Th D f t d f th r vl r: Fr F ht r

t P lt lR f n th ld r
Kostis Karpozilos

Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 16, Number 3, Summer 2014,

pp. 62-87 (Article)

P bl h d b Th T Pr

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The Defeated of the Greek Civil War
Karpozilos

The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

From Fighters to Political Refugees in the
Cold War

✣ Kostis Karpozilos

O
n 20 September 1949 a Greek Communist in the Albanian mili-
tary camp of Burrel, Thanasis Geronikakos, expressed trepidation about his fu-
ture: “And now, what will become of us over here?”1 During the Greek Civil
War from 1946 to 1949, Geronikakos had participated in the covert network
that channeled “internationalist aid”—meaning arms and provisions—from
the People’s Republic of Albania to the ªghting units of the Democratic Army
of Greece (DAG).2 In September 1949, however, the Special Apparatus of the
Greek Communist Party (KKE) to which he belonged was confronted with a
novel task: the rehabilitation of a defeated army. On 29 August, the Greek
National Army had overwhelmed the last line of the Communist defense on
Grammos Mountain in northwestern Greece, forcing 10,000 DAG ªghters to
seek refuge across the border in Albania. The vision of a Greek People’s De-
mocracy had collapsed, and the defeated DAG belonged to a state that never
came to be. In the military camps of Burrel and Elbasan in northern Albania,
the DAG ªghters realized the bleak prospects of the day after. For the victori-
ous Greek government, the armed Communists were not, as in the case of po-
litical dissidents, mere “dangerous citizens.”3 They were perceived as danger-
ous aliens who had challenged national sovereignty under foreign directives.
Deprived of the prospect of repatriation insofar as they had no patria to re-

1. Thanasis Geronikakos, Untitled Report, 20 September 1949, in Archeia Synchronis Koinonikis

Istorias (ASKI), Archeio Kommounistikou Kommatos Elladas (KKE) [Archives of Contemporary
Social History, Communist Party of Greece Papers], Box 176, F 8/2/261.
2. On “external support” to the Greek Democratic Army, see Charles R. Shrader, The Withered Vine:
Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, 1946–1949 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
1999), pp. 159–241; and Nikos Marantzidis, “The Greek Civil War (1944–1949) and the Interna-
tional Communist System,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Fall 2013), pp. 25–54.
3. Neni Panourgia, Dangerous Citizens: The Greek Left and the Terror of the State (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2009).

Journal of Cold War Studies

Vol. 16, No. 3, Summer 2014, pp. 62–87, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00471
© 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology

62
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

turn to, the DAG ªghters and accompanying civilians—captives and sympa-
thizers to the cause alike—faced an uncertain future.
The answer to Geronikakos’s question came from Moscow three days
later. On 23 September 1949, the Central Committee of the Soviet Commu-
nist party (VKP(b)) resolved to move the defeated ªghters from the People’s
Republic of Albania to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan.4 The
Greek Communists were relocated according to the postwar principle of mov-
ing people “to consolidate political boundaries,” in this case the post-1945
Balkan status quo.5 Their story illustrates the demise of the international bod-
ies that had been formed for the regulation of the postwar humanitarian cri-
sis. The defeated DAG ªghters were transported to Uzbekistan covertly and
lived for years in the Soviet Union as “stateless persons,” only belatedly (after
1953) receiving the ofªcial status of “political refugees.”
The resettlement of the 10,000 DAG ªghters in Uzbekistan was part of
an exodus of 100,000 Greeks who had identiªed themselves with the Com-
munist cause and formed numerous communities across Central and Eastern
Europe under the auspices of the receiving governments and the KKE.6 The
case of Tashkent stands out. Exceptionally far from Greek borders, it was cho-
sen to host the DAG’s combat units. For the next three decades, until political
developments in Greece made repatriation possible, the capital of Uzbekistan
became the emblematic city of the Greek Communist movement. Hitherto
unknown Soviet documents reveal connections between the settlement of
Greek Communists in Tashkent and the preceding forced labor of Japanese
prisoners of war (POWs) in Uzbekistan.7 The successive passage through
Uzbekistan of these two groups shows the bizarre itineraries of displaced pop-
ulations in the turbulent 1940s.
This article deals with the “Albanian Months” of the Greek Democratic
Army, from September to December 1949, and with the early years of the ex-
patriates’ life in Tashkent, from 1950 to 1956. The saga of the defeated Greek
Communists highlights the potential at the time for a renewed armed con-
frontation in the Balkans and illuminates the politics of the KKE in the after-
math of the Greek Civil War. Despite the military defeat of 1949, the KKE
did not immediately give up on the idea of a future military comeback. Greek

4. “Voprosy komparti Gretsii” [Issues concerning the Communist Party of Greece], 23 September
1949, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii [Russian State Archive of
Socio-Political History] (RGASPI), Fond (F.) 17, Opis’ (Op.) 162, Delo (D.) 41, Listy (Ll.) 10–12.
5. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999),
p. 214.
6. Katerina Tsekou, Prosorinos Diamenontes: Ellines Politikoi Prosfyges sti Laiki Dimokratia tis Voulgarias
[Temporary Residents, Greek Political Refugees in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria] (Thessaloniki:
Epikentro, 2010).
7. “Spisok” [List], n.d., in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 162, D. 41, L. 134.

63
 Karpozilos

Communist leaders sought to establish in Albania a military base from which

armed ªghters could eventually reenter Greece. To this end, they established a
militarized everyday life in the Tashkent political refugee community. The
combined pressure of the Albanian and Soviet Communists led to the initial
reformulation of this vision, and it subsequently ended altogether after con-
siderable opposition was expressed within the Greek Communist community
of Tashkent itself.
The account of the DAG’s presence in Albania encapsulates the tense
atmosphere following the Greek Civil War, when speculation was widespread
that Albania would become the “pivotal point in the Homeric struggle for
Europe.”8 The “Albanian Months” of the DAG underline the international re-
percussions of the Greek Civil War and how its aftermath was interwoven
with the wake of the Cold War in the Balkans. Competing irredentist aspira-
tions, Western covert operations, and the precarious status of the Albanian re-
gime explain the Soviet decision to move the DAG away from the Balkans.
On the other hand, Greek and Albanian sources reveal that the KKE plan to
retain a military base in Albania led to a sharp deterioration of relations be-
tween the Greek and Albanian Communists.
The social engineering effort to create a prototype Greek “people’s de-
mocracy” in Tashkent demonstrates the belief of the KKE leadership in the
inevitable culmination of events and the prospects of a renewed military con-
frontation in Greece. The implementation of a militarized everyday life, the
operation of military schools, and the rhetoric linking experiences in Tash-
kent with a victorious repatriation elucidate the persistence of this vision.
These policies were contested by dynamics within the Greek political refugee
community as the harsh realization sank in that the military defeat was per-
manent and, later, that de-Stalinization was under way in the USSR. The
story of the Greek Communists in Tashkent illustrates how conditions of
everyday life shape and reshape ideological afªnities. By explaining how the
military defeat reshaped the Greek Communist movement, the article under-
scores the complicated legacy of the Greek Civil War both inside and outside
Greece.

Albanian Months of the DAG

On 15 October 1949 the radio station “Free Greece,” broadcasting from

Bucharest, made an important announcement: the Provisional Democratic

8. Anne O’ Hare McCormick, “A Small Pivot in a Homeric Struggle,” The New York Times, 19 No-
vember 1949, p. 16.

64
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

Government of Greece declared that in light of recent military developments,

the DAG would refrain from further operations. This decision echoed the
proceedings of the KKE Central Committee. Party leaders had convened
in the military camp of Burrel a week earlier and had recognized that the
outcome of the August battles signiªed a transition to a “novel situation.”9
Athens and Washington received the news with relief. The Greek press cele-
brated the end of the war and the belated passage to postwar recovery and re-
construction.10 A couple of days later, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
gave a special press conference to announce that the civil war was “practically
entirely over” and that the United States thus could ªnally disengage from a
signiªcant ªnancial and military responsibility.11
Despite these certainties, the post–civil war situation was far more com-
plicated. According to U.S. diplomats, the “elimination of threat from gueril-
las who have found refuge in Albania” now seemed to be a prerequisite for
security.12 Subsequent “Free Greece” broadcasts indicated that this threat was
ongoing and not eliminated: According to the ofªcial announcement of the
DAG’s General Headquarters on 28 October, “the Greek Democratic Army
has not surrendered; [we] have our ‘guns at the ready’ . . . and we remain alert
to fulªll our duty when the country needs us.”13 The “guns at the ready”
phrase was to haunt the Greek left for decades, inspiring the suppression of
leftwing dissidents on the grounds of a potential Communist insurrection
from the north. The phrase also had immediate repercussions in the fall of
1949, highlighting concerns about stability in the Balkans. In mid-October
the Greek army had arrested a certain Yiorgos Tzoumas after he crossed the
border to surrender. Under interrogation, he reported that in Elbasan, “2,500
to 3,000 guerrillas . . . were undergoing military training, using Albanian mil-
itary equipment.”14 If so, The New York Times’s earlier speculation that “all
signposts point to trouble” seemed about to come true.15

