SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
hotel found through warrantless search is illegal and the
PEOPLE V. LEANGSIRI
Facts
Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of NAIA
bringing 8
225.31grams of heroin hidden under the false bottom of
a black suitcase. Informed of the authorities that he is to
deliver the contraband to 3 people at the Las Palmas
Hotel in Manila. An entrapment was devised by
NARCOM (narcotics command) and agents of the
bureau of customs then ensued.
The 3 were arrested.They learned that Amidu stays at
room 413 of the same hotel. While Omogbolahan and
Bhola were billeted at Royal Palm Hotel.
Accompanied by hotel owner and security officer, they
searched Amidu’s room. Got there a piece of paper with
the name Suchinda Leangsiri written on it tucked within
the pages of his telephone and address book. And other
possessions were confiscated.
NARCOM went to Royal Palm Hotel. Coordinated with
security officers of the hotel who stood as witnesses
when they entered and searched the room. They yielded
2 black suitcases, each with false bottoms and both
smaller than that confiscated from Leangsiri. The
appellants were convicted of conspiring to transport
heroin.
Issue
Whether or not the piece of paper found in the room of
Amidu is admissible as evidence.
Ruling
Revised Rules of Court provides that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant. Strict
application of the exception that such warrantless search
obviously cannot be made at a place other than the place
of arrest.
Immediate Control test was enunciated in the American
case of Chimel vs. State of California. (Arrested at his
house, searched the entire house and things found were
allowed to be admitted as evidence. But the SC reversed
the conviction and held that the search went far beyond
his person and the area from which he might have
obtained either a weapon or something that could have
been used as evidence against him.)
The exception obtains when the plain view doctrine
applies.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in room 504
of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing the
name of Leangsiri obtained in room 413 of the same
piece of paper is held to be inadmissible as evidence
against the appellants. The inadmissibility of the paper
as evidence will not however exculpate the appellants.
Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecutor’s case
against the appellants. The remaining evidence still
established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
VALEROSO V. CA
Facts
Senior Inspector Valeroso filed for a resolution about the
decision against him that he is guilty of possessing
illegal firearms.
An arrest warrant was issued against Valeroso. He was
eventually arrested at the INP Central Police Station in
Quezon City where they conducted a bodily search
against him. They found the gun that was allegedly not
his.
The witnesses to the defense of Valeroso presented a
different story. That at the time that he was arrested, he
was sleeping in a boarding house in Quezon City. He
was awakened by four armed men. They pulled Valeroso
out of the room and began to conduct a search in the
room. Eventually they found the subject firearm in the
closet.
The RTC rendered the decision against Valeroso,
rendering him guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. This was affirmed by the CA
Hence, the present case.
Valeroso argues that the search conducted by the armed
men violates his rights against unreasonable firearms.
Issue
WON the warrantless arrest conducted by the authorities
against Valeroso is valid
Ruling
No. The Court ruled that the search conducted by the
Authorities is invalid. According to the Constitution, the
people have the right against unlawful searches and that
any evidence admitted, if there is no valid reason or
search, it will become inadmissible against him.
A warrantless search as an incident to lawful arrest is
done in order to remove any weapon that the accused
may have used against the authority. It allows the seizure
of evidence either on the person arrested or the area
of his immediate control. The closet where the firearm
was contained is found on a place not within the area of
immediate control of Valeroso, hence the warrantless
arrest was conducted invalidly. The firearm obtained
cannot be turned as evidence against him.
Petition Granted
LUZ V. PEOPLE
Facts
PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle
drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles.
PO3 Alteza invited the Luz to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down the Luz is
almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3
Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket.
Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take out the contents
of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it.  Luzo bliged and slowly put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-
like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair
of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said
container, he asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the
container, PO3 Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the
former spilled out the contents of the container on the
table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the
two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu. Luz was later charged for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that
there was no lawful search and seizure because there was
no lawful arrest. The RTC found that Luz was lawfully
arrested. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs
Decision.
Issue
WON can Luz be considered lawfully arrested based on
traffic violation under the city ordinance, and such arrest
lead to a valid search and seizure
WON was there a valid warrantless search and seizure
that can still produce conviction?
Ruling
No, Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching
of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there
be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the
other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write
his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have
been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of
PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or
take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket,
the period during which petitioner was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In
fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself
testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-
station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost
in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no
intention to take petitioner into custody.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for
a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on
the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of
liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may
be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a
traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest
for the same violation.
NO. Even if one were to work under the assumption that
Luz was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a
traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his
ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested,
it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the
latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them. It may also be noted that in
this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner
had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
[T]here being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. The subject items
seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.
HOMAR V. PEOPLE
Facts
Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered PO1
Eric Tan (Tan) and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy
(Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard.
While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter,
they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking"
portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted
him and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground,
prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery
of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough
search on the petitioner's body and found and
confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected
as shabu.
Issue
WON there is a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest
Ruling
There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which
must precede the search. For this purpose, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 22 The
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. However, this
waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. It is well-settled
that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 32 The
indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was
emphasized in  Luz vs. People of the Philippines.30 The
Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused
in that case was inadmissible as evidence when the
police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had
no intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to
the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was
unlawful. This is notwithstanding the fact that the
accused, being caught in flagrante delicto for violating
an ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully
stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers.
MIGUEL V. PEOPLE
Facts
An information was filed before the RTC charging
Jeffrey Miguel (petitioner) of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, penalized under 9165 or the
“Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
”Prosecution alleged that (prosecution version of facts):
o Around 12:45 am of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan
operative of Brgy. San Antonio Village, Makati, named
Reynaldo Bahoyo was doing his rounds when he
received a report of a man showing off his private parts
at Kaong Street!
Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark
Velasquez then went to said street and saw a visible
intoxicated person, which they later identified as
petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts
while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot.
When they asked petitioner where he lived, the latter
answered “Kaong Street”
Bahoyo then said he lived on the same street but
petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an
ID, but petitioner failed to produce one
Velasquez repeated the for an ID, but instead, petitioner
emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes
containing one stick and two pieces of rolled paper
containing dried marijuana leaves.
