Bureau of Labor Relations; Compromise Agreement
(2007)
No. VII. a. May the NLRC or the courts take
jurisdictional cognizance over compromise
agreements/settlements involving labor matters? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, any compromise agreement, including those
involving labor standards laws, voluntary agreed upon
by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the
regional office of the Department of labor, shall be
final and binding upon the parties. The national Labor
Relations Commission or any court shall not assume
jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case
of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie
evidence that the settlement was obtained through
fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion (Art. 227, Labor
Code).
DOLE Regional Director; Visitorial and Enforcement
Power; Compliance Order (2008)
No. III. c. Savoy Department Store (SDS) adopted a
policy of hiring salesladies on five-month cycles. At
the end of a saleslady's five-month term, another
person is hired as replacement. Salesladies attend to
store customers, were SDS uniforms, report at
specified hours, and are subject to SDS workplace
rules and regulations. Those who refuse the 5-month
employment contract are not hired.
The day after expiration of her 5-month engagement,
Lina wore her SDS white and blue uniform and
reported for work but was denied entry into the store
premises. Agitated, she went on a hunger strike and
stationed herself in front of one of the gates of SDS.
Soon thereafter, other employees whose 5-month
term had also elapsed, joined Lina's hunger strike.
Assume that no fixed-term worker complained, yet in
a routine inspection a labor inspector of the Regional
Office of the Labor Code's security of tenure
provisions and recommended to the Regional Director
the issuance a compliance order. The Regional
Director adopted the recommendation and issued a
compliance order. Is the compliance order valid?
Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the compliance order is not valid.
The Regional Director exercises only visitorial and
enforcement power over the labor standard cases,
and the power to adjudicate uncontested money
claims of employees. The Regional Director has no
power to rule on SDS‘s 5-month term policy.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the Compliance Order is valid because the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives has the power to issue
compliance orders to give effect to the labor
standards based on the findings of labor employment
and enforcement officers or industrial safety
engineersmade during inspection. The Secretary ot his
duly authorized representatives may issue writs of
execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of their orders (Art. 128, Labor Code;
V.L. Enterprises and/or Visitacion v. CA, G.R. No.
167512, March 12, 2007).
DOLE Regional Director; Visitorial and Enforcement
Power; Money Claims (2009)
No. I. a. The visitorial and enforcement powers of the
DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce
compliance with labor standard laws can be exercised
even when the individual claim exceeds P5,000.00.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. The visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce
compliance with labor standards laws can be
exercised even when the individual claims exceeds
P5,000.00, the authority under Article 128 may be
exercised regardless of the monetary value involved.
Under Article 129, however the authority is only for
claims not exceeding P5,000.00 per claimant.
Labor Arbiter; Appeals (2007)
No. VI. Procedurally, how do you stay a decision,
award or order of the Labor Arbiter? Discuss fully.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter may
be stayed by filing an appeal to the Commission by
any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
In case of appeal of a LA‘s judgment involving a
monetary award, it may only be stayed upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission
in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in
the judgment appealed from (Art. 223, Labor Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
By perfecting an appeal, through the filing an Appeal
Memorandum within 10 days from receipt of such
decision, verified by the appellant and accompanied
by his Non-Forum Certification, proof of service on the
other party, proof of payment of the appeal fee and
cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award of the judgment appeal
fromReinstatement is immediately executor (Art. 223,
Labor Code).
Labor Arbiter; Compromise Agreement (2007)
No. XIII. May a decision of the Labor Arbiter which has
become final and executory be novated through a
compromise agreement of the parties? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, although Article 221 of the Labor Code requires
the Labor Arbiter to exert all efforts to amicably settle
the case before him ―on or before the first hearing‖,
it must be noted that neither the Labor Code nor its
implementing rule as well as the NLRC Rules prohibit
the amicable settlement of cases during the pendency
of the proceeding or after a judgment is issued
thereupon.
