The UN General Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Policy: Cyprus, 1954-58

Author(s): Stephen G. Xydis

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 1968), pp. 141-158
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/172693 .
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The UN General Assembly
an instrument of Greek
Cyprus, 1954-581
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
Department of Political Science, Hunter College, City University of New York
Between 1954 and 1958 the Greek gov-
ernment resorted to the UN General
Assembly five times over Cyprus. Its osten-
sible goal was to get the Assembly to adopt
a resolution that referred to the principle
or the right of self-determination for the
population of Cyprus or, in the case of the
fifth recourse, to the establishment of an
independent Cyprus. The Assembly's re-
sponse, however, to these five successive
political stimuli apparently did not help the
achievement of these ostensible Greek goals,
even though the latter was eventually at-
tained.
The setting up of an independent Cyprus
was reached outside, not inside, the United
Nations. On the other hand, as this article
will demonstrate, the United Nations as a
collective third party (minus Britain and
Turkey) which Greek foreign policy-makers
sought to use as an instrument of their
foreign policy was not without effects,
either on the procedure through which the
conflict over Cyprus was resolved in 1959,
or on the substance of the conflict's resolu-
tion.
This article was written on the basis of
materials gathered under grants of the Mershon
Social Science Program of Ohio State Uni-
versity and of the American Philosophical
Society. The views expressed herein are, of
course, the author's.
as
policy:
The foreign policy-makers of Greece, a
small noncaucusing member of the United
Nations (Hovet, 1960, p. 32), resorted
to the Assembly five times in succession.
Why did they do this so persistently when
the response of that organ of the UN fell
each time so far short of the ostensible
goals of the Greek government? What gains
did they achieve from these recourses? A
careful study not only of the relevant UN
records but also of the debates in the Greek
Parliament that usually followed each of
these forays in "parliamentary diplomacy,"
and of some of the relevant diplomatic
materials, makes it possible to give certain
answers to these questions.
Greek Motivations
The motivations for, and the ostensibly
desired gains from, the recourses, debates,
and negotiations with the UN on the Cyprus
question were basically established at the
time the Greek government first asked the
Assembly to consider the question in a
document dated August 16, 1954. It was
entitled: "Application, under the auspices
of the United Nations, of the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples in the case of the population of the
island of Cyprus." In a long explanatory
memorandum, an integral part of the text
142
of the recourse (GAOR, 9, Annexes, Agenda
Item 62, pp. 1-3), Greek policy-makers of
1954 described the political rationale for
their action along lines that can be sum-
marized as follows:
The leaders of the Greek Cypriots (the
majority of the population of Cyprus),
faced by the adamant British attitude
toward their claim for enosis (union with
Greece), desired the UN to consider their
claim against Britain to the right of decid-
ing their own future, with this future def-
initely not excluding enosis. Since under
the Charter only a state could request the
UN to consider such a matter, they had
asked the Greek government to sponsor
this petition of theirs and to request the
Assembly to consider the question. "Public
opinion" in Greece itself was exerting
similar pressures on the Greek government.
Under the circumstances, the Greek govern-
ment had first sought to engage in quiet
bipartite negotiations with the British gov-
ernment over the future of Cyprus. The
British government, however, had rejected
such overtures. It had maintained that no
Cyprus question existed, that Cyprus was
a closed matter, that Cyprus would never
be allowed to break away from British
rule.2 In the island itself, the British
authorities had enacted stringent measures
against "every manifestation of the people's
will." As a result of the British attitude,
the Greek government, "having exhausted
every means of achieving an agreement
directly," had felt "compelled" to ask the
UN "to redress this situation by securing
acceptance of the solution required by
justice, dignity, and the sacred principles
set forth in the Charter," and it appealed
to the Assembly for a constructive solution
"conducive to peace and freedom."
2 For Greek
diplomatic problems with the
British government since 1941, see Xydis
(1966), pp. 1-19.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XII
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
In brief, the Greek government, because
of the intransigent British attitude, wanted
to act-to do something and not let matters
drift along further; it was aware "of both
the present and future dangers inherent
in the situation." It decided to resort to the
Assembly, a collective third party, to get
at least a public face-to-face debate of what
it regarded as an international dispute and
to place before the Assembly certain pro-
posals for dealing with the question. Re-
course to "parliamentary diplomacy," in this
instance, served as a substitute for diplo-
matic negotiations.
On September 24, 1954, the Assembly
decided to include the Cyprus item in its
agenda, although the British representative
in the General Committee, invoking Article
2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, argued that
the Assembly had no right to consider this
item (GAOR, 9, General Committee, 93rd
meeting, 9/23/54, p. 8). On October 8
the Political Committee decided to place
the item at the bottom of its agenda
(GAOR, 9, First Committee, 684th meet-
ing, 10/8/54, p. 3). On December 13 the
Greek delegation tabled a draft resolution
which was greatly watered down but still
substantive (Kyrou, 1955, pp. 299-300).
This draft resolution made no direct ref-
erence to a plebiscite under UN auspices,
as the title of the Greek recourse suggested
it might. Under its operative clause, the
Assembly would have expressed the wish
that the principle of self-determination be
applied in the case of the population of
Cyprus (GAOR, 9, Annexes, Agenda Item
62, p. 3). This draft resolution, however,
was not even put to the vote.
Instead, the Political Committee and
then the Assembly adopted resolution
814(IX). This draft resolution had been
tabled by New Zealand and, after certain
amendments by Colombia and El Salvador
NUMWBER 2
THE U.N. AND GREEK POLICY ON CYPRUS
had been added to it,3 the Greek repre-
sentative had felt able to vote for it. He
chose, however, to interpret the Assembly's
decision to include the Cyprus item in its
agenda as a recognition of the international
character of the Cyprus question, and he
committed himself to interpreting resolution
814(IX) as meaning that the Assembly had
merely postponed, "for the time being,"
taking any decision "on a question which
remains pending before the United Na-
tions" (GAOR, 9, First Committee, 514th
plenary meeting, 12/17/54, pp. 539-40).
Evaluating the Recourse
In publicly evaluating this first recourse
over Cyprus and in defending the handling
of the question in the United Nations
against charges of its own domestic opposi-
tion, Greek government officials emphasized
the side effects4 of the debate in the world
organization and tended to present its
interpretative commitments as objective
gains. Thus, in the Greek Parliament
on February 7, 1955, Premier Alexander
Papagos reported at great length on his
government's futile efforts to engage in
negotiations with the British government
over Cyprus and said there had been no
other way of dealing with the problem
except going to the UN; he then observed
that resolution 814(IX), though not ideal
3 GAOR, 9, Annexes, Agenda Item 62,
p. 4.
The amendmentsformed a preambleto the draft
introduced by New Zealand, and read as fol-
lows: "Considering that for the time being, it
does not appear appropriateto adopt a resolu-
tion on the question of Cyprus, . . ."
