People vs. Teves

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 356 11/18/19, 7:42 AM
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Teves
*
G.R. No. 141767. April 2, 2001.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

HILARION TEVES y CANTOR, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Parricide; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence;

Requisites.·The facts of this case clearly show that nobody had
actually witnessed the killing of the victim, Teresita Teves, in the
evening of August 25, 1996. To prove its case of parricide against
the appellant, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence. In
order to convict an accused based on circumstantial evidence, it is
necessary that: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, circumstancial
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction where the multiple
circumstances are proven and are consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is innocent as well as incompatible
with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the
accused.
Evidence; Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual
findings of the trial courts since the latter are in a better position to
weigh conflicting testimonies, unless it is found that the trial courts
have overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.·In convicting the
appellant of the crime of parricide
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 15
People vs. Teves
based on circumstantial evidence, the trial court found that the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were credible and
sufficient. It is well-settled rule that the trial judgeÊs assessment of
the credibility of witnessesÊ testimonies is accorded great respect on
appeal. Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual
findings of the trial courts since the latter are in a better position to
weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect
the result of the case.
Same; Witnesses; Out-of-Court Identifications; A method of pre-
trial identification in which the prosecution witness was made to
identify the suspect in a one-on-one confrontation which was
pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none,
activated visual imagination and subverted the identification of the
accused by the witness is as tainted as an uncounseled confession
and thus, falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally
entrenched protection.·We note, however, the irregular manner by
which the pre-trial identification of the appellant and his passenger
jeep during the custodial investigation on August 29, 1996 was
made by Milagros. At that time, the appellant, who was already a
suspect in his wifeÊs murder, was alone inside the investigation
room of the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station and without his
counsel. He was also ordered by Supt. Castillo to board his
passenger jeep, extend part of his body outside of the vehicle while
waving his hand, as if doing some kind of a reenactment, to be
observed by Milagros and two (2) other barangay tanods namely:
Jerry Pantilla and Angel Lapitan. We agree with the Solicitor
GeneralÊs observation that the pre-trial identification in which the
prosecution witness was made to identify the suspect (herein
appellant) in a one-on-one confrontation, was pointedly suggestive,
generated confidence where there was none, activated visual
imagination and, all told, subverted the identification of the

appellant by the witness. This method of identification is as tainted
as an uncounseled confession and thus, falls within the same ambit
of the constitutionally entrenched protection.
Parricide; Evidence; Admissions; Witnesses; It would be highly
unlikely and contrary to common sense for the accused to admit his
guilt before the aunt of the victim while vehemently denying to the
police authorities any participation for the death of his wife.·We
also doubt the testimony of Maria Alulod for being contrary to
common human experience. It would be highly unlikely and
contrary to common sense for the appellant to admit his guilt before
this witness, who is an aunt of the victim, while vehemently
denying to the police authorities any participa-
16
People vs. Teves
tion for the death of his wife. It is well-settled rule that evidence, to
be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source
but must, in addition, be credible in itself.
Same; Presumption of Innocence; Suspicion, no matter how
strong, can not sway judgment.·The motive that allegedly drove
the appellant to kill his wife, as testified by prosecution witnesses
Felix Padua and Paula Dia, is not convincing. Both prosecution
witnesses simply stated in general terms that the appellant and his
wife were having a family problem out of the latterÊs jealous
attitude and that they decided to separate. These prosecution
witnesses failed to furnish any specific incident to the effect that
Teresita had actually feared for her life or that appellant had
become so desperate as to will the death of his wife. At the most,
their testimonies simply manifest a suspicion of appellantÊs
responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no
matter how strong can not sway judgment.
Same; Same; Motive; To be sure, motive is not sufficient to
support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence from which
it may reasonably be adduced that the accused was the malefactor.
·Even if we would assume that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were true, it can not be reasonably inferred therefrom

