AQUINAS ON THE ROLE OF EMOTION

IN MORAL JUDGMENT AND ACTIVITY

JUDITH BARAD

Indiana State University

Terre Haute, Indiana

AMONG PHILOSOPHERS who have discussed the role of emotion in morality there is much
disagreement. At one extreme there is a tradition of ethical thinkers, represented by David Hume,
who juxtapose reason and emotion and hold that the choice of ultimate values is always made by
the emotional side of our nature. Insisting that emotion, not reason, is the foundation of moral
philosophy, Hume says "Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions, and can never
pretend to any office other than to serve and obey them."1 Conversely, Immanuel Kant
adamantly insists that reason must be the sole determinant of morality. Since morality is strictly a
rational endeavor, the emotions (or what he more generally called the inclinations), whether
beneficent or maleficent, should never be allowed to intrude into our moral judgments. Each
extreme claims that a part of our nature, respectively reason or emotion, is not essential to the
moral life. But the belief that we should sever any part of our nature from such a pervasive area
of our lives leads to unfortunate consequences. If we base our understanding of morality on
Hume 's call for the slavish submission of reason, we can justify all kinds of social exploitation
and sensuous indulgence. On the other hand, if we follow Kant's ideal of suppressing our
emotions, then bodily desires can appear bad to us, and we may irrationally disallow many
human needs, both to ourselves and to others.

1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3, 3.

397

398 JUDITH BARAD

But on this question of the role of emotion in moral judgment, Aquinas occupies a position
intermediate between Kant and Hume. He neither dismisses reason as a guide to practical affairs
nor regards emotions as mere obstacles to be overcome in formulating a moral judgment. For
Aquinas even though each of the human faculties has a unique role to perform, an individual
functions in his entirety in the moral sphere. This essay will focus on how our emotions can
support as well as impair our moral conduct. The purpose of this study is to show that emotion
may be either an impediment or a useful stimulus to objective moral decision making, obscuring
our moral judgments or reinforcing our commitments. Obviously, Hume's argument that reason
cannot judge or criticize the emotions is very foreign to Aquinas's thought, and no one has yet
attempted to subsume one account under the other. Alan Donagan, however, has claimed that
Aquinas's s moral theory "anticipates Kant's metaphysics of morals," because of what "both [are]
found to say about motivation."2 But, contrary to Donagan's claim, this study will make clear
that in the area of how emotions affect our moral life the two great thinkers part company.

To understand how emotion functions in the moral judgment, we must first examine what
Aquinas means by "emotion." He describes emotion as a spontaneous feeling consisting of both a
physiological and an affective response to an object.4 He observes that emotion involves
virtually the en-

2 Alan Donagan, " Teleology and Consistency in Theories of Morality as Natural Law," in
Georgetown Symposium on Ethics, edited by Rocco Porreco (Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America, 1984), p. 96.

3 Throughout this paper I will use the word "emotion" for the Latin passio, since "passion" has a
more intense connotation in contemporary English than the term employed by Aquinas.

4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, (Westminster, Md.: christian Classics, 1981), I-II, q.22.
In the first article of this question, Aquinas says that "Passion . . . is only in respect of a bodily
transmutation." Quoting Damascene in the third article, he says " Passion is a movement of the
sensitive appetite when we think of good or evil." I have combined both passages to arrive at
Aquinas's description of emotion.

AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 399

tire human being: intellect, sense cognition, spontaneous volition, and bodily changes. Aquinas
bases this position on his hylomorphic conception of the nature of man. A rational animal is a
being constituted of soul and body in such a way that some powers pertain only to the soul while
others are shared by both the soul and the body. The emotions, such as anger, fear, sadness,
pleasure, love, hatred, and hope,5 are acts of both soul and body. In short, the psychic and
corporeal elements of emotional experience are not characteristics of two separate entities;
together they make up one affective experience.

This understanding of emotion underlies his account of the way emotion functions in the moral
judgment: just as emotion contains both psychic and physical elements, so moral judgment
involves both rational and emotional elements. And, falling as it does between two extremes, this
definition of "emotion" is just as controverted as his doctrine on the role of emotions in morality.

