State the various modes of and steps in revising or amending the Philippine Constitution.

(1997)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

There are three modes of amending the Constitution. 1. Under Section 1. Article XVIII of the
Constitution. Congress may by three-fourths vote of all its Members propose any amendment to or
revision of the Constitution.

2. Under the same provision, a constitutional convention may propose any amendment to or revision of
the Constitution. According to Section 3. Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress may by a two-thirds
vote of all its Members call a constitutional convention or by a majority vote of all its Members submit
the question of calling such a convention to the electorate.

3. Under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, the people may directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per cent of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent of the
registered voters therein.

According to Section 4. Article XVII of the Constitution, to be valid any amendment to or revision of the
Constitution must be ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.

It is said that 'waiver of immunity by the State does not mean a concession of its liability" What are
the implications of this phrase? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The phrase that waiver of immunity by the State does not mean a concession of liability means that by
consenting to be sued, the State does not necessarily admit it is liable. As stated in Philippine Rock
Industries, Inc. vs. Board of Liquidators, 180 SCRA 171, in such a case the State is merely giving the
plaintiff a chance to prove that the State is liable but the State retains the right to raise all lawful
defenses.

What do you understand by the “Doctrine of Incorporation in Constitutional Law? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The doctrine of incorporation means that the rules of international law form part of the law of the land
and no legislative action is required to make them applicable to a country. The Philippines follows this
doctrine, because Section 2. Article II of the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts

A month before a forthcoming election, “A" one of the incumbent Commissioners of the Commission
on Elections, died while in office and “B", another Commissioner, suffered a severe stroke. In view of
the proximity of the elections and to avoid paralyzation in the Commission on Elections, the President
who was not running for any office, appointed Commissioner C of the Commission on Audit, who was
not a lawyer but a certified public accountant by profession, ad interim Commissioner to succeed
Commissioner A and des-ignated by way of a temporary measure. Associate Justice D of the Court of
Appeals as acting Associate Commissioner during the absence of Commissioner B.

Did the President do the right thing in extending such ad interim appointment in favor of
Commissioner C and designating Justice D acting Commissioner of the Commission on Elections? (1997
Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The President was wrong in extending an ad interim appointment in favor of Commissioner C. In
Summers vs. Ozaeta to, 81 Phil. 754. it was held that an ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment. Under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, within two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, the President cannot make permanent
appointments.

The designation of Justice D as acting Associate Commissioner is also invalid. Section 1(2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution prohibits the designation of any Commissioner of the Commission on Elections in a
temporary or acting capacity. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution prohibits the designation of any
member of the Judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

A, while serving imprisonment for estafa, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole,
was granted pardon by the President on condition that he should not again violate any penal law of
the land. Later, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of
the pardon granted him because A had been charged with estafa on 20 counts and was convicted of
the offense charged although he took an appeal there from which was still pending. As recommended,
the President canceled the pardon he had granted to A. A was thus arrested and imprisoned to serve
the balance of his sentence in the first case. A claimed in his petition for habeas corpus filed in court
that his detention was illegal because he had not yet b.een convicted by final judgment and was not
given a chance to be heard before he was recommitted to prison.

Is A’s argument valid? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The argument of A is not valid. As held in Torres vs. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272. a judicial pronouncement
that a ' convict who was granted a pardon subject to the condition that he should not again violate any
penal law is not necessary before he can be declared to have violated the condition of his pardon.
Moreover, a hearing is not necessary before A can be recommitted to prison. By accepting the
conditional pardon. A agreed that the determination by the President that he violated the condition of
his pardon shall be conclusive upon him and an order for his arrest should at once issue.
Governor A was charged administratively with oppression and was placed under preventive
suspension from office during the pendency of his case. Found guilty of the charge, the President
suspended him from office for ninety days. Later, the President granted him clemency by reducing the
period of his suspension to the period he has already served. The Vice Governor questioned the
validity of the exercise of executive clemency on the ground that it could be granted only in criminal,
not administrative, cases.

How should the question be resolved? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The argument of the Vice Governor should be rejected. As held In Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844, the
power of executive clemency extends to administrative cases. In granting the power of executive
clemency upon the President. Section 19. Article VII of the Constitution does not distinguish between
criminal and administrative cases. Section 19. Article VII of the Constitution excludes impeachment
cases, which are not criminal cases, from the scope of the power of executive clemency. If this power
may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would have been unnecessary to exclude impeachment cases
from this scope. If the President can grant pardons in criminal cases, with more reason he can grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are less serious.

To what extent, if at all, has the 1987 Constitution affected the “political question doctrine”? (1997)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution has expanded the scope of judicial power by including the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. In Marcos
vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, the Supreme Court stated that because of this courts of justice may
decide political questions if there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.

