Madarang v Morales

G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

Leonen, J

On January 9, 2001, Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales

filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for judicial
foreclosure of a house and lot located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City to which
they alleged that on March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor and Luciana
Bartolome loaned P500,000.00 from them. The Spouses Bartolome agreed
to pay within two months with interest of five percent (5%) per month. To
secure their loan, the Spouses Bartolome mortgaged the Bago Bantay
property to the Spouses Morales.

The obligation fell due, and after demand, the Spouses Bartolome only paid
part of the loaned amount.

In the meantime, the Spouses Bartolome died. The Spouses Morales, thus,
filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property
against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo
and Ruby Anne Bartolome.

The Spouses Morales sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented

herself as Lita Bartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend money
to the Spouses Bartolome.

Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate

heirs of the Spouses Bartolome. Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo
Bartolome’s wife.

In their answer, defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate

mortgage covering the Bago Bantay property, specifically, the Spouses
Bartolome’s signatures on the instrument. Adding to their statement that the
complaint was already barred since it had been dismissed in another branch
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for failure to comply with an
order of the trial court.

In its decision dated December 22, 2009, the trial court ordered defendants
to pay the Spouses Morales P500,000.00 plus 7% interest per month and
costs of suit within 90 days but not more than 120 days from entry of
judgment. Should defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property shall be
sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.

Defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s

decision. They amended their motion for reconsideration and filed a request
for a Philippine National Police handwriting expert to examine the
authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s alleged signatures on the deed of
real estate mortgage.

According to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its
amendment were pro forma as defendants failed to specify the findings and
conclusions in the decision that were not supported by the evidence or
contrary to law.As to the request for a handwriting expert, the trial court
ruled that the "reasons given therein not well taken." Thus, in its order, the
trial court denied the motion

Defendants., filed a notice of appeal. In its order dated August 13, 2010, the
trial court denied due course the notice of appeal for having been filed out of
time. This is evidenced by the registry return receipt on file with the court.
Consequently, they had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to
appeal the trial court’s decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal
only on August 11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-day period to appeal.

On September 24, 2010,defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment,

blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal
within the reglementary period. They argued that Atty. Tugonon’s failure to
appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and an excusable
negligence due to their former lawyer’s old age:

15. Undersigned Petitioner’s counsel is already eighty (80) years of age and
the lapses and failure of their counsel to take appropriate steps immediately
for the protection of his client is a mistake and an excusable negligence due
to the latter’s age and should not be attributable to undersigned defendants.

In its order dated April 27, 2011, the trial court denied the petition for relief
from judgment. The trial court held that the petition for relief was filed
beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to
Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On July 13, 2011, Madarang, Romeo, and Rodolfo and Ruby Anne
Bartolome filed the petition for certiorari  with the Court of Appeals. In its
resolution dated July 27, 2011, the appellate court denied outright the
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners did not
file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief
from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the Court of Appeals

denied in its resolution dated November 10, 2011. Petitioners filed the
petition for review on certiorari with this court. They argue that they need
not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for
relief from judgment because the questions they raised in the petition for
relief were pure questions of law. They cite Progressive Development
Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appealsas authority.

Petitioners add that the trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal.
They personally received a copy of the decision only on August 11, 2011.
They argue that the period to file on appeal must be counted from August
11, 2011, not on the day their "ailing counsel" received a copy of the
decision.

A comment was filed on the petition for review on certiorari by respondents

Spouses Morales. They argue that the trial court did not err in declaring pro
forma petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision.

Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the
petition for certiorari since petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment.

Issues

I. Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice

of appeal within the reglementary period is excusable negligence; and

II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright

petitioners’ petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for
 reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment.

Held:

The petition lacks merit. This court agrees that the petition for relief from
judgment was filed out of time. However, the trial court erred in counting
the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of the
trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner
learns of the judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of
judgment or final order is the six-month period. Section 3, Rule 38 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition

provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified,
filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was
taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense,
as the case may be.

In this case, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the trial court’s
decision on January 29, 2010. They filed a motion for reconsideration and an
amended motion for reconsideration, which similarly alleged the same
issues. Petitioners cannot argue that the period to appeal should be counted
from August 11, 2011, the day petitioners personally received a copy of the
trial court’s decision. Notice of judgment on the counsel of record is notice
to the client.Since petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the decision on
January 29, 2010, the period to appeal shall be counted from that date.
Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12,
2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment.Since petitioners filed their
petition for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for
relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of
judgment.
With respect to the failure of the petitioners’ counsel to file the notice of
appeal within the prescribed period, petitioners failed to prove that their
former counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a
mistake or excusable negligence, hence they were denied consideration
thereon for the setting aside of the order.

