G.R. No.
116692 March 21, 1997 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision
SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED,
represented by PONCIANO R. ROSALES, General
Manager, petitioner,  1) declaring the dismissal of the complainant-appellant
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
FROILAN RAQUIZA, respondents.
 ROMERO, J.:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order seeks the annulment of the March 10, 1994, decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. V-
0307-92, as well as its order dated April 28, 1994, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The
antecedent facts follow.
Private respondent Froilan V. Raquiza was employed by
petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) as
probationary power plant operator on January 1, 1976, and
became a regular employee on July 1, 1976. On February 9,
1980, he was appointed as switchboard operator and
sometimes alternated as acting plant superintendent.
Raquiza's problems began when a major breakdown of the
pielstick engine causing electric failure to the whole franchise
area for a period of four months occurred during his shift on
January 21, 1988. On January 22, 1988, he was immediately
asked to explain the incident, which he did the following day.
After investigation, however, SAMELCO II General Manager
Ponciano Rosales found Raquiza and his two companions in
the shift, Manuel Balasbas and Pascual Martinez, guilty of
gross negligence in the performance of their duty. The three
were placed under preventive suspension from January 27,
1988, until their termination on February 29, 1988. Nine
months later, or on December 5, 1988, Raquiza filed a
complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal, praying for
reinstatement and payment of unpaid wages, unpaid
overtime pay, attorney's fees, moral and exemplary
damages, and the cost of suit.
Labor Arbiter Gabino A. Velasquez, Jr. rendered a decision on
September 25, 1992, finding Raquiza's dismissal to be based
on a just cause. On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed and
set aside his ruling, and ruled as follows:
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and a new
one entered to wit:
(Raquiza) due to gross negligence as illegal;
2) ordering respondents (herein petitioners) to reinstate the
complainant-appellant to his former position with full
backwages not exceeding three (3) years, without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges, or in the event
reinstatement is no longer feasible due to the realities of the
situation, to pay him his separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month for every year of service from January 1, 1976 up to
and including the three (3) years imputed service for which
backwages was awarded;
3) ordering respondents further to pay attorney's fees of 10%
of the total monetary award.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient
basis.
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for reconsideration having likewise failed,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
Petitioner's present action is premised solely on the grave
abuse of discretion allegedly exercised by the NLRC in
reversing the labor arbiter's decision. Its arguments,
however, fail to persuade this Court, and a closer
examination of the questioned judgment would reveal that
the NLRC disposed of the case judiciously.
Labor Arbiter Velasquez opined that since Raquiza was not
able to specifically deny the charges against him, he should
be deemed to have admitted them. Technical rules of
evidence are not, however, strictly followed in labor cases.
The Labor Code itself affirms this liberality, viz.:
Art. 221. Technical Rules not binding and prior resort to
amicable settlement. — In any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that
the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process. . . . 1
This rule is reiterated in the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
to wit:
Rule V.
Sec. 7. Nature of Proceedings. — The proceedings before a
Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the
requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall
not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself
of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the
controversy speedily, including ocular inspection and
examination of well-informed persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule VII.
Sec. 10. Technical rules not binding. — The rules of
procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
Raquiza's failure to specifically deny or explain the charges
against him should not, therefore, be deemed fatal to his
claim.
Our laws as well as this Court have consistently recognized
and respected an employer's right to terminate the services
of an employee for just or authorized causes. This
prerogative, however, must be exercised in good faith. As we
held in Mercury Drug Corp. v. NLRC, et al.: 2
Management also has its own rights, which, as such, are
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple
fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in
life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not
toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with
the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the
Court to rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to
be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
applicable law and doctrine. 3
Petitioner as employer is duty-bound to establish the
existence of a clear, valid and just ground for dismissing
Raquiza. It cannot merely allege that its employee was
grossly negligent in the performance of his duty thereby
causing great damage to its property and resulting in great
pecuniary loss.
Raquiza's dismissal was based on three factors, namely, (a)
leaving his work assignment while on duty; (b) not properly
checking the engine before starting it; and (c) authorizing the
continued running of pielstick (engine) no. 2 in spite of the
discovery that there was an oil leakage.
In the case of Citibank, N.A. v. Gatchalian, 4 we ruled that
"(g)ross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them.
While it is true that Raquiza left his place of work to go to the
administration building to get the proceeds of his loan during
the testing period of the engine, such act cannot be
perceived to be so serious as would amount to gross
negligence. As to the claim that he did not check the engine,
the NLRC found that he actually made several inspections of
the engine before actually starting it. We find no reason to
disturb this finding in view of the respect and finality which
this Court has constantly accorded to factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC.  5 Finally, the fact
that Raquiza failed to prevent the occurrence of the incident
does not sufficiently show nor can it be inferred that he was
grossly negligent. At most, it can be considered an error of
judgment on his part when he continued to operate the
engine. It must be remembered that the purpose of the
operation of said engine was to synchronize it with the
National Power Corporation's Geothermal Plant in Tangonan,
Leyte to augment power during the peak hours in the early
evenings. 6 Stoppage of the operation would have defeated
such purpose and violated the very franchise of petitioner.
The investigation conducted by petitioner revealed that "the
breakdown was due to the serious error committed by Froilan
V. Raquiza, Manuel Balasbas, and Pascual Martinez, although
complainant's command responsibility, liability and
negligence, . . . , was most serious and the gravest."  7 Yet,
despite this collective error, only Raquiza was dismissed; the
other two were merely suspended. Such discrimination
cannot be sanctioned by this Court.
Furthermore, the NLRC correctly pointed out from the
evidence that there was no clarity or confirmation as to the
cause of the pielstick engine breakdown. Thus, it stated:
More significantly, the findings of the consultant who
inspected pielstick Engine No. 2 at the instance of the
respondents cost (sic) a serious doubt on the alleged
negligence of the complainant-appellant as the proximate
cause for the damage of the said engine. It appears from the
said inspection result that the said unit bogged down in
September 1986, and in that incident all con/rod bearings
were replaced with old sets taken from Dorelco Units. The
same con/rod bearings were likewise noted to be due for
replacement in (sic) December 17, 1987. Lastly, the said
engine unit at the time it broke down had a total running
hours [of] 21,332.1 far exceeding the tolerable maximum
requirement of 18,000 hrs. The above attendant
circumstances shows (sic) that Pielstick Engine No. 2 broke
down last January 21, 1988 not due to the negligence of the
complainant but due to worn out spare parts and its
continued operation beyond the schedule of replacement of
con/rod bearing on December 17, 1987. 8
Petitioner claimed below that Raquiza's dismissal was not
solely attributable to the January 21, 1988, incident but was,
in fact, a result of a "long string of neglect and violations of
company R & R (rules and regulations)." But this is beside the
point. What is significant is that the employer bears the
burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee is for a
just cause, failing which the dismissal cannot be deemed
justified thus entitling the latter to reinstatement. 9 The
decision to dismiss must be in accord with the law and the
evidence and not merely the whim or caprice of the
employer. 10
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for
failing to show that respondent National Labor Relations
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving
at its assailed decision dated March 10, 1994, and order
dated April 28, 1994.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 141702-03. August 2, 2001]
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
MARTHA Z. SINGSON, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the 20
September 1999 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals declaring
respondent Martha Z. Singson illegally dismissed by
petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., and thus should be
reinstated with full back wages and awarded moral as well as
exemplary damages.
This petition traces its origin to two (2) petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 initially filed with the Supreme Court: Martha
Z. Singson v. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
and Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., SP Case No. 52104, and
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations
Commission and Martha Z. Singson, SP Case No. 52105,
which were consolidated [2] and referred[3] to the Court of
Appeals in consonance with the St. Martin Funeral Homes
doctrine.
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), is an international
airline company engaged in providing international flight
services while Martha Z. Singson was a cabin attendant of
CATHAY hired in the Philippines on 24 September 1990 with
home base in Hongkong.
On 26 August 1991 Singson was scheduled on a five (5)-day
flight to London but was unable to take the flights as she was
feeling fatigued and exhausted from her transfer to a new
apartment with her husband. On 29 August 1991 she visited
the company doctor, Dr. Emer Fahy, who examined and
diagnosed her to be suffering from a moderately severe
asthma attack. She was advised to take a Ventolin nebulizer
and increase the medication she was currently taking, an oral
Prednisone (steroid). Dr Fahy thereafter conveyed to Dr. John
G. Fowler, Principal Medical Officer, her findings regarding
Singsons medical condition as a result of which she was
evaluated as unfit for flying due to her medical condition.
On 3 September 1991 Singson again visited Dr. Fahy during
which time the latter declared her condition to have vastly
improved. However, later that day, Cabin Crew Manager
Robert J. Nipperess informed Singson that CATHAY had
decided to retire her on medical grounds effective
immediately based on the recommendation of Dr. Fowler and
Dr. Fahy.
Martha Z. Singson was surprised with the suddenness of the
notification but nonetheless acknowledged it. Later, she met
with Nipperess and inquired of possible employment that
entailed only ground duties within the company. She was
advised to meet with certain personnel who knew of the
employment requirements in other departments in the
company, and to await a possible offer from the company.
On 20 December 1991 Singson filed before the Labor Arbiter
a complaint against CATHAY for illegal dismissal, with prayer
for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. Efforts on initial settlement having failed, trial followed.
Robert J. Nipperress and Dr. John G. Fowler appeared as
witnesses for CATHAY. Nipperess confirmed that the decision
to retire respondent was made upon the recommendation of
Dr. Fowler. In turn, Dr. Fowler testified that the affliction of
respondent with asthma rendered her unfit to fly as it posed
aviation risks, i.e., asthma disabled her from properly
performing her cabin crew functions, specifically her air
safety functions.
On the other hand, Singson presented herself and Dr.
Benjamin Lazo, a doctor in the country specializing in internal
medicine and pulmonary diseases. She denied being afflicted
with asthma at any point in her life, while Dr. Lazo confirmed
the same declaring that at the time of his examination of
Singson he found her to be of normal condition.
On the basis of the evidence presented before him, Labor
Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu Jr. declared CATHAY liable for illegal
dismissal and ordered the airline to pay Singson
HK$531,150.80 representing full back wages and privileges,
HK$54,137.70 for undisputed benefits due her,
HK$100,000.00 as actual damages, HK$500.00 as moral
damages, HK$500.00 as exemplary damages, and
HK$168,528.85 as attorneys fees. Furthermore, CATHAY was
ordered to reinstate Singson to her former position as airline
stewardess without loss of seniority rights, benefits and
privileges.
On 19 March 1993 CATHAY appealed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission. On
29 December 1994 the NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and declared valid Singsons dismissal from
service.[4] Relying on the testimony of Dr. Fowler and the
affidavit and medical records submitted by Dr. Fahy,
admitted as newly-discovered evidence, the NLRC found
Singson to be indeed afflicted with asthma that rendered her
unfit to fly and perform cabin crew functions. Consequently,
the NLRC withdrew the back wages, moral and exemplary
damages awarded to Singson for lack of factual or legal
basis. It however ordered CATHAY to retain her services as
ground stewardess, with salaries and benefits, noting that
she had been reinstated therein since 12 March 1993. In turn,
Singson was granted the option to continue her employment
with CATHAY.
Thereafter, both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration[5] before the NLRC which on 31 August 1995
were denied for lack of merit. Petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 were subsequently filed by both parties before the
Supreme Court which, after consolidation, were referred to
the Court of Appeals for resolution.[6]
Meanwhile, pursuant to the decision of the NLRC, Singson
was reinstated as cabin stewardess with ground duties on 12
March 1993 pending the resolution of the petitions.
On 20 September 1999 the Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor
Arbiter declaring Singson to have been illegally
terminated. The appellate court anchored its judgment on the
following findings: First, Dr. Fowlers opinion about Singsons
medical condition was based on the personal examination of
Dr. Fahy, and not his own. The appellate court held that a
personal and prolonged examination of a patient was
necessary and crucial before he or she could be properly
diagnosed as afflicted with asthma,[7] and thus Dr. Fowlers
expert opinion was unreliable and mere
hearsay. Second, CATHAY disregarded Sec. 8, Rule I, Book VI,
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code[8] which
requires a certification by a competent public health
authority when disease is the reason for an employees
separation from service, since it relied merely on the
diagnosis of its company doctors, Dr. Fowler and Dr.
Fahy. Third,  the NLRC erroneously relied on the affidavit
executed by Dr. Fahy since she was not personally presented
as a witness to identify and testify on its
contents. Fourth, respondent passed the medical
examination required of prospective flight cabin attendants,
the International Labor Organizations Occupational Health
and Safety in Civil Aviation examination, prior to her
employment and found to be fit for flight-related
service. Fifth, CATHAY failed to adequately prove the health
standards required in aviation, particularly the non-
qualification of flight attendants afflicted with asthma to
flight-related service.[9]
Consequently, the appellate court awarded respondent full
back wages with reinstatement, as well as moral exemplary
damages, while deleting the award of actual damages
reasoning that no undue damage inured to her since her
husband nonetheless remained in Hongkong managing two
(2) corporations. The appellate court however declared the
option given to respondent to continue her employment as a
ground stewardess with CATHAY to have been erroneously
issued and consequently nullified the same.
CATHAY now argues that the Court of Appeals should have
confined its inquiry to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction
and grave abuse of discretion and not into the factual
findings of the NLRC since the petition before it was made
under Rule 65.
This Court is not persuaded. CATHAYs petition for certiorari
filed before the Court of Appeals assailed specifically the
judgment of the NLRC granting respondent the choice to
continue her employment with CATHAY as ground stewardess
as, in fact, she had been reinstated as such since 12 March
1993. On the other hand, respondents petition attacked the
NLRC decision declaring her dismissal valid and nullifying the
award of damages in her favor on the basis of Dr. Fowlers
testimony and not Dr. Lazos. Consequently, it was inevitable
for the Court of Appeals to examine the evidence anew to
determine whether the factual findings of the NLRC were
supported by the evidence presented and the conclusions
derived therefrom accurately ascertained. As pointed out by
the appellate court, this became even more essential in view
of the fact that there was a conflict of decision between the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. We thus find no error in the
appellate courts evaluation of the evidence despite the
pleadings being petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
CATHAY next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not
admitting as evidence the affidavit of Dr. Fahy. We
agree. The appellate court may have overlooked the principle
in labor cases that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law or equity are not always controlling. [10] It is not
necessary that affidavits and other documents presented
conform to the technical rules of evidence as the Court
maintains a liberal stance regarding procedural deficiencies
in labor case.[11] Section 3, Rule V, of the New Rules of
procedure of the NLRC specifically allows parties to submit
position papers accompanied by all supporting documents
including affidavits of their respective witnesses which take
the place of their testimonies. [12] Thus, the fact that Dr. Fahy
was not presented as witness to identify and testify on the
contents of her affidavit was not a fatal procedural flaw that
affected the admissibility of her affidavit as evidence.
The non-presentation of Dr. Fahy during the trial was duly
explained she was no longer connected with CATHAY and had
transferred residence to Ireland. It is for this same reason
that we find no error in the NLRCs admission of Dr. Fahys
written medical notes as newly-discovered
evidence. Moreover, the submission of additional evidence
before the NLRC is not prohibited by the New Rule of
Procedure of the NLRC, such submissions not being
prejudicial to the party for the latter could submit counter-
evidence.[13]
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we find Singson to have been
illegally dismissed from the service. Granting without
admitting that indeed respondent was suffering from asthma,
this alone would not be valid ground for CATHAY to dismiss
her summarily. Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code requires a certification
by a competent public health authority that the disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within
a period of six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment.
In the instant case, no certification by competent public
health authority was presented by CATHAY. It dismissed
Singson based only on the recommendation of its company
doctors who concluded that she was afflicted with asthma. It
did not likewise show proof that Singsons asthma could not
be cured in six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment. On the contrary, when Singson returned to the
company clinic on 3 September 1991 or five (5) days after
her initial examination on 29 August 1991, Dr. Fahy
diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved.
CATHAY could not take refuge in Clause 22 of
the Conditions of Service it entered into with
Singson. Although a certification by a competent public
health authority is not required, still CATHAY is obliged to
follow several steps under the Conditions of Service before
terminating its employee. The pertinent part of Clause 22
thereof provides
Clause 22. Sick Leave. xxxx In case of serious illness the
Company will grant sick leave with full pay for the first three
months and with 2/3 of pay for the fourth
month. Consideration will be given to granting the cabin crew
further sick leave, either with pay or off pay up to a further
two months, or retiring the cabin crew on medical ground
xxxx
Thus, even on the assumption that asthma is a serious
illness, this again would not excuse CATHAY from ignoring
procedure specified in its employment contract with
Singson. Under the contract, Cathay must first allow Singson
to take a leave of absence and not to terminate her services
right there and then. It is only after the employee has
enjoyed four (4) months of sick leave that the option to retire
the employee based on medical ground arises. In the instant
case, Singson went to the company clinic on 29 August
1991. On 3 September 1991 she returned to the company
clinic only to be told that effective immediately she was
dismissed on medical grounds.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its award of moral and
exemplary damages to respondent. CATHAY summarily
dismissed Singson from the service based only on the
recommendation of its medical officers, in effect, failing to
observe the provision of the Labor Code which requires a
certification by a competent public health authority. Notably,
the decision to dismiss Singson was reached after a single
examination only. CATHAYs medical officers recommended
Singsons dismissal even after having diagnosed her condition
to have vastly improved. It did not make even a token offer
for Singson to take a leave of absence as what it provided in
its Contract of Service. CATHAY is presumed to know the law
and the stipulation in its Contract of Service with Singson.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
September 1999 declaring the dismissal of respondent
Martha Z. Singson by petitioner CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS,
LTD. as illegal and ordering her reinstatement to her former
or an equivalent position without loss of seniority rights, with
full back wages and benefits, and to pay her HK$500.00 as
moral damages, HK$500.00 as exemplary damages plus ten
percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorneys fees,
is AFFIRMED. The amounts received by respondent
representing her six (6) months retirement gratuity and one
(1) month pay in lieu of notice should be DEDUCTED from
respondents computed back wages, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118943      September 10, 2001
MARIO HORNALES, petitioner,  maltreatment by the ship captain, and lack of medical
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE
CAYANAN AND JEAC INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
CONTRACTOR SERVICES, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
It is sad enough that poverty has impelled many of our
countrymen to seek greener pastures in foreign lands. But
what is more lamentable is when a Filipino recruiter, after
sending his unlettered countrymen to a foreign land and
letting them suffer inhuman treatment in the hand of an
abusive employer, connives with the foreign employer in
denying them their rightful compensation. Surely, there shall
be a day of reckoning for such a recruiter whose insatiable
love for money made him a tyrant to his own race.
At bench is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set
aside the (a) Decision1 dated July 28, 1994 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing the
Decision2 of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) in POEA Case No. (L) 92-07-
939,3 and (b) Resolution4 dated October 6, 1994 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1âwphi1.nêt
The facts as shown by the records are:
On July 15, 1992, Mario Hornales (herein petitioner) filed with
the POEA a complaint 5 for non-payment of wages and
recovery of damages against JEAC International Management
& Contractor Services (JEAC) and its owner, Jose
Cayanan (herein private respondents). As private
respondents' surety, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation
(Country Bankers) was later on impleaded by petitioner. The
complaint alleged that on October 8, 1991, private
respondents sent petitioner, together with other Filipinos, to
Singapore. At their departure, they were advised that
someone would meet them in Singapore. True enough, they
were welcomed by Victor Lim, the owner of Step-Up
Employment Agency (Step-Up Agency). 6 He informed them
that they would be working as fishermen with a monthly
salary of US $200.00 each. Thereafter, they boarded Ruey
Horn #3, a vessel owned by Min Fu Fishery Co. Ltd. of
Taiwan.
On board the vessel, petitioner was subjected to inhumane
work conditions, like inadequate supply of food and water,
attendance. He was also required to work for twenty-two
hours a day without pay. Unable to bear his situation any
longer, he joined the other Filipino workers in leaving the
vessel while it was docked at Mauritius Islands on July 15,
1992.
Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner asked private
respondents to pay his salaries. Instead of doing so, they
required him to surrender his passport promising that they
would procure another job for him. Later, private respondents
gave him the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00).
Private respondents filed an answer 7 claiming
that, petitioner, Victor Lim and Min Fee Fishery Co. Ltd are all
"total strangers" to them. To bolster the claim, they offered in
evidence the Joint Affidavit8 of Efren B. Balucas and
Alexander C. Natura, petitioner's co-workers in Singapore,
stating that while they were in Singapore, petitioner admitted
to them that he did not apply in any agency in the
Philippines; that he came to Singapore merely as a tourist;
and that, he applied directly and personally with Step-Up
Agency. These statements were corroborated by the
"Certification"9 issued by Step-Up Agency.
On January 23, 1993, petitioner filed a Supplemental
Affidavit10 claiming that he was not a "total stranger" to
private respondents, and that, as a matter of fact, he knew
respondent Cayanan since 1990, when they used to go to the
San Lazaro Hippodrome to watch horse races. He also
averred that while the vessel was docked at Mauritius Islands
on June 1992, respondent Cayanan reminded him and his co-
workers of their loan obligations by sending them
photocopies of the PNB checks he (respondent Cayanan)
issued in favor of their relatives, and
the agreements whereby they authorized Victor Lim to
deduct from their salaries the amount of their loan
obligations.
On January 5, 1994, the POEA rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents JEAC
International Management and Contractor Services, Jose E.
Cayanan and Travellers Insurance Corp. are hereby ordered,
jointly and severally to pay complainant the amount of US
DOLLARS: ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY SIX AND
66/100 (US$ 1, 646.66) representing his unpaid salaries and
US $ 164.66 as and by way of attorney's fees. Payment shall
be made in Philippine Currency at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of payment.
For want of jurisdiction, the claim for moral and exemplary
damages is denied.
All other claims and counterclaims are denied.
SO ORDERED."11
Incidentally, the POEA dismissed petitioner's claim against
Country Bankers on the ground that the surety bond which
was effective at the time of petitioner's deployment was that
of Travelers Insurance Corporation.
On appeal, respondent NLRC vacated the decision of the
POEA and dismissed petitioner's complaint mainly on the
ground that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the parties. The NLRC ratiocinated as follows:
"At the outset, we note that the record is bereft of any
showing that complainant applied with the respondent
agency as a job applicant and subsequently entered into an
overseas contract with the latter which was later processed
and approved by the POEA. X x x What appears is that
complainant used the agency as a stepping stone to enter
Singapore as a tourist and obtain employment thereat on his
own. This is evidenced by Annexes "A-1 " to '"H" of
Complainant's Reply (See pp. 65-72, record) which purports
to show that the batch of complainant was obligated to pay
back respondent Jose Cayanan the expenses for their
deployment. No less than the POEA noted that the
respondent agency "is a service contractor and is not
authorized to deploy fishermen." Based on this fact, the
respondent agency could not have deployed complainant as
an overseas contract worker. What is apparent is that it
obtained a tourist passport and plane ticket for complainant
as a travel agent on a clearly "fly now pay later" plan.
We cannot rely on the employment agreements and checks
(See pp. 66-67, record) presented by complainant to show
proof of employment relations considering that his name
does not appear in any of the documents, hence they are
merely hearsay."12
In reversing the POEA's finding, respondent NLRC gave
considerable weight to the Joint Affidavit of Natura and
Balucas.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.
Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public
respondent NLRC. He asserts that private respondents were
the ones who deployed him to Singapore to work as
fisherman; and that, respondent NLRC's conclusion that
respondent JEAC was a mere "travel agency" and petitioner,
a mere tourist, has no basis in fact and in law.
For their part, private respondents maintain that respondent
NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it set
aside the decision of the POEA, since petitioner failed to show
any POEA record or document to prove that they deployed
him to work in Singapore. Neither did he present a Special
Power of Attorney to prove that Step-Up Agency authorized
private respondents to recruit and deploy contract workers in
its behalf nor an Affidavit of Responsibility to show that they
(private respondents and Step-Up Agency) assumed solidary
liability to petitioner.13 Private respondents likewise insist that
the photocopies of the PNB checks and agreements are
hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
The Solicitor General, in his comment, 14 joins petitioner in
assailing the decision of respondent NLRC as "baseless and
erroneous." According to him, the conclusion of respondent
NLRC directly contradicts private respondents' defense that
petitioner was a "total stranger." Further, he contends that
the Joint Affidavit of Balucas and Natura are hearsay.
The cardinal issue in this case hinges on the question - Are
private respondents responsible for petitioner's recruitment
and deployment to Singapore?
Let us take a closer look at the scale of evidence.
On one arm of the scale are petitioner's evidence consisting
of photocopies of the PNB checks and agreementswhich
were intended to disprove private respondents' claim that
petitioner, Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency are "total
strangers." The PNB checks represent the payments made
by respondent Cayanan to the relatives of petitioner's co-
workers (including Balucas and Natura). The checks show the
name of LIM Chang Koo &/or Jose Cayanan, as drawers.
While the agreements, denominated "For Fisherman
Deployed For Work To Singapore,"constitute authorization to
Victor Lim to deduct from the monthly salaries of the workers
the amounts of their obligations to private respondents.
Petitioner's own undertaking to private respondents reads:
"I hereby certify that my expenses abroad in going to
Singapore as fisherman amounting to SIXTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P16,000.00) shall be temporarily shouldered by JEAC
INT'L MGT & CONT. SERVICES and as soon as I arrive in
Singapore, said amount will be charged by MR. VICTOR
LIM and will be remitted to Eng. Jose E. Cayanan.
(Sgd.) Mario Hornales
F. CREW" 15
On the other side of the scale are the Joint Affidavit secured
by private respondents from petitioner's co-workers, Balucas
and Natura, and a Certification issued by Step-Up Agency.
These evidence were intended to prove the alleged
admission of petitioner to Balucas and Natura that he went as
a tourist to Singapore and that he applied directly with Step-
Up Agency. The Certification of Step-Up Agency re-echoes
the allegations in the Joint Affidavit.
The scale of evidence must tilt in favor of petitioner.
In a catena of labor cases, this Court has consistently held
that where the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally
rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 16 Private
respondents' Joint Affidavit has no probative value. It
suffers from two infirmities, first, petitioner was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine the two affiants regarding the
contents thereof, and second, the two affiants merely swore
as to what petitioner told them but not as to the truth of the
statements uttered.17
In the same vein, the Certification must not be given
weight. Private respondents not only failed to present Victor
Lim before the POEA to be cross-examined by petitioner, but
the Certification was also not verified or under oath. 18 To
our mind, it is just a last-ditch attempt on the part of Step-Up
Agency to help private respondents free themselves from
liability to petitioner. It bears noting that private respondents,
Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency, as shown by petitioner's
evidence, acted in concert in his deployment to Singapore.
Hence, such certification is, at most, self-serving.
On the other hand, the PNB Checks and
the agreements presented by petitioner strongly disprove
private respondents' total strangers" theory .It may be
observed that, in their attempt to exculpate themselves from
monetary liability, private respondents adopted an extreme
position, i.e., that they have nothing to do with petitioner,
Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency. Such strategy proved to be
disastrous to them. The mere presentation of documents
bearing private respondents' names and that of Step-Up
Agency and Victor Lim is enough to defeat their theory. More
so, when the documetary evidence consist of bank checks
showing the existence of a joint account, and authorization
agreements revealing a contract of agency.
Private respondents' argument that petitioner's evidence are
mere, photocopies and therefore cannot be considered as the
best evidence on the issue does not persuade us. The best
evidence rule enshrined in the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that "when the subject of an inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself."19 This rule is not without
exception. Some of the exception are when the original has
been lost or destroyed; cannot be produced in court without
bad faith on the part of the offeror; or when the original is in
the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice.20 It would be unreasonable to demand
from petitioner the presentation of the original PNB
Checks considering that it is a banking practice that for a
check to be encashed, the same must be surrendered to the
bank first. These checks are, therefore, most likely in the
possession of the bank. As to the agreements, it is
reasonable to conclude that respondent Cayanan was the
one in possession of the originals thereof. It maybe recalled
that these agreements were executed by the workers for his
security and benefit. At any rate, it is worthy to note that
private respondents did not disown the PNB checks nor
deny the existence of the agreements.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be emphasized that
the proceedings before the POEA is non-litigious in nature.
The technicalities of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto
and a hearing officer may avail himself of all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts of the case. 21 On the
applicability of the Rules of Court to labor cases, the Supreme
Court has ruled in Shoemart, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission22:
"The argument cannot be sustained. Whatever merit it might
have in the context of ordinary civil actions, where the rules
of evidence apply with more or less strictness, disappears
when adduced in connection with proceedings before Labor
Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission; for in
said proceedings, the law is explicit that 'the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the (law's) spirit and intention that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process.' Indeed, it is not the Rules of Court enacted by the
Supreme Court but rather the regulations promulgated by the
National Labor Relations Commission which govern "the
hearing and disposition of cases before it and its regional
branches**.' The 'Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines
and prevailing jurisprudence,' the law says, may be applied
to labor cases only under quite stringent limits, i.e., 'in the
absence of any applicable provision (in the Rules of the
Commission), and in order to effectuate the objectives of the
Labor Code**, in the interest of expeditious labor justice and
whenever practicable and convenient, by analogy or in a
suppletory character and effect." Under these rules, the
proceedings before a Labor Arbiter are 'non-litigious in
nature' in which, 'subject to the requirements of due process,
the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in the courts of law ** (do not) strictly apply."
Undoutedly, the factual and legal bases of respondent NLRC's
conclusions are bereft of substantial evidence - the quantum
of proof in labor cases. As aptly said by the Solicitor General,
its decision is "baseless and erroneous." Its disposition is
manifestly a grave abuse of discretion. 23
In concluding that respondent JEAC was a mere "travel
agency" and petitioner, a mere "tourist, " respondent NLRC
came up with a new theory which find no support even from
the evidence of private respondents, the party in whose favor
the decision was rendered. First, there is nothing in the
record which shows that respondent JEAC is a mere travel
agency. Even private respondents consistently plead that
respondent JEAC is a "licensed recruitment agency authorized
to recruit and deploy overseas Filipino contract workers."
Second, the evidence upon which respondent NLRC based its
findings consist of agreements authorizing Victor Lim to
deduct from the salaries of petitioner and his co-workers the
amount of their obligations to respondent Cayanan. It would
be too much of a coincidence to say that petitioner and his
co-workers are all mere tourists who allowed a certain Victor
Lim to deduct from their salaries the amount of their
obligations to respondent Cayanan. What is evident here is
that there is an internal arrangement between respondent
Cayanan and Victor Lim brought about by the fact that the
former deployed these workers to serve the latter. As
correctly pointed out by the POEA, there must be a "previous
arrangement" between private respondents and Victor Lim.
Significantly, from these pieces of evidence respondent NLRC
could already see the falsity in private respondents' "total
strangers" theory. How could there be an arrangement
between two persons who do not know each other? Note how
respondent NLRC conveniently closed its eye to the name of
Victor Lim, as mentioned in theagreements, when it ruled
that Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency are indeed " total
strangers" to private respondents. We sustain the findings of
the POEA, being more convincing and supported by
substantial evidence, thus:
"[C]omplainant applied at the office of respondent agency
and was able to seek employment in Singapore through
Engineer Jose Cayanan, owner of respondent agency.
Complainant's allegations are supported by the Annexes he
attached to his Reply (Annexes "'A" to "H"). These documents
readily show that it was not only complainant who was
recruited by respondent agency through Engr. Cayanan and
as agreed upon, the expenses in going to Singapore shall be
advanced by respondents. Thus their loans payable to Engr.
Cayanan and charged against their salaries. The checks
representing the salaries of the complainant and his
co-workers show that they are drawn from the account
of Lim Chang Khoo and/or Jose Gayanan. From the
foregoing, it is properly noted that complainant's
salaries were taken from the funds of respondents
which means that the latter had a hand or participated
in his recruitment and deployment.
We cannot give credence to respondents' contentions
that complainant is a total stranger to them and that
MIN Fee Fishery Co. Ltd. is not its principal, neither do
we believe that respondents do not know Mr. Victor
Lim who met complainant in Singapore. Annex "B" in
respondents' position paper belies respondents'
contentions. How could respondents write to a certain
Step Up Employment Agency in Singapore,
complainant's employer, when the latter is not even
mentioned in his complaint? We wonder where
respondents got the name of this employer if the
same is really not known to them.
It is very unlikely for complainant to proceed to
Singapore as a tourist without knowing anybody at
the site and just to apply for work. Had there not been
previous arrangements with respondents, it is not all
possible for complainant to land on a job in Singapore
because he is only a tourist.
Respondents had to resort to this misrepresentation of
allowing its recruits to leave as tourist because it is a service
contractor and it is not authorized to deploy fishermen."24
Private respondents further argue that they cannot be held
liable by petitioner because no employment contract
between him and Step-Up Agency had been approved by the
POEA. They also claim that the absence of aSpecial Power of
Attorney and an Affidavit of Responsibility, as required under
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 1, Book III of the POEA Rules and
Regulations25 only proves that they did not deploy petitioner
to Singapore.
Their argument is far from persuasive. Surely, they cannot
expect us to utilize their non-compliance with the POEA Rules
and Regulations as a basis in absolving them. To do so would
be tantamount to giving premium to acts done in violation of
established rules. At most, private respondents' act of
deploying petitioner to Singapore without complying with the
POEA requirements only made them susceptible to
cancellation or suspension of license as provided by Section
2, Rule I, Book VI of POEA Rules and Regulations:
SEC.2.Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
x x x      x x x
m. Deploying workers whose employment and travel
documents were not processed by the Administration;
n. Deploying workers workers or seafarers to vessels or
principals not accredited by the Administration;
But of course, such violations should be threshed out in a
proper administrative proceeding for suspension or
cancellation of license.
Meantime, we just uphold POEA's Decision holding private of the total award is justified under Article 111 (a) of the
respondents and Travelers Insurance Corporation jointly and Labor Code. The solidary liability of Travelers Insurance
severally liable to petitioner. Section 2 (e), Rule V, Book I of Corp., as surety of respondent JEAC, is maintained.
the Omnibus Rules lmplementing the Labor Code requires a
private employment agency to assume all responsibilities for WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
the implementation of the contract of employment of an respondent NLRC's a) Decision dated July 28, 1994,
overseas worker.26 This provision is substantially reiterated in andb) Resolution dated October 6, 1994 are SET ASIDE. The
Section 1 (f) (3) of Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and Decision of POEA Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson in POEA
Regulations which provides: Case No. (L) 92-07-939 is REINSTATED with
the MODIFICATION that the sum of P16,000.00 be deducted
"Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License - Every from the total amount to be awarded to
applicant for license to operate a private employment agency petitioner. 1âwphi1.nêt
or manning agency shall submit a written application
together with the following requirements: Payment should be made in Philippine currency at the
prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment.
x x x      x x x
SO ORDERED.
f) a verified undertaking stating that the applicant:

xxx

(3) shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer
which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
contract, including but not limited to payment of wages,
health and disability compensation and repatriation.