This prompted the Bantay Bayans to seize the items,
take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well
as the items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo
SPO3 Castillo then inventoried the items, and prepared a
request for qualitative examination of the rolled paper
and for petitioner to undergo drug testing. Tests
confirmed it was marijuana and that petitioner was
positive for the presence of Methamphetamine but
negative for THC-metabolites
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and presented a different
version of facts (petitioner version of facts): He was just
urinating in from of his workplace when 2 Bantay Bayan
operatives approached him and asked him where he
lived o Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street,
they frisked him, took away his belongings, and
thereafter handcuffed and brought him to the Brgy. Hall
He was detained for about an hour before being taken to
the Ospital ng Makati and to another office where a bald
officer questioned him o He was then taken back to the
Brgy. Hall where they showed him 2 sticks of marijuana
joints allegedly recovered from him
RTC Ruling RTC found petitioner guilty for the crime
charged. They ruled that the Bahoyo and Velasques
conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as petitioner was
scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his
arrest o Thus, the incidental search which yielded the
seized marijuana was also lawful Petitioner appealed to
the CA
CA affirmed conviction. It held that search made on
petitioner was valid as it was done incidental to his arrest
for exhibiting his private parts on public. As such, said
marijuana is admissible in evidence and sufficient to
convict him for the crime charged
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied,
hence the petition to the SC, Petitioner argues that the
search and arrest was illegal and, thus, the marijuana
purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence
Issue
WON the there was a valid search incidental to a lawful
warrantless arrest
Ruling
No. The Bantay Bayan operatives are not government
agents like the PNP or the NBI in charge of law
enforcement, but are civilian volunteers who act as
“force multipliers” to assist the law enforcement
agencies in maintaining peace and security. The Bill of
Rights generally cannot be invoked against the acts of
private individuals, however, they may be applicable if
such individuals act under the color of a state-related
function
In this case, the acts of the Bantay Bayan relating to the
preservation of peace and order in their respective areas
have the color of a state-related function. As such, the
Bill of Rights may be applied to the Bantay Bayan
operatives who arrested and subsequently searched
petitioner.
(Next, the court determined that the arrest and search
was NOT validly made)
The Bill of Rights provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. The law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest first before a search can be
made – this process cannot be reversed.
A lawful arrest may be made without a warrant,
provided the parameters defined in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are
complied with.
In Section 5(a), or in flagrante delicto arrests, 2 elements
must concur, namely: a. The person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime
b. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer
Section 5(b), requires that at the time of the arrest, an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused had committed it
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of
the fact of the commission of an offense is essential
On the basis of the testimonies, the Court is inclined to
believe that petitioner went out to the street to urinate
(note that there was no CR in his workplace) when the
Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon him. That latter
then approached and questioned petitioner, and
thereafter went on to search his person, which
purportedly yielded the marijuana.
Verily, the prosecution’s claim that petitioner was
showing off his private parts was belied by the
testimonies
Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct
of an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there
was NO overt act constituting a crime committed by
petitioner in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer
 Neither do these circumstances necessitate a “hot records. The district court denied the motion to suppress,
pursuit” warrantless arrest as the arresting operatives do and the Sixth Circuit affirmed
not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner
had just committed an offense Issue
Moreover, if the arrest was made because of the alleged WON the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone
display of private parts, then the proper charge should records, which include the location and movements of
have been filed against him. However, records are bereft cell phone users, violate the Fourth Amendment
of any showing that such charge was filed aside from the
instant criminal charge for illegal possession of
Ruling
dangerous drugs. This strengthens the view that no prior
The government's warrantless acquisition of Carpenter's
lawful arrest was made which led to a valid search
cell-site records violated his Fourth Amendment right
incidental thereto.
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Chief Justice
There must be a lawful arrest FIRST, before a search
John Roberts authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority.
can be made, the process cannot be reversed
The majority first acknowledged that the Fourth
Amendment protects not only property interests, but also
reasonable expectations of privacy. Expectations of
privacy in this age of digital data do not fit neatly into
existing precedents, but tracking person's movements
CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
and location through extensive cell-site records is far
more intrusive than the precedents might have
Facts
anticipated. The Court declined to extend the "third-
party doctrine"—a doctrine where information disclosed
In April 2011, police arrested four men in connection
to a third party carries no reasonable expectation of
with a series of armed robberies. One of the men
privacy—to cell-site location information, which
confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone
implicates even greater privacy concerns than GPS
number and the numbers of the other participants. The
tracking does. One consideration in the development of
FBI used this information to apply for three orders from
the third-party doctrine was the "nature of the particular
magistrate judges to obtain "transactional records" for
documents sought," and the level of intrusiveness of
each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted
extensive cell-site data weighs against application of the
under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
doctrine to this type of information. Additionally, the
2703(d). That Act provides that the government may
third-party doctrine applies to voluntary exposure, and
require the disclosure of certain telecommunications
while a user might be abstractly aware that his cell
records when "specific and articulable facts show that
phone provider keeps logs, it happens without any
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents
affirmative act on the user's part. Thus, the Court held
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or
narrowly that the government generally will need a
other information sought, are relevant and material to an
warrant to access cell-site location information.
ongoing criminal investigation." The transactional
records obtained by the government include the date and
Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in
time of calls, and the approximate location where calls
which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito
began and ended based on their connections to cell
joined. Justice Kennedy would find that cell-site records
towers—"cell site" location information (CSLI).
are no different from the many other kinds of business
records the government has a lawful right to obtain by
Based on the cell-site evidence, the government charged
compulsory process. Justice Kennedy would continue to
Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding
limit the Fourth Amendment to its property-based
and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce,
origins.
in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Carpenter
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, emphasizing
moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence
the property-based approach to Fourth Amendment
on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI
questions. In Justice Thomas's view, the case should not
needed a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the
turn on whether a search occurred, but whose property
was searched. By focusing on this latter question, Justice
Thomas reasoned, the only logical conclusion would be
that the information did not belong to Carpenter.
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Thomas joined. Justice Alito distinguishes between an
actual search and an order "merely requiring a party to
look through its own records and produce specified
documents"—with the former being far more intrusive
than the latter. Justice Alito criticizes the majority for
what he characterizes as "allow[ing] a defendant to
object to the search of a third party's property," a
departure from long-standing Fourth Amendment
doctrine.
Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which he
emphasizes the "original understanding" of the Fourth
Amendment and laments the Court's departure from it.
RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
Facts
David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of
San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others
opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them.
The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove
away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over
driving a different car; he was driving on expired license
registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was
suspended, police policy required that the car be
impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are
required to perform an inventory search to confirm that
the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure,
to protect against liability claims in the future, and to
discover hidden contraband. During the search, police
located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for
possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in
his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective
analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang
signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the
phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated.
Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2
via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to
include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted
murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm
. legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions
Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence
regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired
through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a
gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the
Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs
involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-
related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and
sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The
California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1,
affirmed.
Issue
WON the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell
phone discovered through a search that violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches
Ruling
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion
for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the
warrantless search exception following an arrest exists
for the purposes of protecting officer safety and
preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the
search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as
a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police
officers have the ability to preserve evidence while
awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the
network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The
Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled
with massive amounts of private information, which
distinguished them from the traditional items that can be
seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The
Court also held that information accessible via the phone
but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the
arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some
warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted
in an emergency: when the government's interests are so
compelling that a search would be reasonable.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment in which he
expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception
following an arrest exists for the sole or primary
purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving
evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake,
however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was
the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the
regarding when and what information within a phone
can be reasonably searched following an arrest.
