E X C E L L E N C E

The Seven Failure Modes

FMEA Tips and Tricks

Making FMEAs Smarter

The Forgotten FMEA Manual

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 In this issue ASQ Automotive Division

SUMMER 2008

2007-2008 DIVISION COUNCIL ROSTER Features

Chairperson (Voting Officer)
JACKIE PARKHURST
Exhibits Chair
DENNIS C. SEEGER 2 The Seven Failure Modes
Tel: 313/220-0204 Tel: 313/235-9601 John Lindland
E-Mail: jackie.parkhurst@aam.com E-Mail: seegerdc@dteenergy.com

Past Chair (Voting Officer) Quality Leader Award Chair

8 FMEA Tips & Tricks

CHERYL FRANKS DENMAN CAROLE MALONE
Tel: 313/919-3294 E-Mail: malonec@macomb.edu

Chair Elect (2008-2009) (Voting Officer) Craig Award Chair

Ron Atkinson
JOHN CASEY LARRY R. SMITH
Tel: 248/202-8494 Tel: 313/623-7724

10 How Can We Make Our FMEAs Smarter?

E-Mail: jcasey@whitehallgroupllc.com E-Mail: lrsmith@peoplepc.com

Treasurer (Voting Officer) Koth Award Chair

FRANK BYKAYLO ALLY HAMOOD John Casey
Tel: 248/836-6045 Tel: 586/575-2838
E-Mail: fbykaylo@rdagroup.com E-Mail: ally.hamood@gm.com

Secretary (Voting Officer)

DENISE TISO
Awards Chair (Voting Member)
JAYNIE L. VIZE 12 The Forgotten FMEA Manual
Tel: 248/431-9852 Tel: 248/371-2413 Steven C. Leggett
E-Mail: denise.tiso@gm.com E-Mail: jlvize@wowway.com

07-08 AE Editor Ann Arbor Liaison

AMY LICHONCZAK ERIC ZINK
Tel: 586/214-4131
E-Mail: alichonczak@comcast.net
Tel: 734/741-5399
E-Mail: ericmzink@eaton.com Upcoming Events
Historian/MQC Liaison/AIAG Liaison/ Detroit Liaison/Coordinator Team India
QFD Liaison (Voting Officer) ABHIJIT SENGUPTA Fall Quality Symposium September 2009
LLOYD D. BRUMFIELD Tel: 313/595-5310
Tel: 248/364-0196 Ext: 170
E-Mail: ldbrumfield@earthlink.net
E-Mail: senguptaa@hotmail.com
Macomb Community College - University Center
Northeastern Illinois Section 1212
Health Care Liaison
DAN REID
FRANCES BLOSSER
E-Mail: fab8850@aol.com
Updates and information can be found at www.asq.org/auto/
Tel: 248/857-1166
E-Mail: dan.1.reid@gm.com Scholarships
HIRA FOTEDAR
Standards (Voting Officer) Tel: 440/933-3626
DOUGLAS BERG E-Mail: hirafotedar@yahoo.com
Tel: 248/348-2765
E-Mail: dougberg@earthlink.net Assistant Scholarships/Saginaw
Liaison
Examining Chair Publications Team KEN ZIMMER The American Society for Quality Automotive Division held its annual Awards
(Voting Officer)
JERRY BOWEN
Tel: 989/868-4811
E-Mail: zimmerken@aol.com
Event on June 17, 2008 at the Henry Ford Fairlane Estate, Dearborn, MI.
Tel: 810/694-1586
E-Mail: ronaldjbow@msn.com Vice Chair Programs
NARAYAN DAS Bennie Fowler, Vice President of Quality, Ford Motor Company delivered the
Regional Councilor, WCQI/Annual Tel: 586/492-4671
Boat Cruise E-Mail: narayan.das@gm.com keynote address followed by the awards ceremony.
FRANCIS W. CURTISS
Tel: 763/425-3724 Chair-Paper Symposium
E-Mail: francur@comcast.net ERIC HAYLER
Tel: 864/989-5577
Membership Chair/Professional
Development Detroit Section
E-Mail: eric.hayler@bmwmc.com
ASQ Automotive Division Awards for 2008
CLEM GOEBEL (Voting Member) Coordinator Team India Project
Tel: 810/599-6188
E-Mail: cjgoebel@cac.net Team Thailand Leader
MARIA STOLETOVA
Quality Leader of the Year – Marybeth Cunningham, Global Director,
ASQ BOD President E-Mail: m_stoletova@hotmail.com Excellence, Lean & Operations, Delphi Packard Electric/Electronic Architecture
RON ATKINSON
Tel: 248/821-4806 ASQ Headquarters Administrator
E-Mail: ronalakeo@aol.com SHIRL FURGER
Tel: 800/248-1946 Quality Professional of the Year – Dr. Rajinder Kapur, Supplier Development
Qualkity Professional of the Year
KUSH SHAH
E-Mail: sfurger@asq.org
Engineer for Ford Motor Company
Tel: 248/830-8525
E-Mail: kush.shah@gm.com
Koth Award Winner – Lou Ann Lathrop, Design Release Engineer, Engine
Sensors

Cecil B. Craig Awards for Superior Papers published in the last year – 2
awards
Published by Mirus Graphic Solutions and ASQ Automotive Division
John J. Casey for his paper “3L5Y Explained” and
Editor-in-Chief: Amy Lichonczak
Publication Comittee: Janie Topp
Publisher: Mirus Graphic Solutions Dan Reid for his paper “Developing the Voluntary Healthcare Standard”
Direct all editorial submissions or advertising information to:
Amy Lichonczak @ alichonczak@comcast.net
When reordering request document number B0624
NOTE: Please forward all change of address requests to ASQ headquarters at www.asq.org