With respect to private respondents' surety, its liability is

founded on Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and
Regulations. Cash and surety bonds are required by the POEA
from recruitment and employment companies precisely as a
means of ensuring prompt and effective recourse against
such companies when held liable for applicant's or worker's
claims. The cash and surety bonds shall answer for all valid
and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for
the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditations and
contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee
compliance with the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment
and placement, the POEA Rules and relevant issuances of the
Department and all liabilities which the POEA may impose. 27

Accordingly, we find it proper to reinstate the Decision dated

January 5, 1994 of the POEA subject to the modification that
the amount of P16,000, the amount which petitioner
admitted to have been advanced by respondent JEAC for his
expenses in going to Singapore 28 be deducted from the total
amount to be awarded to him which includes a) US$ 1,646.66
corresponding to his unpaid salaries and b) attorney's fees.
The award of attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%)
G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO.,
INC., petitioner,  Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH
DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO
GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES,
NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA,
BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO SACURA,
FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR,
JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON,
GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO
CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITO
SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO TEJADA,
TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ,
CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO
ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON
ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO,
GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO,
PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO
NIETES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction
Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks to annul the decision of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth
Division and remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch for a
retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
construction business nationwide with principal office at No.
11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988,
petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation
to construct residential houses for its plant employees in
Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were
hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked
under the supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario
Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its completion and
petitioner started terminating the services of private
respondents and its other employees.
In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints
against petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII,
Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that
petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought
payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month
pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-
respondents.
A. Siao while the others were assigned to Labor Arbiter
Nicodemus G. Palangan. Summonses and notices of
preliminary conference were issued and served on the two
engineers and petitioner through Engineer Estacio. The
preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were
attended by Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private
respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before
Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's liability to
private respondents and agreed to pay their wage
differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a
result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived
petitioner's right to file its position paper.  1 Private
respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with
their position papers and were adopting their complaints as
their position paper. 2
On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested
for another week to settle the claims. Labor Arbiter Siao
denied this request. On June 21, 1990, Arbiter Siao issued an
order granting the complaint and directing petitioner to pay
private respondents' claims. Arbiter Siao held:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these
cases were filed, and what the complainants might think as
to how this branch operates and/or conducts its proceedings
as they are now restless, this Arbiter has no other alternative
or recourse but to order the respondent to pay the claims of
the complainants, subject of course to the computation of the
Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch pursuant to the oral
manifestation of respondent. The Supreme Court ruled:
"Contracts though orally made are binding on the parties."
(Lao Sok v. Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).
Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that "a court
cannot decide a case without facts either admitted or agreed
upon by the parties or proved by evidence." (Yu Chin Piao v.
Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby
ordered to pay the individual claims of the above-named
complainants representing their wage differentials within ten
(10) days from receipt of this order.
The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby
ordered to compute the individual claims of the herein
complainants.
SO ORDERED. 3
On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order,
thus:
When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on
June 19, 1990 at 10:00 a.m. respondent thru their
representative manifested that they were willing to pay the
claims of the complainants and promised to pay the same on
June 28, 1990 at 10:30 a.m.
However, when these cases were called purposely to
materialize the promise of the respondent, the latter failed to
appear without any valid reason.
Considering therefore that the respondent has already
admitted the claims of the complainants, we believe that the
issues raised herein have become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the above-entitled cases
are hereby ordered Closed and Terminated, however, the
respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their
differential pay and 13th-month pay within a period of ten
(10) days from receipt hereof based on the employment
record on file with the respondent.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process and
that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to
represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner's appeal was filed by
one Atty. Arthur Abundiente.
In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission
affirmed the orders of the Arbiters.
Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of
respondent Commission was rendered without jurisdiction
and in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner claims that:
I
THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION IS A NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN ISSUED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION;
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY MAKING THE
FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON FACTS AND BUT
ON SPECULATION, SURMISE AND EVIDENCE CONJECTURE:
A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional right to due
process of law when it was adjudged by the NLRC liable
without trial on the merits and without its knowledge;
B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably
interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration
Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence;
C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the NLRC's ruling that
petitioner is already in estoppel to disclaim the authority of
its alleged representatives.
D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying merely on
private, respondents' unsubstantiated complaints to hold
petitioner liable for damages. 5
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor
arbiters and respondent Commission are void for the
following reasons: (1) there was no valid service of summons;
(2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had
no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the
hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent
Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent
Commission are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving
evidence and were rendered in violation of petitioner's right
to due process.
Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is
governed by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC. They provide:
Sec. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. — (a) Notices or
summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall
be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff
or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from
receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided that where a
party is represented by counsel or authorized representative,
service shall be made on such counsel or authorized
representative; provided further that in cases of decision and
final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both the
parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case where
the parties are so numerous, service shall be made on
counsel and upon such number of complainants as may be
practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance
with Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Proof and completeness of service. — The return
is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein.Service by
registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or
his agent. . . .
Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the
respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail
on the party himself. If the party is represented by counsel or
any other authorized representative or agent, summons shall
be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic
corporation with principal address in Quezon City. The
complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and
summonses therefor served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan
City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an
agent and authorized representative of petitioner.
To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized
representative" or "agent" of parties on whom summons may
be served, the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court may
be resorted to. 6
Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private
domestic corporation or partnership must be made upon its
officers, such as the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so
integrated with the corporation that they know their
responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any
legal papers served on them. 8
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer
Dulatre, managed and supervised the construction
project. 9 According to the Solicitor General and private
respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in
Iligan City and supervised the work of the employees thereat.
As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to
realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and
to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer
of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore validly
served on him.
Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters and
his promise to settle the claims of private respondents is
another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear
before the labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases
before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the
rule, viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any
Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided
that he shall be made to present written proof that he is
properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly
recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . .  10
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the
NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a party to the case;
(b) he represents an organization or its members, with
written authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited
member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
in cases referred to by the latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were
they duly-accredited members of a legal aid office. Their
appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as
parties to the cases was authorized under the first exception
to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner
required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent
upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since
both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases
before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever
statements and declarations Engineer Estacio made before
the arbiters could not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases
appealed to respondent Commission did not cure Engineer
Estacio's representation. Atty. Abundiente, in the first place,
had no authority to appear before the respondent
Commission. The appellants' brief he filed was verified by
him, not by petitioner.  12 Moreover, respondent Commission
did not delve into the merits of Atty. Abundiente's appeal and
determine whether Engineer Estacio was duly authorized to
make such promise. It dismissed the appeal on the ground
that notices were served on petitioner and that the latter was
estopped from denying its promise to pay.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty.
Abundiente were authorized to appear as representatives of
petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural
matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission.
Petitioner's liability arose from Engineer Estacio's alleged
promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to
compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the
express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise
cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly established
by evidence.13 This is explicit from Section 7 of Rule III of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure, viz:
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other
representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their
clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a
special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a
compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or
partial discharge of a client's claim.
The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was
made at the preliminary conference and constituted an offer
to settle the case amicably. The promise to pay could not be
presumed to be a single unilateral act, contrary to the claim
of the Solicitor General. 14 A defendant's promise to pay and
settle the plaintiff's claims ordinarily requires a reciprocal
obligation from the plaintiff to withdraw the complaint and
discharge the defendant from liability.  15 In effect, the offer to
pay was an offer to compromise the cases.
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of
any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror. 16 If this rule were otherwise, no attempt to settle
litigation could safely be made.  17 Settlement of disputes by
way of compromise is an accepted and desirable practice in
courts of law and administrative tribunals.  18 In fact, the Labor Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the
Code mandates the labor arbiter to exert all efforts to enable expense of due process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard
the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement of the dispute specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended
within his jurisdiction on or before the first hearing.  19 to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and
inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. 22
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion
in affirming the decisions of the labor arbiters which were not IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The
only based on unauthorized representations, but were also decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth
made in violation of petitioner's right to due process. Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded
to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further
Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides: proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. —
Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement,
in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter
shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and
agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties
to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers
xxx xxx xxx
After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the
workers' claims as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and
Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective
position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on
the merits without at least requiring private respondents to
substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier
waived their right to file position papers but petitioner's
waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that
petitioner shall have paid and settled the claims of private
respondents at the scheduled conference. Since petitioner
reneged on its "promise," there was a failure to settle the
case amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters to
order the parties to file their position papers.
Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before
labor arbiters and respondent Commission, they "shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process." The rule that respondent Commission and the Labor
Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of evidence and
procedure should not be interpreted so as to dispense with
the fundamental and essential right of due process.  20 And
this right is satisfied, at the very least, 'when the parties are
given the opportunity to submit position papers.  21 Labor
Arbiters Siao and Palangan erred in dispensing with this
requirement.
FIRST DIVISION
 
 
GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 166556
INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Petitioner, Present:
 
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
LUZ M. BAUL, Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 31, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
------x
 
DECISION
 
 
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside
the May 31, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 76461 which reversed the Decision [2] of the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No.
GM-12984-202 denying the claim for compensation benefits
of Luz M. Baul under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as
amended.
 
Luz M. Baul was employed by the Department of Education
and Culture and Sports (DECS), Tarlac South District, as an
elementary school teacher on August 1, 1962.
Medical records show that due to extreme dizziness,
headache, chest pain, slurred speech, vomiting and general
body weakness, she was admitted to the St. Martin de Porres
Hospital inside Hacienda Luisita, San Miguel, Tarlac from July
1 to 9, 1993. Dr. Salvador A. Fontanilla, the medical director
of the hospital, diagnosed her illness as Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease (HCVD)-Essential Hypertension.
Prognosis was poor and guarded. [3] To monitor her health
condition, she had frequent consultation and treatment as an
outpatient until her compulsory retirement on May 2, 1998.[4]
 
On January 19 to 20, 1999, Luz was confined at
the Ramos General Hospital in Ligtasan, Tarlac City. Dr.
Conrado M. Orquiola, a cardiologist, corroborated the earlier
findings of Dr. Fontanilla that she had a HCVD. On May 17,
1999, she consulted Dr. Ernesto Cunanan, an internal
medicine specialist, and the doctor noted that her
hypertension had worsened to Transient Ischemic Attack
(TIA), Essential Hypertension Stage III (moderate to severe
hypertension). Eventually, on April 17, 2000, she suffered
from a Cerebro-Vascular Accident (CVA), i.e., stroke, and was
rushed to the Ramos General Hospital where she stayed for
four days under the medical supervision of Dr. Orquiola and
Dr. Albert Lapid, a neurologist. [5] The CT Scan result revealed
the impression ischemic infarct, right occipital lobe. [6]
 
Convinced that her hypertension supervened by reason and
in the course of her employment with the DECS and persisted
even after her retirement, she filed a claim on June 10, 1999
before the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
Tarlac Branch, for disability and hospital medical benefits
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended. [7]
 
On August 15, 2001, GSIS Tarlac Branch Manager Amando A.
Inocentes denied petitioners claim due to the alleged
absence of proof to confirm that there was a resulting
permanent disability due to hypertension prior to retirement.
[8]
 
In its January 23, 2003 decision, the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) sustained the conclusions
of the GSIS,[9] holding that although hypertension is among
the listed compensable illnesses in Annex A of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation, its compensability is
qualified. The ECC declared that petitioner failed to establish
that her hypertension had caused an impairment of body
organ functions resulting in permanent disability. In the same
way, even if her CVA is an occupational disease under No. 19
of Annex A of the Amended Rules of the ECC, she failed to
show the existence of such conditions as required by the
Rules.
 
Luz filed a petition for review with the CA for the reversal of
the ECC decision. On May 31, 2004, the appellate court
reversed the ECC ruling and ordered the GSIS to pay
petitioner the benefits corresponding to permanent partial
disability before retirement and permanent total disability
after retirement benefits.[10] The CA ruled that probability, not
certainty, is the touchstone of workmens compensation.
Since hypertension is listed as a compensable occupational
disease, it is presumed that such illness is reasonably work-
connected. Petitioner had proved by substantial evidence
that her hypertension was work-related; it emanated from
the stress caused by the mental strain of teaching many
pupils aside from the loads of obligations and responsibilities
appurtenant to the profession.
 
The ECC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [11] which the CA
denied.[12]
The GSIS, now petitioner, sought relief in this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner insists that the
ruling of the CA rests on mere presumptions, and points out
that an award of disability benefits cannot depend on
surmises and conjectures. The beneficiary must present
evidence to prove that the illness was caused by employment
or that the working conditions increased the risk of
contracting the disease. Also, there is no showing that
respondents ailment is at all considered permanent partial or
total disability by the GSIS and approved by the ECC medical
groups.
 
Petitioner also claims that the Court must respect the
findings of quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under their special technical
knowledge and training. In this case, respondent failed to file
the claim before retirement and adduce evidence to prove
compensability of her illness; there was no such finding of
permanent partial or total disability at the time of her
retirement. Moreover, her sickness, which developed after
her retirement, could not be attributed to her former
occupation but to factors independent thereof.
 
The petition is denied.
 
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are
considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29,
respectively, of Annex A of the Implementing Rules of P.D.
No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be
proof of causal relation between the work and the illness
which resulted in the respondents disability. The open-ended
Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of
causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an
occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. [13]
 
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential
hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their
compensability requires compliance with all the conditions
set forth in the Rules. In short, both
are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular
accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there
must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work
(to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary
physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to
noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct
connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of
the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the
trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain
hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is
compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body
organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in
permanent disability, provided that, the following documents
substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c)
blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T
scan.
 
The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of
the above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely
substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-
connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that
the hypothesis on which the workmens claim is based is
probable.[14] As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability,
not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation proceedings.[15] For, in interpreting and
carrying out the provisions of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the primordial and
paramount consideration is the employees welfare. To
safeguard the workers rights, any doubt as to the proper
interpretation and application must be resolved in their favor.
[16]
In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of
respondents attending physicians sufficiently support her
claim for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC
convincingly deny their genuineness and due execution. The
reports are made part of the record and there is no showing
that they are false or erroneous, or resorted to as a means of
deceiving the Court, hence, are entitled to due probative
weight. The failure of respondent to submit to a full medical
examination, as required by the rules, to substantiate her
essential hypertension, is of no moment. The law is that
laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG are not
indispensable prerequisites to compensability, [17] the reason
being that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed
in claims for compensation. [18] Medical findings of the
attending physician may be received in evidence and used as
proof of the fact in dispute.[19] The doctors certification as to
the nature of claimants disability may be given credence as
he or she normally would not make untruthful certification.
Indeed, no physician in his right mind and who is aware of the
far reaching and serious effect that his or her statements
would cause on a money claim against a government agency
would vouch indiscriminately without regarding his own
interests and protection.[20]
Significantly, even medical authorities have established that
the exact etiology of essential hypertension cannot be
accurately traced:
 
The term essential hypertension has been employed to
indicate those cases of hypertension for which a specific
endocrine or renal basis cannot be found, and in which the
neural element may be only a mediator of other influences.
Since even this latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is
more properly listed for the moment in the category of
unknown
etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by
failing to define; hence, it is of limited use except as an
expression of our inability to understand adequately the
forces at work.[21]
 
It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing
the etiology of essential hypertension show that there is a
relationship between the sickness and the nature and
conditions of work.[22] In this jurisdiction, we have already
ruled in a number of cases [23] the strenuous office of a public
school teacher. The case of Makabali v. Employees
Compensation Commission,[24] which we have re-affirmed in
the subsequent cases of De Vera v. Employees
Compensation Commission,[25] Antiporda v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission,[26] and De la Torre v. Employees
Compensation Commission,[27] amply summarized, thus:
 
We are well aware of the fact that only a handful of public
elementary school teachers are fortunate enough to be
assigned in urban areas where the working conditions are
comparatively much better than those in the rural areas. A
large majority of public elementary school teachers, as in the
case of the petitioner, work in remote places such as sitios
and barrios under poor working conditions. Thus, the daily
task of conducting classes (normally composed of 40 to 50
pupils in urban areas and up to 70 pupils in rural areas) in an
atmosphere that is, by any standard, not conducive to
learning becomes even more physically taxing to the
teachers. Tremendous amount of paper work during and after
office hours (from correcting examination papers,
assignments, school projects and reports to writing lesson
plans and the computation and recording of grades) can be
very physically draining especially to the senior members of
the teaching profession such as the petitioner. Such and
other related school activities of a teacher, aggravated by
substandard, if not adverse, working conditions, give rise to
increased tension, if not emotional and psychological
disturbance on the part of the teachers. This is especially
true in the case of public elementary school teachers whose
pupils, being of tender age and immature, need to be
disciplined and to be taught good manners and right conduct,
as well as to be assisted in their formal school lessons
 
[We] must not also neglect to mention the fact that public
elementary school teachers are the lowest paid government
workers, considering the nature and importance of the
services they render. They are the most reliable and
dedicated public servants being constantly called upon by
officials of the local and national government to assist in
various extra-curricular and civic activities which contribute
to the welfare of the community and the country. Their
responsibility in molding the values and character of the
young generations of the country, cannot be overestimated.
 
Significantly, even Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known
as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, mandates in
one of its provisions that 'teachers shall be protected against
the consequences of employment injury in accordance with
existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain
on the teacher's health shall be recognized as compensable
occupational diseases in accordance with existing laws.
(Calvero v. ECC, et al., 117 SCRA 462 [1982]. [28]
 
The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent
worsened and resulted in a CVA at the time she was already
out of service is inconsequential. The main consideration for
its compensability is that her illness was contracted during
and by reason of her employment, and any non-work related
factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial.[29]
 
Indeed, an employees disability may not manifest fully at one
precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is
possible that an injury which at first was considered to be
temporary may later on become permanent or one who
suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently
disabled from the same cause. [30] The right to compensation
extends to disability due to disease supervening
upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a
compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to
have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of
the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence
or misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that
flow from the primary injury are compensable. [31]
 
P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the
presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation
prevalent under the Workmens Compensation Act.
Nonetheless, we ruled in Employees Compensation
Commission v. Court of Appeals,[32] that:
 