that the appellant is responsible for killing his wife in the absence
of any other circumstance that could link him to the said killing. To
be sure, motive is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no
other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be adduced
that the accused was the malefactor.
Same; Same; It is well-entrenched rule in criminal law that the
conviction of an accused must be based on the strength of the
prosecutionÊs evidence and not on the weakness or absence of
evidence of the defense.·In view of the foregoing, we cannot sustain
the appealed judgment of the trial court in the ease at bar. The
prosecution miserably failed to establish the circumstantial
evidence to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. Consequently, we need not pass upon the merits of his
defense of alibi. It is well-entrenched rule in criminal law that the
conviction of an accused must be based on the strength of the
prosecutionÊs evidence and not on the weakness or absence of
evidence of the defense.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Biñan, Laguna, Br. 25.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
17
VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 17

People vs. Teves
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Edgar A. Pacis for accused-appellant.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

1
Before us on automatic review is the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25, in
Criminal Case No. 9620-B convicting the appellant,
Hilarion C. Teves, of the crime of parricide and sentencing
him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The lifeless body of Teresita Teves y Capuchino was
found by a group of barangay tanods in Barangay
Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna in the late evening of
August 25, 1996. The body of the victim bore strangulation

marks around the neck and a stab wound just below the
left armpit. During the investigation of the case, the
husband of the victim, herein appellant, Hilarion C. Teves,
was identified as the driver of the passenger jeep that was
allegedly met by the barangay tanods shortly before they
chanced upon the dead body of the victim on that fateful
evening of August 25, 1996. It was also gathered by the
police that the spouses purportedly had misunderstanding
prior to the incident.
On December 3, 1996, Hilarion Teves y Cantor was
charged with the crime of parricide defined and penalized
under Article 2462 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
in an Information that reads:
That on or about August 25, 1996, in the Municipality of Santa

Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused HILARION TEVES y CANTOR,
while conveniently armed with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill
his wife TERESA CAPUCHINO y TEVES (sic) with whom he was
united in lawful wedlock, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously stab and strangle the said TERESA CAPUCHINO
TEVES with the aforesaid deadly weapon, stabbing the latter on
the left side of her chest causing her instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
______________
1 Penned by Judge Hilario F. Corcuera, Rollo, pp. 33-99.

2 Rollo, p. 8.
18

People vs. Teves
Upon being arraigned on January 13, 1997, herein

appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered the plea of „Not
guilty‰ to the charge as contained in the Information.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution
that on August 25, 1996 at around 10:30 oÊclock in the

evening four (4) barangay tanods, namely: Milagros
Tayawa, Jerry Pantilla, Angel Lapitan and Jose Bello, were
patrolling on board a barangay patrol vehicle in Barangay
Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna. Milagros was behind the
steering wheel. From the old national highway, they
entered the NIA road which was an isolated dirt road
seldom used by commuters due to its narrow width. There
were no houses and streetlights along the immediate
vicinity as the road was bound by an irrigation canal on
one side and a stretch of rice field on the other.
Subsequently, they met a passenger jeep that was coming
from the opposite direction. Milagros had3 to maneuver
backward to accommodate the other vehicle.
As the patrol vehicle advanced, the barangay tanods saw
a body of a woman lying on the left side of the NIA road.
The womanÊs white polo shirt was raised above the chest
exposing her right breast and a small wound just below her
armpit; while her black pants were lowered down to her
knees. Upon ascertaining that the woman was dead,
Milagros and her companions immediately informed their
chief before proceeding to the Santa
4
Rosa, Laguna Police
Station to report the incident. The police examined
5
the
cadaver, and then took the sworn statement of Milagros
Tayawa on the same evening of August 25, 1996.
Dr. Erwin Escal, medico-legal officer, conducted the
autopsy on the body of Teresa Teves upon the request of
PO2 Tony Gangano.
6
Dr. Escal identified in court the
Autopsy Report which shows the following findings:
_______________
3 TSN dated May 28, 1997, pp. 2-19.