Automotive Excellence (ISSN) is published by Mirus Graphic Solutions, for ASQ Automotive
Division. All editorial submissions should be directed to Amy Lichonczak, Editor-in-Chief, or
Mirus Graphic Solutions, Publisher at 25531 Dequindre Rd., Madison Hts, Michigan 48071.
Advertising inquiries should be directed to alichonczak@comcast.net Copyright © 2008, ASQ
œœ«iÀ>̈œ˜ÊUÊ*ÀœviÃȜ˜>Ê`iÛiœ«“i˜ÌÊUÊ,iVœ}˜ˆÌˆœ˜ÊUÊ"««œÀÌ՘ˆÌˆiÃÊ̜ʘiÌܜÀŽ
ASQ AUTOMOTIVE DIVISION
VISION: To be the worldwide automotive industry’s leader on issues related to quality
MISSION:Ê/œÊv>VˆˆÌ>ÌiÊVœ˜Ìˆ˜ÕœÕÃʈ“«ÀœÛi“i˜ÌÊ>˜`ÊVÕÃ̜“iÀÊÃ>̈Ãv>V̈œ˜ÊLÞʈ`i˜Ìˆvވ˜}]ÊVœ““Õ˜ˆV>̈˜}Ê>˜`Ê«Àœ“œÌˆ˜}\ÊUÊ+Õ>ˆÌÞʎ˜œÜi`}iÊUÊ>˜>}i“i˜Ì½Ãʏi>`iÀň«ÊÀœiÊUʘ`ÕÃÌÀÞÊ
Automotive Division. No information may be copied without the express written permission CUSTOMERS: PRIMARYÊUÊ
Õ̜“œÌˆÛiÊ`ˆÛˆÃˆœ˜Ê“i“LiÀÃÊUÊ
Õ̜“œÌˆÛiÊÃÕ««ˆiÀÃʇÊ>Ê̈iÀÃÊUÊ
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Õ̜“œÌˆÛiÊˆÛˆÃˆœ˜Ê“i“LiÀÃÊÊ
of the Editor-in-Chief, ASQ, Automotive Division. Neither the ASQ, ASQ Automotive Division, SECONDARYÊUÊ
Õ̜“œÌˆÛiʜÀˆ}ˆ˜>ÊiµÕˆ«“i˜Ìʓ>˜Õv>VÌÕÀiÀÃÊ­"
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nor the Publisher’s office is responsible for the accuracy of information in editorial articles or
œÕ˜VˆÊÊ
advertising in this publication. Readers should independently evaluate the accuracy of any
statements in the editorial or advertising of this publication which are important to them and
rely on their own independent evaluation.
՘ˆÛiÀÈ̈iÃÊUÊ
-+ʅi>`µÕ>ÀÌiÀÃÉ œ>À`ʜvÊˆÀiV̜ÀÃÉi˜iÀ>Ê/iV…˜ˆV>Ê
TERTIARYÊUÊ+Õ>ˆÌÞÊ>Ü>À`ʈ˜ˆÌˆ>̈ÛiÃÊ­vi`iÀ>ÉÃÌ>ÌiɏœV>®ÊUÊ-Ì>˜`>À`ÃÊ>V̈ۈ̈iÃÊUÊ
Õ̜“œÌˆÛiÊ`i>iÀň«ÃÊUʘÌiÀ˜>̈œ˜>Ê}œL>Ê“>ÀŽiÌÃÊUÊ
vÌiÀ“>ÀŽiÌÃÉÊÃiÀۈViÊ«>ÀÌÃÊUÊ/…ˆÀ`Ê«>ÀÌÞÊÀi}ˆÃÌÀ>ÀÃÊ
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www.asq.org/auto
from the home office SUMMER 2008

This edition contains articles on Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This valuable tool still has its imple-
mentation challenges for many companies, but has enormous potential for improving effectiveness. The intent
of these articles is to make implementation easier and the tool more user-friendly. It is our way of welcoming in
the Fourth edition of the FMEA Manual being printed as you read this newsletter.

Fall will be here very soon; the Edition is already underway. With the new council year, it is my pleasure to
introduce you to the new Chair Elect 2008-09 year: John Casey. John has long served as volunteer for the ASQ
Automotive Council and various ASQ events. John has also been a regular author for Automotive Excellence.

It is difficult to believe that my time as Vice-Chair Publications of the ASQ Automotive Division, Automotive
Excellence newsletter has ended. It was an honor to have served the last couple of years in bringing members articles and information on
important industry topics.

Many challenges are ahead for the automotive industry, but no doubt it is here to stay and is evolving in our global market.

iÃÌÊ܈ÅiÃÊ̜Ê>]Ê>˜`ÊʏœœŽÊvœÀÜ>À`Ê̜ÊÃiiˆ˜}ÊޜÕʈ˜Ê̅iÊvÕÌÕÀiÊ>ÌÊ
-+ÊiÛi˜Ìð

Sincerely,
Amy Lichonczak
Vice- Chair Publications 2007-08
ALichonczak@comcast.net

Dear ASQ Automotive Division,

The constant force of change is upon us, the world will never be the same, now more than
ever we need to lead. It is obvious that the competitive offerings and the constant push for savings is
causing our industry to challenge everything in order to survive. We continuously push the organiza-
tion to become more lean, we push for faster product introductions, all in order to get a market place
advantage. Our greatest contribution as quality professionals is to show how the quality methods
have the greatest leverage for our companies.

When you truly improve quality, you achieve it through improving first time yield. This simultaneously
improves productivity, it directly improves cost, it improves employee morale and it improves customer confidence making your
products worthy of a premium price. Strategic deployment of quality techniques is the only discipline that has a multiplier across
all dimensions of business. The massive pressure for financial gains that is on our industry often causes our decision makers to
vœÀ}iÌÊ̅ˆÃʓՏ̈«ˆiÀÊivviVÌÊ>˜`Ê̅iÞʓ>ŽiÊÃÕL‡œ«Ìˆ“>Ê`iVˆÃˆœ˜ÃÊ`ÕiÊ̜Ê̅iÊ«ÀiÃÃÕÀi°Ê >ÈV>Þ]Ê̅iÞÊvœÀ}iÌ°Ê

WE NEED TO LEAD. The tools and skills that you possess are the one’s the auto industry needs more than ever. If you see a prob-
lem, solve it using disciplined methods and teach your peers the techniques you know. Make them problem solvers, just like you.
That’s what leaders do, they show people a better way and enable them to duplicate the success. This leadership in quality can
create geometric multipliers when hundreds of people follow your lead.

My objective over the next year is to find ways to invigorate deployment of the quality tools in our industry. We need an environ-
ment to let you show off your skills and demonstrate the multiplying value that a quality professional like you can bring to your
company. How can the ASQ Automotive Division serve you and your company making the constant changes that we face have
quality in the heart and soul? I am looking for your ideas, and thoughts.

iÃÌÊ܈ÅiÃÊ>ÃÊޜÕʏi>`Ê̅iÊÜ>ÞÊ̜Ê̅iÊvÕÌÕÀi°
John J. Casey
Chair Elect 2008-09
jcasey@whitehallgroupllc.com 1
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
SeVEN FAILURE MODES
The Seven
Failure Modes THE FMEA Process
Workshop: Design Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis
Identify Item Details Structure of the Workshops
and Functions
John Lindland
Brainstorm
DFMEA: Selecting the Correct Level of Detail Potential Failure
Mode(s)
AXIOM: ENERGY CONSUMES ALL MATTER OVER
TIME. PARTS LAST LONGER WHEN THEY ARE
List the Effect(s) of Assess Severity (S) Identify Failure
STRONGER, TOUGHER (RESIST DAMAGE), OR Failure Mode(s) of the Effect(s) modes with S > 8
Controls
THE STRESS IS LOWERED. UNDERSTAND AND to Detect
STUDY THE ENERGY STRESS RELATIONSHIPS. Failure
Mode(s) Brainstorm
Assess Occurrence Calculate Criticality
Within the mission time, the important character- Cause(s) of Failure
(O) of the Cause(s) Crit = S X O
istics cannot degrade outside of design intent for Controls Mode(s)
fit, form function, appearance, or safety. to Prevent
GD&T and Material characteristics will ensure Cause(s) List Current Assess Detection
Calculate RPN
that the design works for a short period of time. Design or Process (D) of the Failure
RPN = S X O X D
Controls Mode (D-Type)
How well the design and material parameters
Scope Risks
handle energy will determine how the design will
perform over the mission time.
Identify Special
When identifying design detail to analyze, Characteristics.
consider any detail which:

Ê UÊÊ -̜ÀiÃʜÀÊÀii>ÃiÃʅˆ}…ɏœÜÊÌi“«iÀ>ÌÕÀi]Ê Create Pareto Charts of

Criticalities and RPNs
radiation, energy or other type of stress
Ê UÊÊ -ˆ`iÃÊ>}>ˆ˜ÃÌÊ>˜Þʜ̅iÀÊÃÕÀv>Vi
Ê UÊÊ ,iViˆÛiÃÊÃÌÀiÃÃÊvÀœ“ÊV…i“ˆV>Ê>ÌÌ>VŽ Prioritize
Ê UÊÊ -iVÕÀiÃʜÀʅœ`ÃÊ>Ê«>ÀÌÊ՘`iÀÊÃÌÀiÃà Recommended Actions
Ê UÊÊ >ÃÊv>ˆi`ʈ˜Ê̅iÊ«>ÃÌÊ
(similar designs/applications) Hold FMEA Reviews
Ê UÊÊ *ÀœÌiVÌÃÊ>ÊÃÕÀv>ViÊvÀœ“Ê>˜ÞÊÌÞ«iʜvÊÃÌÀiÃà and Implement
Ê UÊÊ
˜ÞÊ`iÈ}˜Ê`iÌ>ˆÊ܅ˆV…Ê“ˆ}…Ìʏi>`Ê̜Ê>ÊwÌ]Ê Recommended Actions
form, function, appearance, safety, or
Risk Reduction
government failure.
RPN: Risk Priority Number
Primary Focusing Questions

Ê UÊÊ 7…ˆV…Ê`ˆ“i˜Ãˆœ˜ÃÊ>ÀiÊÀiµÕˆÀi`Ê̜ÊÃ>̈ÃvÞÊ
stated requirements for fit, form, function,
appearance, or safety?
Ê UÊÊ 7…ˆV…ÊœvÊ̅iÃiÊ`ˆ“i˜Ãˆœ˜ÃÊ܈ÊV…>˜}iÊ>ÃÊ>Ê
result of time and energy?
Ê UÊÊ 7…>Ìʓ>ÌiÀˆ>ÃÊ܈ÊV…>˜}iÊ>ÃÊ>ÊÀiÃՏÌʜvÊ̈“iÊ
and energy (strength, brittleness, resistance
to energy transfer/flow, etc.)?
Ê UÊÊ 7…ˆV…Ê“œÛˆ˜}Ê­ÌÀ>˜Ã>̈œ˜>ÉÀœÌ>̈œ˜>®Êˆ˜ÌiÀ‡
faces will change as a result of changing
resistance (increasing or decreasing
resistance)?
Ê UÊÊ 7…ˆV…Êi˜iÀ}ÞÊÜÕÀViÃÊ܈ÊV…>˜}iÊ܈̅Ê̈“i¶
2 Ê UÊÊ `i˜ÌˆvÞÊ̅iÊÌi“ÃÊ̜ÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊ>˜`ÊÃÌ>ÌiÊ̅iÊ
Selecting Detail
Ê UÊÊ "LÌ>ˆ˜Êwi`Êv>ˆÕÀiÊ`>Ì>°
Ê UÊÊ >̅iÀÊ>Ê>Û>ˆ>LiÊ`iÌ>ˆÊ܅ˆV…Ê`iÃVÀˆLiÃÊ
the product design: Assembly drawings, bills
of material, schematics, specifications, etc.
Ê UÊÊ 1ÃiÊ>ÊÞiœÜʅˆ}…ˆ}…ÌiÀÊ>˜`ʓ>ÀŽÊ̅iÊ
selected detail, those which make the
product work and those which will change
over time (energy, resistance, restriction,
strength, etc.).
item in terms of the function verb-noun.
Which dimensions or material properties are
required to make the product work?
Which dimensions, material properties, energy
source, resistance/restriction will change over
time?
Ê UÊÊ œââiÊi˜}̅\Ê/…iÊi>ÀÞÊ«>ÀÌÊ>vviVÌÃÊ
laminar flow. For a given pressure, overall
length affects flow resistance.
Ê UÊÊ œââiÊ >Ãi\ʏ>̘iÃÃÊ«ÀœÛˆ`iÃÊ̅iÊ>LˆˆÌÞÊ̜Ê
achieve a seal
Ê UÊÊ œââiÊ"«i˜ˆ˜}Êˆ>“iÌiÀ\ÊœÀÊ>Ê}ˆÛi˜Ê
pressure, affects flow resistance
www.asq.org/auto
 SUMMER 2008

Examples of Design Functions All problems have three components:

Absorb energy Dampen noise Inject air Provide Identification Remove chemicals
1. Frequency of occurrence of the cause.
Absorb heat Develop finish Inject fuel Provide information Remove element
2. The ability to detect (the failure mode or
Absorb impact Develop heat Inject liquid Provide light Remove heat effect).
Absorb moisture Develop pressure Isolate electrical current Provide reference Remove particles 3. Severity (how the effect impacts the
Absorb radiation Develop seal Isolate materials Provide seal Remove seal customer).
Absorb vibration Develop strain Isolate x Provide signal Remove x
Absorb x Develop x Limit movement Provide spark Resist chemicals
Accept bolt/screw Direct flow Maintain force Provide stiffness Resist damage Mission Time and Action Response
Accept gas/air Direct light Maintain seal Provide structure Resist deformation
Accept liquid End cycle Meter flow Provide tension Resist fatigue The mission time is the length of time that the
Accept part Engage part Modulate brakes Provide x Resist movement product/system must run without failure at its stated
Achieve hardness Guide electrical-current Open circuit Read signal Resist radiation level of reliability.
Adjust speed Guide energy Open x Reduce backlash Resist Strain
Amplify signal Guide fluid Orient part Reduce chattering Resist wear Stated reliability is such that when requested to
Change chemicals Guide force Oxidize material Reduce chemical Resist x perform, the response (action) will meet all stated
Change state Guide heat Position electrode Reduce force Secure part requirements.
Clip signal Guide light Position part Reduce friction Start cycle
Close circuit Guide movement Protect material Reduce heat Support part Ê UÊÊ
ÊL>ÈVʈ˜V>˜`iÃVi˜Ìʏˆ}…ÌÊLՏL\Ê£äääʅœÕÀÃ
Control crack Guide pressure Protect microstructure Reduce leak Transfer electrical-current Ê UÊÊ ˆŽÊˆ˜Ê>ÊV>À̜˜\Ê£{Ê`>ÞÃ
Control direction Guide sound Protect part Reduce heat-loss Transfer electricity Ê UÊÊ œÌÊÜ>ÌiÀʅi>ÌiÀ\Ê£äÊÞi>ÀÃ
Control feedback Guide vibration Protect surface Reduce noise Transfer force Ê UÊÊ >˜Õv>VÌÕÀˆ˜}ÊiµÕˆ«“i˜Ì\ÊÈÊ`>ÞÃÊ>ÌÊÓ{ʅœÕÀÃ
Control force Handle current Protect x Reduce pressure Transfer heat Ê UÊÊ
Õ̜“œLˆi\ÊxÊÞi>ÀÃʜÀÊ£ää]äääʓˆiÃ
Control location Hold liquid Provide clearance Reduce shock Transfer liquid Ê UÊÊ iÜʅœ“i\Ê£ääÊÞi>ÀÃ
Control position Hold oil Provide color Reduce signal-noise Transfer pressure Ê UÊÊ
œ˜Ãˆ`iÀÊ̅iÊÜ>ÀÀ>˜ÌÞÊ«iÀˆœ`
Control pressure Hold paint Provide continuity Reduce vibration Transfer x Ê UÊÊ
œ˜Ãˆ`iÀÊ̅iÊÀiVœ““i˜`i`ʓ>ˆ˜Ìi˜>˜ViÊ«iÀˆœ`
Control shock Hold part Provide feedback Reduce wear Turn fan
Control speed Hold plating Provide force Reduce x Turn shaft Mission Time and Action Response
Control speed Hold pressure Provide form Reflect heat Withstand fatigue
Control temperature Hold x Provide friction Reflect light Withstand force The mission time is the length of time that the
Control x Increase force Provide fuel Reflect particles Withstand heat product/system must run without failure at its stated
Create vacuum Increase pressure Provide heat Reflect x Withstand x
level of reliability.

Stated reliability is such that when requested to

perform, the response (action) will meet all stated
900
Flow Nozzle
Engine: FMEA Number:
Model Year: FMEA Scope:
requirements.
System, Sub-system, Part/Component Design Detail(s) Detail Function(s) Functional Requirement
Item to be Studied: Fuel Nozzle Sub-categories of Item Verb-Noun Specification (if applicable)
Nozzle Length Length Surface Resist Erosion New
Flow Length Resists Flow 1.00 Basic Dimension Ê UÊÊ
ÊL>ÈVʈ˜V>˜`iÃVi˜Ìʏˆ}…ÌÊLՏL\Ê£äääʅœÕÀÃ
Nozzle Opening Diameter Cross Sectional Area Resist Flow 0.15±0.01
Nozzle Opening Resist Buildup New
Ê UÊÊ ˆŽÊˆ˜Ê>ÊV>À̜˜\Ê£{Ê`>ÞÃ
Nozzle Base Flatness Achieve Seal 0.03 Max
Ê UÊÊ œÌÊÜ>ÌiÀʅi>ÌiÀ\Ê£äÊÞi>ÀÃ
1.000 Ê UÊÊ >˜Õv>VÌÕÀˆ˜}ÊiµÕˆ«“i˜Ì\ÊÈÊ`>ÞÃÊ>ÌÊÓ{ʅœÕÀÃ
-A- .15±0.01 Ê UÊÊ
Õ̜“œLˆi\ÊxÊÞi>ÀÃʜÀÊ£ää]äääʓˆiÃ
Understanding Failure Mode Relations Ê UÊÊ iÜʅœ“i\Ê£ääÊÞi>ÀÃ
Ê UÊÊ
œ˜Ãˆ`iÀÊ̅iÊÜ>ÀÀ>˜ÌÞÊ«iÀˆœ`
.03
Every problem is preceded by the failure mode Ê UÊÊ
œ˜Ãˆ`iÀÊ̅iÊÀiVœ““i˜`i`ʓ>ˆ˜Ìi˜>˜ViÊ«iÀˆœ`
and the source of the failure mode, the cause.
The cause is that which produces a poor quality
Ê UÊÊ /…iÊÃÕÀv>ViʜvÊ̅iʘœââiʓˆ}…ÌÊiÀœ`iʜÛiÀÊ
function/response (failure mode).
time
Ê UÊÊ /…iʘœââiʜ«i˜ˆ˜}ʓˆ}…ÌÊ`iÛiœ«Ê>Ê "1,/Ê /"
material buildup over time (D)

Ê
1

Reduce Severity
(O) Ability to Detect through Design
Ê UÊÊ /…iʘœââiÊL>ÃiÊ܈Ê˜œÌÊV…>˜}iÊ܈̅Ê̈“i Frequency (failure mode and problem)
Changes

Ê UÊÊ /…iʘœââiʏi˜}̅Ê܈Ê˜œÌÊV…>˜}iÊ܈̅Ê̈“i Source of

Product: Documenting the Level of Detail

the Failure
Mode
(Cause)
Failure Mode
(Flawed Action/
Response)
Effect
(S)
Severity Available from
Ê UÊÊ -iiVÌÊ̅iÊÌi“ÃÊQÃÞÃÌi“]ÊÃÕLÃÞÃÌi“]Ê«>ÀÌÉ
Reduce Frequency
through Design
Changes (Error
Proofing)
Manage the failure mode
through Mistake-Proofing
and equipment controls.
During the Mission Time,
Manage Problems through the
Process Control Plan for:
Verification, Validation, Process
Control, in partnership with
www.aiag.org
component(s)] for the study the Action/Response
becomes flawed.
Inspection and Testing and Control
of Nonconforming Product
Ê UÊÊ œVՓi˜ÌÊ̅iÊiÈ}˜ÊiÌ>ˆ­Ã®ÊvœÀÊi>V…Ê
Item All problems that relate to customer injury must be
Ê UÊÊ œVՓi˜ÌÊ̅iÊÌi“Ê՘V̈œ˜­Ã®ÊvœÀÊi>V…Ê
Design Detail in the “Verb-Noun” format
given high priority regardless of the RPN that are found
during the analysis.
3
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
7 failure modes
Energy, Resistance, Action, and Results Example: Failure Mode Brainstorming
Worksheets
Energy Resistance Action Results

This relationship is true for both people (transactions)