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of
compensability established by the old law, the present law
has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a
social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of
the working man and woman still prevails, and the official
agency charged by law to implement the constitutional
guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in
favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability,
especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor
which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise
stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the
Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a
liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of
disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to
compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee or
laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the
law on employees compensation to as many employees who
can avail of the benefits thereunder. [33]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76461 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
G.R. No. L-55624 November 19, 1982  The main issue in this petition is the contention of the
BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, petitioner,  petitioner that it was denied due process because its
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIRST
DIVISION, LABOR ARBITER BENIGNO AYSON and JIMMY
SAJONAS, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
On August 18, 1978, the Baguio Country Club Corporation
filed with the Ministry of Labor office at Baguio City an
application for clearance to terminate the services of
respondent Jimmy Sajonas for willful breach of trust, telling
lies in an investigation, taking money paid by customers,
threatening a fellow employee, committing dishonesty
against guests and committing four violations of the club
rules and regulations which would constitute valid grounds
for dismissal.
On August 28, 1978, Jimmy Sajonas filed his opposition
alleging that his dismissal was without justifiable grounds to
support it and that it would contravene his constitutional
right to security of tenure.
After a notice of investigation was issued, the case was
referred to a conciliator who recommended the preventive
suspension of the respondent.
The Regional Director suspended Sajonas and indorsed the
case for compulsory arbitration to Labor Arbiter Benigno
Ayson.
On December 11, 1978, the labor arbiter came out with a
decision denying the application for clearance to dismiss
Jimmy Sajonas for insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner
was ordered to reinstate Sajonas with backwages from the
time of suspension up to reinstatement and without loss of
seniority rights.
The case was appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. On January 17, 1980, the Commission rendered
a decision dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of
the labor arbiter.
The petitioner charges the public respondents with grave
abuse of discretion for, having rendered an "unlawful,
unconstitutional, and unprecedented decision."
evidence was not considered by both the labor arbiter and
the NLRC. The petitioner states that as a result of this
ignoring of its evidence, the decisions of the public
respondents are contrary to the facts and the applicable law.
A careful consideration of the records of this petition
convinces us that there is merit in this petition. The summary
procedures used by the public respondents were too
summary to satisfy the requirements of justice and fair play.
The decision of the respondent Commission which affirmed
the order to reinstate Mr. Sajonas with full backwages was
based on two grounds - First, the evidence available to the
labor arbiter when he decided this case was such that the
respondent had not sufficiently shown a just cause for the
complainant's dismissal. Second, the evidence to support the
application for clearance to dismiss the complainant was
submitted too late because it was submitted only on appeal.
The respondent Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed the irregular and one-sided
procedure adopted by the labor arbiter in arriving at his
finding of insufficiency of evidence and when it decided to
uphold a decision not only contrary to the facts but obviously
unfair and unjust.
When the Baguio office of the Ministry of Labor issued as part
of the conciliation process a notice of investigation for
September 7, 1978 and September 15, 1978, the petitioner
Baguio Country Club submitted a position paper accompanied
by copies of the application to terminate employment and
the sworn statements of witnesses taken during the
investigation of the alleged anomalies. Jimmy Sajonas did not
submit any position paper. No position paper was served on
the petitioner or its counsel. The only document submitted
was one with a short two paragraphs comprising the grounds
for opposition.
As a result of the conciliator's recommendation, the case was
indorsed for arbitration to the labor arbiter. Noting that Mr.
Sajonas did not appear at the arbitration proceedings and did
not present any position paper but left it to some union
members to speak for him and allegedly because Mr. Sajonas
had promised to quietly resign, the petitioner merely adopted
the position paper filed during the conciliation proceedings.
The irregular procedures used by the labor arbiter started at
this point.
The labor arbiter allowed a last minute position paper of
respondent Sajonas to be filed and without requiring a copy
to be served upon the Baguio Country Club and without
affording the latter an opportunity to refute or rebut the
contents of the paper, forthwith decided the case.
The public respondents now argue in their comment that "it
is of no moment that petitioner was not furnished with a copy
of Sajonas' position paper" because as early as the
conciliation stage it was already apprised of the position of
the employee, having been furnished Sajonas' opposition and
that it cannot feign ignorance. This stand of the public
respondents is erroneous. Since the case was decided on the
basis of position papers, the petitioner had a right to be
served a copy of the respondent's position paper admitted
and considered by the arbiter and an opportunity to
introduce evidence to refute it. As explained by the
petitioner, it had been lulled into thinking that because the
private respondent had offered to resign and the employer
had agreed to forego the prosecution of criminal charges,
there would no longer be any complete or full-scale
arbitration proceedings Mr. Sajonas denies that he promised
to resign and contends that criminal proceedings were an
afterthought to harass the poor laborer. The fact that there
were two divergent and clashing allegations before them, not
only on this point but also on the 'Principal issues of
dishonesty and intimidation of co-employees, the public
respondents should have adopted fairer and more accurate
methods of ascertaining truth.
As pointed out by the petitioner, "while an administrative
tribunal possesed of quasi-judicial powers is free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not mean
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it entirely ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process." (Serrano v. PSC, 24 SCRA 867; and Singco v.
COMELEC, 101 SCRA 420).
The petitioner's position paper, passed upon by the labor
arbiter, stated that the petitioner had furnished the oppositor
(Jimmy Sajonas) and the ALU (the union of workers in the
club) copies of the application to terminate, as well as the
investigations of witnesses against Jimmy Sajonas, which
distinctly show the infractions committed by oppositor,
particularly that of the incident of August 6, 1978 wherein
Sajonas was supposed to have pocketed a cash payment of a
customer of the BCC, constituting qualified theft. The
petitioner specifically stressed to the arbiter that it was
"adopting the investigations which were enclosed with the
application to terminate, which are now parts of the record of
the Ministry of Labor, as part and parcel of this position
paper. "
In other words, the petitioner submitted its case on the basis
of the complete records of the conciliation proceedings.
The position paper was before the arbiter but minus sworn
statements comprising the investigations which formed part
of the records of the same labor office.
Inexplicably, the arbiter came out with the conclusion that
"there is thus no document nor statement of evidence value
or of evidencing character which we can consider as evidence
to support, the enumerated violations for which Sajonas is
supposed to be dismissed . " Instead of calling for the records
submitted to the concilliator in the same small Baguio office,
the arbiter denied the application for the clearance on the
ground that all that was before it was a position paper with
mere quotations about an investigation conducted by Major
Pagala.
The error could have been corrected by the respondent
Commission when the petitioner urged that the sworn
statements thus ignored by the labor arbiter should be
considered on appeal.
In the appeal to the commission, the petitioner argued that "
submitted with this application to terminate are the
investigation of Erdulfo Pagala on Bernadette Saliquio, Alma
Jean Quidasol, Cristina Rico, and Clarissa Adalla.
The respondent Commission may not have committed grave
abuse of discretion when it rejected the affidavits of these
witnesses, the information for estafa against Jimmy Sajonas
filed by the assistant city fiscal, did the resolution of the
fiscal's office on the complaint for grave threats, on the
ground that "evidence cannot be submitted for the first time
on appeal." However, it was a denial of elementary principles
of fair play for the Commission not to have ordered the
elevation of the entire records of the case with the affidavits
earlier submitted as part of the position paper but completely
ignored by the labor arbiter. Or at the very least, the case
should have been remanded to the labor arbiter consonant
with the requirements of administrative due process.
The ever increasing scope of administrative jurisdiction and
the statutory grant of expansive powers in the exercise of
discretion by administrative agencies illustrate our nation's
faith in the administrative process as an efficient and
effective mode of public control over sensitive areas of
private activity. Because of the specific constitutional
mandates on social justice and protection to labor, and the
fact that major labor management controversies are highly
intricate and complex, the legislature and executive have
reposed uncommon reliance upon what they believe is the
expertise, the rational and efficient modes of ascertaining
facts, and the unbiased and discerning adjudicative
techniques of the Ministry of Labor and Employment and its
instrumentalities.
Experience has shown this faith to be justified. In the great
majority of petitions for ' review of decisions from the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, we have sustained
agency determinations and denied due course to the
petitions. However, we have never hesitated to exercise our
corrective powers and to reverse labor ministry decisions
where the ministry or a labor tribunal like the respondent
commission has sustained irregular procedures and through
the invocation of summary methods, including rules on
appeal, has affirmed an order which tolerates a violation of
due process. This Court will reverse or modify an
administrative decision where the rights of a party were
prejudiced because the administrative findings, conclusions,
or decisions are in violation of constitutional provisions; in
excess of statutory authority, or jurisdiction; made upon
irregular procedure; vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake;
not supported by substantial evidence adduced at the
hearing or contained in the records or disclosed to the
parties; or arbitrary, capricious, or issued with grave abuse of
discretion, (Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. Castaneda v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 186; Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 745;
Asprec v. Itchon, 16 SCRA 921; Garcia v. Executive Secretary,
6 SCRA 1; Air Manila v. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489; Sichangco v.
Board of Commissioners, 94 SCRA 61).
The instant petition is a timely reminder to labor arbiters and
all who wield quasi-judicial power to ever bear in mind that
evidence is the means, sanctioned by rules, of ascertaining in
a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a
matter of fact. (Section 1, Rule 128) The object of evidence is
to establish the truth by the use of perceptive and reasoning
faculties. (See Martin, Rules of Court, Vol. 5 on Evidence, p. 2
citing Chamberlayne on Trial Evidence and Thayer on Prelim.
Treat.) The statutory grant of power to use summary
procedures should heighten a concern for due process, for
judicial perspective in administrative decision making, and
for maintaining the visions which led to the creation of the
administrative office.
From the records which form part of the position paper
submitted to the labor arbiter and those raised on appeal to
the respondent commission, the following have been
establish.
At about 10:30 in the morning of August 6, 1978, Miss
Bernadette Saliquio, a waitress of the Baguio City Country
Club served two glasses of orange juice tot he maid and the
children of Mrs. Solon . Bartender Jimmy Sajonas pocketed
the cash payment of P7.00 for the juice and utilized Chit No.
183100 signed by Dr. Lodzinski for two bottles of beer to
cover for the order of orange juice which was changed to two
beers. In other words, one chit was used twice. Miss Alma
Jean Quisadol, checker, who corroborated the testimony of
Miss Saliquio, who checks the orders for drinks, and who
mentioned an earlier anomaly involving four loaves of raisin
bread, was threatened several days later by Sajonas for
reporting the incident to management. Miss Cristina Rico,
nutritionist, corroborated the utterance of the threat
"papatayin." An information for estafa was filed in Criminal
Case No. 40292 of the Baguio City Court but the case for
grave threats where the office of the City Fiscal "arrived at
the indubitable conclusion that the respondent indeed
uttered threatened., remarks" was dismissed for having
prescribed. We agree with the petitioner that the loss of trust
and confidence and the wedge driven into the relationship of
the private respondent with both management and his co-
employees warrant the grant of clearance to terminate his
employment. We likewise note the petitioner's statement
that Mr. Sajonas has been working as bartender for a hotel in
Pangasinan since March, 1979 and was about to be promoted
to a hotel in Manila in November, 1979.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted. The
decision dated January 17, 1980 of the National Labor
Relations Commission affirming the December 11, 1978
decision of the labor arbiter is set aside. The appropriate
office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment is ordered to
give the petitioner a clearance to terminate the employment
of the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139368           November 21, 2002]
ROBIN M. CANO, petitioner,  On May 31, 1999, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of
vs.
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, EDGAR C.
GALVANTE, as Police Director for Personnel and
Records Management, PNP,  benefits and emoluments pertaining to his post pursuant to
and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails (a) the
order1 dated May 17, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 224, in Civil Case No. Q-98-36370,
dismissing the complaint filed on December 21, 1998 by
petitioner against respondents for payment of back salaries
and allowances amounting to P301,018; and (b) the order of
said court denying on July 15, 1999, his motion for
reconsideration.
The factual background of the instant petition, as culled from
the records of the case, is as follows:
For the alleged bungled investigation of the Eileen Sarmenta
and Allan Gomez rape-slay, a complaint for grave misconduct
was filed with the National Police Commission under the
Department of Interior and Local Government against
petitioner, then Police Chief Inspector of the Calauan Police
Station. The Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
found petitioner guilty and ordered his summary dismissal
from the service, in a decision 2 dated July 12, 1995. Petitioner
appealed his dismissal to the National Appellate Board of the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). On May 15, 1997,
the NAPOLCOM reversed the decision of the PNP Chief:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find respondent
appellant, Chief Inspector ROBIN M. CANO administratively
culpable for Simple Misconduct and hereby orders (sic) his
suspension for a period of three (3) months. Considering,
however, that said respondent had been under suspension
since August 7, 1995, pursuant to Special Order No. 1690
dated August 8, 1995, the penalty imposed is considered
deemed served. Respondent-Appellant is strongly warned to
be more prudent and responsible in the exercise of his duties
as a member of the PNP.3
The NAPOLCOM decision having been allowed by both parties
to become final and executory, petitioner was restored to full
duty status effective May 15, 1997. He also received all
PNP Special Order No. 1341. With the modification of his
penalty to three (3) months suspension, petitioner filed a
claim for payment of back salaries and other allowances
corresponding to the period he was allegedly unjustly
discharged from service until he was restored to full duty
status, or from August 7, 1995 to May 15, 1997. However,
this claim, computed by the PNP Regional Police
Comptrollership and Finance Division to be Three Hundred
One Thousand Eighteen Pesos (P301,018.00), was denied by
respondent Police Director Edgar C. Galvante of the PNP
Directorate for Personnel and Records Management (DPRM)
on the strength of a Memorandum/Opinion from the PNP
Legal Service. Petitioner forthwith asked for a reconsideration
of the denial but the same was rejected.
On account of said denial, petitioner filed on December 23,
1998 a complaint4 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for the recovery of his back salaries and other
allowances for the said period. The court a quo dismissed the
complaint in an order dated May 17, 1999. Said the trial
court:
The Court is prone to agree with the stand and position of the
defendants that plaintiff's claim should not be granted
because plaintiff has not shown any clear and legal right
which would entitle him to back salaries, allowances and
other benefits and besides, plaintiff has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies no[t] discounting the fact that his
claim against defendants is actually a suit against the state.
xxx
This complaint is actually a suit against the government
because the ultimate liability for payment of back salaries,
etc. will fall on the government. This being so, this case
should be dismissed because the government cannot be sued
without its consent.
Accordingly, therefore, the Court has to dismiss this case
without costs against the plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
the trial court's decision, but his motion was denied in an
order dated July 15, 1999.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the instant appeal via petition for
review on certiorari, raising only one issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to his claim for back
salaries and allowances under the terms of the decision of
the NAPOLCOM Appellate Board.6
Mainly involved in this controversy is petitioner's entitlement
to back salaries and other allowances upon the reduction of
his penalty of dismissal to mere suspension for three months.
But secondarily, it should be asked whether petitioner failed
to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him so as
to render the filing of the complaint with the trial court
premature?
At the outset, we note that the principal issue raised before
us is a mixed question of fact and law. There is a question of
fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts, 7 and there is a question of law
where the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain state of facts.8 Here, petitioner seeks to recover
back salaries and allowances allegedly due him from August
7, 1995, when he was unjustly discharged from the service,
to May 15, 1997, when he was restored to full duty status.
The determination of petitioner's entitlement to said back
salaries and allowances is a mixed question as it involves the
determination of his duty status for the period of his claim
and the resolution of whether the petitioner was acquitted by
the NAPOLCOM Appellate Board in its decision finding him
liable only for simple misconduct, not gross misconduct.
Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an appeal
by certiorari to this Court should raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth in the petition. It is
elementary that a review is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there
are special and important reasons therefor.9 As the error
raised herein includes one of fact and law, and not a proper
subject for a petition for review on certiorari, we are
constrained to decline exercise of our equity jurisdiction in
this case.
At any rate, petitioner also failed without justifiable cause to
observe due regard for the hierarchy of courts. Even on this
reason alone, we are constrained to deny the petition. The
policy of this Court respecting the hierarchy of courts and,
consequently, prohibiting the filing of a petition in this Court
in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with the lower courts
has been consistently observed in the absence of any
compelling reason for departing from such policy. 10 Pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, 11 petitioner should
have taken his appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Having ruled for the denial of the petition, we need not tarry
on the other issues that may have been raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The order of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 224, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No. Q-98-36370 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130209            March 14, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  Subsequently, or on January 29, 1990, the other accused —
vs.
LARRY LAVAPIE, SIMEON LACHANO, ARNOLD BUATES,
SANTOS SAN PASCUAL, SR., SANTOS SAN PASCUAL,
JR., REY SAN PASCUAL, BENIGNO CATINA, JR. and
SEVERAL DOES, accused.
LARRY LAVAPIE and SANTOS SAN PASCUAL,
SR., accused-appellants.
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 16,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch
36,2 finding accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San
Pascual, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Sonny Sierva,
jointly and severally, the amount of P7,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual,
Sr., together with Simeon Lachano, Arnold Buates, Santos
San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr. and
several Does, were charged in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 29th day of March, 1989, at Sitio
Tastas, Barangay San Vicente, (Buraburan) Municipality of
Buhi, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed
with bolos, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with
said bolos one Sonny Sierva, thereby inflicting upon the latter
[a] mortal wound which directly caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs in the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), plus other forms of damages
that may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."3
Upon their arraignment on October 17, 1989, accused Larry
Lavapie and Rey San Pascual pleaded not guilty. 4
Benigno Catina. Jr., Santos San Pascual, Sr. and Santos San
Pascual, Jr. also pleaded not guilty. 5 Accused Simeon
Lachano, likewise, pleaded not guilty on July 16,
1991.6 Accused Arnold Buates remained at large.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses against accused Larry Lavapie, Rey San Pascual,
Benigno Catina, Jr., Santos San Pascual, Sr. and Santos San
Pascual, Jr. — Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Jenny Cordial, Enrico
Sierva, Domingo Samonte, Rogelio Sierva and Sgt. Jaime
Patiam. The following witnesses, on the other hand, testified
against accused Simeon Lachano — Erlinda Sierva and
Rogelio Sierva. In their defense, all of the six (6) accused,
who were brought before the jurisdiction of the trial court,
testified in court, in addition to Felix Lavapie, Juan Bongais
and Loreto Camasis.
For the prosecution, eyewitness Domingo Samonte testified
that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he came from the
dance hall in San Vicente with Rogelio Sierva and the victim
Sonny Sierva.7 While on their way, Rogelio and Sonny talked
with some ladies, then, Rogelio went home ahead, and left
Domingo and Sonny behind.8 While approaching Rogelio's
house, Domingo and Sonny noticed a group of persons
coming towards them. Domingo stepped backwards towards
Sonny. Sonny focused the flashlight, which he was holding,
on accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. and accused-
appellant Larry Lavapie, who was then holding a bolo.
Accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. suddenly held the
hands of Sonny behind his back, while accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie hacked Sonny.9 Domingo testified that Sonny
was hit on the neck, the same witness pointing to the left
side of his neck. 10 When Sonny fell on the ground, Domingo
ran towards some pili trees. Then, Domingo saw two (2)
persons, a boy and a girl, who were following them and
holding a torch which they used to lighten the fallen body of
Sonny. Domingo, however, was not able to recognize these
two (2) persons. On cross-examination, Domingo testified
that when he witnessed the hacking incident, there were
other persons at the scene of the crime but he was not able
to recognize them.11 Domingo further recounted that after he
saw the hacking incident, he ran towards the back of
a pili tree and stayed there until dawn of the following
day.12 At dawn, he proceeded to his house in Buraburan. 13 He
did not report the incident to anybody else but a certain
friend and his wife. Domingo also admitted that when
accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. held the hands of
Sonny behind the latter's back, he did not tell Santos San
Pascual, Sr. to stop but just took a step backwards. 14
Jenny Cordial, a 15-year-old ward of Sonny Sierva's aunt,
testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., she and
Rico Sierva15 came from a dance in San Vicente, Buraburan
and were on their way home when they came upon the body
of Sonny Sierva lying on the middle of the road. 16 They
recognized Sonny Sierva because Cordial was then holding a
torch.17 Cordial and Enrico Sierva came upon Sonny Sierva,
who was lying prostrate on the road, with a hack wound on
the neck, and was almost beheaded. 18 At that instance,
Cordial saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, who was
holding a bolo, standing at a distance of about five (5) to six
(6) meters from the body of Sonny Sierva. 19 Aside from
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, Cordial also saw other
persons at the scene of the crime but she was not able to
recognize them. Thereafter, Cordial and Enrico Sierva ran
away and went home to inform the father of Sonny Sierva of
what happened but they were told by his wife that Rogelio
Sierva was also hacked. Incidentally, while on cross-
examination, the prosecutor informed the trial court that
Cordial actually grew up under the care of Rogelio Sierva's
sister. Cordial testified on cross-examination that when she
and Enrico Sierva saw the body of Sonny Sierva lying on the
road, they were only about one (1) meter away from the
body. When they saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, he
was holding a bolo which was pointed downwards. Cordial
clearly recognized accused-appellant Larry Lavapie because
she was then holding a torch. Cordial described the bolo held
by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie as "shiny and sharp," and
"clear and clean."20 Cordial also noticed that the other
persons, who were at scene of the crime, were standing still,
facing the body of Sonny Sierva, about a meter away from
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, and that some of these
persons were smoking.21 Cordial did not recognize these
other persons because according to her "it was dark."22On
further cross-examination, she estimated these other persons
at the scene of the crime to number about seven (7) persons.
Enrico Sierva, 15-year-old cousin of the victim, Sonny Sierva,
testified that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he and
Jenny Cordial came from a dance in San Vicente, Buhi and
were on their way home. Near the house of the victim's
father, Rogelio Sierva, they saw a man lying prostrate on the
road. They went closer to the body and saw that the said
man sustained a hack wound on the neck. They recognized
the man lying on the road as Sonny Sierva. 23 Glancing
around, Enrico saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie holding a
bolo and standing by the road with accused-appellant Santos
San Pascual, Sr.24 According to Enrico, both accused-
appellants were at a distance of about five (5) to six (6)
meters away from him when he saw them. He also saw other
persons at the scene of the crime but he was not able to
recognize them because they were in a "dark
place."25 Thereafter, he and Jenny Cordial ran towards the
house of Rogelio Sierva, located about 30 meters away, and
informed Rogelio's wife, Erlinda Velasco, that her son was
lying dead on the road. Erlinda Velasco told them that her
husband was also hacked and was being brought to a
hospital. On cross-examination, Enrico Sierva testified that he
told his uncle, Rogelio Sierva, that it was the group of
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie who hacked Sonny
Sierva,26 and that accused-appellants Larry Lavapie and
Santos San Pascual, Sr. were there. 27 Enrico further testified
that the torch they were carrying on the night of March 29,
1989 was made of a round bottle of gin.
Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio, Municipal Health Officer of Buhi II,
Camarines Sur, conducted the autopsy on the body of Sonny
Sierva and prepared an autopsy report 28 dated April 25, 1989,
with the following findings:
"Lesions:
"Incised wound at the neck, right side cutting the whole neck
structure with a portion of the skin only on the left side
holding it in place about 3 in. long.
"Cause of Death — Incised wound, neck (almost whole neck)
with secondary hemorrhage (massive)."29
Dr. Mercurio explained that due to the hack wound (or incised
wound) sustained by the victim, Sonny Sierva, the victim's
head was almost severed from the body, with only three (3)
inches of flesh on the left side of the neck, connecting the
neck to the body.30 According to Dr. Mercurio, the hack
wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument like a
very sharp bolo. Dr. Mercurio further opined that the victim
could have died at around 1 or 2 a.m. of March 30, 1989.
Rogelio Sierva, father of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified
that on March 29, 1989, at around 11 p.m., he came from a
dance in Buraburan, San Vicente, together with his son,
Sonny Sierva and his brother-in-law, Felix Buendia.31 On their
way home, they passed by the house of a certain Teresita
Gaite, where Sonny Sierva was left behind with his friends.
Rogelio and Felix proceeded on their way home. When they
were already near his house, Rogelio saw six (6) of the seven
(7) identified accused.32 Rogelio continued to testify that he
was hacked on his right ear by accused Arnold Buates.
Rogelio and Felix then ran towards Rogelio's house. When
Rogelio was about to open the door of his house, he was
hacked on the right arm by accused Santos San Pascual, Jr.
Rogelio then entered the house and got a bolo but his
assailants already retreated to the place where he was first
hacked. Thereafter, Rogelio sought the assistance of his
brother, Silvestre Sierva, whose house was located about 20
meters away,33 and requested that he be brought to a
hospital. On their way to the hospital, they saw Sonny Sierva,
who was almost beheaded, lying on the road. When Rogelio
discovered that Sonny was already dead, they proceeded to
the San Vicente Assistance Center and reported the hacking
incident. Afterwards, they proceeded to the Mediatrix
Hospital where Rogelio was treated for his wounds. Rogelio
also testified that he spent more or less P7,000.00 which he
incurred due to the death of Sonny Sierva. 34 On cross-
examination, Rogelio admitted that he was previously
charged for the attempted rape of the daughter of accused
Santos San Pascual, Sr.35
Because accused Simeon Lachano was arrested only after the
prosecution had already presented the foregoing witnesses
against the five (5) other accused, the prosecution presented
anew, Rogelio Sierva and an additional witness, Erlinda
Sierva, to testify against accused Simeon Lachano.
Erlinda Sierva, mother of the victim, Sonny Sierva, testified
that she spent less than P10,000.00 as burial and funeral
expenses on account of the death of Sonny Sierva. 36
Rogelio Sierva, in testifying against accused Simeon Lachano,
merely reiterated his previous testimony against the five (5)
other accused.
For the defense, on the other hand, all of the six (6) accused,
who were brought before the jurisdiction of the trial court,
testified together with Felix Lavapie, Juan Bongais and Loreto
Camasis.
Accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, in his defense, interposed
denial and alibi. Lavapie testified that on March 29, 1989, at
around 8 p.m., he was at a dance in San Vicente, Buhi, 37 with
accused Santos San Pascual, Jr., a certain Santiago Sanorjo
and Danny Belardo.38 Lavapie, Santos San Pascual, Jr.,
Santiago Sanorjo39 and Danny Belardo left the dance hall at
past 11:30 p.m. and went to the barn of Santiago Sanorjo,
arriving thereat at around 1 a.m. 40 They slept in the said barn
and went to their respective houses on the following day.
Accused Santos San Pascual, Jr. corroborated the testimony
of accused-appellant Larry Lavapie that they attended a
dance in San Vicente, Buhi. They left the dance hall at past
12 midnight41 and went to the house of Santiago Sanorjo
where they slept until 6 o'clock of the following morning. 42
Juan Bongais testified that in the evening of March 29, 1989,
he was at a dance in San Vicente, Buraburan. He arrived at
the dance at 7 p.m. and left at about 12:30 a.m. of the
following day.43 He left the dance with Jenny Cordial, Rico
Sierva and Liza San Pascual.44 On their way home, they met
Rogelio Sierva who was hacked and being carried by Dionesio
Coronel and Felicito Conas. They continued walking for
several meters until they came upon the dead body of Sonny
Sierva, lying on the road.45 On cross-examination, Bongais
testified that when they were about to leave the dance at
around 12:30 a.m. of March 30, 1989, accused-appellant
Larry Lavapie and his co-accused Santos San Pascual, Jr.
were still at the dancing hall.46
Accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr., likewise, claimed
denial and alibi. San Pascual, Sr. testified that in the evening
of March 29, 1989, he was resting in his house in sitio Tastas,
Labawon, Buhi.47 He slept at 7 p.m. and awoke at 5 o'clock of
the following day.48 San Pascual, Sr. further claimed that
Rogelio Sierva, father of the victim, was actuated by ill-
motive to implicate him in this crime, i.e., he filed a complaint
against Rogelio for the attempted rape of his daughter, Gina
San Pascual.49 On cross-examination, San Pascual, Sr.
testified that sitioLabawon is adjacent to barangay San
Vicente.
The three (3) other accused, Rey San Pascual, Simeon
Lachano and Benigno Catina, Jr., likewise, interposed denial
and alibi in their respective testimonies before the trial court.
On January 23, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision
dated December 16, 1996, finding accused-appellants Larry
Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr. guilty of murder
qualified by treachery. The four (4) other accused, Santos
San Pascual, Jr., Rey San Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr. and
Simeon Lachano were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
The dispositive part of the said Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds —
"1. The accused, Larry Lavapie and Santos San Pascual, Sr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal[s] of the crime of
murder defined and penalized under Article [2]48 of the
Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No.
7659, as charged in the information, and there being no
generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, [the
Court] hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally
the heirs of the deceased, Sonny Sierva, spouses Rogelio and
Erlinda Sierva the following:
a) P7,000.00 as actual damages,
b) P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
"2. [T]he [other] accused, Santos San Pascual, Jr., Rey San
Pascual, Benigno Catina, Jr., and Simeon Lachano, not guilty
of the crime charged in the information and [the Court]
hereby acquits them thereof for insufficiency of evidence.
The bonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby
ordered cancelled and released.
"With respect to the accused, Arnold Buates, who was never
brought to the jurisdiction of this [C]ourt, let the records of
this case be sent to the archives to be revived as soon as this
[C]ourt acquires jurisdiction over [the] said accused.
"SO ORDERED."50
In convicting accused-appellants, Larry Lavapie and Santos
San Pascual, Sr., the trial court relied primarily on the
testimony of prosecution witness Domingo Samonte that
accused-appellant Larry Lavapie was the one who hacked
Sonny Sierva on the neck with the use of a bolo while
accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. was at the back of
Sonny Sierva, holding the latter's hands.51 The trial court also
relied heavily on the testimony of prosecution witness Jenny
Cordial that she saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie,
standing about five (5) meters away from the dead body of
Sonny Sierva; and on the testimony of prosecution witness
Enrico Sierva that he saw accused-appellants, Larry Lavapie
and Santos San Pascual, Sr., standing five (5) meters away
from the dead body of Sonny Sierva. 52 The trial court further
maintained that Jenny Cordial's description of Sonny Sierva's
body when they came upon it, lying prostrate on the road,
was supported by the medical findings stated in the autopsy
report of Dr. Alicia M. Mercurio. 53 The trial court rejected the
defenses of denial and alibi raised by accused-appellants,
and ruled that denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive
identification, and that accused-appellants' alibi was not
corroborated by any credible and disinterested witness. 54 In
ruling that the killing was qualified by treachery, the trial
court explained that accused-appellants awaited, in ambush,
for their victim;"55 and that the suddenness of the attack on
Sonny Sierva and the fact that his hands were being held at
his back by accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr. while
he was hacked by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, rendered
him "helpless to put up any defense." 56 The trial court also
found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime,
based on the fact that ". . .they [accused-appellants] are
related to each other (uncle and nephew) and from their
concerted acts in killing Sonny Sierva."57
On February 3, 1997, accused-appellants filed a Motion for
New Trial, alleging that prosecution witnesses, Jenny Cordial
and Domingo Samonte retracted their respective
testimonies.58 However, in an Order dated March 12, 1997,
the trial court denied the foregoing motion, for lack of merit. 59
Hence, this appeal.
In their appellant's brief, accused-appellants raise a lone
assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
RETRACTION OF PROSECUTION WITNESS[ES] JENNY CORDIAL
AND DOMINGO SAMONTE [AS] NEWLY-DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE WHICH SHALL JUSTIFY THE HOLDING OF A NEW
TRIAL.
We find merit in this appeal.
The conviction of accused-appellants by the trial court was
predicated primarily on the testimony of prosecution witness
Domingo Samonte who "positively identified [accused-
appellant] Larry Lavapie as the one who hacked Sonny Sierva
with a bolo at his neck while accused[-appellant] Santos San
Pascual, Sr., was at the rear of Sonny Sierva, holding his
hands;"60 and on the testimonies of the two (2) witnesses who
arrived at the scene of the crime shortly after the hacking
incident occurred — Jenny Cordial, who "saw accused[-
appellant] Larry Lavapie standing about five [5] meters away
from the dead body of Sonny Sierva"61 and Enrico Sierva, who
"saw and recognized the same accused[-appellant] Larry
Lavapie and accused[-appellant] Santos San Pascual, Sr.,
standing [five] 5 meters away from the dead body of Sonny
Sierva."62 According to the trial court, Jenny Cordial's
description of the condition of Sonny Sierva's body when they
came upon it, ". . . is supported by the medical findings" as
stated in the autopsy report. 63 Furthermore, the trial court
observed that accused-appellants failed to show "any
improper motive on the part of the said witnesses to falsely
testify against them."64
While it is settled to the point of being elementary that on the
issue of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not
disturb the findings arrived at by the trial court, which was
certainly in a better position to rate the credibility of the
witnesses after hearing them and observing their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial; this rule stands
absent any showing that certain facts and circumstances of
weight and value have been overlooked, misinterpreted or
misapplied by the trial court which, if considered, would
affect the result or outcome of the case. 65 After a careful
review of the records of this case, particularly, the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the Court finds that
significant facts and circumstances were overlooked and
disregarded by the trial court, which, if properly considered,
would have affected the result of this case. The records show
that there are strong and cogent reasons that justify a
departure from the trial court's findings.
In the case at bar, prosecution eyewitness Domingo Samonte
testified that accused-appellant Larry Lavapie suddenly
hacked Sonny Sierva, hitting the latter on his neck; Samonte
demonstrated by pointing to the left side of his neck, thus:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:         All right. You said Larry Lavapie suddenly hacked
Sonny Sierva[,] was Sonny Sierva hit?
[WITNESS DOMINGO SAMONTE]:
"A:         Yes, sir.
"Q:         Where was he hit?
"A:         He was hit on his neck. (Witness pointing to the left
side of his neck.)
"Q:         After Sonny Sierva was hacked by Larry Lavapie[,]
what happened to Sonny Sierva, Mr. Samonte?
"A:         He fell down, sir."66 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing testimony of Samonte is belied by the physical
evidence that the deceased, Sonny Sierva sustained an
"incised wound at the neck, right side cutting the whole neck
structure with a portion of the skin only on the left side
holding it in place about 3 in. long."67 (Emphasis supplied.)
While Samonte categorically testified that Sonny Sierva was
hacked on the neck, at the same time, Samonte
demonstrated by pointing to the left side of his neck; the
autopsy report clearly revealed that Sonny Sierva was
hacked on the right side of his neck and not on the left side.
This material inconsistency, consequently, casts a serious
doubt on the testimony of Samonte. As we have ruled
in People vs. Vasquez,68 since the physical evidence on
record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, conclusions as to physical evidence
should prevail. It bears reiteration that physical evidence is
that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which rate
high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 69 In the light of
the physical evidence obtaining in this case, contrary to oral
assertions cannot normally prevail. Greater credence is given
to physical evidence as evidence of the highest order
because it speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses.70
Moreover, Samonte's claim that on March 29, 1989, at
around 11 p.m., he came from the dance hall in San Vicente
with Rogelio Sierva and the victim Sonny Sierva, 71 and that
while on their way, Rogelio and Sonny talked with some
ladies, then, Rogelio went ahead, leaving Domingo and Sonny
behind,72 was even contradicted by Rogelio's (one of
Samonte's alleged companions on that fateful night)
testimony on two (2) different instances, 73that on March 29,
1989, at about 11 p.m., he was with his son, Sonny Sierva
and his brother-in-law, Felix Buendia,74 without any reference
to the alleged presence of Samonte, thus:
"ROGELIO SIERVA'S FIRST TESTIMONY WHICH WAS TAKEN ON
AUGUST 16, 1990:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:         Mr. Sierva, on March 29, 1990 [should be 1989] at
about 11 o'clock in the evening, where were you?
[WITNESS ROGELIO SIERVA]:
"A:         We came from a dance at Sitio Buraburan, San
Vicente, Buhi, Camarines Sur.
"Q:         You said we, who were your companions during that
time[,] Mr. Sierva?
"A:         My son Sonny Sierva and my brother-in-law, Felix
Buendia.
"Q:         While you together with your late son Sonny Sierva
and your brother-in-law Felix Buendia were on your way
home from centro Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur, do you
recall of any incident that happened?
75
"A:         Yes, sir."  (Emphasis supplied.)
"ROGELIO SIERVA'S SECOND TESTIMONY WHICH WAS TAKEN
ON AUGUST 5, 1993:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q:         Mr. Sierva, where were you on March 29, 1989 at
about 11 o'clock in the evening?
[WITNESS ROGELIO SIERVA]:
"A:         I was then at San Vicente, Buraburan, Buhi,
Camarines Sur.
"Q:         Why did you happen to be there, Mr. Sierva during
the aforesaid date and time?
"A:         I accompanied my son to the dancing hall.
"Q:         Where was this dancing hall?
"A:         At Centro San Vicente, Bura-buran.
"Q:         What were you doing at the aforesaid place during
the aforesaid date and time?
"A:         I was watching the dance.
"Q:         Who were with you, if any, during that time, Mr.
Sierva?
"A:         My son and my brother-in-law.
"xxx           xxx           xxx"
"Q:         After watching the dance, what did you do, if any?
"A:         We went home.
"Q:         You said "we went home". Who were with you?
"A:         My brother-in-law and my son.
"Q:         What is the name of your brother-in-law?
"A:         Felix Buendia.
"Q:         While you were on your way home together with
your brother-in-law and your son Sonny Sierva, do you recall
of any incident that happened, Mr. Sierva?
"A:         Yes, sir."76 (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the foregoing testimonies of Rogelio Sierva, which
we find to be consistent on material points, further cast
serious doubt on the veracity of Samonte's testimony.
In addition, we find Samonte's response to the occurrence to
be contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior. If
indeed Samonte was present at the scene of the crime when
the victim, Sonny Sierva, whose hands were held at the back
by accused-appellant Santos San Pascual, Sr., was hacked on
the neck by accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, while the other
accused, numbering at least five (5), were apparently merely
observing the incident; it was then unnatural and against
common experience that Samonte ran away towards
some pilitrees and simply stayed there until dawn of the
following day, even as he had already seen a boy and a girl
discovered the fallen body of Sonny Sierva shortly after the
incident occurred. Considering the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, Jenny Cordial and Enrico Sierva, that after
discovering the dead body of Sonny Sierva lying prostrate on
the ground, and seeing the several accused standing near
the dead body of Sonny Sierva, they were able to run away
and go to Rogelio Sierva's house to report what they saw,
without the several accused following them or even
attempting to threaten them in any way, it appears that the
several accused posed no threat to Samonte, which could
have forced him to remain near some pili trees. It is also
perplexing why Samonte did not see, inform or seek the help
of Rogelio Sierva, Felix Buendia, Silvestre Sierva and an
unidentified person, who also happened to come upon the
dead body of Sonny Sierva while on their way to the hospital.
This Court finds occasion, at this point, to apply a long-held
doctrine that to be credible, testimonial evidence should
come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but it
should also be credible, reasonable and in accord with human
experience.77 While we take judicial notice that eyewitnesses
to a crime are often reluctant to report the incident, the Court
finds the response of Samonte to the occurrence contrary to
human experience, and his testimony not credible, thus, we
reject his testimony.
In view of the resulting lack of positive identification,
accused-appellants' conviction or acquittal would now
depend primarily on the sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence against them, based on the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, particularly, Jenny Cordial and Enrico
Sierva. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there
is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, prosecution witness Jenny Cordial
testified that she saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie, who
was holding a bolo, standing at a distance of about five (5) to
six (6) meters from the body of Sonny Sierva; 78while
prosecution witness Enrico Sierva testified that after he
recognized the man lying on the road as Sonny Sierva, he
saw accused-appellant Larry Lavapie with a bolo, standing by
the road, with accused-appellant Santos San Pascual,
Sr.79 The above circumstance, in the absence of other
corroborative evidence, does not satisfy the requirements
under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court nor point with
moral certainty to the guilt of accused-appellants. As we have
consistently held, the mere presence of accused-appellants
at the locus criminiscannot be solely interpreted to mean that
they committed the killing. The mere presence of accused
appellants at the crime scene, without more, is inadequate to
support the conclusion that, indeed, they committed the
crime.80We also observe that as testified by prosecution
witness Jenny Cordial, the bolo allegedly held by accused-
appellant Larry Lavapie was "shiny and sharp," and "clear
and clean."81 If indeed it was accused-appellant Larry Lavapie
who hacked Sonny Sierva on the neck, the bolo, which he
allegedly used in hacking Sonny Sierva, would not have been
"clear and clean." It should also be noted that aside from the
two (2) accused-appellants, there were at least five (5) other
persons who were at the scene of the crime, and who could
have been responsible for the killing, but unfortunately, they
were not recognized by prosecution witnesses, Jenny Cordial
and Enrico Sierva. According to Jenny Cordial, the other
persons, numbering about seven (7), who were at the scene
of the crime, standing still and facing the body of Sonny
Sierva, were only about a meter away from accused-
appellant Larry Lavapie, 82 but she was not able to recognize
them because "it was dark."83 In corroboration, Enrico Sierva
testified that both accused-appellants were at a distance of
about five (5) to six (6) meters away from him when he saw
them; and that he also saw other persons at the scene of the
crime but he was not able to recognize them because they
were in a "dark place."84
In resume, considering the evidence for the prosecution and
the attendant circumstances, the Court entertains reasonable
doubt as to the culpability of accused-appellants.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants are guilty of
the crime charged, the Decision dated December 16, 1996, of
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City in Criminal
Case No. IR-2639 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellants are ACQUITTED, and their immediate
release from confinement is ordered unless some other lawful
cause warrants their further detention.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this
Decision and to report to this Court immediately the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-52080 May 28, 1993
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner-
appellant,  the said warehouse was owned by the Philippine Tobacco
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
ADMINISTRATION (ACA), respondents-appellees.
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
annulment of respondent court's resolutions dated May 7,
1979 and November 23, 1979 rendered in CA-G.R. No.
59286-R.
The facts of the case, as established by record, being
undisputed, we quote with approval the following concise
summary thereof made by petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) in its brief filed before respondent
court:
On June 20, 1961, Fire Policy No. N-29704 (Exh. 533 and D)
was issued by the Property Insurance Fund of the defendant-
appellee Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to
cover the insurance of various grades of Virginia leaf tobacco
owned by the plaintiff-appellant and stored in Warehouse F
belonging to the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying
Corporation (PTFC & RC), located at Baesa, Novaliches,
Quezon City, with a declared value of P21,459.66 and for the
period from July l, 1961 to July 2, 1962.
On November 17, 1961 another Fire Policy No. N-30871
(Exhs. 534 and H) was issued by the Property Insurance Fund
of the GSIS to cover the insurance of various grades of
Virginia leaf Tobacco belonging to the plaintiff-appellant and
stored in the said Warehouse F, with the declared value of
P2,048,518.50 and for the period from September 30, 1961
to September 30, 1962.
The said insurance policies provide among other things that
in the event of loss, whether total or partial the amount
thereof shall be subject to appraisal and that the liability of
the GSIS, if established shall be limited to the actual loss,
subject to the applicable terms, conditions, warranties and
clauses of the policies, and in no case to exceed the amount
of the policies. This is the open policy clause of the said
insurance policies. (Exhs. 533-A-1 and 534-A-1).
On February 15, 1962 at about 7:20 in the evening thereof, a
fire occurred which burned the said Warehouse F and
practically all the tobacco stored therein. As already stated,
Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, then controlled by the
well known Harry Stonehill. The said warehouse is one of the
warehouses in the Baesa compound of the PTFC & RC.
Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant filed with the GSIS its fire
claim, Exhs. N-1 to N-4.
Pursuant to the open policy clause of the insurance policies,
the GSIS, as is the practice in the insurance business,
employed three insurance adjusters to ascertain the actual
loss suffered by the plaintiff-appellant. Said adjusters are the
Manila Adjustment Company, H. H. Bayne Adjustment
Company and the Allied Adjustment Company. The said
adjusters examined the records of the plaintiff-appellant and
of the Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying
Corporation and they employed two tobacco experts to assist
them in evaluating the loss of the plaintiff-appellant. Said
tobacco experts were Mr. George Flagg and Edrington S.
Penn. After the adjusters, with the assistance of Mr. Flagg
and Penn, had verified the records of the plaintiff-appellant
and of the PTFC & RC and had employed the hogshead metal
strap recovery method, the said adjusters rendered a report
on September 25, 1962 (Exh. 538) and a final report on
September 25, 1963 (Exhs. 29 to 529-F; also marked as Exhs.
Q to Q-6 and Exhs, 537 to 537-H). In said final report, the
adjusters recommend as the basis for the adjustment of the
appellant's claims the amount of P12,557,968.68. Their
verification showed that only 15,467 hogshead of tobacco of
various grades were inside the Warehouse F at the time of
the fire.
Plaintiff-appellant refused to accept the correctness of the
said report and so conferences were had between the
officials of plaintiff-appellant and the GSIS, together with the
adjusters, and as a result, the GSIS offered as final payment
of the appellant's claim the amount of P13,500,000.00. Said
offer was embodied in the letter of December 7, 1964 of then
General Manager Ramon A. Diaz, which read as follows:
Please be advised that we are now preparing partial payment
of the captioned loss in the amount of P2,295,873.21. We
shall effect payment of the balance (of the P13,500,000.00
proposed settlement) as soon as possible.
We sincerely believe that the amount of P13,500,000.00 is
just and fair indemnity for the loss. Inasmuch as that office
refused to execute the required Sworn Statement in Proof of
Loss, we wish to ask your written agreement to the following
conditions (which were embodied in our letter of July 17,
1964 to the Central Bank of the Philippines) before we remit
the above-mentioned partial payment and subsequent
payments of the balance:
1 In the event that ACA claims for additional indemnity (in
excess of the amount of P13,500,000.00) the burden of
proving such additional claim shall be its own responsibility.
2 That should ACA be able to present additional proof and
evidence for additional indemnity, the same shall be referred
for adjudication to a competent court.
(Ex. EE; Exh. 530; pp. 13-14, tsn, May 19, 1972)
Plaintiff-appellant accepted the offer and its acceptance is
embodied in the letter of Mr. Amado A. Lansang, Officer-in-
Charge, dated December 16, 1964. Thus, the body of said
letter, Exh. FF (also Exh. 631) reads as follows:
In attention to your letter of December 7th which was
transmitted to us by the Central Bank under its 1st
Indorsement dated December 14, 1964, please be advised
that we agree to the following condition set by you in your
aforesaid letters, viz: —
1 That in the event ACA claim further indemnity in excess of
the amount of P13,500,000.00, the burden of proving such
additional amount shall be of ACA's responsibility.
2 That ACA shall present additional proof and evidence for
further indemnity to a competent court for adjucation.
(pp. 14-16, tsn, May 19, 1972)
Pursuant to the said agreement of the parties, the GSIS paid
to the plaintiff-appellant the amount of P13,500,000.00. (p.
17, tsn, May 19, 1972).
Since it claims that its loss from the fire is P23,610,571.61,
the plaintiff-appellant filed the present action in Court,
praying among other things, that the defendant-appellee be
ordered to pay the difference of P10,110,571.61 (p.11 Record
on Appeal) (pp. 2-7, Brief for Defendant-Appellee
Government Service Insurance System; p. 83, Rollo)
ACA's complaint was filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 21, 1965 and docketed as
Civil Case No. 62683. On September 9,1975, the trial court
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. ACA appealed
to respondent Court of Appeals where the appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 59286-R. On December 29,1978
respondent court promulgated its decision affirming the
decision of the trial court (de Castro (P), Reyes, Sundiam, JJ.).
However, upon ACA's motion, respondent court issued a
resolution (penned by Justice Samuel Reyes who had taken
over from Justice Pacifico de Castro due to the latter's
promotion to the Supreme Court; and with the addition of
Justice Isidro Borromeo as third member) on May 7, 1979, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHREREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
Granted and consequently, the decision in this case dated
December 29, 1978 is REVERSED, thus, entitling plaintiff-
appellant the balance of P10,110,571.61 on the two (2) fire
insurance policies issued by defendant-appellee covering its
tobacco stocks stored at the PTFC & REC Warehouse "F". (p.
77, Rollo)
On July 16, 1979, GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of
the resolution of May 7, 1979, and on November 23, 1979,
the respondent court issued a resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition under the following assigned
errors.
I VII
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in its Resolution of May 7,
1979 and November 23, 1979 in making a wrong
interpretation and application of the term "additional proof
and evidence for further indemnity" as stipulated in the
agreement of the parties.
II
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in its Resolution of May 7,
1979 and November 23, 1979 in making a wrong
interpretation and application of the said term as originally
made by respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision of
December 29, 1978.
III
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in refusing, and thus
committed a grave abuse of discretion, to make a physical
count of the withdrawals of tobacco hogsheads indicated in
ACA's own evidence, Exhibits QQ to QQ-2024, in the face of
the repeated protestations of petitioner GSIS that the
allegation of ACA's witness, Patrocinio Torres, that the
withdrawals recorded in said exhibits totaled only 12,922
hogsheads is a brazen lie.
IV
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
withdrawals recorded in ACA's Exhibits QQ to QQ-2024
totaled 15,679 hogsheads of tobacco, and not just 12,922
hogsheads.
V hogsheads of tobacco were withdrawn from Warehouse "F"
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in totally ignoring and in
not finding that there were additional withdrawals of 1,994
hogsheads as shown in Exhs. 134 to 368.
VI
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that ACA's
evidence on the withdrawals is correct since such conclusion
is not supported by the evidence on record and adduced
during the trial.
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in making a glaring
misapprehension of fact in concluding that Joseph Singh
confirmed ACA's contention that the tobacco stocks were
intact at the time of the fire, as the evidence is clear that
what were brought out of the warehouse were the contents of
the tobacco hogsheads stored there.
VIII
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
whole contents of warehouse F were substituted with rotten
tobacco before the fire.
IX
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining its
original decision of December 29, 1978 and the decision of
the trial court.
X
Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the
complaint of respondent-appelle Agricultural Credit
Administration. (pp. 1-4, Brief for Petitioner-Appellant
Government Service Insurance System; p.160, Rollo)
The decisive issue involved in the case at bar is the quantity
of tobacco stored in Warehouse "F" at the time said
warehouse was totally destroyed by fire on February 15,
1962. Petitioner GSIS maintains that a total of 17,623
before the fire occurred. On the other hand, respondent ACA
contends that only 12,922 hogsheads of tobacco were
withdrawn.
Before resolving said issue, we shall dispose of an incidental
issue which appears to preoccupy both parties i.e. whether or
not the testimony of ACA's witnesses, Dorotea Toledo, Aurelio
B. de Jesus, Demetrio P. Tabije, and Patrocinio Torres, is "
additional proof of evidence" within the contemplation of the
letter of offer of GSIS dated December 7, 1964 and the letter
of acceptance of ACA dated December 16, 1964. The
discussion by the parties of said issue is a futile exercise in
semantics.
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines vests upon
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts (par. 5 sec. 4,
Art. VIII, Constitution). Even the provision in both the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions that are the rules of court
promulgated by the Supreme Court may be "repealed,
altered or supplemented" by the legislature does not appear
in the 1987 Constitution. Parties have, therefore, no
discretion or power to alter, modify or circumscribe the rules
on evidence to suit their particular needs in a case brought
before the courts.
We, therefore, rule that the admissibility of the testimony of The Court of Appeals, in its resolution of May 7, 1979, mainly Exhs. QQ, QQ-1 to QQ-35 320
ACA's witnesses must be determined by the rules of court. based its findings, that 120,270 hogsheads of tobacco were " QQ-79 to QQ-115 276
Since this testimony is relevant to the facts in issue and said stored in Warehouse "F" immediately before the fire, on " QQ-117 to Q-157 316
witnesses are competent witnesses, we hold that the said Exhibit GG, a summary of the withdrawals based on Exhibit " QQ-244 to QQ-323 691
testimony is admissible in evidence and we shall take it into QQ to Q-2022. The Court of Appeals should not have merely " QQ-325 to QQ-449 980
consideration in resolving the issue involved. relied on the summary but should have gone to the original " QQ-451 22
sources and the bases thereof and should have scrutinized " QQ-464 7
As the general rule the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368, the tally-out " QQ-467 to QQ-499 299
are binding upon this Court (De Gala-Sison vs. Manalo, 8 sheets for these are the primary documents recording each " QQ-503 to QQ-651 1,170
SCRA 595 [1963]; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 416 and every withdrawal of tobacco from the warehouse at the " QQ-653 5
[1970]; Evangelista & Co., vs. Santos, 51 SCRA 416 [1973]. time of delivery. These exhibits constitute the best evidence " QQ-655 to QQ-674 162
However, said rule admits of exceptions. The exceptions, as to prove the withdrawal of tobacco from the warehouse. " QQ-678 184
set forth in Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals (100 SCRA " QQ-704 to QQ-751 742
73 [1980]) are: Nor may the tally sheet summary be of any significance. The " QQ-756 to QQ-764 122
contents of the tally sheet summary were supposed to have " QQ-1022 52
been merely copied from the weighers' tally sheets prepared —
The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on Total 5,348
the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the right at the ramps. The inability of SVTPA to produce the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, original of the weighers' tally sheets or even explain its non-
surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is production creates the impression that no delivery was Crop Year 1957:
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; actually made. As testified to by the plaintiff's witness Maria
(4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) Malabanan, the weighers' tally sheets are prepared at the Exhs. QQ-36 to QQ-78 414
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and same time that the weighing and grading of the delivered " QQ-116 15
its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant tobacco are made in the presence of the respective grader " QQ-158 to QQ-201 404
and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals and the weigher of FVTR and PVTA. " QQ-202 to QQ-243 309
are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of " QQ-324 6
facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on xxx xxx xxx " QQ-450 7
which they are based; (b) the facts set forth in the petition as —
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not The best evidence available, therefore, is that which relates Total 1,155
disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of directly or has a direct connection with the deliver and which
facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of affirm the presence of the tobacco delivered at the FVTR Crop Year 1958:
evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. warehouse. (Santiago Virginia Tobacco Planters Asso., Inc. vs.
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, 31 SCRA 528, Exhs. QQ-654 2
This Court retains the power to review and rectify findings of 538-541 [1970]) " QQ-657 to QQ-678-B 60
fact of the Court of Appeals where said court manifestly " QQ-679 to QQ-703 295
overlooked, ignored, or misinterpreted certain facts or According to Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022, the withdrawals of " QQ-752 to QQ-755 1,150
circumstances of weight and significance (Carolina Industries, tobacco from Warehouse "F" during the period 1955 to 1959 " QQ-765 to QQ-767 800
Inc., vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, 97 SCRA 734 [1980]; People were as follows: " QQ-999 5
vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]). Considering that the findings " QQ-1003 to QQ-1021 185
of fact of the Court of Appeals conflict with those of the trial " QQ-1023 to QQ-1027 336
court, the exercise of our power of review over the decision Crop Year 1955 Number of Hogsheads
Exhs. QQ-452 to QQ-463 87 " QQ-1029 to QQ-1061 246
of the Court of Appeals is not unjustified. " QQ-1064 to QQ-1214 1238
" QQ-465 to QQ-466 13
" QQ-500 to QQ-502 23 ——
As aforementioned, the quantity, the quantity of tobacco " QQ-652 2 Total 4,317
delivered to Warehouse "F" is not dispute. The issue in " QQ-678-A 1
dispute is the quantity of tobacco withdrawn from said — Crop Year 1959:
warehouse before the fire of February 15, 1962. Withdrawals Total 26
of tobacco from Warehouse "F" are recorded in the Delivery
Order and Tally-Out Sheets, Exhibits QQ to Q-2022 and Exhs. QQ-1215 to QQ-1425 1,226
Exhibits 134 to 368. Crop Year 1956: " QQ-1426 to QQ-177 2,019
" QQ-1771 to QQ-2024 1,478
——— WHEREFORE, the resolution dated May 7, 1979, as well as
Total 4,723 that of November 23, 1979, of respondent Court of Appeals
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the complaint filed
(pp. 40-41, Rollo) in Civil Case No. 62683 is hereby DISMISSED.

Adding the withdrawal by crop years, we arrive at the SO ORDERED.

following figures:

Crop Year 1955 126 Hogsheads

Crop Year 1956 5,348 "
Crop Year 1957 1,155 "
Crop Year 1958 4,317 "
Crop Year 1959 4,723 "
————
Total 15,669 Hogsheads

(p. 41 Rollo)

Therefore, according to ACA's own documentary evidence,

15,669 hogshead of tobacco were withdrawn from the
warehouse from 1955 to 1959.

In addition thereto, Exhibits 134 to 368, delivery orders dated

August 13, to 16, 1959, indicate that were further
withdrawals of 1,944 hogsheads from the warehouse during
said period. 15,669 hogsheads plus 1,944 additional
hogsheads, gives us a total of 17,613 hogsheads of tobacco
withdrawn from the warehouse. Deducting 17,613 hogsheads
of tobacco from a total of 15,457 tobacco hogsheads inside
the warehouse at the time of the fire on February 15, 1962.
The documentary evidence on record, therefore, clearly
supports the position of petitioner GSIS.

