(Weapons of Mass Destruction) Kumuda Simpson - U.S. Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran - From The War On Terror To The Obama Administration-Rowman & Littlefield (2015) PDF

U.S.
Nuclear Diplomacy
with Iran
Weapons of Mass Destruction Series
Edited by Joseph M. Siracusa and Aiden Warren

The series focuses on weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), discussing all issues sur-
rounding nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons. The volumes aim to
present varying historical, contemporary, state, non-state, traditional, and non-traditional
approaches from emerging scholars, established academics, and those involved in the
foreign and security policy domains.
In the context of the nuclear section of the WMD series, it is evident that despite there
being fewer nuclear weapons today than during the Cold War era, the threat remains para-
mount. More states in more unstable regions have attained such weapons, terrorists may
pursue them, and the command and control systems in even the most sophisticated nuclear-
armed states remain susceptible not only to system and human error but, increasingly, to
cyber-attacks. The failure of armed states to disarm, the inability to prevent new states and
non-state actors from gaining access to WMDs, and the expansion of nuclear energy plants
present a real security danger today. As such, the series is timely and necessary.
Joseph M. Siracusa is professor of Human Security and International Diplomacy

and Deputy Dean of Global and Language Studies at the Royal Melbourne Institute of
Technology University, Australia.
Aiden Warren is senior lecturer in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at the
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University in Melbourne, Australia.
Titles in the series include:

• A History of U.S. Nuclear Testing and Its Influence on Nuclear Thought, 1945–1963
by Joseph Siracusa and David M. Blades, 2014
• The Challenges of Nuclear Non-Proliferation by Richard D. Burns and Philip Coyle,
2015
• Nuclear Iran: Accord and Détente since the Geneva Agreement of 2013
by Nader Entessar and Kaveh Afrasiabi, 2015
• U.S. Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran: From the War on Terror to the Obama
Administration by Kumuda Simpson, 2015
• Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Introduction to Today’s Security Dilemma
by Richard D. Burns, Joseph Siracusa, and Aiden Warren, 2016
• India-Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy: Constructivism and the Prospects for Nuclear
Arms Control and Disarmament in South Asia by Mario Carranza, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Diplomacy
with Iran
From the War on Terror to
the Obama Administration
Kumuda Simpson
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

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Contents
Acknowledgementsvii
Introductionix
1 America and Iran during the Cold War 1

Foundational Narratives 1
Mohammad Mosaddeq and the CIA Coup 5
The Iranian Revolution and the American Hostage Crisis 7
The Iran–Iraq War 10
The Iran–Contra Affair 11
Conclusion14
2 The War on Terror and Iran’s Nuclear Programme 19
Neoconservatism and the Bush Doctrine 20
Neoconservatism and Benign Hegemony 22
The Bush Doctrine 24
September 11 and the Bush Doctrine 25
The National Security Strategy 2002 27
The National Security Strategy 2006 31
Axis of Evil 34
The IAEA and the Inspections Process 37
2003–200439
200546
3 Policy Confusion and Regional Instability 55
Referral to the UNSC 55
To Engage or Not to Engage 60
The Nuclear Tipping Point 63
v
vi Contents
Regime Change 65
Hardliners, Pragmatists and Reformers 73
Consequences for Democracy and Political Reform
in the Middle East 76
Stability versus Reform 79
Conclusion81
4 President Obama and the Enrichment Issue 91
Nuclear Abolition and Disarmament 92
Engagement and Coercive Arms Control 94
The 2009 Iranian Elections 97
Enrichment and the NPT 99
Coercive Arms Control I: Sanctions 100
Coercive Arms Control II: Stuxnet and Covert Action 101
Red lines and the Middle East in Turmoil 102
Iran’s Growing Regional Influence 104
Iranian Influence in Iraq 107
The Syrian Crisis and Regional Consequences 108
America’s Response 110
5 Diplomacy and the Geneva Process 119
Domestic Disrupters: The US Congress 121
Saudi Concerns and Regional Turmoil 123
Implications of a Nuclear Deal for the Oil Trade 125
The Interim Deal 128
The IAEA and the PMD Issue 129
Sanctions and Diplomacy 130
Netanyahu’s Speech to Congress and the Letter
to Iran’s Leaders 131
The Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action 132
6 The Future of Middle Eastern Proliferation 143
Proxy Wars and Iranian Power after the Nuclear Deal 144
A Middle East Arms Race 146
The Security Dilemma and Regional Security Concerns 147
Rogue States and the Narrative of Exceptionalism 150
Conclusion159
Bibliography163
Index185
About the Author 188
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr Benjamin MacQueen for his encouragement and

feedback as I began this thesis. His advice was always timely and generous.
I’d also like to thank Dr Timothy Lynch for his extremely useful feedback
and constant advice and support during the final months.
I’d like to offer my immense gratitude to Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh
for his supervision. His guidance and mentoring throughout this process has
been unfailing and I couldn’t have achieved this without it.
I’d also like to thank Judith Simpson, Michael Bradley, and Billy McCabe
for their words of encouragement and for reading through the finished manu-
script. Their feedback and comments greatly improved the book and their
friendship and support were essential during the writing process.
Lastly, this book is for Harriet. I hope you grow up in a world where the
narratives we tell create harmony and understanding.
vii
Introduction
This book engages in an exploration of the evolving US policy regarding Iran,

catalysed by the 2002 revelations about expansion of its nuclear programme.
By examining the unfolding nuclear crisis and the contours of US diplomacy
during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, it seeks to under-
stand the strengths and weaknesses of American non-proliferation policies
and the lessons and implications this has for future proliferation challenges.
At a deeper level though, this book is a critique of the nuclear alarmism and
demonization of Iran that has been a feature of American public diplomacy
throughout the period. The dire warnings and extreme predictions of nuclear
disaster and war in the Middle East did very little to educate the public about
the very real concerns about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, nor did
it appear to be helpful diplomatic behaviour.
The classification of Iran as a ‘rogue’ state, and the potential global disaster
should it acquire a nuclear weapon, has been at the centre of public discourse
about that country. While Iran’s disruptive behaviour in the Middle East,
including its support for the Assad regime and groups such as Hamas and
Hezbollah, certainly explains the appellation of rogue state, the term is also
a deeply politicized one and should be interrogated. For both the Bush and
Obama administrations, emphasizing Iran’s pariah status served important
political ends. It reinforced the existing balance of power in the Middle East,
reassuring regional Gulf Arab allies that the United States remained com-
mitted to containing Iranian influence. It also contributed to the changing
discourse of American security in the post–September 11 context, which
emphasizes the threat from rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
In this context, identity politics, and their impact on security discourse,
has gained attention as an important area of study that offers insights beyond
ix
x Introduction
the traditional rationalist assumptions that inform the study of international

relations.1 A study of the cultural identity of the United States, primarily
through the discourse of American exceptionalism, provides a framework
for understanding how America positions itself in the world in opposition to
the ‘Other’. In this case, the ‘Other’ is Iran, a state inherently antagonistic
to American regional interests and security. The language used to describe
Iran often bordered on the absurd, giving credence to Edward Said’s critique
of the way in which Western states often engaged with the Middle East. He
argued that the West dealt ‘with it by making statements about it, authoriz-
ing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short
. . . a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over
the Orient’.2 The debate over Iran’s nuclear programme, and attempts to
discover its ‘true’ intentions, suggest that Said’s criticisms are still relevant.
Iran continues to be one of the most pressing foreign policy issues in
America. A work outlining the patterns and mistakes of both the Bush and
Obama administrations is timely and will make a positive contribution to
the debate about nuclear proliferation and how to deal with potential future
proliferators. Yet this book aims to do more than offer a simple comparative
analysis of the differences in approach between Obama and Bush. Such a
description would tell us little about the ideological underpinnings of US for-
eign policy that have shaped and influenced both presidents’ Iran policy to a
significant extent. Rather I hope to shed some light on the continuity between
the two presidents’ policies in terms of ideological framing of the Iranian
threat, and the inherent limitations that framing narrative thus imposed upon
American policy.
The pattern of policy confusion that this book will highlight in many
ways is a common problem for US policy in the Middle East. It reflects the
competing requirements of strategic realpolitik considerations, such as pre-
venting nuclear proliferation and regional instability, with the desire to exert
American moral leadership in order to actively reshape the political environ-
ment of the Middle East. As we have seen over the past decade, this is often
a difficult task full of contradictions.
Framing the conflict with Iran as an ideological one created certain expec-
tations. First, in the context of the War on Terror and preventing the Iranian
regime from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, America’s Iran policy
fit neatly into the broader policy of preventing the proliferation of WMD.
Second, the US policy of promoting and supporting democratic reform within
Iran can be seen within the larger goal of transforming the Middle East
through democracy promotion. The policies that were implemented by the
Bush administration, however, were unable to achieve either the goal of shut-
ting down Iran’s nuclear programme, or significant democratic reform within
the Islamic Republic. Likewise, the Obama administration’s negotiations with
Introduction xi
Iran have strengthened Iran’s regional influence and left traditional US allies,
including Israel and Saudi Arabia, feeling vulnerable and insecure.
Assessing whether coercive or traditional approaches to arms control work,
and the extent to which US foreign policy in this area has become overly
ideological, has important implications for non-proliferation policies beyond
the Iranian case. The Middle Eastern region continues to be beset by instabil-
ity. The prospect of nuclear proliferation in the region is one that deserves
attention and analysis. This book assesses the extent to which the ideologi-
cally driven narrative of Iran’s intent to develop a nuclear weapon, and the
necessity of America taking the lead to prevent this from happening, shaped
and constrained policy options.
Chapter 1 provides a concise overview of US nuclear policy during the
Cold War. It details the role of the United States in setting up the Iranian
nuclear programme under the Shah. The Cold War considerations of the
United States, and the strategic importance of Iran in balancing Soviet
expansion into the Middle East, help explain the early US efforts to help Iran
develop its nuclear infrastructure. However, this chapter will also highlight
two important elements of US Cold War policy. The first is that the United
States did not intend, and arguably never intended, for Iran to develop an
indigenous nuclear weapons capability. This would have been at odds with
US Cold War policies. The Iranian regime also received technical assistance
from many other countries, including Germany. This highlights the extent
to which Iran’s early programme was aided by states other than the United
States.
What emerges from this examination of the relationship between the
United States and Iran during the Cold War is the way that certain events
have shaped and defined it. The 1979 revolution, the hostage crisis, the
Iran–Iraq war; each of these has exerted a considerable degree of influence
over the period. It gives an account of some of the key historical events that
have fundamentally shaped each country’s understanding of, and perception
of, the other. By revisiting the past, this book will illustrate how events such
as the 1953 coup against the Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Mossadeq,
and the 1979 hostage crisis are utilized by each side to mythologize the
past and reinforce the sense of antagonism and hostility that characterizes
their relationship. By examining how each side has engaged in this kind of
revisionist politics, continuity in attitude is revealed across successive US
administrations. Any understanding of the factors that continue to shape and
influence the US–Iran relationship must be anchored in history. The deeply
emotional nature of the relationship is in part a response to the many episodes
of betrayal and humiliation that each state has experienced at the hands of
the other. This chapter also presents a narrative of missed opportunity for
improving relations—the explanation for why the political will to positively
xii Introduction
shape this relationship has often been the result of multiple factors, including
domestic and international considerations. Yet a clear pattern has emerged of
both states’ reliance on ideological language that reinforces the Manichean
and binary dynamic that pits good against evil.
Chapter 2 begins with the revelations about Iran’s expanded nuclear pro-
gramme that surfaced in 2002 and radically altered America’s public rhetoric
about the country. Iran policy quickly became absorbed into the broader
strategic calculations of the War on Terror. In this context, the spectre of an
Iranian nuclear bomb took on a new and frightening urgency for the mem-
bers of the Bush administration. The policy response focused on four main
interests: geostrategic consideration about the security of Israel and the Gulf
States, particularly Saudi Arabia; energy security; counter-terrorism; and the
broader prevention of regional nuclear proliferation.
This chapter will detail the ideological nature of the Bush administration’s
public diplomacy. Despite the strategic interests that drove the approach to
the problem of Iran’s nuclear programme, the public diplomacy of many of
its members bordered on the alarmist, and drew heavily on the tradition of
American exceptionalism. This chapter will situate the Bush administration’s
ideological response to Iran’s nuclear programme within the broader, ideo-
logical context of the War on Terror. It will also provide a detailed account
of the significant gap between the alarmist rhetoric, and the specific actions
pursued by the Bush administration. These included the referral of the matter
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), eventual referral to the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the imposition of sanctions.
The purpose of this chapter will be to contrast the reality of the nuclear pro-
gramme in Iran with the often-misleading language used by public officials
in the United States.
Chapter 3 will explore the consequences of the Bush administration’s
policies, with a focus on the further expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme
and the challenge this presents for non-proliferation norms. Despite strong
statements about the irrational and untrustworthy nature of Iran’s leaders, the
likelihood of its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, and the
assertion that diplomacy and sanctions had already failed, the Bush admin-
istration followed a pragmatic course of action—referring the matter to the
IAEA, and pursuing the matter to the UNSC where it finally imposed inter-
national sanctions against the Iranian regime. This, in contrast to the claims
that Iran constituted part of an ‘Axis of Evil’ led to considerable policy con-
fusion and doubts about the intentions of the United States. Two possibilities
were of concern to Iran’s leadership—regime change, and military action to
disable Iran’s nuclear programme. Both regime change, and the possibility
of military action, especially after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, significantly
undermined the Iranian regime’s trust in the United States as negotiating
Introduction xiii
in good faith, and it created further doubts about the true intentions of the
United States. This chapter will highlight the flawed strategy that the Bush
administration utilized here and the way in which the very real concerns
about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, articulated in alarmist ways,
undermined their efforts to resolve the matter diplomatically.
Chapter 4 will assess the Obama administration’s approach to Iran dur-
ing its first term in office. In 2008, President Obama inherited eight years of
policy confusion that had resulted in the worrying expansion of Iran’s nuclear
programme. The most significant policy shift was the willingness shown by
the new administration to negotiate directly with the Iranian regime without
precondition. The most important issue was Iran’s ability to enrich uranium
and thus potentially master the complete nuclear fuel cycle. The willingness
to talk directly to the Iranian leadership was an important step forward in
finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis; however, it raises important ques-
tions about how much the United States was willing to compromise on in
order to achieve a diplomatic solution.
This chapter will explore the legal and diplomatic implications of Obama’s
carrot and stick approach. The combination of sanctions and diplomacy
highlighted two important issues: the first was the limits that could reason-
ably be imposed regarding a states’ right to enrichment and access to the
complete fuel cycle under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The
second concerned how much the United States would be willing to compro-
mise when it came to negotiating a diplomatic deal. The first four years of
Obama’s presidency arguably achieved very little in terms of any immedi-
ate halt to Iran’s nuclear programme. Instead, Iran continued to expand and
develop it. Despite a shift in tone from the Bush administration’s unwilling-
ness to negotiate, very little changed in terms of the stated aim of convincing
Iran to halt its programme. This chapter will explore the weaknesses of both
administration’s approaches and present the argument that America’s ability
to influence the Iranian regime has been limited from the start.
Chapter 5 focuses on how Obama’s second term in office has seen a sig-
nificant shift in the relationship between the United States and Iran. This
chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the negotiations with Iran since
the election of President Hassan Rouhani. The Geneva Process refers to the
diplomatic negotiations between 2013 and 2015 between the United States,
Russia, China, France, United Kingdom, and Germany, and Iran (P5+1).3 The
product of the diplomatic negotiations was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), which sought to resolve many of the outstanding issues
surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme. The JCPOA could open Iran up to
some of the most intrusive inspections and stringent monitoring by the IAEA
of any NPT signatory. And yet, for all that it might achieve diplomatically,
it would still leave Iran with a clear breakout capability. This is far short of
xiv Introduction
both the Bush and Obama administrations’ stated aim of convincing Iran to
substantially limit its nuclear programme.
Chapter 6 will explore the long-term implications of the Obama administra-
tion’s policy of engagement with Iran on nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East region, the strengthening of Iranian regional influence and the potential
for this to increase instability, and the broader consequences for the strength
of the NPT. The challenge that Iran has posed to the NPT, and to the broader
non-proliferation regime, is significant. It has highlighted the weakness of the
verification mechanisms provided in the NPT, and the inherent problem that
an indigenous nuclear energy programme could provide the infrastructure and
expertise needed for a breakout capability. The international community and
the United States have found themselves in the difficult position of having
to accept that the Iranian regime will be added to the list of states that could
one day choose to go down this path. This is a deeply troubling development
and one that has important implications for the future of non-proliferation
efforts globally.
Underpinning the account offered in this book of the evolving US policy
towards Iran over the past several decades is the theme of national narra-
tives and identity formation. Iran and the United States have each engaged
in this process of recounting and retelling the past in order to make sense of
the present. Each state has told a very different story, or set of stories. For
America, the central narrative arc has focused on the threat emanating from a
rogue state in the Middle East that is most likely pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability. The only force strong enough to prevent this from happening has
been America. Iran, though, has consistently seen itself as the victim of inter-
national bullying and vilification. Its leaders have repeatedly claimed that
the nuclear programme is for peaceful civilian purposes and that it has been
unfairly targeted by the United States. It is not yet clear how these competing
narratives will develop, but it is important to acknowledge the extent to which
each state rejects the premise of the other side’s arguments, thus widening the
gap between them and in the process reinforcing their own sense of national
identity in opposition to the other.
NOTES
1. Lindeman, T. and Ringmar, E. (2014), The International Politics of Recognition,

Denver, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
2. Said, E. (1978), Orientalism, London: Penguin Books, p. 3.
3. The P5+1 has also been referred to as the EU3+3.
Chapter 1
America and Iran during the Cold War
This chapter provides a concise overview of US nuclear policy during the

Cold War. It details the role of the United States in setting up the Iranian
nuclear programme under the Shah. The Cold War considerations of the
United States, and the strategic importance of Iran in balancing Soviet
expansion into the Middle East help explain the early US efforts to help Iran
develop its nuclear infrastructure. This chapter, however, will also highlight
two important elements of US Cold War policy. The first is that the United
States did not intend, and arguably never intended, for Iran to develop an
indigenous nuclear weapons capability. This would have been at odds with
the US Cold War policies that were preoccupied with preventing nuclear pro-
liferation. The Iranian regime also received technical assistance from many
other countries, including Germany; Iran’s early programme was aided by
states other than the United States.
The second theme that this chapter will develop is the intensely ideologi-
cal nature of US nuclear policy during the Cold War. The role of culture and
identity and its impact upon security discourse within the United States will
be explored here.
FOUNDATIONAL NARRATIVES
National narratives play an important role in how decision makers interpret

and understand the world around them and the actions of other countries. Nar-
ratives serve a powerful function in explaining who we are, where we come
from, and where we fit within the broader international context. In interna-
tional relations, research into the role of national narratives, how they influ-
ence foreign policy, and how domestic contestation occurs to reshape and
1
2 Chapter 1
reinforce these narratives, has begun to pay particular attention to the realm of
security studies.1 As Subotic argues, foundational state narratives are products
of the socially constructed discourse describing who we are, and where we
come from, and involve ‘a process of telling that grants ideological and emo-
tional value to what we hear and how we choose to act on that knowledge’.2
Understanding what the foundational narrative is, and participating in the
retelling and the reconstructing of that narrative, selectively emphasizing
some parts while discarding others all help define national identity. Identity
matters as much for states as it does for individuals.3 Erik Ringmar claims
that national identity involves the telling of particular stories that require
recognition by others.4 Yet not all states will recognize the narrative of oth-
ers, particularly when that state is regarded as a threat. The conflict between
the United States and Iran over the latter’s nuclear programme can in many
ways be viewed as a series of competing and contradictory narratives about
how each has positioned the other as a threat. These narratives have had a
considerable impact on the contours of the policy debate within Washington.
It has led to Iran’s leaders being overwhelmingly characterized as hostile
and motivated by anti-Western sentiment. This is significant because US
policy makers have very little in the way of first-hand, verifiable information
about the internal political workings of the Iranian regime. Since 1979, the
United States has had no diplomatic or intelligence presence within Iran and
has had to rely on third-party intelligence and analysis. As a result, certain
interpretations about past events have been able to define the relationship.
Detailed recounting of key moments in the relationship between Iran and
America is a feature of most books about this topic, and while it is not the
purpose of this book to explore in depth the history of these two countries,
it is impossible to arrive at a clear understanding of the debate over US–Iran
relations without revisiting the past. The intention of this chapter is to high-
light the way in which these events have been understood and mythologized
on both sides and how they have shaped each country’s perception of the
other. As Alethia Cook and Jalil Roshandel have shown, ‘It is critically impor-
tant for establishing the context of the current climate of distrust and ani-
mosity in the relationship.’5 Events such as the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) involvement in the 1953 coup that overthrew Iranian prime minister
Mohammad Mosaddeq, the Iran/Contra affair, the 1979 Iranian Revolution
and subsequent hostage crisis all continue to dominate the lens through which
Iran’s actions today are understood.
What clearly emerges here is the key role that ideology has played in the
relationship between the United States and Iran. It is not enough to merely
look for geostrategic explanations for why Iran continues to regard America as
‘the Great Satan’ or why America sees Iran as in the control of ‘Mad Mullahs’
and prey to conspiracy theories. Both states are certainly concerned with
America and Iran during the Cold War 3
the regional balance of power, yet ideology, and, particularly for the United
States, the need to promote its values, have been essential elements of foreign
policy and have shaped each state’s interaction with the other. As this chapter
will demonstrate, they also continue to shape how the past is interpreted.
For the United States, that ideology takes the shape and form of American
exceptionalism and belief in the American Creed. The American Creed, writ-
ten by William Tyler Page and accepted as the national creed by the United
States House of Representatives on April 3, 1918, states:
I believe in the United States of America as a government of the people, by the

people, for the people; whose just powers are derived from the consent of the
governed, a democracy in a republic, a sovereign Nation of many sovereign
States; a perfect union, one and inseparable; established upon those principles of
freedom, equality, justice, and humanity for which American patriots sacrificed
their lives and fortunes. I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love
it, to support its Constitution, to obey its laws, to respect its flag, and to defend
it against all enemies.6
These values describe the American experience and have helped create
a sense of uniqueness and mission for the American republic, a theme that
appears constantly in the early writings about the nation.
The movement that has carried our people from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean
and in the short space of two centuries and a half has founded the greatest
republic that the world ever saw, has already taken its place in history as one of
the grandest achievements of humanity since the world began. It is a moral as
well as a physical triumph, and forms an epoch in the advance of civilisation.7
This combination of ideals and mission has helped shape the contours of
American foreign policy and as such are an essential aspect of understanding
the debate about how America should, or has, responded to the rest of the
world.
Henry Kissinger once wrote, ‘America’s journey through international poli-
tics has been a triumph of faith over experience. . . . Torn between nostalgia for
a pristine past and yearning for a perfect future, American thought has oscil-
lated between isolationism and commitment.’8 This struggle is about more
than finding a successful foreign policy. As art historian Robert Hughes wrote,
Americans are ‘longing for a better past which, if preserved can sanctify the
present, but if lost will degrade the future’.9 This quote illustrates a peculiarly
American expression of nostalgia, and it describes quite aptly that country’s
constant struggle to understand the role it should play in international politics.
The historical narrative resulting from the deliberate efforts by national-
ist elites is one that casts the nation as the natural expression of a people
4 Chapter 1
with origins deep in the past and a future without end.10 It is a dilemma that
concerns questions about the exercise of power and the importance of values
and morality, and the relationship between national interest and international
responsibility. Many American presidents and policy makers have attempted
to articulate a vision for America’s future, drawing on the principles and val-
ues that are the foundation of its unique past.
A recurring theme in America’s national mythology has been the way in
which its unique founding based on an ideal has shaped its role in the world,
that it is an exceptional country. The term American exceptionalism has
strong religious roots. In 1630, when the Puritans were migrating to America
from England, their leader, John Winthrop, declared that in America they
would create a country that would be ‘a city on a hill where the eyes of the
world are upon us’.11 This well-known biblical reference encapsulates the
attitude of the Puritans to their new homeland, an attitude that is still an indel-
ible part of the American culture and psyche.12
Herman Melville went further, combining the religious and civic ele-
ments of American national identity: ‘We Americans are the peculiar chosen
people—the Israel of our times; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world.
God had predestined, mankind expects, great things from our race; and great
things we feel in our souls.’ Melville continues,
The rest of the nations must soon be in our rear. We are the pioneers of the
world; the advance guard, sent on through the wilderness of untried things; to
break a new path in the New World that is ours. . . . And let us always remember
that with ourselves, almost for the first time in the history of the earth, national
selfishness is unbounded philanthropy; for we cannot do a good to America, but
we give alms to the world.13
American exceptionalism is not just an expression of a particularly Protes-

tant trend in American history. Part of its enduring power and appeal was the
fact that over time it moved away from exclusively religious language toward
being an expression of Enlightenment values.
Thus Americans were committed to the principles of constitutionalism, the
rule of law, liberty and egalitarianism. In this way, American exceptionalism
has been both inclusive, appealing to universally shared values, while at the
same time setting America apart from the world. As historian Walter Russel
Mead has argued,
The belief that the essence of American nationality lies in dedication to uni-
versal principles is constantly at war with the idea that American nationalism
belongs exclusively to the American people and must be defended against alien
influences rather than shared with mankind.14
Questions about what America’s role in the world should be have histori-
cally revolved around the debate over isolationism versus expansionism. This
is partly a result of the conflict at the core of American national identity. That
conflict is between the desire to avoid the chaos and violence that character-
ized European power politics by remaining an isolationist power, and the
somewhat contradictory belief that its uniqueness also gave it the responsibil-
ity to guide other states towards democracy.
MOHAMMAD MOSADDEQ AND THE CIA COUP
America’s complex and often troubled relationship with the Middle East,
and particularly Iran, must be understood in the broader context of the Cold
War. The ideological and geostrategic conflict between the United States and
the USSR help explain the pattern of intervention in these states by the two
superpowers. It can also help provide some insight into why the key events in
Iran have fuelled so much mistrust and animosity towards the United States.
The Middle East had been of strategic interest to the United States since
before World War II, yet it became unquestionably important as the Cold War
developed and the United States sought to extend its Open Door policy and
maintain influence in the resource-rich region. America’s relationship with
Iran was of vital importance in the context of Cold War competition between
the United States and the USSR.
The Middle East was recognized as containing a significant share of the
world’s oil reserves with the prospect for finding more. A US-sponsored sur-
vey of the region’s importance for the oil industry concluded, in 1943, that
the region would become increasingly important in the years to come.15 Iran
was seen as a strategic bulwark between the Soviet Union and America’s oil
interests in the Middle East Persian Gulf region.16 In 1943, Secretary of State
Cordell Hull explicitly advised President Roosevelt that ‘it is to our interest
that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important
petroleum development in Saudi Arabia’.17
The accusation of American meddling and interference in Iran’s internal
affairs in pursuit of its own interests has been one of the most common com-
plaints made by Iran against the United States. It is no secret that America’s
interests in Iran were largely strategic and, in the context of the Cold War,
securing US interests did often result in the exploitation and sacrifice of
Iranian interests. American involvement in the 1953 coup, which led to
the collapse of the government of the Iranian prime minister Mohammad
Mosaddeq, is a salient example of this. This incident has assumed a mythical
importance in Iranian historical narrative. Without going into too much detail,
a brief recounting of the incident is important here, as for many Iranians it
6 Chapter 1
has come to represent the state’s first real attempts at democracy, and the
thwarting of the people’s desire for self-determination by the United States.18
The background to the crisis concerns British and American oil interests
in Iran and the growing nationalist movement there. The period from 1941
to 1953 saw a struggle between various political forces attempting to map
out Iran’s national identity. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr have argued that the
movement towards greater democracy involved only a relatively small portion
of the population and yet it has had a lasting impact on Iranian imagination,
while not really effecting the development of political structures within Iran.19
At the time, the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) con-
trolled most of Iran’s oil resources. After being elected by the Majlis (Iranian
Parliament) in 1951, Prime Minister Mosaddeq nationalized the AIOC. The
United States attempted for the next two years to negotiate a compromise
over the resulting crisis. Both the United Kingdom and the United States were
also concerned about the wider implications of the nationalist movement that
was spreading across the Middle East. In Iran, they feared that Prime Minister
Mosaddeq’s actions would encourage the Socialist Tudeh party, thus increas-
ing Soviet influence in the strategically important region.20 At the time,
American policy makers clearly saw the oil crisis within the broader context
of the Cold War and their desires to limit Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf
region coloured their interpretation of events in Iran. As Donald Wilbur, the
CIA’s official historian of CIA involvement in the coup, wrote in 1954:
By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran
was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries;
was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal, deficit financing; was
disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Moss-
adeq’s tenure of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq’s desire for personal
power; was governed by irresponsible policies based on emotion; had weakened
the Shah and the Iranian Army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated
closely with the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran. In view of these factors, it
was estimated that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain; if
that happened, it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a
major setback for the West in the Middle East.21
As the oil crisis reached deadlock, the United States agreed to participate
in a coup against the prime minister that resulted in his dismissal from parlia-
ment and subsequent trial and house arrest.
Prime Minister Mosaddeq had made significant gains towards democracy
during his time in parliament. He attempted to weaken the powers of the mon-
archy and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, which he claimed were uncon-
stitutional, and sought to enact education, electoral and law reforms.22 The
legacy of the coup and the negative impact it continues to have on US–Iran
relations will be discussed in some detail later. What the incident illustrates
is the extent to which the hegemonic policies of the United States in the
Middle East were laying the foundations for future policy in the region. US
interventionism was largely justified in the context of the Cold War; however,
the impact it was seen to have on Iran has over time been decoupled from its
Cold War context and instead is regarded as evidence of American arrogance
and disrespect for the Iranian state.
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE

AMERICAN HOSTAGE CRISIS
For America, the hostage crisis, which began in 1979, has played a signifi-
cant role in shaping the perceptions of Iranian intentions and motivations. In
November 1979, during the early days of the Iranian Revolution, a group of
students took over the American Embassy in Tehran and held 52 Americans
hostage for 444 days. For months, images of Iranians marching through the
streets of Tehran chanting ‘Death to America’ were broadcast on American
television. The event became a defining moment in the revolution. Shaul
Bakhash has described the event as pivotal:
Had I not been there I would never have imagined how electric the seizure of the
embassy was for society as a whole. I mean within hours of the seizure of the
street and whole area outside the embassy was full of tens of thousands of peo-
ple and those crowds remained around the embassy for days maybe even weeks
afterwards. It really was a galvanizing moment in the history of revolution and
it helped to consolidate the revolution and push it in a more radical direction.23
For America, the event was deeply humiliating. It highlighted the sense of
American weakness as President Jimmy Carter struggled to resolve the crisis
through negotiations.
President Carter’s response to the crisis must be seen in the context of the
post-Vietnam and post-Nixon mood in America that had largely been respon-
sible for his election. The election of President Carter was in many ways
regarded as a rejection of the conservative hawkish attitude that had seen fear
of the Communist threat dominate US foreign policy throughout the previous
decade. Carter campaigned on a platform that prioritized human rights. Once
elected, he cut US military spending by 5 percent and explained:
We can already see dramatic, worldwide advances in the protection of the indi-
vidual from the arbitrary power of the state. For us to ignore this trend would be
to lose influence and moral authority in the world. To lead it will be to regain
the moral stature that we once had.24
8 Chapter 1
Despite President Carter’s rhetorical commitment to upholding human

rights, America’s relationship with Iran under the Shah, an extremely repres-
sive regime with one of the most notoriously brutal secret police (Savak), was
seemingly immune from criticism. Iran had for decades acted as an important
buffer between the Soviet Union and US oil interests in the Persian Gulf
region.
Early in his presidency, Carter claimed that the Cold War no longer repre-
sented such an intense threat and that détente with the Soviet Union was the
preferred policy of the United States. Despite this, however, Iran remained a
key US ally in the region. The economic impact of the Arab oil embargo in
1973 and the necessity of preventing the Soviets from gaining greater influ-
ence in the region meant that the United States supported the Shah through
economic aid and arms sales. Gary Sick, who served on the National Security
Council under President Carter and was the senior White House aide for Per-
sian Gulf affairs, has pointed out that by the time President Carter was elected
to office, Iran had already been engaged in extensive purchasing of US
military equipment in a significant military build-up under President Nixon.
Combined with high oil prices through the latter part of the 1970s, the Shah
had been able to fund this military and economic expansion that required
thousands of US personnel to run, maintain and to train Iranian technicians.25
Since the CIA and the British led coup in the 1950s, Mohammad Reza Shah
Pahlavi had, for many Iranians, come to be regarded as a puppet of the United
States, who continued to prop up his corrupt and repressive regime to serve
its own national interests. The apparent inability of successive US presidents
to acknowledge the level of discontent among the Iranian population to some
extent explains why the revolution took the United States by surprise. In their
book Eternal Iran, Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin argue that even today
‘a sober analysis of what happened and why it happened still leaves a dissat-
isfying sense that the revolution is a mystery’.26 Cook and Roshandel argue
‘all through the Revolution, U.S. perception of Iran was based on inexact and
perhaps inaccurate evaluation of the situation in Iran’.27 The hostage crisis
was a painful example of the chaotic way in which events in Iran were unfold-
ing. Clawson and Rubin point out that the Iranian perception of US meddling
may have been in some way responsible for the hostage taking:
In February 1979, the U.S. Embassy had been briefly taken over by demonstra-
tors. On November 1, while in Algiers, he [Prime Minister Bazargan] met with
Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. That set off the wor-
ries of some extremists—who called themselves students, though many were
not—that the United States was conspiring to mount a coup similar to the over-
throw of Musaddiq [sic], so they seized the U.S embassy on November 4. In her
memoirs, one hostage-taker writes, ‘We were convinced that foreign elements
were actively involved in attempts to weaken and undermine the new republic.’
In that light, they interpreted embassy documents about contacts with Iranians
as proof that the embassy was a ‘nest of spies’ (in their colorful phrase). They
selectively leaked documents seized from the embassy, some pieced together
after having been shredded. While many documents were innocuous accounts
of dinnertime conversations, they were used to jail liberals as spies. This fed
nicely into the agenda of the Khomeini camp, which was calling the shots about
the embassy affair. In the words of his agent controlling the hostage-takers,
Mohammad Musavi-Khoeniha, the aim was ‘to defeat the attempt by the ‘liber-
als’ to take control of the machinery of the state’.28
President Carter expected that the hostages would be released within a

fairly short time, but the political factions within Iran continued to struggle
for control of the new state. Khomeini declared his support for the hostage
taking and was able to use this event to cement his own power. Carter, unable
to resolve the crisis diplomatically, orchestrated a covert CIA operation that
ultimately failed and remains an embarrassing incident in the history of US
relations with Iran.
The failure of a covert CIA attempt to rescue the hostages, which resulted
in the deaths of eight Americans, added to the sense of American impotence
and resentment towards the new Islamic regime in Iran. In the context of the
Cold War, the role that Iran played in highlighting the limits of American
power in the region would have a lasting impact on how the United States
sought to project an image of strength in the Middle East. Gary Sick has
written extensively about the impact of this event on US-Iran relations. Com-
menting on the consequences of the hostage crisis and the way Americans
perceived it, Sick has argued,
They became a pariah state. They became a complete outlaw state. People still
remember Iran as this mob of fanatics marching in the street, waving their fists,
shouting Death to America, and that’s as much as they remember about Iran.
That’s all they need to know. And for Iran to overcome that image is taking a
very very long time. And it’s undoubtedly the reason why the United States and
Iran don’t have relations.29
These pivotal events shaped the way America perceived and understood
Iran. It also continued well after the event to influence, if not determine, the
way in which assumptions were formed about Iran’s foreign policy intentions
on a range of issues.
Robert Jervis, describing how beliefs shape one state’s understanding of
another’s intentions, wrote, ‘When a statesman has developed a certain image
of another country he will maintain that view in the face of large amounts of
discrepant information.’30 The Algiers Accords, agreed to in January 1981,
10 Chapter 1
brought about an end to the hostage crisis, and established certain conditions
on the relationship between the two states, including the agreement that ‘the
United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the
United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily,
in Iran’s internal affairs’.31 This particular issue has remained a key concern
for the Islamic Republic of Iran.
THE IRAN–IRAQ WAR
The Iran–Iraq war broke out not long after the Iranian Revolution. Sad-
dam Hussein, believing that he could take advantage of the turmoil in Iran,
invaded in September 1980. The war, which went on from 1980 to 1988,
was initiated by Iraq partly as a response to an ongoing dispute between
both states over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The United States initially
adopted a position of neutrality; however, in the context of the Cold War and
concerns about regional stability should Iran successfully export its revolu-
tion to other parts of the Middle East, US policy gradually shifted towards
Iraq. Perhaps the most controversial issue of the entire conflict was the use
of chemical weapons by Iraq against the Kurdish population in the north of
Iraq, and against Iran, and the failure of the international community to con-
demn such action in a meaningful way. This has had significant and lasting
consequences for Iran’s relations with the United States and the international
community.
Beginning in 1983, Iraq used chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds, most
notably in the attack on Halabja in Northern Iraq, where the death toll was
in the thousands, and then continuing throughout the war against Iranian sol-
diers and civilians.32 The use of chemical weapons against soldiers and civil-
ians is certainly not the only atrocity committed during the war. Both states
engaged in tactics that were morally reprehensible, including Iraq’s bombing
of Iranian civilian centres and Iran’s use of child soldiers as a human wave
to clear mine fields.33 Yet the use of chemical weapons is singled out for its
complete violation of international human rights norms.
The United States was initially reluctant to verify the Iranian government’s
claims that Iraq had used chemical weapons. A State Department docu-
ment, declassified and available through the United States National Security
Archives, advised the US government to ‘limit its efforts against the Iraqi
CW program to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf
war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired
results’.34 Later, when the United States did publicly condemn Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons, it did so with a certain caveat. On March 5, 1984, the
United States declared:
The United States has concluded that the available evidence substantiates
Iran’s charges that Iraq has used chemical weapons. The United States strongly
condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons wherever it occurs. While
condemning Iraq’s chemical weapons use . . . The United States finds the pres-
ent Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective
of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent
with the accepted norms of behaviour among nations and the moral and reli-
gious basis that it claims.35
Joost Hiltermann has argued that the lukewarm reaction of the international
community on this issue had several important consequences, one of which
was reinforcing Iran’s sense of vulnerability in the region and thus justifying
its need to build up its own defences.36
Indeed, even in 2008, in the context of negotiations over verifications of
the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, the legacy of this issue con-
tinued to influence perceptions about the efficacy of international law. One
author in the Iranian newspaper Sobh-e Sadeq wrote:
The most important point is that the western countries themselves remain the
main element in distributing weapons of mass destruction across the region.
They were the ones who equipped Saddam with chemical weapons that caused
hundreds of Iraqis, Iranians and Kuwaitis to lose their lives during the imposed
war. They are the ones who have equipped Israel with exceptional weapons
and nuclear weapons and do not believe in any restrictions for this regime and
they are the ones that have sold and shipped so many advanced and dangerous
weapons to the Middle East that has turned the Middle East into an explosive
barrel.37
Even as the war between Iran and Iraq was continuing, and the United
States was shifting towards greater support for Iraq, President Ronald Reagan
signed a Presidential Finding that authorized a covert arms deal with Iran,
with weapons to be channelled through Israel. The resulting scandal further
damaged US–Iran relations and entrenched perceptions in both countries of
the other state’s intransigence and hostility.
THE IRAN–CONTRA AFFAIR
The Iran–Contra affair involved the Reagan administration and the selling of
arms to Iran and using the funds derived from those sales to fund US-backed
Contras in their civil war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
The arms deal with the Iranian regime and the funding of the Contras was
designed to circumvent Congress’s vote to cease funding for them. It was also
12 Chapter 1
hoped by some in the Reagan administration that in exchange for the sale of
weapons the Iranian regime would help convince Hezbollah to release the
American hostages it was holding in Lebanon.
Many of the key players in the Iran–Contra scandal continued to hold
prominent positions within the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush. They include Vice President Richard Cheney,
then vice president to George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State George P.
Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, CIA director William J.
Casey, White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, Elliott Abrams, deputy
assistant to George W. Bush and deputy national security adviser for global
democracy strategy, John Bolton, George W. Bush’s ambassador to the
UN, and Robert M. Gates, secretary of Defense under George W. Bush and
Barack Obama.38
The purpose of highlighting the involvement of many of these well-known
political figures is to make the point that strategic thinking about US–Iran
policy has for the past thirty years been dominated by the same policy mak-
ers whose views about the Islamic Republic have inevitably been shaped by
these pivotal crises. The arms deal was also aimed at setting up links between
the United States and moderate factions within the Islamic Republic. Cook
and Roshandel have asserted that the logic behind wanting to set up a channel
of communication between the United States and the moderates was to keep
open the possibility that on Khomeini’s death they would be able to use those
ties to seek a normalization of ties with Iran. Instead, it resulted in ‘members
of the U.S. government breaking a host of laws, including the Boland Amend-
ment and its prohibitions against provision of U.S. support to the Contras’.39
Cook and Roshandel go on to explain that, rather than helping mend rela-
tions between America and Iran, it left a lasting and negative impression in
Iran about American hypocrisy: ‘This episode was further evidence to Iran
that the United States was willing and able to circumvent even its own laws
in order to try and undermine its government.’40 When the whole affair was
made public, it almost destroyed the Reagan presidency.41
The Iran–Contra affair is one of the more bizarre episodes in the history of
US–Iran relations. As Ray Takeyh argues,
The Iran-Contra affair is no passing episode, as subsequent Administrations

have been gun-shy about approaching Iran, a nation generally regarded as
poisonous. Any notion of engagement with Iran was sacrificed on the altar of
bureaucratic expediency and self-preservation. It was simply convenient to
sustain a policy of containment, however flawed and ineffective that approach
may have been. It was such politically sensitive caution that caused the Clinton
Administration to miss one of the rare opportunities to fundamentally alter the
parameters between the two countries. . . . The Iran-Contra affair continues to
exercise a subtle yet perceptible influence on US policy. The primary impera-

tive of politics is caution, which has usually translated into unimaginative and
banal policies.42
Takeyh’s conclusion would seem to be that one of the lasting negative

consequences of the Iran–Contra scandal has been the apparent discrediting
of the notion that there are moderate factions within Iranian politics who
are more conducive to engagement with the United States. Rosemary Hollis
makes a similar argument about the lasting impact of the affair on US–Iran
relations. She writes, ‘It left the Iranians with the impression that Washing-
ton was more than capable of double-dealing and subterfuge if it suited its
purposes.’ In agreement with Takeyh, Hollis goes on to claim that the last-
ing impact on Americans has been ‘an aversion to secret talks with Iranian
government officials, for whatever purposes. The net result has been to limit
the use of quiet diplomacy as a way of improving bilateral relations in the
post-Khomeini era.’43
The subject of more moderate factions within the Iranian government is
discussed in greater detail in chapter 3, but it is worth mentioning here that
the internal dynamics of Iranian politics, particularly the suggestion that the
United States could exploit the differences between these groups has been a
recurring theme. The debate about the internal dynamics of Iranian politics
became prominent once again in 1990 with the election of Iranian president
Mohamad Khatami.
During the Bush administration’s time in office, there were many who
argued that setting up a dialogue with moderates in Iran should be a priority.
Yet critics of engagement, such as Michael Ledeen, a prominent advocate of
military action against Iran, reject the notion that moderates have any influ-
ence within Iranian politics. In an article he wrote for The National Review
about a supposedly unauthorized meeting between the CIA and an Iranian
dissident, Manoucher Ghorbanifar, Ledeen claims that those who were highly
critical of the supposed meeting were incorrect in their assertion that the
‘Pentagon was repeating the errors of Iran-Contra by talking to Ghorbanifar’.
Ledeen argues that it was actually the ‘State Department that has repeated one
of Iran-Contra’s momentous blunders by believing that there are “moderates”
in Tehran with whom the United States can and should work’.44
For decades the question of whether or not to engage Iran’s leaders in the
hope of resetting the relationship has been prey to the unpredictability of
dealing with the regime in Tehran and the negative domestic reaction in the
United States.45 Yet the reluctance to deal with Iran directly has often led to a
default policy of avoidance until events force the United States to react, often
in an incoherent manner, before reverting back to ignoring the problem, hop-
ing it will just resolve itself.
14 Chapter 1
CONCLUSION
Each US president since Carter has inherited the difficult problem of how
to deal with the Iranian issue. Presidents Reagan, George H. W. Bush and
Clinton all displayed a reluctance to shape a new approach. Each president
continued the policy of containment in the short term, while neglecting to
craft a policy that would help shift the relationship towards a more positive
path over the long term. As Ali Ansari eloquently puts it,
The enmity that exists today cannot be understood outside the intimacy that
preceded it—friendship precedes betrayal. As with any betrayal, the two par-
ties possess different recollection, suffer from selective amnesia (when the
facts are inconvenient), and propose alternate interpretations of their shared
experiences.46
That a sense of betrayal and suspicion continues to define the relationship

suggests that any solution to the antagonistic relationship will need to address
the past and the grievances of both states.
For the United States, the power that the 1953 coup against Mohammad
Mosaddeq has had on the modern Iranian imagination must be understood,
not just as a past grievance but also as representative of much deeper issues
about Iran’s role in the region and its often-unequal treatment and exploita-
tion at the hands of more powerful states. The coup has become, for many
Iranians, a defining moment when Iranians tried to assert their democratic
will. For Iran, the impact of the hostage crisis on the American nation, and
the resulting sense of impotence and vulnerability cannot be underestimated.
It crippled Carter’s presidency and has continued to affect each subsequent
administration. These events would continue to inform the perceptions of
each state during the presidency of George W. Bush as international atten-
tion focused on Iran’s nuclear programme and its support for terrorism in the
aftermath of September 11.
Part of the problem is the continual oversimplification of the issues by both
sides. In an interview with this author in 2011, conducted via Skype with Ali
Ansari, who resides in the United Kingdom, the problem was described as a
sort of populist politics [that] will always pander to the easy solution and
the thing that can basically be summarised in one or two sentences. Why go
into great depth when you can talk of the United States as the Great Satan, or
America can basically identify Iran with terrorism or hostage taking. It’s a much
easier thing to sell on a political message.47
The mythologizing that both countries engage in is also part of a deeper

problem where the boundaries between the domestic and international have
been blurred. The articulation of American foreign policy is meant for both
domestic and international consumption. In this sense, the public diplomacy
of the United States is an essential aspect of any analysis of US foreign pol-
icy, and public diplomacy is frequently dominated by the legacy of American
exceptionalism and the debate about values and interests.
NOTES
1. Subotic, J. (2015), ‘Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy’,

