pass
through Shikarpoor, and enter the same great desert
which was crossed by the army of the Indus, and
where they suffered so much. Instead, however, of
crossing, as that army did, to Dadur, the reader, pass
ing over the same desert, but more to the north, for
a dreary distance of about 120 miles, will arrive at
Poolajee, at the foot of the chain of the Murree hills,
which divide the plains from the town or fort of
Kahun.
These hills are of a very formidable character for
the purposes of defence, and render Kahun almost un
approachable by an armed force. The direct approach
'to the town from the plains, after leaving Poolajee, is
over two successive mountain passes—namely, first, the
pass of Surtoof, and then beyond that the pass of
Nuffoosk. So steep and rugged are both these passes
‘that if the track be lost the traveller has to crawl on
his hands and knees in order to regain it. These
passes having been surmounted at the expense of in
finite perseverance and fatigue, the track rapidly
descends from Nuffoosk and leads over a level plain

for a distance of about five miles to the town itself,
which is situated on a rocky eminence rising out of
the plain.
The town is the capital of the fierce and warlike
Murree tribes, men of gigantic stature, practised in
arms, and capable of using their jazails, or long-
barrelled matchlocks, with sure and certain effect.
It is difiicult to say why Sir John Keane, or any
other General,' in carrying out the campaign, should
have had anything to do with Kahun, situated as it
is in the middle of a narrow plain, five miles from
the wild mountain range which completely cuts it oft"
from the line to Candahar, and equally from the line
of the Indus; or why, under any circumstances, he
should have thrown a military force into an isolated
fort which commanded nothing, and was itself com
manded by the whole country round, and was not only
cut off by the adjoining mountain range from succour
and supplies, but even from the means of practicable
retreat in case of mischance.
But, worse than this, no armed foes, no geographical
obstacles, however formidable, could be compared in
their deadly effect to the fatal evils of climate and
want of water which, during the greater part of the
year, beset that desolate portion of Beloochistan.
A distinguished officer, the late General Sir Thomas.
Seaton, who, I am proud to say, was a relative of my
own, himself one of the “ Illustrious Garrison ” of Jel
lalabad, wrote and published, some years since, an un

affected and interesting memoir of his own eventful
life, entitled From Cadet to Colonel. In this book
he narrated his personal experiences of the Scinde
desert. On his return to India, as a regimental captain,
after a short furlough, in 1839, he was ordered to join
his regiment which had already marched towards Cabull
with the army of the Indus. He pushed on from,
Sukkur, and at Shikarpoor fell in with the convoy
about to march across the desert, and to overtake the
army if possible at Quetta or Candahar. This was in
May, the hottest month of the year. The march was
accomplished, after the most intolerable sufferings from
heat and want of water, and he eventually overtook
the army at Ghuznee just too late to be present at its
fall.
I am tempted to extract a few passages from his book,
describing the sufferings of the convoy in their march
across the desert, just to convey to the reader some idea
of the climate of Beloochistan.
“ On receipt of intelligence,” the General writes “that
the wells at Burshoree (the first oasis in the desert)‘
were dry, a council of war was held to decide whether
the attempt to cross the desert should be made. A
convoy of 2,500 camels had crossed six weeks earlier,
and the officer commanding had written to the autho
rities describing the sufferings of himself and his men,
and declaring that it would be madness to send another
convoy at this season of the year. The people in the
‘12 THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN.
villages said that such a thing had never been heard

'of as a kafilah traversing the desert in the month of
May, and that, if we tried it, not one of us would live
‘to tell the tale. On the other hand, the stores were
‘imperatively called for, the treasure was equally required,
and, as the want of it might seriously embarrass our
commissariat, and compromise the success of our army,
the council decided that, whatever might be the issue,
'the attempt should be made.”
Accordingly the convoy struck camp at sunset and
entered the desert. “ The water in the men’s brass pots
was soon exhausted, for the hot wind and dust created
‘an intolerable thirst, and they drank without restraint.
At midnight they began to flag, then to murmur, and
shortly there was a universal cry of ‘Water—water!’
A strong guard was put over the water as fast as the
camels came up, and then it was served out. Such was
the eagerness of the poor creatures that a frightful
tumult arose. The camp-followers, in the hope that
they might succeed in obtaining by some lucky chance
:a draught of water, rushed in among the sepoys. A
sergeant was then appointed to serve it out; and so
great was the distress, that even the all-powerful preju
dices of caste were forgotten, and Hindoos drank out of
the leathern bags, in common with the Mahomedans,
water served out by a European sergeant.”
After a short halt the march was continued. “A
sepoy who was near me was in such a state, that when
I spoke to him he could scarcely reply, his tongue
THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN.
rattled in his mouth, and his whole countenance was.

distorted with agony. Day dawned upon the frightful
waste, a boundless plain of hard alluvial soil, apparently
deposited by the annual overflow of the Indus. The
ravines we met with were the channels cut by the retiring
waters. Not a tree, bush, shrub, or blade of grass was
to be seen-nothing but a scene of dreary desolation;
and the road over this horrible plain was distinctly
marked by the skeletons of men, camels and horses
abandoned by kafilahs, or by the army that had preceded
us.”
Still they marched on. “Two days afterwards Con
ductor Haviland died of brain-fever, and was buried atv
sunset. He was ill only three hours. Death, at this
time, was rapid in his strides. Many cases of brain-
fever occurred, and in the evening that most dreadful
scourge of the East, cholera, made its appearance. -I
cannot describe our sufferings from the heat, the dust,
the desert wind, the myriads of flies, and the stench of‘
the dying and dead camels which rendered our lives
intolerable. The heat in our tents rose to 119 degrees,
the whole camp smelled like a charnel-house, and in
very truth it might be called one, for no person could
take three steps in camp anywhere without seeing a dead
or dying man or animal.”
Still marching on, more deaths occurred, Chalmers
and Jervis; both were buried at sunset. In the midst
of these horrors the Beloochees came down on the
convoy, and such' among the force as were able snatched
their arms and hurried off to repel the attack. The

General continues: “ Returning to camp, I found Lieu
tenant Beaufort attacked by cholera; and Dr. Halloran,
who had been unwell before, was now down with brain
fever, and delirious. The scene in Major Liptrap's tent
vI shall never forget; it was appalling. Beaufort, suffer
ing all the agonies of cholera, was the colour of lead.
Halloran was raving. Liptrap and Manning, both of
‘them speechless and helpless from utter exhaustion,
appeared likewise as if struck withv cholera. The hospi
tal sergeant came in every few minutes, to report some
one or two deaths to those who seemed to be dying,
and, when he had retired, with the exception of the
fierce desert wind howling through the tents, no sound
was to be heard but the groans of the dying or the
wail for the dead.”
These extracts are sufficient for the purpose. There
.is much more of the same kind in the General’s book.
In the seven days’ march across the desert from Shikar
poor to Dadur the convoy had lost six out of the
fourteen Europeans in camp, 100 sepoys and more than
300 camp-followers!
CHAPTER II.
FROM the fore-going pages it will, I think, be clear to

everyone that Kahun was, on all accounts, a place to
be avoided. Nevertheless Sir John Keane, in the teeth
of all these obstacles, and apparently with no one single
countervailing advantage, thought it expedient, on the
return of his victorious army from Ghuznee, to occupy
and garrison the fort. Full of his own campaign, and
flushed with victory, he did not give suflicient thought
to the remote and isolated position of Kahun, to the
obstacles a mixed force of horse and foot, with guns
and camels, would experience in getting over the Sur
toof and Nufl‘oosk passes, and to the difficulty of
maintaining the garrison when once in, or of relieving
it in case of necessity. He may possibly have under
rated the quality of the warlike tribes who were certain
to emerge from their fastnesses and combine to oppose
the advancing force, and, failing in that, to beleaguer
and starve out the garrison. Such, however, is only
the charitable conjecture offered by way of excuse for
a strategic movement which had no object in itself‘,
and carried with it the certainty of a wanton and reckless

sacrifice of human life. In any case, the order was
given to occupy Kahun.
In the early part of the month of April 1840, Captain,
Lewis Brown, of the 5th Regiment Bombay Native
Infantry, then stationed at Sukkur, was appointed to‘
the command of the small force collected at Poolajee,.
in the plains, which, with the convoy of camels, was to
march from Poolajee over the passes of Surtoof and
Nuffoosk, and take possession of the fort.
Now we come to the mode in which this oflicer and
those who were appointed with him, and those who
afterwards were sent to his rescue, performed their duty;
and it may be asserted, without fear of challenge, that,
though the annals of our Indian history are rich in the
records of deeds which rival those of the heroes of‘
antiquity, there is nothing in those annals which exceeds,
in manly courage and endurance, the deeds enacted in
and around the walls of Kahun.
Fortunately I am able to tell the story almost entirely
in the words of the chief actors themselves—words full
of vigour and freshness, because written down at the
moment.
Captain Lewis Brown, as it afterwards turned out,
had kept a private journal (so he himself called it) of'
his march to Kahun in command of the detachment,
and of the whole time whilst he was in occupation of
that outpost. I do not know that he ever expected it
would obtain publicity—it certainly was not written
with that object—but somehow or other, after all was

over, it was brought‘ to the notice of the Bombay
Government, and the Governor, by an order of the
Council dated 10th April 1841, directed that publicity
should be given to it. The journal was printed by the
Government at the Bombay Government Press. What
circulation (if any) it had in India at the time is not
known. It was, most probably, like other ofiicial docu
ments, stowed away carefully, after it was printed,
amongst the Archives of the Department. It was not
sent to England, and had no circulation here. The
Historian of the War in Afghanistan would scarcely
have overlooked it. But, quite recently, a relative of
my own noticed casually, in the catalogue of a second
hand bookseller, that a copy of the journal was for sale,
and immediately sent for and purchased it.
Believing the journal to be entirely new to this coun
try, I have made it the staple of this short account.
It will be seen, in the sequel, how intense the interest
it possessed for my own family.
The journal is headed, “Rough Notes by Captain
Lewis Brown, of the 5th Regiment Bombay Native
Infantry, of a Trip in the Murree Hills and detention
in Kahun.” There is a grim humour in this heading.
The words “trip” and “detention” afford a good
insight into the character of the author.
Here is the journal, as kept by him day by day during
the march, and afterwards at Kahun :—
“Having been appointed to the command of a detach
2
ment about to occupy Kahun, a walled town in the

Murree hills, I proceeded to Poolajee en route, in
company with Lieutenant Clarke, 2nd Grenadiers, on
the 8th April 1840. On the morning of the 8th I
reached that post, and found the following detach-ment
assembled:—
“ 300 bayonets, 5th Regiment, under Ensign Taylor.
“ Two 12-pounder howitzers, Lieutenant D. Erskine.
“ 5O Scinde Irregular Horse, Lieutenant Clarke.
“ 5O Patan horsemen.
“With this detachment I was to convoy up 600
camels, being supplies for four months, and Lieutenant
Clarke was to return with the empty camels, with an
escort of 80 infantry and 50 horse, and bring up four
months’ more. I left Sukkur in a great hurry, but on
my arrival at Poolajee was detained, in consequence of
delays in the Commissariat Department, until the 2nd
May. About the 15th April the weather became exces
sively hot, the thermometer ranging to 112° in my
tent in the middle of the day; the consequence was
some sickness in the detachment. Lieutenant Erskine
and Ensign Taylor were both attacked with fever, and
one subedar died from a coup de soleil.
“April 20th.—At the requisition of the Political
Agent I despatched Lieutenant Clarke and his horse
men in the direction of Shapoor, there to be joined by
100 men of the Belooch levy, under Lieutenant Vardon,
and from thence to proceed S.E. in the direction of the
hills to try and surprise a party of Culpore Boogtees.
The Chuppao failed, in consequence of the treachery of

the guide. The sufferings of the party from the heat
and want of water, when crossing the desert on their
return, were beyond anything conceivable. The Belooch
levy alone left twenty-five men behind, three of whom
died.
“ 27tk.—1teceived an express from the Brigade-Major
directing me, in consequence of Erskine’s sickness, to
order the guns back to Lehree, and proceed with the
cavalry and infantry alone to Kahun. Dr. Glasse
joined to-day.
“ 29th.-——This morning I received such strong reports
of the intention of the Murrees to oppose us at the pass
of Nufi‘oosk, and again in the fort, that I immediately,
on my own responsibility, made a requisition on Lehree
for one of the guns to be sent back under a native
ofiicer. Having been before over the hills with a
detachment under the late Major Billamore, I knew
the almost utter impossibility, if opposed, of getting my
convoy up safe without artillery. Erskine, having
somewhat recovered from the fever, came himself with
the gun.
“ May 2nd.—-There being some dispute about finding
the Patans in provisions on their way up, and not
myself thinking they would be much use to me, having
been present in November 1839 when they turned
their backs on the enemy without drawing a sword,
I at once ordered them back to their quarters, and,
the Gommissariat having reported the four months’
2*
supply being all ready, I this morning commenced

my march into the hills, leaving behind one gun and
50 horse. -
“Marched six miles into the hills direct east. The
last four miles very heavy for guns, being nothing but
the bed of a dry river, with deep sand and pebbles.
Encamped close to a delicious stream of water. Wood
and grass in abundance, but the heat between the
rocks was excessive. Ensign Taylor became too sick
to proceed, and returned to head—quarters, leaving only‘
one ofiicer (myself) in charge of three companies.
“3rd.—Marched on eight miles, starting at 2 A.M.,
and arriving at 7. Road very heavy. Encamped in
bed of river. Forage abundant. Sulphur rocks close
by. This was the hottest day I ever remember to have
felt in India, the thermometer rising to 116°, with a hot
wind like a furnace blowing.
“4th.—Marched on seven miles, not getting over
more than a mile an‘ hour, the road being so heavy.
Water nearly the whole way, which was most accept-
v__ I able, as the hot wind of yesterday continued the whole
night. Encamping ground as yesterday.
“ 6th.—-Marched on six miles; the wheels of the gun
and waggon becoming rickety from the stony state of
the road, lightened them by loading the ammunition
boxes on camels. A sepoy died here from the effects
of the sun. Encamping ground as yesterday.
“ 7th.—-—Marched on twelve miles, five along the bed
of the river, then over some table-land to a drop leap
into the river again, down which the gun and carriages
were obliged to be lowered by ropes. Strong reports
reached us of the enemy getting ready to oppose us, ‘and
that they were busy getting in their crops. From this
encamping ground there are two roads to Kahun, one
round by Deerah, distance seventy-four miles, and the
other a short cut over the mountains of Surtoof and
Nuffoosk, distance only twenty miles, but very difiicult
for guns. Being left to my own judgment by the
Brigadier, I decided on the short cut, having been over
the same before with artillery, trusting to arrive in time
to save some of the crops.
“ 8th.—Left the bed of the river, and marched over a
table-land to the bottom of the Surtoof, distance six
miles, which took us five hours, there being some very
bad nullahs on the road for guns. Encamped at the
foot of the hill, where we found a beautiful stream of
water and abundance of forage. At 4 P.M. we com
menced ascending the hill, the camels going up first.
The distance is but a mile, but so steep that the last
camel did not reach the top until daylight, exactly
twelve hours. The labour of getting up the gun and
carriages was trying and laborious in the extreme; some
parts of the hill were almost perpendicular, and not one
inch up would the bullocks pull. Here, while all
hands were engaged in this labour, the Beloochees
began first to show themselves, in small bodies, annoy
ing our flanks and rear. Encamped on the top of the
hill, but, in consequence of there being neither water
nor forage, obliged to send down all the animals to the