The presentation of the testimony of ACA's witnesses,

Doroteo Toledo, Aurelio B. de Jesus, Demetrio P. Tabije, and
Patronicio Torres is nothing but a convoluted attempt of ACA
to minimize and neutralize the impact of Exhibits QQ to QQ-
2022 and Exhibits 134 to 368. Their testimony consisted
mainly in trying to explain away, vary, and modify the
meaning and significance of Exhibits QQ to QQ-2022 and
Exhibits 134 to 368. Testimonial evidence is easy of
fabrication and there is very little room for choice between
testimonial evidence and documentary evidence (Marvel
Building Corporation vs. David, 94 Phil. 376 [1954]).
Generally, documentary evidence prevails over-testimonial
evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RODRIGO
BALLENO y PERNETES, appellant. G.R. No. 149075,
August 7,2003
This is an appeal from the decision [1] dated January 17, 2001,
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Criminal Case No. 00-0408, finding accused-appellant
Rodrigo Balleno y Pernetes guilty of rape and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information reads:
That on or about the 18 th day of March 2000, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
stepfather of complainant Jacquelyn Balandra y Alzate, a
minor 13 years of age, with force and intimidation did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with complainant against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial on the merits ensued.
The facts of the case as established by the prosecution:
At 12:15 p.m. of March 18, 2000, thirteen year-old Jacquelyn
Balandra was with her step-sisters, Titin and Crismarie, inside
the room of their home located at Old Air Academy, ATO, Don
Carlos Village, Pasay City. Appellant Rodrigo Balleno, the live-
in partner of Jacquelyns mother, Lorna, entered the room and
ordered Titin and Crismarie to go out. [3] When they were
alone, appellant sat at the side of the bed where Jacquelyn
was lying down. Then he touched her thighs, placed her
hands on her back and covered her mouth. He then removed
Jacquelyns shorts and panties, lay on top of her and kissed
her lips. He took off his shorts and inserted his penis into
Jacquelyns vagina who tried to push him away.[4]
Jacquelyn went to her friends, Toochie, Nanette and Mylene
and related to them what happened. They accompanied her
to the local barangay where she reported the incident. On the
same day, barangay officials Luis Alintana, Efren Bais and
Rogelio Basagre arrested appellant Rodrigo Balleno.
[5]
 Jacquelyn executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay [6] and
submitted herself to a medical examination.[7]
Dr. Estela Guerrero Manalo, a physician assigned at the Child
Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, Manila,
conducted a physical and genital examination on Jacquelyn
on March 20, 2000. Her examination showed that the victims
external genitalia and hymen were normal. [8] There was no
evidence of spermatozoa. She, however, claimed that it was
possible that the victim was sexually abused even if the
result of the examination showed a normal genital. [9]
In his defense, appellant denied the charge against him, and
claimed that on March 18, 2000, he had a drinking spree at
home with his cousin Lito Balleno and Sammy Alzate, uncle of
Jacquelyn, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. They consumed three
bottles of gin.[10] He admitted that he kissed Jacquelyn
because the latter took care of his youngest child. Thereafter,
Jacquelyn pushed him away and left. He fell asleep and was
awakened by the barangay officials who arrested him.
Appellant further alleged that the crime was imputed to him
because Jacquelyn wanted her real father, Charlie, to be
reunited with her mother.[11]
After trial, judgment was rendered against appellant, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the
qualifying circumstance of stepparent relationship between
the accused and the complainant, as alleged in the
information, this Court finds the accused guilty for simple
rape.
It would appear therefore that accused Rodrigo Balleno y
Pernetes and the mother of the victim were not married to
each other and therefore not the stepfather of the victim,
hence, the Court finds the accused guilty of simple rape and
hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua. He is likewise
ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00
and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to the
victim Jacquelyn Balandra y Alzate with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In this appeal, appellant contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT
HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant assails Jacquelyns credibility by referring to the
inconsistency between her testimony and her sworn
statement. In her statement before the police, Jacquelyn
stated that there was no insertion of the penis inside her
vagina Hindi ko naramdaman na naipasok niya kasi po sa
may itaas po ng pepe ko ito naramdaman. Sa loob ng labi ng
ari ko.[13] In open court, however, she testified that appellant
inserted his penis inside her vagina. [14]
It has been held that some discrepancies between the
affidavit and the testimony of the witness in open court do
not necessarily impair the credibility of her testimony, for
affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often
incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries
by the investigating officer.[15] An affidavit is not a complete
reproduction of what the declarant has in mind because it is
generally prepared by the administering officer and the
affiant simply signs it after it has been read to him. In any
case, open court declarations take precedence over written
affidavits in the hierarchy of evidence. Unlike written
statements, there is flexibility on the part of the questioner to
adapt his questions to elicit the desired answer in order to
ferret out the truth.[16]
In the case at bar, appellant has not shown any material
discrepancy between the sworn statement and testimony of
the victim that would seriously taint her credibility and
warrant a reversal of the trial courts factual findings. Even
assuming for the sake of argument, that there was no penile
penetration of private complainants vagina because her legs
were not spread apart, it has been consistently ruled that the
mere touching of the labia of the woman consummates the
crime of rape.[17] Hence, the fact that no laceration and no
ruptured hymen were found in this case, does not necessarily
negate rape. The fact that the hymen was intact upon
examination does not, likewise, belie rape, for a broken
hymen is not an essential element of rape, nor does the fact
that the victim remained a virgin exclude the crime. In a
prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be
considered is the occurrence of the rape, which the
prosecution in this case was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt.[18] In any event, a medical examination is not essential
in the prosecution of a rape case. A medical examination and
a medical certificate are merely corroborative in
character. They are not indispensable requirements for
conviction, for what matters greatly is the clear, unequivocal
and credible testimony of the victim.[19]
Similarly, it must be stressed that the absence of
spermatozoa in the victims sex organ does not disprove rape.
It could be that the victim washed or urinated prior to her
examination, which may well explain the absence of
spermatozoa.[20]
Appellant contends that he could not have possibly raped
Jacquelyn inside a room in a thickly populated squatters area
wherein a commotion can be easily heard by their neighbors
and where houses were built close to each other. The
argument deserves scant consideration. Lust is no respecter
of time and place. Several times, we held that rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in parks,
along the roadsides, in school premises, in a house where
there are other occupants, in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping, and even in places
which, to many, would appear unlikely and high risk venues
for its commission.[21]
Moreover, appellants allegation that there was no force or
intimidation because private complainant did not suffer
injuries and her clothes were not torn is not well taken. The
testimony of Jacquelyn established the fact that, through
force and intimidation, appellant pinned her hands at her
back, covered her mouth and succeeded in abusing her. The
absence of external signs of physical injuries does not prove
that rape was not committed, for proof thereof is not an
essential element of the crime of rape.[22] Settled is the rule
that the force employed in rape need not be irresistible so
long as it is present and brings the desired result. All that is
necessary is that the force be sufficient to fulfill its evil end,
or that it be successfully used; it need not be so great or be
of such a character that it could not be repelled. [23] Indeed,
the degree of force or intimidation required for the act to
constitute rape is relative, and must be viewed in the light of
the complainant's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the offense.[24]
In the case at bar, Jacquelyns testimony is clear, candid,
straightforward and consistent. She had positively identified
appellant as her malefactor. No ulterior motive was offered to
explain why the victim would concoct a story charging
appellant with the crime of rape. Jacquelyn testified:
Q: As a matter of fact, you do not treat your stepfather, the
suspect in this case, as your father?
A: I consider him as my father.
Q: Was it true that before this incident happened on March
18, 2000 your mother Lorna and your stepfather has a
serious quarrel?
A: No, sir.
Q: Your father Charlie Balandra is not the friend of your
stepfather, am I correct?
A: Yes, they are friends.
Q: They have quarreled before this incident, am I correct?
A: None.[25]
Time and again, we have consistently held that when a Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise
woman, more so if a minor, states that she has been raped, known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which reads:
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. For no woman, least of all a child, would weave a ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is
tale of sexual assaults to her person, open herself to committed.
examination of her private parts and later be subjected to
public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape
and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. 1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under
[26]
 Hence, we find no basis to depart from the well-settled any of the following circumstances:
rule that trial courts assessment of the credibility of
complainants testimony is entitled to great weight, absent a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
any showing that some facts were overlooked which, if
considered, would affect the outcome of the case. [27] ART. 266-B. Penalties.- Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
The Information alleged that appellant was the stepfather of preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
the victim. This was inaccurate. The word step, when used as
prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to Lastly, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
blood relationship and is indicative of a relationship by P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be
affinity.[28] Since appellant and the victims mother were not reduced to P50,000.00.[35] Civil indemnity is separate and
married, no such relationship by affinity existed between distinct from the award of moral damages which is
appellant and the victim. The records indicate that the automatically granted in rape cases. [36] Moral damages in the
victims mother, Lorna, and the appellant were live-in amount of P50,000.00 are additionally awarded without need
partners, the former, in fact, lawfully married to Charlie of pleading or proof of the basis thereof. This is because it is
Balandra, the victims father. A stepfather-stepdaughter recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and
relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, i.e., the necessarily resulting from the odiousness of the crime to
appellant should have been legally married to Lorna, the warrant per se the award of moral damages.[37]
victims mother. A stepfather is the husband of ones mother
by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
person spoken of is the offspring. [29] A stepdaughter is a Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal
daughter of ones spouse by previous marriage or the Case No. 00-0408, finding appellant Rodrigo Balleno y
daughter of one of the spouses by a former marriage.[30] Pernetes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
In People v. Fraga,[31] we held that although the rape of a perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party
person under eighteen (18) years of age by the common-law P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the
spouse of the victims mother is punishable by death, this MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity in the amount of
penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant x x x P75,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00.
because his relationship was not what was alleged in the
information. What was alleged was that he is the stepfather Costs de oficio.
of the complainant. The filiation or kinship with the accused
SO ORDERED.
must be alleged in the information as part of the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. [32] Therefore,
the failure to accurately allege the relationship between
appellant and his victim in the information bars his conviction
of rape in its qualified form. [33] The appellant, having been
referred to as the stepfather of the victim in the information,
is thus auspiciously spared from the supreme punishment of
death by this technical flaw.[34]
Thus, the trial court correctly convicted appellant of simple
rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
[G.R. Nos. 146284-86. January 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ABDUL
MACALABA y DIGAYON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Abdul Macalaba y Digayon (hereafter ABDUL) was
charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, with violations of the Presidential Decree No. 1866 [1];
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code [2]; and Section 16 of
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236, 1237
and 1238, respectively. The accusatory portions of the
informations in these cases read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 1236
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San
Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused without the
required permit/license from the proper authorities, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control one (1) caliber .45 pistol with
Serial No. 909904, and one (1) magazine with five (5) live
ammunition thereof.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 1237
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San
Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two (2) ONE THOUSAND
PESOS bill with Serial Numbers BG 021165 and BG 995998,
knowing the same to be forged or otherwise falsified with the
manifest intention of using such falsified or forged
instruments.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 1238
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San
Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused without
being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control one (1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag of
methamphetamine hydrochloride shabu weighing 226.67
grams (3 medium sized transparent plastic bags and 1 big
heat-sealed transparent plastic bag).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
The three cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch 31
of said court. Upon his arraignment, ABDUL entered in each
case a plea of not guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1
Generoso Pandez, PO3 Ernani Mendez, Police Inspector
Anacleta Cultura and Police Inspector Lorna Tria. ABDUL was
the sole witness for the defense.
SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal
Investigation Detection Group (CIDG), testified that on 12
April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major R Win Pagkalinawan ordered
the search of ABDUL, alias Boy Muslim, based on a verified
information that the latter was driving a carnapped Mitsubishi
olive green car with Plate No. UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher
in San Pedro, Laguna. Two teams were formed for the
search. The first was headed by Major Pagkalinawan, with
SPO4 Aberion and five others as members; and the second
was led by Capt. Percival Rumbaoa, with SPO1 Pandez and
PO3 Mendez as members.[6]
Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded
to Barangay Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, on board a car and a
van. They went to ABDULs apartment where he was
reportedly selling shabu, but they learned that ABDUL had
already left. While looking for ABDUL, they saw the suspected
carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro,
Laguna, going towards the Poblacion. When it stopped due to
the red traffic light, the CIDG officers alighted from their
vehicles. Capt. Rumbaoa positioned himself at the passenger
side of the suspected carnapped car, while Major
Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car. SPO1 Pandez, with
PO3 Mendez beside him, went straight to the driver and
knocked at the drivers window. ABDUL, who was driving the
car, lowered the glass window. SPO1 Pandez introduced
himself as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked ABDUL
to turn on the light and show them the cars certificate of
registration.[7]
When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black
Norinco .45 caliber gun[8] inside an open black clutch/belt bag
placed on the right side of the drivers seat near the gear. He
asked ABDUL for the supporting papers of the gun, apart
from the cars certificate of registration, but the latter failed to
show them any.[9] When ABDUL opened the zipper of the
clutch/belt bag, the CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic
sachets of what appeared to be shabu. They likewise found a
self-sealing plastic bag which contained the following items:
two fake P1,000 bills, a list of names of persons, a magazine
and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber gun. They confiscated
the gun, the shabu, and the fake P1,000 bills and thereafter
brought ABDUL to the CIDG office.[10]
PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of
SPO1 Pandez.[11]
The two P1,000 bills were found to be counterfeit after an
examination conducted by Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura,
[12]
 a document examiner at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba,
Laguna. The white crystalline substance contained in the four
small plastic bags was subjected to physical and laboratory
examination conducted by Police Inspector Lorna Tria, a
Forensic Chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV,
Camp Vicente Lim. Her findings[13] were as follows: (a) the
three small plastic sachets weighed 29.46 grams, while the
big plastic sachet weighed 197.21 grams, or a total weight of
226.67 grams; (b) representative samples taken from the
specimens thereof were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug; and (c) the
improvised tooter and the rolled aluminum foil with residue
found in the self-sealing plastic bag were also positive of the
presence for shabu residue.
As expected, ABDUL had a different story to tell. He testified
that on 12 April 1999, between 6:50 and 7:00 p.m., he was
driving a borrowed Mitsubishi Galant Car with Plate No. UPV
501 somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna. With him was Rose,
his live-in partner, whom he fetched from Angeles City,
Pampanga. He had borrowed the car from his friend
Ferdinand Navares, who instructed him to return it in front of
the latters store at San Pedro Public Market.[14]
ABDUL was about to park the car when a man knocked hard
on the glass window on the drivers side of the car and
pointed at the former a .45 caliber pistol. Another one who
was armed with an armalite rifle positioned himself in front of
the car, while the third one positioned himself near the
window on the passenger side and pointed a gun at his live-in
partner Rose.ABDUL then lowered the cars window. The man
near him opened the door, held him, and told him to alight.
When the man asked him whether he was Boy Muslim, he
answered in the negative. The same man opened the back
door of the car and boarded at the back seat. Rose remained
seated at the front passenger seat.  [15]
The other men likewise boarded the car, which was
thereafter driven by one of them. While inside the car, they
saw a .45 caliber pistol at the edge of the drivers seat. They
asked him whether he had a license. He showed his gun
license and permit to carry. After taking his gun, license, and
permit to carry, they tried to remove his belt bag from his
waist, but he did not allow them.[16]
Upon reaching the headquarters, ABDUL learned that these
people were C.I.S. agents. There, he was told to surrender
the belt bag to the officer who would issue a receipt for it. He
did as he was told, and the money inside his belt bag was
counted and it amounted to P42,000. They then got his
money and the cellular phone, which was also inside the bag,
together with some other pieces of paper. They also took
another cell phone from the car. He was never issued a
receipt for these items.[17]
Thereafter, a man entered the office with a white plastic bag
allegedly taken from the borrowed car. ABDUL denied
ownership over the plastic bag. That same man then told him
that it contained shabu. ABDUL and Rose were detained at
the headquarters. The next morning, Rose was allowed to get
out; and in the afternoon, he was transferred to San Pedro
Municipal Jail.[18]
After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1236 and 1237 for violations of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 and Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively, due to insufficiency of evidence. However, it
convicted him in Criminal Case No. 1238 for violation of
Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, [19] and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P500,000, as well as the costs of the suit.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, ABDUL interposed the present
appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him
for violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, despite insufficiency of
evidence; and (2) admitting the evidence presented by the
prosecution although it was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights.
In his first assigned error, ABDUL argues that the prosecution
failed to prove the material allegations in the
information. The information charges him, among other
things, that without being authorized by law, [he] did then
and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control methamphetamine
hydrochloride. However, the prosecution did not present any
certification from the concerned government agency, like the
Dangerous Drugs Board, to the effect that he was not
authorized to possess shabu, which is a regulated drug.Thus,
his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In his second assigned error, ABDUL asserts that he was not
committing a crime when the CIS agents boarded his car,
searched the same and ultimately arrested him. He was
about to park his borrowed car per instruction by the owner
when he was harassed by the operatives at gunpoint. The
gun seen was properly documented; thus, there was no
reason for the CIS agents to bring him and his companion to
the headquarters. The shabu allegedly found in the car was
brought in by somebody at the time he was under
interrogation. It was taken in violation of his constitutional
right against illegal search and seizure. Being a fruit of a
poisonous tree it should not have been admitted in evidence.
Moreover, the members of the CIDG merely relied on the
information received from an anonymous telephone caller
who said that ABDUL was driving a carnapped vehicle. They
had no personal knowledge of the veracity of the
information. Consequently, there was no legal basis for his
warrantless arrest.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) maintains that ABDUL had the burden of proving that
he was authorized to possess shabu, but he failed to
discharge such burden. Therefore, it is presumed that he had
no authority; consequently, he is liable for violation of Section
16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. The OSG likewise refutes ABDULs argument that
there was a violation of his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a
negative allegation, or that a negative averment is an
essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden
of proving the charge. However, this rule is not without an
exception. Thus, we have held:
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct
proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the
knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon
him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a
negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by
established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily
be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendants knowledge or control. For
example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on
a certain business without a license (as in the case at bar,
where the accused is charged with the selling of a regulated
drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a
matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must
establish that fact or suffer conviction. [20]
In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had
no license or authority to possess methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug, has been fairly
indicated by the following facts proven by the testimonies of
the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL was
driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was
caught, and he appeared to be healthy and not indisposed as
to require the use of shabu as medicine; (b) the contents of
the sachets found in ABDULs open clutch bag inside the
car were prima facie determined by the CIDG officers to
be shabu; and (c) the said contents were conclusively found
to be shabu by the forensic chemist. With these established
facts, the burden of evidence was shifted to ABDUL. He could
have easily disproved the damning circumstances by
presenting a doctors prescription for said drug or a copy of
his license or authority to possess the regulated drug. Yet, he
offered nothing.
And now on the second issue. The Constitution enshrines in
its Bill of Rights the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose.[21] To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also
ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained
in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[22]
It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that
reasonable searches and seizures are not proscribed. If
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the guidelines prescribed by the Constitution
and reiterated in the Rules of Court, the search and seizure is
valid.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is
not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in
plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented
search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry search); and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules
of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit,
and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.[23] Another exception is
a search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure,
which is authorized under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.[24]
The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure
conducted on, ABDUL constitute a valid exemption from the
warrant requirement. The evidence clearly shows that on the
basis of an intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle
was driven by ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug
pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around
looking for the carnapped car.[25] They spotted the suspected
carnapped car, which was indeed driven by ABDUL. While
ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the
registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four
transparent sachets of shabu.[26] These sachets of shabu were
therefore in plain view of the law enforcers.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within
the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence
in plain view must comply with the following requirements:
(a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.[27]
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the
circumstances above discussed that all the elements of
seizure in plain view exist in the case at bar. Thus, the
warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL, as well
as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his constitutional
rights.
ABDULs sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated. We have
time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, just like alibi,
is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible shabu in Criminal Case No. 1238 was proved beyond
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a reasonable doubt since ABDUL knowingly carried with him at
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a the time he was caught 226.67 grams of shabu without legal
bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to authority. There being no modifying circumstance proven,
prevail.[28] the proper penalty pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised
Penal Code isreclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the
On the issue of credibility between ABDULs testimony and trial court, including the fine, is, therefore, in order.
the declarations of the CIDG officers, we hold for the
latter. As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses Court of San Pedro, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 1238
especially when they are police officers who are presumed to convicting appellant ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON of the
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs
be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing him
proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
the accused, the presumption of regularity in the ofP500,000 and the costs of the suit, is hereby affirmed in
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the toto.
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over
accuseds self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having Costs de oficio.
been framed.[29] ABDUL miserably failed to rebut this
SO ORDERED.
presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses.
Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under Section 16 of Article III, in relation to
Section 20 of Article IV, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by P.D. Nos. 44, 1675,
1683, and 1707; Batas Pambansa Blg. 179; and R.A. No. 7659
(now further amended by R.A. No. 9165). These sections
provide as follows:
SEC.16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -- The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture
of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -- The penalties
for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be
applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
following quantities:
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride.
G.R. No. 140550            February 13, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,  further relation to paragraph 16, article 14 of the Revised
vs.
EDGAR AYUPAN, GERRY HABLONA (at large), accused,
EDGAR AYUPAN, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the evidence does not establish how the aggression
commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify a
killing to murder. In the present case, the lone prosecution
witness did not see how the attack on the victim was
initiated. Hence, the crime is only homicide, not murder.
The Case
Edgar Ayupan appeals the August 12, 1999 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City (Branch 33) in
Criminal Case No. 32949, finding him guilty of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated April 17, 1989 and signed by Second
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Irene S. Panigbatan, charged
appellant as follows:
"That on or about the 27 th day of June, 1984 in the
Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating, with an
unidentified companion, with treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strength, and a decided purpose to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab
several times the victim FRANCISCO MENDOZA using the
bladed weapon the accused were provided at that time,
thereby hitting him and inflicting upon FRANCISCO MENDOZA
several stab wounds on different parts of his body which
caused his death."2
With the assistance of counsel, 3 appellant pleaded not guilty
when arraigned on November 28, 1995. 4 After trial, the RTC
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby decrees that:
"1. Accused Edgar Ayupan is guilty of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized by paragraph 1, Article 248 in its
Penal Code, as proven beyond reasonable doubt;
"2. Accused Edgar Ayupan is meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by reason of the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance;
"3. Accused Edgar Ayupan is directed to indemnify the heirs
of deceased-victim Francisco Mendoza [in] the amount of
P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;
"4. The Director of [the] Bureau of Correction, Muntinlupa
City is directed to credit in favor of the accused Edgar
Ayupan the duration of his preventive detention reckoned
from 24 January 1995 until the promulgation of this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the facts is summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General, as follows: 6
"On June 26, 1984, prosecution witness Helen Batislaong
accompanied by her younger sister, Juvy, and her cousin,
Joseph, arrived at the dance hall of Crossing Hamod, Batad,
Iloilo Province at around 9:00 p.m. At around 12:00 o’clock
midnight, Batislaong heard a commotion inside the dance
hall. Concerned that her cousin might be involved in the
fight, since he was no longer near her, Batislaong ran to the
center of the dance floor. She did not see her cousin but
instead, it was the sight o a bloodied Francisco Mendoza lying
down on the floor which confronted her. Francisco Mendoza,
who is also her relative since her mother and his father are
cousins was being stabbed repeatedly in the chest by
appellant Edgar Ayupan who was kneeling over the victim.
Batislaong knows appellant since they both reside in Batad.
Batislaong saw everything clearly since she was only four (4)
meters away from the attacker and the victim. Furthermore,
there was a light bulb brightly illuminating the scene.
"Horrified, Batislaong shouted at appellant, demanding why
he was stabbing Francisco Mendoza when as far as she knew
her relative had done no wrong. She shouted for people to
help Mendoza. But since most of the people ran away,
nobody assisted them. Appellant and his companions ran
away after stabbing the victim. Finally, the barangay captain
came and investigated the incident. Weak after witnessing
the stabbing incident, Batislaong was brought home by the
barangay captain.
"Batislaong was not able to report the incident immediately
because at that time she was nervous and afraid. A week
after the incident, she was able to relate the circumstances
surrounding the killing to Atty. Teodosio. Atty. Teodosio told
her that they ha[d] two other witnesses to the killing which
he felt were quite sufficient in prosecuting appellant. But he
told her that he would call her if the need arises.
"Dr. Noel C. Posadas, a retired rural health physician and a
resident of Batad, conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of
the victim. He testified that the victim received three (3) stab
wounds on the chest, the third of which was fatal. The
immediate cause of death was shock and hemorrhage."
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, presented the following version
of the facts:7
"Accused Edgar Ayupan testified that he did kn[o]w the
victim but he did not stab him. On June 26, 1984, he and his
companions Gerry Hablona, Roquito Penuela and Efren
Hablona were at the dance party. Before entering the dance
hall, the barangay tanod at the gate, frisked him and his
companions. Once inside the hall, he invited a lady to dance
with him. At said instance, the victim slapped his hand. When
he turned his head, he saw the victim and the latter
immediately boxed him. Hit at the bridge of his nose, he lost
his consciousness. Gerry Hablona and Roquito Penuela
brought him out of the dance hall when he regained his
consciousness. He did not know Helen Batislaong; he did not
leave his barangay. He only learned of the charge against
him when he was arrested on June 21, 1995.
"Roquito Penuela corroborated the testimony of accused
Ayupan that before they entered the dance hall on June 26,
1984 at Barangay Hamod, they were bodily frisked. At about
1:00 early morning of June 27, 1984, accused Ayupan
approached a woman. At said instance, the hand of the x x x
victim slapped the hand of the accused. Accused Ayupan
then boxed the latter on the nose. Accused fell down. When
the victim went away and walked towards the center of the
dance hall, somebody met him and stabbed him many times
and [a] commotion took [place] and people were running. At
that time, accused Ayupan was still lying down. He carried
the accused out of the dance hall and went home when [the]
accused regained his consciousness."
Ruling of the Trial Court
Giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Helen
Batislaong, the trial court held that the witness, having been
at the locus criminis had the opportunity to see and observe
the specific details of the crime.
The RTC disbelieved appellant’s defense of denial and
rejected the evidence of good moral character offered by the
defense witnesses. It held that this defense was based purely
on conjecture and might have even been fabricated, since it
was unsubstantiated by concrete details. 8 Further, it ruled
that the flight of appellant after the commission of the crime
was an indication of his guilt.
Hence, this appeal.9
The Issue
Appellant raises this lone assignment of error for our
consideration:
"The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant
Edgar Ayupan of the crime of murder despite the insufficient,
unreliable testimony of prosecution lone witness Helen
Batislaong."10
This Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be
convicted only of homicide.
Main Issue:
Credibility of Lone Witness
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in relying on the
testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Helen Batislaong,
because her testimony was not corroborated by other
witnesses. We disagree.11
It is well-settled that the testimony of a lone witness – if
found by the trial court to be positive, categorical and
credible – is sufficient to support a conviction. This is so,
especially if the testimony bore the earmarks of truth and
sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a
straightforward manner.12 Corroborative evidence is
necessary only when there are reasons to suspect that the
witness bent the truth, or that his or her observation was
inaccurate.13 Evidence is assessed in terms of quality, not
quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted. 14Therefore, it is not
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the
testimony of a lone witness.15
In the case at bar, the prosecution could have presented two
other witnesses, Rodrigo L. Demayo and Noel T. Estebal, but
both died before they could testify. 16 Be that as it may, the
trial court found Batislaong’s narration of the incident
straightforward and categorical. She testified thus:
"ATTY TEODOSIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
May it please the honorable court.
Q         Miss Batislaong, you said you are a resident of Batad,
Iloilo[;] since when have you been a resident of Batad, Iloilo?
A         Since I was small.
Q         Do you know the accused in this case Edgar Ayupan?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         If he is present inside this courtroom will you please
point to us Edgar Ayupan?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         Where is he?
A         (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom
who upon being asked his name, x x x answered Edgar
Ayupan)
Q         On the evening of June 26, 1984, do you remember
where were you?
A         I was at the dance hall.
COURT:
(to witness)
Where is that dance hall?
THE WITNESS:
At Hamod, Batad, Iloilo.
x x x           x x x           x x x
Q         In going [to] the dance hall from your house, [did] you
have any companions?
A         My younger sister and my cousin.
x x x           x x x           x x x
Q         What was your purpose in going to the dance hall?
A         To watch the dance.
Q         At about 12:00 o’clock midnight[,] June 26, 1984,
could you tell us if there was anything unusual that happened
in that dance hall?
A         There was a commotion.
Q         Where were you when you noticed that there was a
commotion?
A         I was inside the dance hall on the bench.
Q         And because you notice that there was a commotion,
what did you do if any?
A         I ran [to] the center of the dance hall to see x x x what
happened.
Q         Why did you r[u]n towards the middle of the dance
hall to see what happened?
A         Because I ha[d] to see x x x who were fighting
because my cousin was no longer with me.
Q         And what did you observe when you proceeded to the
middle portion of the dance hall?
A         I saw Francisco Mendoza lying [down while] being
stabbed by Edgar.
Q         What is the family name of this Francisco?
A         Mendoza.
Q         And what is the family name of this Edgar?
A         Ayupan.
Q         This Edgar Ayupan whom you said was stabbing
Francisco Mendoza, was he the same Edgar Ayupan whom
you identified a while ago as the accused in this case?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         And do you know what kind of weapon was being used
by Edgar Ayupan when you saw him [stabbing] Francisco
Mendoza?
A         A knife.
Q         What was the position of Francisco Mendoza when he
was stabbed by Edgar Ayupan?
A         He was lying [down].
Q         Where was he lying [down]?
A         At the center of the dance hall.
Q         And how about this Edgar Ayupan[,] where was he
situated in relation to Francisco Mendoza when he stabbed
Francisco Mendoza while the latter was lying on the ground?
A         Near the knee and he was kneeling.
x x x           x x x           x x x
Q         How many times did Edgar Ayupan stab Francisco
Mendoza?
A         Many times.
Q         Now what did you do when you saw Edgar Ayupan
kneeling somewhere on the knee portion of the body of
Francisco Mendoza, at the same time stabbing Francisco
Mendoza?
A         I shouted why he stabbed Francisco Mendoza because
he ha[d] no fault.
Q         In what part of the body of . . Were you able to see if
Francisco Mendoza was hit when he was stabbed for several
times by Edgar Ayupan?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         And could you tell the Court in what part of the body
of Francisco Mendoza was hit when he was stabbed for
several times by Edgar Ayupan?
A         On the chest.
Q         Now after you shouted considering that you saw Edgar
Ayupan [stab] Francisco Mendoza for several times what next
happened?
A         I shouted for help [for] Francisco Mendoza.
Q         Then what happened next?
A         Nobody help[ed] us because most people ran away.
Q         After Edgar Ayupan stabbed Francisco Mendoza for
several times[,] what [happened next]?
A         He ran away.
Q         Aside from – do you know if Edgar Ayupan had other
companions?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         And where [were] his companions at that time that he
was stabbing Francisco Mendoza?
A         Just near him.
Q         Now you said – what happened to the companions of
Edgar Ayupan after Edgar Ayupan ran away?
ATTY. LAUREA:
Incompetent, your honor, he would be incompetent as to
what happened to the companions of Edgar Ayupan after he
ran away.
COURT:
What happened to the companions after he ran away?
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
What happened to the companions of Edgar after Edgar
Ayupan ran away?
A         They ran away together.
Q         Now after Edgar Ayupan and his companions ha[d]
left, what did you do?
A         I shouted and cried for help for Francisco Mendoza.
Q         Then what next happened when you were there?
A         When I was there[,] the barangay captain also went
there and [saw] who was there and he was left there and I
was brought by the barangay captain, because I was crying[;]
since I [could] not walk, they just brought me home.
Q         Were you able to reach your house?
A         Yes, sir, I was brought by my younger sister and my
cousin.
Q         Could you tell the Court how were you able to
recognize Edgar Ayupan as the person whom you saw [stab]
for several times Francisco Mendoza, considering that it was
night?
A         Because I already knew him and he is also from
Batad."17
Moreover, Batislaong had a clear view of the stabbing
incident as shown by the following:
"ATTY. TEODOSIO:
How far were you from Edgar Ayupan and Francisco Mendoza
when you saw Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco Mendoza?
A         Four (4) meters.
Q         And where were you situated in relation to Francisco
Mendoza who was lying on the ground when he was stabbed
by Edgar Ayupan?
A         Somewhere on the head of Francisco Mendoza.
x x x           x x x           x x x
Q         What was a condition of the light at that time in that
dance hall when you saw Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco
Mendoza?
A         The light was bright.
Q         And from where [did] this brightness come x x x?
THE WITNESS:
Because the light [was] near x x x them because they [were]
in the center of the dance hall.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
That would be all for the witness.
x x x           x x x           x x x
That would be all."18
Based, on the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the RTC. Time and time again, we have
held that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to
the determination of the trial court because of its unique
advantage of observing them firsthand; and of noting their
demeanor, conduct and attitude.19 It is aided by
various indicia that could not be readily seen on the records.
The "candid answer, the hesitant pause, the nervous voice,
the undertone, the befuddled look, the honest gaze, the
modest blush, or the guilty blanch"20 – these reveal if the
witness is reciting the whole truth or merely weaving a web
of lies and deceptions.
Positive Identification
Well-settled is the rule that the positive identification of the
accused – when categorical and consistent and without any ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter
– prevails over alibi and denial which are negative and self-
serving, undeserving of weight in law.21
In the present case, there is no doubt that Batislaong’s
testimony positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of
the crime. First, she had a clear view of the stabbing incident,
as she was standing just four (4) meters from the victim.
Moreover, the dance hall was sufficiently illuminated. As a
witness to a violent incident, she strove to see the
appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the
manner in which it was committed. 22 Second,the
medicolegal’s testimony23 and Medical Report24 corroborated
her recollection of the specific details of the crime – the
stabbing of the victim on the chest several times, the use of a
knife, and the position of the assailant. A detailed testimony
acquires greater weight and credibility when confirmed by
autopsy findings.25
The fact that Batislaong is a relative of the victim does not
necessarily taint her testimony. We have held that blood
relationship between a witness and the victim does not, by
itself, impair the former’s credibility. On the contrary,
relationship may strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural for
an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than
the real culprit.26
On the other hand, while appellant denies being the
perpetrator of the crime, he admits that he was in the dance
hall where the victim was stabbed to death. His claim that he
was unconscious at that particular instant does not persuade.
The denial by appellant is inherently weak and must fail vis-
à-vis Batislaong’s positive declaration affirming that he was
at the scene of the crime and was its perpetrator. 27 It was not
physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis.28 More so, undisputed is his admission that, prior to
the stabbing incident, his hand was slapped by the victim
when the former asked a lady for a dance.29
When there is no evidence to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by an improper
motive, the presumption is that such motive was absent, and
that the witness’ testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.30 Between appellant’s denial and the witness’ positive
testimony, there is no doubt that the latter is entitled to
credence.
Delay in Reporting
In a futile attempt to discredit Batislaong, appellant argues
that since she did not immediately report the incident to the
police, her testimony deserves scant consideration. We are
not convinced.
We have held that different people react differently to a
given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard
form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful experience. 31Delay in a witness’
reporting of a crime to police authorities, when adequately
explained, does not impair that witness’ credibility. 32
In the present case, Batislaong explained that, initially, she
was nervous and afraid to report the incident. 33 In fact, she
had to be brought home, as she was weak from crying after
witnessing the stabbing incident. 34 Thus, it was quite
understandable that she did not immediately report the
identity of the offender after the startling occurrence, which
became an even more traumatic experience because she
was related to the victim. 35Moreover, there is no rule that the
suspect in a crime should be immediately named by a
witness.36
Appellant’s Flight
The crime happened in June 1984, and the indictments
against appellant commenced only in 1995. In addition, he
claims that the prosecution has no record to show that the
facts of the case have been preserved. We disagree.
First, as correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, 37 the
relevant documents had been preserved before the case was
archived. Second, appellant is to blame for the delay in the
prosecution of this case. A review of the records reveals that
an Order for his arrest was issued on July 24, 1984. 38 For
failure to serve the warrant of arrest, another Order was
issued on November 22, 1984, implementing an alias warrant
of arrest against him.39Because he remained at large, another
alias warrant of arrest was issued on August 20, 1987. 40
Thereafter, the case was archived on November 29, 1989, in
view of several failed attempts to apprehend him. It was only
in 1995 – ten years after the commission of the crime – that
he was arrested by the police, although in connection with
another crime attributed to him.
In criminal law, flight means the act of evading the course of
justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or
detention or the institution or continuance of criminal
proceedings. The unexplained flight of the accused may, as a
general rule, be taken as evidence tending to establish
guilt.41
In the present case, it is interesting to note that as soon as
the Information was filed and the corresponding warrant of
arrest issued, appellant could not be found in Batad, resulting
in the archiving of the case. It is thus plain that he left the
place to avoid arrest and prosecution. 42 If it were true that he
never left Batad, as he claims, he should have been
apprehended by the police a long time ago. Indeed, his flight
to Masbate is an indication of his guilt.
Treachery
In his Reply,43 appellant argues that if he was responsible for
the death of the victim, he would be guilty only of homicide,
because the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
proven.
We are convinced. Well-settled is the rule that treachery
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as
conclusively as the killing itself. 44 Any doubt as to the
existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the
accused.45 There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof, tending directly
and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.46 To appreciate treachery, two conditions must be
present: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
for retaliation and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of
the means of execution.47
The RTC explained that the crime had been attended by
treachery because, at the moment of its commission,
appellant stabbed the victim who was lying on the ground. It
rationalized that such a situation propelled the method of
attack to a successful accomplishment of the criminal act
without exposing the accused to any possible retaliation from
the victim.48
True, the essence of treachery is the swiftness and the
unexpectedness of an attack upon an unsuspecting and
unarmed victim who has not given the slightest
provocation.49 However, the suddenness of the attack does
not by itself suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if
the purpose is to kill, so long as the decision is sudden and
the victim’s helpless position is accidental. 50 In order to
appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a
continuous aggression, as in the present case, it must be
shown to have been present at the inception of the attack. 51
We hold that the second requisite was not sufficiently
established by the prosecution. It was not able to show that
appellant had deliberately adopted the attack, considering
that it was executed during a commotion and as a result of
it.52 The lower court failed to consider that the lone
eyewitness could not have had any knowledge of it. She
arrived at the scene sometime after the stabbing started;
thus, she could not testify on whether there was provocation
on the part of the victim.53
It must be pointed out that appellant and the victim had an
altercation prior to the stabbing incident. Indeed, the attack
could have been done on impulse as a reaction to the latter’s
actual or imagined provocation. Such provocation negated
the presence of treachery, even if the attack may have been
sudden and unexpected.54
Further, the mere fact that, according to the testimony of the
medicolegal officer, several stab wounds were inflicted on the
victim – who was either sitting or lying down – did not show
treachery unless there was evidence that such form of attack
had purposely been adopted by the accused. 55 Also, the fact
that a bladed weapon was used did not per se make the
attack treacherous.56
Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the
aggression commenced, treachery cannot be
appreciated.57One cannot substitute mere suppositions for a
hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence, as the trial court
apparently did.58 Since the lone prosecution witness failed to
see how the attack had been initiated on the victim, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
applied.59 Thus, appellant can be convicted only of
homicide,60for which the imposable penalty under the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering
the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
proper penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.61
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium, as minimum to 14 years eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. The civil indemnity awarded by the RTC
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 138933. October 28, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JERRYVIE
GUMAYAO y DAHAO @ BIVIE, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision [1] dated March 31, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, convicting appellant Jerryvie Gumayao of the crime
of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of his victim Concordio
Sulogan in the sum of P50,000.
The appellant was charged in an Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 8437-97 which reads:
That on or about the 28 th day of December, 1996, in the
evening at Purok 2, barangay Kalasungay, municipality of
Malaybalay, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill by means of treachery, with the
use of a sharp bladed instrument, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and stab
CONCORDIO SULOGAN, inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused the instantaneous death of
CONCORDIO SULOGAN; to the damage and prejudice of the
legal heirs of CONCORDIO SULOGAN in such amount as may
be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Republic Act No. 7659. [2]
Upon his arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution[3]
Concordio Sulogan and his wife Wilma resided at Zone 2,
Kalasungay, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Concordio was a corn
farmer by profession and tilled his own land, which was about
5.8 hectares. The couple had three children.[4]
At around 10:00 to 10:45 p.m. on December 28, 1996,
Diocrly[5] Binayao was standing by the Syre Highway at
Kalasungay, City of Malaybalay. He and Concordio Sulogan,
were watching a disco party being held at
the plaza of Kalasungay, which was about thirty
meters[6] from where they were. The plaza was adorned with
brightly colored blinking lights. There was a gate surrounding
the area of the party place, and an area where the
partygoers had to pay their entrance fees.[7]
Concordio and Diocrly sat down beside each other, cross-
legged, by the side of the asphalt pavement and talked as
they watched the ongoing party.[8] An electric light post,
which was about ten meters away, illuminated the street.
Also about ten meters from where Concordio and Diocrly
were sitting was a nearby store, across the street and
opposite to the plaza, which was likewise lighted.[9] The store
was owned by SPO1 Ersie Paano.[10]
Jerryvie Gumayao approached the two and joined them. In a
squatting position, he sat beside Concordio, to the latters
right.
Edmund Paano had known Concordio since he was seven
years old.[11] They were first cousins[12] and lived near each
other in Zone 2, Kalasungay. That fateful night, Edmund was
with his other cousin Kenneth in their aunties house, which
was located near the plaza.[13] Edmund and Kenneth decided
to go to the plaza to check out the ongoing disco party. On
the way, they passed by the Syre highway and saw Diocrly,
Concordio, and Jerryvie, who were sitting at the edge of the
asphalt road.[14] Edmund walked towards them and shook
Concordios hand, and thereafter proceeded to the disco
place.[15]
When Edmund and Kenneth left, Jerryvie suddenly took out a
seven-and-a-half-inch-long knife[16] with his right hand and
stabbed Concordio on the left side of the chest, and again on
the abdomen, also on the left side. [17] Concordio fell, mortally
wounded, on his back, the knife still embedded in his body.
Jerryvie hurriedly left the scene, going towards the direction
of their house in Zone 4.[18] Diocrly walked away, and sought
help to aid the fallen Concordio, in the direction of the nearby
store.[19]
Edmund and Kenneth did not enjoy the disco because there
were no ladies there for them.[20] They stayed for only about
fifteen minutes and headed back in the direction of the
highway.[21] They saw Concordio lying on his back, bloodied
all over.[22] Edmund ran towards the direction of his aunties
house and informed the victims brother, Christopher, that
Concordio was stabbed.[23] Edmund went back to the scene of
the crime, and found that Concordio had already been
brought to the hospital. He later learned that Concordio had
succumbed to his injuries and had died in the hospital.
SPO1 Paano was fast asleep inside his house. He was
suddenly awakened by one of his daughters and his wife,
who informed him that a stabbing incident had occurred right
in front of his residence. [24] He immediately proceeded to the
area, and saw the victim lying prostrate on the ground,
beside the road.[25] A crowd had by then already gathered
around the crime scene. SPO1 Paanos brother Edmund
revealed that the persons who were with the victim before
the incident were Diocrly and Jerryvie. [26] Because he was
more interested in apprehending the suspect and getting on
with the investigation, SPO1 Paano instructed the persons
present to bring the victim to the hospital.[27]
SPO1 Paano immediately went to Diocrlys house and inquired
about the incident. Diocrly told him that the person
responsible for the stabbing of Concordio was Jerryvie.
[28]
 SPO1Paano then proceeded to look for Jerryvie in Purok 4,
Kalasungay, City of Malaybalay, where the latters father
lived. Jerryvie was not there, but his father accompanied
SPO1 Paano to his residence, which was about fifty meters
away.[29] Jerryvie was nowhere to be found.
At around 6:00 a.m. the next day, December 29, 1996, SPO1
Paano went to the Malaybalay Police Station to verify if the
incident had already been recorded in the police blotter. At
around 7:10 that same morning, SPO1 Boy Solito brought
Jerryvie to the Malaybalay Police Station. [30]
Wilma Sulogan, the victims widow, testified that her husband
sustained two stab wounds on the chest, above his left
nipple.[31] Her husband was buried on December 31, 1996.
They spent P1,500 for the embalmment, and P30,000 for the
wake. The coffin was a donation from the barangay. [32] She
also suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish upon her
husbands untimely death.
The Evidence for the Defense[33]
Jerryvie denied the charges against him. He testified that he
was a long-time resident of Kalasungay, City of Malaybalay.
[34]
 He was married to Josalyn Binayao, and they lived with his
mother.
Jerryvie testified that he and a certain Popoy Helacio were
enemies.[35] The misunderstanding apparently came about
when Jerryvies cousin drove without permission the
motorcycle of Helacios uncle, about two years ago.
[36]
 On December 24, 1996, Jerryvie had an encounter with
Helacio.[37]
At 7:00 p.m. of December 28, 1996, Jerryvie was in his
aunties house, which was about 2 kilometers away from the
plaza. He and three others were having a drinking spree.[38] At
around 9:00 p.m., Jerryvie and his companions thereafter
proceeded to the plaza to participate in the ongoing disco.
Upon entering the area, Jerryvie came face to face with
Helacio, who challenged him to a fight.[39] Jerryvie gamely
asked where, and Helacio replied, On the portion outside by
(sic) this disco place.[40]
A fight ensued. Jerryvie punched Helacio, and the latter fell.
When he got up, Jerryvie saw that he was armed with a knife
and declared, We will kill you now. [41] Jerryvie replied, Wait for
me and ran towards his mother-in-laws house. When he
returned, he saw that Helacio had summoned two more
companions, Edmund and Concordio. The three men
surrounded him. Sulogan was able to take hold of him, twist
his head, and say, We will kill him. [42] Jerryvie struggled to
free himself, and was able to do so. He then took hold of
Concordio and stabbed the latter with the knife, which he had
tucked by his waist. Jerryvie testified that he could no longer
remember how many times he stabbed Concordio.[43]
Jerryvie fled from the scene and went to his godfather,
George. He told George that he had stabbed a person in the
plaza whose identity he did not know.[44] Jerryvies father
thereafter arrived and told him to surrender to the
authorities. Jerryvie decided to follow his fathers advice and
surrendered to Boy Solito, the husband of his mothers niece,
who also happened to be a policeman. On Solitos advice,
Jerryvie surrendered the following morning where he was
brought to the CID to be investigated.
Jerryvie also testified that prosecution witness Diocrly
Binayao was his brother-in-law, and that the two of them had
differences because the latter did not want him to marry her
sister in the first place. [45] He insisted that he did not intend to
kill anyone that fateful night, but when Concordio held him,
he had no choice but to stab the latter. [46]
Lilency Liman-ay testified that Jerryvie was her nephew and
that she had known him since he was a small boy. His
misunderstanding with Helacio started during a drinking
spree at the house of Lilencys niece. Lilencys son, along with
Jerryvie, apparently used a motorcycle parked near the
house. The motorcycle was owned by Helacios relative,
Arlene. Arlene got angry, and Helacio joined in the fray.
On December 29, 1996, Lilency woke up very early and found
out that the authorities were looking for Jerryvie. She assisted
the latters mother in the search, and they found Jerryvie in
Lumayagan, near the BFI Nursery at Kalasungay, about two
kilometers away from the latters residence.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
The trial court rendered a decision on March 31, 1999, finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Jerryvie Gumayao guilty
of murder and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659.
Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender which is not offset by any generic aggravating
circumstance, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
his victim Concordio Sulogan in the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[47]
The Case on Appeal
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court
contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE ANENT THE STABBING
INCIDENT;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AND HIS WITNESS;
III
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF MURDER AS
THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS ONLY HOMICIDE. [48]
According to the appellant, his passive stance, when Helacios
group confronted him, proved the fact that he was not the
unlawful aggressor as the prosecutions evidence tends to
establish. He was surrounded by three men; Helacio was
armed with a knife, and Concordio was backing up the
latter. The use of a knife in inflicting the fatal blow on
Concordio was justified, as it was reasonable under the
circumstances then prevailing. The appellants also points out
that he was clearly outnumbered and literally pushed to the
limit, without any means to choose what kind of weapon with
which to defend himself. Popoy Helacio, who was
accompanied by the victim, was determined to attack the
appellant, owing to the long-standing feud between them.
That the appellant acted in self-defense in stabbing the
victim is clear and convincing, as the prosecution did not
present rebuttal witnesses to assail the same. The claim of
self-defense is further strengthened by the fact that the
appellant voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after the
stabbing incident. In fact, the trial court had no other
recourse but to accept the fact of voluntary surrender when
the prosecution admitted the same during the trial.
The appellant further insists that there was a fight between
the appellant and Helacio prior to the stabbing incident. Thus,
when the appellant returned to the scene, armed with a
knife, the victim and his companions were forewarned of an
impending danger. Thus, should the Court render a verdict of
conviction, the crime committed by the appellant would only
be homicide.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that
the appellants claim that he acted in self-defense when he
stabbed the victim is belied by the location, nature and
number of wounds inflicted. The appellant stabbed the victim
on the chest and the abdomen, and the wounds proved to be
fatal. Furthermore, the appellants attack on the victim was
sudden, without affording opportunity on the part of the
victim to defend himself. As such, the appellant committed
murder, not homicide.
The Courts Ruling
The appellants contentions are devoid of merit.
The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-defense is
an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate.
[49]
 In a case where self-defense is invoked by the accused,
the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove, with clear
and convincing evidence, the following essential requisites:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or
prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself. There can be no complete or
incomplete self-defense unless the accused proves unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. [50] The accused must rely
on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of
the evidence of the prosecution. This is so because in
pleading self-defense, the accused thereby admits to the
killing and can no longer be exonerated of the crime charged
if he fails to prove the confluence of the essential requisites
of self-defense.[51]
The appellant failed to discharge his burden.
First. After stabbing Concordio, the appellant fled from
the situs criminis. Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and
negates the plea of self-defense.
Second. Although the appellant surrendered to the police
authorities early the next day, he failed to inform them that
he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim.
Moreover, the records show that the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Malaybalay issued a subpoena on January 10, 1997,
requiring the appellant to submit his counter-affidavit, but
the latter failed to do so. It was only during the trial that the
appellant, for the first time, invoked self-defense.
Third. The appellant stabbed the victim twice on the chest,
and both wounds proved fatal. As correctly contended by the
prosecution, the nature and the number of the wounds of the
victim negate the appellants claim that he acted in self-
defense. On the contrary, they prove that the appellant was
determined to kill the victim.[52]
Fourth. As found by the trial court, the appellant made
inconsistent and conflicting statements. During the direct
examination, the accused told the court that it was only with
Popoy Helacio that he was to have a confrontation. It was
only when he went back to the plaza with a knife that he
found that Helacio had already summoned two companions.
[53]
 However, when the court questioned the appellant how he
and Helacio met that fateful night at the disco entrance, the
appellants version of the story changed, such that the victim
was already a participant in the fray, even before the
appellant went back to the plaza to get a knife.[54] Thus, the
appellants testimony is inconsistent on material points, and
cannot be given credence.
Case law has it that the trial courts findings of facts, its
calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses, its
assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of the
parties, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said
findings, are accorded great weight, and even conclusive
effect, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance
which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.
This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to
observe, at close range, the conduct, demeanor and the
deportment of the witnesses as they testify.[55] Upon careful
review of the records of the case, the Court finds no cogent
reason to overrule the trial courts finding that the appellant
stabbed the victim in cold blood.
An eyewitness account, coupled with the fact of the victims
death, are sufficient proof of the guilt of the appellant,
beyond cavil of doubt, for the crime of murder. [56] In this case,
the appellant failed to show any ill or improper motive on the
part of Diocrly to impute the crime of murder to the
appellant, for which the latter could be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. As this Court had the occasion to state
in People v. Sibonga:[57]
This Court has consistently ruled that the testimony of a
single prosecution witness, as long as it is positive, clear and
credible is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of
conviction. Corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a
prerequisite to the conviction of the accused. Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality
of their testimonies.[58]
The trial court found Diocrly to be a credible witness. He
testified that he was very sure that Jerryvie was Concordios
assailant, since the scene of the crime was adequately
lighted:
Q: Now, considering that, that was 10:45 in the evening
already of December 28, 1996, how were you able to really
recognize Jerryvie to be the one who stabbed Concordio?
A: I saw him.
Q: That is why, why were you very sure that, that was he who
stabbed?
A: The moon was bright.
Q: Other than the moon was bright what light [sic], if there
was any?
A: The electric lights coming from the electric bulb of the
store and the disco dance area.
Q: Now you mentioned of [the] street lights a little while ago,
what kind of light installed in that street light [sic]?
A: A big lamp.
Q: Have you seen a very big lamp along Fortich Street, is that
a big lamp also at Kalasungay?
A: Yes.[59]
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder,
qualified by treachery under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. There is treachery in the commission of the crime
when (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; (b) the offender consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method and form
of attack employed by him. Even a frontal attack may be
considered treacherous when sudden and unexpected, and
employed on an unarmed victim who would not be in a
position to repel the attack or to avoid it.[60]
In this case, the victim was merely sitting on the pavement at
the edge of the road, chatting with a friend as they watched
an on-going disco party. The appellant joined them, without
giving the victim any inkling as to the tragedy that was about
to befall the latter. Suddenly, and without warning, the
appellant pulled out the knife hidden in his waist, and
stabbed the victim twice, on vital parts of the body, ensuring
the latters immediate death. Thus, the appellant killed the
victim in a treacherous manner.
Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. [61] As such, the
circumstance of voluntary surrender will not affect the
penalty to be meted on the appellant, since under Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua must be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the crime.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