BIRCHFIELD V. NORTH DAKOTA
Facts
Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County,
North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they
believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed
both the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was
arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test.
Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing
to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He
moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state
law violated his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police
were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three
men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water
and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr.,
admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in
his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to
perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on
suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and taken to
the police station, where he refused to consent to a
chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law.
Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree test
refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident,
Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to
confirm he was driving under the influence after being
informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to
refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was
over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with
driving under the influence.
All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing
refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the
statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there
was no probable cause that would support a warrant for
the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the
Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that
criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Issue
WON in the absence of a warrant, may a state statute
criminalize an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood
alcohol test
Ruling
A state statute may not criminalize the refusal to submit
to a blood test in the absence of a warrant because, while
the Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless breath
tests incident to an arrest for drunk driving, warrantless
blood tests incident to an arrest violate the Fourth
Amendment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the
opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that
warrantless breath tests are permissible under the search
incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement because they do not implicate
significant privacy concerns. They involve minimal
physical intrusion to capture something that is routinely
exposed to the public, reveal a limited amount of
information, and do not enhance any embarrassment
beyond what the arrest itself causes. Blood tests,
however, implicate privacy interests because they are
much more physically invasive -- they require the
piercing of the skin -- and they produce a sample that
can be preserved and used to obtain further information
beyond the subject’s blood alcohol level at the time of
the test. The Court also determined that criminalizing
refusal to submit to a breath test is designed to serve the
government’s interest in preventing drunk driving, which
is greater than merely keeping currently drunk drivers
off the roads, and does so better than other alternatives.
However, the same rationale did not apply to
criminalizing refusal to submit to a blood test because of
the greater degree of intrusion and the available
alternative of the breath test.
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against warrantless searches should apply to
breath tests unless exigent circumstances justify one in a
particular case. In establishing exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the Court has routinely examined whether a
legitimate government interest justified the search in
light of the individual’s privacy interest and whether that
determination should be made based on a case-by-case
analysis or a categorical rule. Based on this analysis,
Justice Sotomayor argued that a categorical rule
allowing warrantless breath tests incident to arrest was
unnecessary to protect the government interest of
preventing drunk driving because at that point the driver
is off the road and a warrant could be obtained if
necessary. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas
wrote that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement should apply
categorically to all blood alcohol tests, including blood
tests. By drawing an arbitrary line between blood tests
and breath tests, the majority destabilized the law of
exceptions to the warrant requirement and made the jobs
of both police officers and lower courts more difficult.
PEOPLE V. SALANGUIT
Facts
Police officers went to Salanguit’s house with a search
warrant for shabu. When they knocked on the door, no
one opened the door. They heard people panicking so
they forced the door open and entered the house. After
showing the warrant, they searched the house, they
found 12 small plastic bags containing and paper clip
bags containing shabu and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana. The accused was
charged with the unlawful possession of shabu and
marijuana. Accused was convicted. On appeal, he
questions the validity of the search warrant and the
seizure of the bricks of marijuana.
Issue
WON the seizure of the latter drug (marijuana) was
justified on the ground that the drug was seized within
the plain view of the searching party.
Ruling
Not justified. The decision of the trial court was reversed
and set aside. Accused is acquitted
For the plain view doctrine to apply, there must be: (a)
prior justification,
(b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence,
(c) immediate
apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.
The question is whether these requisites have been
complied with
The only justification for an intrusion by the police is the
conduct of a search pursuant to accused appellant’s
lawful arrest for possession of shabu. The police failed
to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was
found; whether or prior to, or contemporaneous with, the
shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered
on accused-appellant’s person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably
during the search conducted after the shabu, had been
recovered from the cabinet. Moreover, the marijuana
was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in
newsprint could not have been readily discernible as
marijuana. The recovery of marijuana is INVALID. It is
inadmissible in evidence against accused and-
appellant.
TERRY V. OHIO
Facts
A Cleveland police officer (Martin McFadden) observed
two unidentified men on a street corner in his beat. As
the officer watched, the men took turns walking a short
distance down the sidewalk and peering in a particular
store window. After each circuit, the men would appear
to confer about something. This occurred a total of
twenty-four times (according to the Supreme Court
opinion; McFadden's earlier testimony indicates the men
walked to the store and peered through the window
approximately 3-5 times each). McFadden watched as
the men were briefly joined by a third person who left
quickly. The suspicious activity caused McFadden to
suspect the men were planning to rob the store. After the
third individual left, the men began walking away in the
direction of the store. McFadden followed and observed
from a distance until they met up with the third party.
McFadden then approached the group, identified himself
as police, and asked the men'snames. The men mumbled
something unintelligible, at which point
McFaddenturned one of the suspects and patted down
the outside of his clothing. In the process, the officer
found a gun in the pocket of the suspect's jacket. He then
directed all three men to enter a store with their hands
raised, and proceeded to pat down the other two
suspects, recovering a revolver from one. The three were
taken to the local police station, where two were charged
with carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue
WON it is unreasonable for a policeman to seize a
person and subject him to a limited search for weapons
unless there is probable cause for an arrest.
Ruling
The Court held that the stop, or seizure, and frisk, or
search, was valid when a "reasonably prudent officer"
has cause to believe a limited
CABALLES V. CA
Facts
2 policemen, while performing a routine patrol, spotted
passenger jeep covered with “kakawati” leaves driven by
the appellant. The policemen stopped the jeep, and when
asked what was loaded on such, the appellant did not
answer appearing pale and nervous. They checked the
cargo and discovered that it contained
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by NPC(national power corporation) He was
convicted of theft. However on appeal, he raised the
validity of the warrantless search and the admissibility of
the evidence thus obtained.
Issue
WON police officers who were on routine patrol, merely
on “suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled goods,”
constitutes probable cause that will justify warrantless
search and
Seizure
Ruling
There is no probable cause and therefore illegal. The
mere mobility of vehicles, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrant if made within the interior of
the territory and the absence of probable cause. Probable
cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong, in
themselves, to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. The required probable cause will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a
fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case. “stop-and-search”
without warrant at military or police checkpoint
Dela Cruz v People
Facts: Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-
island vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming back and
forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11,
2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port
to go home to Iloilo. He bought a ticket and left his bag
with a porter for an alleged15 mins. Dela Cruz then
proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his
bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. Flores
saw the impression of what appeared to 3 firearms inside
Dela Cruz's bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she
called the attention of port personnel Igot who was the
baggage inspector then. Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he
was the owner of the bag. The latter said yes and
consented to Igot's manual inspection of the bag. Officer
Abregana was on duty at the terminal of the Cebu
Domestic Port in Pier 1-Gwhen his attention was called
by Igot. He was told of the firearms inside a bad of
ascertain someone, later identified as defendant. Dela
Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. The bag
was then inspected and the following items were found
inside: 3 revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman's book; other
personal items; and 4 live ammunitions placed inside the
cylinder. Defendant had noproper docs for the firearms
and was then arrested and informed of his violation of a
crime punishable by law.
