ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
CASE NAME FACTS
Merlin Magallona vs In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act
Secretary Eduardo defining the archipelagic baselines of the contentions
Ermita Philippines was enacted – the law is also Magallona et al are means to acquire, or lose, territory. The
known as the Baselines Law. This law
was meant to comply with the terms of
the third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified
by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al
questioned the validity of RA 9522 as
they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of
the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional. Some of their
particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation
set by the Treaty of Paris and other
ancillary treaties – this also resulted to
the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself,
describes the Philippine waters as
“archipelagic” waters which, in
international law, opens our
waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels
(innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources,
in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as
ISSUE/S RULING
Whether or not the No. The Supreme Court emphasized
of that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a
tenable. treaty and the baseline law has nothing
to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the
Philippine territory. What controls
when it comes to acquisition or loss of
territory is the international law
principle on occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription and NOT the
execution of multilateral treaties on
the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty’s terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the
demarcation of our territory. In fact it
increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we
adhered with the rectangular lines
enclosing the Philippines. The area that
it covered was 440,994 square nautical
miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and
with the inclusion of the exclusive
economic zone, the extent of our
maritime was increased to 586,210 sq.
na. mi.  (See image below for
comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to
the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights.
NOTES
Under UNCLOS and the
baselines law, we have three
levels of maritime zones
where we exercise treaty-
based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12
nautical miles from the
baselines; where we
exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24
nautical miles from the
baselines; jurisdiction where
we can enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone –
200 nautical miles from the
baselines; where we have
the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in
the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be
added which is
the continental shelf – this is
covered by Article 77 of the
UNCLOS.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A

a “regime of islands” pursuant to Anent their particular contentions:

UNCLOS results in the loss of a large
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah
maritime area but also prejudices the
claim. This is evident on the provision
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines
of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, situated
in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as
“archipelagic waters” and that we may
term it as our “internal waters”, but
the bottom line is that our country
exercises sovereignty over these
waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes
that. However, due to our observance
of international law, we allow the
exercise of others of their right of
innocent passage. No modern State
can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that
is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without
risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the
Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal, as a regime of islands did not
diminish our maritime area. Under
UNCLOS and under the baselines law,
since they are regimes of islands, they
generate their own maritime zones – in
short, they are not to be enclosed
within the baselines of the main
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
Oposa vs. Factoran The plaintiffs in this case are all minors
duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as
a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional
Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests. They further asseverate
that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation
have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance
and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.  and conservation of the country's
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be
rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
archipelago (which is the Philippine
Island group). This is because if we do
that, then we will be enclosing a larger
area which would already depart from
the provisions of UNCLOS – that the
demarcation should follow the natural
contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay
claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal through effective
occupation.
Whether or not the Respondents aver that the petitioners
plaintiffs have a cause failed to allege in their complaint a
of action. specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. The Court did
not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right
-- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution.
The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things,
the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the
exploration, utilization, development
natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
existing Timber License Agreement
(TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.  Thus, right of the petitioners (and all
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political
question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to
dismiss, further ruling that granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent RTC Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.
Whether or not the
complaint raises a
political issue.
Whether or not the
original prayer of the
of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy
formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR.
those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as
DENR's duty to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the
other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or
respect the same gives rise to a cause
of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a
balance and healthful ecology. Hence,
the full protection thereof requires that
no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
After careful examination of the
petitioners' complaint, the Court finds
it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article
VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the
Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the
decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because it is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
The Court held that the Timber License
Agreement is an instrument by which
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A

plaintiffs result in the the state regulates the utilization and

impairment of disposition of forest resources to the
contracts. end that public welfare is promoted. It
is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause thus, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked.
It can be validly withdraw whenever
dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property
rights. 