Foreign Policy Analysis, 0, pp. 1–18. 3.
2. Ibid.
3. Lindeman, T. and Ringmar, E. (eds) (2014), The International Politics of
Recognition, Denver, CO: Paradigm Publishers, p. 6.
4. Ibid., p. 7.
5. Cook, A. H. and Roshandel, J. (2009), The United States and Iran: Policy
Challenges and Opportunities, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 15.
6. Page, W. T. (1917), The American Creed. Adopted by the United States Con-
gress, Washington DC April 13, 1918. http://www.ushistory.org/documents/creed.htm
(Accessed July 11, 2011).
7. Fowler, W. W. (1877), Woman on the American Frontier: A Valuable and
Authentic History of the Heroism, Adventures, Privations, Captivities, Trials, and
Noble Lives and Deaths of the Pioneer Mothers of the Republic, Hartford: S. S. Scran-
ton and Company. EBook produced by Project Gutenberg. Kobo Edition, p. 5.
8. Kissinger, H. (1994), Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 18.
9. Hughes, R. (1999), ‘O My America, My New Founde Land’, chapter 1 in
American Visions: The Epic History of Art in America, London: The Harvill Press,
pp. 3–67, 25.
10. Doyle, D. H. (2009), ‘Beginning the World Over Again: Past and Future in
American Nationalism’, in S. Carvalho and F. Gemenne (eds), Nations and their
Histories: Constructions and Representations, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan,
pp. 77–92.
11. John Winthrop quoted in Hughes, R. (1999), American Visions: The Epic
History of Art in America, p. 21.
12. Ibid.
13. Melville, H. (1952), White Jacket or The World in a Man-Of-War, London:
Purnell and Sons, p. 151.
14. Mead, W. (1999/2000), ‘The Jacksonian Tradition’, The National Interest,
p. 58.
15. Painter, D. S. (1986), Oil and the American Century: the Political Economy
of US Foreign Oil Policy 1941–1954, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
p. 52.
16. Painter, D. S. (2005), ‘Oil, Resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962’, in M. P.
Leffler and D. S. Painter (eds), Origins of the Cold War: An International History,
London: Routledge, p. 494.
16 Chapter 1
17. Foreign Relations of the United States 1943 (1964), US Department of State,
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, vol. IV, p. 378. http://digicoll.
library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUSidx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1943v04.
p0390&id=FRUS.FRUS1943v04&isize=M (Accessed March 21, 2011).
18. For a comprehensive and dynamic account of the events leading up to the coup
and the extent to which the United States can reasonably be held responsible, see:
Bayandor, D. (2010), Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mossaddeq Revisited, London:
Palgrave MacMillan.
19. Gheissari, A. and Nasr, V. (2006), Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest
for Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 46.
20. Painter, D. S. (2005), ‘Oil, Resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962’, p. 500.
21. Wilber, D. (1954), Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mos-
sadeq of Iran: November 1952–August 1953, Washington DC: CIA, p. iii.
22. Abrahamian, E. (1982), Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, p. 273.
23. Bakhash, S. (2004), ‘The US and Iran Part III—The Hostage Crisis’, transcript
of radio program with Jeb Sharp from The World, October 27. http://sharif.ir/~maleki/
article/The%20Hostage%20Crisis.pdf (Accessed March 23, 2011).
24. Carter, J. (1977), Speech at the University of Notre Dame Commence-
ment, May 22. http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3399 (Accessed
July 13, 2011).
25. Sick, G. (2011), ‘The Carter Administration’, The Iran Primer, The United
States Institute of Peace. http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/carter-administration-0
26. Clawson, P. and Rubin, M. (2005), Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos, New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 88. For detailed recounting and analysis of the events
leading up to, and of the Iranian Revolution, see Kurzman, C. (2004), The Unthink-
able Revolution in Iran, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Abrahamian, E.
(1982), Iran Between Two Revolutions; Keddie, N. R. (2006), Modern Iran: Roots and
Results of Revolution, New Haven: Yale University Press.
27. Cook, A. H. and Roshandel, J. (2009), The United States and Iran, p. 21.
28. Clawson, P. and Rubin, M. (2005), Eternal Iran, p. 95.
29. Sick, G. (2004), ‘The US and Iran Part III—The Hostage Crisis’, transcript
of radio programme with Jeb Sharp from The World, October 27. http://sharif.
ir/~maleki/article/The%20Hostage%20Crisis.pdf (Accessed March 23, 2011).
30. Jervis, R. (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 146.
31. Algiers Accords (1981). Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19. http://www.parstimes.com/history/
algiers_accords.pdf (Accessed July 12, 2011).
32. Hiltermann, J. R. (2004), ‘Outsiders as Enablers: Consequences and Lessons
from International Silence on Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons During the Iran–Iraq
War,’ in L. G. Potter and G. Sick (eds), Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies or War, New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 152–54.
33. Singer, P. W. (2006), Children At War, California: University of Calilfornia

Press, p. 22.
34. Battle, J. (ed.) (2003), ‘Shaking Hands With Saddam Hussein: The US Tilts
Toward Iraq 1980–1984’, The National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book
no. 83. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/ (Accessed July 15,
2011).
35. Ibid.
36. Hiltermann, J. R. (2004), ‘Outsiders as Enablers’, p. 152.
37. Baqeri, S. (2008), ‘Incentives or Oppressive Package?’, Sobh-e Sadeq, BBC
Monitoring Middle East—Political, supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
June 27.
38. ‘The Iran Contra Affair 20 Years On’, (2006), The National Security Archives.
November 24. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/index.htm
(Accessed July 12, 2011). For an in-depth analysis of the affair, see: Kornbluh, P. and
Byrne, M. (1993), The Iran–Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, New York:
W. W. Norton.
39. Cook, A. H. and Roshandel, J. (2009), The United States and Iran, p. 27.
40. Ibid.
41. ‘The Iran Contra Affair 20 Years On’, The National Security Archives.
42. Takeyh, R. (2006), Hidden Iran, pp. 85; 108.
43. Hollis, R. (2004), ‘The US Role: Helpful or Harmful’, in L. G. Potter and
G. Sick (eds), Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies or War, New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
p. 199.
44. Ledeen, M. (2003), ‘Iran–Contra Revisited?’, National Review Online,
August 14. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/207771/iran-contra-revisited/
michael-ledeen (Accessed June 9, 2011).
45. Ansari, A. M. M. (2006), Confronting Iran, p. 3.
46. Ibid., p. 4.
47. Ansari, A. M. (2011), Interview conducted by Kumuda Simpson via Skype,
Melbourne, Australia, August 1, 2011.
Chapter 2
The War on Terror and Iran’s

Nuclear Programme
The revelations about Iran’s expanded nuclear programme that surfaced in

2002 radically altered America’s policy stance towards the country. Iran’s
policy quickly became absorbed into the broader strategic calculations of the
War on Terror. In this context, the spectre of an Iranian nuclear bomb took
on a new and frightening urgency for the members of the Bush administra-
tion. The policy response focused on four main interests: geostrategic con-
sideration about the security of Israel and the Gulf States, particularly Saudi
Arabia; energy security; counter-terrorism; and the broader prevention of
regional nuclear proliferation.
This chapter will detail the ideological nature of the Bush administration’s
public diplomacy. Despite the strategic interests that drove the approach to
the problem of Iran’s nuclear programme, the public diplomacy of many of
its members bordered on the alarmist, and drew heavily on the tradition of
American exceptionalism. This chapter will situate the Bush administration’s
ideological response to Iran’s nuclear programme within the broader, ideo-
logical context of the War on Terror. It will also provide a detailed account
of the significant gap between the alarmist rhetoric, and the specific actions
pursued by the Bush administration. These included the referral of the matter
to the IAEA, eventual referral to the UNSC, and the imposition of sanctions.
The purpose of this chapter will be to contrast the reality of the nuclear pro-
gramme in Iran, and the intelligence that the international community had
between 2002 and 2008, and the often-misleading language used by public
officials in the United States.
19
20 Chapter 2
NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE
The development of what Irving Kristol, often regarded as the ‘godfather’ of

neoconservatism, has termed the ‘neoconservative persuasion’ is to a large
extent a peculiarly American phenomenon.1 It is also a difficult term to define,
with considerable differences of opinion and worldview between those who
could be labelled neoconservative. The movement had its origins in intel-
lectual circles in New York and its proponents were regarded as belonging to
‘one of the most extensive and sophisticated bodies of American political dis-
course’.2 Neoconservatives were concerned with domestic policy, but eventu-
ally became more focused on foreign policy, championing a more aggressive
and at the same time, a more ideological approach to fighting the Cold War.
Neoconservatism is largely defined by its focus on the protection of demo-
cratic capitalism, the promotion and preservation of American values and
America’s role in the world. On the subject of foreign policy, Irving Kristol
stated that while disagreeing on many issues, neoconservatives could gener-
ally be found to agree that ‘American democracy is not likely to survive
long in a world that is overwhelmingly hostile to American values’.3 To a
significant degree neoconservatism has followed in the tradition of Wilsonian
internationalism by seeking to combine American values with the exercise
of American power. And yet, unlike President Wilson’s vision of a global
system governed by international law and multilateral institutions, such as the
UN, neoconservatives are generally unified in their suspicion of institutions
that limit the autonomy of the United States.
The Cold War acted as a catalyst in the articulation of neoconservatism
and became a seminal conflict for many neoconservatives. They regarded the
Soviet Union as one of the greatest existential threats facing America. As the
anti-war movement exploded during the early 1970s and Americans increas-
ingly began to question their role in the conflict, neoconservatism sought to
rescue American foreign policy from self-doubt and to reassert the importance
of American patriotism. Many of the original proponents of neoconservatism
began as liberals who during this era became increasingly disillusioned with
the isolationist trend in the policies of the Democratic Party, eventually shift-
ing their alliance to the Republican Party under the leadership of President
Ronald Reagan. The debate about the Vietnam War and America’s role in
the world became a defining issue in the shift of many neoconservatives from
the left to the right. It was a debate about the very nature of America’s moral
responsibility in international affairs.4 Prominent neoconservatives who held
influential positions within the Reagan administration included Paul Wol-
fowitz, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Elliot Abrams.
The idea that the United States was involved in an existential struggle was,
for the neoconservatives, so strong that more pragmatic considerations were
The War on Terror and Iran’s Nuclear Programme 21
often ignored or overlooked. As Gary Dorrien has argued, the neoconserva-

tives were looking for a leader ‘who recognised the implacable hostility of the
Soviet state and faced up to the necessity of making life intolerable for it’.5
This tendency to view the conflict in such ideological terms to the exclusion
of all other considerations prevented many neoconservatives from consider-
ing factors such as geostrategic considerations, each state’s perceptions of
their national interest and the dynamics of great power competition.
Drawing on the tradition of American exceptionalism, the neoconserva-
tives saw in Reagan a chance to put into practice ‘a foreign policy that was
at once robust, idealistic and interventionist’.6 Neoconservatives continued to
credit this aggressive approach to foreign policy as the overriding reason that
the United States won the Cold War.7 They did not just believe, however, that
it was aggression alone that won the Cold War. Rather it was the combina-
tion of military might and the promotion of American values that eventually
conquered communism. Ronald Reagan, a president who helped define much
of the neoconservatives’ foreign policy beliefs, illustrated this point rather
aptly when, in relation to the Cold War, he said,
Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain

this strength in the hope it will never be used, for the ultimate determinant in
the struggle now going on in the world will not be bombs and rockets but a test
of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve, the values we hold, the beliefs we
cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated.8
For President Reagan, America’s national interest could not be defined

merely by strategic and security considerations. The nation’s values needed
to be elevated to an equal footing. A key concern for US policy makers
then was how to interpret what constituted a legitimate threat to the national
interest.
The end of the Cold War signalled a crisis in neoconservatism, and the
demise of the Soviet Union left America as the sole superpower in the
international system. Neoconservatives who had spent the previous several
decades arguing for the need to assert American dominance found themselves
in the position of having that dominance unchallenged. The question became
what to do with that power?
In the first decade after the Cold War, this was an extremely difficult task.
Irving Kristol highlighted this issue when he said ‘it is very difficult for a
great power—a world power—to articulate a foreign policy in the absence of
an enemy worthy of the name. It is, after all, one’s enemies that help define
one’s national interest.’9 In the absence of an identifiable enemy, such as the
Soviet Union had been until the late 1980s, the neoconservatives attempted
to articulate a new vision for an American foreign policy. That foreign policy
22 Chapter 2
vision still called for the primacy of American morality and values, the
promotion of democracy throughout the world, protecting US interests and
enhancing its own strength.10
At the end of the Cold War, the international system ceased to be a bipo-
lar one and instead resembled a ‘unipolar world’.11 Throughout most of
the 1990s, neoconservatives believed that ‘even if the chances of another
assault on world peace are remote, what is at stake is too great to permit
complacency or neglect of America’s responsibility as the world’s domi-
nant power’.12 These two assumptions were central to the neoconservatives’
attitudes towards American power. The first was the belief that the fact of
American hegemony necessarily meant it also had a particular responsibility
in the world; the second was that American dominance was directly linked
to preserving and promoting peace and stability in the world.13 Two themes
emerged in the writing of neoconservatives during this time: the need to
expand America’s military power and the desire to support the spread of
democracy across the globe. According to neoconservatives, both of these
policies should be pursued aggressively.
NEOCONSERVATISM AND BENIGN HEGEMONY
Implicit in this line of thinking was the belief that American hegemony in the
international system was an end in itself. That idea led directly to the assump-
tion inherent in the belief that the United States had the responsibility to lead
the world: that there was a direct link between global peace and stability and
the predominance of US power, and that ‘American hegemony is the only
reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order’.14 The
key to the belief that America could be a ‘benign hegemon’15 was of course
the centrality of American values in its foreign policy. As has already been
asserted in chapter 1, the conception of hegemony as being the ability to
project influence through broad consensus, as opposed to imperialism, which
implies coercion through force, fit neatly with the neoconservative belief that
American leadership was a positive factor in international affairs.
During the 1990s, the tone of neoconservatism began to shift towards
a more overtly vindicationist view of America’s role. Neoconservatives
sought to redefine America’s foreign policy vision and place the ‘protection
of freedom’ as the underlying principle of American national interest. The
promotion of democracy throughout the world was often linked to American
security. They argued that this could best be done by moving away from the
Wilsonian tradition of relying on treaties and multilateral institutions and
instead reasserting American unilateralism.16 They did not believe that this
could be done through international institutions such as the UN, or by binding
itself to international treaties. Instead they believed that the national interest
was linked to the idea that America had a unique global mission.17
America was both the embodiment and the protector of an ideal type of
civilization, and neoconservatives shared a belief in the uniqueness and vir-
tue of the American political system that, when translated into foreign policy
terms, offered the United States as a model for the world. It was a model
because faith in the universal idea of freedom, as a blood and soil national-
ism, was what defined the American idea.18 Many American presidents and
policy makers have shared this belief in the ‘exceptionalism’ of the United
States, yet most have regarded their country’s role in the world as setting an
example, and would only consider intervening in international affairs when
their material interests were directly threatened.19
This new zeal and aggressively interventionist stance signalled a split
between the older generation of neoconservatives, led by Irving Kristol and
other notable policy makers such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Norman Podho-
retz. Kirkpatrick, who served as foreign policy adviser to President Reagan,
and then as US ambassador to the United Nations (1981–85), expressed con-
cern about the direction in which younger neoconservatives, such as Charles
Krauthammer and Joshua Muravchik, were heading. She argued that ‘it is not
the American purpose to establish “universal dominance” in the provocative
formulation of Charles Krauthammer—not even the universal dominance
of democracy’.20 This split within neoconservative ranks was an important
development and it once again focused foreign policy debate around the
question of whether America should pursue an exemplarist or a vindicationist
foreign policy. For neoconservatives like Krauthammer and Wolfowitz, uni-
polarity became the perfect setting for a vindicationist foreign policy, neatly
combining both strategic capabilities and moral justification.
The younger generation of neoconservatives used to great effect many
advocacy and policy institutions including The Weekly Standard, Commen-
tary, The Public Interest, The National Interest, The National Review, the
American Enterprise Institute, The Hoover Institution, the Centre for Security
Policy and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
Here, then, we find perhaps the most important aspect that defined the
younger generation of neoconservatives’ conception of foreign policy in the
post–Cold War era. It was the assumption that it was the unarguable mission
of the United States to intervene in international affairs not only when its
material interests were at stake, but also when its ideological values were
threatened.21 Indeed, under this definition of national interest, a threat to a
nation’s material interests was also a threat to its ideological interests and
the values its people stood for. This aspect of neoconservatism had several
problematic implications, one of which was that any potential adversary was
inevitably viewed as both an ideological and as a material enemy.
24 Chapter 2
Many conservatives in America regarded the neoconservatives’ calls for

the consolidation of American hegemony as dangerously antagonistic in the
relatively peaceful post–Cold War era.22 Neoconservatives argued, however,
that the absence of an obvious threat did not mean that threat did not exist,
but rather ‘potential challengers are deterred before even contemplating
confrontation’ in the face of American power.23 In an article titled Toward a
Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy, two leading neoconservative theorists, Wil-
liam Kristol and Robert Kagan, argued that one of the key features of this
foreign policy should be ‘moral clarity’.24 This argument was ‘based on the
understanding that [America’s] moral goals and its fundamental national
interest are almost always in harmony’.25 Once again, however, this faith in
the purity and universal applicability of American values was enunciated as
part of the legacy of the founding of that nation where
the remoralisation(sic) of America at home ultimately requires the

remoralisation(sic) of American foreign policy. For both follow from Ameri-
can’s belief that the principles of the Declaration of Independence are not
merely the choices of a particular culture but are universal, enduring, ‘self-
evident’ truths.26
Thus, national identity was acknowledged as the key factor in the form-
ing of foreign policy. Unlike realists, who tended to view foreign policy as
the decisions made by states in response to the perception of threat and the
desire to protect their interests, neoconservatives highlighted the inherently
ideological nature of the choices made by key decision makers.
The blurring of the line between values and interests meant that American
hegemony became an increasingly complex and problematic idea. On the one
hand, hegemony referred to the fact of American pre-eminent power defined
in material terms. On the other, it referred to the neoconservative belief that
the United States could legitimately use its overwhelming force unilaterally
in pursuit of its interests.
THE BUSH DOCTRINE
The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, had a pro-
found impact on the American nation. Not only did it highlight US vulner-
ability and the need for President Bush to articulate a strong response, but it
also provided the opportunity for the president to frame the resulting foreign
policy in a way that reinforced American’s sense of mission and purpose
in the world. Speaking at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C., on
September 14, 2001, President Bush remarked:
War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is
peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. . . . In every generation, the world has
produced enemies of human freedom. They have attacked America, because we
are freedom’s home and defender. And the commitment of our fathers is now
the calling of our time.27
Since the end of the Cold War, there had been considerable speculation
about how the United States should best respond to the myriad challenges in
the new global era. Did the United States have a responsibility to the inter-
national community to maintain peace and security within the current status
quo?28 If so, was that responsibility limited to the role of global policeman
and protector, or was there opportunity for the United States to use its unprec-
edented power to actively shape the world in a way that US policy makers
believed would create lasting peace and security?29 Responding to the terror-
ist attacks, the Bush administration sought to answer these questions in a way
that placed American values and ideology at the forefront of its approach to
global challenges.
The broad outlines of the Bush administration’s foreign policy were articu-
lated in two separate National Security Strategy (NSS) documents in 2002
and 2006. Two themes emerge from these documents that dominated the
public diplomacy and foreign policy rhetoric: military strength and democ-
racy promotion. In practice, however, US foreign policy demonstrated more
continuity with previous administrations than was expected. It also high-
lighted a gap between rhetoric and action that became a feature of the Bush
administration’s foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East.
SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE
Robert Jervis has described the Bush administration’s response to the terror-
ist attacks on September 11 as ‘the product of idiosyncratic and structural
factors, both a normal reaction to an abnormal situation and a policy that is
likely to bring grief to the world and the United States’.30 Jervis is suggest-
ing that the Bush doctrine grew out of a deep sense of fear and shock at the
attacks on American soil, the first since the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941,
and that it was also, in many ways, an overreaction in order to prevent any
future attacks.
As Vice President Dick Cheney said in an interview on NBC’s Meet the
Press on September 16, ‘If you provide sanctuary to terrorists, you face the
full wrath of the United States of America, and that we will, in fact, aggres-
sively go after these nations to make certain that they cease and desist from
providing support for these kinds of organizations.’31 Schonberg argues:
26 Chapter 2
A country with a longer history of terrorism might have reacted differently,

but in the United States the effect of 9/11 was nothing less than widespread
insecurity approaching psychic crisis. This social reality provided the unique
political and cultural environment that enabled the Bush Administration to assert
the need for a global war against terror involving the unilateral use of force to
prevent threats from becoming imminent, and for these ideas to gain significant
traction within American society as a whole.32
During his presidential campaign, George W. Bush claimed that his presi-
dency would see a return to a more conservative and humble foreign policy.
Condoleezza Rice, in her role as foreign policy adviser during the campaign,
wrote in an article for Foreign Affairs that ‘the President must remember that
the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not
a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not
designed to build a civilian society.’33
President Bush appeared to be honouring his promise to eschew the inter-
national community by withdrawing from both the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. He also made it clear that
the United States would not support the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Rice explained America’s reluctance to ratify certain agreements by arguing
that the United States acts in a manner that still upholds the principle of the
agreement and is thus ‘an example to the rest of the world yet it does not tie
its own hands “in perpetuity”’.34 The assumption implicit in Rice’s statement
was that the United States was both a perfect example of responsible interna-
tional behaviour, while at the same time being outside the rules and norms of
the international system. Hegemony in this sense was both an excuse and a
justification for American unilateralism.
Until September 11 and the subsequent declaration of the war against ter-
ror, there was very little in the way of an overall strategic approach when it
came to dealing with the various conflicts that confronted the United States.
Defending the freedom of strangers in the Republic of Yugoslavia highlighted
very different US interests than protecting the freedom of strangers in Rwanda.
Despite American rhetoric committing itself to ‘“promoting”, “fostering”,
“encouraging”, and “facilitating” democracy and free markets . . . these fine
sounding words had a metaphorical tendency to dissolve on contact with
reality’.35 The 2002 NSS brought together many of the ideological aspects of
American nationalism and highlighted two of the major assumptions about
the role of the United States in the post–Cold War world: that the values of
freedom and liberty are an intrinsic part of the American national identity;
and that the United States is committed to protecting and promoting those
values at home and abroad.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002
The introduction to the 2002 NSS outlines the American perception of itself
as a benign hegemon.
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism
ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable
model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-
first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human
rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the
potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People everywhere want
to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please;
educate their children—male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of
their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every
society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the com-
mon calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.
Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength
and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and
principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek
instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in
which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and
challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will
be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting
terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations
among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open
societies on every continent.36
The NSS further articulated the idea of the United States as a benign
hegemon by describing the current era as
a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of

influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. The U.S. national secu-
rity strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects
the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to
help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress
are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states,
and respect for human dignity.37
It enshrined in official policy the notion of the War on Terror, and the
view that this would be an open-ended conflict that would require new ways
of countering threats to the national interest, including: the shift away from
a policy of deterrence to an emphasis on pre-emption, a renewed and overt
reliance on military power to shape the international system according to
28 Chapter 2
American values, with a particular focus on the Middle East, and the rejection
of multilateralism as a guiding principle in international relations, stating that
the United States reserves the right to act unilaterally if and when it serves
American national interests.38
The 2002 NSS definition of the War on Terror made the extraordinarily
broad connection between non-state actors and the states that provided sup-
port to them, stating, ‘We make no distinction between terrorists and those
who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.’39 Such a definition helped
address the near impossibility of responding effectively to suicide terrorism,
the very act of which left no visible enemy to deter or retaliate against. This
policy would have serious consequences for states such as Iran, who had for
decades been accused by the United States of supporting terrorism.
In the NSS document, the United States also vowed to fight terrorism
‘using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information
and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies
ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism’.40 The idea that the promotion of
democracy would be an effective way to combat those who would choose
to engage in terrorist actions against US interests was a significant theme
throughout President Bush’s time in office. Again, this aspect of US foreign
policy would have particular significance for America’s Iran policy, in par-
ticular its funding for democracy assistance programmes aimed at destabiliz-
ing the Iranian regime.
In a clear effort to conflate American values and interests, President Bush
linked the ability to succeed in the War on Terror to the strength of American
values and national identity. ‘In the war against global terrorism, we will
never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and
way of life. Freedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy
end to this conflict.’41 Unilateralism, military preponderance and democracy
promotion were explicitly entwined with America’s ability to prevent further
terrorist attacks like the ones on September 11.
This emphasis on unilateralism was not a totally new characteristic of
American foreign policy. ‘In every era the United States has shown a willing-
ness to reject treaties, violate rules, ignore allies, and use military force on its
own.’42 It did, however, significantly alter other major powers’ perceptions
of the exercise of US power in the world. America was no longer seeking
to maintain the status quo, but was instead signalling its willingness to use
its military preponderance to alter the balance of power in a way that would
ultimately increase America’s global dominance.43
Section five of the 2002 NSS is titled ‘Prevent Our Enemies From Threat-
ening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction’.
In this section, the concept of pre-emption is justified in the context of the
post-9/11 world where rogue states and terrorists are determined to obtain
WMD and use them against the United States and its allies and friends.44
Pre-emption refers to war that is waged in self-defence against an enemy who
is about to attack.
The fact that America reserves the right to act pre-emptively to prevent an
attack against its interests or allies is not a new concept, and even in 1914
the legitimacy of pre-emption was defended by then Secretary of State, Elihu
Root, who proclaimed that it is ‘the right of every sovereign state to protect
itself by preventing condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect
itself’.45 Indeed, the 2002 NSS makes an important caveat stating that ‘the
United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats,
nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression’. It goes on to
warn, however, that ‘in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and
actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States
cannot remain idle while dangers gather’.46
Pre-emptive action in the context of self-defence is an entirely understand-
able concept. Part of the reasoning of declaring pre-emption as an official
policy was not the fact of pre-emption as such, but rather the way in which
what was deemed a threat to the United States, and its interests, could be
interpreted post-September 11.47 The NSS declared in its introduction that the
greatest threat to the nation ‘lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technol-
ogy . . .  and as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act
against such emerging threats before they are fully formed’.48 Acting against
a threat before it has fully formed is a worryingly ambiguous interpretation
of the concept of pre-emption.
Critics of the Bush administration’s rhetoric regarding this concept, how-
ever, claimed that it seemed more accurately to be describing prevention:
waging war against a potential enemy who might unleash an attack in the
future. The result of this expansive interpretation was that the doctrine of
security is reduced to a simple, even primitive maxim: ‘Kill them before they
kill us.’49 Significantly, the doctrine of pre-emption raised certain expecta-
tions about the lengths the United States would go to in order to counter what
it regarded as a serious threat to its national security. As will be discussed
in detail in chapter 6, these expectations were to a large extent unachievable
and served to draw attention to the limits of American power and influence.
In the NSS, President Bush states,
It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must

build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military’s highest prior-
ity is to defend the United States . . . . The unparalleled strength of the United
States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace
in some of the world’s most strategically vital regions . . . . The presence of
American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S.
30 Chapter 2
commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use force in our
own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve
to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom.50
The strength of the US military and its willingness to use it would act as
a warning and a deterrent to other states, such as Iran and Syria, which may
aspire to challenge the United States in some way.51 In line with America’s
perception of itself as a benign hegemon, the NSS also assumed that most
friendly and neutral states would adopt a policy of bandwagoning with the
United States rather than risk damaging relations with the world’s super-
power. Thus, military dominance throughout the globe was regarded as
essential to global peace, rather than as inimical to it.
A military beyond compare was regarded as essential to pursue the expan-
sive policy set by the 2002 NSS. Yet even with a military that was clearly
stronger than any of the next half dozen most powerful nations, did the Bush
administration’s emphasis on unilateralism really serve America’s interests?
In response to the NSS, the debate about the merits or otherwise of acting
unilaterally went beyond the material capacity of the United States to pursue
its own interests in the face of worldwide opposition and raised significant
concerns about the legitimacy of American power.
The debate about international legitimacy is of vital importance in a world
where military power and the willingness to use it is usually a determining
factor in the relations among states. The sustainability of the Bush adminis-
tration’s mission to ‘create a balance of power that favors human freedom’52
required a prodigious degree of goodwill and cooperation among states in
the international arena. The NSS makes constant reference throughout the
document to the importance of good relations among the great powers of the
world. There is, however, an important caveat to this commitment to creating
and maintaining alliances: the United States always reserves the right to act
alone if necessary.53 In articulating a vision for American foreign policy that
emphasized American military power, it became clear that international legit-
imacy and the creation of multilateral alliances would ultimately be regarded
as subservient to the larger goal of maintaining US hegemony.
Almost every state in the international system would to some degree
reserve the right to act unilaterally to protect its national interests. In an inter-
view with Patrick Clawson, director of Research at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy and director of the Iran Security Initiative, he argued
that America
has long taken the attitude that we will work with multilateral institutions when
we can, and when we can’t we will see if we can’t form a new one . . . . So this
tradition of using an overlapping set of multilateral organizations, and where
necessary forming new coalitions, is, there’s a long tradition, a long tradition of
this. But Mr Bush, on this issue, as on democracy, articulated this rather firmly
. . .  and was, how shall I put it, less ready to . . .  emphasize the advantages of
working within a broader institution . . . . So there is a tradition in the United
States of saying that if you’re going to establish a multilateral organization that
the organization has to have authority, and um, that’s often sat poorly with many
other members of those organizations which have felt that the ah, the exhorta-
tory efforts of that organization are worthwhile and if occasionally the exhorta-
tions of the organization are ignored, well that’s unfortunate. And Mr Bush was
pushier on this than many.54
Indeed, this rhetorically aggressive approach to public diplomacy implied

a foreign policy that would be robustly interventionist and where necessary,
unilateral. In such cases, the expectation was that the United States would act
even in the face of opposition from traditional friends and allies.
These assumptions raised by the 2002 NSS promoted much discussion
among conservatives and liberals alike about from where the legitimacy for
state action comes. Those who subscribe to the more unilateralist argument
tended to believe that legitimacy resides in the American people and their
directly elected representatives in Congress. This argument suggests that
seeking the approval of the UN in order to obtain some veneer of legitimacy
only serves to ‘reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient
to, dependent on, constricted by the will—and interests—of other nations’.55
The concern that rather than representing a higher moral authority, institu-
tions like the UN merely represent the self-interest of other nations does
have much in common with a realist perspective. Why, for example, should
America seek the approval of countries such as China, France and Russia?
While neither accepting that the UN has a monopoly on legitimacy nor
rejecting it outright, critics of unilateralism argue that there is undeniable
value in gaining support for US actions from the larger international commu-
nity.56 US president Richard Nixon acknowledged that there seemed to be no
easy solution to the problem, musing that ‘there is certainly a danger of losing
international influence in the narrow pursuit of unilateral advantage. But there
is also sometimes a danger of losing “hard power” in the illusory pursuit of
world order’.57 Clawson argues that while most states would act unilaterally
if faced with certain security situations, ‘Mr Bush is perhaps more blunt than
others’58 and thus less effective at reassuring allies.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2006
The 2006 NSS further emphasized the values-driven aspects of American

foreign policy, placing democracy promotion at the heart of its approach to
32 Chapter 2
the Middle East. In the introduction to the NSS, President Bush declared that
America’s security was dependent on two pillars:
The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working

to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity
through free and fair trade and wise development policies. Free governments
are accountable to their people, govern their territory effectively, and pursue
economic and political policies that benefit their citizens. Free governments do
not oppress their people or attack other free nations. Peace and international
stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.
The second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time
by leading a growing community of democracies. Many of the problems we
face—from the threat of pandemic disease, to proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, to terrorism, to human trafficking, to natural disasters—reach
across borders. Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these prob-
lems. Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs.
America must continue to lead.59
President Bush was clearly drawing on the assumptions of the democratic

peace theory here in linking the spread of democracy across the globe to the
ability to effectively work with other states to address transnational threats
like terrorism and weapons proliferation.
The key to this argument is the belief that the interests of other democratic
states will necessarily be in alignment with US interests. The president was
also clearly reiterating the position expressed in the 2002 NSS that American
global leadership was essential to creating a stable and peaceful global order.
The NSS went on to state:
It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements
and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending
tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes
matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our
statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that
can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the
American people.60
In a clear attempt at conflating American values and interests, the NSS

claims that
the United States has long championed freedom because doing so reflects our
values and advances our interests. It reflects our values because we believe the
desire for freedom lives in every human heart and the imperative of human
dignity transcends all nations and cultures.61
In similar fashion to the 2002 NSS, the 2006 security document also drew a
clear link between American national security and the protection and promo-
tion of American values.
The desire to promote the efficacy of American values in its foreign policy
has been a popular feature of previous US administrations. Likewise, there
has often been some degree of discord between the goals and ideals prompted
by American exceptionalism and the strategic interests required to protect
American security. For President Bush the dilemma of how to effectively
balance values and interests would come to dominate his administration’s
Iran policy. In many ways, the highly ideological and far-reaching goals
articulated in these key foreign policy documents raised expectations that
were beyond the ability of the United States to achieve.
Past US presidents have not denied the need for morality and values to
play some part in international politics, yet previous administrations have
generally avoided the problems faced by the Bush administration because
they were wary of letting a particular ideological vision be the driving force
behind such policy.62 The most significant implication of this is that potential
enemies are regarded not only as material threats but also as ideological ones.
As discussed above, this tendency to view very different threats as part
of a collective problem, and one that is essentially ideological in nature, can
only limit the ability of the United States to effectively assess each individual
existing and potential threat. Dmitri K. Simes, president of the Nixon Centre,
argued at the time that as a significant portion of American resources were
being used to rebuild Iraq, the United States more than ever needed to main-
tain focus and flexibility in its approach to other potential threats and not
‘confine itself with ideological straightjackets’.63 It became increasingly clear
that the neoconservative rhetoric, counselling a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach
to any state that does not uphold the same democratic values cherished by
Americans, was more likely to increase the threats to America’s material
interests rather than diminish them.
Professor Gary Sick, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s
Middle East Institute, and a former principal White House aide for Persian
Gulf affairs under President Jimmy Carter, argued in an interview with this
author conducted in 2008, that the foreign policy pursued after September
11 did draw on certain themes and traditions in American foreign policy.
The Bush administration took the idea of American exceptionalism and by
describing it in such terms which sought to justify a ‘blatantly unilateral’
world view ‘carried it to a level far beyond anything’ that had been seen pre-
viously. Professor Sick argued that neoconservatives had been propounding
these ideas for many years, right back to the time of the Reagan administra-
tion, and that the events on September 11 provided the opportunity: ‘They
had been thinking about this for a generation, so when 9/11 happened they
34 Chapter 2
came in with a plan. They said here’s the way to deal with it. And nobody
else had a plan.’64
It is important to reiterate that the foreign policy language that was adopted
by the Bush administration bore very little resemblance to the actual policy
that the administration pursued. As will be argued in the following chap-
ters, when it came to confronting Iran, there was a fundamental disjuncture
between the expectations raised by public diplomacy and the actual policy
that was pursued.
Patrick Clawson questioned the extent to which President Bush’s foreign
policy was actually different from past presidents. In his interview with this
author, he pointed out that past presidents have all used the idea of human
rights and democracy promotion as a moral anchor for their foreign policy.
[President] Kennedy’s alliance for progress and his description of what that
was established for . . . . [President] Carter’s emphasis on human rights in
his Presidential campaign . . . . [President] Reagan’s founding of the National
Endowment for Democracy, there was a long tradition in the United States of
going beyond just being the city on a hill . . . the nineteenth century image of
promoting democracy by being this example to others . . . and [President] Bush,
had a combination of approaches which . . .  many found jarring, but with which
he was comfortable, which is really like that of the recently deceased Senator
Edward Kennedy. Mainly grandly announced goals, but a willingness to com-
promise and to accept very incremental progress . . . . Because if you look even
at his most sweeping rhetoric, like his second inaugural address, he talks about
‘this challenge of our time’, he is still very comfortable singling Saudi Arabia
out as a country that is making appropriate progress, because he did, like Sena-
tor Kennedy, think in terms of very incremental measures to move forward. He
was not interested in revolutions.65
Two key ideas emerged in the neoconservative lexicon, ideas that were
embraced by President Bush and translated into official policy in the 2002
National Security Policy: democracy promotion, and military primacy and
unilateralism. Military primacy and unilateralism were ideas championed
not just by neoconservatives. Rather it was the use of overwhelming military
force in the service of democracy promotion that received strong emphasis in
the foreign policy rhetoric of President Bush.
AXIS OF EVIL
After September 11, President George W. Bush signalled a shift in America’s

Iran policy. In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President
Bush declared that the United States would not allow its enemies to acquire
WMD. He singled out Iran stating, ‘Iran aggressively pursues these weapons
and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope
for freedom,’ and he referred to Iran as being part of an ‘Axis of Evil’. The
aggressive tone was partly a reaction to the September 11 terrorist attacks,
and a policy of zero-tolerance for state sponsors of terrorism, but it was also
a response to intelligence that had recently come to light about Iran’s ongo-
ing clandestine nuclear programme, including undeclared construction of
uranium enrichment facilities.
Over the next eight years, the Bush administration pursued a policy
towards the Islamic Republic that included one of the most intrusive inspec-
tion regimes conducted by the IAEA, a series of economic sanctions imposed
through the UNSC and the United States Congress, and a multilateral diplo-
matic strategy that was at times quite belligerent in tone. Yet this policy was
a far cry from the ‘zero-tolerance’ approach that President Bush had prom-
ised in his State of the Union Address and then outlined in the 2002 NSS.
Despite frequent iterations of the significant threat posed by Iran’s nuclear
programme and the regime’s links to the terrorist organizations Hezbollah
and Hamas, the White House relied on much the same strategy of contain-
ment that had characterized previous administrations’ approach to Tehran.
The Bush administration’s stated aim was to convince Iran’s leaders to
give up their indigenous nuclear programme, or, at the very least, to cease all
enrichment-related activities. President Bush declared time and again that he
was committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear
programme but that if this failed, the United States was prepared to consider
a military option. Yet despite this, the Bush administration resisted directly
engaging with the Iranian regime, instead leaving the negotiations regarding
such an important security issue to third parties.
In order to understand why the Bush administration ultimately failed to
convince Iran to comply with its demands cannot only be explained in terms
of power and the uses and limits of that power. Rather, one must also look at
the beliefs and ideology that led to the formulation of a policy where America
sought to control the actions of another state through coercion and intimida-
tion. The Bush administration’s approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme was, from the very beginning, characterized by statements about the
dire threat posed by Iran’s behaviour. The belief that other states would trust
in the benign nature of American foreign policy and the failure to adequately
acknowledge the extent to which US policy in the Middle East had contributed
to Iran’s sense of vulnerability was one consequence of this type of thinking.
The result was a foreign policy agenda that focused on the extreme nature of
the threat, while actually pursuing a policy that was relatively restrained. This
was partly a result of war in Iraq that had stretched its resources almost to
breaking point, and highlighted the limitations of American power.
36 Chapter 2
During George W. Bush’s presidency, the clandestine nature of Iran’s

nuclear programme gained prominence and became one of the major security
issues facing the international community. The Bush administration was deeply
divided over how to respond to this foreign policy challenge and for eight years
they attempted to find a diplomatic solution, working through the IAEA and
the UNSC, while at the same time threatening military action and declaring
their ultimate goal of regime change. The result was often scepticism about
America’s commitment to a diplomatic solution and, given the chaotic situation
that America faced in Iraq, doubts also about the US ability or even inclination
to pursue a military option. The result was a policy that was frequently at odds
with the alarmist tone often used to describe the Iranian regime’s behaviour.
The 2002 NSS of the United States of America outlines the four main
components of the Bush Doctrine: the use of force in the pursuit of American
interests, the right to act pre-emptively against perceived threats, the right
to act unilaterally if need be, and the promotion of democracy abroad. None
of these elements was particularly new in American foreign policy, rather
it was the explicit way in which President Bush declared a grand vision for
American foreign policy that did not shy away from proclaiming America’s
moral and strategic global leadership. This policy direction signalled a low
tolerance for regimes, such as Iran, whose policies were antagonistic to US
interests. Yet continuity rather than change best describes the Bush adminis-
tration’s overall approach to dealing with Iran.
Iran’s efforts to build and develop a nuclear programme began under the
Shah in the late 1950s. The United States, France and Germany all provided
significant material support to the Pahlavi regime throughout the 1960s and
1970s. Concern about the long-term availability of oil, and the significant
increase in the price of this resource, was in part responsible for the Shah’s
interest in developing a nuclear energy capacity.66 The most significant devel-
opment was the two nuclear reactors at Bushehr, which were being built by
the German firm Siemens and its subsidiary, Kraftwerke Union. By the time
the Shah was overthrown during the 1979 revolution, these two reactors were
more than half finished.
The Shah always maintained that Iran’s nuclear programme was intended
for peaceful purposes, even going as far as calling for the entire Middle East
to be a nuclear weapon-free zone.67 In 1968, the Shah signed the NPT and it
was ratified in 1970. Despite this, however, there were concerns at the time
that the Shah might be pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapon capability.
There is considerable debate about this and much of the evidence is specula-
tive; however, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has cited several sources
claiming that the Shah, on the subject of whether the country would ever
have this capability, was quoted as saying in June 1974, ‘without a doubt and
sooner than one would think’.68
The nuclear programme came to a halt after the 1979 Islamic Revolution
as Western governments withdrew their support for the new Islamic regime.
Ayatollah Khomeini, believing that nuclear weapons were contradictory to
the basic tenets of Islam,69 did little to continue the programme until some-
time in the mid-1980s during the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) when it was
restarted. Pressure from the United States, however, meant that many West-
ern states refused to support the Islamic regime.70 The result of this was that
Iran looked to the Soviet Union and China for help and signed cooperation
agreements with them in 1990, and in 1995 signed an $800 million deal with
Moscow to complete the reactor at Bushehr.71
THE IAEA AND THE INSPECTIONS PROCESS
After September 11, President Bush signalled a shift in America’s Iran

policy, which up until this point had been characterized by the logic of con-
tainment. Even though there had been evidence throughout the 1990s that
Iran had violated its Safeguards Agreement, there was no concerted effort to
make these violations known publicly or to aggressively confront Iran over
the issue.72 Indeed, both Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton had
practised a strategy of containment.73
In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President Bush
declared that the United States would not allow its enemies to acquire weap-
ons of mass destruction. He went on to characterize the Iranian regime in
language that was to have a lasting negative effect on relations with Iran:
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to
threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these
regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to
terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack out
allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price
of indifference would be catastrophic.74
The Iranian reaction to the Axis of Evil speech was understandably one of
anger, ‘the nation united against the “foreign threat”; and conspiracies were
amplified’.75 In an interview with this author, Ansari explained that it resulted
in an immense sense of betrayal for the Iranians and was a disastrous piece
of public diplomacy:
Of course the reaction in Iran was extremely bad . . . . I mean the Iranians had
helped quite a bit in Afghanistan. They had every right to feel hurt by it. And
to feel betrayed. We ought not to forget that the Americans, certain parts of the
38 Chapter 2
American political leadership have been complicit in an absolutely disastrous

foreign policy. They didn’t think about it. They thought that what they were
doing was a speech for domestic audiences.76
The Axis of Evil label sent a clear message to the Iranian regime that the
Bush administration was not interested in any sort of rapprochement and was
instead adopting a confrontational approach.
With the focus of the world on Iraq, Iran’s nuclear programme did not
really attract significant public attention until August 2002, when Alireza
Jafarzadeh, the chief Congressional liaison and media spokesperson for
the US representative office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran
(NCRI), gave a press briefing in Washington D.C., where he revealed new
information about Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme.77 He highlighted
two sites, a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and construction of a heavy
water reactor at Arak, as being particularly suspicious. The Bush administra-
tion responded to these revelations by referring the matter to the IAEA.
The IAEA Board of Governors met in September to discuss the issue.
Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, Iranian vice president for Atomic Energy and
president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) addressed
the conference and informed the IAEA that it was planning to develop a
nuclear programme that would include ‘the associated technologies such as
fuel cycle, safety and waste management techniques’.78 He also stated that
Iran would cooperate with the IAEA and that the Iranian government was
committed to transparency. Tehran had always maintained that its nuclear
programme was purely for domestic energy purposes and that the develop-
ment and use of nuclear weapons was deeply abhorrent to the Islamic regime.
In December, a report was released by the Institute for Science and Inter-
national Security in conjunction with CNN, revealing satellite imagery of dis-
puted nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak.79 The report argued that the secrecy
surrounding these two sites increased suspicion about the apparently peaceful
purposes of Iran’s nuclear programme and called on Iran’s leaders to sign
an Additional Protocol (AP) to the NPT and allow IAEA inspectors greater
access to these sites. The US State Department drew its own conclusions
from this information. In a daily press briefing, State Department spokesman
Richard Boucher stated that the sites in question were particularly interesting
and had ‘lead to the conclusion that this nuclear program that Iran has is not
peaceful and is certainly not transparent. As I said, we have reached the con-
clusion that Iran is actively working to develop nuclear weapons capability.’80
The publication of the Institute for Science and International Security’s
report and the US State Department’s response compelled Mohamed ElBare-
dai, director general of the IAEA (1997–2009), to publicly request Iran to
sign an AP ‘so as to remove any ambiguity there might exist about Iran’s
nuclear programs’.81 Iran did not agree right away to sign the AP but did agree
to let IAEA inspectors into Iran to assess its nuclear facilities.
2003–2004
In his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush argued that
different threats require different strategies. In Iran, we continue to see a gov-

ernment that represses its people, pursues weapons of mass destruction, and
supports terror. We also see Iranian citizens risking intimidation and death as
they speak out for liberty and human rights and democracy. Iranians, like all
people, have a right to choose their own government and determine their own
destiny—and the United States supports their aspirations to live in freedom.82
President Bush used this speech to link the Iranian regimes’ development
of its nuclear programme with the oppression of the Iranian people and its
abuse of human rights. This speech was delivered around the same time as
Iran’s leaders were allowing the IAEA inspectors significant access to various
nuclear sites.
A team of IAEA inspectors visited Iran in early 2003. Director General
Mohamed ElBaradei, deputy director and head of the Department of Safe-
guards, Pierre Goldschmidt, and Olli Heinonen led the team. The inspections
provided the IAEA with unprecedented access to the Iranian nuclear pro-
gramme and the Iranians acted with an increasing degree of transparency and
cooperation.83 Before departing, Goldschmidt and Heinonen gave the Iranians
a letter that asked a series of questions about discrepancies between the infor-
mation that the Iranians had provided to the IAEA and what the inspectors
had found on the ground.84
At the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—held in Geneva from
April 28 to May 9, 2003—the US delegation argued that Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme was only really logical when viewed in the context of a weapons
programme.85 The issue of Iran signing an AP was also raised. Iran’s repre-
sentatives rejected the American accusations and demanded that its right to
a peaceful nuclear programme, as guaranteed under the NPT, be recognized.
After considerable debate, Iran did manage to have its right to a peaceful
nuclear programme confirmed. In the Chair’s Factual Summary, an appendix
attached to the official PrepCom report reads:
The inalienable right of all states parties in full compliance with the Treaty to
develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses without discrimination, as well the inviolability of nuclear facilities, were
reaffirmed.86
40 Chapter 2
For the next eight years, discussion about Iran’s nuclear programme would
continually shift from a debate about whether or not it was pursuing a nuclear
weapons programme, to whether it had the right, as it maintained, under the
NPT, to develop the complete fuel cycle. This would have serious conse-
quences for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as the global
debate about the development of nuclear energy programmes.
On May 31, President Bush launched the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). As a voluntary association of states, the PSI focused on preventing the
transfer of WMD through interdiction. The US State Department describes
the goals of the PSI as aiming to
interdict transfers to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation con-
cern to the extent of their capabilities and legal authorities; develop procedures
to facilitate exchange of information with other countries; strengthen national
legal authorities to facilitate interdiction; and take specific actions in support of
interdiction efforts.87
While the IAEA was still trying to determine if Iran had actually violated
its agreements under the NPT, the United States was continuing to claim
unequivocally that Iran’s nuclear programme was intended to provide the
Islamic Republic with nuclear weapons. In its June report to the Board of
Governors, the IAEA found that Iran had violated its obligations under
its Safeguards Agreement, but stopped short of declaring it in violation of
the NPT. The report once again called for Iran to sign an AP. In Washing-
ton, however, the report was seen as further evidence of Iran’s ‘persistent,
decades-long pattern of . . .  material procurements that clearly point[ed] to a
clandestine weapons program’.88
On October 21, the foreign ministers of France, Britain and Germany vis-
ited Tehran and after extensive negotiations released a joint statement which
included the following commitment from Iran:
To promote confidence with a view to removing existing barriers for co-

operation in the nuclear field:
Having received the necessary clarifications, the Iranian Government has
decided to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification pro-
cedures. As a confirmation of its good intentions the Iranian Government will
continue to co-operate with the Agency in accordance with the Protocol in
advance of its ratification.
While Iran has a right within the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes it has decided voluntarily to suspend all
uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.89
In October, Richard Armitage, US deputy secretary of State, appeared