Two Infos were filed against def, one for illegal
possession of firearms and another for the violation of
the Gun Ban during election period. Def pleaded not
guilt. RTC Cebu City found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Banunder
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in
relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 1 year with
disqualification from holding public office and the right
to suffrage. But the case for illegal possession was
dismissed since RA 8294 penalizes simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested
committed 'no other crime.' RTC ruled that the
prosecution proved the following elements: "(a) the
existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
license or permit to possess the same." The prosecution
presented the firearms and live ammunitions found, 3
prosecution witnesses who testified that the firearms
were found inside def's bag, a Certification that Dela
Cruz did not file any application for license to possess a
firearm, and he was not given authority to carry a
firearm outside his residence. RTC also held that the
search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable
and, thus, valid. The resulting warrantless arrest was in
flagrante delicto. RTC did not the “planted” firearms
defense as this was "easy to fabricate, but terribly
difficult to disprove." Def also did not show improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to
discredit their testimonies. CA affirmed. MR denied.
Hence, this petition. Dela Cruz argues that there was no
voluntary waiver against warrantless search. He had no
actual intention to relinquish his right against warrantless
searches. He knew in all honest belief that when his
luggage would pass through the routine x-ray
examination, nothing incriminating would be recovered.
It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed
the examination of his luggage. The People counter, that
there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz's right to
unreasonable search and seizure and that the firearms
were seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of
Cebu, a common seaport security procedure. It is
claimed that this case is similar to valid warrantless
searches and seizures conducted by airport personnel
pursuant to routine airport security procedures
Issues:
1. W/n defendant was in possession of the illegal
firearms within the meaning of the Gun Ban
2. W/n defendant waived his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures
Held:
YES. The law applicable is Section 2(a) of Commission
on Elections Resolution No. 7764, “ During the election
period from January 14, 2007it shall be unlawful for xxx
Any person, including those possessing a permit to carry
firearms outside of residence or place of business, to
bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons
in public places including any building, street, park,
private vehicle or public conveyance. For the purpose
firearm includes airgun, while deadly weapons include
hand grenades or other explosives, except pyrotechnics.
In relation to Section 261 BP 881.
YES. There’s waver and warrant. When petitioner gave
his bag for x-ray scanning to port authorities-was there
an unreasonable search then? No. In People vs Marti, it
was held that items seized pursuant to a reasonable
search conducted by private persons are not covered by
the exclusionary rule as the Bill of Rights invokable as
against the State.
However, as in this case the actions of port personnel
during routine security checks at ports have the color of
a state-related function. People vs Marti is inapplicable
here. The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority
by the state to oversee the security of persons and
vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction
between port personnel and port police officers in this
case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily
law enforcers, both should be considered agents of
government under Article III of the Constitution.
Villanueva v. People
Facts: A complaint was filed by Brian Resco against
Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former
along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After recording the
incident in the police blotter, police officers together
with Resco proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They
informed him of the complaint filed against him. And
then subsequently, he was invited to the police station to
which he complied. While Villanueva was being
subjected to a body search, a plastic sachet of shabu was
recovered from the left pocket of his jeans. This sachet
of shabu was brought to the National Police District
Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO). In his
defense, Villanueva denied the allegations. He testified
that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching
TV when he was invited by the police officers to go with
them to the police station. Informed that he had been
identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused
was then frisked and detained.
RTC convicted petitioner for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II
of RA 9165. Further, it was held that the 0.63 g of shabu
recovered from him shall be confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government. Likewise, CA affirmed the
ruling of the lower court, finding Villanueva guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Petitioner contends that his arrest does not fall within the
purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it took place
on the day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence, to
"invite" him to the precinct without any warrant of arrest
was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently,
inadmissible. The OSG avers that the shabu confiscated
from petitioner was admissible in evidence against him;
that the search conducted on him was valid; and that he
cannot raise the issue regarding the apprehending
officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of
R.A. 9165 for the first time on appeal.
Issues:
(1) Is there a valid warrantless arrest?
(2) Is there a valid warrantless search?
Held:
(1) No. The warrantless arrest is not valid, however,
he is estopped from questioning the validity of
his arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a
private person. The circumstances that
transpired between accused-appellant and the
arresting officer show none that would make the
warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records
reveal that accused-appellant never objected to
the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. He actively participated in the trial
of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who
had properly and voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived
his right to question the validity of his arrest.
(2) No. A waiver of an illegal arrest is not a waiver
of an illegal search. Records have established
that both the arrest and the search were made
 without a warrant. While the accused has already
waived his right to contest the legality of his
arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived
his right to contest the legality of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on
when a warrantless search can be
conducted.1âwphi1 These searches include: (1)
search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or
consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation;
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstance. Consent
must also be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In
this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take
out the contents of his pocket. Having been
obtained through an unlawful search, the seized
item is thus inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance
of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Without the seized item, therefore, the
conviction of accused appellant cannot be
sustained.
People v Johnson
Facts: Leila Johnson was frisked at the gate at the NAIA
departure area. The lady frisker, Olivia Ramirez, felt
something hard on Leila’s abdominal area, which Leila
claimed to be a special girdle. Disbelieving this, Olivia
reported this to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile,
who instructed her to inspect her further. Leila was then
directed to remove the object. She had three plastic
packs of shabu, weighing over 580 grams total. Her
passport, ticket, luggage, and other personal effects were
seized and pictures were taken of her. She was convicted
in the RTC for violating Sec. 16 of RA 6425
In her version: She was waiting in line at the boarding
gate when she was approached by Embile and two
female officers, handcuffed, and taken to the women’s
room, where she was asked to undress and subjected to a
body search. Nothing was found on her. She was
transferred to the custody of Col. Castillo who presented
her with two white packages and told her to admit the
packages were hers and affix her signature thereon. She
claims she was detained for two days and was not
allowed to speak to counsel or family. Leila appealed,
claiming the shabu should be inadmissible since she was
forced to sign the bags and not informed of her rights.