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty

of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limit by the exercise by the
police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare. In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed

with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the
RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
Resident Marine June 13, 2002, the Government of the Whether or not the No, the disposition, exploration,
Mammals v. Reyes Philippines, acting through the DOE, service contract is development, exploitation, and
entered into a Geophysical Survey and prohibited on the utilization of indigenous petroleum in
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with ground that there is the Philippines are governed by
JAPEX. This contract involved geological no general law Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
and geophysical studies of the Tañon prescribing the Exploration and Development Act of
Strait.  standard or uniform 1972. This was enacted by then
terms, conditions, President Ferdinand Marcos to
May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted and requirements for promote the discovery and production
seismic surveys in and around the Tañon service contracts of indigenous petroleum through the
Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom involving oil utilization of government and/or local
profiling covering approximately 751 exploration and or foreign private resources to yield the
kilometers was also done to determine extraction. maximum benefit to the Filipino people
the area's underwater composition.  and the revenues to the Philippine
January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Government.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
Management Board of the Tañon Strait
(PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution
No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the
Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably
recommended the approval of JAPEX's
application for an ECC.  seems to be in conflict with the
March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region
VII granted an ECC to the DOE and
JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Tañon Strait.
Months later, on November 16, 2007,
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well,
with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu
Province. This drilling lasted until
February 8, 2008.  rather than the letter of the law
Petitioners then applied to this Court for
redress, via two separate original
petitions both dated December 17, 2007,
wherein they commonly seek that
respondents be enjoined from
implementing SC-46 for, among others,
violation of the 1987 Constitution.  which a service contract for petroleum
Oh Cho V. Director Oh Cho is appealing from the rejection
Of Lands of his application based on
disqualification as alien (Chinese) from
acquiring lands of the public domain.
He had open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the lot from
1880 to filing of the application for
registration on January 17, 1940
Contrary to the petitioners' argument,
Presidential Decree No. 87, although
enacted in 1972, before the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a
valid law unless otherwise repealed.
Moreover, in cases where the statute
Constitution, but a construction that it
is in harmony with the Constitution is
also possible, that construction should
be preferred. This Court, in
Pangandaman v. Commission on
Elections expounding on this point,
pronounced: It is a basic precept in
statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with
the Constitution and that the spirit,
determines its construction; for that
reason, a statute must be read
according to its spirit and intent.
Note that while Presidential Decree No.
87 may serve as the general law upon
exploration and extraction may be
authorized, as will be discussed below,
the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law
passed by Congress, since the Tañon
Strait is a NIPAS area.
W/N Oh Cho entitled All lands that were not acquired from
to decree or the Government, either by purchase or
registration of the lot. by grant below to the public domain
Exception: in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
Republic vs Dela Paz Respondents alleged that they acquired
the subject property, which is an
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng
Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987,
executed by their parents Zosimo dela
Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and
Ester), who earlier acquired the said
property from their deceased parent
Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue
of aSinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa
Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay dated
March 10, 1979. In their application,
respondents claimed that they are co-
owners of the subject parcel of land and
they have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse
possession of the same, in the concept
of owner since they acquired it in 1987.
Respondents further averred that by
way of tacking of possession, they,
through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, public, adverse,
continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the same, in the concept
of an owner even before June 12, 1945,
been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even
before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño v.
Insular Government) - not applicable
since only from 1880
His immediate possesor failed to
comply with the condition precedent
to apply for the registration of the land
of which they had been in possession
at least since July 26, 1894 so what was
transferred to Oh Cho is merely
possesory right which cannot ripen to
ownership by prescription (aliens
disqualified to own by prescription)
Whether or not the Respondents earliest evidence can be
continuous, traced back to a tax declaration issued
uninterrupted, public, in the name of their predecessors-in-
adverse, and open interest only in the year 1949. At best,
possessions was respondents can only prove possession
sufficiently since said date. What is required is
established by open, exclusive, continuous and
evidence. notorious possession by respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest,
under a bona fideclaim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Respondents failed to explain
why, despite their claim that their
predecessors-in interest have
possessed the subject properties in the
concept of an owner even before June
12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their
predecessors-in-interest started to
declare the same for purposes of
taxation. Well settled is the rule
that tax declarations and receipts are
not conclusive evidence of ownership
or of the right to possess land when
not supported by any other
evidence.  The fact that the
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A