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss US policy towards
Iran. In his prepared statement, he listed ‘sanctions, interdiction, law enforce-

ment, diplomacy and international public opinion’ as some of the options
that the Bush administration was pursuing in its efforts to counter Iran’s
programme.90 He maintained that the Bush administration ‘believe a united
international front is especially critical in dealing with Iran’s clandestine
nuclear weapons program’, but ‘when necessary, we will act alone’.91
John Bolton, under secretary for Arms Control and International Security,
reiterated the Bush administration’s emphasis on unilateralism and pre-
emption in remarks made on December 2. Referring to Iran as a ‘terrorist
state’, he warned that ‘our attention is required now before the threats become
reality, and tens of thousands of innocent civilians, or more, have been vapor-
ized’.92 When talking of consequences, he warned that ‘no option is off the
table’.93 Bolton’s more aggressive stance and his reiteration of the dire nature
of the threat posed to the United States if Iran, a ‘terrorist state’, acquired a
nuclear weapons capability was evidence of the split within the administra-
tion over how to deal with the Iranian issue. It also reflected the divisions in
the broader Washington policy community and President Bush’s move away
from the muscular unilateralism espoused in the 2002 NSS.
The lack of verifiable intelligence about Iran’s nuclear programme was
increasingly becoming an issue. In the wake of the Iraq war and the absence
of any significant WMD stockpile, the reliability of US intelligence had fre-
quently been called into question, especially when it could eventually lead to
justification for military action against another state. Bolton addressed criti-
cisms of US intelligence gathering in that instance by responding that ‘these
criticisms miss the mark that our concern was not the imminence of Saddam’s
threat, but the very existence of his regime, given its heinous and undeniable
record, capabilities, intentions, and longstanding defiance of the international
community’.94
Rumours surfaced about unofficial meetings with Iranian ex-pats who
were feeding Washington officials with intelligence that could help under-
mine the Iranian regime. One of the key figures whose name kept appearing
in news reports was Manourchr Ghorbanifar, an instrumental player in the
Iran–Contra scandal. Laura Rosen, reporting on the questionable information
that Ghorbanifar was feeding the Pentagon, places the issue within the much
broader problem of US information about Iran. She argued:
Whatever political aims Ghorbanifar may be pursuing remain as murky as ever.

But given the controversies that have surrounded him for more than two decades,
and the messy aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair, it is remarkable that he has
once again surfaced as a middleman and intelligence source. Yet the return of
Ghorbanifar is merely one symptom of a much graver problem: the paucity of
reliable U.S. intelligence about people and events in Iran. Lacking well placed
42 Chapter 2
sources there, the U.S. government ﬁnds itself listening again to someone with
a track record of supplying false information and playing both sides.95
It was becoming increasingly clear that while the international community

was still attempting to establish whether Iran had been in violation of its com-
mitments under the NPT, the Bush administration had already decided that it
had. For them, the purpose of the IAEA inspections was actually to establish
that Iran’s nuclear programme was beyond a doubt a quest for nuclear weap-
ons, thus paving the way for a referral to the UNSC.
Bolton claimed that the IAEA Board of Governors unanimously adopted a
resolution in November 26, 2003 that ‘establishes beyond doubt Iran’s multiple
violations’. He concluded that the evidence gathered over several years by the
IAEA made Iran’s claims that its programme is for peaceful purposes ‘increas-
ingly implausible’.96 He went on to argue that ‘the United States believes that
the longstanding, massive and covert Iranian effort to acquire sensitive nuclear
capabilities makes sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program’.97
The IAEA Resolution that Bolton refers to does indeed state that Iran had
been in violation of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement. By the
time the November report was tabled, however, Iran had agreed to sign an
AP and had voluntarily suspended all uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities. The November IAEA report to the Board acknowledged the posi-
tive steps taken by the Iranian leadership. It is useful here to quote the resolu-
tion in some detail in order the highlight the complexity of the issue that is
not evident in Under Secretary Bolton’s analysis. The resolution laid out a
series of troubling issues:
(f) Noting with deep concern that Iran has failed in a number of instances over
an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, and its process-
ing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has
been processed and stored, as set out in paragraph 48 of the Director Gen-
eral’s report,
(g) Noting in particular, with the gravest concern, that Iran enriched uranium
and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities, in the absence of IAEA
safeguards,
(h) Noting also, with equal concern, that there has been in the past a pattern of
concealment resulting in breaches of safeguard obligations and that the new
information disclosed by Iran and reported by the Director General includes
much more that is contradictory to information previously provided by Iran.98
The resolution went on, however, to report the steps that the Iranian regime
was taking to cooperate with the IAEA and address some of these concerns.
The resolution reads:
(i) Noting that the Director General, in his opening statement, indicated that
Iran has begun cooperating more actively with the IAEA and has given
assurances that it is committed to a policy of full disclosure,
(j) Recognising that, in addition to the corrective actions already taken, Iran has
undertaken to present all nuclear material for Agency verification during its
forthcoming inspections,
(k) Emphasizing that, in order to restore confidence, Iranian cooperation and
transparency will need to be complete and sustained so that the Agency can
resolve all outstanding issues and, over time, provide and maintain the assur-
ances required by Member States,
(l) Noting with satisfaction that Iran has indicated that it is prepared to sign the
Additional Protocol, and that, pending its entry into force, Iran will act in
accordance with the provisions of that Protocol,
(m) Noting that the Director General, in his opening statement, reported that Iran
has decided to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
(n) Stressing that the voluntary suspension by Iran of all its uranium enrich-
ment-related activities and reprocessing activities remains of key importance
to rebuilding international confidence.99
On December 18, 2003, Ambassador Salehi of Iran and Mohamad ElBara-

dei met in Vienna to sign an AP to the NPT Safeguards Agreement. Several
points are worth highlighting here. The first is that the ‘pattern of conceal-
ment’ that the report refers to in Iran’s behaviour would remain a feature of
the negotiations process throughout the eight years of the Bush presidency.
This behaviour was often interpreted as both an admission of guilt and evi-
dence of something to hide.
The second important aspect of this resolution is the fact that the IAEA
appeared to be at pains to stress the various ways in which Iran was actually
cooperating with the inspections process. Perhaps if they could slow down
the US push for a referral of the issue to the UNSC, the directors could main-
tain the integrity and thoroughness of the IAEA process.
President Bush gave a speech at the National Defense University on
February 11, 2004. In his speech he outlined proposed changes to the govern-
ment’s non-proliferation policy. Of particular note was his proposal to only
allow states that have signed an AP to import equipment for their nuclear
programmes. He also argued:
The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment
and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already
possess full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. This step
will prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile material
for nuclear bombs. Proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate
the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing
illegal weapons.100
44 Chapter 2
Once again President Bush and his administration were behaving as if

there was no doubt that Iran was clandestinely developing a nuclear weapons
programme. By framing the issue in this way, the Bush administration was
essentially denying Iran’s right under the NPT to develop a civilian nuclear
capability. Similar to statements about Iraq, President Bush was attempt-
ing to eradicate a perceived threat before it had actually manifested. As has
previously been stated, and will be discussed further below, this reworking
of the international norms pertaining to the NPT regime would have serious
implications for the viability of it and member states incentive to behave
within its guidelines.
Despite the positive gestures of the Iranian government, troubling ques-
tions still remained about aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. In March
2004, in testimony before the United States House International Relations
Committee, John Bolton provided a list of issues that the Iranian regime
had failed to disclose to the IAEA but which had nevertheless come to light.
These included the following:
Iran denied testing centrifuges with uranium, denied the existence of a laser
enrichment program, and denied producing enriched uranium. In each of these
cases, Iran later backtracked and confessed the truth only when confronted with
irrefutable technical evidence from IAEA inspections; Iran failed to report the
production of plutonium by covertly introducing uranium targets into the safe-
guarded Tehran Research Reactor; Iran reprocessed irradiated targets to sepa-
rate plutonium; Iran failed to report the use of imported uranium hexafluoride
for testing centrifuges and producing enriched uranium.
On at least one occasion, moreover, after IAEA inspectors asked to visit a
suspect facility at which it turned out centrifuges had secretly been operated,
Iran delayed the visit for months while the interior of the entire facility was torn
out, repainted, and tiled over in an effort to defeat IAEA testing for radioactive
particles.101
The European Union (EU), while not showing the same degree of alarm
as the Bush administration, was also deeply concerned about the failure of
Iran’s leaders to answer significant questions about its nuclear programme.
While maintaining Iran’s right to develop and use nuclear energy for peace-
ful purposes, it also called on Iran to act with complete transparency in its
dealings with the IAEA.102
In June 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution that once
again deplored the fact that ‘Iran’s cooperation has not been as full, timely
and proactive as it should have been’.103 In response to this, Under Secretary
John Bolton stated,
The United States believes the time to report this issue to the Security Council
is long overdue. We are working closely with our friends and allies to urge an
IAEA Board of Governors resolution that declares Iran in noncompliance with

its IAEA safeguards obligations and reports that noncompliance to the UN
Security Council. It is not a question of ‘if’, but of ‘when’ the IAEA Board
will report that noncompliance. We believe it must happen soon, or risk erod-
ing an important part of the IAEA safeguards system, and risk sending a signal
to would-be proliferators that there are not serious consequences for pursuing
secret nuclear weapons programs.104
Bolton went on to reiterate the Bush administration’s determination to

‘end’ Iran’s nuclear programme.105 In outlining the administration’s policy
to combat the proliferation of WMD, Bolton, rather cynically, highlighted
the importance of diplomacy and multilateralism. He also made reference
to the proposals put forward in President Bush’s speech in February 2004,
particularly preventing the transfer of equipment to countries that have not
signed an AP.106
On November 15, 2004, Representatives from France, Germany and the
United Kingdom, the High Representative of the European Union (EU-3)
and the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted a letter to the IAEA director
general. The letter outlines an agreement, which later became known as the
Paris Accord, between the parties that reaffirmed Iran’s decision to continue
its voluntary suspension of all enrichment activities while negotiations were
undertaken to reach an agreement on security, economic and political issues
and the nuclear issue.107 The agreement indicated that once the IAEA had
fully verified the suspension of all enrichment activity, the EU would open
negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and that it would sup-
port Iran’s accession negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO).108
On November 15, the IAEA adopted a resolution that stated that more time
was needed in order to verify the full extent of Iran’s nuclear programme.
The US response to this was publicly cautious with White House spokesman
Scott McClellan stating that the White House welcomed the resolution and if
Iran was found to be in violation of its Safeguards Agreement, then the mat-
ter would be referred back to the IAEA for consideration. Behind the scenes,
however, US ambassador to the IAEA, Jackie Sanders, attacked Iran and
questioned the IAEA’s efficiency at a closed-door session of the Board. She
argued that the Board had a
‘statutory obligation’ to recommend consequences for Iran in the Security

Council. Affirming that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons program that
‘poses a growing threat to international peace and security’, she declared that
the United States could refer Iran to the Security Council unilaterally, as any
other member of the UN could do in view of a situation that might endanger
international peace and security. She stressed that the United States reserves all
its options in this regard.109
46 Chapter 2
The criticism of the IAEA Board reflected the growing frustration in

Washington of the slow and lumbering bureaucratic process that seemed to
be allowing Iran to continue its development without consequences.
2005
In a similar fashion to the 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush
continued in his 2005 State of the Union speech to claim that Iran’s nuclear
programme was undoubtedly a nuclear weapons programme, and he linked
the nuclear issue to America’s war against terror, and reiterated America’s
call for democracy and respect for freedom stating,
Today, Iran remains the world’s primary state sponsor of terror—pursuing

nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and
deserve. We are working with European allies to make clear to the Iranian
regime that it must give up its uranium enrichment program, and any plutonium
reprocessing, and end its support for terror. And to the Iranian people, I say
tonight: As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.110
Over the following two years, inspections continued as did negotiations

between Iran and the EU-3 to resolve unanswered questions about troubling
aspects of the nuclear programme and to negotiate economic incentives.
A General Framework for Objective Guarantees between Iran and the EU3
was released in March.111 This framework built on the Paris Agreement and
included granting Iran greater access to EU markets and EU support for Iran’s
application to the WTO in exchange for, among other things, Iran ratifying an
AP and continuing its suspension of all enrichment activities. At this stage,
Iran had in principle agreed to ratify the AP but had not actually followed
through on this commitment.
Despite growing impatience with the IAEA inspections process and
scepticism about the ability of the EU-3 to achieve results that would be
acceptable to the United States, the Bush administration publicly declared
its support for the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the EU-3. Vice
President Dick Cheney was quoted at the time as saying ‘I can’t think of
anybody who is eager to see the Iranians develop that kind of capability.
Now, we are moving to support efforts to resolve it diplomatically.’112 Under
secretary for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, called on Iran to honour the
Paris Agreement, stating that ‘if it is breached, the United States and the EU3
must support a resolution in the IAEA Board of Governors reporting Iran to
the UN Security Council’.113
The Bush administration also agreed that the EU3’s arguments that Iran
should be offered realistic economic incentives had merit. They offered to
withdraw their objections to Iran’s application to the WTO and agreed to the
EU3 proposal to sell aircraft parts to Tehran.114 Iran claimed, however, that
the Europeans expected them to completely give up all enrichment activity,
not just in the short term but also as a permanent condition.115 Iran’s president
Mohammad Khatami argued that ‘if the Europeans insist on a cessation, that
is obviously a breach of the agreement we reached with them . . . . If they
break the agreement, whatever happens after, the responsibility lies with the
Europeans.’116
The nuclear issue became further complicated with the election in Iran of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the lead up to the June 2005 elections,
Iranian officials were vocal in their support for Iran’s nuclear programme,
with the secretary of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Supreme National
Security Council going so far as to say that no matter who was elected presi-
dent, Iran’s nuclear programme would continue because it was supported by
95 per cent of the population.117
Iran eventually rejected EU proposals as insufficient, and in August
2005 Iran resumed its uranium enrichment programme. The United
States and the EU3 subsequently threatened to take the matter before the
UNSC.118 Throughout this time the Bush administration repeatedly called
for regime change in Iran, and made it clear that the military option had
not been taken off the table should Iran continue to defy the international
community.119 In response to the perceived threat from the United States,
along with the knowledge of the presence of US soldiers in Iraq, Iran’s
leaders made it clear that economic and technical incentives being offered
by the EU3 were not sufficient and that any agreement to halt the uranium
enrichment process would need to include security guarantees from the
United States.120
The Bush administration responded to Iran’s resumption of uranium
enrichment activity and nuclear research by increasing their pressure on the
IAEA to refer the matter to the UN Security Council. In September, Bush
administration officials held a closed-door briefing with diplomats from
various countries in an attempt to garner support. At the time, several dip-
lomats commented on the similarity of the presentation they received, to the
one presented by Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UNSC about Iraq’s
presumed WMD capabilities.121 The multilateral approach to diplomacy, and
the recognition by President Bush that his government needed to pursue this
issue through both the IAEA and the UNSC, was evidence of a reluctance to
pursue the ‘unilateralism’ of the 2002 NSS and policy-wise, showed much in
common with the practice of previous presidents.
48 Chapter 2
NOTES
1. Kristol, I. (2003), ‘The Neoconservative Persuasion’, The Weekly Standard, 8,

47, pp. 23, 23–25.
2. Halper, S. and Clarke, J. (2004), America Alone: The Neoconservatives and
the Global Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 42.
3. Steinfels, P. (1979), The Neo-Conservatives: The Men Who Are Changing
America’s Politics, New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 51–53.
4. Ibid., p. 52.
5. Dorrien, G. (2004), Imperial Designs, p. 10.
6. Kaplan L. F. and Kristol, W. (2003), The War Over Iraq, p. 66.
7. Afsah, E. (2003), ‘Creed, Cabal, or Conspiracy – The Origins of the Current
Neoconservative Revolution in US Strategic Thinking’, German Law Journal, 4, 9,
pp. 901–23, 912; Kristol, I. (2004), ‘It Wasn’t Inevitable’, American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.20767/
pub_detail.asp (Accessed July 21, 2007); Kristol, W. and Kagan, R. (1996),
‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, July to August, 75, 4,
pp. 18–32, 19.
8. Reagan, R. (1982), The Evil Empire, President Ronald Reagan’s speech to the
House of Commons, June 8. http://www.townhall.com/hall_of_fame/reagan/speech/
empire.html (Accessed August 18, 2007).
9. Kristol, I. (1991), ‘Defining Our National Interest’, in O. Harries (ed.),
America’s Purpose: New Visions of US Foreign Policy, San Francisco, CA: ICS Press,
pp. 53, 53–73.
10. Kristol, W. and Kagan, R. (1996), ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’,
p. 20.
11. Krauthammer, C. (1990/1991), ‘The Unipolar Moment’, p. 23.
12. Wolfowitz, P. (2000), ‘Remembering the Future’, The National Interest,
Spring, pp. 35–45, 37.
13. Schmitt, G. (2003), ‘Power and Duty: US Action is Crucial to Maintaining
World Order’, Los Angeles Times, March 23. http://www.newamericancentury.org/
global-032303.htm (Accessed April 4, 2004).
14. Ibid., p. 23.
15. Harries, O. (2004), Benign Or Imperial? Reflections on American Hegemony,
Sydney, NSW: ABC Books, pp. 23–25, 76.
16. Halper, S. and Clarke, J. (2004), America Alone, pp. 76–77.
17. Rhodes, E. (2003), ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda’, Survival,
45, 1, pp. 131–32, 131–54.
18. Kaplan, L. F. and Kristol, W. (2003), The War Over Iraq, p. 64.
19. Simes, D. K. (2003), ‘Realism: it’s High-minded . . .  and it Works’, The
National Interest, 74, pp. 168–72, 169.
20. Kirkpatrick, J. (1990), ‘A Normal Country in a Normal Time’, National
Interest, Fall, pp. 40–43.
21. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002),
pp. 1–31. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (Accessed July 20, 2007);
Kagan, R. and Asmus, R. D. (2002), ‘Commit For the Long Run’, The Washington
Post, January 29.
22. Kirkpatrick, J. (1990), ‘A Normal Country in a Normal Time’.
23. Kristol, W. and Kagan, R. (1996), ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’,
pp. 22–23.
24. Ibid., p. 27.
25. Ibid., p. 27.
26. Ibid., p. 31.
27. Bush, G. W. (2001), Remarks at the ‘National Day of Remembrance Ser-
vice’ at the National Cathedral, Washington DC, September 14. http://usinfo.org/
wf-archive/2001/010914/epf502.htm (Accessed January 29, 2011).
28. Kagan, R. and Asmus, R. D. (2002), ‘Commit For the Long Run’.
29. Schmitt, G. (2003), ‘Power and Duty: U.S. Action is Crucial to Maintaining
World Order’, Los Angeles Times, March 23. http://www.newamericancentury.org/
30. Jervis, R. (2003), ‘Understanding the Bush Doctrine’, p. 366.
31. Fenner, L. (2001), Summary of interview with Vice President Dick Cheney
on NBC Meet the Press, September 16. http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2001/010917/
epf104.htm (Accessed July 27, 2011).
32. Schonberg, K. K. (2009), Constructing twenty-first Century U.S. Foreign
Policy, p. 64.
33. Rice, C. (2000), ‘Promoting the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs, 79,
January/February, pp. 45–62, 53.
34. Ibid., p. 48.
35. Mandelbaum, M. (2003), The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace,
Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century, New York: Public Affairs,
p. 382.
36. NSS 2002, p. iv.
37. Ibid., p. 1.
38. NSS 2002, p. 6.
39. NSS 2002, p. 5.
40. NSS 2002, p. 6.
41. NSS 2002, p. 7.
42. Ikenberry, G. J., Knock, T. J., Slaughter, A. and Smith, T. (eds) (2009),
The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 7.
43. Walt, S. M. (2005), Taming American Power: The Global Response to US
Primacy, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, pp. 11–12.
44. NSS 2002. Section Five, pp. 13–16.
45. Kaplan, L. F. and Kristol, W. (2003), The War Over Iraq, p. 85.
46. NSS 2002, p. 15.
47. Jervis, R. (2003), ‘The Compulsive Empire’, Foreign Policy, 137, July/
August, pp. 82–87, 86.
48. NSS 2002. Introduction, pp. i–vi.
50 Chapter 2
49. Ikenberry, G. J. (2004), ‘The End of the Neoconservative Moment’, Survival,

46, 1, pp. 7–22, 18.
50. NSS 2002, p. 29.
51. Kagan, R. and Kristol, W. (2004), ‘The Right War for the Right Reasons’,
Weekly Standard, 9, 23, February 27, pp. 20–28, 28.
52. NSS 2002, p. 1.
53. NSS 2002, p. 6.
54. Clawson, P. (2009), Interview conducted by Kumuda Simpson at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC. September 1.
55. Krauthammer, C. (2004), Democratic Realism, p. 6.
56. Kagan, R. (2003), ‘Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places’, p. 70.
57. Kissinger, H. (2002), Does America Need a Foreign Policy? New York:
Touchstone, p. 203.
58. Clawson, P. (2009), Interview conducted by Kumuda Simpson.
59. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), pp.
1–49, ii. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ (Accessed June
14, 2009).
60. NSS 2006, p. 1.
61. NSS 2006, p. 3.
62. Dimitri, K. Simes (2003), ‘Realism: it’s High-minded . . .  and it Works’,
p. 168.
63. Ibid., p. 169.
64. Sick, G. (2009), Interview conducted by Kumuda Simpson at Columbia
University, New York, September 9.
66. Fayazmanesh, S. (2008), The United States and Iran: Sanction, Wars, and the
Policy of Dual Containment, London: Routledge, p. 124.
67. Bahgat, G. (2007), Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East,
Tallahassee, FL: University Press of Florida, p. 21.
68. ‘Iran: Nuclear Chronology: 1957–1985’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washing-
ton DC. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/chronology_1957_1985.
html (Accessed July 29, 2011).
69. Bahgat, G. (2007), Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, p. 21.
70. ‘Iran: Nuclear Chronology: 1957–1985’, Nuclear Threat Initiative,
71. Bahgat, G. (2007), Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, p. 22.
72. Albright, D. (2006), ‘Iran’s Nuclear Program: Production and Potential’,
Prepared Testimony, Institute for Science and International Security, Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 17. http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/
testimony/2006/AlbrightTestimony060517.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2007).
73. Fayazmanesh, S. (2008), The United States and Iran, pp. 70–95.
74. Ibid.
75. Ansari, A. M. (2006), ‘Iran and the US in the Shadow of 9/11’, p. 165.
76. Ansari, A. M. (2011), Interview conducted by Kumuda Simpson.
77. Ritter, S. (2006), Target Iran: The Truth About the US Government’s Plans
for Regime Change, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, pp. xxv-xxvi.
78. Aghazadeh, R. (2002), vice president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
president of the Atomic Energy Organization Of Iran, Statement to the 46th General
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, Septem-
ber 16. http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC46/iran.pdf (Accessed March 15,
2010).
79. Albright, D. and Hinderstein, C. (2002), ‘Iran Building Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Facilities: International Transparency Needed’, Institute for Science and International
Security, Issue Brief, December 12. http://www.isisonline.org/publications/iran/irani-
mages.html (Accessed March 19, 2010); Ensor, D. (2002), ‘US Has Photos of Secret
Iran Nuclear Sites’, CNN, December 13. http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/
meast/12/12/iran.nuclear/ (Accessed 19, 2010).
80. Boucher, R. (2002), Daily Press Briefing, US State Department, Wash-
ington DC, December 13. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/15976.htm
(Accessed March 19, 2010).
81. Ritter, S. (2006), Target Iran, pp. 56–57.
82. Bush, G. (2003), State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress.
83. Ritter, S. (2006), Target Iran, pp. 60–65.
84. ‘Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic
of Iran’, (2003). Report by the director general, International Atomic Energy Agency,
June 6. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf
85. Ritter, S. (2006), Target Iran, p. 71.
86. ‘Chair’s Factual Summary’, (2003), Ambassador Laszló Mólnár of Hun-
gary, Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Geneva, May 9. http://www.acronym.org.
uk/dd/dd71/71chair.htm (Accessed March 22, 2010).
87. ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’, United States Department of State, May 31.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm (Accessed April 12, 2010).
88. Chubin, S. and Litwak, R. (2003), ‘Debating Iran’s Nuclear Aspirations’, The
Washington Quarterly, 26, 4, pp. 99–114, 99–100.
89. ‘Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers’,
(2003), IAEA, October 21. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/state-
ment_iran21102003.shtml (Accessed April 16, 2010).
90. Armitage, R. (2003), Prepared Testimony before the United States Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, October 28. http://www.sen-
ate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2003/ArmitageTestimony031028.pdf (Accessed
November 16, 2007).
91. Ibid.
92. Bolton, J. (2003), ‘Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge and
Response’, Remarks to the Conference of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
and the Fletcher School’s International Security Studies Program, Washington DC,
December 2. http//www.state.gov/t/us/rm/26786.htm (Accessed May 7, 2007).
93. Bolton, J. (2003), ‘Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge and
Response’.
94. Ibid.
52 Chapter 2
95. Rosen, L. and Heer, J. (2005), ‘The Front: Hardliners want evidence Iran is up
to no good. And they’re turning to strange sources to get it’, The American Prospect,
Match 20. http://prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=9361 (Accessed June 9, 2011).
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran’, (2003). IAEA Board of Governors, Resolution adopted by the Board,
November 26.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf
99. Ibid.
100. Bush, G. W. (2004), The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Speech Delivered
at the National Defence University, Washington DC, February 11. http://www.
nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/10WEBPTEX.html?pagewanted=1&pagewanted=p
rint (Accessed April 9, 2010).
101. Bolton, J. (2004), ‘The Bush Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy: Suc-
cesses and Future Challenges’, Testimony before the United States House Interna-
tional Relations Committee, Washington DC, March 30. http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/
us/rm/31029.htm (Accessed March 29, 2010).
102. European Council Conclusions Iran 2004–08. http://ec.europa.eu/external_
relations/iran/docs/iran_council_2004-08_en.pdf (Accessed March 29, 2010).
103. ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran’, IAEA Board of Governors, Resolution adopted by the Board on June
18, 2004. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-49.pdf
(Accessed April 9, 2010).
104. Bolton, J. (2004), ‘Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion’, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee
on the Middle East and Central Asia, Washington DC, June 24. http://20012009.state.
gov/t/us/rm/33909.htm (Accessed April 9, 2010).
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. ‘Paris Accord’, (2004), Signed by representatives of the governments of
France, Germany, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Paris, November 15. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf (Accessed April 9, 2010).
108. Ibid.
109. Crail, P. and Sobrado, M. L. (2004), ‘IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agree-
ment: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement?,’ International
Organizations and Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
(CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies, December. http://www.nti.org/e_
research/e3_59a.html#fn9 (Accessed April 9, 2010).
110. Bush, G. W. (2005), State of the Union Address to the 109th Congress.
111. ‘General Framework for Objective Guarantees between Iran and the EU3’,
(2005), March. http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/
proliferation/iran/iran_eu_objectives.pdf (Accessed April 16, 2010).
112. Cordesman, A. H. and Al-Rodhan, K. R. (2006), ‘Iranian Nuclear Weapons?

The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s Nuclear Programs’, Working Draft Paper, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, April 12, p. 41. http://csis.org/
files/media/csis/pubs/060412_iran_uncertainty.pdf (Accessed April 16, 2005).
113. Burns, N. (2005), United States Under Secretary for Political Affairs, ‘United
States Policy Toward Iran’, Prepared Statement before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Washington, DC, May 19, 2005. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/
rm/2005/46528.htm (Accessed April 12, 2009).
114. Mouawad, J. (2005), ‘Iran Offers Europe ‘Guarantees’ on Its Nuclear Pro-
gram’, The New York Times, March 17. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?re
s=9D0CE2D7133CF934A25750C0A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print
115. Cordesman, A. H. and Al-Rodhan, K. R. (2006), ‘Iranian Nuclear Weapons?’.
116. Mouawad, J. (2005), ‘Iran Offers Europe “Guarantees” on Its Nuclear
Program.’
117. Cordesman, A. H. and Al-Rodhan, K. R. (2006), ‘Iranian Nuclear Weapons?’,
p. 44.
118. ‘Iran Resuming Uranium Conversion’, (2005), International Herald Tribune,
Tuesday August 9. http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/08/news/adlate.php?page=1
(Accessed January 26, 2009).
119. ‘Iran, Iraq, and Chinese Arms on Agenda as Bush Arrives in Germany’,
(2005), International Herald Tribune, Thursday February 24. http://www.iht.com/
articles/2005/02/23/news/bush.php (Accessed January 26, 2009).
120. Ross, D. (2008), ‘Diplomatic Strategies for Dealing with Iran’, in J. N. Miller,
C. Parthemore and K. M. Campbell (eds), Iran: Assessing US Strategic Options,
Centre for a New American Security, September, p. 39.
121. Linzer, D. (2005), ‘U.S. Deploys Slide Show to Press Case Against Iran’, The
Washington Post, September 14. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301837_pf.html (Accessed April 19, 2010).
Chapter 3
Policy Confusion and

Regional Instability
This chapter will explore the consequences of the Bush administration’s

policies, with a focus on the further expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme
and the challenge this presents for non-proliferation norms. Despite strong
statements about the irrational and untrustworthy nature of Iran’s leaders, the
likelihood of its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, and the
assertion that diplomacy and sanctions had already failed, the Bush admin-
istration followed a pragmatic course of action—referring the matter to the
IAEA, and pursuing the matter to the UNSC where it finally imposed interna-
tional sanctions against the Iranian regime. This, in contrast to the claims that
Iran constituted part of an ‘Axis of Evil’ led to considerable policy confusion
and doubts about the intentions of the United States.
Two main assumptions were of concern to Iran’s leadership—regime
change, and military action to disable Iran’s nuclear programme. Both regime
change, and the possibility of military action, especially after the 2003 inva-
sion of Iraq, significantly undermined the Iranian regime’s trust in the United
States as negotiating in good faith, and it created further doubts about the
true intentions of the United States. This chapter will highlight the flawed
strategy the Bush administration utilized here and the way in which the very
real concerns about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, articulated in
alarmist ways, undermined their efforts to resolve the matter diplomatically.
REFERRAL TO THE UNSC
On January 12, 2006, the EU3 released a statement declaring Iran’s rejection
of the EU3 proposal, its resumption of enrichment activity and removal of
IAEA seals from equipment at its uranium enrichment facility at Isfahan, and
55
56 Chapter 3
its refusal to adequately answer all outstanding questions about its nuclear
programme, including deeply troubling questions about its links with the
AQ Khan network. This left the EU3 with little option but to call for an
Extraordinary IAEA Board meeting with the intention of requesting a referral
of the issue to the UN Security Council.1 The statement reiterated the EU3’s
contention that ‘the need for Iran to build confidence has been and continues
to be the heart of the matter’ and that the dispute was not between Iran and
Europe but was a matter of concern to the whole international community.2
In noticeably more forceful language, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice, in a statement of support for the EU3 declaration, stated in a press brief-
ing that the Bush administration
agree that the removal of seals by the Iranian Government, in defiance of numer-
ous IAEA Board resolutions, demonstrates that it has chosen confrontation with
the international community over cooperation and negotiation. As the EU-3 and
EU have declared, these provocative actions by the Iranian regime have shat-
tered the basis for negotiation.3
On February 4, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution refer-

ring the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme to the UN Security Council.4
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ‘vowed to “resist any pres-
sure or threat”’ and Iran’s president Ahmadinejad was quoted by Iranian state
television as saying ‘we will not bend to a few countries’ threats, as their
demands for giving up our nation’s rights are unfair and cruel’.5
In March, President Bush released the 2006 NSS. In this report, the issue
of Iran’s nuclear programme was referred to as one of the greatest security
challenges facing America.6 The 2006 NSS also restated the Bush adminis-
tration’s commitment to deal with the broader issue of WMD proliferation.
President Bush outlined a proposal for an international system that would
supply states with nuclear energy without the need for states to develop their
own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.7 This was a clear message that
the Iranian ambition of mastering the complete fuel cycle, including enrich-
ment and reprocessing, would never be acceptable to the United States.
President Bush also made clear reference to his administration’s desire for
regime change in Iran. In a speech to the graduating class at the Merchant
Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York, on June 19, 2006, President Bush
announced that his administration was providing $75 million ‘to promote
openness and freedom for the Iranian people’.8 He went on to argue that
the Iranian people ‘want and deserve an opportunity to determine their own
future, an economy that rewards their intelligence and talents, and a society
that allows them to pursue their dreams’.9 At a time when the UNSC was
negotiating a resolution that would be acceptable to all members, including
Policy Confusion and Regional Instability 57
permanent members, Russia and China, such rhetoric was evidence of the
Bush administration’s determination, despite diplomatic efforts, to prevent
Iran from ever acquiring the expertise needed to create a nuclear weapon. It
also made clear that the administration was committed to the policy of regime
change. While this desire was certainly not unique to President Bush, the
strategy of pursuing a diplomacy solution while also publicly desiring regime
change suggests confusion about how best to deal with the issue.
In a sudden shift in policy, Secretary of State Rice stated that the Bush
administration would be willing to join the EU3 in direct talks with Iran’s
leaders on the nuclear issue. She stipulated, however, that they would only
engage directly with the Iranian regime ‘as soon as Iran fully and verifiably
suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities’.10 In an article in The
New Yorker, Seymour Hersh argued that this apparent shift in policy was not
quite so significant when one considered the condition placed on Iran. He
questions whether ‘Iran, which has insisted on its right to enrich uranium, was
being asked to concede the main point of the negotiations before they started.
The question was whether the Administration expected the Iranians to agree,
or was laying the diplomatic groundwork for future military action’.11
On July 31, 2006, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1696, which demanded
that Iran suspend all ‘enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including
research and development’ or face the possibility of economic and diplomatic
sanctions.12 At the Security Council meeting, Iran expressed its unhappiness
with the turn of events by once again asserting that its programme was for
peaceful purposes and that ‘dealing with the issue in the Council was, there-
fore, unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility’.13
In August, President Bush stated:
We know the death and suffering that Iran’s sponsorship of terrorists has
brought, and we can imagine how much worse it would be if Iran were allowed
to acquire nuclear weapons. Many nations are working together to solve this
problem. The United Nations passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend
its nuclear enrichment activities. Today is the deadline for Iran’s leaders to reply
to the reasonable proposal the international community has made. If Iran’s lead-
ers accept this offer and abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions, they can set
their country on a better course. Yet, so far, the Iranian regime has responded
with further defiance and delay. It is time for Iran to make a choice. We’ve made
our choice: We will continue to work closely with our allies to find a diplomatic
solution—but there must be consequences for Iran’s defiance, and we must not
allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.14
In December 2006, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1737,

which called on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment activities and answer
any outstanding questions raised by the IAEA. It also called on all member
58 Chapter 3
states to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of any materials that could
contribute to the nuclear programme or Iran’s weapons delivery systems.15
In response to this, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, Mohammad Ali
Hosseini, stated that the resolution ‘cannot affect or limit Iran’s peaceful
nuclear activities but will discredit the decisions of the Security Council,
whose power is deteriorating’.16 Iran continued to work on its nuclear pro-
gramme, and the United States continued to warn the regime that it would not
allow it to possess nuclear weapons. Both sides acknowledged the need for
dialogue on the issue, but the United States refused to talk directly to the Ira-
nian regime until it promised to cease all enrichment activities. Iran’s leaders
stated that they were open to the prospect of direct talks, but that they would
not suspend uranium enrichment.17
UNSC Resolution 1747 was passed in March 2007. It extended the sanc-
tions imposed by UNSC Resolution 1737 to include freezing the assets of
certain entities and individuals connected to the nuclear programme.18 It also
offered a series of economic and political incentives that included dialogue
on security issues and guarantees for the supply of fuel for Iran’s nuclear
reactors.19 Ali Larijani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security
Council, and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, responded by saying that ‘the
Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to negotiate only on non-diversion of its
nuclear program for military purposes, and not on its nuclear rights’.20
On October 25, 2007, Secretary of State Rice announced that the United
States had designated Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Quds
Force as terrorist organizations.21 The rationale behind this decision was to
target the economic and commercial interests of these organizations, which
the United States accused of transferring arms to Hamas, Hezbollah and to
Shia militant groups in Iraq.22 ‘Anyone doing business with these people will
have to reevaluate their actions immediately’, said a US official familiar with
the plan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the decision had
not been announced. ‘It increases the risks of people who have until now
ignored the growing list of sanctions against the Iranians. It makes clear to
everyone who the IRGC and their related businesses really are. It removes the
excuses for doing business with these people.’23
In November 2007, the US government released the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE). The NIE made several key judgements about Iran’s nuclear
weapons programme. Its most significant finding, and one that caused contro-
versy in Washington, read ‘we judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,
Tehran halted its nuclear program.’ It went on to say:
Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less deter-
mined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.
Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to
international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the

issue than we judged previously.
It later argued that ‘only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear

weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing
nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible’. The report
ended by stating ‘we assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific,
technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it
decides to do so’.24
The impact of the release of the NIE in Washington was significant. It
seemed to undermine and indeed highlight the inaccuracy of the Bush admin-
istration’s dire predictions of how soon Iran would have a bomb. The recom-
mendation implied by this new intelligence assessment was that there was
still time for diplomacy to work. As an editorial in The Economist pointed
out, however, the effect of the report would most likely make it even harder
to make any progress on the diplomatic front. In many ways, the release of
the NIE appeared to have weakened the sense of urgency in finding a resolu-
tion to the nuclear issue.25 Ali Ansari has argued that the NIE was evidence
of serious concerns within the US intelligence community that the United
States might actually pursue a military option against Iran. Ansari argued that
it did appear as though ‘the intelligence agencies were so worried about what
Bush might do, that they wanted to put the kibosh on it. But from an Iranian
perspective, it looked as if Ahmadinejad had got away with it again’.26
In early 2008, a third UNSC Resolution was passed, furthering sanctions
against Iranian banks and freezing the assets of various government officials.
It also prohibited the sale to Iran of materials that could have a dual military
and civilian use.27 Throughout 2008, the Bush administration was under sig-
nificant pressure to resolve the issue before leaving office. In particular there
were factions within the White House who were seriously pushing for the
military option. Vice President Dick Cheney consistently called for the mat-
ter to be dealt with militarily. In an interview several months after leaving
office, Vice President Cheney argued ‘that negotiations could not possibly
succeed unless the Iranians really believed we were prepared to use military
force’28.
Within the Pentagon there was widespread opposition to the military
option, with chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, stating
that a military strike on Iran would only create more instability in the region.29
It was also suggested that Admiral Mullen was leading a concerted push to
resist White House pressure regarding the military option.30
Also of serious concern to the White House was the prospect of Israeli
military action against Iran’s nuclear programme. In an interview with direc-
tor of research, Patrick Clawson, conducted at his office at the Washington
60 Chapter 3
Institute for Near East Policy in Washington D.C., the very real possibility
that Israel would pre-emptively attack Iran was discussed:
Well the great problem that we face on this matter is that for us this is a big
problem, but for Israel, it’s arguably an existential problem. And . . .  if they
regard it as an existential problem, they’re likely to take action long before we
will take action.31
By the end of 2008, as George W. Bush was preparing to leave office and
hand over the Presidency to Barack Obama, it was difficult to assess what the
United States had achieved. While its stated goal had always been to prevent
Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, it had become increasingly clear that
Iran could develop the expertise and infrastructure long before they ever con-
sidered building a weapon. Diplomacy and sanctions had signally failed to
convince Iran to cease work on the uranium enrichment and fuel-reprocessing
aspects of its programme, two aspects that could be directly linked to the
development of nuclear weapons.
TO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE
As the United States became more outspoken in its condemnation of the

programme and of the Iranian regime, Iran’s leaders managed to turn this
issue into one of national pride, a cause behind which both conservatives and
liberals could join in bipartisan support. This raised the stakes considerably
for Iran’s leaders, as the widespread public support for the programme as a
national symbol of defiance towards America made it highly unlikely that
the Iranian leadership could compromise without significant incentives being
offered.
Alongside the nationalist rhetoric, there were also important security con-
cerns that added to the reluctance of the Iranian leadership to back down.
Before the US invasion of Iraq, Iran was prepared to talk to the United States
about halting uranium enrichment and finding a reasonable compromise.
After the Iraq war and the subsequent insurgency there, Iran’s influence in
the region expanded. The United States had removed the two main threats
to Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The result
was that Iran became by default the most powerful state in the region. While
increasing Iranian influence, however, there were also compelling reasons
for the Iranian regime to still feel under threat. With American troops in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran was almost completely surrounded by US military.
While there are some who argue that President Bush’s approach to dealing
with Iran’s leaders over the nuclear issue was at least partly influenced by
neoconservatism, this appears to have mainly been the case at the rhetorical
level.32 The idea of regime change was certainly a feature of the Bush admin-
istration’s thinking about how to deal with Tehran, yet the administration
was largely reluctant to put into action such a policy. The antagonism and
reluctance of the administration to meaningfully engage Iran was the result
of both ideological and structural, or institutional factors. ‘The ideology was
underpinned and reinforced by decades of historical mythology, which nei-
ther side had the political will nor mechanisms to challenge.’ He goes on to
explain that these ideological patterns ‘were being reinforced by bureaucratic
structures, which were naturally given to inertia’.33
While relations between the two countries had been hostile since the
Islamic Revolution in 1979, and the severing of all diplomatic ties, the gen-
eral attitude of the United States was guided by pragmatism and the logic of
containment. Open confrontation was certainly not a priority. Ray Takeyh, a
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a prominent scholar of
Iranian history and foreign policy, explains the political impasse between the
two as the result of a decades-long misunderstanding, on both sides, of each
state’s interests and motivations.34 He argues this is as true today as it was
in 1979. As an example he cites Iran’s involvement in Iraq as the result of
realistic strategic assessments of Iran’s interests, not, as some would argue, a
desire to see scores of Americans dying in Iraq.35 For this reason, a practical
and realistic solution can only be found when both parties develop a deeper
understanding of what motivates each state to act the way they do.36 This
includes acknowledging the motivations behind Iran’s persistent defiance of
the international community over the nuclear issue.
Iran’s reluctance to engage with the United States has to a certain degree
been the de-facto policy in Tehran since the revolution. In the context of US
unipolarity, the inability of the United States to change Iran’s behaviour can
be read as a serious challenge to American unilateral power. Yet even consid-
ering the fact of American unipolarity, under the Bush administration, policy
options regarding Iran’s nuclear programme were to some extent dependent
on the degree of cooperation or resistance from other major powers. America
at the time characterized Iran as the greatest threat to global security, and yet
other major powers, most notably Russia and China, remained sceptical of
this justification.
Direct engagement with Iran’s leaders was one of the least favoured policy
options recommended to President Bush and his administration. Any possi-
bility of talks between the two states was always conditional, with President
Bush demanding Iran cease all uranium enrichment-related activities and
cease its support for terrorist organizations before the United States could
agree to sit down at the table with them. This reluctance to establish direct
diplomatic contact with Iran’s leaders at times seemed counter-intuitive.
62 Chapter 3
A particularly revealing example was the Bush administration’s reluctance to

seek Iran’s support for the reconstruction process in Iraq.
A telling episode during the Bush presidency helps illustrate how the emo-
tional rhetoric that had often been used regarding Iran, such as the ‘axis of
evil’, begged the question as to whether it was ‘possible to have a dialogue
with a state that was evil?’.37 In December 2006, a report was released by the
Iraq Study Group (ISG) that identified the major problems in Iraq, as well as
the many challenges that the United States faced in averting further deterio-
ration of the security situation. The report painted a bleak picture of a state
on the brink of civil war, beset by widespread violence, corruption, rampant
crime, weak institutions and the absence of the provision of basic goods and
services. Co-chaired by former secretary of State James A. Baker III and
former US Democrat Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, the ISG made a series
of recommendations to the American government, recommending that they
needed to pursue both an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ approach.38
The external approach proved to be quite controversial, sparking consider-
able debate. The ISG argued that it was necessary for the United States to
engage all of Iraq’s neighbours, including Iran and Syria, in a ‘support struc-
ture’ to stabilize Iraq.39 The Bush administration responded to the recommen-
dations by acknowledging the need to work more closely with some states,
such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, it continued to refuse diplomatic
engagement with Iran and Syria.
The arguments for engaging Iran were persuasive. There were grave costs
associated with Iraq further disintegrating into chaos and civil war, not only
for the United States but also for Iran. At the time, it was believed that the
violence could have spread beyond Iraq’s borders, forcing other states to
become involved to protect their interests and internal security. There also
seemed to be a possibility that foreign troops could potentially become
involved inside Iraq, which would have further inflamed the situation inter-
nally, while increasing tensions between major players in the region. Given
the tensions between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria and the other regional
states, the possibility that conflict within Iraq could trigger a broader regional
conflict was not unreasonable.
There were two key suggestions from the ISG report on possible induce-
ments the United States could offer to convince Iran that cooperation on
Iraq was in its interest: the first included recognizing Iran’s right to pursue
a self-sufficient nuclear programme for peaceful purposes (with important
caveats), reassurance from the United States that it did not seek to destabilize
the regime in Iran, and the ‘establishment of a new regional framework based
on collective security and pledges of non-interference in domestic affairs’.40
Yet Washington was still flatly refusing to engage Iran without significant pre-
conditions. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed that a nuclear-capable
Iran was too high a price to pay for stability in Iraq.41 In the case of Iran, it
had become clear that through the consistent reliance on values-driven, overly
ideological political rhetoric, President Bush had made it seemingly impossible
to engage Iran without fundamentally undermining perceptions of American
power and the moral legitimacy for their actions in the region.
The options that were being debated in Washington reflected the fear that
a nuclear-capable Iran would pose a serious threat to American security. Yet
when confronting the nuclear issue, the options available to the United States
were, and remain, quite limited. The difficult position that the Bush admin-
istration found itself in vis-à-vis Iran has drawn attention to the much deeper
problems inherent in the Bush Doctrine, namely the vast difference between
unilateralist rhetoric, and the resources and capability of US foreign policy
institutions. Indeed, Ansari makes the argument that this reflected a deep
level of confusion about America’s overall strategy for dealing with Iran.42
It also highlighted the weaknesses in the Bush administration’s policy of
democracy promotion in the Middle East. While very few policy analysts in
Washington were openly calling for the kind of policy to be pursued in Iraq,
democracy promotion through forced regime change, this remained a key ele-
ment of some recommendations regarding Iran. The military option was seen
as a last resort, and in the light of ongoing problems in Iraq, a very risky one.
Perhaps because of a reluctance to repeat the same mistakes as had been made
in Iraq, democracy promotion in Iran was pursued through funding for NGOs
and democracy assistance programmes.43 This apparent retreat from President
Bush’s statements early in his presidency about aggressively confronting
threats to American security began to frustrate many of the neoconservatives
who had supported his policies.
THE NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT
The nuclear issue dominated the Bush administration’s concerns about Iran.
The issue over whether or not the nuclear programme was intended for
domestic energy purposes or whether it contained a clandestine weapons
component remained largely unanswered despite rigorous and continued
IAEA inspections. One of the broader issues that the Iranian nuclear pro-
gramme has highlighted is the desire by many non-nuclear weapon states
to have access to nuclear energy for domestic purposes. The possibility that
peaceful nuclear energy programmes could be diverted to develop nuclear
weapons has been a significant concern. The NPT was created in part to deal
with this problem. The NPT requires its signatories to not develop or acquire
nuclear weapons (Article II), and to accept safeguards and agree to their
implementation by the IAEA under Article III.44 What the Iranian case has
64 Chapter 3
drawn attention to is the very real possibility for states to develop a nuclear
power programme in compliance with their commitments under the NPT
while covertly developing a latent weapons capability.45
The stalemate between the United States and Iran on this issue cannot be
separated from the other forces that were at play, and have been of significant
influence in the relationship between the two states for decades. The level of
mistrust and suspicion on both sides was deeply rooted in the historical expe-
riences of both, events like the 1952 coup against Mohammad Mossaddeq
and the 1979 American hostage crisis, played an important role in shaping
each state’s perceptions. The antagonism exhibited by both sides at various
times throughout President Bush’s terms in office inevitably resulted in the
perception by many that the issue was one of US–Iran animosity and was part
of the decades-long hostility between the two states.
Despite the occasional tendency towards alarmist predictions regarding
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons by many Washington officials, the nuclear
issue was not just about political opportunism. The issue of nuclear prolif-
eration is one of those significant global concerns, like global warming, that
will require an unprecedented level of international cooperation in order
to confront it. The Bush administration’s rhetoric reflected, therefore, deep
concern about the potential impact for the Middle East region, and the world,
if another state was able to successfully add itself to the nuclear club. The
strategy pursued by the Bush administration, however, did not match that
concern. Too often the problem of nuclear proliferation and the safeguards
regime were obscured by the emotional nature of US–Iran relations.
This also obscured some of the deeper implications of the legitimate inter-
national concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and the failure of the
international community to find a way to resolve the issue that reflected the
interests of the parties involved. As Asli U Bali has pointed out, there are dif-
ficult questions that the current non-proliferation regime has so far not been
able to address. He writes:
The basic bargain underlying the nonproliferation regime—already under

assault as a result of nuclear weapon states’ failure to disarm and the limitations
on meaningful civilian nuclear energy cooperation between the weapons states
and the non-weapons states—was dealt another blow as the right to civilian
nuclear energy programs for non-weapons states was called into question. The
energy needs of the developing world in the next century are clearly going to
require the rapid development of alternatives to fossil fuel consumption. The
energy needs of the developing world are therefore setting the stage for a cen-
tury in which the expansion of the use of nuclear of energy is a near certainty.46
There was always a significant difference in the way the Americans

and Europeans portrayed the nuclear problem. For the United States, the
confrontation with Iran over its nuclear programme was clearly about
whether or not Iran could be allowed to develop the expertise to build a
nuclear weapon. For the Europeans, however, at least initially, the issue was
about verifying whether Iran had complied with its obligations under the
NPT, and therefore it reflected the broader concerns about the strength of the
global non-proliferation safeguards regime.
Ansari has persuasively argued that the nuclear matter became so impor-
tant for the United States because it provided an opportunity to challenge
the Iranian regime on a tangible issue. Prior to 2002 ‘Iran was basically
being criticised on three aspects: terrorism, the peace process, and weapons
of mass destruction. But the weapons of mass destruction they were looking
at were basically chemical and biological weapons.’47 Yet, on these issues
there was very little evidence that could actually be tied to the regime in
Tehran.
But the nuclear issue was clear. The nuclear thing was a legal problem. Within
the European framework it was legal, it was specific, it was precise. So the
origins of the problem was political but the reason the nuclear issue suddenly
became the most prominent issue is because in diplomatic terms you can do
something about it.48
Ansari maintains that the Iranians fundamentally misunderstood the nature

of the issue.
While they saw it as a purely political matter that could be resolved
through political negotiation, they missed the fact that for the United States
the political legal argument was a means to an end. It was an opportunity to
increase the costs for Iran on other issues that were less tangible:
Of course in some ways the motivations are political, but because it’s politi-
cal it makes it more serious because they’re not going to let it go. And the
Americans and the Europeans have suddenly realised that you’ve given them
the opportunity to go at you on an issue of legal technicality almost, you know
on the NPT and whether they’d adhered to it or not. It’s tangible. And that was
the problem.49
In other words, confronting Iran over terrorism, or its belligerence towards

Israel, was complicated and less clear-cut than the nuclear issue.
REGIME CHANGE
The accusation from many Iranian officials that the American policy of
democracy promotion in the Middle East was actually a smokescreen for a
66 Chapter 3
policy of regime change was understandable. In a speech to the American

Enterprise Institute, President Bush stated:
The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable
and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the
peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for free-
dom in the Middle East . . .  . A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic
and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.50
After the initial success of the US invasion of Iraq, it quickly became clear
that there had been almost no substantive post-war planning.
As the security situation deteriorated and the country split largely along
sectarian lines, critics questioned not only the wisdom of the Bush admin-
istration’s desire to see democratic government in Iraq, but also its commit-
ment to such a policy. As a result of this the prospect of military intervention
in Iran diminished and President Bush and the State Department had to rely
on policy tools centred on public diplomacy and funding for various govern-
ment and NGO programmes.51 This resulted in a strategy that was quite simi-
lar in approach to both the George H. W. Bush and Clinton presidencies and
consequently fell far short of the goals outlined in the 2006 NSS regarding
the democratic transformation of the Middle East.
The legal framework for the Bush administration’s Iran policy consisted
of several bills and resolutions passed by both houses of Congress. In 2003,
the United States Senate passed the Iran Democracy Act that explicitly stated
that it was US policy ‘to support transparent, full democracy in Iran’.52 The
2006 Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 6198, 109th Congress) aimed ‘to hold
the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to
support a transition to democracy in Iran’. Section 301 stated that it should
be US policy
(1) to support efforts by the people of Iran to exercise self-determination over

the form of government of their country; and (2) to support independent human
rights and peaceful prodemocracy forces in Iran. (b) Nothing in this Act shall be
construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran.53
Opposition to the bill within Congress was led by Congressman Dennis J.

Kucinich, the ranking member on the House Government Reform Subcom-
mittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations,
who likened the bill to the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, and warned that
despite the clause stipulating that it did not pave the way for military inter-
vention in Iran, the bill did make it clear that the United States supported
regime change rather than a change in the behaviour of the Iranian govern-
ment. This, he argued, made the task of finding a diplomatic solution to the
nuclear issue extremely problematic.54
In a statement applauding Congress for passing the Iran Freedom Support

Act into law, President Bush claimed that the bill was designed to ‘facilitate
America’s support for the Iranian people in their efforts to build a just, free,
and peaceful society’.55 The Iran Freedom Support Act was a clear example
of Congress adopting law that in many ways was in contradiction to the inter-
ests of the United States. When talking about the Iran Freedom Support Act,
it was important to remember that
the legislation was voted by Congress and Congress is an autonomous organiza-

tion. The separation of powers in the United States is very real and Congress
very often votes on the basis of pressure from lobbies within constituencies of
individual members of Congress, so that what comes out of the Congress is not
necessarily something which makes sense from the point of view of the overall
policies of the United States but is something which is a summing up of local
interests which in the end leads to this.56
The Iran Freedom Support Act was clearly aimed at supporting regime
change.
This appeared to present a contradiction with the Bush administration’s
claim that it was committed to finding a diplomatic solution regarding Iran’s
nuclear programme and its desire to avoid an escalation of the conflict. And
yet the commitment to diplomacy was hampered significantly by the admin-
istration’s reluctance to talk directly to the Iranians. As will be discussed in
more detail in chapter 6, the United States consistently relied on third par-
ties—as had previous presidents—such as its European allies and the IAEA,
to do the actual negotiating.
Marina Ottaway, an expert on US democracy promotion, argued in an
interview with this author in 2009 that this aversion to talking directly to the
leadership in Tehran signalled a significant ‘change in US policy in general
because the United States has always relied on diplomacy, has always taken
the position that you talk not only to your friends, but you also talk to your
enemies. The United States talked to the Soviets in the darkest period of the
Cold War.’ She argues that this was because the United States and the USSR
understood that you are less likely to enter into conflict with a country you
are talking to, when you understand the other side’s position and interests:
So that when the Bush Administration took this position that you only talk to the
good guys, essentially, that talks are the candy that you give to the children that
have behaved well, that was a real departure from US foreign policy.57
Ottaway argued that this legislation was extremely dangerous and that it
crossed the line ‘openly between democracy promotion and regime over-
throw’.58 Ottaway’s view reflects the often cautious approach that tradition-
ally characterizes Washington’s foreign policy institutions like the State
68 Chapter 3
Department and the Department of Defense, an attitude that is frequently

at odds with the ideologically ambitious rhetoric employed by most US
presidents.
Through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) at the Department of State, and
the Office of Iranian Affairs within the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the
Department of State (established in 2006), the Bush administration funded
programmes that provided
training to Iranian NGOs in management practices, democratic values, and

civic practices, along with promoting sharing of information among activists
and organizations; Educational, cultural, and professional exchanges that bring
Iranians to the United States to study a variety of issues, giving them exposure to
functioning democratic institutions and establishing ties to the next generation
of Iranian leaders; [and] Efforts to increase the availability of information about
democratic values to Iranians through Persian language print and online publi-
cations and speaker programs featuring experts on issues such as rule of law.59
The Bush administration targeted three key areas in its support for democ-
racy in Iran: NGOs, exchange programmes and print and radio broadcasts.
The administration’s involvement in each of these areas generated significant
problems and raised serious questions about the wisdom and effectiveness of
these programmes.
Kenneth Katzman’s report prepared for the US Congress titled Iran: US
Concerns and Policy Reponses, which was a detailed breakdown of funding
requested by the Bush administration and granted by Congress for democ-
racy promotion programmes in Iran, illustrates the extent to which the Bush
administration was focusing its resources and energy on regime change in
Iran.
Between 2004 and 2006, the US State Department requested between
$1.5 million and $11 million for programmes aimed at supporting democracy
in Iran. In 2006, Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, went before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and asked for $75 million as part of a supple-
mental to the FY2006 budget to ‘be spent on advancing freedom and human
rights within Iran’.60 The funding was then allocated to the Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG) for International Broadcasting Operations; MEPI;
the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) for Internet and other
interactive programming; and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
(ECA) for education and cultural exchanges between America and Iran.61
There was widespread concern about the impact such a significant increase
in funding for democracy promotion support would have on activist groups
within Iran. The US government consistently claimed that ‘the money would
probably be concentrated on groups seeking to document human rights

abuses and promote women’s and labor rights, rather than groups seeking
direct political change’.62 The details of recipients of US funding, however,
was classified and as such, the secrecy surrounding the funding allocation
gave the Iranian regime an excuse to harass and arrest Iranian political activ-
ists, accusing them of being foreign agents and traitors.63
In a joint letter organized by the National Iranian American Council and
published by the Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a group of
Iranian civil society activists called on the United States Congress to abandon
their democracy funding for Iran, claiming that it carried on the tradition of
US government interference in Iran’s domestic affairs and impeded the indig-
enous support for democracy.64 The authors of the letter went on to argue that
the funding allocated by Congress had ignored Iranians’ hatred of outside
interference in their affairs, that it had fuelled the Iranian regime’s paranoia
about US intentions and that this had made it harder for civil society activists
to operate, thus undermining ‘home grown civil society initiatives’, and that
the secrecy surrounding the recipients of such funding had only increased
the level of mistrust and suspicion between the two governments.65 Human
Rights Watch added its voice to the growing opposition to the funding, argu-
ing that ‘giving tens of millions of dollars to support Iranian activists inside
Iran is counterproductive . . . . It supports Iranian government efforts to cast
activists as foreign agents.’66
The Iranian government’s backlash against those seen as working with
the United States to overthrow the Islamic regime gained significant inter-
national attention with the arrest and imprisonment in 2007 of four Iranian-
Americans. Haleh Esfandiari was perhaps the most prominent detainee. As
the director of the Middle East Program at the Washington-based Woodrow
Wilson Centre, she was accused of trying to destabilize the Islamic Repub-
lic while visiting her mother in Iran. She was held in Tehran’s Evin Prison
for four months before being released and allowed to return to America.
She afterwards wrote that during her imprisonment her interrogators had
explained to her the suspicions about US foreign policy towards Iran that had
led them to arrest her.
This is the belief that the Bush Administration, entangled in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, no longer contemplates military action against Iran. Rather, it hopes to
encourage a ‘velvet’ revolution, like the peaceful ones that occurred in Georgia
and Ukraine. To achieve this end, it uses think tanks, foundations and even
universities to organize workshops for Iranian women, to invite Iranian opinion-
makers and scholars to conferences and to offer them fellowships. In time, the
officials believe, the Administration hopes to create a network of like-minded
people in Iran who are intent on regime change.67
70 Chapter 3
In response to the controversy, Senator Joseph Lieberman, in an interview

with Radio Free Europe, responded to criticism of the funding by arguing that
the United States was merely making the money available to Iranian groups.
Those groups would then be able to make the decision about whether or not
to accept that funding.68
In a sense the argument being made was that if political reformists were
wary of accepting American assistance there was nothing preventing them
from refusing it. Unfortunately, this did not quite address the concern that
the Iranian government would use the excuse of covert American funding to
target political activists regardless of whether they received support or not.
In an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, Esfandiari and Robert
S. Litwak, the vice president for Programs and director for International
Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, argued that the Bush admin-
istration’s policy of supporting democracy and regime change in Iran did sig-
nificantly more harm than good. They argued that the cultural and education
exchange aspect of the government’s policy had led to academics, journalists
and members of NGOs in particular being targeted by their government for
colluding with the United States.
The Iranian regime repeatedly accused individuals who had spent time in
America of having been in touch with intelligence agencies and policy mak-
ers in order to spy on Iran on behalf of the United States.69 As well as the
inevitable risk to individuals of punishment by the Iranian regime, a broader
consequence of this, the authors argued, was a significant diminishment
in dialogue between the two countries.70 Given the absence of diplomatic
contact at the government level, cultural and educational communication
between Iranians and Americans provided the greatest opportunity for pro-
moting a shift in each state’s attitude towards the other. It was also perhaps
the most realistic method for providing exposure to, and promoting ideas
about, liberal democracy and American values.
The widespread opposition to US policy among prominent Iranians contin-
ued. Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian human rights lawyer and recipient of the 2003
Nobel Peace Prize, and Muhammad Sahimi, a professor at the University of
Southern California, pointed out that the Bush administration’s meddling in
Iranian affairs was resented by many Iranians, arguing that ‘Iranian reform-
ists believe that democracy can’t be imported. It must be indigenous. They
believe that the best Washington can do for democracy in Iran is to leave
them alone. The fact is no truly nationalist and democratic group will accept
such funds.’71
In an interview with this author, Marina Ottaway endorsed this point of
view by stating that the Bush administration was pursuing a policy that was
very far from supporting actual political reform in Iran. She argued that
it would be better for the ‘US to stop providing support, cut down on the
propaganda, stop supporting the exiled organizations, which in the end are
irritants and do not achieve anything. Because frankly the change is not going
to be brought about by exiled organizations in Los Angeles.’ She continued:
My sense is, right now, just about the worst thing the US could do is to explic-
itly support the reformers, or any particular individual among the reformers,
because I think that would immediately open them up to accusations that they
are stooges of the United States and so on, and it would make it very difficult
for the regime to maintain their credibility so I think this is a situation where for
the time being, we’d be very well advised to stay out of the domestic political
scene completely.72
In a similar vein to this view, Ali Ansari argued in an interview conducted

in 2011 that the democracy promotion programme probably had far less prac-
tical impact than was frequently claimed:
The whole democracy agenda, had very little . . .  practical effect in Iran,
because I think a lot of the changes in Iran were going on anyway, a lot of
the changes were going on in the 1990s, well before the Americans were even
awake to the fact that anything was going on in Iran. What it did do though,
[was] probably a lot of damage, particularly in terms of those conspiracy theo-
rists in Iran who saw the duplicity of American foreign policy.73
Ansari went on to argue that the impact of US democracy promotion was

ineffective partly as a result of structural factors. The foreign policy insti-
tutions within the US make it extremely difficult for radical policies to be
effectively implemented. The reason for this has
to do with the fact that if you want to get anything done in America you have to
go through so many different channels and hurdles and you have to get so many
different people to agree, and everyone has to have their say that actually what
emerges out of it is too clunky for diplomacy.74
US efforts at democracy promotion were particularly vulnerable to this

bureaucratic confusion.
The covert nature of much of the Bush administration’s democracy promo-
tion efforts regarding Iran seriously undermined not just US credibility, but
also the possibility for open debate about reform in Iran. One of the main
concerns of opponents of the Bush administration’s funding initiative was
its secretive nature. The recipients of the funding were regarded as classified
information and thus the Iranian government regarded all reformers, political
activists, members of NGOs, intellectuals and journalists sympathetic to politi-
cal reform as potential enemies of the state. Yet the alternative—declassifying
72 Chapter 3
this list of recipients, would have been even more disastrous for the safely
of those activists receiving US support within Iran. The problem was further
complicated by the assertion that President Bush had expanded his covert
operations inside Iran in order to prevent the Iranian regime from developing
its nuclear programme and potentially a nuclear weapon.
In an article in The New Yorker, Seymour Hersh claimed that this had been
confirmed by current and former military and intelligence officials.75 In a
later article he claimed that President Bush had signed a presidential finding
in which he sought up to $400 million from Congress for covert activities
against Iran.76 The covert activities included support for minority dissident
groups within Iran. The expansion of destabilizing and intelligence gather-
ing within Iran that Hersh claimed this funding covered was largely aimed at
disrupting Iran’s progress on its nuclear programme.
In an article published in 2005, Michael McFaul, a pre-eminent scholar on
democracy promotion and Iran, argued that unlike many of the other coun-
tries in the Middle East, Iran has the most favourable conditions for the devel-
opment of a stable democracy. He argued that national unity, high levels of
education and literacy, and a significant wealthy middle class all boded well
for the country’s prospects for making an eventual transition to democracy.
He also argued that the likelihood of it successfully consolidating a political
transition were also high.77 He also points out that Iran has a long history of
democratic activism78 dating back to the early 1900s when Iran elected its
first parliament.
Since the Islamic Revolution, the debate has ebbed and flowed but certain
themes have remained consistent:
the relative powers of the state, social forces, and civil society institutions; the
scope of social freedoms and individual rights; the role of religion in politics;
oscillation between populist policies and the mercantile economy; and the cen-
trality of nationalism and discourse on culture to political change.79
Outside perceptions of Iran as a repressive theocratic state often miss the

complexity and nuance of the political situation within that country, including
the often fractious and shifting balance of power between different factions.
Policy makers in Washington have been particularly prone to this kind of
oversimplification. Vali Nasr, a well-known and highly respected Iranian-
American academic, has written extensively about this very issue.
Iranian society often appears to be gripped by contradictions: a theocracy coex-

ists with limited democratic practices; a secularised middle-class youth culture
shares the public sphere with a sizable share of the populace that still puts its
trust in Khomeini and his legacy. Daily newspapers run full-page discussions
of debates between French philosophers over the meaning of ‘postmodernist
discourse’, yet the country continues to languish under the Islamic Republic.
The pull of modernity and reformism is strong, but so is that of tradition and
conservatism. Despite the influence of the latter two forces, however, Iran more
than any other society in the Muslim world is a place where fundamentals are
under scrutiny and open to questioning and new thinking.80
Much of the discourse on Iran within US policy circles often failed to

acknowledge this complexity.
HARDLINERS, PRAGMATISTS, AND REFORMERS
The main political forces in Iran are often divided into three main groups:
reformers, pragmatists and hardliners. While this is somewhat of a simpli-
fication of the range of policy attitudes across the political spectrum on a
range of issues, these categories do describe similarity of views on important
issues.81 Perhaps the most pressing concern has been how best to manage the
economy and respond to the needs of a rapidly changing state. It has become
a deeply divisive issue on which the three political factions differ markedly.
Despite broad agreement on certain issues within the different factions, it is
important to remember that none of these groups are homogenous and there
is often debate and disagreement among them.
The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and former Iranian
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are conservative hardliners. Their politics
are largely based on loyalty to the legacy of Supreme Leader Ayatollah,
Ruhollah Khomeini and his ideal of an Islamic state. To this end, the hardlin-
ers are resistant to democratic political change and their stance when it comes
to issues to do with human rights, freedom of the press, institutional reform
and any behaviour which they deem threatening to their authority has often
been violently repressive.
Ray Takeyh has argued that the hardliners are deeply influenced by an ide-
ological and religious zeal. He points out that because many of the younger
generation of hardliners are veterans of the Iran–Iraq war, they are also deeply
suspicious of international treaties and international law. He claims that ‘as
Iran’s revolution matures and the politicians that were present at the creation
of the Islamic Republic gradually recede from the scene, a more dogmatic
generation is beginning to take hold of the reins of power’.82 Religious piety
and the observance of strict interpretations of Islamic law guide their views
on cultural issues to foreign affairs. As the demographics change within the
country, however, these conservative attitudes have become less appealing
to the younger generation. Conservative hardliners and younger people have
repeatedly clashed over issues such as strict dress codes for women and the
74 Chapter 3
segregation of the sexes, and the rising tensions between different forces in
society have become more evident.
The hardliners are also deeply conservative when it comes to the economy.
They have resisted calls for the modernization of the economy and are still
committed to the bonyads, charitable trusts that provide social welfare and
are effectively beyond state oversight and control. The bonyads were ‘chari-
table’ foundations under Shah Pahlavi’s regime—essentially holdings for the
regime’s wealth. After the Islamic Revolution, the bonyads were national-
ized. There is, however, still widespread criticism that these foundations
are monopolies protected from competition and that they control too large
a proportion of the Iranian economy with some estimates claiming that they
account for more than 20 percent of Iran’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).83
The pragmatists, led by former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
(1989–97), look to China as a model, hoping to modernize Iran’s economy
while remaining politically autocratic.84 The pragmatists believe that the
stability of the regime, even its survival, depend in large part on the strength
and efficiency of the economy. Their greatest difference from the hardliners
is found in their willingness to circumvent certain aspects of Islamic law in
order to expand the bureaucracy and institutions of the Iranian economy in
order to make it more transparent and bring it in line with the global economy.
To do this, they have realized that certain cultural and political concessions
have needed to be made to the younger generation, who have called for
greater participation in and transparency of the political system.
The pragmatists are not, however, committed to democracy and the separa-
tion of religion and state. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr have argued that the
pragmatists, having lived through the revolution and the destructive Iran–Iraq
war, were instead attempting to ‘resolve the incongruities inherent in theoc-
racy and to give ‘pragmatism’ a free hand’.85 The pragmatists have been care-
ful to work within the system to gradually affect change, rather than pushing
for wholesale reform of the structures of the Iranian state.
The reform movement has many factions, some calling for complete
democratic transformation of the state, and others who wish to work within
the system, like the pragmatists, to promote greater liberalism and represen-
tational politics without losing the Islamic foundation of the state. The figure
most often identified as spearheading this movement is former president
Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). The election of President
Khatami in 1997 represented a shift in the way elections were run in Iran. He
campaigned on a platform that promoted the ideas of free speech, women’s
rights, democracy, the rule of law, and he coined the phrase ‘dialogue of civi-
lizations’. As Gheissari and Nasr have argued, Khatami’s election generated
widespread expectation, both within Iran and in the wider international world,
that this was evidence that Iran could institute ‘political change through the
ballot box rather than through Islamic reform at the top’.86
The reformists, however, were ultimately unable to deliver on their cam-
paign promises. The most powerful institutional bodies within Iran, the
Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, not to mention the office of posi-
tion of supreme leader, as well as the security forces including the IRGC,
were able to frustrate and block most of the gains made by the reformers in
government. By 2004 the expectations for radical change held by many sup-
porters of Khatami’s presidency had been largely unrealized and the result
was a significant degree of disenchantment within the reform movement.87
In 2005, the reform movement appeared to have failed as the hardline con-
servative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected to the presidency. Vali Nasr
wrote at the time that the 2005 elections were one of the most vigorously
contested in Iranian history.
The 2005 campaign was one of the most dynamic and innovative that Iran has
ever seen. It brought to the fore not only intense debates over various concep-
tions of government and social organization, economic development, and for-
eign policy, but also experimentation with new language and political styles. It
involved new methods—many openly borrowed from the West—such as focus
groups, targeted advertising, image management, and sound bites. Despite the
dynamism of the campaign, however, the outcome of the election opened new
political fissures and raised serious concerns about the prospects for democracy
in Iran.88
Ali Ansari saw the election of Ahmadinejad as a rejection of the reform

movement attempted under President Khatami. He argues that the political
system has
been systematically deconstructed over the last decade. And what you have
now is basically an absolute authority around Khamenei . . . and he makes all
the decisions . . . . This fractiousness that exists, Khamenei has encouraged. He
has to encourage it. The republican experiment that took place under Khatami,
the logic of that was, as enlightened despots the world over have discovered,
is that it makes them irrelevant. He fought against it, and what he did is he
undermined it. Now the consequences of that will be for us to see in the years
to come.89
Throughout Khatami’s presidency and the many opportunities it pre-

sented for dialogue between the United States and Iran, both countries
remained either unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to begin
repairing the damage that thirty years of hostility had done to the relation-
ship between them.
76 Chapter 3
President Bush, like past presidents, was unable to reset relations on a more
positive path. The policy of supporting democratic change in Iran, while a
response to the repressive practice of the Iranian regime, and in keeping with
the administration’s broader commitment to democracy promotion, added
to the sense of threat from the United States that Iran’s leaders frequently
claimed they were facing. The failure of the US policy to reflect the fac-
tional complexities within Iran and the constantly shifting balance of power
between them, has raised the question of whether President Bush’s democ-
racy promotion policy was implemented badly, or whether the problems that
the United States encountered with Iran reflect deeper problems with the
strategy of democracy promotion.
CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRACY AND

POLITICAL REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The conflation of democracy promotion with regime change is perhaps the

most obvious negative consequence of the Bush administration’s ‘freedom
agenda’. It justifiably caused concern for leaders in the Middle East, includ-
ing those who were allies of the United States, that the US policy masked
a policy of military expansion in the region. Authoritarian regimes were
able to exploit the rhetoric of freedom and democracy for their own ends,
claiming to be on the path to democracy while justifying their own contin-
ued repressive rule as necessary for stability in an important region. The
legitimacy of democracy promotion itself was arguably undermined by the
elevation of this policy to the forefront of US foreign strategy, most clearly
in the case of Iraq, and the weaknesses that were revealed through its uneven
implementation.
Those who blame the way in which the Bush administration implemented
the policy of democracy promotion in Iraq, rather than the idea itself, have
criticized the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for myriad
planning problems, including insufficient troop deployment at the beginning
of the war and the complete failure to adequately plan for a post-invasion
policy.90 John Ikenberry pointed out that despite the substantial disparity in
military and economic strength between the United States and the next half
dozen or so most powerful states, the costs of an expansive ‘Wilsonianism
in boots’ was expensive, it stretched American resources too thin, and at the
domestic level, the American public were increasingly reluctant to bear this
burden alone.91
Despite the problems encountered in Iraq, defenders of the neoconser-
vative belief in the efficacy of US democracy promotion do not believe it
should be abandoned altogether. Joshua Muravchik argued that ‘our efforts
to foster democracy in the Middle East must not be curtailed but prosecuted
more effectively . . . . The modest liberalization in the Middle East and the
democratic ferment that we have stirred there promise further advances if we
persevere.’92 What is clear from this statement, made in 2007, is the resistance
to abandoning the belief that the United States can use its military dominance
to affect change in the world, and that democracy promotion is still a nec-
essary and indeed, noble facet of American foreign policy that was merely
flawed in its execution.
Neoconservatives and supporters of President Bush’s policy record are not
the only ones who still hold that democracy promotion has an important role
to play in foreign policy. In a policy brief for the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Marina Ottaway characterized the Bush administration’s
policy of being ‘never clearly defined, long on rhetoric, short on strategy,
and fitfully implemented’.93 Ottaway goes on to make the important point
that because there is significant transformation in the region economically
and socially, there is a serious danger of political instability if regimes fail
to adapt to these changes. She argues that ‘the United States needs a new
approach toward regimes that are facing deep political challenges but do not
see the United States as either a model to imitate or a reliable ally’.94
In an interview that this author held with Marina Ottaway in 2009, she
offered a detailed analysis of the various ways in which the Bush administra-
tion’s policy of democracy promotion had differed from past US presidents
and the damage it had done to the idea more broadly. Describing President
Bush’s policies as “extremely counterproductive” and contributing to dete-
rioration in relations with Iran, Ottaway argued that after Afghanistan and
Iraq the ‘the lines became very blurred and what it showed was that [the US
was] much better at regime change than democracy promotion . . . . What
goes under the name of democracy promotion is very often something quite
different and not necessarily in the interests of the United States.’95
As George W. Bush prepared to leave office in January 2009, US democ-
racy promotion had become all but synonymous with President Bush’s disas-
trous reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Iran continued to
defy the international community and expand its nuclear programme. Democ-
racy promotion scholars have argued that much of the damage done to the
concept of democracy promotion, and to the credibility of the United States,
was in its coupling of that policy with US military intervention.96 Under
President Bush, the concept of democracy promotion became so tarnished
by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the belligerent relationship between
America and Iran, that it will require a concerted effort to re-establish it as a
legitimate tool of US foreign policy.
Despite the negative consequences of the Bush era strategy of democracy
promotion in the Middle East, Ottaway believes the United States should
78 Chapter 3
still support states that have chosen to adopt a more democratic form of
government.
I don’t see any problem in supporting a country where the majority of the
population has clearly made the choice for democracy or for a regime based on
popular participation. What becomes problematic is when we become part of a
power struggle within the country.97
The issue of Iran’s nuclear programme and its ongoing defiance of the
international community, and America’s seeming inability to convince Iran’s
leaders to comply with its demands, provided a serious challenge to the per-
ceptions of US influence in the region.
Added to this, any role that America plays in the region is going to be com-
plicated by the negative legacy of the past several decades of US hegemony.
Ansari aptly expresses the problem of Western involvement as the difference
between being a help or a hindrance.
Its function, if anything, is to facilitate, not to hinder . . . . If the West just did
not hinder that would be good enough. The trouble is when the West hinders.
And it has done it in the past, and it goes back to Axis of Evil, for instance. That
incident was a disaster for the reform movement.98
Ansari argues that the failure of the Americans to take advantage of the
Khatami years and the signs of a possible rapprochement with Iran resulted
not just in a missed opportunity, but in setting back the reform movement and
fundamentally undermining its legitimacy.
In some ways, you know, you talk to Americans now and they’re absolutely
kicking themselves over the Khatami period. They think they really missed
an opportunity. And they’ve said basically that we just have to wait and see
if someone of his caliber comes back again. Unfortunately, as with all these
movements, you know, Khatami was a relative moderate, and you will not get
a moderate again. Because no one [in Iran] will trust someone like Khatami
again. And it’s like with these things if you don’t allow the relative moder-
ate to make the changes that are necessary, then the next round it will be
someone more radical. And this is what will happen in Iran. I hope that the
Americans and the British and the Europeans do not get involved other than
to not hinder it.99
Restoring American credibility would go some way to militating against

the negative perceptions of US democracy promotion; however, Marina Ott-
away makes an incredibly important point by arguing that perhaps even the
language is part of the problem. She asserts:
The goal of the United States should not be to try and shape the Arab world
in the Western image of liberal democracy but to help Arab countries in the
difficult task of realigning their stagnant political systems with changing socio-
economic realities. In some cases, this realignment might lead to greater democ-
racy in the foreseeable future. In others, Western style democracy may be too
distant an idea to be worth discussing seriously at this time.100
What is important here is the subtle shift away from the language of
democracy to a more nuanced policy of supporting political transformation.
The United States would indeed have an important role to play in helping to
encourage political transitions towards ones that are based on popular partici-
pation and the protection of individual human rights.
STABILITY VERSUS REFORM
American foreign policy in the Middle East has for most of the last century
largely been driven by the desire for stability in a strategically important
region. The Cold War policy of supporting authoritarian regimes in order
to balance Soviet influence continued in the post–Cold War era. During
George W. Bush’s presidency, the United States maintained its close ties to
the regimes in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf States, over-
looking their repressive tactics and human rights abuses in order to maintain
support in the region. One of the key concerns expressed by policy makers
within the United States was the possibility of Islamist parties coming to
power through elections.
Despite its vigorous rhetoric calling for freedom and democracy to take
root in the Middle East, the Bush administration appeared to be alarmed and
completely unprepared for the outcome of the 2006 Palestinian elections
where Hamas emerged victorious. In its push for democracy in the Middle
East, Washington was confronted with the very real prospect of Islamist par-
ties coming to power. Understandably, this raised serious questions about
the efficacy of democracy promotion, as the administration regarded Islamist
groups as potentially being at odds with US interests.101 As a result of this
concern, President Bush’s foreign policy agenda in the Middle East became
less focused on pressuring friendly Arab regimes for change and more prag-
matic in its desire to maintain stability.
The extent to which Islamist parties can become more moderate as they
participate in a legitimate political process, and whether or not they are likely
to revert to a more extreme ideology once in power, are questions that cannot
be answered with any certainty. Yet the fear that this will happen has been a
key factor in Washington’s policy of supporting authoritarian regimes. It also
80 Chapter 3
appears so far to have prevented a much-needed discussion about the legiti-

mate role that Islamist parties will inevitably play in any movement towards
more representative politics in the region.
Many leaders in the Middle East implemented minor political reform,
including elections at the municipal and lower levels of government, in order
to present the appearance of moving towards political liberalization. Egypt’s
former president, Hosni Mubarak, manipulated the electoral process in Egypt
and excluded many opposition parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood,
whom he outlawed, from participating while paying lip service to the idea
of democracy. While continually promising reform, his repressive and often
violent crackdowns on political activists and protesters signalled a cynicism
and lack of respect for his own citizens, and also, and importantly, scepticism
for the idea that America would act in any way to stop him. Like Mubarak,
other leaders of authoritarian regimes have exploited Washington’s fear of
Islamist parties coming to power as an excuse to avoid real political reform.
The common argument has been that they were committed to a long-term
policy of reform, but that it would be a long-drawn-out process in the interests
of maintaining stability.
In response to the Arab uprisings in 2011, Michelle Dunn has argued that
the result of decades of political manipulation by leaders like Mubarak, and
the acquiescence of Washington, had made it practically impossible for top–
down, gradual political reform to take place. As a consequence, the peoples
of Egypt and other Middle Eastern states were demanding immediate change.
The potential for that change to be chaotic, unpredictable and inherently
destabilizing has become one of the many policy challenges for the United
States in the region.102 Serious questions were raised about the costs of rapid
political transformation that seemed to be the consequence of the Bush
administration’s push for rapid democratization.
Considerable evidence exists suggesting that countries making the transi-
tion to democracy are often more vulnerable to internal and civil conflicts,
a phenomenon witnessed extensively since the end of the Cold War.103 Both
Afghanistan and Iraq provide constant reminders of the internal turmoil and
violence that can accompany rapid political transformation when instigated
from the outside. Likewise, the political transitions in post-2011 Egypt, Tuni-
sia, Libya and Yemen have been anything but peaceful.
The possibility of political reform in Iran, if it occurred, would likely be
just as chaotic and unpredictable as it has been in other Arab states. For the
United States to play a positive role would require a humble and nuanced
approach, one that was led by clear assessments of reality rather than ideo-
logical assumptions. It would mean recognition by Americans that much
of their attitude towards Iran is deeply emotional and ideological. Ansari
describes the problem by saying that ‘the trouble with American politics in
terms of Iran is that it does swing from one extreme to the other . . . . They
either have to put their hands up in despair, or they decide they want regime
change. There’s no middle of the road’.104
CONCLUSION
Democracy promotion has a strong pedigree in the history of American for-