On the one hand, William James's interpretation of emotional experience reduces emotions to
perceptions of physical sensations. "We feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike,
afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or
fearful." 6 In this reversal of what is ordinarily held as the causal order of events, the physical
reaction explains the emotion. Being "afraid" is not the cause of the physical reaction of
trembling, but in-stead it is the experience of trembling. For James, emotions are immediate
reflex reactions to certain circumstances, independent of evaluation by reason.

At the other extreme, Robert Solomon holds an intellectualist theory of emotion, likening
emotion to judgment. For instance, he claims that sadness is a judgment that one has suf-

5 Aquinas lists eleven emotions: love, hatred, desire, aversion, joy, sadness, hope, despair,
audacity, fear, and anger.

6 William James, "What is an Emotion?" in Mind, 1884.

400 JUDITH BARAD

fered a loss,7 and "love is a set of constitutive judgments to the effect that we will see in this
person every possible virtue, ignore . . . every possible vice." Since emotions are judgments, they
can be rational in the same sense in which judgments can be rational. We choose our emotions
and can be held responsible for them. Emphasizing their cognitive role and sharply minimizing
their physiological aspect, Solomon explicitly denies that emotions are feelings.

Both Solomon's and James's views run counter to our experience. James's theory fails because
my perception of crying is not identical with sorrow: I can easily distinguish my awareness of
sorrow from my awareness that I'm Moreover, James insists that each distinctive emotion is
differentiated by the physiological changes in the person experiencing that emotion. But
physiological changes alone do not provide us with enough information to differentiate between
emotions. Changes such as increased respiration or pulse rate may mean we are afraid or may
mean we are pleasurably excited. I must rely upon my conscious experience, not just my
physical sensations, to determine whether I am angry, fearful, or overjoyed. It is true tha.t if the
physical sensations are abstracted from anger or fear or joy a very substantial element of the
emotion will be excluded. Yet the residuum is no mere neutral state of perception; it is a process
of consciousness con-taming an awareness of some object and a resulting impulsive state. A
cognition of some object is an integral part of my emotional experience, for an emotional
reaction depends upon whether I consciously experience a situation as pleasant or unpleasant.
Unless I am at least vaguely aware of danger, I will not be fearful. Since physical sensations
alone neither account

7 Robert Solomon, The Passions (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p.
186.

8 Ibid., p. 199.
9 I am indebted to my colleague Dr. G. Foulk for this point. For theories of emotion, see
Cheshire Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?" in What Is an Emotion? edited by Cheshire Calhoun
and Robert Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 327-342.

AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 401

for my ability to feel nor distinguish different types of emotion--and I do, in fact, feel and
distinguish various types-- this account that seeks to reduce emotion to physical sensation is
erroneous.

On the other hand, to characterize emotions as acts of the intellect, or judgments, is also
mistaken. The command "control yourself" makes sense only when applied to one's emotions
and not to one's judgments. Emotions do not always reflect conscious choices, for weakness of
will (a familiar state to most of us) typically occurs when our avowed judgments are in conflict
with our emotions. Moreover, James's view is partially correct in that emotion can be found only
where there is some physiological change. Although James erred in claiming that emotion is only
the perception of a physiological change, his theory does recognize that a bodily change is a
necessary condition for emotion, and this echoes Aquinas's observation that "Emotion is properly
to be found only where there is corporeal transmutation." 10 While physical changes may occur
in the absence of emotion, when emotion is present they are never lacking. The physical changes
which occur in every emotion include changes in blood pressure, respiration, and pulse rate. For
instance, I might describe my anger by speaking of my blood boiling'1 or my being in love by
speaking of my heart skipping a beat.