The established rule is that the compromise
agreement or amicable settlement may still be made
even after the judgment has become final and
executor. Settlement of case is encouraged as
authorized by law. Article 2040 of the Civil Code
impliedly authorizes this. It is even encourage by
express provision of law.
FIRST ALTERNATTIVE ANSWER:
Yes, provided that the same is not unconscionable,
and the agreement was approved by the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC or the Court of Appeals, before
whom the case is pending.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, provided that the new agreement is not tainted
with fraud duress or undue influence.
Labor Arbiter; Execution Order; Appeal (2007)
No. XII. b. Cite two instances when an order of
execution may be appealed. (5%)
SUGGETED ANSWER:
An Order of Execution may be appealed:
(1) Where the Order of Execution varies or goes
beyond the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce
or the terms of the judgment are ambiguous (DBP v.
Union Bank, 419 SCRA 131 [2004]);
(2) Where the implementation of the Order was
irregular (Metrobank v. C.A. 356 SCRA 563 [2001]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(1) When its execution becomes impossible or unjust,
it may be modifiedor altered on appeal or harmonize
the same with justice and the facts (Torres v. NLRC,
339 SCRA 311 [2001]).
(2) Supervening events may warrant modification in
the execution of the judgment, as when
reinstatement is no longer possible because the
position was abolished as a cost-cutting measure due
to losses (Abalos v. Philex Mining Corp., 393 SCRA 134
[2000]).
Labor Arbiter; Execution, Orders or Awards (2007)
No. XII. a. How do you execute a labor judgment
which, on appeal, had become final and executory?
Discuss fully. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or
decision that finally disposes of the action or
proceedings after the counsel of record and the
parties shall have been furnished with copies of the
decision in accordance with these Rules but only after
the expiration of the period of appeal if no appeal has
been duly perfected.
The Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director, or his duly
authorized hearing officer of origin shall, motu proprio
or upon motion of any interested party, issue a writ of
execution on a judgment only within five (5) days
from the date it becomes final and executory, so
requiring the sheriff or duly deputized officer to
execute the same. No motion for execution shall be
entertained nor a writ be issued unless the labor
Arbiter is in possession of the records of the case
which shall include an entry of judgment in case of
appeal except hat, as provided for in Section 10 Rule
VI, and in those cases where partial execution is
allowed by law, the Labor Arbiter shall restrain
duplicate original copies thereof for the purpose of its
immediate enforcement.
Labor Arbiter; Labor Disputes; Barangay Lupong
Tagapamayapa (2007)
No. XVII. P.D. 1508 requires the submission of
disputes before the Barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa
prior to the filing of cases with the courts or other
government bodies. May this decree be used to
defeat a labor case filed directly with the Labor
Arbiter? Discuss fully. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Requiring conciliation of labor dispute before the
Barangay Lupon Tagapamayapa would defeat the
salutary purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying
labor proceedings designed at expeditious settlement
or referral to the proper courts or office to decide it
finally, the conciliation of the issues before the
Barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa would only duplicate
the conciliation proceedings and would unduly delay
the disposition of labor cases (Montoya v. Escayo, 171
SCRA 446 [1989]).
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, because under Article 217 of the Labor Code, the
Labor Arbiter exercises original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
P.D. 1508 does not apply to labor dispute because
labor cases have their own grievance and mediation
processes.
Labor Arbiter; Money Claims (2009)
No. III. a. Richie, a driver-mechanic, was recruited by
Supreme Recruiters (SR) and its principal, Mideast
Recruitment Agency (MRA), to work in Qatar for a
period of two (2) years. However, soon after the
contract was approved by POEA, MRA advised SR to
forego Richie’s deployment because it had already
hired another Filipino driver mechanic, who had just
completed his contract in Qatar. Aggrieved, Richie
filed with the NLRC a complaint against SR and MRA
for damages corresponding to his two years’ salary
under the POEA-approved contract.
SR and MRA traversed Richie’s complaint, raising the
following arguments:
The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case;
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. Section 10, R.A. No.
8042, reads:
―Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer –
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages.‖
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.