The trial court correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim

civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000, which needs no
other proof than the death of the victim. [62] The trial court
was, likewise, correct in not awarding actual damages to the
said heirs, considering that there were no receipts to support
them.[63] The heirs are, nevertheless, entitled to temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.[64]
Finally, the trial court was correct in not awarding damages
for lost earnings. The prosecution merely relied on Wilma
Sulogans self-serving statement, that her husband was
earning more or less P40,000 a year as a corn farmer.
Compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages,
and requires adequate proof thereof. For loss of income due
to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds
average income as well as proof of average expenses. The
award for lost income refers to the net income of the
deceased; that is, the total income less average expenses.
No proof of the victims average expenses were adduced in
evidence; as such, there can be no reliable estimate of lost
earnings.[65]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, in Criminal Case
No. 8437-97 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
Jerryvie Gumayao y Dahao is found GUILTY of murder,
qualified by treachery, penalized under Republic Act No.
7659, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The appellant
is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Concordio
Sulogan P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral
damages; and P25,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172322 and as a consequence of which, this Court hereby sentences
Appellee, him to suffer the mandatory penalty of death and to
Present: indemnify the offended party in the amount of P75,000.00
  and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Panganiban, C.J.,  
Puno, SO ORDERED.[4]
Quisumbing,  
Ynares-Santiago, Owing to the imposition of the death penalty, the case was
Sandoval-Gutierrez, elevated to the Court for automatic review. Pursuant,
- versus - Carpio, however, to the ruling in People v. Mateo,[5] the case was
Austria-Martinez, referred to the Court of Appeals for evaluation in a Resolution
Corona, dated September 7, 2004.[6]
Carpio-Morales, In his appeal, appellant alleged that
Callejo, Sr.,  
Azcuna, 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
Tinga, DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT WOULD EXCULPATE HIM
Chico-Nazario, FROM THE CRIME OF RAPE.
Garcia,  
Velasco, Jr., JJ. 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED UPON THE
RENE SANTOS, ACCUSED THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH.
Appellant. Promulgated:  
September 8, 2006 In its Decision [7] dated October 19, 2005, the appellate court
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------- x affirmed the judgment of conviction and, in addition to the
  P75,000.00 civil indemnity imposed, ordered appellant to pay
DECISION P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
  damages.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:  
  The prosecutions version of the incident narrates that
  sometime between July 17 and 23, 1999, AAA was playing at
For allegedly sexually assaulting 5-year-old AAA, Rene Santos the northern portion of xxx Bridge, xxx, Pampanga, when she
was charged with Rape in an Information[1] alleging was taken by appellant and brought to his house, which is
  about one kilometer away from AAAs residence. While inside
That on or about in the afternoon of between 17th and 23rd the house, appellant took off the clothes of AAA and had
of July 1999 in the [B]arangay of xxx, [M]unicipality of xxx, sexual intercourse with her.[8] The victim felt pain and her
[P]rovince of Pampanga, Philippines and within the vagina bled.[9]
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named  
accused, RENE SANTOS, with lewd designs and by means of After a complaint was lodged with the barangay and the
deceit, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, police authorities, AAA was brought to
unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having carnal the Jose B. Lingad Memorial Regional Hospital in San
knowledge with AAA, 5 years of age, against her will. Fernando, Pampanga, where she was examined. [10] The
  Medico Legal O.B. Gyne Report indicated multiple superficial
Contrary to law. healed lacerations.[11] The victim, who was already six years
  old when she testified in court,[12] positively identified the
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the appellant during the trial and testified on the affidavit she
charge.[2] Trial thereafter ensued, after which the Regional executed before the police officers of xxx, Pampanga.[13]
Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, rendered  
judgment[3] imposing the death penalty thus: Appellants version of the incident is one of denial and
  alibi. He testified that he was the driver of BBB who lived in
WHEREFORE, on the basis of all the foregoing, the Court finds Barangay xxx, xxx, Pampanga which is a kilometer away
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of from his place in Sulipan. [14] Appellant usually leaves his
Rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
house at 7:00 a.m. and stays at his workplace up to 7:30
p.m. or sometimes even up to 10:00 p.m. when necessary.[15]
 
His job was to drive his employer whenever the latter had
appointments in Manila.[16] When BBB had no appointments,
he drove a passenger jeepney plying San Fernando,
Pampanga and Malolos, Bulacan, a route which passed
Sulipan.[17] On July 17, 1999, appellant drove his employer to
the Wheels Motor Shop at E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon
City leaving Apalit at 9:00 a.m. and returning at 8:30
p.m. On July 18, 1999, appellant left his house at 6:00
a.m. arriving at his workplace at 7:30 a.m. and from there he
delivered surplus bumpers to Malinta, Manila.[18] On July 19,
20, 21 and 22, 1999, appellant plied the San Fernando-
Malolos route on board his passenger jeepney. [19]On July 23,
1999, appellant went to Makati leaving xxx at 10:00 a.m.,
returning only at 10:00 p.m.[20]
 
On July 30, 1999, between 6:30 to 7:30 a.m.,[21] he was
sweeping the ground in front of his house when a white car
pulled over.[22] The vehicles occupants introduced themselves
as police officers and asked him if he was Rene Santos.
[23]
 Thereafter, he was taken to the police headquarters for
questioning. Once they arrived at the headquarters, he was
detained and remained in detention up to the time of his trial.
[24]
 
We have examined the evidence on record and find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. We accord great respect on the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, for the trial judge observes the behavior and
demeanor of the witnesses in court. His evaluation or
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and of testimony
acquires greater significance in rape cases because from the
nature of the offense, the only evidence that can oftentimes
be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the victims
testimony.[25]
 
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an
important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely
on because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude
during the direct and cross-examination by counsel. [26] It is
likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim
is generally given full weight and credit, more so, if she is a
5-year-old child as in this case. The revelation of an innocent
child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as
her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of
a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her
complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled
to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill Q And where is that house?  
motive.[27] A In Sulipan, sir. COURT
    Questioning
The trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the Q In Apalit, Pampanga?  
testimony of AAA who was only six years old when she A Yes, sir. Is this Rene Santos inside this courtroom?
narrated the sordid details of her ravishment, viz:    
  Q You said that this Rene Santos raped you, what WITNESS
FISCAL PINEDA particular actuations did he do? Answering
Questioning A He inserted his penis, sir.  
    Yes, sir.
If Rene Santos is inside this courtroom, can you point at him? Q Where?  
  A Here, sir, in my vagina. Q Point to him?
WITNESS   A There he is, sir.
Answering INTERPRETER  
    INTERPRETER
Yes, sir. Witness pointing to her private organ.  
    Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who when
Q Please point at him? Q Where did that happen? asked gave his name as Rene Santos.[28] (Emphasis and italics
A There he is, sir. A In their house, sir. supplied)
    Counsel for the defense attempted, albeit futilely, to impeach
INTERPRETER Q In what portion of his house? the credibility of the victim. [29] We have held time and again
  A Inside their house, sir. that testimonies of rape victims who are young and
Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who [when]   immature, as in this case, deserve full credence considering
asked gave his name as Rene Santos. Q You said that Rene Santos inserted his penis into that no young woman, especially one of tender age, would
  your vagina, what did you feel? concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
Q Between the period of July 17 to 23, 1999, do you A I felt pain, sir. private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject
remember where were you?   to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire
A Yes, sir. Q When he inserted his penis into your vagina did he have to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. It is
  any clothings (sic)? highly improbable for an innocent girl of tender years like the
Q Where were you then? A . . . victim, who is very naive to the things of this world, to
A . . .   fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself but also
  ATTY. VIOLA to her family. Stated succinctly, it is beyond the mind-set of a
Q You said you know this Rene Santos, why do you know   six-year old child, like the offended party herein, to fabricate
him? Leading, Your Honor. a malicious accusation against appellant if the crime did not
A Because he raped me, sir.   truly transpire.[30] Verily, when a guileless girl of six credibly
  COURT declares that she has been raped, she has said all that is
Q Can you remember when was that?   necessary to prove the ravishment of her honor.[31]
A Yes, sir. Reform the question.  
  FISCAL PINEDA Appellants reliance on the corroboration by his wife of his
Q When? Questioning alibi cannot overturn the clear and categorical declarations of
    the victim identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime.The
WITNESS When he inserted his penis into your vagina, what was his corroboration should, furthermore, be received with caution
Answering appearance? coming as it does from appellants spouse whose emotional
I do not know when, sir.   ties and interest in his acquittal cannot be gainsaid.Indeed, it
  WITNESS has even been held that some wives are overwhelmed by
FISCAL PINEDA Answering emotional attachment to their husbands such that they
Questioning   knowingly or otherwise suppress the truth and act as a
  It was hard, sir. medium for injustice to preponderate. [32]
Do you recall where?    
A In their house, sir. Q What was hard? In addition to his defense of alibi, appellant further faults the
  A His penis, sir. trial court with acting as the prosecutor and the judge at the
same time[33] for allegedly initiating and propounding the
questions, short of supplying the desired answer from the
witness.[34]
 
The argument is tenuous. As has been pointed out in People
v. Guambor:[35]
 
The trial judge is accorded a reasonable leeway in putting
such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial
judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both law and the
facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of
their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a
result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness
which might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put
such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a
sound opinion as to the ability and willingness of the witness
to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine
a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to
test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material
testimony though that testimony may tend to support
or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. It cannot be taken against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one
party. (Emphasis supplied)
 
The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the
courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child
witness.[36] Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on
Examination of a Child Witness, [37] child witnesses may testify
in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by
the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will
further the interest of justice.[38] It must be borne in mind that
the offended party in this case is a 6-year old minor who was
barely five when she was sexually assaulted. As a child of
such tender years not yet exposed to the ways of the world,
she could not have fully understood the enormity of the
bestial act committed on her person.Indeed
 
Studies show that children, particularly very young children,
make the perfect victims. They naturally follow the authority
of adults as the socialization process teaches children that
adults are to be respected. The childs age and developmental
level will govern how much she comprehends about the
abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is
too young to understand what has happened to her, the
effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension
of the consequences. Certainly, children have more
problems in providing accounts of events because
they do not understand everything they
experience. They do not have enough life experiences from
which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear,
taste, smell and feel.Moreover, they have a limited
vocabulary. With her limited comprehension, the child
could not have a perfect way of relating that she had
been sexually abused.[39] (Emphasis and italics supplied)
 
The record discloses that the questions propounded by the
judge were intended to elicit the truth from the child
witness. This perceived undue inquisitiveness of the judge did
not unduly harm the substantial rights of the appellant. In
fact, it is only to be expected from the judge who, with full
consciousness of his responsibilities could not, and should
not, easily be satisfied with incompleteness and obscurities in
the testimonies of the witness.[40]
 
While judges should as much as possible refrain from
showing partiality to one party and hostility to another, it
does not mean that a trial judge should keep mum
throughout the trial and allow parties to ask questions that
they desire, on issues which they think are important, when
the former are improper and the latter immaterial. If trials are
to be expedited, judges must take a leading part therein, by
directing counsel to submit evidence on the facts in dispute
by asking clarifying questions, and by showing an interest in
a fast and fair trial. Judges are not mere referees like those of
a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the results of a
game; they should have as much interest as counsel in the
orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, calling
attention of counsel to points at issue that are overlooked,
directing them to ask the question that would elicit the facts
on the issues involved, and clarifying ambiguous remarks by
witnesses. Unless they take an active part in trials in the
above form and manner, and allow counsel to ask questions
whether pertinent or impertinent, material or immaterial, the
speedy administration of justice which is the aim of the
Government and of the people cannot be attained. [41]
 
Appellant also invites the Courts attention to what he
perceives as uncharacteristic behavior of the victim who,
according to him, should be traumatized after undergoing the
onslaught of sexual molestation. [42] He insists that it is
unnatural for the 6-year old victim to go to school the day
following her supposedly shocking experience. He also points
out that she was answering not as seriously as one who has
been sexually molested.[43]
 
The contention is neither novel nor persuasive. There is no
standard form of behavior that can be expected of rape
victims after they have been defiled because people react
differently to emotional stress. [44] Nobody can tell how a
victim of sexual aggression is supposed to act or behave
after her ordeal.[45] Certainly, it is difficult to predict in every
instance how a person especially a 6-year old child, as in this
case would react to a traumatic experience. [46] It is not proper
to judge the actions of rape victims, especially children, who
have undergone the harrowing experience of being ravished
against their will by the norms of behavior expected under
such circumstances from mature persons.[47] Indeed, the
range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be
captured even by calculus. [48] It is thus unrealistic to expect
uniform reactions from them.[49] In fact, the Court has not laid
down any rule on how a rape victim should behave
immediately after her ravishment.[50]
 
In his attempt to extricate himself from criminal liability,
appellant further insinuates that his sons may be the possible
perpetrators of the felony saying that it could have been
Rene Santos, Jr. or Michael Santos who could have raped the
victim considering that AAA and her sister CCC allegedly
complained earlier that they were raped by the two brothers.
[51]
 
If at all, the foregoing suggestion that his sons may have
been the malefactors who sexually assaulted the victim and
her sister only succeeds in underscoring his moral depravity
and his capacity to commit the crime. Only one whose degree
of wickedness plumbs the deepest depths of criminal
perversity would have no qualms of laying the onus of his
guilt even on his own offspring and, worse, blacken the
memory of one of them who is already dead in his endeavor
to exculpate himself from the consequences of his felonious
acts.
 
Much less convincing is appellants proposition that ill feelings
and ill motives of the victims mother impelled the filing of the
charges against him. Ill-motives become inconsequential
where there are affirmative or categorical declarations
establishing appellants accountability for the felony. [52] We
have, furthermore, observed not a few persons convicted of
rape have attributed the charges against them to family
feuds, resentment or revenge.[53] However, as borne out by a
plethora of cases, family resentment, revenge or feuds have
never swayed us from giving full credence to the testimony
of a complainant for rape, especially a minor who remained
steadfast and unyielding throughout the direct and cross-
examination that she was sexually abused.[54] It would take a
certain degree of perversity on the part of a parent,
especially a mother, to concoct a false charge of rape and
then use her daughter as an instrument to settle her grudge.
[55]

 
Given the foregoing factual, legal and jurisprudential
scenario, we agree with both the trial and appellate courts
that the appellant is guilty as charged. He was, likewise,
correctly meted the penalty of death because rape
committed against a child below seven (7) years old is a
dastardly and repulsive crime which merits no less than the
imposition of capital punishment under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code.[56] That AAA was only five years
old when she was ravished is clear from her birth certificate.
[57]

 
However, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346
entitled An Act Prohibiting The Imposition Of The Death
Penalty In The Philippines, the penalty that should be meted
isreclusion perpetua, thus:
 
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:
 
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
 
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated
does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
 
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court affirms the
award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and increases the Court of Appeals
award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. [58]
 
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. H.C. No. 01424 finding appellant Rene Santos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and odering
him to indemnify the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is increased to P75,000.00 and that in lieu of
the death penalty, appellant Rene Santos is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout
possibility of parole.
 