Case: SANTOS vs MOJICA

Facts:
A case for partition and annulment of certain conveyances of a 360 square meter parcel
of land
was filed by eleven brothers and sisters, all surnamed Allanigue against their sister,
Lorenza Allanigue her husband Simeon Santos, Maria San Agustin and Felicidad San
Agustin. The trial court rendered a judgment ordering the partition of the land among the
Allanigue siblings including Lorenza. However, due to failure to pay rents as directed in
the decision, the court issued a subsequent order setting off Lorenza's share. The court
then ordered the defendants (those to whom lands were conveyed) in the present case
to vacate the land and to deliver the possession to the plaintiffs (Allanigue siblings).
Leonardo Santos, son of Lorenza Allanigue and husband Simeon Santos, filed a third
party claim and a motion to recall the writ of execution. (because may house sya sa
subject land). Since the defendants and Leonardo refused to vacate the land, the court
ordered the sheriff for the demolition of the houses. Leo and the defendants then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Angel Mojica and the Sheriff
questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court to order the demolition which was
subsequently denied by the Supreme Court. After the decision became final Judge
Mojica ordered the postponed demolition. The defendants voluntarily removed their
houses. The only house that remained was that of Leo Santos. Judge then (for the
second time) ordered the demolition of the house of Leo. Hence the present petition on
certiorari and prohibition filed by Leo Santos (plaintiff) against Judge Mojica.

Issue: Whether or not the present petition filed by petitioner be denied?

Held: YES. First, Leo as son of the Lorenza and Simeon (defendants of the prior case
CC 217-R) is bound by the judgment being a successor in interest. The fact that the sale
from his parents was registered, is of no moment because he is BOUND by the
judgment, as already mentioned. Leo was also considered as builder IN BAD FAITH.
Why? His parents were summoned 1959, and Leo Santos' house having been built and
reconstructed into a bigger one after his parents were summoned (after March 1962).
Obviously, BAD FAITH. So, Allanigue sibling became the owners if they choose to
appropriate the accession but they choose to demolish it at the expense of the builder.
And applying ART. 449- As a builder in bad faith he lost the improvement made by him
consisting the reconstructed house to the owners of the land without the right to be
indemnified. Second, present petition is barred by res judicata---- the question on the
validity of the demolition order has already been decided by SC and such decision is res
judicata to the present petition raising the same question of validity involving same
parties and same subject matter.

G.R. No. 74975 January 12, 1987

TOMASA L. BELGADO, in her capacity as Administratrix of the estate of the late AMADA T. LAIZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FRANCISCO LAIZ, REMEDIOS LAIZ, and LAIZ DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Arturo E. Balbastro for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The present controversy addresses itself mainly to the proper interpretation of Section 23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines promulgated
by this Court, providing:

Sec. 23. Perfection of appeal. — In cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon expiration of the last day to
appeal by any party.

Particularly, the timeliness of a Motion for Immediate Partial Execution is involved.

On September 1, 1984, in an action for annulment with damages filed by petitioner-plaintiff against private respondent-defendant, the
Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch XXI I I, rendered a Decision in petitioner's favor declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the Deed of Conveyance of Real Properties, subject matter of the annulment action, as null and void and, in so far as pertinent to this
case, "ordering defendants (private respondents herein) upon receipt of this decision to deposit to this Court the rentals and/or income due
the properties subject of this case from the date of filing" (par. 4, Dispositive portion).

The Decision was received by private respondents on September 25, 1984. They had, therefore, until October 10, 1984 within which to
appeal.

On October 2, 1984, or, on the seventh (7th) day from receipt of the Decision, private respondents filed a Notice of appeal

On the other hand, petitioner was served with copy of the Decision on October 1, 1984. Her last day to appeal, therefore, fell on October
16, 1984.

On October 11, 1984, or, on the tenth (10th) day after receipt of the judgment, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Partial Execution
pending appeal of that portion of the judgment, among others, requiring the deposit of rentals in Court on the ground that it "necessitates
immediate implementation." Private respondents opposed the Motion alleging that the Motion for Partial Execution was filed after the
perfection of their appeal and that no mention was made of any good reason to warrant execution pending appeal.

