Foreign Policy

Foreign Policy of Pakistan:

In the simplest way, the foreign policy can be defined as the connections or association amongst
the sovereign states. However, in the broader perspective the foreign policy is said to be those
endeavors of the independent states which they embark upon to develop close relations between
them in order to benefit form each other’s achievements in various fields of human activity. The
foreign policy is usually referred to as the general principles by which a state governs its re-
action to the international environments.
Foreign policy is a nation’s contemplation, longing and reflection of domestic political trends
and behavior. It is always the product of interaction of many forces like ideological, historical,
economic, national interests and geo-political locations. These factors determine the country’s
outlook in world affairs. It is more or less, a compatible standpoint taken over by a nation in its
dealings and connections with other nations with respect to the affairs falling beyond the ambit
of the conventional alliances or convenient settlement.
The peculiar location of Pakistan with its linkages with the West and Central Asia, its cultural
and ideological orientations as well as circumstances surrounding its birth culminating in the
partition of the Indian sub-continent make the task of fashioning a rational approach to
international affairs complex and difficult. The wars with its hostile neighbor, the loss of its
eastern part, its policy with regard to Afghanistan and its relations. To these may be added close
links with China and the Muslim countries especially Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Iran and Turkey.
Another very important factor has been the weak and unstable political system and the
emergence of military as a dominant political foce3 making the task of foreign policy
formulating still much difficult.

Determinants of Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy:
The foreign policy of a country reflects the behavior pattern of a nation based on its collective
wisdom in dealing with other nations. It can neither be based permanently on the wishful
thinking of an individual, nor on the idealism of a group. The national goals, more or less, at
external ends, as collected carefully through record, of the nations, remain consistent, although
they may be inharmonious internally with the man and the groups in power from time to time. A
multitude of factors contribute to the making of an outlook in dealings with nations of the world
abroad. Friends and foes, as with individuals, are determined by the history compared to its
internal policy is much more important and significant, as any change in the latter may not have
any dire consequences whereas a change in the former may have. The foreign policy in other
words, greatly serves the national interests while policies in other areas may cater to individual
or special interests of a group or individual. Similarly, the handling of the external policy needs
persons more adept in their execution than those in other policy areas. A successful foreign
poli8cy fills the gap where physical strength is wanting. Thus it is not an easy task to frame the
foreign policy of a country. A number of factors have to factors have to be kept in view in this
regard. The following five factors are discernible in the formulation of Pakistan’s foreign policy.
1. ideological Obligation
2. historical legacy
3. geographical location
4. the Indian Threat
5. Economic Compulsions.
Ideological Obligation:
Islamic ideology is a very important factor in the determination of Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Pakistan calls itself a Muslim country for two reasons; firstly, more than 85 per cent of the
population adheres as to Islam. Secondly, Pakistan was created to meet the irresistible urge of
Muslims of the subcontinent to have a homeland of their own where they could live in preserve
in safety and tranquility their religion, culture and way of life and where they could live in peace
and prosperity. The late Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan once said:
“The underlying idea of the movement for the achievement of Pakistan was not just to add
one more county to the conglomeration of countries in the world or to add one more patch of
color to the multi-colored global map. Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the
Muslims of this subcontinent to secure a territory, however limited, where the Islamic ideology
and way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world. A coordinal feature of this
ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality. It is, therefore, part of the mission
which Pakistan hands set before it to do every thing in its power to promote closer fellowship
and cooperation between Muslim countries.”
Historical Legacy:
Both India and Pakistan were successors to an administration which carried certain defense
objectives in the area. The subcontinent had been the haunt of foreign invaders from the north
since times immemorial. The Russian expansion in the north-wet of India and the Chinese
presence in the north east rugged the British authorities in the subcontinent to devise a
mechanism assuring safety against the northern threats.
The British northern command at Rawalpindi, the Quetta Staff Training College, the extension of
Indian railway line to Chapman and Landikotal, the creation of the militia force in the tribal belt
in the north-west and the establishment of a powerful intelligence and surveillance station at
Peshawar are but a few instances in this regard. This threat perception, as of natural
consequence, was inherited by both the successive stated after the partition of India in 1947. The
Russian advances southward during the last century had aroused international concern the world
over and the new state of Pakistan could not shut its eyes to it. Pakistan inherited from the British
files of the India Office the fear of Russia like that of China by India. The decision makers of
Pakistan’s foreign policy always sought western assistance to stem the Russian advance towards
their territory, though at present there is an interregnum period in this threat perception.