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 142930. March 28, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. KAKINGCIO CAETE, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No.
2523, convicting appellant of rape, imposing on him the
death penalty and ordering him to pay damages to the victim
in the amount of P50,000.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The spouses Paquito Caete and Sedaria Caete had three
children, one of whom was Alma, who was born on March 24,
1983. In 1986, the spouses decided to live
separately. Sedaria resided in Pook West, Cubala, Biliran,
with some of her children by Paquito. The latter decided to
live in Basey, Samar, and brought Alma with him. Thereafter,
Paquito decided to live with his older brother, Kakingcio
Caete, and the latters common-law wife, Alejandra Caete,
whom Alma called Yaya Alejandra, and their two children, five
and four years old, respectively, in Barangay Gayad,
Capoocan, Leyte. After some years, Paquito and Alma
decided to return to and live in Basey, Samar. In the
meantime, Paquito became blind and a paralytic. In January
1996, Kakingcio had Paquito and Alma fetched from Basey,
Samar, and brought to Barangay Gayad, Capoocan, Leyte, to
live with him and his family. By then, Alma was already
twelve years old. She noticed that her uncle Kakingcio was
nice and amiable to her.
On February 1, 1996, Alejandra visited her daughter in
Montebello, Kananga, Leyte, leaving behind Kakingcio and
their two young children and Paquito and Alma. At about 8:00
p.m., Alma was already asleep. Paquito was sleeping near her
feet. The house was dark. Momentarily, Alma was awakened
when she felt someone caressing her. When she opened her
eyes, she saw her uncle Kakingcio who was wearing a pair of examined Alma. The doctor prepared and signed a medico-
short pants but naked from waist up. He was beside her with legal certificate on her examination of Alma which contains
his left palm touching her forehead, down to her face, hand her findings:
and feet.She could smell liquor from his breath. He poked an
8-inch long knife on her neck and whispered to her: Ma, dont Physical Examination Findings:
tell your yaya because I will do something to you. Kakingcio
then removed his short pants, lifted her skirt and pulled down
her panties. He threatened to kill her if she made a Breast: normal, no abrasions, no lacerations, no hematoma
sound. Alma was terrified. Kakingcio then inserted his private
organ into Almas vagina and made a push and Abdomen: normal
pull movement of his body. Alma felt pain in her private part
and could do nothing but cry as Kakingcio ravished her. In Extremities: normal
the process, Alma lost consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, it was already 6:00 in the morning of
February 2, 1996. She was weak and could hardly stand Pelvic Examination: scanty pubic hair noted
up. She noticed blood in her vagina. By then, Kakingcio had
already left the house. Alma could do nothing but cry. External Genitalia: grossly normal
Kakingcio arrived back home after lunch time. Alma hid from
her uncle. Internal & Speculum Examination Findings:
On February 3, 1996, at 8:00 in the evening, Alma was asleep Introitus: non-parous, admits 2 fingers with slight difficulty
in the sala of their house. She was awakened when she felt
her pants being pulled down. She was aghast when she saw
Kakingcio beside her pulling down her pants. She resisted Cervix: pinkish, soft hymenal healed old lacerations at 6
oclock and 9 oclock
and ran out of the house to escape from Kakingcio. She
rushed to the house of a neighbor Ka Caring to whom Alma
revealed that her uncle raped her and that he was about to Discharges: scanty brownish discharges
rape her again. Caring adviced Alma not to return to their
house. Alma slept in the house of Caring. Alma returned to Uterus: small
their house the next day, February 4, 1996. By then,
Kakingcio was no longer in the house.
Adnexa: negative for masses and tenderness[2]
On February 5, 1996, Alejandra went up the hill to gather
camote tops. She was then armed with a bolo. Alma followed
Alma was entrusted to the Lingap Center in Pawing Palo,
Alejandra to the hills and revealed to her that Kakingcio Leyte.
raped her on February 1, 1996. Alejandra was livid with
rage. She rushed back to the house and confronted Kakingcio On April 26, 1996, an Information was filed with the Regional
with the charge of Alma. Alejandra and Kakingcio Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36, charging Kakingcio with rape,
quarreled. She berated him for having taken advantage of his thus:
own flesh and blood. She told him to leave the
house. Kakingcio agreed on the condition that he would bring That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the
his personal belongings with him. After Kakingcio left, municipality of Capoocan, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and
Alejandra accompanied Alma to the barangay captain and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
complained against Kakingcio. The Barangay Captain wrote a named accused, with deliberate intent and with lewd designs
letter to the local police authorities requesting assistance to and by use of force and intimidation then armed with the
Alejandra and Alma. On February 9, 1996, Dra. Bibiana A. short bladed weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
Cardente, the Municipal Health Officer of Capoocan, Leyte, and feloniously have carnal knowledge with ALMA CAETE, a
minor (12 years old) against her will to her damage and
prejudice.
[3]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on September 18, 1996, Kakingcio, assisted
by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
When he testified, Kakingcio denied having sexually
assaulted Alma. He interposed the defense of alibi. He
claimed that he was a farmer. He planted root crops such as
banana. On February 1, 1996, he went to the house of
Romulo Lukaba located at Barangay Gayad, Capoocan, Leyte,
about three kilometers from his house, for the purpose of
accompanying and helping Rolly Lukaba, the son of Romulo,
gather coconuts in the coconut plantation of Romulo in the
mountains. It took Kakingcio thirty minutes to reach the
place. At about 9:00 in the evening, Kakingcio, Rolly and
Romulo drank tuba. By 10:00 in the evening, Rolly and
Kakingcio went to sleep. Romulo, however, left the two. The
next day, Rolly and Kakingcio went back to the mountains
and gathered coconuts.
Kakingcio returned to their house on February 7, 1996.
Kakingcio testified that he was not aware of any reason why
his wife and Alma would charge him with rape.
On February 4, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision
finding Kakingcio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and
imposing on him the penalty of death in view of the presence
of the special qualifying circumstance of the minority of
private complainant Alma and her relationship to Kakingcio
and the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon and without any mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the crime.
In his appellants brief, appellant Kakingcio assails the
decision of the trial court contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY AND
ACTIVELY IN THE PRESENTATION AND RECEPTION OF THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE THEREBY FAILING TO UPHOLD THE
COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- COURT:
APPELLANT OF RAPE DESPITE WANT OF CLEAR, POSITIVE AND
CONVINCTING IDENTIFICATION. Q How did he manage to have his penis inserted to your
vagina?
III A No, sir, because when he placed himself on top of me he
pulled down his shorts and thereafter he inserted his penis
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND into my vagina.
CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE Q At that time what was your apparel going up from your
COMPLAINANT AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE
vagina?
ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
A I was wearing then a t-shirt and skirt, sir.
IV Q About your skirt?
ON THE ASSUMPTION HOWEVER THAT THE ACCUSED- A He pulled up my skirt, sir.
APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF RAPE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
Q What about your t-shirt?
IMPOSING UPON HIM THE PENALTY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF A He did not do anything about my t-shirt.
RELATIONSHIP WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION,
HENCE, THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY SHOULD ONLY BE Q After placing his penis on your vagina, what else
RECLUSION PERPETUA.[4] transpired?
A He keeps on kissing me sir.
On the first three assignments of errors, the appellant avers
that the prosecution had a difficulty proving that the Q At that time he keeps on kissing you, where was his penis
appellant raped the private complainant in light of her in relation to your vagina?
testimony that when the appellant mounted her, he still had
A It was inside my vagina sir.[5]
his short pants on. When the prosecution tried to elicit from
the offended party how appellants penis could have been The appellant further stresses that when Alma was raped it
inserted into her vagina with his pants still on and the was nighttime and the place where she was molested was
appellants counsel objected to the question, the presiding dark. She could not have recognized and identified the
judge himself took the cudgels for the prosecution and appellant as her rapist. Furthermore, Alma failed to report the
propounded questions on the private complainant. Worse, rape immediately to the police authorities.
the presiding judge posed leading questions to the private
complainant. The presiding judge was biased and partial to The Court does not agree with the appellants
the prosecution. To buttress his contention, the appellants submission. In People v. Ancheta,[6] this Court emphasized
counsel cited a portion of the transcript of the stenographic that a presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in
notes taken during the trial on September 17, 1997: examining witnesses within the course of evidentiary
rules. The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony
PROS. PERIDA: should not be incomplete or obscure. After all, the judge is
the arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as
Q So, after he laid himself over you with his trouser what else
to the respective claims of the parties in the criminal
happened?
proceedings. In People v. Zheng Bai Hui,[7] this Court
A His penis was inserted into my vagina, sir. reiterated that:
Q Where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of
wearing a short pants?
the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth
ATTY. DILOY: and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a
charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident
Objection your Honor! It is leading. desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the
witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a
reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as
may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record
speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of
both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in
the performance of their duties if they permitted a
miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a
proper question to a witness which might develop some
material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound
discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will
enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or
the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may
examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths
which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
In this case, the relevant direct-examination questions posed
by the public prosecutor of the private complainant and her
corresponding answers, the objections thereto by the
appellants counsel and the questions propounded by the trial
court were as follows:
Q After taking off your panty or underware (sic) what else
transpired?
A He placed himself on top of me sir.
Q Please describe to us your uncle at that moment when he
placed himself over your body!
A He placed himself on top of me in a prone position.
Q What was he wearing at that time when he was carressing
(sic) your face down to your arm?
A He was just wearing a short pants sir.
Q What about the upper portion of his body?
A None sir.
Q At the time he put himself over you on a prone position,
what about his short pants, was it still there?
ATTY. DILOY:
We request Your Honor that the question not be made in a
leading manner!
COURT:
Place of record the comment!
PROS. PERIDA:
I withdraw that Your Honor!
Q Where was the short pants which your uncle originally
wearing that time?
ATTY. DILOY:
He was wearing it Your Honor as described by the witness!
PROS. PERIDA:
At this moment now, when he was already on top of the Q While his penis was inside your vagina and the accused
victim! keeps on kissing you what else transpired?
ATTY. DILOY: A (witness weeping in tears as been directly examined by the
It was answered by the witness! According to the witness, Public Prosecutor).
accused was wearing short pants but the upper part of his COURT:
body the accused had nothing worn! Place it of record that the child witness is crying in the
PROS. PERIDA: witness stand!
That is agreed Your Honor. Now my question is, at the time PROS. PERIDA:
Kakingcio Caete was already on top of Alma where was this May we ask for suspension Your Honor! I move for suspension
short pants! considering the condition of the victim witness Your
ATTY. DILOY: Honor! Hes already crying!
It was being worn by the accused! COURT:
PROS. PERIDA:
Let the witness answer that Your Honor! We can come back tomorrow.[8]
ATTY. DILOY: The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by
We submit Your Honor! the trial court. Neither are the questions prejudicial to the
COURT: appellant or suggestive of any partiality of the trial court. It
Q What were your uncle, when your uncle placed himself on bears stressing that from the testimony of the private
top of your body as you said, in a prone position, was he complainant, the appellant was wearing his short pants
wearing clothes or none? before he mounted her and even when he was already on top
A He was still wearing Your Honor. of her and managed to penetrate her sexual organ with his
Q What clothes? penis. The public prosecutor wanted the private complainant
A Short pants Your Honor. to explain to the court how the appellant could have inserted
Proceed Fiscal! his penis into her vagina considering that he was still wearing
PROS. PERIDA: his short pants. Although crudely and ungrammatically
Q So, after he laid himself over you with his trouser, what phrased, the question of the public prosecutor where did he
else happened? let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short
A His penis was inserted into my vagina sir. pants was not leading. The trial court should have overruled
Q Where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then the objection and allowed the private complainant to answer
wearing a short pants? the question. However, the trial court was not precluded from
ATTY. DILOY: asking questions to avoid further wrangling between the
Objection Your Honor! It is leading! public prosecutor and the appellants counsel which may
COURT: frightened or unnerved the private complainant, a minor and
Q How did he manage to have his penis inserted to your who was unused to judicial proceedings. After all, the trial
vagina? court was mandated to discover the truth. As it turned out,
A No sir, because when he placed himself on top of me he the private complainant cried profusely as she testified
pulled down his shorts and thereafter he inserted his penis impelling the trial court to order a continuance. Even the
into my vagina. counsel of the appellant agreed to a continuance.
Q At that time what was your apparel going up from your
vagina? Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on
A I was wearing then a T-shirt and skirt sir. Examination of a Child Witness which took effect on
Q About your skirt? December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a
A He pulled up my skirt sir. narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the
Q What about your t-shirt? trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will
A He did not do anything about my t-shirt. further the interest of justice. Objections to questions should
Q After placing his penis on your vagina, what else be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse,
transpired? frighten and intimidate the child:
A He keeps on kissing me sir.
Q At that time he keeps on kissing you, where was his penis Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. The court shall exercise control
in relation to your vagina? over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the
A It was inside my vagina sir. ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of
the child, (3) protect children from harassment or undue
embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative
form.[9]
While it may be true that it was dark when the appellant
ravished the private complainant in his house, it cannot,
however, be gainsaid that the private complainant could
have sufficiently identified the appellant as the culprit. The
appellant was the uncle of the private complainant. She and
her father Paquito had been living with the appellant and his
family off and on for years before she and her father were
brought back with appellant in January 1996 to Capoocan,
Leyte, to live anew with the appellant and his family. The
private complainant was thus familiar not only with the
physical build of the appellant but also with his voice and
peculiar smell. A person may be identified by these
factors. Once a person has gained familiarity with another,
identification is quite an easy task.[10] In this case, the
appellant poked a knife on her neck and whispered to the
private complainant before she raped her: Ma, ayaw
pagsumat kan imo yaya kay may-ada ako ha imo
bubuhaton (Ma, dont tell to your yaya because I will do
something to you. Ma was the nickname of Alma, the private
complainant. Yaya was Alejandra Caete, the common-law
wife of the appellant. [11] Moreover, as testified to by the
private complainant, the only persons left in the house in the
evening of February 1, 1997 were the appellant and his two
young children, Paquito, who was blind and an invalid, and
the private complainant:
PROS. PERIDA:
Q You stated that on February 1, there was no light at the
place where you were raped. How did you recognize with
certainty that it was Kakingcio Caete who raped you?
ATTY. DILOY:
I object to that Your Honor. It should have been taken during
the direct examination.
PROS. PERIDA:
No, Your Honor. We are already talking about lights Your
Honor.
COURT:
Well, at least for purposes or in the interest of the trial, let
the witness answer!
WITNESS: Q When you told your Yaya Alejandra, how did she react to
your information?
A Because we were the only one staying in the house, and
besides I can detect his smell. WITNESS:
PROS. PERIDA: A Upon learning about the rape incident she was very angry
and she reacted angrily and carried with her the camote tops
Q Why? What was his smell? and went down proceeding towards their house bringing with
WITNESS: her a long bolo, in our dialect it is used for farming and
cutting grass and a long pointed bolo, a sharp instrument,
A Smells like a smoker.[12] and upon reaching their house they have a quarrel with my
uncle.
When Alejandra Caete confronted the appellant on February
PROS. PERIDA:
5, 1997, with the claim of the private complainant that he
raped the latter and demanded that the appellant leave the
Q How about you, did you follow your Yaya in going home?
house, the appellant did not deny the charge and even
agreed to leave the house on condition that he be allowed to WITNESS:
take his personal belongings with him:
A Yes, sir.
PROS. PERIDA:
PROS. PERIDA:
Q On the following day, that was Monday, February 5, 1996,
what did you do if any? Q After they quarrel, what transpired?
WITNESS: WITNESS:
A That morning Monday, my auntie Yaya Alejandra went up A My auntie, Yaya Alejandra told my uncle Yayo Kaking to
the hill and I followed them and I told them about my ordeal leave the house because he ate his own blood, and Yayo
that I was raped by my Yayo Kaking. Kaking answered in the affirmative, saying Yes, I will leave
the house so long I will bring with me all my belongings. [13]
PROS. PERIDA:
The credibility of the private complainant was not degraded
Q Who was the companion of your Yaya Alejandra who went by her and Alejandra Caetes reporting the sexual assault to
up the hill? the police authorities only on February 5, 1996. The evidence
WITNESS: shows that the private complainant was only twelve years old
when she was raped by the appellant. She and her father,
A Her daughter Ate Belen. who was completely blind and a paralytic, were living in the
house of the appellant. The latter threatened to kill her if she
PROS. PERIDA: revealed what he did to her. It was thus easy for the
appellant to fulfill the threat if she divulged the violation of
Q What is her real name?
her honor.[14] The private complainant could do nothing but
WITNESS: cry. When the appellant tried in the evening of February 3,
1996 to violate her again, she ran to a neighbor, Ka Caring,
A Belen Pepito. divulged to her that the appellant tried to rape her anew and
sought her help. In fact, the private complainant slept in the
PROS. PERIDA:
house of Ka Caring that evening and went back home only
Q Was he already married? the next morning on February 4, 1996. On February 5, 1996,
the private complainant revealed to her Yaya Alejandra, the
WITNESS: wife of the appellant, that the latter had raped her. In People
v. Bea,[15] this Court held that it is not uncommon for a young
A That her family name is the surname of her mother.
girl at the tender age of sixteen years to be intimidated into
PROS. PERIDA: silence and conceal the sexual assault on her by the
appellant.[16]
When cross-examined by the public prosecutor, the appellant
unabashedly admitted that he did not know any improper or
ill-motive on the part of the private complainant for charging
him with rape, and on the part of his wife Alejandra Caete for
reporting the sexual assault on the private complainant by
the appellant to the police authorities:
Q The complainant here testified in Court that she was raped
by you at 9:00 oclock in the evening of February 1, 1996. Are
you aware of that?
A No, sir.
Q In fact the victim here testified that it was your very own
wife who accompanied her to report this matter to the
barangay (sic) Chairman of Barangay Gayad, and likewise
reported this matter to the PNP of Capoocan. Are you aware
of that?
A No, sir.
Q Do you know of any reason or reasons why your own wife
would report this rape incident against your person?
A I dont know sir what is her reason.
Q And you dont know likewise of any reason or reasons why
your own niece, a twelve (12) year old child would accuse
you of rape, right?
A I dont know also, sir.[17]
The records show that the private complainant lived in a rural
area, unaffected by the worldly ways of urban life. It is thus
incredible that the private complainant would weave a story
of defloration and undergo a medical examination of her
private parts and charge the appellant with rape for which, if
convicted, he could be meted the penalty of either reclusion
perpetua or death. As this Court held:
Accused failed to attribute any ill motive on the part of the
victim to testify falsely and impute against him the
commission of a grave offense such as rape. To the contrary,
the trial court observed that the victim lived in place more
rural than most rural villages in the country, and was still
unaffected by the wordly ways of urban life. It is highly
inconceivable for a young barrio lass, inexperienced with the
ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration,
undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject
herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys honor and
reputation unless she was motivated by a potent desire to
seek justice for the wrong committed against her.[18]
In contrast to the positive and straightforward testimony of Code, as amended. Since the prosecution failed to prove any
the private complainant, the appellants denial of the charge, aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime,
which is merely a negative self-serving evidence, cannot the appellant may be meted only the penalty of reclusion
prevail.Equally undeserving of merit is his defense of perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal
alibi. Appellant failed to prove with clear and convincing Code.
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have
been in his house at the time when the private complainant
was raped.[19] The only evidence adduced by the appellant to
prove alibi was his own testimony. By his own admission, the Civil Liability of Appellant
appellants house was barely a thirty-minute walk to the
house of Romulo Lukaba. It was thus not physically
impossible for the appellant to have been in his house at 8:00 The trial court ordered the appellant to pay P50,000 as civil
in the evening of February 1, 1996, when the private indemnity but failed to award moral damages and exemplary
complainant was raped. damages considering the tender age of the private
complainant and of the uncle-niece relationship of the
appellant and the private complainant. [22] In light of recent
case law, the Court must order the appellant to pay the
Proper Penalty on Appellant private complainant the amounts of P50,000 as moral
damages[23] and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
The trial court imposed the death penalty on the appellant on IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
its finding that the appellant used a knife when committing Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No.
the crime and that the private complainant was under 2523, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
appellant KAKINGCIO CAETE is found guilty beyond
eighteen years of age and the niece of the appellant and,
hence, a relative of the private complainant within the third reasonable doubt, as principal, of simple rape under Article
civil degree. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is meted
the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay to
This Court agrees with the trial court that the appellant used private complainant Alma Caete the amounts of P50,000 as
a knife in committing the crime charged and that he is the civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as
uncle of the private complainant and, hence, her relative exemplary damages.
within the third civil degree. However, as to the latter, there
is no allegation in the Information that the appellant is the Costs de oficio.
uncle of the private complainant as required by Section 8 of
SO ORDERED.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[20]
 In People v. Bernaldez,[21] this Court held that the minority
of the private complainant and her relationship to the
appellant must be alleged in the Information because these
circumstances are special qualifying circumstances for rape
to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Although this
rule took effect on December 1, 2000, or before the crime
charged in the Information was committed, the Court has
consistently applied the rule retroactively. Thus, since the
relationship of the private complainant and the appellant was
not alleged in the Information, the appellant cannot be
convicted of qualified rape, otherwise he would be deprived
of his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against
him. The appellant may only be convicted of simple rape with
the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon in the commission of the crime. Rape with use of a
deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under the third paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
G.R. No. 137933            January 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  examination; (iii) the case of attempted homicide filed by the
vs.
VALENTIN BARING, JR., accused-appellant.
BUENA, J.:
Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted
for statutory rape committed against a seven-year-old girl in
an information that reads-
"That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several occasions
thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force,
violence and intimidation taking advantage of his superior
strength over the person of the victim who is only seven (7)
years old, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Jennifer Donayre,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite rendered a
decision dated January 20, 1999, convicting accused-
appellant of rape, to wit –
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of rape, the accused-Valentin Baring Jr. is
sentenced to die by lethal injection and to pay the victim an
indemnity of P50,000.00 plus moral damages of
another P50,000.00 plus the cost of this suit.
"SO ORDERED."2
In a sworn complaint,3 Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin
Baring, Jr., her grandmother’s common–law husband, of
raping her on several occasions. It appears that Jennifer was
living with her grandmother in Dasmariñas, Cavite. She does
not know her real father since her mother and father were
separated.4 Since 1990, when she was about 8 months
old5 until 1997, she was left under her grandmother’s care
and custody. She calls Valentin Baring, Jr. as "Papa." 6
According to Jennifer, the repeated sexual abuse happened
when she was about 6 years old whenever she was left alone
in the house. Accused-appellant would touch her private
parts, and on such occasions, accused-appellant would
remove her panty, mount on her and violate her. She
informed her grandmother that accused-appellant sexually
abused her.7
On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her
daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in Dasmariñas, Cavite. She
learned from her daughter that the latter was sexually
abused by accused-appellant. Acting on her daughter’s
accounts of sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the National
Bureau of Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter,
Jennifer underwent a medical examination at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Dennis G. Bellen, the medico-legal
officer at Camp Crame found that Jennifer was in "non-virgin
state physically." The examination disclosed a "congested,
fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 9
o’clock position and the external vaginal orifice admits tip of
the examiner’s smallest finger."8
For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations
against him.9 According to accused-appellant, he has been
living with Jennifer’s grandmother for ten (10) 10 or eighteen
(18) years.11 Accused-appellant claimed that Jennifer was not
living with them during the time the alleged rape
occurred.12 Later on, he testified that prior to July, 1997,
Jennifer was living with them since 1990.13 However, Jennifer
was taken from them sometime in July 1997, but he does not
know why.14
The trial court meted out its judgment of conviction on the
basis of the victim’s clear, trustworthy and positive testimony
that she was raped several times by accused-appellant.
Because of the penalty imposed, this case is now before us
on automatic review.
On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel,
filed a petition before this Court to dismiss the case that is
subject of our automatic review because (i) the three-page
double-spaced decision of the trial court is bereft of material
facts supporting the conviction; (ii) the medico-legal
certificate is merely a scrap of paper since the physician who
conducted the examination was not presented as a witness
that deprived accused-appellant of his right to cross-
victim’s grandmother against accused-appellant was
provisionally dismissed; and (iv) accused-appellant was
merely a "fall guy" and that another person is responsible for
the commission of the crime charged against him.15
In the appellant’s brief filed on November 4, 1999, accused-
appellant assigns the following errors-
"The lower court erred:
"I. In promulgating a brief and short decision with material
facts that have been omitted with no allusions to the
transcripts of records erroneous of tenses and grammar
jotted by the Court Stenographer.
"II. In denying the accused his right to plead for a DNA Test to
determine that the blood found in the panty of the victim is
not his but of another man, Venancio Mendoza, live-in
husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer Donayre, the victim.
"III. In not finding the accused as a ‘fall guy’ framed up to
take the place of Venancio Mendoza, live-in husband of
Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer, whose behavior in the
courtroom as a witness has been beyond normal."16
The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.17 This vital requirement is not only demanded from
the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly required to give
basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to
the Administrative Code18 whose roots may also be traced to
the Constitutional mandate.
A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence
presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly
and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn
therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in
order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is
imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the
dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case,
summarize the facts with references to the record, and
contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence
and the tribunal’s assessments and conclusions on the case.
This practice would better enable a court to make an
appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion
of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the
findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal
that rendered the decision.19 Compliance with this
requirement will sufficiently apprise the parties of the various
issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in
assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent with
the facts and the law.
In the case at bar, the trial court’s decision may cast doubt as
to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt may be
engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against
accused-appellant but by the trial court’s failure to fully
explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or
admissibility of the evidence presented for or against the
accused, the assessments made from the evidence
presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after
applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime of rape despite prosecution’s
failure to present the examining physician to appear in court
depriving him of his constitutional right to confront a witness
against him.20 However, a review of the transcript of
stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel
waived presentation of the medico-legal officer and thus, was
not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said
witness, to wit-
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
Your Honor, I was informed by the mother of the private
complainant that the doctor is no longer connected with the
Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City but
was reassigned to the Eastern Police District at Mandaluyong
City.
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
I just prefer that a subpoena be sent. We have to ask for the
postponement.
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We can dispense with the testimony.
"COURT:
Provided this is admitted. A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove
the commission of rape. 22 It is well entrenched in our
"COURT: jurisprudence that a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the
victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict
Do you admit the due execution and authenticity of the the accused of the crime. 23 Besides, testimonies of rape
report of the doctor? victims who are of tender age are credible, 24 and the
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit. 25
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
Accused-appellant likewise impugns the credibility of the
We admit everything written here because (sic) doctor says. victim by pointing out that the rape was filed one year after
its commission, which allegedly leaves doubt as to the real
"COURT: identity of the culprit.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any
Yes, whatever is written there, do you admit that?
doubt over the credibility of the complainant nor can it be
taken against her.26 The following realities justified the delay
ATTY. ABUBAKAR in the filing of the case against accused-appellant: (1) the
victim was merely six years old when she was sexually
Yes, your Honor. abused; (2) the victim lived separately from her mother and
was left under her grandmother’s care; and, (3) the victim’s
"COURT: sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather.
According to accused-appellant, he was simply ‘framed-up’
No need to present the doctor
and that another person also raped the victim. 27 He avers
that his allegation is supported by the testimony of the
"PROS. ORQUIEZA: victim’s mother Jenelyn that the victim was likewise abused
by the latter’s husband.
We will no longer present Dr. Dennis G. Bellen of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service at Camp The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by
Crame, Quezon City. We have here the xerox copy of the accused-appellant cannot be overturned by the bare denial
medico legal report no. M-2831-97. and defense of being ‘framed-up’ interposed by accused-
appellant. The victim made a positive, clear and categorical
"COURT: declaration pointing to accused-appellant as the person who
sexually ravaged her-
Will you show that to Atty. Abubakar.
"Q:     Are you the same Jennifer Donayre the private
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR: complainant against the accused Valentin Baring, Jr.?
"A:     Yes, sir.
"x x x           x x x           x x x
Yes, your Honor. "Q:     Who is your father?
"A:     I do not know the name of my father because my father
"COURT: and mother are separated.
"Q:     If your father is in the courtroom can you point to him?
"A:     Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man inside this
Admitted.
courtroom when asked given [sic] his name as Valentin
Baring.)
You dispense the testimony of the doctor. 21 "Q:     Is he your true father?
"A:     No sir. He is my stepfather.
"Q:     You were pointing to your stepfather, do you know "A:     Five, sir. minimize trauma, encourage children to testify in legal
what things or particular things, if any, he did to you? "Q:     How about this?(Prosecutor is depicting 10 fingers) proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.38
"A:     Yes, sir. "A:     Ten, sir.28
"Q:     What were those particular things your stepfather had In line with our foregoing thrust to protect children, we
done to you? Accused-appellant even contends that the failure of the observed the peculiar physical examination performed by the
"A:     He raped me. prosecution to establish the dates when the other alleged doctor on the seven-year-old victim in this wise-
"Q:     When your stepfather raped you, what actually did rapes were committed justifies the outright dismissal of the
your stepfather do to you? case.29
"A:     He removed my panty. "GENITAL
"Q:     What did your stepfather do after removing your
panty? Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex and
"A:     He placed himself on top of me. occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective slightly gaping with the pinkish brown labia minora
"Q:     Was he naked when he placed himself on top of you? on its face.30 When all the essential elements of the crime of presenting in between. On separating, the same disclosed a
"A:     Yes, sir. rape are stated in the information, an accused is sufficiently congested, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing laceration
"Q:     When he was on top of you, did he place his penis apprised of the charged against him. Moreover, the precise at 9 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice admits tip
inside your private parts? time of the commission of the crime of rape is not an of the examiner’s smallest finger."39 (emphasis ours)
"A:     Yes, sir. essential element of rape.31 Neither is the exact date of
"Q:     What did you feel when his penis was inside your commission of rape an element of the crime 32 for the
gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse without This Court is disturbed by the method of physical
private parts, if any? examination done on the seven-year-old victim. We noticed
"A:     I felt pain. consent.33
that in the examiner’s effort to show the existence of abuse,
"Q:     Was your private part bleeding as a result of the the examining physician inserted his smallest finger, as
insertion of the penis of your stepfather into your private Accused-appellant contends that the trial court denied him shown in the medico-legal report that the ‘external vaginal
parts? his right to subject the blood found on the victim’s panty for orifice admits tip of the examiner's finger.’
"A:     Yes, sir. DNA testing.
"Q:     Did he kiss you while he was on top of you?
"A:     Yes, sir. It bears to stress that this particular manner of establishing
The records reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel initially evidence – by determining the diameter/hymenal opening in
"Q:     What parts of your body or face was kissed? asked the court to subject the alleged blood found in the
"A:     My cheek. rape cases – was a common practice in the past. With the
victim’s panty to a DNA test for comparison with accused- passage of R.A. 7610, this Court has nonetheless allowed the
"Q:     Where did this happen? appellant’s blood.34 However, he voluntarily withdrew his
"A:     Dasmariñas, Cavite. utilization of the same kind of evidence in the prosecution of
proposition.35 Obviously, accused-appellant’s counsel is Child Abuse cases. In light however of radical medical
"Q:     In whose house or place? misleading the Court. It was even accused-appellant’s
"A:     In the house of my grandmother. developments and findings, specifically as to the
counsel who recalled the submission for DNA testing. The determination of the existence of child sexual abuse, this
"Q:     Who are the residents of that house at that time? alleged denial of accused’s right to avail of the DNA tests is a
"A:     At that time nobody was in the house because they Court deems it necessary to firmly adopt a more "child
futile attempt to confuse the issues. He lost sight of the sensitive" approach in dealing with this specie or genre of
were working. categorical testimony of the victim pinning him down as the
"xxx           xxx           xxx crime.
perpetrator. It would have been more prudent for him to
"Q:     Can you recall if the rape you mentioned to us attack this damaging evidence directly. It must be noted that
happened while you were 7 years old, 6 years old? What was in the prosecution of rape cases, the presentation of the In the international scientific community, recent medical
your age then if you can recall? bloodstained panty is not even essential. 36 The victim’s studies have shown that measurement of hymenal opening is
"A:     6 years old. credible testimony, standing alone, is sufficient basis for the unreliable in determining and/or proving child sexual abuse –
"Q:     How many times did your stepfather do to you these conviction of accused-appellant.
things you mentioned to us that is by placing (sic) on top of "The diameter of the hymenal opening previously has been
you and inserting his penis into your private parts and kissing used as a diagnostic criterion for abuse. More recent studies
you? Cases subject of our review, especially those in the nature of
child sexual abuse, often involve victims of tender years. On have shown this to be undependable (Paradise, 1989).Factors
"A:     10 times. affecting hymenal and anal diameter include the examination
"Q:     Do you know how to count? account of the increased number of children coming into the
realm of the judicial system, we adopted the "Rule on position (McCann, Voris, Simon, & Wells, 1990) and the
"A:     Yes, sir. degree of relaxation of the child. The anal diameter is also
"Q:     How many is this? (prosecutor is depicting two fingers) Examination of a Child Witness" to govern the examination of
child witnesses who may either be victims, accused or affected by the presence of stool in the ampulla. Hymenal
"A:     Two, sir. diameter may increase with age and with the onset of
"Q:     How about this, how many? (Prosecutor is depicting witnesses to a crime.37 This rule ensures an environment that
allows children to give reliable and complete evidence, pubertal development."40
five fingers).
In fact, there is no evidence, nor published research studies
which show that enlarged hymenal opening diameter is any
more common in abused than in non-abused children." 41 Thus
- children [adolescents included] must be conducted with
"In the latest revision of the classification system, ‘enlarged
hymenal opening’ is also removed as a criterion that should
be considered suspicious for abuse. With labial traction, the
hymenal opening may appear quite large, especially to the
less experienced clinician, and internal structures such as
vaginal ridges, rugae, and vaginal columns may be
visualized. This is purely a matter of how much traction is
applied, and the degree of patient relaxation, and has no
proven correlation with past sexual abuse. Likewise, it is not
possible to obtain accurate measurements of the dilated
hymenal opening, unless photographs are taken at the point
of maximal dilation and measurements are taken from the
photographs using a calibrated measuring device. Rings of
different sizes that are etched into eyepieces of certain types
of colposcopes can be used to estimate diameter size but not
to obtain exact measurements."42
Hence, insertion of a finger or any foreign matter inside the
hymenal opening under the pretext of determining abuse is
unnecessary and inappropriate. The Philippine Judicial
Academy [PHILJA] training program for family court
judges,43 through the auspices of the U.P.-P.G.H. Child
Protection Unit, sanctioned that in prepubertal girls44 without
active bleeding, all that is needed is an external examination
with a good light source and magnification. Be that as it may,
the physical findings alone will not be conclusive of child
sexual abuse, for a child who gives a clear, consistent,
detailed, spontaneous description of being sexually molested
may still have normal genital examination. Despite the
physical or laboratory findings, however, a child’s clear and
convincing description of the abuse has a high rate of
probability.
We are not at all uninformed in this regard for we, in a
plethora of cases, have consistently upheld the full weight of
a young victim’s unwavering testimony.45 Also, there is
Section 22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,
which categorically states:
Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not be
required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible
by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact,
conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard proof
required in criminal and non-criminal cases.
What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate to SO ORDERED.
reiterate, is that forensic examination – inclusive of physical
examination and forensic interview – of sexually assaulted
maximum sensitivity to the young victim’s feelings of
vulnerability and embarrassment. Great care must be
observed in order to make the examination less stressful lest
they be more traumatic to the victim than the very assault
itself. The value of collecting evidence should always be
weighed against the emotional cost of the procedure and
examination of the child.
We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed by
the trial court. The single information filed against accused-
appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6334-98, charged
him with the crime of "Multiple Statutory Rape." 46 Even then,
accused-appellant cannot be held answerable for the other
incidents of rape committed. Each and every charge of rape
is a separate and distinct crime so that each of the other
rapes charged should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.47
Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the Revised Penal Code,
imposes death penalty when the victim is a child below seven
(7) years old. The allegation in the information specifically
stated that "xxx the victim xxx is only seven years old" which
clearly rules out the application of this specific provision that
can justify the imposition of the capital punishment.
Paragraph No. 1 of the same article which warrants the
imposition of the death penalty if the crime of rape is
committed where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common–law spouse of the parent of the
victim,48 will not apply for while the victim is under eighteen
(18) years old, the accused-appellant is not the common-law
husband of the victim’s mother. The trial court therefore
erred in meting out the death penalty upon accused-
appellant for qualified rape. Thus, accused-appellant may
only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In line with our prevailing jurisprudence, 49 we sustain the trial
court’s award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity andP50,000.00
moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. 6334-98,
finding accused-appellant Valentin Baring, Jr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
A.M. NO. 004-07-SC             November 21, 2000
RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - Unless otherwise
provided, this Rule shall govern the examination of child
witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and
witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings
and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.
Section 2. Objectives. - The objectives of this Rule are to
create and maintain an environment that will allow children
to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to
children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings,
and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.
Section 3. Construction of the Rule. - This Rule shall be
liberally construed to uphold the best interests of the child
and to promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.
Section 4. Definitions. -
(a) A "child witness" is any person who at the time of giving
testimony is below the age of eighteen (18) years. In child
abuse cases, a child includes one over eighteen (18) years
but is found by the court as unable to fully take care of
himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.
(b) "Child abuse" means physical, psychological, or sexual
abuse, and criminal neglect as defined in Republic Act No.
7610 and other related laws.
(c) "Facilitator" means a person appointed by the court to
pose questions to a child.
(d) "Record regarding a child" or "record" means any
photograph, videotape, audiotape, film, handwriting,
typewriting, printing, electronic recording, computer data or
printout, or other memorialization, including any court
document, pleading, or any copy or reproduction of any of
the foregoing, that contains the name, description, address,
school, or any other personal identifying information about a
child or his family and that is produced or maintained by a
public agency, private agency, or individual.
(e) A "guardian ad litem" is a person appointed by the court
where the case is pending for a child who is a victim of,
accused of, or a witness to a crime to protect the best
interests of the said child.
(f) A "support person" is a person chosen by the child to
accompany him to testify at or attend a judicial proceeding or
deposition to provide emotional support for him.
(g) "Best interests of the child" means the totality of the
circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the
survival, protection, and feelings of security of the child and
most encouraging to his physical, psychological, and
emotional development. It also means the least detrimental
available alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the child.
(h) "Developmental level" refers to the specific growth phase
in which most individuals are expected to behave and
function in relation to the advancement of their physical,
socio-emotional, cognitive, and moral abilities.
(i) "In-depth investigative interview" or "disclosure interview"
is an inquiry or proceeding conducted by duly trained
members of a multidisciplinary team or representatives of
law enforcement or child protective services for the purpose
of determining whether child abuse has been committed.
Section 5. Guardian ad litem. -
(a) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who
is a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to promote
the best interests of the child. In making the appointment,
the court shall consider the background of the guardian ad
litem and his familiarity with the judicial process, social
service programs, and child development, giving preference
to the parents of the child, if qualified. The guardian ad litem
may be a member of the Philippine Bar. A person who is a
witness in any proceeding involving the child cannot be
appointed as a guardian ad litem.
(b) The guardian ad litem:
(1) Shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial
proceedings in which a child participates;
(2) Shall make recommendations to the court concerning the
welfare of the child;
(3) Shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and records
necessary to effectively advocate for the child, except
privileged communications;
(4) Shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources
and special services to the child;
(5) Shall explain, in language understandable to the child, all
legal proceedings, including police investigations, in which
the child is involved;
(6) Shall assist the child and his family in coping with the
emotional effects of crime and subsequent criminal or non-
criminal proceedings in which the child is involved;
(7) May remain with the child while the child waits to testify;
(8) May interview witnesses; and
(9) May request additional examinations by medical or
mental health professionals if there is a compelling need
therefor.
(c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings
but shall not participate in the trial. However, he may file
motions pursuant to sections 9, 10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If
the guardian ad litem is a lawyer, he may object during trial
that questions asked of the child are not appropriate to his
developmental level.
(d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns
regarding the child to the court through an officer of the
court designated for that purpose.
(e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding
concerning any information, statement, or opinion received
from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem,
unless the court finds it necessary to promote the best
interests of the child.
(f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in
good faith in compliance with his duties described in sub-
section (b).
Section 6. Competency. - Every child is presumed qualified
to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a
competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on
motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate
the duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity. - A party seeking a competency
examination must present proof of necessity of competency
examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient
basis for a competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof. - To rebut the presumption of
competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on
the party challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the
following are allowed to attend a competency examination:
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;
(2) The counsel for the parties;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that
competence can be fully evaluated in his absence.
(d) Conduct of examination. - Examination of a child as to his
competence shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel
for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge
that he may, in his discretion, ask the child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. - The questions
asked at the competency examination shall be appropriate to
the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be
related to the issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of
the child to remember, communicate, distinguish between
truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify
truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. - The court has the
duty of continuously assessing the competence of the child
throughout his testimony.
Section 7. Oath or affirmation. - Before testifying, a child
shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.
Section 8. Examination of a child witness. - The
examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any
proceeding shall be done in open court. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally.
The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad
litem of such child witness may, however, move the court to
allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 9. Interpreter for child. -
(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino
language or is unable to communicate in said languages due
to his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other
similar reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand
and who understands the child may be appointed by the
court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.
(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the
only person who can serve as an interpreter for the child, he
shall not be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of
the child. The interpreter, however, who is also a witness,
shall testify ahead of the child.
(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a
true and accurate interpretation.
Section 10. Facilitator to pose questions to child. -
(a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a
facilitator if it determines that the child is unable to
understand or respond to questions asked. The facilitator
may be a child psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker,
guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent, or
relative.
(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels
for the parties shall pose questions to the child only through
the facilitator. The questions shall either be in the words used
by counsel or, if the child is not likely to understand the
same, in words that are comprehensible to the child and
which convey the meaning intended by counsel.
(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose
questions to the child according to the meaning intended by
counsel.
Section 11. Support persons. -
(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a
deposition shall have the right to be accompanied by one or
two persons of his own choosing to provide him emotional
support.
(1) Both support persons shall remain within the view of the
child during his testimony.
(2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to
the witness stand, provided the support person does not
completely obscure the child from the view of the opposing
party, judge, or hearing officer.
(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand
of the child or take other appropriate steps to provide
emotional support to the child in the course of the
proceedings.
(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to
prompt, sway, or influence the child during his testimony.
(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness,
the court may disapprove the choice if it is sufficiently
established that the attendance of the support person during
the testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of
influencing or affecting the content of the testimony of the
child.
(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by
the court, his testimony shall be presented ahead of the
testimony of the child.
Section 12. Waiting area for child witnesses. - The
courts are encouraged to provide a waiting area for children
that is separate from waiting areas used by other persons.
The waiting area for children should be furnished so as to
make a child comfortable.
Section 13. Courtroom environment. - To create a more
comfortable environment for the child, the court may, in its
discretion, direct and supervise the location, movement and
deportment of all persons in the courtroom including the
parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support persons,
guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court personnel. The child
may be allowed to testify from a place other than the witness
chair. The witness chair or other place from which the child
testifies may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the
opposing party and his counsel must have a frontal or profile
view of the child during the testimony of the child. The
witness chair or other place from which the child testifies
may also be rearranged to allow the child to see the opposing
party and his counsel, if he chooses to look at them, without
turning his body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need
not wear his judicial robe.
Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except
official in-court identification provisions, shall be construed to
require a child to look at the accused.
Accommodations for the child under this section need not be
supported by a finding of trauma to the child.
Section 14. Testimony during appropriate hours. - The
court may order that the testimony of the child should be
taken during a time of day when the child is well-rested.
Section 15. Recess during testimony. -
The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while
undergoing direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations
as often as necessary depending on his developmental level.
Section 16. Testimonial aids. - The court shall permit a
child to use dolls, anatomically-correct dolls, puppets,
drawings, mannequins, or any other appropriate
demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony.
Section 17. Emotional security item. - While testifying, a
child shall be allowed to have an item of his own choosing
such as a blanket, toy, or doll.
Section 18. Approaching the witness. - The court may
prohibit a counsel from approaching a child if it appears that
the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel.
Section 19. Mode of questioning. - The court shall
exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1)
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of
time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative
form.
Section 20. Leading questions. - The court may allow
leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the
same will further the interests of justice.
Section 21. Objections to questions. - Objections to
questions should be couched in a manner so as not to
mislead, confuse, frighten, or intimidate the child.
Section 22. Corroboration. - Corroboration shall not be
required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible
by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact,
conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of proof
required in criminal and non-criminal cases.
Section 23. Excluding the public. - When a child testifies,
the court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all
persons, including members of the press, who do not have a
direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made to
protect the right to privacy of the child or if the court
determines on the record that requiring the child to testify in
open court would cause psychological harm to him, hinder
the ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to
effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or
timidity. In making its order, the court shall consider the
developmental level of the child, the nature of the crime, the
nature of his testimony regarding the crime, his relationship
to the accused and to persons attending the trial, his desires,
and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The court
may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if
the evidence to be produced during trial is of such character
as to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may
also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from trial,
except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.
Section 24. Persons prohibited from entering and
leaving courtroom. - The court may order that persons
attending the trial shall not enter or leave the courtroom
during the testimony of the child.
Section 25. Live-link television testimony in criminal
cases where the child is a victim or a witness. -
(a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may
apply for an order that the testimony of the child be taken in
a room outside the courtroom and be televised to the
courtroom by live-link television.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this
section, he shall consult the prosecutor or counsel and shall
defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding
the necessity of applying for an order. In case the guardian
ad ltiem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or
counsel not to apply will cause the child serious emotional
trauma, he himself may apply for the order.
The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5)
days before the trial date, unless the court finds on the
record that the need for such an order was not reasonably
foreseeable.
(b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with
notice to the parties, the need for taking the testimony of the
child through live-link television.
(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some
comfortable place other than the courtroom, in the presence
of the support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and
counsel for the parties. The questions of the judge shall not
be related to the issues at trial but to the feelings of the child
about testifying in the courtroom.
(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the
accused, whose presence or conduct causes fear to the child.
(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use
of live-link television and stating the reasons therefor. It shall
consider the following factors:
(1) The age and level of development of the child;
(2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or
physical disability;
(3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury
experienced by him;
(4) The nature of the alleged abuse;
(5) Any threats against the child;
(6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party;
(7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in
court or elsewhere;
(8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was
discussed with him by parents or professionals;
(9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the
days prior to testifying;
(10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;
(11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of
the members of his family regarding the events about which
he will testify; and
(12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and
formalities of court procedure.
(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be
taken by live-link television if there is a substantial likelihood
that the child would suffer trauma from testifying in the
presence of the accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the
case may be. The trauma must be of a kind which would
impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of
the child.
(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link
television:
(1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the
courtroom in the presence of the guardian ad litem; one or
both of his support persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if
any; a court officer appointed by the court; persons
necessary to operate the closed-circuit television equipment;
and other persons whose presence are determined by the
court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the
child;
(2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the
parties shall be in the courtroom. The testimony of the child
shall be transmitted by live-link television into the courtroom
for viewing and hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for
the parties, accused, victim, and the public unless excluded.
(3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at
trial, the court may allow the child to enter the courtroom for
the limited purpose of identifying the accused, or the court
may allow the child to identify the accused by observing the
image of the latter on a television monitor.
(4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the
taking of the testimony that it finds just and appropriate,
taking into consideration the best interests of the child.
(h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on
videotape, digital disc, or other similar devices which shall be
made part of the court record and shall be subject to a
protective order as provided in section 31(b).
Section 26. Screens, one-way mirrors, and other
devices to shield child from accused. -
(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an
order that the chair of the child or that a screen or other
device be placed in the courtroom in such a manner that the
child cannot see the accused while testifying. Before the
guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he
shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the
second and third paragraphs of section 25(a) of this Rule. The
court shall issue an order stating the reasons and describing
the approved courtroom arrangement.
(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from
the accused while testifying in the courtroom, the courtroom
shall be arranged to enable the accused to view the child.
Section 27. Videotaped deposition. -
(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply
for an order that a deposition be taken of the testimony of
the child and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this
section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel
subject to the second and third paragraphs of section 25(a).
(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in
open court at trial, it shall issue an order that the deposition
of the child be taken and preserved by videotape.
(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a
child. Objections to deposition testimony or evidence, or
parts thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be
stated and shall be ruled upon at the time of the taking of the
deposition. The other persons who may be permitted to be
present at the proceeding are:
(1) The prosecutor;
(2) The defense counsel;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e);
(5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court
to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child;
(6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and
interpreter, if any;
(7) The court stenographer; and
(8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.
(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right
to counsel and to confront and cross-examine the child, shall
not be violated during the deposition.
(e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the
child is unable to testify in the physical presence of the
accused, the court may direct the latter to be excluded from
the room in which the deposition is conducted. In case of
exclusion of the accused, the court shall order that the
testimony of the child be taken by live-link television in
accordance with section 25 of this Rule. If the accused is
excluded from the deposition, it is not necessary that the
child be able to view an image of the accused.
(f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and
stenographically recorded. The videotape and the
stenographic notes shall be transmitted to the clerk of the
court where the case is pending for safekeeping and shall be
made a part of the record.
(g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the
deposition that it finds just and appropriate, taking into
consideration the best interests of the child, the
constitutional rights of the accused, and other relevant
factors.
(h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall
be subject to a protective order as provided in section 31(b).
(i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is
unable to testify for a reason stated in section 25(f) of this
Rule, or is unavailable for any reason described in section
4(c), Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
may admit into evidence the videotaped deposition of the
child in lieu of his testimony at the trial. The court shall issue
an order stating the reasons therefor.
(j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial,
any party may file any motion for additional videotaping on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court may
order an additional videotaped deposition to receive the
newly discovered evidence.
Section 28. Hearsay exception in child abuse cases. - A
statement made by a child describing any act or attempted
act of child abuse, not otherwise admissible under the
hearsay rule, may be admitted in evidence in any criminal or
non-criminal proceeding subject to the following rules:
(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its
proponent shall make known to the adverse party the
intention to offer such statement and its particulars to
provide him a fair opportunity to object. If the child is
available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party,
require the child to be present at the presentation of the
hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse
party. When the child is unavailable, the fact of such
circumstance must be proved by the proponent.
(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement,
the court shall consider the time, content and circumstances
thereof which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall
consider the following factors:
(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;
(2) The general character of the declarant child;
(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;
(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between
the declarant child and witness;
(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge
of the declarant child;
(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child
is remote; and
(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such
that there is no reason to suppose the declarant child
misrepresented the involvement of the accused.
(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under
the following situations:
(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of
memory, mental illness, or will be exposed to severe
psychological injury; or
(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance by
process or other reasonable means.
(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay
testimony shall be admitted only if corroborated by other
admissible evidence.
Section 29. Admissibility of videotaped and
audiotaped in-depth investigative or disclosure
interviews in child abuse cases. - The court may admit
videotape and audiotape in-depth investigative or disclosure
interviews as evidence, under the following conditions:
(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds
and under conditions established under section 28 (c).
(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained
members of a multidisciplinary team or representatives of
law enforcement or child protective services in situations
where child abuse is suspected so as to determine whether
child abuse occurred.
(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove
that:
(1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all
individuals present and at all times includes their images and
voices;
(2) the statement was not made in response to questioning
calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement or
is clearly shown to be the statement of the child and not the
product of improper suggestion;
(3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was
capable of recording testimony;
(4) the person operating the device was competent to
operate it;
(5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and
(6) it has been duly preserved.
The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be
available at trial for examination by any party. Before the
videotape or audiotape is offered in evidence, all parties shall
be afforded an opportunity to view or listen to it and shall be
furnished a copy of a written transcript of the proceedings.
The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or
audiotaped as required by this section shall not by itself
constitute a basis to exclude from evidence out-of-court
statements or testimony of the child. It may, however, be
considered in determining the reliability of the statements of
the child describing abuse.
Section 30. Sexual abuse shield rule. -
(a) Inadmissible evidence. - The following evidence is not
admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child
sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged
in other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the
alleged victim.
(b) Exception. - Evidence of specific instances of sexual
behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a person other
than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other
physical evidence shall be admissible.
A party intending to offer such evidence must:
(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial,
specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose
for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause,
requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial;
and
(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem
at least three (3) days before the hearing of the motion.
Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a
hearing in chambers and afford the child, his guardian ad
litem, the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be
heard. The motion and the record of the hearing must be
sealed and remain under seal and protected by a protective
order set forth in section 31(b). The child shall not be
required to testify at the hearing in chambers except with his
consent.
Section 31. Protection of privacy and safety. -
(a) Confidentiality of records. - Any record regarding a child
shall be confidential and kept under seal. Except upon written
request and order of the court, a record shall only be
released to the following:
(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;
(2) The prosecuting attorney;
(3) Defense counsel;
(4) The guardian ad litem;
(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies; and
(6) Other persons as determined by the court.
(b) Protective order. - Any videotape or audiotape of a child
that is part of the court record shall be under a protective
order that provides as follows:
(1) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their
expert witness, and the guardian ad litem.
(2) No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any
person mentioned in sub-section (a) to any other person,
except as necessary for the trial.
(3) No person shall be granted access to the tape, its
transcription or any part thereof unless he signs a written
affirmation that he has received and read a copy of the
protective order; that he submits to the jurisdiction of the
court with respect to the protective order; and that in case of
violation thereof, he will be subject to the contempt power of
the court.
(4) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made
available to the parties, their counsel, and respective agents
shall bear the following cautionary notice:
"This object or document and the contents thereof are
subject to a protective order issued by the court in (case title)
, (case number) . They shall not be examined, inspected,
read, viewed, or copied by any person, or disclosed to any
person, except as provided in the protective order. No
additional copies of the tape or any of its portion shall be
made, given, sold, or shown to any person without prior court
order. Any person violating such protective order is subject to
the contempt power of the court and other penalties
prescribed by law."
(5) No tape shall be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any
person except as ordered by the court.
(6) Within thirty (30) days from receipt, all copies of the tape
and any transcripts thereof shall be returned to the clerk of
court for safekeeping unless the period is extended by the
court on motion of a party.
(7) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect
until further order of the court.
(c) Additional protective orders. - The court may, motu
proprio or on motion of any party, the child, his parents, legal
guardian, or the guardian ad litem, issue additional orders to
protect the privacy of the child.
(d) Publication of identity contemptuous. - Whoever publishes
or causes to be published in any format the name, address,
telephone number, school, or other identifying information of
a child who is or is alleged to be a victim or accused of a
crime or a witness thereof, or an immediate family of the
child shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
(e) Physical safety of child; exclusion of evidence. - A child
has a right at any court proceeding not to testify regarding
personal identifying information, including his name, address,
telephone number, school, and other information that could
endanger his physical safety or his family. The court may,
however, require the child to testify regarding personal
identifying information in the interest of justice.
(f) Destruction of videotapes and audiotapes. - Any videotape
or audiotape of a child produced under the provisions of this
Rule or otherwise made part of the court record shall be
destroyed after five (5) years have elapsed from the date of
entry of judgment.
(g) Records of youthful offender. - Where a youthful offender
has been charged before any city or provincial prosecutor or
before any municipal judge and the charges have been
ordered dropped, all the records of the case shall be
considered as privileged and may not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone for any purpose whatsoever.
Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court
acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an
institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to
Chapter 3 of P. D. No. 603, all the records of his case shall
also be considered as privileged and may not be disclosed
directly or indirectly to anyone except to determine if a
defendant may have his sentence suspended under Article
192 of P. D. No. 603 or if he may be granted probation under
the provisions of P. D. No. 968 or to enforce his civil liability,
if said liability has been imposed in the criminal action. The
youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any
provision of law to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or
misrepresentation by reason of his failure to acknowledge the
case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any
inquiry made to him for any purpose.
"Records" within the meaning of this sub-section shall include
those which may be in the files of the National Bureau of
Investigation and with any police department or government
agency which may have been involved in the case. (Art. 200,
P. D. No. 603)
Section 32. Applicability of ordinary rules. - The
provisions of the Rules of Court on deposition, conditional
examination of witnesses, and evidence shall be applied in a
suppletory character.
Section 33. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on
December 15, 2000 following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 170338             December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,  subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE
AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275             December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.
AGCAOILI, petitioners,  of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C.
AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a
wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President
of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured
unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a
controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present
administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse
of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to
as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the
by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005,
then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a
privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a
congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry,
several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged.
But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer
respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape
recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation.
After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
members on the admissibility and authenticity of the
recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers
of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees
decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless,
they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said
recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. 3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O.
Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the
respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other
purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and
any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of
the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed
to desist from further using the recordings in any of the
House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and
debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo
Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech,
"The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse,
Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole
unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and
why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the
perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to
participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s
speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon,
who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to regulate the
sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to
prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy
debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his
concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on
the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her
considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the
use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of
the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a
legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence
Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or
other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of
public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and
Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals,
filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3,
Article III of the Constitution. 11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate
proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes
on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents, 15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M.
Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and
Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment 16on the petition on
September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of
the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the
Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to
intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275. 18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate
G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello
Garci" recordings, they have different objectives–the first is
poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House
and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and
the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the
Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and
grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first
resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in
their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal
standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental
act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he
can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed,
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales 25 even
permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed
to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,
to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the
National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in
the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has
repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving
serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest,
in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution
to determine whether or not other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution
and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion
given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing
to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person
alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly
identified by the members of the respondent committees as
one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously, therefore,
petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the
House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud.
The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for
prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify
their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens,
taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm
conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will
further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and
proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in
the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through
the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of
legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein
through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He
further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct
of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest
in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge
asserts his constitutional right to due process, 30 they satisfy
the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and
Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the
continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned
legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of
public funds.32 It should be noted that inFrancisco, rights
personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the
petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked
the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and
members of the bar and of the legal profession–which were
also supposedly violated by the therein assailed
unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows
that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and
the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all. 34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the
liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the
more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal
standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being
moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior
decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution
of actual cases and controversies. 35 By actual cases, we
mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise
the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion.
The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical
questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. 36 Neither will the Court
determine a moot question in a case in which no practical
relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose
has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, cannot be enforced. 38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the
Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ
to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing
the tape recordings and from including the same in their
committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be
stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the
Court notes that the recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello
Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been
overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be
dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition
is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about
to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the
same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings
and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same
question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure."
We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the
Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate
is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings
in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring
Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer
a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-
four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years
for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve
Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a
majority of Senators to continue into the next
Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution,
requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do
business." Applying the same reasoning inArnault v.
Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority of the Senators
continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that
the Rules of Proceduremust be republished by the Senate
after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in
our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the
same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this
Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as
it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the
conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of
the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms
this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall
be taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate
upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first
time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress
and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first time. The
logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of
the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the
Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct
of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a
matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the
same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an
institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e.
the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of
office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which
should be presented at least one day before its consideration,
and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the
session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules
at the start of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language
is conspicuously absent from theRules. The Rules simply
state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The
latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity
of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of
the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules,
it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries)
would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the
next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished
business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective
in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress,
it could have easily adopted the same language it had used
in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite
that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone
for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet
web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to
the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that
the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not
these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over
any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the
respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of
the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is
not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to
comply with the due process requirement because the Rules
of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through
the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only
for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only
"in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact,
the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.
Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because
no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary
to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated
petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED,
and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of
prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of
the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting
any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci"
tapes.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 186228 On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
[4]
PHILIPPINES,    During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the
Plaintiff-Appellee,   defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the
  Present: findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician
    who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years
  CARPIO, J., old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that
  Chairperson, AAA is the daughter of the appellant. [5] On trial, three (3)
  BRION, witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA;
[6]
-versus- DEL CASTILLO,  her brother BBB;[7] and one Moises Boy Banting,[8] a bantay
  ABAD, and bayan in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the
  PEREZ, JJ. following:
     