4F. C. Ikle6 (1964, esp. p. 27) introduces
this term and proposes that side effects, too,
are one sort of objective of negotiations-one
of the reasons why governments engage in
diplomatic talks. Among specific side effects
which are relevant to negotiations are propa-
ganda or the modification of the political
attitude of nonparticipants.
143
for the Greeks, was a favorable solution, a
good omen on the way toward a solution
of the Cyprus problem. The Assembly, said
Papagos, had "affirmed" in this resolution
its competence "to seize itself of the mat-
ter," although it had considered that "for
the time being" it was inappropriate to
take a decision on it. The Cyprus question
had now been brought out into the open.
It no longer was an internal affair of Britain.
It had become an international question,
and the United Nations could deal with it.
Besides, the sixty members of the United
Nations had been informed about the ques-
tion (GPD, February 7, 1955, p. 673).
Foreign Minister Stefanos Stefanopoulos,
in his report to Parliament, emphasized the
same points, after stressing that the raising
of the question was fully in accord with the
aims of free peoples seeking to organize
a world based on justice and freedom. The
recourse to the UN, he added, had helped
project the Cyprus question before "in-
ternational public opinion" (GPD, February
7, 1955, p. 677). Ambassador Alexis A.
Kyrou (1955, p. 307), the chief spokesman
on the Cyprus issue in the Assembly that
year, wrote that the debate in the Political
Committee about whether or not to consider
further the Cyprus item had made it abun-
dantly possible for the Greek government
to present its views on the substance of
the question.
Greek foreign policy-makers of 1954 who
envisaged the recourse to the Assembly as
leverage toward an extra-UN goal-bipar-
tite negotiations with the British over the
issue-were, to a very limited extent, suc-
cessful in achieving this objective, though
they did not mention this in Parliament,
and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, on
October 25, flatly denied in the Commons
that any conversations with the Greek gov-
ernment had taken place during the
144
previous three months on the Cyprus ques-
tion (531 HC Deb. 5 s., 226, written
answer). In September ultra-secret British
efforts were made, but not through normal
diplomatic channels, to approach Premier
Papagos with proposals that suggested the
possibility of some arrangement. But these
talks, which lasted for about two months
(till the end of November), came to
nought. Premier Papagos rejected further
contacts for reasons not precisely known--
possibly because of the imminent debate of
the Cyprus item in the Political Committee
and because of the feeling that these ex-
changes were merely a feint for achieving
the side effect of hindering Greek "parlia-
mentary diplomacy" in the UN by a show
of British willingness to negotiate outside
the world organization (Xydis, 1966, p.
16).
Second Recourse
The interpretive commitment made by
the Greek representative when resolution
814(IX) was adopted provided a rationale
for bringing the Cyprus question to the
Assembly again in its tenth session
(GAOR, 10, Annexes, Agenda Item 8, p.
3). Since December 19, 1954, Premier
Papagos had publicly committed his gov-
ernment to such a move, and Foreign
Minister Stefanopoulos had restated this
commitment in January 1955 with Ethnarch
Makarios concurring.5
In January, too, the Greek government
covertly endorsed the unconventional war-
fare which George Grivas-under the nom
de guerre of Dighenis, a legendary Byzan-
tine folk hero-was preparing to wage. This
added a new dimension to the commitment.
5 Royal Greek Embassy, 33, 12/23/54, p. 3;
35, 1/1-10/55, p. 2; 28, n.d.-Makarios speech
of January 15, 1955, in Nicosia. Archbishop
Makariosis referred to here as Ethnarch in his
role of leader of the nation.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XII
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
The founding charter of EOKA (National
Organization of Cypriot Fighters), drafted
in 1953, proclaimed that the organization's
activities aimed at drawing the attention
of "international public opinion" to the
struggle waged in Cyprus and would be
continued "until international diplomacy-
the United Nations-and the British" were
forced to examine the question and find a
solution to it (emphasis added; Grivas-
Dighenis, 1961, Appendix, p. 3). Thus, if
the Greek government were to refrain from
resorting to the United Nations, that would
have been tantamount to abandoning Grivas
and his struggle in Cyprus.
The failure of the Tripartite London Con-
ference on the Eastern Mediterranean and
Cyprus,6 together with the Turkish anti-
Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir of Septem-
ber 6, led the Greek government to persist
in its recourse to the Assembly's tenth
session-just as the earlier lack of any
diplomatic negotiations with the British
government had led it to resort to the UN
in the first place. This time, however, the
Assembly adopted the General Committee's
recommendation against inclusion of the
Cyprus question in the agenda.
Third Recourse
Early in March 1956, talks between
Cyprus Governor Sir John Harding and
Ethnarch Makarios broke down,7 and the
latter was deported on March 9 to the
Seychelles islands. This triggered the third
Greek recourse to the UN on March 13,
1956. Premier Constantine Karamanlis told
Parliament that the move was motivated
by a desire not only to exert pressure on the
British but also to bolster the morale of
6 August 29-September 6, 1955. See Great
Britain, 1955, Cd. 9594.
7The talks extended over the period from
October 4, 1955 to March 3, 1956. See Great
Britain, 1956, Cmd. 9708; Greece, 1956.
NUMBER 2
THE U.N. AND GREEK POLICY ON CYPRUS
the Cypriot people. As long as Makarios
was in exile, the Premier warned, no diplo-
matic negotiations could take place. The
recourse to "parliamentary diplomacy" was
the only move available to the Greek gov-
ernment, or-as the Foreign Minister ex-
plained-though it was not a solution, it
was a means for promoting the issue on a
worldwide scale and for exerting strong
diplomatic pressure for negotiations, which
was the only way to solve the problem
(GPD, 4/25/56, p. 287; 11/30/56, pp.
111-12; 11/29/56, p. 87).
The eleventh Assembly was faced not
only by the Greek recourse but also by a
British one, of October 12, 1956, entitled
"Support from Greece for Terrorism in
Cyprus" (GAOR, 11, Annexes, Agenda
Item 55, pp. 4-5). On November 15, 1956,
it decided to include both these items in its
agenda under a single title, "The Question
of Cyprus," with two subitems referring to
the titles of these two recourses.8 On Feb-
ruary 18, 1957, the Greek delegation tabled
a draft resolution that was similar to,
though somewhat stronger than, the one
it had introduced at the Assembly's ninth
session; it referred not to the "principle"
but to the "right" of self-determination.
Under this draft resolution's preambular
clauses, the Assembly was asked to recog-
nize (1) the right of the people of Cyprus
to self-determination; (2) the serious de-
terioration of the situation on the island;
(3) the vital importance of freedom and
peace there, not only for the people of
Cyprus but for all peoples in the area; and
(4) the contribution which an equitable
solution of the question would make to
peace and stability throughout the entire
area. In the operative clauses, the Assembly
8
GAOR, 11, Annexes, Agenda Item 55, p. 17.
For the inclusion see General Committee, 107th
meeting, 11/14/56, p. 8, and 578th plenary
meeting, 11/15/56, p. 42.
145
was asked to express the wish that the
people of Cyprus would be given the right
to determine their own future by the appli-
cation of their right to self-determination
(GAOR, 11, Annexes, Agenda Item 55, p.