Item: Fuel Injection
and equipment (technical). Detail Name: Nozzle
Ê UÊÊ *iÀviVÌÊ ˜iÀ}ÞÊ>˜`Ê,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê*iÀviVÌÊ Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel
Action and Results
Ê UÊÊ <iÀœÊ ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀʘw˜ˆÌiÊ,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê 1. Failure Mode (Omission): Does not Atomize
No Action
Ê UÊÊ /œœÊÕV…Ê ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀÊ/œœÊˆÌ̏iÊ,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê Fuel
Too Much Action
Ê UÊÊ /œœÊˆÌ̏iÊ ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀÊ/œœÊÕV…Ê,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê 2. Failure Mode (Excessive Action):
Too Little Action Excessively Atomized Fuel
Ê UÊÊ ÀÀ>̈VÊ ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀÊ,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê ÀÀ>̈VÊ
V̈œ˜
Ê UÊÊ 1˜iÛi˜Ê ˜iÀ}ÞʜÀÊ,iÈÃÌ>˜Vi\Ê
Ê Ê 1˜iÛi˜Ê
V̈œ˜
3. Failure Mode (Incomplete
Ê UÊÊ ˜iÀ}ÞÊ,>ÌiÊ̜œÊœÜʜÀʘVÀi>Ãi`Ê Action):Incompletely Atomized Fuel
Resistance: Action too Slow
Ê UÊÊ ˜iÀ}ÞÊ,>ÌiÊ̜œÊˆ}…ÊœÀÊ,i`ÕVi`Ê 4. Failure Mode (Erratic Action): Erratically
Resistance: Action too Fast
Atomized Fuel
For Product Design: Energy can be by design or a
component of Noise (heat, cold, vibration, chemical 5. Failure Mode (Uneven Application of Action):
reactions,...). Resistance can also be by design, or a
component of noise (dirt, changing load, corrosion,...) Unevenly Atomized Fuel
Simple Example of Function and Failure Modes 6. Failure Mode (Too Much Time): Atomized
Fuel too Slowly
[O] Fuel not Atomized

Fuel Atomized Too

7. Failure Mode (Too Little Time): Atomized
[+]
Function Much Fuel too Quickly
Verb-
Fuel not Atomized
Noun [-]
Spray Atomize
Enough
8. Failure Mode (Other): N/A
Nozzle Fuel Erratic Atomizing
[V]
of Fuel

Uneven Atomizing
[U]
of Fuel
Make sure that
the verb-noun is Fuel Atomized too
[+T]
Slowly Causes, Failure Modes, and Effects
included in the
failure mode [-T]
Fuel Atomized too
Quickly
statement
Technical Root
Cause
Dimension

 *Ê9"1, Dimension Changes

Surface Failure
Cause Effect
Mode
  ,-*Ê Interface
Material Resistance

1,, / Energy Restriction
Failure Mode
Noise
Renew online at: Behavioral Root
From Another
Part
www.asq.org Cause
Human Tactile

4
www.asq.org/auto
 SUMMER 2008

Technical Root Causes relate to specific product, Example: Determining Causes and Effects
process, or energy faults that cause the action Begins with Defining the Potential Failure Mode
to fail. Technical causes relate to too much/little
resistance or restrictions to an action or energy Causes Interface Function
transfer. Resistance relates to friction and
Dimension: Nozzle between Fuel and Pintle
restrictions relate to a material to material
interference. Resistance and restrictions also Angle too Small
Failure
relate to employees working with each other. It is Dimensional Change:
Mode:
interesting that in the mechanical world None
resistance creates heat and that resistance Incompletely
between workers creates anger/resentment. Surface: None Atomized
In other words, resistance wears out processes Fuel
and/or breaks down relationships. Interface: Fuel Viscosity
to High Effects
i…>ۈœÀ>Ê,œœÌÊ
>ÕÃiÃÊ>ÀiÊ̅iÊëiVˆwVʅՓ>˜Ê
tactile (movement/ words) that directly creates Material: None Local Effect (part): None
the failure mode. Example, the failure mode
might be “low specified design margin” while Energy: Fuel Pressure
the human tactile is “engineer selected a design too Low Assembly Effect: None
margin that was too low.”
Noise: Buildup on Pintle
A previous failure mode can be a
cause, but not a root cause as it has System Effect: Engine
its own causes. Human Tactile: None Vibration

UÊ
>ÕÃiÃÊ>ÀiÊ̅iÊÀi>ܘÊ̅>ÌÊÜiʅ>ÛiÊ>Êy>Üi`ÊÊ Resistance: None User Effect: Poor Cold
action (failure mode). The failure mode (flawed
action/response) occurs at the exact same Restriction: Buildup on Starts, Poor Gas Mileage
time that the correct action should occur, and Pintle Changes Shape
the resulting problems are preceded
Failure Mode from Government Effect: High
immediately by the failure mode (flawed Emissions
action/response). Another Part: None
List All Important Effects

The components which are missing from this

analysis are:
Ê UÊÊ
˜Ê՘`iÀÃÌ>˜`ˆ˜}ʜvÊ̅iÊseverity of the effects
Ê UÊÊ /…iÊControls for the failure mode (Detection)
and causes (Prevention)
to tf Ê UÊÊ /…iÊvÀiµÕi˜VÞʜvÊv>ˆÕÀiʓœ`iÊoccurrence

Mission
Identify Current Controls
Control Time of Current Controls are not what an organiza-
Requirements tion could be doing to detect failures. Current
Factors Function controls are that which are actually being
performed. Controls are used to detect either the
failure mode or causes.

Cause 1 Time Local Effect (part)

There are two primary types of controls Preven-
tive (P) and Detection (D). Detection is generally
Cause 2 Assembly Effect considered to focus on the failure mode and
Failure prevention addresses cause controls. Preventive
Cause 3 System Effect controls do not receive detection ratings (they
Mode reduce the frequency of occurrence). Detection
Cause 4 User Effect controls receive ratings. The ratings will be
described later in the materials. Only describe
Cause 5 Government Effect the actual controls that are currently being used.

Time
5
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
7 FAILURE MODES
Failure Mode Relationship to Causes,
Effects and Detections

Time Effect Based Failure Mode

Prevention 1 Cause 1 Effect 1 Detection 1
Effect Based Failure Mode
Prevention 2 Cause 2 Effect 2 Detention 2
Failure Effect Based Failure Mode
Prevention 3 Cause 3 Effect 3
Mode Detention 3
Effect Based Failure Mode
Prevention 4 Cause 4 Effect 4 Detention 4
Effect Based Failure Mode
Prevention 5 Cause 5 Effect 5 Detention 5
Failure
List the current P- Mode List the D-type controls to
type controls that Detection detect the failure mode
will prevent cause. through the effect. These
List the current must be established/
Examples: material D-type controls performed prior to the
specifications, that will detect release of the design.
design standards, the failure
design reviews, mode. Examples: Reliability
documented Example: Heat Testing, Validation
procedures/ thermography, Testing, Sensor Based
processes, etc. vibration and Engine Controls, etc.
sound sensing,
etc.

