G.R. No. 179382               January 14, 2013
Peña and Gaddi even admitted their negligence during the
SPOUSES BENJAMIN C. MAMARIL AND SONIA P. MAMARIL,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AIB SECURITY AGENCY,
INC., CESARIO PEÑA,* AND VICENTE GADDI, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the May 31,
2007 Decision1 and August 16, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75978. The dispositive portion
of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 28, 2001 and the
Order dated June 11, 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 39 is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that only
defendants AIB Security Agency, Inc., Cesario Peña and Vicente
Gaddi are held jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiffs-
appellees Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00)
representing the cost of the lost vehicle, and to pay the cost of
suit. The other monetary awards are DELETED for lack of merit
and/or basis.
Defendant-Appellant Boy Scout of the Philippines is absolved
from any liability.
SO ORDERED.3
The Antecedent Facts
Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril (Sps.
Mamaril) are jeepney operators since 1971. They would park
their six (6) passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of
the Philippines' (BSP) compound located at 181 Concepcion
Street, Malate, Manila for a fee of ₱300.00 per month for each
unit. On May 26, 1995 at 8 o'clock in the evening, all these
vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound. The following
morning, however, one of the vehicles with Plate No. DCG 392
was missing and was never recovered. 4 According to the
security guards Cesario Peña (Peña) and Vicente Gaddi (Gaddi)
of AIB Security Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had
contracted5 for its security and protection, a male person who
looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the
compound.
On November 20, 1996, Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint 6 for
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 39, against BSP, AIB, Peña and Gaddi. In support
thereof, Sps. Mamaril averred that the loss of the subject
vehicle was due to the gross negligence of the above-named
security guards on-duty who allowed the subject vehicle to be
driven out by a stranger despite their agreement that only
Torts Cases Page 1 of 55
authorized drivers duly endorsed by the owners could do so.
ensuing investigation. Notwithstanding, BSP and AIB did not
heed Sps. Mamaril's demands for a conference to settle the
matter. They therefore prayed that Peña and Gaddi, together
with AIB and BSP, be held liable for: (a) the value of the subject
vehicle and its accessories in the aggregate amount of
₱300,000.00; (b) ₱275.00 representing daily loss of
income/boundary reckoned from the day the vehicle was lost;
(c) exemplary damages; (d) moral damages; (e) attorney's fees;
and (f) cost of suit.
In its Answer,7 BSP denied any liability contending that not only
did Sps. Mamaril directly deal with AIB with respect to the
manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, but
the parking ticket8 itself expressly stated that the
"Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any
of its accessories or article left therein." It also claimed that
Sps. Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract.
Apart from not being parties thereto, its provisions cover only
the protection of BSP's properties, its officers, and employees.
In addition to the foregoing defenses, AIB alleged that it has
observed due diligence in the selection, training and
supervision of its security guards while Peña and Gaddi claimed
that the person who drove out the lost vehicle from the BSP
compound represented himself as the owners' authorized
driver and had with him a key to the subject vehicle. Thus, they
contended that Sps. Mamaril have no cause of action against
them.
The RTC Ruling
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision 9 dated
November 28, 2001 in favor of Sps. Mamaril. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants Boy Scout of the Philippines and AIB Security
Agency, with security guards Cesario Pena and Vicente Gaddi: -
1. To pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the cost of
the vehicle which is ₱250,000.00 plus accessories of
₱50,000.00;
2. To pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the daily
loss of the income/boundary of the said jeepney to be
reckoned fromits loss up to the final adjudication of
the case, which is ₱275.00 a day;
3. To pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs moral
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
4. To pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
 5. To pay jointly and severally the attorney's fees of
₱50,000.00 and appearances in court the amount of
₱1,500.00 per appearance; and
6. To pay cost.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC found that the act of Peña and Gaddi in allowing the
entry of an unidentified person and letting him drive out the
subject vehicle in violation of their internal agreement with Sps.
Mamaril constituted gross negligence, rendering AIB and its
security guards liable for the former's loss. BSP was also
adjudged liable because the Guard Service Contract it entered
into with AIB offered protection to all properties inside the BSP
premises, which necessarily included Sps. Mamaril's vehicles.
Moreover, the said contract stipulated AIB's obligation to
indemnify BSP for all losses or damages that may be caused by
any act or negligence of its security guards. Accordingly, the
BSP, AIB, and security guards Peña and Gaddi were held jointly
and severally liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
On June 11, 2002, the RTC modified its decision reducing the
cost of the stolen vehicle from ₱250,000.00 to ₱200,000.00. 11
Only BSP appealed the foregoing disquisition before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision,12 the CA affirmed the finding of
negligence on the part of security guards Peña and Gaddi.
However, it absolved BSP from any liability, holding that the
Guard Service Contract is purely between BSP and AIB and that
there was nothing therein that would indicate any obligation
and/or liability on the part of BSP in favor of third persons, such
as Sps. Mamaril. Nor was there evidence sufficient to establish
that BSP was negligent.
It further ruled that the agreement between Sps. Mamaril and
BSP was substantially a contract of lease whereby the former
paid parking fees to the latter for the lease of parking slots. As
such, the lessor, BSP, was not an insurer nor bound to take care
and/or protect the lessees' vehicles.
On the matter of damages, the CA deleted the award of
₱50,000.00 representing the value of the accessories inside the
lost vehicle and the ₱275.00 a day for loss of income in the
absence of proof to support them. It also deleted the award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees for lack of
factual and legal bases.
Sps. Mamaril's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied
in the August 16, 2007 Resolution.13
Issues Before the Court
Torts Cases Page 2 of 55
Hence, the instant petition based on the following assignment
of errors, to wit:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ABSOLVING RESPONDENT BOY SCOUT OF
THE PHILIPPINES FROM ANY LIABILITY.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS MISTAKE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE GUARD
SERVICE CONTRACT IS PURELY BETWEEN BOY SCOUT
OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND AIB SECURITY AGENCY, INC., AND IN
HOLDING THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING IN
THE SAID CONTRACT THAT WOULD INDICATE ANY
OBLIGATION AND/OR LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE
PARTIES THEREIN IN FAVOR OF THIRD PERSONS, SUCH
AS PETITIONERS HEREIN.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF LAW
WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PETITIONERS A
CONTRACT OF LEASE, WHEREBY THE BOY SCOUT IS
NOT DUTY BOUND TO PROTECT OR TAKE CARE OF
PETITIONERS' VEHICLES.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.14
In fine, Sps. Mamaril maintain that: (1) BSP should be held
liable for the loss of their vehicle based on the Guard Service
Contract and the parking ticket it issued; and (2) the CA erred in
deleting the RTC awards of damages and attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person, who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Similarly,
Article 2176 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate cause of the
loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security
guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to
drive out the subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined
as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury or loss, and without which the result would not have
occurred.15
Moreover, Peña and Gaddi failed to refute Sps. Mamaril's
contention16 that they readily admitted being at fault during the
investigation that ensued.
On the other hand, the records are bereft of any finding of
negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no reversible error was
committed by the CA in absolving it from any liability for the
loss of the subject vehicle based on fault or negligence.
Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article
218017 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It is uncontested that
Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP
pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no
employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the
security guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the
latter's negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but should
be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi. 18
In the case of Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, 19 the Court enunciated
thus:
It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits,
hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards,
the agency is the employer of such guards and watchmen.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security
guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients
or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client or
customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who
among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by
the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the
guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded
from the client whose premises or property are protected by
the security guards. The fact that a client company may give
instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it,
does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer
of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful
acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily
no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for
services entered into with the security agency. 20
Nor can it be said that a principal-agent relationship existed
between BSP and the security guards Peña and Gaddi as to
make the former liable for the latter's complained act. Article
1868 of the Civil Code states that "by the contract of agency, a
Torts Cases Page 3 of 55
person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter." The basis for agency
therefore is representation,21 which element is absent in the
instant case. Records show that BSP merely hired the services
of AIB, which, in turn, assigned security guards, solely for the
protection of its properties and premises. Nowhere can it be
inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was appointed
as an agent of BSP. Instead, what the parties intended was a
pure principal-client relationship whereby for a consideration,
AIB rendered its security services to BSP.
Notwithstanding, however, Sps. Mamaril insist that BSP should
be held liable for their loss on the basis of the Guard Service
Contract that the latter entered into with AIB and their parking
agreement with BSP.
Such contention cannot be sustained.
Article 1311 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is
not liable beyond the value of the property he received from
the decedent.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third
person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is
not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
Thus, in order that a third person benefited by the second
paragraph of Article 1311, referred to as a stipulation pour
autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites
must concur: (1) There is a stipulation in favor of a third person;
(2) The stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3)
The contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a
favor to the third person - the favor is not merely incidental; (4)
The favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) The third
person communicated his or her acceptance of the favor
before its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not
represent, or are not authorized, by the third party. 22 However,
none of the foregoing elements obtains in this case.
It is undisputed that Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard
Service Contract.1âwphi1 Neither did the subject agreement
contain any stipulation pour autrui. And even if there was, Sps.
Mamaril did not convey any acceptance thereof. Thus, under
the principle of relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim
any rights or favor under the said agreement. 23 As correctly
found by the CA:
First, the Guard Service Contract between defendant-appellant
BSP and defendant AIB Security Agency is purely between the
parties therein. It may be observed that although the whereas
clause of the said agreement provides that defendant-appellant
desires security and protection for its compound and all
properties therein, as well as for its officers and employees,
while inside the premises, the same should be correlated with
paragraph 3(a) thereof which provides that the security agency
shall indemnify defendant-appellant for all losses and damages
suffered by it attributable to any act or negligence of the
former's guards.
Otherwise stated, defendant-appellant sought the services of
defendant AIB Security Agency for the purpose of the security
and protection of its properties, as well as that of its officers
and employees, so much so that in case of loss of [sic] damage
suffered by it as a result of any act or negligence of the guards,
the security agency would then be held responsible therefor.
There is absolutely nothing in the said contract that would
indicate any obligation and/or liability on the part of the parties
therein in favor of third persons such as herein plaintiffs-
appellees.24
Moreover, the Court concurs with the finding of the CA that the
contract between the parties herein was one of lease 25 as
defined under Article 164326 of the Civil Code. It has been held
that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a
fixed amount, is a lease.27 Even in a majority of American cases,
it has been ruled that where a customer simply pays a fee,
parks his car in any available space in the lot, locks the car and
takes the key with him, the possession and control of the car,
necessary elements in bailment, do not pass to the parking lot
operator, hence, the contractual relationship between the
parties is one of lease.28
In the instant case, the owners parked their six (6) passenger
jeepneys inside the BSP compound for a monthly fee of
₱300.00 for each unit and took the keys home with them.
Hence, a lessor-lessee relationship indubitably existed between
them and BSP. On this score, Article 1654 of the Civil Code
provides that "the lessor (BSP) is obliged: (1) to deliver the
thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as
to render it fit for the use intended; (2) to make on the same
during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it
suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless there
is a stipulation to the contrary; and (3) to maintain the lessee in
the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the
entire duration of the contract." In relation thereto, Article
1664 of the same Code states that "the lessor is not obliged to
answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may
cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a
direct action against the intruder." Here, BSP was not remiss in
its obligation to provide Sps. Mamaril a suitable parking space
for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to secure the
premises; hence, it should not be held liable for the loss
suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
Torts Cases Page 4 of 55
It bears to reiterate that the subject loss was caused by the
negligence of the security guards in allowing a stranger to drive
out plaintiffs-appellants' vehicle despite the latter's instructions
that only their authorized drivers may do so. Moreover, the
agreement with respect to the ingress and egress of Sps.
Mamaril's vehicles were coordinated only with AIB and its
security guards,29 without the knowledge and consent of BSP.
Accordingly, the mishandling of the parked vehicles that
resulted in herein complained loss should be recovered only
from the tort feasors (Peña and Gaddi) and their employer, AIB;
and not against the lessor, BSP.30
Anent Sps. Mamaril's claim that the exculpatory clause:
"Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any
of its accessories or article left therein" 31 contained in the BSP
issued parking ticket was void for being a contract of adhesion
and against public policy, suffice it to state that contracts of
adhesion are not void per se. It is binding as any other ordinary
contract and a party who enters into it is free to reject the
stipulations in its entirety. If the terms thereof are accepted
without objection, as in this case, where plaintiffs-appellants
have been leasing BSP's parking space for more or less 20
years,32 then the contract serves as the law between them. 33
Besides, the parking fee of ₱300.00 per month or ₱10.00 a day
for each unit is too minimal an amount to even create an
inference that BSP undertook to be an insurer of the safety of
plaintiffs-appellants' vehicles.
On the matter of damages, the Court noted that while Sonia P.
Mamaril testified that the subject vehicle had accessories
worth around !J50,000.00, she failed to present any receipt to
substantiate her claim.34 Neither did she submit any record or
journal that would have established the purported ₱275.00 35
daily earnings of their jeepney. It is axiomatic that actual
damages must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty
and a party is entitled only to such compensation for the
pecuniary loss that was duly proven. Thus, absent any
competent proof of the amount of damages sustained, the CA
properly deleted the said awards.36
Similarly, the awards of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees were properly disallowed by the CA for lack of
factual and legal bases. While the RTC granted these awards in
the dispositive portion of its November 28, 2001 decision, it
failed to provide sufficient justification therefor. 37
WHEREFORE premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED. The May 31, 2007 Decision and August 16, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75978 are
AFFIRMFED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116624 September 20, 1996
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DIVINA VDA. DE DIONISIO, for herself
and in behalf of her minor children MARK ANGELO and MA.
LIZA, both surnamed DIONISIO, respondents.
 