4 TSN dated May 28, 1997, pp. 20-25.
5 Exhibit „C.‰
6 Exhibit „E.‰
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VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 19

People vs. Teves
Post Mortem Examination:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished female cadaver in rigor
mortem with post mortem lividity at the dependent portion of the
body. Palpabral conjunctive are pale. Lips and nail beds are
cyanotic.
There are petechial hemorrhages on the face and neck and
subconjunctival hemorrhage on the left lateral conthal region.
Head, Neck, Trunk and Extremities:
1. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. mid-pariento occipital area left.

2. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. parieto occipital area right.
3. Contusion hematoma right lateral neck, measuring 6 cm. x
0.1 cm.
4. Punctured wound triangular in shape at the mid-axillary
line, left pectoralis region measuring 1 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm.,
nonpenetrating.
5. Contusion hematoma 12 x 4 cm. right lateral abdominal
region.
6. Abrasion 4 x 2 cm. right lumbar region.
7. Area of contusion hematoma with abrasion right buttocks
measuring 7 x 6 cm.
On opening up: The scalp was deflicted to expose the skull and
was sawing it off coronally. No skull fracture noted and the brain
was grossly normal.
Conclusion:
The cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation.
According to Dr. Escal, the victim could have been

strangled („binigti‰) with the use of a constricting material
which may be a wire, a rope or a nylon cord and that the
victim may have been dead for not less than thirty-six (36)
hours when it was brought to him for autopsy examination
7
at 5:00 oÊclock in the afternoon on August 26, 1996.
On August 29, 1996 Milagros was invited to the Santa
Rosa, Laguna Police Station by the PNP Provincial
Director, Supt. Arthur Castillo, to identify a certain person
and a passenger jeep in connection with the incident on
August 25, 1996. She remembered
_______________
7 TSN dated June 18, 1997, pp. 9-10.
20

People vs. Teves
the person, who turned out to be the husband of the victim,

herein appellant Hilarion C. Teves, as the driver of the
passenger jeep that they met on the NIA road in Barangay
Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna shortly before they
chanced upon the body of a dead woman later identified as
Teresa C. Teves. She recognized the appellant when their
respective vehicles momentarily stopped facing each other
with their headlights switched on. She had also seen the
appellant while the latter was sitting on a bench at the
back of the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station when she
came to verify the status of the case on August 27, 1996.
8
Milagros likewise recognized the passenger jeep as the
same vehicle being driven by the appellant when they met
on the NIA road in the late evening of August 25, 1996.
Milagros explained that she instructed her fellow barangay
tanods to train their flashlight on its direction after the
passenger jeep sped away and she read partly the plate
number at the 9
back as „DJN 6‰ which she wrote on a
cigarette foil („palara‰). She also noted the distinguishing
features of the passenger jeep such as: a) the maroon paint
on the bumper; b) the small lights attached to the bumper;
and c) the green reflectorized paints on the bumper. After
identifying the appellant and the 10passenger jeep, Milagros
executed another sworn statement before the police.
Upon his detention on the same date of August 29, 1996,
the appellant allegedly requested the aunt of the victim,
Maria Alulod, who was present at the Santa Rosa, Laguna
Police Station, to send his Tata Enteng (Vicente Alulod) to
the police station and to bring money for a certain
barangay tanod of Barangay Macabling so that his
sentence11 for the commission of the crime would be
reduced. Vicente turned down the request as he noted
during the wake of Teresa that Hilarion was not actually
sorry for 12his wifeÊs death although he appeared worried
(„balisa‰).
_______________
8 Exhibits „A‰; „A-1.‰

9 Exhibit „B.‰
10 Exhibit „D.‰
11 TSN dated September 3, 1997, p. 22.
12 TSN dated August 12, 1997, p. 20.
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VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 21