Issues: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
Held: This is a warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto,
pursuant to a valid search made on her person. Her rights
were not violated since she wasn’t placed in custodial
investigation. Persons may lose the protection of the
search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures, with increasing
concerns over hijacking & terrorism requiring increased
security. The shabu was acquired legitimately pursuant
to airport security procedures. The packs of shabu
having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless
search, are admissible in evidence. Her subsequent
warrantless arrest, was justified since it was effected
upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person
in flagrante delicto. However, the other personal effects
and pictures taken from and of her are inadmissible and
should not have been confiscated/taken, since they are
unrelated to the offense. Her belongings should be
returned to her. WHEREFORE, RTC Pasay decision is
affirmed. SO ORDERED.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well
as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question
that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved,
and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
New Jersey v TLO
Facts: T.L.O. was a 14-year-old female student at a New
Jersey high school. A teacher found T.L.O. and another
student smoking cigarettes in the girls’ restroom in the
school building in violation of school rules. The teacher
brought the two students to a school administrator, who
questioned each of them. The second student admitted to
smoking cigarettes. T.L.O. denied the allegations. The
administrator then accused T.LO. of lying to him, and
demanded to see her purse in an attempt to find the
cigarettes. Among other things, when the administrator
opened her purse, he found a pack of cigarettes, and
cigarette rolling paper. Due to the fact that the
administrator knew that cigarette rolling paper is used to
smoke marijuana he now suspected T.L.O. of marijuana
use. He further searched T.L.O.’s purse, and found a
small plastic bag containing a grass-like substance and
items that could be drug paraphernalia, including a pipe,
a wad of money, a piece of paper with the names of
students who apparently owed T.L.O. money, and a
letter that appeared to implicate T.L.O. in dealing
marijuana. The administrator contacted the police who,
in turn, contacted T.L.O.’s mother. Her mother brought
T.L.O. to the police station, where she confessed to
selling marijuana. Due to her age, T.L.O. faced
delinquency charges in Juvenile Court. The Juvenile
Court denied T.L.O.’s motion to suppress (keep out) her
confession and the evidence from the search. Her lawyer
argued that the search of her purse was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. T.L.O. was found delinquent, and
was put on probation for one year. After a lengthy appeal
process in the New Jersey state court system, the U.S.
Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear the
case.
Issues: Whether evidence unlawfully seized by a school
official – without involvement of law enforcement
officials – should be allowed in as evidence at juvenile
delinquency proceedings.
Held: The Court did not reach this issue. As explained
in the reasoning section below, the Court concluded that,
under the circumstances of this case, the search of
T.L.O.’s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. The Court did not address the
issue of whether unlawfully seized evidence should be
suppressed in a juvenile delinquency hearing. However,
the Court decided that the Fourth Amendment applies to
school officials. he Court held that the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures is not limited solely to the actions of law
enforcement personnel. It also applies to the conduct of
public school officials. Public school teachers act as
agents of the state, and not merely agents of the students’
parents. Thus, the Fourth Amendment applies to their
actions. The Court also held that students have some
legitimate expectation of privacy at school. However,
the students’ expectation of privacy must be balanced
against the needs of school authorities to maintain an
educational environment. As such, school authorities do
not need to obtain a warrant or have probable cause that
a crime occurred before searching a student. Rather, the
reasonableness of a search, under all circumstances, will
determine its legality. The Court established the
following test to determine the reasonableness of a
search: whether the search was 1) justified at its
inception and 2) as the search was conducted, was it
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place.
In a concurrence, Justice Powell, joined by Justice
O’Connor, agreed with the majority’s opinion, but he
would have emphasized the fact that, in a school setting,
the Constitution may not afford students all of the
constitutional protections they would otherwise have in
a non-school setting.
In a concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with the
majority. However, he emphasized that the need for
school authorities to immediately respond to threats to
safety and to protect the education environment would
justify a special exception from the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant and probable cause requirements for school
searches.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred
in part and dissented in part. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, agreed with the Court’s finding that the
Fourth Amendment applies to public school teachers and
that school officials may generally search students
without a warrant. However, he disagreed with the
Court’s holding that reasonable suspicion as opposed to
probable cause should be the test for determining
whether such searches may be permitted.
Applying the probable cause standard, Justice Brennan
held that the school administrator’s actions violated
T.L.O.’s rights and, thus, the evidence from the illegal
search should be suppressed. Justice Stevens, in his
concurrence in part and dissent in part, noted that the
Court should address the original issue, i.e., whether the
exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public
school officials and teachers in school. Justice Stevens
concluded that the search was not justified at its
inception because the school administrator had no reason
to believe that T.L.O.’s purse contained evidence of
criminal activity or a violation of school rules at the time
that he searched it. Thus, the search violated the Fourth
Amendment and the evidence should be suppressed.
Vernonia v Acton
Facts: An official investigation led to the discovery that
high school athletes in the Vernonia School District
participated in illicit drug use. School officials were
concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-
related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School
District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug
Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing
of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was
denied participation in his school's football program
when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.
Issues: Does random drug testing of high school athletes
violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the
Fourth Amendment?
Held: No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by
"balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." In the case of high school
athletes who are under State supervision during school
hours, they are subject to greater control than over free
adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine
samples are negligible since the conditions of collection
are similar to public restrooms, and the results are
viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the
governmental concern over the safety of minors under
their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion
in student-athletes' privacy.
Social Justice v Dangerous Drugs
Facts: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions
assailing the constitutionality of Section 361 of RA 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. According to
Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a
candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, said
mandatory drug testing imposes an additional
qualification for Senators beyond that which are
provided by the Constitution. No provision in the
Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC
to expand the qualification requirements of candidates
for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)
(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power when they give
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. It also violates the
equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a
student or employee deemed undesirable. The
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached. In addition to the abovementioned
contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and
taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against
self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.
Issues: W/n Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are
unconstitutional
Held: No. Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor
of the constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying the
following reasonable deductions: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer
rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard
the health and well - being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are
fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Therefore, the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is
not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. Just as in the case of secondary
and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random
drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers
and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. For another, the
random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of
the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ
two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as
possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall
be conducted by trained professionals in access -
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of
Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and
to ensure an accurate chain of custody. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy,
under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In
context, the right to privacy means the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from
intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.
And while there has been general agreement as to the
basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted
search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad
guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a
difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal
Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public
and defers to the state's exercise of police power. The
first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is
the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. Just as
defining as the first factor is the character of the
intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a
question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is
the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn"
or "narrowly focused"? To reiterate, RA 9165 was
enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the
country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens,
especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs. Taking into account the foregoing
factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the
part of the employees, the compelling state concern
likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in
the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government
officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service
law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.
And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for
private employees, the more reason that it should pass
the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to
the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility
and efficiency. On the charge of being an undue
delegation, the provision in question is not so
extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to
schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. It expressly provides how drug testing for
students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo
drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be
in accordance with the school rules as contained in the
student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part
of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account
the company's work rules. In either case, the random
procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to
be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in
an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against
misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the
test results are established.
Dela Cruz v People (2014)
Facts: Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas. The
NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and
Charito Escobido that Ariel, the live-in partner of
Corazon and Charito was picked up by unknown male
persons believed to be police officers for allegedly
selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the
complainants, and when the latter gave the number a
ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo
Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City.