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The wages earned by Mario Dionisio were the lifeblood of his
family — his wife Divina and their children Mark Angelo and
Ma. Liza, both minors. A work-related disruption unfortunately
abruptly ended the means of livelihood of Mario prompting his
defendant family to sue his employer and co-employee for
damages.
On 2 November 1990, at about 3:30 in the afternoon,
petitioner's Baliwag Transit Bus No. 117 was driven by Juanito
Fidel to its terminal on 2nd Avenue, Caloocan City, for repair of
its brake system. Juanito Fidel told mechanic Mario Dionisio to
inform the headman about the matters so that proper order to
the mechanics could be made. Fidel then alighted from the bus
and told the gasman to fill up the gas tank.
Shortly after, Juanito Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the
driver's seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt something was
hit. When he went down to investigate he saw Mario Dionisio
lying on the ground bleeding and convulsive, sandwiched
between Bus No. 117 and another bus parked thereat owned
by the same petitioner. Fidel summoned his co-employees and
they all helped to extricate Mario Dionisio. They rushed him to
St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. On 6 November 1990
however he expired as evidenced by his Certificate of Death
issued 22 November 1990.
Thereafter a complaint for damages was lodged by private
respondents Divina Vda. de Dionisio, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children Mark Angelo and Ma. Liza as heirs of the
deceased, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On 3
February 1993 the trial court rendered a decision ordering
petitioner Baliwag Transit, Inc., and its employee Juanito Fidel
jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Mario Dionisio the
following amounts: P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P10,000.00
as attorney's fees, P3,000.00 as funeral expenses, and costs of
suit.1
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on
23 March 1994 rendered a decision modifying the appealed
judgment and ordering petitioners instead to pay jointly and
severally, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P1,429,050.00 for
loss of earning capacity, P3,000.00 for funeral expenses,
P60,000.00 for moral damages, P30,000.00 for exemplary
damages, P50,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit2
Torts Cases Page 5 of 55
On 8 August 1994 the motion to reconsider the decision was
denied.3 Hence, this petition.
Petitioners maintain that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the appealed judgment despite the contributory
negligence of the deceased Mario Dionisio, i.e., in failing to
take the necessary precaution while doing repair work on the
brake system of Bus No. 117, and that the increase of the
award of damages in unreasonable being unsupported by law
and the evidence.
The petition must fail. The circumstances clearly show that the
proximate cause of the death of Mario Dionisio was the
negligence of driver Juanito Fidel when he failed to take the
necessary precaution to prevent the accident. He boarded his
bus, sat on the driver's seat and was at the steering wheel
when the bus moved pinning down the deceased who was
repairing the defective brake system below. Driver Fidel should
have parked the bus properly and safely. After alighting from
the bus to tell the gasman to fill the tank, he should have
placed a stopper or any hard object against a tire or two of the
bus. But without taking the necessary precaution he boarded
Bus No. 117 causing it to move and roll, pinning down the
deceased which resulted in his serious injuries and eventual
death. The reckless imprudence of Juanito Fidel makes him
liable to the heirs of offended party for damages together with
his employer. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides —
Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Complementing Art 2176 is Art. 2180 which
states —
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible . . .
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry . . .
The responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Article 2180, in relation to Art. 2176, of the Civil Code provides Article 2231 also awards exemplary damages if the defendant
that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the acted with gross negligence, as Juanito did, when he moved
damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the Bus No. 117 without first ascertaining if the repair of its break
negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption system was already undertaken. Exemplary damages having
of the law that there was negligence on the part of the been awarded, recovery of attorney's fees follows under Art.
employer either in the selection of his employee or in the 2208, par. (1), of the Civil Code.
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after
such selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by a WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent Court
clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised of Appeals subject of the instant petition are MODIFIED as
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the follows: petitioner BALIWAG TRANSIT INC., and JUANITO FIDEL
selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Mario
solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the Dionisio (a) P50,000.00 for death indemnity, (b) P712,002.16
employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such for loss of earning capacity, (c) P3,000.00 for funeral expenses,
degree of care.4 Petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised (d) P40,000.00 for moral damages, (e) P15,000.00 for
the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection exemplary damages (f) P20,000.00 for attorney's fees, and, (g)
and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it solidarily to pay the costs of suit.
liable with the latter for damages caused by him.
SO ORDERED.
As regards the reasonableness of the damages awarded, under
Art. 1764, in conjunction with Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, as
well as established jurisprudence, several factors are
considered, namely: (a) life expectancy (considering the health
of the deceased and the mortality table being deemed
conclusive) and loss of earning capacity; (b) pecuniary loss, loss
of support and service; and (c) moral and mental sufferings.
The loss of earnings capacity is based mainly on two factors,
namely, the number of years on the basis of which the
damages shall be computed, and the rate at which the loss
sustained by the heirs should be fixed.5

Finding discrepancies in the computation of respondent Court

of Appeals, we here opine that the correct computation of the
loss of earning capacity of the deceased, considering that he
was the sole bread-winner of the family and only 29 years old
when he met his untimely death, should be based on the
formula: 2/3 x 51 (80 - 29 [age at time of death]) = life
expectancy. Thus —

P33,273.60 — gross annual income (P2,772.80 x 12

mos.)
Add: 4,244.64 — gross annual allowance (P353.72 x 12
mos.)
3,199.00 — 13th month pay
P40,717.24 — total annual income
Less: 6,000.00 — annual expenses (P500.00 x 12 mos.)
13,776.00 — annual pension (P1,148.00 x 12 mos.)
P20,941.24 — total annual net income
Multiply: 34 — life expectancy of Mario (2/3 x 51 [80
-29
{age at date of death}])
P712,002.16 — total loss of earning capacity

Article 2206 grants the spouse, legitimate descendants and

ascendants of the deceased moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of death. Indisputably, the heirs of Mario suffered no
small amount of mental anguish brought about by the manner
he died and bearing in mind that he was the sole breadwinner
of the family.
Torts Cases Page 6 of 55
G.R. No. 82465             February 25, 1991
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO
NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN,
TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND
PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION
and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.
Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.
Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of
Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby
affirmed, with the following modifications: (1)
Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are
hereby awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual
damages of P30,000.00, moral damages of P20,000.00
and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00
awarded to plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2)
St. Francis High School, represented by the Spouses
Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and
Benjamin Illumin, are hereby held jointly and severally
liable with defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chaves,
Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment to
plaintiffs of the abovementioned actual damages,
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's
fees, and for costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and
Nida Aragones are hereby absolved from liability, and
the case against them, together with their respective
counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman
student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to
join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents,
respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz
Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join
but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the
picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after
doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers,
Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand,
were in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently
drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to
her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who
drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him
Torts Cases Page 7 of 55
ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya,
Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he
was pronounced dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as
Civil Case No. 8834, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of
Lucena City, against the St. Francis High School, represented by
the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin
Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito
Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria
Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from
the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo.
Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of
the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father
of the family in preventing their son's drowning, respondents
prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against
petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro
and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay
respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages,
P20,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs. The court a quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this
Court believes that the defendant teachers namely:
Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly
Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to
exercise the diligence required of them by law under
the circumstances to guard against the harm they had
foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)
x x x           x x x          x x x
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and
Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning
incident had already occurred, such fact does not and
cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could
be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their
duty to safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)
The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years
old), were easily attracted to the sea without
aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the
precautions and reminders allegedly performed by the
defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the
standard required by law under the circumstances.
While the defendants-teachers admitted that some
parts of the sea where the picnic was held are deep,
the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even
actually go to the water to test the depth of the
particular area where the children would swim. And
indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area
was dangerous was confirmed by the fact that three
persons during the picnic got drowned at the same
 time. Had the defendant teachers made an actual and
physical observation of the water before they allowed
the students to swim, they could have found out that
the area where the children were swimming was
indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male
teachers who according to the female teachers were
there to supervise the children to ensure their safety
were not even at the area where the children were
swimming. They were somewhere and as testified to
by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking
spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against
the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora
Cadorna. Said the court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot
find sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a
school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has been
shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and
Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of
Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant
teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin
Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in
fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant
Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise
and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly
invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class
I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Respondents-spouses assigned the following errors
committed by the trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not declaring the
defendant St. Francis High School and its
administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as equally
liable not only for its approved co-curricular activities
but also for those which they unreasonably failed to
exercise control and supervision like the holding of
picnic in the dangerous water of Talaan Beach,
Sariaya, Quezon.
2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St.
Francis High School and principal Benjamin Illumin as
jointly and solidarily liable with their co-defendants-
teachers Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death
of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at Talaan Beach,
Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20, 1982.
3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher
amount for actual and moral damages for the
untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in
favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all the
defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
Torts Cases Page 8 of 55
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in question was
not a school-sponsored activity, nonetheless it cannot
be gainsaid that the same was held under the
supervision of the teachers employed by the said
school, particularly the teacher in charge of Class I-C to
whom the victim belonged, and those whom she
invited to help her in supervising the class during the
picnic. Considering that the court a quo found
negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers
who, as such, were charged with the supervision of
the children during the picnic, the St. Francis High
School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are
liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st,
4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse
that the picnic was not an "extra-curricular activity of
the St. Francis High School." We find from the
evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the
school principal had knowledge of the picnic even
from its planning stage and had even been invited to
attend the affair; and yet he did not express any
prohibition against undertaking the picnic, nor did he
prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted
during the picnic. At the least, We must find that the
school and the responsible school officials, particularly
the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to the
holding of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and
defendant school principal must be found jointly and
severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the
damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the
death of their son. It is the rule that in cases where the
above-cited provisions find application, the negligence
of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives
rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the
owner and/or manager of the establishment (in the
present case, St. Francis High School and its principal);
and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be
overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that
the owner and/or manager exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and/or supervision of the employee or employees
causing the injury or damage (in this case, the
defendants-teachers). The record does not disclose
such evidence as would serve to overcome the
aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High
School and its principal from liability under the above-
cited provisions.
As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-
appellants, while We cannot but commiserate with the
plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the
untimely death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and
understand their suffering as parents, especially the
victim's mother who, according to appellants, suffered
 a nervous breakdown as a result of the tragedy, We
find that the amounts fixed by the court a quo as
actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those
which are sustained by the evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or corrective
damages in the amount of P20,000.00 may and should
be, as it is hereby, imposed in the present case by way
of example of correction for the public good, pursuant
to Article 2229 of the Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following
errors committed by the trial court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso
de Chavez, Luisito Vinas, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and
Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and
severally liable for damages such finding not being
supported by facts and evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by
the defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is
that plaintiffs, the parents of the victim Ferdinand
Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that
they did not give their son consent to join the picnic in
question. However, We agree with the trial court in its
finding that whether or not the victim's parents had
given such permission to their son was immaterial to
the determination of the existence of liability on the
part of the defendants for the damage incurred by the
plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their
son. What is material to such a determination is
whether or not there was negligence on the part of
defendants vis-a-vis the supervision of the victim's
group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the
trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has
been satisfactorily established by the evidence, as
already pointed out.
However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as
two of the defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones, are concerned. As to them, the trial court
found:
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly
Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic
site, the drowning incident had already
occurred, such fact does not and cannot
excuse them from their liability. In fact, it
could be said that by coming late, they were
remiss in their duty to safeguard the
students.
Torts Cases Page 9 of 55
The evidence shows that these two defendants had
satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to
the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the
entrance examination being conducted by the school
which is part of their duty as teachers thereof. Since
they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence
in question, it cannot be said that they had any
participation in the negligence attributable to the
other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise
diligence in the supervision of the children during the
picnic and which failure resulted in the drowning of
plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or
omission to the two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury caused
to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son
resulting from his drowning at the picnic. Accordingly,
they must be absolved from any liability.
As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-
appellants, We agree with the court a quo that the
counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp.
59-60, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
The issues presented by petitioners are:
A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable
to the defendants which will warrant the award of
damages to the plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of
the New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral
damages is proper under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)
In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of
their own negligence or the negligence of people under them.
In the instant case however, as will be shown hereunder,
petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty
of the negligence of those under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any
negligence. Consequently they cannot be held liable for
damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses,
parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the
excursion.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores
Q Now, when your son asked you for money
to buy food, did you not ask him where he
will bring this?
A I asked him where he was going, he
answered, I am going to the picnic, and when
I asked him where, he did not answer, sir.
Q And after giving the money, you did not tell
him anything more?
A No more, sir.
Q And after that you just learned that your
son join the picnic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you came to know of it after the news
that your son was drowned in the picnic came
to you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to
12:00 o'clock noon of March 20, 1982, you
did not know that your son join the picnic?
A No, sir, I did not know.
Q Did you not look for your son during that
time?
A I am too busy with my profession, that is
why I was not able, sir.
Q You did not ask your wife?
A I did not, sir.
Q And neither did your wife tell you that your
son join the picnic?
A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you were too busy
that you did not inquire whether your son
have joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984
witness Romulo Castillo)
Torts Cases Page 10 of 55
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the
picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of
consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:
Q How did you conduct this mental and
physical examination?
A I have interviewed several persons and the
patient herself She even felt guilty about the
death of her son because she cooked adobo
for him so he could join the excursion where
her son died of drowning.
Q Why were you able to say she was feeling
guilty because she was the one who
personally cooked the adobo for her son?
A It was during the interview that I had
gathered it from the patient herself. She was
very sorry had she not allowed her son to join
the excursion her son would have not
drowned. I don't know if she actually
permitted her son although she said she
cooked adobo so he could join. (Emphasis
Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30,
1984, Dr. Lazaro — witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying
Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school
liable for the death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may
be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage or prejudice must have
occurred while an employee was in the performance of his
assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the
actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school day
and most importantly while the teachers and students were
holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the
beginning that the incident happened while some members of A Yes, sir.
the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at
Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer
or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a responding to your application of first aid?
school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-
curricular activity. A Yes, sir.

As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by Q You have never been disturbed,
petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the "nababahala" in the process of your
students and their teachers does not in any way or in any application of the first aid on the body of
manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the Ferdinand Castillo?
same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in
law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were
A No, sir, because we were attending to the
to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score,
application of first aid that we were doing, sir.
employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of
being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions
Q After you have applied back to back
of the employees even if such act or omission he committed
pressure and which you claimed the boy did
while they are not in the performance of their duties.
not respond, were you not disturb anyway?
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-
A I was disturbed during that time, sir.
teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-
spouses.
Q For how many minutes have you applied
the back to back pressure?
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section
where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward A From 9 to 11 times, sir.
incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and the pressure of your body on the body of
Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters Ferdinand Castillo?
who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified A Yes, sir.
that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers
especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. Q Will you please describe how you applied a
85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez single act of back to back pressure?
and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.
A This has been done by placing the boy lay
Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination, first downwards, then the face was a little bit
facing right and doing it by massaging the
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand back of the child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35,
Castillo, you approached the boy and claim hearing of July 30, 1984)
also having applied first aid on him?
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. FLORES:
Q And while you were applying the so called
first aid, the children were covering you up or Q Who actually applied the first aid or
were surrounding you? artificial respiration to the child?

A Yes, sir. A Myself, sir.

Q You were rattled at that time, is it not? Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?

A No, sir.

Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful

condition?
Torts Cases Page 11 of 55
 A The first step that I took, with the help of
Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I applied back to back
pressure and took notice of the condition of
the child. We placed the feet in a higher
position, that of the head of the child, sir.
required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the
safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were
able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence.
Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes
baseless.

Q After you have placed the boy in that
particular position, where the feet were on a
higher level than that of the head, what did
you do next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly
myself, was that after putting the child in that
position, I applied the back to back pressure
and started to massage from the waistline up,
but I noticed that the boy was not
responding, sir.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated
November 19, 1987, finding petitioners herein guilty of
negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and
awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE
insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned, but the portion
of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there being
no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Q For how long did you apply this back to

back pressure on the boy?

A About 10 seconds, sir.

Q What about Mr. Vinas?

A Almost the same a little longer, for 15

seconds, sir.

Q After you noticed that the boy was not

responding, what did you do?

A When we noticed that the boy was not

responding, we changed the position of the
boy by placing the child facing upwards laying
on the sand then we applied the mouth to
mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)

With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages

may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at
bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral
damages.

Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering,

mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.

Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are

not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages
can be assessed against them.

