Written Report (Finals)

Special Proceedings
Thursdays 7:30 – 9:30

Submitted by:

Anor, Jennifer L.
 REPUBLIC VS. MERCADERA
637 SCRA 654 DECEMBER 8, 2010

FACTS:

On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted
Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her
Certificate of Live Birth—from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).

Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now
authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical
errors in civil registry entries.

The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a
court order was obtained “because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent
appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by
Republic Act 9048.”

Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC).

The RTC granted Mercadera’s petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to
correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN
Lacquiao Mercadera.

The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It
mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous enough to
grant but “it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights.” What the
lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercadera’s given name, which would have been proper
had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the changing of Mercadera’s name from Marilyn to Merlyn falls within Rule 103, not Rule
108.

RULING:

No. Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both,
pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special
proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal
position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails of
a remedy to alter the “designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and
is best known.” When granted, a person’s identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new “label
or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing
with him.” Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the
change by virtue of a court decree.

The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by
the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with,
the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves
to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. “It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.”

A change of name does not define or effect a change of one’s existing family relations or in the rights and
duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. However, “there could be
instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the
surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but
because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind.” Hence, in
requests for a change of name, “what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the
request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x
mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant x x x.”

Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries
in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to “acts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,” also as enumerated in Article 408 of
the same law. Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the
civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule.

The “change of name” contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article
412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by
law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for
the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To
assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes “changes of
name,” the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all
alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set
right under Rule 108.

This rule in “names,” however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical
errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia,
141 SCRA 462 (1986), is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil
status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. “After all,
the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.”

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a
correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from.” To change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute.”36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly
prayed for the lower court “to remove the faults or error” from her registered given name “MARILYN,” and
“to make or set aright” the same to conform to the one she grew up to, “MERLYN.” It does not take a
complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling.
Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to
enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief.

OSHITA VS. REPUBLIC

19 SCRA 700, March 81, 1967

FACTS:

On February 15, 1962, Antonina B. Oshita filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a petition to have
her name changed from “Antonina B. Oshita” to “Antonina Bartolome”. The petition was signed by the
petitioner herself and was “subscribed and sworn to” by her before the Deputy Clerk of Court.

The trial court granted the petition as Antonina has established the evidence that she is the legitimate
daughter of Kishimatsu Oshita, a Japanese citizen, now deceased, and Buena Bartolome, a Filipina; that
she was born in the City of Davao on May 9, 1940 and has since then, up to the time of the hearing,
resided in said city; that upon reaching the age of majority, appellee elected Philippine citizenship and
took her oath of allegiance; that being already a Filipino citizen she desired to have her family name
changed .from “Oshita” to “Bartolome”, the latter being the family name of her mother, and because she
felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing a Japanese surname; that her older brother and sister,
who had earlier elected Philippine citizenship, have been using the surname “Bartolome.”

In his appeal, the Solicitor General insists (1) that the lower court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case because the petition was not verified as required by Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and (2) that no sufficient reason had been shown to justify the change of the surname of the appellee.
The appellant urges that under Article 364 of the Civil Code legitimate children shall principally use the
surname of the father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to verify the petition as required by Section 2 of Rule 103 is ground for
dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

No.

While it is true that under Section 2, Rule 103, it is required that the petition for change of name be
verified, nevertheless, no provision exists in the rules which declares that such a requirement regarding
verification is jurisdictional. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply intended to
secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The requirement
regarding verification of a pleading is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-
compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order the
correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is not verified if the
attending circumstances are such that the strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice or the law may thereby be served.
Where a petition for change of name was under oath but was not verified, the lower court did not commit
a reversible error when it denied the motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the court was not affected by the absence of the proper verification. However, before
setting the petition for hearing, the lower court should have required the petitioner to have her petition
verified.

This provision (Article 364 of the Civil Code), however, is not absolute because under Article 264 of the
same Code, it is provided that legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the father and of
the mother.