In contrast to intellectualist theories of emotion, Aquinas maintains that, since emotions are
sensory reactions of attraction or repulsion with some physiological change, they are to be
attributed more directly to the physical powers than to the rational. "Emotion is more properly in
the act of the sensitive appetite than in that of the intellectual appetite." 12 It is a matter of
common experience that attraction and repulsion affect our physical desires more than they affect
our knowledge.13 The physical 'changes induced by attraction and re-

10 Summa theologica, I-II 22, 3.

11 Ibid., I-Il 22, 2 ad 3.

12 Ibid., I-lI 22, 3.

13 An exception is the attraction of knowledge itself.

402 JUDITH BARAD

pulsion are an integral part of the emotional process, for the emotions are deeply rooted in
human biology.

Yet, in opposition to James, Aquinas maintains that bodily changes are the cause of emotion only
in the sense that they are its material embodiment. He did not share James's view that emotion is
the mere perception of physiological changes. For Aquinas, the fact that we are composite beings
precludes ascribing emotion either solely to our rational element or solely to our bodies.

In a being made of matter and form, action comes from form and emotion from matter. . . . But
no one feels any emotion unless something acts upon him, because all emotion is the effect of
action.14

Thus to hold that emotions are only physical sensations is to consider the matter of the
phenomenon without the form. And to identify emotions with judgments would be to take the
form without the matter. Both views run contrary to Aquinas's hylomorphic theory of human
nature.

While Aquinas asserts that bodily changes are essential to emotion, he does not regard the
perception of those changes as essential to its cognitive element. An emotion is a bodily reaction,
but it is composed of two other constituent elements, namely, apprehension and desire. Once an
object is apprehended, an emotion involves an affective response according to whether the object
is perceived as pleasant or unpleasant, useful or harmful. The affective response, t.hat is, the
desire, mediates the apprehension and communicates it to the body. Aquinas says that emotions
like anger and fear "can be produced only if there is apprehension and desire on the part of the
soul."" In these cases "the emotion begins in the soul in so far as the soul is the mover of the
body, and so enters the body."'6 In short, Aquinas describes a process of apprehension

14 St. Thomas Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, translated by Robert Schmidt
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954), 26. 2.

15 Disputed Questions on Truth, 26, 2.

16 Ibid.

AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 403

and desire on the one hand resulting in bodily change on the other. But, his central point is that
the hylomorphic composition of the human being causes the soul and body to act as a single
principle of operation. Because of continuous interactions between the rational and emotional
factors in the human being, rational judgment may modify physical feelings, and physical
reactions may obstruct rational judgments.

Considered apart from rational judgments, Aquinas realized that emotions in themselves are
neither morally good nor morally bad.'7 My state of anger, fear, or joy, considered in itself, is a
morally neutral matter. These states are morally neutral: for instance, when someone orders me
about too sharply, I may feel a sudden surge of anger before giving the matter any thought or
willing to feel the anger. Since emotions are spontaneous feeling states, I have little control over
their immediate presence in me. I may be responsible for controlling the expression of my
emotions, but I am not responsible for their onset in the first place. An emotion in itself is not
voluntary since the voluntary "requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act
of will; namely, in order that it be in one's power to consider, to wish and to act." 18 And I should
not be held responsible for that over which I have little control.

However, our attitude toward our emotions, once they arise, can integrate them into the activity
of our will and reason. It is only when emotions are considered by will and reason that they are
amenable to rational guidance and become good or bad in a moral sense. H the intellectualist
account of the emotions were correct, the emotions, being judgments, would not be neutral but as
immediately open to evaluation as any other judgment. In other words, my inner state of fear
could be immediately evaluated as good or bad in itself, apart from my attitude toward it. Such a
theory would either have us deny the spontaneity of our emotions or hold us responsible for our

17 Summa theologica, I-II 24, 1.

18 Ibid., I-II 6, 3 ad 2.

404 JUDITH BARAD

inner spontaneous states. Yet the former alternative runs counter to our experience, since
emotions are rarely deliberate in origin, while the latter would hold us responsible for that over
which we have very little control.