9. “Ylika tis Ektis Olomeleias tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou Kommounistikou Kommatos Elladas” [Min-
utes of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece], 9 October
1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 102, F 2/1.
10. “O tritos gyros elixe” [The third round is over], Eleftheria (Athens), 18 October 1949, p. 1.
11. “Acheson Considers Cuts in Greek Aid,” The New York Times, 20 October 1949, p. 17.
12. ‘The United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
(Drew) to the Secretary of State, United States Department of State (Athens September 2, 1949),” in
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 394 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers).
13. “Emerisia Diatagi” [Daily order], 28 October 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 109, F 4/1/94.
14. “Greek Rebels Say They Have Ceased Fire; They Keep Forces,” The New York Times, 17 October
1949, p. 1; and “Anasygrotountai para to Elvasan oi diafygontes ex Ellados Symmorites” [Fugitive
bandits reorganize near Elbasan], Eleftheria (Athens), 16 October 1949, p. 6.
15. “Albanian Stew,” The New York Times, 15 September 1949, p. 26.

65
 Karpozilos

During the civil war, Greek Communists had received vital refuge for
reorganization and rearmament from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia—the
latter until 1948. This had been the basis for the internationalization of
the “Greek issue” and the creation of the United Nations Special Committee
on the Balkans (UNSCOB).16 Given this experience, the Hellenic Army Gen-
eral Staff anticipated that “as soon as enemy forces regroup . . . they will seek
to reenter [Greece],” and in response the Greek government declared its in-
tention to invade Albania.17 Even though an immediate redeployment of the
DAG did not seem possible, the lack of information from Albania and the
ambiguities of the Communist statements generated various scenarios point-
ing to an all-Balkan spillover of the Greek upheaval. Reports portrayed KKE
ªghters training in military camps, transferring to Bulgaria, or even reorganiz-
ing under Soviet directives “for employment in Yugoslavia.”18
The future of the DAG appeared intertwined with the prospects of
the Albanian regime. After Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Communist Infor-
mation Bureau (Cominform) in 1948, the Albanian “enfant terrible of the
Balkans” was isolated geographically from the Eastern bloc and was already
immune to Western diplomatic supervision. “Heard, but not seen,” the Alba-
nian regime vocally protested against UNSCOB demands and denied Greek
accusations regarding the activities of DAG ªghters.19 The Albanian side de-
clared the absolute disarmament of the DAG forces, a statement that was in
fact true. The Greek ªghters had been obliged to hand over their arms to the
Albanians immediately after crossing the border and were promptly trans-
ported to the camps of Burrel and Elbasan in the country’s north.20 The oper-
ation, organized with the help of the KKE special apparatus, reºected Alba-
nian concerns about a Greek assault on its southern borders. Two weeks
before the ªnal battles of Grammos the chief of the Albanian General Staff,
Mehmet Shehu, had invoked the possibility of a “monarchist-fascist invasion”
and announced border fortiªcations.21
Albanian anxiety derived from Greek plans to eradicate the strongholds
of the DAG and to pursue irredentist claims regarding the Greek-speaking

16. On UNSCOB, see Amikam Nachmani, International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The
United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, 1947–1952 (New York: Praeger, 1990).
17. Geniko Epiteleio Stratou—Diefthinsi Istorias Stratou [General Staff—Army History Directorate],
Archeia Emfyliou Polemou [General Staff –Army History Directorate, Archives of the Civil War],
Vol. 16, (Athens: Geniko Epiteleio Stratou, 2006), pp. 155–159.
18. “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense (Washington November
9, 1949),” in FRUS, 1949, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Vol. V, p. 323.
19. “Albanian Stew,” p. 26.
20. Lampros Sampanis, Anamniseis apo tin Ethiniki Antistasi kai ton Emfylio [Memoirs from the
National Resistance and the Civil War], (Thessaloniki: Maliaris Paideia, 2007).
21. “Ekthesi” [Report], 19 August 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 176, F. 8/2/260.

66
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

Orthodox minority in southern Albania. Nationalist circles in Athens and

representatives of the Greek government threatened to invade Albania “in self
defense,” emphasizing the geographical isolation of Enver Hoxha’s regime
from the Eastern bloc.22 Greek irredentism not only agitated Albanian of-
ªcials but also generated a low-level crisis with the United States. President
Harry S. Truman’s statement that the Greek government acts like “any other
dog who has been down in a ªght and then gets on top” portrays the nature of
these revanchist tendencies.23 An offensive against Albania, U.S. ofªcials
feared, could trigger a domino effect with unpredictable escalations. “The
Greeks cannot expect us to take overt or positive steps which would lead to
World War III,” stated Henry F. Grady, the U.S. ambassador in Athens,
pointing out that “middle-ranking ofªcers in the Greek Army . . . were
tempted by the advantages of entering Albania.”24 U.S. policy toward the Al-
banian regime focused on internal subversion rather than direct military con-
frontation with unpredictable consequences. This was clearly stated in a
meeting between Acheson and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, in
which the latter even wondered whether there were “any kings around that
could be put in.”25 This oath of allegiance to the old political order was out of
touch with contemporary developments, however. In mid-August, Albanian
émigrés in Paris had formed a National Committee for Free Albania, with the
intent to overthrow Hoxha’s dictatorship.
The precarious Albanian position deªned Soviet policies toward the de-
feated KKE and spurred the decision to relocate the DAG ªghters. In the
early days of September 1949, KKE leader Nikos Zachariadis left Albania
to visit Iosif Stalin at Lake Ritsa in Soviet Abkhazia. Zachariadis submitted
a resolution of the KKE Politburo dated 8 September asking “for your
[Stalin’s] help in confronting the issues deriving from the present-day situa-
tion in Greece.”26 The nine numbered points of the resolution indicate how
the Greek Communist leaders were reacting to the August military defeat and
how they viewed the immediate future. The resolution recognized that “our
goal, which was the overthrow in the near future of the monarchist-fascist re-

22. “Greece to Caution U.N. over Albania,” The New York Times, 14 September 1949, p. 12.
23. “Memorandum of Meeting with the President, Monday September 26, by the Acting Secretary of
State (Washington October 1, 1949): Authorization to Ambassador Grady to Use Drastic Measures if
Necessary to Prevent Greek Invasion of Albania,” in FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 427.
24. “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Leonard J. Cromie of the Division of Greek, Turkish and
Iranian Affairs (Washington July 27, 1949),” in FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 374.
25. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State (Washington, September 14, 1949),” in
FRUS, 1949, Vol. V, pp. 315–316.
26. “Pros tin Kentriki Epitropi tou Kommounistikou Kommatos (B) tis Sovietikis Enosis” [To the
Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of the Soviet Union], 8 September 1949, in ASKI/
KKE, Box 383, F. 20/33/74.