The Trial Court initially denied execution pending appeal on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case with the perfection of
private respondents' appeal. Subsequently, however, it reconsidered, not by way of granting execution pending appeal, but on the theory
that the decretal portion of the judgment directing the deposit of rentals in Court was, in effect, an order of accounting of the rentals due so
that pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, 1 execution may not be stayed by the perfection of an appeal On January
11, 1985, the Trial Court issued an Order requiring the lessees of the properties, subject of the action, to deposit the rentals in
Court.

On Certiorari, respondent Appellate Court found the Orders of the Trial Court devoid of legal justification on the ground that the judgment
directing the deposit of rentals in Court is not an order of accounting within the contemplation of Section 4 of Rule 39. It further opined that
the appeal was perfected on October 10, 1984, so that when petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Partial Execution pending appeal on
October 11, the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules,  supra. Thus, it allowed private
respondents to withdraw whatever rentals had been deposited in Court "either in obedience to the nullified orders of respondent Court or by
way of consignation thereof." The authorization to withdraw was reiterated in a Resolution, dated October 23, 1985, while petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied on June 13, 1986.

We find that Section 23 of the Interim Rules has been misread. The period to perfect an appeal should be reckoned not only from the date
one party receives a copy of the Decision but also from the date the other party had notice hereof. In this case, the "last day to appeal by
any party" is October 16. The appeal can be deemed to be perfected only upon the expiration of that last day to appeal, which is later than
the period to appeal of private respondents.   Consequently, when petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Partial Execution on October 11,
2

the Trial Court still retained jurisdiction over the case. To rule otherwise would be to allow a party litigant to deprive the adverse party of the
latter's right to move for new trial or for reconsideration or even for execution pending appeal by the simple expedient of immediately
perfecting his appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under review is hereby SET ASIDE and this case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of General Santos City, Branch XXIII, for determination, on the merits, of petitioner's Motion for Immediate Partial Execution pending
appeal. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-1403             October 29, 1948

VICENTE CALUAG and JULIANA GARCIA  vs. POTENCIANO PECSON and

ANGEL H. MOJICA, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and
LEON ALEJO

FACTS: On August 10, 1937, Alejo filed a complaint against Caluag and Garcia
for the redemption of one-half pro indiviso of a parcel of land in Guiguinto,
Bulacan. After trial, the CFI Bulacan rendered judgment ordering petitioners to
execute a deed of sale in favor of Fortunato Alejo, upon payment by plaintiff, as
purchase price, of the amount of P2,551. Petitioners filed an appeal to the CA but
it was denied. Consequently, Alejo filed a Motion for Execution.

When the petitioners opposed, Alejo filed before CFI a petition for contempt
and it was granted by the respondent. A petition for certiorari was filed against
the respondent judge, allegedly acted without or in excess of the jurisdiction of
the court in rendering the resolution which declares the petitioners guilty of
contempt of court for not complying or performing its prior order requiring the
petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff over one-half of the
land pro indiviso in question. The petitioners in support of the present petition for
certiorari, alleged other 2 grounds, to wit: (1) that plaintiff's action abated or was
extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff Fortunato Alejo, because his right of
legal redemption was a personal one, and therefore not transferable to his
successors in interest; and (2) that, even assuming that it is a personal one and
therefore transferable, his successors in interest have failed to secure the
substitution of said deceased by his legal representative under section 17, Rule
3.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Angel Mojica acted without jurisdiction in
proceeding against and declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes

RATIO: It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case
is something more than the general power conferred by law upon a court to take
cognizance of cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs.
The respondent Judge Mojica acted not only without jurisdiction in proceeding
against and declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the confinement of the petitioners, because it had no
power to impose such punishment upon the latter. The respondent judge has no
power under the law to order the confinement of the petitioners until they have
compiled with the order of the court.

A wrong decision made within the limits of the court's authority is erroneous and
may be corrected on appeal or other direct review, but a wrong, or for that matter
a correct, decision is void, and may be set aside either directly or collaterally,
where the court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in rendering it. Hence though
the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the particular case
has been submitted properly to it for hearing and decision, it will overstep its
jurisdiction if it renders a judgment which it has no power under the law to render.