16).
On the same day, in response to the
British "counterrecourse," the Greek dele-
gation introduced another draft resolution
under which the Assembly was requested
to set up a seven-nation fact-finding com-
mittee to investigate (1) the British charges
of Greek support for the Cyprus terrorists
and (2) the Greek countercharges of atroc-
ities or violations of human rights com-
mitted by the British authorities in Cyprus
against the people of the island (GAOR, 11,
Annexes, Agenda Item 55, p. 16).
The Political Committee debated and
considered the Cyprus question at ten
meetings (February 18-22, 1957). How-
ever, the Greek draft resolutions were not
put to the vote nor, as a matter of fact, were
those tabled by the British and Panamanian
delegations (GAOR, 11, Annexes, Agenda
Item 55, pp. 16-18). Instead, the Com-
mittee and then the Assembly adopted a
"colorless" draft resolution put forward by
Krishna Menon of the Indian delegation-
resolution 1013(XI). Under this resolution
the Assembly, believing that the solution
of the Cyprus question required an atmo-
sphere of peace and freedom of expression,
expressed the earnest desire that a peaceful,
democratic, and just solution could be
found in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter, and the hope that
negotiations would be resumed and con-
tinued to that end (ibid., p. 18).
The Greek delegation, as it had done
in the case of resolution 814 (IX), voted
in favor of this resolution. Foreign Minister
Averoff-Tossizza warned, however, that his
delegation was not withdrawing its draft
146
resolutions; it was merely not pressing for
a vote on them. He hoped, he said, that
they would not have to be revived within
six months at the next Assembly because by
then democratic conditions would have pre-
vailed in Cyprus. He also stressed that he
had voted in favor of the Indian resolution
because his government had always felt
that, prior to self-determination, a period
of self-government could exist (GAOR, 11,
First Committee, 856th meeting, 2/22/56,
p. 275).
Answering the criticism which the Greek
parliamentary opposition aimed at resolu-
tion 1013(XI) and at the handling of the
Cyprus question by the Greek delegation
at the Assembly's eleventh session, the
Foreign Minister and other government
spokesmen emphasized (March 11-15,
1957) the gains believed to have been
achieved through the UN's consideration
of the Cyprus question. Averoff-Tossizza
stressed the length of the committee debate
on the question, the number of speakers
who had taken part in it, and the dignified
presentation of the Greek viewpoint. The
British charges that the Greek government
had organized a resistance movement on
the territory of another state and thus had
violated the rules of international law had,
he maintained, been rebutted together with
several other charges of the opponents.
Grievous blows had been dealt to the idea
of partition. The prompt rejection by the
Greek government of Lord Radcliffe's con-
stitutional proposals (Radcliffe, 1956, Cmd.
42)9 had been explained so that the Greek
position in this respect did not appear
intransigent. All in all, the debate had
9 Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd, in
presenting these proposals to the House of
Commons on December 19, 1956, also said
that double-self-determination-i.e., the appli-
cation of the principles of self-determination
separately for the Greek and the Turkish
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XII
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
allowed the Foreign Minister to stress that
Greece would never drop its demand for
self-determination for the Cypriot popula-
tion (GPD, March 11, 1957, pp. 34-35).
The Foreign Minister also minutely an-
alyzed the somewhat sibylline resolution
1013(XI). He stressed the favorable ele-
ments he chose to discern in it, and noted
that several other delegations had given to
it interpretations similar to his own, espe-
cially in the matter of who the parties to the
negotiations called for in that resolution
should be-the British and the people of
Cyprus, not Britain, Greece, and Turkey, as
the opponents maintained. The words
"earnest desire," he said, were quite strong
for UN phraseology. He also drew attention
to the words "freedom of expression" and
a "just and democratic solution." "Freedom
of expression," he explained, meant general
freedom, the freeing of Ethnarch Makarios,
the closing of the concentration camps, the
end of the emergency regulations. The word
"resumed" in the operative clause of resolu-
tion 1013 (XI) implied the resumption of
the interrupted negotiations between the
Governor of Cyprus and the Ethnarch. The
London Tripartite Conference on the East-
ern Mediterranean and Cyprus had failed,
it had come to an end, i.e., it had not been
interrupted, therefore it could not be re-
sumed. Even if one assumed for a moment
that not only Anglo-Cypriot but other nego-
tiations were implied in this resolution, it
would mean not tripartite but multipartite
negotiations, with the participation of all
countries that claimed to be concerned in
the issue, such as Syria and Egypt (GPD,
March 11, 1957, pp. 38-39).
As for the goal of self-determination which
Cypriots-was one of the eventual options the
British Government would consider when the
international strategic situation permitted and
self-governmenthad been working satisfactorily
(562 HC Deb. 5 s., 1272).
NUMBER 2
THE U.N. AND GREEK POLICY ON CYPRUS
the Opposition, not for the first time,10 ac-
cused him of having abandoned, the For-
eign Minister pointed out that this concept
was subsumed in the resolution's reference
to "the principles and purposes of the Char-
ter" which included the principle of self-
determination in Article 1, paragraph 2.
This was more specific than a reference to
a solution "in accordance with the Charter."
He also emphasized that the Assembly had
never adopted any resolution calling for the
application of the principle of self-determi-
nation in the case of a specific country. In
contrast to certain resolutionary proposals
which had been made backstage, resolution
1013(XI) contained no reference to a solu-
tion acceptable "to the parties concerned"
or "to the three parties concerned." Thanks
to the Indian resolution, Turkey had thus
been prevented from getting a sort of legal
endorsement from the Assembly that it
(Turkey) was one of the parties concerned;
that would have given it the right to veto
any proposed solution of the Cyprus prob-
lem (GPD, March 11, 1957, p. 37).
View of UN Role
In an implicit criticism of the presenta-
tion of the first recourse by the preceding
government,1' the Foreign Minister dwelt
0 GPD, 4/5/56, p. 18; 4/11/56, p. 176;
4/25/56, p. 273; 5/22/56, p. 393; 11/29/56, p.
93 (George Papandreou). Speeches by George
Kartalis: GPD, 4/5/56, p. 24; 4/11/56, p. 184;
4/25/56, p. 293; 11/29/56, p. 95. By J.
Passalidis: GPD, 4/5/56, p. 26. By S. Papapoli-
tis: GPD, 4/6/56, p. 41. These Opposition
leaders also charged the government with seek-
ing to compromise and with having a defeatist
attitude.
11Another government spokesman criticized
the first recourse on five grounds. First, it had
been introduced with a request for enosis.
Second, it was suspect because it had been
preceded by a plebiscite in Cyprus, in Jan-
uary 1950. Third, Turkey had not been con-
147
at some length on the character of the
United Nations as an instrument of national
policy. The Assembly, he observed, was
not a court of justice and did not judge on
the basis of laws and legal precedents. It
was a universal political arena in which all
nations of the world gathered and the
interests of all nations clashed. In that arena,
what mainly occurred was the projection
of various issues. What could come out of
this arena was moral and political pressure
for the solution of problems. That was all
the United Nations could achieve. The
debate, if carried out widely and well,
could be useful because, in addition to
enlightening eighty-odd governments, it
also enlightened world public opinion
through the proceedings and the radio.