67
 Karpozilos

gime in Greece, is not yet readily achievable” and sought to place all blame for
the military defeat on Yugoslavia for having closed its borders to DAG forces.
The Soviet side endorsed this argument, which ªt well with Stalin’s campaign
against the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. At the third and ªnal conference
of the Cominform, the Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej reiterated
that Tito had dealt “a blow to the Democratic Army of Greece.”27
The ªnal results of the Zachariadis-Stalin discussions were formulated in
a subsequent version of the resolution dated 16 September and labeled “Lake
Ritsa Document.”28 Structured in ªve points, the revision provided the guide-
lines for the Sixth Broad Plenum of the KKE Central Committee, which con-
vened in Burrell on 9 October after Zachariadis had returned to Albania.29 In
the complicated inner world of the Communist movement, every word
counts; this is evident in the successive drafts of ofªcial party proceedings, the
handwritten revisions on the margins of documents, and the effort to defend
present decisions against future accusations. A comparison of the two docu-
ments (of 8 September and 16 September) reveals signiªcant differences in
tone and scope that reºect the differences in attitude between the Greek and
the Soviet parties.
In the original response of the KKE, the future of the Democratic Army
appears linked to the prospects of a renewed armed confrontation. The 8 Sep-
tember document states the necessity of maintaining the military prepared-
ness of the DAG units that were “abroad”; insists that “support” be provided
to remaining partisan units active in Greece; and intertwines the civilian do-
mestic political activities of the outlawed KKE and the contradictions of post-
war transition with presumed future military operations. The eighth point
summarizes this explicitly: “because we will deploy mass and popular strug-
gles, we will retain partisan groups all over the country and having our forces
abroad ready and taking into account developments at an international level
we will be able, at the appropriate time, to take up once more the armed
struggle for the overthrow of monarchism-fascism.” This statement reºects
basic elements of revolutionary thought: the inevitable culmination of histori-
cal development leads to “an appropriate time” that in turn calls upon the
vanguard to intervene.
In the revised version as dictated and approved by Stalin, however, the

27. Giuliano Procacci et al., The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994), p. 845.
28. Untitled Document [“Lake Ritsa Document”], 16 September 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 109,
F 4/1/93.
29. “Ylika tis Ektis Olomeleias tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou Kommounistikou Kommatos Elladas”
[Minutes of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece], 9 Octo-
ber 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 102, F 2/1.

68
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

overall tone marks a decisive turn in party line in favor of ordinary political
activity. The phrase that “[the KKE] ought to stop the armed struggle as of to-
day,” which had not appeared in the 8 September version, encapsulates a
completely different outlook. All references to a renewed armed confrontation
are omitted, and the ªnal point of the 16 September document describes the
culmination of political struggles in Greece, with no further armed ªghting:
“the complete understanding and implementation in real life of the party’s po-
litical turn amid the crisis of monarchism-fascism, the rise of difªculties in the
imperialist camp, and the strengthening of the forces of peace, democracy and
socialism all over the world will give the opportunity for the fast stabilization
and growth of the Greek popular democratic movement in Greece, in the fu-
ture.” The KKE was instructed to launch a newspaper in Athens, to form a
broad political coalition party, and to reconstruct its party cells according
to this new line. As far as the DAG was concerned, a passing reference to the
“military development of its personnel and ªghters” was accompanied by
the need for their “ideological, political and organizational” development.
For decades the Lake Ritsa proceedings have remained a murky topic of
the inner world of Greek Communism. The 16 September document has
only recently attracted historiographical attention. The Greek historian
Ioanna Papathanasiou, for instance, has pinpointed the Soviet Union’s role in
the formulation of the document and in how this reºects the overall position
of the Cominform toward Western democracies.30 However, she does not dis-
cuss the 8 September version or the initial response of the Greek Communists
to their military defeat, a topic that has been thoroughly neglected.31 This is
surprising because the 8 September document has been available to research-
ers but has apparently been overlooked because it does not ªt the popular as-
sumption, phrased by Papathanasiou, that the KKE “abandoned deªnitively
the strategy of an armed confrontation and revised thoroughly its political
strategy.” Having drawn this conclusion, Papathanasiou construes the “gun at
the ready” command solely as an internal policy of retaining discipline among

30. Ioanna Papathanasiou, “To Oplo Para Poda: Lektiki Polemiki e Politiki Anasigrotisis” [Gun at the
ready: Verbal polemic or political reorganization?], in Elias Nikolakopoulos et al., O Emªlios Polemos:
apo ti Varkiza sto Grammo, Fevrouarios 1945–Avgoustos 1949 [The Civil War from Varkiza to
Grammos, February 1945–August 1949] (Athens: Themelio, 2002), pp. 143–161. For an alternative
position that does not go into details, see Nikos Marantzides and Kostas Tsivos, O Ellinikos Emªlios
kai to Diethnes Kommounistiko Sistima mesa apo ta Tsechika Archeia [The Greek Civil War and the In-
ternational Communist System through the Czech Archives] (Athens: Alexandria, 2012), pp. 117–
120.
31. The document was published without commentary in Philippos Eliou, O Ellinikos Emfylios
Polemos: e Embloki tou KKE [The Greek Civil War: KKE’s Involvement] (Athens: Themelio, 2004),
pp. 270–272. A recent KKE publication includes the 8 September version, mainly to assist the party’s
current historiographical project to portray the DAG as a “revolutionary army.” See Kommounistiko
Komma Elladas, Dokimio Istorias tou KKE, 1949–1968 [KKE History, 1949–1969] (Athens:
Synchroni Epochi, 2011), pp. 144–145.

69
 Karpozilos

the defeated ªghters. She does not examine the particulars of the transition
from military confrontation to life in political refugee communities, nor does
she take into account the prospect of a renewed military confrontation.
This interpretation fails to consider the much more complicated picture
that derives from the stated intention of the KKE to retain a military force
“abroad” for future developments. The indisputable fact that this historical sce-
nario remained no more than a scenario should not detract from the belief of
the Greek Communist leadership in the inevitable culmination of historical de-
velopment toward that end. Moreover, it does not take into consideration the
reshaping of the Greek Communist position under the inºuence of the Soviet
regime and the decisive change of line that occurred after 1956. Finally, the in-
tentions of the KKE should also be understood in connection with the effort to
establish a permanent operational center in Albania, the dispute between the
Albanian and Greek parties on the handling of “internationalist aid,” and the
operation of military schools “abroad” after 1949. The Lake Ritsa proceedings
illustrate the Soviet position toward the Democratic Army of Greece, the debate
within the international Communist movement, and the way this reshaped the
initial Greek response to the military defeat of August 1949.
The subsequent Soviet decision regarding evacuation of the Democratic
Army ªghters from Albania highlights the USSR’s priorities regarding the
Balkan peninsula: the relocation of the Democratic Army of Greece meant
the removal of a thorn from its Balkan side. Therefore, on 23 September, a
few days after Zachariadis left Lake Ritsa, the VKP(b) Central Committee ap-
proved the naval transportation of “12,000 persons stationed in Durres” and
their resettlement in Uzbekistan.32 The operation signiªes an important shift
in Soviet tactics on the “Greek question.” During the civil war the Soviet
Union had carefully avoided actions that would provoke Western accusations.
In a telling episode of 1948, VKP(b) leaders had rejected, in a mild but deªn-
itive tone, the “inexpedient” admission of the KKE into the Communist
Information Bureau.33 But by 1949 Soviet vessels were assigned to transfer
former ªghting units into the Soviet Union itself. This was in contrast to the
refugee relocations, which had involved moving civilian refugees from north-
ern Greece to Central and Eastern Europe.
This military operation was executed under extreme secrecy, and the
Soviet military and trade liaisons in Tirana received a directive to take the nec-
essary measures for a “covert” mission.34 The speciªcs of the operation are

32. “Voprosy komparti Gretsii,” Ll. 10–12.

33. Procacci et al., The Cominform, p. 601.
34. “Voennomu attashe Sokolovu torgpredu SSSR Chekmarevu” [To the military attaché Sokolov and
the trade representative of the USSR, Chekmarev], n.d., in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 162, D. 41, L. 135.

70
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

striking. The ªrst Soviet vessel, Taiganos, was instructed to arrive at Durres on
25 September, just two days after the Soviet decision. The other four mer-
chant ships involved—Pulkovo, Chiatouri, Sukhona, and Vladivostok—were
then to arrive from the Romanian port of Constant,a The whole operation
was to be completed by 1 November. In accordance with this goal, authorities
in the Soviet Union were instructed to provide without hesitation the mass
quantities of wood for the required conversion of cargo compartments into
makeshift dormitories. The conversion itself was to be executed in Durres un-
der the supervision of Soviet liaisons, or en route “by the passengers them-
selves.” Raw materials on top of the dormitories disguised the operation as an
ordinary transport of goods, safeguarding the covert transportation of numer-
ous passengers. The Soviet documents provide extensive details about the op-
eration, which was conducted under the auspices of the naval, internal, and
war ministries. Even though references to the passengers are intentionally
vague (“persons in Durres”), the military connotations are numerous, ranging
from the daily rations (which were analogous to the ones for Red Army per-
sonnel) to the revelation of the destination only after embarkation.
The expedited Soviet operation coincided with the deterioration of rela-
tions between the Greek Communists and the ruling Albanian Party of Labor.
The Greek-Albanian crisis offers additional insight into the contesting visions
regarding the future of the Democratic Army. During the civil war in Greece,
the Albanian side had fulªlled its “internationalist” duties, albeit with consid-
erable strain and criticism of the war tactics of the Democratic Army.35 The
ªnal defeat of the DAG and the escalating tensions in the Balkans trans-
formed the rhetorical accusations against Greek Communists for not follow-
ing the “Marxist-Leninist principles of peoples’ war” into outspoken hostility.
In a 27 October 1949 letter to the Albanian leadership, Zachariadis summa-
rized the main issues of the controversy as, ªrst, the interrogations of DAG
ªghters by Albanian authorities and, second, the dispute regarding the han-
dling of the “internationalist aid” stocked in military warehouses. Both issues
demonstrated a power struggle between the Albanian authorities and the
KKE apparatus.36
The interrogation of Greek Democratic Army ªghters was related to the
anti-Titoist campaign in Albania that had climaxed in the summer of 1949 af-

35. For a synopsis, see Ana Lalaj, “The Implication of Albania in the Civil War in Greece,” paper pre-
sented at the International Conference: The Balkans in the Cold War, 26–29 May 2011, Athens,
Greece.
36. “Pros tin Kentriki Epitropi tou Kommatos Ergasias tis Alvanias” [To the Central Committee of the
Albanian Party of Labor], 27 October 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 353, F 20/3/54. The same issues in
“Pros to Politiko Grafeio tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou Kommatos Ergasias tis Alvanias” [To the Politburo
of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor], 13 November 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box
353, F 20/3/57.