bottom again, the men going down by divisions.
“ 9th.—About 150 Beloochees assembled below the
hill, evidently with the intention of attacking the
watering-party, in consequence of which I reinforced
them with 100 men, under Clarke, when they imme
diately dispersed. Marched on over a table-land to the
foot of the Nuffoosk pass, at 6 o’clock this evening,
distance only six miles, but, from the number of small
nullahs and the overloaded state of the camels, we did
not reach our ground until daylight.
“10th.—Ascended the Nuffoosk pass this morning
with 100 men. No appearance of an enemy, although
we found that they had built up breastworks across the
road in three different places. Removed them, and
commenced getting up the gun, &c., which took us from
6 in the morning until 4 in the afternoon, the bullocks
being perfectly useless. This was an exceedingly hard
day’s work, the heat being, excessive, and a great want
of water; in fact, none at all for the cattle. Com
menced passing up convoy at 4 P.M., the last camel
not reaching the top until 3 A.M., although the distance
was only a quarter of a mile. This was caused by the
overloaded state of the camels, and there being only one
camel-man to six or seven. The camels fell down, and
gave in by dozens, and many bags were dropped. To
obtain these last some sixty Beloochees, who had been
watching us all day, followed up the rear-guard, when
a few shots were exchanged, and Clarke and myself
took post with twelve men on some ridges overhanging

the road. When the moon went down the Beloochees
made many attempts to get up the pass, but were
easily kept at bay. A great deal of ammunition was
wasted, without much effect, from the darkness of the
night. This was the third night we had been under
arms.
“Milt—From the top of the hill we saw several
fires in the Kahun plain. Commenced descending at.
daylight. Descent one mile in extent. Immediately
the rear-guard left the top it was crowded by about
sixty Beloochees, who commenced a sharp fire, but at
a long distance ; Clarke and myself having remained in
the rear to try and bring on some of the bags dropped,
we received some special marks of their favour. One
Beloochee appeared to be a particularly good shot, for
he managed to wound slightly Clarke and his servant,
and a havildar standing close by was only saved by the
ball lodging in a small mussuck he had slung on his
shoulder. We were obliged to put up with this annoy
ance for some time, being too anxious to get my convoy
safe to Kahun to think of returning up the hill to attack
these people. The cattle were almost dying for want of
water. By 2 P.M. we got guns and all safe to the
bottom, only leaving two bags behind, and encamped
for an hour in a strong nullah clear of the hill. At
5 P.M. moved on to Kahun, distant five miles over a
level plain, reaching it at 7, and finding it completely
deserted and the gates removed. Thus ended this
arduous and trying march; the difl‘iculties we encoun

tered from the nature of the road, being entirely through
beds of rivers and over hills, and the want of water at
the latter, being great indeed. The heat was excessive,
and, the bullocks refusing to put their shoulder to the
collar, the labour of getting the guns over the hills
fell entirely on the sepoys. The convoy often stretched
for two miles, so to properly guard it on all sides was
out of the question, but, through the strenuous exer
tions of officers and men, all was got up safe without
loss or damage. Encamped under the walls of the fort
for the night, all hands being completely done up. It
was a delightful sight to see the camels and bullocks
rushing to the river. I thought they never would have
stopped drinking.”
CHAPTER 111.
THE convoy having arrived safely at Kahun, it may be

as well to remind the reader that the officers with the
force were four only in number, namely, Captain Lewis
Brown himself, Lieutenant Walpole Clarke, of the 2nd
Grenadier Regiment Bombay Infantry, but then in com
mand of a troop of Scinde Irregular Horse, Lieutenant
D. Erskine, of the Bombay Artillery, in charge of the
guns, and Dr. Glasse, the medical officer accompanying
the detachment. It will be remembered that Lieutenant
Clarke was soon to leave the fort, in command of the
return convoy of empty camels.
The Journal proceeds as follows :
“Kahun is a large, irregular, sex-angular walled
town, 900 yards in circumference, with six bastions and
one gate-way. The walls are about twenty-five feet
high, but so thin in some places that they are seen
through half-way down. There is no ditch, but a tank
in front of the gate-way, which fills after a heavy fall
of rain. The houses inside are in very fair order;
they principally belong to the Banyans, the Murrees

(with the exception of the chief, his brother, and a
few followers) inhabiting the plains outside, building
mat huts in the summer, and retiring to the narrow
passes on the hills in the cold weather. The plain on
which Kahun is situated is about fifteen miles long and
six broad. The air is very pure, and heat not nearly
so great as it is in the plains.
“12th (May).—Got detachment into fort during
the day—found the inside of all the bastions destroyed,
some still smoking. A sepoy, strolling out without
his arms, was cut down within 500 yards of the fort,
and his head severed from his body. Clarke, with
twenty horsemen, had a long chase after the enemy,
but could not touch them. However, he sent in in
formation of some grain still standing; sent out- party
and secured fifty camel-loads of wheat in stalk. The
party also found the gates of the fort in a field about
two miles off. These gates were afterwards invaluable
to us.
-'‘__._ “13th.—During the night the Beloochees commenced
burning the wheat they could not carry away in the
day-time. Sent out another party and secured fifty
more camel-loads. Commenced clearing out the large
well into which the Beloochees had thrown large logs
of timber and other kinds of lumber. An unfortunate
dooly-wallah was smothered in going down to fasten on
a rope.
“ 14tb.—Busy all day in repairing bastions and put
W‘__
‘'_.
THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN. 2'7
ting up gate. In the former found layers of cow-dung‘

covered over with earth, some still smoking, and water
seems to have no effect in putting out the fire.
“16th.—-The return convoy, under Clarke, started
this morning at 2 A.M., en 'route to Poolajee. I had’
received instructions from the Brigadier to increase the
number of infantry if I thought it necessary. I did
so, with a subedar’s party consisting of five havildars
and eighty rank and file. Clarke took them over the
first bill, when, I suppose, finding no opposition at the
diflicult pass of Nuffoosk, he sent them back, proceeding
himself with the original party and 700 empty camels
About 12 o'clock a dooly-wallah (a dooly and six had
accompanied the subedar’s party) came running in with
the dreadful report that every man of the subedar’s.
party had been massacred. The dooly-wallah was the
only man who escaped, and his is the only account we
have of this melancholy affair. He says that the
subedar, on seeing the last of the camels over the hill,
began to descend on this side, and. that when half-way
down they, all of a sudden, saw the top and bottom
covered with Beloochees; that the subedar then com
menced a double march, and took up a position on
some rising ground, forming square. The Beloochees,
to the number of 2,000, then completely surrounded
them, and, after receiving two volleys, rushed boldly in
on them, and began to slaughter them right and left.
He saw the subedar fighting to the last; he himself
managed to escape by hiding in a nullah, where an old
Beloochee found him, and, after stripping him of what

he had, let him go. The poor subedar was one of the
best native officers in the regiment; he belonged to
my light company, and was a great favourite of mine.
We had been much together during our former cam
paign in these hills, and I felt his loss very much.
._yo-u.~ .» “17th.——In great suspense about Clarke and his
convoy. A spy came in from the enemy to-day, and
was very inquisitive as to what number of men were
left to defend the fort, &c. Put him close prisoner,
with orders to shoot him on the first approach of the
enemy. Busy all day strengthening post, the detach
ment being new reduced, in consequence of this un
fortunate affair, to 140 bayonets and one gun: rather
too few to man 900 yards of wall. Got the gun on
bastion next the gate-way.
“18tl¢.—About sixty horsemen passed coolly round
the fort at a hand-gallop, waving their swords and
giving us much abuse, but taking very good care to
keep well out of range of musket-shot, also from the
gun side. Offered 150 rupees to any man (follower) in
the fort to take a tapaul down to the plains, but none
would venture.
“ 19th and 20th.—All hands during these two days
employed in repairing bastions, &c.
“ 21st.—A cossid came in this morning with a note
from Lieutenant Vardon, containing the most melan
choly intelligence of poor Clarke’s death and the defeat
of his party. It would appear that they had got as far
as the bottom of the Surtoof mountain, thirteen miles

from Kahun, when the Murrees were seen assembled in
large numbers on the top. Clarke, after placing his.
convoy and part of his infantry to the best advantage
round his convoy, proceeded a little way up the hill,
with about thirty infantry, to attack the most forward
of them, and, after fighting most gallantly for two
hours, the ammunition being all gone, he, with the
rest of the men who were with him, were all killed.
Clarke himself killed two of the Beloochees with his
own hand, and a third he seized round the waist, dash
ing him to the ground. He was then seen to stagger,
as if wounded ; and some of the Beloochees on another
part of the hill, seeing a bugler Clarke had sent down
bringing up ammunition, called out, ‘Now charge them!
they are out of cartridges! ’ They did, and every man
fell. The Beloochees then fell on the convoy. The
horsemen made for Poolajee at speed, and the rest of
our unfortunate sepoys were all massacred, save one
havildar and eleven privates. The number of Beloo
chees present appears, from all accounts, to have been
2,000. The loss they suffered is unknown, and ever
will be. They only acknowledge to twenty-five. They
secured every camel, tent, &c.
“Poor Clarke! Although having only known him
for eight or nine months, still it was during scenes
when months become years and friendship becomes firm
and lasting. We first met in November 1839, when he
joined a field detachment (of which I was staff officer)
‘proceeding against the Beloochees in these same hills.

He at this time commanded 150 of the Scinde Irregular
Horse. From the day he joined he was the life and
soul of the party, and, although a stranger to most of
us, soon gained the esteem of all. Before he arrived
the country around had been subject to almost daily
‘plundering. Enthusiastically fond of his profession,
more particularly of his new command, the Horse, he
sought daily and hourly opportunities of distinguishing
himself. He was, in the opinion of all, the beau ideal
-of an Irregular Horseman. Brave and daring himself
to a degree, he soon inspired his men with the same
:spirit: men who were before almost a perfect rabble
became, through his bright example, most excellent
soldiers in a short space of time. The men became
‘very fond of him, and with him at their head seemed
(to think any odds against them of no moment. During
‘our short campaign of four months he was engaged
.in every skirmish we had. A few days after he joined,
being detached to a post nine miles off‘, without infor
mation and perfectly ignorant of the country around,
he succeeded in surprising sixty Beloochees plundering
some fields about an hour before daylight. At the
time he fell in‘ with them he had only ten men up with
him, but, not hesitating a moment, he dashed in amongst
them, killing seven and taking three prisoners, the rest
‘escaping through the thick jungle. Again, when the
Boogtees attacked a party under Lieutenant Raitt in
the hills, he distinguished himself greatly, charging
through and through the enemy and killing three with

his own hand. On our march up to Kahun he was of
the utmost assistance to me, not only in commanding
the rear-guard the whole way up, but in his strenuous
exertions throughout. When wounded on the thigh at
the last hill his coolness and courage showed them
selves conspicuously; thinking the ball had gone
through (he afterwards described the feeling to be just
the same as he felt when wounded at Kurrachee, when
the ball went right through his thigh), he said to me,
‘Don't say a word; it has gone right through me, but
I do not want to show these fellows their shot has
taken effect.’ To this day the Murrees speak of his
bravery, calling him the ‘Bure- Bahadoor! ’ He now
lies buried half-way up the Surtoof. Thus did the
5th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry lose in one day,
killed—1 subedar, 1 jemadar, 5 havildars, 139 rank and
file.”
CHAPTER IV.
THE loss of this gallant comrade, and of so many

brave men of their own regiment, might well have
dispirited the small remnant of the force which remained
in the fort. The eloquent eulogy on the deceased
officer just transcribed shows how deeply the blow was
felt by Captain Lewis Brown and his companions; but
in deference to stern duty no outward expression was
allowed to be given to that feeling, and all of them
to a man prepared to meet the worst.
The Journal proceeds as follows :—
“21st (May).—Despatched cossid on return to the
plains, and, knowing the anxiety that would be felt
regarding not only our present but future fate, reported
to Brigadier Stevenson my having still four months’
provisions left, and that I would do my utmost to hold
the fort.
“24th.—Thinking there was not much chance of
another convoy coming up, took a strict account of
the provisions, putting the men on half-rations. All
hands busy strengthening the fort. Divided detach

ment into four divisions, giving each a side to defend,
and obliged to bring every man on duty at night for
fear of a surprise. From this to the 27th busy clear
ing the ground of everything in the shape of tree or
shrubs for 200 yards round the fort outside.
“27th.—An express from Lieutenant Loch to-day,
saying he was coming up with 200 horse to see what
had become of us, and to open communication. Sent
back the cossid immediately to tell him on no account
to attempt it as, if defended, hecould never force the
Nufi’oosk pass, particularly with horse.
“ 28th.—This morning, when the foraging party were
out, some horsemen were seen prowling about the bed
of the river. The ‘ assembly’ was sounded, and some
seven or eight horsemen, more bold than the rest,
coming within long musket range, a sepoy shot one.
They then moved off at speed, Erskine getting a. long
shot and killing another.
“29th, 30th, 31st.—Busy cleaning out tank, which
had become most offensive, and also commenced digging
deep trenches along the foot of the walls inside, planting
sharp-pointed stakes in them; pulled down‘ the houses
touching the walls to prevent the enemy landing in
overwhelming numbers. This gave them a drop leap
of twenty-five feet on to a body of stakes.
“June 3rd.—Heard that the old chief, Dodah, had
tried all in his power to prevent his tribe attacking
Clarke’s party, and that, on their leaving for that pur
3
pose, exclaimed, ‘ Ah ! there you go selling your country

for five hundred camels.' Beloochees on the move in
every direction, but keeping at a respectful distance.
Prevented in consequence sending out foraging parties.
The river, which was a mile off, was almost dry, and
the banks were high enough to conceal a thousand
horsemen. It became necessary to use the utmost
caution, not being able to afford the loss of a single
man.
“4th.—Commenced digging a fresh well, the other
wells containing very bad water, causing bad ulcers on
the men; but finding water at all in the fort was a
most fortunate circumstance, as any party sent down to
the river would certainly have been cut up. Received
an express from the Political Agent intimating that I
must not expect reinforcements from Sukkur, but that
a request had been made to Captain Bean, at Quetta,
to obtain, if possible, the assistance of a tribe, called
Kahars, inhabiting the hills in the Bolan, and deadly
enemies of the Murrees.
"7th, 8th, 9th.—Nothing new stirring. Working
parties employed strengthening an old inner fort which,
in case of our being hard pushed, will contain all the
supplies, and two wells out of the three. Banyans
employed in filling all the empty grain-bags with sand.
Lascars busy cutting good stout clubs for all the
followers. Commenced bringing the latter on duty at
night as look-out men, a fourth part of them being
attached to each division. The enemy getting more
harassing daily, firing at every man who appears 200

yards from the walls. Furnished a new bastion on
opposite fort for a gun. We can now ply it from both
sides, having a good road made from one bastion to the
other.
“15th.—Cossids came in this morning, bringing
intelligence of the Murrees and Boogtees having agreed
to stand by each other and attack the fort on the
approaching dark nights with their whole force. Got
the front of gateway well palisaded. From this to the
25th nothing new, all working at the defences most
cheerfully, and every man seeming to think that the
safety of the whole depends on his individual bravery.
Treat sepoys kindly, and I do not think they will ever
fail at the push. Nearly fourteen years of uninterrupted
regimental duty, I think, entitles me to give an opinion
on this point, and that before formed is now fully
confirmed.
“25th.—'An old acquaintance of mine, Sheer Bheg
Boogtee, who had acted as guide to us through these
hills last year, paid me a visit. I had had the means
of showing him some kindness. During the campaign
he had been taken prisoner and plundered of many
head of cattle; and I having obtained his release and
clothed him, he has followed me like a shadow ever since.
“29th.—No appearance of any night attack as
reported, but this morning about 150 Beloochees came
sweeping round the fort. Unfortunately, twenty bullock
drivers were out foraging more than a mile beyond the
3*
36 THE DEFENCE 0F KAHUN.
river, consequently they were cut off and surrounded