Therefore, a broader pressure was exerted
upon the nation whose conduct was under
scrutiny.
If the Assembly's resolution was good, it
was useful, too, because beyond the moral
pressure it exerted within the United Na-
tions, it exerted pressure also on the
government of the responsible country. This
pressure was no weak weapon. Exactly for
that reason the opposing side each time
sought to prevent the inclusion of items in
the Assembly's agenda or, should these
items be inscribed for debate, it sought to
prevent the adoption of any resolution at
all or the adoption of a resolution that
would be clear and useful to the other
party. Consequently, both debates and res-
olutions were important weapons.
But even when both these objectives had
been achieved, the Foreign Minister warned,
one should entertain no illusions. There
had been many fine debates and many fine
sulted in advance. Fourth, the number of
favorable votes in the UN had been overesti-
mated. Fifth, Greece had voted in favor of
resolution 814(IX). See GPD, 3/12/57, p. 58
(Gregory Kassimatis).
148
resolutions never implemented nor even
taken into account by the states concerned.
In full awareness of this situation, the
Greek government had resorted to the UN
over Cyprus because it had no other course
of action open in order to promote the issue
or because, as another government spokes-
man put it quite succinctly, it was not
possible to wage war against Britain and
no negotiations with Britain had ever taken
place (GPD, March 11, 1957, pp. 34-35;
March 14, 1957, p. 106 [Constantine
Tsatsos]).
Because the UN was a political arena,
not a court of justice, Averoff-Tossizza ex-
plained further, efforts were always made-
even before the debate began-to find
compromise resolutions. Most of the coun-
tries did not wish to take sides against one
of the parties to the dispute, and govern-
ments, although taking into account the
principles of international law, in the last
analysis defined their attitude on a partic-
ular issue on the basis of political interest.
One country belonged to a particular politi-
cal bloc. Another exported 70 percent of its
commodities to one of the parties concerned.
A third was aware that the solution of one
of its own problems depended on that state.
Hence, all countries exerted efforts for the
adoption of a resolution which would not
be in opposition to the disputants and es-
pecially to the most powerful of them
(GPD, March 11, 1957, p. 35).
Uses of Resolution 1013(XI)
To promote its Cyprus policy further,
outside as well as inside the UN, the Greek
government used resolution 1013(XI) in
various ways. Within the sphere of covert
activities and intragroup relations, it in-
voked the resolution's reference to an "at-
mosphere of peace" in order to persuade
Grivas at least to suspend his acts of un-
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XII
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
conventional warfare (Grivas - Dighenis,
1961, p. 158). On March 14, 1957, the
leader of EOKA proclaimed that, in com-
pliance with the spirit of this resolution and
in order to facilitate the resumption of
negotiations between the British govern-
ment and "the real representative" of the
people of Cyprus, Ethnarch Makarios, he
was willing to order the suspension of opera-
tions as soon as the Ethnarch was freed
(Grivas-Dighenis, 1961, p. 165).
In the international sphere, the Greek
government used its own interpretation of
resolution 1013 (XI) to justify its fourth
recourse to the United Nations and its
negative attitude to two proposals made
to it for entering into negotiations on the
Cyprus problem. Thus, late in March, 1957,
it rejected the offer of Lord Ismay, Secre-
tary-General of NATO, to use his good
offices to conciliate the differences between
the Greek, Turkish, and British governments
(Royal Greek Embassy Information Service,
pp. 282-83). As the permanent representa-
tive of Greece to the UN, Ambassador
Christian X. Palamas, put it in a note of
March 22 to the UN Secretary-General, the
British government had totally ignored the
United Nations in accepting Lord Ismay's
offer of good offices. In the absence of the
main interested party, the people of Cyprus,
for whom the Greek government was acting
merely as an agent, no conclusive discussions
could be held. Palamas said his govern-
ment was not disposed to bypass the UN
since the Cyprus issue was "pending" before
that international organization, in the sense
that resolution 1013 (XI) was waiting for
adequate implementation, and compliance
with this resolution and its adequate im-
plementation were now a direct responsi-
bility of the UN (Royal Greek Embassy
Information Service, pp. 284-86). The
Greek government justified in a similar way
NUMIBER 2
THE U.N. AND GREEK POLICY ON CYPRUS
its qualified but negative reaction to British
soundings in August 1957 aiming at the
convocation of a new, tripartite, agenda-less
conference in London. In an aide-memoire
of August 27 to the British government, it
observed that the Cyprus issue, in its view,
"lay between the British government and
the people of Cyprus, as also set down in
resolution 1013(XI) . ." (A-T Papers).
Fourth Recourse
Three weeks before the first British
sounding, of August 3, the Greek govern-
ment, in a letter of July 12 addressed to the
UN Secretary-General, had asked him to
place the Cyprus item on the provisional
agenda of the Assembly's twelfth session
(GAOR, 12, Annexes, Agenda Item 58, p.
1). Likewise, on July 12, a Greek govern-
ment spokesman stated that there would
always be time to suspend action before the
UN if a proposal satisfactory to the people
of Cyprus were put forward from the British
or any other quarter (Royal Greek Embassy,
press release, July 12, 1957.) As already
mentioned, since the Assembly's eleventh
session, the Greek Foreign Minister had
committed himself to a new recourse to the
UN if no progress were made toward a
solution. He had repeated this warning as
a commitment in Parliament in March and
again in May (GPD, March 11, 1957, p.
39; May 20, 1957, p. 13).
In its explanatory memorandum of Sep-
tember 13, the Greek government justified
its new recourse to the UN by referring,
among other things, to resolution 1013(XI),
by noting that since its adoption no progress
had been made on the road toward a solu-
tion of the Cyprus problem, and by stressing
that the British government had flatly
turned down a proposal by Ethnarch Ma-
karios for resuming negotiations "in con-
formity with the relative [sic] resolution of
149
the General Assembly."12 As to the British
offer to deal with this question on a tri-
partite basis within the framework of, or
in connection with, NATO, the Greek gov-
ernment felt, according to this memoran-
dum, that it did not have the right to get
involved in proceedings that were not in
line with the Assembly's resolution and
would result in the total or partial with-
drawal of the question of Cyprus from the
authority and responsibility of the United
Nations (GAOR, 12, Annexes, Agenda Item
58, pp. 1-2).