If there is a sufficient reason, a legitimate child may change his surname from that of the father to that of
the mother, since the law allows him to bear the surname of the father and of the mother. Where the
petitioner, the legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother and a Japanese, elected Philippine citizenship, and
her older brother and sister are using their mother’s surname and she felt embarrassed in using her
Japanese surname because of the ill-feeling harbored by some Filipinos against the Japanese, and there
is no showing that her desire to use her mother’s surname was motivated by any fraudulent purpose or
that the change of her surname would prejudice public interest, her petition to change her surname from
“Oshita” to “Bartolome” was properly granted.

In the instant case, it has been shown that the petitioner-appellee is the Iegitimate daughter of Buena
Bartolome and Hishimatsu Oshita; that upon reaching the age of majority she elected Philippine
citizenship and took her oath of allegiance; that being already a Filipino citizen she desires to adopt a
Filipino surname; that her older brother and sister who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been
using the surname “Bartolome”; and that she desires to have the surname “Bartolome” instead of
“Oshita”, because she felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing Japanese surname. The lower
court further observed that “It cannot be denied that there had been ill feeling among the Filipinos against
the Japanese due to the last Pacific war. Although normal relations between the Philippines and Japan
have been established the ill feelings still persist among some Filipinos especially among the less
educated who had unpleasant experience during the war.” There is no showing that the appellee was
motivated by any fraudulent purpose, or that the change of her surname will prejudice public interest. The
lower court acted correctly when it considered these circumstances as reasons sufficient to justify the
change of name as prayed for by the petitioner-appellee.

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG
454 SCRA 155, G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005

FACTS:

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna
Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of
entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.

The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that the reason given for the
change of name sought in the petition—that is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when
studies in Singapore because of his middle name—did not fall within the grounds recognized by law.
Wang filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied. The trial court maintained
that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle
name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there.

Wang filed a petition before the Supreme Court arguing that the trial court has decided a question of
substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a
minor child is contrary to Article 1747 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that “[W]ith globalization
and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family
name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking
into consideration the “best interest of the child.” It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid
reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out
that the middle name “Carulasan” will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or
pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community.
Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until
he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases9
decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.

The OSG, on the other hand, argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have
the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere
expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the
middle name “Carulasan” is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to
support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dropping of petitioner’s middle name “Carulasan” considering the best interest of the
child is proper.

RULING:

No.

The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of
birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.

GIL GO VS. REPUBLIC

77 SCRA 65, No. L-31760 May 25, 1977

FACTS:

Gil Go was born in Tacloban City on September 1, 1942. His name in the civil register is Gil Co. He was
registered as the legitimate son of Co Beng Chiong and Ong Sun Ti (mother). During liberation
(Commonwealth, according to petitioner’s counsel), Co Beng Chiong, following a Chinese custom,
allegedly adopted the surname Yao of his godfather and changed his name to Yao Ka Sin. No
documentary evidence was presented on this point.

When Gil Go was baptized, he was allegedly given the name Gil Yao Eng Hua. His baptismal certificate
was not presented in evidence. Gil Go testified that since childhood, he has been known as Henry Yao
among his relatives, friends and business associates, but in his business and government transactions,
he used the name Gil Co. No third person corroborated his testimony. He did not present any
documentary evidence to prove that he is known in the community as Henry Yao.

In his alien registration certificate (ACR), which was marked as Exhibit G but is not found in the record (he
withdrew it and did not present later the photostatic copy which his counsel promised to offer as a
substitute), he is registered as Gil Go due to an alleged error of an immigration clerk, Because of the
confusion generated by those names, he wants legal authorization for the use of the name Henry Yao.

On March 9, 1965 Gil Go filed the instant petition in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. He prayed that
his name be changed to Henry Yao. It was not indicated in the title or caption of Gil Go’s petition that he
desired to change his name to Henry Yao. The published order setting his petition for hearing reproduced
that defective title. Nor was It indicated in his petition that his registered name is Gil Co, a name which he
allegedly used in his official transactions (19 tsn), in his petition, he used the name Gil Go.

The trial court granted the change of name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in allowing the change of name.

RULING:

Yes.

The proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine the
petition for change of name is acquired after due publication of the order, setting it for hearing, which
order should contain certain data, among which is the name sought to be adopted, a matter which should
be indicated in the title of the petition.
It was not indicated in the title or caption of Gil Go’s petition that he desired to change his name to Henry
Yao. The published order setting his petition for hearing reproduced that defective title. Nor was it
indicated in his petition that his registered name is Gil Co, a name which he allegedly used in his official
transactions. In his petition, he used the name Gil Go. Inasmuch as the title of the petition and the order
setting it for hearing were deficient, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding.

The reason for that rule is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published
order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding. Only if the caption or the title strikes him does he
proceed to read the contents of the order. And the probability is great that he does not at all notice the
other names or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
The non-inclusion of all the names or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or in the title of
the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication.

Change of name is a matter of public interest. It is a privilege and not a matter of right. The court should
weigh carefully the consequences of the change of name and deny the same unless weighty reasons are
shown. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. Change of name may entail serious consequences and cause some complications. It
should be authorized only for compelling reasons.

Gil Go (Gil Co)’s assertion that he has used the name Henry Yao was not solidly substantiated by any
documentary evidence or by the testimony of other persons, His uncorroborated evidence consisted only
of his testimony and his birth certificate where his surname is Co, not Go. On the witness stand, he
contradicted the allegation in paragraph 3 of his petition (which he had verified) that he was “christened
Gil Go”. He testified that he was christened Gil Yao Eng Hua.

He failed to prove the allegation in his petition that the change of his name to Henry Yao is justified by
“convenience and business reasons”. As already observed, he did not offer indubitable proof that he used
the name Henry Yao, or that his father was known as Yao Ka Sin, He used the name Gil Co in his school
records (13 tsn).

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS

628 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.

From the RTC’s ruling, Gerbert filed the present petition. Taking into account the rationale behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the recognition of the Canadian divorce decree authorizes the cancellation of the entry in
the civil registry under the Rules of Court.

RULING:

No.

The recognition that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not,
by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil
Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may
be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these
basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Court pointed out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry—one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
 REPUBLIC VS. COSETENG-MAGPAYO
641 SCRA 533, G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011

FACTS:

Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth1 shows, contracted marriage on
March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez Lim Coseteng.

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating
that his mother Anna Dominique “does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.”2 Respondent also
submitted his academic records from elementary up to college3 showing that he carried the surname
“Coseteng,” and the birth certificate of his child where “Coseteng” appears as his surname.4 In the 1998,
2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District
using the name “JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.”

After he amended his petition to comply with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103
of the Rules of Court and publication, the trial court granted his petition and directed the Civil Registrar of
Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry “March 26, 1972” in Item 24 for “DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES”
[in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry “MAGPAYO” in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to “COSETENG”;
3. Delete the entry “COSETENG” in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry “Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr.” in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]

The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the court. Hence, the
OSG field a petition for review before the Supreme Court assailing that the petition for change of name
involves the change of Coseteng-Magpayo’s civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and therefore
should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings and that the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rule 103 would suffice to grant respondent’s petition.

RULING:

No.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious
grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for changing
his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 168 SCRA 294 [1988], categorically holds that “changes which may affect the
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only
be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .” Since respondent’s desired change affects his
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies.

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry
in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and “all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby” should be made parties to the
proceeding.

REPUBLIC VS. NISHINA

634 SCRA 716, G.R. No. 186053 November 15, 2010

FACTS:

Nisaida Sumera Nishina, represented by her mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe (Zenaida), filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and
change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan.

After hearing the petition, the lower court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Local Civil
Registry of Malolos “to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada issued in 1993
[bearing] Registry No. 93-06684 and to change it [in its stead] Registry No. 87-04983, particularly the
surname of [respondent] from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE.”

The OSG filed a notice of appeal, but Nishina filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Republic adopted
a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Republic countered that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings where
multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the present case.

