TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM ZEÑAROSA, Petitioners, v. FELICIANO Z.

PAJARON
AND LARRY A. CARBONILLA, Respondent. G.R. No. 207156, January 16, 2017- case in page 42

Factual Antecedents

Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service crew and Larry A. Carbonilla
(Carbonilla) in April 2007 as head crew. On April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their respective
Complaints5 for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners.
Both Complaints were consolidated.

Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zeñarosa asked him to sign a piece of paper6 stating that he was
receiving the correct amount of wages and that he had no claims whatsoever from petitioners.
Disagreeing to the truthfulness of the statements, Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zeñarosa to
fire him from work.

Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in June 2008, he had an altercation with his
supervisor Conchita Marcillana (Marcillana) while at work. When the incident was brought to the
attention of Zeñarosa, he was immediately dismissed from service. He was also asked by Zeñarosa to sign
a piece of paper acknowledging his debt amounting to P7,000.00.

Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal and that
petitioners also failed to comply with the requirements of due process

In a Decision9 dated December 102010, the Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version
and held them constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners.

Due to alleged non-availability of counsel, Petitioner Zeñarosa himself filed a Notice of Appeal with
Memorandum and Motion to Reduce Bond11 with the NLRC. Along with this, Zeñarosa posted a partial
cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00,12 maintaining that he cannot afford to post the full amount of the
award since he is a mere backyard micro-entrepreneur. He begged the NLRC to reduce the bond.

The NLRC, in an Order13 dated March 18, 2011, denied the motion to reduce bond.
They insisted that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal for failure to post the
required appeal bond.

On May 8, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision18 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. It held that the
NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for non-perfection
because petitioners failed to comply with the requisites in filing a motion to reduce bond, namely, the
presence of a meritorious ground and the posting of a reasonable amount of bond.

Hence, this present Petition.

Petitioners insist that the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's dismissal of their appeal for the following
reasons: first, there was substantial compliance with the Rules on perfection of appeal; second, the
surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the appeal bond; third, they
exhibited willingness and good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period; and lastly,
a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of
resolving controversies on the merits.

Issue: won the appeal of the petitioner was correctly dismissed?

LAW: Article 223 of the Labor Code, which sets forth the rules on appeal from the Labor Arbiter's
monetary award

CASE HISTORY:
 On April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their respective Complaints before LA

 LA: In a Decision9 dated December 102010, the Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and
Carbonilla's version and held them constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners 
 Due to alleged non-availability of counsel, Petitioner Zeñarosa himself filed a Notice of Appeal
with Memorandum and Motion to Reduce Bond11 with the NLRC
 NlRC: The NLRC, in an Order13 dated March 18, 2011, denied the motion to reduce bond.

 In CA, Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Writ of Preliminary

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order17 with the CA.
 SC: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 8, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R SP No. 121956 is AFFIRMED.

Ruling: Yes. The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is
it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law."19 "The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so the right to appeal is lost."20

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.

"It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there is legislative and
administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost
regard to this intention."21 The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional;
failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.

This indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal "is to assure the workers that if they finally
prevail in the case[,] the monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's
appeal [and] is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of
their obligations to the employees."

However, the Court, in special and justified circumstances, has relaxed the requirement of posting a
supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal on technical considerations to give way to equity and
justice.24 Thus, the reduction of the appeal bond is allowed, subject to the following conditions: (1) the
motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation
to the monetary award is posted by the appellant. Compliance with these two conditions will stop the
running of the period to perfect an appeal.

In the case at bar, petitioners filed a Motion to Reduce Bond together with their Notice of Appeal and
posted a cash bond ofP15,000.00 within the 10-day reglementary period to appeal. The CA correctly
found that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion to reduce
bond as such motion was not predicated on meritorious and reasonable grounds and the amount
tendered is not reasonable in relation to the award. The NLRC correctly held that the supposed ground
cited in the motion is not well-taken tor there was no evidence to prove Zeñarosa's claim that the payment
of the full amount of the award would greatly affect his business due to financial setbacks. Besides, "the
law does not require outright payment of the total monetary award; [the appellant has the option to post
either a cash or surety bond. In the latter case, appellant must pay only a] moderate and reasonable sum
for the premium to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail."25 Moreover, the
absence of counsel is not a valid excuse for non-compliance with the rules. As aptly observed by the CA,
Zeñarosa cannot feign ignorance of the law considering that he was able to post a partial bond and ask for
a reduction of the appeal bond.