by the enemy, who commenced a regular slaughter.
‘Erskine managed to screw round the gun, and I threw
out about forty men in the direction, well flanked to
two bastions. By these means we managed to save ten
out of the twenty. A shell from the gun sent the
enemy to the right-about, and the party served as a
rallying point for those who could manage to escape.
One of the latter, who contrived to conceal himself
under a bush, heard our poor fellows beg for mercy;
but Kurreem Khan, the chief, who was superintending
the slaughter, kept crying out ‘Maro! Marc ! ’ This
all took place in the bed of the river, and was not
visible from the fort. He also says he saw the shrapnell
burst right in amongst them, knocking over three and
dispersing the rest. I had an opportunity this morning
of promoting two sepoys for bravery. They were out
cutting forage near the fort, with some eight or ten
camel-men, when about twenty Beloochees rode at speed
at them. Instead of running for it, the two sepoys
coolly stood still and fired into their faces, wounding
one of them. This was quite sufficient for the Beloo
' chees, who turned and fled. Had the sepoys retreated
under the walls, the camel-men must have been cut
up. This morning was full of adventures—nearly lost
the only sheep we had left. The Beloochees got between
them and the fort, but were too eager to cut up the
camel-men to see them. They would have been a sad
loss to us, for not another could we get.
" 30th.—Let loose the old spy to-day, tired of keeping

him any longer; besides, we have neither guards nor
food to waste on such kind of people. He is quite
welcome to report to the enemy all he has seen, which is
but little.
“ July 3rd.—Sheer Bheg again made his appearance,
agreeably to promise, bringing with him forty-five sheep
and goats—a most welcome supply, as we were almost
reduced to the last goat. The sepoys, not having tasted
any meat for two months, highly enjoyed the treat. He
tells us that it is the intention of the Murrees to
attack the fort on the night of the 6th instant, when the
moon goes down, with fifty scaling-ladders, their Syud
having persuaded them that our leaden bullets will not
kill; in proof of which he had placed a bullock 100
yards off, and had 300 bullets (taken from Clarke’s
party) fired at it without effect! This story frightened
my naib (a Belooch) so that he came to me with a
most serious face, and begged that‘ I would procure iron
bullets for the two first rounds, and that then the
Beloochees would run away! These Murrees seem to
have a great name amongst the other tribes.
“7th.—An express from Captain Bean, at Quetta,
offering me assistance and regretting the position in
which I was placed. The same post also brought a
letter from the Political Agent at Shikarpoor, to say it
was intended to act on the defensive until the season
opens. Fifty Beloochee horsemen kicked up a great
dust this afternoon. Erskine emptied three of their
saddles. They had been snugly hid all day in the

river, ready to cut off any parties who ventured out
side. _
“9th.—Getting used to Beloochee visits; indeed, we
are glad of anything in the shape of excitement to
change the monotonous life we are leading. Unfor
tunately, we cannot afford to expend much gun ammu
nition, and can therefore only take a shot occasionally,
which is always a source of amusement to all in the
fort, particularly when it falls in amongst the Beloo
chees, who retaliate by heaping abuse on us as they
scamper off. Sheer Bheg came again to-day, bringing
a few chillies and sugar, for which he obtained enor
mous prices. No doubt he is a spy in a small way;
but, being the only face we see—save the cossids, who
are decided spies—he is too useful to quarrel with. He
puts me in mind of the old beggar, Edie, in the Anti
quary. Whenever he makes his appearance, the word
is passed from bastion to bastion, and all the fort turns
out to meet him, being delighted to see him, not only
for old acquaintance sake, but for the few trifies he
always brings. The camels are now beginning to
break up for want of grain and forage. Ditto gun
bullocks. Shot five of the former this evening in con
sequence of their being in a dying state.
“11th.——-About two hundred head of cattle going
across the plain about ‘a mile and a half off. Most
tempting, but very suspicious. The first we have seen.
It is no doubt a trap; no doubt plenty of horsemen
THE DEFENCE OF KAHU'N. 39
are in the bed of the river ready to cut in between

the party and the fort if we sallied out. Sepoys mad
to go after them ; perhaps they will come a little nearer
by-and-bye and give us an opportunity.
“13th.—An express arrived from Lehree with intelli
gence that, instead of the Kojucks and Kahars coming
to our assistance, the former had joined the Murrees
against us, and the latter had attacked Captain Bean
himself at Quetta on the 22nd ultimo. They excuse
themselves from attacking the Murrees until September
on account of the great heat. It is fortunate that we
do not depend on these allies.
“ 14th.—Men suffering severely from ulcers, upwards
of ninety of all ranks laid up with them, and several
not able to put on their belts in consequence; still
they all manage to go to their posts at night, although
several cannot stand sentry". The dooly-wallahs, camel
men, and bullock-drivers now become useful, having
gone through a kind of drill.
“18tlz.—A tremendous storm of wind and rain,
lasting the whole night. Thought the old fort was
going to be washed away. At day-break got all hands
to work to drain the fort, the water having lodged in
every direction and threatening to undermine the walls.
Tank filled, and country around flooded.
“25th.—At 12 o’clock to-day about 200 horsemen
came galloping round the fort at a quick pace; thought
at first they were going to assault the fort, but after a
shell or two they retreated. They have now become
4:0 THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN.
very cunning, and, instead of appearing in a large body,

as formerly, they ‘now sail along ‘Indian file,’ like a
fiock of wild ducks, and it is very seldom we can
get a shot at them. In the afternoon they were seen
cultivating the fields in all directions, quite an enlivening
scene.
“26th.—A horse was this morning found dead where
Erskine’s shell fell yesterday, so it is to be hoped there
was some mischief done amongst the enemy; at the
time there was so much dust that we could not see any
distance. The Beloochees have now completely sur
rounded the fort, little parties, like pickets, appearing
seated around in every direction. This looks bad for
our communication. As yet the tapaul has arrived
pretty regularly once in eight days, and has been a
source of amusement to us. Much fever is now pre
veiling amongst us, myself attacked, and Glasse is also
very sick; the sepoys and followers are coming into
hospital as many as six or seven a day. Beloochees
advancing closer and closer every day; their match
locks, I verily believe, carry twice as far as our muskets.
From this to the 6th August nothing new. The same
daily routine of duty, with generally a ‘fall’ in every
twelve hours. Laid up with fever and prevented
writing.
“August 6th.-—The men still continue very sickly,
thirty-three in hospital with fever. Glasse is very un
well, and unable to leave his bed. Out of the most
useful medicines. Hot water the order of the day, and
found to be a very good substitute, being of a purga

tive nature. Made a kind of truce with a Murree
chief, called Hybutt Khan, who acknowledged himself
the owner of most of the flocks grazing around, and
also of some of the land now being cultivated. He told
us to look out for Lall Khan and some 150 of his
people a day or two hence. ‘
“7th.—-Beloochees, on the gin’ valve, fired two shots
at us as we were taking our walk in front of the gate
way. Hybutt Khan wants forty rupees to take a tapaul
to Dehree. He is evidently a doubtful character, and
thinks to take us in ; refused to sell us one sheep.
“8tla-Had a slight skirmish this morning with
Beloochees. When taking our walk some Beloochees
appeared about the nullah, evidently up to mischief;
enticed them out with a few men, when fifty or sixty
of them immediately sprang up, and a little file-firing
commenced ; withdrew party to allow Erskine to have a
:shot, which fell into the midst of them, and they
immediately bolted. (I have since heard, from one who
was then in the Murree hills, that this was an intended
attack on the fort, and that Lall Khan, with 500 men,
was close by at the time, intending to rush into the
gateway after us, as we retreated in ; but that, hearing
the gun which the Syud had agreed to render harmless,
and seeing the effect of the two shells thrown by
Erskine (fifteen Murrees were killed and wounded by
them), they gave up the idea.)
“9th.—Beloochees up to some mischief at the
Nufi‘oosk pass, going up there in small bodies of twenty

and thirty, destroying the road up, I suspect.
“ 10th.—For the last four or five days the. flocks had
been coming closer and closer to the walls, eating up
what little grass there was left. I had warned Hybutt
Khan of this three or four times, and had also offered
to purchase 100 at his own price; but he declared I.
should not have one. Erskine and I had finished the
last but one of those we had procured from old Sheer
Beg. We have both excellent appetites, although shut
up in a fort. 'l.o-day two large flocks of sheep and
goats came most temptingly near, and the sepoys
earnestly entreated for some fresh meat. Watching our
opportunity, no Beloochees being then in sight, we
slipped out about thirty sepoys, flanking them with two
bastions filled with men, and Erskine got the gun
round to bear in the direction. There were only three
Beloochees then in charge ; they immediately ran off for
their lives, and the goats, by some instinct, and to our
great annoyance, followed them at speed like dogs; two
horsemen then came up, looking very fierce, but soon
rode off on getting a shot. To describe the delight of'
all on getting this flock inside the fort is impossible;
there was a perfect uproar. On counting our plunder
we found we had secured three‘hundred sheep and fifty
seven goats; most of the latter were milk-goats, so that
the highest castes shared the enjoyment. We imme
diately made a division of the whole, charging one
quarter of a rupee on the head of each, for the benefit
of the widows of those who fell on the 16th of May.

That evening the fort became one large cook-shop.
“ Ulla-Hybutt Khan came to-day to try and recover
his sheep; told us that Nusseer Khan had driven all
our detachments into Sukkur ; also brought a note from
Dodah, the chief, desiring us to leave his fort forthwith,
and that he and his army would escort us down to the
plains! When Hybutt Khan found he could not get.
back his sheep, being told that most of them were already
killed, he flew into a great rage and declared he would3
come and attack the fort; for which I told the sentry
to give him a shot, when he quickly departed.
“15th.—A cossid, to our great joy, came in this.
morning, after a lapse of twenty days; could have
hugged the old rascal, although I knew him to be the
greatest of spies. A letter arrived by him from the
Political Agent, saying it was contemplated to try and
throw in supplies through the agency of Jeytt Sing
and Meer Hussain, to save moving the troops up with
a convoy.
“16th.——Another cossid this morning. The system
mentioned yesterday of throwing in supplies discarded,
being found impracticable, and the welcome, most
welcome, intelligence of the following detachment leaving
Sukkur for our relief: detachment of H.M. 40th Regi
ment, 1st Grenadiers, 2nd ditto, 4 guns, 200 horse,
under the command of Major Clibborn, 1st Grenadiers.
Received intimation that it was arranged between Hybutt
Khan and the rest of the chiefs that the former, in
making a truce, should encourage us to go out foraging

:and then cut us up.
“24th.—Another cossid arrived to-day, bringing the
welcome intelligence of the convoy being actually on
their march up with a reduced detachment, having left
behind detachment 40th, all but the light company 2nd
'Grenadiers, and one gun. To describe the joy of all
._.-i_ _;_:~_
hands, on my immediately giving out this news, is im
possible. Those only who have suffered a four months’
imprisonment, with the addition of never lying down
to sleep without a chance of having to turn out for an
attack, can conceive it.
“ 28th.—Hybutt Khan told us that the Murrees are
now assembled, to the number of 3,000, behind the
hill N.E. of the fort, and that they intend to have three
fights with the coming convoy for the honour of their
land—first, at the pass of Nuffoosk; second, where they
now are; and then, if beaten by us in both, to fall
back on Meer Hadjee’s fort of Barkoe, where they will
fight to the last.
“29th.—Captured two bullocks, which we found a
,great treat, not having tasted beef for a long time.
The convoy can now be only two marches off. Cheering
news!
“ 31st.—A day of great and almost overpowering
excitement. It commenced about 5 o’clock last evening,
when the plains and hills became alive with Beloochees,
and at dark large signal-fires on the tops of all the hills.
At daybreak large parties of horse and foot were seen
hurrying across the plain to the Nuffoosk pass, on the

opposite side of which we soon learnt of the arrival
of our convoy from the report of one of their guns, a
signal agreed upon between us. About sunrise we saw
collected, on the very top of' the pass, about 2,000
Beloochees, and others prowling about in all directions ;
the distance, as the crow flies, from the fort to the pass.
is about four miles. In fact, we were completely behind
the scenes, and saw all the Beloochees were at, and, fully
expecting to 'see our comrades crown the top every
hour, we were highly amused and excited. 2 P.M.—
No sight of the convoy coming over the pass; they
must be repairing the road up. 3 P.M.—Saw the
shrapnel flying over the hill and bursting in the
midst of the enemy with the most beautiful effect
5 P.M.—Still no sight of convoy. Beloochees still
crossing the plains towards the seat of action. Erskine
scattered a small body of them with a shell. 8 P.M.——
Heavy firing of guns and musketry for ten minutes,
when all was silent for the rest of the night. I should
be very sorry to pass many days of my life like this.
I would ten thousand times sooner have been in the
thick of it. The excitement and suspense was beyond
anything I ever felt before. Knowing the difliculty of
the pass, and not seeing our people crown the top, I
felt there must be much bloodshed going on.”
CHAPTER V.
THIS brings the Journal down to the 31st August, and

in explanation of the obscure and excited entry of that
day, as also to preserve a strict chronological account
of the proceedings of the relieving force, I am com
pelled, for the present, to break off the Journal at that
point and to take the reader back, in point of time, in
order that I may make him acquainted with the opera
tions of the detachment which, at that date, the Kahun
garrison were so anxiously expecting. Here I must
ask the indulgence of the reader to permit me to in
.troduce to him my brother Alfred, who formed part of
that force, and whose short life is identified with this
narrative. He had passed through Addiscombe, on the
nomination of the late Sir James Rivett Carnac, one
of the Directors of the East India Company, with great
credit, as first cadet for infantry, and was, on his arrival
in Bombay, posted to the 2nd Grenadier Regiment.
He was only nineteen years of age. On leaving England
to embark for Bombay I accompanied him to Ryde,

'in the Isle of Wight, one Saturday in February 1840.
We spent Sunday with an old Indian friend of ours,
‘General Aitchison, and on the following Monday mom
:ing—a flat calm it was, and a genial, sunny day—we
took a four-cared boat from Ryde and were pulled out
to Spithead, where I saw him safe on board the Thomas
Courts, one of the East India Company's old tea-ships,
vin which Sir James Carnac had also taken his passage as
the newly appointed Governor of Bombay.
I see the boy now before me, tall, handsome, dark,
yet fresh-coloured, leaning over the gunwale of the ship
and waving his farewell (a long and last farewell, alas !)
to me as I slowly returned in the shore-boat to Ryde.
Soon after landing at Bombay he joined his regiment
at Kurrachee, and I trust I shall not do injustice to
the main narrative, or spoil its continuity, if I now
weave into it the two following letters written by
him to his mother, closely connected as these letters
are with the events we are describing, and containing
an heroic passage which may be taken as foreshadowing
his own death by reference to that of Clarke.
“ Camp, Kurrachee, 3rd June 1840.