Documenting Risks

Identify the 2 Identify the 1 Identify the 3

Occurrence #'s Severity #'s Detection #'s
O Identify the 3 S D
Cause 1 Detection #'s Effect 1 Effect FM Det 1
D
Cause 2 Effect 2 Effect FM Det 2
Failure
Cause 3 Effect 3 Effect FM Det 3
Mode
Cause 4 Effect 4 Effect FM Det 4
Cause 5 Effect 5 Effect FM Det 5

¢ QualSAT
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet
Item: Fuel Injector Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel
Design Detail: Nozzle YC/YS Description:
2 3
1
D 3
S: SO: RPN: Cause Occurrence #
3 5 YC YS
4 O S D
(P) Control 1: Finite Element Cause 1: Wrong Design Effect 1: High Emissions FM (Effect) Detection 1:
6 10 Engineering Emission Test 3
Failure Mode Detection: High

Analysis Angle
(P) Control 2: Parametric Design Cause 2: Pressure Too Effect 2: Poor Cold Starts FM (Effect) Detection 2: Cold
of Experiments High 5 8 5
Failure Mode: Fuel Not

Room Start Test

Speed Digital Pictures

(P) Control 3: Parametric Design Cause 3: Pressure Too Effect 3: Poor Gas Mileage FM (Effect) Detection 3:
Atomized Enough

of Experiments Low 5 6 Highway Road Validation Test 6

(P) Control 4: Internal Auditing Cause 4: Simulation Not Effect 4: FM (Effect) Detection 4:
Performed 4

(P) Control 5: Cause 5: Effect 5: FM (Effect) Detection 5:

6
www.asq.org/auto
 SUMMER 2008

Workshop

Severity Evaluation Criteria

Ranking Effect Severity of Effect
1 None No Effect
2 Very Minor Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform.
Defect noticed by discriminating customer.

3 Minor Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform.
Defect noticed by average customer.
4 Very Low Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform.
Defect noticed by most customers.
5 Low Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience
item(s) operable at reduced level of performance.
Customer experiences some dissatisfaction.
6 Moderate Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience
item(s) inoperable. Customer experiences
discomfort.
7 High Vehicle/item operable, at reduced level of
performance. Customer Dissatisfied.
8 Very High Vehicle/item inoperable, with loss of primary
function.
9 Hazardous – Very high severity ranking when a potential failure
With Warning hazardous- mode affects safe vehicle operation
and/or involves with warning noncompliance with
government regulation with warning.
10 Hazardous – Very high severity ranking when a potential failure
Without hazardous- mode affects safe vehicle operation
Warning and/or involves with warning noncompliance with
government regulation without warning.
Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis.

Occurrence Evaluation Criteria

Risk Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates R/100 Cpk
1 Remote: Failure is 1 in 1,500,000 0.0000006667 0.00 ≥1.67
2 unlikely 1 in 150,000 0.0000066667 0.00 ≥1.50
3 Low: Relatively few 1 in 15,000 0.0000666667 0.01 ≥1.33
4 failures 1 in 2,000 0.0005000000 0.05 ≥1.17
5 Moderate: Occasional 1 in 400 0.0025000000 0.25 ≥1.00
6 failures 1 in 80 0.0125000000 1.25 ≥0.83
7 1 in 20 0.0500000000 5.00 ≥0.67
High: Repeated failures
8 1 in 8 0.1250000000 12.50 ≥0.51
9 Very High: Failure is 1 in 3 0.3333333333 33.33 ≥0.33
10 almost inevitable 1 in 2 or more ≥ 0.5000000000 >50.00 <0.33
Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system
which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis.
7
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
7 Failure modes tips
Ranking Risk Of Non- Detection
Detection Evaluation Criteria
Likelihood of Detection By Current
FMEA Tips &
1
Detection
0% to 5% Almost
Design Control
Current Control will almost certainly detect a
Tricks
Certain potential cause/mechanism and subsequent Get the most out of your
failure mode.
2 5% to 15% Very High Very High chance the Current Control will process
detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode. Ron Atkinson

-+Ê "Ê*ÀiÈ`i˜Ì]ÊÓääLJän
3 15% to 25% High High chance the Current Control will detect a
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent
Give initial FMEA training on an object that is
failure mode.
common to the students and not part of their
4 25% to 35% Moderately Moderately high chance the Current Control
work processes. That way they can concentrate
High will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
on the concepts. Move on to actual work pro-
subsequent failure mode.
cesses when the concepts are understood.
5 35% to 45% Moderate Moderate chance the Current Control will
detect a potential cause/mechanism and
The logical sequence is to do Design FMEA
subsequent failure mode.
training followed by Process FMEA training. It is
6 45% to 55% Low Low chance the Current Control will detect a
actually easier to grasp the concepts by doing
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent
the Process FMEA first and then transfer the
failure mode.
concepts to the Design FMEA.
7 55% to 65% Very Low Very low chance the Current Control will
detect a potential cause/mechanism and
Failure is the inability of the item or activity being
subsequent failure mode.
studied to perform its intended function. This
8 65% to 75% Remote Remote chance the Current Control will can happen even if the part or process does not
detect a potential cause/mechanism and ‘break’.
subsequent failure mode.
9 75% to 85% Very Very remote chance the Current Control will FMEA is used to evaluate POTENTIAL failures.
Remote detect a potential cause/mechanism and A FMEA analysis does not mean that the failure
subsequent failure mode. has occurred in the past or will occur in the
10 85% to 100% Absolute Current Control will not and/or cannot detect future, just that it potentially could occur.
Uncertainty a potential uncertainty cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode; or there is no The Cause of the Failure is often given as the Po-
Current Control. tential Failure Mode. This creates a problem and
Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system results in confusion when identifying the Cause.
which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis. Example: People see a tire without air and state
that the Failure Mode is a nail in the tire. The tire
losing air pressure slowly is the Potential Failure
Summarizing the Results of the Brainstorming Mode and a nail in the tire is the Cause.
on the DFMEA Form
Ê UÊÊ /…iʈ˜vœÀ“>̈œ˜Ê˜iÝÌÊ̜Ê̅iʘՓLiÀÃÊÀi>ÌiÊ iÌÌiÀÊ`iw˜ˆÌˆœ˜ÊœvÊ̅iÊÀiµÕˆÀi“i˜ÌÃʜvÊ̅iÊ
to the numbers on the DFMEA form on the design or process make the rest of the FMEA
following page. analysis easier.