The NLRC exercises full discretion in resolving a motion for the reduction of bond32 in accordance with
the standards of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount. The "reduction of the bond is not a matter of
right on the part of the movant [but] lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC

OPINION: I agree with the decision. In another case, our supreme court once said,
“While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that rules of procedure shall not be
strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice, it must be emphasized that procedural rules should not
likewise be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance might result in prejudice to a
party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most
persuasive of reasons”
In this case, no persuasive reason warrants the liberal application they claim.
 People's Security, Inc. and Nestor Racho vs. Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru
G.R. No. 211312. December 5, 2016
PAGE 43 CASE

Facts
Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru (respondents) were security guards previously employed by
People's Security, Inc. (PSI). The respondents were assigned at the varfous facilities of Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) pursuant to a security services agreement between PSI and PLDT.

On October 1, 2001, however, PSI's security services agreement with PLDT was terminated and,
accordingly, PSI recalled its security guards assigned to PLDT including the respondents. On October 8,
2001, the respondents, together with several other security guards employed by PSI, filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against PLDT and PSI, claiming
that they are PLDT employees.

Thereafter, PSI assigned the respondents to the facilities of its other clients such as the warehouse of a
certain Marivic Yulo in Sta. Ana, Manila and Trinity College's Elementary Department in Quezon City.

Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003, the respondents were relieved from their respective assignments. Thus,
a complaint for illegal dismissal among others were filed.

In their position paper, the respondents claimed that, after they were relieved from their assignment in the
warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila on January 13, 2003, they repeatedly reported to PSI's office for possible
assignment, but the latter refused to give them any assignment.

On the other hand, the petitioners, in their position paper, claimed that the respondents were merely
relieved from their assignment in the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila and that the same was on account of
their performance evaluation, which indicated that they were ill-suited for the said assignment.

Issue:
1. Whether respondents were illegally dismissed.

Law: No less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article 13 guarantees security of tenure for workers
and because of this, an employee may only be terminated for just or authorized causes that must comply
with the due process requirements mandated by law.

CASE HISTORY:

 On January 30, 2009, the LA rendered a Decision finding that the respondents were illegally from
their employment
 On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 14, 2010, reversed the LA Decision dated
January 30, 2009.
 On April 25, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, reversing the NLRC's Decision
dated April 14, 2010 and Resolution dated June 15, 2010.
 In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners claim that the CA committed reversible
error in ruling that the respondents were illegally dismissed from their employment.
Ruling: Yes. a As rule, employment cannot be terminated by an employer without any just or authorized
cause. No less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article 13 guarantees security of tenure for
workers and because of this, an employee may only be terminated for just or authorized causes that must
comply with the due process requirements mandated by law. Hence, employers are barred from arbitrarily
removing their workers whenever and however they want.

There is no merit to the petitioners' claim that the respondents were not dismissed, but merely relieved
from their respective assignments. While it is true that Special Order No. 20031010, which the petitioners
issued to the respondents on January 13, 2003, indicated that the latter were merely relieved from the
warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila, such fact alone would not negate the respondents' claim of illegal
dismissal. Indeed, the respondents pointed out that after they were relieved from their previous
assignment, the petitioners refused to provide them with new assignment.

Further, as aptly ruled by the CA, the petitioners miserably failed to prove that the respondents abandoned
their work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from
certain equivocal acts. For abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must
have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second,
there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee
relationship as manifested by some overt acts. The Court is not convinced that the respondents failed to
report for work or have been absent without valid or justifiable cause. After the petitioners relieved them
from their previous assignment in Sta. Ana, Manila, the respondents were no longer given any
assignment.

What is more, PSI did not afford the respondents due process. The validity of the dismissal of an
employee hinges not only on the fact that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause, but also on the
very manner of the dismissal itself.

It is elementary that the termination of an employee must be effected in accordance with law. It is
required that the employer furnish the employee with two written notices: (1) a written notice served on
the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established
to justify his termination.

Here., no written notice was sent by PSI informing the respondents that they had been terminated due to
abandonment of work. This failure on the part of PSI to comply with the twin-notice requirement, indeed,
placed the legality of the dismissal in question, at the very least, doubtful, rendering the dismissal illegal.