71
 Karpozilos

ter the execution of Koci Xoxe, former minister of defense. Albanian authori-
ties targeted Macedonian ªghters and conducted interrogations that bypassed
KKE representatives. “Are we prisoners or ªghters?” protested 70 captives in
the labor camp of Lushnja to a silent Thanasis Geronikakos, who was unable
to answer.37 In the camps of Burrel and Elbasan, the prevailing distrust trans-
formed routine incidents of military life—such as disciplinary measures for
mishandling a vehicle—into serious confrontations between Greeks and Al-
banians. The confrontation over “internationalist aid” was manifested in this
power struggle: Albanian military personnel appeared to have conªscated pro-
visions for the deprived locals, paying no attention to protests by the Greek
functionaries. In just one reported incident the dispute entailed 8,210 trou-
sers, 8,236 blouses, 6,528 shirts, 7,202 pairs of boots, and 20,750 great-
coats—revealing at the same time the large quantities stocked in the military
shelters of Burrell and Elbasan.38
Moreover, the KKE “insisted on keeping” control of the stored arms and
ammunition that were not used during the civil war.39 This intertwined with
the Greek Communist plan to establish an operational center in Albania that
would supervise the passage of illegal functionaries and small partisan units to
Greece. Zachariadis also raised this issue in his 27 October letter. The timing
was disastrous, however.40 Recent developments had agitated the Albanian re-
gime into the anticipation of an imminent military invasion from Greece. On
1 October, when the ªrst of the ªve Soviet merchant ships, the Taiganos, de-
parted from the port of Durres carrying the men and women of the Demo-
cratic Army’s 8th Infantry Division, two dozen Albanian saboteurs trained by
British ofªcers were landing not far away to the south.41 Operation Valuable,
organized by British intelligence ofªcer David Smiley (who had been in
Albania during the Second World War), was intended to enhance an anti-
Communist network in close connection with the National Committee for a
Free Albania. Smiley had trained the saboteurs in Malta, set up radio trans-
mitters in Corfu, and coordinated activities from the Athenian suburb of
Glyfada. Despite all precautions, the anti-Communist guerillas were am-
bushed upon their arrival, and Operation Valuable proved a complete failure.
Nonetheless, it spurred ofªcials in Tirana to resent the Greek Communist

37. Untitled report, 28 October 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 176, F 8/2/263.

38. Untitled report, 1 November 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 176, F 8/2/271.
39. Ole L. Smith, “Two Friendly Nations: From the Political Journal and Other Documents on Alba-
nian-Greek Relations, 1941–1984: Enver Hoxha,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. 12, No. 3
(1985), pp. 61–64.
40. “Pros tin Kentriki Epitropi tou Kommatos Ergasias tis Alvanias” [To the Central Committee of the
Albanian Party of Labor], 27 October 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 353 F 20/3/54.
41. David Smiley, Albanian Assignment (London: Chatto & Windus, 1985), pp. 158–164.

72
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

military presence on Albanian territory, which, they feared, could legitimize

foreign interventions and the activities of the National Committee for a Free
Albania.
Yet Zachariadis appears to have been totally oblivious to these develop-
ments, in part because no exchange of information took place between the
Greek and Albanian leaders after a certain point. Hoxha rejected the request
of the Greek Communists “to use our land as a base for their varied and un-
controlled activities,” while requesting the immediate departure of all remain-
ing forces of the DAG and the party apparatus “as undesirables.”42 In a later
debate with the Greek Communist leadership in Moscow, Hoxha restated
that “the Central Committee of our Party could not permit the Greek Com-
munist Party to have the centre of its activities in Albania, nor could it permit
their troops to be organized and trained in our country in order to resume the
war in Greece.”43
The “Albanian Months” of the DAG thus ended with an accumulation of
grievances. On 29 November, refugees and ªghters arrived in Durres to em-
bark on the Polish ship Kosciuszko—this was part of a second operation under
Polish auspices, smaller in scale, to transport those who had only recently
crossed the border, as well as civilians who had been excluded from the Octo-
ber operation.44 Waiting on the docks, the Albanian Major Sotiris Voulkanis,
who had been designated as a liaison with the Greek Communists because of
his Greek origins, demanded on the spot the surrender of ªfteen “defectors of
the royal-fascist army” for interrogation. The havoc that followed in the pres-
ence of the astonished Polish sailors verged on an organized mutiny. Passen-
gers resisted the order, causing the delay of the scheduled embarkation, while
Albanian Lieutenant Ali Corby shouted, “you’re not Communists—you’re
shit.” Finally, an order came by phone from “comrade Yiorgos” in Tirana to
“let them do as they wish; they are in charge.” The episode summarizes the
Greek-Albanian conºict beyond the Communist etiquette of “warm, com-
radely revolutionary greetings.”45
The Greek and Albanian Communist leadership met under Stalin’s su-

42. Lalaj, “Implication of Albania in the Civil War in Greece,” p. 10. Leading Greek Communists
(Zachariadis and Mitsos Partsalidis) alleged that the Albanian side “demanded that all Greeks without
exception . . . leave [Albania].” See “Pros tin Kentriki Epitropi tou Kommounistikou Kommatos (B)
tis Sovietikis Enosis” [To the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of the Soviet Union],
15 January 1950, in ASKI/KKE, Box 383, F 20/33/81.
43. Enver Hoxha, With Stalin: Memoirs (Tirana: 8 of November Publishing House, 1981), p. 194.
44. Untitled report, 30 November 1949, in ASKI/KKE, Box 176, F 8/2/275.
45. “Chairetistirio psiªsma pros tin Kentriki Epitropi tou Kommatos Ergasias Alvanias (14.10.1950)”
[Greeting resolution to the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor], in Kommounistiko
Komma Elladas (KKE), Episima keimena, 1949–1975 [Ofªcial documents, 1949–1975], Vol. 7 (Ath-
ens: Synchroni Epochi, 1995), p. 96.

73
 Karpozilos

pervision in Moscow in January 1950. The only known record of this meet-
ing, from Hoxha himself, shows the Albanians siding with the Soviet assess-
ment of the Greek Civil War and its aftermath. The concluding remark from
a leading Greek Communist—“There is no one like Stalin, he behaved like a
father to us. Now everything is clear.”—reveals a striking simplicity in the un-
derstanding of relations within the postwar Communist movement.46 The
Greek and Albanian parties had behaved like children, and now they would
reconcile under the Soviet fatherly inºuence that made everything “clear.”
Around that time the “children” of the Greek revolution had just reached
Tashkent, having no clear vision of what lay ahead of them. Their travel
from Durres to the Soviet Union had been a lengthy and tiring process (see
Table 1). In October 1949, as set forth in the Soviet directive of 24 Septem-
ber, ªve merchant vessels departed from Durres: Taiganos, Pulkovo, Vlad-
ivostok, Chiatouri, and Sukhona all followed the same route, sailing in interna-
tional waters, heading south to the Adriatic Sea, circumventing Crete, turning
to the north, and passing through the Istanbul straits. The nausea-stricken
passengers, who had remained in their compartments for twelve days, disem-
barked at the Georgian port of Poti in the Black Sea. Military trains trans-
ferred them from Poti to Baku on the eastern shore of Georgia, where they
embarked once again. Having crossed the Caspian Sea, the exhausted Greek
Communists reached Krasnovodsk (today Türkmenbaqy) in the Soviet Re-
public of Turkmenistan, the last stop before their ªnal destination: Soviet
Uzbekistan and the city of Tashkent.