    In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at
  Promulgated: home.[9] AAAs father, the appellant, was having a drinking
ANTONIO LAUGA Y   spree at the neighbors place. [10] Her mother decided to leave
PINA ALIASTERIO, March 15, 2010 because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of
Accused-Appellant. mauling AAAs mother.[11] Her only brother BBB also went out
  in the company of some neighbors. [12]
     
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA
--x up;[13] removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA
  and removed her pants and underwear;[14]warned her not to
DECISION shout for help while threatening her with his fist; [15] and told
  her that he had a knife placed above her head. [16] He
PEREZ, J.: proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and
  inserted his penis inside her vagina. [17]
Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the  
appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter. Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. [18] Appellant
  claimed he scolded her for staying out late. [19] BBB decided to
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. take AAA with him.[20] While on their way to their maternal
Cabalquinto,[1] the real name and the personal circumstances grandmothers house, AAA recounted her harrowing
of the victim, and any other information tending to establish experience with their father.[21] Upon reaching their
or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle
family or household members, are not disclosed in this of the incident,[22] after which, they sought the assistance
decision. of Moises Boy Banting.[23]
   
The Facts Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only
  his underwear.[24] He invited appellant to the police station,
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,[2] the appellant [25]
 to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he
was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to
committed as follows: control himself.[26]
   
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical
at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, examination.[27] Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate,
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of AAA which reads:
with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have  
carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated
minor against her will.[3] hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an
  alleged raping incident[28]
 
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the
defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-
motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife
in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument,
[29]
 and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.[30] He
went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the
alleged rape.
 
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food
prepared for him at lunchtime.[31] Shortly after, AAA arrived.
[32]
 She answered back when confronted. [33] This infuriated
him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks. [34]
 
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3
oclock in the afternoon.[35] Finding nobody at home,[36] he
prepared his dinner and went to sleep. [37]
 
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of
the Bantay Bayan headed by Moises Boy Banting. [38] They
asked him to go with them to discuss some matters. [39] He
later learned that he was under detention because AAA
charged him of rape.[40]
 
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its
decision[41] in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant
guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
[42]
 It also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary
damages of P25,000.00.[43]
 
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS[44] by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN. [45] The appellate court found
that appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both
the civil indemnity and moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[46]
 
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course
to the appellants notice of appeal. [47] This Court required the
parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
briefs,[48] but both manifested that they will no longer file
supplemental pleadings.[49]
 
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that,
the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt,[50] because: (1) there were
inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother
BBB;[51] (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy
Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation
of his constitutional right;[52] and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-
motivated.[53]
Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged
confession with a bantay bayan and the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution.
 
Admissibility in Evidence of an
Extrajudicial Confession before
a Bantay Bayan
 
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed
to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, the confession was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a
lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. [54]
 
The case of People v. Malngan[55] is the authority on the
scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III,
Section 12(1)[56] and (3)[57] of the
Constitution. InMalngan, appellant questioned the
admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the
barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private
complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
 
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including
the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be
deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When
accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the
morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect,
actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several
houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to
her.Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman
x x x was made in response to the interrogation made by the
latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-
appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of
accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well
as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in
evidence against her x x x.
 
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal.
x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through
questioning by the police or their agents but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits
x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors
x x x [of the private complainant].[58] (Emphasis supplied)
 
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this
Court needs to ascertain whether or not
a bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement officer
within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution.
 
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,[59] this Court had the
occasion to mention the nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a
group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the
purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.[60]
 
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section
1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November
1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in
each barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing
arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at
the Barangay level.[61] The composition of the Committee
includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as
Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan;
(3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4)
a BarangayTanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of
existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood
Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization
Representative well-known in his community.[62]
 
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in
the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local
government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken
byMoises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on
the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry
he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12
of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned.
 
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant,
which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
 
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from
the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence
of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [63]
 
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of
AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB
accompanied her to the house of their
grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives,
proceeded to look for a bantay bayan. On the other hand,
BBB testified that he brought her sister to the house of
their bantay bayan after he learned of the incident.
 
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,[64] appellant argues that
where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand
together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must
be telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction. [65]
 
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at
bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not simply stand
together because:
 
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not
have possibly seen the hacking incident since he had
accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to
accept the testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have
possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with
Vicente at that time.
 
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of
BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a bantay
bayan. Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the
help was sought for, which this Court could well attribute to
the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of
AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the
incident.
 
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the
assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of
the testimonies.[66] In fact, inconsistencies which refer to
minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even
strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase
doubts that such testimonies have been coached or
rehearsed.[67]
 
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only
because she bore grudges against him is likewise
unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives
of feuds, resentment or revenge. [68] As correctly pointed out
by the Court of Appeals:
 
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough
to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that
would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and
their families but also bring their fathers into the gallows of
death.[69] The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is
unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with
rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a
public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if
such heinous crime was not in fact committed. [70] No person,
much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to
one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very
existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting
gratefulness.[71] Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a
certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman
to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for
the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family
including herself to a lifetime of shame. [72] It is highly
improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual
perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake charges
much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is
entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were
directed against a close relative. [73]
 
Elements of Rape
 
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997[74] to the case at bar.
 
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among
others, [b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman through force, threat or intimidation.[75] The death
penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with
aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, [w]hen
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent.[76]
 
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how
she was raped, culminating with the penetration of appellants
penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had
carnal knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed.[77] Further, when such testimony
corresponds with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to
conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge
have been established.[78]
 
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or
intimidation is not essential when the accused is the father of
the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or
influence substitutes for violence and intimidation. [79] At any
rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with his fist
and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head. [80]
 
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward
testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, alibi is an
inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion
because it is easy to fabricate. [81] Alibi and denial must be
supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to merit
credibility. [82] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the accused must establish two elements (1) he was not at
the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and
(2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at
the time of its commission.[83] Appellant failed in this wise.
 
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
 
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship with the offender in the instant case has likewise
been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances
were specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and
admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by
both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such
stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they
are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
  
Penalty
 
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and
damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the
effect that where, as here, the rape is committed with any of
the qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled
to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto[84] and P75,000.00
as moral damages.[85] However, the award of exemplary
damages should have been increased
from P25,000.00to P30,000.00.[86] Also, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed
considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon
appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.[87] We further
affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellants non-
eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly
provides that persons convicted of offenses punished
withreclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be
eligible for parole.
 
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is
hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant
Antonio Lauga isGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay
AAAP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
 
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72244 May 8, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
JOSE AGRIPA, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
A grisly sight awaited the authorities who had come to
investigate reports of a stabbing in the house of Jose and
Adelfa Agripa at barangay Humapon in Legazpi City. On the
floor awash with blood, Jose was locked in a final embrace
with his wife, who was already dead. Adelfa had sustained
fifteen wounds and had expired due to shock and massive
hemorrhage. Jose himself had four wounds in his body and
was hardly alive. Because he refused to release his hold on
his dead wife, the couple was rolled in a mat and rushed to
the hospital. All this occurred at about one o'clock in the
morning of April 30, 1980.
That same morning, Corporal Wilfredo Bermas, a member of
the investigating team took down the following exchange
between him and Jose, 1 whom he believed to be on the
verge of death:
Q What is your name please?
A Jose Agripa.
Q Who stabbed you?
A I myself.
Q Who stabbed your wife?
A I myself.
Q Why did you stab your wife?
A Because of problems in the family.
Q What do you think, will you die from your wounds?
A No.
Q Was it really your intention to kill your wife?
A Yes, I want to die with her.
The statement was not signed by Jose. On Bermas's request,
it was witnessed by the barangay captain, Salustiano Botin,
who was present during the recorded conversation.
Jose survived to face prosecution for parricide two months
later. He was convicted on July 18, 1985. 2
The principal evidence presented against him at the trial was
the above-quoted statement, which was offered as a dying
declaration or as part of the res gestae. Also submitted as an
exhibit was the 8-inch bolo-knife used in the killing, which
was turned over by Botin to the police at seven o' clock that
same morning. He had received it from a neighbor of the
couple who had picked it up at the scene of the killing. 3 The
police had evidently neglected to look for it when they went
to investigate.
In his defense, Jose gave a different version of the killing of
his wife. He said that he had gone to sleep early that night
but was awakened when he felt a stab wound in his stomach.
He could not see his assailant because it was dark. He
covered the wound with his right hand but there was a
second thrust that wounded him again almost in the same
place. Instinctively, he curled himself into a fetal position with
his hands at the back of his neck and asked, "Why did you
stab me?" He received no answer but soon enough a third
thrust sliced through his left arm and pierced the right part of
his chest. It was then that he grabbed the fist of his attacker
and the two of them wrestled in the dark for possession of
the weapon. He could not recall what happened afterwards
as he must have fainted. He said he also had no recollection
of the statement he supposedly made before he was brought
to the hospital. He recovered consciousness there only on
May 4, 1980, and was then told that his wife had tried to kill
him. 4
His statements were corroborated by his 18-year old son,
Edwin, who testified that there was no quarrel between his
parents when his father went to sleep early that night of April
29, 1980. His mother was in her usual angry mood, however.
After studying his lessons, he himself went to sleep while his
mother continued folding clothes. He was awakened later by
the sound of a scuffle, and when he turned on his flashlight
he saw his mother stabbing his father. He amplified his
testimony with gestures, swinging his right arm downward in
simulation of stabbing. Afraid to succor his father, he woke
up his two brothers and rushed with them to their
grandfather's house to seek his help. On their way out, they
heard his father say, "Why did you stab me?" 5
Edwin identified the bolo-knife as belonging to his mother,
who he said usually carried it on her person for cutting leaves
to cover herself whenever it rained. On two occasions,
however, she used it for a different purpose. The first incident
was when Adelfa stabbed Jose on the right side of his body,
and the second was when she hacked Jose's upper right arm.
Both incidents were reported to the barangay captain. 6
Edwin admitted loving his father more than his mother. He
recalled that when he was in Grade I, his mother hanged him
by the neck from a coconut tree with a piece of katsa cloth. 7
The violent nature of Adelfa was affirmed by another witness,
Manuel Cardel, who testified that he was in the store of one
Macedonio in the afternoon of April 29, 1980, when he heard
Adelfa say she would stab Jose if he came home without any
money. (As it turned out, Jose did come home without his
salary, saying he would collect it the following day. This could
have been the reason why Edwin observed his mother to be
in a sullen mood that night.) Cardel also recalled one time
when Adelfa ran after her husband with a bolo in her hand. 8
The trial court correctly rejected the above-quoted
interrogation as a dying declaration because it did not
comply with all the requirements of this particular exception
to the hearsay rule. The statement does not show that it was
made by the declarant under the consciousness of impending
death (although it is true that Jose was near death at that
time). Nevertheless, it was correctly admitted as part of
the res gestae, having been made soon after the startling
occurrence of the multiple stabbing of Jose and Adelfa.
But the mere fact that evidence is admissible does not
necessarily mean that it is also credible. The testimony of a
competent witness may be admissible if relevant but it is not
for this reason alone believable. According to Rule 128, Sec.
3, "evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or these rules." Credibility depends
on the evaluation given to the evidence by the court in
accordance with the guidelinesprovided in Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court and the doctrines laid down by this Court. 9
As the Court sees it, Jose's statement, while admissible as
part of the res gestae, is not credible evidence of his criminal
liability. It is quite obvious that he was not in full possession
of his faculties when he made that statement, which,
significantly, he did not sign. We note that when the
authorities came upon the wounded couple, Jose refused to
let go of his dead wife and was rolled up with her cadaver in
a mat to be brought to the hospital. That was not the conduct
of a rational man. Moreover, Jose was himself suffering from
four stab wounds which could have cost him his life had he
not been treated immediately. Given the condition of his
mind and body at the time the statement was made, Jose
could not be expected to think clearly and to willingly make
the serious and damning confession now imputed to him.
It is true that when the accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional
presumption of innocence and assumes the burden of
proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the justification
for his act. 10 The essential elements of self-defense,
according to Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, are: a)
unlawful aggression: b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. We
feel that all these requisites are present and have been
sufficiently established in the case at bar.
The accused-appellant was sound asleep when he was
suddenly attacked by his wife, who fell upon him with intent
to kill. There was no warning at all of the deadly assault.
There was no provocation either, unless it be her frenetic
anger over his failure to bring home his salary, which was not
the sufficient provocation required by the law. Jose was
totally unprepared for the knife thrusts in his stomach and
chest that posed an immediate threat and danger to his life.
Under this vicious attack, he had no choice but to defend
himself against his unknown assailant and by the only means
available to him. He grabbed the knife from his maddened
wife and struck wildly at his would-be killer. He stabbed
blindly, thinking only to save his life even as it drained from
the wounds he had sustained. If it appeared later that he had
wounded his wife no less than fifteen times, it was not
because he was a cruel and bloodthirsty killer. The only
reason was that he was fighting desperately for his very life
and, animated only by his mortal fear of his unknown
aggressor and moved like a wild beast by the elemental
instinct for survival, did not know when to stop.

Jose Agripa was a peaceful law-abiding person with no known

police record. He pursued the humble tenor of his life,
working quietly as a lowly laborer, struggling as best he could
to provide for his wife and children. If suddenly he became a
killer, it was not by inclination or design or with malice
aforethought. He was merely a hapless pawn of fortune, an
unfortunate victim of tragic circumstances, more so, indeed,
than the wife he killed.

The Court sees in this case a man dominated if not terrified

by a wife given to cruelty and violence. It is not unlikely that
she was paranoid. Twice before, she had hacked her husband
with her bolo, and there was also that time he ran for dear
life as she chased him with her trusty weapon. The act of
hanging a small child by the neck from a coconut tree can
hardly be called the manifestation of a normal psyche. It was
this woman who, heeding the urgings of her twisted mind,
decided to kill her sleeping husband in the dark even as her
children slumbered peacefully nearby.

A Higher Tribunal shall judge Adelfa Agripa. But this Court

need not wait a minute longer to absolve the accused-
appellant. Jose Agripa is innocent. There is no stronger
instinct than the instinct for survival, which moved him
without fault to do what he did.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and

accused-appellant Jose Agripa is ACQUITTED on the ground of
self-defense. It is the order of this Court that he be released
immediately. No costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181037
Appellee,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Carpio,*
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario, and
Leonardo-De Castro,** JJ.
SAIDAMEN MACATINGAG
y NAMRI alias SAI, Promulgated:
Appellant.
January 19, 2009
x containing suspected shabu from appellant. The policemen
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- x
 
DECISION
 
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 
 
For review is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01487, which affirmed in toto the June 16, 2005
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo, Laguna,
Branch 32 in Criminal Case No. 14730-SP(04), finding
appellant Saidamen Macatingag y Namri guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In its Brief for the Appellee, [3] the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts
as follows:
On January 17, 2004, about 8:00 oclock in the morning, the
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp
Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Calamba City formed a buy-bust
team because of a report from a confidential informant about
the drug pushing activities of a certain Sai, who later turned
out to be appellant. The team was composed of P/Sr. Insp.
Julius Cesar V. Ablan, as leader, and PO3 Marino A. Garcia as
the poseur-buyer and PO3 Danilo Leona as the arresting
officer, as well as two police officers. After discussing the
buy-bust procedure including the pre-arranged signal which
is the removal of PO3 Garcias cap, and the preparation of two
P500.00 bills initialed with MAG, the police authorities
immediately proceeded to the target area at the vicinity of
Phase I, Villa Antonio, San Pablo City.
 
Upon arriving thereat about 11:30 oclock in the morning of
that day, PO3 Garcia and the confidential informant waited
for appellant at the entrance gate of Villa Antonio Subdivision
in San Pablo City. Some twenty (20) minutes later, appellant
arrived sporting black pants and dark gray t-shirt. PO3 Garcia
was introduced to appellant as the prospective
buyer. Appellant, on the other hand, asked PO3 Garcia about
the money amounting to P52,500.00. PO3 Garcia then pulled
out an envelope containing the two P500.00 bills with the
boodle money from his pocket, and demanded the
drugs. Appellant thereafter pulled out from his pocket one
plastic sachet and handed it to PO3 Garcia. Immediately upon
giving appellant the marked money, PO3 Garcia lost no time
in giving the pre-arranged signal to PO3 Leona. PO3 Leona
thereupon hurriedly seized from appellant the marked
money, while PO3 Garcia recovered the plastic sachet
thereafter brought appellant to their station in Canlubang,
Calamba City. PO3 Garcia marked the seized plastic sachet
with markings A and MAG representing his initials, and the
date and time of arrest. After making an inventory on the
seized suspected shabu, the police authorities requested for
the laboratory examination thereof with the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
 
The seized suspected sachet of shabu was shown positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 25.23 grams per
Chemistry Report No. D-54-04 issued by P/Insp. Lorna R. Tria,
Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory. [4]
 
On January 19, 2004, appellant was charged with Violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, [5] in an Information[6] that
reads:
 
That on or about January 17, 2004, in the City of San Pablo,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell 25.23 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug,
without being authorized by law.
 
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
 
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. [8] He
maintained that he was at home with his wife on January 17,
2004 when four armed men suddenly entered their house,
seized his money, placed handcuffs on his wrists, and forcibly
brought him to the police headquarters in Bgy.
Canlubang. He averred that he was not allowed to talk with
anybody when he was incarcerated for two days and that he
was alone during the preliminary investigation. Thereafter, he
was transferred to the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) in San Pablo City, where he was formally
charged with selling shabu.
On June 16, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
accused SAIDAMEN MACATINGAG Y NAMRI alias SAI is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 also known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and there
being no mitigating circumstance, accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer a penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a
fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), and
to pay the costs.
 
The effects of the crime are ordered confiscated in favor of
the government. The custodian of the shabu subject of the
case is hereby ordered to submit the same to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition within 48 hours from
receipt of a copy of this judgment and the latter is given 48
hours from receipt of the same to submit an acknowledgment
receipt to this Court to form part of the records of this case.
 
SO ORDERED.[9]
The trial court found that all the elements of the crime
charged were present and proven beyond reasonable doubt
by the evidence of the prosecution and the testimonies of the
poseur-buyer and the arresting officer who are presumed to
have performed their duties regularly. It disregarded the
allegations of the defense that appellant was a victim of a
frame-up and that he was not arrested pursuant to a valid
buy-bust operation.
 
On July 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision which affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial
court. The appellate court held that the constitutional right of
appellant against warrantless arrest and search was not
violated; that appellant failed to assail the legality of the
arrest and the seizure of the sachet of shabu prior to his
arraignment or at any stage in the proceedings of the trial
court; that the arrest was pursuant to a buy-bust operation
which is a valid form of entrapment of felons in the execution
of their criminal plan; and that the search conducted on
appellant was incidental to a lawful arrest. [10] The appellate
court also gave more weight and credence to the testimonies
of the members of the buy-bust team because they were not
shown to have been impelled by ill-motives in testifying
against appellant.
 
Hence, this petition.[11]
 
Appellant avers that the trial court and the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in giving undue credence to the testimonies of
the police officers and in upholding the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official functions. He
also assails the validity of his arrest because the police
officers were not armed with any warrant when he was
arrested. Finally, he assails the propriety of the chain of
custody of the shabu allegedly seized from him due to the
non-observation of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. [12]
 
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[13]
 
These elements have been proven to be present in the
instant case. PO3 Garcia who acted as the poseur-buyer,
categorically testified about the buy-bust operation from the
time he was introduced by the informant to appellant as the
buyer of the shabu; to the time when appellant agreed to the
sale; to the actual exchange of the marked money and the
heat-sealed sachet containing a white crystalline substance;
and until the apprehension of appellant, to wit:
 
A I myself together with confidential informant just walked,
as well as the area and waited the poseur at the agreed place
situated at the vicinity of entrance of Villa Antonio, San Pablo
City.
 
Q You were waiting for the suspects at the entrance of Villa
San Antonio and then what else transpired next?
A After more or less 20 minutes of waiting maam we saw a
man wearing a black pants and dark gray t-shirts arrived in
our position, it was introduced our confidential informant, he
was introduced our confidential that as the poseur, likewise I
was also introduced as the seller, [sic] I was also introduced
by the confidential informant as the buyer.
 
Q Who are the supposed to be the buyer, you were
introduced as a buyer?
A Yes, maam.
 
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q And this suspect who was the seller, is he present in Court
today?
A Yes, maam.
 
Q Would you kindly point to him?
A The 6th man from the Steel Cabinet.
 
INTERPRETER
Makikitayo, anong pangalan mo?
 
ACCUSED
Saidamen Macatingag po.
xxxx
 
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q So, after the introductions were made what happened?
A The seller identified the money, maam, which is amounting
to P52,500.00.
 
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q What did you do?
A I immediately pull out from my pocket the envelope which
is contained the 2 pieces of P500 bills and the bodol money
as agreed amount of P52,500. Likewise as also the seller if it
has a dangerous drugs, maam.
Q And then what happened?
A I immediately pulled out 1 plastic sachet from his pocket
and handed it over to me maam.
 
Q One (1) plastic sachet was handed to you?
A Yes, maam.
 
Q After you handed that money?
A No, maam we handed first to me the sachet and he
demanded the payment of sachet, maam.
 
xxxx
 
FISCAL LAGMAN
Q What happened after the exchanged of the money and
plastic sachet?
A After I gave him the buy bust money as agreed upon before
we discovered as the bodol money, I immediately executed
the pre-arranged signal which is remove my cap, maam.
 
Q After you removed your cap, what happened?
A I saw PO3 Leona arrived and assisted me, after the
arresting.
 
Q While you were arresting this Saidamen, this accused, what
did you do as a matter of procedure, what did you tell him?
A We informed him the constitutional rights, maam. PO2
Leona was able to recovered this custody control of bodol
money.
 
xxxx
 
Q So, after that, where did you bring Saidamen?
A We immediately brought him at our office at Camp Vicente
Lim, Canlubang, Laguna together with confiscated pieces of
evidence for proper disposition.
Q You said that you were able to buy 1 plastic sachet of
shabu that was supposed to be worth of P52,500, would you
be able to identify the plastic sachet if you will be shown to
you?
A Yes, maam.
 
Q What markings did you place if any?
A I put my exhibit A, my initials, the date and time of arrest
included the month and year, maam.
 
Q I am showing to you exhibit F, would you kindly tell us if
this is the one that you brought from Saidamen Macatingag?
A Yes, maam.[14]
PO3 Leona, the back-up arresting officer during the buy-bust
operation corroborated PO3 Garcias testimony, thus:
 
Q After you placed yourself 10 meters a way from the house,
from the site and likewise Marino Garcia and the informant
and the fence near the site, what happened thereafter?
A I saw a person came out from that way near the hollow
blocks fence wearing black pants and green t-shirt and I saw
they were talking with our confidential informant.
 
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Could you see the person who just arrived and talked with
your confidential informant on said occasion, is he in Court?
A Yes, sir.
 
Q Could you please point to him if he is present?
 
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person who gave us his name as
Saidamen Macatingag.
 
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Now, Mr. Witness after the confidential informant and the
accused had a conversation what did if any transpired after
this conversation?
A After 30 minutes I saw the pre-arranged signal that this
PO3 Marino Garcia will remove his cap.
 
Q You mean to say or to impress this court that Mr. Witness
that the informant and Mr. Garcia were together when they
had a transaction with the accused?
A Yes, sir because the confidential informant introduced Mr.
Marino Garcia to the accused.
 
xxxx
 
FISCAL COMILANG
Q After you saw PO3 Marino Garcia removed his cap, what
did you do after that?
A I went to the area to help PO3 Garcia.
 
Q What if any did you find out after helping PO3 Marino
Garcia?
A I arrested Saidamen and I removed from him the 2 pieces
of P500 the bodol money.
 
xxxx
 
Q Now after recovering that 2 P500 bills from the accused
what will be, were you able to recover?
A I recovered from the accused the money and it was SPO3
Marino Garcia who recovered the 25 grams of shabu
conducted.[15]
 
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation.[16] It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial
courts which are factual in nature and which involve
credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a
better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where said findings are sustained
by the Court of Appeals.[17]
 
The testimonies of police officers Garcia and Leona, and the
sachet of shabu sold by appellant sufficiently proved the
crime charged. Moreover, the prosecution was able to
establish that the substance recovered from appellant was
indeed shabu.[18]
 
In view of these testimonies and evidence of the prosecution,
appellants denial must fail. The Court has consistently
stressed that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense that
becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of
the accused by prosecution witnesses. [19] Moreover, appellant
failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to overturn
the presumption that the arresting officers regularly
performed their duties. It was not shown, by any satisfactory
degree of proof, that said policemen were impelled by ill-
motives to testify against him. There is, therefore, no basis to
suspect the veracity of their testimonies.
 
With regard to the validity of his arrest, evidence shows that
appellant was the subject of a buy-bust operation. In this
jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common
and accepted mode of apprehending those involved in illegal
sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to
be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers
and of luring them out of obscurity. [20] It catches the
violator in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting
the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to
apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that
may have been part of or used in the commission of the
crime.[21]
 
Finally, this Court likewise finds no merit in appellants
contention that the police officers failed to comply with the
guidelines on the chain of custody and disposition of the
seized sachet of shabu as provided in Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. Testimonies of prosecution witnesses
convincingly state that the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized item was properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. P03 Garcia testified that he marked
the sachet of shabu with his initials, and the date and time of
appellants arrest.[22] PO3 Leona confirmed that he had seen
PO3 Garcia mark the same sachet of shabu sold by appellant;
that a letter of request for the examination of said sachet was
made; and such request was received by the regional crime
laboratory office. Thus:
 
Q Were you able to see that the shabu was actually was you
said that recovered PO3 Marino Garcia from the accused?
A Yes, sir.
 
COURT
Q Did you put your initial in the specimen?
A I was only accompanied Marino Garcia in bringing to the
crime lab.
FISCAL COMILANG
Q Since you have seen Mr. Witness the actual shabu was
taken from the accused, do you know if Mr. Garcia placed any
reference on the said article, if any?
A Yes, sir, the initial of Marino Garcia.
 
Q What is that initial?
A MAG.
 
Q Mr. Witness, why do you know that police officer Marino
Garcia actually placed his initial on the said specimen or
item?
A Everytime that we conducted the buy bust, it is our SOP to
place the marking.
 
Q Mr. Witness I will show you that item confiscated Marino
Garcia from the accused on the alleged of the item, could you
identify it?
A Yes, sir.
 