While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent

to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the
petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the
Torts Cases Page 12 of 55
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P.
SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR.,
respondents.
Bedona & Bedona Law Office for petitioner.
Rhodora G. Kapunan for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan,
seek reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on
October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of
Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate court's
conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relationship
between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The
Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries
caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an
authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly
and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a
working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not
considered an employee of the petitioner.
The private respondents assert that the circumstances
obtaining in the present case call for the application of Article
2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee
of the petitioner. The private respondents maintain that under
Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse against the
servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the
incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of
the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha
allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride
without the knowledge of the school authorities.
After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found
by the trial court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders
its decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision
penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in
by Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying
Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court decision which ordered the payment of the P20,000.00
liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00
moral damages, P4,000.00 litigation and actual expenses, and
P3,000.00 attorney's fees.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a
part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in
relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to
Torts Cases Page 13 of 55
clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning
of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the
driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle
while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is
significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the
house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa.
Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed
free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after
driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and
viewing that the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79)
According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring
lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to
avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not
stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the
pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in
the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan
affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the
right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in
Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a
security guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that
there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after
driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had
to go back to school and then drive home using the same
vehicle.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school
president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in
furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job
demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to
fetch students in the morning of the next school day.
It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school
president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven
home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that
the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's
possession of a student driver's license and his desire to
undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the
direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a
joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the
service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577,
80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for World
Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618
[1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that
the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one
done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing
that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The
clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes
of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes
any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of
the infliction of the injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va
906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the employee
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the
existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210
NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937
[1937])
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor
Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only
for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions
of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly,
Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which
the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what
records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll;
and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of
resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as
compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working
conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of
the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the
distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
against a working student of a school and against the school
itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on
conditions of employment between an alleged employee and
an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a
person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence,
the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the
primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be
used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case
an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or
reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia v.
Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not
have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that
Torts Cases Page 14 of 55
the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent
act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the
incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact
that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting
within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the
petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family
over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation
of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v.
Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987])
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the
necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act
indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set
forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its
employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the
official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer
president from authorizing another employee to drive the
school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove
that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against
the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for
injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha
drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768,
772 [1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the
vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. (Umali
v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200
[1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989];
Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989];
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989])
The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against
the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the
heirs of the plaintiff.
It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep,
Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case
for damages. This is quite understandable considering that as
far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was
concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the
vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to
drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer
without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the
consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for
the petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose of
recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is
enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were
able to establish the existence of employer-employee
relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the
fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an
independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the
business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the
part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily
demonstrated.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision

dated October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court
decision is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Torts Cases Page 15 of 55

CECILIA YAMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
MELCHORITA C. ZUÑIGA, LEOVIGILDO C. ZUÑIGA, REGINALDO
C. ZUÑIGA, AND THE MINORS, HERMINIGILDO C. ZUÑIGA, JR.,
AND LOVELY EMILY C. ZUÑIGA - both represented by their
legal guardian, the aforenamed MELCHORITA C. ZUÑIGA,
respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set
aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated September
8, 2000, in CA-G.R. CV No. 52275. The appellate court affirmed
the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City,
Bulacan, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 581-M-92, finding herein
petitioner, among others, liable for the untimely death of
Herminigildo Zuñiga in a vehicular accident and ordering her to
indemnify his legal heirs, the respondents herein. Also
challenged in this petition is the resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 27, 2000, denying the petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Cecilia Yambao is the registered owner of "Lady Cecil
and Rome Trans" passenger bus with Plate No. CVK 606, with a
public transport franchise to ply the Novaliches-via Quirino-
Alabang route.
The respondents are the legal heirs of the late Herminigildo
Zuñiga. Melchorita Zuñiga is the surviving spouse, while
Leovigildo, Reginaldo, Herminigildo, Jr., and Lovely Emily are
their children.
The facts, as established by the trial court and affirmed by the
appellate court, are as follows:
At around 3:30 p.m. of May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the
petitioner was being driven by her driver, one Ceferino G.
Venturina along the northbound lane of Epifanio delos Santos
Avenue (EDSA), within the vicinity of Bagong Barrio, Kalookan
City. With Venturina was the bus conductor, Fernando
Dumaliang. Suddenly, the bus bumped Herminigildo Zuñiga, a
pedestrian. Such was the force of the impact that the left side
of the front windshield of the bus was cracked. Zuñiga was
rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was given
medical attention, but due to the massive injuries sustained, he
succumbed shortly thereafter.
Private respondents, as heirs of the victim, filed a Complaint4
against petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 581-M-92 at the RTC of Malolos City.
The complaint essentially alleged that Venturina drove the bus
in a reckless, careless and imprudent manner, in violation of
traffic rules and regulations, without due regard to public
safety, thus resulting in the victim’s premature death.
Torts Cases Page 16 of 55
In her Answer, the petitioner vehemently denied the material
allegations of the complaint. She tried to shift the blame for the
accident upon the victim, theorizing that Herminigildo bumped
into her bus, while avoiding an unidentified woman who was
chasing him. She further alleged that she was not liable for any
damages because as an employer, she exercised the proper
diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection and
supervision of her bus driver.
On September 8, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
ordering the herein defendants jointly and severally, with
Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., and Times Surety & Insurance
Co. Inc. to the extent of their respective liabilities under their
respective insurance policies to pay the herein plaintiffs the
following sums of money:
1. ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Herminigildo Zuñiga;
2. ₱92,000.00 as funeral expenses;
3. ₱200,000.00 as moral damages;
4. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
6. ₱5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of the suit
to be paid by all the herein defendants and third party
defendants within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision.
The counterclaim of the defendant Cecilia Yambao is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
In finding for the respondents herein, the trial court observed:
[T]he allegations and evidence presented by the defendants
that it was the victim Herminigildo Zuñiga who bumped the bus
owned by defendant Cecilia Yambao and her husband… is
incredible if not preposterous. No sane person would bump his
head or body against a running bus along a big highway like
EDSA at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and neither did any of the
defendants presented (sic) any evidence or proof to show that
the victim was mentally deranged at the time of the accident
and the presumption therefore is that he was in his normal
senses.6
In holding the petitioner liable for Herminigildo’s death, the
trial court applied Article 17567 of the Civil Code, observing
that petitioner had failed to prove that she observed the
diligence required by Articles 17338 and 17559 of the said
Code.
Dissatisfied, Yambao filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52275, faulting the trial court for
failing to appreciate that: (a) it was the victim who ran into her
bus, and (b) she had exercised the proper diligence of a bonus
pater familias in the selection and supervision of her employee,
the driver of said bus.
On September 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R.
CV No. 52275 as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing modificatory premises, and
considering that the same result has been reached by the trial
court, its Decision dated September 8, 1995 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.10
While sustaining the trial court’s findings that Venturina had
been reckless and negligent in driving the petitioner’s bus, thus
hitting the victim with fatal results, the appellate court,
however, found the trial court’s reliance on Articles 1755 and
1756 of the Civil Code misplaced. It held that this was a case of
quasi-delict, there being no pre-existing contractual
relationship between the parties. Hence, the law on common
carriers was inapplicable. The court a quo then found the
petitioner directly and primarily liable as Venturina’s employer
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code as she failed to
present evidence to prove that she has observed the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
her employees.
Yambao then duly moved for reconsideration, but her motion
was denied for want of merit.11
Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following
formulation of issues:
I Court.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER, THE VICTIM HERMINIGILDO
ZUÑIGA WAS THE ONE WHO BUMPED THE BUS OWNED BY
HEREIN PETITIONER CECILIA YAMBAO AND HER HUSBAND AND
WHO DISREGARDED THE TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS AT
THE PLACE AND TIME OF THE INCIDENT WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY
AND CONCLUSIVELY PROVED THAT IT WAS THE PLAINTIFF’S
OWN NEGLIGENCE THAT WAS THE IMMEDIATE AND
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS DEATH.
Torts Cases Page 17 of 55
II
WHETHER OR NOT, PETITIONER CECILIA YAMBAO IS NOT
LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES AND THAT SHE EXERCISED THE
PROPER DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY, BOTH
IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF HER DRIVER AND/OR
EMPLOYEE.12
At the outset, we must state that the first issue raised by the
petitioner is a factual one. Whether a person is negligent or not
is a question of fact,13 which this Court cannot pass upon in a
petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law.14 The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the trial court and its findings on these matters are,
as a general rule, binding on this Court,15 more so where these
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.16 We have
carefully examined and weighed the petitioner’s arguments on
the first issue submitted, as well as the evidence on record, and
find no cogent reason to disregard the cited general rule, much
less to reverse the factual findings of the trial court as upheld
by the court a quo. Hence, we sustain the trial court’s finding,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was Venturina’s
reckless and imprudent driving of petitioner’s bus, which is the
proximate cause of the victim’s death.
To our mind, therefore, the only issue before the Court
properly is whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees, thus absolving her from any liability.
Petitioner contends that as an employer, she observed the
proper diligence of a good father of a family, both in the
selection and supervision of her driver and therefore, is
relieved from any liability for the latter’s misdeed. To support
her claim, she points out that when Venturina applied with her
as a driver in January 1992, she required him to produce not
just his driver’s license, but also clearances from the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police,
and the barangay where he resides. She also required him to
present his Social Security System (SSS) Number prior to
accepting him for employment. She likewise stresses that she
inquired from Venturina’s previous employer about his
employment record, and only hired him after it was shown to
her satisfaction that he had no blot upon his record.
The petitioner’s arguments ring hollow and fail to sway this
The law governing petitioner’s liability, as the employer of bus
driver Venturina, is Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the full text
of which reads:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 217617 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(Italics ours)
The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last
paragraph of the aforecited statute means diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees.18 Thus, when an
employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to
persons or property due to his own negligence, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, either
in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him
after the selection.19 For the employer to avoid the solidary
liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer
must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and
convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his
employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good
father of a family.20 In the instant case, we find that petitioner
has failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on her part.
Petitioner’s claim that she exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of her driver, Venturina, deserves but
scant consideration. Her allegation that before she hired
Venturina she required him to submit his driver’s license and
clearances is worthless, in view of her failure to offer in
evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances.
Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence.21 Moreover,
as the court a quo aptly observed, petitioner contradicts
herself. She declared that Venturina applied with her sometime
Torts Cases Page 18 of 55
in January 1992 and she then required him to submit his license
and clearances. However, the record likewise shows that she
did admit that Venturina submitted the said requirements only
on May 6, 1992, or on the very day of the fatal accident itself
(italics for emphasis). In other words, petitioner’s own
admissions clearly and categorically show that she did not
exercise due diligence in the selection of her bus driver.
In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his
license and clearances when he applied with petitioner in
January 1992, the latter still fails the test of due diligence in the
selection of her bus driver. Case law teaches that for an
employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family, he should not be satisfied with the applicant’s mere
possession of a professional driver’s license; he must also
carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service.22
Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to
this extent of verifying Venturina’s qualifications, safety record,
and driving history. The presumption juris tantum that there
was negligence in the selection of her bus driver, thus, remains
unrebutted.
Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision
over Venturina after his selection. For as pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present any proof that she
drafted and implemented training programs and guidelines on
road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of any
showing that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic
seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. Hence, petitioner
cannot claim exemption from any liability arising from the
recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
In sum, petitioner’s liability to private respondents for the
negligent and imprudent acts of her driver, Venturina, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and clear.
Petitioner, having failed to rebut the legal presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of her driver, is
responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the
relationship of pater familias or on the employer’s own
negligence.23 Thus, this Court has no option but to uphold the
ruling of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 8, 2000, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52275, as well as its resolution dated November
27, 2000, denying petitioner Cecilia Yambao’s motion for
reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163186             February 28, 2007
EMERLITO F. AGUILA and DANILO D. REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN R. BALDOVIZO, EDGAR R. BALDOVIZO, and
CARMELO R. BALDOVIZO, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse the Decision 1 dated
June 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73321,
and its Resolution2 dated April 1, 2004. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Amended Decision3 dated August 13, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 225, which
found petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages as a
consequence of the death of Fausto T. Baldovizo, spouse of
respondent Carmen R. Baldovizo, and father of respondents
Edgar and Carmelo Baldovizo.
The facts are as follows:
On April 19, 1993, at about 11:30 a.m., Marlun Lisbos was
driving, along the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in
Caloocan City, a van with Plate No. TER-883, registered under
the name of petitioner Danilo D. Reyes. The van sideswiped
Fausto who was walking along the pedestrian lane in front of
the Monumento Market in Caloocan City. He was crossing
EDSA. Fausto fell on the pavement and suffered injuries, and
was brought to the Manila Central University Hospital for
treatment. Subsequently, Fausto died on July 6, 1993.
On May 20, 1994, Marlun Lisbos was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide at the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 52.
On September 24, 1994, Fausto’s wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo,
and children, Edgar and Carmelo, filed before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 225, a separate complaint for damages
against Marlun Lisbos, Danilo D. Reyes, petitioner Emerlito F.
Aguila, the actual operator and possessor of the van, and Times
Surety and Insurance Company, the insurer of the van under a
third-party liability insurance contract.
Summons were served on the defendants except Marlun Lisbos
whose whereabouts were unknown according to the Sheriff’s
Report.
In his Answer, Aguila claimed that Fausto disregarded traffic
rules when he crossed EDSA; that Aguila exercised due
diligence in the selection of Lisbos as driver; and that Aguila
provided assistance and support during the hospitalization of
Fausto.
Torts Cases Page 19 of 55
On the other hand, Reyes denied ownership of the van.
Although the van was registered in his name, Reyes claimed
that Aguila was its actual possessor and operator. Hence, Reyes
claimed he could not be liable for damages.
Meanwhile, Times Surety and Insurance Company was declared
in default for failure to file an Answer.
After the parties failed to arrive at a settlement, trial ensued.
Petitioners were considered to have waived their right to
present their evidence due to their failure to appear on the
December 1, 1999 hearing.
On March 7, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision. Its
decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs Carmen, Edgar and Carmelo R.
Baldovizo and against the defendants Emerlito F. Aguila, Danilo
Reyes, Marlun G. Lisbos and Times Surety [a]nd Insurance Co.,
Inc., ordering the latter to jointly and severally pay the
following amounts:
1. ₱43,800.00 for loss of earning capacity
2. ₱110,700.00 for medical expenses and hospital bills;
and ₱15,800.07 for medicine expenses incurred after
confinement
3. ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity for the victim
4. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
5. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages
6. COSTS OF SUIT.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2000, petitioners Aguila and Reyes filed a petition
for relief from judgment before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
225. The trial court denied the petition in a Resolution dated
November 20, 2000.
Meanwhile, the Baldovizos moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution after the judgment in their favor attained finality.
However, petitioners filed (1) a motion for reconsideration of
the November 20, 2000 Resolution and (2) a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the certification
against forum shopping was defective.
On May 21, 2001, the trial court granted the motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution and denied petitioners’
motions.1awphi1.net
On June 26, 2001, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order for the issuance of the writ of execution and
informed the trial court of their intention to appeal the
November 20, 2000 Resolution denying their petition for relief
from judgment.5 Simultaneously, petitioners filed a second
motion for reconsideration of the November 20, 2000
Resolution.6
On August 13, 2001, the trial court denied the second motion
for reconsideration as well as the reconsideration of the order
for the issuance of the writ of execution. In addition, the trial
court resolved to strike off the name of Marlun Lisbos in the
dispositive portion of its March 7, 2000 Decision for having
been inadvertently included therein. The decretal portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Second Motion For
Reconsideration on the Resolutions/Orders denying the
petition for relief from judgment is hereby DENIED and the
Motion For Reconsideration To The Resolution Granting The
Issuance Of A Writ of Execution is likewise DENIED for lack of
merit.
Further, the name of defendant Marlun Lisbos is ordered
stricken off in the dispositive portion of the Decision dated
March 7, 2000 and the Court hereby issues an Amended
Decision.
SO ORDERED.7
Accordingly, the trial court issued an Amended Decision 8 dated
August 13, 2001, which deleted the name of Marlun Lisbos as a
party liable for damages.
Petitioners Aguila and Reyes appealed the Amended Decision
before the Court of Appeals. In denying the appeal for being
improper, the appellate court ruled that Aguila and Reyes had
lost their right to appeal. Since no appeal of the March 7, 2000
Decision was made within the reglementary period, the
decision became final and executory. The Amended Decision
did not give the parties a fresh period within which to file an
appeal. The appellate court also held that petitioners’ attempt
to revive their rights in the case failed after their petition for
relief from judgment was denied for lack of merit.
In any event, the appellate court sustained the Amended
Decision which deleted the name of Marlun Lisbos among the
parties held liable. The appellate court also denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.
The lone issue to be resolved in this case is: Do the petitioners
have the right to appeal the amended decision after the
original decision had become final and executory?
Torts Cases Page 20 of 55
Petitioners contend that while their right to appeal the March
7, 2000 Decision of the trial court had been lost, their right to
appeal the August 13, 2001 Amended Decision remained. They
claim that the Amended Decision superseded the original
decision because the amount of their liabilities increased as a
result of the exclusion of Marlun Lisbos. They add that the
Court of Appeals should have taken cognizance of their appeal
since their notice of appeal was approved by the trial court.
Petitioners invoke substantial justice for this Court to consider
the merits of the case which the appellate court failed to
address. They pray that they be absolved from liability.
We find petitioners’ contentions devoid of merit.
Under Section 2,9 Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or
final order becomes final and executory if no appeal or motion
for new trial or reconsideration was filed within the period
provided by the Rules.
Before a judgment becomes final and executory, that judgment
may be amended. Upon finality of the judgment, the court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. 10
Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc
pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party, or
where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be
amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. 11
This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is
subject only to a few exceptions. 12 None of the exceptions are
present in this case.
Upon review of the records of this case, we note that
petitioners received the March 7, 2000 Decision on April 24,
2000 and had until May 9, 2000 to file an appeal or a motion
for new trial or reconsideration. During this period, petitioners
filed instead a petition for relief from judgment on May 4,
2000. However, the trial court denied the petition.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, their petition for relief from
judgment was not the proper remedy because it is an
extraordinary remedy available only if there are no other
remedies. The remedies available to petitioners were the filing
of an appeal, motion for reconsideration, or motion for new
trial. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment did not toll the
running of the reglementary period and, accordingly, the
March 7, 2000 Decision became final and executory after the
lapse thereof.
Nevertheless, while the Resolution dated August 13, 2001,
correcting the March 7, 2000 Decision, stated that the name of
Marlun Lisbos was inadvertently included in the dispositive
portion, hence, said name was ordered stricken off, the ensuing
Amended Decision rendered on August 13, 2001 is null and
void because any amendment or alteration made which
substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction. 13 Although the rule that a
judgment that becomes final and executory cannot be
disturbed admits of exceptions, none of those are present in
this case.