"‘ MY DEAREST MOTHER,
“ The whole station, and in fact the whole army,
are at present wrapped in melancholy and regret, on
account of a most sad occurrence which happened to
an oflicer of our regiment a few days ago; and when
I give you the particulars I am sure you will participate

in our sorrow. Walpole Clarke, the brother of our
adjutant, was offered, just before I joined, the com
mand of a troop of irregular horse at that time serving
in Upper Scinde against the Beloochees. He was just
the man for the service. Young, active as a deer,
bold and courageous as a lion, good-tempered, witty,
lively almost to boisterousness, generous and hand
some! His figure was that of Hercules, six feet in
height and supposed to be the strongest man in the
army, and on horseback he was a perfect centaur.
Well, this model of a man very soon became the idol
of his corps, with whom he used to perform the most
surprising feats of valour. In fact, no one could resist
the weight of a blow from his gigantic arm, and,
having such indomitable courage to back it, no one
could stand against him. The consequence was that
he had so great a contempt for these fellows, by others
considered so formidable, that he used to leave his men,
spur his horse at the mass, cut his way through them
and then back again. The number he killed with his
own hand was quite incredible. His career was as short
as it was brilliant, for a fortnight ago he was sent from
the fort of Kahun with 156 infantry and 40 horse, to
escort 600 camels and bring back provisions. Their
first day’s march was uninterrupted; so Clarke, fancy
ing the others would be like it, sent back 76 infantry
to Kahun, being unwilling to harass the men so much
worked already. The next day, on their arrival at
the middle of a tremendous pass, they descried about

v2,000 Beloochees, who had lain hid until that moment,
occupying the heights around them, so as to hem them
in on every side. Clarke, however, was not by any
means disconcerted, but, leaving his cavalry, who were
useless on the hills, to guard the camels, he divided his
little band into three detachments, and, putting himself
at the head of one, he charged up the hills around him.
There they maintained their ground for about two
hours, until their ammunition failed, when every man
was cut to pieces, not one escaping. All died, as we
hear from the horsemen who have arrived, like true
soldiers, fighting to the last. Yesterday we heard that
the seventy-six who were sent home were massacred to
a man within four miles of Kahun. Poor Clarke’s
body is not to be found. Upon that we ground a hope
that he has been carried into the hills to be ransomed.
His poor brother is quite heart-broken, and the whole
regiment participate most sincerely in his grief, so much
was he beloved by both officers and men. In his death
the regiment has sustained an irreparable loss, and the
service one of the finest young men that ever entered it.
“I hear we go up there next year, or rather in a
few months. If so, so great is the thirst for revenge
burning amongst us, that I am afraid the first oppor
tunity that presents itself will find our men more like
infuriated tigers than human beings. I am hard at
work at a survey of Kurrachee. My map will contain
about 150 square miles. Captain Le Mesurier and I are
4
1;.‘ p
working together. If we do not go up to Sukkur we

are going to survey a place that no European has ever
travelled over. Our route will be thus: striking directly
North from Kurrachee, we shall travel 150 miles, then,
taking an easterly direction, separate and survey the
passes until we arrive at the longitude of Sornmiany,
when we move towards that place, surveying the country
about Himlaj, which only one European has ever visited
(Hart, of ours). From thence we return by different.
roads to Kurrachee. If we do that, I think I shall be
able to get my name up a little. Until next month,
good-bye.
“Your affectionate Son,
“ ALFRED WILLIAMS."
The second letter to his mother is as follows :—
“ Sukkur, July 30, 1840.

“ MY DEAREST MOTHER,
“ No sooner had I started my last letter from
Kurrachee than the route came for us. Although we
had some presentiment that the 2nd Grenadiers were
destined to distinguish themselves among the hills, yet
we never expected that we should so soon be turned
out of our houses, in which we hoped that we should
have been allowed two or three cool months of ease at
least. The loss, however, of 250 shiners is nothing
when compared to the pleasure we all feel at the
prospect of a little active service.
"Before I give you an account of the march, I

must let you into the secret why we have been so
expeditiously roused out. In the first place, the most
powerful and warlike of the tribes of Beloochees,
Gilzees by name, having taken fright at something in
the course of the treaty which was being contracted
between them and the Company, declared war, and‘
immediately commenced hostilities. Upon this, a
detachment was sent to take possession of Kahun under
Captain Brown of the 5th, accompanied by Clarke of‘
our regiment with the Auxiliary Horse, a movement
highly injudicious, as from the inclemency of the season
no communication can be sustained between them and
head-quarters. The result you must know. Kahun
was occupied, and Clarke,ipoor fellow, after leaving
Brown to garrison the fort, on returning was cut up

by 2,000 of the enemy. Why I say ‘ poor fellow ’ I
don’t know; for, surely, to die adored by one's regi
ment, covered with laurels and fighting like a hero, is
better than to go out by fever, or otherwise die in your
bed. Even his enemies say that he was a ‘Bura
Bahadur,’ meaning a perfect hero. The consequence
of this is that the garrison are blockaded in such a
way that not a man can leave or stir outside the walls.
His provisions can only last till the end of August,
and so, naturally, he is in an anxious state. Quetta,
too, is so pressed that the oificer in command says,
unless reinforced, he must give way to numbers; and,
lastly, Poolajee is expected to be attacked nightly by
4’
an overwhelming force which has been collected in its

vicinity.
“Such is the state of affairs, or rather was, when
the 2nd Grenadiers and five companies of Her
Majesty’s 40th were ordered to Sukkur. And now
congratulate me. I no longer belong to a battalion,
but to the light company! Fancy, such men! My
eyes! not a man under 5 ft. 8 in. or above 5 ft. 9 in.,
the recent pick of the whole regiment. I am as proud
of them as if they were my own children, and the
advantage is, my dearest mother, that no laurels will
be won without us. Think of that! and hope to see
in the next Gazette your affectionate son as having
gained the mural crown. Now mind you congratulate
me in your next letter, and say you are glad to hear it.
My Captain is in England and I shall have the com
mand of them, which, when you come to think that
there is not an individual among the number who, if
properly led, will not charge the devil, is a most
satisfactory idea.
“Well, to return. Soon after the news arrived to
inform us of our not far distant departure, another
despatch made its appearance intimating that two
steamers were waiting our arrival at Tatta. Now two
small vessels were not enough to transport the whole,
so the Major called me to his quarters and, after holding
out for some time on the importance and responsibility
of the charge, said that I should see myself in orders to
proceed immediately in command (mind that) of 300
men, that is to say, three companies—the right flank,

5th, and light company.
“Never having had a command before, I assure you I
felt somewhat nervous when, mounted on my new horse,
I galloped on parade, and heard my own voice raised '
to such an astounding pitch. I almost fancied that
my Arab, who is a most fiery gentleman, would take
fright at the unusual sound which was issuing from
its insane master. But no, nothing seemed to feel the
circumstance but myself: and so we proceeded on our
way. ‘The way was long,’ as Scott says, but as for
wind there was none. I soon found out that it was
not the season for marching, for the men, encumbered
with knapsacks, pouches (each containing forty-eight
cartridges), muskets, bayonets, lotas and havresacks,
soon began to lag, and, notwithstanding we halted
three or four times, when we reached the encampment
more than one hundred were behind. It was, however,
sixteen miles, and the first march.
“ On arriving, how changed was the consequence of
your dutiful son! My tent was crowded with native
ofiicers coming for orders, orderlies, and non-commis
sioned ofl‘icers. I was at once transformed from ensign
to major, and the other man, Jameson, who was with
me, was ‘ Chota,’ while I was ‘Bura' Sahib. This was
the only beauty of the expedition, for the thermometer
stood at 115° in the tent, which was so full of dust
that we did nothing but sneeze all day. My greatest
grief was the loss of my dear old setter, who gave up
the ghost the first march from Kurrachee. I was nearly

crying when I saw my old companion die. I never saw
a more game animal; he hunted till he died, poor old
fellow!
“ On our arrival at Tatta, we embarked the men and
all their kit, and on the following morning I went on
board myself. I say ‘we’ because at Hyderabad we
took on board Franklin, who had been there in com
mand of the Resident’s guard. The river itself is
magnificent, grand in the extreme; I never saw anything
like it, and am, therefore, at a loss to find words to
describe it. The vast mass of dark, muddy waters
rushes on in a way wonderful to behold; the rapids
of St. Goar are sluggish when compared to the rushing
volume of the Indus. In many places the banks cannot
be descried, and the river assumes the appearance of
the sea. Indeed, it goes by the name of the ‘ Meeta
Darya.’ Its surface is covered with men and women on
chatty-pots, who in this way float from place to place.
The native boats are tracked up by men who, up to
their necks in water, drag them along about a mile
a day.
“ Now that we have left Kurrachee, we are all saying
what a nice place it was; certainly in comparison with
this it was Paradise. We also had some very good fun
there, which now affords many a laugh, and many a
frolic after mess which used to end nearly in the guard
house. But in Sukkur there is no fun. What can
you do with the thermometer at 125° in tents? If
this is not a withering heat, what is? But the dis-

gusting part is that in the evening, when other people
are cool, we are at the hottest; ‘the wind at that time
is as if it came out of a burning fiery furnace.
"Major Newport has just marched out to Shikar
poor. He really is a plucky fellow. When every
body was saying that he would be obliged by the heat
to come back, he replied, ‘No, no 5 nothing but a
bond fide fiery flame shall stop me.’ He told me that
if I would pass in six months, he would give me any
thing I liked—a horse, a tent, anything; but what
I could do in one month in Bombay I could not do
herein six; for, independent of the heat, the camels
being 120 rupees renders it impossible to transport
such heavy appendages as Hindostanee books. How
I shall be able to get any at all, I don’t know; for
the Company, having been liberal enough to allow
thirty rupees a month to keep up beasts of burthen
whose keepers would consume that, think that her
ofi‘icers are quite off her hands.
“The Brigade at this place is a large one—the 1st
Grenadiers, the 23rd, the 5th, the 2nd Grenadiers, five
companies of the 40th, lots of Irregular Horse, and
two troops of Artillery. We expect to take out 1,500
men to the hills; they say that is the maximum
number that can exist in the hills. We all anticipate
much pleasure from the trip; but, beyond a con
siderable expense and perhaps a loss of kit, no incon
venience or danger will be incurred. What is the
reason you never say anything about my regiment in

your letters? You ought to be as proud of it as if ‘it
were your daughter-in-law, for she is my bride, and a
very pretty one she is! I am writing this long letter
because the probability is that you will not receive many
more for some months, as I believe we leave Sukkur
soon.
“Sukkur is built on lime rocks, which get so hot
towards the end of the day that they give out as much
heat as the sun itself. The game is most plentiful
all round, but nobody exposes themselves to the
frizzling heat. We are all living in resuscitated tombs,
which keep out the heat better than canvas. We must
not, however, turn up our noses at tents, for few sub
alterns will be able to take more than a routie, with
camels at such an exorbitant price. Besides they may
be stolen the very first day. I think if I lose my kit
I shall be supremely happy; it is a splendid idea not
to have anything in the world to think of. I am close
upon that already, so I can give you a pretty good
opinion on the subject.
“ My horse has just arrived in a boat from Tatta,
which has put to rest one source of anxiety. You will
probably say that I am extravagant in horses; but the
fact is that I now ride nearly twelve stone, the con
sequence of which is natural—I must have a strong
horse. My last was not; so, as I saw one to suit
me selling at half its value, I bought him—the more
necessary as he will have hard work soon. You will
THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN. 5'7
recognize him by the name of ‘Cock Robin.’ He is

such a beauty! quite one to please a lady. Such a
tail, mane, and head! such spirits and temper! and
paces unequalled for appearance and freedom.
“The head-quarters of our regiment have not yet
arrived ; we expect them in about a week from this time.
Everybody is looking forward to their arrival,'as the
band will be a great acquisition to our dulness. I hear
they have lost a great many men on the march between
Kurrachee and Tatta. The unhealthy season at that
place will soon be commencing again. The 26th left
it last year with 700 men sick, and only ten men ready
for duty to guard the colours. They left dead about
200 men. When they were at Kurrachee they were a
splendid body of men, quite complete; when they left it
for Bombay they were a parcel of useless invalids.
“ I have made lots of sketches since I have arrived
here, chiefly figures and from life. Rochard's lessons
have been invaluable to me. I ,am in great want of
Chinese white. It is astonishing how few draw in this
country, where there is so much subject, opportunity,
and leisure.
“Your most loving Son,
“ ALFRED WILLIAMS.”
Have I transcribed these letters at too great length‘?

The thought has occurred to me, whilst I have been so
engaged, that I ought to have curtailed them, and that
possibly my weakness may have blinded my judgment.
But I could not bring myself to alter or suppress a

single word, feeling sure they will find their way to the
heart of the reader, who will himself decide whether,
in this youth of nineteen, they do not breathe the
spirit which animated his hero, Clarke, and furnish
promise of a bright career had his life been prolonged.
CHAPTER VI.
THE force destined to relieve the beleaguered fort of

Kahun assembled at Sukkur early in August. It con
sisted of 400 men of the 1st Grenadiers, 100 of the 2nd
'Grenadiers (the light company, including my brother),
‘200 Irregular Horse, and three guns, all under the
command of Major Clibborn, of the 1st Grenadiers,
with a convoy of upwards of 1,000 camels. They left
Sukkur on the 12th August, and, toiling across the
fiery desert, encamped on the 29th at the entrance to
the pass of Surtoof.
The tragic incidents of the following days are best
described in a letter written by Ensign Edward Fanning,
of the 1st Grenadiers, on his return to Sukkur, to his
father, as he himself witnessed them. The following
is an extract from the letter, as given to us by Mr.
Fanning :—
“ Camp Sukkur, 25th September 1840.
“ In my last letter I told you that I had volunteered
to join my regiment previous to its marching on field
service, and had been refused by the Brigadier. How
ever, on the 12th August, a memorable day in my life,

poor Hon-nor, the adjutant of our regiment, was taken
ill and unable to take the field. The commanding
ofl‘icer of our regiment, Major Clibborn, immediately
applied for me, and accordingly, with only six hours’
notice, I was ordered to receive charge of the Adjutant’s
ofiice, and make ready to start that night. Accord
ingly, on the night of the 12th, a force consisting of
400 men 1st Grenadiers, 100 2nd Grenadiers, 200 Irre
gular Horse, and three guns, left Sukkur, our object
being to bring the garrison of the Murree fort of Kahun
back into the plains. After marching eight very long
marches, we arrived at Poolajee, the village by which
we
we were
left to enter the
Poolajee, andhills. Ontothe
started thenight
hills, ofand,
the 23rd
after I
making six marches unmolested, we arrived at the foot

of a tremendous mountain called Surtoof, the place
where poor Clarke’s party was cut up, and there pitched
our camp for the day, the 29th August. Over this
tremendous mountain there was a pass about a mile in
length, of sheet rock, and up this we were to bring
guns and a convoy of 1,100 camels. In every direc
tion about the camp the remains of poor Clarke’s
disaster were visible by the clothes and bones of the
-..-_--¢
-
unfortunate company of the 5th Regiment; the only
way by which we could find out where poor Clarke met
,_ his fate was by seeing the remains of his Tartan
trousers lying outside his grave.
“At 2 o’clock A.M. on the morning of the 30th we
commenced the ascent of this mountain pass, and, by