¢ QualSAT
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet
Item: Fuel Injector
10
Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel 11 STAY INFORMED!
Design Detail: Nozzle YC/YS Description:

S: SO: RPN: 20
Cause Occurrence # 16 D
3 19
14
21
YC YS
18
The Fall Edition
O S D
(P) Control 1: Finite Element Cause 1: Wrong Design
15 6
Effect 1: High Emissions FM (Effect) Detection 1:
10 Engineering Emission Test 3 19 of
Failure Mode Detection: High

Analysis 17 Angle 13
12
18
(P) Control 2: Parametric Design Cause 2: Pressure Too Effect 2: Poor Cold Starts FM (Effect) Detection 2: Cold
of Experiments 17 High 15 5 13 8 Room Start Test 5 19
Automotive
Failure Mode: Fuel Not

Speed Digital Pictures

(P) Control 3: Parametric Design Cause 3: Pressure Too Effect 3: Poor Gas Mileage FM (Effect) Detection 3:
Atomized Enough

of Experiments 5 13 6 6 19
17 Low 15 Highway Road Validation Test
(P) Control 4: Internal Auditing

(P) Control 5:
Cause 4: Simulation Not
17 Performed
Cause 5:
15 4
Effect 4:

Effect 5:
13
FM (Effect) Detection 4:

FM (Effect) Detection 5:
Excellence
13
17 15

is Coming Soon
8
www.asq.org/auto
 SUMMER 2008

ASQ Greater Detroit Section 2008 Schedule of Refresher Courses

All classes are held on Saturdays at Macomb Community College, South Campus, Building "T"
(located between 12 Mile Road & Martin Road, west of Hayes Road). Refresher course starting
dates are subject to change, student should verify.

Certification Refresher Refresher Examination Examination Fee

Course # Course Application Date
Start (Last) Date
Date
Certified Quality Engineer CQE 808 08-09-2008 10-03-2008 12-06-2008 $450
(CQE) 12 Sessions CQE 209 02-07-2009 04-03-2009 06-06-2009

Certified Quality Technician CQT 1108 07-12-2008 08-15-2008 10-18-2008 $325

(CQT) 10 Sessions CQT 709 11-08-2008 01-09-2009 03-07-2009

Certified Quality Inspector CQI 1108 07-12-2008 08-15-2008 10-18-2008 $325

(CMI) 10 Sessions CQI 709 11-08-2008 01-09-2009 03-07-2009

Certified Six Sigma Black Belt CSSBB 608 06-21-2008 08-15-2008 10-18-2008 $1000
(CSSBB) 10 Sessions CSSBB1108 11-08-2008 01-09-2009 03-07-2009

Certified Six Sigma Green Belt CSSGB908 09-20-2008 10-03-2008 12-06-2008 $500
(CSSGB) 10 Sessions CSSGB309 03-14-2009 04-03-2009 06-06-2009

REGISTRATION
FORM
Greater Detroit Section 1000
27350 Southfield Rd., Suite 102
Lathrup Village, MI 48076
www.asqdetroit.org
Name Last First Mid. Initial

Home Address Home Phone

Employer Work Phone

Employer Address

ASQ Member No Yes Member Number

͘ ͘

Payment: Make check payable to Greater Detroit Section, ASQ

Mail to: Greater Detroit Section 1000

27350 Southfield Rd., Suite 102
Lathrup Village, MI 48076

For more information call Rajinder Kapur at 248-703-7148 or e-mail rajinderkapur@yahoo.com

9
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
Smarter fmeas
How can we
make our
FMEA’s
Smarter?
John Casey
/…iÊ1°-°Ê>Õ̜ʈ˜`ÕÃÌÀÞʅ>ÃÊLii˜Ê«ÕÀÃՈ˜}ʵÕ>-
ity with a passion to stop things that could go
wrong—that is, prevent issues and problems
from reaching customers. This truly is a smart
“œÛi°Ê1˜vœÀÌ՘>ÌiÞ]ʈÌʈÃÊLiˆ˜}Ê`œ˜iʈ˜Ê̅iÊ
“things gone wrong” method of Failure Mode

½ÃÊ>Àiʏœ}ˆV>ÊqÊœœŽÊvœÀʈÃÃÕiÃÊ>ÌÊ
Effects Analysis (FMEA), which was a great tool
that has now served its purpose.

½ÃÊ*ÀˆœÀˆÌˆâiÊ7œÀŽÊqʈ˜`Ê̅iʅˆ}…iÃÌÊ
The auto industry has wrung out the maximum

½ÃÊ
>Ìi}œÀˆâiÊ“«>VÌÊqÊ/…iÊvœVÕÃʜ˜Ê causes an error.
I believe we can document the exact steps of each Success Every Time (SET) - as an Alternative
operator and have simple devices guide the
operator’s efforts to help him follow the exact ÞÊVœ˜Vi˜ÌÀ>̈˜}ʜ˜Ê̅iÊii“i˜ÌÃÊ̅>ÌÊ`ÀˆÛiÊÃÕV-
pattern with a guiding principal of “If each part is cess, you focus on a much smaller set of actions
not made exactly right, we will stop the process than the infinite listing of what can go wrong
and start over.” This is the heart of Success Every
Time or SET. SET is a cost effective methodology
(such as with FMEA). Instead, you need to define
what must go right and set up assisting devices
to help companies move from 200 PPM down to
1 PPM or better and simultaneously maximize profits.
on these actions to help operators do their work
exactly right. For line associates, it is just as
easy to make a part correctly as it is to make a
The Best Thing about FMEA’s
part improperly, so you generally won’t get any
resistance from them regarding this idea of doing
Please recognize that I think FMEA’s bring us a
it right. The problem, however, is that normal
terrific aspect and that we should keep FMEA’s
actions within a day cause disruptions that dis-
as a fundamental process in the quality disci-
pline. The things I like about FMEA’s are: tract people for a very short while. These
Ê UÊ 
distractions could last a few seconds or a few
operation then create a countermeasure minutes, but as soon as you have a small mental
Ê UÊ 
lapse and day dream, boom—a mistake is made.
risk and work to reduce it Although this is normal and utterly human, it still
Ê UÊ 
benefit out of the approach and needs a new
driving force in order to achieve the next level.