People vs. Teves
It also appears that before her untimely demise, Teresa

was able to confide with an aunt, Paula Beato Dia, that she
had a marital problem. Paula counseled her that it was
natural for any husband and wife to have occasional
problems. She even13
suggested to Teresa to seek the advice
of her Tata Felix.
In July 1996 Teresa approached her uncle, Felix Padua,
to seek the latterÊs advice concerning her marital problem.
Apparently, her husband, herein appellant Hilarion Teves,
proposed that they live separately. He also wanted to
secure an arrangement regarding the custody of their
children and his wifeÊs consent regarding the disposition of
their house and lot. Teresa could not recall any serious
reason for her husbandÊs behavior but she surmised that
the appellant resented her comment that his peers were all
„dalaga‰ and „binata.‰ Since Felix was busy at that time, he
advised Teresa to visit him on another14occasion so that they
could discuss her problem thoroughly.
In the same month of July, Teresa and the appellant
went to the house of Felix Padua in Santa Rosa, Laguna.
When asked about their problem, the appellant disclosed
that he could no longer put up with TeresaÊs jealousy that
often caused him embarrassment before his friends. Felix
tried to explain that it was common between any husband
and wife to get jealous and that appellant should realize
that his wife simply loved him very much. However, the
appellant would not15listen and even imputed that his wife
had a bad character.
On July 20, 1996 Paula Beato Dia learned from Teresa
that the couple had finally decided to live separately after

conferring with their Tata Felix. On July 30, 1996 Teresa
informed Paula that the appellant became violent
(„nagwala‰) over her refusal to sell their properties. Paula
then advised
16
her niece to bring the matter to the barangay
officials.
The evidence of the defense shows that the appellant
stayed in their house during the day on August 25, 1996.
He helped his wife,
________________
13 TSN dated July 2, 1997, pp. 23-26.

14 TSN dated July 2, 1997, pp. 23-26.
15 TSN dated July 2, 1997, pp. 29-32.
16 TSN dated August 12, 1997, pp. 6-8.
22

People vs. Teves
Teresa, wash their clothes. In the afternoon, he watched

basketball game on the television and also helped his
children with their school assignments. He started to ply
the Biñan-Cabuyao route with his passenger jeep at 6:30
oÊclock in the evening as it was his usual schedule. Before
leaving however, he told his wife that he would spend the
night in the house of17his uncle Caloy in Barangay Tagapo,
Santa Rosa, Laguna. It appears that the daughter of his
uncle Caloy celebrated her debut which the appellant and
his children attended on August 24, 1996. When the party
ended, he was requested by the family to help in returning
some of the borrowed equipment on the following day.
Teresa also left the house at about 8:30 oÊclock in the
evening on the same day allegedly to confer with somebody.
She instructed her daughter, Leizel, not to lock the door
when they go to sleep. Leizel saw her mother board a
tricycle behind the driver, inasmuch
18
as there were already
two passengers in its sidecar. Teresa was also seen by
another tricycle driver, a certain Edwin Carapatan, at
around 9:00 oÊclock in the evening while she was on board a
tricycle behind the driver which was 19

bound for the town
proper. Both even greeted each other.
Meanwhile due to heavy traffic, the appellant managed
to ply his route 2 1/2 times only after which he proceeded to
the house of his Tiyo Caloy in Barangay Tagapo, Santa
Rosa, Laguna. Upon arrival at exactly 8:30 oÊclock in the
evening, the appellant ate his supper. Thereafter, they
arranged the things for him to bring home on the following
day. Before going to sleep, the appellant joined the family
in watching basketball game on the television 20
until the
same was over at 10:00 oÊclock in the evening.
When the appellant arrived home in Barangay
Sinalhan, Santa Rosa, Laguna on August 26, 1996, he was
informed by his youngest child that his wife was not
around. According to appellant, he thought that his wife
left early on that day to look for a job. He learned that his
wife left the house at 8:30 oÊclock in the previous
_______________
17 TSN dated October 12, 1998, pp. 20-29.