The failure to deploy a worker within the prescribed
period without valid reason is a recruitment violation
under the jurisdiction of the POEA.
Labor Arbiter; Reinstatement Pending Appeal (2009)
No. VIII. a. Alexander, a security guard of Jaguar
Security Agency (JSA), could not be given any
assignment because no client would accept him. He
had a face only a mother could love. After six (6)
months of being on "floating" status, Alexander sued
JSA for constructive dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
upheld Alexander’s claim of constructive dismissal and
ordered JSA to immediately reinstate Alexander. JSA
appealed the decision to the NLRC. Alexander sought
immediate enforcement of the reinstatement order
while the appeal was pending.
JSA hires you as lawyer, and seeks your advice on the
following:
Because JSA has no client who would accept
Alexander, can it still be compelled to reinstate him
pending appeal even if it has posted an appeal bond?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the posting of the bond of the employer does not
have the effect of staying the execution of the
reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter (Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC,280 SCRA
806 [1997]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, JSA can be compelled to reinstate Alexander,
pending appeal of the decision of the Labor Arbiter to
the NLRC, even if JSA post a bond.
―Art. 223. Appeal xxx In any event, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned shall be immediately executor, even
pending appeal and the posting of a bond.
Labor Arbiter; ULP; Damages and Reliefs (2012)
No. III. a. On August 01, 2008, Y, a corporation
engaged in the manufacture of textile garments,
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
Union X in representation of the rank and-file
employees of the corporation. The CBA was effective
up to June 20, 2011. The contract had an automatic
renewal clause which would allow the agreement
after its expiry date to still apply until both parties
would have been able to execute a new agreement.
On May 10, 2011, Union X submitted to Y's
management their proposals for the negotiation of a
new CBA. The next day, Y suspended negotiations
with Union X since Y had entered into a merger with
z,· a corporation also engaged in the manufacture of
textile garments. Z assumed all the assets and
liabilities of Y. Union X filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court for specific performance and
damages with a prayer for preliminary injunction
against Y and Z and Z filed a Motion to Dismiss based
on lack of jurisdiction. Rule on the Motion to Dismiss.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Motion to Dismiss must be granted. The claim
against Y and Z consists mainly of the civil aspect of
the unfair labor practice charge referred to in Article
247 of the Labor Code. Under Article 247 of the Code,
―the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor
practices, which may include claims for damages and
other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction
of the labor arbiters.‖ (National Union of Bank
Employees v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 56431, ajnuary 19,
1988). Besides, what the parties have is a labor
dispute as defined in Article 212 (I) of the Labor Code
―regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee‖. Being
so, the RTC is prohibited by Art. 254 of the Code from
excercising jurisdiction over the case.
Labor Arbiter; Voluntary Arbitration (2008)
No. II. b. Can a dispute falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter be submitted to
voluntary arbitration? Why or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, provided that the parties to the dispute falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
states in unequivocal language that they conform to
the submission of said dispute to the voluntary
arbitration (Vivero v. CA, G.R. No . 138938, October
24, 2000).
Nat‘l Labor Relations Commission (2013)
No. V. Cris filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Baker Company. The Labor Arbiter dismissed
the complaint but awarded Cris financial assistance.
Only the company appealed from the Labor Arbiter's
ruling. It confined its appeal solely to the question of
whether financial assistance could be awarded. The
NLRC, instead of ruling solely on the appealed issue,
fully reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision; it found
Baker Company liable for illegal dismissal and ordered
the payment of separation pay and full backwages.
Through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, Baker Company challenged the validity
of the NLRC ruling. It argued that the NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on the illegal
dismissal issue, when the only issue brought on
appeal was the legal propriety of the financial
assistance award.
Cris countered that under Article 218(c) of the Labor
Code, the NLRC has the authority to "correct, amend,
or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in
substance or in form" in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Decide the case. (8%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The review power of the NLRC in perfected appeals is
limited only to those issues raised on appeal. Hence, it
is grave abuse of discretion for the NLRC to resolve
issues not raised on appeal (United Placement
International v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 445 [1993]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the NLRC is
empowered to determine even the issues not raised
on appeal in order
to fully settle the issues surrounding the case [See:
Art. 218(e), now Art. 224(e)].
Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor Dispute (2013)
No. VII. Philippine Electric Company is engaged in
electric power generation and distribution. It is a
unionized company with Kilusang Makatao as the
union representing its rank-and-file employees.
During the negotiations for their expired collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), the parties duly served
their proposals and counter-proposals on one
another. The parties, however, failed to discuss the
merits of their proposals and counterproposals in any
formal negotiation meeting because their talks
already bogged down on the negotiation ground rules,
i.e., on the question of how they would conduct their
negotiations, particularly on whether to consider
retirement as a negotiable issue.
Because of the continued impasse, the union went on
strike. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
immediately assumed jurisdiction over the dispute to
avert widespread electric power interruption in the
country. After extensive discussions and the filing of
position papers (before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board and before the Secretary himself) on
the validity of the union's strike and on the wage and
other economic issues (including the retirement
issue), the DOLE Secretary ruled on the validity of the
strike and on the disputed CBA issues, and ordered
the parties to execute a CBA based on his rulings.
Did the Secretary of Labor exceed his jurisdiction
when he proceeded to rule on the parties' CBA
positions even though the parties did not fully
negotiate on their own? (8%)
SUGGESTED ANWER:
No, the power of the Secretary of Labor under Article
263(g) is plenary. He can rule on all issues, questions
or controversies arising from the labor dispute,
including the legality of the strike, even those over
which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction
(Bangong Pagkkaisa ng mga Manggagawa sa Triumph
International v. Secretary, G.N. No. 167401 and
167407, July 5, 2010).
Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor Dispute (2010)
No. XIX. a. Several employees and members of Union
A were terminated by Western Phone Co. on the
ground of redundancy. After complying with the
necessary requirements, the Union staged a strike and
picketed the premises of the company. The
management then filed a petition for the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over
the dispute. Without the benefit of a hearing, the
Secretary issued an Order to assume jurisdiction and
for the parties to revert to the status quo ante litem.
Was the order to assume jurisdiction legal? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
plenary power to assume jurisdiction under Article
263(g) of the Labor Code. When in his opinion, there
exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify it
to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration (Art. 263[g],
Labor Code). This extraordinary authority given to the
Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful
and speedy solution to labor disputes, without
jeopardizing national interests (Steel Corporation v.
SCP Employees Union, 551 SCRA 594 [2008]). Such
assumption shall have the effect of automatic
enjoining an impending strike or lockout, or an order
directing immediate return to work and resume
operations, if a strike already took place, and for the
employer to re-admit all employees under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout (Art. 263(g), Labor Code; Sec. 15, Rule XXII,
Dept. Order No. 40-G-03).
Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor Dispute (2010)
No. XIX. b. Several employees and members of Union
A were terminated by Western Phone Co. on the
ground of redundancy. After complying with the
necessary requirements, the Union staged a strike and
picketed the premises of the company. The
management then filed a petition for the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over
the dispute. Without the benefit of a hearing, the
Secretary issued an Order to assume jurisdiction and
for the parties to revert to the status quo ante litem.
Under the same set of facts the Secretary instead
issued an Order directing all striking workers to return
to work within 24 hours, except those who were
terminated due to redundancy. Was the Order legal?
Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED NASWER:
No, the Secretary of Labor‘s order will be inconsistent
with the established policy of the State of enjoining
the parties from performing acts that undermine the
underlying principles embodied in Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code.
In this case, excepting the employees terminated due
to redundancy from those who are required to return-
to work, which was the very labor dispute that
sparked the union to strike, the Secretary of Labor
comes short of his duty under Article 263(g) to
maintain status quo or the terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike. In fact, the Secretary
could be accused of disposing of the parties‘ labor
dispute without the benefit of a hearing, in clear
derogation of due process of law.
Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor Dispute (2008)
No. VI. b. On the day that the Union could validly
declare a strike, the Secretary of Labor issued an
order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute and
enjoining the strike, or if one has commenced,
ordering the striking workers to immediately return to
work. The return-to work order required the
employees to return to work within twenty-four hours
and was served at 8 a.m. of the day the strike was to
start. The order at the same time directed the
Company to accept all employees under the same
terms and conditions of employment prior to the
work stoppage. The Union members did not return to
work on the day the Secretary's assumption order was
served nor on the next day; instead, they held a
continuing protest rally against the company's alleged
unfair labor practices. Because of the accompanying
picket, some of the employees who wanted to return
to work failed to do so. On the 3rd day, the workers
reported for work, claiming that they do so in
compliance with the Secretary's returnto-work order
that binds them as well as the Company. The
Company, however, refused to admit them back since
they had violated the Secretary's return-to-work order
and are now considered to have lost their
employment status.
The Union officers and members filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal arguing that there was no strike but a
protest rally which is a valid exercise of the workers
constitutional right to peaceable assembly and
freedom of expression. Hence, there was no basis for
the termination of their employment.
You are the Labor Arbiter to whom the case was
raffled. Decide, ruling on the following issues:
Were the employees simply exercising their
constitutional right to petition for redness of their
grievances? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, there was a defiance of the assumption order of
the Secretary of Labor by the union. The assumption
order is immediately executor. Following an
assumption order by the strikers is not a matter of
option or voluntariness but of obligation on their part
(Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Brillantes, G.R. No.
119381, March 11, 1996; Art. 264[a], Labor Code).
Sec. of Labor; Assumption over Labor Dispute;
National Interest (2008)
No. III. b. Savoy Department Store (SDS) adopted a
policy of hiring salesladies on five-month cycles. At
the end of a saleslady's five-month term, another
person is hired as replacement. Salesladies attend to
store customers, were SDS uniforms, report at
specified hours, and are subject to SDS workplace
rules and regulations. Those who refuse the 5-month
employment contract are not hired.
The day after expiration of her 5-month engagement,
Lina wore her SDS white and blue uniform and
reported for work but was denied entry into the store
premises. Agitated, she went on a hunger strike and
stationed herself in front of one of the gates of SDS.
Soon thereafter, other employees whose 5-month
term had also elapsed, joined Lina's hunger strike.
The owner of SDS considered the hunger strike staged
by Lina, et al.., an eyesore and disruptive of SDS
business. He wrote the Secretary of Labor a letter
asking him to assume jurisdiction over the dispute and
enjoin the hunger "strike". What answer will you give
if you were the Secretary of Labor? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Although the Secretary of Labor has wide discretion in
exercising jurisdiction over labor dispute, he may not
enjoin the strike because SDS‘s is not indispensable to
the national interest (Art. 263[g], Labor Code).
Voluntary Arbitrators (2010)
No. XXV. Company C, a toy manufacturer, decided to
ban the use of cell phones in the factory premises. In
the pertinent Memorandum, management explained
that too much texting and phone-calling by
employees disrupted company operations. Two
employee members of Union X were terminated from
employment due to violation of the memorandum-
policy. The union countered with a prohibitory
injunction case (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order) filed with the Regional
Trial Court, challenging the validity and
constitutionality of the cell phone ban. The company
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case should
be referred to the grievance machinery pursuant to an
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement with Union
X, and eventually to Voluntary Arbitration. Is the
company correct? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, termination cases arising in or resulting from the
interpretation and implementation of the collective
bargaining agreements, and interpretation and
enforcement of company personnel policies which
were initially processed at the various steps of the
plant-level Grievance Procedure under the parties
collective bargaining agreements, fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator pursuant to Article 217 (c) of the Labor
Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the prohibitory injunction case filed
byUnion X against Company C to enjoin the latter
from implementing the memorandum-policy against
use of cell phones in the factory. What is at issue in
Union X‘s challenge against the validity and
constitutionality of the cell phone ban being
implemented by Company C. the issue, therefore,
does not involve the interpretation of the
memorandumpolicy, but its intrinsic validity
(Haliguefla v. PAL, 602 SCRA 297 [2009]).