On the other hand, James's theory of the emotions would destroy their moral role, since they
would be as little open to rational guidance as are our bodily reflexes. When a physician hits my
knee with a hammer, the physical reflex is morally neither good nor bad, because it does not fall
under my voluntary control. But should I voluntarily raise my knee to injure someone, my
physical reaction is subject to moral evaluation. For Aquinas, since emotional responses involve
a rational element, they are more intimately connected to reason than are our bodily parts, say,
our arms and legs.'2 Since physical reactions may be called morally good or bad insofar as they
are voluntary, and since emotions involve a rational element (unlike our arms and legs) , it
follows that emotions, insofar as they are voluntary, may be called good or evil even more
properly than physica.l reactions can. When emotions are amenable to rational control they are
good; when they are permitted to obscure reason and to lead us into acts which are opposed to
reason they are bad.

Aquinas explains that emotions are morally good or bad "either from being commanded by the
will, or from not being checked by the will."20 In other words, failing to modify a negative
emotional response when one is able to so is just as morally culpable as voluntarily intensifying
it. To experience anger m itself is morally neutral: I may not be able to control whether or not I
feel angry; anger may well up in me before I have time to reflect on it. But anger loses its moral
neutrality when I fail to keep my expression of it within rational limits. For Aquinas, failing to
restrain my expression of anger is just as worthy of blame as having purposefully "worked
myself up" into a violent rage.

19 Ibid., I-Il 24, 1.

20 Ibid.

AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 405

Apart from reason, the emotions are inadequate guides to moral action. Since emotions lack an
internal system of controls, they can become a destructive force within us, if they are permitted
to run rampant without rational restraint. Having spontaneously experienced an emotion, there
are appropriate and inappropriate ways in which one can respond to its objects. In order for us to
respond morally in a given situation, reason must determine whether the object of our emotion is
really good or bad and whether our emotion is appropriate in this situation. The evaluation of the
appropriate and inappropriate, the morally good and bad, is made by reason. For instance, Peter
sees a stranger and spontaneously senses a threat, inducing in him an emotion of fear. However,
whether or not fear is a good emotion for Peter to fcel in this particular circumstance cannot be
determined by the mere presence of the stranger. Certainly not all strangers are threats to our
well-being, though some may be. Yet if only some strangers are threatening, what is the cause for
this stranger being threatening? Having discovered that Peter is afraid of a stranger, we may
typically ask him "But why are you afraid of this stranger? "Peter's fear would be morally
justifiable only if he could assign a reasonable cause for his fear. Only reason can comprehend
causes and make comparisons. Peter can determine whether or not his fear is reasonable by
comparing what has caused his sense of threat with what he knows can actually Threaten his
well-being. If his fear stands up to this comparison and conduces to his development as a human
being, then his emotion is morally good. If his emotion fails to meet rational standards, he is, at
least for the moment, emotionally disordered. For Aquinas, an emotion derives its moral quality
from its compatibility or incompatibility with the attainment of the human good. As long as one
retains his use of reason, he can reflect on his emotion and assess whether or not it is compatible
with the good for his nature considered as a totality.

A person in an emotionally excited condition such as fear is

406 JUDITH BARAD

at a disadvantage when it comes to moral reasoning since emotions serve to concentrate the
mind's attention on only certain aspects of the alternatives available for choice and either
emphasize or lessen the attractiveness of these alternatives. Aquinas explains "Because when a
man is affected by emotion things seem to him greater or smaller than they really are:

thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful."
21 This has the effect of modifying the way in which objects are presented to the mind as moral
values. Being overtaken by a strong emotion, our reasoning ability becomes centered on the
object of the emotion to such a degree that we do not consider the advantages of alternative
objects and alternative courses of action. The lover in the throes of passion will not debate with
himself whether he should see his beloved or visit his sick aunt. Consequently, a strong emotion
may cause an object to appear so attractive that it becomes for us the only worthwhile object.
The more volatile the emotion, the more likely we are to reach an erroneous moral judgment; the
less emotionally agitated we are, the greater the chances that we will reach a sound moral
judgment.