the incessant exertions of the sepoys, the guns and
convey were dragged and conveyed to the halting-ground
on the top by 6 o’clock P.M., through a burning sun.
There was no water whatever here, except what the
sepoys brought up in their skins and in their pots from
the bottom of the mountain.
“ Here we made a halt till 3 o’clock A.M. of the 31st,
and during this short halt the enemy first showed them
selves by their skirmishers firing upon our pickets. In
consequence of this firing, the troops were under arms
all night, and the men, therefore, got little rest after
their labours of the previous day. At 3 o’clock A.M.
we started on a good road, and, as day dawned,
approached the range of mountains over which lay the
route to Kahun. We could plainly observe that the
heights were crowned by thousands of the enemy, who
kept up a brisk fire on our men as they advanced to
their ground. Immediately at the base of this range of
mountains there are several ravines, and in one of these
the labour of the men was greatly increased by the
upsetting of one of the 12-pounder howitzers, limber
and all. However, after great perseverance and labour,
the advance of the convoy, consisting of 350 Infantry,
with 50 Irregular Horse and two guns, arrived at the
halting-ground. The guns were immediately placed in
position to enfilade the summit of the pass in front of
us, which rose in a zig-zag course up the side of the
precipitous mountain. It was now about 10 o’clock
A.M., and the heat fearfully oppressive. A letter had

been received from Captain Brown, from Kahun, some
days before, reporting that a great deal of rain had
fallen, and that we were pretty sure of finding plenty
of water; but, to our horror, we found none, and the
little the men had brought up from the bottom of
Surtoof was exhausted long before. The men had,
therefore, little or no water, many of them since the
evening of the 29th.
“Under these circumstances, it was evident that both
men and cattle must perish from thirst unless the
mountain passwere carried, beyond which water was
___ said to be procurable, and the fort of Kahun distant
_
about six miles.
-'.
“We waited anxiously till 1 o’clock’ P.M. for the
arrival of the rear-guard, consisting of the remainder of
_. ._ . the force, under Captain Heighington, of our regiment.
About 2 o’clock P.M. the dispositions for attacking the
pass were made, and the left flank companies of the 1st
and 2nd Grenadiers were appointed as the storming
party, supported by the remaining divisions, leaving the
colours of our regiment under charge of two strong
companies. I was ordered to the front with two com
panies, there being few European ofiicers, and my duty
was to keep the heights clear whilst the storming-party
were ascending. During the time I was forming my
men so as to open fire we were fearfully knocked over
by the enemy's musketry, and it was a merciful Pro
vidence that spared my life, as the man on my right
THE DEFENCE 0F KAHUN. 63
was shot before we could return a volley. I at last

opened a heavy fire, as also did the guns, and the
heights were soon cleared.
“ The storming-party, commanded by Captain Raitt,
of our regiment, was then by him led on with admirable
coolness and order. As they ascended, the road became
excessively diflicult, at times admitting of only a single
file, and as they neared the top they found breastworks
of stones, surmounted by thorn-bushes, built across
the road. It was getting over one of these that poor
young Williams, brother of Monier Williams, and who
was at Addiscombe with me a term, was shot through
the heart. When he was raised up his head fell forward
upon his breast, quite dead. It might be some satis-
faction to his unhappy mother to know that he was not
butchered, as all those were, or at least most of them,
who subsequently fell, and, should you think proper,
you might let her know it, as coming from one who
saw him fall. He was picked off by a single shot, not
in any melée. I mention this, because I well know what
reports get afloat. He was a great favourite, you may
say beloved by all who knew him. I hardly ever felt
anything like the moment when I saw he was no more!
“ Raitt, shortly afterwards, was shot through the
thigh. He quietly turned round to Franklin, who com
manded the left company 2nd Grenadiers, of which
poor Williams was subaltern, and said, ‘ Franklin, I
am shot; lead my company whilst I bind up my wound
with my handkerchief.’ He was soon again at the head
‘64 THE DEFENCE 0F KAHUN.
of his company. All the breastworks had been sur

mounted, the ledge at the head of the pass was gained,
and the men were preparing for the rush, when a dense
mass of the enemy, as it seemed by signal, rose from
behind the crest of the mountain and completely over
whelmed the storming-party with showers of stones and
with musketry, whilst others fell on them with their
sabres,
sepoys. committing fearful havoc on the retreatingv
“During this rush poor Raitt and Moore of our

regiment, and Franklin of the 2nd Greuadiers, lost
their lives. The ‘retreat’ was immediately sounded
for the support of the guns and colours, so I accord
ingly doubled back to the colours. We were, however,
too late; hundreds of the enemy were within twenty
yards of us, so we had no time to form or manoeuvre.
The colours were moved quickly to the gun, and the
word ‘ rallying square round the gun ’ was immediately
given. The square was quickly formed, and the hard
fighting now commenced. They were on all sides of
us, dashing large stones into the square, and many
‘closing and fighting sword to bayonet. Our wounded
and dying were all in the middle of the square raving
mad from thirst.
“ We fought in this way for twenty minutes, making
a complete circle of dead men about five yards from our
bayonets. Our ammunition was now nearly expended,
‘not above four rounds left in each man’s pouch; how
ever, the fire on our side was so heavy, and our volleys
of grape-shot, beautifully directed by Captain Stamford

of the Artillery, blowing them away from the muzzle
of the gun, killing thirty in one round, had such an
effect upon them that they all made for the hill again,
having succeeded in carrying off the greater part of the
convoy during the action. All our camel-men and
palanquin-bearers for the sick had absconded, so we
were left perfectly helpless.
“The scene that ensued after the action baflles all
description. The cries for ‘Water! water!’ and the
intense heat, the groans of the wounded and dying, as
well as the inevitable death that stared us all in the
face unless water were speedily procured, gave rise to
the most dreadful scenes. One of our guides shortly
afterwards came up and reported that water had been
discovered about half a mile distant, so all the camels
remaining, as well as the Government and ofl‘icers’
horses, were sent off immediately to bring the water.
We waited anxiously till sunset for the return of the
water-party, when some stragglers shortly arrived, re
porting that the party had been surrounded and cut to
pieces !
“It now became necessary to determine what was to
be done. We had already lost 179 men out of our
small force, and upwards of 200 followers, and the
remainder were perfectly helpless from exhaustion and
thirst, and, to add to our difficulties, all the flour,
commissariat, and tents, oflicers’ and men's, had been
carried off. In this state we found it impossible,
5
supposing we attempted another attack upon the hill,

to be able to convey the guns over it. So poor Clibborn
called us all together and, after mature deliberation,
said he thought it impossible to carry out the object
of the convoy, namely, the relief of Captain Brown.
The dreadful alternative, the abandonment of the un
fortunate garrison of Kahun, was decided on. We
therefore, at 10 o’clock at night, made a rapid retreat
to the water at the bottom of the Surtoof mountain,
distant about nine miles, leaving many wounded men
on the ground for want of sick-carriage.
“On reaching the top of the Surtoof mountain, or,
at least, the commencement of the descent, our rear
was again attacked, and we lost every atom of the con
voy; the men, being quite helpless, were an easy prey
to the enemy. Our only chance now was to make for
the plains as speedily as possible. The officers were
fairly knocked up, and two out of the number on the
verge of their graves. The men kept falling dead by
the road-side. We reached Poolajee in two days and
two nights from the bill (it took us eight days to go
there). Upon our arrival at Poolajee, poor Heighington
died of fatigue. Recollect we were without food or
tents and in a burning sun for two days. We arrived
at Poolajee about 10 o’clock at night on the 2nd
September, with only twenty men with the colours of
the regiment; the remainder straggled in during the
night.
‘_ “When, on the morning of the 3rd, I was ordered, as
Adjutant, to go and call the roll, the poor men could

not stand in the ranks, and nearly every man had good
honest tears rolling down his cheeks. In a sepoy regi-.
ment there are always a great many relations, and
these poor fellows had lost fathers, brothers, sons, and
many of their near relations. We stopped some time
at Poolajee to rest the men, and then continued our
march to Sukkur, where we arrived on the 20th, having
left behind us five out of thirteen oificers, and about
190 of our unfortunate men!
“This was a harder battle than Ghuznee or Khelat;
we lost three times the number of both of them put
together. I have been laid up with fever since my
arrival. I lasted out the fatigue wonderfully well;
better, perhaps, than any of them. It is, however, telling
on me now; fever is the order of the day. Our regi
ment is, of course, practically disorganised. All oflicial
papers and documents are gone, as well as upwards of
twenty-two thousand rupees. I have lost everything on
earth, except what I had on in the action.”
The guns were spiked and abandoned. Nothing else
can be added to this letter. It was written five days
only after the return of the shattered remnant of the
force to Sukkur, and speaks for itself, as only a letter
can do when written by an eye-witness
the time. v of the scene at
68 THE DEFENCE oF KAHUN.
CHAPTER VII.
No wonder that Captain Lewis Brown should have

entered in his Journal, under date of the 31st August,
“A day of great and almost overpowering excitement!”
Shut up in the fort, he could hear the sound of the
guns and see the shrapnel bursting in the midst of the
enemy, but could know nothing of the repulse or of
the extent of the disaster. Then “All was silent for
the rest of the night” was his sole ground for con
jecture. Where were the relieving force? Why did
they not come on ? What had become of them ? What
could be the cause of that strange and dreadful silence ?
As hour after hour, day after day, passed with no visible
sign of the convoy, he consoled himself, or tried to
console himself, with the hope that it was coming round
by the other and longer road, finding the Nuffoosk pass
too difficult. Eight days passed in that expectation,
every day adding to the anxiety as it lessened the pro
bability of the hope. Such a state of suspense would
appear to have been almost insupportable, yet the garri
son met it without flinching, without even a murmur!
THE DEFENCE OF men. 69
I now return, in proper order of sequence, to the

Journal :—
“ September 1st.—Not a single Beloochee to be seen
on the top of the hill at daylight, but several passing
across the plain in that direction. No sight or sound
of convoy all day! Sadly perplexed to know what
has become of them. Conclude that, finding the pass
too strongly defended yesterday, they had fallen back to
go round by the Deeyrah road, as I first recommended.
“ 2nd.—-Beloochees in all directions and as busy
as bees. Another day of suspense and excitement.
After 11 o’clock they pitched one of our sepoys’ tents
about halfway up the hill, up and down which batches
of loaded and unloaded camels are going. Suppose
the convoy must have dropped some of their baggage
and stores in the hurry of their departure. About 12
o’clock much firing commenced, and continued with
intervals until 2 P.M. From the sound, it would appear
the convoy had fallen back in the direction of the
Deeyrah road, some twenty miles. Cannot now expect
to see them for the next six or seven days—tantalizing,
when they were so close. Not a drop of spirits, a
cheroot, or a cup of tea left, nor have we tasted any
for some time. Sepoys very weak from short rations,
only six bags of flour left—a bad look-out. Cannot
help thinking of our having got our convoy over so
snugly in May, when we had only a third of the
number of the present convoy.
“SnL—Still in suspense. No communication from
outside; all on the look-out, particularly at night.

Upwards of one hundred loaded camels going across
the plain, some distance off. Whether these are horses
or camels cannot be clearly ascertained without a glass ;
persuaded the people in the fort that they were the
former, although the sepoys made the shrewd remark
that they never saw horsemen look so large, or go
along one after the other so regularly. About twenty
horsemen, with eight or ten spare horses, came down
from the hill to water near the fort; looks as if the
owners of the latter had been killed. Two bodies
carried across the plain on charpoys, with a kind of
funeral-party following them; suppose they are two
chiefs. At 3 P.M. saw a large body of Beloochees
pitching a sort of camp within a mile and a half of the
fort. No mistaking our sepoys’ tents, also one ofificers"
tent; five of the former and one of the latter, exactly
the number they took from Clarke’s party. Trust they
are those only, but appearances are very suspicious.
Just as it was getting dark, saw the whole body
assembled in one dense mass in front of their tents;
warned all hands to keep a bright look-out when the
moon goes down.
“4th.—To-day some horsemen came and informed
us ‘that they had cut up our convoy, taken the guns
and all the stores and supplies, and had killed all the
Sahib-log except three, who were prisoners in their
camp ’ ; in proof of which assertion they offered to show
the guns to any person I chose to send, who would also
bring a chit from the prisoners. This offer, however,
I refused, firmly believing the report to be altogether
untrue, and made with a view of getting hold of one of
my people for information. They also said that if I
would leave the fort and go to the plains, they would
not molest me. We had a very heavy fall of rain
about 4 P.M. More tents springing up in the Murree
camp; about three hundred Beloochees seated on a
rising ground on one flank; great amusement in watch
ing their movements; having a good glass, we could
almost see into their very tents.
“5th.—A person came under the fort calling out,
wishing to give us the news. Had had already quite
enough of these people’s stories, so sent a bullet or
two after him to hurry his departure. All in the fort
sadly perplexed to know what to think of affairs.
Beloochees on the move in every direction; 100 passed
this morning in the Deeyrah direction, the road from
which we are expecting the convoy. The Beloochees
do not seem in good spirits; not like men who have
destroyed a large convoy; there has evidently been
mischief somewhere. A storm occurred about 4 o’clock,
which, to our great delight, blew down all the Beloochee
tents; they, however, soon had them up again.
“6th—No grain left for camels or bullocks, and
little or no forage; they must take their chance, poor
creatures! Nothing now left but a few bags of rice,
and three or four of flour. Ten bags of the latter,
which were thrown aside as being half sand, now
came into use and were greedily devoured by the

sepoys. A camel-man shot himself, being detected in
a theft.
“7th.—Half expected, on taking a look at the
Beloochee camp this morning, to find them all de
camped; but a sad reverse met our sight—the three
guns belonging to the convoy staring us in the face!
They are placed on a piece of rising ground on one
flank of their camp, their muzzles pointed towards the
fort. What can have become of Major Clibhorn and
his convoy? Many ofiicers and men must have lost
their lives before they gave up the guns! There is no
doubt now that something most disastrous must have
happened, and we must prepare for the worst. Sepoys
keep up their spirits amazingly well, not the slightest
sign of flinching, although they seem to be aware that
their situation is rather perilous; luckily, they cannot
see the guns with the naked eye, on account of the
jungle. There are chances in our favour yet, and that
the guns will not be of much use to them—first, they
may be spiked; secondly, they may have no ammunition;
and lastly, they know not how to load or fire them.
Luckily, they are howitzers instead of field-pieces.
10 A.M.—-All the Beloochees are assembled round the
guns and peeping into their muzzles ; quite playthings '
to them.
“ 8th.—Small parties of horsemen prowling all round
the fort, watching us, I suppose, knowing we must soon
take to flight for want of provisions. They need not
‘be in such a hurry, as we have still some rice and gun