In the said police office, they met "James" who
demanded from them P100,000, later lowered to
P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. The
special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text
messages received by the complainants. A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment
operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at
the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu
City. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug
testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of
dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test
result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) . The
version of the defense stated otherwise, petitioner claims
that when he is in the NBI Office, he was required to
extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying
he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request
was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed
to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample,
to no avail.
Issues: W/n the drug test conducted upon the petitioner
is illegal and does it violate the petitioner right against
self-incrimination
Held: Yes. We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial
court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA,
erroneous on three counts. The drug test in Section 15
does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of R.A. 9165. To make the provision
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any
crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly
expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here
was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. The drug test
is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused
and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it
may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included
in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak
his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. The essence of the right against
self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act. In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample
could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC
and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the
extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug
testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation." The
drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible
that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and
tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his
urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but
all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under
those circumstances.
Lucas v Lucas
Facts: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish
Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who
got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in
Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a)
petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma,
showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University
in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of
several articles from different newspapers about
petitioner, as a musical prodigy. Jesus learned of this and
he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting
that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse
filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case
which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence
set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had
on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as
Jesse’s father. Acting on Jesus’ Motion for
Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held
that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four
procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in
the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case,
affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the
child.
Issues: Whether aprima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order
Held: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa
prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner.Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.
It states that the appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person, who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing
and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant
to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not
previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific
potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence
of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA
testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest
of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before
a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions
are established. In some states, to warrant the issuance of
the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for
the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for
blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding
of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart
of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary
showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show
that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held
in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The
same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.”
Maryland v King
Facts: The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA)
allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect
DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a
crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence,
burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr.
was arrested on first and second degree assault charges.
While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA
was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database.
That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample
from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only
evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied
King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was
convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in
prison. King appealed the conviction, arguing that the
MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his
Fourth Amendment privilege against warrantless
searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed,
holding that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court
held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than
Maryland's interest in using the DNA for identification
purposes.
Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment allow states to
collect and analyze DNA from people arrested, but not
convicted, of serious crimes?
Held: Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that
conducting a DNA swab test as a part of the arrest
procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment
because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is
not so invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine
administrative procedures that occur during a booking
for an arrest do not require the same justification and the
search of a location. The Court held that ascertaining an
arrestee's identity and criminal history is a crucial part of
the arrest procedure and that a DNA test is just as valid
and informative as fingerprinting. Determining an
arrestee's criminal history also serves the legitimate state
interest of determining what level of risk the individual
poses to the public and what conditions should be set on
his/her release from custody. Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourth
Amendment categorically prevents searching a person
for evidence of a crime without cause. Because the
majority's opinion allows for DNA tests to be conducted
in the absence of evidence linking the arrestee to a
specific DNA-related crime, these tests fall within the
boundaries of the British "general warrants" the Fourth
Amendment was intended to prohibit. He also argued
that the procedural safeguards on the DNA evidence
make it an ineffective and redundant identification tool.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor,
and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.
Kyllo v US
Facts: A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious
that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a
thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging
was to be used to determine if the amount of heat
emanating from the home was consistent with the high-
intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana
growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that
relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the
home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal
imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to
search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing
marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug
charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the
evidence seized from his home and then entered a
conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court
of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective
expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt
to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if
he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy because the imager "did not expose any
intimate details of Kyllo's life," only "amorphous 'hot
spots' on the roof and exterior wall."
Issue: Does the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect
relative amounts of heat emanating from a private home
constitute an unconstitutional search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment?
Held: Yes. Court held that "[w]here, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant." In dissent, Justice John
Paul Stevens argued that the "observations were made
with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data
exposed on the outside of [Kyllo's] home but did not
invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy,"
and were, thus, "information in the public domain."
Pollo v Constantino-David
Facts: An anonymous letter-complaint was received by
the respondent Civil Service Commission Chairperson
alleging that an officer of the CSC has been lawyering
for public officials with pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team with
background in information technology and issued a
memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in
the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan
Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.” The team
proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in
the hard disk of computers at the PALD and the Legal
Services Division. Within the same day, the
investigating team finished the task. It was found that
most of the files copied from the computer assigned to
and being used by the petitioner were draft pleadings or
letters in connection with administrative cases in the
CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued
a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit
his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days
from notice. Petitioner denied that he is the person
referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He
asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his
computer done while he was on leave, and that the files
in his computer were his personal files and those of his
relatives and associates, and that he is not authorize the
activities as they are in violation of his constitutional
right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination
and warrantless search and seizure. Also, the
files/documents copied from his computer without his
consent are inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a
poisonous tree.” The CSC found prima facie case
against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). On 24 July 2007, the CSC
issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of the
same merits and meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties.
This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein
petitioner. By a Decision dated 11 October 2007, the
CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari after
finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondents CSC officials. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner
brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted and the
copying of petitioner’s files without his knowledge and
consent lawful?
Held: Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded
recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all
searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable”
searches and seizures. Applying the analysis and
principles announced in O’Connor and Simons for
warrantless searches involving public employees for
work related reasons to the case at bar, we now address
the following questions:
(1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files?
(2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair
reasonable in its inception and scope?
The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his office and computer files for he failed to prove that
he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his
office or government-issued computer which contained
his personal files. He did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with
anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitors. He did not use
passwords nor adopted any means to prevent access by
others of his computer files. The CSC also implemented
a policy which implies on-the-spot inspections may be
done to ensure that the computer resources were used
only for such legitimate business purposes. The search
authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable
since it was conducted in connection with investigation
of work-related misconduct.
A search by a government employer of an employee’s
office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee
is guilty of work-related misconduct. Even conceding
for a moment that there is no such administrative policy,
there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the
search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the
test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace. It bears emphasis that the Commission
pursued the search in its capacity as a government
employer and that it was undertaken in connection with
an investigation involving a work-related misconduct,
one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant
requirement. The nature of the imputation was serious,
as it was grievously disturbing.
If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with
pending cases before the Commission would be a highly
repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually
impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the
general public would not have any trust and confidence
in it. Considering the damaging nature of the accusation,
the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit
any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus,
petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right
to privacy must necessarily fail.
His other argument invoking the privacy of
communication and correspondence under Section 3(1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable
considering the recognition accorded to certain
legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the
government workplace under the aforecited authorities.
We likewise find no merit in his contention that
O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the
present case does not involve a criminal offense like
child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of
petitioner’s computer was justified there being
reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored
therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to
the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the
anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under
the exception to the warrantless requirement in
administrative searches defined in O’Connor
People v Villareal
Facts: In the morning of December 25, 2006, Police
officer Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle.