OPINION: I agree that there is illegal dismissal in this case because considering the hard times in which
we are in, it is incongruous for the respondents to simply abandon their employment after being relieved
from their previous assignment. No employee would recklessly abandon his job knowing fully well the
acute unemployment problem and the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood nowadays.
As such, the claims of the workers in this case seems to have more merit.
DOEHLE-PHILMAN1 MANNING AGENCY INC., DOHLE (IOM) LIMITED AND CAPT.
MANOLO T. GACUTAN, ,Petitioners vs.HENRY C. HARO, Respondent. PAGE 45

FACTS: On May 30, 2008, Doehle-Philman, in behalf of its foreign principal, Dohle Ltd., hired
respondent as oiler aboard the vessel MV CMA CGM Providencia8 for a period of nine months with basic
monthly salary of US$547.00 and other benefits.9 Before deployment, respondent underwent pre-
employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty.10

Respondent stated that on June 1, 2008, he boarded the vessel and assumed his duties as oiler; however,
in November 2008, he experienced heartache and loss of energy after hammering and lifting a 120-
kilogram machine; thereafter, he was confined at a hospital in Rotterdam where he was informed of
having a hole in his heart that needed medical attention.11

After his repatriation on December 6, 2008, respondent reported to Doehle-Philman which in turn
referred him to Clinico-Med. Respondent claimed that he was confined for two days in UST12 Hospital
and that a heart operation was recommended to him. He nevertheless admitted that he has not yet
undergone any surgery.13 On April 24, 2009, respondent’s personal doctor, Dr. Luminardo M. Ramos (Dr.
Ramos), declared him not fit to work.14

Consequently, on June 19, 2009, respondent filed a Complaint for disability benefits, reimbursement of
medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioners.15 Respondent
claimed that since he was declared fit to work before his deployment, this proved that he sustained his
illness while in the performance of his duties aboard the vessel

Petitioners argued that since respondent’s illness is not an occupational disease, then he must prove that
his work caused his illness; because of his failure to do so, then he is not entitled to disability benefits.25

Law: The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board
Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC), particularly Section 20(B) thereof, provides that the employer is
liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term
of his contract. To emphasize, to be compensable, the injury or illness 1) must be work-related and 2)
must have arisen during the term of the employment contract.42

CASE HISTORY:

 On February 26, 2010, the LA dismissed26 the case for lack of merit.

 Respondent interposed an appeal. On September 28, 2010, the NLRC dismissed27 the appeal. It
found no sufficient evidence that respondent’s illness is work-connected.

 Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA arguing that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding him not entitled to disability benefits, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.

 On July 20, 2012, the CA granted29 the Petition and concomitantly reversed and set aside the
September 28, 2010 and November

Issue: Won petitioner-employer is liable int his case? (permanent and total disability benefits)
Ruling No. "[T]he constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to
oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from
sustaining the employer when it is in the right. We should always be mindful that justice is in every case
for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing
Jurisprudence."2

x x x [T]o be entitled to compensation and benefits, the seafarer must prove by substantial evidence that
he contracted the illness during the term of his contract and [that] such infirmity was work-related or at
the very least aggravated by the conditions of the work for which he was engaged. Failing on this aspect,
the assertion of [respondent] that his illness was work-connected is nothing but an empty imputation of
fact without any probative weight.51

In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena,43 the Court held that those diseases not listed as occupational diseases
may be compensated if it is shown that they have been caused or aggravated by the seafarer’s working
conditions.

In this case, considering that respondent did not suffer from any occupational disease listed under Section
32-A of the POEA-SEC, then to be entitled to disability benefits, the respondent has the burden to prove
that his illness is work-related. Unfortunately, he failed to discharge such burden.

Records reveal that respondent was diagnosed of aortic regurgitation, a heart "condition whereby the
aortic valve permits blood ejected from the left ventricle to leak back into the left ventricle."46 Although
this condition manifested while respondent was aboard the vessel, such circumstance is not sufficient to
entitle him to disability benefits as it is of equal importance to also show that respondent’s illness is work-
related.

In Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corporation,47 the Court held that for a disability to be

compensable, the seafarer must prove a reasonable link between his work and his illness in order for a
rational mind to determine that such work contributed to, or at least aggravated, his illness. It is not
enough that the seafarer’s injury or illness rendered him disabled; it is equally necessary that he
establishes a causal connection between his injury or illness, and the work for which he is engaged.48

Here, respondent argues that he was unable to work as a seaman for more than 120 days, and that he
contracted his illness while under the employ of petitioners. However, he did not at all describe his work
as an oiler, and neither did he specify the connection of his work and his illness.

OPINION: I agree that not all cases shall be decided in favor of labor when the case clearly yields
towards employer’s rights. Here, the worker failed to elaborate on the nature of his work or to even
specify his tasks as oiler which rendered it difficult to determine a link between his position and his
illness. He did not adduce substantial evidence that his work conditions caused, or at the least increased
the risk of contracting his illness.

Thus, it is correct the SC ruled that he is not entitled to any disability compensation.
NORTH SEA MARINE SERVICES CORPORATION, MS. ROSALINDA CERDINA AND/OR
CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, Petitioners, v. SANTIAGO S. ENRIQUEZ, Respondent.

Facts: North Sea Marine Services Corporation, for and on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner
Carnival Cruise Lines, entered into a Contract of Employment with respondent for a period of six months
as Assistant Plumber for the vessel MS Carnival Triumph.

While in the performance of his duties, respondent experienced pains. The ship doctor diagnosed him to
be suffering from mechanical back pains and prescribed him with medicines but was later medically
repatriated due to the worsening of back pains.

Respondent was immediately referred to the company-designated physician, Dr. John Rabago.

On November 28, 2008, he was referred to a physiatrist to undergo physical therapy. Dr. Rabago declared
respondent fit to resume sea duties. Respondent thereafter signed a Certificate of Fitness to Work,
releasing petitioners from all liabilities. Respondent consulted an independent orthopedic surgeon, Dr.
Venancio P. Garduce, Jr., of the UP-PGH Medical Center, who certified his unfitness to work as a
seaman.

Respondent filed a Complaint with the NLRC seeking to recover permanent disability compensation in
the amount of US$80,000.00 under the International Transport Workers' Federation Cruise Ship
Collective Bargaining Agreement, balance of sick wages for two months, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees.

Issue: Is respondent entitled to benefits claimed herein?

LAW: Section 20 B (3) of the POEA-SEC provides:

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty
(120) days.

CASE HISTORY:

 The Labor Arbiter denied respondent's claim for disability benefits.

 The respondent appealed from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

 Petitioners instead filed an Opposition to Complainant's Request for Payment of Financial

Assistance.

 NLRC found respondent's appeal meritorious.

 The NLRC ruled that permanent and total disability did not mean a state of absolute helplessness
but mere inability to perform usual tasks.

 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

  Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the enforcement and
execution of the NLRC judgment but was again denied the prayer for TRO and dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari.

RULING: No. Dr. Rabago's fit to work assessment

prevails. Respondent is not entitled to
total and permanent disability benefits.

There was no evidence that an accident happened that caused respondent's injury. There was no report in
the crew illness log that an accident happened on board the vessel which resulted in respondent's back
pain.

It is clearly provided in the POEA-SEC that in order to claim disability benefits, it is the company-
designated physician who must proclaim that the seafarer suffered a permanent disability, whether total or
partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment. If the doctor appointed by the
seafarer makes a finding contrary to that of the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third
doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and seafarer whose decision shall be binding on both
of them.

In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,28  the Court pronounced that while a seafarer has the
right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail
must be done in accordance with this agreed procedure. The Court went on to emphasize that failure to
observe this will make the company-designated physician's assessment final and binding.

While the provisions of the POEA-SEC are liberally construed in favor of the well-being of Filipino
seafarers, the law nonetheless authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.

In any event, we sustain the Labor Arbiter's award of US$3,000.00 as financial assistance in the interest
of equity and compassionate justice. Besides, the same was not properly assailed by the petitioners via an
appeal to the NLRC. As such, the same had attained finality and could no longer be questioned by
petitioners.
OPINION: I agree with the SC in this case. Indeed, the constitutional policy to provide full protection to
labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of
labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.
In this case, the sc merely applied the law. That while the ruling does not favor the worker is of no
moment because justice is always for the deserving in light of existing laws and jurisprudence.
SEAPOWER SHIPPING ENT., INC., Petitionervs.HEIRS OF WARREN M. SABANAL,
representedby ELVIRA ONG-SABANAL, Respondents G.R. No. 198544- June 19, 2017-PAGE 46

FACTS:Petitioner Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. (Seapower) hired Warren M. Sabanal (Sabanal)
as Third Mate onboard MT Montana on July 20, 1995. 1 After undergoing the routine pre-employment
medical examination and being declared fit to work, 2 Sabanal boarded the ship and commenced his
duties.