Life in Soviet-Japanese Style

A year after arriving in Tashkent, Yiorgos Ermidis addressed “comrade Nikos

Zachariadis” to ask for help.47 The account by Ermidis describes a life full of
ironies: born in the Crimea in 1895, he had ºed Russia after the October Rev-
olution, only to become a Communist in interwar Greece and eventually re-
turn to Soviet Russia as a refugee of a different kind in 1949. In the civil war
Ermidis had volunteered with the “Maritime Workers’ Brigade” of the Demo-
cratic Army. This brigade of one hundred men had been organized by the
Federation of Greek Maritime Unions through a network connecting its
headquarters in Cardiff with New York, Marseilles, Alexandria, and the train-
ing grounds of the Communist army in Czechoslovakia. In Tashkent, mem-

46. Hoxha, With Stalin, p. 200.

47. “Ekthesi pros ton archigo tou KKE s. Niko Zachariadi” [Statement to the leader of the KKE, com-
rade Nikos Zachariadis], 15 February 1951, in ASKI/KKE, Box 164, F 7/51/12.

74
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

Table 1. Departures from Durres

Date Ship Regiment

1 Oct 1949 Taiganos [Soviet] 8th Infantry Division
15 Oct 1949 Pulkovo or Chiatouri [Soviet] 9th Infantry Division

16 Oct 1949 Vladivostok [Soviet] 10th Infantry Division

17 Oct 1949 Pulkovo or Chiatouri [Soviet]
23 Oct 1949 Sukhona [Soviet]
29 Nov 1949 Kosciuszko [Polish] Civilian Refugees
28 Dec 1949 Kosikow [Polish]
30 Dec 1949 Kosciuszko [Polish] 2nd Infantry Division

Sources: Testimonies of arrested Communists in Greece, stored in Diplomatiko kai Istoriko Archeio,
Ypourgeio Exoterikon [Diplomatic and Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs],
Folder 1950/33/1; Stelios Giatroudakis, Taskendi, 30 Chronia Prosfygia [Tashkent, 30 years as Refugee]
(Athens: Diogenis, 1995); Dimitris Zygouras, Ena Megalo Taxidi, Ethniki Antistasi, Emªlios, Prosfygia [A
Long Journey, National Resistance, Civil War, Time as Refugee] (Athens: Themelio, 2012); Mairi Zioga,
“Emeis oi politikoi prosfyges” [We the political refugees], Rizospastis (Athens), 28 October 1998; Giorgos
Chouliaras (Periklis), O Dromos einai Asotos: ELAS, Dimokratikos Stratos, Polonia, 1941–1958 [The Road is
Prodigal: ELAS, Democratic Army, Poland, 1941–1958] (Lamia, Greece: Oionos, 2006); and memoirs
stored in ASKI/KKE, Box 149, F 7/36/214, Box 176 F 8/2/273, Box 176, F 8/2/275.

bers of the brigade asked to get back on the ship. Soviet authorities rejected
their demand, fearing that information regarding the destination of the Dem-
ocratic Army would be disclosed. Realizing that Tashkent was to be the last
stop in a life of constant mobility, the veteran of two civil wars—Ermidis had
also fought in Spain—protested to Zachariadis, hoping the latter was not
aware of this decision. The outcome suggests otherwise. Ermidis was put on
trial for “anti-Soviet conduct” and was imprisoned in the Alexandrov Prison
for ªve years. Twenty more maritime workers served time in Soviet prisons,
each from ªve to ten years.48
The maritime workers affair is one of numerous incidents that exemplify
the difªculties of adapting to conditions in Uzbekistan. The ensuing tensions
dominated the Greek political refugee communities. Upon arrival in Tash-
kent, the former DAG ªghters encountered harsh living conditions. However,
this was not the main cause of their grievances. After all, the newcomers had
survived a military confrontation amid exhausting conditions and were not
unaccustomed to hardship. Their concerns in Uzbekistan were aroused by the

48. Giatroudakis, Taskendi, pp. 339–340.

75
 Karpozilos

constant state of alert and continuing expectation of strict obedience to mili-

tary discipline. Expectation mingled with disillusionment as the realization of
the distance from Greece sunk in. Further alienation was caused by the vast
surrounding steppes and the Central Asian winter. In 1962, Nikos and Argyri
Kokovli managed to reach Tashkent after an extraordinary itinerary starting
in the mountains of Crete, where they were hiding for a decade after the end
of the civil war. Their ªrst question “to our compatriots, political refugees
who had been transferred here thirteen years earlier, was: ‘But why didn’t they
leave you in the Caucasus, where the climate is more like that of Greece?’”49 In
a similar vein, Dinos Rozakis dared to ask his party unit what many had pri-
vately thought: “Why did they bring us here?”50
Two factors seem to have been behind the Soviet authorities’ choice of
Tashkent: its distance from the Greek frontiers and the potential for incorpo-
rating the former DAG ªghters into the regional labor force. The Stalinist re-
gime aimed to transform the capital of Uzbekistan into a “model socialist city
for Central Asia” and to combine postwar reconstruction with a modernizing
project of industrialization.51 The inºux of thousands of young, militant, and
devoted Communists could provide a vital contribution to this end, helping
to alleviate the acute scarcity of labor. The local populations were reluctant to
abandon their traditional, agrarian, mobile ways of life: in 1948, Uzbek
male workers constituted only “15 percent of the total number of industrial
workers,” and the percentage of female workers in industry was barely mea-
surable.52 The local Soviet government also faced the loss to repatriation of
20,000 Japanese POWs who had been brought to Uzbekistan in 1945 and
were ruthlessly exploited in the years that followed. Until 1948 the Japanese
captives had occupied ªfteen labor camps adjacent to major industrial units.
By the time the Greek Communists arrived, only one of these was still in
operation.53
Soviet directives of September 1949 indicate a connection between the
departure of the Japanese POWs and the arrival of the former DAG ªghters.

49. Nikos Kokovlis and Argyro Kokovlis, Allos dromos den Ypirche: Antistasi, Emªlios, Prosfygia [There
was no other way: Resistance, Civil War, Refugee] (Athens: Politipo, 2002), p. 453.
50. Ntinos Rozakis, Sarantachroni Poreia: Taigetos, Grammos, Taskendi, 1936–1976 [A 40-Year Jour-
ney: Taigetos, Grammos, Tashkent] (Athens: n.pub., 2008), pp. 212–213.
51. Paul Stronski, Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930–1966 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2010), pp. 145–201.
52. Ibid., p. 177.
53. Gunji Abe, “Concentration Camps in Siberia,” in The Japanese Internees and Forced Labor in the
USSR after the Second World War; The Excerpt Version (Tokyo: The Public Foundation for Peace and
Consolation, Incorporated Administrative Agency, 2008), pp. 159–240; and Yokote Shinji, “Soviet
Repatriation Policy, U.S. Occupation Authorities, and Japan’s Entry into the Cold War,” Journal of
Cold War Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 2013), pp. 30–50.

76
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

The “ex-camps of prisoners of war in the region of Uzbekistan” provided the

infrastructure for the settlement of the newcomers. Uzbek authorities were
urged “to take all necessary measures for the Greek political refugees to work
in industries.”54 The local authorities removed the wire fences and observation
towers from the labor camps, and after various other rearrangements fourteen
communities (politeies/gorodok) of Greek political refugees were organized.
Twelve were in the vicinity of Tashkent and two in the neighboring town of
Tsirtsik.55 After a six-month transitional period, “comrades who had never
seen a factory in their life” were compelled to fulªll the norms of socialist pro-
duction in industrial facilities with names like Elektrokambel, Tashelmash,
Uzbekshelmash, and Uzbektextilmas.
The Soviet plans appealed to the KKE’s ambition of shaping the peasant
ªghters of the Democratic Army into a working-class force. This also aligned
with the KKE’s rhetoric that Tashkent was but an interlude before a trium-
phant revanche of the Communist movement in Greece. Even though the
documents refer only indirectly to a future military contest, they constantly
connect the political refugees’ experience in the Soviet Union with the even-
tual socialist transformation of Greece. The German Communist experience
provided a blueprint: In the words of Kostas Karayiorgis, a leading party func-
tionary who was soon to be denounced and murdered in Romania, the
“émigré experience” produced functionaries for the future Greek Popular De-
mocracy that would follow in the footsteps of the interwar German Commu-
nists who were building the German Democratic Republic.56
Those chosen to live in Tashkent were therefore seen as privileged. They
had the opportunity to create a prototype of the Greek People’s Democracy
within the prototypically socialist state of the world. Admiration for the
Soviet system and Stalin was overwhelming: the third KKE party plenum in
1950 called for the development of functionaries who would “creatively adapt
the elements of the higher civilization, the socialist civilization, and the theory
of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.”57 Links between the Democratic Army strug-
gle, life in Tashkent, and a future victorious repatriation were illustrated in the
local Greek party newspaper, which carried the title of the Democratic Army
publication during the civil war: Pros ti Niki (To Victory!). Its “domestic news”

54. “Voprosy komparti Gretsii,” Ll. 10–12.