Besides, it is not necessary to amend the original decision

holding the petitioners, Marlun Lisbos, and the insurance
company solidarily liable. In an action based on quasi-delict, the
liability of the employer is direct and primary, subject to the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee.14 Thus, even if the driver was included albeit not
served with summons, petitioners are directly and primarily
liable. Thus, petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer and
registered owner or possessor-operator of the van,
respectively, are solidarily liable in accordance with Article
218015 in relation to Articles 218416 and 219417 of the Civil Code.

In view of the foregoing, there is no basis for petitioners to

appeal the Amended Decision which is void. As for petitioners’
plea for substantial justice, time and again, we have reminded
the litigants that the Rules of Court are not mere tools that
they can readily use or discard to serve their own purpose, but
they are purposively devised for the proper administration of
justice. Litigants should not, after resorting to a wrong remedy,
then cry for liberal construction of these rules. For utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by merely
harking on the policy of liberal construction. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. However,

the Amended Decision dated August 13, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 225, is declared void for lack
of jurisdiction, and its original Decision dated March 7, 2000 is
hereby reinstated. The total amount adjudged therein shall
earn an interest rate of 6% per annum from the date of
judgment of the trial court until finality of this Decision.
Thereafter, the total amount adjudged shall earn an interest
rate of 12% per annum until it is fully paid. Cost against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Torts Cases Page 21 of 55

G.R. No. 149149             October 23, 2003
ERNESTO SYKI, petitioner,
vs.
SALVADOR BEGASA, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in the instantthis petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is the decision1 dated January 31, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision dated May 5, 1998
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 48,
Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 7458 for damages. The trial court
awarded actual and moral damages to herein respondent
Salvador Begasa who suffered injuries in an accident due to the
negligence of Elizalde Sablayan, the truck driver of petitioner
Ernesto Syki.
The facts follow.
On June 22, 1992, around 11:20 a.m., near the corner of
Araneta and Magsaysay Streets, Bacolod City, respondent
Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a
passenger jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by
Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger
jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on
the boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven by
Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki
bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent
fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur). He also suffered
lacerations and abrasions in his left leg, thusas follows:
1. Fracture left femur, junction of middle and distal
third, comminuted.
2. Lacerated wounds, left poplitial 10 cm. left leg
anterior 2.5 cm.
3. Abrasion left knee.2
On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for
damages for breach of common carrier’s contractual
obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena, the owner
of the passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Ernesto Syki, the
owner of the truck;, and Elizalde Sablayan, the driver of the
truck.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against
Aurora Pisuena, the owner and operator of the passenger
jeepney, but ordered petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck
driver, Elizalde Sablayan, to pay respondent Salvador Begasa,
jointly and severally, actual and moral damages plus attorney’s
fees as follows:
Torts Cases Page 22 of 55
1. Actual damages of ₱48,308.20 less the financial
assistance given by defendant Ernesto Syki to plaintiff
Salvador Begasa in the amount of ₱4,152.55 or a total
amount of ₱44,155.65;
2. The amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The amount of ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s
fees.3
Petitioner Syki and his driver appealed to the Court of Appeals.
However, the appellate court found no reversible error in the
decision of the trial court and affirmed the same in toto.4 The
appellate court also denied their motion for reconsideration.5
Aggrieved, petitioner Ernesto Syki filed the instant petition for
review, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
respondent Begasa guilty of contributory negligence. Hence,
the damages awarded to him (respondent) should have been
decreased or mitigated. Petitioner also contends that the
appellate court erred in ruling that he failed to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his driver. He asserts that he presented sufficient
evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee, thus he should not be held liable for the injuries
sustained by respondent.
The petition has no merit.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
. . . . . . . . .x x x x x x x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxxxxxxxx
.........
The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
From the above provision, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises
that the employer was negligent, either or both, in the
selection and/or supervision of his said employeeduties. The
said presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on
the part of the employer that he had exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal
presumption of negligence, he is relieved of liability.6 In other
words, the burden of proof is on the employer.
The question is: how does an employer prove that he had
indeed exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee? The case of
Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals7 is
instructive:
In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the
trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a
favorable judgment. . .In making proof in its or his case, it is
paramount that the best and most complete evidence is
formally entered.1ªvvphi1.nét
Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which
requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be
corroborated by documentary evidence, inasmuch as the
witnesses’ testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot
consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there
was observance of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees. Petitioner’s attempt to prove its
"deligentissimi patris familias" in the selection and supervision
of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable
to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature
of the testimony.
Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls short of
the required evidentiary quantum as would convincingly and
undoubtedly prove its observance of the diligence of a good
father of a family has its precursor in the underlying rationale
pronounced in the earlier case of Central Taxicab Corp. vs. Ex-
Meralco Employees Transportation Co., et. al., set amidst an
almost identical factual setting, where we held that:
The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any
‘record’ or other documentary proof tending to establish that it
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses,
notwithstanding the calls therefore by both the trial court and
the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.
We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast rule on the
quantum of evidence needed to prove due observance of all
the diligence of a good father of a family as would constitute a
valid defense to the legal presumption of negligence on the
part of an employer or master whose employee has by his
negligence, caused damage to another. x x x (R)educing the
testimony of Albert to its proper proportion, we do not have
enough trustworthy evidence left to go by. We are of the
considerable opinion, therefore, that the believable evidence
on the degree of care and diligence that has been exercised in
the selection and supervision of Roberto Leon y Salazar, is not
legally sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence
against the defendant company. (emphasis ours)
Torts Cases Page 23 of 55
The above 1993 ruling in Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals was reiterated in a recent case again involving
the Metro Manila Transit Corporation,8 thus:
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience,
and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation,
and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To
establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
In this case, MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the
selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial
evidence on its hiring procedure. According to MMTC,
applicants are required to submit professional driving licenses,
certifications of work experience, and clearances from the
National Bureau of Investigation; to undergo tests of their
driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision; and, to
complete training programs on traffic rules, vehicle
maintenance, and standard operating procedures during
emergency cases.
. . . . . . . . .x x x x x x x x x
Although testimonies were offered that in the case of Pedro
Musa all these precautions were followed, the records of his
interview, of the results of his examinations, and of his service
were not presented. . . [T]here is no record that Musa attended
such training programs and passed the said examinations
before he was employed. No proof was presented that Musa
did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records
of daily inspections, allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever
presented. . . The failure of MMTC to present such
documentary proof puts in doubt the credibility of its witnesses.
x x x x x x x x x. . . . . . . . .
It is noteworthy that, in another case involving MMTC,
testimonial evidence of identical content, which MMTC
presented to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees
and thus avoid vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its
employees, was held to be insufficient to overcome the
presumption of negligence against it. (emphasis ours)
Based therefore on jurisprudential law, the employer must not
merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he had
observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also
support such testimonial evidence with concrete or
documentary evidence.1awphi1.nét The reason for this is to
obviate the biased nature of the employer’s testimony or that
of his witnesses.9
In this case, petitioner’s evidence consisted entirely of
testimonial evidence. He testified that before he hired Elizalde
Sablayan, he required him to submit a police clearance in order
to determine if he was ever involved in any vehicular accident.
He also required Sablayan to undergo a driving test with
conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca. Petitioner claimed
that he, in fact, accompanied Sablayan during the driving test
and that during the test, Sablayan was taught to read and
understand traffic signs like "Do Not Enter," "One Way," "Left
Turn," and "Right Turn."
Petitioner’s mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other hand,
testified that Sablayan passed the driving test and had never
figured in any vehicular accident except the one in question. He
also testified that he maintained in good condition all the
trucks of petitioner by checking the brakes, horns and tires
thereof before leaving forproviding hauling services.10
Petitioner, however, never presented the alleged police
clearance given to him by Sablayan, nor the results of
Sablayan’s driving test. Petitioner also did not present records
of the regular inspections that his mechanic allegedly
conducted. The unsubstantiated and self-serving testimonies of
petitioner and his mechanic arewere, without doubt,
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that petitioner
was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.
Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is liable for the injuries suffered by respondent.
It should be emphasized that the legal obligation of employers
to observe due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees provided under in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is not an empty provision or a mere formalism since the
non-observance thereof actually becomes the basis of the
employers’ vicarious liability.11 Employers should thus
seriously observe such a degree of diligence (and must
presentprove it in court by sufficient and concrete evidence) in
court showing such observance in order to be freethat would
exculpate them from liability.
Petitioner next contends that, even if he is liable, the award of
damages given to respondent should be decreased or mitigated
because respondent was guilty of contributory negligence.
Petitioner claims that his driver was allegedly caught unaware
when the passenger jeepney hailed by respondent suddenly
stopped at the intersection of a national highway. Petitioner
argues that, had respondent flagged down the passenger
jeepney at the proper place, the accident could have been
avoided.12
Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
Article 2179 provides:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
Torts Cases Page 24 of 55
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept of the above article on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be and is not entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. Inferrably, tThe defendant must thus be held liable
only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.13
In the present case, was respondent partly negligent and thus,
should not recover the full amount of the damages awarded by
the trial court? We rule in the negative.
There was no evidence that respondent Begasa and his three
companions flagged down the passenger jeepney at in a
prohibited area. All Tthe facts only showed was that the
passenger jeepney was near the corner of Araneta and
Magsaysay Streets, Bacolod City when petitioner’s driver
bumped it from the rear. No city resolution, traffic regulation or
DPWH memorandum were was presented to show that the
passenger jeepney picked up respondent and his three
companions at in a prohibited area. In fact, the trial court
dismissed the case against the driver and/or owner of the
passenger jeepney on the ground that they were not liable,
which meansing, that no negligence could be attributed to
them. The trial court also found no negligence on the part of
respondent Begasa. This factual finding was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals.14
It must be emphasized that petitions for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court should deals only with questions of law.
The factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals are given great
weight and even finality by the Supreme Court, especially
when, as in the present case, the appellate court upholds the
findings of fact of the trial court. The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals can only be overturned if it is shown that such
findings are obviously whimsical, capricious and arbitrary, or
are contrary with to the factual findings of the trial court.15 In
this case, we find no reason to overturn the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals. Thus, we affirm the appellate court’s
finding that there was no contributory negligence on the part
of respondent.
In sum, the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of petitioner’s driver who, as found by the lower
courts, did not slow down even when he was already
approaching a busy intersection within the city proper.16 The
passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up respondent and
his three companions and, in fact, respondent was already
partly inside the jeepney, when petitioner’s driver bumped the
rear end ofrear-ended it. The impact was so strong such that
respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur), and
suffered severely woundeds in his left knee and leg. No doubt
that respondentpetitioner’s driver was reckless speeding.
Since the negligence of petitioner’s driver was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident, in the present case, petitioner
is liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to pay damages to
respondent Begasa for the injuries sustained by latterhim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163609             November 27, 2008
SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME,
petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN,
MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF
KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF
SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the MUNICIPAL
TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q.
MIGUEL, and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the
negligent acts of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in
the death of a minor pedestrian?
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Polomolok,
Cotabato City, Branch 39, insofar as defendant Mayor Fernando
Q. Miguel is concerned. The CA absolved Mayor Miguel from
any liability since it was not he, but the Municipality of
Koronadal, that was the employer of the negligent driver.
The Facts
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South
Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel
Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. 2 The
pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. 3
Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring
Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his
Manila flight.4
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor,
who was then crossing the National Highway in Poblacion,
Polomolok, South Cotabato.5 The intensity of the collision sent
Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from the point of impact, a
clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at
the time of the accident.6
Torts Cases Page 25 of 55
Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma
and diffused cerebral contusion.7 He was initially treated at the
Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital. 8 Due to the seriousness of
his injuries, he was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical
Center in Davao City for more intensive treatment. 9 Despite
medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the
accident.10
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the
parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC
against respondents.11 In their complaint, they prayed that all
respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss. They pointed
out that that proximate cause of Marvin's death was Lozano's
negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. They prayed for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and
litigation expenses.
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for
Marvin's death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took
the pick-up truck without their consent. Likewise, Miguel and
Lozano pointed out that Marvin's sudden sprint across the
highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel
denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. The
Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and
Miguel. As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance
Company, Inc., the vehicle insurer, it insisted that its liability is
contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured.
Since the insured did not file a claim within the prescribed
period, any cause of action against it had prescribed.
RTC Disposition
On January 25, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
spouses Jayme, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant
Municipality of Koronadal cannot be held liable for the
damages incurred by other defendant (sic) being an
agency of the State performing a (sic) governmental
functions. The same with defendant Hermogenes
Simbulan, not being the owner of the subject vehicle,
he is absolved of any liability. The complaint against
defendant First Integrated Bonding Insurance
Company, Inc. is hereby ordered dismissed there being
no cause of action against said insurance company.
However, defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol,
and Mayor Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly and severally to
pay the plaintiff (sic) the following sums:
1. One Hundred Seventy Three Thousand One
Hundred One and Forty Centavos
(P173,101.40) Pesos as actual damages with
legal interest of 12% per annum computed
from February 11, 1989 until fully paid;
 2. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages;
3. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as
exemplary damages;
4. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as
Attorney's fees;
5. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for the
death of Marvin Jayme;
6. Three Thousand (P3,000.00) as litigation
expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel interposed an
appeal to the CA.
CA Disposition
In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in
ruling that he was Lozano's employer and, hence, solidarily
liable for the latter's negligent act. Records showed that the
Municipality of Koronadal was the driver's true and lawful
employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise
due care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. The
incident, although unfortunate, was unexpected and cannot be
attributed to him.
On October 22, 2003, the CA granted the appeal, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, insofar as defendant-appellant Mayor
Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned, and the complaint
against him is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.13
The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for
damages for the death of Marvin Jayme. Said the appellate
court:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees admitted that Mayor
Miguel was not the employer of Lozano. Thus,
paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that the
Municipality of Koronadal was the employer of both
Mayor Miguel and Lozano. Not being the employer of
Lozano, Mayor Miguel could not thus be held liable for
the damages caused by the former. Mayor Miguel was
a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at the time of
the accident.14 (Emphasis supplied)
Torts Cases Page 26 of 55
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered
owner of a vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the
driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a
consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of
the vehicle.
Issues
The spouses Jayme have resorted to the present recourse and
assign to the CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT MAYOR FERNANDO MIGUEL CANNOT
BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MARVIN JAYME
WHICH CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE
SETTLED PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE
TRIBUNAL;
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD; MOREOVER, THE
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ARE ALL BASED ON CONJECTURES AND
SURMISES AND AGAINST ACCEPTED COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH URGENTLY CALL FOR
AN EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S
SUPERVISION.15
Our Ruling
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no
application in the present case.
Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability
attaches to Mayor Miguel. He was not a mere passenger, but
instead one who had direct control and supervision over
Lozano during the time of the accident. According to
petitioners, the element of direct control is not negated by the
fact that Lozano's employer was the Municipality of Koronadal.
Mayor Miguel, being Lozano's superior, still had control over
the manner the vehicle was operated.
Article 218016 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not
only liable for one's own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those
persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is
popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain
claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee
was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2)
That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and
(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or
by reason of the functions entrusted to him. 17
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5
and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious
or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was
performing his functions.18
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be
assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the
relationship by preponderant evidence. In Belen v. Belen,19 this
Court ruled that it was enough for defendant to deny an
alleged employment relationship. The defendant is under no
obligation to prove the negative averment. This Court said:
It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the
burden of proving the action is upon the plaintiff, and
that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no
obligation to prove his exceptions. This rue is in
harmony with the provisions of Section 297 of the
Code of Civil Procedure holding that each party must
prove his own affirmative allegations, etc. 20
In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out
if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and
therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To
determine the existence of an employment relationship, We
rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer's
power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other
remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method
of doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or
dismissal.21
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was
the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer
of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that
Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he
was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of
the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several
occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still
exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to
another person or entity because control over the employee
subsists.22 In the case under review, the Municipality of
Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding
Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least
supervision and control over Lozano and how the latter
operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the
accident. They, however, failed to buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to
give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held
liable. In Benson v. Sorrell,23 the New England Supreme Court
ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.
Torts Cases Page 27 of 55
Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. This
Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,24 ruled in a similar vein, to wit:
x x x The fact that a client company may give
instructions or directions to the security guards
assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts and
omissions. Those instructions or directions are
ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged
in the contract for services entered into with the
security agency. x x x25 (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow
employee although the person may have the right to control
the manner of the vehicle's operation. 26 In the absence of an
employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability,
the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow
employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. 27
Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the
driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v. Lombardi28 is
instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability:
Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver
of the truck, but only an intermediate and superior
employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine of
respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not
properly applicable to him. His power to direct and
control the driver was not as master, but only by
virtue of the fact that they were both employed by
Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse's agent he
was delegated Kruse's authority over the driver. x x x
In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well
settled both in this state and elsewhere that the
negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is
not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent,
but only to the master or principal. (Hilton v. Oliver,
204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R. 297, 269 Pac. 425; Guild v.
Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1 Pac. (2d) 528; Ellis v.
Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378, 52
S. E. 228; Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41
Mont. 141 [108 Pac. 588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p. 829; and see
the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277, and particularly
that part commencing at p. 290.) We can see no
logical reason for drawing any distinction in this regard
between actionable negligence and contributory
negligence. x x x29
The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.[30 and
again in Sichterman v. Hollingshead Co.31
In Swanson v. McQuown,32 a case involving a military officer
who happened to be riding in a car driven by a subordinate
later involved in an accident, the Colorado Supreme Court
adhered to the general rule that a public official is not liable for
the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a vicarious basis since
the relationship is not a true master-servant situation. 33 The
court went on to rule that the only exception is when they
cooperate in the act complained of, or direct or encourage it. 34
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's
employer nor the vehicle's registered owner. There existed no
causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle
used that will make him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor
Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.
and loss. The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent
driver, the driver's employer, and the registered owner of the
vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from
the negligent operation of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger

to assist the driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as
lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter's
negligent acts.35 The driver's duty is not one that may be
delegated to others.36

As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful

employer of Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal.
Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be
sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This
immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union v. Firme,37 where this Court held:

It has already been remarked that municipal

corporations are suable because their charters grant
them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can only be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the
State merely gives the claimant the right to show that
the defendant was not acting in governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the
case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.38

Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent

driver and his direct employer. The CA observation along this
line are worth restating:

Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a

vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for
damages incurred by passengers and third persons as
a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the
actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record
continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards
the public and third persons, and as such is directly
and primarily responsible for the consequences
incident (sic) to its operation x x x.39

The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his

parents. However, justice demands that only those liable under
our laws be held accountable for Marvin's demise. Justice can
not sway in favor of petitioners simply to assuage their pain

Torts Cases Page 28 of 55

G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989
SPOUSES FEDERICO FRANCO and FELICISIMA R. FRANCO,
petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANTONIO REYES, MRS.
SUSAN CHUAY and LOLITA LUGUE respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The instant petition for review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals deals mainly with the nature of an employer's liability
for his employee's negligent act.
At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro
swerved the northbound Franco Bus with Plate No. XY320-PUB
he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a truck with a trailer
parked facing north along the cemented pavement of the
MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby
taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate No.
YL-735 being driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a
collision between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and
disastrous eventuality.
Dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway
the length of the parked truck with trailer), the mini bus landed
right side down facing south in the canal of the highway, a total
wreck. The Franco Bus was also damaged but not as severely.
The collision resulted in the deaths of the two (2) drivers,
Macario Yuro and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of
the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.
Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu
Mini Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay,
and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno
Lugue, filed an action for damages through reckless
imprudence before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in
Angeles City, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 2154 against
Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and operators of the
Franco Transportation Company. The complaint alleged that:
(a) the recklessness and imprudence of the Franco Bus driver
caused the collision which resulted in his own death and that of
the mini bus driver and two (2) other passengers thereof; (b)
that as a consequence of the vehicular mishap, the Isuzu Mini
Bus became a total wreck resulting in actual damages
amounting to P50,000.00 and the loss of an average net
income of P120.00 daily or P3,600.00 monthly multiplied by a
minimum of one more year of serviceability of said mini bus or
P40,200.00; and, (c) that in view of the death of the three (3)
passengers aforementioned, the heirs of each should be
awarded a minimum of P12,000.00 and the expected average
income of P6,000.00 each of the driver and one of the
passengers and P12,000.00 of the Chinese businessman
passenger.
Torts Cases Page 29 of 55
In answer to the complaint, defendants set up, among others,
the affirmative defense that as owners and operators of the
Franco Transportation Company, they exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of all their employees,
including the deceased driver Macario Yuro.
Said defense was, however, rejected by the trial court in its
decision 1 dated May 17, 1978, for the reason that the act of
the Franco Bus driver was a negligent act punishable by law
resulting in a civil obligation arising from Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
It said: "This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil
liability arises, and not a case of civil negligence and the
defense of having acted like a good father of a family or having
trained or selected the drivers of his truck is no defense to
avoid civil liability." 2 On this premise, the trial court ruled as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs,
Antonio Reyes, Lolita Lugue, and Susan
Chuay, and against the defendants Mr. and
Mrs. Federico Franco, ordering the latter:
(1) To pay Antonio Reyes, actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of
P90,000.00 for the Isuzu Mini Bus;
(2) To pay Lolita Lugue, the widow of
Magdaleno Lugue, actual and compensatory
damages in the total sum of P18,000.00;
(3) To pay Susan Chuay, the widow of
Fernando Chuay, actual and compensatory
damages in the total sum of P24,000.00; and
(4) To pay attorney's fee in the amount of
P5.000.00;
All with legal interests from the filing of this
suit on November 11, 1974 until paid; and the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 3
On appeal by herein petitioners as defendants-appellants,
respondent appellate court, agreeing with the lower court, held
that defendants-appellants' driver who died instantly in the
vehicular collision, was guilty of reckless or criminal
imprudence punishable by law in driving appellants' bus; that
the civil obligation of the appellants arises from Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code resulting in the subsidiary liability of
the appellants under the said provisions, 4 that the case subject
of appeal is one involving culpable negligence out of which civil
liability arises and is not one of civil negligence; 5 and that
there is nothing in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code which requires a prior judgment of conviction of the criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers,
erring vehicle driver and his obligation to pay his civil liability and any other persons or corporations shall
before the said provisions can be applied. 6 Respondent be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
appellate court increased the award of damages granted by the establishments, in all cases where a violation
lower court as follows: of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulations shall have been
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is committed by them or their employees.
hereby modified as follows:
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the
1. To pay Susan Chuay, widow of Fernando restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
Chuay, the sum of P30,000.00 for the latter's within their houses from guests lodging
death and P112,000.00 for loss of earning therein, or for the payment of the value
capacity; thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or
2. To pay Lolita Lugue, widow of Magdaleno the person representing him, of the deposits
Lugue, the sum of P30,000.00 for the latter's of such goods within the inn; and shall
death and P62,000.00 for loss of earning furthermore have followed the directions
capacity. The rest of the judgment appealed which such innkeeper or his representative
from is affirmed. Costs against defendants- may have given them with respect to the care
appellants. and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless
SO ORDERED. 7
committed by the innkeeper's employees.
On April 1, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other
of the aforesaid respondent appellate court's decision dated
persons. — The subsidiary liability established
January 2, 1985 but the same was denied on May 13, 1985.
in the next preceding article shall also apply
to employers, teachers, persons, and
Hence, the instant petition raising two (2) legal questions: first, corporations engaged in any kind of industry
whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by for felonies committed by the servants,
herein private respondents was predicated upon crime or pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees
quasi-delict; and second, whether respondent appellate court in the discharge of their duties;
in an appeal filed by the defeated parties, herein petitioners,
may properly increase the award of damages in favor of the
while the second kind is governed by the following provisions
private respondents Chuay and Lugue, prevailing parties in the
of the Civil Code:
lower court, who did not appeal said court's decision.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

Petitioners contend that the allegations in paragraph 9 of the
damage to another, there being fault or
Amended Complaint 8 of herein private respondents as
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2154 unequivocally claim that the
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
former as the employers of Macario Yuro, the driver of the
pre-existing contractual relation between the
Franco Bus who caused the vehicular mishap, are jointly and
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed
severally liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them
by the provisions of this Chapter.
which thus makes Civil Case No. 2154 an action predicated
upon a quasi-delict under the Civil Code subject to the defense
that the employer exercised all the diligence of a good father of Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be made
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the
damages twice for the same act or omission
Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary liability under
of the defendant.
the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code which provide as follows: Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of
persons for whom one is responsible.
innkeepers, tavern-keepers and proprietors of
establishments. — In default of the persons
Torts Cases Page 30 of 55
 xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry,
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates
from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily
liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's
subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's
subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative
that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's
criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability
therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the
employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103.
9 supervision of their bus driver. The evidence
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the
person who should stand as the accused and the party
supposed to be primarily liable for the damages suffered by
private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap
died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand
on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their
employee's primary liability. Logically therefore, recourse
under this remedy is not possible.
On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code, liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the
employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees
subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employees.
Respondent appellate court relies on the case of Arambulo,
supra, where it was held that the defense of observance of due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of employees is not applicable to the subsidiary
liability provided in Article 20 of the Penal Code (now Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code). By such reliance, it would seem
that respondent appellate court seeks to enforce the subsidiary
civil liability of the employer without a criminal conviction of
the party primarily liable therefor. This is not only erroneous
and absurd but is also fraught with dangerous consequences. It
is erroneous because the conviction of the employee primarily
liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary
liability 10 and, at the same time, absurd because we will be
faced with a situation where the employer is held subsidiarily
Torts Cases Page 31 of 55
liable even without a primary liability being previously
established. It is likewise dangerous because, in effect, the
employer's subsidiary liability would partake of a solidary
obligation resulting in the law's amendment without legislative
sanction.
The Court in the aforecited M.D. Transit case went further to
say that there can be no automatic subsidiary liability of
defendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code where his employee has not been previously criminally
convicted.
Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action
to impose the primary liability of the employer as a result of
the tortious act of its alleged reckless driver, we confront
ourselves with the plausibility of defendants-petitioners'
defense that they observed due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
On this point, the appellate court has unequivocally spoken in
affirmation of the lower court's findings, to wit:
Anyway, a perusal of the record shows that
the appellants were not able to establish the
defense of a good father of a family in the
presented by the appellants in this regard is
purely self-serving. No independent evidence
was presented as to the alleged supervision
of appellants' bus drivers, especially with
regard to driving habits and reaction to actual
traffic conditions. The appellants in fact
admitted that the only kind of supervision
given the drivers referred to the running time
between the terminal points of the line
(t.s.n., September 16, 1976, p. 21). Moreover,
the appellants who ran a fleet of 12 buses
plying the Manila-Laoag line, have only two
inspectors whose duties were only ticket
inspection. There is no evidence that they are
really safety inspectors. 11
Basically, the Court finds that these determinations are factual
in nature. As a painstaking review of the evidence presented in
the case at bar fails to disclose any evidence or circumstance of
note sufficient to overrule said factual findings and conclusions,
the Court is inclined to likewise reject petitioners' affirmative
defense of due diligence. The wisdom of this stance is made
more apparent by the fact that the appellate court's
conclusions are based on the findings of the lower court which
is in a better position to evaluate the testimonies of the
witnesses during trial. As a rule, this Court respects the factual
findings of the appellate and trial courts and accord them a
certain measure of finality. 12 Consequently, therefore, we find
petitioners liable for the damages claimed pursuant to their
primary liability under the Civil Code.
On the second legal issue raised in the instant petition, we
agree with petitioners' contention that the Intermediate
Appellate Court (later Court of Appeals) is without jurisdiction
to increase the amount of damages awarded to private
respondents Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom appealed the
decision of the lower court. While an appellee who is not also
an appellant may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to
maintain the judgment on other grounds, he cannot ask for
modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief
unless he has also appealed. 13 For failure of plaintiffs-
appellees, herein private respondents, to appeal the lower
court's judgment, the amount of actual damages cannot
exceed that awarded by it. 14