On September 20, the twelfth Assembly
decided to include the Cyprus item in its
agenda, after the General Committee had
recommended that it do so but with a
change in the item's title, since subitem (b)
referred to British atrocities against the
Cypriots and, therefore, was unacceptable
to the British government and other mem-
bers of the Committee.13 This time, the
novelty in the Assembly's consideration of
the Cyprus item was that the British, Greek,
and Turkish representatives, having at their
disposal resolution 1013 (XI), reported to
the Assembly about their own compliance
with it and charged their opponents with
12
In a letter of May 28, 1957, addressed to
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Makarios
had proposed negotiations and had referred to
resolution 1013 (XI), among other things, in
support of his proposal. The British authorities
in Cyprus, he wrote, should in compliance with
that resolution put an end to all emergency
measures. These prevented freedom of ex-
pression. The British government, in its reply
of May 30, wrote that it would be incompatible
both with the responsibilities of the Cyprus
government and with the requirements of an
atmosphere of peace and freedom of expres-
sion, specified in resolution 1013(XI), to allow
the Ethnarch'sreturn to Cyprus (571 HC Deb.
5 s., pp. 66-69).
13 GAOR, 12, General Committee, 111th
meeting, 9/18/57, p. 4. For Assembly's de-
cision taken without a formal vote, see GAOR,
12, 682nd plenary meeting, 9/20/57, p. 50.
150
noncompliance or with only limited com-
pliance.14
The draft resolution which the Greek
delegation tabled on December 9 in the
Political Committee referred to resolution
1013 (XI). In this draft's preambular clauses,
the Assembly was asked to express its con-
cern that "no progress had been made
toward the solution of this problem in com-
pliance with the operative paragraph" of
that resolution. As a warning against
further procrastination, the Assembly should
assert that the situation in Cyprus was still
"fraught with danger" and that a speedy
solution of the question was required in
accordance with the principles of the Char-
ter in order to secure peace and stability in
the area. As for the single operative clause
of this draft resolution, it literally revived
the wording of the Greek draft resolution
introduced at the previous Assembly. In this
clause, the Assembly was asked to express
its wish that the people of Cyprus be given
the opportunity to determine their own
future by the application of its right to
self-determination (GAOR, 12, Annexes,
Agenda Item 58, p. 8).
The importance attached by the Greek
government to its goal of getting bipartite
negotiations started between the British and
the Cypriots is revealed by the fact that
backstage, until the very eve of the Cyprus
debate in the Political Committee, the
Greek delegation offered to withdraw its
own draft resolution if the British delega-
tion, during the Committee debate, was
willing to commit itself publicly to entering
into such bipartite negotiations and if it
agreed that the relevant statement be em-
14GAOR, 12, First Committee, 927th meet-
ing, 12/9/57, p. 346 (Commander Noble); pp.
347-349 (Averoff-Tossizza); 928th meeting,
12/9/57, p. 355 (Selim Sarper). The latter
charged that the Greek Government had been
"misrepresenting" resolution 1013(XI).
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME X II
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
bodied in a draft resolution to be tabled for
adoption by the Assembly. Only after the
British delegation rejected this offer did the
Greek delegation go ahead and wage its
resolutionary struggle (A-T Papers).
In contrast to what had happened at the
previous sessions of the Assembly, the Greek
draft resolution, after its preambular clauses
had been amended in a manner acceptable
to the Greek delegation and after the Com-
mittee had adopted a Greek subamendment
to an amendment to the operative clause,
as proposed jointly by Canada, Chile, Den-
mark, and Norway,15 was put to the vote
and adopted by the Political Committee.
This important operative clause referred to
the Cypriot people's right to self-determina-
tion. In it, the Assembly was to express
"the earnest hope that further negotiations
and discussions will be undertaken promptly
and in a spirit of cooperation with a view
to applying the right of self-determination
in the case of the people of Cyprus"
(GAOR, 12, Annexes, Agenda Item 58, p.
9).
In the Assembly, however, this draft
resolution failed to gather the required two-
thirds majority of members present and
voting on December 14. Hence it was not
adopted. To avoid this not unforeseeable
outcome, the Greek delegation had con-
sidered asking the Assembly to postpone
its decision on the resolution the Commit-
tee had recommended for adoption. Eth-
narch Makarios, however, opposed such a
move, arguing inter alia that such a move
would be interpreted as an indication that
the Greeks had not dared to wage the
battle in the Assembly (A-T Papers).
It could not be doubted that the Greek
delegation and the Foreign Minister per-
sonally had scored a first-rate political suc-
15 See
GAOR, 12, First Committee, 933rd
meeting, 12/12/57, p. 388, and 934th meeting,
12/12/57, p. 395.
NUMBER 2
THE U.N. AND GREEK POLICY ON CYPRUS
cess in this struggle over the Cyprus issue
at the twelfth Assembly, the Permanent
Mission of Greece to the UN reported
several days later. This success had been
even more astonishing because it had been
achieved in an unfavorable political climate
and because it was disproportionate with
the capabilities and political potential of
Greece. Of course, the justice of the cause
had been a factor in this success. But it
had been only one factor among others, for
in the UN justice constituted a very rela-
tive and limited factor. A strictly objective
judgment, in the Greek Mission's estimate,
would attribute this success to three factors
mainly: First, to the good preparation of
the case on the Greek side and to the per-
sonality of the Foreign Minister himself,
who had won general sympathy and had
demonstrated great courage at critical
moments, as well as a remarkable tenacity
and maneuvering ability. Second, to the
tactical mistakes of the adversaries, who
had complacently relied on their superiority
and on American support beyond any per-
missible bounds. Third, to the indubitable
fact that Greece, though a very small state,
had been able to generate considerable in-
fluence because of its historical and moral
tradition. When Greece was expressed as
a faith, as an idea, and as an eternal value,
the Greek Mission felt, it constituted a
capital of unlimited potential (A-T Papers).
Reporting to Parliament on January 20,
1958, about the Cyprus proceedings at the
twelfth Assembly, the Greek Foreign Min-
ister declared he wished neither to over-
estimate nor to underestimate their results.
Even if the resolution had received the two-
thirds vote required for its adoption, it would
have had only an indirect effect of moral
pressure, since it was not enforceable. At
the same time, he could not belittle the
value of the voting on the Cyprus question.
This time the Committee, which was a sort
151
of kiln in which resolutions were fired, had
prepared and had voted for a resolution by
which the UN would have recommended
the application of self-determination as a
solution of the Cyprus problem. Indubit-
ably, this had been a gain and a means for
exerting moral pressure. In the Assembly
this resolution had not gathered the re-
quired two-thirds vote, but, at least, it had
obtained a simple majority. Here, too, then,
was a possibility of exerting moral pressure.
Averoff-Tossizza further underlined the
fact that the Greek draft resolution had
been the only one mentioning self-deter-
mination that had ever been put to the vote.
Thus, it represented a pioneering event in
the history of the United Nations. The
Algerian draft resolution had mentioned
self-determination only in its preamble. Be-
sides, it had never been put to the vote.
But the extent of the success could be
judged by the fierce opposition which the
draft resolution had generated. This had
become plain on the diplomatic level and
in the backstage diplomatic pressures which
had been exerted on several delegations to
get them to abstain or to vote against the
draft resolution. All in all, a very hard
battle had been fought. Its results, he
repeated, had been a pioneering success
(GPD, January 20, 1958, pp. 455-56).