18 TSN dated May 26, 1998, pp. 18-21.
19 TSN dated August 31, 1998, pp. 7-9.
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VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 23

People vs. Teves
evening upon arrival of his second21 eldest daughter, Lalaine,

from school at 12:00 oÊclock noon.
The appellant and his neighbors searched for Teresita in
the entire afternoon but in vain. At 10:00 oÊclock in the
evening, he heard of talks that a body of a dead woman was
found in Barangay Balibago, Santa Rosa, Laguna. He went
to Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station together with a
certain Lebong Dia and was instructed by the police to
proceed to Funeraria Lim after hearing his description of
his wife. At 11:30 in the evening, he saw the dead body of
his wife at22 the funeral parlor which he brought home after
midnight.
On August 27, 1996, the appellant went back to the

police station in Santa Rosa, Laguna where he was initially
informed by a certain police officer Laurel that his wife
might be a victim of gang rape. However, he learned later
that he was a suspect in the killing of his wife when he was
investigated by the police.
On August 29, 1996, he returned to the police station in
Santa Rosa, Laguna upon being informed that Supt.
Arthur Castillo would investigate the case. Three (3)
barangay tanods, namely: Angel Lapitan, Milagros Tayawa
and Gerry Pantilla were present in the police station.
Castillo requested them to identify the appellant; however,
none of the three (3) was able to recognize him. The
appellant was asked to sit behind the steering wheel of his
passenger jeep and was even ordered to wave his hand
while pictures of him were being taken. Subsequently,
Castillo urged the three (3) barangay tanods to take a good
look at the appellant to refresh their memory after which
he asked: „Ano sa tingin niyo?‰ When no response from the
tanods was forthcoming, Castillo again asked: „Hindi pa ba
ninyo nakikilala yan?‰ After putting his hand on the
shoulder of Barangay Tanod Milagros Tayawa, the latter
remarked: „Parang kahawig niya.‰23
Thereafter, Col. Castillo
ordered the appellantÊs arrest.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court rendered a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
_______________

22 Id., pp. 9-18.
23 TSN dated December 7, 1998, pp. 14-37.
24

People vs. Teves
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor,

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, defined
and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, restored
in R.A. No. 7659, Imposing Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
Crimes, and there being present the aggravating circumstances the

herein accused killed his wife (a) during nighttime; (b) in an
uninhabited place; and (c) with the use of a motor vehicle (jeepney),
hereby imposes upon him the DEATH PENALTY and orders him to
indemnify the heirs of Teresa Teves the sum of P100,000.00, as
moral damages.
The Provincial Jail Warden of Santa Rosa, Laguna is hereby
ordered to transfer accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor to the National
Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, immediately
upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the decision, Hilarion C. Teves appealed to

this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE AS CHARGED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9620-B DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN
THE INFORMATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE
INCOHERENCE, INCREDIBILITY AND INADEQUACY IN
WEIGHT AND VALUE OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
RELIED UPON.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

ACCUSED IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED
BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF MILAGROS TAYAWA AND
MARIA ALULOD WHICH ARE INCREDIBLE BASED ON
COMMON OBSERVATION AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN INTERPRETING

THE EQUIVOCAL TESTIMONY OF DR. EDWIN ESCAL IN
FAVOR OF GUILT AND AGAINST THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED.
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VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 25

People vs. Teves
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE

OF ALIBI.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE

PRESENCE OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
24
In his brief, the appellant contends, in essence, that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime. Under the factual milieu of the
case, Milagros could not have recognized the vehicle and its
driver which she allegedly met on August 25, 1996. He also
contends that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Felix Padua and Paula Beato Dia to the effect that the
appellant and his wife had a misunderstanding were
basically anchored on mere suspicion. Moreover, the
alleged implied admission by the appellant of his alleged
guilt before Maria Alulod, who is an aunt of the victim is
incredible as it contradicts common human experience.
Lastly, the testimony of Dr. Edwin Escal suggests that
several malefactors may be responsible for the killing of the
victim.
The facts of this case clearly show that nobody had
actually witnessed the killing of the victim, Teresita Teves,
in the evening of August 25, 1996. To prove its case of
parricide against the appellant, the prosecution relied on
circumstantial evidence. In order to convict an accused
based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that 1)
there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is 25
such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In other words,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction
where the multiple circumstances are proven and are
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty

and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is innocent as well as incompatible with
________________
24 Rollo, pp. 111-187.