'bullocks left.
“9th.—L0aded camels still going across the plain.
'Two Beloochees mounted on artillery-horses; no mis
taking them, from their size and their having blinkers
on, which they determined should not escape our sight, as
‘they galloped up and down in front ofthe fort for an hour.
“10th.—Our old friend Sheer Bheg came in this
‘morning, but in such a suspicious manner, that I put
him prisoner. He tells us the Beloochees’_ report of
having destroyed our convoy is all true. He mentions
‘poor Raitt and Moore as being two of the killed.
“11th.—\/Iade some horsemen, who were grazing
‘their horses rather too close, scamper off, and received
much abuse from them for my pains. The Murrees
acknowledge to their having had eighty killed and
eighty wounded in the fight. Our old acquaintance
Hybutt Khan and his son are, it is stated, both killed;
also Kurreem Khan, who superintended the slaughter
'on the 29th of June.
“ 12th.—Saw a very pleasing sight this morning
‘nothing more or less than the Murrees moving away
‘the guns; they appear to be taking them to pieces and
.away. This looks very much like a bolt on their part;
perhaps they have got intelligence of another convoy
coming up. Beloochees rather quiet; allowed two
vcamelmen to loot them of _three mares out grazing.
160 killed and badly wounded will make a hole in their
tribe.
_w‘.
“13tlr.—About 1 A.M. a great noise and many fires

in the direction of the Murree camp. At daylight not
a single tent to be seen, and our eyes are no longer
made sore by the sight of the convoy’s guns. Everyone
delighted beyond measure; this is quite a reprieve.
“ 14th.—Sent off Sheer Bheg with a message to
Major Clibborn that we were all well in the fort. This
is the first opportunity that has offered of sending any
thing in the shape of a letter since the 26th ultimo..
Captured two camels this morning with the C. D.
mark fresh upon them. No doubt from whence they
came ! Feel the want of a drop of spirits or a cup of tea
most sadly when keeping watch at night. Water (and.
such water, too!) is but cold comfort.
“ 17th.—About 12 o'clock last night a cossid arrived‘
with an oflicial letter from the Brigade-Major at Sukkur,
informing us of the full particulars of Major Clibborn’s
disaster, and leaving me to my own resources, it being
found impossible to send me any further relief.”
Here I pause in the Journal to interpolate the
Brigade-Major’s letter, which is as follows :—
“ To CAPTAIN L. BROWN, Commanding Kahun.
“ SIR,
“ ’Ere this letter reaches you, if it ever should.‘
reach, you will probably have heard of the sad and»
disastrous misfortune that has befallen the detachment
under the command of Major Clibborn, 1st Grenadier‘
Regiment, which was despatched for the purpose of
relieving your worn-out men, and throwing a new garri~
THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN. 75‘
son into Kahun with provisions for two months. At

the pass of Nuffoosk, on the 31st ultimo, after some
hours spent in desperate attempts to crown the heights,
and after severe fighting till noon, after hours of
patient perseverance against raging thirst from the want
of water, and the utmost efforts of men determined to
carry out the objects for which they were destined, and;
the loss of four oflicers killed and one severely wounded,
Major Clibborn, with the only chance of saving the
remnant of his enfeebled troops by falling back for
water, was under the painful necessity of deciding on
the abandonment of your brave detachment in Kahun.
Under these circumstances, I am directed by Major
Forbes to state that all attempts to relieve you have
failed—there are neither troops, followers, or supplies
or carriage for another expedition in your favour; and‘
being under the painful necessity of leaving you, after
having done all in his power, to your own resources.
Your post has become untenable, and he begs you to
act in any way—either by a rapid night-march, or, if
so fortunate, by making any terms you can possibly
conclude with the enemy. He begs you to act for‘
yourself in the best way you can possibly manage, and
he fully authorises any agreement or arrangement that
may enable you to bring your detachment and your
companies safely to the plains.
“ I have, &c.,
“ Camp, Sukkur, “J. DOWN, Brigade-Major.
“ 7 September, 1840.”
After the receipt of this letter, the Journal continues,

under date of the 17th September, as follows :—
“ Well, this decides the matter at once. The number
‘of sick, and the weakly state of the rest of the detach
ment, give little chance of escape by a night-march,
and I do not suppose the Murrees will agree to any
terms I may offer. Put the best face we could on the
matter, and, on making a calculation, find we can last
out until the 15th October on quarter rations and the
gun-bullocks. Decided on holding out unless we get
honourable terms. Perhaps something will turn up in
the meantime; and if it comes to the worst, we must
try and make our way down to the plains. Replied
to the Brigade-Major in conformity with decision, not
allowing the cossid to enter into the fort, knowing he
would not have the most cheering news for the people
inside. Sepoys in excellent spirits, although well aware
that there is some mischief in the wind. From this
to the 22nd instant nothing extraordinary occurred.
“ 23rd.—Sheer Bheg returned from the plains to-day,
‘but without any reply to my letter, having had it taken
from him. He tells me that ‘ Dodah sent twice to him
immediately after the fight, knowing he had access to
the fort, to say he should be happy to make any terms
with me as long as I would leave his fort; and that
'he had sent two people to me, but that I would not
listen to them, firing upon and driving them away.’
The Belooch who came on the 5th, and whom we treated
so roughly, must have been one of these peaceable
messengers. Well, this seems an opening for obtain

ing favourable terms, particularly as old Dodah has
made the first advances; and, knowing the impossi
bility of holding the post much longer for want of
supplies, I opened a communication with the Chief,
Sheer Bheg and my Naib being the bearers of the
following proposal :—
“ ‘Dodah Murree, I’ll give you back your fort on
conditions, viz. that you give me personal security for
my safe arrival in the plains. If not, I will remain
here two months longer, having provisions for that
time.’ ”
CHAPTER VIII.
BEFORE giving the reply to the above proposal, and

continuing the Journal, it may here be remarked, by
way of prelude to what follows, that if Captain Lewis
Brown had ever thought of abandoning Kahun he
might with equal safety have secured an earlier retreat.
But he appears to have felt that it did not lie with
him to determine whether or not the fort should be
given up. He had been appointed to hold Kahun, and
hold it he would. He never for a moment thought of
retreat till ordered by the Brigade-Major’s letter of the
7th September to retire as he best could. His mes
sage to Major Olibborn on the 14th, when the garrison
were nearly in extremis, “All well in the fort,” has
found an echo and a striking parallel in the now cele
brated message, under similar circumstances, of “ Khar
toum all right.” Even when the order came that he
was at liberty to act for himself and make the best of
his way down to the plains, he hesitated to do so.
The particulars of his retreat are so singular and

interesting that they read like a romance.
The treaty by which the retreat of the beleaguered
garrison was secured having once been arranged, nothing
could be more strict or chivalrous than the manner
in which its terms were adhered to, until the safe
.arrival of the party at Poolajee. The most civilised
nation in the world could not have acted a nobler part
than the Murrees did from the time Kahun was aban
doned until the arrival of its garrison in the plains.
Not to anticipate further, I continue the Journal as
sfoll0ws:-—
“24th September.—The Deputation returned, inform
ing me that, on receiving the communication (Le. the
letter to Dodah Murree, which concluded the last chap
ter) the whole of the chiefs had assembled together,
and, after some consideration, took a solemn oath on
the Koran that if I would leave the fort in three days
‘they would protect me from all opposition down to the
plains, ending by saying that ‘Whatever my wishes
were should be their law.’ Two hours afterwards a
cossid brought a letter from Dodah himself, in answer
(to mine, containing an agreement on oath to my pro
posal. He said he would send his nephew to‘ pay his
respects to me, and to see the agreement conformed to
by all his people.
“ 25th.—Replied to Dodah’s letter to the effect that I
would give up the fort three days hence on the above
‘terms. Surprised at their letting us 011' so easily;
namely, simply to return to the plains without let or

hindrance from his people on condition of giving up
the fort, which Dodah must well know we cannot hold
a month longer. Plenty of room to suspect treachery,
but we must run the risk. This evening Guamaul
Khan came near the fort and sent a message to say that
he feared to venture inside, but that if I would meet
him outside without my troops he would ratify the
agreement. Wishing at once to see whether it was to‘
be treachery or no treachery, I agreed, and with Erskine‘
and four native officers met him about a mile from the
fort. I never saw a man in such a fright in my life.
Although he had thirty horsemen armed to the teeth,
and there were only six of us, he retreated twice before
he would venture near us! He thought, from our
coming alone, there must be treachery; that some men
were hidden somewhere; even after we had met he had
his horse all ready close by for a start. Down we all
sat in a circle; a wild scene! His followers appeared
to be exceedingly well-armed, and all fine, stout-built,
men. After compliments, &c., the nephew began to
talk very reasonably. He expressed a hope ‘ that there
would now be a lasting peace between his tribe and
the British; that they had only fought at the Nuffoosk
pass to save their country and their lives; that it,
was the least they could do when they had the fate
of Bejah Khan staring them in the face; that they
had never killed any of our people after the fight, and
that all the prisoners had been fed, clothed, and set
free.’ He concluded by saying ‘ that he should remain

near the fort till we left, to prevent any disturbances
between his people and mine, and that he would furnish
me with trustworthy guides down.’ There was not the
slightest appearance of treachery. Thus ended this
most interesting conference. It will not, I think, be
easily forgotten by either Erskine or myself; so much
depended on it, the fate of ourselves and the whole of
the detachment. We found these Beloochees the most
civil and polite of men; the confidence we placed in.
their word by meeting them, in the way we did, seemed
to please them much; and from having been deadly
enemies for five long months, we became, in one hour,
the best of friends. No doubt their joy was just as.
great in getting rid of us as ours was in obtaining our
freedom.
"26th and 27th.—Most delightfully employed in
preparing for our start. Only ten public camels left,
and those as thin as rats. None here procurable. The
number of sick amounts to forty, and these require
twenty! Then there are the rations, ammunition, both
gun and musket, water and tents. In fact, I found I
could not move without sacrificing all private property
and half the ammunition and tents. Obliged to call
on oflicers and men to give up what private camels
they had; this was most willingly agreed to; and all
kit, even to our bedding, was left behind. The gun
ammunitionfrom
oppositionv I wasthe
obliged to take,
Boogtees, as I rather
through whose expected
country
6
_v_
we had forty miles to go. At first we were almost

afraid we should not be able to bring down the gun,
from the wretched state of the bullocks and the weak
ness of the men. However, we determined to try, and,
leaving the waggon and forge-cart behind, picked out
thirty of the best for the gun alone. The sepoys, think
ing we were going to leave it behind, came and begged
me not, as they themselves would drag it down and
defend it with their lives! When Erskine was burning
the forge-cart and waggon the Beloochees outside
thought we were setting fire to the fort, and sent to
beg us to spare it.
“28th.—Turned our backs on Kahun this morning
at 2 o’clock. Much trouble in getting off, in conse
quence of the number of the sick; obliged to tie some
of the poor fellows to the camels. Commenced the
ascent of the big hill at 6 o’clock, and, after immense
fatigue and labour, got the gun to the top by 2 P.M.
The sepoys were regularly overpowered with fatigue
halfway up; the call for water now was dreadful, all
that I had brought with me in the knapsacks being
expended. About 9 o’clock about 300 Beloochees had
assembled in our front, near the right flank, perched
on the top of the hills; they seemed highly amused
at our getting the gun up; but, when they saw the
sepoys completely done up with thirst and fatigue, they
called out, ‘Ah! you will never get the gun down to
the plains, you had better give it to old Dodah.’ I
offered them money to show us some water; they said
they would for 1,000 rupees! After some talk they

agreed to show us some for 100 rupees, which was
immediately given ; there was just enough to give each
man a handful or so, and then they set to and got the
gun up. I really thought, at one time, we must have
left it behind. At the very top of the pass were about
fifty of Hybutt Khan’s followers; these men swore we
should not go any further until we had paid for the
Hock of sheep we captured on the 13th August. How
ever, when it came to the point, and seeing the gun
too close to be pleasant, they thought better of it, and
begged a few rupees for Hybutt Khan’s family, who,
they said, were very poor. It was as much as I could do
to restrain myself from giving this party a round of
grape; it is well I did not, perhaps, as it would most
likely have embroiled me with the rest of the tribe,
and my detachment was not in much of a fighting con
dition! It was now 4 P.M., and we had still to descend
the Nuffoosk pass, to some water which our Murree
guides reported was in abundance three miles from the
bottom, in consequence of much rain having fallen.
Commenced descending, when a spectacle the most
horrible to be conceived met our sight. The bodies of
all our poor fellows, both ofiicers and men, who fell on
the 31st August, lying unburied, with all their clothes
on! having been merely dragged ofi‘ the road. Raitt’s
body was first, being almost on the top of the pass.
Through this dreadful scene we had to lower our gun
down the hill, inch by inch. I would have given
6%
84 THE DEFENCE Or KAHUN.
the world to have buried the poor fellows, but this was
out of the question; we had then been fourteen hours
under arms, and had still to seek for water, besides
which we had no intrenching tools. The bodies were
lying in heaps, which shows what a bitter fight it must
have been. The Murrees spoke highly of poor Raitt’s
bravery in being at the head of all. They had buried
all their own dead at the bottom of the hill; but,
although I offered them any money they chose to ask,
they refused to bury ours, in consequence of the state
of decomposition they were in. After much labour got
the gun down the bill, and proceeded on along the table
land until 7 o’clock, when we found water in abun
dance in a deep watercourse, on the banks of which
we bivouacked for the night. Although the men had
had no food all day, they all (save the pickets) imme
diately fell asleep without tasting a bit. They had been
under arms nineteen hours, the first bugle having been
sounded at twelve last night. Had this water been
found when the fight of the 31st took place, what a
different tale would have been told I
“ 29lh.—-Marched this morning from the top of the
Surtoof mountain, four vmiles ; descended hill, lowering
gun down with drag ropes. Reached bottom at 10
o’clock. On examining one of the gun-wheels found
the ironwork of the axletree box split in several places ;
to all appearance it seemed impossible to repair it, or
that the gun could travel any further; but Erskine, by
great exertions, got it bound up, and we went on again,
starting at 2 P.M., but did not reach our ground until

10, having lost the road and got jammed in between
ravines. I should have wished to have made only one
march a day, in consequence of the weak state of the
men; but there was no help for it, on we must go,
night as well as day, having only two days’ provisions
with us. Here no water was procurable; luckily the
sepoys were so done up that they soon fell asleep, and
forgot all about their thirst. Received an express
from the Assistant Political Agent, warning us to expect
opposition from the Boogtees, in whose country we are
now; not in much of a fighting train, half the men
being on camels, but, with the gun, I think we have not
much to fear from them.
“30tl1..—Started at 5 A.M. and arrived at 10 at a
beautiful stream of water. On this march I was
obliged to throw away all the ammunition save a few
rounds of grape, otherwise I must have left eight or
ten sick behind. Men and camels regularly gave in
during this march; and how we all got safe up, I
hardly know. Remaining with the rear-guard, I cheered
them on as well as I could. One poor fellow died on
the camel’s back. Our Murree guide, who had behaved
as yet very well, did an act‘of extraordinary kindness
(for a Beloochee) ; hearing that one of our people was
left behind for want of carriage to bring him on, he
went back of his own accord, mounted him on his
horse and brought him into camp, walking himself by
his side. From this ground sent off an express by our
Murree guide (the only man who would venture) to

Poolajee for some spare camels and gun-bullocks, and
we proceeded on another eight miles at 4 A.M., getting
to some water about 10 o’clock.
“October 1st.—Started at 3 am. and marched on
eight miles. Soon after our arrival, to our great
delight, up came our Murree guide with some Scinde
Horse, spare camels, and gun-bullocks. Proceeded on
to Poolajee at 4 P.M., reaching that post at 12, dis
tance fourteen miles. On coming out of the hills
into the plain, fired off our howitzer to give notice to
our friends at Lehree, the head-quarters of’ the 5th
Regiment, of our safe arrival.
“ Thus, after a detention of five months in the fort of
Kahun, was our escape from that position and the
Murree hills accomplished. The hardships and priva
tions circumstances forced upon us were most cheer
fully borne with by all. After the attack on Major
Clibborn’s party it often appeared impossible to expect
a release, yet not a murmur was heard. On no one
occasion had I to find fault with the men; and the
alacrity and cheerfulness with which they performed the
exceedingly onerous duties which I was forced to exact,
reflects, in my humble opinion, great credit on the
Kalee (5th) Pultan and small detachment of artillery.
Of the constant aid afforded me on every occasion by
Lieutenant Erskine, and Dr. Glasse I note nothing;
it can never cease to be fresh in my memory, and
their rank is too near my own to admit of my saying
all I could wish, or they deserve, even in this my private