Fifth Recourse
Even though the Greek delegation did
not commit itself to a new recourse as it
had done at the Assembly's ninth and
eleventh sessions, there was one more battle
over Cyprus in the UN, at the Assembly's
thirteenth session. In its recourse dated
August 15, 1958, the Greek government,
instead of using its customary formula of
"self-determination under the auspices of
the United Nations," merely asked for the
inclusion of the "Question of Cyprus" in
the Assembly's agenda. In its explanatory
152
memorandum dated September 12, it em-
phasized that the issue was one of freedom
and self-determination. The British govern-
ment, it charged, continued to deny these
rights to the Cypriots. In spite of resolution
1013(XI) it had avoided entering into di-
rect negotiations with the Cypriots. It had
also failed to take into account that the
Political Committee, at the Assembly's pre-
vious session, had adopted a resolution call-
ing for the application of the right of
self-determination for the Cypriot people
and that the Assembly by a simple majority
had likewise favored it, while "those who
abstained refused to side with those voting
against self-determination" (GAOR, 13, An-
nexes, Agenda 68, pp. 1-3).
This time, during the two-stage decision-
making on including the Cyprus item in
the Assembly's agenda, no difficulties were
experienced. On September 22, 1958, the
Assembly decided in favor of its inclusion.16
A few days later, since the immediate goal
of the Greek government was now to pre-
vent the application of the Macmillan plan
to Cyprus (announced by the British gov-
ernment on June 19, 1958), the Greek
Foreign Minister met Foreign Secretary
Selwyn Lloyd and said he was prepared to
recommend to Athens the withdrawal of
the Cyprus item from the Assembly's agenda
if the British government were to propose
the suspension of the plan's application.
Lloyd, however, was obdurate. His govern-
ment was officially committed to the Mac-
millan plan. If it dropped this commitment,
perhaps EOKA would cease its operations,
but a Turkish EOKA would start similar
activities (The Last Battle, 1961, pp. 15-
16).
16GAOR, 13, 752nd plenary meeting, 9/22/
58, p. 51. In the General Committee the
recommendation for inclusion was made on
September 17, 1958 (GAOR, 13, General Com-
mittee, 117th meeting, p. 4).
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XII
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
Matters in the Assembly thus took their
course. The Greek delegation this time
sought to get the Assembly to approve in
principle the establishment of an indepen-
dent Cyprus instead of urging it, as it had
done in the past, to adopt a resolution
calling for the application of the principle
or of the right of self-determination for the
people of Cyprus (GAOR, 13, First Com-
mittee, 996th meeting, November 25, 1958,
p. 249). Introduced on November 25, the
Greek draft resolution, in its operative
clauses, proposed that the Assembly invite
the British government to help the Cypriots
toward instituting "the status of indepen-
dence" following a period of "genuine and
democratic self-government," in which ade-
quate guarantees would be provided for
the protection of the Turkish minority and
for its participation in the island's admin-
istration. For implementing the above
points, this draft resolution proposed setting
up a good offices committee (GAOR, 13,
Annexes, Agenda Item 68, p. 16).
The success of 1957 in getting an es-
sentially Greek draft resolution put to the
vote and adopted at least by the Political
Committee was not, however, repeated at
the thirteenth Assembly. The Committee,
which considered the Cyprus item at 15
meetings between November 25 and De-
cember 4, was faced by six other draft
resolutions and adopted the one sponsored
by Iran. This resolution, in its operative
clauses, urged that a conference be con-
vened between "the three governments di-
rectly concerned" (a phrase anathema to
the Greek delegation) and representatives
of the Cypriots, at which there would be a
discussion not only of the interim arrange-
ments of the administration of Cyprus but
also of a final solution, with the assistance
(if desired) of governments and personal-
ities acceptable to the interested parties.
Such a conference, according to this resolu-
NUMBER 2
THE U.N. AND GREEK POLICY ON CYPRUS
tion, offered the best hope of peaceful prog-
ress toward an agreed solution of the
Cyprus problem. To meet the legitimate
aspirations of the Cypriots, self-government
and free institutions should be developed in
accordance with the Charter (GAOR, 13,
Annexes, Agenda Item 68, p. 14). This
resolution urged something more than the
tripartite conference the British govern-
ment, with the support of the US
government, had urged upon Greece and
Turkey since August 1957. It hewed close
to procedures Henri Spaak, NATO's Secre-
tary-General, had first mentioned in mid-
September 1957 during exploratory talks he
had had with the Greek Foreign Minister
(A-T Papers).
This time the Greek representative voted
against the Iranian draft resolution. The
US representative (Henry Cabot Lodge),
on the other hand, voted in its favor,
whereas at the Assembly's previous session
he had abstained from the vote.17 In the
Assembly, however, the Iranian resolution
was never put to the vote. Whether it
would have gathered the required two-thirds
majority is a moot point.18 On December 5,
after the chairman of the Political Com-
mittee submitted his report on the Cyprus
item in the Assembly, the representative of
Mexico recommended the text of another
draft resolution "negotiated with all the
17
GAOR, 13, First Committee, 1010th meet-
ing, 12/4/58, pp. 316-17; GAOR, 12, First
Committee, 934th meeting, 12/12/57, pp. 395-
96; 731st plenary meeting, 12/14/57, p. 623.
18The First Committee had adopted the
Iranian draft resolution by 31 votes to 22, with
28 abstentions. This indicates that the resolu-
tion had not gathered the required two-thirds
majority for adoption by the Assembly. Sir
Pierson Dixon, of the British delegation, how-
ever, was reportedly confident that such a
majority would have been obtained in the
Assembly (Foot, 1964, p. 176; also the London
Times, December 6, 1958).
153
parties directly concerned" and expressed
the hope that the Assembly would unani-
mously adopt it and that there would be no
need for further debate or explanations of
votes. The President, after inquiring
whether there were any objections to the
Mexican proposal and ascertaining that
there were none, asked the Assembly to
decide on the new draft resolution. With-
out objection, the Assembly adopted it.19
Under this outwardly innocuous document
-resolution 1287(XIII)--the Assembly,
having considered the question of Cyprus
and recalling resolution 1013(XI), "ex-
pressed its confidence" that continued ef-
forts would be made by the "parties" to
reach a peaceful, democratic, and just
solution in accordance with the Charter
(GAOR, 13, Annexes, Agenda Item 68, p.
19).
Evaluating the Fifth Recourse
In his report to the Greek Parliament on
the UN proceedings, Foreign Minister
Averoff-Tossizza observed on December 11
with regard to the earlier Iranian resolution
that its supporters, in spite of their voting
victory, had suffered a political defeat. For
in a battle that involved Greece, on the one
hand, and Britain and Turkey supported by
the United States on the other, the victors
had managed to muster in their favor only
31 votes out of a total membership of 82.
Of the 20 Latin American delegations
which usually followed the policy line of the
"free world," three had voted against that
resolution and 11 had abstained.