A, while an incumbent Governor of his province, was invited by the Government of Cambodia as its
official guest.

While there, the sovereign king awarded Governor A with a decoration of honor and gifted him with a
gold ring of insignificant monetary value, both of which he accepted.

Was Governor A’s acceptance of the decoration and gift violative of the Constitution? (1997 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 Yes. It violated Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. For his acceptance of the decoration of honor
and the gold ring from the Government of Cambodia to be valid, Governor A should first obtain the
consent of Congress.

Upon request of a group of overseas contract workers in Brunei, Rev. Father Juan de la Cruz, a Roman
Catholic priest, was sent to that country by the President of the Philippines to minister to their
spiritual needs. The travel expenses, perdiems, clothing allowance and monthly stipend of P5,000.00
were ordered charged against the President’s discretionary fund. Upon post audit of the vouchers
therefor, the Commission on Audit refused approval thereof claiming that the expenditures were in
violation of the Constitution.

Was the Commission on Audit correct is disallowing the vouchers in question? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the Commission on Audit was correct in disallowing the expenditures. Section 29(2), Article VI of
the Constitution prohibits the expenditure of public funds for the use, benefit, or support of any priest.
The only exception is when the priest is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium. The sending of a priest to minister to the spiritual needs of
overseas contract workers does not fall within the scope of any of the exceptions.

A, while on board a passenger jeep one night, was held up by a group of three teenagers who forcibly
divested her of her watch, necklace and wallet containing P 100.00. That done, the trio jumped off the
passenger jeep and fled. B, the Jeep driver, and A complained to the police to whom they gave
description of the culprits. According to the Jeep driver, he would be able to identify the culprits if
presented to him. Next morning A and B were summoned to the police station where five persons
were lined up before them for identification. A and B positively identified C and D as the culprits. After
preliminary investigation, C and D and one John Doe were charged with robbery In an information
filed against them in court. C and D set up, in defense, the illegality of their apprehension, arrest and
confinement based on the identification made of them by A and B at a police line-up at which they
were not assisted by counsel.

How would you resolve the issues raised by C and D? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The arguments of the accused are untenable. As held in People vs. Acd 232 SCRA 406, the warrantless
arrest of accused robbers immediately after their commission of the crime by police officers sent to look
for them on the basis of the information related by the victims is valid under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to People vs. Lamsiiig. 248 SCRA 471, the right to counsel
does not extend to police line-ups, because they are not part of custodial investigations. However,
according to People vs. Macon 238 SCRA 306, after the start of custodial investigation. if the accused
was not assisted by counsel, any identification of the accused in a police line-up is inadmissible.
A. When may the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended? (1997 Bar Question)

B. If validly declared, what would be the full consequences of such suspension? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
suspended when there is an invasion or rebellion and public safety requires it.

B. According to Section 18. Article VII of the Constitution, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged with rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion. Any person arrested or detained should be judicially charged within
three days. Otherwise, he should be released. Moreover, under Section 13, Article III of the Constitution,
the right to ball shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila approved an ordinance (No. 1000) prohibiting the operation in
the streets within the city limits of taxicab units over eight years old (from year of manufacture). The
imposable penalty for violation thereof is a fine of P4,000.00 or imprisonment for one year upon the
erring operator. Thereafter, and while the city ordinance was already in effect, Congress enacted a law
(Republic Act No. 500) prohibiting the operation in the streets of cities throughout the country of
taxicab units beyond ten years old. The imposable penalty for violation thereof is the same as in
Ordinance No. 1000. An owner/operator of a taxicab unit operating in the City of Manila, was charged
with violation of the city ordinance. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty; whereupon, trial was
set five days thereafter. For failure of the witnesses to appear at the trial, the City Court dismissed the
case against A The City Prosecutor of Manila forthwith filed another information in the same court
charging A with violation of Republic Act No. 500-for operating the taxicab unit subject of the
information in the first case. The accused moved to dismiss the second case against him invoking
double Jeopardy.

How would you rule on A’s motion if you were the Judge? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If I were the judge, I would grant the motion. The dismissal of the first case for failure of the witnesses
to appear terminated the first jeopardy. As held in Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54,
the dismissal of a case for failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear constitutes an acquittal.
The acquittal of A for violation of Ordinance No. 1000 bars his prosecution for violation of Republic Act
No. 500. Under Section 21, Article III of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either bars another prosecution for the same act.
State how (a) pre-proclamation controversies, on the one hand, and (b) election protests, on the
other, are initiated, heard and finally resolved. (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Pre-Proclamation Controversies

Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the
board of canvassers or directly with the Commission on Elections. Questions involving the election
returns and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first instance before the board of
canvassers only. (Section 17, Republic Act No. 2166.)

The board of canvassers should rule on the objections summarily. (Section 20. Republic Act No. 7166.)