55. “Spisok” [List], n.d., in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 162, D. 41, L. 134.
56. Kommounistiko Komma Elladas, E Ekti Olomeleia tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE, 9 Oktovriou
1949 [The Sixth Plenum of the KKE Central Committee, 9 October 1949] (n.pub., 1951), p. 47.
57. “Apofasi pano sto deftero thema: E katastasi kai ta provlimata ton politikon prosfygon stin Laikes
Dimokraties” [Resolution on the second issue: The situation and the problems of the political refugees
in the Peoples’ Democracies], 10–14 October 1950, in Kommounistiko Komma Elladas, Episima
Keimena [KKE: Ofªcial Documents], Vol. 7, p. 84.

77
 Karpozilos

columns were devoted to political and social developments in Greece, and it

continued to propagate the prospect of a Greek Popular Democracy: “The
more we work with fervor for the industrial quotas, for the growth of labor
productivity, for the strengthening of discipline . . . taking advantage of the
invaluable help provided by our Soviet comrades, we will be able to produce
the technical and political functionaries who will be needed tomorrow in
Greece.”58
Generational and party dynamics underpinned such optimism. In Alba-
nia, party functionaries had taken pains to separate civilian refugees, invalids,
elders, and minors from the combat units that had embarked on the ªve
Soviet ships.59 Even though the criteria for selecting eventual destinations for
the refugees were subject to the chaotic conditions of the Albanian moment,
party statistics from 1950 reveal an exceptional pattern. The new Greek Com-
munist communities of Uzbekistan numbered 8,537 men, 3,407 women, and
only 1,128 minors. By comparison, the Greek Communist refugee group in
Romania numbered 3,900 adults and 5,132 children. The ªgures for Tash-
kent show no invalids and a strikingly high concentration of card-carrying
party members: 7,644 of the Greeks—seven out of ten of the overall Greek
population—were party members.60 Thus, Tashkent was home to one-half of
the 15,354 KKE party members in all of the political refugee communities of
Eastern and Central Europe. The two politeies adjacent to the Tashelmash
and Uzbekshelmash plants alone housed 2,700 party members, or more than
the KKE party membership living in Hungary (1,017) and Bulgaria (1,140)
combined.61
All aspects of everyday life were penetrated by the extended network of
248 local and industrial nuclei under the central guidance of the Greek
Tashkent Communist Organization (GTCO), the governing body of the
Greek political refugees. The GTCO’s predominance derived from the Soviet
policy of granting a certain degree of autonomy to the KKE. In sharp contrast
to the persecution of foreign Communists and political refugees in the late
1930s, and also to the Soviet treatment of minorities after the war, the Greek
Communists enjoyed the privilege of operating through their own national
party. The DAG ªghters were not subject to automatic suspicion and

58. “Doxa sti Sovietiki Enosi, to sotira tis anthropotitas” [Glory to the Soviet Union, the savior of
mankind], Pros ti Niki [Toward Victory!] (Tashkent), 22 June 1951, p. 1.
59. Rozakis, Sarantachroni poreia, p. 207.
60. “Eisigisi stin triti syndiaskepsi tou KKE pano sto deftero thema: E katastasi kai ta provlimata ton
politikon prosfygon stin laikes dimokraties” [Presentation on the third conference of the KKE to the
second issue: The situation and problems of the political refugees in the peoples’ democracies], 10–14
October 1950, in KKE, Episima keimena, Vol. 7, p. 482–483.
61. Untitled report, 28 December 1950, in ASKI/KKE, Box 163, ! 7/50/2.

78
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

Sovietization policies, as had been the case with the perceived anti-Commu-
nist ethnic populations on the western borders of the Soviet Union.62 The
special status of the Greeks in Tashkent is further illustrated by the comparison
to the treatment of “politically unreliable elements” of Greek descent who were
subjected to forced resettlement from the Black Sea coast to southern Kazakh-
stan in June 1949.63 Trusted for its ideological afªnity, the KKE was allowed to
supervise the political, social, and cultural activities of the refugees, to publish
in Greek, and to conduct educational programs. This should not imply com-
plete autonomy, however. The Uzbek Ministry of Internal Affairs kept a careful
watch on manifestations of “Greekness,” intervened in issues of everyday life,
and oversaw the higher command of the political refugee communities. Each
community had a Soviet military ofªcer in charge, and a bilingual Soviet citizen
censored the Greek-language newspaper. These tactics resembled interwar
Soviet policies before the Great Terror of 1937–1938, when foreign Commu-
nists were allowed to operate through their respective national parties as long as
they followed the line of the Communist International.
The KKE’s limited authority came at a high price. The Soviet Union did
not ofªcially grant the status of “political refugees” to the defeated DAG
ªghters, who had “no rights as citizens . . . [and instead] had the legal status of
stateless persons.”64 This policy hindered their assimilation in the USSR and
generated resentment among the newcomers. However, the “stateless person”
identiªcation was not discriminatory as far as material conditions were con-
cerned. Newcomers enjoyed a six-month beneªt upon arrival, and their
communities were subsidized by the Soviet state. But Greek political refu-
gees were barred from becoming members of the VKP(b). Their position as
non-citizens was precarious and intensiªed their submission to the authority
of the KKE.
This paradoxical situation elevated the GTCO to a state within a state.
The organization registered newborns, processed applications for housing, su-
pervised requests to reunite families, granted papers, and allotted positions,
privileges, and opportunities provided by the local Uzbek government or the
Soviet party. The local Greek Communist leadership possessed the standing
to marginalize ideological dissenters, bar them from scholarships, block their
requests, or expose them as potential threats to the Soviet state. In January
1951 KKE members went through a reevaluation process to determine

62. Peter Gatrell and Nick Baron, eds., Warlands: Population Resettlement and State Reconstruction in
the Soviet-East European Borderlands, 1945–1950 (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009).
63. Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), pp. 168–169.
64. Loring M. Danforth and Riki Van Boeschoten, Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the
Politics of Memory (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012), p. 68.

79
 Karpozilos

whether they could retain their party status.65 Examination of past experiences
and present activities—“party members should become shock workers and
Stakhanovites”—resembled the Soviet self-criticism accounts of the late
1930s, wherein trivial instances often had signiªcant consequences.
Maintaining the perpetual state of alert, the KKE leaders implemented a
“spirit of iron revolutionary vigilance” against those who thought “there is no
need for watchfulness, since we live in the People’s Democracies.”66 In March
1950 Panayiotis Mavromatis, a member of the Central Committee, was ac-
cused of belonging to the “anti-party elements that expressed themselves right
from the start of our life in the Soviet Union.” Mavromatis had questioned
the choice of Tashkent, made comments about the difªculty of the Russian
language (and the distance kept by Russian women), and publicly complained
that “we shouldn’t be living collectively in barracks.”67 Within a few months
he was expelled from the party and lost the privileges of his former status.68
Others were more careful, and expressed their thoughts only at the appropri-
ate party proceedings. “Even though it was initially correct to retain military
formation and discipline, we should have gradually implemented normal
party activities in a more decisive way,” Leonidas Strigos commented after vis-
iting Tashkent on behalf of the KKE Central Committee.69 His remarks un-
derline the militarization of everyday life in Tashkent.
Even though discipline and party control were common in the Greek po-
litical refugee experience, only in Tashkent were the continuities with the mil-
itary past so evident. The specter of the Greek Democratic Army haunted
everyday life.70 The hierarchical order of military life continued to exist. Set-
tlement in communities was by military regiment. Political refugees wore uni-
forms. They marched in the streets of Tashkent while going to work, much to
the amusement of locals. They followed a supervised communal daily pro-
gram with roll-calls, dining hours, and chore allotments. They slept in bar-
racks, shared kitchens and lavatories, and went through a guarded main en-

65. “Apofasi tou Politikou Grafeiou tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou KKE gia tin katastasi ton kommatikon
melon pou vriskontai stis laikes dimokraties kai stin ESSD” [Resolution of the Politburo of the Cen-
tral Committee of the KKE on the situation of the party members located in the peoples’ democracies
and the USSR], 10 January 1951, in KKE, Episima keimena, Vol. 7, p. 125–129.
66. “Apofasi pano sto deftero thema,” p. 85.
67. “Porisma” [Report], 20 March 1950, in ASKI/KKE, Box 102, ! 2/1/63.
68. “Apofasi gia ton P. Mavromati,” [Decision on P. Mavromatis], in KKE, Episima keimena, Vol. 7,
p. 43.
69. “Gia to Politiko Grafeio” [For the Politburo], 28 December 1950, in ASKI/KKE, Box 163,
! 7/50/2.
70. Gavrilis Labatos, Ellines Politikoi Prosfyges stin Taskendi, 1949–1957 [Greek Political Refugees in
Tashkent] (Athens: Kourier Ekdotiki, 2001), pp. 33–41.