CLIDORO v JALMANZAR

PETRONIO CLIDORO, DIONISIO CLIDORO, LOLITA CLIDORO, CALIXTO CARD ANO, JR., LOURDES
CLIDORO-LARIN, MATEO CLIDORO and MARLIZA CLIDORO-DE UNA, Petitioners, 
vs.
AUGUSTO JALMANZAR, GREGORIO CLIDORO, JR., SENECA CLIDORO-CIOCSON, MONSERAT
CLIDORO-QUIDAY, CELESTIAL CLIDORO-BINASA, APOLLO CLIDORO, ROSALIE CLIDORO-
CATOLICO, SOPHIE CLIDORO, and JOSE CLIDORO, JR., Respondents.

DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the complaint for
revival of judgment are different from the names of the parties in the original case would
not necessarily mean that they are not the real parties-in-interest. What is important is
that, as provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are "the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit."
SUMMARY:

Clidoro sought for the dismissal of the petition for revival of judgment on the ground that
the plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest. The RTC agreed and dismissed the
complaint, but the CA reversed the decision. The SC upheld the CA decision and said
that the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action is improper. The difference
in parties in the decision for partition and in the petition for revival of judgment does not
indicate that the parties are not the real parties in interest based on the face of the
pleadings. The determination of who the real parties in interest are requires a full blown
trial.

FACTS:

A petition for revival of judgment was filed by Rizalina Clidoro against Onofre Clidoro.
(The original decision, sought to be revived, was about the partition of the estate of the
late Mateo Clidoro.)

Petitioners (then defendants) moved to dismiss the complaint (on revival of judgment)
based on the following:

1. Petition, not being brought up against the real parties-in-interest, is dismissible

for lack of cause of action
2. Substitution of the parties defendant is improper and is not in accordance with
the rules
3. Even if the decision is ordered revived, the same cannot be executed since the
legal requirements of Rule 69, Section has not been complied with
4. Judgment of the Honorable Court ordering partition is merely interlocutory as it
leave something more to be one to complete the disposition of the case.

RTC granted the motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action:

Complaint shows that most of the parties-plaintiffs, parties-defendants and interested

parties are already deceased and have no more natural or material existence. This is contrary
to Rule 3, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court. They could no longer be considered as the real parties-in-
interest. Besides, where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case. In the
instant case, the beneficiaries are already deceased persons. Also, the Complaint states that they
were the original parties in the Civil Case for Partition, but this is not so. Some of the parties are
 actually not parties to the original case, but representing the original parties who are indicated as
deceased.

Respondents appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC Decision and remanded the
case to RTC for further proceedings.

Petitioners were alleging that there was no proper substitution of parties in the instant
action for revival of judgment, and that the CA erred in considering respondents as well
as the petitioners as the real parties in interest. So it was brought to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint for revival of judgment may be dismissed for lack of
cause of action as it was not brought by or against the real parties-in-interest

HELD: NO

Lack of cause of action is not enumerated as one of the grounds for dismissal of a
complaint. (We know this already. Mali na lack of cause of action, dapat failure to state a
cause of action.) If the ground is for failure to state a cause of action, such fact can only
be determined from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other.

In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for revival of judgment that the parties
therein were also the parties in the action for partition.

Applying the foregoing test of hypothetically admitting this allegation in the complaint,
and not looking into the veracity of the same, it would then appear that the complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action as the plaintiffs (respondents in this case) in the
complaint for revival of judgment, as the prevailing parties in the action for partition, had
a right to seek enforcement of the decision in the partition case.

It is understandable that there would be instances where the parties in the

original case and in the subsequent action for revival of judgment would not be
exactly the same. The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the the

complaint for revival of judgment are different from the names of the parties in

the original case would not necessarily mean that they are not the real parties-in-

interest. What is important is that, as provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of

Court, they are “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment

in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Definitely, as the

prevailing parties in the previous case for partition, the plaintiffs in the case for

revival of judgment would be benefited by the enforcement of the decision in the

partition case.

Even just one of the co-owners, by himself alone, can bring an action for the

recovery of the co-owned property, even through an action for revival of

judgment, because the enforcement of the judgment would result in such

recovery of property. Thus, it is not necessary in this case that all of the parties,

in whose favor the case for partition was adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the

action for revival of judgment. Any which one of said prevailing parties, who had

an interest in the enforcement of the decision, may file the complaint for revival of

judgment, even just by himself.

ABELLERA vs CA
Nevertheless, it ruled that petitioner was estopped from claiming that the trial court
acted in excess of jurisdiction as she herself had participated in the trial de novo and
failed to object, through counsel, to the issuance of the order to conduct an ocular
inspection.