9 Only the Soviet representative made a
statement in connection with the vote which
had been taken (GAOR, 13, 782nd plenary
meeting, 12/5/58, pp. 547-49). His adverse
comments were directed almost exclusively
against the Iranian draft resolution that was
not put to the vote. Evidently he had been
unprepared for commenting on the Mexican
resolution.
154
As for resolution 1287 (XIII), if it was
compared to the draft resolutions tabled
by Britain, Greece, and Turkey, it was
negatively equal for all three governments.
It could even be maintained that there had
been a slight gain for the Cyprus question
because the UN, by this resolution, though
not entering into the substance of the
question, had confirmed its active interest
in it. This would exert a slight moral
pressure. At the Assembly's previous ses-
sion, the Foreign Minister reminded Parlia-
ment, certain delegations had favored the
adoption of no resolution at all. A second
and slight gain had been that the UN by
this resolution, had indirectly adopted the
view that the bloody drama of Cyprus had
not been settled. As for the debate, this
had been useful. Toward the end of it
there had been a relaxation in the tone of
the Turkish statements, for what reasons
he could not say, even though he had had
private talks with the Turkish Foreign
Minister (GPD, December 11, 1958, pp.
258-59).
At this critical juncture in the Cyprus
question, the Greek Foreign Minister did
not emphasize in Parliament the point made
by the Mexican representative in the As-
sembly on December 5-that resolution
1287(XIII) had been the outcome of nego-
tiations between "all the parties directly
concerned," namely, that it had been the
result of backstage exchanges between him-
self and the Turkish Foreign Minister at a
meeting attended also by the representa-
tives of Britain, the United States, Iran, and
Mexico, and that, therefore, this resolution
was something more than resolution 1013
(XI) which genuinely had been the creation
of a third party. Nor did Averoff-Tossizza
reveal on this occasion that, prior to the
negotiations for substituting the Mexican
for the Iranian resolution, he had com-
mitted himself to meeting the Turkish
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XII
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
Foreign Minister once the Assembly had
taken a decision on the Cyprus item, and
that this meeting took place on December
6, in the Delegates' Lounge of the UN
building. During this meeting, which lasted
for two hours, the two Foreign Ministers
discussed, for reference to their respective
governments, the broad constitutional out-
lines for setting up a new state, the Republic
of Cyprus (The Last Battle, pp. 127-29).
This was the goal mentioned in the never-
voted-on Greek draft resolution and pro-
claimed by Ethnarch Makarios in his famous
interview of September 22, 1958, with
Barbara Castle, Vice-Chairman of the
British Labor Party (Royal Institute of In-
ternational Affairs, 1959, pp. 51-52).
Discussion
This chronological account of selected
aspects of the handling by the Greek gov-
ernment of its five successive recourses to
the Assembly over Cyprus between 1954
and 1958 suggests why Greek foreign
policy-makers resorted so persistently to the
UN even though, each time, the response
of the Assembly fell far short of their
ostensible goals. They did so because they
found themselves in a situation in which
they preferred to act rather than to refrain
from acting and believed that they had no
appropriate alternative technique of state-
craft available for promoting a cause to
which they attached considerable impor-
tance. Their recourses were, in brief, re-
sponses to situations in which conventional
diplomacy was believed to be fruitless and
war unthinkable. In terms of action theory
the five recourses were actions-a process
of striving-directed toward the attainment
of goals within a situation which had re-
sulted from the denial of a state of gratifica-
tion through enosis.
Greece's decision-makers, in other words,
acted no differently from those of greater
NUMBER 2
THE U.N. AND GREEK POLICY ON CYPRUS
national powers, even superpowers, when-
ever they found themselves in a similar
situation (e.g., the decision-makers of the
US in 1947 and 1956 when they resorted
to the Assembly over the Korean and Hun-
garian questions, joining with Britain and
France in the latter case; or the decision-
makers of the USSR when, in 1950 and
1954, they complained to the Assembly
about US aggression against China, or,
more recently, when they resorted to the
Assembly in the Middle East crisis of 1967).
These Greek recourses were also com-
bined in various ways with a technique of
force-below the level of formal war, how-
ever. In this respect, too, they were not
unique. They resembled the Soviet and
Ukrainian recourses to the Security Council
over the "Greek question" in January and
August 1946, or the most recent recourse
of the US to that same organ of the UN
over the question of Vietnam; not to men-
tion the various recourses of groups of
Arab or Asian and African states to the
Assembly in the Moroccan, Tunisian, and
Algerian questions.
As for the goals of these recourses, they
remained fairly constant. First came the
ostensible goal of getting the Assembly to
adopt Greek draft resolutions concerning
Cyprus and, as a corollary but nonostensible
goal, of preventing the adoption of draft
resolutions Greek policy-makers regarded as
adverse or harmful. Second came the goal
of achieving various side effects through
these negotiations in the UN that initially
aimed at redistribution.20
20
Ikle (1964, pp. 26-27) distinguishes this
type among other types of negotiations based
on the criterion of the sort of goals pursued.
It could be said that the Greek government,
in the Cyprus question, started out with a de-
sire for negotiations aiming at redistribution,
whereas finally it agreed to negotiations aiming
at innovation-another type distinguished by
Ikle.
155
Greek policy makers never attained, nor
expected to attain, their ostensible resolu-
tionary goals. For they were well aware
that so long as the US opposed the Assem-
bly adoption of any substantive resolution
on Cyprus, their draft resolutions had no
chance of being adopted. Nonetheless, the
fact that the Greek representatives were
able to vote for resolutions 814(IX), 1013
(XI), and 1287(XIII) indicates that they
felt they had achieved at least their corol-
lary goal of preventing the adoption of
adverse or harmful resolutions. Moreover,
as this study reveals, they exploited with
considerable versatility the political poten-
tialities which these procedural or deliber-
ately ambiguous and "colorless" resolutions
offered them in order to pursue the tactical
and even the strategic aims of their Cyprus
policy in both domestic and international
arenas.
Foremost among the side effects desired
by Greek policy-makers were (1) publicity
for the dispute, with both governments and
their constituencies as targets of these
publicizing efforts; and (2) negotiations
outside the UN for settling the dispute.
Through their successive recourses to
the Assembly Greek policy-makers achieved
the first of these objectives. They managed
to draw the attention of the society of
nations to the Cyprus question, "interna-
tionalizing" it, as it were. In the Assembly
proceedings they were able to explain their
side of the story; to unmask the antagonist
government before the eyes of representa-
tives of third states; to conduct propaganda
among the constituencies of these as well
as of the antagonist states; to demonstrate
rectitude and firmness of purpose in pur-
suing their objectives both for foreign
,policy and domestic purposes; to harass the
antagonist; and to exert moral and political
pressures upon him directly or indirectly.
