55 ICASIANO V ICASIANO

FACTS:
Petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for the
appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof. Natividad Icasiano, led her opposition; and she
petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator. Subsequently Enrique Icasiano, also led a
manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged Celso Icasiano commenced
the introduction of evidence but later on filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental
petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, which he
allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the petition
and marked as Exhibit “A” consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain
the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate
copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit “A” is signed by the testatrix and
her three attesting witnesses in each and every page. Witness Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page
three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but
affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence. Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony
to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit “A”) are not genuine nor were they written
or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine,
they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived
into adopting as her last will and testament.

ISSUE: WON the trial court was correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations of
forgery of the testator’s signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue
influence and pressure?

RULING: YES
On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:
The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The opinion of a
handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s signature failed to convince the Court, not only
because it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity of the standards used
by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her
signature, and the effect of writing fatigue.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not
appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with
different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor’s expert is insufficient to
overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses as to the will’s execution, which were presented
by Celso during the trial.

Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others
is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent
might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other property and
that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free
part, do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence.

On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate:
The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own
testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The
text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was
aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty. Natividad’s failure to sign page 3 of the original through mere
inadvertence does not affect the will’s validity.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did
sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages
is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate is not entitled
to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily
discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and invalid, then in law
there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and
can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and
irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the
original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

45 CANIZA VS. CA
FACTS: Carmen Cañiza being then 94 years of age was declared incompetent by judgment of the RTC Quezon City
in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her
advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo
Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian, Evangelista, commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City to eject spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint
was later amended to identify the incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista.

The amended complaint pertinently alleged that:

(1) plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question
(2) out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free
(3) Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds
could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment
(4) by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they were
enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they were saving money by not paying
any rent for the house, the incompetent Cañiza was losing much money as her house could not be rented by
others
(5) complaint was filed within one year from date of first letter of demand

The defendants in their Answer with Counterclaim argued:

(1) In consideration of their faithful service, they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family
(2) Cañiza in fact executed a holographic will by which she bequeathed to the Estradas the house and lot in
question

MetroTC – rendered judgment in favor of Cañiza, the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises.

RTC Quezon City – reversed the decision

CA – affirmed RTC’s judgment in toto. It ruled that:

(a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the
MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by
tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as evidenced by what purports
to be the holographic will of the Cañiza; and
(b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of
defendants' claim to the property, . . . it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that
defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's
supervening incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the
defendants out.

Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate Court's judgment. She
contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not
an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is
irrelevant to this case.

Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer and neither one of forcible entry
because they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Cañiza, which
"occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Cañiza is admitted
to probate." They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal guardian to oust
them from the disputed premises.

Carmen Cañiza died and she was substituted by her heirs, the aforementioned guardian Amparo Evangelista and
her other nephew, Ramon Nevado, respectively.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the Estradas have a right to remain in possession of the property by virtue of the alleged holographic will,
which was not probated, bequeathing them the same – NO
(2) WON Evangelista can continue to represent Cañiza after the latter’s death – YES

RULING:
(1) No. The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That permission was
subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made
through her judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any
consequence that Carmen Cañiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that
circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they
might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership
being possible unless and until the will is duly probated.

Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to the property,
whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by
sufferance,that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership
of the house; their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property
had allegedly been bequeathed to them — an event which still has to take place; in other words; prior to the
probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious.
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain
in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court" (ART. 838, Id.).
An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that
in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
(2) Yes. As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the
present appeal.
The motion is without merit. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the
Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they were in
fact substituted as parties in the appeal in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the ROC.

To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit
instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs
have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.

Decision: Petition is granted. The CA decision affirming the RTC’s Judgment is reversed and set aside. Metropolitan
Trial Court’s decision is reinstated and affirmed.