Indeed, although Regional Trial Courts should decide cases on appeal on the basis solely
of the record of the proceedings in Municipal Trial Courts and other courts of equal rank,
nonetheless, the principle of estoppel may bar a party from questioning the reception of
additional evidence, as in this case. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 17 this Court ruled:

[A] party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean v. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease v. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L.
Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. LOUIS etc. v. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659.) And in
Littleton v. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon the principle stated in Sibonghanoy, we hold that petitioner cannot be permitted to
question at this stage the reception of additional evidence and ocular inspection of
property after she participated but eventually lost in what she now calls the irregular
proceedings of the trial court. During the seven hearings conducted by Branch 106 of
the RTC, Quezon City, petitioner presented no less than seven witnesses in addition to
several documentary evidence to support her case. Afterwards, on September 15, 1994,
she filed her Formal Offer of Exhibits 18 followed by a Supplemental Memorandum on
September 26, 1994. 19 The order to conduct ocular inspection was likewise made in
open court, the presence of petitioner’s counsel. 20 It was only after the court rendered
its ruling on December 15, 1994, reversing the lower court, that petitioner, in her
motion for reconsideration, questioned for the first time the authority of said court to
conduct the hearings and ocular inspection.

We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents’
motion for execution pending appeal. For, indeed, the case was not with said court on
appeal but on a petition for certiorari. Thus, the appellate court’s jurisdiction was only to
pass upon the validity of the orders of the RTC in the conduct of clarificatory hearings
and ocular inspection. Since the RTC has yet to act on private respondents’ motion for
execution pending appeal, this matter should have been left for resolution by the trial
court, not by the Court of Appeals.

ROLANDO TING v. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO

518 SCRA 334 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted an application filed by the Spouses Diego
Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of a certain parcel of land. A certificate of title
was thereafter issued to Spouses Lirio. On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title over the
same lot. The RTC dismissed Ting‘s application on the ground of res judicata.

In a decision in 1976, CFI granted the application filed by the Lirio spouses for registration of title
to a certain lot

The said decision become final and executor in 1977

In 1982, the judge of CFI directed the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding
decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.

On Febraury 12, 1997, Petitioner Ting filed an application to register title to the same lot with
the RTC of Cebu

The respondents, heirs of Lirio, filed their Answer calling attention to the 1976 decision which
had become final and executor in 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of Ting’s
application on the ground of res judicata

The RTC dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata

Petitioner argues that although the 1976 decision had become final and executor in 1977, no
decree of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority.

Petitioner contends that the LRA has not issued the decree of registration and that a certain
Engr. Rafaela Belleza claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and
all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by the Land
Management Services of the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in
court

ISSUE:

Whether or not the application for land registration should be barred for being res
judicata

Held:
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or
without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or
oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes,
when final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within
the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. The
land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court‘s approval in LRC
No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza‘s application for registration of the
lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including Ting.

Ting insists that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree
is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the
court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are
in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is
their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the
court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to “extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings.”

As for Ting‘s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading: SEC. 6.
Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or
order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, the December 10, 1976 decision became “extinct” in
light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the
same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment
may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by
an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In
special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration,
no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.

Infante v. Aran Builders

Facts:

Aran Builders went before the RTC of Muntinlupa city for action for revival of judgement
against Adelaida Infante. The judgement sought to be revived was rendered by the RTC
of Makati in an action for specific performance and damages. The Makati RTC ruled in
favor of Aran Builders which ordered Infante to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of
land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of Aran Builders, pay all pertinent taxes,
register the deed of sale and deliver the certificate of title. Infante filed a motion to
dismiss (for revival of judgement) on the ground that the RTC of Muntinlupa has no
jurisdiction over the person of the parties. The motion to dismiss was denied. The RTC
of Muntinlupa rationed that it is because at the time decision was rendered by the
Makati RTC, there was no RTC yet in Muntinlupa. Since now there is an RTC in
Muntinlupa and the subject property is located therein, Muntinlupa is a proper venue to
file the complaint for revival of a judgement. Infante’s motion to dismiss was denied
Infante: The CA acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A complaint for specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC is
a personal action, therefor the suit to revive judgement is also personal therefore
jurisdiction lies in either Makati or Paranaque where they reside, at the election of the
respondent. Aran builders: It is quasi in rem because it involves real property, thus
venue lies in Muntinlupa CA ruled in favor of Aran Builders, thus an appeal by Infante.