From a distance of 8 to 10 meters he saw the appellant
Villareal, holding a plastic sachet of shabu. When
Villareal saw him, he immediately ran away. When de
Leon caught Villareal, he was brought to the police
station where he was arrested and the alleged shabu was
turned over to be marked as evidence. The substance
was tested and was proven to be a 0.03 gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The appellant was charged with the violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. During the trial de Leon claimed that
the appellant had previous criminal charges for the same
offense and that he arrested the appellant because when
he saw that the appellant was holding a powdery white
substance, it immediately gave him suspicion as to the
matter thereof.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest
based on the police officers personal knowledge of the
criminal record of the appellant.
Held: No, there was no valid warrantless arrest. A
lawful warrantless arrest exists when either of the
following circumstances are present:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit an offense,
(b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that he person to be arrested
has committed it, and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
service final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. Based on
the distance and the amount of the powdery substance it
is insufficient to conclude, even with clear vision that
such substance constitutes as shabu.
The act of the appellant of examining the substance is
not tantamount to arouse suspicion of a commission or
possible commission of a crime even if he has previous
criminal history on the same offense. Personal
knowledge is not defined as knowledge of a person’s
criminal record, but personal knowledge as to the actual
commission of the crime. The act of running away from
authority also does not automatically imply guilt on the
accused. There are various reasons to run away from
authority, and commission of a crime is just one of the
possible reasons. Because there is an absence of overt
act there is no justification for the appellant’s
warrantless arrest. Hence, it cannot be presented as
evidence in court as it is a fruit of the poisonous tree.  
Posadas v Ombudsman
Facts: Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the
University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble
between his fraternity and another fraternity on
December 8, 1994. Petitioner Posadas, then Chancellor
of U.P. Diliman, asked the Director of the NBI for
assistance in determining the persons responsible for the
crime. With that, respondent Dizon, Chief of the Special
Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P.
and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification
of two alleged eyewitnesses, they attempted to arrest
Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as
suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the
two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police
Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the
Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Lambino, and Torres-Yu, also of
U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the
suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not
have warrants of arrest with them. As a result of their
intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the
NBI agents on that day. However, criminal charges were
filed later against the two student suspects.
Issue: Whether the attempted arrest of the student
suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a
warrant.
Held: No. In view of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution,
the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of
a warrant issued by a judge after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after
finding probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions when
an arrest may be made even without a warrant are
provided in Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
There is no question that this case does not fall under
paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case
did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are
the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had
escaped from confinement. The question is whether
paragraph (b) applies because it is the contention of the
respondents that the NBI agents had personal knowledge
of facts gathered by them in the course of their
investigation indicating that the students sought to be
arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. But the Court
ruled in negative.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a
warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense is based on actual facts. • At the time
Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere
near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and
his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter
were not committing a crime nor were they doing
anything that would create the suspicion that they were
doing anything illegal
Pestilos v Generoso
Facts: The petitioners were indicted for attempted
murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there no
valid warrantless arrest took place. The RTC denied the
motion and the CA affirmed the denial. Records show
that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and
Atty. Moreno Generoso. The latter called the Central
Police District to report the incident and acting on this
report, SPO1 Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to
the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2,
together with augmentation personnel arrived at the
scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty.
Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who
mauled him which prompted the police officers to
“invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for
investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon who fortunately
survived the attack.Petitioners aver that they were not
validly arrested without a warrant.
Issue: Are the petitioners validly arrested without a
warrant when the police officers did not witness the
crime and arrived only less than an hour after the alleged
altercation?
Held: Yes, the petitioners were validly arrested without a
warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that: When an offense has
just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it. The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an
offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it. The Court’s
appreciation of the elements that “the offense has just
been committed” and ”personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested committed
it” depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
The element of ”personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances”, however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification. Circumstances may pertain to events or
actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation
or observation of the police officer at the scene of the
crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen
someone actually fleeing, he could still make a
warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of
the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could
determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However,
the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after
the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy. In other words, the clincher in
the element of ”personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances” is the required element of immediacy
within which these facts or circumstances should be
gathered.
Silverthorne Lumber v US
Facts: Silverthorne (the individual who owned the
company) was cited for contempt for refusing to produce
books and documents before the Grand Jury.
Silverthorne had been indicted and arrested. While
Silverthorne (and his father) were detained, a U.S.
Marshal “without a shadow of authority,” went to their
company and seized all books and papers held there. The
papers were seized pursuant to an invalid warrant, and a
new warrant was drafted based on information in the
documents seized. The Court ordered the original
documents returned, and then issued a subpoena for the
documents. The Silverthornes refused to produce the
documents, arguing that the Court was benefiting from
the original unlawful seizure, as without that seizure,
they would not have been able to draft a new warrant for
the materials.
Issue: Is it permissible for the government to benefit
from an unlawful act?
Held: The Court agreed that it “reduces the Fourth
Amendment to a form of words” by allowing the
government to use the knowledge obtained unlawfully.
The Court agreed that “[I]f knowledge of them (the
evidence) is gained from an independent source they
may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained
by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in
the way proposed.” In other words, if the government
can show it could have obtained the needed information
from another source, it may be permitted to keep the
evidence, but absent that proof, the evidence will be
inadmissible.
Stonehill v Diokno
Facts: Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the
corporations they form were alleged to have committed
acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code.” Respondents issued, on different dates, 42
search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace
officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search
for personal properties “books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette
wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of
Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for
being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court
by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents,
books and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned
in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued
to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the
petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner; and the docu paper and cash money
weren't delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.
Issue: W/n search warrant is valid.
Held: No, the search warrant is invalid. The constitution
protects the people’s right against unreasonable search
and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The
warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners
committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code.” The warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of petitioners regardless of whether the transactions were
legal or illegal. Thus, openly contravening the explicit
command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be
seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants
Ople v Torres
Facts: This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to
invalidate the Administrative Order No. 308 or the
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.
The petitioner contends that the implementation of the
said A.O. will violate the rights of the citizens of privacy
as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of
privacy.
Held: Yes. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The right of privacy is guaranteed in several
provisions of the Constitution: "Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8
and 17 of the Bill of Rights. The right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence,
it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308
is justified by some compelling state interest and that it
is narrowly drawn.
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1)
the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce,
if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It
is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.
But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness,
the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much
less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They
threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent. The petition is granted and declared the
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System"
null and void for being unconstitutional.
KMU v Dir-Gen
Facts: President Arroyo issued Executive Order 450
which requires all government agencies and controlled
corporations to have a uniform identification card; the
director-general of the national economic development
authority was tasked to implement this order. The
information required to be in the said identification card
would be: name, home address, sex, picture, signature,
date of birth, place of birth, marital status, names of
parents, height, weight, two index fingers and two thumb
marks, any prominent distinguishing features like moles
and others, tax identification number (TIN). The
petitioners argued that the said executive order usurped
legislative functions and violates the right of privacy.