or for a period of more than fifty (50) disputed property may have been
years since the filing of the application declared for taxation purposes in the
of registration with the trial court. They names of the applicants for registration
maintained that the subject property is or of their predecessors-in-interest
classified as alienable and disposable does not necessarily prove ownership. 
land of the public domain. They are merely indicia of a claim
of ownership
Whether the land is To overcome this Republic of the Philippines v.
part of the alienable presumption, incontrovertible evidenc Rosila Roche, the Court held
and disposable public e must be established that that the applicant bears the
domain. the land subject of the application (or burden of proving the status
claim) is alienable or disposable. of the land. In this
connection, the Court has
Respondents' reliance on the afore- held that he must present a
mentioned annotation is misplaced. certificate of land
In Republic v. Sarmiento, the Court classification status issued
ruled that the notation of the surveyor- by the Community
geodetic engineer on the blue print Environment and Natural
copy of the conversion and subdivision Resources Office (CENRO),
plan approved by the Department of or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Environment and Natural
(DENR) Center, that this survey is inside Resources Office (PENRO) of
the alienable and disposable area, the DENR. He must also
Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, prove that the DENR
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Secretary had approved the
Bureau of Forestry, is insufficient and land classification and
does not constitute incontrovertible released the land as
evidence to overcome the presumption alienable and disposable,
that the land remains part of the and that it is within the
inalienable public domain. approved area per
verification through survey
by the CENRO or PENRO.
Further, the applicant must
present a copy of the
original classification
approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as
true copy by the legal
custodian of the official
records. These facts must be
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
Republic vs. CA These cases arose from the application
Republic of the for registration of a parcel of land filed
Philippines, Benguet on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa
& Atok vs. Court of on his own behalf and on behalf of his
Appeals & De La three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Rosa Eduardo. The land was divided into 9
lots and according to the application of
registration of the parcel of land, Lots 1-5
were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-
9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and
Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed
by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots
1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to
Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9,
and by the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Bureau of Forestry
Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both
Balbalio and Alberto testified that they
had acquired the subject land by virtue
of prescription Balbalio claimed to have
received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly
after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that
the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots
1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934,
by the successors-in-interest of James
Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its
purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of
established by the applicant
to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Whether respondent No. Our holding is that Benguet and
court’s decision, i.e. Atok have exclusive rights to the
“the surface rights of property in question by virtue of their
the de la Rosas over respective mining claims which they
the land while at the validly acquired before the 1935
same time reserving Constitution prohibited the alienation
the sub-surface rights of all lands of the public domain except
of Benguet and Atok agricultural lands, subject to vested
by virtue of their rights existing at the time of its
mining claim,” is adoption.
correct.
The land was not and could not have
been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription. The use of the land could
not be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for
agricultural and mineral purposes. It is
true that the subject property was
considered forest land and included in
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve,
but this did not impair the rights
already vested in Benguet and Atok at
that time. Such rights were not
affected either by the stricture in the
Commonwealth Constitution against
the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except those agricultural in
nature for this was made subject to
existing rights. The perfection of the
mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public
domain. By such act, the locators
acquired exclusive rights over the land,
against even the government, without
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its
affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land.
Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5
and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located
by Harrison and Reynolds on December
25, 1930, and recorded on January 2,
1931, in the office of the mining recorder
of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2,
1931, by Atok, which has since then been
in open, continuous and exclusive
possession of the said lots as evidenced
by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels,
and its payment of annual taxes
thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development
also interposed its objection, arguing
that the land sought to be registered
was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve under Proclamation No.
217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover,
by reason of its nature, it was not
subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
Trial Court: The trial court denied the
application, holding that the applicants
had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land
sought to be registered.
CA: Reversed the trial court. Affirmed
need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention
of a patent over it. As the land had
become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer
the same, as they did, to Benguet and
Atok.
The Court feels that the rights over the
land are indivisible and that the land
itself cannot be half agricultural and
half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as
already observed, the land which was
originally classified as forest land
ceased to be so and became mineral —
and completely mineral — once the
mining claims were perfected. As long
as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it
did not cease to be so and become
agricultural, even if only partly so,
because it was enclosed with a fence
and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian
doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State,
not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that
may be found in public and even
private land devoted to “agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining.”
Thus, if a person is the owner of
agricultural land in which minerals are
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over
the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their
mining claims.
Basis of CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals
justified this by saying there is “no
conflict of interest” between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of
the sub-surface rights. This is rather
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle
that the owner of piece of land has
rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace
above it up to a reasonable height.
Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also
difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.
PROVINCE OF On August 5, 2008, the Government of
NORTH COTABATO the Republic of the Philippines and the
VS GOVERNMENT Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
OF THE REPUBLIC were scheduled to sign a Memorandum
OF THE PHILIPPINES of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on
matters of public concern, the
petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the
discovered, his ownership of such land
does not give him the right to extract
or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the
respondent court is in supposing that
the rights over the land could be used
for both mining and non-mining
purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the
use to which it is being devoted at the
time, such use may be discontinued by
the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not
be used by any private party, including
the registered owner thereof, for any
other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken
therein. For the loss sustained by such
owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws
or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.
Whether or not the The MOA-AD provides that “any In sum, the Presidential
signing of the MOA, provisions of the MOA-AD requiring Adviser on the Peace
the Government of amendments to the existing legal Process committed grave
the Republic of the framework shall come into force upon abuse of discretion when he
Philippines would be the signing of a Comprehensive failed to carry out the
binding itself Compact and upon effecting the pertinent consultation
necessary changes to the legal process, as mandated by
framework,” implying an amendment E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
of the Constitution to accommodate 7160, and Republic Act No.
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, 8371. The furtive process by
guaranteed to the MILF the which the MOA-AD was
amendment of the Constitution . designed and crafted runs
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A