ISSUE:

W/N the RTC of Muntinlupa is the proper venue for the present action for revival of
judgment?

HELD:

YES Section 6, Rule 39 provides that after the lapse of 5 years from entry of judgement
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or
order may be enforced by action. The rule however does not specific in which court the
action should be filed. Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether
the present actions for revival of judgement is a real action or a personal action. If it
affects title or possession of real property or interest therein it is a real action to be filed
with the court of the place where the real property is located, if it does not fall under
such category of real actions, then it is a personal action to be filed with the court of the
place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

The allegations in the complaint will determine whether it is a real or personal action.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared Aran Builder’s right to have title over
the property. The sole reason for the action is the enforcement of her rights over the
piece of realty, thus it falls under the category of a real action, and thus should be filed
with the RTC of where the realty is located. The RTC of Muntinlupa therefore has valid
jurisdiction over the subject property and the revival of judgement.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.
GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Gloria Bermudez-Lorino filed a verified petition with the Regional

Trial Court under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law provided for in the Family Code to declare her husband judicially presumed
dead for the purpose of remarriage. She averred that she was unaware that her husband
was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity
to go out with friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work prior to
their marriage. Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave
him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her three children. In
order to support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of
her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She
had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his relatives. The RTC
granted the petition and rendered the decision final and executory. Nevertheless, the CA
studied the case upon appeal of the Solicitor General representing the republic, but
affirmed the decision of the RTC; hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether the appeal was correct considering that the decision was rendered as final and

executor.

Ruling:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary

period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are “immediately
final and executory”. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due
course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case
to the Court of Appeals. It was fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting
through its Special Fourth Division, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as Acting
Chairman and ponente, denied the Republic’s appeal and affirmed without modification
the final and executory judgment of the lower court. The petition is therefore denied.

CUSTODIO v SANDIGANBAYAN

Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquinos security detail upon his
arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together
with several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator
Aquino who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the
Manila International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman
who was also gunned down at the airport tarmac.

Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting all the accused, which include the petitioners.
However, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found to be a sham trial. The
Court thus nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial
of the cases.

A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.

In its decision, Sandiganbayan, found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder
in both Criminal Cases

Petitioners, assisted by PAO, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this
Court and ask the Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to
determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando
Galman.

Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings of the forensic group composed of
Prof. Jerome B. Bailen, a forensic anthropologist from the University of the Philippines, Atty.
Erwin P. Erfe, M.D., a medico-legal practitioner, Benito E. Molino, M.D., a forensic consultant
and Human Rights and Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a forensic dentistry
consultant. Their report essentially concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic
study of the evidence in the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio Moreno fired at Senator
Aquino as they descended the service stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino
was shot while he was walking on the airport tarmac. This is contrary to the finding of the
Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it was C1C Moreno, the security escort positioned behind
Senator Aquino, who shot the latter.

Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic group of the physical evidence in the double
murder case constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial
under Rule 121 of Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE: Should the case be re-opened based on the alleged new evidence found by the forensic
group?

HELD: NO. Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence,  it
must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence
is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as
petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic
study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case.  It appears from their
report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred
during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence

These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that
prevented the petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not
the military, but Rolando Galman, who killed Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present
motion, failed to present any new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the
defense at the time of the trial even with the exercise of due diligence. If they really wanted to
seek and offer the opinion of other forensic experts at the time regarding the physical evidence
gathered at the scene of the crime, there was ample opportunity for them to do so before the
case was finally submitted and decided.

A reading of the Sandiganbayan decision dated September 28, 1990 shows a thorough study by
the court of the forensic evidence presented during the trial:

Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the single bullet that penetrated the head and caused the death of
Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory ought to be the findings during the autopsy. The prosector
in the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, that the
trajectory of the gunshot, the wound of entrance having been located at the mastoid region, left, below the external
auditory meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior portion of the mandible, was forward, downward and
medially.

XXX

he downward trajectory of the bullet having been established, it stands to reason that the gun used in shooting the
Senator was fired from an elevation higher than that of the wound of entrance at the back of the head of the Senator.
This is consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses to the effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as he
stood at the upper step of the stairs, the second or third behind Senator Aquino, while Senator Aquino and the military
soldiers bringing him were at the bridge stairs. This is likewise consistent with the statement of Sandra Jean Burton that
the shooting of Senator Aquino occurred while the Senator was still on the bridge stairs, a conclusion derived from the
fact that the fatal shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed the service door and was led down the
bridge stairs.