25 Rule 134, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
26
26a SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Teves
every rational
26
hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of
the accused.
In convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide
based on circumstantial evidence, the trial court found that
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were credible
and sufficient. It is well-settled rule that the trial judgeÊs
assessment of the credibility of witnessesÊ
27
testimonies is
accorded great respect on appeal. Appellate courts will
generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial courts
since the latter are in a better position to weigh conflicting
testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless
it is found that the trial courts have overlooked certain
facts of substance and value 28
that, if considered, might
affect the result of the case.
After thorough review, however, we find sufficient basis
to warrant the reversal of the assailed judgment of
conviction. The trial court relied on the identification made
by Milagros Tayawa during the trial of this case in finding
that the appellant was the person driving the passenger
jeep that was allegedly met by the four (4) barangay tanods
along the NIA road in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa,
Laguna in the late evening of August 25, 1996 shortly
before they accidentally found the dead body of Teresita
Teves. We note, however, the irregular manner by which
the pre-trial identification of the appellant and his
passenger jeep during the custodial investigation on
August 29, 1996 was made by Milagros. At that time, the
appellant, who was already a suspect in his wifeÊs murder,

was alone inside the investigation room of the Santa Rosa,
Laguna Police Station and without his counsel. He was also
ordered by Supt. Castillo to board his passenger jeep,
extend part of his body outside of the vehicle while waving
his hand, as if doing some kind
________________
26 People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675, 685 (1993); People v. Alabaso,

204 SCRA 458, 463 (1991); People v. Maravilla, Jr., 167 SCRA 645, 652
(1988).
27 People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64, 72 (1993); People v. Gerones, 193
SCRA 263, 267 (1991).
28 People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535, 552 (1991); People v. Alburo, 184
SCRA 655, 662 (1990).
27
VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 27

People vs. Teves
of a re-enactment, to be observed by Milagros and two (2)

other barangay tanods namely: Jerry Pantilla and Angel
Lapitan.
We agree with the Solicitor GeneralÊs observation that
the pretrial identification in which the prosecution witness
was made to identify the suspect (herein appellant) in a
one-on-one confrontation, was pointedly suggestive,
generated confidence where there was none, activated
visual imagination and, all told, subverted the
identification of the appellant by the witness. This method
of identification is as tainted as an uncounseled confession
and thus, falls within the same 29
ambit of the
constitutionally entrenched protection.
Besides, there is reason to doubt the reliability of the
said testimony of Milagros Tayawa. Milagros allegedly
recognized the appellant when their respective vehicles
momentarily stopped facing each other while their
headlights were switched on. In the ocular inspection
conducted during the trial on July 2, 1997, it was
demonstrated that the two (2) vehicles were initially
twenty and one-half (20 1/2) feet apart when they stopped
facing each other. When the barangay patrol vehicle backed
off to accommodate the passenger jeep, the two (2) vehicles
were thirty-six and one-half (36 1/2) feet apart, at which
distance the trial court made the observation that the man
behind the30
steering wheel was not cognizable in broad
daylight.
If the man on the driverÊs seat was not cognizable in
broad daylight, this court is not convinced that an accurate
identification of the driver of the passenger jeep, who was
allegedly met by the barangay tanods at around 10:30
oÊclock in the evening on August 25, 1996, can be made
even from a distance of twenty and one-half (20 1/2) feet by
the prosecution witness. It must be pointed out that the
two (2) vehicles were then passing along an isolated dirt
road where there were no houses and streetlights in the
immediate vicinity. Under the circumstances, clear
visibility was practically improbable, if not impossible,
from a distance.
_______________
29 People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261, 271-272 (1988); People v. Cruz, 32