80
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

trance that deªned the boundary to the outer world. A daily item at the top-
right corner of the Greek-language newspaper warned readers not to “be
taken out” from the designated political refugee communities.71
To the KKE, the military-type organization reºected a broader vision of
social organization as a matter of discipline, order, and productivity. The per-
sistence of military practices highlighted the potential combat redeployment
of the former DAG ªghters but also served the imminent purpose of keeping
uniformity and discipline. Answering Strigos’s comments, the KKE Politburo
insisted on the continuation of the prevailing tactics: “your thoughts . . .
about the military-type organization are erroneous and we are not in agree-
ment. The reasons that necessitated this type of organization still obtain. . . .
Of course the military-type organization has nothing in common with milita-
ristic methods. . . . We should retain a military-type organization without bu-
reaucratic and simplistic implementations.”72
On a more practical level, the KKE in cooperation with Soviet authorities
organized the reeducation of selected DAG ªghters and ofªcials. Panayiotis
Melas had attended the Hellenic Military Academy in Athens before the Sec-
ond World War and had participated as an ofªcer in the national resistance
movement and the civil war. In the autumn of 1951 he was one of the men
chosen to attend the military school of Fergana 400 kilometers to the east of
Tashkent.73 Even though this remains one of the most covert aspects of the
political refugee experience, memoirs describe full-scale military training with
tangible connections to a renewed armed struggle. Yiorgos Chouliaras, a mili-
tary ofªcer of the DAG, had succeeded in entering Albania in December
1949 and was transported, along with his group, to Poland. There he enrolled
in the “500” military school through 1951, after which Polish authorities de-
cided to terminate it: “The reasons that made the Poles close the ‘500’ over-
night are understandable; what is not understandable though is why Zach-
ariadis, after destroying the popular movement [in Greece], needed military
ofªcers and insisted that conditions in Greece were revolutionary and the
coming revolution a Socialist one.”74
The apparent continuities with life in the DAG were met with diverse re-
sponses among the political refugees. For many, the unquestionable authority

71. Pros ti Niki (Tashkent), 22 June 1951, p. 1.

72. “Politiko Grafeio tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou Kommounistikou Kommatos Elladas pros tin
Kommatiki Epitropi Taskendis” [The Politburo of the Central Committee of the KKE to the party
delegation of Tashkent], 24 January 1951, in ASKI/KKE, Box 164, ! 7/51/10.
73. P. G. Melas, Emeis to Tragoudi mas to Eipame [We have Sung our Song] (Athens: n.pub., 2012),
pp. 217–219, 230–236.
74. Chouliaras, O Dromos einai Asotos, p. 814.

81
 Karpozilos

of the party and admiration for the Soviet Union trumped all reservations.
The ofªcial party line had its ardent supporters, and they often overreacted in
their efforts to impose discipline, marginalize defectors of any kind, and pun-
ish those who violated the communal rules of barracks life. Adaptation to in-
dustrial labor was among the primary concerns. Charts depicted a passion for
productivity and time management. Political refugees strove to excel and earn
enough to ameliorate their circumstances. Shock workers had priority in re-
uniting families and were offered the prospect of an exodus from the commu-
nal barracks to small apartments in buildings that gradually went up near the
politeies in the districts of Tsilantzar, Yalangats, and Severvostok.75 The cen-
trally planned organization of life provided employment, medical beneªts,
technical school training, and a satisfactory educational program that ap-
pealed to the political refugees.
Nevertheless, on a daily basis, grievances and tensions targeted the Greek
Communist apparatus and its methods and tactics. Sarcasm became a popular
outlet for expressing dissatisfaction with the imbalance between the “novel
conditions” and the persistence of militarism. Remarks such as “I have never
seen a pregnant woman in the ªrst line of combat” challenged the customary
parading to work.76 Disciplinary measures caused estrangement among many
a devoted party member. Takis Kostopoulos was in charge of leading the men
and women of the 105th GAD brigade to work in a textile factory. One day
he ordered them to walk in single ªle. He was subsequently called to apolo-
gize at the party’s headquarters.77 In Tsirtsik, the 1,500 political refugees who
lived in the 5th and 14th communities expressed frustration with the required
military saluting of superiors and a harsh daily routine that began at 4:00 a.m.
and continued with hard work throughout the day. When a leading function-
ary announced that dissenters would be expelled from the party, enraged
members threw their documents in protest.78 Among their leaders was
Thanasis Chatzis, who had been a prominent ªgure in the National Libera-
tion Front (EAM) during the German occupation. He was expelled from the
party and in 1954 was sent into exile in a small Siberian city.
Small-scale frictions correlated with questioning of the prevailing KKE
policies. Starting in 1950, the evident failure of the National Liberation Front
(EAM) and the Democratic Army ªnally set off an internal crisis over the fu-

75. Labatos, Ellines Politikoi Prosfyges stin Taskendi, pp. 48–50.

76. Rozakis, Sarantachroni Poreia, p. 211.
77. Takis Kostopoulos, Me tous Antartes sti Ditiki Makedonia [With the Guerillas in Western Macedo-
nia] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2006), pp. 112–113.
78. Labatos, Ellines Politikoi Prosfyges stin Taskendi, pp. 118–120.

82
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

ture of the political refugee communities as well as the trajectory of the Com-
munist movement in Greece. The details of this factional dispute are confus-
ing. Prominent members and functionaries were expelled, but it is impossible
to draw clear-cut lines between the different groupings and factions operating
unofªcially in the political refugee communities. Tashkent became the epi-
center of factional dispute due to its heavy concentration of party mem-
bership and afªnity to the Soviet party. Eventually, two main groups were
formed. The ªrst adhered to Zachariadis. The second, enjoying Soviet sup-
port, defended the local Greek Tashkent Communist Organization in its chal-
lenge to KKE policies and the tactics of the leadership under Zachariadis. The
power struggle between the two groups erupted on the dawn of 11 September
1955, when hundreds of Greek political refugees clashed in a massive street
ªght. Stones, knives, and clubs were used, leaving 118 wounded and a deep
trauma among those who just some years earlier had fought side-by-side for
their very lives.
The riot exposed the accumulated rage and shattered the ofªcial party
rhetoric of discipline and cohesion. It also signiªed the end of an era for the
KKE. As the new de-Stalinization policies took hold, the Soviet party deter-
mined that Zachariadis had to go. The lifelong leader of the Greek Commu-
nists, their general secretary since 1931, was expelled from the party in 1956.
He ended up in Siberian exile under the anonymous identity of “Nikolai
Nikolaivitch Nikolaev.” Just as the Uzbek police had restored order in the
streets of Tashkent in 1955, the Soviet party restored order in the KKE by
ousting the “anti-Soviet” elements and dictating a change of line.79 Pre-1953
dissenters such as Mavromatis and Chatzis were readmitted and now took
their turn to launch a crusade of discrimination against the followers of
Zachariadis. The latter found himself defending Soviet policies that no longer
existed. Even as Nikita Khrushchev visited Belgrade in 1955, Zachariadis was
still insisting that nothing could alter the fact that Tito bore the primary re-
sponsibility for the Democratic Army’s defeat.
The change in Soviet position toward the Greek Communists illustrates
the differences between the early 1950s and the epoch of de-Stalinization after
Stalin’s death. Until 1953 the Soviet state entrusted the KKE with the supervi-
sion of the political refugees and sought a balance between supporting KKE
policies while also disassociating itself from activities that might allow accusa-

79. Documents from Soviet archives relating to the “de-Stalinization of the Greek Communist Party
and the Tashkent crisis” in V. G. Aªnian et al., eds., Oi Sheseis metaxi KKE kai KKSE sto Diastima
1953–1977 [Relations between KKE and CPSU in the Period of 1953 to 1977] (Thessaloniki:
Epikentro, 200[2]), pp. 21–159. See, for instance, the decision of the CPSU Central Committee on
the riots in the Greek political refugee communities, 12 October 1955, pp. 63–65.