According to Aquinas, a moral judgment is an act of intellect determining what is to be willed in

regard to a moral issue. It expresses a universal principle of action such as, "Act justly to all,"
from which one can formulate a singular moral judgment, "Act justly to this person." But the
moral judgment is not purely a phenomenon of intellect since it involves an admixture of will
and emotion. Intellect deliberates about the value of several individual objects and will
completes this deliberation, making its choice when one of these objects sufficiently appeals to
it. The things which are presented to the intellect and will as objects of choice are judged as
appealing or unappealing not only on the basis of a rational appreciation of their value but also
insofar as they evoke the various emo-

21 Ibid., I-II 44, 2.

AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS407

tions. The emotions of sorrow and pleasure, for example, can motivate us toward making the
right choices "since just as good is more easily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more
undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow." 22 Reflecting on our emotions can motivate us to
make moral judgments. For example, seeing a starving African child on television I experience
the emotion of pity. If I reflect on my emotion as a moral good, it may prompt me to generalize
about the situation which evokes my pity and I may form the moral judgment "The hungry
should be fed."

In order to clarify the relationship between moral judgments and emotions, Aquinas distinguishes
a double relationship between them. Antecedent emotions, the emotions that we experience prior
to judgment, arise from a bodily disposition or from the operations of the senses and the
imagination. Aquinas explains how their derivation from the senses and imagination accounts for
our immediate reactions to certain objects:

Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the imagination apprehends
the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the
likeness.23

He adds that an act of the sensitive appetite "is a kind of incination to the thing itself," 24
whereas an act of the intellect "does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather the
reverse."25 Since Aquinas describes emotions as acts of the sensitive appetite, they can play a
role in moral judgment by acting as intermediaries, relating the mind to a particular object. In
this way the antecedent emotions influence our judgment by making an object appear more
attractive or repulsive. Sometimes the antecedent emotion may be so strong as to prevent the
intellect from deliberating about other objects, obscuring the moral judgment on which the value
of our act is

22 Ibid., I-lI 59, 3.

23 Summa theologica, I-Il 15, 1.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., I-lI 15, 1 ad 3.

408 JUDITH BARAD

based.26 When an emotion becomes the sole moitive for an act, the act is no longer voluntary
and loses its moral value. This is why Aquinas says, "It is more praiseworthy to do a work of
charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere emotion of pity." 27 Emotions which are
so overpowering that they drown out the voice of reason impede the formation of responsible
moral judgments. One's ability to judge a situation objectively depends on the extent to which
reason is able to weigh and assess the available alternatives.

Yet insofar as we are able to deliberate over the object of the emotion and compare it with other
objects, moderate emotions can actually stimulate us to ponder a moral predicament more deeply
than we otherwise would have done. With regard to fear, Aquinas says "if the fear be moderate,
without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, insofar as it causes a
certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel." 18 To return to our earlier example, Peter's
antecedent emotion of fear upon meeting a new person may move him to examine this emotion
rationally: Does it arise from an unfounded prejudice, which he ought to reconsider, or from
some very real worry that one of this stranger's character traits may be detrimental to his physical
or to his psychological well-being? The latter case may move him to reflect on this negative
character trait, understand its undesirability, and form a general moral judgment regarding it.
Aquinas notes that sorrow can have a similar effect, "Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the
mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard to those things by
which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow." 29 Sorrow over the loss of

26 Aquinas says, "If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those
whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away
voluntariness. And yet . . . it would not result in the act being involuntary because in things bereft
of reason, there is neither voluntary nor involuntary." I-II 6, 8 ad 3.