SCRA 181, 186 (1970).
30 TSN dated July 2, 1997, pp. 9-14.
28

People vs. Teves
There is more reason to doubt the reliability of the

testimony of Milagros
31
Tayawa upon consideration of the
sworn statement that she gave before the police
authorities during the investigation of this case. Her sworn
statement contains a narration of the circumstances
leading to the discovery of TeresitaÊs dead body.
Significantly, no mention was made therein that she had
seen the driver of the passenger jeep that they allegedly
met in the late evening of August 25, 1996 on the NIA road,
much less described his face or his other physical features.
It is absurd to believe that Milagros forgot or the police
investigators had been so negligent as to overlook this

omission in her affidavit. In the first place, the purpose of
the investigation was to elicit basic information about the
killing, such as the identity of the perpetrator thereof. It
was only during the custodial investigation on August 29, 32
1996 that Milagros claimed in her subsequent affidavit
that she had seen the driver of the same passenger jeep
after the irregular one-on-one confrontation with the
appellant and after unwarranted suggestions had been
made to the said witness by the police officer.
Notably, the prosecution failed to present the testimony
of the other barangay tanods who were likewise present
during the incident on August 25, 1996 to corroborate the
testimony of Milagros. This is not difficult to understand
considering that the statements elicited from Angel
Lapitan during the investigation of the case run counter to
the testimony that she gave during the trial, to wit:
Tanong: Nakilala ba ninyo ang nagmamaneho at nakuha

ba ninyo ang plaka nito?
Sagot: Hindi namin nakilala ang driver dahil patay ang
kanyang ilaw sa loob at ng aming ilawan
33
ang
kanyang likuran ay walang plaka.
Due to the above statement of Angel Lapitan before the

police investigator, even the testimony of Milagros Tayawa
that she recognized the passenger jeep of the appellant as
the same vehicle
_______________
31 Exhibit „C.‰
32 Exhibit „D.‰
33 Exhibit „4.‰
29
VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 29

People vs. Teves
that they met along the NIA road shortly before having
accidentally discovered the dead body of the victim, was
also rendered doubtful. Besides, the passenger jeep of the

appellant had been impounded at the Santa Rosa, Laguna
Police Station since August 27, 1996 or two (2) 34
days before
the pre-trial identification of the said vehicle.
We also doubt the testimony of Maria Alulod for being
contrary to common human experience. It would be highly
unlikely and contrary to common sense for the appellant to
admit his guilt before this witness, who is an aunt of the
victim, while vehemently denying to the police authorities
any participation for the death of his wife. It is well-settled
rule that evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only
proceed from a 35 credible source but must, in addition, be
credible in itself.
The motive that allegedly drove the appellant to kill his
wife, as testified by prosecution witnesses Felix Padua and
Paula Dia, is not convincing. Both prosecution witnesses
simply stated in general terms that the appellant and his
wife were having a family problem out of the latterÊs
jealous attitude and that they decided to separate. These
prosecution witnesses failed to furnish any specific incident
to the effect that Teresita had actually feared for her life or
that appellant had become so desperate as to will the death
of his wife. At the most, their testimonies simply manifest
a suspicion of appellantÊs responsibility for the crime.
Needless to state, however,36
suspicion no matter how strong
can not sway judgment.
On the other hand, the victimÊs daughter, Leizel Teves,
testified that her family was a normal and happy family.
LeizelÊs testimony was corroborated by the victimÊs cousin,
Minerva Diaz, who testified that 37the Teves family was a
harmonious and happy family. Additionally, Rosita
Barreto, a friend of the Teves family and a
_______________

35 People v. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, 459 (1967); People v. Masco, 64
SCRA 659, 665 (1975); People v. Peruelo, 105 SCRA 226, 235 (1981).
36 People v. Balderas, 276 SCRA 470, 484 (1997).
37 TSN dated April 21, 1998, pp. 2, 16.
30