Sometime in September 1995, during voyage, Sabanal started exhibiting unusual behavior.The sailors
watching over Sabanal reported that he wanted to board a life boat, citing danger in the ship's prow.
Because of Sabanal 's condition, the captain relieved him of his shift and allowed him to sleep in the cabin
guarded. 3

 The following day, the captain wanted to supervise Sabanal better, so he took him on deck and assigned
to him simple tasks

Sabanal requested the sailor-on-guard that he be allowed to return to the deck for some fresh air. Once on
deck, Sabanal suddenly ran to the stem and jumped to the sea. The ship's rescue attempts proved futile,
and Sabanal's body was never recovered. 5

During the first week of October 1995, Seapower informed Sabanal's wife, Elvira, regarding the incident.
However, it was only on May 16, 2005 that Elvira was able to file a complaint for payment of Sabanal' s
death benefits. 8

Seapower raised as defenses the prescription of Elvira's action, the assumption of Bright Maritime
Corporation of full responsibility over seafarers onboard MT Montana, and the noncompensability of
death resulting from suicide. 9

ISSUE: whether Sabanal's death is compensable?

LAW: The provision reads:No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the
employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him.21

CASE HISTORY:

 The Labor Arbiter dismissed Elvira's case on the grounds of prescription and lack of merit.

 On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) First Division affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's dismissal of the complaint. Although it found that the action had not prescribed because
the prescriptive period only began to run upon Seapower's categorical denial of Elvira's claim in
early 2005, the NLRC found that Sabanal's suicide was established by substantial evidence. It
held that when the death of the seaman resulted from his own willful act, the death is not
compensable: 11

 Elvira elevated the case to the Court of Appeals

  With respect to the first issue, the Court of Appeals did not find grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC

 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the NLRC on the second issue. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals ordered Seapower to pay death benefits to Elvira. 16 It subsequently denied Seapower's
motion for reconsideration. 17

RULING: NOT LIABLE. As he was not proved to be insane. Thus, his act was willful (an exception)

Under the POEA-SEC, the employer is generally liable for death compensation benefits when a seafarer
dies during the term of employment. This rule, however, is not absolute. Part II, Section C (6) of the
POEA-SEC exempts the employer from liability if it can successfully prove that the seafarer's death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. 20 

The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that Sabanal's act was not a willful one because he was not in his
right mental state when he committed the act.

Evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a
matter of counter-defense. 22 But the burden of evidence is then shifted to the claimant to prove that the
seafarer was of unsound mind.(to prove that it is unintentional act) 

The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the
usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition
of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of [a
deceased seafarer] requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was
insane based on the witness' own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim. 28 (Citation omitted.)

Here, Elvira did not present any evidence to support her claim that Sabanal was already insane when he
jumped overboard.

In order for insanity to prosper as a counter-defense, the claimant must substantially prove that the
seafarer suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act or complete absence of
the power to discern the consequences of his action. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties does not
foreclose willfulness. 29 

In fact, the ship log shows Sabanal was still able to correct maps and type the declarations of the crew
hours before he jumped overboard. The captain observed that Sabanal did not appear to have any
problems while performing these simple tasks, while the sailor-on-guard reported that Sabanal did not
show any signs of unrest immediately before the incident. 30 These circumstances, coupled with the legal
presumption of sanity,31 tend to belie Elvira's claim that Sabanal no longer exercised any control over his
own senses and mental faculties.

While it is true that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA-
SEC must be construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels, still, the rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving,
to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. 35
OPINION: I do not agree with the decision. The employer should have been liable for the death benefits.
Aside from the fact that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the
POEA-SEC must be construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seafarers. It is also clear in this
case that the seafarer was not in his sound mind when he committed the act. Thus, his act should have
been construed as not intentional.

Indeed, homesickness and/or family problems of our OFWs may result to depression as in this case that
caused the end of one’s life shall be construed as an unintentional act.