27 Ibid., I-II 24, 3 ad 1.

28 Ibid., I-lI 44, 4.

29 Ibid., I-II 37, 3 ad 1.

AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 409

money, for instance, may provide an incentive to learn about whether or not or to what degree
money is connected with personal happiness. This lesson, in turn, may take the form of a moral
judgment concerning the importance of money to living a self-fulfilled life. If the sorrow over
money had not been experienced, this kind of reflection may never have occurred. Thus
deliberating or learning about the object of an emotion can draw one's attention to the moral
aspects of a situation one had never previously considered.
Aquinas's observations only intimate rather than explicitly state how moderate emotions may
stimulate the formation of moral judgments. But this function of the emotions is certainly
compatible and consistent with his teachings. Why did Aquinas not pursue this line of reasoning
in greater detail? The most likely answer is that in the passages quoted above Aquinas is merely
describing, rather than prescribing, the effects of the emotions. Yet in view of the practical
importance this function of the emotions can serve, namely, to make us learn and deliberate
about their objects in order to advance our moral reasoning, a normative account would have
been most welcome.

Aquinas does attach a normative status to consequent emotions, which follow the judgment,
claiming that they increase the goodness of a moral act in two ways:

First by way of redundancy, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to
anything, the lower part also follows that movement; and thus the emotion that results in
consequence is a sign of the intensity of the will." 30

For instance, having rationally concluded that helping the poor is my -duty, I feel an emotion of
pity when I think about their plight. The second way a consequent emotion may increase the
value of an act is by "way of choice when a man, by the judgment of his reason chooses to be
affected by an emotion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation

30 Ibid., I-II 24, 3 ad 1.

410 JUDITH BARAD

of the sensitive appetite." 31 In both cases, the emotions are voluntary, since they follow a
judgment and, consequently, the person is responsible for any act resulting from them. Thus
Aquinas praises consequent emotions since they increase the moral value of a good act and
intensify our commitment to it. A person who is not only rationally but also emotionally
committed to a moral act is more resolved to accomplish it.

In addition to adding to the moral value of an action, a consequent emo-tion enables a person to
perform an action "more promptly and easily" than if the emotion were absent. Since emotion "is
closely connected with a change in the body ", the physical movement is facilitated when the
emotion corresponds to the choice of the will.32 Referring to consequent emotions, Aquinas
explains, "When a man is virtuous with the virtue of courage, the emotion of anger following
upon the choice of virtue makes for greater alacrity in the act." The increased adrenalin brought
on by a person's anger can give him the physical boost he needs to deal more efficaciously with a
perceived wrong.

Aquinas insists -that our desires, pleasures, and fears need to be brought under the control of
reason for a morally good life to ensue. Insofar as emotions participate in reasoning, they may
intensify our moral life by becoming the instruments of moral virtue. Virtues require appropriate
emotions as instruments in the exercise of their activity. For instance, pity can become the
instrument of mercy, and boldness can subserve courage. Temperance presupposes the physical
desires which it keeps in check. Courage is compatible with fear, for the really brave person fears
what he should when there is a reasonable basis for fear but can also stand up to this fear and
confront

31 Ibid. On the other hand, Aquinas observes that consequent emotions may also increase the
malice of an act if used to serve a morally bad judgment. For instance, if I judge that the poor
should not be given charity, my emotion of hatred or anger toward the poor would increase the
malice of my failure to help them.

32 Ibid., I-II 59, 2 ad 3.

33 Disputed Questions on Truth, 26, 7.

AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 411

danger.34 And we have seen that courage is also compatible with anger if it conforms to the
demands of reason.

Kant could not accept this symbiotic relationship between emotion and virtue because he
excluded the component of emotion from morality as something foreign to reason. (Emotion is a
brute force separated from our higher rational faculties, and an emotion such as fear or pain can
overwhelm reason.) This exclusion of emotion from the moral life reflects an intellectualism that
can be traced back to the ancient Stoics. Like Kant, the Stoics held emotions to be disturbances
to which the virtuous person must not yield. Responding to the question of whether moral virtue
and emotion can be compatible, Aquinas explains that the Stoics called emotion "a movement
That exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero . . . calls all emotions diseases of the
soul."35 Aquinas agrees that, if emotions are defined as "inordinate passions," contrary to the
order of reason, they cannot be in the virtuous person. However, he defines an emotion in a
broader sense as any movement in the sensitive appetite. In this sense "they can be in a virtuous
person, insofar as they are subordinate to reason." 36 Aquinas's response to the Stoics would
doubtlessly extend to Kant's view that virtue requires a dispassionate equanimity. Kant's concept
of the virtuous person as one who continually struggles against his inclinations is entirely
different from Aquinas's accounts of both emotion and virtue.
Kant maintained that it is in itself better to do one's duty lacking or even against inclination than
do it with inclination. Now Aquinas would agree with Kant that doing acts of kindness solely to
derive a pleasurable feeling from them is not the ethical ideal. Moreover, he would agree that it is
better to do an act of kindness even though we are otherwise disposed than to refrain entirely
from the act of kindness. On the other hand, he deemed it morally better to perform acts of
kindness