Furthermore, the records 15 show that plaintiffs-private

respondents limited their claim for actual and compensatory
damages to the supposed average income for a period of one
(1) year of P6,000.00 for the driver Magdaleno Lugue and
P12,000.00 for the Chinese businessman Fernando Chuay. We
feel that our award should not exceed the said amounts .16

However, the increase in awards for indemnity arising from

death to P30,000.00 each remains, the same having been made
in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence decreeing such
increase in view of the depreciated Philippine currency. 17

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

modified decreasing the award to private respondents of actual
and compensatory damages for loss of average income for the
period of one year to P6,000.00 for the deceased Magdaleno
Lugue and P12,000.00 for the deceased Fernando Chuay. The
rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs
against the private respondents. This decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

Torts Cases Page 32 of 55

G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988
REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y
TACORDA and CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN, respondents-
appellees.
YAP, J.:
This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order
of March 10, 1970 of the Honorable Judge (now Supreme Court
Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing plaintiffs-
appellants' complaint in Civil Case No. 77188 entitled
"Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez,
plaintiffs, versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng
Sun Kwan, defendants," and from the Order of May 7, 1970
denying plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.
The background facts of the case are as follows:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by
Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-
year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy
sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal
Case No.92944 for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was
filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office.
Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27,1969 in the said criminal
case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action."
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for
damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila docketed as
Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. et al.,
Plaintiffs vs. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun
Kwan, Defendants." Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the
action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence
in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the
trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the
accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their
right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court
decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against
defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of
the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case
for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally
terminated. From said order, plaintiffs filed the present appeal,
stating as their main reasons the following:
I. The main issue brought before this
Honorable Court is whether the present
action is based on quasi-delict under the Civil
Code and therefore could proceed
independently of the criminal case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Torts Cases Page 33 of 55
II. The second question of law is whether the
lower court could properly suspend the
hearing of the civil action against Domingo
Pontino and dismiss the civil case against his
employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of
the fact that a criminal case for homicide thru
reckless imprudence is pending in the lower
court against Domingo Pontino
III. The last question of law is whether the
suspension of the civil action against
Domingo Pontino and the dismissal of the
civil case against his employer Cordova Ng
Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal
case against Domingo Pontino for homicide
thru reckless imprudence in the lower court
could be validly done considering that the
civil case against said defendants-appellees
also sought to recover actual damages to the
jeep of plaintiffs-appellants."
We find the appeal meritorious.
The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether
the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is founded on
crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated the case as an
action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the
offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944),
also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action.
Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this
action on the assumption that defendant
Pontino's negligence in the accident of May
10, l969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court
cannot accept the validity of that assumption.
In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court,
plaintiffs had already appeared as
complainants. While that case was pending,
the offended parties reserved the right to
institute a separate civil action. If, in a
criminal case, the right to file a separate civil
action for damages is reserved, such civil
action is to be based on crime and not on
tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs.
Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial
court is inapplicable to the instant case. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto,
the Court held:
The issue in this case is: May an employee's
primary civil liability for crime and his
employer's subsidiary liability therefor be
proved in a separate civil action even while
 the criminal case against the employee is still
pending?
To begin with, obligations arise from law,
contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasi-
delict. According to appellant, her action is
one to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime. With respect to obligations arising
from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil
Code provides:
Civil obligations arising from
criminal offenses shall be
governed by the penal laws,
subject to the provisions of
article 21 77, and of the
pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary,
Title, on Human Relations,
and of Title XVIII of this
book, regulating damages.
xxx xxx xxx
It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable,
the following requisites must be present: (1) that an employee
has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that
said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability;
(3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1
Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964]) G.R. No.
L-59621 February 23, 1988
MAXIMILIANO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, as
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Quezon & Lucena City, Atty. ELENO M. JOYAS, as Provincial
Sheriff of Quezon, FRANCISCO T. FORTUNADO, Deputy Sheriff
of Quezon and ATTY. FELICISIMO S. GARIN, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution * of the Court
of Appeals dated 23 October 1980 in CA-G.R. No. SP-10069,
entitled "Maximiliano Alvarez, petitioner, versus Hon. Milagros
V. Caguioa, etc. et al., respondents" setting aside its earlier
decision of 16 May 1980,** and the Resolution dated 20
January 1982 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of 23 October 1980.
Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide with
Multiple Serious Physical Injuries Through Reckless Imprudence
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. After trial, the
court rendered judgment against the accused, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
Torts Cases Page 34 of 55
This Court, therefore, finds the accused
Renato Ramos guilty of negligence and
sentences him to pay a fine of TWO
HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is
civilly liable for the death and physical injuries
that resulted from the collision of the
sakbayan and the weapon's [sic] carrier. He
should indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Rodolfo Briones the amount of TWELVE
THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, as actual
damages; the heirs of the deceased Juan
Briones, the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND
(Pl2,000.00) PESOS, as actual damages;
Socorro Briones, the amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND (P l5,000.00) PESOS,
hospitalization and burial expenses;
Exaltacion de Gala the amount of THREE
THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS,
hospitalization and incidental expenses;
Basilica de Gala the amount of THREE
THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS,
hospitalization and incidental expenses; to
Joselito Leonor and Cenon Leonor, for actual
damages and for permanent facial deformity,
the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
(Pl5,000.00) PESOS and for attomey's fees,
the amount of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS. . . .
The records show that Maximiliano Alvarez is
engaged in his business of buying coconuts
and copra for re-sale, therefore, he is ' . . .
engaged in any kind of industry . . . .' He
should, therefore, be subsidiarily liable and
pay the amount above-mentioned to the
persons concerned jointly and severally with
Renato Ramos The bail bond filed by the
accused Renato Ramos for his provisional
liberty is hereby ordered cancelled. 1
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 19077-CR. On 13
December 1977, the Court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision but deleted that part thereof making herein petitioner,
as employer of Renato Ramos, subsidiarily liable for payment of
the adjudged indemnities to the offended parties. The Court of
appeals, in said CA-G.R. No. 19077-CR, reasoned thus:
There is merit in the appellant's contention
that the trial court erred in ordering
Maximiliano Alvarez to be subsidiarily liable
with the appellant in the payment of the
indemnities awarded in favor of the offended
parties and the heirs of the deceased.
Maximiliano Alvarez is not a party in this
action. Altho it is the law that employers are
subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of their
 employees for felonies committed in the
discharge of the latter's duties if they are
engaged in any kind of industry (Art. 103,
Revised Penal Code), such subsidiary liability
is not litigated in connection with the criminal
prosecution of the employees and may not
therefore be adjudged therein (Philippine
Railways Company v. Jalandoni, CA, 40 O.G.
19). It is true that the judgment of conviction
in the criminal case binds the person
subsidiarily liable with the accused (Martinez
v. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1), and it is therefore the
duty of the employer to participate in the
defense of his employee (Miranda v. Malate
Garage, 99 Phil. 670). The law, however, does
not authorize that the subsidiary liability of
the employer be adjudged in the criminal
action. This is because, in the criminal
proceeding, the employer, not being a party,
is denied the opportunity to present his
defense against such subsidiary liability, such
as, his not being engaged in any kind of
industry or that the crime committed by his
employee was not on the occasion of the
discharge of the latter's duties. Due regard to
due process and observance of procedural
requirements demand that a separate action
should be filed against the supposed
employer to enforce the subsidiary liability
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
2 the duty of the courts 'to assist the parties in
The appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 19077-CR was not
appealed. Meanwhile, on 14 December 1978, Pajarito v.
Seneris 3 was decided by this Court, holding inter alia that--
Considering that the judgment of conviction,
sentencing a defendant employee to pay an
indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the latter's
civil liability but also with regard to its
amount, . . . in the action to enforce the
employer's subsidiary liability, the court has
no other function than to render decision
based upon the indemnity awarded in the
criminal case and has no power to amend or
modify it even if in its opinion an error has
been committed in the decision.
In view of the foregoing principles, . . . it
would serve no important purpose to require
petitioner to file a separate and independent
action against the employer for the
enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil
liability. Under the circumstances, it would
not only prolong the litigation but would
require the heirs of the d victim to incur
Torts Cases Page 35 of 55
unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the
proceeding for the enforcement of the
subsidiary civil liability may be considered as
part of the proceeding for the execution of
the judgment. A case in which an execution
has been issued is regarded as still pending so
that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. There is no question
that the court which rendered the judgment
has a general supervisory control over its
process of execution, and this power carries
with it the right to determine every question
of fact and law which may be involved in the
execution.
... Indeed, the enforcement of the employer's
subsidiary civil liability may be conveniently
litigated within the same proceeding because
the execution of the judgment is a logical and
integral part of the case itself. This would
certainly facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of the contending parties.
"The purpose of procedure," observed this
Court in Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney
General, is not to thwart justice. Its proper
aim is to facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of the contending parties. It
was created not to hinder and delay but to
facilitate and promote the administration of
justice.' In proceedings to apply justice, it is
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination' of their rival claims. Thus, the
Rules require that they should liberally
construed "to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceedings." 4
After finality of the Court of appeal judgment in CA-G.R. No.
19077-CR, the case was remanded to the trial court where, on
2 July 1979, the private prosecutor filed a "Motion for Issuance
of Subsidiary Writ of Execution" after the writ of execution
against the accused was returned unsatisfied on 27 February
1979. 5 Petitioner opposed the Motion. However, on 14
November 1979, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of the
subsidiary writ of execution. A motion for reconsideration of
this order was denied in an order dated 26 November 1979.
Consequently, on 29 November 1979, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of appeals, questioning the acts of
the respondent Judge and the Sheriff who had levied on his
properties pursuant to said subsidiary writ of execution. The
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-10069.
On 16 May 1980, the Court of appeals granted the petition and
declared the Orders of the respondent Judge, dated 14
November 1979 and 26 November 1979, as well as the
Subsidiary Writ of Execution issued on 15 November 1979 null action against the employer
and void. It reasoned that, as its judgment in the criminal case for the enforcement of the
(CA-G.R. No. 19077-CR) was promulgated on 13 December latter's subsidiary civil
1977, whereas, Pajarito was promulgated by the Supreme liability . . . . At any rate, the
Court only on 14 December 1978, the final judgment in the proceeding for the
criminal case, which expressly declared that a separate action enforcement of the
should be instituted to enforce petitioner's subsidiary civil subsidiary civil liability may
liability, had long become the "law of the case" 6 and, be considered as part of the
therefore, prevails. proceeding for the
execution of the judgment.
On 24 July 1980, respondents filed a Motion for A case in which an
Reconsideration. On 23 October 1980, the Motion was granted execution has been issued is
and the decision of 16 May 1980 was set aside on the strength regarded as still pending so
of the Pajarito decision. said the Court of Appeals: that all proceedings on the
execution are proceedings
The doctrine of the "law of the case" is in the suit."
ordinarily a very wise rule of action, but it is
not a universal, inexorable command. For xxx xxx xxx
while the doctrine is generally deemed
applicable whether the former determination xxx xxx xxx
is right or wrong, (Wills vs. Lloyd, 21 Cal. 2d
452,132 p. 20 471, 474; In re Taylor's Estate, xxx xxx xxx
110 Vt. 80, 2 A. 2d 317, 319; Greenwood
Country vs. Watkins, 196 S.C. 51, 12 S.E. 2d Indeed, the enforcement of
545, 550), there are some cases which hold the employer's subsidiary
that the doctrine is in applicable where [the] civil liability may be
prior decision is unsound (Standard Oil Co. of conveniently litigated
California vs. Johnson, 56 Cal. App. 2d 411, within the same proceeding
132 P. 2d 910, 913; Atchison T.& S.F. Ry Co. because the execution of
vs. Ballard, C.C.A. Tax 108 F. 2d 768, 772); or the judgment is a logical
incorrect principles were announced or [al and integral part of the case
mistake of fact was made on first appeal. itself. (pp. 282, 283)
(Nation of Match Co. vs. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 227 Mo Supp. 11 5, 58 S.W. 2d 997;
[W]hile We had, by our Decision in CA-G.R.
Morris vs. E.I.Du Pont De Nemours & Com;
No. 19077-CR, modified the decision of the
346 Mo. 126,139 S.W. 2d 984,986, 129 A.L.R.
trial court when, among such modifications.
352).
We deleted the trial court's direction, in the
dispositive portion of said decision, that
It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that Maximiliano Alverez 'should, therefore, be
in the search for truth through the process of subsidiarily liable and pay the amount above-
inclusion and exclusion, it behooves us to mentioned to the persons concerned jointly
correct the application of the doctrine of "the and severally with Renato Ramos,' and all
law of the case" upon such questions which other references of the trial court of Articles
prove to have been mistaken. 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, yet
such modification does not reduce the
. . . [T]he Honorable Supreme Court in the effectiveness nor prevent the application of
case of Lucia Pajarito vs. Hon. Alberto V. the ruling laid down in the case of Lucia S.
Seneris, et. al. (G.R. No. L-44627, December Pajarito vs. Hon. Alberto V. Seneris et. al.
14, 1978; 87 SCRA 275) has definitely set the Indeed, it was not necessary at all for the trial
rule that; — court to have pronounced, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, on the subsidiary
. . . considering that Felipe liability of the employer, Maximiliano Alvarez,
Aizon does not deny that he because the provisions of the Revised Penal
was the registered operator Code on subsidiary liability (Articles 102 and
of the bus . . ., it would 103) are deemed written in the judgment in
serve no important purpose the respective cases in which they are
to require petitioner to file applicable. In a word, such a pronouncement
a separate and independent and a direction of such subsidiary liability is a
Torts Cases Page 36 of 55
surplausage although We should not, in the liability but also his
least, begrudge the trial court in having done employer's subsidiary
so. It was, perhaps, to him, an attempt to be liability for such criminal
emphatic, or if not, a matter of legal taste negligence. (Almeda et al.
than an answer to a legal requirement. In vs. Albaroa, 8 Phil. 178,
other words, even if the pronouncement and affirmed in 218 U.S. 476, 54
direction of the subsidiary liability of the Law ed., 116; Wise & Co. vs.
employer were not written in the dispositive Larion 45 Phil. 314, 320;
portion of the decision, or any part of the Francisco vs. Onrubia, 46
decision for that matter, just the same the Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos
trial court, upon the finality of its decision, Sur vs. Tolentino, G.R. No.
can order the employer, on its subsidiary 34186,56 Phil. 829; Moran,
liability, to answer for the civil liability of the Comments on the Rules of
convicted employee, if the latter is shown to Court, Vol. II, p. 403)
be unable to satisfy his civil liability because (Martinez vs. Barredo, 81
of his insolvency. Phil. 1).