The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s appeal, holding that since respondent’s petition before the RTC
“is classified as a special proceeding,” petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record of
appeal within 30 days from receipt of the order granting respondent’s petition, and by not filing a record
on appeal, petitioner “never perfected” its appeal. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
Republic filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of a record on appeal was necessary.

RULING:

No.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special
proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal, viz.: x x x The above-quoted rule contemplates
multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal—in addition to the
notice of appeal—is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the
trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is
resolved by said court and held to be final. In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not
necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the
appealed order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in
the civil registry.

BRAZA VS. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

607 SCRA 638, G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

FACTS:

Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as “Pablito Sicad Braza,” were
married on January 4, 1978. The union bore Paolo Josef and Janelle Ann on May 8, 1978 and June 7,
1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo on June 4, 1980.

Pablo died on April 15, 2002. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines,
Lucille Titular began introducing minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza as her and Pablo’s son. Ma. Cristina
thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, which contains an annotation that Patrick was acknowledged by the
father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997. Ma. Cristina also obtained a copy of a marriage contract
between Pablo and Lucille on April 22, 1998.

Ma. Cristina and her children filed before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental
a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. They contended
that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said
marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and
Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his
legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name “Braza”; 2) a
directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the
legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage
of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the petition without
prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a
family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of marriage as void can be a subject of a petition under Rule 108.
RULING:

No.

In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an
entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may
generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made
by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of
name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick. It is well to
emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the
petition filed before the court a quo.

REPUBLIC VS. OLAYBAR

715 SCRA 605, G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

FACTS:

Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on
June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not
appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers.[4] She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the
entries in the wife portion thereof. Olaybar impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her
alleged husband, as parties to the case. She completely denied having known the supposed husband,
but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while
she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a
certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order
for her to obtain a passport.

The Regional Trial Court granted Olaybar’s petition for cancellation of entries in the latter’s contract
marriage. The Republic moved for reconsideration assailing that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. The lower court denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. The Republic then filed a petition for review before the
Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Rule 108 applies only when there are errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected.

2. Whether or not granting the cancellation of “all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract,” is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio.

RULING:

1. No.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of
a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of
Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that “even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established
and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.” An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

2. No.

While the Court maintains that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties
had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as
set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage
by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as
there was no marriage to speak of.
 SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio
and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio”
in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as “male.”

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.

From then on, Silverio lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. On November 26, 2002,
he then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his
sex from “male” to “female” in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner which was of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity and ordered the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries
appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from “Rommel
Jacinto” to MELY and petitioner’s gender from “Male” to FEMALE.”

The Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is
no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal
basis.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Silverio’s first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

RULING:

No.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority.
RA 9048 governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name
is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within
that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all
these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his
first name was concerned.

As used in this Act (RA 9048), the following terms shall mean: x x       x x x      x x x (3) “Clerical or
typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding,
and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that
it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means “to make or set
aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards
his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the
legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought
by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as
the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a
person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment
of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may
be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a
law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

565 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008

FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate before the RTC of Laguna. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981
and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed
secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which
is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent
an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her
ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender
be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. To prove her claim,
respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating
that respondent’s condition is known as CAH.

The RTC granted Cagandahan’s petition and ordered the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed
fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

The OSG filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the lower court’s ruling. The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. It contends that the
petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction
of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the court a quo
did not implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is fatally
defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition
was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person
and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender
is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition
known as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff,” under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code,
this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408.
The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated
under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or “inappropriate” appearance of
male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone.

Ultimately, the Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as
a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his
body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken
its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one
who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and
of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the
path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
“incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid
and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling the Court does no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in
respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE CASES OF SILVERIO AND CAGANDAHAN

A change of name is a privilege, not a right.”

- (Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007)

In the cases of Silverio vs. Republic (537 SCRA 373) and Republic vs Cagandahan (565 SCRA 72), the
Supreme Court has set when sex becomes a proper ground for allowing the change of name under
Republic Act 9048.

BACKGROUND

In Silverio, the petitioner, Rommel Jacinto Dantes was born male as indicated in his Certificate of Birth. In
Cagandahan, the petitioner, Jennifer Cagandahan, was born female.