People vs. Teves
neighbor for over seventeen (17) years, attested that the

relations38 of the appellant and his wife were generally
smooth.
Even if we would assume that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were true, it can not be reasonably
inferred therefrom that the appellant is responsible for
killing his wife in the absence of any other circumstance
that could link him to the said killing. To be sure, motive is
not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no other
reliable evidence from which it may 39reasonably be adduced
that the accused was the malefactor.
In view of the foregoing, we cannot sustain the appealed
judgment of the trial court in the case at bar. The
prosecution miserably failed to establish the circumstantial
evidence to prove its case against the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. Consequently,40
we need not pass upon the
merits of his defense of alibi. It is well-entrenched rule in
criminal law that the conviction of an accused must be
based on the strength of the prosecutionÊs evidence and 41
not
on the weakness or absence of evidence of the defense.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision in Criminal Case No. 9620-B is reversed and set
aside. The appellant Hilarion Teves y Cantor is acquitted of
the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Unless convicted for any other crime or detained for some
lawful reason, appellant Hilarion Teves y Cantor is ordered
released immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
Puno, J., On official leave.
Appeal granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

Accused-appellant acquitted.
_______________
38 TSN dated May 5, 1998, pp. 3, 5.

39 People v. Manambit, 271 SCRA 344, 368 (1997).
40 Id., p. 381.
41 See Note no. 36, supra, p. 480.
31
VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 31

Tung Chin Hui vs. Rodriguez
Notes.·Abuse of superior strength cannot be

considered by the mere fact that the husband is stronger
than the wife. (People vs. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 [1994])
In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the
marriage certificate, and in the absence thereof, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered if such
proof is not objected to. (People vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA
198 [1996])
The phrase „whether legitimate or illegitimate‰ in
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code characterizes the
relationship between the accused and his victim who might
be his father, mother, or child, but not the „spouse‰ who
obviously refers to either the legitimate husband or the
lawful wife. (People vs. Ignacio, 270 SCRA 445 [1997])
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 356 11/18/19, 7:42 AM

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Criminal Law; Parricide; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence;

VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 15

People vs. Teves

based on circumstantial evidence, the trial court found that the

imagination and, all told, subverted the identification of the

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Teves

witnesses were true, it can not be reasonably inferred therefrom

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 17

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

August 25, 1996. The body of the victim bore strangulation

That on or about August 25, 1996, in the Municipality of Santa

1 Penned by Judge Hilario F. Corcuera, Rollo, pp. 33-99.

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Upon being arraigned on January 13, 1997, herein

that on August 25, 1996 at around 10:30 oÊclock in the

3 TSN dated May 28, 1997, pp. 2-19.

VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 19

Post Mortem Examination:

1. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. mid-pariento occipital area left.

According to Dr. Escal, the victim could have been

7 TSN dated June 18, 1997, pp. 9-10.

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the person, who turned out to be the husband of the victim,

8 Exhibits „A‰; „A-1.‰

VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 21

It also appears that before her untimely demise, Teresa

that the couple had finally decided to live separately after

13 TSN dated July 2, 1997, pp. 23-26.

22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Teresa, wash their clothes. In the afternoon, he watched

tricycle behind the driver which was 19

17 TSN dated October 12, 1998, pp. 20-29.

VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 23

evening upon arrival of his second21 eldest daughter, Lalaine,

On August 27, 1996, the appellant went back to the

21 TSN dated October 20, 1998, pp. 5-8.

24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor,

Crimes, and there being present the aggravating circumstances the

Aggrieved by the decision, Hilarion C. Teves appealed to

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN INTERPRETING

VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 25

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE

consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty

24 Rollo, pp. 111-187.

26a SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

appellant, who was already a suspect in his wifeÊs murder,

26 People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675, 685 (1993); People v. Alabaso,

VOL. 356, APRIL 2, 2001 27

of a re-enactment, to be observed by Milagros and two (2)

29 People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261, 271-272 (1988); People v. Cruz, 32

28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

There is more reason to doubt the reliability of the