83
 Karpozilos

tions of Soviet interference in Greece. So on the one hand the Soviet regime
provided Greek Communists with military school training but on the other
did not ofªcially endorse the dispatching of party functionaries for the under-
ground work of rebuilding the party in Greece. When in late 1951 the politi-
cal refugees held a drive for the “victims of monarchism-fascism in Greece,”
Soviet ofªcials warned them not to organize such collections “here in the
USSR.”80 On the other hand, they allowed rhetorical proclamations regarding
the prospect of a victorious repatriation in Greece, and they did not challenge
the military organization of life as promoted by the KKE.
The post-Stalin era brought a decisive change, underpinned also by the
social developments within the political refugee world and by the growth of a
legally functioning left in Greece. The reorganized KKE gave priority to civil-
ian political activities and directed that its illegal party cells in Greece be
dissolved. It also abandoned militant rhetoric about a future victorious repa-
triation. Meanwhile, Greek Communists had increasingly adapted to the con-
ditions of life in Tashkent. The building of the housing projects signaled the
end of life in the barracks of repurposed labor camps. Families were increas-
ingly reunited. Interethnic marriages altered the population composition. Flu-
ency in Russian and technical diplomas provided more labor opportunities.
Military organization gradually came to an end. In 1954, the KKE yielded its
position in the organization of everyday life to the Association of Political
Refugees from Greece. The Tashkent communities gradually came to look
more and more like the rest of the Greek political refugee world.
In 1950, the KKE had asked the East-bloc ruling parties to accept Greek
Communists into their organizations, but it had not made such a request of
the Soviet party.81 That ªnally came in 1958, when the KKE Central Com-
mittee asked that party members living in the Soviet Union be allowed to join
the CPSU alongside “granting Soviet citizenship.”82 The true signiªcance of
the request was disguised with customarily pompous rhetoric: joining the
Soviet party would allow political refugees to “participate fully in the multi-
faceted activity of the Soviet people in the struggle for Communism,” the pre-
existing organization appears as a relic of the past, and so on. But one can dis-
cern the realization, ªnally, that the future of the former DAG ªghters lay in
Soviet Uzbekistan and not on a Greek battleªeld. The transformation was en-

80. “Pros to Politiko Grafeio” [To the Politburo], 10 December 1951, in ASKI/KKE, Box 163,
! 7/50/8.
81. “Eisigisi stin triti syndiaskepsi tou KKE pano sto deftero thema,” p. 531.
82. “Stin Kentriki Epitropi tou Kommounistikou Kommatos Sovietikis Enosis” [To the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (29 March 1958), in V. G. Aªnian et al., Oi
sheseis metaxi KKE kai KKSE, pp. 158–159.

84
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

capsulated in the new name given to the local newspaper: Neos Dromos [New
Road]. The publication remained blunt, but the new title signiªed transition
from the mountains of Grammos to the realities of Tashkent.

The Looming “Fourth Round”

Did the KKE prepare for renewed armed struggle despite the military defeat
of 1949? This question dominated Greek social and political life for decades.
Anticipating a “fourth round,” the anti-Communist state that emerged from
the civil war implemented policies of discrimination and created an extended
network of civilian surveillance. According to the dominant ideology, the
Communists had successively tried to conquer power in the 1940s by taking
advantage of the nation’s precarious condition. Their ªrst attempt was dur-
ing the German occupation of 1941–1944. The second came when the
Communists clashed with the British forces in Athens following the coun-
try’s liberation in December 1944. The “third round” was the civil war of
1946–1949, or, as it was labeled in the ofªcial rhetoric, the Communist ins-
urgency. The anti-Communist crusade combined tangible political aims—
namely, the marginalization of the defeated left—with the perception com-
mon in the Western world of Communism as a continuous threat to stability
and progress.
History played an integral role in Greek anti-Communism. The success-
ful “resistance” against the Communist “menace” of 1946–1949 was posi-
tioned as one part of a historical continuum, an ongoing struggle between the
Greek nation and its multifaceted enemies, “Slavs” and “Reds” alike. The ex-
periences of the 1940s appeared to ratify this historical schema, since the
“three” rounds proved the determination of the “enemies of Hellenism.” At
the same time, they provided a blueprint for the imminent future, which was
seen as an evolution in the ongoing struggle between opposing forces. A pub-
lication of the Hellenic Army General Staff from 1950 proclaimed,

the war is not over: it goes on in new forms. . . . Everything else—words and
deeds alike [of the Communists]—are tactical maneuvers, temporary retreats,
“new forms,” “new stages” of the same struggle. But—and this is the most im-
portant point—the “new stage” is a temporary one. It has only one purpose: to
prepare for the ultimate stage, the armed one . . . the last word belongs to guns:
this is the fourth round.83

83. Stratis Bournazos, “To kratos ton ethnikofronon: Antikommounistikos logos kai praktikes” [The
state of the national-minded: Anti-Communist rhetoric and practices], in Christos Chatziiosif, ed.,

85
 Karpozilos

Anti-Communists and Communists shared the idea that historical devel-

opment would lead inevitably to an “ultimate stage.” For the Greek state, this
was the “fourth round.” For the KKE, it was the prospect of a victorious
comeback. The Communist mindset did not easily accept terminal defeat,
and the party cadres’ past experiences encouraged optimistic conceptualiza-
tions of historical development. In 1940, the party had been on the edge of
extinction, its leadership imprisoned by the fascist Metaxas regime and torn
apart by deep disputes and mutual distrust. Just a few years later, it had
become a powerful mass social and political force at the head of the national
resistance movement.
The expectation of a “fourth round” was never fulªlled, since the KKE
never challenged the Greek state’s monopoly on power after 1949. Due to its
pivotal position in legitimizing harsh and undemocratic repressive measures,
the slogan of the “fourth round” left public discourse only after the proclama-
tion of the Third Republic in 1974. The post-1974 national consensus em-
phasized the years of the seemingly uniªed national resistance movement of
1941 to 1944 and avoided the perplexing period of civil war. The left had a
signiªcant role in this project, denying the legacy of armed conºict and pro-
moting an image of self-victimization in which the Communist ambition for
power was consciously downplayed. In the same context, the question of a
“fourth round” appeared to be an irrelevant remnant of the past and merely
underlined the anti-Communist psychosis of the postwar Greek state.

Conclusion

This article has highlighted some of the potentials for eventual military con-
frontation that still existed in the early postwar period and has also revisited
the question of how Greek Communists interpreted their defeat and what
they thought of the future. The KKE did not immediately give up on the idea
of a future victorious comeback, but in 1949 the international Communist
movement no longer shared in the anticipation of the revolutionary moment
that had underpinned the KKE’s quest for power in Greece. Communist par-
ties took power in the Eastern bloc in an entirely different manner, while
Western Communist parties after 1948 readily accepted their legitimate posi-
tion within national political spectra, rejecting the adventurous policies of the
immediate postwar era. On a different level, the Soviet Union wished to con-

Istoria tis Elladas tou 20ou aiona: Anasygrotisi, Emfylios, Palinorthosi, 1945–1952 [History of Greece in
the 20th century: Reconstruction, civil war, restoration], Vol. D2 (Athens: Vivliorama, 2009), p. 37;
emphasis in original.

86
 The Defeated of the Greek Civil War

solidate the successful remapping of Europe. The relocation of the Greek

Communist military force from the Balkans to Uzbekistan provides an addi-
tional example of Soviet willingness to avoid further complications at a time
marked by the anti-Titoist crusade within the Eastern bloc. Stalin had repeat-
edly expressed his doubts about the future of the Greek struggle, pointing out
that “one should not think that if nothing comes up in Greece, everything else
is lost.”84 The outcome of the civil war conªrmed Soviet concerns, and the de-
feat of the Greek Communists signiªed the demise of the armed revolution-
ary insurrections that had deªned the development of Europe in the interwar
and wartime years.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Mark Mazower and Thanasis Sªkas for providing
critical comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Thanks also go to
Nicholas Levis for his help with editing.

84. Georgi Dimitrov, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949, ed. by Ivo Banac (New Haven: Yale
University Press), p. 443.

87