However, both parties’ sex become apparent as they were growing up. Dantes identified himself as a
male transsexual. Accordingly, he was “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that
he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted
several doctors, underwent hormone treatment and breast augmentation and successfully underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, Dantes lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. As Jennifer was growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and
was diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where a person possesses both
male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed with clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and
at the age of six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered she has small ovaries. At age thirteen,
her ovarian structures had minimized. She stopped growing, had no breasts or menstrual development.
For all interests and appearances, she has become a male person.

For Dantes, he had to undergo sexual reassignment, while for Cagandahan, he let nature takes its
course.

In different occasions, each of them filed a petition for the correction or change of the entries in their birth
certificate under Republic Act 9048. Rommel Jacinto then sought to become Mely and his sex to be
changed from “male” to “female.” Meanwhile, Jennifer wanted to change her name to Jeff Cagandahan
and her gender from “female” to “male.” The RTC of Manila and RTC of Laguna both rendered decision in
favor of Dantes and Cagandahan, respectively.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, the basic question to answer was: When may a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate on the ground of sex
change?

The Court looked into Republic Act 9048 which vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned and Rules 103 and
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

LEGAL BASIS: CHANGE OF SEX

In Cagandahan, the OSG contended that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. On the
other hand, Jennifer argued that she is actually is a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender; change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108. In Silverio,
Dantes’ basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make
his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.

The Court declared in Silverio that no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on
the ground of sex reassignment. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code. In the later case of Cagandahan, the Court ruled: “Ultimately, we are of the view that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Respondent here has simply let nature
take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a
female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.”

LEGAL BASIS: CHANGE OF NAME

With the enactment of RA 9048, the law excluded the change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. The remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

In Silverio, the Court declared that a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications
in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

The Court further ruled that the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s
first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him
at all.

As a consequence of the Court’s decision of allowing change of sex in Jennifer’s Certificate of Birth, the
Court finds merit in the change of name from Jennifer to Jeff. Accordingly, such a change will confirm with
the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
 SALIENT FEATURES OF REPUBLIC ACT 9048 (CLERICAL ERROR LAW)

Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to
what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous
nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
substantial kind. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that
appropriate adversary proceeding. (Herrera, 2005)

Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
These includes rectification affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party.

The following are the corrections that can be made under RA 9048:
 Correction of clerical or typographical errors in any entry in civil registry documents, EXCEPT
corrections involving the change in sex, age, nationality and status of a person.
 Change of a person's first name in his/her civil registry document under certain grounds specified
under the law through administrative process.

Section 2 of RA 9048 defines clerical or typographical error" as referring to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality,
age, status or sex of the petitioner.

For the petition for change of first name or nickname, Section 4 provides that it may be allowed in any of
the following cases:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce.
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or
3. The change will avoid confusion.

WHO MAY FILE

Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an
entry and/or change of first name or nickname (Sec. 3).

VENUE

Under Section 3, the interested person may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry
office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for
such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local civil
registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the
local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their
petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.

CONTENTS OF THE PETITION

The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by
the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the
petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The
petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the
change sought to be made.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

1. A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the
entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed.
2. At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the
correction or change shall be based; and
3. Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general
may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the documents
mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least
once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the
petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no
pending case or no criminal record.

The petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as follows: first
copy to the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or the consul general; second copy to the Office of
the Civil Registrar General; and third copy to the petitioner.

DECISION AND APPEAL

The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to whom the petition is presented shall examine
the petition and its supporting documents. The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall
act on the petition and shall render a decision not later than five (5) working days after the completion of
the posting and/or publication requirement. (Sec. 6)

The civil registrar general shall, within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision granting a
petition, exercise the power to impugn such decision by way of an objection based on the following
grounds:
1. The error is not clerical or typographical;
2. The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is substantial or controversial as it affects
the civil status of a person; or
3. The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of a person does not fall under SECTION
4.
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner
may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper
court. (Sec. 7)