Journal.”
Thus ends, in an appropriate manner, this most
interesting Journal. But, as connected with some of the
incidents referred to in it, and especially as additional
proof that the Murree tribe were not wanting in the
chivalrous feeling common everywhere to warlike natures,
it should be added that shortly after Captain Lewis
Brown's safe return he communicated with one of the
chiefs, Mendoo Khan, and with that chief’s assistance
succeeded in getting all the brave men who were killed
in the fight at Nuffoosk, on the 31st August, buried in
the ground on which they fell, being assisted in that
duty by some of the Murrees who were actually engaged
in the fight. In further proof of the same chivalrous
quality, my brother's sword was found by his side after
the engagement, by the son of the chief Dodah, and
was by him brought to Colonel French, then at Lehree,
as a tribute of the man's respect for his enemies.
Colonel French sent me the sword accompanied by a
letter, from which the following is an extract :—“I
was on outpost duty at Lehree, in Cutchee, near the
Murree Hills soon after the defeat of Major Clibborn’s
force, and frequently had the wandering bards of the
country to chaunt of an evening their historical ballads.
They extemporisedand introduced the names of those
who fell at Nufi‘oosk and Surtoof, and with great praise
of their gallantry; that of your brother, as ‘ chota’ (or
youthful) was a theme in itself, and the occasion was
_va_ v. ~ _. _‘ _
not lost by the berds of referring to his youth and yet

his courage. But the sword was given to me by the
son of the chief who defeated us, Dodah Murree, and he
took occasion to speak of the courage displayed by all
on the Nuffoosk field." The sword is now a valued
treasure in my possession.
Many other letters were received by us from friends
in India, after the occurrence of these events, but they
are too personal to interest the general reader. One,
however, I may venture to transcribe, from Major
Clibborn himself to Mr. Farish, then in Council in
Bombay, and afterwards forwarded by Mr. Farish to us
in England. It is as follows :—
“ It has been the custom of everybody to call our
enemies barbarians, truculent rascals, &c. The Murrees
are not only a fine race of mountaineers, but they
are a brave and gallant enemy; and their conduct to
Brown (of whose safe arrival you will have heard)
should raise them in the estimation of everyone. The
repulse that my men sustained must have fallen alike
on Europeans, for even French armies in the Tyrol have
been destroyed by showers of rocks and stones from an
unseen enemy; and their gallant rush on our main
body and guns was as dashing and formidable an affair
as our sepoys have ever had to contend against. I
had almost forgotten to speak of poor young Williams
of the 2nd Grenadiers. He was a general favourite
with everybody. I saw him dozing in the shade of a
dooly—for no tree was to be found on the bare ground
of our battle-field ; he looked the picture of youth and

freshness, with his rosy cheeks. Half-an-hour after
he was with his company advancing gallantly up the
wall, I may almost call it, of Nuffoosk to the attack.
He was shot through the heart, almost one of the first,
on coming under the fire of the enemy, on the crest of
the mountain, near the top, and fell dead. Poor
Franklin held him up for a moment or two, but found
he was dead ; and poor Franklin himself was killed soon
after in the melée. You may judge of the steepness of
the ascent by the circumstance that anyone getting off
the track was obliged to crawl on hands and knees.”
To Captain Lewis Brown, to Lieutenant Erskine,
and Dr. Glasse, and to their companions in arms, was
accorded the full mood of praise by the Bombay Govern
ment. The Governor in Council, by a General Order,
issued in March 1841, declared that, “in order to testify
his admiration of the gallantry, prudence, and perseve
rance which distinguished Captain Brown in the defence
of Kahun, and the fidelity and bravery 0f the officers
and men under his command, the 5th Regiment Native
Infantry should be permitted to have ‘ Kahun ’ inscribed
on their colours and borne on their appointments.”
It is to tell the story of that defence to congenial
spirits of the present generation that, recalling many
monrnful memories, I have collected the foregoing facts
and endeavoured to place them, in all simplicity, before
the reader.
90 THE DEFENCE Or KAHUN.
SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.
_-_q__
THE short and simple narrative recorded in the pre-

ceding chapters of this little volume appeared recently,
for the first time, in two consecutive numbers of the
Army and Navy Magazine. It is introduced, as has
been seen, by an abridged summary of events which ex
emplified our political position in the East during the
years 1838 and 1839. The summary is confined to the
great historical events which followed on Sir Alexander
Burnes’ Mission to Cabul in 1838, and was purposely
left merely in outline so as not to interfere, more than
necessary, with the incidents of the narrative itself.
But, whilst seeking to enlist the interest of the reader,
primarily, in the young men who are there brought to
his notice, it has been deemed desirable, now that an
opportunity is afforded of presenting the narrative to
the public in a substantive form, to give it more local
interest, and especially to connect it with the first cam
paign in the hills north of Kutchee, in Beloochistan,
which immediately preceded the occupation of Kahun

by Captain Lewis Brown, and his defence of that out
post.
There are many references to persons and places in
that officer’s journal which will be better understood by
a fuller description of the circumstances under which a
handful of native soldiers were sent forth, for the first
time, in that deadly climate and into a country of which
they knew nothing, to suppress, as they best could, the
predatory warfare then carried on by the wild tribes who
inhabited that district.
The campaign was necessarily a rough and ready one,
the natural consequence and outcome of the advance
through that district of Sir John Keane’s Army of the
Indus, which reaped all the honours and, passing on,
left unheeded all this hard and thankless work and all
these harassing difficulties in its train. With little or
no assistance from head-quarters, and without public
treasure or adequate commissariat, the few ofiicers to‘
whom the duty was entrusted were left to make their
own dispositions, to trust to their own resources, and to'
find out everything for themselves. Splendidly did they
and the native troops under them discharge the duty ;.
and no further proof need be required of the fact that.
our Bombay sepoys, who are now, in comparison with‘
the Sikhs and Goorkas, held in somewhat low esteem,.
could, when well led and commanded, behave as well as.
any other corps of the Indian army.
Though myself born in India, connected with it from
childhood, and revisiting it in after life, I do not claim

19»‘-.._
to possess any exceptional knowledge on Indian affairs.
In the present instance it is not required. Some thirty
years ago we had given to us the most direct and
authentic information on this particular campaign, be
fore but little known beyond the sphere of its opera
tions, in a work deeply interesting and instructive to all
who seek the welfare of British India, entitled, Views
and Opinions of Brigadier-General John Jacob, col
lected and ediled by Captain Lewis Pally.
General Jacob, though in the year 1839 only a lieu
tenant in the artillery, took an active part in organising
the small force which was destined to operate in that
vyear against the wild marauding tribes in Kutchee, and
was himself engaged throughout those operations. The
work in question comprises and consists chiefly of the
wise maxims and opinions of that distinguished ofi’icer
on civil as well as military matters connected with India,
and was given to the public immediately after, and as a
consequence of, the Mutiny of the Indian army, in order
that our Governors and Legislators might, with the
assistance founded on the wisdom and valuable expe
rience of that ofiicer, be warned and instructed for the
future. Interpolated in the book is a memoir of the
campaign. From this I have drawn largely, condensing
and adapting so much of the descriptive matter con
tained in that memoir as has a bearing on the narrative
contained in the previous chapters, and gleaming and
filling up from other authentic sources (partly oral), in
the hope of making the narrative more interesting to

the general reader.
The province of Kutchee, in Beloochistan, consists
partly of plains and partly of mountains, the boundary
between the two being sharply defined, the mountains
being split, roughly speaking, east and west, by long
parallel valleys or ravines. The province was inhabited
by separate predatory tribes, some of whom resided
wholly in the plains, their fighting men being all
mounted. Their chief towns were Lehree and Poola
jee The others, known by the names of the Murrees
and the Boogtees, kept to their mountains, the chief
towns of the Murrees being Kahun, and of the Boogtees
Deyra. The mountain men were nearly all footmen,
and being safe in their mountain fastnesses seldom ven
tured into the plain country, the horsemen of the plains
being, in fact, too much for them. At the same time,
all these warlike tribes were, except when engaged in
robbing each other, on fairly good terms and afforded
each other mutual support when necessity required.
Sir Charles Napier, on the occasion of his subsequent
campaign, described them as follows :—-“They are
divided into tribes, each tribe protecting itself, because,
in fact, no law existed, and in a strange way they did
so :—tribe A being in want would rob tribe B, which
took no notice of the depredation for a time—longer or
shorter, according to circumstances. But when the
proper time came tribe B, having, perhaps, a. quarrel
with tribe C, would propose to pardon A if it would
94: THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN.
help B to rob 0. Thus a sort of rotatory plunder,

mutually understood, went on amongst all the tribes.”
These plundering incursions into each other's districts
by these border chiefs, and the existence of perpetual
blood-feuds resulting therefrom, was the chief cause of
the terrible disorder which for years prevailed along
the border country.
The chief of the tribes who inhabitated the plains
was one Beejar Khan, a man of great stature as well as
‘of ability and influence, having the command of up
wards of a thousand horsemen, the best and boldest in
the country, whom he kept completely under his
authority. His chief town was Poolajee, situate about
five miles from the foot of the hills, a miserable collec
tion of huts surrounded by a. mud wall, unprovided
with any flanking defence, and altogether in awretchedly
crazy condition.
There was no necessity for Beejar Khan to shelter
himself behind his mud wall, nor did he do so whilst
plunder was to be got. In the year 1839, after Sir
John Keane with the army of the Indus had passed
through Kutchee en route to Candahar and Ghuznee,
Beejar Khan, at the head of his dashing horsemen,
scoured the plains and directed all his efforts towards
plundering the valuable British convoys passing within
his reach from Shikarpoor, through Kutchee, to Dadur,
at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. This freebooter,
with others of less note associated with him, infested
the road from Shikarpoor to the mouth of the Bolan
'in such numbers, that a whole regiment was required to

‘escort a convoy in safety across the intervening desert.
The matter was of serious importance, for the safety of
'the army of the Indus depended on the supplies for
warded to it from Scinde. The heat, also, in that part
of the world, from April to October, is more deadly than
the sword of any human enemy, and scarcely an escort
at that time marched through the country without losing
many men from this cause alone.
To check the plundering raids of Beejar Khan a
‘detachment was ordered, in the month of June 1839,
to proceed from Sukkur and Shikarpoor against him.
The season was one of intense heat. To this fact we
have already read in this volume the independent
testimony of Sir Thomas Seaton, who experienced all
the horrors of that fiery heat on his march with a con
voy to join the army of the Indus at this very time and
across this very desert. The thermometer in the hos
pital shed at Shikarpoor stood commonly at 130°, and
on several days reached the astonishing height of 140°.
The wind was like a blast from a furnace, and this even
at midnight.
There had been left behind from the army of Sir
John Keane at Sukkur about one hundred-and fifty
European soldiers, men too feeble or too unfit to
march. With fifty of these men Lieutenant Jacob was
‘ordered to form a company of artillery, and to proceed
from Sukkur to Kutchee. On the three days’ march
from Sukkur to Shikarpoor one ofiicer and fifteen men
‘A;..
Q._.‘-_-°'_
96 THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN. v
were struck dead with heat and the march was aban
doned. A fresh start was made in October 1839 with
a force consisting of a wing of the 1st Grenadier Begi
ment of Bombay Native Infantry, four hundred and
fifty strong, the light company of the 5th Regiment of
Bombay Native Infantry, eighty strong, and a bullock
battery composed of 24-pounder howitzers and one 6
pounder gun. Major Billamore of the 1st Bombay
Grenadier regiment commanded the whole force;
Captain Baitt, the Grenadier Regiment; Captain Lewis
Brown, the light company of the 5th ; and Lieutenant
Jacob, the artillery.
This little force crossed the desert to operate against
Beejar Khan; but on reaching Poolajee found that he
had abandoned the town and taken to the hills for
safety. Whilst, however, the force remained encamped
at Poolajee, Beejar suddenly left the hills and with his
horsemen entered the plain, as if to attack Major Billa
more. On the representation of Major Billamore that
it was necessary he should have cavalry at his disposal
to enable him to act effectively against these border
robbers, a detachment of one hundred and eighty irregu
lar horse under the command of Lieutenant Walpole
Clarke, of the 2nd Bombay Grenadier Regiment, was
ordered to join the force at Poolajee.
On the arrival of Lieutenant Clarke and his horse at
Chuttur, the village before reaching Poolajee, he
received information of a strong party of Beejar Khan’s
horsemen having left the hills that evening to plunder.
Acting at once on this information, and guided by a

man of the village who had been plundered shortly
before, Clarke sallied out about midnight with one half
his men, and managed matters so well, that just before
daybreak he fell in with the robbers, about three hun
dred in number, dismounted in a corn-field. They had
just time to spring on their mares before Clarke closed
with them, killing fifty of their number and taking
eleven prisoners. v
To appreciate this exploit as it deserves, it should
be borne in mind that the country, its people, and all
belonging to it were at this time entirely unknown to
the oflicers and men of the Indian army. Everything
was different from their former experiences in India.
And they had to deal with active and fierce tribes
who knew every inch of their own difficult country.
The forays of these robber tribes were generally made
on small high‘blooded mares, not exceeding fourteen
hands in height, and so trained as to make almost in
credible journeys, abstaining wonderfully from water
and being at times fed on raw meat. The ordinary food
of the mare, as well as the man’s food (a coarse cake
and some arrack), was carried in capacious saddle-bags.
All the warriors carried swords and embossed shields,
some two swords of the finest temper and sharpness, and
sword-whetters always attended them. Every man bore
a matchlock, and some of the men spears. Going into
battle they resolved to win or die, neither giving nor
taking quarter. But battle was, in fact, only another
7
name for a plundering raid. When hard up for food or

money, the tribe so in want, having previously arranged
their plans, started off overnight on their maraud
ing expedition, so as to arrive at their ground just
before daybreak. They then dismounted, hobbled their
mares by the legs, and, stealthily creeping up on foot to
the flocks or herds grazing on the ground in supposed
safety, surrounded them and drove them off to their
own country, reserving part for food and selling the
remainder across the frontier. Mares were always used
on these occasions. Horses of the other sex would
have given the alarm by their neighing and squealing
on arriving at their halting-ground. The mares were
never shod, notwithstanding the rocky ground and
stony plains over which they travelled.
It was now reported to Major Billamore that a strong
body of the enemy under Janee and Rahmut, two of the
most enterprising and famous of the Belooch warriors,
had for some time past been assembled at Ooch,
a curious place where a stream of fresh water, largely
drunk by man and beast, runs out of a hill of salt—at
least, out of a rounded bank partly covered with coarse
reeds, and, where it is not so, entirely covered with a
thick incrustation of efllorescent salt. The country all
around is barren and desolate, Ooch being the only
green spot in the midst of it. As Major Billamore
approached Ooch, single horsemen were seen galloping
from all quarters towards one spot, and towards this
also rode Clarke and his horsemen, and soon found
themselves in the middle‘of the Belooch encampment.