Petitioners alleged that EO 450 is contrary to law
because it violated the principle handed down by the
Court in Ople v Torres and RA 8282 or the Social
Security Act of 1997. The order according to the
petitioners was also going to use funds that are not
appropriated by the Congress, it was also issued without
a public hearing. The order was also violating the
constitutional provision of equal protection of the laws
because it discriminates and penalizes those who do not
have an id. The petitioners also argue that the order
violates the right to privacy by allowing for the access of
the personal data of the owner without his or her
consent.
Issue: Whether or not EO 450 usurped legislative
functions and violated the citizen’s right to privacy.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the petition had no
merit. The said order only applies to government
agencies who are already issuing identification cards
even before the said order was implemented. The
purposes of the order were to: reduce costs, achieve
efficiency and reliability, convenience to the people
served by the government entities and insure
compatibility. Section 17 Article VII of the Constitution
also provides for the President to have control to all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. This
constitutional power of the President is self-executing
and does not need implementing legislation. This power
of course is limited to executive branch of the
government and does not extend to other branches or
independent constitutional commissions. EO 450 does
not violate the right to privacy since no citizen
particularly government employee have complained
upon the showing of information on their identification
cards, even the petitioners have not made any complaint
about their own identification cards. EO 450 also issues
identification cards that only have 14 data about the
owner much less than what is issued upon Supreme
Court employees
Gamboa v Chan
Facts: Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa Commission
which was formed to investigate the existence of private
army groups in the country in view of eliminating and
dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon
conclusion of its investigation, the Commission
submitted a confidential report to the office of the
President. Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of
Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the
Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte conducted
surveillance operation against her and her aides and
classified her as PAG coddler. Purportedly without the
benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the
Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.
Gamboa’s association with PAG was published
and released in the different forms of media, publicly
tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to
privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a petition before the
RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy
the unverified reports from the PNP data base and
restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports against
her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the
report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC
dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data
saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the
information.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the forwarding or information or
intelligence report by the PNP to the Commission was an
unlawful act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of
habeas data was proper
Held: Forwarding of information or intelligence report
gathered by the PNP to the Commission is NOT an
intrusion of petitioner’s right to privacy It is clear that
the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim
which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the
ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as
well as the powers and functions accorded to the
Commission and the PNP, the latter collected
information on individuals suspected of maintaining
PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.
One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently
establish that the data contained in the report listing her
as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the
ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Commission was not
unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to
privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was
rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for
the purpose of investigating the existence of these
notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the
fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the
power to request assistance from the latter. Hence,
Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER
In this case, Chan and Fang admitted the existence of
report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it
was leaked to third parties and the media was
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be
stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that PNP was
responsible for his unintended disclosure. In any event,
there are other reliefs available to her to address the
purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to
the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data
unnecessary and improper.
Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that
her inclusion in the list of individuals made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased
police surveillance. As public officials, they enjoy
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must
be denied.
Vivares v STC
Facts: Julia and Julienne , both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at STC.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend,
Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her
Facebook profile.
Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors
at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Upon
discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through
one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto
Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-
Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
investigation, STC found the identified students to have
deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the
school’s Student Handbook. On March 1, 2012, Julia,
Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office Sr. Purisima,
STC’s high school principal and. They claimed that
during the meeting, they were castigated and informed
their parents the following day that, as part of their
penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement
exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012. A week before
graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr.
Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction
and Damages before the RTC and command the
respondent not to implement the said sanction which the
RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony,
to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration. Despite
the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the
sanctioned students from participating in the graduation
rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement
exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the
issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved. Thereafter,
petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, Finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the
writ of habeas data.
Through the same Order, herein respondents were
directed to file their verified written return, together with
the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days
from service of the writ. In time, respondents complied
with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written
return, laying down the following grounds for the denial
of the petition. the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing
the petition for habeas data. Hence the petition.
Issues: 1.) Whether a writ of habeas data should be
issued given the factual milieu? 2.) Whether the
Respondents violated the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Held:
1.) No, The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a
whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public
officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in
gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved
party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her
family. Such individual or entity need not be in the
business of collecting or storing data. To “engage” in
something is different from undertaking a business
endeavor. To “engage” means “to do or take part in
something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity
must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is
that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved
party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking
carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a
business, and is in the nature of a personal Endeavour,
for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from
getting to said person or entity. to agree with the
argument of the petitioners, would mean unduly limiting
the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data gathering and
storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness
of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right
which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements
in the information and communications technology––a
right which a great majority of the users of technology
themselves are not capable of protecting.
2.) No, the respondents failed to established that the
uploading or showing the photos to Tigol constitute a
violation of their privacy. the showing of the said photo
to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were
viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence
to corroborate their statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without their
challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students
were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed
Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the
minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos
using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to
show that no special means to be able to viewthe
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either
by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
large. Considering that the default setting for Facebook
posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs
in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook,
absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph.
If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection
attached to the right to informational privacy. That the
photos are viewable by “friends only” does not
necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. It is well
to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can
no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The
user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag
his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends
or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends
of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
“Friends.”
Lee v Ilagan
Facts: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Data, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy
Margate Lee were former common law partners.
Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s
condominium, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was
missing. Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office
regarding a purported sex video she discovered from the
aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman.
Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his
office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the
said video as evidence in filing various complaints
against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for
violation of R.A. 9262; and (b) an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct before the
NAPOLCOM. Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of
reproducing the subject video and threatening to
distribute the same to the upper echelons of the
NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated
not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy
but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance
of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted. The
RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
Ilagan’s favor, and ordered the implementing officer to
turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and
enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
Held: The petition is meritorious. The Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially
the right to informational privacy of individuals, which
is defined as “the right to control the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about
oneself.”
No. The Court dismisses the petition for the writ of
habeas data on the ground that respondent Rodrigo Roa
Duterte as the incumbent President of the Philippines is
immune from suit during his incumbency

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the

writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges,
among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party.”

The allegations in the petition must be supported by

substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that
the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague
and doubtful. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was
not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in
life, liberty or security was or would be violated through
the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination
of the subject sex video.

As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter

evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus
between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so
much so that a failure on either account certainly renders
a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. Hence,
due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the
glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds
it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the
habeas data petition.

De Lima v Duterte
Facts: De Lima filed the case in 2016, after Duterte
delivered several speeches against the senator. Duterte
also called De Lima an "immoral, dirty woman" for
supposedly having an affair with her former bodyguard
Ronnie Dayan. Duterte had also alleged that the senator
had a "sex tape," which De Lima had categorically
denied. Duterte allies at the House of Representatives
had even threatened to show it during a public hearing.

Held: