IX. Donation play only when the rights of third persons are affected.
only when the rights of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the
G.R. No. 149570. March 12, 2004.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO, as represented by ESTRELLITA
FLORENCIO-CRUZ and RODRIGO R. FLORENCIO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON as represented by VALERIANA MORENTE,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Ejectment; In ejectment cases, the issue is the physical or material
possession (possession de facto) and any pronouncement made by the trial court on the
question of ownership is provisional in nature.—Prefatorily, in ejectment cases, the issue is the
physical or material possession (possession de facto) and any pronouncement made by the trial
court on the question of ownership is provisional in nature. A judgment rendered in ejectment
cases shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land and shall not
be conclusive as to the facts found therein in a case between the same parties upon a different
cause of action involving possession of the same property.
Civil Law; Donation; Donation is one of the modes of acquiring ownership; Essential
Elements of Donation.—Under the New Civil Code, donation is one of the modes of acquiring
ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to possess the property. The essential
elements of donation are as follows: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the
donation be made in a public document and that the acceptance thereof be made in the same
deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in
both instruments.
Same; Same; Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable and
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account of officiousness,
failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.—As a
mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the
acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from
accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,
and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account of officiousness,
failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The
acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It
must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donee’s acceptance
must come to the knowledge of the donor.
Same; Same; In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must
be made in a public document; Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or
in the Assesor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official.—In order that
the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document.
Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessor’s Office is not
necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely
evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of registration comes into
deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Joint Decision  of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 59698-99 which affirmed the June 5, 2000 Decisions  of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 20 in Civil Cases No. 1018-M-99 and 1019-
M-99, and the resolution of the appellate court denying the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828 square meters
located in San Miguel, Bulacan. The said lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-44349. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the spouses Rosendo and
Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said property and stay therein without
any rentals therefor.
On September 26, 1966, De Leon, with the consent of her husband Luis, leased
the aforesaid parcel of land for P5 per month to Bienvenido Santos “for as long as the
lessor (Teresa de Leon) had an outstanding loan with the Second Quezon City
Development Bank of Quezon City but not to exceed the period of fifteen (15) years.”
De Leon assigned her leasehold right in favor of the Second Quezon City
Development Bank. The lease and De Leon’s leasehold right were annotated at the
back of TCT No. T-44349 as Entry Nos. 152248 and 152249, respectively. Thereafter,
Bienvenido Santos constructed a house thereon.
In November 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. In deference to
her wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property.
In March 1995, Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the respondents, remained in
the property. On April 26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to
the heirs of Florencio, demanding that they vacate the property within ninety (90)
days from receipt thereof. The latter refused and failed to vacate the property.
The heirs of De Leon, through Valeriana L. Morente, thereafter filed a complaint
for ejectment against the heirs of Florencio before the Municipal Trial Court of San
Miguel, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 2061. Therein, the plaintiffs alleged that
they were the pro-indiviso owners of the 828 square-meter lot covered by TCT No. T-
44349, which they inherited from their mother. During her lifetime, their mother
allowed Florencio and his family to occupy the property without any compensation,
subject to the condition that they shall vacate the same upon demand; such
arrangement went on even after their mother’s demise. They further averred that
sometime in 1995, they demanded that the heirs of Florencio vacate the property, but
that the latter refused to do so.

The plaintiff thence prayed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that after due
hearing, judgment be rendered ordering defendants to:
1.Vacate the premises which they are presently occupying;
2.Pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s
fees;
3.Pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as moral damages;
4.Pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
5.Pay plaintiff P10,000.00 per month from April 26, 1995 up to and until
defendants vacate the premises.
Plaintiff prays for other reliefs just and equitable under the circumstances.
In their answer to the complaint, the heirs of Florencio alleged that the plaintiffs had
no cause of action against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of
Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land in favor of their
predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter accepted the donation, as shown by his
signature above his typewritten name on page one of the deed. The execution of the
deed was witnessed by Patria L. Manotoc and Valeriana L. Morente. Atty. Tirso L.
Manguiat, a notary public in the City of Manila, notarized the deed on said date and
entered it in his notarial record as Doc. No. 1724, page 71, Book IV, series of 1976.
The heirs of Florencio further averred that since then, their predecessor and his
family possessed the aforesaid property as owners. After De Leon’s death, Florencio
and his children, in coordination with Jose de Leon, the administrator of the aforesaid
property, arranged for the registration of the land subject of the donation in the name
of Rosendo Florencio, which was, however, superseded by the untimely demise of
Jose de Leon in 1991. Thus, the property remained in the name of Teresa Sevilla de
Leon, even after Florencio’s death in March of 1995.
On February 1, 1996, the heirs of De Leon, represented by Valeriana L. Morente, also
filed a complaint for ejectment against the heirs of Bienvenido Santos before the MTC
of San Miguel, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 2062. They prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that after due
hearing, judgment be rendered ordering defendants to:
1.Vacate the premises which they are presently occupying;
2.Pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s
fees;
3.Pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as moral damages;
4.Pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5.Pay plaintiff P10,000.00 per month from April 26, 1995 up to and until
defendants vacate the premises.
Plaintiff prays for other reliefs just and equitable under the circumstances.
In their answer to the complaint, the heirs of Bienvenido Santos, through counsel,
alleged that the plaintiffs had no cause of action against them, and that they did not
occupy the property by mere tolerance but on the basis of a contract of lease
executed by De Leon on September 26, 1966. Furthermore, De Leon donated the
property to Rosendo Florencio on October 1, 1976, and the latter, after the expiration
of the contract of lease, allowed and permitted them to continue and remain in
possession of the property without any compensation. According to the heirs of
Bienvenido Santos, only Florencio’s heirs had the right to cause their eviction from
the property by reason of the deed of donation executed in favor of the latter.
The trial of the two cases was consolidated.
The parties agreed to litigate the following issues:
After the preliminary conference, parties submitted their respective position papers.
Plaintiffs raised and argued on the following issues:
a).Defendants’ possession of the premises was merely on the tolerance of the
late Teresa de Leon.
b).The alleged Deed of Donation does not exist, is patently a falsified document
and can never be the source of any right whatsoever.
Defendants, on the other hand, raised and argued on the following issues:
a).Defendants do not have only a better right of possession over the questioned
parcel of land and they do not have only the absolute and lawful possession of
the same but they have the absolute and lawful ownership of the same not only
against the plaintiffs but against the whole world.
b).Defendants are entitled to their counterclaim.
On motion of the plaintiffs in both cases, the court issued an Order directing the heirs
of Florencio to produce the original of the Deed of Donation purportedly executed by
Teresa de Leon. However, they failed to comply with the order of the court and
submitted a mere photocopy of the same.
The plaintiffs adduced in evidence the following: (1) TCT No. T-44349 in the
name of Teresa Sevilla; (2) demand letters sent by the plaintiffs’ counsel to the
defendants demanding that the latter vacate the subject premises; (3) affidavit-
complaint of Valeriana Morente filed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan docketed as I.S. No. 96-1513 for falsification, perjury and applicable crimes
against Rodrigo Florencio and Atty. Tirso Manguiat, dated May 8, 1996; (4) affidavit-
complaint executed by Ramon de Leon Manotoc dated May 8, 1996;  (5) copies of
Teresa de Leon’s passport issued on April 28, 1975 containing specimens of her
signature; (6) copy of Patria Manotoc’s passport issued on September 16, 1997 with
her specimen signature therein; (7) copy of Valeriana Morente’s passports issued on
the following dates: (a) February 20, 1967;  (b) April 28, 1975;  (c) October 4, 1984;
and (d) August 22, 1994,  with specimens of her signature appearing therein covering
a span of thirty years; (8) copy of the Certificate of Death of Patria Manotoc; (9)
Certification dated April 23, 1996 issued by Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief, Archives
Division of the Records Management and Archives Division of Manila  to the effect
that nothing in the notarial register of Atty. Tirso L. Manguiat show that he notarized a
deed of donation dated October 1, 1976 in favor of Rosendo Florencio; (10) copy
of Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 19, 1996 executed by one Rodolfo Apolinario;
and, (11) copies of the official receipts of the real estate taxes paid.
For their part, the heirs of Florencio adduced in evidence a photocopy of the Deed
of Donation dated October 1, 1976 purportedly executed by De Leon in favor of
Rosendo Florencio.
The heirs of Bienvenido Santos submitted in evidence as Exhibits “1” and “1-H”
the Contract of Lease dated September 6, 1966 between Teresa Sevilla and
Bienvenido R. Santos.
On December 3, 1996, the MTC rendered a decision in Civil Cases Nos.
2061 and 2062 dismissing the complaints for lack of jurisdiction upon the finding that
the issue of possession cannot be determined without resolving, in a full blown trial,
the issue of ownership.
The heirs of De Leon appealed the decisions of the MTC to the RTC of Bulacan,
Branch 83, which rendered judgment reversing the decision of the court a quo. It held
that the MTC had jurisdiction over the cases; as such, the trial court should proceed
and render judgment therefor.
In the course of the proceedings, the defendants adduced in evidence a copy of the
Deed of Donation as certified by the RTC of Bulacan on May 29, 1996.
On August 27, 1999, the MTC rendered an Amended Decision in Civil Case No.
2061 in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the court finds the defendants as having a better right of
possession over the subject parcel of land as against the plaintiffs and hereby
orders this case DISMISSED.
“For lack of evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs in the
filing of this case, and in line with the policy not to put premium on the right to
litigate, the counterclaim of the defendants is, likewise, ordered DISMISSED.
“With no pronouncements as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
The decision was appealed to the RTC of Bulacan. On June 5, 2000, the RTC
rendered judgment reversing the decision of the MTC and rendered a new judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 27, 1999,
rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Bulacan, in Civil Case No.
2061, is hereby set aside and a new one is hereby rendered, as follows:
“a)Ordering the heirs of Rosendo Florencio and all those claiming any
rights under them to vacate the subject premises, particularly that parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44349,
situated in San Jose, San Miguel, Bulacan;
“b)Ordering the Heirs of Rosendo Florencio to pay the heirs of Teresa
Sevilla the amount of P2,000.00 per month as reasonable monthly rental
on the premises, to commence on April 1995 until the premises is
vacated by them; and
“c)Ordering the heirs of Rosendo Florencio to pay the heirs of Teresa
Sevilla the amount of P10,000.00, as attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation.
“SO ORDERED.”
The RTC ruled that the deed of donation was insufficient to support the claim of the
heirs of Florencio that they were the owners of the property and were, thus, entitled to
its possession.
The defendants, now the petitioners, filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals of the decision of the RTC. On May 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the RTC decision. The CA adopted the
findings of the RTC and its disquisitions on why the deed of donation was not a
credible piece of evidence to support the petitioners’ claim over the property; hence,
did not transfer title over the property in favor of the petitioners.
First. The deed of donation (Exh. “1”), which purports to have been executed in 1976,
is not annotated on the title to the property which remains registered in the name of
Teresa Sevilla under TCT No. T-44349 (Exh. “A” and “A-1”). There is no showing
whatsoever that the same or a copy thereof was submitted to the Office of the
Register of Deeds.
Second. As earlier pointed out, throughout the years, the real estate taxes on the
property continued to be paid in the name of Teresa Sevilla by the caretaker Rodolfo
Apolinario and nobody else. There is no showing that the defendants had previously
laid any claim of title or ownership over the property and attempted to pay the taxes
thereon.
Third. Although it purports to have been notarized in the City of Manila by one
Atty. Tirso L. Manguiat, there is no indication of its existence in the notarial record of
Atty. Manguiat, as per Certification dated April 23, 1996 (Exh. “L”) of the Manila
Records Management and Archives Office. One can only wonder why from the place
of execution in San Miguel, Bulacan on October 1, 1976, its notarization on the same
date had to be in the City of Manila.
Fourth. The Court has noted, as anyone can easily do, that the signature
purported to be that of Teresa de Leon appearing in the deed of donation (Exh. “1-
B”), is dissimilar to her customary signatures affixed to her passports (Exhs. “E” and
“E-1”). The same is true with those of Patria Manotoc and Valeriana L. Morente
appearing in the same deed of donation (Exhs. “1-D” and “1-E”), with those of their
customary signatures appearing in their respective passports (Exhs. “F” and “F-1”;
“G,” “G-1” and “G-2”; “H,” “H-1” and “H-2”; “I” and “I-1” and “J” and “J-1”).
 And Fifth. There is no explanation given why since 1976, when the deed of
donation was supposedly executed, up to the present, the defendants did not register
the same to secure a new title in their names. In fact, there is no showing that efforts
toward that end were ever executed.
As it is, the Court holds that the deed of donation in question is not a credible
piece of evidence to support the defendants’ claim of acquisition of title and
ownership over the subject property and therefore insufficient to justify their
continuing possession and occupancy thereof. Thus, as against defendants’ claim
which is unregistered, the plaintiffs’ right over the property as the legal heirs and
successors-in-interest of the registered owner must prevail.
The Present Petition
The petitioners now contend in this case that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred
in rendering judgment for the respondents, thus:
1.In finding no reversible error committed by the Regional Trial Court as an
appellate court and affirming its decision.
2.In concluding that the evidence presented reveals serious doubts as to the
veracity and authenticity of the notarized deed of donation, contrary to the
findings of the trial court that there is a legal presumption of regularity in the
execution thereof.
3.In holding that private respondents are entitled to possess the subject property
notwithstanding petitioners’ claim to the contrary and despite the latter’s
continuous, open and adverse possession for more than forty years.
The petitioners aver that donation is one of the modes of acquiring ownership. Their
claim for possession is precisely based on the deed of donation executed by Teresa
Sevilla de Leon on October 1, 1976 in favor of their father, Rosendo Florencio. The
aforesaid deed was duly notarized, and by virtue of its notarization, such deed
became a public document. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, an examination
of the deed reveals that it had conformed to all the essential requisites of donation, as
required by the provisions of the New Civil Code; hence, its validity must be
presumed. From the time of the donation up to the present, the petitioners assert that
they possessed the property openly, publicly and against the whole world.
As regards the alleged forgery of the signatures of the donor and the witnesses,
the petitioners assert that absent any clear, positive and convincing evidence that the
same were forged, the presumption is that they are genuine. The mere variance in
the signatures of the donor and the witnesses cannot be considered as conclusive
proof of the forgery. They aver that the Certification dated April 23, 1996 of the Manila
Records Management and Archives Office stating that no such notarized deed
existed in the notarial records of Atty. Manguiat cannot be conclusive evidence that
no donation ever existed. According to the petitioners, such certification was merely
preponderant and, therefore, not enough to overthrow the presumption of regularity in
the notarization as well as the genuineness of the document.
The petitioners posit that their failure to register the deed of donation did not
affect its validity, it not being a requisite of a valid donation. They allege that their
effort to register the same during the lifetime of Jose de Leon, the administrator of the
property, did not materialize because of the latter’s untimely death in 1991. The
petitioners conclude that because of the respondents’ failure to destroy the validity of
the deed of donation, their right over the property should prevail; the petitioners’ right
accrued on October 1, 1976, while that of the respondents accrued only in November
of 1978.
In their comment, the respondents, through counsel, argue that the deed of
donation executed by De Leon dated October 1, 1976 in favor of Rosendo Florencio
is not a credible piece of evidence. The deed is insufficient to justify the petitioners’
stay in the premises because the original copy was never presented to them or to the
court. Furthermore, while the photocopy of the deed of donation states that it was
notarized by a certain Tirso Manguiat, a notary public for the City of Manila, under
Doc. 1724, Page No. 71, Book No. IV, Series of 1976, the presumption of regularity in
the notarization of the deed was destroyed by the certification from the Records
Management and Archives Office of Manila that no such deed exists. The
respondents further assert that the signatures appearing on the said deed, i.e., that of
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, Patria Manotoc and Valeriana Morente, were all forgeries.
According to the respondents, the following facts bolster the incredibility of the
deed of donation: (a) the deed of donation was executed in 1976 but was not
registered; (b) the TCT is still registered in the name of Teresa Sevilla de Leon; (c)
the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT should have been transmitted to the donees;
and, (d) the real estate taxes were continuously paid in the name of Teresa Sevilla de
Leon. Thus, the respondents, as her heirs, are the legal owners of the property.
The Ruling of the Court
The threshold issue in this case is whether or not the petitioners, as heirs of Rosendo
Florencio, who appears to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of Donation,
have a better right to the physical or material possession of the property over the
respondents, the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the property.
The petition has no merit.
Prefatorily, in ejectment cases, the issue is the physical or material possession
(possession de facto) and any pronouncement made by the trial court on the question
of ownership is provisional in nature. A judgment rendered in ejectment cases shall
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land and shall not
be conclusive as to the facts found therein in a case between the same parties upon
a different cause of action involving possession of the same property
 We agree with the petitioners that under the New Civil Code, donation is one of
the modes of acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to
possess the property.
The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a) the essential reduction of
the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the
intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an
immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public
document and that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a
separate public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic form, to
be noted in both instruments.
As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the
donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not
disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to
comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be
valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be
made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donee’s
acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor.
In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be
made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of
Deeds or in the Assessor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and
official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a
particular parcel of land. The necessity of registration comes into play only when the
rights of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of
contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.
On the other hand, the fundamental principle is that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein as the registered owner. The registered owner
has the right to possess, enjoy and dispose of the property without any limitations
other than those imposed by law.
In this case, the deed of donation, on its face, appears to bear all the essential
requisites of a valid donation inter vivos. With Teresa de Leon as the donor and
Rosendo Florencio as the donee, the deed of donation appears to have been
notarized by Notary Public Tirso Manguiat. On this premise, Florencio, and after his
death, his heirs, acquired ownership over the property although Certificate of Title No.
T-44349 under the name of Teresa de Leon had not yet been cancelled.
However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are cogent
facts and circumstances of substance which engender veritable doubts as to whether
the petitioners have a better right of possession over the property other than the
respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased registered owner of the property,
Teresa de Leon, based on the Deed of Donation.
First. Teresa de Leon purportedly executed the Deed of Donation on October 1,
1976 in favor of Rosendo S. Florencio. If she, indeed, donated the property, she
would surely have turned over the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. T-44349 to Florencio,
to facilitate the issuance of a new title over the property in his favor. There was an
imperative need for the deed to be registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds,
and the title to the property to be thereafter issued in the name of the donee,
Florencio. Before then, Florencio and his family had been residing in the property
solely at the sufferance of Teresa de Leon and her husband. Their possession of the
property and their continued stay therein was precarious. They could be driven out
from the property at any time by De Leon if she disowned the deed or, after her
death, by her heirs. It behooved Florencio to have the said deed filed and duly
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds without delay and, thereafter, to
secure a new title under his name. This would have resulted in the cancellation of
TCT No. T-44349 under the name of Teresa de Leon, and thereby averted any
disturbance of Florencio’s possession of the property, and after his death, that of his
heirs.
At the very least, Florencio should have caused the annotation of the deed
immediately after October 1, 1976 or shortly thereafter, at the dorsal portion of TCT
No. T-44349. Such annotation would have been binding on the respondents, as De
Leon’s successors-in-interest, as well as to third persons. However, Florencio failed
to do so. Even as De Leon died intestate in 1978, Florencio failed to secure title over
the property in his name before he himself died intestate in 1995. If, as the petitioners
claimed, Florencio acquired ownership over the property under the deed, it is
incredible that he would fail to register the deed and secure title over the property
under his name for almost twenty years. All these years, Florencio, and thereafter, his
heirs, remained passive and failed to act upon the deed of donation to protect their
right. This, the Court finds difficult to understand.
The claim that Florencio and his heirs sought the registration of the deed and the
transfer of the title to and under Florencio’s name from 1978 to 1991, in coordination
with Jose de Leon is incredible. There is no evidence on record that the deed of
donation was ever filed with and registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds at
any time during the period from 1978 to 1991. The petitioners’ claim that the
registration of the deed was delayed and later aborted by the demise of Jose de Leon
is not substantiated by evidence. Moreover, there is no reason why Florencio, or after
his death, the petitioners, could not have had the deed registered even after Jose de
Leon’s death.
 Second. Florencio failed to inform the heirs of De Leon that the latter, before her
death, had executed a deed of donation on October 1, 1976 over the property in his
favor. It was only in 1996, or eighteen years after the death of De Leon when the
respondents sued the petitioners for ejectment that the latter claimed, for the first
time, that De Leon had executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their
predecessor, Florencio.
Third. In the meantime, the respondents consistently paid the realty taxes for the
property from 1978 up to 1996, completely oblivious to the existence of the deed of
donation. On the other hand, Florencio, and, after his death, the petitioners, never
paid a single centavo for the realty taxes due on the property, even as they continued
staying in the property without paying a single centavo therefor. The petitioners
should have declared the property under their names and paid the realty taxes
therefor, if they truly believed that they were its owners. They failed to do so. The fact
of Florencio’s inaction and that of the petitioners’ weakened the latter’s claim that they
acquired ownership over the property under the deed of donation.
Fourth. The petitioners never adduced in evidence the owner’s duplicate of TCT
No. T-44349 under the name of De Leon. Their possession of the owner’s duplicate
of the title would have fortified their claim that indeed, De Leon had intended to
convey the property by donation to Florencio. Furthermore, the petitioners did not
explain why they failed to adduce in evidence the said owner’s duplicate of the title.
The only conclusion is that the said owner’s duplicate copy was not turned over to
Florencio contemporaneously with or after the execution of the deed of donation;
hence, their failure to secure title over the property.
MARCELO G. AURE
Municipal Mayor
It appears that a second page was added, with the name of Atty. Manguiat
typewritten therein as notary public, obviously, with the use of a different typewriter.
In sum then, we agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the deed of
donation relied upon by the petitioners is unreliable as evidence on which to anchor a
finding that the latter have a better right over the property than the respondents, who,
admittedly, are the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the property
under TCT No. T-44349 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decisions of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 20, in Civil Cases Nos. 1018-M-
99 and 1019-M-99, and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59698-99, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Note.—The donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance,
hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee. (Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 393 [1999])
——o0o——

Fifth. The respondents adduced in evidence the affidavit-complaint of Valeriana

Morente dated May 8, 1996, one of the witnesses to the deed, for falsification and
perjury against Florencio and Atty. Tirso Manguiat. They also adduced the
Certification dated April 23, 1996 issued by Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief, Archives
Division of the Records Management and Archives Division of Manila, to the effect
that nothing in the notarial register of Atty. Tirso L. Manguiat, a notary public of
Manila, showed that the latter notarized a Deed of Donation executed by De Leon
and Florencio in San Miguel, Bulacan dated October 1, 1976. However, the
petitioners failed to adduce in evidence Atty. Manguiat’s counter-affidavit to the said
complaint, or, at the very least, a separate affidavit explaining the facts and
circumstances surrounding the notarization of the deed of donation.

Sixth. A reading of the deed will show that at the bottom of page one thereof,
Florencio was to subscribe and swear to the truth of his acceptance of the donation
before Municipal Mayor Marcelo G. Aure of San Miguel, Bulacan. However, the
mayor did not affix his signature above his typewritten name, thus:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 1976, the
DONOR having exhibited her Res. Cert. No. A-3723337 issued at Quezon City
on January 10, 1976.
 G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA
MANGUBAT, respondents.
Contracts; Donations; Kinds of; Words and Phrases; “Pure or Simple Donations,”
“Remuneratory or Compensatory Donations,” “Conditional or Modal Donations,” and “Onerous
Donations,” Defined and Distinguished.—Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be
categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal;
and (4) onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity.
This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation
is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not
amount to a demandable debt. A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is
made in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions,
limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation
given. Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation
or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of
which is equal to or more than the thing donated.
Same; Same; Same; Of the different classifications of donations, onerous donations are
the most distinct since, unlike the other forms of donations, the validity of and the rights and
obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by the law
on donations but by the law on contracts.—Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the
onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the
validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is
completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard,
Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present
Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
Same; Same; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Presumptions; Where the trial court
considered the written acceptance of the donation in arriving at its decision, there is the
presumption that such exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.—Private
respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer of exhibits by the defendants in the trial
court, an affidavit of acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit “8,” was
offered in evidence. However, private respondents now question this exhibit because, according
to them “there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants have been
admitted nor such exhibit appear on record.” Respondents’ stance does not persuade. The
written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving at its
decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the
court.
Estoppel by Laches; Words and Phrases.—Estoppel by laches, or the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Donations; The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to
ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor.—The purpose of the formal
requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly
communicated to the donor. Thus, in Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held: x
x x A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion that the annulment of the
donation for being defective in form as urged by the petitioners. This would be in keeping with
the unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision. However, we find that under the
circumstances of the present case, a literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result
not in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of the
Court to avoid such an interpretation. The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the
acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even
suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and
requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given this
significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the donation ineffective because
there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee’s acceptance. That would be
placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of
the acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate instrument dated June 20, 1946,
and as later acknowledged by Juan.
Same; The actual knowledge by the donor of the construction and existence of the
school building pursuant to the condition of the donation fulfills the legal requirement that the
acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.—In the case at bar, a
school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had
knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the donated lot through the efforts of
the Parents-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school building was
being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was
constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of
Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school
building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be
communicated to the donor.
Same; Contracts; Administrative Law; Contracts or conveyances may be executed for
and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long
as the same are not prohibited by law.—On respondents’ claim, which was upheld by the Court
of Appeals, that the acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio Buendia of the donation
was ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the
Philippines, it is undisputed that the donation was made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools.
Such being the case, his acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the 1987
Administrative Code which states: SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances.—Contracts or
conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches,
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies
of the service and as long as the same are not prohibited by law.
Same; Words and Phrases; “Exclusively used for school purposes,” Construed.—What
does the phrase “exclusively used for school purposes” convey? “School” is simply an institution
or place of education. “Purpose” is defined as “that which one sets before him to accomplish or
attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with the ends sought,
an object to be attained, an intention, etc.” “Exclusive” means “excluding or having power to
exclude (as by preventing entrance or debarring from possession, participation, or use); limiting
or limited to possession, control or use.”
Same; The condition for the donation—that the lot be exclusively used for school
purposes—is not violated when the lot donated is exchanged with another one, where the
purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school.—Without
the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot
donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same,
which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or
affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for
the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43840, entitled Leon Silim, et al. vs.
Wilfredo Palma, et al., which declared null and void the donation made by
respondents of a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality
of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa
Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of
Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of
Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said property should “be used
exclusively and forever for school purposes only.”  This donation was accepted by
Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance
and/or Confirmation of Donation.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parents-Teachers
Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on the
donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be
allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be
released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel
of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent of the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor
Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school
site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit
the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia
and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was
exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan
school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the school building
previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new
location.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma
was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was
building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma
replied that he is already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim
endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the donated property but Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in court.
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and
Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of Deed of Exchange and Recovery
of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor
Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 21. In its Decision dated 20 August
1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The pertinent portion of
the decision reads:
Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that there was no breach or violation
of the condition imposed in the subject Deed of Donation by the donee. The
exchange is proper since it is still for the exclusive use for school purposes and
for the expansion and improvement of the school facilities within the community.
The Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the desired purpose of the donation
made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
In sum, it may be safely stated that the aforesaid transaction of exchange is
a (sic) exception to the law invoked by the plaintiffs (Art. 764, Civil Code). The
donee, being the State had the greater reciprocity of interest in the gratuitous and
onerous contract of donation. It would be illogical and selfish for the donor to
technically preclude the donee from expanding its school site and improvement
of its school facilities, a paramount objective of the donee in promoting the
general welfare and interests of the people of Barangay Kauswagan. But it is a
well-settled rule that if the contract is onerous, such as the Deed of Donation in
question, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests,
which in the instant case, is the donee. x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgement is hereby rendered:
1.Dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;
2.Dismissing the counterclaim for the sake of harmony and reconciliation
between the parties;
3.With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 22 October 1999, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void on the
grounds that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on
the donation was violated.
Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the following issues:
I.WHETHER THE COURT OP APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE
DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN INVALID ACCEPTANCE BY THE
DONEE.
II.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE
DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF A
CONDITION IN THE DONATION.
The Court gives DUE COURSE to the petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation null
and void for the reason that the acceptance was not allegedly done in accordance
with Articles 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code.
We agree.
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or
simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous.
A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is
donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory
donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which
services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional or modal donation is one
where the donation is made in consideration of future services or where the donor
imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which
is inferior than that of the donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that which
imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind
of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more
than the thing donated.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most
distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the
rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely
governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard,
Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there
is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property.
The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid acceptance of the donation
because:
xxx
Under the law the donation is void if there is no acceptance. The acceptance
may either be in the same document as the deed of donation or in a separate
public instrument. If the acceptance is in a separate instrument, “the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and his step shall be noted in both
instruments.
“Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee
by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a
public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. (Abellera vs.
Balanag, 37 Phils. 85; Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245). If the
acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in
another. Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the
intention to accept. But in this case, it is necessary that formal notice
thereof be given to the donor and the fact that due notice has been given
it must be noted in both instruments (that containing the offer to donate
and that showing acceptance). Then and only then is the donation
perfected. (11 Manresa 155-11. cited in Vol. II. Civil Code of the
Philippines by Tolentino.).”
This Court perused carefully the Deed of Donation marked as exhibit “A” and
“1” to determine whether there was acceptance of the donation. This Court found
none. We further examined the record if there is another document which
embodies the acceptance, we found one. Although the Court found that in the
offer of exhibits of the defendants, a supposed affidavit of acceptance and/or
confirmation of the donation, marked as exhibit “8” appears to have been offered.
However, there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the
defendants have been admitted nor such exhibits appear on record.
Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the said supposed acceptance was
not noted in the Deed of Donation as required under Art. 749 of the Civil Code.
And according to Manresa, supra, a noted civilist, the notation is one of the
requirements of perfecting a donation. In other words, without such a notation,
the contract is not perfected contract. Since the donation is not perfected, the
contract is therefore not valid.
xxx
We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an
authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and
sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.
ART. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be laid, it must be
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charge which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptances may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer of exhibits by the
defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of acceptance and/or confirmation of the
donation, marked as Exhibit “8,” was offered in evidence. However, private
respondents now question this exhibit because, according to them “there is nothing in
the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants have been, admitted nor such
exhibit appear on record.”
Respondents’ stance does not persuade. The written acceptance of the donation
having been considered by the trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the
presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
 Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals. Nowhere in their
brief did respondents question the validity of the donation on the basis of the alleged
defect in the acceptance thereof. If there was such a defect, why did it take
respondents more than ten (10) years from the date of the donation to question its
validity? In the very least, they are guilty of estoppel.
Respondents further argue that assuming there was a valid acceptance of the
donation, the acceptance was not noted in the Deed of Donation as required in Article
749 of the Civil Code, hence, the donation is void.
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure
that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor. Thus, in Pajarillo vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held:
There is no question that the donation was accepted in a separate public
instrument and that it was duly communicated to the donors. Even the petitioners
cannot deny this. But what they do contend is that such acceptance was not
“noted in both instruments,” meaning the extrajudicial partition itself and the
instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two instruments
showing that “authentic notice” of the acceptance was made by Salud to Juana
and Felipe. And while the first instrument contains the statement that “the donee
does hereby accept this donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the
kindness and liberality of the donor,” the only signatories thereof were Felipe
Balane and Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the
separate instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a month later.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion that the
annulment of the donation for being defective in form as urged by the petitioners.
This would be in keeping with the unmistakable language of the above-quoted
provision. However, we find that under the circumstances of the present case, a
literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the
parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of the
Court to avoid such an interpretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the
donation is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even
suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it
later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by
Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare
the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial
settlement of the donee’s acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on
mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the
acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate instrument dated June
20, 1946, and as later acknowledged by Juan.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation
was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building
put up on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of
Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school building was being dismantled and
transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a
house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of
Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of
the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation
by the donee be communicated to the donor.
On respondents’ claim, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the
acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio Buendia of the donation was
ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of
the Philippines, it is undisputed that the donation was made in favor of the Bureau of
Public Schools. Such being the case, his acceptance was authorized under Section
47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances.—Contracts or conveyances may be
executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches,
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the
exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not prohibited
by law.
Finally, it is respondents’ submission that the donee, in exchanging the donated lot
with a bigger lot, violated the condition in the donation that the lot be exclusively used
for school purposes only.
What does the phrase “exclusively used for school purposes” convey? “School” is
simply an institution or place of education. “Purpose” is defined as “that which one
sets before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project.
Term is synonymous with the ends sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc.”
“Exclusive” means “excluding or having power to exclude (as by preventing entrance
or debarring from possession, participation, or use); limiting or limited to possession,
control or use.”
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way
violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the
donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity
of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much
bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction
of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited
area of the donated lot.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—An unregistered deed of donation is not binding on third persons. (Sales vs. Court
of Appeals, 211 SCRA 858 [1992]) Only the donor or his heirs have the personality to question
the violation of any restriction in the deed of donation. (Garrido vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA
450 [1994])
 ——o0o——
G.R. No. 57455. January 18, 1990.
EVELYN DE LUNA, ROSALINA DE LUNA, PRUDENCIO DE LUNA, JR., WILLARD
DE LUNA, ANTONIO DE LUNA, and JOSELITO DE LUNA, petitioners, vs. HON.
SOFRONIO F. ABRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch IX, and LUZONIAN UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.
Civil Law; Donations; Article 764 of the New Civil Code does not apply to onerous
donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are
governed by the rules on Contracts.—It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-
compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does not
apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
Same; Same; Same; The rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and
not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.—In the light of the above, the rules
on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable
in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; The stipulation under paragraph 11 of the Revival of Donation
Intervivos not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid
and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.—Under Article 1306 of the
New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right “to establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” Paragraph 11 of the “Revival of Donation
Intervivos, has provided that” violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic
reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, x x x, without the need of executing any
other document for that purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR.” Said
stipulation not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid
and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an
agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof even
without court intervention.—“x x x There is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from
entering into agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation
thereof, even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always necessary for the injured
party to resort to court for rescission of the contract.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial intervention necessary not for purposes of obtaining
a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.—It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already
deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
Civil Procedure; Judgment on the pleadings; In the absence of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, the Court cannot motu proprio render such judgment.—Finally, considering that
the allegations in the complaint on the matter of the donee’s non-compliance with the conditions
of the donation have been contested by private respondents who claimed that improvements
more valuable than the donated property had been introduced, a judgment on the pleadings is
not proper. Moreover, in the absence of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court
cannot motu proprio render such judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: “Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.”
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order dated July, 7, 1981 of
respondent judge Sofronio F. Abrigo of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch
IX in Civil Case No. 8624 dismissing the complaint of petitioners on the ground of
prescription of action.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of 7,500 square
meters of Lot No. 3707 of the Cadastral Survey of Lucena covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1-5775 to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now Luzonian
University Foundation, Inc., herein referred to as the foundation). The donation,
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos (Annex “A” of Petition) was subject to
certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of
the donated property in case of violation or non-compliance (pars. 7 and 10 of Annex
“A”, p. 20, Rollo). The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.
On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna “revived” the said donation in favor of the
foundation, in a document entitled “Revival of Donation Intervivos” (Annex “B” of
Petition) subject to terms and conditions which among others, required:
“x x x.
“3. That the DONEE shall construct at its own expense a Chapel, a Nursery
and Kindergarten School, to be named after St. Veronica, and other
constructions and Accessories shall be constructed on the land herein being
donated strictly in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by the
O.R. Quinto & Associates and made part of this donation; provided that the
flooring of the Altar and parts of the Chapel shall be of granoletic marble.
“4. That the construction of the Chapel, Nursery and Kindergarten School
shall start immediately and must be at least SEVENTY (70) PER CENTUM
finished by the end of THREE (3) YEARS from the date hereof, however, the
whole project as drawn in the plans and specifications made parts of this
donation must be completed within FIVE (5) YEARS from the date hereon,
unless extensions are granted by the DONOR in writing;
“x x x.” (p. 23, Rollo)
As in the original deed of donation, the “Revival of Donation Intervivos” also provided
for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of the
conditions thereof, couched in the following terms:
“x x x.
 “11. That violation of any of the conditions herein provided shall cause the
automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, assigns and
representatives, without the need of executing any other document for that
purpose and without obligation whatever on the part of the DONOR.” (p.
24, Rollo).
The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation in the same document,
subject to all the terms and conditions stated in the donation (p. 24, Rollo). The
donation was registered and annotated on April 15, 1971 in the memorandum of
encumbrances as Entry No. 17939 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5775 (p.
15, Rollo).
On August 3, 1971, Prudencio de Luna and the foundation executed a “Deed of
Segregation” (Annex “C” of Petition) whereby the area donated which is now known
as Lot No. 3707-B of Subdivision Plan Psd-40392 was adjudicated to the foundation.
As a result, transfer certificate of title No. T-16152 was issued in the name of the
foundation. The remaining portion known as Lot. No. 3707-A was retained by the
donor. (p. 16, Rollo).
On September 23, 1980, herein petitioners, Evelyn, Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr.,
Willard, Antonio and Joselito, all surnamed de Luna, who claim to be the children and
only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna who died on August 18, 1980, filed a
complaint (pp. 14-17, Rollo) with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon alleging that the
terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the foundation.
Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the reversion of the
donated land to the heirs. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 8624.
In its answer (pp. 29-36, Rollo), respondent foundation claimed that it had partially
and substantially complied with the conditions of the donation and that the donor has
granted the foundation an indefinite extension of time to complete the construction of
the chapel. It also invoked the affirmative defense of prescription of action and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint.
During the pre-trial of the case, the foundation moved for a preliminary hearing of
its affirmative defense of prescription of action which was opposed by the plaintiffs.
After the parties have filed their respective written motions, oppositions and
memoranda, an Order (pp., 40-43, Rollo) dated July 7, 1981 was issued dismissing
the complaint. The dispositive portion of the Order states:
“In view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the motion to dismiss
deemed filed by the defendant on the ground of prescription to be well-taken and
the same is hereby GRANTED.
“WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
“No pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
No motion for reconsideraton was filed by petitioners.
On July 22, 1981, petitioners brought the instant petition for review with the
following assignments of error:
“I.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DONEE’S CONSENT
TO THE REVOCATION OF A DONATION TO BE VALID MUST BE GIVEN
SUBSEQUENT TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE DONATION OR VIOLATION
OF (THE) ANY OF THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED THEREIN.
“II.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN TREATING THE COMPLAINT AS ONE
FOR JUDICIAL DECREE OF REVOCATION OF THE DONATION IN
QUESTION AS CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 764 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4) YEARS AND IN
NOT CONSIDERING IT AS AN ACTION TO ENFORCE A WRITTEN
CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN (10) YEARS AS PROVIDED IN
ARTICLE 1144, HENCE, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT.
“III.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS BY WAY OF JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.” (pp. 1-2, Petitioner’s
Brief)
We gave due course to the petition on August 3, 1981 (p. 45, Rollo). After the parties’
submission of their respective briefs, the Court resolved to consider the petition
submitted for decision on January 27, 1982 (p. 62, Rollo).
The assailed order of the trial court stated that revocation (of a donation) will be
effective only either upon court judgment or upon consent of the donee as held in the
case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, No. 24190, July 13, 1926, 49 Phil. 143. The trial
court dismissed the claim of petitioners that the stipulation in the donation providing
for revocation in case of noncompliance of conditions in the donation is tantamount to
the consent of the donee, opining that the consent contemplated by law should be
such consent given by the donee subsequent to the effectivity of the donation or
violation of the conditions imposed therein. The trial court further held that, far from
consenting to the revocation, the donee claimed that it had already substantially
complied with the conditions of the donation by introducing improvements in the
property donated valued at more than the amount of the donated land. In view
thereof, a judicial decree revoking the subject donation is necessary. Accordingly,
under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions to revoke a donation on the ground
of non-compliance with any of the conditions of the donation shall prescribe in four
years counted from such non-compliance. In the instant case, the four-year period for
filing the complaint for revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9,
1980. Since the complaint was brought on September 23, 1980 or more than five (5)
months beyond the prescriptive period, it was already barred by prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that Article 764 of the New Civil Code was
adopted to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment of conditions when
revocation of the donation has not been agreed upon by the parties. By way of
contrast, when there is a stipulation agreed upon by the parties providing for
revocation in case of non-compliance, no judicial action is necessary. It is then
petitioners’ claim that the action filed before the Court of First Instance of Quezon is
not one for revocation of the donation under Article 764 of the New Civil Code which
prescribes in four (4) years, but one to enforce a written contract which prescribes in
ten (10) years.
The petition is impressed with merit.
From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2)
remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is one the cause of which is pure
liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory donation is one where the donee gives
something to reward past or future services or because of future charges or burdens,
when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the
donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future
services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated (Edgardo L. Paras,
Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 11 ed., Vol. 11, p. 726).
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the
donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to
the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten
school in the donated property within five years from execution of the deed of
donation.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause
are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in the
cases of Carlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de
Mesa, L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495. On the matter of prescription of
actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on
prescription applies. (Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra.). The same rules apply
under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
“Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.”
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does not apply
to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that
onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on
prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right
“to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy.” Paragraph 11 of the “Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided
that”violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of
the donated area to the donor, his heirs, x x x, without the need of executing any
other document for that purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR”.
Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented
thereto.
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic reversion
of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in
the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally
in case of breach, without need of going to court. Upon the happening of the
resolutory condition of non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the
donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
In the case of University of the Philippines v. de los Angeles, L-28602, September 29,
1970, 35 SCRA 102-107, it was held:
“x x x There is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into
agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation
thereof, even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always
necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract
(Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., L-11897, 31 October 1964, 12 SCRA
276).”
This was reiterated in the case of Angeles v. Calasanz, L-42283, March 18,
1985:
“Well settled is, however, the rule that a judicial action for the rescission of a
contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions (Lopez v. Commissioner
of Customs, 37 SCRA 327, 334, and cases cited therein).
“Resort to judicial action for rescission is obviously not contemplated. The
validity of the stipulation can not be seriously disputed. It is in the nature of a
facultative resolutory condition which in many cases has been upheld, by this
court. (Ponce Enrile v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 504)”
However, in the University of the Philippines v. Angeles case, (supra), it was held that
in cases where one of the parties contests or denies the rescission, “only the final
award of the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether the
resolution is proper or not.” It was held, thus:
“x x x since in every case, where the extrajudicial resolution is contested, only the
final award of the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether
the resolution was proper or not. It is in this sense that judicial action will be
necessary as without it, the extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable and
subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become barred by
acquiescence, estoppel or prescription.”
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of
obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by
virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but
in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
 The case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra, relied upon by the trial court, is
not applicable in the case at bar. While the donation involved therein was also
onerous, there was no agreement in the donation providing for automatic rescission,
thus, the need for a judicial declaration revoking said donation.

The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint in the case
at bar is barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code because
Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations.

As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, compliance with the terms
and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years from its
execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within
the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract (Article 1144[1], New
Civil Code), counted from April 9, 1976.

Finally, considering that the allegations in the complaint on the matter of the
donee’s non-compliance with the conditions of the donation have been contested by
private respondents who claimed that improvements more valuable than the donated
property had been introduced, a judgment on the pleadings is not proper. Moreover,
in the absence of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court cannot motu
proprio render such judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: “Where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.”
(Emphasis Ours)

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 8624 is hereby

ordered reinstated. Respondent judge is ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to
determine the propriety of the revocation of the subject donation.
SO ORDERED.

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 133705. March 31, 2005.
the conditions thereto attached, to wit:
C-J YULO & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN
PABLO, INC., respondent.
Civil Law; Property; Donations; Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be
categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal;
and (4) onerous.—Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1)
pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A
pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in
its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the
purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a
demandable debt. A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in
consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or
charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given. Finally, an
onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more
precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal
to or more than the thing donated. Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous
type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and
the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed
not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts.
Same; Same; Same; Revocation; Considering that the donee’s acts did not detract from
the very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack
of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will
not warrant the revocation of the donation.—As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein
entered into by the donee were for the sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the
donation was intended. In fact, such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in
the deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence,
considering that the donee’s acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation
was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor
would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the
donation.
GARCIA, J.:
Appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari are
the Decision dated December 19, 1997 and Resolution dated April 30, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392, reversing an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34, which ruled in favor of the
herein petitioner C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., in a suit for revocation of donation with
reconveyance of title, thereat commenced by the petitioner against the herein
respondent, Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.
The facts are not at all disputed:
On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at
Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna with an area of 41,117 square meters and registered in
its name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-82803. The deed of donation
which also bears the acceptance of the donee recites the considerations therefor and
WHEREAS, Donee is a religious corporation engaged in much (sic) humanitarian
Christian work in Laguna and elsewhere, educating and forming the young,
caring for the infirm and the aged in the fulfillment of its mission;
WHEREAS, Donor recognizes the need for a privately endowed institution
that will care for the homeless and destitute old people in the community, as well
as the other senior citizens who for some reason or other find themselves without
family with whom to live the last years of their life:
WHEREFORE, Donor is willing, in order to help establish and support such an
institution to donate the land necessary for its housing, as well as an area of land
whereon it may raise crops for its support and for the sustenance of its residents;
WHEREAS, Donee is willing and able, with the wanted help of Donor and of
other benefactors, to establish, operate and maintain such a home for the aged.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing premises, Donor
hereby transfers and conveys to Donee by way of donation all its rights, title and
interest in that certain parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82803 of the Land
Records of Laguna, the technical descriptions of which are recited above, subject
to the following conditions and covenants, each of which is a material
consideration for this Deed:
1.So much of the land as may be necessary shall be used for the
construction of a home for the aged and infirm, regardless of religion or
creed, but preferably those coming from Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna;
provided that retired and/or aged priests may be admitted to the home;
and provided further that any senior citizen from the area who has retired
from business or work may likewise be admitted to the home, subject to
the payment to the institution of such sum as he may afford for his
support.
2.A Green Belt that is 15 meters wide shall be established and
maintained by the Donor along the length of the land to separate and
insulate it from the projected highway.
3.Such part of land as may not be needed for the residence and the
Green Belt shall be devoted by Donee with the help of such residents of
the home as are able, to the raising of agricultural crops for the
consumption of the residents of the home, and of such other crops that
may be sold to defray the cost of running the home and feeding its
residents; provided, that should the area later become so fully urbanized
as to make this limitation on use economically, impractical, any portion of
the land may, with the written consent of the Donor, be put to commercial
use by the Donee by leasing the same for wholesome and socially-
acceptable activities; provided further that the rentals from such
commercial leases shall be used, first, to meet the expenses of the home;
second, to enlarge its population and expand its facilities; and finally for
other charitable purposes in Laguna, in that order.
4.Donee acknowledges that Donor’s generous act will greatly aid Donee
in accomplishing its mission on earth, and, recognizing the generosity of
the Yulo family as the reason for such act, Donee undertakes to cause
every year the celebration of masses for the intention of the various
members of the family of Mr. Jose Yulo, Sr., on festive and solemn
occasions in the said family.
 5.Except with prior written consent of the Donor or its successor, the
Donee shall not use the land except for the purpose as provided above in
paragraph 1 hereof, nor sell or dispose the land for any reason
whatsoever, nor convey any portion of the same except in lease for
commercial use as provided above in paragraph 3 hereof, otherwise the
said land with all real improvements thereon shall revert in trust to the
Donor for prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable
organization that Donor may deem best suited to the care of the aged.
(Italics supplied).
On the basis of the same deed, TCT No. T-82803 of the donor was cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. T-91348 in the name of donee Roman Catholic Bishop of San
Pablo, Inc.
Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to
build the perimeter fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus
building for the aged and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to one
Martin Gomez who planted said portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute that the
lease agreement was entered into by the donee without the prior written consent of
the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease to Gomez ended in 1985.
The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by
the donee, this time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As
explained by the donee, it entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the
premises from vandals and for the electrification of the nucleus building of the home
for the aged and in the infirm, which was named as “Casa dela Merced.” As before,
however, the donee executed the lease contract without the prior written consent of
the donor.
After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time,
leased a portion of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased
area for fattening cattles. The donee explained that the lease agreement with Bostre
was also for the purposes of generating funds for the completion of “Casa dela
Merced.” Again, however, the donee did not secure the prior written consent of the
donor.
Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor,
through its president Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the
latter that it was revoking the donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due
to the donee’s non-compliance with and material breach of the conditions thereunder
stipulated. In the same letter, the donor requested for the turn-over of the donee’s
TCT No. T-91348 over the donated property.
In a reply-letter dated November 5, 1990, the donee, through Bishop Pedro N.
Bantigue, D.D., denied any material breach of the conditions of the deed of donation
and manifested its continued and faithful compliance with the provisions thereof. In
the same letter, the donee refused the turnover of its title to the donor.
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on November 19, 1990, in
the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna the donor, alleging non-compliance with
and violation by the donee of the conditions of the deed of donation, filed its complaint
in this case against donee Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Pablo, Inc., therein
reciting the imputed non-compliance and violations by the donee of the terms and
conditions of the deed of donation, as follows:
a) non-construction of the home for the aged and infirmed in the lot despite the
lapse of a reasonable and considerable length of time;
b)present land use of the area is a cattle farm, the owner of which has a lease
contract with the donee; and
c)no prior written consent of the donor has been obtained for the present and
actual use of the property donated,
and accordingly prayed that the subject deed of donation be adjudged revoked and
void and the donee ordered to return and/or reconvey the property donated.
In its answer, defendant donee alleged that it was doing its best to comply with
the provisions of the deed of donation relative to the establishment of the home for
the aged and the infirm, adding that the leases of portions of the land were with the
express, albeit unwritten consent, of Jesus Miguel Yulo himself. In the same answer,
defendant donee interposed the defense that the donor’s cause of action for
revocation, if any, had already prescribed because the leases were known to the
latter since 1980.
In a decision dated December 22, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment for
donor-plaintiff C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., thus:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff and against the
defendant, declaring the Deed of Donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exh. “C”)
REVOKED, affirming plaintiff’s revocation of the same in the letter dated
September 20, 1990 (Exh. “D”).
Defendant and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to
immediately vacate the premises of the donated property and to hand over to
plaintiff the peaceful possession of the aforesaid premises.
To avoid multiplicity of suits, the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, is
hereby ordered to require the defendant to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-91348 (Exh. “B”) and thereafter cancel the same and issue, upon payment
of the required fees, a new Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiffs, with
cost against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.”
Therefrom, donee-defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc., went to the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392.
In the herein assailed Decision dated December 19, 1997,  the Court of Appeals
reversed that of the trial court and upheld the donation in question, to wit:
 “WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated December 22, 1993 is
hereby REVERSED and the donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exhibit “C”)
which conveyed title to the donated property in the appellee’s name is
hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.”
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its Resolution
of April 30, 1998, donor C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., has come to this Court via the present
recourse on its sole submission that—
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (THAT THE REVOCATION OF
THE DONATION BY PETITIONER WAS IMPROPER) IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
We DENY.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s finding that the donation is an
onerous one since the donee was burdened with the establishment on the donated
property of a home for the aged and the infirm. It likewise agreed with the trial court
that there were violations of the terms and conditions of the deed of donation when
the donee thrice leased a portion of the property without the prior written consent of
the donor. Likewise upheld by the appellate court is the ruling of the trial court that the
prescriptive period of the donor’s right to revoke the donation is ten (10) years based
on Article 1144 of the Civil Code, instead of four (4) years per Article 764 of the same
Code, and therefore the action for revocation filed by the petitioner is not barred by
prescription.
Even then, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, the reversal
being premised on the appellate court’s finding that the breaches thrice committed by
the respondent were merely casual breaches which nevertheless did not detract from
the purpose of which the donation was made: the establishment of a home for the
aged and the infirm.
We agree.
Petitioner contends that the case at bar is similar to the 1995 case of Central
Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals, where the donee failed for more than 50
years to establish, as required, a medical school on the land donated, and where this
Court declared the donation to have been validly revoked.
To the mind of the Court, what is applicable to this case is the more recent [2001]
case of Republic vs. Silim, where respondent Silim donated a 5,600-square meter
parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur with the condition that the said property should be used
exclusively and forever for school purposes only. Although a school building was
constructed on the property through the efforts of the Parent-Teachers Association of
Barangay Kauswagan, the funds for a Bagong Lipunan school building could not be
released because the government required that it be built on a one-hectare parcel of
land. This led the donee therein to exchange the donated property for a bigger one.
In Silim, the Court distinguished the four (4) types of donations:
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or
simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4)
onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain
gratuity. This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or
compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for
past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional
or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future
services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges
upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given.
Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal
obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable
consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the
most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of
and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is
completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In
this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 733. Donations with onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous
since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated
property.
Here, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law on contracts instead of the law
on donations because the donation involved in this case is onerous, saddled as it is
by a burden imposed upon the donee to put up and operate a home for the aged and
the infirm. We thus quote with approval the terse ruling of the appellate court in the
challenged decision:
First, the violations of the conditions of the donation committed by the donee
were merely casual breaches of the conditions of the donation and did not
detract from the purpose by which the donation was made, i.e., for the
establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm. In order for a contract which
imposes a reciprocal obligation, which is the onerous donation in this case
wherein the donor is obligated to donate a 41,117 square meter property in
Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna on which property the donee is obligated to
establish a home for the aged and the infirm (Exhibit “C”), may be rescinded per
Article 1191 of the New Civil Code, the breach of the conditions thereof must be
substantial as to defeat the purpose for which the contract was perfected
(Tolentino, “Civil Code of the Philippines,” Vol. IV, pp. 179-180; Universal Food
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, 233
SCRA 551, 562). Thus, in the case of “Ocampo v. C.A.” (ibid.), citing the case of
“Angeles v. Calasanz” (135 SCRA 323, 330), the Supreme Court ruled:
The right to rescind the contract for non-performance of one of its
stipulations x x x is not absolute. In Universal Food Corp. v. Court of
Appeals (33 SCRA 1) the Court stated that:
 The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial
and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties
in making the agreement (Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine
Co., 47 Phil. 821, 827). The question of whether a breach of a contract
is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances (Corpus v.
Hon. Alikpala, et al., L-23707 & L-23720, Jan. 17, 1968).
The above ruling of the Court of Appeals is completely in tune with this Court’s
disposition in Republic vs. Silim, supra. The donor therein sought to revoke the
donation on the ground that the donee breached the condition to exclusively and
forever use the land for school purpose only, but this Court ruled in favor of the
donee:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way
violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for
the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the
lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of
the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the release of funds
for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the
sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact,
such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed of donation,
albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence, considering
that the donee’s acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation was
made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the
donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the
revocation of the donation.
Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by
the donor for all contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute
ground for revocation of the donation because such a condition, if not correlated with
the purpose of the donation, would constitute undue restriction of the donee’s right of
ownership over the donated property.
Instructive on this point is the ruling of this Court in The Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, viz.:
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of
title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted,
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the
donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not
be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
xxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation
against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership,
should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation
of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No
reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of
donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale
supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the deed of
donation is not in truth violative of the latter, hence, for lack of cause of action,
the case for private respondents must fail.
If petitioner would insist that the lack of prior written consent is a resolutory condition
that is absolute in character, the insistence would not stand the validity test under the
foregoing doctrine. What would have been casual breaches of the terms and
conditions of the donation, may, in that event, even be considered as no breach at all
when the Court strikes down such absolute condition of prior written consent by the
donor in all instances without any exception whatsoever. The Court, however,
understands that such a condition was written with a specific purpose in mind, which
is, to ensure that the primary objective for which the donation was intended is
achieved. A reasonable construction of such condition rather than totally striking it
would, therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of the donation. Thus, for as long
as the contracts of lease do not detract from the purpose for which the donation was
made, the complained acts of the donee will not be deemed as substantial breaches
of the terms and conditions of the deed of donation to merit a valid revocation thereof
by the donor.
Finally, anent petitioner’s contention that the Court of Appeals failed to consider
that respondent had abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and
infirm, the explanation in respondent’s comment is enlightening. Petitioner relies on
Bishop Bantigue’s letter  dated June 21, 1990 as its basis for claiming that the donee
had altogether abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and the infirm
on the property donated. Respondent, however, explains that the Bishop, in his letter,
written in the vernacular, expressed his concern that the surrounding area was being
considered to be re-classified into an industrial zone where factories are expected to
be put up. There is no question that this will definitely be disadvantageous to the
health of the aged and the infirm. Thus, the Bishop asked permission from the donor
for a possible exchange or sale of the donated property to ultimately pursue the
purpose for which the donation was intended in another location that is more
appropriate.
The Court sees the wisdom, prudence and good judgment of the Bishop on this
point, to which it conforms completely. We cannot accede to petitioner’s view, which
attributed the exact opposite meaning to the Bishop’s letter seeking permission to sell
or exchange the donated property.
In Silim, supra, this Court ruled that such exchange does not constitute breach of
the terms and conditions of the donation. We see no reason for the Court to think
otherwise in this case. To insist that the home for the aged and infirm be constructed
on the donated property, if the industrialization indeed pushes through, defies rhyme
and reason. Any act by the donor to prevent the donee from ultimately achieving the
purpose for which the donation was intended would constitute bad faith, which the
Court will not tolerate.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     
Note.—A valid donation once accepted becomes irrevocable except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation or
ingratitude. (Gestopa vs. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 105 [2000])

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 G.R. No. 111904. October 5, 2000.
SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL,
respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Donations; Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos
or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership
over the properties upon the execution of the deed.—Crucial in resolving whether the donation
was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In ascertaining the intention of
the donor, all of the deed’s provisions must be read together.
Same; Same; Same; Acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the
donees during the donors’ lifetime.—In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245
(1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance
is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are
not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors’ lifetime.
Same; Same; Same; A limitation on the right to sell during the donors’ lifetime implied
that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors’
lifetime.—The Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of the
properties belonged to the donee. The donor’s right to give consent was merely intended to
protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell
during the donors’ lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was
already effective during the donors’ lifetime.
Same; Same; Same; A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on
account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the
donation, or ingratitude.—A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on
account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the
donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of
revocation.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38266, which
reversed the judgment  of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of
unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa,  two of
which are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor of
private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil.  The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2
with Tax Declaration Nos. 11345 and 11347, respectively. The second deed
pertained to parcel 3, with TD No. 018613. The last deed pertained to parcel 4 with
TD No. 016821. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to
amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage,
or encumber the properties donated during the donors’ lifetime, if deemed necessary.
On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag,
executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land
plus two other parcels with TD spondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions,
that (1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their
lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime
of the said spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the
transfer of the parcels’ tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels
3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. On September 29,
1979, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation  recovering the six parcels of land
subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.
On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil (herein private respondent) filed with the
RTC a petition against the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the
above parcels of land. She alleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego
Danlag; that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his
mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. In recognition of the services
she rendered, Diego executed a Deed of Donation on March 20, 1973, conveying to
her the six (6) parcels of land. She accepted the donation in the same instrument,
openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and
caused the transfer of the tax declarations to her name. Through machination,
intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded the husband of Mercedes, Eulalio
Pilapil, to buy two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said
donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since
its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any
act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking the
subject donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas.
In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of
donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by
Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly
executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the
donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any
property at all.
On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
‘WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the; Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff:
 1.Declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and Inter Vivos as revoked, and,
therefore, has (sic) no legal effect and force of law.
2.Declaring Diego Danlag the absolute and exclusive owner of the six (6)
parcels of land mentioned in the Deed of revocation (Exh. P-plaintiff, Exh.
6-defendant Diego Danlag).
3.Declaring the Deeds of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of
spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979
(Exh. S-plaintiff; Exh. 18-defendant); Deed of Sale dated December 18,
1979 (Exh. T plaintiff; Exh. 9-defendant); Deed of Sale dated September
14, 1979 (Exh. 8); Deed of Sale dated June 30, 1975 (Exh. U); Deed of
Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exh. X) as valid and enforceable duly
executed in accordance with the formalities required by law.
4.Ordering all tax declaration issued in the name of Mercedes Danlag Y
Pilapil covering the parcel of land donated cancelled and further restoring
all the tax declarations previously cancelled, except parcels Nos. 1 and 5
described, in the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. “1”) and Deed of
Sale (Exh. “2”) executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff and her
husband.
5.With respect to the contract of sale of abovestated parcels of land,
vendor Diego Danlag and spouse or their estate have the alternative
remedies of demanding the balance of the agreed price with legal
interest, or rescission of the contract of sale.
SO ORDERED.”
In rendering the above decision, the trial court found that the reservation clause in all
the deeds of donation indicated that Diego Danlag did not make any donation; that
the purchase by Mercedes of the two parcels of land covered by the Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos bolstered this conclusion; that Mercedes failed to rebut the
allegations of ingratitude she committed against Diego Danlag; and that Mercedes
committed fraud and machination in preparing all the deeds of donation without
explaining to Diego Danlag their contents.
Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued that the trial court erred
in (1) declaring the donation dated January 16, 1973 as mortis causa and that the
same was already revoked on the ground of ingratitude; (2) finding that Mercedes
purchased from Diego Danlag the two parcels of land already covered by the above
donation and that she was only able to pay three thousand pesos, out of the total
amount of twenty thousand pesos; (3) failing to declare that Mercedes was an
acknowledged natural child of Diego Danlag.
On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the trial court. It ruled:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and a
new judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.Declaring the deed of donation inter vivos dated January 16, 1973 as
not having been revoked and consequently the same remains in full force
and effect;
2.Declaring the Revocation of Donation dated June 4, 1979 to be null and
void and therefore of no force and effect;
3.Declaring Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the absolute and exclusive owner
of the six (6) parcels of land specified in the above-cited deed of
donationinter vivos;
4.Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor of
spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979 (Exhibits S
and 18), Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979 (Exhibits T and 19),
Deed of Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exhibit 8), Deed of Sale dated
June 30, 1975 (Exhibit U), Deed of Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exhibit X)
as well as the Deed of Sale in favor of Eulalio Danlag dated December
27, 1978 (Exhibit 2) not to have been validly executed;
5.Declaring the above-mentioned deeds of sale to be null and void and
therefore of no force and effect;
6.Ordering spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Silerio Gestopa to
reconvey within thirty (30) days from the finality of the instant judgment to
Mercedes Danlag Pilapil the parcels of land above-specified, regarding
which titles have been subsequently fraudulently secured, namely those
covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and O.C.T. No. 17523.
7.Failing to do so, ordering the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court (Branch V) at Cebu City to effect such reconveyance of the
parcels of land covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and 17523.
SO ORDERED.”
The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct
indicated that he transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties;
that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor’s right referred to that of
merely giving consent; that the donor changed his intention by donating inter
vivos properties already donated mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes’ name of
the tax declarations pertaining to the donated properties implied that the donation
was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of land
donated to her.
Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the Gestopa spouses, asserting
that:
“THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION, HAS
GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO.”
Before us, petitioners allege that the appellate court overlooked the fact that the
donor did not only reserve the right to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also
prohibited the donee from selling or disposing the land without the consent and
approval of the Danlag spouses. This implied that the donor still had control and
ownership over the donated properties. Hence, the donation was post mortem.
Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the
determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed.
In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed’s provisions must be read
together. The deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes
contained the following:
“That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the Donor inspires
in the Donee and as an act of liberality and generosity, the Donor hereby gives,
donates, transfer and conveys by way of donation unto the herein Donee, her
heirs, assigns and successors, the above-described parcels of land;
That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall continue to enjoy
all the fruits of the land during his lifetime and that of his spouse and that the
donee cannot sell or otherwise, dispose of the lands without the prior consent
and approval by the Donor and her spouse during their lifetime.
xxx
That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further states
that he has reserved for himself sufficient properties in full ownership or in
usufruct enough for his maintenance of a decent livelihood in consonance with
his standing in society.
That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks and
gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the Donor.”
Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love
and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked
ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what was
the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of the
properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with
the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In the case
of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that a acceptance clause is
a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for
donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not
required to be accepted by the donees during the donors’ lifetime.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to
dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor’s right to give consent
was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that
a limitation on the right to sell during the donors’ lifetime implied that ownership had
passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors’ lifetime.
The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also
demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject
properties upon its execution.  Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, the
Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the difference
between the two donations. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos,  they would not
again donate the four lots already donated mortis causa. Petitioners’ counter
argument that this proposition was erroneous because six years after, the spouses
changed their intention with the deed of revocation, is not only disingenious but also
fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of revocation to show the spouses’ intent
because its validity is one of the issues in this case.
Petitioners aver that Mercedes’ tax declarations in her name can not be a basis in
determining the donor’s intent. They claim that it is easy to get tax declarations from
the government offices such that tax declarations are not considered proofs of
ownership. However, unless proven otherwise, there is a presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties. We find that petitioners did not overcome this
presumption of regularity in the issuance of the tax declarations. We also note that
the Court of Appeals did not refer to the tax declarations as proofs of ownership but
only as evidence of the intent by the donor to transfer ownership.
Petitioners assert that since private responsdent purchased two of the six parcels of
land from the donor, she herself did not believe the donation was inter vivos. As aptly
noted by the Court of Appeals, however, it was private respondent’s husband who
purchased the two parcels of land.
As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court, especially when it is supported
by evidence on record, is binding on us  On the alleged purchase by her husband of
two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the purchase was without private
respondent’s consent. Purchase by her husband would make the properties conjugal
to her own disadvantage. That the purchase is against her self-interest, weighs
strongly in her favor and gives credence to her claim that her husband was
manipulated and unduly influenced to make the purchase, in the first place.
Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable,
except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges
imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke any of
these reasons in the deed of revocation. The deed merely stated:
“WHEREAS, while the said donation was a donation Inter Vivos, our intention
thereof is that of Mortis Causa so as we could be sure that in case of our death,
the above-described properties will be inherited and/or succeeded by Mercedes
Danlag de Pilapil; and that said intention is clearly shown in paragraph 3 of said
donation to the effect that the Donee cannot dispose and/or sell the properties
donated during our life-time, and that we are the one enjoying all the fruits
thereof.”
Petitioners cited Mercedes’ vehemence in prohibiting the donor to gather coconut
trees and her filing of instant petition for quieting of title. There is nothing on record,
however, showing that private respondent prohibited the donors from gathering
coconuts. Even assuming that Mercedes prevented the donor from gathering
coconuts, this could hardly be considered an act covered by Article 765 of the Civil
Code. Nor does this Article cover respondent’s filing of the petition for quieting of title,
where she merely asserted what she believed was her right under the law.
 Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to
revoke the donation in accordance with Article 769 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
the supposed revocation on September 29, 1979, had no legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Note.—Collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties
conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.
(Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647 [1997])

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