The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense
during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but
rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules. If at all, it only serves to discredit the
version of the prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld
by the Sandiganbayan.

Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. Also, new trial will not be granted if the new
evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching.
SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC. vs MAGSALIN
G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012
BRION, J.

FACTS: Petitioner claims that Leticia Magsalin had breached their subcontract agreement for the
supply, delivery, installation and finishing of the tiles in certain floors in petitioner’s
condominium project. The agreement was terminated.

Due to Magsalin’s refusal to return unliquidated advance payment and other monetary
liabilities, petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU Insurance demanding damages pursuant
to the bonds the former had issued for the subcontract. 

Petitioner filed a complaint for actual damages for breach of contract against Magsalin and FGU.
FGU was duly served with summons. With respect to Magsalin, despite efforts, their new
addresses could not be determined.

FGU filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. Likewise, MR was denied. FGU was obliged to file
an answer.
 
Petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of
publication. Then, the petitioner filed its reply  to FGU Insurance’s answer.

FGU filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint. Baetiong, G. Garcia and C.
Garcia were named as third-party defendants.

FGU claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties over bonds it executed for the
subcontract w/ Magsalin and, hence, should be held jointly and severally liable

RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by publication
on the ground that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.

RTC issued a notice setting the case for hearing. FGU filed a motion to cancel the hearing on the
ground that the third-party defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was granted.

Of the three third-party defendants, only Baetiong filed an answer, the officer’s returns on the
summons to the Garcias state that both could not be located at their given addresses. Petitioner
was not served w/ Baetiong’s answer.

For failure of petitioner to prosecute, RTC dismissed the case. RTC denied the petitioner’s MR
prompting the latter to elevate its case to the CA via a Rule 41 petition for review.
CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The appeal raised a pure question
of law as it did not dispute the proceedings before the issuance of the December 16, 2003
dismissal order.

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari.  

Issues: W/N THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROSECUTE

THE CASE
W/N THE APPELLATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL AS
THE MATTERS THEREIN INVOLVE BOTH QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT.
W/N IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE LOWER COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE CASE IS A CLEAR DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS.

RULING: The petition is granted. The Dismissal  Order  is Void, the December 16,

2003 dismissal  order shows that it  is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a
dismissal with prejudice.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court. Dismissal with prejudice means dismissal on adjudication of merits.

It is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on
the writing of valid judgments and final orders.

(Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.  — A judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of the court.)

The December 16, 2003 dismissal  order  clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how
and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. A trial court should always specify the
reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine
the prima facie justification for the dismissal

There was a denial of due process. Elementary due process demands that the parties to a
litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. Where the reasons are absent,
a decision has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.

The appeal was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:

In Olave vs. Mistas, among the critical factual questions was whether, based on the
records,  there had been factual basis for the dismissal of the subject complaint. This same
question is particularly significant in the present case given that the order appealed does not
even indicate the factual basis for the dismissal of the case.
Due to the absence of any stated factual basis, and despite the admissions of the parties, the CA
still had to delve into the records to check whether facts to justify the prejudicial dismissal even
exist. Since the dismissal of the case appears to have been rendered motu proprio (as the
December 16, 2003 dismissal  order does not state if it was issued upon the respondents’ or the
trial court’s motion), the facts to be determined by the CA should include the grounds specified
under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A court could only issue a motu proprio dismissal
pursuant to the grounds mentioned in this rule and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. These grounds are matters of facts. Thus, given that the dismissal order does not
disclose its factual basis, we are thus persuaded that the petitioner had properly filed its appeal
from the dismissal order under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The dismissal of the case is not supported by the facts of the case:

The following events were chronologically proximate to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488:
(a) the court admitted FGU Insurance’s third-party  complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled
hearing upon FGU Insurance’s motion; and (c) Baetiong filed his Answer  to the third-
party  complaint  but did not serve it upon the petitioner.

None of these events square with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court for the motu proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute.

This does not satisfy the standards of non prosequitur. The fundamental test for non
prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due
diligence in failing to proceed with  reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the
part of the plaintiff to prosecute.
 
In this case, the parties’ own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioner’s willingness to
prosecute its complaint. Indeed, neither respondents FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was able to
point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify the dismissal of their case.
 
While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made
with care. The sound discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances
surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantial justice.