Any party adversely affected may appeal to the Commission on Elections. (Section 20, Republic Act No.
7166.)

The decision of the Commission on Election may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party. (Section 7. Article IX-A of the Constitution.)

All pre-proclamation controversies pending before the Commission on Elections shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the board of canvassers
shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of an election protest. However, the
proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence presented so far. The Commission on
Elections or the Supreme Court determines that the petition appears to be meritorious. (Section 16.
Republic Act No. 7166.)

(b) Election Contests

An election protest is initiated by filing a protest containing the following allegations: 1. The protestant
is a candidate who duly filed a certificate of candidacy and was voted for in the election; 2. The
protestee has been proclaimed; and 3. The date of the proclamation. [Miro vs. Commission on Elections.
121 SCRA 466)

The following have jurisdiction over election contests: 1. Barangay officials - Inferior Court; 2. Municipal
officials - Regional Trial Court; 3. Regional, provincial, and city officials - Commission on Elections
(Section 2(2), Art. LX-C of the Constitution) 4. Congressman - House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
5. Senators - Senate Electoral Tribunal. (Section 17. Article VI of the Constitution) 6. President and Vice
President - Supreme Court (Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution)

The decision of the inferior court in election contests Involving barangay officials and of the Regional
Trial Court in election contests involving municipal officials are appealable to the Commission on
Elections. (Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution) The decision of the /Commission on Elections
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari on questions of law. [Rivera vs. Commission on
Elections, 199 SCRA 178)

The decision of the Commission on Elections in election contests involving regional, provincial and city
officials may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari (Section 7, Article IX-A and Section 2(2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.)

The decisions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
may be elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari if there was grave abuse of discretion. [Lazatin vs.
CGmmission on Elections. 168 SCRA 391)

Due to over-crowding in the public market in Paco, Manila, the City Council passed an ordinance
allowing the lease to vendors of parts of the streets where the public market is located, provided that
the lessees pay to the city government a fee of P50.00 per square meter of the area occupied by the
lessees. The residents in the area complained to the Mayor that the lease of the public streets would
cause serious traffic problems to them. The Mayor cancelled the lease and ordered the removal of the
stalls constructed on the streets.

Was the act of the Mayor legal? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The cancellation of the lease and the removal of the stalls are valid. As held in Macasiano vs. Diokno,
212 SCRA 464. The lease of public streets is void, since they are reserved for public use and are outside
the commerce of man.

About a hundred people occupied a parcel of land in Quezon City belonging to the city government and
built shanties thereon which they utilized for dwelling, sari-sari stores, etc. The City Mayor issued an
order directing the occupants to vacate the structures within five days from notice, otherwise they
would be evicted and relocated and their shanties removed, in order that the parcel of land could be
converted into a park for public use and enjoyment. The inhabitants of the parcel of land complained to
the Commission on Human Rights urging that the Mayor of Quezon City be stopped from doing what he
has threatened to do. The Commission on Human Rights, after conducting an investigation and finding
that the shanties of petitioners were already being demolished by then, ordered the Quezon City Mayor
and persons implementing his order to cease and desist from demolishing petitioners’ shanties under
pain of contempt.

What have you to say on the validity of the actuation of the Commission on Human Rights in relation
to that of the Quezon City Mayor? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The actuation of the Commission on Human Rights is void. In Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights,
229 SCRA 117, the Court held that the Commission on Human Rights has no power to issue a restraining
order or a writ of injunction and has no power to cite for contempt for violation of the restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction. The cease and desist order, according to the Court, is a semantic
interplay for a restraining order. Its power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers, which it is constitutionally authorized to adopt.

X, a Secretary and Consul in the American Embassy in Manila, bought from B a diamond ring in the
amount of P50.000.00 which he later gave as a birthday present to his Filipino girlfriend. The purchase
price was paid in check drawn upon the Citibank. Upon presentment for payment, the check was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Because of Xs failure to make good the dishonored check, B filed
a complaint against X in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for violation of Batas Pambansa
Big. 22. After preliminary investigation, the information was filed against X in the City Court of Manila.
X filed a motion to dismiss the case against him on the ground that he is a Secretary and Consul in the
American Embassy enjoying diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution in the Philippines.

If you were the Judge, how would you resolve the motion to dismiss? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If I were the Judge, I would grant the motion to dismiss.

As consul, X is not immune from criminal prosecution. Under Paragraph 3 of Article 41 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, a consular officer is not immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state. In Schneckenburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 249, it was held that a consul is not exempt from
criminal prosecution in the country where he is assigned. However, as secretary in the American
Embassy, X enjoys diplomatic Immunity from criminal prosecution. As secretary, he is a diplomatic
agent. Under Paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic
agent enjoys immunity from the criminal Jurisdiction of the receiving State.