eign policy. US presidents frequently renew their commitment to the ideals of
freedom and liberty. Pledging American support for the struggle for freedom
by people across the globe has the power to inject moral purpose into stra-
tegic policy. The desire to see the spread of liberal democracies has almost
always had bipartisan support. Yet there has never been any consensus on the
precise role that the United States should play in this endeavour. The age-old
question for Americans, whether to lead by example or by force, has contin-
ued to make the policy of democracy promotion a difficult one to implement.
Support for freedom and democracy in other parts of the world had been a
common feature of every US presidency since Woodrow Wilson. America’s
role as the champion of freedom and liberty across the globe became one of
the defining features of American foreign policy during the Cold War. The
framing of America’s role as a force for ‘good’ as opposed to the Soviet
Union’s ‘evil empire’ was an important propaganda tool for the United
States. The commitment to democracy had, however, largely been at the
mercy of Cold War priorities that often saw the United States allying itself
with authoritarian regimes in opposition to the Soviet Union. Strategic inter-
ests generally trumped moral imperatives and to a large extent realist logic
governed American foreign policy.
One of the key issues that was highlighted by the emphasis that the Bush
administration placed on the promotion of democracy in the Middle East was
the conflict between policies that were aimed at supporting genuine demo-
cratic reform in the long term, and policies where the desired outcome was
regime change in the short term. The former implied a gradual institutional
change with some form of cooperation from the incumbent regime, while
the latter became closely associated with military intervention and regime
overthrow.
The tension between American values and strategic interests in US foreign
policy and the fact that they are at times in seemingly direct conflict, was
exacerbated by the soaring rhetoric and ideologically driven pronouncements
in President Bush’s speeches. In this respect, President Bush was continu-
ing a long tradition in American foreign policy public diplomacy by placing
religion and American exceptionalism front and centre in the policy speeches
that defined the Bush administration’s democracy promotion agenda. Yet the
82 Chapter 3
policy bureaucracy and tools used by Washington to pursue this agenda were
fragmented and decentralized to a considerable degree, making it extremely
difficult to determine the effectiveness of the strategy.
The incoherence of the strategy implementation and the unrealistic expec-
tations raised by the government’s rhetoric, however, were only part of the
problem. Until the end of the Cold War, the United States had needed to exer-
cise prudence in its foreign strategies, the structure of the international system
placing constraints on the range of policy options that it could pursue without
upsetting the balance of power. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
fact of global unipolarity created an unprecedented situation, where it was
able to act with seeming impunity in the pursuit of its interests. Indeed,
the first Gulf War and America’s intervention in Somalia under President
George H. W. Bush, and President Bill Clinton’s interventions in Bosnia and
Kosovo, were arguably, wars of choice. Despite this, or perhaps because of
the appearance of impunity, the need to frame US actions as part of a broader
moral purpose continued to be an essential part of US public diplomacy. The
democracy promotion agenda championed by President Bush neatly com-
bined both the strategic and moral elements of foreign policy.
The absolutely disastrous post-invasion situation in Iraq had serious conse-
quences for the Bush administration’s policy of promoting democracy in Iran.
Apart from significantly undermining America’s reputation in this area and
the rapid increase in anti-American sentiment in the region, the ongoing crisis
in Iraq also limited Washington’s policy options when it came to Iran. It was
apparently an open secret in Washington in the days before the Iraq invasion
that Tehran was next on the list.105 It was also no secret, especially in the light
of the Iraq war, that the Bush administration regarded the military as the best
foreign policy tool with which to bring about their policy of regime change.
First, the Bush administration’s push for political reform in the Middle
East was almost impossible to distinguish from its policy of forced regime
change through military intervention, of which Iraq was a constant and vio-
lent reminder.106 The second issue was that as the US military continued to
fight insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq, its resources were stretched
almost to breaking point, making any threat of military intervention against
Iran highly doubtful.
Funding for NGOs and political activists within Iran, education exchanges,
radio broadcasts and public diplomacy had only a limited impact on the push
for political reform within that country. In the case of US funding being
channelled to Iranian activists and NGOs, US policy actually had a nega-
tive impact. Various factors contributed to this but the policy of keeping the
information of who received funding classified directly led to reformers being
targeted by the Iranian government who set about accusing them of colluding
with the United States in trying to overthrow the regime.107 The overall result
of this demonstration of the limits of US military power was that it left the US
government with limited policy tools with which to support political reform
within Iran.
After September 11, the nuclear issue and Iran’s links to terrorism inevi-
tably came to dominate US thinking. US policy makers frequently claimed
that Iran’s nuclear programme masked its ambitions to acquire a nuclear
weapons capability, and thus it constituted the greatest security threat to the
United States and the world. The policy recommendations offered by Bush
administration officials all centred on persuading the leadership in Tehran to
give up its nuclear programme altogether, whether through the use of aggres-
sive sanctions and international isolation, or with the threat of military force.
Surprisingly, given its effectiveness throughout the Cold War, containment
was rarely explicitly discussed as a viable long-term strategy. The implication
was that the threat posed by Iran potentially building a nuclear weapon was so
great that containment would not be an adequate response. The risks of failure
would be too severe. Yet containment is precisely the policy that seems to
have dominated during President Bush’s eight years in office.
During these eight years, what emerged when it came to the Iranian
nuclear issue was a significant disconnect between the language used by the
administration, emphasizing the dire nature of the threat posed by an Iranian
nuclear weapons programme, and the restrained policy that the United States
pursued. The threat from the Iranian regime was largely determined by the
nature of its undemocratic system and thus American values featured con-
stantly in the way the issue was framed, contrasting American freedom and
liberalism with the repressive theocracy of Tehran. As a result of this inability
to move beyond the ideological mindset that has characterized US–Iran rela-
tions for decades, recommendations for engagement with the Iranian regime
were largely ignored or discounted. One of the consequences of this, from
an Iranian perspective, has been to reinforce the perception among Iran’s
leadership that American policy is confused when it comes to them and ‘the
consequence is that the Iranians really don’t take the Americans seriously’.108
At the same time, the expectations raised by the Bush administration, that it
would ‘confront threats before they reach our shores’,109 was seriously at odds
with the prudent and drawn-out policy of inspections, sanctions and multilat-
eral diplomatic pressure. One of the consequences has been to highlight the
limitations of American power and evidence that despite the unipolar system,
America is constrained in ways that have a significant impact on its foreign
relations. American public diplomacy and the language of exceptionalism,
however, have created discord between what America says it stands for, and
what it can realistically achieve.
84 Chapter 3
NOTES
1. ‘Statement by Germany, United Kingdom, France and EU High Representa-

tive on Iranian Nuclear Issue’, The Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Great
Britain, Mr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Mr Jack Straw and Mr Philippe Douste-Blazy
and the EU high representative Javier Solana, Berlin, January 12, 2006. http://www.
europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5554_en.htm (Accessed April 19, 2010).
2. Ibid.
3. Rice, C. (2006), On-the-Record Briefing by Secretary of State Condo-
leezza Rice, Washington DC, January 12. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/
4. ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic
of Iran’, IAEA Board of Governors, Resolution Adopted February 4, 2006. http://
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf (Accessed April
19, 2010).
5. Sciolino, E. (2006), ‘Showdown at U.N.? Iran Seems Calm’, The New
York Times, March 14. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/14/international/middleeast/
14iran.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print (Accessed April 19, 2010).
6. NSS 2006, p. 20.
7. Ibid., pp. 18–21.
8. Ritter, S. (2006), Target Iran, p. 195.
9. Ibid.
10. Rice, C. (2006), United States Secretary of State, Statement by Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice, Washington DC, May 31. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2006/67088.htm (Accessed April 23, 2010).
11. Hersh, S. (2006), ‘Last Stand: The Military’s Problem with the President’s Iran
Policy’, The New Yorker, July 10. http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/10/
060710fa_fact (Accessed April 12, 2010).
12. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696, Adopted at its 5500th Meet-
ing on July 31, 2006. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/
PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed April 12, 2010).
13. ‘United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Demands Iran Sus-
pend Uranium Enrichment By August 31, Resolution 1696 (2006) Adopted by Vote
of 14—1 (Qatar), Iran Says Peaceful Program No Threat, Council’s Consideration
Unwarranted”’, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New
York, July 31, 2006. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8792.doc.htm
14. Bush, G. W. (2006), Address to the American Legion National Convention in
2006, titled The Ideological Struggle of the Twenty-first Century, Salt Lake City, UT:
Salt Palace Convention Centre, August 31.
15. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, Adopted by the Security
Council at its 5612th meeting, on December 23, 2006.
16. ‘UN Passes Iran Nuclear Sanctions’, BBC News, Saturday December 23,
2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6205295.stm (Accessed January 27,
2009).
17. ‘Iran Says It’s Willing to Discuss Nuclear Program’, Radio Free Europe,
Radio Liberty, February 11, 2007. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074636.html
18. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747, Adopted by the Secu-
rity Council at its 5647th meeting on March 24, 2007. http://daccessdds.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/281/40/PDF/N0728140.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed
January 27, 2009).
19. Ibid.
20. Cordesman, A. H. (2007), ‘Iran’s Nuclear Program: UN and IAEA Report-
ing and Developments’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, December 4,
p. 32. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071127_iraniaea.pdf (Accessed April 14,
2010).
21. Rice, C. (2007), United States secretary of State, Remarks with Secretary of
the Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Washington DC, October 25. http://2001-2009.state.
gov/secretary/rm/2007/10/94133.htm (Accessed April 10, 2010).
22. R. Nicholas Burns, under secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Stuart
A. Levey, under secretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Brief-
ing on Iran, Washington DC, October 25, 2007. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/
rm/2007/94178.htm (Accessed May 3, 2010).
23. Wright, R. (2007), ‘Iranian Unit to Be Labeled “Terrorist”: U.S. Mov-
ing Against Revolutionary Guard’, The Washington Post, August 15. http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/14/AR2007081401662.html
(Accessed May 3, 2010).
24. ‘Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities’, United States National Intel-
ligence Estimate, November 2007. http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_
release.pdf (Accessed January 27, 2009).
25. Ross, D. (2008), ‘“Diplomatic Strategies for Dealing with Iran,’ p. 42.
27. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803, Adopted by the Security
Council at its 5848th meeting on March 3, 2008. http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm (Accessed December 3, 2008).
28. Phillips, M. M. (2009), ‘Cheney Says He Was Proponent for Military
Action Against Iran: Former Vice President Also Criticizes CIA Probe as Politi-
cal Move’, The Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB125164376287270241.html (Accessed May 3, 2010).
29. Ibid.
30. Hersh, S. (2008), ‘Preparing the Battlefield’.
32. See Takeyh, R. (2006), ‘Under the Shadow of September 11’, chapter 5 in
Hidden Iran, pp. 117–34; Rajee, B. (2004), ‘Deciphering Iran: The Political Evolution
of the Islamic Republic and US Foreign Policy After September 11’, Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 24, 1, pp. 159–72; Dunn, D. H.
(2007), ‘Real Men Want to Go to Tehran’; Simes, D. K. (2007), ‘End the Crusade’,
The National Interest Online, January/February, pp. 4–11. http://nationalinterest.org/
Article.aspx?id=13272 (Accessed July 27, 2007).
86 Chapter 3
33. Ansari, A. M. (2006), Confronting Iran, p. 192.

34. Takeyh, R. (2007), ‘The Iran Puzzle’, The American Prospect, May 22. http://
www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_iran_puzzle (Accessed July 13, 2007).
35. Takeyh, R. (2007), ‘Time for Détente With Iran’, Foreign Affairs, 86, 1.
36. Takeyh, R. (2007), ‘Understanding the Iran Crisis’, Prepared Testimony
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 31. http://www.internation-
alrelations.house.gov/110/tak013107.htm (Accessed April 27, 2007).
38. Iraq Study Group Report (2006), James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton
(Co-Chairs).
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day
O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simp-
son, December, p. 59. www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_
study_group_report.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2007).
39. Ibid., p. 43.
40. Ibid., p. 24.
41. Kessler, G. and Wright, R. (2006), ‘Rice Rejects Overture to Iran and Syria’,
The Washington Post, December 15.
43. Melia, T. (2005), ‘The Infrastructure of American Democracy Promotion’,
A discussion paper prepared for the Princeton Project on National Security Working
Group on Global Institutions and Foreign Policy Infrastructure, Washington DC,
pp. 1–70. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/democracy_bureaucracy-2.pdf
(Accessed November 4, 2010).
44. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2005), Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, New York, May 2–27. http://www.un.org/en/
conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html (Accessed August 1, 2011).
45. Bali, A. U. (2008), ‘At the Nuclear Precipice: Iran’, in R. Falk and D. Krieger
(eds), At the Nuclear Precipice: Catastrophe or Transformation?, New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, pp. 97–160, 138.
46. Bali, A. U. (2008), ‘At the Nuclear Precipice: Iran,’ p. 138.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Bush, G. (2003), Speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Thursday Feb-
ruary 27. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/27/usa.iraq2 (Accessed Novem-
ber 4, 2010).
51. ‘Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports’, (2008), United States Depart-
ment of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Washington DC May.
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/afdr/2008/nea/129900.htm (Accessed November 19,
2010).
52. ‘Iran Democracy Act’, (2003), United States Congress, Text of S. 1082
[108th]: May 19. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s108-1082
(Accessed December 3, 2010).
53. ‘Iran Freedom Support Act,’ (2006), United States Congress, Text of H.R.
6198, [109th], September 30. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Documents/pl109_293.pdf (Accessed December 12, 2010).
54. Kucinich, D. J. (2006), ‘Kucinich Speaks Out Against House Bill That Lays
The Ground Work For War Against Iran’ (Leads House Opposition To HR 282), Tran-
script of speech given before US Congress, April 26. http://kucinich.house.gov/News/
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=42687 (Accessed December 6, 2010).
55. Bush, G. W. (2006), ‘President Applauds Congress for Passage of Iran
Freedom Support Act’, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington DC, September
30. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060930-4.
html (Accessed December 6, 2010).
56. Ottaway, M. (2009), Interview Conducted by Kumuda Simpson at the Carn-
egie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, Friday September 4.
57. Ottaway, M. (2009), Interview Conducted by Kumuda Simpson.
58. Ibid.
59. McInerney, S. (2008), ‘The President’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2009:
Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East’, The Project on
Middle East Democracy, Washington DC, p. 34. http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2008/05/fy-09-budget-report.pdf (Accessed November 1, 2010).
60. Azimi, N. (2007), ‘Hard Realities of Soft Power’, The New York Times,
June 24; See also: Ong, C. (2008), ‘An Exercise in Futility: State Department
“Democracy Promotion” Funding for Iran’, The Centre for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation, Washington DC. http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/iran/articles/
democracy_promotion_funding_iraq/ (Accessed November 12, 2010); McInerney, S.
(2008), ‘The President’s Budget request for Fiscal Year 2009: Democracy, Gover-
nance and Human Rights in the Middle East’, Project on Middle East Democracy,
Washington DC, pp. 33–34.
61. US Department of State, ‘Update on Iran Democracy Promotion Funding’,
Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, Washington DC, June 4, 2007. http://merln.
ndu.edu/archivepdf/iran/State/85971.pdf (Accessed November 15, 2010).
62. Weisman, S. (2006), ‘US Program Is Directed at Altering Iran’s Politics’, The
New York Times, April 15.
63. Wright, R. (2007), ‘Cut Iran Democracy Funding, Groups Tell US’, The
Washington Post, October 11.
64. The letter was sent to Carah Ong, an analyst with the Centre for Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation, and was published on her blog Iran Nuclear Watch, Tuesday
July 15, 2008. http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com/2008/07/iranians-speak-out-on-
regime-change.html (Accessed September 2, 2010).
65. Ong, C. (2008), ‘Iranians Speak Out On Regime Change’, Iran Nuclear
Watch.
66. Wright, R. (2007), ‘Cut Iran Democracy Funding, Groups Tell US’.
67. Esfandiari, H. (2007), ‘Held In My Homeland’, The Washington Post, Sep-
tember 16.
68. Tavanah, K. (2007), ‘Iran: US Senator Discusses Democracy Promotion
Efforts’, Interview with US senator Joseph, L. Lieberman, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, September 6. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078553.html (Accessed
November 29, 2010).
69. Esfandiari, H and Litwak, R. S. (2007), ‘When Promoting Democracy is
Counterproductive’, Chronicle of Higher Education, 54, 8.
70. Ibid.
88 Chapter 3
71. Ebadi, S. and Sahimi, M. (2007), ‘The Follies of Bush’s Iran Policy’,
The International Herald Tribune, May 30.
72. Ottaway, M. (2009), Interview Conducted by Kumuda Simpson.
74. Ibid.
75. Hersh, S. (2006), ‘The Iran Plans: Would President Bush Go to War to Stop
Iran from Getting the Bomb?’, April 17.
76. Hersh, S. (2008), ‘Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration Sets
Up its Secret Moves Against Iran’, The New Yorker, July 7.
77. McFaul, M. (2005), ‘Chinese Dreams, Persian Realities’, Journal of Democ-
racy, 16, 4, pp. 74–82, 74–75.
78. McFaul, M. (2005), ‘Chinese Dreams, Persian Realities’, p. 75.
79. Gheissari, A. and Nasr, V. (2006), Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest
for Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
80. Nasr, V. (2006), The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam will Shape the
Future, New York: W. W. Norton.
81. Takeyh, R. (2006), Hidden Iran, pp. 31–57.
82. Ibid., p. 35
83. Molavi, A. (2006), The Soul of Iran: A Nation’s Journey to Freedom,
New York: W. W. Norton, p. 176.
84. Takeyh, R. (2006), Hidden Iran, p. 40.
85. Gheissari, A. and Nasr, V. (2004), ‘Iran’s Democracy Debate’, p. 95
86. Ibid., p. 98.
87. McFaul, M. (2005), ‘Chinese Dreams, Persian Realities’, p. 79.
88. Nasr, V. (2005), ‘The Conservative Wave Rolls On’, Journal of Democracy,
16, 4, pp. 9–22, 10.
90. See Fukuyama, F. (2006), America At the Crossroads: Democracy, Power
and the Neoconservative Legacy, New Haven: Yale University Press; Isikoff, M. and
Corn, D. (2006), Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq
War, New York: Crown Publishing Group.
91. Ikenberry, G. J. (2004), ‘The End of the Neoconservative Moment’, p. 11.
92. Muravchik, J. (2007), ‘The Past, Present, and Future of Neoconservatism’,
Commentary, October 2, pp. 19–29, 29.
93. Ottaway, M. (2008), ‘Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Restoring
Credibility’, Policy Brief 60, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, May, p. 1.
94. Ibid., p. 1.
95. Ottaway, M. (2009), Interview conducted by Kumuda Simpson.
96. Carothers, T. (2008), ‘Democracy and Discontent: With Democracy on the
Run and American Power in Question, What’s the Future of Democracy Promotion’,
Democracy Journal, Fall, pp. 70–76, 73.
97. Ottaway, M. (2009), Interview conducted by Kumuda Simpson.
98. Ansari, A. M. (2011), Interview Conducted by Kumuda Simpson.
99. Ibid.
100. Ottaway, M. (2008), ‘Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Restoring

Credibility’, p. 5.
101. Akbarzadeh, S. (2006), ‘Does Hamas Victory Advance Peace in the Middle
East?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60, 2, pp. 201–06.
102. Dunn, M. (2011), ‘Too Late for Reform Now’, Arab Reform Bulletin,
January, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
103. Snyder, J. (2000), From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist
Conflict, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
105. Dunn, D. H. (2007), ‘Real Men Want to Go to Tehran’.
106. Ibid., pp. 19–20.
107. Ibid., p. 34.
109. Bush, G. W. (2006), Address to the Nation on the Fifth Anniversary of 9/11,
The Oval Office, Washington DC, September 11.
Chapter 4
President Obama and the

Enrichment Issue
In 2008, President Obama inherited eight years of policy confusion that had
resulted in the worrying expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme. One of the
more significant policy shifts was the willingness shown by the new admin-
istration to negotiate directly with the Iranian regime without pre-condition.
The most difficult issue to resolve in any future negotiations would be Iran’s
ability to enrich uranium and thus potentially master the complete nuclear
fuel cycle. While the willingness to talk directly to the Iranian leadership
was an important step forward in finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis, it
exposed the Obama administration to criticism over a perceived willingness
to compromise on a variety of issues, most notably uranium enrichment, in
order to achieve a diplomatic solution.
This chapter will assess the Obama administration’s approach to Iran
during its first term in office. While voicing his commitment to diplomacy,
President Obama pushed for more targeted sanctions against the Iranian
regime than had been imposed during the Bush years. These included tar-
geting Iran’s oil and financial and banking sectors. The combination of a
much tighter sanctions strategy and multilateral diplomacy highlighted the
important issue of a states’ right to enrichment and access to the complete
fuel cycle under the NPT. Throughout the process it became clear that the
United States would have to compromise on how much it could realistically
limit Iran’s ability to master the fuel cycle and thus move closer to being a
nuclear weapons threshold state. The first four years of Obama’s presidency
arguably achieved very little in terms of any immediate halt to Iran’s nuclear
programme. Instead, Iran continued to expand and develop it. Despite a shift
in tone from the Bush administration’s unwillingness to negotiate, very little
changed in terms of the stated aim of convincing Iran to halt its programme.
91
92 Chapter 4
President Obama’s efforts at reaching out to Tehran were also complicated

by regional events. The 2009 election in Iran and the regime violence perpe-
trated against protesters arguably sparked several years of political uprisings
across the Middle East that upended US assumptions about regional stabil-
ity, and sorely tested Washington’s relationships with traditional allies. The
uprisings also consolidated and deepened Iran’s growing regional influence, a
dynamic that had been triggered by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the loss
of a key balancing power against Iranian regional dominance. In the context
of the Arab uprisings and the sense of insecurity in several of the Gulf States,
the desire to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state took on even
greater urgency for the Obama administration.
Like the Bush administration before him, President Obama embedded his
Iran strategy within the same tradition of American exceptionalism, and thus
his rhetoric and public diplomacy often revealed the similarly ideological
contours of American’s perceptions of Iran. This chapter will explore the
weaknesses of this approach and present the argument that the ideological,
exceptionalist foundation of US thinking over the nuclear issue, links both the
Bush and Obama policies. These assumptions rested on the belief that Ameri-
can leadership was both necessary and benign, and that Iran was an untrust-
worthy rogue state, whose potential acquisition of nuclear weapons presented
the greatest threat to global security. Thus while President Obama promised a
significant change in the way America approached Iran, fundamental assump-
tions remained that shaped and influenced the relationship.
NUCLEAR ABOLITION AND DISARMAMENT
It is important to assess Obama’s opposition to the Iranian nuclear programme

within the broader context of his own beliefs about nuclear non-proliferation.
Obama’s own belief in the inherent dangers of nuclear proliferation, and
his efforts early on during his presidency to signal his commitment to dis-
armament, offer insight into the value that he placed on diplomacy and his
desire to prevent any state, not just Iran, from adding its name to the nuclear
weapons club. Thus the Iranian programme was not an isolated case of a
rogue state upsetting the global norm of non-proliferation. Rather, Iran’s
programme, and like it North Korea’s, were part of a much larger problem
of nuclear proliferation. Indeed, an article written for the Wall Street Journal
by Obama’s vice president Joe Biden, explicitly linked Obama’s calls for US
leadership on disarmament with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues.1
Obama’s Prague speech calling for the eradication of nuclear weapons was
hailed around the world as a watershed moment in the movements towards
disarmament and eventual abolition.2 He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
President Obama and the Enrichment Issue 93
in 2009 in part because of his rhetorical commitment to ridding the world of

nuclear weapons.3
Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not.
In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but
the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weap-
ons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear
materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are
determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are
centred on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations
break the rules, we could reach the point where the centre cannot hold.4
Obama’s speech highlights the need to strengthen the global non-prolif-

eration regime, which includes the NPT, the IAEA and the various treaties
and arms control agreements that help prevent or limit the spread of these
weapons. Yet he also cautions that this global regime is weak and under
mounting pressure. The problem of rogue states seeking nuclear weapons is
placed squarely within the context of a weakening norm of non-proliferation.
Obama also positions the problem within the context of the global war on
terror. Although eschewing that term early in his presidency,5 his commit-
ment to fighting terrorism saw the expansion of the use of unmanned drones,
international and domestic surveillance, and covert actions designed to con-
tinue many of the Bush era counter-terrorism policies.
Taken together—a weak non-proliferation regime and rogue states seek-
ing nuclear weapons—Obama claims the ongoing need for US leadership
to prevent the disastrous consequences should a state like Iran acquire such
a capability.6 Despite claims to the contrary, President Obama was to all
appearances deeply committed to the tradition of American exceptionalism.
While a senator in 2007, Obama wrote:
The mission of the United States is to provide global leadership grounded in the
understanding that the world shares a common security and a common human-
ity. Our global engagement cannot be defined by what we are against; it must
be guided by a clear sense of what we stand for. We have a significant stake in
ensuring that those who live in fear and want today can live with dignity and
opportunity tomorrow.7
In his acceptance speech upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama
again claimed that it was the combination of both moral purpose and mili-
tary strength that had underwritten global security for in the post–World
War II era.8
Yet his desire for disarmament was always tempered with a cautious tone,
reminding those listening not to have unrealistic expectations. His caveat:
94 Chapter 4
‘I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my
lifetime.’9
All of this highlights the context within which the Obama administration’s
early approaches to opening up diplomacy with Tehran were framed. From
this it seems reasonable to assume that perceptions about Iran’s intentions
and behaviour had not softened in Washington D.C., nor had the problem
of its nuclear programme suddenly been divorced from the broader counter-
terrorism and non-proliferation efforts of the new administration. Rather,
Obama was positioning the Iran problem as intrinsically connected to these
broader security concerns. By doing this, Obama was able to justify the
renewal of American diplomacy as essential for the continued security of the
United States.
ENGAGEMENT AND COERCIVE ARMS CONTROL
Barack Obama’s campaign for the presidency sought to distinguish itself

from the Bush era in many ways, not the least of which was the stated
intention to open up direct diplomatic talks with the Iranian regime over
the nuclear issue. These talks would be significant because, unlike the Bush
administration, a new Obama administration would not demand a complete
halt to enrichment before agreeing to them. The prospect of direct talks was
significant. It addressed what was regarded as the main obstacle to progress
on the issue—the refusal to hold high-level talks without preconditions.
It has become a common argument that with Obama’s election, he ushered
in a radical new opportunity for improving US–Iran relations, signalled by
his willingness to talk to Tehran.10 This argument ignores the flip side of his
engagement policy, which saw President Obama continue many of the Bush
administration’s more coercive policies, including the covert efforts to sabo-
tage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, and targeted sanctions. A renewed push
for diplomacy was seen by many as having two possible outcomes both of
which would further American interests: if diplomacy worked, then Obama
would be the president responsible for finding a peaceful solution to one of
America’s most pressing security problems. If it failed, it would provide jus-
tification for ‘tightening the screws diplomatically’ and imposing a new suite
of targeted sanctions in order to coerce the Iranian regime.11
Obama signalled his intention to directly engage in diplomatic talks with
Iran during his campaign for the presidency, stating during a debate with
fellow Democratic candidate Hilary Clinton that he would re-invigorate
American diplomacy. He also agreed with Clinton that while direct talks with
Iran would be important, a good deal of preparation before those talks would
be an essential aspect of any strategic change.12 While his commitment to
diplomacy was clear, very few details were offered at that stage beyond the
desire to differentiate his approach from that of the Bush administration’s,
starting with direct talks with Iran.
President Obama’s inauguration address provided the first clear picture of
how significant that change would be. Seeking to reset America’s relationship
with much of the Muslim world after the damage caused by the Bush admin-
istration’s policies in the Middle East, Obama signalled a new beginning in
his inaugural address to the nation, stating,
To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and
mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or
blame their society’s ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on
what you can build, not what you destroy.
To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silenc-
ing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will
extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.13
More remarkable was the president’s message directly to Iranians celebrat-

ing Nowruz. Addressing the Iranian people and the leadership in Tehran,
Obama called on those watching the video of his speech to commit to resolv-
ing their differences peacefully and through diplomacy.14
Ayatollah Khamenei’s response to Obama’s message was less than posi-
tive. The day after Obama’s message was broadcast on YouTube, Khamenei
responded by accusing the Obama administration of continuing the Bush
administration’s policy of insulting and isolating Iran, stating,
They chant the slogan of change but no change is seen in practice . . . . We

haven’t seen any change . . . . Have you released Iranian assets? Have you lifted
oppressive sanctions? Have you given up mudslinging and making accusations
against the great Iranian nation and its officials? Have you given up your uncon-
ditional support for the Zionist regime? Even the language remains unchanged.15
Once again history, and a deeply troubled one at that, made it difficult for
the two states to move ahead. Iran’s reluctance to accept the American offer
to negotiate at face value is understandable considering the past efforts by
moderate leaders such as Khatami. Ayatollah Khamenei was also acutely
aware of the similarity in language between the new president and his pre-
decessor. Al Arabiya reported that during one of Obama’s first press confer-
ences as president elect, he reaffirmed America’s opposition to Iran’s nuclear
programme, stating that an Iranian bomb ‘was unacceptable’ and reprimand-
ing the Iranian state for its ongoing support of terrorism.16 Thomas Erdbrink,
writing in the Washington Post, quoted the deputy commander of IRGC as
saying, ‘People who put on a mask of friendship, but with the objective of
96 Chapter 4
betrayal, and who enter from the angle of negotiations without preconditions,
are more dangerous.’17
Despite the seemingly negative response, some analysts have suggested
that attitudes towards Obama and the possible thawing of relations were
more complicated within Iran.18 Among the political elite within Iran there
was sense that a Democratic president offered a better chance of change than
another Republican one.19
Other states in the region were, however, deeply suspicious of the new US
president’s efforts to engage Iran. Israel and Saudi Arabia were concerned
about the possible implications of US–Iranian rapprochement for their own
security and interests. Since 1979, Washington and Riyadh have largely
shared the determination to see Iran isolated and excluded from not just the
region, but global politics as a whole. In the United States, the legacy of the
revolution, especially the infamous hostage crisis, has shaped a generation’s
thinking on Iran. For Saudi Arabia, the challenge was more immediate. The
Shia revolutionary doctrine that swept to power in Iran was directly opposed
to the brand of Sunni conservatism practised in Saudi Arabia. Throughout the
years, Iran and Saudi Arabia, backed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states, have tussled for influence and control in the Gulf region. The United
States has traditionally sided clearly with the Kingdom in these matters,
actively seeking to ostracize Iran from the global community.20
Wikileaks revealed details about the Saudi concerns about the shift in
US policy. One cable quoted the Saudis calling on the United States to ‘cut
the head off the snake’.21 The regional balance of power in the Middle East
had, since the 1979 Revolution, relegated Iran to the status of a pariah state,
isolated and de-legitimized in the eyes of the international community. As a
result, Saudi Arabia had benefited from asserting its leadership and authority
over the Islamic Middle East. It was feared that any easing of tensions with
the Iranians would inevitably lead to greater legitimization of their regime,
and thus increase their influence in the region. This proved to be a persistent
complaint by the Saudis to the Obama administration.
After his initial public diplomacy reaching out to Iran had elicited little
in the way of positive reciprocal action by the Iranians, President Obama is
reported to have a sent a private letter to Ayatollah Khamenei via the Swiss
calling for direct diplomatic relations between the two countries.22 While
the White House did not receive a direct response to the letter, journalist
David Sanger quotes an Obama aide describing a public speech by Khame-
nei shortly afterwards as a ‘diatribe about the United States’,23 recalling past
grievances and once again displaying a deep mistrust of American intentions.
The new US president was sending signals through public and private
diplomacy that the opportunity to reset relations was possible, and that the
new administration was committed to finding a peaceful solution to the crisis
that had plagued the Bush administration. Obama pushed this policy despite
the deep misgivings of America’s regional allies and the continued resistance
of the Iranian regime. It was in this atmosphere that Iran headed to elections
on June 12, 2009.
The 2009 Iranian Elections

Throughout the Bush administration’s time in office, there had been a recur-
ring narrative promoted within the White House about the possibility of an
Iranian uprising that would overthrow the regime. President Obama had to
all appearances abandoned the overt focus on democracy promotion that
had characterized much of President Bush’s early approach to the Middle
East. Yet the 2009 elections offered some hope in Washington that while the
regime was probably there to stay, the election had at least been lively and
President Ahmadinejad had shown signs of a willingness to negotiate with
the P5+1.24 Obama though was also acutely aware of the historical legacy of
American meddling in Iranian politics, and he reportedly made sure that his
aides were conscious of the significance of this legacy on the current animos-
ity between the two states.25
The reluctance of President Obama to be perceived as meddling in Iran’s
domestic political affairs highlights a significant contrast with the rhetoric of
the Bush administration. It indicated a sense of nuance in their approach to
Tehran and a deeper understanding of the root causes of the problems in the
relationship. Yet looking back, it also signals a somewhat confused policy.
Obama’s Iran policy sought to correct the mistakes of the Bush administra-
tion, with its emphasis on democracy promotion and thinly veiled desires for
regime change, by refraining from using the language of democracy promo-
tion. Yet it also remained committed to the promotion of American values
and human rights. The 2009 election, and consequent uprising and state-
perpetrated violence in Tehran drew attention to the difficulty of doing both.
The lead up to the June election had been characterized by a robust and
important debate within Iran about the need for some degree of reform within
the state. The competition between Ahmadinejad and his opponent, Mir Hos-
sein Mousavi, became a symbolic fight between the status quo in Iran and
the desire for reform.26 Emerging as the key figure of the reformist camp,
former president Khatami publicly announced his support for Mousavi.27 In
a live televised debate, Mousavi accused Ahmadinejad of leading the coun-
try into a dictatorship and argued that illusions and fear mongering drove
his foreign policy.28 In the days leading up to the election, the expectation
was that Ahmadinejad would lose.29 In many ways, the support for Mousavi
could be read as a rejection of both the domestic and foreign policies of the
Ahmadinejad government.
98 Chapter 4
Hours after the polls closed in Iran, the state announced that Ahmadinejad
had won in a landslide victory. The news prompted thousands of Iranians
identifying with the Green Movement, named for the colour that represented
Mousavi’s campaign, to flood the streets of Tehran, claiming electoral fraud
and chanting ‘what happened to our vote?’30 The regime responded with
violence, arresting thousands of protesters and killing dozens. Neda Agha-
Soltan, a young woman watching the protesters from the sidelines, was killed
by a sniper. Her death was captured on video and uploaded to YouTube
where her death became symbolic of the violent and brutal response by the
regime.31 The footage of her dying in the street, covered in blood, stirred
international outrage and condemnation.
President Obama did not immediately respond to the allegations of elec-
toral fraud. Several days after the election in Iran, Obama responded by stat-
ing in a press conference:
I think it would be wrong for me to be silent about what we’ve seen on the
television over the last few days. And what I would say to those people who put
so much hope and energy and optimism into the political process, I would say
to them that the world is watching and inspired by their participation, regardless
of what the ultimate outcome of the election was. And they should know that
the world is watching.
Now, with respect to the United States and our interactions with Iran, I’ve
always believed that as odious as I consider some of President Ahmadinejad’s
statements, as deep as the differences that exist between the United States
and Iran on a range of core issues, that the use of tough, hard-headed diplo-
macy—diplomacy with no illusions about Iran and the nature of the differences
between our two countries—is critical when it comes to pursuing a core set of
our national security interests, specifically, making sure that we are not seeing
a nuclear arms race in the Middle East triggered by Iran obtaining a nuclear
weapon; making sure that Iran is not exporting terrorist activity. Those are core
interests not just to the United States but I think to a peaceful world in general.
And particularly to the youth of Iran, I want them to know that we in the
United States do not want to make any decisions for the Iranians, but we do
believe that the Iranian people and their voices should be heard and respected.32
President Obama’s reaction to the Iranian repression of the Green Move-

ment offered a nuanced and thoughtful reading of events. It tried to balance
America’s long-standing efforts to promote democratic values and human
rights around the world, with its pragmatic security interests, in this case,
efforts to open a diplomatic dialogue with Iran over its nuclear programme.
It also reveals a break with the Bush administration’s efforts, overt and
covert, at fostering unrest in Iran in order to bring about regime change.
It demonstrated his ambivalence about the role America could, or should,
play in such an uprising, particularly given the complex history between

America and Iran. This ambivalence about America’s role would become
more pronounced during the 2011 Arab uprisings.
Obama was roundly criticized for his apparent silence over the Iranian
state’s violence against protesters. The consequence of all this was a harden-
ing of President Obama’s position. Over the next three years the administra-
tion utilized a variety of coercive tools to bring as much pressure to bear on
the Iranian regime as they could, short of war, in order to persuade Tehran
to cooperate with international demands. Key issues remained unchanged:
Iran’s insistence on its right to enrichment of uranium never wavered, and
as its nuclear infrastructure expanded, its commitment to mastering the com-
plete fuel cycle became more entrenched. The reality of Iran’s rapidly grow-
ing expertise over this technology, and the physical expansion of its nuclear
sites, meant that a shifting of the parameters for the P5+1 was inevitable.
Karim Sadjadpour has posited that from an Iranian perspective, the presence
of an estimated 19,000 centrifuges in 2014, as opposed to roughly 3,000 in
2003, gave Iran the leverage it desired.33
Enrichment and the NPT

The Bush administration’s strident opposition to allowing Iran the ability to
enrich uranium in any negotiated settlement remains one of the key weaknesses
in its Iran strategy. The debate over whether or not Iran had a right under the
NPT to enrich uranium had by no means been settled by the time Obama took
office.34 Indeed, if anything, the enrichment issue threatened to undermine his
initial efforts to reach out to Iran. It became the key issue that Republicans
were able to rally around, accusing Obama of dangerous compromise.
Leaders in Tehran have consistently pointed to their right to enrich uranium
under the terms of the NPT. As outlined in previous chapters, this argument
was used by the Iranian regime to point out the unfair treatment of Iran. It
also explains Iran’s refusal to give up the technological knowledge that they
believe the NPT guarantees them. Article IV of the NPT reads, ‘Nothing in
this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Par-
ties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles
I and II of this Treaty.’35 The Iranians have consistently interpreted this as an
explicit statement of NPT signatory states’ right to possess the complete fuel
cycle. The enrichment issue, and questions over contradictory interpretations
of the NPT have plagued the Iranian question, and it became one of the most
contested elements of Obama’s negotiations with Iran.
For the Obama administration, the enrichment issue, along with other
future concessions to the Iranian regime, would have to be assessed in the
100 Chapter 4
context of the vastly expanded nuclear infrastructure and expertise that had
developed since the Bush administration’s initial attempts to halt the pro-
gramme. The reality of Iran’s limited nuclear infrastructure that President
Bush was dealing with presented a significantly different obstacle to the
programme that President Obama had to confront.
Coercive Arms Control I: Sanctions

The first major piece of legislation that President Obama signed regarding
Iran was the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010.36 This document extends the sanctions that had been in place
against Iran in various forms since the hostage crisis in 1979. Section 2,
paragraph 1 of the Act states,
The illicit nuclear activities of the Government of Iran, combined with its
development of unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles and its sup-
port for international terrorism, represent a threat to the security of the United
States, its strong ally Israel, and other allies of the United States around the
world.37
The Obama administration never rejected the fundamental assumption

underpinning the Bush administration’s policies towards Iran. Indeed, the
Obama administration consistently reiterated its deep mistrust of the Iranian
regime, its belief that Iran’s intent was to eventually develop nuclear weap-
ons, and the idea that an Iranian nuclear capability presented the greatest
threat to the United States and its allies.
The efficacy of sanctions against the Iranian regime is difficult to deter-
mine. A detailed report by the Crisis Group has argued that
it is a study in the irresistible appeal of sanctions, backed both by hardliners

who wish to cripple the regime and by more moderate actors who view them as
the alternative to a military strike. And it is a study in how, over time, means
tend to morph into ends: in the absence of any visible shift in Tehran’s political
calculus, it is difficult to measure their impact through any metric other than
the quantity and severity of the sanctions themselves. That they have yet to
significantly curb Tehran’s nuclear drive becomes, in this context, more or less
an afterthought.38
The sanctions regime against Iran has in many ways become an end in
itself. For many it is believed that sanctions will have one of two effects:
either they will cripple the Iranian regime to such a degree that it caves in to
Western demands or, failing this, the Iranian population will become so disil-
lusioned with the regime that it overthrows them in a democratic revolution.39
Conversely Iran’s attitude to the sanctions regime for most of the Bush era
and well into President Obama’s first term in office was to view them as
part of the greater struggle against Western bullying, dovetailing neatly with
the Iranian narrative of resistance and independence.40 Evidence of this per-
ception can be seen in Khamenei’s statement: ‘You impose—in your own
words—crippling sanctions to paralyse the nation. Does this show good or ill
intention . . . . They naively think that the nation has been exhausted by the
sanctions and will therefore yearn for negotiations with the U.S.’41
Coercive Arms Control II: Stuxnet and Covert Action

One of the more surprising aspects of Obama’s Iran policy has been the con-
tinuation and even escalation of the covert policies begun by the Bush admin-
istration. The Stuxnet virus that targeted Iran’s centrifuges during 2009–2010
is an extraordinary story of technological espionage and sabotage that was
unprecedented in international relations. Stuxnet was a computer virus that
infected the operating systems controlling the IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz
enrichment facility. The virus caused the centrifuges to malfunction, result-
ing in damage to hundreds of centrifuges and arguably resulting in significant
delays in Iran’s nuclear capability.42
The assumption now is that the malware was created by the United States
and Israel and used to target Iran.43 Obama reportedly escalated the covert
operation, begun during the Bush administration’s tenure in the White House,
as a way to forestall Israeli calls for military action against Iran.44
The implications of the cyber-attack are complex. In general, issues falling
under the broad umbrella term of ‘cyber security’ have tended to focus on
cyber defence. The United States, particularly under President Obama, has
sought to create an integrated approach to cyber security under its already
existing security architecture.45 The goal of the United States in terms of
cyber strategy is to ‘prevent, or else minimize, cyber-attacks on the US;
strengthen US military capabilities and gain operational advantage; keep
adversaries from gaining military advantage through cyber war; conduct
non-military cyber operations when necessary; and promote cyber restraint
internationally, especially against civilian systems’.46
There is a very obvious dilemma here. The US desire to emphasize its own
focus on defensive aspects of cyber security and thus promote international
caution and restraint in this area, has been fundamentally undermined and
weakened by the Stuxnet episode. Not only has it demonstrated how to go
about conducting a cyber-attack that successfully sabotages another state’s
civilian energy infrastructure, it has also left a blueprint of its strategy avail-
able for anyone to copy and modify. This is because the code used in Stuxnet
is now available online for anyone interested in re-engineering it.47 All of this
102 Chapter 4
raises important questions about the actual usefulness of cyber-attacks and

their unintended consequences.48
As the Stuxnet worm was shutting down Iran’s centrifuges, Iran also
confronted several high-profile defections and the assassinations of several
scientists involved in the nuclear programme.49 The assassination of Mostafa
Ahmadi Roshan, who was the deputy director of the enrichment facility at
Natanz, followed several other high-profile murders.50 While it was suspected
that Israel’s Mossad was behind the murders, Israel consistently denied the
accusation, even after reports surfaced that the United States had pressured
Israel to stop.51 The incidents, despite the absence of evidence against Israel,
hardened Iran’s opposition to cooperating with the United States.52
RED LINES AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN TURMOIL
The unfolding series of Arab uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa,
beginning in Tunisia towards the end of 2010 and spreading to other states
during 2011, arguably changed the parameters for the United States and Iran
in significant ways. For America, the uprisings and the loss of allies such as
the Mubarak regime heightened concerns about the protection of US interests
in what was an increasingly volatile and unstable region. For Iran, the period
offered new opportunities to assert its growing influence and to complicate,
and indeed threaten, the interests of states like Saudi Arabia. The US–Saudi
relationship, and the escalating tension with Iran, would come to play an
important, and complicating, factor in America’s diplomatic efforts with Iran.
Yet it also drew attention to the weaknesses in the decades-long US policy
of supporting authoritarian regimes in the interests of maintaining regional
stability.
This problem has continued to trouble US policy makers. The various
uprisings that swept through the Middle East in early 2011, collectively
referred to as the Arab Spring, placed President Bush’s successor, President
Barack Obama, and his administration, in an extremely difficult position.
As each crisis developed, and Arab populations across the region demanded
greater representation and meaningful political reform, policy makers in
Washington were largely cautious in their response. There seemed to be a
marked reluctance to imply that America had any role to play in the popular
uprisings. This reluctance can be seen in part as a reaction to the bombastic
and aggressive role that the United States had played in the region under the
Bush presidency.
Despite the cautious approach, or perhaps because of it, President Obama
has been criticized for both failing to seize the moment and lead the way in
the popular demand for freedom, and, particularly in the case of Libya, for
committing US resources when American interests were not clearly at stake.

For President Obama, just as for President Bush, the key challenge facing
America, as it attempted to construct a response to the myriad uprisings,
was how to find a balance between protecting US interests and promoting
American values.
In June 2009, President Obama gave what came to be regarded as an
important policy speech in Cairo. He focused on restoring a sense of trust
and respect between America and the Middle East. He acknowledged the his-
tory of US meddling in the internal affairs of many Middle Eastern countries
and the damage this had done to the region’s relationship with America. He
promised a significant change in policy. When talking of democracy, he was
adamant in stating that democracy could not be imposed from outside. This
was a clear indictment of the perception of interference that had become the
legacy of the Bush administration democracy promotion policy.
In the same speech that championed the principle of self-determination,
President Obama echoed the problem that the Bush administration had had to
grapple with in Gaza with the election of Hamas. The concern about the role
that Islamist groups could play in Middle Eastern politics, including groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, appeared to place US interests at
odds with its desire to champion freedom and democracy. President Obama
appeared to be addressing this issue directly in the Cairo speech:
There are some who advocate for democracy only when they’re out of power;
once in power, they are ruthless in suppressing the rights of others. So no matter
where it takes hold, government of the people and by the people sets a single
standard for all who would hold power: You must maintain your power through
consent, not coercion; you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate
with a spirit of tolerance and compromise; you must place the interests of your
people and the legitimate workings of the political process above your party.
Without these ingredients, elections alone do not make true democracy.53
This issue is still confronting US policy makers, particularly in the light of

recent events in the Middle East. The solution to balancing US interests and
values here is in no way clear. President Obama’s distinction between elec-
tions and ‘true democracy’ indicates the complexities inherent in the process
of political transition towards democracy.
The distinction here between the institutional and normative aspects of
democracy is an important one, and one that demonstrates that the process of
democratic transition can be long and extremely difficult. Elections without
the structural and normative safeguards can often be counter-productive.
As was argued in chapter 3, there is ample evidence showing that the pro-
cess of transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system can often be
104 Chapter 4
profoundly destabilizing, not just for the state in transition, but also for its
neighbours.
This raises a difficult problem, and one that the Bush administration did not
adequately address. Namely, does the promotion of democracy in the short
term actually serve US interests? In the case of Iran, and the broader Middle
East, US interests revolve around stability, the uninterrupted flow of oil to the
global market, the security of Israel and, specifically regarding Iran, the abil-
ity to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. It would seem clear,
especially in the light of the Arab uprisings, that all of these interests would,
to some degree, be adversely affected by the instability that often accompa-
nies political upheaval.
Yet America has defined its national identity around the ideological com-
mitment to the values embodied in liberal democracy. Furthermore, whether
it is by example or through active promotion, supporting the spread of those
values is essentially America’s raison d’être. It is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that in order to promote its values, the United States must at times
be willing to sacrifice its interests, and vice versa. Every president has faced
this conundrum. For the Bush administration this problem was highlighted
time and again as it sought to find an elusive balance between its interests
and values. By placing values front and centre in US public diplomacy, and
by arguing that they could be brought into harmony through the promotion
of democracy abroad, it became evident just what an impossible task that
would be. The resulting policy was one that rhetorically drew on the tradi-
tions of American exceptionalism and benign leadership, while pursuing a
strategy that often saw those very same values being sacrificed for the sake
of pragmatic interests.
President Obama’s dilemma would become acute as he confronted the
growing regional influence of Iran and its disruptive behaviour. Reigning in
Iran’s influence, and keeping allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel secure
were likely to directly undermine America’s ability to convince Iran that
diplomacy on the nuclear issue would be pursued in good faith. It seemed
likely that Iran would view it as an effort to manipulate and contain it.
IRAN’S GROWING REGIONAL INFLUENCE
In late December 2011, the GCC met to discuss various issues concerning
the region, including concerns about Iran’s growing power. Saudi Arabia’s
King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz called on the Arab GCC members to form a
Gulf union in response to the escalating fears about Iran, saying, ‘I ask today
that we move from a phase of cooperation to a phase of union within a single
entity.’54 In a thinly veiled reference to Iran, he warned, ‘You must realize

that our security and stability are threatened and we need to live up to our
responsibilities.’55
At the same meeting, the GCC called on Iran to ‘stop these policies and
practices . . . and stop interfering in the internal affairs of the Gulf nations’.
The Sunni-led GCC also expressed concern over attempts by Shiite Iran to
‘instigate sectarian strife’.56 While calls for Iran to change its behaviour were
not new, the calls for the GCC to form a union demonstrated the seriousness
of Arab concerns about Iran’s growing region influence.
The calls for forming a union were also particularly significant as they
coincided with discussions that had been taking place between Arab states
about the possibility of expanding its membership to include Jordan and
Morocco. One analyst has argued that the announcement of possible expan-
sion could ‘be read in light of the security role that Jordan could play for
the Gulf States in confronting Iran’s growing influence and its appetite to
interfere in the Gulf’.57
At a symposium in Washington, D.C., convened by the Middle East Policy
Council in 2011 to explore the impact that the uprisings were having on
regional stability, the issue of deepening tension between the GCC and Iran
was discussed, along with the potential for sectarian conflict to escalate.58
One of the panel members, Thomas Lippman, recounted being in Wash-
ington D.C. just after the GCC intervention in Bahrain, where a delegation of
prominent members of the Saudi Consultative Assembly met at the Middle
East Institute. ‘There was no doubt in their minds that Bahrain represented
a red line of Iranian/Shia encroachment on territory that naturally was part
of Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence. It could not be tolerated.’59 While
the GCC had been unified in its condemnation of Iranian interference in the
region, it was becoming apparent that the rivalry was about more than just the
recent events in Bahrain, but rather had more to do with traditional Saudi–
Iranian competition.60
For the Obama administration, the war of words between the Saudis
and Iran over the events in Bahrain was further evidence that the regional
dynamic was shifting. While there was very little evidence that Iran was
actively engaged in any sort of destabilizing activity in Bahrain, the Iranian
regime’s rhetoric clearly sought to inflame sectarian tensions.
As the narrative of Arab uprisings began to take on sectarian undertones,
analysts warned that the tendency of the Arab states to reinforce the sectar-
ian narrative would potentially hurt those states’ interests while benefiting
Iranian interests. Former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Chas W. Freeman,
cautioned that appealing to Arab nationalism rather than sectarianism would
have been a more effective way of countering Iranian influence.
106 Chapter 4
Religious ideology is Iran’s battleground of choice. One should never allow

one’s adversary to pick the field of battle. Only Saudis can decide who they
are, but, in terms of Saudi prospects for victory in the struggle for the soul of
the Arab world, Arab identity and tradition would seem to be a more promising
choice of terrain on which to make a stand than religion.61
Whether an appeal to Arab nationalism would have prevented the descent

into sectarian conflict across the Middle East over the following years is
difficult to say.
One analyst during this period argued that one of the key features of Saudi
regional influence was ideological. ‘Riyadh has for decades promoted Islam
generally and its own specific interpretation of Islam, Wahhabism or, as it
is more commonly known in the Arab world, salafism.’62 Gregory Gause
thus cautioned that Saudi Arabia’s, and indeed Iran’s, tendency to encourage
sectarian differences across the region was decidedly dangerous.63 ‘Raising
the sectarian temperature around the region might help the Saudis mobilize
domestic and regional support against Iran and its allies in the short term, but
only at a serious cost.’ He went on to argue that in Iraq this would make it
even harder for the various parties involved reaching much-needed compro-
mises on collective and inclusive governance. He claimed that this sectarian
narrative would ‘help fuel salafi jihadist extremism, represented by al-Qaeda,
because anti-Shiism is a strong element of the salafi extremist agenda’.64
The concerns about sectarianism fuelling intra and inter-state conflicts
seem quite prescient, given the violence now occurring in Syria, Yemen and
Iraq. What is clear with hindsight is the fact that as the increasingly sectarian
nature of the uprisings in countries including Bahrain and Syria spread to
neighbouring states it further complicated Obama’s attempts to deal with Iran
and its nuclear programme.
Suzanne Maloney, a former State Department official under the Bush
administration, argued that the uprisings had radically transformed percep-
tions about the regional balance of power in the Middle East.
For Iran’s neighbors, the regional turmoil has also reshaped their approach to
the Islamic Republic, intensifying the deeply-held trepidations that emanate
from strategic competition as well as ethnic and sectarian differences. The Gulf
States’ cold peace with Iran has relapsed into another cold war, as Saudi Arabia
and the smaller emirates have sought to preserve the status quo amidst an envi-
ronment of regional flux.65
As Maloney points out, the tensions between Iran and its neighbours were
not new, yet the Arab uprisings and the political turmoil that many states had
experienced had rekindled their mistrust of Iran. Iran’s championing of the
mainly Shiite-led protests in Bahrain while condemning the protests in Syria
as the work of ‘foreign meddling’ had only increased their concern about
Iran’s intentions. She predicted that ‘the eruption of an existential contest for
influence between Riyadh and Tehran—two states with sectarian impulses,
little tolerance for democracy, and vital significance for the world economy—
appears almost certain to incite volatile future repercussions for U.S. interests
and international security’.66
The political turmoil in the region was being used by both Iran and Saudi
Arabia to exploit sectarian fears. As one analyst put it, ‘In response to the
Arab Spring, sectarianism became a Saudi pre-emptive counter-revolutionary
strategy that exaggerates religious difference and hatred and prevents the
development of national non-sectarian politics.’67 In this volatile climate, the
debate about a nuclear arms race in the Middle East had decidedly alarmist
overtones.
An op-ed appearing in The New York Times warned of the dire conse-
quences should Iran develop a nuclear weapon. It claimed that
an Iranian atom bomb will force Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt to acquire
their own atom bombs. Thus a multipolar nuclear arena will be established in
the most volatile region on earth. Sooner or later, this unprecedented develop-
ment will produce a nuclear event. The world we know will cease to be the
world we know after Tehran, Riyadh, Cairo or Tel Aviv become the twenty-first
century’s Hiroshima.68
Yet, not all commentators believed that an arms race was inevitable. The
overwhelming majority of states have chosen not to pursue a weapons capa-
bility, even when states in their region have gone nuclear.69 Dire predictions
aside, what was becoming apparent was the deepening sense of insecurity felt
by many states in the region. The fear that the Saudis, or another Gulf State,
could potentially seek a nuclear capability, hinted at deeper insecurities being
felt in the region. The Saudis in particular seem to have perceived their own
problems with sectarian tensions and the potential for protests demanding
political reform as potential weaknesses that the Iranians could exploit, argu-
ably prompting the government to seek reassurances from the Americans that
their security was still a priority.
IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ
An issue that caused serious concern among Arab states during this time was
the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and the belief that this would create
political space for the Iranian regime to exploit. Iran and Saudi Arabia have
traditionally competed for influence among the Shiite and Sunni populations,
108 Chapter 4
respectively, in Iraq, and ever since the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein,
Iran’s presence in the fragile state had been growing. The concern was that
as the US presence was significantly reduced it resulted in increased sectarian
tensions, further destabilizing the country.
In a report on Iranian influence in Iraq for the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali
argued that Iran had made considerable use of its soft power in Iraq. It did this
by ‘enacting protectionist measures and trade policies to Iraq’s advantage,
tried to co-opt the transnational Shiite clerical network based in Najaf, and
attempted to influence Iraqi public opinion though information activities’.70
Iran had also frequently been linked to Shiite militias within Iraq, and various
Shiite and Kurdish political parties. The authors argued at the time that Iran
had done this in order to ‘create a weak federal state dominated by Shiites and
amenable to Iranian influence’.71
The report also expressed concern about Iran’s use of ‘Shiite militant
proxies to stoke sectarian tensions and to foment violence, only to then step
in diplomatically to resolve these conflicts—thereby ensuring itself a role
as mediator in Iraq’.72 The authors argued that ‘following the U.S. military
withdrawal from Iraq, Tehran may use its support for these Shiite militias
and insurgent groups to press the Iraqi government to curtail its relation-
ship with the United States and as a source of leverage on other issues’.73
Despite these concerns, it remained unclear how much leverage Iran actually
had over the various political parties and the extent to which Tehran could
manipulate the political process within that country. In many ways Iraq’s
Shiite political elite was driven by self-interest rather than by a particular
loyalty to Iran.
The Syrian Crisis and Regional Consequences

As protests spread across Syria and the Assad regime responded by violently
suppressing the protest movement, Iran faced a difficult choice. Despite inter-
national condemnation of the violence, Iran’s leaders continued to support
the Assad regime. Indeed, Iran characterized the uprisings there as the work
of foreign powers’ interference in direct contrast to the narrative of ‘Islamic
Awakenings’ that it had promoted in response to other uprisings.
An early report by the International Crisis Group raised the concern that
Iran could play a complicating role if the Assad regime ever fell. The report
warned that
Iran . . . would want to thwart emergence of a Sunni-dominated polity and

could be tempted to play the Alawite card; Tehran in particular might sponsor
remnants of the former security services. The more Syria is exposed to external
interference before the transition takes place, the more likely that it will become
an arena for foreign intrusion after it has occurred.74
It was becoming clear that while the Arab uprisings initially presented Iran
with an opportunity to boost its image in the region, the Syrian crisis altered
the calculus and instead presented a serious threat to the regional balance of
power.
As Iran inserted itself into the narrative of the ‘Arab Spring’, Michael
Eisenstadt argued that ‘its propensity to be its own worst enemy in dealing
with its Arab neighbors’75 highlighted the limitations of Iranian soft power.
Eisenstadt went on to argue that Tehran sought to use its soft power in four
significant ways: ‘reputation and image management . . . economic leverage
. . . export of revolutionary Islam . . . [and] propaganda and spin’.76 Indeed
the language the Iranian government used regarding the Arab Spring, refer-
ring to it as an ‘Islamic Awakening’ was an attempt to link the revolutionary
experience in Iran to the Arab uprisings. Eisenstadt went on to make the
point, however, that despite its efforts to win Arab ‘hearts and minds’, Iran’s
actions have often been at odds with the image that it was trying to project.
Despite Iran’s attempts to appeal to protesters in various Arab states
regardless of religion, Iran’s long history of sectarian activism made this a
difficult task. Iran has long used its ties and influence with the Shiite com-
munity throughout the Middle East as a way of expanding its strategic power
beyond its own borders by
establishing ties with Shiite and Muslim communities worldwide [and] by

co-opting Shiite clerical networks and through religious outreach by Iranian
cultural centers (which are often staffed by Iranian intelligence personnel). Iran
hopes that these ties will ensure that these communities will rally to its side if
it is attacked.77
An opinion poll conducted by James Zogby for the Arab American Insti-
tute Foundation, found a significantly negative opinion towards the Iranian
regime across the Arab states. Conducted in June 2011, and with four thou-
sand people polled, it was found that ‘most Arabs look askance at Iran’s role
across their region, with substantial majorities seeing Iran playing a negative
role especially in Iraq, Bahrain and the Arab Gulf’.78
Arab public opinion regarding Iran’s role in the Arab Spring and its non-
sectarian agenda had been materially damaged by its own violent suppression
of the Green Movement. It had also drawn attention to the Iranian regime’s
poor treatment of its own Sunni minority. Despite its public diplomacy
efforts at reassuring Arab states about its benign foreign policy intentions,
the impression in the Arab world has mostly been that Iran is intent on
extending its own power and influence in service of Shiite interests. Alaeddin
110 Chapter 4
Boroujerdi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission

of the Iranian Parliament once described his country as ‘the most influential
country in the region which tightens regional security and has played a valu-
able role in defusing crisis and establishing security’.79
In a speech on Iran’s National Day of the Persian Gulf in April 2011, Major
General Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of Staff of Iran’s armed forces, stated,
‘The Persian Gulf has always, is and shall always belong to Iran.’80 Major
General Firouzabadi, in reference to the GCC intervention in Bahrain, stated
that ‘the Arab dictatorial regimes in the Persian Gulf are unable to contain the
popular uprisings. Instead of trying and failing to open an unworkable front
against Iran, these dictators should relinquish power, end their savage crimes
and let the people determine their own future.’81
Some analysts conclude that ‘these statements, and others like them, do
much to reveal the perceptions of Iranian leaders and military officers. They
reflect Iran’s perception of itself as a Gulf power and a natural regional
leader, and as a state with a special mission and justification for its actions.
Moreover, they show that Iran sees the United States and its regional allies as
the principal threat to what the country perceives as its inalienable rights as
the Gulf’s dominant polity’.82
AMERICA’S RESPONSE
Given the strength of the anti-Iranian narrative within Washington, D.C., it

was always going to be a problematic task for the Obama administration to
convince Congress and the American public that diplomacy would work with
Iran in solving the nuclear issue. In response to the Syrian crisis, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13572, imposing sanctions against Iran for
its involvement in Syria, sending a signal that it would not tolerate Iranian
interference in that state.83
The Arab uprisings that began in 2011 and triggered deep unease through-
out the region made that task all the more difficult. Indeed, as the tensions
between Iran and the Saudis escalated, it also appeared that Obama would
have to convince not just his own domestic audience about the wisdom of
talking to the Iranians, but also the Saudis and Israelis. Obama’s response
to the changing conditions within the region can therefore be understood, in
part, as a balancing act between competing interests that included containing
Iran, reassuring Saudi Arabia and Israel and ensuring some semblance of
stability in the oil and energy markets.84
By August 2012, the prospect for diplomatic talks seemed even less likely
as the IAEA released a report criticizing Iran for its continued failure to
resolve outstanding issues. In particular, the IAEA was concerned about
activity at a nuclear site in Parchin, long suspected of being a clandestine site

for testing military activities related to nuclear weapons.
Despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January
2012, efforts to resolve all outstanding substantive issues have achieved no
concrete results: Iran, in an initial declaration, simply dismissed the Agency’s
concerns in connection with the issues identified in Section C of the Annex
to GOV/2011/65; Iran has not responded to the Agency’s initial questions on
Parchin and the foreign expert; Iran has not provided the Agency with access to
the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access.85
The military dimensions of the Parchin site and the refusal of Iran to allow
adequate inspections in order to satisfy the concerns of the IAEA monitoring
team, heightened concerns that Iran was attempting to conduct research into
explosives that could be used in developing a nuclear weapon.86
In September 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu addressed the UN
General Assembly, giving a speech that would highlight his state’s growing
alarm over the developing Iranian nuclear programme. Netanyahu, with visual
props including a cartoon image of a bomb depicting the levels of enrichment
leading to weapons grade uranium, warned the United States that Israel would
take matters into its own hands if the United States could not stop Iran.87
As frustration mounted over the disruptive role that Iran was playing in
many of the crises in the Middle East, and as multilateral talks stalled over
Iran’s refusal to comply with IAEA requests, the United States and the EU
states expanded and strengthened the sanctions regime against Iran. The US
Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, which significantly expanded the already existing US sanctions against
Iran. In particular, it focused on sanctioning Iran’s energy and financial sec-
tors with the explicit intention of crippling the Iranian economy in order to
alter the calculations of the Iranian regime and coerce them to limit their
nuclear programme.88
By October it was clear that the EU states involved in confronting Iran
were equally dissatisfied with the lack of progress on the problem in the pre-
vious two years. Adding to the sanctions imposed by the United States, the
EU announced its own in response to the August IAEA report. The EU stated:
Iran is acting in flagrant violation of its international obligations and contin-

ues to refuse to fully co-operate with the IAEA to address the concerns on its
nuclear programme. In this context, and in coherence with previous European
Council and Council conclusions, the Council has agreed additional restric-
tive measures in the financial, trade, energy and transport sectors, as well as
additional designations, notably of entities active in the oil and gas industry. In
particular, the Council has agreed to prohibit all transactions between European
112 Chapter 4
and Iranian banks, unless authorised in advance under strict conditions with
exemptions for humanitarian needs. In addition, the Council has decided to
strengthen the restrictive measures against the Central Bank of Iran. Further
export restrictions have been imposed, notably for graphite, metals, software for
industrial processes, as well as measures relating to the ship building industry.89
The targeting of Iran’s energy and financial sector would have significant
consequences for the state. Some reports estimated that as a result of the
combined sanctions, Iran’s oil revenue fell by almost 40 per cent compared
to previous levels.90
As the November 2012 US presidential elections approached, it became
clear that the turmoil in the Middle East, and the increasing tensions between
Iran and key powers within the region, had significantly changed the calculus
for the Obama administration surrounding the nuclear issue. Finding a solu-
tion to the issue would require balancing the deepening security concerns
of allies such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States, and reaffirming the
relationship between America and Israel.
During his speech to the UN General Assembly in September, Obama’s
language on Iran signalled a zero-tolerance attitude for the kind of disruptive
behaviour that they perceived Iran to be engaging in. He stated:
In Iran, we see where the path of a violent and unaccountable ideology leads.
The Iranian people have a remarkable and ancient history, and many Iranians
wish to enjoy peace and prosperity alongside their neighbours. But just as it
restricts the rights of its own people, the Iranian government continues to prop
up a dictator in Damascus and supports terrorist groups abroad.
Time and again, it has failed to take the opportunity to demonstrate that its
nuclear program is peaceful and to meet its obligations to the United Nations.
So let me be clear: America wants to resolve this issue through diplomacy,
and we believe that there is still time and space to do so. But that time is not
unlimited.
Make no mistake: A nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be con-
tained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations,
and the stability of the global economy. It risks triggering a nuclear arms race in
the region, and the unravelling of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
That’s why a coalition of countries is holding the Iranian government
accountable. And that’s why the United States will do what we must to prevent
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.91
This speech was a far cry from the early efforts at diplomacy that had
characterized Obama’s first few months in office. The four years since he
had taken office had presented a far more complex set of issues and obstacles
to diplomacy than expected. Indeed, the prospects for a diplomatic solution
towards the end of 2012 seemed remote.
NOTES
1. Biden, J. (2010), ‘The President’s Nuclear Vision’, The Wall Street Journal,
January 29. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487048789045750313822
15508268.
2. Evans, G. (2010), ‘Obama’s Prague Speech One Year On: The Nuclear Balance
Sheet’, address to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March18. http://www.gevans.org/
speeches/speech409.html (Accessed July 30, 2015).
3. Oslo, October 9, 2009. Announcement awarding President Barack Obama the
Nobel Peace Prize. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/
press.html.
4. Obama, B. (2009), Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square,
Prague, Czech Republic, Prague: White House Transcript, April 5. https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered.
5. Burkeman, O. (2009), ‘Obama Administration Says Goodbye to ‘War on Ter-
ror’, The Guardian, March, 26. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/25/
obama-war-terror-overseas-contingency-operations.
6. Obama, B. (2007), ‘Renewing American Leadership’, Foreign Affairs, 86, 4,
July/August, p. 4.
7. Ibid.
8. Obama, B. (2009), Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel
Peace Prize, Oslo: White House Transcript, December 10. https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize.
9. Obama, B. (2009), Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square,
Prague, Czech Republic, Prague.
10. Parsi, T. (2011), A Single Roll of the Dice (ebook version: chapter 1).
11. Ibid., p. 37.
12. CNN Transcript of Democratic Presidential Debate, CNN, February 21, 2008.
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/21/debate.transcript/.
13. Obama, B. (2009), President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, Washington
DC, January 21. https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
14. Obama, B. (2009), Obama’s Message in Celebration of Nowruz, Washington
DC, March 20. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123752091165792573.
15. ‘Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Dismisses Barack Obama’s Overtures to Iran’,
The Guardian, March 21, 2009. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/21/
ali-khamenei-barack-obama-iran.
16. ‘Obama says Iranian Nukes “Unacceptable”’, Al Arabiya, November 7, 2008.
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/11/07/59695.html.
17. Erdbrink, T. (2008), ‘Facing Obama, Iran Suddenly Hedges on Talks’, The
Washington Post, November 13. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/11/12/AR2008111203075.html.
18. Parsi, T. (2011), A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran, New
Haven: Yale University Press, p. 35.
19. Ibid.
114 Chapter 4
20. Baxter, K. and Simpson, K. (2015), ‘The United States and Saudi Arabia
through the Arab Uprisings’, Global Change, Peace and Security, 27, 2, pp. 139–51.
21. ‘US Embassy Cables: Saudi King Urges US Strike on Iran’, The Guardian,
November 29, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-docu-
ments/150519 (Accessed July 30, 2015).
22. Slavin, B. (2009), ‘US Contacted Iran’s Ayatollah Before Election’, The
Washington Times, June 24. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/24/us-
contacted-irans-ayatollah-before-election/?feat=home_cube_position1.
23. Sanger, D. E. (2013), Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Sur-
prising Use of American Power, Broadway Books (Ebook Edition), p. 162.
24. Sanger, D. E. (2013), Confront and Conceal, p. 161.
25. Ibid.
26. Kazemi, A. V. (2013), ‘Appropriating the Past: The Green Movement in Iran’,
Global Dialogue, International Sociological Association, 3, 3.
27. Sahimi, M. (2010), ‘The Political Evolution of Mousavi’, PBS Frontline:
Tehran Bureau, February 16. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbu-
reau/2010/02/the-political-evolution-of-mousavi.html.
28. Fathi, N. (2009), ‘Iran President and Challenger Clash in Debate’, The New
York Times, June 3. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/world/middleeast/04iran.
html.
29. Black, I. and Walker, P. (2009), ‘Iranians Flood to Polls for Pivotal Elec-
tion’, The Guardian, June 12. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/12/
iranian-election-president-ahmadinejad-mousavi.
30. Black, I. (2009), ‘Ahmadinejad Wins Surprise Iran Landslide Victory’, The
Guardian, June 13. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/13/iran-election-
ahmadinejad-wins-president.
31. Fathi, N. (2009), ‘In a Death Seen Around the World, A Symbol of Iranian
Protests’, The New York Times, June 22. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/world/
middleeast/23neda.html.
32. Obama, B. (2009), ‘The President Meets with Prime Minister Berlusconi, Com-
ments on Iran’, White House, June 15. https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/The-President-
Meets-with-Prime-Minister-Berlusconi-Comments-on-Iran/.
33. Sadjadpour, K. (2014), ‘No, Sanctions Didn’t Force Iran to Make a Deal’, For-
eign Policy, May 14. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/14/no-sanctions-didnt-force-
iran-to-make-a-deal/.
34. Donohue, N. (2013), ‘Understanding Iran’s Right to Enrichment’, Cen-
tre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC. http://csis.org/blog/
understanding-irans-right-enrichment.
35. NPT http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html.
36. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/hr2194.pdf.
37. Ibid.
38. ‘Spiderweb: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions’, Crisis Group,
February 25, 2013, p. i.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. ii.

41. Ibid., p. 2.
42. For a detailed account of the technical aspects of the Stuxnet virus and its
wide-reaching consequences, see: Zetter, K. (2015), Countdown to Zero Day, Broad-
way Books; ‘Basic Attack Strategy of Stuxnet 0.5, Rev. 1’, Institute for Science and
International Security, February 26, 2012. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/
documents/Stuxnet_attack_strategy_26Feb2012.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2015).
For an account of the political story behind Stuxnet, see: Sanger, D. E. (2013), Con-
front and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power,
Broadway Books.
43. Sanger, D. E. (2012), ‘Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against
Iran’, The New York Times, June 1. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/
middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?_r=0 (Accessed
February 9, 2015).
44. Ibid.
45. Cavaiola, L. J., Gompert, D. C. and Libicki, M. (2015), ‘Cyber House Rules:
On War, Retaliation and Escalation’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57, 1, pp.
81–104, 89.
46. Ibid., p. 94.
47. Kello, L. (2013), ‘The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and
Statecraft’, International Security, 38, 2, pp. 7–40, 14.
48. Ackerman, S. (2011), ‘With Stuxnet, Did the US and Israel Create a New
Cyber War Era’, Wired, January 16. http://www.wired.com/2011/01/with-stuxnet-did-
the-u-s-and-israel-create-a-new-cyberwar-era/ (Accessed July 14, 2015).
49. Cowell, A. and Gladstone, R. (2012), ‘Iran Reports Killing of Nuclear Sci-
entist in “Terror Blast”’, The New York Times, January 11. http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/01/12/world/middleeast/iran-reports-killing-of-nuclear-scientist.html?_
r=1&scp=49&sq=iran%20women%20hostages%20released%201979&st=cse
(Accessed June 12, 2015).
50. Hasan, M. (2012), ‘Iran’s Nuclear Scientists are not Being Assassinated, they are
Being Murdered’, The Guardian, January 17. http://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2012/jan/16/iran-scientists-state-sponsored-murder (Accessed July 24, 2015).
51. ‘Report: US Pressure Israel to Halt Assassinations of Iranian Nuclear
Scientists’, Haaretz, March 2, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/1.577360 (Accessed July 24, 2015).
52. Gladstone, R. (2012), ‘Iran Signals Revenge Over Killing of Scientist’, The
New York Times, June 12. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/middleeast/
iran-outrage-over-scientist-killing-deepens-as-it-signals-revenge.html (Accessed July
24, 2015).
53. Obama, B. (2009), Text of Obama’s Speech in Cairo, The New York Times,
June 4. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0 (Accessed June 12, 2011).
54. ‘Saudi King Abdullah Urges GCC “to move from phase of cooperation to
phase of union”’, (2011), Al Arabiya, December 20. http://www.alarabiya.net/arti-
cles/2011/12/20/183512.html (Accessed December 19, 2011).
116 Chapter 4
55. Ibid.
56. ‘GCC Tells Iran to “stop interfering”: says Damascus Must Embrace
Arab Plan’, (2011). Al Arabiya, December 20.<http://www.alarabiya.net/arti-
57. Ibrahim Saif (2011), ‘New Reasons for the GCC to Consider an Expanded
Bloc’, National, May 29, 2011.
58. ‘A Reawakened Rivalry: The GCC versus Iran’, (2011), edited transcript of
symposium, Middle East Policy, xviii, 4, Winter, pp. 1–24.
59. Ibid., p. 3.
60. Ibid., p. 4.
61. Chas W, Freeman (2011), ‘The Mess in the Middle East’, Middle East Policy,
xviii, 4, Winter, pp. 96–105, 104.
62. Ibid., p. 20.
63. Ibid., p. 21.
64. Ibid., p. 21.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Al-Rasheed, M. (2011), ‘Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses
to the Arab Spring’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 11, 3, pp. 513, 513–26.
68. Shavit, A. (2012), ‘The Bomb and the Bomber’, The New York Times, March
21. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/opinion/the-bomb-and-the-bomber.html
69. Cook. S. A. (2012), ‘Don’t Fear a Nuclear Arms race in the Middle East’, For-
eign Policy, April 2. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/02/dont-fear-a-nuclear-arms-
race-in-the-middle-east/ (Accessed July 23, 2015).
70. Eisenstadt, M., Knights, M. and Ali, A. (2011), ‘Iran’s Influence in Iraq: Coun-
tering Tehran’s Whole-of-Government-Approach’, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, April 2011.
71. Ibid., p. ix.
72. Ibid., pp. ix–x.
73. Ibid., p. x.
74. ‘Uncharted waters: Thinking Through Syria’s Dynamics’, International Crisis
Group, Middle East Briefing 31, November 24, 2011.
75. Eisenstadt, M. (2011), ‘The Limits of Iran’s Soft Power’, The Iran Primer,
United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC, March 22. http://iranprimer.usip.
org/blog/2011/mar/22/limits-iran%E2%80%99s-soft-power (Accessed November 16,
2011.
76. Ibid.
77. Eisenstadt, M. (2011), ‘The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Operational and Policy Implications’, Middle East Studies Monographs, Marine
Corps University, August 2011, pp. 1–19, 5.
78. James Zogby (analyst) (2011), ‘Arab Attitudes Toward Iran, 2011’, Arab
American Institute Foundation, pp. 1–12. http://aai.3cdn.net/fd7ac73539e31a321a_
r9m6iy9y0.pdf (Accessed October 31, 2011).
79. Wilner, A. and Cordesman, A. (2011), ‘U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition:
The Gulf Military Balance’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Novem-
ber 2, pp. 1–135, 18.
80. Ghasemilee, S. (2011), ‘Iranian Armed Forces Chief: The Gulf is Persian,
and has Belonged to Iran Forever’, Al Arabiya, April 30. http://www.alarabiya.net/
articles/2011/04/30/147308.html (Accessed November 5, 2011).
81. Ibid.
82. Wilner, A. and Cordesman, A. (2011), ‘U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competi-
tion,’ p. 18.
83. ‘Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Human Rights Abuses
in Syria’, Executive Order 13572, April 29, 2011. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13572.pdf (Accessed July 24, 2015).
84. Byman, D. (2013), ‘Explaining the Western Response to the Arab Spring’, The
Journal of Strategic Studies, 36, 2, pp. 289–320.
85. ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Provisions
of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic republic of Iran’, IAEA Report by the
director general, August 30. 2012. http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/
documents/Iran_report_--_August_30_2012.pdf (Accessed July 23, 2015).
86. Parchin, Institute for Science and International Security, http://www.isisnucle-
ariran.org/sites/detail/parchin/ (Accessed July 23, 2015).
87. Gladstone, R. and Sanger, D. E. (2012), ‘Nod to Obama by Netanyahu in
Warning to Iran on Bomb’, The New York Times, September 27. http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/09/28/world/middleeast/netanyahu-warns-that-iran-bombmaking-ability-
is-nearer.html?pagewanted=all (Accessed June 12, 2014).
88. ‘Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012’, United States
Congress, January 3, 2012. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Docu-
ments/hr_1905_pl_112_158.pdf (Accessed July 24, 2015).
89. ‘Council Conclusions on Iran’, Council of the European Union, Luxembourg,
October 15, 2012. http://www.consilium.europa.eu//uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/132833.pdf (Accessed July 24, 2015).
90. ‘Sanctions reduced Iran’s Oil Exports and revenues in 2012’, US Energy
Information Administration, April 26, 2013. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
cfm?id=11011 (Accessed July 24, 2015).
91. Obama, B. (2012), ‘President Obama’s Address to UN General Assembly’, The
Washington Post, September 25. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/president-
obamas-2012-address-to-un-general-assembly-full-text/2012/09/25/70bc1fce-071d-1
1e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_print.html (Accessed July 24, 2015).
Chapter 5
Diplomacy and the Geneva Process
Obama’s second term in office has seen a significant shift in the relation-
ship between the United States and Iran. This chapter will provide a detailed
analysis of the negotiations with Iran since the election of President Hassan
Rouhani. The Geneva Process with the P5+1 and the Joint Plan of Action
(JPOA) has sought to resolve many of the outstanding issues surrounding
Iran’s nuclear programme. If a comprehensive agreement were reached, it
would open Iran up to some of the most intrusive inspections and stringent
monitoring by the IAEA of any NPT signatory. And yet, for all it might
achieve diplomatically, it would still leave Iran with a clear breakout capabil-
ity. This is far short of both the Bush and Obama administration’s stated aim
of convincing Iran to substantially limit its nuclear programme. The nuclear
deal has also had a disruptive effect on America’s traditional regional allies,
most notably Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States, who fear the growing
influence of Iran within the region.
Heading into his second term, Obama also confronted a Middle East in
turmoil. Traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel placed much of
the blame for the crises unfolding in the region at America’s door. For the
Saudis, the prospect of diplomacy leading to warmer relations between Iran
and the United States threatened to compromise their own sense of security
and their faith that American and Saudi interests would continue to align.
This fear, shared by other members of the GCC, took on a renewed urgency
with the election of Hassan Rouhani in Iran and his seeming willingness to
reopen nuclear negotiations.
On June 15, 2013, Iranians went to the polls again. Unlike the 2009 elec-
tion though, this one offered some hope that the newly elected president,
Hassan Rouhani, might display a less antagonistic leadership style than his
119
120 Chapter 5
predecessor, Ahmadinejad.1 It was also regarded as a possible sign that Iran

might be willing to restart the stalled (and largely unproductive) nuclear talks
that had ended in 2012 in acrimony and no indication that talks would be
resumed in the near future.2 Indeed, much of 2012 and 2013 had consisted
of frustrating disagreements between the P5+1 and Iran over the enrichment
issue.
In what was perhaps the clearest public signal of a shift in Iran’s willing-
ness to commit to diplomacy, the newly elected president Rouhani published
an opinion piece in The Washington Post, claiming that his election was
evidence that the Iranian people wanted to find a peaceful and diplomatic
solution to the nuclear crisis. He wrote:
The international community faces many challenges in this new world—ter-
rorism, extremism, foreign military interference, drug trafficking, cybercrime
and cultural encroachment—all within a framework that has emphasized hard
power and the use of brute force. We must pay attention to the complexities of
the issues at hand to solve them.
Enter my definition of constructive engagement. In a world where global
politics is no longer a zero-sum game, it is—or should be—counterintuitive to
pursue one’s interests without considering the interests of others. A constructive
approach to diplomacy doesn’t mean relinquishing one’s rights. It means engag-
ing with one’s counterparts, on the basis of equal footing and mutual respect, to
address shared concerns and achieve shared objectives. In other words, win-win
outcomes are not just favourable but also achievable. A zero-sum, Cold War
mentality leads to everyone’s loss.
As I depart for New York for the opening of the U.N. General Assembly,
I urge my counterparts to seize the opportunity presented by Iran’s recent elec-
tion. I urge them to make the most of the mandate for prudent engagement
that my people have given me and to respond genuinely to my government’s
efforts to engage in constructive dialogue. Most of all, I urge them to look
beyond the pines and be brave enough to tell me what they see—if not for their
national interests, then for the sake of their legacies, and our children and future
generations.3
The message was clear that Iran was ready to change course on the nuclear
issue. Yet the tone was also confident in Iran’s own rights and dignity. Read-
ing between the lines, the article seemed to be offering the prospect of sub-
stantial talks while holding strong to Iran’s right to enrichment.
Presidents Obama and Rouhani exchanged a series of letters outlining their
desire for diplomatic talks and the willingness to seek a solution to the crisis
that has been consuming both the states for more than decade.4 On Septem-
ber 27, President Obama spoke on the phone to President Rouhani, the first
direct communication between the leaders of the two states since the 1979
hostage crisis.5 It was an important symbolic moment. For the two states,
direct contact between its leaders had been unthinkable, even weeks before,
Diplomacy and the Geneva Process 121
and it offered an unprecedented opportunity to move ahead with the stalled

diplomatic process.
As the P5+1 resumed talks in Geneva which continued throughout October,
the reaction in the United States, Iran and Israel was mixed. While Democrats
were cautiously optimistic, the Republicans in Congress were deeply suspi-
cious of Iran’s intentions and continued to push for new sanctions.
DOMESTIC DISRUPTERS: THE US CONGRESS
Domestic politics in the United States have presented a special problem for
Obama’s negotiations with Iran. The narrative surrounding Iran has come
to emphasize the deeply untrustworthy nature of the regime, and this theme
dominated statements within the United States about the possibility of a dip-
lomatic deal. Even those members of Congress who were more supportive,
including Secretary of State John Kerry, cautioned that any future deal would
aim to ensure that Iran ‘would never be able to get a nuclear weapon’,6 hardly
a statement that indicated a new found level of trust.
In early October, just as the talks were getting underway again in Geneva,
a group of Republican and Democratic senators wrote a joint letter to Presi-
dent Obama arguing that any early good faith offer by Iran must include the
immediate suspension of all enrichment activity.7 Once again, the enrichment
issue was central to being able to trust that Iran was not intent on developing
a weapons capability. In return, the senators agreed to withhold the imposi-
tion of new sanctions.
Among the Republicans though, the rhetoric about Iran tended towards the
alarmist, and demonstrated strong opposition to a diplomatic deal that would
also see the easing of sanctions against Iran. The opposition to a deal high-
lighted several ongoing problems for the Obama administration. The first was
how visceral the hatred and suspicion of Iran was amongst some members of
Congress. It would continue to drive certain representatives to undermine the
prospect of a diplomatic solution through quite extraordinary means.
The second problem concerned the narrative of Iranian intentions. For
those opposed to a diplomatic deal, there appeared to be no doubt that Iran’s
true intentions were to develop a nuclear weapon: the ability to enrich ura-
nium was inseparable from a desire to develop a weapon. The logic seemed
to suggest that if Iran could do one, it would absolutely do the other. In an
interview with CNN, the House majority leader at the time, Eric Cantor,
stated that ‘I find it astounding that the White House would say that a deal that
would allow enrichment of uranium and building a plutonium reactor is not
a march to war . . . to allow Iran the ability to continue to enrich or to build
a plutonium factory is a sure way to spawn nuclear proliferation—and God
forbid, face a nuclear Iran.’8
122 Chapter 5
Senator Marco Rubio, a Republican senator from Florida who would later
run as a presidential candidate, went even further in his dire predictions that
Iran was determined to deceive the international community and develop a
weapons capability:
No one who is serious about preventing a nuclear-armed Iran should be com-

forted by what transpired this weekend in Geneva. After ten years of talks that
have been multilateral, bilateral, secret and open, we should expect more than
just inconsequential interim measures from Iran.
The urgency of the situation and the significant progress Iran has made in its
nuclear efforts over the last decade demand much more than what the Obama
administration appears willing to accept. Iran continues to refuse to meet the
requirements of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions and abandon its
nuclear weapons program. None of the steps Iran reportedly has proposed will
do much to significantly postpone the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran even
as the U.S. and our partners would give up key economic leverage with Tehran.
I am also concerned that in our haste to endorse a flawed arrangement with
Iran, this administration appears willing to ignore the concerns of some of our
closest allies. We should be learning from our experiences with other nuclear
rogues, such as North Korea, and not repeat the same mistakes, which I fear is
the case here.9
Senator Bob Corker, who would become a key player in the battle that
Congress waged against the Obama administration over the nuclear deal,
drew attention to the third issue that would prove an obstacle to President
Obama and his negotiating team—the role of sanctions. Senator Corker, in an
interview with NBC’s Meet the Press, claimed that sanctions were the reason
American had any leverage whatsoever against Iran, and to ease sanctions
would be a dangerous move.
The [U.N.] security council resolutions call for a complete stoppage [of Iran’s
enrichment activities] . . . so you can imagine that Congress—that put these
sanctions in place with the administration kicking and screaming all the way,
pushing back against these sanctions—[is] very concerned that we’re going to
deal away the leverage that we have where we finally have Iran willing to sit
down and talk about these issues.
A partial agreement leads us down the same path we went down with North
Korea, where just to get people to act right . . . you continue to reduce sanc-
tions. So, again, a lot of concerns about the approach. A lot of us want to see it
resolved diplomatically. We know the sanctions got us here, and we’re worried
we’re dealing away our leverage.10
The idea that sanctions were the surest way to force Iran to give up its
right to enrich uranium, and indeed perhaps to give up its nuclear programme
altogether, was an argument that would resurface again and again in the fol-
lowing years as the nuclear deal entrenched certain aspects of Iran’s nuclear
programme.
Democratic members of Congress were overwhelmingly cautious in their
statements about the Iran talks. In an OpEd written for USA Today, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Democratic senator Robert
Menendez, warned:
Today, Iran has reluctantly arrived at the negotiating table because of tough
sanctions imposed by the international community and the U.S. Congress—the
same sanctions that critics long opposed.
Iran is on the ropes because of its intransigent policies and our collective
will, and it would be imprudent to want an agreement more than the Iranians do.
Tougher sanctions will serve as an incentive for Iran to verifiably dismantle
its nuclear weapons program. When Iran complies, sanctions can be unwound
and economic relief will follow.
This approach is in concert with our diplomatic efforts and consistent with
previous actions taken by the international community. It’s a necessary insur-
ance policy, too. Should Iran fail to negotiate in good faith or abide by any
agreement, the penalties will be severe.11
What was abundantly clear from these, and many other statements,12 was
the extreme difficulty that Obama would have changing the narrative about
Iran within the United States. Diplomacy, even high level contact between the
leaders of the two states, would not be enough to convince many in Washing-
ton that Iran was serious about ending the decades’ long tensions between it
and the United States.
SAUDI CONCERNS AND REGIONAL TURMOIL13
Since 1979, Washington and Riyadh have largely shared the determination
to see Iran isolated and excluded from not just the region, but global politics
as a whole. In the United States, the legacy of the revolution, especially the
infamous hostage crisis, has shaped a generation’s thinking on Iran. For Saudi
Arabia, the challenge is more immediate. The Shia revolutionary doctrine that
swept to power in Iran was directly opposed to the brand of Sunni conserva-
tism practised in Saudi Arabia. Throughout the years, Saudi Arabia, backed
by the GCC states, has tussled for influence with Iran for control in the Gulf
region. The United States has traditionally sided clearly with the Kingdom in
these matters, actively seeking to ostracize Iran from the global community.
The Bush administration effectively reversed this long-standing policy
through its actions in Iraq. As the true scale of the miscalculation in Iraq
124 Chapter 5
and the consequent empowerment of Iran became evident, the Bush admin-
istration’s rhetoric against Tehran only intensified. The Obama administration
sought to shift this trend and entered office with the publicly stated intention
to engage with Tehran.14 While much feted at the time, this focus needs to
be viewed in context of the confrontational approach of the preceding Bush
administration. For Obama, returning Washington’s Iran policy to a more
even keel was a useful way to distance his administration from the ill-fated
‘War on Terror,’ which had come to characterize his predecessor, rather than
a radical readjustment of policy. It also served as a timely acknowledgement
that Iranian influence was vital in the attempt to restore some semblance of
stability to the American battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. For much of
his first term in office, Obama’s efforts at reaching out to Iran achieved little.
Obama’s second term, however, signalled a renewed focus on relations with
Iran, driven no doubt in part by a desire for a ‘run on the board’ in relation
to his administration’s Middle East policy in the face of the disintegration of
the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, and a regional perception of American
uncertainty in the face of the uprisings.
The Saudi government saw Obama’s determination to engage Tehran as
misguided at best. At a base level, Riyadh is fundamentally opposed to any
continuation of Iran’s nuclear programme, which it clearly views as a prelude
to a weapons programme. However, and in this context more powerfully,
since the P5+1 and Iran’s agreement to the JPOA, the Saudis have expressed
concerns that as the United States and Iran improve relations, the flow-on
effect will be a strengthening of Tehran’s regional agenda at the expense of
Saudi’s interests.15 These concerns were only reinforced by the concurrent
events of the Arab uprisings, with Iran holding significant political influence
within the embattled Syrian regime, and the governments of Iraq, Yemen
and Lebanon. Historically, the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran
has been intense, with often cynical appeals to sectarianism and ideology a
feature of their interaction.16 In this way, the sectarian makeup of the region
has often proved a useful tool by which they have sought to divide the Middle
East—Iran, Syria and Lebanon on one side with the Gulf Arab states on the
other. Undoubtedly, sectarian issues play a major role in Saudi–Iranian ten-
sions, yet the competition between the two states is also about simpler con-
cerns: resource control, regional influence and military capacity.
Some commentators have warned that US efforts at diplomacy over the
nuclear issue are perceived by Riyadh as ‘naïve appeasement’ and that the
Saudis could potentially seek to project their own power and leadership in
the region without waiting for US support.17 Martin Chulov recently cited
a senior Saudi figure’s views that ‘the US has underwritten the regional
security order for the past 70 years and [Riyadh] sees now as a good time to
disengage. . . . We will have to do it all ourselves.’18 In a similar vein, Prince
Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud stated that if Iran did develop a
nuclear weapons capability, Saudi Arabia would seek to balance the nuclear
equation and that ‘proliferation in the Middle East would become the norm’.19
Even more explicitly, Al Saud counselled that the ‘Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) members should carefully weigh all options, including acquiring a
nuclear deterrent’.20
These rumblings against the Saudi Arabia’s dependence on the United
States were not new. Indeed, like the rulers before him, the late king Abdullah
faced the ‘fundamental paradox of Saudi foreign relations’; the Kingdom’s
security has always been underwritten by external power that is broadly
unpopular.21 The rhetoric of independence aside, the central question of what
foreign policy options the Kingdom actually has is important.
The purchase of military hardware is a key aspect of the Kingdom’s
interaction with a range of states, most notably China and Pakistan. In 2014,
media coverage detailed the Saudi purchase of high-tech ballistic missiles
from China,22 raising the profile of this relationship. Meanwhile, Pakistan has
long served as a key ally for the Kingdom; the two states have religious ties
yet because of its distance from Arab politics, when coupled with nuclear
capabilities it has proven a useful friend. While neither state represents a
meaningful replacement to a superpower alliance, Riyadh has been carefully
fostering and publicizing these relationships arguably to lessen—or lessen the
domestic perception of—its dependence on the United States.
The Kingdom’s frustration with the P5+1 negotiations, and increasing
alarm about Iran’s nuclear programme, have prompted Riyadh to send out
very clear signals to the region about its sophisticated military capabilities.23
The potential for nuclear proliferation across the Middle East would be pro-
foundly destabilizing and it would undermine the efficacy of the global non-
proliferation regime, including the strength of the NPT.
In relation to the fraught dynamics between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the
United States, permanent reconciliation between Washington and Riyadh
is difficult to foresee. Even if the Geneva Process completely collapses, the
precedent for US–Iranian engagement has now been established and Saudi
sensitivity to this is unlikely to diminish. Indeed, given the current trajectory,
such tensions are likely to increase. Moreover, the new threats in the region,
emanating largely from Sunni jihadism, only provide further ground for Ira-
nian–US rapprochement.
Implications of a Nuclear Deal for the Oil Trade