At the same time, Greek foreign policy
156
makers became progressively aware that
publicizing the Cyprus dispute through the
UN created not only these favorable side
effects but also certain disadvantages as
well as diminishing returns. For these re-
courses allowed the antagonists and their
friends to counter with their own unmask-
ings, propaganda, harassment, demonstra-
tions of rectitude and firmness, and moral
and political pressures. Moreover, these
activities wearied, if not bored, the delega-
tions of third party states, once the novelty
and the initial excitement of the dispute
wore off. Quite understandably, Greek
government spokesmen never publicly ac-
knowledged these adverse side effects of the
Greek recourses. When addressing them-
selves to the domestic constituency and
defending themselves against Opposition
criticism, they emphasized the favorable
side effects of these recourses as well as the
victories gained in the secondary and
tertiary engagements of the Assembly pro-
ceedings, belittling or passing over in silence
the successes of the antagonists.
Greek foreign policy-makers were like-
wise successful in achieving their second
side-effect objective: negotiations outside
the UN for resolving the Cyprus conflict.
But here, too, their success was limited,
particularly insofar as the procedures for
reaching a settlement were concerned. At
the outset, after failing to get the British
government to negotiate over the future of
Cyprus, they had hoped that their recourse
to the UN would serve as leverage for such
bipartite diplomatic negotiations. Then,
having failed in achieving this objective,
they had sought to promote negotiations
between the British authorities in Cyprus
and the Cypriots led by Archbishop and
Ethnarch Makarios, with the aim of pre-
venting the Turkish government from hav-
ing any say on the island's future. In the
end, however, under resolution 1287 (XIII),
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XII
STEPHEN G. XYDIS
they implicitly committed themselves to
negotiations with the Turkish government
over this future. This was a procedure
recommended by both the American and
British governments, in November 1956
and October 1957 (A-T Papers), but
strenuously opposed by Greek policy-makers
as long as the Turkish government main-
tained that the sole acceptable solution to
the Cyprus problem was the island's par-
tition.
Modification of Goals
The recourses to the UN contributed to
the sort of procedures that eventually led
to the resolution of the Cyprus conflict
outside the UN, but they did more than
this. They also had a subtle but quite
perceptible effect on the substance of the
settlement reached. For the Greek govern-
ment, by trying to bend the UN into an
instrument of its policy, had to adapt itself
in terms of form to the technical potential-
ities of the UN as an instrument for pro-
moting the particular foreign policy goal
and the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots
led by Makarios. And form affected con-
tent. Thus the UN (together, of course,
with several extra-UN factors) brought
about a modification of the goal itself-
enosis-in the following manner:
The Greek government in its resort to
the UN had a choice between two ways of
using the Charter and the resolutionary
work of the UN General Assembly. It could
invoke either the Declaration on Non-Self-
Governing Territories (Chapter XI of the
Charter) or Article 1, paragraph 2 of the
Charter. The former refers, inter alia, both
to the obligation of the administering states
to take due account of the political aspira-
tions of the peoples in non-self-governing
territories and to develop these peoples'
self-government-with the term "self-gov-
ernment" being somewhat ambiguous. For
NUMBER 2
THE U.N. AND GREEK POLICY ON CYPRUS
the ChurchillianBritishit implied autonomy
short of full independence, whereas for the
Rooseveltian Americans it subsumed full
independence (Russell, 1958, pp. 75, 86,
88-89, 175, 337, 815, 817). Article 1,
paragraph2, of the Charter, on the other
hand, refers to "the principleof equal rights
and self-determination"which the USSR
had managed to get inserted in the Charter
at San Francisco (Russell, 1958, p. 811),
while certain subsequent General Assembly
resolutions introduced the concept of the
"right" of self-determination into UN prac-
tice.21
Because the British government since
1948 had been offering the Cypriots self-
government in various forms short of full
independence, and the Cypriots had re-
jected these proposals, the Greek govern-
ment chose to base its first four recourses
on Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter.
This, however, had a feedback effect on
other instrumentscreated by the Greek gov-
ernment for promoting the goal of enosis
(e.g., the title of the Pan-Hellenic Commit-
tee for Enosisof Cypruswas changedto "Pan
Hellenic Committee for Self-Determination
in Cyprus"); it also led to expressions in
the UN of Greekwillingness to accept goals
other than enosis but more than self-govern-
ment in the British sense of the word, as a
solution to the Cyprus conflict. The Greek
Foreign Minister at both the eleventh and
twelfth sessions of the General Assembly
emphasized this willingness (Xydis, 1967,
pp. 42 and 324-25).
Britain and Turkey initially opposed any
change of sovereignty in Cyprus, main-
tained that the principle of self-determina-
tion did not apply to Cyprus, and charged
that the Greek request for Cypriot self-
determination masked a desire for the is-
land's annexation. By late 1956, however,
21
E.g., Resolutions 421 (V), 545 (VI), and
637 (VII).
157
they were obliged to concede that the prin-
ciple of self-determination invoked by
Greece applied to Cyprus, too-with the
catch that it should do so separately for
each of the two main ethnic groups of the
island. Thus, through their use of UN
terminology, they masked their own pref-
erence for partition as a solution of the
Cyprus conflict.
In mid-1958 the Britishgovernmentcame
up with the Macmillanplan for self-govern-
ment which, as its implementation began,
appeared to be leading to partition. There-
upon Ethnarch Makariosand Greek policy-
makers dropped their claim for Cypriot
self-determinationand adopted a view that
India, one of the most influential anti-
colonial members of the UN at the time,
had consistentlyfavored from the very out-
set of the General Assembly debates on
Cyprus in 1954 (Xydis, 1967, pp. 41-42):
they came out in favor of the island's inde-
pendence. In the Indian view, self-govern-
ment in the Charter'sDeclaration on Non-
Self-Governing Territories was a generic
term that included the concept of indepen-
dence among its several species. As Krishna
Menon put the Indian view at the twelfth
Assembly, explaining his delegation's ab-
stention from the Committee vote on the
essentially Greek draft resolution that re-
ferred to self-determination, non-self-gov-
erning territoriesor colonies were entitled
to, and should have, independence so that
they might take their place in the comity
of nations. This was not a denial of what-
ever right to self-will or self-election there
might be. But there ought to be a "self"
first. A subject people could not choose,
and therefore its independence had to be
established, Menon declared (Xydis, 1967,
p. 470). These points had greatly im-
pressed the Greek delegation. As they saw
it, KrishnaMenon had made it abundantly
clear that independence could not mean a
158
limitation of the right of self-determination
but, on the contrary, presupposed this right.
A people should first become free, and
afterward it would be free to choose the
regime it preferred (Xydis, 1967, pp. 472-
73).
In brief, even though the conflict over
Cyprus was resolved outside the UN, the
international instrument the Greek govern-
ment sought to use for promoting its foreign
policy goal as well as the Greek Cypriot
aspirations for enosis influenced not only the
procedures finally adopted for solving the
conflict but also the substance itself of the
solution. Beneath the corporate veil of the
United Nations, two of the most influential
third-party member states at the time-the
United States and India-had exerted their
political weight. As a result, if the pro-
cedure of the conflict's resolution was pri-
marily American, the substance of the
settlement was, in the last analysis, Indian.
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NUMBER 2