complete and official copies of the MA- contrary to and in excess of

AD and to prohibit the slated signing of It will be observed that the President the legal authority, and
the MOA-AD and the holding of public has authority, as stated in her oath of amounts to a whimsical,
consultation thereon. They also pray office, only to preserve and defend the capricious, oppressive,
that the MOA-AD be declared Constitution. Such presidential power arbitrary and despotic
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO does not, however, extend to allowing exercise thereof. It
enjoining the GRP from signing the her to change the Constitution, but illustrates a gross evasion of
same. simply to recommend proposed positive duty and a virtual
amendments or revision. As long as she refusal to perform the duty
limits herself to recommending these enjoined.
changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional The MOA-AD cannot be
amendments and revision, her mere reconciled with the present
recommendation need not be Constitution and laws. Not
construed as an unconstitutional act. only its specific provisions
but the very concept
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA- underlying them, namely,
AD viewed in light of the above- the associative relationship
discussed standards. envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are
Given the limited nature of the unconstitutional, for the
President’s authority to propose concept presupposes that
constitutional amendments, she the associated entity is a
cannot guarantee to any third party state and implies that the
that the required amendments will same is on its way to
eventually be put in place, nor even be independence.
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she
could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress
or the people, in whom constituent
powers are vested.
Whether or not to This strand begins with the statement
concede to or that it is “the birthright of all Moros
recognize the claim of and all Indigenous peoples of
the Moro Islamic Mindanao to identify themselves and
Liberation Front for be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It
ancestral domain in defines “Bangsamoro people” as the
violation of Republic natives or original inhabitants of
Act No. 8371 (THE Mindanao and its adjacent islands
INDIGENOUS including Palawan and the Sulu
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A

PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT archipelago at the time of conquest or

OF 1997), colonization, and their descendants
particularly Section whether mixed or of full blood,
3(g) & Chapter VII including their spouses.
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as
ANCESTRAL defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,
DOMAINS) includes not only “Moros” as
traditionally understood even by
Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD adds that the freedom of
choice of indigenous peoples shall be
respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically
defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer
to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the
ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people
by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation. Both parties to the MOA-
AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public
domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among
other things, the observance of the
free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any
government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A
Cruz vs Secretary of Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar
DENR Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and
its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain
provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or
program critical to the environment
and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein.
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to
the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
Do the provisions of No, the provisions of IPRA do not Per Curiam - by decision of a
IPRA contravene the contravene the Constitution. judge, or of a court in
Constitution? Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in unanimous agreement.
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources
in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the
IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not part of the
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – CASE SUMMARY CMG - JD2A

lands of the public domain. They are

private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs
by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the
State. However, the right of ownership
and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.