Since the 1940s, the alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia has
been a key platform in US foreign policy. The relationship was founded on a
purely economic basis, that of the trade of oil. Saudi Arabia has the world’s
126 Chapter 5
largest proven oil reserves and to this day its production capacity is essential
to regulating the price of oil on the global market.24
As early as 1945, President Roosevelt recognized the Kingdom’s integral
role in the global economy.25 Successive US presidents have also reaffirmed
the importance of Saudi Arabia in ensuring resource stability in the region.26
The Kingdom’s elite was enriched through the oil trade and this triggered an
expansive view of Saudi Arabia’s potential role within the Arab, particularly
Sunni Arab, political milieu. These two currents proved oppositional at times.
Washington needed the Kingdom’s role to be one of stabilization, while
Riyadh increasingly moved to claim a leadership role in a region swept with
revolutionary doctrines.
As early as 1973, the Arab oil embargo presented a significant challenge for
the Saudi–US alliance. This confrontational economic action was Riyadh’s
strategic response to Washington’s support for Israel during the Yom Kip-
pur/Ramadan War in 1973 and the failure of the Arab states to remedy their
political grievances against Israel on the battlefield. The Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members had been meeting as the
crisis unfolded and were contemplating a series of increasing oil cutbacks to
the United States.27 The reaction to the announcement by then-US Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger, of a $2.2 billion military aid package to Israel,
strengthened the resolve of the OPEC members, and Saudi Arabia announced
on October 20 that it was cutting all shipments of oil to the United States.28
In the aftermath of the embargo, two key outcomes emerged: Washington’s
awareness of the Kingdom’s role in regional economic stability and Riyadh’s
understanding that a close relationship with the emergent sole superpower
offered the Kingdom greater global legitimacy. In the longer term, this inci-
dent ultimately drove Riyadh and Washington into an even closer alliance—
an alliance in which American criticism of the litany of political failures of
the Saudi state were submerged.
Oil remains one of the key elements of the US–Saudi relationship. In 2013,
Saudi Arabia was the second largest crude oil exporter after Russia.29 Despite
programmes of economic diversification, the Saudi government continues to
rely heavily on the revenue from this industry to finance both its domestic
initiatives and its external policies. Using data from OPEC annual reports, the
US Energy Information Administration estimated that in 2011 this revenue
accounted for almost 90 per cent of the total export revenue for the King-
dom.30 In addition to its export trade, Saudi Arabia is the largest consumer
of oil in the Middle East.31 Like many of the oil-producing countries in the
region, the Saudi government provides substantial subsidies to the national
population. Indeed, the country has some of the lowest domestic fuel prices
in the region. A Chatham House report on the sustainability of Saudi Arabia’s
energy policies puts the domestic cost of transport fuel at a low 12–16 cents
a litre for gasoline.32 The combination of vast oil reserves, high production
capacity and relatively high international oil prices over the past decade33 has
served to enhance the influence that Saudi Arabia can exert over a range of
US policies.
Consequently, Washington has traditionally privileged this relationship.
Official statements regarding the importance of the alliance are continual,
with Secretary of Defense Hagel recently reiterating America’s commit-
ment to maintaining stability and security in the region.34 However, such
statements now need to be seen in the light of broadly held concerns that
the United States’ growing energy independence may foreshadow an Ameri-
can desire to disengage politically from the region. In 2014, these concerns
were only reinforced when the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicted
that due to the development of Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), the United
States could overtake Russia and Saudi Arabia as the largest producer of oil
and natural gas within the next few years.35 The geopolitical ramifications
of these developments are significant. Indeed, Daniel Yergin has posited
that Iran’s recent move to the negotiating table may have been triggered in
part by its fear of the economic ramifications of increased US production of
oil and shale gas.36 Yergin is quick to point out, however, that this does not
diminish the importance of the Middle East, and in particular Saudi Arabia,
to the stability of the global oil market. Yet it does facilitate the possibility
for a little more resilience for the United States when it comes to the issue of
energy security.37
In addition to the US angle, the Saudi Kingdom has its own domestic
imperatives for promoting policies that ensure consistency in global oil
prices. Predictions that the increased US production could potentially drive
down oil prices holds significant, and troubling, implications for the Sau-
dis.38 As has been the case throughout modern Saudi history, high oil prices
are integral to domestic stability. Oil revenue has allowed Riyadh to fund
its expansive domestic programmes that are vital to its hold on social and
political cohesion, programmes that have been especially important since the
Arab uprisings. In late 2014, the linkage between the oil trade and political
stability was once again illuminated when a market fluctuation triggered a
global fall in oil prices. During the final months of 2014 and into early 2015,
oil prices fell from more than $100 a barrel to below $46. This drop in rev-
enue has left many OPEC members uncertain about their ability to absorb
significant losses. While Saudi Arabia has a greater capacity than other states
to withstand short-term losses, it is unclear how such situations might add to
tensions with the United States.39 In the past, when oil prices have declined
significantly, the Saudi Kingdom has tended to enact a range of cuts to social
programmes, including programmes to support the unemployed, and the pro-
vision of government subsidies in housing, gasoline and other state services.40
128 Chapter 5
The potential for unrest if such cuts weaken the social contract between the
Royal Family and the Saudi population is a worrying possibility.
The Saudi elite had been foreshadowing this concern for years, and as
recently as 2013, Prince Turki Al Faisal had sought to remind US policy
makers of the importance of stability in the Kingdom. Al Faisal stated that
the ‘Kingdom is a confident participant in world affairs and keeps an ever
vigilant eye towards its own internal safeguarding’.41 He went on to claim that
Saudi stability and global economic stability are intimately related.42 This was
both a reminder to the Obama administration of the importance of the alliance
for US interests, and perhaps a warning that without the Saudi Royals, the
potential for internal dissent within the Kingdom could carry significant costs
for the broader international environment.
THE INTERIM DEAL
By November the P5+1 had agreed to an interim deal referred to as the JPOA
with Iran that aimed to halt some aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme and
slow others down. In return, and as a sign of good faith, the United States
would refrain from imposing new sanctions. The JPOA would last for a six-
month period which would give both sides much-needed breathing space in
order to negotiate a more detailed diplomatic agreement that would resolve
all outstanding issues.
The JPOA, signed on November 24, targeted specific areas of Iran’s nuclear
programme that had been the focus of international concerns. The first was the
amount of enriched uranium that Iran was able to stockpile, and the percent-
age to which Iran could enrich. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran agreed
to reduce by half its stockpile of 23 per cent enriched uranium and to convert
it to a form that is not weapons usable.43 It also required Iran to voluntarily
commit to a maximum 5 per cent enrichment of uranium during the six-
month agreed period.44 Iran also agreed to not develop any new sites used for
enrichment, and halt activity at Fordow, Natanz and the Arak45 heavy water
facility. Activity at these three sites comprised the bulk of the issues that had
preoccupied the negotiators. Most importantly, it ensured the most meaningful
freeze on Iran’s ever expanding nuclear programme. During this time IAEA
inspectors also had ongoing access to monitor activity at the identified sites.
The major concession by the P5+1 was the promise to not impose any new
sanctions and to ease the negative impact that the sanctions had had on some
sectors. Of particular concern was the humanitarian impact. The sanctions in
Iran had led to significant shortages in medical supplies that had highlighted
the often unintended victims of Western sanctions.46 It is worth noting that
while there was a firm statement promising no new sanctions from the EU
states and the UNSC, the wording regarding US action left some room for
interpretation. The JPOA stated that ‘the U.S. Administration, acting consis-
tent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain
from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions’.47 This, however, would prove
to be an ongoing battle.
The IAEA and the PMD Issue

For the IAEA, the Iran issue has highlighted the serious limitations of the ver-
ification and monitoring that the non-proliferation regime depends on. Mark
Hibbs, an arms control expert writing on the Iranian nuclear programme, has
made the very important point that in analysing the timeline of US–Iran rela-
tions over the nuclear issue, it is important to separate the diplomatic efforts
from the work of the IAEA.48 This is significant for several reasons. The P5+1
and the IAEA have very different jobs and use very different tools to achieve
their goals. The question over the possible military dimensions (PMD) of
Iran’s nuclear programme highlights the divergence between the P5+1 and
the IAEA in terms of both methods and goals.
During the eight years that President Bush was in office, the work of the
IAEA had become increasingly politicized.49 During that time, the Bush
administration had disagreed with many on the Board of Governors of the
IAEA over what constituted a breach of obligations under the NPT and
Safeguards Agreements. For the IAEA Board of Governors, not every single
breach warranted reporting to the UNSC.50 There was also concern within
Washington over the aspects of the Iranian nuclear programme that were
related to possible military and weapons-related activities. The IAEA listed
several specific issues including:
• High-explosives testing. Iran’s experiments involving exploding bridge wire

detonators and the simultaneous firing of explosives around a hemispherical
shape point to work on nuclear warhead design. Iran admits to carrying out
such work, but claims it was for conventional military and civilian purposes
and disputes some of the technical details.
• Warhead design verification. Iran carried out experiments using high explo-
sives to test the validity of its warhead design and engaged in preparatory
work to carry out a full-scale underground nuclear test explosion.
Shahab-3 re-entry vehicle. Documentation reviewed by the IAEA has suggested
that as late as 2003, Iran sought to adapt the payload section of a Shahab-3 mis-
sile for accommodating a nuclear warhead.51
The PMD of Iran’s nuclear programme would end up being part of a sepa-
rate agreement between the IAEA and Iran.52
130 Chapter 5
Sanctions and Diplomacy

It was clear from the reaction by members of the US Congress that the role
of sanctions in the relationship with Iran had taken on important dimensions.
In many ways, sanctions were regarded as the ultimate weapon, short of war,
that remained in the US foreign policy toolbox. As the talks between Iran and
the P5+1 gained momentum, sanctions also emerged as the one area where
Congress could continue to exercise some influence and control over the
diplomatic process.
Republicans and Democrats alike expressed concerns after the announce-
ment of the JPOA about the prospect of easing sanctions. US Senator Bar-
bara Boxer, a senior Democratic member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, welcomed the deal but in her statement she explicitly linked the
effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the US Congress during Obama’s
time in office with the fact that Iran agreed to direct talks.53 Others in Con-
gress echoed this sentiment. Senator Carl Levin, a Democrat from Michigan,
argued that the deal was ‘another example of the value of tough sanctions
backed by a broad international coalition . . . . If Iran does not consent to a
comprehensive agreement that ensures it cannot acquire a nuclear weapon,
there is a broad consensus in Congress to impose even tougher sanctions’.54
Reaction in the House of Representatives was generally more sceptical
of the deal, particularly of Iran’s intention to fulfil all of the requirements.
Because of this deep wariness, many called for the tightening of the sanc-
tions, despite admitting that they would likely undermine diplomacy. House
Speaker at the time, Republican John Boehner, summed up Republican sen-
timent claiming that ‘the lingering question, however, is whether the nego-
tiating partners will work equally hard to preserve the strong international
sanctions regime until that goal is achieved. Otherwise we will look back on
the interim deal as a remarkable clever Iranian move to dismantle the inter-
national sanctions regime while maintaining its infrastructure and material to
pursue a break-out nuclear capability’.55
Several things stand out from this statement. The first is the fear, obvious in
many statements reacting to the interim agreement, that the dismantling of the
sanctions regime would mean the loss of the strongest tool the United States
had in negotiations to coerce the Iranians. Second, that no matter what the
details of the diplomatic agreement were, Iran could not be trusted and was in
all likelihood using the prolonged negotiations to buy time to covertly expand
its nuclear programme. Given this abiding mistrust and inability to believe
that Iran’s negotiators were working in good faith, any nuclear deal would
likely be met with scepticism and concern by the Republicans in Congress.
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor voiced similar concerns, pointing to
Iran’s history of non-compliance with the IAEA and UNSC Resolutions, and
once again claiming that the Iranians could not be trusted. He also linked their
ongoing support for terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah as further
evidence for why they should be regarded with suspicion.56 One of the most
extreme statements came from a young senator from Arizona, Tom Cotton.
Cotton would prove to be a significant problem for the Obama administra-
tion in the battle between the White House and Congress over sanctions.
In response to the Interim Deal, Cotton claimed that ‘with this agreement,
the United States has suffered an unmitigated, humiliating defeat and Iran
has won a total victory. The United States will ease sanctions and give the
mullahs billions of dollars in return for their empty promises. Iran will keep
enriching uranium, keep its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, keep its
plutonium-producing reactor, and keep its missile program.’57 Alarmism not-
withstanding, the concern over the promise under the deal to release US$7
billion in Iranian assets within America, frozen since the 1979 hostage crisis,
threatened to derail the ongoing negotiations.58
Netanyahu’s Speech to Congress and the Letter to Iran’s Leaders

In the lead up to announcing the Agreed Framework and the extension of a
deadline to agree to a Comprehensive Nuclear Deal, Republicans, and some
Democrats in the US Congress, engaged in a series of public acts of quite
extraordinary defiance against the White House. The first incident high-
lighted the extent of the tensions between the White House and Congress. In
an unprecedented move, the Republican leadership in Congress invited the
prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, to address a joint session.59
His appearance was controversial as it violated diplomatic norms that usually
saw foreign leaders only ever being invited to address the domestic legisla-
ture by the head of that state. Bypassing President Obama in this way was
regarded by many as evidence of a desire among Republicans to undermine
Obama’s authority.60 Many Democrats boycotted the speech, which laid bare
the fears that the Israeli leader held about the growing reality of a nuclear deal
between Iran and the United States.
Netanyahu made it clear he had no doubts that Iran’s intention was
to develop a nuclear weapon and he reminded his audience of the many
instances where Iranian leaders had called for the destruction of Israel.61 He
went on to describe Iran’s regional activities stating,
Iran’s goons in Gaza, its lackeys in Lebanon, its revolutionary guards on the
Golan Heights are clutching Israel with three tentacles of terror. Backed by Iran,
Assad is slaughtering Syrians. Backed by Iran, Shiite militias are rampaging
through Iraq. Backed by Iran, Houthis are seizing control of Yemen, threaten-
ing the strategic straits at the mouth of the Red Sea. Along with the Straits of
Hormuz, that would give Iran a second choke-point on the world’s oil supply.62
132 Chapter 5
While the language in the speech was alliterative and colourful, he was
drawing attention to the concerns that Israel, and other US allies including
Saudi Arabia, have about Iran’s growing regional assertiveness.
The tension between the White House and Congress intensified in the
weeks following Netanyahu’s appearance, with many commentators criti-
cizing the Israeli leader for interference in US politics to the point of actu-
ally undermining his own cause.63 The partisan disagreements in Congress
between Democrats and Republicans then took an unprecedented turn when
47 Republican senators signed a letter addressed to the Iranian foreign minis-
ter, Javad Zarif, warning him that any agreement between Iran and the United
States, could be reversed by a subsequent president. Critics immediately
took the senators, led by Tom Cotton, to task for undermining the authority
of a US president and behaving in a way that ‘threatened to subordinate our
interests to their political agenda’.64 The partisan bickering also distracted
from a substantial debate about the realistic options still available to the
United States.65 Despite the drama playing out in Congress, the negotiators
in Vienna remained committed to finding an agreement that all parties could
accept.
THE COMPREHENSIVE JOINT PLAN OF ACTION
The Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in Geneva on July

14, 2015 by the P5+1 and Iran marked an historic and important achievement
for all involved. The agreement was the culmination of more than a decade
of disagreement over issues that had at times seemed intractable. Yet for all
that the deal signalled about the strength of the diplomatic process engaged in
by the various parties for several years, its impact on the American narrative
about Iran is likely to be minimal. This is because the nuclear issue is just
one issue among an array of complex security crises in the region, many of
which involve Iran.
In the final days before the signing of the comprehensive deal, the language
emerging from key policy makers was still redolent with suspicion about
Iran’s true intentions. Former State Department spokeswoman, Marie Harf,
reportedly claimed that the efforts by the administration to defend Iran’s
record of compliance with its obligations under the JPOA didn’t amount to
defending the regime itself, merely its ability to comply with the requirements
imposed on it.66 This apparent splitting of hairs suggested the impossibility of
completely abandoning the familiar rhetorical tropes regarding Iran.
The text of the agreement extends and elaborates on the JPOA. Indeed
there were very few significant changes in the comprehensive agreement,
the preface to which opens with an interesting statement, one that signals
the hope that the deal would have a positive flow-on effect to other issues in
the region. It states that the signatories ‘anticipate that full implementation
of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace
and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek,
develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.’67 It continues: ‘In this context,
the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will
be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran’s peace-
ful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial
programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international
non-proliferation norms.’
The JCPOA set out significant limits on the development and expansion
capacity of Iran’s nuclear programme. During the first 10 years, Iran would
be required to use only the IR-1 centrifuge, an older design that is far less
efficient and produces less enriched uranium than more advanced designs. It
tracks the entire uranium process from mining through to enrichment, ensur-
ing that everything can be accounted for.68 This means that if Iran attempted
to divert any uranium away from its closely monitored enrichment facility at
Natanz, towards a secret enrichment facility anywhere else, the IAEA would
notice the missing uranium and thus catch Iran in the act.
The only enrichment allowed must take place at the Natanz enrichment
facility. Concentrating all enrichment activity to one facility gives the IAEA
a definite advantage when it comes to monitoring. The deal also set out strict
limits on the amount of enriched uranium that Iran could accumulate and the
level to which it could enrich—not above 3.67 per cent.69 There were also
clear limitations placed on Iran’s research and development activities, its
heavy-water reactor at Arak, and thus its ability to produce and stockpile plu-
tonium.70 The JCPOA also required Iran to implement the Addition Protocols
and engage in other trust-building measures. In return, the sanctions that had
been imposed against Iran would gradually be lifted.
After announcing the deal, President Obama went to work convincing
the American public, and particularly pessimists in Congress, that it was the
best option in dealing with the nuclear issue. In describing the achievement,
Obama stressed time and again that it should be judged on its merits as a
strategy to limit and monitor Iran’s nuclear programme, in order to prevent
them from developing a nuclear weapon. Every other concern about Iran and
its assertive behaviour in the region were separate issues, and should not be
conflated with the JCPOA.
In an interview with Thomas Friedman in the The New York Times, hours
after the deal was signed, Obama reiterated this request.
We are not measuring this deal by whether it is changing the regime inside of Iran,
‘said the president’. We’re not measuring this deal by whether we are solving
every problem that can be traced back to Iran, whether we are eliminating all their
nefarious activities around the globe. . . .That was always the discussion. And
134 Chapter 5
what I’m going to be able to say, and I think we will be able to prove, is that this
by a wide margin is the most definitive path by which Iran will not get a nuclear
weapon, and we will be able to achieve that with the full cooperation of the world
community and without having to engage in another war in the Middle East.71
In statement after statement, Obama seemed to be challenging opponents

of the deal to offer an alternative that achieved more.
Opponents of the deal had long been arguing that if the United States just
kept up the pressure through sanctions and the threat of force that Iran’s lead-
ers would eventually buckle under that pressure and would agree to give up
their entire nuclear programme. At least that was the goal. If Iran didn’t con-
cede this, then the military option should be utilized.72 Obama made reference
to this argument, cautioning that without the deal it was highly likely that the
sanctions regime would have unravelled, leaving America in a much weaker
negotiating position.73 The sanctions were composed of a series of complex
multilateral actions to target various parts of the Iranian economy and key
individuals. Compared to the United States, which had limited economic
relations with Iran since 1979, the cost of economic sanctions was dispropor-
tionately borne by the other members of the P5+1. The assumption that these
states would have been content to continue to uphold the sanctions regime if
the United States had walked away from the diplomatic process was absurd.74
One area where the deal achieved perhaps less that an optimal outcome was
the inclusion of lifting the arms embargo against Iran along with the lifting
of other sanctions. The arms embargo had been imposed in 2006 as part of
UNSC Resolution 1736 which included a ban on exporting any good to Iran
that contributes to a nuclear weapon delivery system.75 This was expanded
in 2010 under UNSC Resolution 1929 to include an embargo on all conven-
tional weapons exports to Iran.76 While the arms embargo was imposed within
the context of the nuclear issue, and Iran’s failure to comply with requests for
information and cooperation with the IAEA, the arms embargo had the added
effect of limiting Iran’s ability to supply its allies in the region with weapons.
As the issue of whether, and when, the embargo would be lifted under the
JCPOA became headline news leading up to July 14, Republicans in the US
Congress characterised it as a disaster for regional security.77 The JCPOA,
however, stipulates that the conventional arms embargo would remain in
place for five years, while the ban on exports of materials that would be used
in missile technology, that is technology that could be used to develop a mis-
sile delivery system for a nuclear weapon, would remain in place for eight
years.78 It is important to remember that all or any of these aspects could be
reassessed through that period.
What are the regional and global consequences of the nuclear deal with
Iran? Since 2002 there have been wild, and often alarmist, predictions about
the apocalyptic nightmare that would befall the Middle East should Iran be
allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. Indeed, some of the more dire predic-
tions foresee doom and chaos unfolding should Iran develop even the capac-
ity to one day develop a nuclear weapon.79 For them, the mere possibility that
Iran could one day decide to develop a weapon was just as worrying as the
presence of a physical weapon. Despite the historic deal reached between the
P5+1 and Iran in July 2015, the narrative of Iran’s disruptive behaviour didn’t
disappear. If anything, the nuclear deal allowed both opponents and support-
ers of the deal to look beyond the nuclear issue and once again focus on other
aspects of Iran’s regional behaviour. The early assessments of whether or
not that behaviour was likely to be positively impacted by the deal were not
encouraging.
The quest to transform Iran’s behaviour had eluded previous administra-
tions, from President Carter through to President Obama. Obama was among
those who were loudest in cautioning that the diplomacy that had taken place
with Iran did not presage a significant transformation in Iran’s calculus.
Suzanne Maloney, a former State Department official, warned: “The nuclear
agreement was a transactional decision for Iranian leaders, not a transforma-
tional one, and the odds against the moderation of the Iranian system remain
overwhelmingly stacked against the establishment of the revolution’s elusive
Thermidor.”80 This was not to say that exerting a positive influence over the
Iranian regime was not possible, merely that it would not happen just because
of the diplomatic breakthrough. Maloney had long been an advocate of using
the diplomatic negotiations as a platform to address other issues regarding the
actions of the Iranian state.81
Some supporters of the deal claimed that while it certainly placed signifi-
cant limitations on Iran’s ability to develop a weapon and was therefore the
best option available, they cautioned that ‘the sweeping sanctions relief also
frees Iran’s hand in all manners of non-nuclear mayhem that its Revolutionary
Guard specializes in; with a shorter hiatus, Iran will also be free to advance
its missile systems and to trade in conventional arms which it routinely sup-
plies to its proxies in the region’.82 Indeed, the regional conflicts that had only
intensified through 2014–2015 in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, could all potentially
deteriorate even further if Iran were able to increase its material support for
its proxies in those conflicts. Yet, without the deal, Iran would potentially
become more aggressive in the region as it would have little remaining incen-
tive to cooperate with its neighbours, and with the international community.
As one analyst pointed out, without a diplomatic agreement, the region would
likely see ‘an expanded Iranian nuclear program; an erosion of broad inter-
national sanctions without any benefit to regional and global security; height-
ened potential for military conflict; and the loss of opportunities to work on
major areas of common concern to Iran and the United States’.83
136 Chapter 5
NOTES
1. Erdbrink, T. (2013), ‘President-Elect Stirs Optimism in Iran and West’, The

New York Times, July 26. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/world/middleeast/
president-elect-stirs-optimism-in-iran-and-west.html?pagewanted=al.
2. Herszenhorn, D. M. (2013), ‘Nuclear Talks with Iran End Without Accord
of Plans for Another Round’, The New York Times, April 6. http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/04/07/world/middleeast/talks-on-irans-nuclear-program-remain-far-apart.
html?ref=middleeast.
3. Rouhani, H. (2013), ‘President of Iran Hassan Rouhani: Time to Engage’,
The Washington Post, September 19. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
president-of-iran-hassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-
966c-9c4293c47ebe_story.html?hpid=z1.
4. Erdbrink, T. and Landler, M. (2013), ‘Iran Said to Seek a Nuclear Accord
to End Sanctions’, The New York Times, September 19. http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/09/20/world/middleeast/iran-said-to-seek-a-nuclear-accord-to-end-sanc-
tions.html?ref=world.
5. Baker, P. (2013), ‘US and Iran Agree to Speed Talks to Defuse Nuclear Issue’,
The New York Times, September 27. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/world/
obama-says-he-spoke-to-irans-president-by-phone.html?ref=world.
6. Interview with John Kerry on MSNBC, November 14, 2013. http://www.state.
gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/217575.htm.
7. ‘Bipartisan Senate Leaders to President Obama: The True Test of Iranian Sin-
cerity is a Willingness to Match Rhetoric with Action’, October 11, 2013. http://www.
menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/bipartisan-senate-leaders-to-president-
obama-the-true-test-of-iranian-sincerity-is-a-willingness-to-match-rhetoric-with-
actions.
8. Rubin, J. (2013), ‘Lawmakers Brush off Kerry on Iran’, The Washington Post,
November 14. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2013/11/14/
lawmakers-brush-off-kerry-on-iran/.
9. Rubio, M. (2013), ‘Stalemate in Iran Nuclear Talks Makes Clear More Sanc-
tions Needed’, Press Release, November 10. http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/press-releases?ID=de5d157a-eb52-4e97-965d-cf69d8ca6bf5.
10. ‘In Case You Missed It: Corker on NBC’s Meet the Press: We’re Worried
We’re Dealing Away Our Leverage in Iran Negotiations’, Meet the Press, November
10, 2013. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/in-case-you-missed-
it-corker-on-nbcs-meet-the-press-were-worried-were-dealing-away-our-leverage-in-
iran-negotiations.
11. Menendez, R. (2013), ‘Senator Menendez: Iran’s Record of Deception’,
USA Today, November 11. http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/11/11/
iran-nuclear-weapons-sen-robert-menendez-editorials-debates/3501207/.
12. The Iran Primer has compiled a comprehensive database of reactions to, and
analysis of, the ongoing diplomatic talks, found at iranprimer.usip.org
13. The following section on the regional implications is taken from an article co-
authored with Dr Kylie Baxter: Baxter, K. and Simpson, K. (205), ‘The United States
and Saudi Arabia Through the Arab Uprisings’, Global Change, Peace and Security,
27, 2, pp. 39–5.
14. Barack Obama, The President’s Message to the Iranian People, March 19,
2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-Presidents-Message-to-the-Iranian-
People/#transcript.
15. Worth, R. ‘U.S. and Saudis in Growing Rift as Power Shifts’, New York Times,
November 25, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/world/middleeast/us-and-
saudis-in-growing-rift-as-power-shifts.html?pagewanted=all.
16. Frederic Wehrey et al., ‘Saudi–Iranian Relations’, p. 11.
17. Chulov, M. ‘Barack Obama Arrives in Saudi Arabia for Brief Visit With Upset
Arab Ally’, The Guardian, March 28, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
mar/28/barack-obama-saudi-arabia-arab-ally.
18. Ibid.
19. Prince Turki Al Faisal, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy’, p. 38.
20. Ibid.
21. Lippman, T. W. ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, a Wily King Who Embraced
Limited Reform, Dies’, The Washington Post, January 22, 2015. http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/local/obituaries/abdullah-of-saudi-arabia-a-wily-king-who-embraced-
limited-reform-dies/2015/01/22/2ed987f0-a28d-11e4-9f89-561284a573f8_story.html.
22. Stein, J. ‘CIA Helped Saudis in Secret Chinese Missile Deal’, Newsweek,
January 29, 2014. http://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-cia-helped-saudis-secret-
chinese-missile-deal-227283.
23. Lewis, J. ‘Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?’, Foreign Policy,
January 30, 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/why-did-saudi-arabia-buy-
chinese-missiles/.
24. ElGamal, M. A. and Jaffe, A. M. (2013), ‘Oil Demand, Supply, and Medium
Term Price Prospects: A Wavelets Based Analysis’, Institute of Transportation, Davis:
University of California, p. 13.
25. Bergen, P. ‘Why the Saudis Unfriended the US’, CNN, March 28, 2014.
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/26/opinion/bergen-obama-saudi-tensions/index.html
(Accessed August 12, 2014).
26. Jones, T. (2006), ‘Shifting Sands: The Future of US–Saudi Relations’, Foreign
Affairs, 85, 2, (March/April); and Kern, N. (2012), ‘Symposium: Policy Choices for
the New Administration’, Edited Transcript of Symposium with Scott McConnell,
Jocelyne Cesari, Nathaniel Kern and Paul Pillar, Middle East Policy, XIX, 4, p. 13.
27. Yergin, D. (1991), The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power,
New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 589–91.
28. ‘Oil Embargo 1973–1974’, Milestones, US Department of State, Office of the
Historian. http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo; and Yergin, D.
(1991), The Prize, pp. 589–91.
29. Saudi Arabia, United States Energy Information Agency, February 26, 2013.
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Saudi_Arabia/saudi_arabia.pdf.
30. Ibid., p. 1.
31. OPEC June 2014 Report http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/
media/downloads/publications/MOMR_June_2014.pdf.
138 Chapter 5
32. Lahn, G. and Stevens, P. (December 2011), ‘Burning Oil to Keep Cool: the
Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia’, Chatham House, p. 12.
33. ‘World Energy Investment Outlook’, International Energy Agency Special
Report, 2014, p. 52.
34. ‘Chuck Hagel visit to Saudi Arabia’, Department of Defense Press Release,
May 13, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16700.
35. Smith, G. ‘US to Be Top Oil Producer by 2015 on Shale, Says IEA’, Bloom-
berg, November 13, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-12/u-s-nears-
energy-independence-by-2035-on-shale-boom-iea-says.html.
36. Yergin, D. ‘The Global Impact of US Shale’, Project Syndicate, January 8,
2014. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/daniel-yergin-traces-the-effects-
of-america-s-shale-energy-revolution-on-the-balance-of-global-economic-and-politi-
cal-power.
37. Ibid.
38. Pickrell, E. ‘Saudi Arabia Remains Key to Oil Prices, Despite U.S. Pro-
duction Surge’, Fuel Fix-Houston Chronicle, June 12, 2013. http://fuelfix.com/
blog/2013/06/12/saudi-arabia-remains-key-to-oil-prices-despite-u-s-production-
surge/ (Accessed August 5, 2014).
39. Macalister, T. ‘Low Oil Prices Mean High Anxiety for OPEC as US
Flexes Its Muscles’, The Guardian, October 19, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2014/oct/19/oil-price-us-opec-brinkmanship-shale-gas.
40. Alwahabi, S. ;How Will Saudis Adapt to Low Oil Prices?’, Gulf Pulse: AlMon-
itor, December 8, 2014.
41. Prince Turki Al Faisal (2013), ‘Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy’, Middle East
Policy, 20, 4, Winter, p. 37.
42. Ibid., p. 44.
43. Rauf T. and Kelly, R. (2014), ‘Nuclear Verification in Iran’, Arms Control
Today, 44. http://www.armscontrol.org/node/6554#17 (Accessed July 8, 2015).
44. Joint Plan of Action, Geneva, November 24. http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf.
45. The issue with these specific sites is detailed by the JPOA as: ‘Namely, during
the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enrich-
ing uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first
6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. . . . At
Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not
increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would
remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades.
Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges
with centrifuges of the same type. . . . Iran announces on concerns related to the con-
struction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor
or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or
produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components.”
46. Borger J. and Dehghan, S. K. (2013), ‘Iran Unable to Get Life-Saving Drugs
Due to International Sanctions’ The Guardian, January 14. http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/jan/13/iran-lifesaving-drugs-international-sanctions.
47. Joint Plan of Action, Geneva, November 24.

48. Hibbs, M. (2012), ‘The IAEA and Iran’s Face Saving Solution’, Carn-
egie Endowment for International Peace, December 10. http://carnegieendowment.
org/2012/12/10/iaea-and-iran-s-face-saving-solution/eshd.
49. ElBaradei, M. (2011), The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacher-
ous Times, London: Bloomsbury, pp. 215–17.
50. Ibid.
51. ‘A Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement and Possible Military Dimensions to
Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Arms Control Association Issue Brief, October 17, 2014.
https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2014/10/A-Comprehensive-Nuclear-Agree-
ment-and-Possible-Military-Dimensions-to-Irans-Nuclear-Program (Accessed July
30, 2015).
52. On July 14, the IAEA and Iran signed a road-map for the clarification of
past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The purpose
of the separate agreement was to resolve outstanding issues that the IAEA had been
investigating and set out a series of steps that Iran would take to resolve the said
issues. It also included provisions for the inspection of the military site at Parchin.
‘IAEA Director General’s Statement and Road-map for the Clarification of Past &
Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program’, IAEA, July 14, 2015.
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-
road-map-clarification-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-pro-
gram (Accessed July 30, 2015).
53. Boxer, B. ‘Statement on Interim Nuclear Agreement with Iran’, Washington
DC, November 25, 2013. https://www.boxer.senate.gov/press/release/boxer-state-
ment-on-interim-nuclear-agreement-with-iran/ (Accessed July 8, 2015).
54. ‘Geneva Deal IV: Congressional Reaction’, The Iran Primer, Washington DC,
November 24, 2013. http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/nov/24/geneva-deal-iv-
congressional-reaction (Accessed July 8, 2015).
55. Boehner, J. ‘Statement on Obama Administration Deal With Iran’, Washington
DC, November 24, 2013. http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-
statement-obama-administration-deal-iran (Accessed July 7, 2015).
56. ‘Geneva Deal IV: Congressional Reaction’, The Iran Primer.
57. Ibid.
58. Borger, J. ‘Obama May Unfreeze Iranian Assets to Keep Nuclear Diplomacy
Going’, The Guardian, October 19, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-
borger-global-security-blog/2013/oct/18/us-sanctions-iran-nuclear (Accessed July 7,
2015).
59. ‘The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress’, The
Washington Post, March 3, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/ (Accessed July 8,
2015).
60. McGreal, C. (2015), ‘How Netanyanhu’s Speech to Congress Has Jeopardized
US–Israel Relations’, The Guardian, February 25, 2015. http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2015/feb/24/obama-binyamin-netanyahu-congress-speech-boehner-leaks
(Accessed July 4 2015).
140 Chapter 5
61. Netanyahu, B. (2014), ‘Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Con-

gress’, The Washington Post, March 3. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/ (Accessed June 3,
2015).
62. Ibid.
63. Cohen, M. A. (2015), ‘Benjamin Netanyahu Goes Too Far’, The Boston Globe,
January 23. https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/01/23/benjamin-netanyahu-
goes-too-far/t9DYcYGG2EQuNDFWam2xUM/story.html# (Accessed July 3, 2015).
64. Rothkopf, D. (2015), ‘In the Supreme Leader We Trust’, Foreign Policy,
March 11. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/11/in-the-supreme-leader-we-trust-iran-
nuclear-negotiations-cotton-letter/?wp_login_redirect=0 (Accessed March 20, 2015).
65. Lewis, J. (2015), ‘Why a ‘Bad’ Deal With Iran Is Better Than No Deal At All’,
Foreign Policy, March 11. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/11/why-a-bad-deal-with-
iran-is-better-than-no-deal-at-all-tom-cotton-letter/ (Accessed March 20, 2015).
66. Charbonneau, L. (2015), ‘US and Iran: The Unbearable Awkwardness of
Defending Your Enemy’, Reuters, July 5. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/05/
us-iran-nuclear-usa-awkward-idUSKCN0PF0NL20150705.
67. ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, Vienna, July 14, 2015. http://eeas.
europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-
action_en.pdf (Accessed July 20, 2015).
68. Ibid. Section A: paragraph 5, p. 7.
69. Ibid. Section A: paragraph 7, p. 7.
70. Ibid.
71. Friedman, T. (2015), ‘Obama Makes His Case on Iran Nuclear Deal’, The New
York Times, July 14. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/opinion/thomas-friedman-
obama-makes-his-case-on-iran-nuclear-deal.html?_r=0 (Accessed July 15, 2015).
72. Kroenig, M. (2011), ‘Kroenig’s case for War with Iran’, Foreign Policy,
December 27. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/27/kroenigs-case-for-war-with-iran/
73. Friedman, T. (2015), ‘Obama Makes His Case on Iran Nuclear Deal’.
74. Kahler, M. (2015), ‘Iran, Sanctions, and the Illusion of a Better Bargain’, Brook-
ing Institution, July 21. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/07/21-
iran-sanctions-illusion-of-a-better-bargain (Accessed July 22, 2015).
75. UNSC resolution 1736, December 27, 2006. http://www.sipri.org/databases/
embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/iran/1737 (Accessed August 5, 2013).
76. UNSC Resolution 1929, June 9, 2010. www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/
un_arms_embargoes/iran/UNSCres1929.pdf (Accessed August 5, 2013).
77. Spetalnick, M. and Zengerle, P. (2015), ‘Republicans target UN Arms Embargo
Rollback in Bid to derail Iran Deal’, Reuters, July 16. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/07/17/us-iran-nuclear-embargo-idUSKCN0PQ2T920150717 (Accessed
July 22, 2015).
78. ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’.
79. Kroenig, M. (2015), ‘Why Is Obama Abandoning 70 Years of US Non-prolif-
eration Policy?’, Tablet Magazine, June 15. http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-
and-politics/191479/obama-iran-nonproliferation (Accessed July 22, 2015).
80. Maloney, S. (2015), ‘For the US and Iran, Nuclear Accord Upends Old
Assumptions’, Lawfare Blog, July 16, 2015. http://www.lawfareblog.com/us-and-
iran-nuclear-accord-upends-old-assumptions (Accessed July 20, 2015).
81. Maloney, S. (2013), ‘Turning Tehran’, Brookings Institution, January 13.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/turning-tehran (Accessed July
6, 2015); Maloney, S. (2014), ‘Broaden the Approach to Tehran’, Brookings Institu-
tion, January 23. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/approach-iran-
nuclear-concerns-maloney (Accessed July 6, 2015).
82. Sachs, N. (2015), ‘Israel and the United States: A Dialogue of the Deaf’, Brook-
ings Institution, July 21. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/07/21-
israel-netanyahu-iran-deal-dialogue-of-the-deaf (Accessed July 22, 2015).
83. Kaye, D. D. (2015), ‘The Middle East After Vienna: Here’s What Will Happen
if the Iran Deal Falls Through’, Foreign Affairs, July 7. https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/iran/2015-07-07/middle-east-after-vienna (Accessed July 22, 2015).
Chapter 6
The Future of Middle

Eastern Proliferation
This chapter will explore the long-term implications of the Obama administra-
tion’s policy of engagement with Iran on nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East region, the strengthening of Iranian regional influence and the potential
for this to increase instability, and the broader consequences for the strength
of the NPT. The challenge that Iran has posed to the NPT and the broader
non-proliferation regime is significant. It has highlighted the weakness of the
verification mechanisms provided in the NPT, and the inherent problem that
an indigenous nuclear energy programme could provide the infrastructure and
expertise needed for a breakout capability. The international community and
the United States now find themselves in the difficult position of having to
accept that the Iranian regime will be added to the list of states that could one
day choose to go down this path. This is a deeply troubling development, one
that is only slightly tempered by the strict monitoring of Iran’s nuclear sites,
and one that has important implications for the future of non-proliferation
efforts globally.
The concerns about the potential regional ramifications of the Iran nuclear
deal extend beyond the question of whether or not Iran might one day try to
build a nuclear weapon. Indeed, the issue of Iranian intentions must be under-
stood in the context of the broader regional dynamics and the increasingly
sectarian nature of the conflicts that have occurred since the 2003 US inva-
sion of Iraq. As detailed in chapter 2, the invasion of Iraq set in motion a civil
war in that state that left the Shiite and Sunni communities deeply divided.
Iran has been a key beneficiary of the rise to power of the Shiite majority
there and it has continued through the past decade to increase its influence
and control over the political and militant groups within Iraq.1 Add to this,
the complex civil war in Syria, the expansion of Islamic State, the fighting
in Yemen and the increasingly tense public diplomacy between Iran and the
143
144 Chapter 6
Gulf States, and it becomes clear that the nuclear deal could have myriad
unintended consequences.
Throughout the negotiations with Iran over the nuclear issue though, Iran
refused to expand the discussion to address these other regional problems. In
his Nowruz speech on March 21, 2015, Ayatollah Khamenei stated:
We only negotiate with America on the nuclear issue, not on any other issue.
Everyone should know this. We do not negotiate with America on regional
issues. America’s goals in the region are the exact opposite of our goals. We
want security and peace in the region. We want the rule of peoples over their
countries. America’s policy in the region is to create insecurity. Take a look at
Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Arrogant governments—headed by America—have
begun a counterattack against Islamic Awakening, which was created by
nations. This counterattack is continuing in the present time and it is gradually
creating a disastrous situation for nations. This is their goal, which is the exact
opposite of ours. We do not at all negotiate with America, neither on regional
issues, nor on domestic issues, or [sic] nor on the issue of weapons. Our negotia-
tions with the Americans are confined to the nuclear issue and on how we can
reach an agreement through diplomacy.2
As one analyst put it, ‘In the Middle East, the nuclear negotiations are
viewed as being inextricably linked to the broader struggle for the legitimate
stewardship of the region, as well as to the regional balance of power.’3 Saudi
Arabia’s prince Turki Al-Faisal warned that ‘Iran is already a disruptive
player in various scenes in the Arab world, whether it’s Yemen, Syria, Iraq,
Palestine, or Bahrain . . . . So ending fear of developing weapons of mass
destruction is not going to be the end of the troubles we’re having with Iran.’4
Once the agreement was signed, it looked as though each of the other
regional issues would once again come to the forefront.
PROXY WARS AND IRANIAN POWER

AFTER THE NUCLEAR DEAL
Iran’s involvement in the key conflicts taking place in the Middle East and
North Africa provides an important context for understanding the deep
concerns that some of the Gulf States have about the future of the region if
sanctions are lifted and the terms of the nuclear deal are implemented. The
narrative promoted by Iran’s leaders during the Arab uprisings in 2011, that
this was an Islamic Awakening, had, by the middle of 2015, evolved into a
more worrying discourse of sectarian regional struggle. This sectarian nar-
rative pitted Shiites fighting the rising power of Sunni extremists, including
Islamic State.
The Future of Middle Eastern Proliferation 145
Syria and Iraq have become the proving ground for what increasingly looks
like a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Throughout 2012, Iran’s
response to the civil war in Syria had been somewhat cautious. By 2013,
however, as Assad began to look increasingly vulnerable, Iran increased
its support for the regime by sending Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps
officers and weapons and money.5 Around the same time, Hezbollah became
actively involved in fighting the rebel movement near the Lebanese bor-
der. The Crisis Group has argued that Iran and Hezbollah’s involvement is
directly linked to their perception of the sectarian nature of the regional fight-
ing.6 The Crisis Group report goes on to explain that if Assad fell, it would
have meant a complete reordering of the strategic balance of power for Iran
and Hezbollah. Without the Assad regime in Syria, Iran’s supply lines to
Hezbollah would have been cut off. Quoting a Hezbollah official, it’s clear
how seriously the antagonism between Iran and the Gulf States had become:
As the Syrian conflict became ever more regionalized and internationalized,

Hizbollah could not have stood on the sidelines. The involvement of . . .
Islamists, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, the US and France posed a direct threat
to us and to Iran. Not only could it have led to Assad’s fall, but it also could
have guaranteed that future Syrian regime would have been under the influence
of forces fundamentally hostile to the resistance axis.7
It’s clear from this statement that for some who are fighting this war, there
is more at stake than immediate territorial gains or regime survival; the whole
balance of power in the Middle East could rest on the outcome of this con-
flict. Iran’s involvement in Syria, and the implications this has for the United
States, are further complicated by Russia’s ongoing support for the Assad
regime.8 The Russian and Iranian interest in keeping the Assad regime in
power are closely aligned, a fact that complicated the Russian role in nuclear
negotiations.
The conflict in Syria also became closely entwined with the fight against
the Islamic State in Iraq. Surprisingly, while the United States and Iran are
on opposite sides of the Syrian conflict, their shared interest in defeating, or
at the very least containing, the spread of the Islamic State, has opened the
possibility for cooperation between the two.9 That cooperation was fraught
though, as both the United States and Iran have invested so heavily in demon-
izing the other side, they risked domestic backlash if they were seen to be
fighting alongside a state that each characterized as an existential enemy.10
Yet their desire to combat the Islamic State diverged sharply in terms of
strategy and long-term solutions.
Obama’s solution to the Syrian and Iraqi sectarian crises has been to
encourage inter-sectarian dialogue and the need for inclusive governance.11
146 Chapter 6
For Iran, however, the conflict is about the broader issue of regional power
and influence. The increasingly exclusionary policies against Sunnis in Iraq
has been largely blamed for the resurgence of popularity for the Islamic State,
a group that largely formed out of the dislocation and targeting of Sunnis by
Shiite militias after Saddam’s regime fell.12 The role that key Iranian-backed
groups have played in exacerbating the sectarian divide has shared some of
the blame for the deteriorating security in Iraq.13
Even in Syria, where by the middle of 2015, the Islamic State had made
significant territorial gains, the interests of America and Iran in stopping
that group were quite different. Crisis Group argued that Iran’s support for
Assad’s strategy in Syria was deeply problematic, as his regime targeted
most of his military resources at the various rebel groups, largely leaving the
Islamic State to fight its own battles against the rebel groups. Crisis Group
characterizes this strategy as one that leaves the rebel’s fighting a war on two
fronts, thus leaving them increasingly vulnerable and fractious.14 There’s very
little indication that Assad has a longer-term strategy for dealing with the
Islamic State if the rebel groups completely disintegrate. Thus for America,
the seeming reluctance of the Assad regime, and Iran, to directly target the
Islamic State in Syria was at odds with its own efforts to combat the group.
While international attention has largely focused on the fighting in Iraq
and Syria, the security situation in Yemen deteriorated to the point of civil
war, providing a new arena for the Saudis and Iran to extend their sectarian
influence.
This brief snapshot of just some of the crises unfolding across the Middle
East as the JCPOA was signed provides an important picture of the complexi-
ties of understanding the context within which the debate about the nuclear
deal with Iran was taking place. Moving beyond the immediate nature of the
regional conflicts, and the growing tensions between Iran and its Gulf neigh-
bours, the nuclear deal also prompted important discussions about the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and the future role of the NPT.
A MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE
As the diplomatic talks between the P5+1 and Iran gained momentum, atten-
tion increasingly turned once again to the prospect of a nuclear arms race in
the Middle East. Yet the concern that Iran’s nuclear programme could trigger
an arms race was not new. President Obama even claimed this possibility in
a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) arguing
‘it is almost certain that others in the region would feel compelled to get
their own nuclear weapon, triggering an arms race in one of the world’s most
volatile regions’.15 While Obama was referring to the explicit presence of a
weapons regime as the causal mechanism here, the argument that the mere
existence of the programme absent a weapons component is still enough to
encourage proliferation in others is worth examining in some detail.
This fear rests on several assumptions: the first draws on the realist theory
of the security dilemma and the stability/instability paradox. The second
assumption relates to the theory of the security dilemma and has to do with
the particularities of the Middle East and the volatile balance of power in the
region. The third problem concerns broader questions about the strength of
the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the immense pressure that the Ira-
nian nuclear crisis had exerted on it. Finally, concerns about regional prolif-
eration highlight the power of the US narrative of rogue state behaviour and
the belief that the Iranian nuclear programme presents a unique challenge to
the non-proliferation regime because of Iran’s exceptional status as a rogue
state.
The Security Dilemma and Regional Security Concerns

The security dilemma describes the situation whereby as a state seeks to
increase its own security, usually through military build-up and expansion,
other states view that action as inherently threatening to their own security
and thus respond by increasing their own defences. The first state regards
this response as an indication of threat and thus further expands its defences.
The cycle of suspicion and preventive action resulting from this can, and has,
often resulted in war, despite the fact that this was neither state’s original
intention nor desire. In the realist conception of an anarchical system in which
the security dilemma is a constant feature, and in which there is no higher
authority, a state must protect its own interests at all costs, or face extinction.
Thus the international environment as conceived by realists is by necessity a
self-help system.
Given the regional power competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia,
most of the predictions of future regional proliferation have focused on
Saudi Arabia. This is not surprising given the tendency for Saudi officials to
explicitly warn that they will match any Iranian capability, including seeking
their own nuclear weapon within weeks if Iran developed one.16 The idea of a
proliferation cascade across the region in response to Iran’s own programme
draws on a long history of scholarship that both supports, and rejects, the
idea of a domino theory of nuclear proliferation.17 There are, however, a few
factors that suggest that we should approach predictions of imminent nuclear
proliferation with caution.
Jeff Stein argues that states rarely announce to the world their intention to
develop nuclear weapons, they tend to do so covertly.18 Philip Bleek makes
a similar point, arguing,
148 Chapter 6
History suggests that while some states have trumpeted their potential desire
for nuclear weapons—think Germany in the early years of the Cold War, or
Japan more recently—they tend not to be those that later went on to actually
acquire them. And for good reason: calling attention to proliferation intentions
is counterproductive if one is intent on actually proliferating. Instead, states tend
to draw attention to their potential proliferation in the service of another goal:
rallying others to address the security concerns that are motivating potential
proliferation, and especially securing protection from powerful allies.19
Indeed, if this is the Saudi’s intention, then it appears to be working.