Geographical Location:
Geography controls political environment of a country and the prize of modern international
politics is the earth. The term may also be used to describe political geography considered in
terms of the structure of the world and its component states, or to refer to those aspects of foreign
policy planning that must take into account various geographical factors such as location, size,
shape, climate and topography. Geopolitics, therefore, involves varying degrees of historical
determinism based on geography and it also affects the country’s foreign policy and her national
interests. Napoleon aptly said about 175 years ago that “the foreign policy of a country is
determined by its geography the political significance of an area bears a well defined relation to
its climate, land-forms and natural resources.”
Indian Threat:
From the day of independence, Pakistan was involved in a bitter and prolonged struggle for her
very existence and survival. Its strategic environment has been largely conditioned by its
perception of a security threat from India. The two nations have fought three wars (1948, 1965
and 1971) within the last five decades and experienced countless border clashes. To obviate any
threat from India, Pakistan’s security planners, in defense terms, have been constantly engaged in
search fro a near parity situation with India. A ceaseless effort to improve and expand Pakistan’s
military machine in order to search and maintain a relative parity has been undertaken by all the
governments.
Pakistan’s fear of India was deepened and its problems of security and survival rendered more
complex by the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan hostilities over Kashmir soon after the Partition. This
was followed by a communal holocaust and mass migration, India’s refusal to give Pakistan its
due share of arms and financial assets, India’s violent take-over of Junagarh and Hyderabad, the
stoppage of river water flowing into Pakistan ECT. The Indo-Pakistan enmity as a matter of fact,
is rooted in history. Both regard the partition of India as a tragic blunder, each attributing its own
explanation to it. The Hindus are looking forward to a day when India will be united under them
as legendary Mahabharata. The Muslims see in it a loss to their political hold on the
subcontinent. Firstly, on account of the British highhandedness and secondly, because of
fraudulent stratagems of the Hindus to corner them within the subcontinent. To a Pakistani, an
Indian is his arch enemy, always hatching plans to indo his existence. To an ordinary Indian the
agreement to allow Pakistan to come into being was a tragic blunder which needs rectification.
The Indian hegemonic role over the subsequent years further strengthened this mistrust in the
minds of the intelligentsia in Pakistan.
India is militarily almost ten times as strong as Pakistan but Pakistan’s basic aim is to offset
India’s military superiority and mobilize world opinion in order to compel India to hold a
plebiscite in Kashmir. Hence, Kashmir is a touchstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy and Pakistan
tends to judge its international friends and foes by the measuring rod of the Kashmir question.
However, relations with India have been very complicated. “There are complexes of social
religious, historical, political and psychological forces all tending in a sinister combination to
antagonize the two states.”
The fixation on India has in fact largely shaped Pakistan’s relations with and attitude towards
other countries. President Ayub Khan argued:
We have an enemy, an implacable enemy in India” and he referred to “India’s ambitions to
absorb Pakistan and turn her into a satellite.”
Consequently, Pakistan’s foreign policy was shaped in a defensive mould from the earlier days
of independence, which urged it to look fro security arrangements elsewhere. Thus Pakistan
found itself placed in a camp opposite to India. Both China and the West under this programme
find a significant place in Pakistan’s security plan.
Economic Compulsions:
Few states were born as poor as Pakistan in 1047. The Muslim minority of India occupied the
north-western highland and the eastern rimland of India. Industrially these areas did not figure
anywhere on the map of the subcontinent. Pre-partition industrial and commercial growth was
associated with Calcutta, Bombay and Madras which form part of new India. On the reverse,
there was very little industry in the areas that were to become Pakistan. Thus the new state of
Pakistan was confronted with a multitude of socio-economic and political problems and looked
for foreign assistance and loans in her struggle for economic and political survival. The first
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to America in 1950 was actuated by the same
considerations.
The American economic aid to Pakistan started in fiscal year 1951 and it gradually began to
increase after signing by Pakistan of mutual security assistance agreement and its participation in
the SEATO and CENTO (Baghdad Pact) in 1954 and 1955 respectively. This aid factor is very
strong in shaping our foreign policy even today.