Q I will show to you now the plastic sachet big plastic sachet
which contained white crystalline substance, could you
please tell us what is the relationship of this item from that
item allegedly taken by Marino Garcia from the accused on
which marking was placed?
A This is the item which is recovered from the accused. Mr.
Garcia placed his initial.
 
Q What is MAG?
A MAG referred to Marino A. Garcia.
 
xxxx
 
Q After the specimen and the accused were transferred to
the investigator of Regional director what happened to the
accused and the specimen?
A The investigator prepared a paper for the filing of theand
prepared a letter request for the examination.
 
Q Would you specify what are those documents prepared by
the investigator as pre-requisite of filing of this case?
A We prepared the letter request for the crime lab request for
the accused we first report to the effectdid not suffer physical
injury.
 
xxxx
 
Q Do you know if this document was actually received by the
addressee?
A Yes, sir, because I was with them.
Q What proof that this document was actually received by
the addressee?
A There was a stamp marked of receipt, sir.[23]
 
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the seized sachet of
shabu was immediately marked for proper identification and,
thereafter, forwarded to the Crime Laboratory for
examination. The Chemistry Report of the Regional Crime there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
Laboratory Office stated that the specimen submitted by the admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative
apprehending officers indeed bore the marking Exh A MAG value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the
171200-01-14 and that the same gave positive result to the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
tests for the presence of Methamphetamine obtaining in each case.[28]
Hydrochloride. Forensic Chemical Officer Tria confirmed on  
the witness stand that she examined the specimen submitted All told, We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial
by the PDEA and that she was the one who prepared the court that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Chemistry Report No. D-54-04.[24] illegal sale of a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized
  in Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Under said provision,
It is thus evident that the identity of the corpus delicti has the illegal sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its
been properly preserved and established by the quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to
prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.
presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad  
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered For illegally selling 25.23 grams of shabu, and there being no
with. The appellant in this case has the burden to show that modifying circumstance alleged in the Information, the trial
the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance with
officers and a presumption that public officers properly Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code [29] and a fine
discharge their duties.[25] Appellant failed to discharge such of P500,000.00.
burden.  
  WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of
This Court has held that non-compliance with Section 21, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01487 dated July
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 will not render an accuseds arrest 31, 2007, sustaining the conviction of appellant Saidamen
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him Macatingag y Namri for violation of Section 5, Article II of
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the Republic Act No. 9165, and imposing upon him the penalty of
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 is
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the hereby AFFIRMED.
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. [26]  
  SO ORDERED.
In People of the Philippines v. Del Monte,[27] it was held that:
 
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must
be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided in
Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein a party
producing a document as genuine which has been altered
and appears to be altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the
alteration. His failure to do so shall make the document
inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the
rules.
 
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in
any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the
confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if
G.R. No. 121087           August 26, 1999
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,  know why he took a picture. 3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision  of
the Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe
Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
sentencing him to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, but increased the
death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique
"Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The information against petitioner alleged —
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the
nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena
Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike
Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where
authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of
their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with
the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by
banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a
consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral
concussion and shock which directly caused his death.
The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of
February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan,
who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City,
together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment
City following reports that it was showing the nude dancers.
After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered
beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to
perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena
brought out his camera and took a picture. 2
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security
guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to
pakialam, because this is my job."4Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill
him.5 When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his
gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. 6
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to
report the matter. Three of the policeman on duty, including
petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police
station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join
them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt.
Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle.7
Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked
with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.8Afterwards,
petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the
wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin,
anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?" 9 Petitioner
Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and,
pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na
kita?"10
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner
Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan pumarito kami para
magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate." 11 Petitoner Navarro
replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." 12He then
turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the
behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.13
This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo
diyan"14 Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay
ko."15The two then had a heated exchange. 16 Finally, Lingan
said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at
magsuntukan na lang tayo."17 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah,
ganoon?"18
As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him
with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan
fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get
up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the
forehead which floored him.19
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan
ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon." 20 He
said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni
Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon."21 He then poked his gun at the right temple of
Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the
blotter.22 Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand
was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. 23
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner
Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI,
Boy, Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been
taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from
his injuries.24
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record
on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased.25 The following is an excerpt from the tape
recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the
problem. I'm out of the problem.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .
Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley,
dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here to
ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the
number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na
tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan: I'm brave also.
Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka
namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng
ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka
dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda.
Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang
minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi
lang ikaw!
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo!
Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare
hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko.
Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa
harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh.
Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex,
ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo
ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who
tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck
both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor
twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete. 26
In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the
trial court stated:
After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court finds
that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible,
concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the
mind of the court that accused herein is criminally
responsible.
The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial
could not under the circumstance overturn the strength of
the prosecution's evidence.
This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more
particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make
false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause
accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or
injury.
Going over the evidence on record, the postmortem report
issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed account
given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head
injuries.
Said post-mortem report together with the testimony of
Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the
head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's
falling down on the concrete pavement head first.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid
disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting
versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we
find the trial court's factual conclusions to have better and
stronger evidentiary support.
In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a
victim of appellant's aggression does not impair the probative
worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in
question. In fact, far from proving his innocence, appellant's
unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has
virtually admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or
disposition and his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the
same motivation that led him into assailing Jalbuena must
have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had
interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated him and further
challenged to a fist fight.1âwphi1.nêt
xxx     xxx     xxx
On the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan
was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is in
fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of
Lingan's injuries as shown in thepost-mortem report (Exh. D).
According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was
outbalanced in the course of boxing the appellant. And yet,
Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left
eyebrow, between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion
in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E.). Certainly,
these injuries could not have been resulted from Lingan's
accidental fall.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE
CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A
FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR
CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED
BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
The appeal is without merit.
First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the
testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased
witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a
witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused
is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. 27 Trial courts, which
have the opportunity observe the facial expressions,
gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are
competent to determine whether his or her testimony should
be given credence.28 In the instant case, petitioner Navarro
has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight
to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording had made. It may be asked whether the tape is
admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of
dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or
not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record,
disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken word secured either before or
after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited
by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided,
That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence
in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same
or any part thereof, or any information therein contained
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. 29 Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2)
that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded;
and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons
such are claimed to belong. 30 In the instant case, Jalbuena
testified that he personally made the voice recording; 31 that
the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; 32 and
that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and
Lingan.33 A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established:
(1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an
entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan,
with the latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy
on the body of Lingan, issued the medical certificate, 34 dated
February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:
Post Mortem Findings:
= Dried blood, forehead & face
= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth WITNESS:
= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral Q   Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?
eyebrow, Left
A   The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a
= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.
the left & right eyebrow
Q   How about this findings No. 4?
= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead,
Left A   By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.
= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes Q   And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?
CAUSE OF DEATH: A   Same cause, sir.
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
Q   This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?
= BLOW ON THE HEAD A   Same thing sir.
Dr. Yamamato testified: Q   How about the last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and
toes, what could have caused it doctor?
Q   Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of
this findings number one, which is oozing of blood from the WITNESS:
forehead?
It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.
A   It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a
hard object, sir.
FISCAL:
Q   Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound
No. 1.? In this same post mortem report and under the heading
cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion
and Shock, will you explain it?
A   It is possible, sir.
A   Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak"
Q   And in the alternative, could have it been caused by or jarring of the brain, sir.
bumping on a concrete floor?
Q   What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?
A   Possible, sir.
A   It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.
FISCAL:
Q   What about the shock, what could have caused it?
What could have been the cause of the contusion and
swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?
A   It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.
Q   Could any one of both caused the death of the victim? party immediately preceding the act should have been petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate
appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the
A   Yes, sir. defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the penalty next lower degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the
offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or irritating maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum
anyone.36 The provocation must be sufficient and should period.45
Q   Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of immediately precede the act. 37 To be sufficient, it must be
the deceased? adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from
must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. 38 And it must P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with the current
A   May be, sir. immediately precede the act so much so that there is no jurisprudence.46
interval between the provocation by the offended party and
FISCAL: the commission of the crime by the accused. 39
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro
Which of these two more likely, to cause death? In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years
immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso,40 we appreciated of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
WITNESS: this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a
policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had
Shock, sir. repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of
Q   Please explain further the meaning of the medical term petitioner Navarro.
shock?
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender
A   It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
earlier sir. committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner.
The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the
scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he
xxx     xxx     xxx had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating
circumstance should be taken into account in determining
FISCAL: the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro.
The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent
Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
floor have caused shock? person committing a felony although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended. 41 In People
v. Castro,42 the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
WITNESS: commit so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated
in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
Possible, sir.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a
How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock? crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in
the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against
A   Possible, sir.35 petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed
right in the police station where policemen were discharging
their public functions.43
The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena
that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol
above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with The crime committed as found by the trial court and the
his fist. Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under
Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As
there were two mitigating circumstances and one
Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended minimum period.44 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 186459 peso bills bearing Serial Numbers BT219634 and XN547078 Police Station represented by
THE PHILIPPINES,   to be used as buy-bust money, wrote his initials ARM thereon PO1 Aldrin Mariano
Appellee, Present: at the lower left portion.  
      SPECIMEN SUBMITTED One (1) heat sealed
  CARPIO MORALES, J., The operation was recorded in the police blotter and transparent plastic sachet
- versus - Chairperson, coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency containing undetermined
  BERSAMIN, (PDEA) which gave it control number NOC-1305-03-10.[3] amount of suspected shabu
  DEL CASTILLO,*   Marked EXH A ARM
  VILLARAMA, JR., and At around 8:00 in the evening, the team, together with the 05/13/03
  SERENO, JJ. confidential informant, proceeded to the residence of  
NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER,   appellant who was standing in front of her house. The 2. Request acknowledge (sic) receipt. [5] (emphasis and
Appellant. Promulgated: informant at once introduced PO1 Mariano as buyer. As underscoring supplied)
September 1, 2010 appellant inquired how much, PO1 Mariano handed her the Acting on the above-quoted memorandum, P/Sr. Insp.
  two marked bills upon which appellant drew out one Annalee R. Forro, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - substance-filled sachet from the outside wall of her house. At Police District Crime Laboratory Office, who received the
- - - x  that instant, PO1 Mariano removed his cap, the pre-arranged sachet, conducted on the same night of May 13, 2003, at
  signal for the team members to, as they did, close in. around 8:33 P.M, a laboratory examination of the contents
D E C I S I O N    of the sachet, the result of which she recorded in Chemistry
  PO1 Mariano then held appellants arm, identified himself as a Report No. D-889-03E[6] wherein she concluded that the
CARPIO MORALES, J.: police officer, and apprised her of her constitutional rights as substance inside the sachet weighed 0.03 gram and was
  he retrieved from her the buy-bust money. He thereafter positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Nita Eugenio y Pejer (appellant) was charged before the marked EXH-A arm/05/13/03 on the substance-filled sachet  
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City [1] for violation sold to him by appellant. Hence, the filing of the Information against appellant.
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No.    
9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, The buy-bust team brought appellant to the Rizal Medical Denying the charge against her, appellant gave the following
allegedly committed as follows:[2] Center for physical check-up and later to the police version:
On or about May 13, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the detachment office where P/Sr. Insp. Chief Villaruel prepared  
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being the following memorandum of May 13, 2003 [4] addressed to On May 11, 2003, while fetching water from a nearby well,
lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, the Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory she was, in the presence of family and neighbors, accosted
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Office, requesting the conduct of laboratory examination on by police officers who brought her to the police station. At the
Aldrin Mariano, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed the seized substance-filled sachet to determine the presence station, she was questioned whether she knew one Baylene
transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams of dangerous drugs and their weight: Ramba, to which she replied in the negative. She was later
(0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found   surprised to learn that an Information for violation of R.A.
positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a 1.      Respectfully forwarded to your good office 9165 had been filed against her.
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. herewith/attached (sic) submitted specimen for laboratory  
  examination to wit: Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of May
Contrary to law. (underscoring supplied)   31, 2005, convicted appellant, disposing as follows:
  NATURE OF OFFENSE VIOLATION OF RA 9165  
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version   WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused NITA EUGENIO y Pejer
is culled: NAME OF SUSPECT NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER, @ Aruba GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
  57 years old, widow, violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as
On the night of May 13, 2003, at around 7:30 p.m., a Res. At Vicper Compound, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and
confidential informant reported to PO1 Aldrin Mariano (PO1 Malinao, Pasig City imposes upon her the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to
Mariano), officer-on-duty at the Pasig City Hall Detachment,   pay a fine of Php500,000.00
that one alias Aruba was selling shabu at Vicper Compound, D.T.P.O. On or about 8:30 PM 13 May  
Malinao, Pasig City. 2003 at Vicper Compound, SO ORDERED.[7] (underscoring supplied)
  Malinao, Pasig City  
P/Sr. Insp. Chief Rodrigo Villaruel at once formed a buy-bust    
team to conduct an operation composed of, among others, ARRESTING OFFICER Elements of Mayors Special By Decision of September 16, 2008,[8] the Court of
PO3 Amilassan Salisa as team leader, and PO1 Mariano as Action Team/ City Hall Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
poseur-buyer. PO1 Mariano, who was given two one hundred Detachment, Pasig City
In affirming the trial courts rejection of appellants defense,
the appellate court held:
. . . As correctly observed by the trial court, the claim that
accused-appellant was arrested without reason is not
supported by evidence. Not one of the alleged witnesses to
the unlawful arrest, including accused-appellants own
daughter, was presented to corroborate the claim. Hence, the
court a quo is correct in considering the defense incredible
for being self-serving and uncorroborated.[9] (underscoring
supplied)
 
 
In her present appeal, appellant claims, in the main, that
there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A.
No. 9165, hence, it compromised the integrity and
evidentiary value of the allegedly seized item.
Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of
all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner:
 
(1)     The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs  shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;  x x x (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 
Appellant specifically claims that no physical inventory and
photographing of the specimen took place. Respecting the
required conduct of an inventory, since only one sachet was
seized, failure to comply therewith may understandably have
been rendered unnecessary.
 
As for the required photograph of the seized item, a reading
of the testimony of PO1 Mariano confirms the prosecutions
failure to follow such requirement:
 
Atty. Ronatay:
Q: Are you aware that it is required under the dangerous
drugs law that in case of the buy-bust operation, the subject
specimen their (sic) must be a picture taken on the subject
specimen?
A: What I said is that impossible, we have a buy-bust to
verify.
 
 
Atty. Ronatay:
Your Honor, I think the answer is not responsive to the
question. We moved (sic) to strike that out and the witness to
answer the question.
 
 
Court: Answer the question.
 
Witness:
A: Not yet maam.
Atty. Ronatay:
Q: How many times have you been engaged in buy-bust
operation?
A: More or less ten maam.
 
Q: And in those ten cases, was there ever an occasion that
the subject specimen, there was a picture taken on that
subject specimen?
 
A: None, maam.
 
Q: Are you also aware Mr. witness that under the dangerous
drugs law, it is standard operating procedure that in cases of
operation specifically in a buy-bust operation, there has also
be (sic) a presence of the media?
 
A: I do not know, maam.
 
Q: In this case was there a media present at the time of
the operation?
 
A: None maam.
 
Q: Are you also aware that under the dangerous drugs law, it
is required that there has to be coordination with the
Local Brgy.?
 
A: None maam.[10] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
Failing to comply with the provision of Section 2 of R.A. No.
9165 does not necessarily doom the case for the prosecution,
however. People v. Pringas enlightens:
 
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with
Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is  justifiable
ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an
accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
[11]
 (citation omitted, emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
 
The Courts pronouncement in Pringas is based on the
provision of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations[12] of R.A. No. 9165 reading:
 
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items; (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 
 
Clearly, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu was
preserved.
 
As reflected in the above-quoted Memorandum of P/Sr. Insp.
Chief Villaruel, the time of operation was on or about 8:30
P.M., 13 May 2003. If the allegedly seized substance-filled
sachet was confiscated at 8:30 p.m., it is highly improbable
that it was received at the Crime Laboratory at 8:33 P.M or a
mere three minutes after the seizure, given that appellant
was after his arrest first brought to a hospital for physical
check-up.
 
Doubt is thus engendered on whether the object evidence
subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court
is the same as that allegedly sold by appellant. In fine, the
prosecution failed to prove the integrity and evidentiary
value of the 0.03 gram specimen.
Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present
case questioned early on, during the cross examination of
PO1 Mariano, the failure of the apprehending officers to
comply with the inventory and photographing requirements
of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. And the defense raised it
again during the offer of evidence by the prosecution, thus:
 
Atty. Ronatay:
 
xxxx
 
Exh. C - we object to its admission as well as the purpose for
which they are being offered for being planted evidence, your
honor. [13] (underscoring supplied)
The prosecution having failed to discharge the burden of
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the burden of the evidence did not shift to the defense
to thus leave it unnecessary to pass upon the defense
evidence even if it were considered weak. Appellants
acquittal based on reasonable doubt is then in order.
 
 
 
 
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Nita
Eugenio y Pejer, is ACQUITED for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections for Women, Mandaluyong City who is
directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless
she is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform
this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice.
 
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 181831 The Information against appellant Rodnie for violation Janet, who was designated as poseur-buyer, gave the pre-
THE PHILIPPINES,   of Section 11 of the same law (Crim. Case No. 13117-D) marked P200 (in five P20 and two P50 bills) to Rodnie who
Appellee, Present: reads:[2] placed them inside his pocket. Rodnie thereupon took out a
      black plastic container [5] from his pants back pocket from
  CARPIO xxxx which container he drew two plastic sachets which he,
  MORALES,* Acting   however, returned to the container.
- versus - Chairperson, On or about November 27, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the  
  LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being Rodnie thereafter parted with some of the money bills to his
  PERALTA,** lawfully authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, companion who turned out to be his co-appellant Ryan,
  BERSAMIN, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in whom he asked Akina yung binigay ko sa yo kanina.Ryan at
  ABAD,*** JJ. his possession and under his custody and control two (2) once gave Rodnie a sachet of shabu which Rodnie in turn
RODNIE ALMORFE y   heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing two (2) gave to Janet. At that instant, Janet executed the pre-
SEDENTE Promulgated: centigrams (0.02 gram) each, of white crystalline substance, arranged signal to the other members of the team who
and RYAN ALMORFE y March 29, 2010 which were found positive to the test for methylamphetamine swooped down on appellants and arrested them. Janet then
VALLESTER,   hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law. and there seized the money and the two plastic sachets
Appellants.   inside the black plastic container in Rodnies possession, and
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xxxx affixed her signature thereon, as well as on the plastic sachet
- - - x   subject of the sale.
  Culled from the records of the case is the following version of  
DECISION the prosecution: The contents of the three sachets were found positive
    for methylamphetamine hydrochloride by the Eastern Police
CARPIO MORALES, J.: At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of November 27, 2003, District Crime Laboratory Office, [6] hence, the indictment of
Appellants Rodnie Almorfe y Sedente (Rodnie) and Ryan an informant personally reported to the Pasig Police Station appellants.
Almorfe y Vallester (Ryan) were convicted of violation about the rampant selling of shabu in Callejon 64, Purok 6,  
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Villa Antonio, Brgy. Bambang, Pasig by a certain Taga, During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on, inter alia, the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) by the Regional Trial prompting a team belonging to the Mayors Special Action existence but not the source of the three plastic sachets; and
Court of Pasig, Branch 70. Appellant Rodnie was further Team of Pasig City to conduct a buy-bust operation at the the due execution and genuineness of the result of the
convicted of violation of Section 11 of the same law. target area. examination of the specimens to thus dispense with the
    testimony of the Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural-
  The team was composed of PO1 Aldrin Mariano, P01 Roland Cejes[7] who examined and found the contents of the sachets
  Panis, PO2 San Andres, PO3 Salisa and PO1 Janet Sabo to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.[8]
The Information against appellants for violation of Section (Janet).  
5 (Crim. Case No. 13116-D) reads:[1]   Upon the other hand, appellants gave the following version:
  Together with the informant, the team members, in  
xxxx coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, On November 27, 2003, as he was assisting his wife who was
  repaired to and arrived at the target area at around 8:30 about to give birth, Rodnie saw his cousin Ryan being pushed
On or about November 27, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the p.m. of the same day, November 27, 2003. After the service by Janet and four other companions towards his house. Once
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring vehicle bearing the team members parked along Akasya St., inside the house, Janet frisked Ryan and Rodnie. The
and confederating together, and both of them mutually in a vacant lot,[3] a lengthy street [with many alleys members of the team soon took money inside Rodnies pocket
helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized intersecting it],[4] Janet, together with the informant, at once and searched his house which yielded nothing.Appellants
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously proceeded to the target address about 50 meters away, were, however, handcuffed and brought to the police station.
[9]
sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Janet Sabo y Ampuhan, a leaving behind the other team members inside the vehicle.
police poseur-buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic    
sachet containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of white On reaching the target address, the informant nodded at one Appellants neighbor, Aida Soriano (Aida), corroborated
crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for of two men standing in front thereof who turned out to be appellants version.[10]
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in Rodnie a.k.a. Taga. Rodnie at once asked the informant what  
violation of said law. their purpose was, to which the informant replied Iiskor By Decision of July 29, 2005,[11] Branch 70 of the Regional
  kami. Rodnie then asked Magkano?, and the informant Trial Court of Pasig convicted both appellants in the first case
xxxx answered Dos, pare which means P200 in the drug trade. and appellant Rodnie in the second case, disposing as
    follows:
   
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
 
In Criminal Case No. 13116-D filed against Rodnie Almorfe
and Ryan Almorfe for violation of Section 5, Article II,
Republic Act 9165 (Illegal Sale of Shabu), they are hereby
sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to solidarily pay a Fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
 
In Criminal Case No. 13117-D filed only against Rodnie
Almorfe for violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act
9165 (Illegal Possession of Shabu), said accused is hereby
sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty
(20) Years and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00). (underscoring supplied)
 
 
On appeal, the appellate court, by Decision of August 30,
2007,[12] affirmed that of the trial courts.  It discredited
appellants claim of frame-up in the absence of proof of ill-
motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely accuse
them, aside from the fact that the officers are presumed to
have regularly performed their official duty.
 
The appellate court discredited too the testimony of Aida
which it found to be laced with several inconsistencies vis--
vis those of appellants.
 
Hence, the present appeal, appellants assigning as sole error
of the appellate court their conviction despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove that the  shabu  submitted for
laboratory examination is the same one allegedly taken from
them.
 
 
 
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 charts the procedure on the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, given the severity of the
penalties imposed for violations of said law, viz:
 
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments, paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
 
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
 
During the cross-examination of Janet, appellants counsel
elicited the following testimony:[13]
 
Q: Now, madam witness, these two (2) accused were being
charged of violating Section 5 and Section 11, of Republic Act
9165. And it is presumed that you know R.A. 9165?
A: Section 5 is the only case we filed against them, sir.
 
Q: During the inventory, did you secure the presence of the
media team?
A: We did not conduct an inventory, sir.
 
Q: You did not conduct an inventory with regard to this case?
A: We just marked the sachets right then and there for
purposes of not alternating the sachets  we recovered from
them, sir.
[Defense counsel]
Atty. Sorongon:
But the law provides, your Honor, that it should be
inventoried.
COURT:
Let the Court decide on that matter. You have already
established that there was no inventory.
 
x x x x (italics and underscoring supplied)
 
Oddly, from the above-quoted testimony of alleged poseur
buyer Janet, she clarified that they filed a case against
appellants only for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165.Appellant Rodnie was, however, additionally indicted for
violation of Section 11.
Respecting the teams non-compliance with the inventory, not
to mention the photograph, requirement of R.A. No. 9165, the
same does not necessarily render void and invalid the seizure
of the dangerous drugs. There must, however, be justifiable
grounds to warrant exception therefrom, and provided that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/s. [14]
 
For the saving clause to apply, it is important that the
prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses[15] and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had been preserved:
 
x x x [N]on-compliance with the strict directive of Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions
case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated
evidence may still have lapses, as in the present case. These
lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms
of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been
preserved. [16] (italics in the original)
 
 
 
 
The presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus
delicti of the offenses,[17] calls for the necessity of proving
beyond doubt that they are the same seized objects. This
function is performed by the chain of custody requirement as
defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1, Series of 2002,[18] which requirement is necessary to
erase all doubts as to the identity of the seized drugs by
establishing its movement from the accused, to the police, to
the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[19]
In the present case, even if the requirement to conduct an
inventory were to be excused, given that there were only
three sachets confiscated, the prosecution just the same
failed to discharge its burden. Although Janet identified
Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 as the drugs seized from appellants
which she claimed to have marked immediately after the
bust,she did not disclose the name of the investigator to
whom she turned them over. And there is no showing if that
same investigator was the one who turned the drugs over to
the forensic chemist, or if the forensic chemist whose name
appears in the physical science report [20] was the one who
received them from that investigator, or where the drugs
were kept for safekeeping after the chemical test was
conducted up to the time they were presented in court.
 
It bears recalling that while the parties stipulated on the
existence of the sachets, they did not stipulate with respect
to their source.
People v. Sanchez[21] teaches that the testimony of the
forensic chemist which is stipulated upon merely covers
the handling of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and
the result of the examination, but not the manner the
specimen was handled before it came to the possession of
the forensic chemist and after it left his possession.
 
While a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible
to achieve, an unbroken chain becomes indispensable and
essential in the prosecution of drug cases owing to its
susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and
even substitution and exchange. [22] Hence, every link must be
accounted for.
 
In fine, the prosecution failed to account for every link of the
chain starting from its turn over by Janet to the investigator,
and from the latter to the chemist.
As for the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty relied upon by the courts a quo, the same cannot
by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
Parenthetically, the following testimony of Janet raises a
nagging doubt regarding the buy-bust version of the
prosecution:
Q: So, you were fifty (50) meters away from your
companions, where did you meet the accused?
A: We entered Callejon 64, and they were standing by in front
of their house where there was a lighted post, sir.
Q: Madam witness, you stated that you entered Callejon 64,
which is an alley, and you left your vehicle fifty (50) meters
away from Callejon 64. Was your vehicle parked
perpendicularly to Callejon 64 or, was it parked parallel to
Callejon 64?
A: We parked in one of those alleys named Akasya, when you
make a turn, there was a creek.  And after that, there were
several other alleys, and there is a two-way street and then
after that, there were alleys again, sir.
Q: From the place where you parked your service vehicle, you
have to enter into different streets before arriving at the
house of the accused, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir, when we parked, we walked straight, and when
we reached the street, we walked again. After that, was an
alley, Callejon 64, sir.
Q: Will you agree with me, madam witness, that you have to
turn from one street to another before arriving at Callejon
64? You testified that awhile ago, will you agree with me?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then, you stated during the direct examination, madam
witness, that before you alighted from your vehicle, there is
this agreement of the pre-arranged signal?
A: Yes, sir.[24] (underscoring supplied)
 
Given Janets description of the target address and the
location of her fellow team members, how could the latter
have seen Janet execute the pre-arranged signal to draw
them to close in and arrest appellants?
Just as the lack of showing whether the team confiscated the
black container allegedly brought out by Rodnie containing
two sachets raises a nagging doubt. If it did, why was it not
presented? If it did not, why? That was an object evidence
which could have lent credibility to the prosecutions version.
WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. H.C. No. 02178 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Rodnie Almorfe y
Sedente and Ryan Almorfe y Vallester who are accordingly
hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged against them and
ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they
are being held for some other lawful cause. 
 
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to
forthwith implement this decision and to INFORM this Court,
within five days from receipt hereof, of the action taken. 
 
Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the PNP Director
and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for information and guidance. No costs.  
 
SO ORDERED.
 BSB GROUP, G.R. No. 168644 aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys
INC., represented by its   customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of
President, Mr. RICARDO   being turned over to the companys coffers, indorsed by
BANGAYAN, Present: respondent who deposited the same to her personal banking
Petitioner,   account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company
  CORONA, J., Chairperson, (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch. [7] Upon a finding
  VELASCO, JR., that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant
  NACHURA, city prosecutor recommended the filing of the Information for
  PERALTA, and qualified theft against respondent. [8]
-versus- MENDOZA, JJ.  
    Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional
    Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an Information, the
  Promulgated: inculpatory portion of which reads:
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY     quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the
GO-BANGAYAN, February 16, 2010 That in or about or sometime during the period comprised
Respondent. (sic) between January 1988 [and] October 1989, inclusive, in
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
-----x there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent [to] gain
  and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
  take, steal and carry away cash money in the total amount
DECISION ofP1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF COMPANIES
  represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and
  prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount
PERALTA, J.: of P1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.
   
  That in the commission of the said offense, said accused
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of acted with grave abuse of confidence, being then employed
Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- as cashier by said complainant at the time of the commission
G.R. SP No. 87600[1] dated April 20, 2005, which reversed of the said offense and as such she was entrusted with the
and set aside the September 13, 2004[2] and November 5, said amount of money.
2004[3] Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,  
Branch 36[4] in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for qualified Contrary to law.[9]
theft. The said orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion  
filed by herein respondent Sally Go for the suppression of the Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. [10] The
testimonial and documentary evidence relative to a Security trial ensued. On the premise that respondent had allegedly
Bank account, and denied reconsideration. encashed the subject checks and deposited the
  corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed. account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of
  subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic respective managers or records custodians of Security Banks
corporation presided by its herein representative, Ricardo Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now
Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad
referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.[11] The trial court granted the
Bangayans wife, who was employed in the company as a motion and issued the corresponding subpoena.[12]
cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and  
account for the payments made by the various customers of Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated
the company. November 4, 2003, addressed to Metrobank, noting to the
  court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor,
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a there was no mention made of the said bank account, to
complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft[5] against which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account
[6]
respondent, alleging that several checks  representing the identified as Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly deposited the
proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while
respondent characterized the Metrobank account as
irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the S
ecurity Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-
affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to address
the allegations with respect thereto.[13]
 
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the
relevancy of the Metrobank account on the ground that the
complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which
respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said
bank.[14] To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to
Metrobank account under the provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1405.[15] The trial court did not sustain respondent;
hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. [16]
 
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the
testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the
representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans
testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989,
respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc.,
was able to run away with the checks issued to the company
by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the
corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with
Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject
checks were presented to Marasigan for identification and
marking as the same checks received by respondent,
endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account with
Security Bank.[17] But before the testimony could be
completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,[18] seeking
the exclusion of Marasigans testimony and accompanying
documents thus far received, bearing on the subject Security
Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to
irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No.
1405.
 
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its
September 13, 2004 Order.[19] A motion for reconsideration
was subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order
dated November 5, 2004. [20] These two orders are the subject
of the instant case.
 
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion in acting the way it did, respondent elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed orders
of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision. [21] The decision
reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
orders dated September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC
representative is ordered stricken from the records.
 
SO ORDERED.[22]
 
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, [23] petitioner
is now before the Court pleading the same issues as those
raised before the lower courts.
 
In this Petition[24] under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the
main that the Court of Appeals had seriously erred in
reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect
striking out Marasigans testimony dealing with respondents
deposit account with Security Bank.[25] It asserted that apart
from the fact that the said evidence had a direct relation to
the subject matter of the case for qualified theft and, hence,
brings the case under one of the exceptions to the coverage
of confidentiality under R.A. 1405.[26]Petitioner believed that
what constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be
determined by the allegations in the information and, in this
respect, it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of
the trial court, which declared to be erroneous the limitation
of the present inquiry merely to what was contained in the
information.[27]
 
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented
by the Security Bank account was neither relevant nor
material to the case, because nothing in the criminal
information suggested that the money therein deposited was
the subject matter of the case. She invited particular
attention to that portion of the criminal Information which
averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in
the total amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion
that the term cash money stated in the Information was not
synonymous with the checks she was purported to have
stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking
account. Thus, the checks which the prosecution had
Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself of
Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least
for violating respondents right to due process. [28] More in
point, respondent opined that admitting the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining to the Security
Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No.
1405.[29]
 
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the
allegations in the criminal Information for qualified theft, as
the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense
charged. It posits that through Marasigans testimony, the
Court would be able to establish that the checks involved,
copies of which were attached to the complaint-affidavit filed
with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by respondent
as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to
her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner held that
the checks represented the cash money stolen by respondent
and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the
cash amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by
respondent, but also the checks themselves.[30]
 
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that
the issue for resolution is whether the testimony of Marasigan
and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case,
and whether they are also violative of the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by
operation of R.A. No. 1405. The question of admissibility of
the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the Court, after
deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be
indeed inadmissible.
 
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal
prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense
must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral
certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to a
finding of guilt. [31] Theft is present when a person, with intent
to gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, takes the personal property of
another without the latters consent. It is qualified when,
among others, and as alleged in the instant case, it is
committed with abuse of confidence. [32] The prosecution of
this offense necessarily focuses on the existence of the
following elements: (a) there was taking of personal property
belonging to another; (b) the taking was done with intent to
gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of the
owner; (d) the taking was done without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it was
done with abuse of confidence. [33] In turn, whether these
elements concur in a way that overcomes the presumption of
guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of
relevancy and competency in accordance with Section
3[34] Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
 
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be
suppressed in this case  the testimony of Marasigan, as well
as the checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in
respondents Security Bank account  are relevant, is to be
addressed by considering whether they have such direct
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact
from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as
to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue. [35]
 
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken
away cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of
petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to
establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by
adducing evidence that respondent, at several times
between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to her
personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the
incongruence between the allegation of theft of cash in the
Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that
respondent had first stolen the checks and deposited the
same in her banking account, on the other hand, by
impressing upon the Court that there obtains no difference
between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting
respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
 
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of
personal property of one by another with intent to gain, and
it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation
relative to the offended party has already ensued from such
act of execution.[36] The allegation of theft of money, hence,
necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency
to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money
belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains
in attempting to draw a connection between the evidence
subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in
the Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulently
deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of
argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in
effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of theft, but
rather of some other crime  probably estafa.
 
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check
is true in other instances. In estafa by conversion, for
instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is
immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an
information for that offense; a check, after all, while not
regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under
commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it
represents in stated monetary value is properly capable of
appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the offender
does with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully
taking it becomes material inasmuch as this offense is a
continuing one.[37] In other words, in pursuing a case for this
offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the
presentation of the checks involved. These checks would
then constitute the best evidence to establish their contents
and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of
the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the
same in his own name.[38]
 
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our
purposes, as the Information in this case accuses respondent
of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that
respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing
the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her
personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also
immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.
 
We now address the issue of whether the admission of
Marasigans testimony on the particulars of respondents
account with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding
evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said account,
constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not
bothered with the triviality of specifically addressing privacy
rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless,
exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy
governing such accounts. The source of this right of
expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No. 1405,
[39]
 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955.  [40]
 
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage
private hoarding and at the same time encourage the people
to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may
be utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in
economic development.[41] Owing to this piece of legislation,
the confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic
state policy in the Philippines. [42] Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely
confidential in general all deposits of whatever nature with
banks and other financial institutions in the country. It
declares:
 
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including investments
in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its
political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may
not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
 
Subsequent statutory enactments [43] have expanded the list
of exceptions to this policy yet the secrecy of bank deposits
still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the
legally recognized zones of privacy. [44] There is, in fact, much
disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental
exceptions in a manner that would authorize unbridled
discretion, whether governmental or otherwise, in utilizing
these exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry into
bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the present legal
order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits.[45]
 
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been
explained in China Banking Corporation v. Ortega. [46] That
case principally addressed the issue of whether the
prohibition against an examination of bank deposits
precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling
on that issue in the negative, the Court found guidance in the
relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate
Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the
Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality
rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from
unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such
inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the existence
and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in any given
bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or
inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required
Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of
the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference
committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977which later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was
not the intention of the lawmakers to place banks deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment.
Thus:
 
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should
like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case.He is
being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or,
say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the
deposit of this individual [has been] attached by the [BIR].
 
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has
pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such
person. But where the primary aim is to determine
whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about
a proper assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not
allowed by this proposed law.
 
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the
Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is
a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain
individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out
into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited
by... the law?
 
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the
inquiry... is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax
liability already declared for the protection of the right in
favor of the government; but when the object is merely
to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for
purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the
law. x x x
 
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into
the existence and the amount of the deposit.
 
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x[47]
 
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality
rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that the account
maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the
proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently
appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the
exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405  that the money
kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To
highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., [48] that the subject matter
of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or
personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in relation
to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the instant case
should refer to the money deposited in the Security Bank
account.[49] On the surface, however, it seems that petitioners
theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to
show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because,
while Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an
action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine whether
the class suit in that case was properly brought to the court.
 
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in
relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and
amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,[50] in which the Court noted that the inquiry into to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was,
bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial
premised on the fact that the money deposited in the court.
account is itself the subject of the action.[51] Given this  
perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of
in the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment privacy extends its scope to include an individuals financial
that charges respondent with the offense, and not from the privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is an
evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and
records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, legislators to laws infringing such rights. [52] Should there be
respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of
with qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into
confidence and stealing cash in the amount such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of
of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual the former. This attitude persists unless congress lifts its
allegation that in some material way involves the checks finger to reverse the general state policy respecting the
subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits. [53]
to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said  
Information make mention of the supposed bank account in WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20,
been kept. 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5,
  2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.
itself that the Security Bank account is the ostensible subject  
of the prosecutions inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the SO ORDERED.
scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the
subject matter of the action in this case is the money
amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by
respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks
which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that,
which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence,
and no other.
 
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and
documentary evidence relative to respondents Security Bank
account serves no other purpose than to establish the
existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in
it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an
impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy
and confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score
alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to
suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy
at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court.
 
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the
particulars of respondents supposed bank account with
Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by
the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No.
1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as
they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable
connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified
theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondents objection