Recent arms shipments to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have increased
significantly over the past year.20 The Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute reported in mid-2015 that Saudi Arabia had spent close to
eighty billion dollars on arms during 2014, giving it the fourth largest military
expenditure for the year, behind the United States, China and Russia.21 An
article in The New York Times, published a few months before the signing of
the JCPOA, argued that the increased arms sales to the Gulf States, includ-
ing Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, along with Saudi Arabia, was being
viewed by some as a long-term trend that would benefit US defence firms
such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin.22
The argument that the Saudis and Gulf States are unlikely to acquire their
own nuclear weapon shouldn’t in any way diminish the concerns about the
increased military spending going on. In particular, the advanced Saudi mis-
sile programme should receive far more attention than it currently does.23
However, the alarmism associated with the nuclear weapons discourse when
it comes to the Middle East appears on balance to be a less than an inevitable
probability. A recent report by the Strategic Studies Institute pointed to the
lack of technical expertise and the lack of nuclear infrastructure to support
the development of a nuclear weapons programme.24 Of course this doesn’t
mean to suggest that Saudi Arabia would never be able to do this. Nor does
it preclude the Saudis from seeking a weapon from a state such as Pakistan.
Rather, it suggests that analysts should be cautious in predicting future prolif-
eration, as there are opportunities to provide incentives for Iran’s neighbours
not to choose that particular path.25 This is perhaps the most important issue.
As Christopher Hobbs and Matthew Moran have pointed out,
A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a significant threat to regional stability,

and at first glance it seems that proliferation by neighbouring countries fear-
ful of Iranian regional ascendency would be a likely response. However, the
unique nature of individual domestic contexts, combined with the gamut of
non-proliferation tools and incentives available to the international community
indicates that a proliferation cascade in the Middle East is not a very likely
outcome at all.26
Providing incentives and reassurance to Iran’s neighbours will perhaps

be the most effective way to prevent the Saudis and others from deciding to
embark on the nuclear weapons path. The NPT and non-proliferation regime
offer one such tool.
The strength of the NPT as the preeminent arms control mechanism has
been a central issue throughout the Iran nuclear crisis. Measuring the success
or failure of the NPT to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons depends
to a large extent on expectations. Pessimists would point to the non-NPT
states, Israel, Pakistan and India, and the withdrawal from the NPT by North
Korea, as key instances of its weakness. Yet despite these examples, the over-
whelming majority of states have chosen to not develop nuclear weapons.
The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs lists the 190 states that have ratified
the NPT and claim it as the most successful arms control treaty in existence.27
While there have been obvious failures, including Iraq in the 1980s, North
Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel among others, the international norm of
non-proliferation has been overwhelmingly upheld. The Iranian nuclear deal
is notable for its likely effect of strengthening this norm.
Yet significant challenges remain. The 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Review Conference was notable for its failure to achieve agreement on the
two main issues that the participating states had met to discuss—strength-
ening the NPT, and moving forward on discussions to establish a nuclear
weapons-free zone in the Middle East (MENWFZ). The former issue primar-
ily centred on the efforts by disarmament activists to designate the use of
nuclear weapons as illegal under international law.28
One important statement that came out of the Conference on behalf of the
26 states pushing for consideration of the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear
weapons use reportedly gained far less support than was hoped. The State-
ment on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons29 presented by
the Australian delegation to the Conference drew attention to the deep divide
between the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and the Non-Nuclear Weapons
States (NNWS) over the question of disarmament. For many, the non-prolif-
eration regime is a cynical exercise in power and exclusion.
The strategy of exclusion is based pragmatically in the conventions of realpo-

litik. It involves the candid declaration that, while nuclear weapons may be no
more dangerous in the hands of Muslims or Hindus than in those of Christians,
they are a prerogative of power, and the powerful have no intention of allowing
the powerless to acquire them. This is a position that, in its rejection of easy
racism and phony moralism, is at least honourable in its frankness.30
The unwillingness of the NWS to make serious efforts towards disarma-

ment has important implications for the ongoing willingness of states, like
150 Chapter 6
Iran, to continue to invest in a system that is increasingly regarded as an

unequal one.
The second issue that dominated the conference has particular relevance
to Iran and the prospect of regional proliferation. Indeed some analysts have
tied the success of the NPT more broadly with preventing nuclear prolifera-
tion in the Middle East.31 Like many security issues in the Middle East, there
is a temptation to view the prospect of a MENWFZ as achievable only if it is
part of a broader improvement in regional security. Given the ongoing civil
wars, and the regional tensions between, and within, various states, the push
for regional disarmament will certainly be a monumentally difficult task.32 As
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova described, the effort to organize a conference on
establishing a MENWFZ failed on a series of details about who would par-
ticipate and the role that various participants would play.33 While efforts so
far have stalled, working towards a Middle East NWFZ remains an important
and positive possibility.
Rogue States and the Narrative of Exceptionalism

The lack of trust in Iran’s nuclear programme manifests in two different
ways: (1) the international community lacks trust in Iran’s repeated declara-
tions that its nuclear programme is solely intended for peaceful energy pur-
poses, and (2) the international community does not trust in Iran’s capacity
to control, secure, or maintain its nuclear facilities and materials in line with
international security and safeguards requirements. In focusing on these two
areas in which Iranian behaviour is deviant and often completely divorced
from context, the discourse around Iran’s nuclear programme has tended to
take on an alarming tone, with warnings about the inevitability of a nuclear
war between Israel and Iran as only one of the many horrifying spectacles in
store should we fail to stop Iran from getting the bomb.
This nuclear alarmism when it comes to Iran is neatly severed from con-
cerns about the many thousands of nuclear weapons already in existence. As
Hugh Gusterson writes,
In the production of this binary distinction, possible fears and ambivalences

about Western nuclear weapons are purged and recast as intolerable aspects of
the Other. This purging and recasting occurs in a discourse characterised by
gaps and silences in its representation of our own nuclear weapons and exag-
gerations in its representations of the Other’s. Our discourse on proliferation is
a piece of ideological machinery that transforms anxiety-provoking ambiguities
into secure dichotomies.34
The horror of an Iranian bomb has a far more powerful sway over the
imagination than an American, French or British bomb.
The intention here is not to suggest in any way that the development of
a nuclear weapon in Iran would not be deeply destabilizing for the Middle
East region and for the global non-proliferation regime. Rather, it is to delve
more deeply into the stark differences in how we talk about nuclear weap-
ons depending on who has them, or who might have them. The problematic
nature of nuclear weapons in the NWS themselves, and nuclear alarmism
about other states possessing them, serves to obscure the debate about dis-
armament and the place of nuclear weapons in contemporary strategic and
security discourse.
As Gusterson points out, this division of the world into those that can be
trusted with nuclear weapons, and those that cannot, is built into the very
structure of the modern non-proliferation regime, starting with the NPT.35
The effect that this inequality in nuclear status—or nuclear apartheid as India
and Pakistan have characterized it—has had on our thinking about respon-
sible nuclear possession deserves greater scrutiny. America, France, the UK,
Russia and China are responsible and legitimate NWS. Yet what is it exactly
that these states have done that makes them either responsible or legitimate?
And what is it that makes other states with nuclear weapons incapable of
being either responsible or legitimate?
Gusterson cites a pamphlet produced by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory justifying the continued relevance of nuclear weapons based on
the calculation that
political, diplomatic, and military experts believe that wars of the future will
most likely be ‘tribal conflicts’ between neighboring Third World countries or
between ethnic groups in the same country. While the Cold war may be over,
these small disputes may be more dangerous than a war between the superpow-
ers, because smaller nations with deep-seated grievances against each other may
lack the restraint that has been exercised by the US and the USSR. The existence
of such potential conflicts and the continued danger of nuclear holocaust under-
score the need for continued weapons research.36
What is remarkable about this passage, apart from the implicit assumption
of rational superiority of the developed states compared to developing ones,
is the conclusion that the continued threat of nuclear weapons use requires,
not their abolition, but rather their continued existence and further develop-
ment. The arguments that a nuclear weapon in the hands of the Iranian regime
would inevitably lead to a nuclear holocaust ring with the echoes of alarmism
over nuclear weapons in the hands of India and Pakistan, and Saddam’s Iraq.
The growing resentment of the NWS’ failure to materially commit to
disarmament was evident in the disagreements during the 2015 NPT Revcon
discussed above. While this certainly doesn’t mean that the NNWS are about
152 Chapter 6
to leave the NPT en masse, it can be regarded as evidence of an increasingly

unfair system that contributes to these states’ frustration and anger.37 The
long-term consequences of this could certainly undermine the strength of the
non-proliferation regime, and some states’ commitment to it.
Being regarded as a ‘legitimate’ nuclear state ‘depends on far more than
mere access to nuclear weaponry. It relies on belief in the integrity of the
systems and actors that constitute the nuclear weapons organization.’38 The
American nuclear weapons organization is comprised of the vast military-
industrial complex, and also includes scientists, engineers, academics, policy
analysts, media, politicians and the public. In myriad ways each of these
actors interacts and participates in the normalization and acceptance of
nuclear weapons as an essential component of American defence. Con-
versely, while nuclear weapons are essential for American security, in the
hands of a rogue state they become something infinitely more dangerous.
The sharp contrast between what each administration was saying about Iran
and what it was doing with its own nuclear weapons arsenals can be read as
signs of the deeply ambiguous relationship that states have with nuclear weap-
ons. We believe they are essential to our own protection and global stability,
yet we are hyper aware of their awesome destructive capacity. It is increasingly
difficult to reconcile these two positions, so we frame the debate in terms of
‘responsible and trustworthy’ nuclear states versus those who will surely use
them to wreak destruction. The reality is far more complex and troublesome.
Joseph Masco captures this uneasy tension well, stating,
Los Alamos scientists today self-consciously devote their careers to engineering

the bomb so that it will never actually be used as a bomb. Caught between the
competing demands of a shifting experimental foundation, state secrecy, and
the increasingly symbolic role nuclear weapons have come to play in (inter)
national politics, the reality of the bomb as both a machine and a weapon of
mass destruction has become (for all but its most direct victims) difficult to
locate in the post-Cold War United States.39
It is precisely this ambiguity about the bomb and its place within one’s own
state that lends such intensity to the fear that states express at the prospect of
an adversary getting hold of one. If citizens of the United States can not feel
safe and secure in their own ability to maintain and ensure that accidents,
theft, miscalculation, corruption, etc. do not happen, then how could we
possibly trust one in the hands of an ‘irrational’ theocracy with an explicitly
anti-Western leadership?
There is an essential difference between the American bomb and a potential
Iranian one. The American bomb is one that is immersed in a vast complex
of technical and scientific knowledge and experimentation. Since the 1992
underground testing moratorium, there have been no nuclear tests and thus all
research and development of advanced nuclear weaponry takes place within
laboratories as theoretical experiments. Thus, as Masco argues, ‘The shifting
experimental regimes open to Los Alamos scientists have, over time, worked
to position the U.S. nuclear arsenal within the laboratory as an increasingly
aesthetic-intellectual project, one that is both normalized and depoliticized.’40
The ‘integrity of the systems and actors’ that O’Gorman and Hamilton refer
to above, suggests that it carries with it the implicit assumption that because
America is a responsible democracy its military-industrial system is therefore
subject to the same checks and balances that govern the political sphere.
To use Max Weber’s seminal terms, instrumental rationality . . . must ultimately

appeal to value rationality . . . as a basis for its legitimate exercise. If applied
to nuclear legitimacy, this view would suggest that belief in the integrity of
the systems and actors that constitute the nuclear weapons organization rest on
more fundamental, value-oriented ideologies of Western modernity, especially
a belief in human agency and rationality as a transcendentally derived means of
progress, social order, and human flourishing.41
This of course comes back to the way in which each state (Iran and Amer-
ica) has used national narratives to describe the other. It also helps explain
the stark contrast in the way various actors have characterized the impact of
an Iranian bomb. The resulting visceral difference between the American and
Iranian bomb reinforces our sense of one being legitimate, and thus in many
ways benign, while the other is illegitimate and the potential cause of human
destruction. Once again, this simplistic division overstates the dangers of a
future Iranian bomb by obscuring and erasing the very real dangers of the
American, or any other, nuclear arsenal.
It is important to note here that context in this discussion does of course
matter. We don’t know how Iran would behave if it did possess a nuclear
weapon. Given its often disruptive behaviour in the recent past, including its
deeply anti-Semitic statements about Israel, it is not hard to see why many
regard the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon with fear. However, it is
also paramount that we continue to examine the deeply unequal non-prolif-
eration regime, and the essentialist, bordering on Orientalist, discourse sur-
rounding nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. This is important because
the tendency towards alarmism obscures and distracts from the more complex
reality of the region.
Demonizing Iran has served different purposes for Presidents Bush and
Obama. For Bush, the sudden and highly theatrical claims about the Iranian
bomb were part of the War on Terror narrative that was being constructed
in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Like the Cold War efforts
154 Chapter 6
to instil nuclear anxiety in the American public, the rhetoric regarding Iran
tried to communicate the threat without crossing the line into national panic,
and thus the new condition of insecurity in the post–September 11 America
required an articulation of threat that could be contained and managed.
The threat of an Iranian bomb was so terrifying a prospect that it required
a beefing up of US defences, including a radical rethinking of the role of
nuclear weapons in US strategy. The 2002 NSS and the Nuclear Posture
Review are remarkable for the breaking of the global normative acceptance of
nuclear weapons as a solely deterrent entity. For President Bush, the extreme
and unprecedented danger of the new terrorism, and possibly nuclear terror-
ism, justified this reimagining of the role of American nuclear weapons.42 For
Obama though, the alarmist rhetoric, while still present, has been tempered
by the desire to pull back from the Bush era enthusiasm for coercive arms
control and nuclear weapons use. His desire for nuclear abolition, while
clearly utopian even by Obama’s own admission, was an important rhetori-
cal signal of retreat from the new nuclear enthusiasm displayed by the Bush
administration. In this context then, nuclear alarmism could be downplayed to
‘international concern’ and solved by containment and monitoring.
Yet Obama displays evidence of uneasiness about nuclear weapons.
Even with his early speeches promoting abolition, he never really engaged
real efforts at arms reduction and through the commitment to nuclear force
modernization, has signalled that they will continue to play a central role in
American security strategy for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Obama has
stated that nuclear weapons remain essential to US security stating that they
will continue to maintain ‘a credible deterrent, capable of convincing any
potential adversary that the adverse consequences of attacking the United
States or our allies and partners far outweigh any potential benefit they may
seek to gain through an attack’.43 This commitment has been reinforced by
the likelihood that over the next thirty years, the United States will potentially
spend roughly a trillion dollars on modernizing its nuclear forces.44
It is worth remembering that the danger that nuclear weapons pose tran-
scends the often politicized debate about who is a responsible power and who
is not. The strength of the diplomatic deal between the P5+1 and Iran is that
it reinforces the non-proliferation norm, an outcome that should be the focus
of analysis, rather than this being a win for those who wish to see Iran pun-
ished for its perceived regional antagonism. George Kennan recognized the
worrying way in which nuclear weapons were becoming normalized within
the NWS when he said:
I see the danger not in the number or quality of the weapons or in the intentions
of those who hold them but in the very existence of weapons of this nature,
regardless of whose hands they are in. I believe that unless we consent to
recognize that the nuclear weapons we hold in our hands are as much a danger
to us as those that repose in the hands of our supposed adversaries there will
be no escape from the confusions and dilemmas to which such weapons have
brought us, and must bring increasingly as time goes on. For this reason, I see
no solution to the problem other than the complete elimination of these and all
other weapons of mass destruction from our national arsenals; and the sooner
we move toward that solution, and the greater courage we show in doing so, the
safer we will be.45
NOTES
1. Dalton, M. G. and Bensahel, N. (2012), ‘Revitalizing the Partnership: The

United States and Iraq a Year after Withdrawal’, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, December. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_
RevitalizingThePartnership_DaltonBensahel.pdf (Accessed July 23, 2015).
2. Khamenei, A. (2015) Nowruz Speech, March 21. http://english.khamenei.ir/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2025 (Accessed July 23, 2015).
3. Friedman, B. (2015), ‘The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Negotiations with Iran’,
Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, April. http://www.fpri.org/docs/fried-
man_-_geopolitics_of_nuclear_negotiations_with_iran.pdf (Accessed July 23, 2015).
4. Usher, B. P. (2015), ‘Iran Deal Could Start Nuclear Fuel Race—Saudi Ara-
bia’, BBC News, March 16. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31901961
5. (2014), ‘Rigged cars and Barrel Bombs: Aleppo and the State of the Syrian
War’, Crisis Group Middle East report 155, Crisis Group, September 9, p. 35.
6. (2014), ‘Lebanon’s Hizbollah Turns Eastward to Syria’, Middle East Report
153, Crisis Group, May 27.
7. Ibid. Note: the ‘resistance axis’ that the Hizbollah official refers to is the alli-
ance of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas and their ongoing opposition to Israel.
8. Trenin, D. (2012), ‘Russia’s red Line in the Sand on Syria’, Foreign
Affairs, February 5. http://carnegie.ru/2012/02/05/russia-s-line-in-sand-on-syria/ajv0
9. Milani, M. (2014), ‘This is What Détente Looks Like: The United States and
Iran Join Forces Against ISIS’, Foreign Affairs, August 27. https://www.foreignaf-
fairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-08-27/what-d-tente-looks (Accessed July 23,
2015).
10. Arango, T. and Erdbrink, T. (2014), ‘US and Iran both Attack ISIS, But Try
Not to Look Like Allies’, The New York Times, December 3. http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/12/04/world/middleeast/iran-airstrikes-hit-islamic-state-in-iraq.html?_r=>
11. Goldenberg, I., Stokes, J. and Heras, N. A. (2015), ‘Slow Thaw: Testing Pos-
sibilities for Cooperation with Iran after a Nuclear Deal’, Center for a New American
Security, January. http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_
Iran%20Slow%20Thaw_policybrief_Goldenberg-Stokes-Heras.pdf (Accessed July
23, 2015).
156 Chapter 6
12. (2014), ‘Lebanon’s Hizbollah Turns Eastward to Syria’, p. 9.

13. Chulov, M. (2014), ‘Controlled by Iran, the Deadly Militia Recruiting Iraq’s
Men to Die in Syria’, The Guardian, March 13. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/mar/12/iraq-battle-dead-valley-peace-syria (Accessed July 23).
14. (2014), ‘Rigged cars and Barrel Bombs’, p. 13.
15. Obama, B. (2012), ‘Remarks by the President at AIPAC Policy Conference’,
Washington DC, March 4. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/04/
remarks-president-aipac-policy-conference-0 (Accessed July 24, 2015).
16. Tomlinson, H. (2012), ‘Saudi Arabia Threatens to go Nuclear “Within Weeks”
if Iran gets the Bomb’, The Times, February 10. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/
world/article3315479.ece (Accessed July 24, 2015).
17. Mueller, J. (2010), Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to
Al Qaeda, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Gavin, F. (2009/2010), ‘Same as it Ever
Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War’, International Security,
34, 3, pp. 7–37; Sagan, S. D. (1996/1997), ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?
Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, 21, 3, pp. 54–86.
18. Stein, J. (2015), ‘Nuclear Chain Nonsense’, Arms Control Wonk Blog,
March 31. http://guests.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5108/nuclear-chain-nonsense
19. Bleek, P. (2013), ‘Atomic Kingdom? Not So Fast . . .’, The Nonprolifera-
tion Review, November 15. http://wmdjunction.com/131113_atomic_kingdom.htm
20. Mazzetti, M. and Cooper, H. (2015), ‘Sale of US Arms Fuels the wars of Arab
States’, The New York Times, April 18. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/world/
middleeast/sale-of-us-arms-fuels-the-wars-of-arab-states.html (Accessed July 24,
2015).
21. (2015), ‘Trends in World Military Expenditure 2014’, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, April.
22. Mazzetti, M. and Cooper, H. (2015), ‘Sale of US Arms Fuels the wars of Arab
States’.
23. For a detailed description of the conventional military capabilities of the Gulf
States including Saudi Arabia, see: Wilner, A. and Cordesman, A. H. (2011), ‘Iran and
the Gulf Military Balance’, Center for Strategic and Strategic and International Stud-
ies, December 11; Cordesman, A. H. with assistance from Peacock, M. (2015), ‘The
Arab–U.S. Strategic Partnership and the Changing Security Balance in the Gulf: Joint
and Asymmetric Warfare, Missiles and Missile Defense, Civil War and Non-State
Actors, and Outside Powers’, Center for Strategic and Strategic and International
Studies, July 13. http://csis.org/files/publication/150713_Cover_and__Report%20_
Gulf_Military_Balance_2015.pdf (Accessed July 28, 2015).
24. Acton, J. M. and Bowen, W. Q. (2010), ‘Atoms for Peace in the Middle
East: The Technical and Regulatory Requirements’, in Sokolski (ed.), Nuclear
Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing Its Costs and Risks, Strategic Studies Institute,
pp. 423–75.
25. Guzansky, Y. (2015), ‘The Saudi Nuclear Genie is Out’, The Washington Quar-
terly, 38, 1, pp. 93–106, 103.
26. Hobbs, C. and Moran, M. (2012), ‘Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran:

Is Regional Proliferation inevitable?’ The International Spectator: Italian Journal of
International Affairs, 47, 4, pp. 127–148, 146.
27. ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’, United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/
NPT.shtml (Accessed July 30, 2015).
28. Statement by H. E. Gillian Bird, ambassador and permanent representative of
Australia to the United Nations (2015) ‘Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences
of Nuclear Weapons’, the Ninth Review of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 30, 2015.http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/
statements/pdf/HCG_en.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2015).
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 133.
31. Shaw, D. (2012), ‘Middle East Non-proliferation: Toward a Zone of Inclusion’,
Non Proliferation Review, 19, 3, pp. 357–63, 357.
32. Berger, A. ‘Gangs of New York: The 2015 NPT RevCon’, European Leader-
ship Network, May 27, 2015. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/gangs-of-
new-york-the-2015-npt-revcon_2790.html (Accessed July 13, 2015).
33. Mukhatzhanova, G. (2015), ‘The Revcon of Our Discontent: The Postmortem’,
Arms Control Wonk, June 8. http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/7695/notes-
from-the-revcon-iii (Accessed July 30, 2015).
34. Gusterson, H. ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination’,
Cultural Anthropology, 14, 1, pp. 111–43, 115.
35. Ibid., p.113.
36. Ibid., p. 111.
37. Hummel, A. (2014), ‘Recognition, the Non-Proliferation Regime, and Prolif-
eration Crises’, in T. Lindeman and E. Ringmar (eds), The International Politics of
Recognition, Denver, CO: Paradigm Publishers, pp. 171–187.
38. O’Gorman, N. and Hamilton, K. (2011), ‘At the Interface: The Loaded Rhe-
torical Gestures of Nuclear Legitimacy and Illegitimacy’, Communication and Criti-
cal/Cultural Studies, 8, 1, pp. 41–66, 44.
39. Masco, J. (2004), ‘Nuclear Technoaesthetics: Sensory Politics from Trinity to
the Virtual Bomb in Lost Alamos’, American Ethnologist, 31, 3, pp. 1–25, 1.
40. Masco, J. (2004), ‘Nuclear Technoaesthetics: Sensory Politics from Trinity to
the Virtual Bomb in Lost Alamos’, American Ethnologist, 31, 3, pp. 1–25, 2.
41. O’Gorman, N. and Hamilton, K. (2011), ‘At the Interface: The Loaded
Rhetorical Gestures of Nuclear Legitimacy and Illegitimacy’, Communication and
Critical/Cultural Studies, 8, 1, pp. 41–66, 44.
42. Woolf, A. E. (2008), ‘Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past,
Present, and Prospects’, Congressional Research Service, December 30. https://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34226.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2015).
43. White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the
United States’, June 19, 2013. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/
fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states (Accessed July 30,
2015).
158 Chapter 6
44. Wolfsthal, J. B., Lewis, J. and Quint, M. (2014), ‘The Trillion Dollar Nuclear
Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernisation Over the Next Thirty Years’, James
Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, January. http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/
pdfs/140107_trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad.pdf (Accessed July 30, 2015).
45. Gusterson, H. ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Other’, p. 134.
Conclusion
The problem of Iran’s nuclear programme has dominated US foreign policy

for more than a decade. The desire to prevent Iran from ever gaining the
ability to develop a nuclear weapon fit within the broader tradition of US
non-proliferation policy. Yet, despite being one of the most powerful states
in the international system, US leaders were unable to achieve their ultimate
goal which was to coerce Iran into giving up its nuclear programme. Today
Iran has mastered the complete fuel cycle, and continues to act in ways that
are highly destabilizing for many states in the Middle East region. How can
we explain this failure to achieve the oft-stated goal of preventing Iran from
having a weapons capability? Arguably all that now stands between Iran and
a nuclear weapon is an inspections regime that is temporary.
The nuclear deal that was signed by the P5+1 and Iran in 2015 offered the
best available means of freezing Iran’s programme and preventing it from
developing a weapon. Yet that agreement, if implemented successfully, only
guarantees this for 10–25 years. What is at stake here is more than just the
long-term monitoring of Iran’s nuclear capacity. The ongoing strength of the
non-proliferation regime and trust in the diplomacy process to resolve seem-
ingly intractable issues will also be effected by the long-term success or fail-
ure of this agreement. In a short piece published in The National Interest in
the days before the Comprehensive Deal was signed, Graham Allison made
the important point that very rarely are international agreements perfect.1 This
is even more so when it comes to arms control agreements. This is because,
he argued, context, and the alternative to no deal, matters. It seems clear that
the alternative to no deal would be a deeply unstable region and the likelihood
of nuclear proliferation.
What is less clear is how this deal could effect the relationship between the
United States and Iran. Ali Ansari’s description of the nature of the US–Iran
159
160 Conclusion
relationship as being deeply emotional2 is frequently misunderstood by policy

makers and analysts alike as they try to comprehend why the United States
and Iran have for decades been locked in an antagonistic and seemingly
unending conflict. US policy makers have frequently ignored this aspect of
the relationship and as a result the two states have remained locked in a pat-
tern of antagonistic rhetoric that has favoured the status quo.
President Bush’s construction of the Iranian threat as an existential one that
threatened international peace and security continued this pattern. Yet, given
the heightened emotional atmosphere after September 11, it also reflected an
urgency that had previously been absent. It was articulated and constantly
reinforced through speeches and policy papers, numerous Congressional
hearings on the issue, and the ongoing media attention to the IAEA inspec-
tions process and eventual UNSC sanctions. As Ansari has argued, after
September 11, American’s Iran policy
leapt from containment to confrontation, from apparent disinterest to an urgent

need to do something. Iran is not simply a problem, it’s the problem. It’s not
just a member of the Axis of Evil, but the founding member, the chief sponsor
of terrorism . . . . No rhetorical flourish, no level of hyperbole, seems excessive
in the ritual condemnation of Iran.3
Thus geopolitical assessments of each state’s foreign policy only go so far

in explaining why neither state has been able to re-establish formal relations
with the other since the 1979 Revolution. So, what are the factors that have
prevented the United States and Iran from finding the political will to improve
relations?
One answer certainly has to do with opportunity. At key moments through-
out the decades since the severing of diplomatic relations, the leaders of one
state appear to be willing to pursue some degree of rapprochement, but the
other state is either unable or unwilling at that time to reciprocate. This is a
recurring pattern. As was discussed in chapter 1, part of the rationale behind
the Iran–Contra affair under President Reagan was ostensibly to establish
a channel of communication between the United States and the ‘moder-
ates’ within the Iranian regime. It is still unclear whether the failure of that
endeavour was a result of the unwillingness of moderates to risk their politi-
cal careers at a time when the country was at war with Iraq, or whether, as
many neoconservatives have suggested, the existence of moderates within
Iran is itself a fallacy.
Similarly, it is difficult to determine precisely why the diplomatic outreach
by Iranian president Mohammad Khatami to President Bill Clinton and the
offer of a ‘Dialogue Among Civilizations’ never produced a tangible warm-
ing of relations. Various explanations seem equally credible. It is entirely
Conclusion 161
plausible that it was in part the result of a distinct lack of political will
within the Clinton administration to pursue a policy that would have been
domestically unpopular and at the time not a high strategic priority. At the
same time, it is equally likely that the more conservative factions within Iran
manoeuvred to curtail President Khatami’s reform agenda and thus made it
extremely difficult for the Khatami government to pursue a policy that would
have been equally unpopular domestically in Iran as it would in the United
States. Couple this with the fact that his own political leverage was being
undermined within Iran and it is perhaps not so difficult to understand why
the diplomatic initiative never succeeded.
When it comes to President George W. Bush and the issue of missed
opportunity, a familiar pattern emerges. In the immediate aftermath of Sep-
tember 11, the Iranian public displayed a marked degree of empathy for the
suffering of the American nation. Reports of a capacity crowd at Tehran’s
soccer stadium observing a minute’s silence in honour of the victims of
September 11, illustrated a remarkable change from the oft-chanted slogan in
Iran of ‘death to America’. This was followed by unprecedented cooperation
between the United States and Iran in the US-led war in Afghanistan.
The opportunity here for engagement was clear. With the US invasion of
Afghanistan and then Iraq, Iran had strong incentive to avoid the same fate
and seek to improve its ties to the United States. Yet the Bush administration,
with what in hindsight can be seen as profound hubris, ignored this opportu-
nity and disastrously evoked the ‘axis of evil’ image to describe Iran.
In each of these cases, language has played a leading role in determining
how one side would perceive the other. The ‘axis of evil’ phrase was primar-
ily meant for a domestic audience in shock after the most significant attack
on its territory in its history. The need to project an image of strength and
purpose was clear in many of President Bush’s speeches at the time, perhaps
none more so than the annual State of the Union speech, where this phrase
was first used. Despite the domestic audience, however, President Bush’s
speechwriters could not have been ignorant to the effect that the phrase would
have on Iran.
What is less clear is whether the speechwriters, and more importantly
President Bush, were aware of the extent to which this binary language would
compromise its policy towards Iran for the next seven years. Indeed, as was
discussed in chapter 3, the deeply ideological and values-driven language that
characterized the Bush Doctrine set up a dichotomy between the image it was
seeking to project to the world, and the strategy it would end up pursuing.
This question of image projection is one that deserves greater attention.
The United States has sought to project a particular image of itself over the
past century, yet that image has started to become unstuck. This is because
the image of the United States as the moral arbiter of world affairs, confronted
162 Conclusion
the reality of a far more complex environment in the Middle East, particularly
after the 2003 war in Iraq. Likewise, the Iranian narrative of America as the
Great Satan was certainly challenged through the diplomatic process and
likewise forced leaders to confront the overly simplistic assumptions that had
underpinned past policy.
It seems unlikely that the narratives of each state will radically change
in the near future. This book has recounted the strong national influence
that events like the 1953 coup that overthrew President Mossadeq, the 1979
Iranian Revolution and American hostage crisis, the Iran–Iraq war have had.
They have dominated the antagonistic public rhetoric as each state demonises
the other.
It is impossible to say what would have happened if President Bush had
agreed to talk directly to the Iranian leadership when that opportunity pre-
sented itself in 2003. What is obvious though is that the United States gained
absolutely nothing from years of refusing to talk to Iran. President Obama’s
decision to commit every resource to diplomacy has had important results.
Yet many of Iran’s neighbours remain deeply troubled by the prospect of
Iranian influence and wary of America’s long-term commitment to stability
in the region.
President Obama, despite breaking the tradition of hostility, has faced
many of the same obstacles to rapprochement that his predecessors have. He
has had to battle against a deeply divided and partisan Congress. External
events have also played a significant role in shaping his ability to work with
Iran. The Arab uprisings that began in 2011 disrupted long-standing alliances
and assumptions. Iran’s influence, increasing since the 2003 invasion of Iraq
that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, has left America’s traditional allies
in the Gulf feeling more vulnerable and less accommodating of US desires to
repair relations with Iran.
The Comprehensive Deal signed in July 2015 will hardly be a panacea for
all that ails the Middle East. Yet it offers, at least for the time being, diplo-
matic space to engage Iran and its neighbours on a range of other problems
that for too long have been eclipsed by the nuclear issue.
NOTES
1. Allison, G. (2015), ‘Assessing an Iran Deal: 5 Big Lessons from History’,

The National Interest, July 7. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25514/
assessing_an_iran_deal.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F1287%2Fnonprolifer
ation_persuasion_and_peace (Accessed July 13, 2015).
2. Ansari, A. M. M. (2006), Confronting Iran, p. 4.
3. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
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Index
Afghanistan, 38, 60, 69, 77, 80, 82, 124, Cheney, Richard, 12, 25, 47, 59
161 China, 31, 37, 57, 61, 74, 125, 148, 151
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 47, 56, 59, 73, Clinton, Bill, 12, 14, 37, 66, 82, 160
75, 97–98, 120 Clinton, Hilary, 94, 161
American exceptionalism, 3–4, 15, Cold War, 1–15, 20–26, 67, 79–83, 93,
19–21, 33, 81, 92–93, 104 106, 120, 148, 151–53
American Israel Public Affairs counterterrorism, 94
Committee, 146
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 6 Democratic Party of the United States,
Arab Spring (Arab Uprising), 80, 92, 20, 94, 96, 121, 123, 130–32
99, 102, 107–10, 124, 127, 144, Department of Defense. See Pentagon
162 Department of State, 10, 13, 38–40, 66,
Arak, 38, 128, 133 68, 106, 132, 135
Assad, Bashar-Al, 108, 131, 145–46 disarmament, 92–93, 149–51
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
(AEOI), 38 Egypt, 62, 79–80, 103, 107, 144
Australia, 149 ElBaredai, Mohamad, 39, 62
energy security, 19, 62, 127
Bahrain, 105–10, 144 E3+3. See P5+1
Boeing, 148 European Union (EU), 44–47, 111,
Bolton, John, 12, 41–45 128–29
Britain. See United Kingdom
Bush, George H. W., 12, 14 Fordow, 128
France, 31, 36, 40, 45, 145, 151
Carter, Jimmy, 7–9, 14, 33–34, 135
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2, Gaza, 103, 131
5–9, 12, 13 Germany, 1, 36, 40, 45, 148
centrifuges, 44, 99, 101–2 Green Movement, 98, 109
chemical weapons, 10–11 Gulf Arab States, 112, 124
185
186 Index
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 96, Lockheed Martin, 148

125
Majlis, 6
Hamas, 35, 58, 79, 103, 131 Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free
Hezbollah, 12, 35, 58, 131, 145 Zone (MENWFZ), 149–50
Hussein, Saddam, 10, 11, 41, 60, 108, Mossadeq, Mohammad, 6–7, 162
146, 151, 162 Mousavi, Mir Hussein, 97–98
Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), 127 Mubarak, Hosni, 80, 102
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, 8, 36, 74
India, 149, 151
International Atomic Energy Agency Natanz, 38, 101–2, 128, 133
(IAEA), 19, 35–48, 55–57, 63, National Council of Resistance of Iran
67, 93, 110–11, 119, 128–31, (NCRI), 38
133–34, 160 National Endowment for Democracy,
International Energy Agency, 127 34, 68
Iran-Contra Affair, 11–13, 42, 160 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),
Iran Freedom Support Act, 66–67 58–59
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp Netanyahu, Benjamin, 111, 131–32
(IRGC), 58, 75, 95–96 North Korea, 92, 122, 149
Iraq, 10–11, 33, 35–38, 41, 44, 47–48, nuclear fuel cycle, 38, 40, 56, 91, 99, 159
55, 58, 60–63, 66, 69, 73–74, 76, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
77, 80, 82, 92, 106–9, 123–24, (NPT), 36–44, 63–65, 91, 93, 99,
131, 135, 143–46, 149, 151, 119, 125, 129, 143, 146, 149–52
160–62;
Iraqi Kurds, 10 oil, 5–6, 8, 36, 91, 104–7, 110–12,
Islamic State (ISIS), 143–46 125–27, 132
Israel, 11, 19, 59–60, 65, 96, 100–104, Open Door policy, 5
110–12, 119, 121, 124, 126, 131– Organisation of the Petroleum
32, 146, 149–50, 153 Exporting Countries (OPEC),
126–27
Jafarzadeh, Ali Reza, 38
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Pakistan, 125, 148–51
(JCPOA), 132–35, 146, 148 Palestinian, 79, 124
Parchin, 111
Kerry, John, 121, 135 Pentagon, 13, 42, 59, 68, 76
Khamenei, Ali, 56, 73, 75, 95–96, 101, Powell, Colin, 48
144
Khatami, Mohammad, 13, 47, 74–75, Qatar, 145, 148
78, 95, 97, 160–61
Khomeini, Ruhollah, 9, 12, 13, 37, Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 74
72–73 Republican Party of the United States,
Kissinger, Henry, 3, 126 20, 75, 96, 99, 121–22, 130–34
Rice, Condoleeza, 26, 56–58, 62, 68
Lebanon, 12, 124, 131 rogue states, 28, 93, 150
Libya, 80, 102–3, 144 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 5, 126
Index 187
Rouhani, Hassan, 119–21 terrorism, 14, 19, 26, 28, 32, 35, 65, 83,
Rumsfeld, Donald, 76 93–95, 100, 120, 154, 160.
Russia, 31, 57, 61, 126–27, 145, 148, See also War on Terror
151. Tudeh Party of Iran, 6
See also Soviet Union Turkey, 62, 107, 145
sanctions, 19, 35, 41, 55, 57–60, 83, 91, United Kingdom, 6, 14, 40, 45, 151
93–94, 100–101, 110–12, 121–23, United Nations General Assembly,
128–35, 144, 160 111–12, 120
Saudi Arabia, 5, 19, 34, 62, 79, 96, United Nations Security Council
102, 104–12, 119, 123–27, 132, (UNSC), 19, 35–36, 42–43,
142–48 47–48, 55–59, 129–30, 134, 160
shale oil and gas, 127 uranium enrichment, 35, 38, 41–47
Shias, 58, 96, 105, 123
Soviet Union, 5, 8, 20–21, 37, 81–81 War on Terror, 19, 27–28, 153
State of the Union Address, 34–35, 37, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
39, 46, 161 29, 35, 40–41, 45, 48, 56
Stuxnet, 101–2 Wikileaks, 96
Sunnis, 96, 105, 107–9, 123, 125–26, World Trade Organisation, 45–46
143–44, 146
Syria, 30, 62, 106, 108–12, 124, 131, Yemen, 80, 106, 124, 131, 135, 143–44,
135, 143–46 146
Taliban, 60 Zarif, Javad, 132

About the Author
Dr Kumuda Simpson is a Lecturer in International Relations in the Department

of Politics and Philosophy at La Trobe University. She received her PhD from
the University of Melbourne in 2012 and has taught at several Australian
Universities. Her research interests nuclear proliferation and energy security,
Arms Control, and American Politics. She has published on a range of issues
including gun control in America and regional security issues in the Middle
East. She is a regular commentator on RRR, ABC Radio, and Joy FM. She
has also contributed to The Conversation.
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Edited by Joseph M. Siracusa and Aiden Warren

Joseph M. Siracusa is professor of Human Security and International Diplomacy

Titles in the series include:

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB

Copyright © 2016 by Rowman & Littlefield

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Printed in the United States of America

1 America and Iran during the Cold War 1

I would like to thank Dr Benjamin MacQueen for his encouragement and

This book engages in an exploration of the evolving US policy regarding Iran,

the traditional rationalist assumptions that inform the study of international

1. Lindeman, T. and Ringmar, E. (2014), The International Politics of Recognition,

America and Iran during the Cold War

This chapter provides a concise overview of US nuclear policy during the

National narratives play an important role in how decision makers interpret

I believe in the United States of America as a government of the people, by the

American exceptionalism is not just an expression of a particularly Protes-

MOHAMMAD MOSADDEQ AND THE CIA COUP

THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE

Despite President Carter’s rhetorical commitment to upholding human

President Carter expected that the hostages would be released within a

THE IRAN–IRAQ WAR

THE IRAN–CONTRA AFFAIR

The Iran-Contra affair is no passing episode, as subsequent Administrations

exercise a subtle yet perceptible influence on US policy. The primary impera-

Takeyh’s conclusion would seem to be that one of the lasting negative

That a sense of betrayal and suspicion continues to define the relationship

The mythologizing that both countries engage in is also part of a deeper

1. Subotic, J. (2015), ‘Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy’,

33. Singer, P. W. (2006), Children At War, California: University of Calilfornia

The War on Terror and Iran’s

The revelations about Iran’s expanded nuclear programme that surfaced in

NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE

The development of what Irving Kristol, often regarded as the ‘godfather’ of

often ignored or overlooked. As Gary Dorrien has argued, the neoconserva-

Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain

For President Reagan, America’s national interest could not be defined

NEOCONSERVATISM AND BENIGN HEGEMONY

Many conservatives in America regarded the neoconservatives’ calls for

the remoralisation(sic) of America at home ultimately requires the

THE BUSH DOCTRINE

SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE

A country with a longer history of terrorism might have reacted differently,

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002

a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of

It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must

Indeed, this rhetorically aggressive approach to public diplomacy implied

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2006

The 2006 NSS further emphasized the values-driven aspects of American

The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working

President Bush was clearly drawing on the assumptions of the democratic

In a clear attempt at conflating American values and interests, the NSS

After September 11, President George W. Bush signalled a shift in America’s

During George W. Bush’s presidency, the clandestine nature of Iran’s

THE IAEA AND THE INSPECTIONS PROCESS

After September 11, President Bush signalled a shift in America’s Iran

American political leadership have been complicit in an absolutely disastrous

different threats require different strategies. In Iran, we continue to see a gov-

To promote confidence with a view to removing existing barriers for co-

In October, Richard Armitage, US deputy secretary of State, appeared

1 America and Iran during the Cold War 1

They chant the slogan of change but no change is seen in practice . . . . We