Voluntary Arbitrator; Conciliation; Mediation;
Arbitration (2010)
No. II. a. Distinguish the terms “conciliation,”
“mediation” and “arbitration.” (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There is a DOLE official called a ―Conciliator
Mediator‖. He is an officer of the NCMB whose
principal function is to assist in the settlement and
disposition of labor – management disputes through
conciliation and preventive mediation. However, he
does not promulgate decisions that settle
controversies about rights, which are demandable and
enforceable. The latter is called arbitration and is the
function of a labor arbiter or a voluntary arbitrator.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(1) CONCILIATION is the process of dispute
management whereby parties in dispute are brought
together for the purpose of: (1) amicably settling the
case upon a fair compromise; (2) determining the real
parties in interest; (3) defining and simplifying the
issues in the case; (4) entering into admissions or
stipulations of facts; and (5) threshing out all other
preliminary matters (Section 3, Rule V, 2005 NLRC
Rules of Procedure). In resolving labor disputes, this
comes before arbitration, as a mandatory process,
pursuant to the State policy of promoting and
emphasizing conciliation as modes of settling labor
disputes (Art. 211 (A)(a), Labor Code).
(2) MEDIATION is a voluntary process of settling
disputes whereby the parties elect a mediator to
facilitate the communication and negotiation
between the parties in dispute for the purpose of
assisting them in reaching a compromise. (Sec. 3(q),
Rep. Act No. 9285 or the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Law).
(3) ARBITRATION is a system of dispute settlement
that may be compulsory or voluntary, whereby the
parties are compelled by the government, or agree to
submit their dispute before an arbiter, with the
intention to accept the resolution of said arbiter over
the dispute as final and biding on them (Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon
Development Employees, 249 SCRA 162 [1995]).
(4) in this jurisdiction, compulsory arbitration in labor
disputes are submitted to a labor arbiter, whose
powers and functions are clearly defined under Article
217(a) of the Labor Code; whereas in voluntary
arbitration, the powers and functions of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators elected to
resolve the parties‘dispute involve the interpretation
and implementation of the parties‘ collective
bargaining agreement, pursuant to Articles 260-262 of
the Labor Code.
Art. 260, Labor Code; Navarro III v. Damasco, G.R. No.
101875, July 14, 1995).
Voluntary Arbitrator; Voluntary Arbitration;
Compulsory Arbitration (2008)
No. II. c. Can a dispute falling within the jurisdiction of
a voluntary arbitrator be submitted to compulsory
arbitration? Why or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, jurisdiction in compulsory
arbitration is conferred by law, not by agreement of
the parties (Veneracion v. Moncilla, G.R. No. 158238,
July 20, 2006).
The law mandated that all grievances submitted to
the grievance machinery which are not settled shall
be referred to the voluntary arbitration prescribed in
the CBA Art. 260, Labor Code). This procedure
providing for a conclusive arbitration clause in the
CBA must be strictly adhered to and respected if the
ends are to be achieved (Liberal Labor Union v. Phil.
Can Co., G.R. No. L-4834, March 28, 1952, cited in San
Miguel Corporation v, NLRC, G.R. No. 99266, March
02, 1999). Hence, to submit a dispute falling within
the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitration to
compulsory arbitration would be to trifle faith the
express mandate of the law.

Voluntary Arbitrator; Labor Disputes; Voluntary

Arbitration (2008)

No. II. a. What issues or disputes may be the subject

of voluntary arbitration under the Labor Code? (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Disputes that may be subject of voluntary arbitration

are:

(1) Distortion of the wage structure within an

establishment arising from any prescribed wage
increase because of a law or wage order which any
Regional Board issues (Art. 124, Labor Code); and

(2) Interpretation and implementation of the parties‘

collective bargaining agreement and those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies (Art. 217, as amended by R.A. 6715;