34 Summa theologica, II-II 123, 3.

35 Ibid., I-II 24, 2.

36 Ibid., I-II 59, 2.

412 JUDITH BARAD

with a complementary emotion than to do them dispassionately or indifferently and out of duty
alone. Discussing the motivation for a moral action, Aquinas says that an act can be good in
respect of its intention alone, but the best motivation will include both a good intention and a
corresponding emotion.

Just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it
belong to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect
of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite.37

My act of comforting others is better if I feel sad over their misfortune than if I merely go
through the motions of giving comfort. For Aquinas, to possess a deeply emotional nature does
not necessarily lead to moral ruin; rather it makes for greater possibilities either for moral evil or
for moral good.

Although Aquinas does not oppose emotions to the realm of the moral as Kant does, neither does
he adopt the Humean position that emotions are the ground of all value. Unlike Hume, Aquinas
holds that emotions alone are inadequate guides to moral judgments; for moral judgments they
require the assistance of reason. Yet emotions are not subject to the direct control of reason.
Distinguishing between those acts over which we have direct control and those over which we
have only indirect control, Aquinas says
That rule is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the means to resist . . .
the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that rule is
called politic by which a man rules over free subjects who, though subject to the government of
the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders
of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic rule, . . . But the
reason is said to govern the emotions by a politic rule. . .38

The rule of reason within the individual himself over his emotions is a political rule: each
emotion contains within itself its own freedom, its own power of resistance; it is the role of a

37 Ibid., I-II 24, 3.

38 Ibid., I 81, 3 ad 2.

AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 413

virtue to overcome this resistance, but in such a way so as not to suppress the power itself.
Following this analogy we may say That, whereas Aquinas describes a political rule of reason
over the emotions, Kant holds a despotic view of reason, and Hume supports a despotic view of
emotion.

The power of reason is not meant, as in Kant's teaching, to suppress the emotions but only to
channel their responses in a manner subject to the dictates of reason. Rather than contributing
towards the acquisition of a "holy will," suppressing our emotions deprives our rational faculties
of a great source of support. A suppressed emotional life can stand in the way of forming moral
judgments and of acting on the basis of these judgments. Generally, if a person is dispassionate
by nature or permits his emotions little expression, he can become too meek or hesitant to
formulate moral judgments independently and may thus indiscriminately rely on the moral
judgments of others.

For Aquinas, emotion plays an integral and essential part in our moral activity since it relates us
to the concrete, "to things existing in themselves." But emotion alone does not see its object
clearly enough to serve as a guide for moral living. Although an antecedent emotion is not
cognitively blind, it is near-sighted since it takes place more in the physical powers than in the
cognitive. One needs to see this object through the corrective lens of a moral judgment before
one can see it in proper perspective. Judgment looks at things from afar, from the realm of the
abstract and universal. But in order for us not to become so far-sighted that we remain in the
realm of the abstract, in order to attend to the specific problem we see before us here and now,
we must rely on the emotion consequent to the moral judgment. Thanks to consequent emotion,
after we have seen the object of our emotion from the proper moral perspective, we can better
understand how to approach the object of the emotion. In summary, Aquinas shows that emotions
can have a moral significance of their own, contributing to the goodness of a moral action and
thereby truly enriching our moral life.
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