To underscore, Our deletion from Our
decision in CA-G.R. No. 19077-CR, therefore,
of the trial court's pronouncement and
directions on the subsidiary liability of
Maximiliano Alverez would have not
prevented the respondent court from issuing
the writ of subsidiary execution and all other
matters now under question.
On the issue of the deprivation of the
employer of due process, unless he is allowed
his day in court in the enforcement of his
subsidiary liability in a separate civil action,
the Honorable Supreme Court, citing relevant
holdings in previous cases said:
The employer cannot be
said to have been deprived
of his day in court, because
the situation before us is
not one wherein the
employer is sued for a
primary liability under
articles 1903 of the Civil
Code, but one in which
enforcement is sought of a
subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent
upon his driver's criminal
negligence which is a
proper issue to be tried and
decided only in a criminal
action. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable
upon his driver's conviction
and upon proof of the
latter's insolvency, in the
same way that acquittal
wipes out not only the
employee's primary civil
Torts Cases Page 37 of 55
Then, the Supreme Court went on to say:
In Miranda vs. Malate
Garage & Taxicab Inc. this
Court father amplified the
rule that the decision
convicting the employee is
binding and conclusive
upon the employer, "not
only with regard to (the
latter's) civil liability but also
with regard to its amount
because the liability of an
employer can not be
separated but following
that of his employee ... And
this Court, in Miranda
further explained that the
employer is in substance
and in effect a party to the
criminal case, considering
the subsidiary liability
imposed upon him by law.
It is true that an employer,
exactly speaking, is not a
party to the criminal case
instituted against his
employee, but, in substance
and in effect he is [,]
considering the subsidiary
liability imposed upon him
by law. It is his concern. as
well as of his employee, to
see to it that his interest be
protected in the criminal
case by taking virtual
participation in the defense
of his employee. He cannot
leave him to his own fate
because his failure is also
 his. And if because of his
indifference or inaction the
employee is convicted and
damages are awarded
against him, he cannot later
be heard to complain, if
brought to court, for the
enforcement of his
subsidiary liability, that he
was not given his day in
court.
This is the rule that governs the case at bar. It
does not matter now that Our decision in CA-
G.R. No. 19077-CR was promulgated on
December 13, 1977 while the case of Pajarito
vs. Seneris was promulgated later on on [sic]
December 14, 1978. This fact alone would not
prevent the application of the Pajarito vs.
Seneris ruling to the execution of the case at
bar, because, firstly, the Seneris case is
merely a reiteration and perhaps an
amplification of the previous rulings in the
Miranda and the Martinez cases adopted
much earlier than the rendition of the trial
court's decision, subject of the appeal in CA
G.R. No. 19077-CR; and secondly, because,
for all purposes of the execution of Our
decision in CA-G.R. No. 19077-CR, the said
case is still pending and there is no legal
impediment to the application, even
retroactively if private respondents think it
that way, of the Seneris ruling to the
execution of Our decision.
We hold, therefore, that the respondent
Court has not committed any grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the questioned
orders for such issuance has been made in
pursuance of law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, We set aside Our decision
promulgated on May 16,1980, and enter
another dismissing the instant petition for
lack of merit. With costs against petitioner. 7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
Resolution. He pointed out that the 16 May 1980 decision of
the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory
when respondents, through counsel, filed their Motion for
Reconsideration, hence, the Court of appeals no longer had
jurisdiction to reverse itself. He argued that the 16 May 1980
decision was already the "law of the case' as far as petitioner's
subsidiary liability is concerned, notwithstanding Pajarito.
Petitioner also cited the "bad faith" of respondents' counsel in
deliberately instructing his clerks not to receive the 16 May
1980 decision on the day of its service on 22 May 1980, while
Torts Cases Page 38 of 55
he was still in the United States, with the consequent finality of
the decision thirty (30) days from the day it should have been
received by respondents' counsel. Respondents could not,
according to petitioner, have belatedly asked for
reconsideration on 24 July 1980.8 He further pointed to the
none-existence of the Pajarito doctrine on 13 December 1977,
the day judgment of conviction against the accused employee
Renato Ramos was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, excluding
the trial court's order finding petitioner-employer subsidiarily
liable in case Ramos was found insolvent.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution dated 20 January 1982.
Hence, petitioner's present recourse to this Court. The petition
is not impressed with merit.
While counsel for respondents could have been more efficient
and even scrupulous in the receipt of the adverted to decision
of 16 May 1980, his censurable act cannot be made the basis
for a strict and rigorously technical interpretation of procedural
rules on grounds which do not touch on the merits of the
criminal case but win only needlessly prolong its course and
unjustly delay relief to the victims of petitioner-employer's
criminally negligent driver.
It is already a settled rule that the subsidiary liability of an
employer automatically arises upon his employee's conviction,
and subsequent proof of inability to pay. In this light, the
application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a
procedural remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation for
recovery of indemnity by the victims of a judicially-declared
criminally negligent act.
As has been aptly stated,
A separate civil action may be warranted
where additional facts have to be established
or more evidence must be adduced or where
the criminal case has been fully terminated
and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a
timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspects of the case....
These do not exist in this case. Considering
moreover the delays suffered by the case in
the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this
case to require at this time a separate civil
action to be filed. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the principle of "law of the case" as discussed in
People vs. Pinuila 10 is not applicable to a Court of Appeals
decision at odds with this Court's decision, and where the
Supreme Court still has the power to decide on the applicable
doctrine to the issue at hand. The rule cannot be utilized to
accomplish injustice or manifest delay in the execution of
justice. The principle is merely a rule of convenience and public
policy to stabilize judicial decisions of tribunals of coordinate
jurisdiction, to prevent re-litigation of questions in the same
action, and to obviate undue prolongation of litigation,
purposes which would be negated if Pajarito were not to be
applied in this case simply because of purely technical reasons
not touching on the merits of the case.
One last word: there is sufficient evidence to hold that counsel
for respondents, Felicisimo S. Garin, deliberately skirted the
first service on him of the Court of Appeals judgment of 16 May
1980. He wanted it served on him at his own convenience. We
note his action with great disapproval. As an officer of the
court, he must conduct himself with candor and sincerity. He is
warned that any repetition of this or similar misconduct will be
dealt with severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, dated 23 October 1980 and 20 January
1982, are AFFIRMED Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Without the conviction of the employee, the
employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi- delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil
Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer
solidarity liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to
the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. 1 The fact that appellants
reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent
civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil
action for quasi-delict.
The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, which provide:
Section 1. — Institution of criminal and civil
action. — When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party expressly waives
the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately.
Torts Cases Page 39 of 55
Section 2. — Independent civil action.-In the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case,provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111,
provides that —
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an
independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such
a reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the criminal
1 case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover
damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R. No.
74041, we held:
However, it does not follow that a person
who is not criminally liable is also free from
civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in
a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a
civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes
the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not
exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA
559).
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the
appealed orders of the trial court, dated March 10, 1970 and
May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further proceedings. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141538 March 23, 2004
HERMANA R. CEREZO, petitioner,
vs.
DAVID TUAZON, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the
Resolution2 dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20
January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of the
Decision3 dated 30 May 1995 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 ("trial court"), in Civil Case No.
7415. The trial court ordered petitioner Hermana R. Cerezo
("Mrs. Cerezo") to pay respondent David Tuazon ("Tuazon")
actual damages, loss of earnings, moral damages, and costs of
suit.
Antecedent Facts
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines
passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a
tricycle bearing plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo
Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On 1 October 1993,
tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against
Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney
Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda
("Foronda"). The complaint alleged that:
7. At the time of the incident, plaintiff [Tuazon] was in his
proper lane when the second-named defendant [Foronda],
Torts Cases Page 40 of 55
being then the driver and person in charge of the Country Bus
with plate number NYA 241, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a
negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard
to traffic rules and regulations, there being a "Slow Down" sign
near the scene of the incident, and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries, his
negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe
damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff
thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with
his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut[.]4
On 1 October 1993, Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a
pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issued summons against
Atty. Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses") at the
Makati address stated in the complaint. However, the
summons was returned unserved on 10 November 1993 as the
Cerezo spouses no longer held office nor resided in Makati. On
18 April 1994, the trial court issued alias summons against the
Cerezo spouses at their address in Barangay Sta. Maria,
Camiling, Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the
complaint were finally served on 20 April 1994 at the office of
Atty. Cerezo, who was then working as Tarlac Provincial
Prosecutor. Atty. Cerezo reacted angrily on learning of the
service of summons upon his person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly told
Sheriff William Canlas: "Punyeta, ano ang gusto mong
mangyari? Gusto mong hindi ka makalabas ng buhay dito?
Teritoryo ko ito. Wala ka sa teritoryo mo."5
The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the
proceedings before the trial court. The Cerezo spouses filed a
comment with motion for bill of particulars dated 29 April 1994
and a reply to opposition to comment with motion dated 13
June 1994.6 On 1 August 1994, the trial court issued an order
directing the Cerezo spouses to file a comment to the
opposition to the bill of particulars. Atty. Elpidio B. Valera
("Atty. Valera") of Valera and Valera Law Offices appeared on
behalf of the Cerezo spouses. On 29 August 1994, Atty. Valera
filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of
Tuazon’s motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of
new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service
in accordance with the Rules of Court.7
On 30 August 1994, the trial court issued an order resolving
Tuazon’s motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses’
urgent ex-parte motion. The order reads:
At the hearing on August 30, 1994, the plaintiff [Tuazon]
testified that he is presently jobless; that at the time of the
filing of this case, his son who is working in Malaysia helps him
and sends him once in a while P300.00 a month, and that he
does not have any real property. Attached to the Motion to
Litigate as Pauper are his Affidavit that he is unemployed; a
Certification by the Barangay Captain of his poblacion that his
income is not enough for his family’s subsistence; and a
Certification by the Office of the Municipal Assessor that he has
no landholding in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province of
Pampanga.
Article 121(3) of the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs.
Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon
arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee,
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The dispositive
portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant Hermana Cerezo to pay the plaintiff:

a) For Actual Damages

The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the
plaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this
case as a pauper under existing rules.

-
On the other hand, the Court denies the prayer in the
Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion requiring new
summons to be served to the defendants. The Court is of the
opinion that any infirmity in the service of the summons to the
defendant before plaintiff was allowed to prosecute his
complaint in this case as a pauper has been cured by this Order.
P69,485.35

If within 15 days from receipt of this Order, the defendants do

not question on appeal this Order of this Court, the Court shall
proceed to resolve the Motion for Bill of Particulars.8

1) Expenses for operation and medical Treatment

On 27 September 1994, the Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration.

On 14 November 1994, the trial court issued an order directing

the Cerezo spouses to file their answer within fifteen days from
receipt of the order. The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer.
On 27 January 1995, Tuazon filed a motion to declare the
Cerezo spouses in default. On 6 February 1995, the trial court 2) Cost of repair of the tricycle
issued an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default and
authorizing Tuazon to present his evidence. 9

On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazon’s testimonial and b) For loss of earnings
documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor.
The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability
because there was no service of summons on him. The trial
court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show
that Mrs. Cerezo’s business benefited the family, pursuant to
Torts Cases Page 41 of 55
- petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of "fraud,
mistake or excusable negligence." Testifying before the trial
court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of
notices of hearings and of orders of the court. Atty. Valera
added that he received no notice before or during the 8 May
1995 elections, "when he was a senatorial candidate for the
KBL Party, and very busy, using his office and residence as Party
39,921.00
National Headquarters." Atty. Valera claimed that he was able
to read the decision of the trial court only after Mrs. Cerezo
sent him a copy.11

c) For moral damages

Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to

prove the participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case.
Tuazon presented the following exhibits:

Exhibit 1

43,300.00

d) And to pay the cost of the suit.

Sheriff’s return and summons;

Exhibit 1-A

20,000.00

The docket fees and other expenses in the filing of this suit
shall be lien on whatever judgment may be rendered in favor of
the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.10

Court’s return slip addressed to plaintiff’s counsel, Atty.

Norman Dick de Guzman.12
Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on 25 June 1995.
On 10 July 1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial court a
Torts Cases Page 42 of 55
On 4 March 1998, the trial court issued an order13 denying the preliminary injunction enjoining execution of the trial court’s
petition for relief from judgment. The trial court stated that decision pending resolution of the petition.
having received the decision on 25 June 1995, the Cerezo
spouses should have filed a notice of appeal instead of
resorting to a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court
refused to grant relief from judgment because the Cerezo The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of
spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal. Moreover, judgment in a resolution dated 21 October 1999. The
the Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud, accident, resolution reads in part:
mistake or excusable negligence by conclusive evidence, they
also failed to prove that they had a good and substantial
defense. The trial court noted that the Cerezo spouses failed to
appeal because they relied on an expected settlement of the
In this case, records show that the petitioner previously filed
case.
with the lower court a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the
ground that they were wrongfully declared in default while
waiting for an amicable settlement of the complaint for
damages. The court a quo correctly ruled that such petition is
The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of without merit. The defendant spouses admit that during the
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65. The initial hearing they appeared before the court and even
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48132.14 The petition mentioned the need for an amicable settlement. Thus, the
questioned whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant spouses.
the case considering there was no service of summons on
Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was an
indispensable party. In a resolution15 dated 21 January 1999,
the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari and
Therefore, petitioner having availed of a petition for relief, the
affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition for relief
remedy of an annulment of judgment is no longer available.
from judgment. The Court of Appeals declared that the Cerezo
The proper action for the petitioner is to appeal the order of
spouses’ failure to file an answer was due to their own
the lower court denying the petition for relief.
negligence, considering that they continued to participate in
the proceedings without filing an answer. There was also
nothing in the records to show that the Cerezo spouses actually
offered a reasonable settlement to Tuazon. The Court of
Appeals also denied Cerezo spouses’ motion for Wherefore, the instant petition could not be given due course
reconsideration for lack of merit. and should accordingly be dismissed.

The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court a petition for review SO ORDERED.18
on certiorari under Rule 45. Atty. Cerezo himself signed the
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 137593. On 13 April 1999, this
Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for review on
certiorari for failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of On 20 January 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the Cerezo
the petition to the Court of Appeals and to the adverse parties. spouses’ motion for reconsideration.19 The Court of Appeals
Even if the petition complied with this requirement, the Court stated:
would still have denied the petition as the Cerezo spouses
failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error. The Court’s resolution was entered in the Book of Entries
and Judgments when it became final and executory on 28 June
A distinction should be made between a court’s jurisdiction
1999.16
over a person and its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case. The former is acquired by the proper service of summons
or by the parties’ voluntary appearance; while the latter is
conferred by law.
Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of
Appeals on 6 July 1999 a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 with prayer for restraining order. Atty. Valera
and Atty. Dionisio S. Daga ("Atty. Daga") represented Mrs.
Resolving the matter of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
Cerezo in the petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53572.17
Section 19(1) of B[atas] P[ambansa] 129 provides that Regional
The petition prayed for the annulment of the 30 May 1995
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
decision of the trial court and for the issuance of a writ of
Torts Cases Page 43 of 55
civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of Once again, it bears stressing that having availed of a petition
pecuniary estimation. Thus it was proper for the lower court to for relief, the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
decide the instant case for damages. available.

Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case which is Based on the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration could
absolute and conferred by law; any defects [sic] in the not be given due course and is hereby DENIED.
acquisition of jurisdiction over a person (i.e., improper filing of
civil complaint or improper service of summons) may be
waived by the voluntary appearance of parties.
SO ORDERED.20

The lower court admits the fact that no summons was served
on defendant Foronda. Thus, jurisdiction over the person of The Issues
defendant Foronda was not acquired, for which reason he was
not held liable in this case. However, it has been proven that
jurisdiction over the other defendants was validly acquired by
the court a quo.
On 7 February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo, this time with Atty. Daga
alone representing her, filed the present petition for review on
certiorari before this Court. Mrs. Cerezo claims that:

The defendant spouses admit to having appeared in the initial

hearings and in the hearing for plaintiff’s motion to litigate as a
pauper. They even mentioned conferences where attempts
1. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment, the
were made to reach an amicable settlement with plaintiff.
Court of Appeals assumes that the issues raised in the petition
However, the possibility of amicable settlement is not a good
for annulment is based on extrinsic fraud related to the denied
and substantial defense which will warrant the granting of said
petition for relief notwithstanding that the grounds relied upon
petition.
involves questions of lack of jurisdiction.

xxx
Assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve
his right to institute a separate action for damages in the
criminal action, the petitioner cannot now raise such issue and
question the lower court’s jurisdiction because petitioner and
her husband have waived such right by voluntarily appearing in
the civil case for damages. Therefore, the findings and the
decision of the lower court may bind them.
Records show that the petitioner previously filed with the
lower court a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground
that they were wrongfully declared in default while waiting for
an amicable settlement of the complaint for damages. The
court a quo correctly ruled that such petition is without merit,
jurisdiction having been acquired by the voluntary appearance
of defendant spouses.
Torts Cases Page 44 of 55
2. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of
Appeals disregarded the allegation that the lower court[’s]
findings of negligence against defendant-driver Danilo Foronda
[whom] the lower court did not summon is null and void for
want of due process and consequently, such findings of
negligence which is [sic] null and void cannot become the basis
of the lower court to adjudge petitioner-employer liable for
civil damages.
3. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of
Appeals ignored the allegation that defendant-driver Danilo A.
Foronda whose negligence is the main issue is an indispensable
party whose presence is compulsory but [whom] the lower
court did not summon.
4. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court of
Appeals ruled that assuming arguendo that private respondent
failed to reserve his right to institute a separate action for
damages in the criminal action, the petitioner cannot now raise
such issue and question the lower court’s jurisdiction because
petitioner [has] waived such right by voluntarily appearing in
the civil case for damages notwithstanding that lack of
jurisdiction cannot be waived.21
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit. As the issues are interrelated, we
shall discuss them jointly.
Remedies Available to a Party Declared in Default
An examination of the records of the entire proceedings shows
that three lawyers filed and signed pleadings on behalf of Mrs.
Cerezo, namely, Atty. Daga, Atty. Valera, and Atty. Cerezo.
Despite their number, Mrs. Cerezo’s counsels failed to avail of
the proper remedies. It is either by sheer ignorance or by
malicious manipulation of legal technicalities that they have
managed to delay the disposition of the present case, to the
detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon.
Mrs. Cerezo claims she did not receive any copy of the order
declaring the Cerezo spouses in default. Mrs. Cerezo asserts
that she only came to know of the default order on 25 June
1995, when she received a copy of the decision. On 10 July
1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial court a petition for
relief from judgment under Rule 38, alleging "fraud, mistake, or
excusable negligence" as grounds. On 4 March 1998, the trial
court denied Mrs. Cerezo’s petition for relief from judgment.
The trial court stated that Mrs. Cerezo could have availed of
appeal as a remedy and that she failed to prove that the
judgment was entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. Mrs. Cerezo then filed before the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65
assailing the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. On
21 January 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed Mrs. Cerezo’s
petition. On 24 February 1999, the appellate court denied Mrs.
Cerezo’s motion for reconsideration. On 11 March 1999, Mrs.
Cerezo filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, questioning the denial of the petition for relief
from judgment. We denied the petition and our resolution
became final and executory on 28 June 1999.
On 6 July 1999, a mere eight days after our resolution became
final and executory, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the Court of
Torts Cases Page 45 of 55
Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial
court under Rule 47. Meanwhile, on 25 August 1999, the trial
court issued over the objection of Mrs. Cerezo an order of
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 7415. On 21
October 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
annulment of judgment. On 20 January 2000, the Court of
Appeals denied Mrs. Cerezo’s motion for reconsideration. On 7
February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo filed the present petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the dismissal of
her petition for annulment of judgment.
Lina v. Court of Appeals22 enumerates the remedies available
to a party declared in default:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery
thereof and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set
aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule
18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the
defendant discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment
has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief
under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him
as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to
set aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec.
2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added)
Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a
judgment by default is also available if the trial court
improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court
properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion
attended such declaration.23
Mrs. Cerezo admitted that she received a copy of the trial
court’s decision on 25 June 1995. Based on this admission, Mrs.
Cerezo had at least three remedies at her disposal: an appeal, a
motion for new trial, or a petition for certiorari.
Mrs. Cerezo could have appealed under Rule 4124 from the
default judgment within 15 days from notice of the judgment.
She could have availed of the power of the Court of Appeals to
try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence, and perform
all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its appellate jurisdiction.25
Mrs. Cerezo also had the option to file under Rule 3726 a
motion for new trial within the period for taking an appeal. If
the trial court grants a new trial, the original judgment is
vacated, and the action will stand for trial de novo. The
recorded evidence taken in the former trial, as far as the same
is material and competent to establish the issues, shall be used
at the new trial without retaking the same.27
Mrs. Cerezo also had the alternative of filing under Rule 6528 a
petition for certiorari assailing the order of default within 60
days from notice of the judgment. An order of default is
interlocutory, and an aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.29 In a petition for certiorari,
the appellate court may declare void both the order of default
and the judgment of default.
Clearly, Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of these
remedies within the reglementary periods provided under the
Rules of Court. However, Mrs. Cerezo opted to file a petition
for relief from judgment, which is available only in exceptional
cases. A petition for relief from judgment should be filed within
the reglementary period of 60 days from knowledge of
judgment and six months from entry of judgment, pursuant to
Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.30 Tuason v. Court of
Appeals31 explained the nature of a petition for relief from
judgment:
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may
either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this
Torts Cases Page 46 of 55
petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise
the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal
which has been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
Evidently, there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence that prevented Mrs. Cerezo from filing an appeal, a
motion for new trial or a petition for certiorari. It was error for
her to avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
After our resolution denying Mrs. Cerezo’s petition for relief
became final and executory, Mrs. Cerezo, in her last ditch
attempt to evade liability, filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial court.
Annulment is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, a party must
file the petition within four years from its discovery, and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or estoppel bars the
petition. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if such fraud was
used as a ground, or could have been used as a ground, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment.32
Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction, not extrinsic fraud,
was her ground for filing the petition for annulment of
judgment. However, a party may avail of the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of the party.33 Mrs. Cerezo could have availed of a
new trial or appeal but through her own fault she erroneously
availed of the remedy of a petition for relief, which was denied
with finality. Thus, Mrs. Cerezo may no longer avail of the
remedy of annulment.
In any event, the trial court clearly acquired jurisdiction over
Mrs. Cerezo’s person. Mrs. Cerezo actively participated in the
proceedings before the trial court, submitting herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The defense of lack of jurisdiction
fails in light of her active participation in the trial court
proceedings. Estoppel or laches may also bar lack of jurisdiction
as a ground for nullity especially if raised for the first time on
appeal by a party who participated in the proceedings before
the trial court, as what happened in this case.34
For these reasons, the present petition should be dismissed for
utter lack of merit. The extraordinary action to annul a final
judgment is restricted to the grounds specified in the rules. The
reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action
from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a
duly promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory. There would be no end to litigation if parties who
have unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate remedies
or lost them through their fault could still bring an action for
annulment of judgment.35 Nevertheless, we shall discuss the
issues raised in the present petition to clear any doubt about
the correctness of the decision of the trial court.
Mrs. Cerezo’s Liability and the Trial Court’s Acquisition of
Jurisdiction
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for
annulment is lack of jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the
trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to
acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs. Cerezo points out that
there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover,
Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action for damages in the criminal action. Such contention
betrays a faulty foundation. Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds
from the point of view of criminal law and not of civil law, while
the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under
the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a
delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give
rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two
remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed
independently from the criminal action.36 There is, however, a
distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy,
whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the
procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.37
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-
delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo,
"without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision
and management of her employees and buses," hired Foronda
as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s
"recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence," aggravated
by Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack of due care and diligence in the selection
and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda."38
Torts Cases Page 47 of 55
The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in part:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an
indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one
whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation,
and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.39
However, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for
a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.
Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of
Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.40 Where there is a solidary obligation
on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for
the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the
entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of
rights, but only mutual representation.41 Where the obligation
of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
and the other is not even a necessary party because complete
relief is available from either.42 Therefore, jurisdiction over
Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages
from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is
primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a
delict is merely subsidiary.43 The words "primary and direct,"
as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided
by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character
and limits of the obligation.44 Although liability under Article
2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an
employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer
has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns.
While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for
the employee’s criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly
liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in
failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. The idea that the employer’s liability is solely
subsidiary is wrong.45
The action can be brought directly against the person
responsible (for another), without including the author of the
act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by
the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can
not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of
the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action;
the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action.46
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial court’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the
present case on the merits.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the
subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence
of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity
under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal
action where the employee’s delict and corresponding primary
liability are established.47 If the present action proceeds from
a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is
necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-
delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
The Cerezo spouses’ contention that summons be served anew
on them is untenable in light of their participation in the trial
court proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses’ contention
would make a fetish of a technicality.48 Moreover, any
irregularity in the service of summons that might have vitiated
the trial court’s jurisdiction over the persons of the Cerezo
spouses was deemed waived when the Cerezo spouses filed a
petition for relief from judgment.49
We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent
to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo
even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s
contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the
present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the
filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and
directly liable for her own civil negligence. The words of Justice
Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia still hold true today as much
as it did in 1942:
Torts Cases Page 48 of 55
x x x [T]o hold that there is only one way to make defendant’s
liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his
(the latter’s) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of
obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws,
but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article
[2180] of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay,
it being a matter of common knowledge that professional
drivers of taxis and other similar public conveyances do not
have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then,
should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this
roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In
construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.50
Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is due on the amount of
damages adjudged by the trial court.51 The 6% per annum
interest shall commence from 30 May 1995, the date of the
decision of the trial court. Upon finality of this decision, interest
at 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per annum, is due on the
amount of damages adjudged by the trial court until full
payment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for review. The
Resolution dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20
January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount due shall
earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed from 30 May
1995, the date of the trial court’s decision. Upon finality of this
decision, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per annum,
in lieu of 6% per annum, until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-
President and General Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod
City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA,
respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review
on certiorari is the Decision1 dated April 25, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003,2
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, affirming an earlier Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43, which
denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 99-
10845, an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident
thereat instituted by the herein private respondents - the
spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the
petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the
spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a
Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time
by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles
died as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 67787, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent
Norman Yeneza.
Torts Cases Page 49 of 55
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused
driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience
and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of
September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses
Vallejera filed a complaint3 for damages against the petitioners
as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as
such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. Thereat docketed
as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch
43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the
petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the
Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the
required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed in
their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause
of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their
dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court required
them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities
supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities,
the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally
arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary
liability against an employer" under the provision of Article
1035 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they
contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction
against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them
liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the
criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary
liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on
the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the
plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate
action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the
damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the
criminal action. which was already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001,6 the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-
trial. With their motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the same court in its subsequent order7 of September 26,
2001, the petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic complaint
for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision8 dated April 25, 2003, the CA
denied the petition and upheld the trial court. Partly says the
CA in its challenged issuance:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that
the responsibility charged was the petitioner's subsidiary
liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by
the trial court] in the Order of September 4, 2001, the
complaint does not even allege the basic elements for such a
liability, like the conviction of the accused employee and his
insolvency. Truly enough, a civil action to enforce subsidiary
liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even
unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for
fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the
liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate,
and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or prior showing of the latter's insolvency.
(Underscoring in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their
motion was denied by the CA in its resolution9 of July 10, 2003.
Hence, the petitioners' present recourse on their submission
that the appellate court committed reversible error in
upholding the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss.
We DENY.
Torts Cases Page 50 of 55
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the
spouses Vallejeras' cause of action in Civil Case No. 99-10845 is
founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as
maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article 218010
of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two courts below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint
for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. That complaint alleged,
inter alia, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered
owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS 881 and
employer sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at
Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son of said plaintiffs [now
respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and
bumped by above-described vehicle then driven by said
employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of
defendant's employee, who drove said vehicle, recklessly,
negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic
condition and safety of other road users and likewise to the
fault and negligence of the owner employer, herein defendants
LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs' son suffered
multiple body injuries which led to his untimely demise on that
very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendant's
employee, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed
as Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III,
entitled "People v. Yeneza" for "Reckless Imprudence resulting
to Homicide," but the same was dismissed because pending
litigation, then remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant
death suffered by the late minor Charles Vallejera were due to
the negligence and imprudence of defendant's employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of his employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if exercised,
would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed words and
emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely,
that the herein petitioners are being made to account for their
subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of
September 4, 2001 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss,
the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the
subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in
the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff
Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages
based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations
of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy
against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged
in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the
driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are
civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since
they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have
prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of
their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines
cause of action as the "act or omission by which a party violates
Torts Cases Page 51 of 55
the right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to an
obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;12 and 2) independent
civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law;13 the intentional torts;14 and
culpa aquiliana15); or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action.16 Either of these two possible liabilities may be
enforced against the offender.17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under
Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action
chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer
liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the
employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father
of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for
culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily
liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.18
Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation
arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws
subject to the provision of Article 217720 and of the pertinent
provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation,
and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly,
Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff
may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of
arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-
delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known
his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint,21 and
not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the
plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based on the defendant's
perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the
employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee.22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the
couple's minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were The argument is specious.
civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee,
the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented
To start with, the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is obviously
said accident."
misplaced. There, the civil case was filed while the criminal case
against the employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case
against the employee driver was prematurely terminated due
to his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was filed by the
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners respondent spouses because no remedy can be obtained by
based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal
have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven case against their driver during the pendency thereof.
beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent;
that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as
employers to pay for the damage done by their employee
(driver) based on the principle that every person criminally
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate
liable is also civilly liable.23 Since there was no conviction in the
civil action for damages was made when the criminal case was
criminal case against the driver, precisely because death
filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal
intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings,
case was dismissed without any pronouncement having been
the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for
made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no
their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the
petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a
condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to
ask for the impossible.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their
Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim,24 repeatedly made
mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their
defense on their allegation that "they had exercised due
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
diligence in the selection and supervision of [their] employees."
merit.
The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the
petitioners acknowledged the private respondents' cause of
action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Costs against the petitioners.

All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought

under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily SO ORDERED.
from the petitioners as employers responsible for their
negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for
damages caused by his employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former is not engaged in any business or industry.

Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue that Civil Case

No. 99-10845 should have been dismissed for failure of the
respondent spouses to make a reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages when the criminal case
against the driver was filed.

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