The enemy’s horsemen, well knowing the country, made
their escape, and the footmen, whilst Clarke was pur
suing the flying horse, climbed to the top of the hill
and opened a smart matchlock-fire. Our own infantry
was, of course, far behind, but Clarke soon dismounted
his men and attacked the enemy on the hill, killing
twenty of them, and compelling the remainder to
surrender.
Major Billamore endeavoured the next day to follow
up the enemy with his cavalry, but got entangled
amongst extensive quicksands, and, failing in his pursuit,
returned to Poolajee. Here he received orders, in
November 1839, to proceed in two detachments to enter
the Murree and Boogtee hills, where Beejar Khan and
his tribes had found refuge. One party, commanded by
Major Billamore, accordingly proceeded towards Deyra,
and the other, commanded by Captain Raitt, towards
Kahun, and both reached the respective halting-places,
Deyra and Kahun, by regular marches. Arriving at
Deyra, Major Billamore soon found out that the small
numerical strength of his detachment appeared to be
exciting contempt among the Boogtees, who were fast
assembling at a spot in the hills near Deyra for the
purpose of attacking him, and in order to meet the
expected attack he directed Captain Raitt to leave a
company of Grenadiers strongly posted in a small fort
near Kahun, and to march with the rest of his detach
ment to Deyra. At daybreak following Captain Raitt’s
7*
100 THE DEFENCE Or‘ KAHUN.
arrival, the Boogtees, about twelve hundred in number,

were seen approaching through the jungle to the attack,
presenting a most formidable appearance to the small
British detachment drawn up to oppose them. During
this advance, a traitorous old Boogtee chief, Beebruck, '
who had been detained as a kind of hostage in our
camp, had been allowed, on some specious pretence, to
go to a little distance outside the town in charge of a
file of sepoys. A small party of the Boogtee horsemen
contrived to approach unseen up the bed of a nullah,
and suddenly made a dash at the sepoys guarding
Beebruck, with a view of carrying him off. The sepoys,
however, stood firm, and in an instant Clarke, perceiving
what was going on, sprang to the spot, struck one of
the Boogtees from his horse, seized another by the ‘
throat, and brought him, as well as the old chief, back
prisoner. The enemy continued to advance but would
not come to close quarters, and, after some sharp firing,
withdrew with a loss of thirty-three men and some
horses killed by the fire of the British artillery.
Next day, a party consisting of one hundred and
fifty infantry, under Captain Raitt, and one hundred
horse, under Lieutenant Clarke, proceeded with all the
camels of the detachment to some fields about seven
mile's west of Deyra, to bring in forage. This was too
tempting an opportunity for the Boogtees to lose. The
camels had hardly been loaded with forage when the
mountaineers, outnumbering the British detachment in
the proportion of five to one, came down with loud
THE nnFnncn 0F KAHUN. 101
shouts on the sepoys. Captain Raitt received them

with a rapid and well-sustained fire; but, unchecked by
the musketry, the swordsmen rushed on, and were not
ten yards from the bayonets of the infantry when Clarke
let loose his horsemen. In an instant the mountaineers
were broken, struck down, trampled under foot, and
compelled to flight. Seventy-nine of them were killed,
‘the remainder found refuge in their hills, and the horse
men were recalled. The loss on the British side was
trifling; of the horsemen, one only was slain, but many
were wounded, including their gallant leader Lieutenant
‘Clarke. These are the exploits of the young hero whose
subsequent death is chronicled in the previous chapters.
Major Billamore now determined to leave part of his
force at Deyra for awhile, and to proceed with the
remainder to Kahun, thence to return to the plain by
the best route he could find. It was considered of
importance that his artillery should accompany him, in
order to show the mountain tribes that their highest
and most rugged bills were not inaccessible to our guns,
though the nature of the country was reported to be so
diflicult as to render the transport of artillery through
it a matter of absolute impossibility. Lieutenant Jacob
was, however, confident, and, having received permission
to explore the route, he returned to Major Billamore
and reported that he was ready to proceed with his
artillery to Kahun. A few days afterwards Major
Billamore, Captain Lewis Brown with the light company
of the 5th, a company of the Grenadiers, a troop of
Irregular Horse, and the artillery under Lieutenant

Jacob, marched from Deyra for Kahun, and, trans
porting the artillery-carriages over the diflicult hills
with great labour, reached Kahun in two long and most
fatiguing marches without opposition. The town was
deserted; and was occupied by the British troops. This
was by the circuitous Deyra route, but Lieutenant
Jacob thought there must be a nearer and shorter route
back to Poolajee. He had picked up a man of the
Boogtee tribe, by name Shere Beg, so frequently referred
to in Captain Lewis Brown’s Journal, who had long
been resident as a herdsman in the hills, and this man
said, in answer to inquiries, that there did exist a path
over the mountains, bounding the south side of the
Valley of Kahun, which he was willing to point out.
Under his guidance LieutenantJacob proceeded to the top
of the mountain. The path was only a sheep-walk, and
seemed tremendously difficult even for a single horse-
man. The path over and through the mountain was
about four miles in length. This was the Pass of'
Nuffoosk.
The pioneers and all the camp-followers were then
set to work at the road over N uffoosk, and in three days
it was thought practicable for artillery. On the fourth
day the 24-pounder howitzer and other carriages were
dragged with great labour over the mountain, and,
before night, the detachment had crossed Nuffoosk.
The next day the detachment marched to Surtoof,
and, safely descending the mountain, proceeded without
further adventure in three or four marches to Poolajee,

which it reached on the 11th of February 1840.
Thus ended the first campaign in the hills north of‘
Kutchee. The mountains had been penetrated in every
direction; the wild tribes had been beaten whenever
encountered, and every object accomplished.
The expedition under Captain Lewis Brown, in April
1840, to take and occupy the fort of Kahun, may, I
think, be called the second campaign into the Murree‘
hills. It forms the subject of the preceding chapters.
The third campaign, under General Sir Charles
Napier, was of a far more elaborate character. The
year 1843 was the year of the battles of Meeanee and
Hyderabad, the year of his conquests in Scinde, and of‘
the annexation of that province to the British Empire
In the following year he turned his attention to a cam
paign in the Boogtee hills, against the old chief, Beejar
Khan, who, it was said, had in the interim devoted him-‘
self to Mahomet, dressed in black, and divided his pro~
perty, resolved to die a Ghazee, sword in hand. All
these predatory tribes in the bills were again fostering
hostilities and organising resistance. In January 1845,
the General collected his forces at Poolajee : 2,000 in
fantry, 1,100 cavalry, and 23 guns, and after encounters,
(in which he was aided by the Murrees), with Bejar
Khan at Ooch and other places familiar to those who had
gone through the same kind of work in the first cam-
paign, succeeded in turning the passes of Nuffoosk andv
Surtoof, and thus commanding the road from Deyra to
104 THE nnFnncn OF KAHUN.
Kahun. Negotiations thereupon commenced for a sur

render, one of the conditions imposed by Sir Charles
Napier being that the guns taken by the Murrees from
Major Glibborn in his unsuccessful attempt to relieve
the fort of Kahun in August 1840 should be given up.
These negotiations came to nothing, and the General
then followed up the retreating robber tribes till at last
Beejar Khan, with his associates, eooped up in the
stronghold of Trukkee, finally surrendered, and with
his surrender the campaign was nominally ended. Here
is the description of Trukkee, as given by the historian
of Sir Charles Napier's “Administration of Scinde,”_ and
it may be taken as a fair sample of the craggy passes,
narrow and precipitous defiles, and desolate nature of
the hills in which all these operations were conducted:
“‘ Trukkee, resembling an extinct crater, was twelve
miles long, by five or six broad, and nature had con
trived it alike for secrecy and strength. For strength,
because externally it presented a belt of rocks many
hundred feet high and nearly impracticable of ascent on
the south side; and though it was less austere on the
'north, the inside was as precipitous. Thus the whole
extent was equally impervious to assault, and the interior
was a vast collection of rocky hillocks with chasms of
different depths, yet all precipitous. For secrecy, b8
.cause on the south was a second wall, or screen, of per
pendicular rocks some hundred feet high, forming, with
the actual belt of Trukkee, a restricted valley, or rather
lane, which was to be entered by narrow fissures before
the passes into the crater could be approached; and all

the country for miles around, beyond that screen, was a
chaos of huge loose stones, which it was hardly possible
to cross. The entrances to this hidden fastness, which
seemed like some ruined colossal amphitheatre, were
mere cracks in a wall of rock, so suddenly opened that
the upper parts seemed still to touch, and refused to let
in the light.” In reply to an adverse comment on the
disposition of his force on this occasion, Sir Charles
Napier wrote: “You ask why this flanking party was
so far separated from the main column, and where were
the connecting files? My answer is, You were never in
Trukkee, or you would not ask. It is there quite im
possible to keep either distances or communications. 1
have seen an ofl‘icer, whom I knew to be a gallant
fellow under the enemy’s fire, lose his head on the ledge
of a rock overhanging a precipice, so that several sol
diers were obliged to help him across. I have seen
others caught by the feet between two rocks, and several
men required to extricate them, with the loss of their
shoes. If this will not explain to the martinet why
distances and communications were not kept I have
nothing left for it but to recommend him to “Try
Trukkee."
General Jacob took the command of the province in
1846. Notwithstanding Sir Charles Napier’s recent
campaign, the frontier was then in the wildest disorder,
plundering going on by large bands of mounted men
up to the gates of Shikarpoor. In the following year,
vb
.106 THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN.

-‘‘v:“f
Lieutenant (afterwards Major-General Sir William)
Merewether, in command of a detachment of Scinde
Irregular Horse, hearing that a raiding party of Boog
tees were approaching the frontier, marched out, and
met them at Chuttur, where he attacked them, killing
six hundred out of seven hundred of the Boogtees, and
taking eighty prisoners. Notwithstanding that quarter
was repeatedly offered to them, they obstinately refused
the boon, and provoked their own destruction. A few
mounted men only escaped. The Boogtees never re
covered this defeat, but the Murrees kept up their
plundering to the end.
The fourth campaign has a special interest in con
nection with the preceding narrative. In consequence
of the persistent raiding of the Murrees on the Punjab
frontier, a further expedition was undertaken against it
at the close of the Indian Mutiny, in the year 1859.
Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General Sir Henry)
Green, having succeeded General Jacob, then com
manded on the frontier. Having, with the assistance
of the Khan of Khelat, collected at the town of Bagh a
force of some five thousand horse and foot, composed
of different Brahoe and Belooch tribes, Colonel Green,
accompanied by his brother, Major (now Colonel) Mal
colm Green, in command of a squadron of the Scinde
Irregular Horse, and by Assistant-Surgeon Henry Wake
field, early in that year entered the Murree and Boogtee
hills. Taking the Deyra route, he occupied Kahun
without opposition. The loss of the guns on the occa
sion of Major Clibborn’s expedition had always been a

source of great distress to General Jacob. With the
natural jealousy of an Artilleryman, he looked upon
that loss as a lasting evidence of defeat, and a slur on
our arms, and to his dying day his hope was that the
guns might be recovered. Three guns had been spiked
and abandoned by Major Clibborn. Colonel Green, in
strong sympathy with that chivalrous sentiment, imme
diately on arriving at Kahun made inquiry about these
guns. He found that one of them had been placed in
position on one of the bastions of the fort—the carriage
of another was found in the fort, but detached from the
gun, and on searching further for the gun itself it was
discovered at the bottom of a newly-made grave in a
burial ground outside the fort. The third gun had been
thrown down a very steep precipitous ravine and could
not be found. One of the two guns had the mark of a
deep sabre-cut across the breech, evidence of the close
hand-to-hand fight at Nuffoosk in 1840. The two guns,
thus recovered after an interval of nearly twenty years,
were slung on camels, and were taken by some of the
Belooch force down to the British Cantonment at
Jacobabad, in the hope that General Jacob might see
the wish of his heart gratified. Alas! he never did
live to see it. He died at Jacobabad in November 1859
just before the arrival of the guns.
Colonel Green, having destroyed the fort, continued
his march along the north of the chain of mountains
through country which had never before been explored
by any European, and over some almost impracticable

ground, to the whole of which the previous description
of Trukkee might fairly apply, until the Murree tribe,
including Noor Mahommed, the principal chief, Hybutt
Khan, and other chiefs of renown, were brought to bay
in a very strong position, at a pass called Keamaree.
Here they surrendered, and, accompanied by them, the
force re-entered the plains of Kutchee at Tullee, in the
direction of, and not very far from, Dadur at the mouth
' of the Bolan Pass, having completely accomplished the
objects of the expedition.
I only wish that I possessed more materials to enable
me to do justice to the cool unflinching courage of these
three gallant oflicers, who, at the most critical period
of our Indian History, when every European held his
life in his hand, could by themselves, and wholly unsup
ported, lead a wild lawless horde of Brahoes and Beloo
chees upon such an expedition, and through such a
country, relying only on the dominant strength of the
British character, and on the assurance that they were
doing. their duty. But, in fact, the best men are often
the most chary of talking about their actions; and so
the world loses a long record of individual pluck and
prowess, which otherwise would help to illustrate and
adorn our magnificent Indian History.
London: Printed by W. H. Allen & 00., 13 Waterloo Place. s.w.

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This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized

by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the

Charles Lesley Ames

BEING A NARRATIVE COMPILED FROM A JOURNAL KEPT

DURING THE SIEGE, AND FROM ORIGINAL LETTERS,

CHARLES REYNOLDS WILLIAMS.

(Reprinted from “THE ARMY AND NAVY MAGAZINE," April 1886.)

(All Rights Reserved.)

THE DEFENCE OE KAHUN.

IT may be as well to face the fact at the outset that

Without doubt it is true that the last half-century

amongst us, and excite our enthusiasm in modern

Still is the story told

And I cannot but think that the following record of

leave it to others to chronicle more minutely the progress

affairs our Government felt the importance of taking

But it was a hollow devotion, a subjection in name

i‘ As these pages were going to press there appeared in the

was then carried by'assault in twenty-four hours. So

ment from that column, in charge of political functions

to Bombay, thought it expedient to take and occupy

descends from Nuffoosk and leads over a level plain

lalabad, wrote and published, some years since, an un

villages said that such a thing had never been heard

rattled in his mouth, and his whole countenance was.

their arms and hurried off to repel the attack. The

FROM the fore-going pages it will, I think, be clear to

and carried with it the certainty of a wanton and reckless

with that object—but somehow or other, after all was

ment about to occupy Kahun, a walled town in the

The Chuppao failed, in consequence of the treachery of

supply being all ready, I this morning commenced

nor forage, obliged to send down all the animals to the

took post with twelve men on some ridges overhanging

arduous and trying march; the diﬂ‘iculties we encoun

THE convoy having arrived safely at Kahun, it may be

they principally belong to the Banyans, the Murrees

ting up gate. In the former found layers of cow-dung‘

Beloochee found him, and, after stripping him of what

as the bottom of the Surtoof mountain, thirteen miles

‘proceeding against the Beloochees in these same hills.

through and through the enemy and killing three with

THE loss of this gallant comrade, and of so many

hands busy strengthening the fort. Divided detach

pose, exclaimed, ‘ Ah ! there you go selling your country

harassing daily, ﬁring at every man who appears 200

river, consequently they were cut off and surrounded

" 30th.—Let loose the old spy to-day, tired of keeping

saddles. They had been snugly hid all day in the

are in the bed of the river ready to cut in between

very cunning, and, instead of appearing in a large body,

found to be a very good substitute, being of a purga

Nuﬁ‘oosk pass, going up there in small bodies of twenty

of the widows of those who fell on the 16th of May.

making a truce, should encourage us to go out foraging

hurrying across the plain to the Nuffoosk pass, on the

THIS brings the Journal down to the 31st August, and

to embark for Bombay I accompanied him to Ryde,

“ Camp, Kurrachee, 3rd June 1840.

I give you the particulars I am sure you will participate

the middle of a tremendous pass, they descried about

50 THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN.

working together. If we do not go up to Sukkur we