Almost fifty years have elapsed since the evolution of policy pursued by Pakistan in dealing with
nations abroad. It has, during the course of this period, seen both the fruit and the bruises of it,
yet it is clinging on to the spirit it imbibed at an early stage of its formation. There has been little
substantive change in its overall international performance or outlook. All the aforesaid factors
and forces lay at the root constitute the determinants of Pakistan’s foreign policy and in this
entire India factor is the most important.

Different Phases of
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:
During 1947-67 Pakistan’s foreign policy can be divided into three main phases. In the first
period of early independence the country had a pro-Western tendency without necessarily
consummating any definite political marriage with a particular western power. In the second
phase Pakistan became the most allied of the allies of the US and began to receive economic and
military aid from the US. In the third period Pakistan joined western sponsored pacts of SEATO
and CENTO in the hope that adherence to them would strengthen its security and its capacity to
resist aggression.
In retrospect, however, Pakistan’s earlier efforts at promoting the Islamic unity failed because
both the environment of world politics and the national style of diplomacy copied from the
European powers discouraged religious elements from being at centre stage in the international
affairs. The nature and dynamics of domestic politics added much to this state of affairs. The
change in Muslim League leadership with a greater tilt towards the US, made Pakistan a US
citadel to combat communism. This policy was greatly resented by most of the Pakistani leaders
in the late 1960 when it became very apparent that Pakistan’s western allies were not willing to
help her deal with India, rather they wanted Pakistan’s support only to deter communist menace.
Pakistan’s tilt towards the west undoubtedly helped Pakistan greatly to come out of the economic
ordeal which befell it soon after the independence, No one could ignore the American aid and its
healthy impact on Pakistan’s economy. It certainly sustained a degree of economic development
in Pakistan.
The major benefit which Pakistan acquired out of its pro-West policy was that it obtained
western support on the issue of Kashmir. There is no doubt about the initial western support in
the UN for the Kashmir accuse, but when Pakistan actually became the member of the western
alliances, the western support on Kashmir began to wobble and eventually nullified. Pakistan’s
decision of joining the western alliances was motivated by the desire of developing relations in
view of the constant hostility from India and Afghanistan. It was obvious that the Pakistani
leaders in signing the western alliances were motivated primarily by their desire to improve the
defense capability against India.
There was also a deep yearning in Pakistan to develop close relations with the Muslim countries.
In Baghdad Pact Pakistan saw a chance to develop close relations with the Muslim countries.
Alignment with the west could be said to have given some psychological satisfaction to local
hardliners who were involved in a cold war with India. American aid served double-edged
objective of sustaining a military establishment which in fact was beyond the capacity of
Pakistan’s economy.
However, if Pakistan gained out of its pro-West stance in the foreign policy, we as well had to
pay a heavy price for our alignment with the West. The immediate effect was that Pakistan lost
its freedom and became a prey to the US dictates. Pakistan’s foreign image as a non-aligned
country received a severe set-back and it was now seen as a fully committed and aligned nation.
Kashmir cause, in particular, was heavily impaired as the attitude of USSR became immensely
hardened on the Kashmir issue.
Pakistan acquired the ire of the USSR for her membership of the SEATO and CENTO. Russian
leaders led by Nikita Khrushchev visited Stringer and proclaimed Kashmir to be the integral part
of India. They went to Kabul and extended support the stunt of Pakhtoonistan. In the UN
Security Council, USSR placed there veto at India’s disposal. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister,
utilized Pakistan’s alignment with the West as an excuse to go back on Indian commitment to
hold plebiscite in Kashmir, Pakistan also annoyed some of the Arab countries on her being the
founder member of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO). President Nasser of Egypt accused Pakistan
vehemently of indulging in divisive activities in the Arab world.’ The Arab world openly
demonstrated its aversion on Pakistan’s membership of the CENTO by pulling back its support
to the cause of Kashmir despite the fact that Kashmir is a Muslim state being occupied by a non-
Muslim country.
The important of these pacts for Pakistan lessened due to the attitude of the US and other allies
who failed to come to Pakistan’s help in her time of need. The resentment which already existed
against these pacts in Pakistan enormously increased during the war of 1965. The 1965 war
exposed the fallacy of theses pacts when the US failed to extend assistance to its ally, Pakistan,
against foreign aggression. According to these pacts Pakistan was committed to fight against
communism along with the US and other Western members, while the US and other members of
the alliances were to oblige to help Pakistan for its requirements in the wake of foreign
aggression.