½ÃÊ
««i>Ê̜Ê
˜}ˆ˜iiÀÃÊqÊ/…iÀiʈÃÊ>Ê Success Every Time is investing in devices to
The auto industry, in fact all industry, needs to
move the actions of the engineering and man-
agement community into a situation where you
can guarantee operator success. Let me illus-
trate. Quality of products is typically measured
ˆ˜Ê*>ÀÌÃÊ*iÀʈˆœ˜Ê`iviV̈ÛiÊqʜÀÊ**ÊvœÀÊŜÀÌ°Ê
Most suppliers in the auto industry perform at
100 PPM or better. This means their performance
is 99.99% good and only .01% defective (1 bad
product out of 10,000).
For a production operator, they followed an exact
and perfect set of steps almost all of the time but
once out of 10,000 tries, the operation was differ-
ent and made an unacceptable part. The problem
with FMEA’s is right here. There are an infinite
number of things that an operator can do wrong
and FMEA’s are trying to address all of them.
Chasing infinity is a very frustrating activity. Isn’t
it smarter to focus on the steps that must go right
and only look for the deviations? Wouldn’t it be
better to have the base philosophy drive our ef-
forts to “Either do it right or we won’t let you do it
at all?” This seems simpler to me and I think we
would get greater yield on our engineering hours
if we had a method that could guide our thinking
in this way.
10
www.asq.org/auto
Ê Ê -iÛiÀˆÌÞÊqÊiÌiV̈œ˜Ê>˜`Ê"VVÕÀÀi˜Vi
Ê UÊ 
logical easy to follow formula
This approach is so logical and direct, it is dif-
ficult to argue with it. In fact, the greatest asset
of the FMEA is that it can be applied to various
levels of design and manufacturing. This tool
has been effective in bringing the industry a long
way in improving quality. The problem is, the
FMEA approach cannot cost effectively take the
industry to the next level.
What can we do instead?
The difference between the FMEA approach and the
SET Approach can best be illustrated described in a
Ying Yang Diagram as illustrated in Diagram 1.1. In the
world of manufacturing, every operation performs work
and can either be done right or done wrong. In the
FMEA approach, you focus on stopping activities in the
º`œ˜iÊÜÀœ˜}»ÊÈ`i°Ê ÕÌÊ>ÃÊ̈“iÊ}œiÃʜ˜]ÊÜiÊ`ˆÃVœÛiÀÊ
new things we never thought of and find new ways
to do it wrong. The list of possibilities grow and grow
and the time, effort, and expense to protect us from this
list grows in proportion.
This continued pursuit of infinity may be a
solid explanation of why, after 25 years, the
auto industry still has trouble creating totally
comprehensive FMEA’s to catch every problem.
Anyone facing an infinite task like this will look
for shortcuts, take risks, or just go as far as time
and energy permits and stop, which is exactly
what has happened to the FMEA process. It has
passed the point of diminished returns. We need
something different now.
help operators remember what to do, and help
them do it right. One operator I worked with
described it most profoundly: “Set the system
up so that the process is telling me everything I
need to know”.
If you look quickly, you may be thinking that this
is just a different way of describing the Poke
9œŽiÊ«ÀœViÃÃiÃÊÕÃi`Ê>ÊœÛiÀÊ>«>˜°Ê ÕÌÊ-ÕV-
cess Every Time is much larger. Here’s why: the
typical concept of error-proofing is looking at
the device level. It is looking for means to detect
defects, many of which are discovered one at a
time.
I define error proofing as a method that PRE-
VENTS an error from occurring. It has two key
pieces. The first is some type of mechanism or
sensing device that for this operation everything
is exactly right. The second feature is a con-
trol element that will only allow the operation
to proceed based on the devices sensing that
every element is right. If they are not right the
potential defective operation is stopped before
the actual error is built in to the product before
the value adding step builds the part. In simple
terms, either the product is right or it is stopped.
Error Proofing Prevents the defects from being
created.
 SUMMER 2008

A Simplified Look at Manufacturing

The Other Side of the World

A Tough Question:
What’s our method to What needs to go
SYSTEMATICALLY FMEA’s
RIGHT? Focus our
focus on what needs
to go right? attention here.
What can go
WRONG
FMEA’S
Currently Systematically
Reduce Risk
We Have Nothing le
m
ob
Pr

That Aims at l em
bl em ob
This target Prob
lem Pro Pr
Potential Problems
Problem
Problem can be infinite

The elements of the Success Every Time Process
I believe there are a very clear set of actions
done on every job that makes perfect parts to
standard. This set of actions is done every day,
hundreds of times by each operator as they
make the thousands of great parts every week.
The Set of “perfect” Actions by Operators
1. Select the correct part
Ê Ó°Ê"Àˆi˜ÌÊ̅iÊ«>ÀÌÊ­,ˆ}…ÌÊÈ`iÊÕ«ÊqÊ«Àœ«iÀÞÊ
rotated)
3. Place the part in the exact correct location
within the tooling (multiple parts go
return to step 1 and repeat the sequence)
4. Activate the value adding energy
The operators need the correct tooling to do
each job correctly
5. The Correct Set of Tools (including gages)
6. Properly aligned to mating fixtures and
equipment
The Parameters governing the value added
energy
7. Correct amount of energy
8. Correct dwell time or parameters on each
job
9. Energy deployed to the correct location on
the part
What will be the result?
ÞÊvœVÕȘ}ʜ˜Ê܅>ÌʈÃʈ`i>Ê>˜`ʜ˜ÞÊ>œÜˆ˜}Ê
value add to proceed if the ideal is in place, we
have a much smaller task to drive quality and
productivity. All you need to do is monitor 9 spe-
cific elements and ask the question “Is every-
thing right?” If it is, allow the process to proceed.
If any one of the 9 elements are not right, STOP,
make a correction or dispose of the part. I think
this is a smarter way to approach FMEA’s
because it is a finite set and we can stop chasing
infinity.
John Casey is a Supply Chain improvement
expert at the Whitehall Group LLC in Troy,
Michigan.
jcasey@whitehallgroupllc.com

11
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
FORGOTTEN FMEA MANUAL
The Forgotten
FMEA Manual
Steven C. Leggett
The Automotive Division requested authors submit
articles on technical subjects. What better subject
than FMEA’s! This subject is always misunderstood,
and there are many interpretations about FMEA’s
and how they are applied. It has been my experience
that most organizations and suppliers do an excel-
lent job, but there are times when Design/Process
FMEAs, have many errors or conflicting information,
or the failure mode was never thought through or
incorporated into the original documents. The Poten-
tial Failure Modes are always added after the fact,
or after the failure occurred. Then the FMEA Team
scrambles to update the latest documents. On many
occasions, the Quality or Engineering Manager or
Quality Engineer is the FMEA Team, and completes
the required documentation just prior to the PPAP

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submission deadlines.
People need to understand that all FMEA Teams
should be cross-functional, multidisciplinary teams,
and this is a real life scenario. Please review these
reference manuals to help you facilitate your PPAP
Requirements.
The Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) are an important tool for evaluation and pro-
cess analysis for finding and identifying any potential
irregularities and weaknesses in the production
and manufacturing processes. For the past three
decades, two groups have collaborated to develop
and improve these FMEA Reference Manuals.
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) devel-
oped SAE J1739 with the coordination of the Chrysler
Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and General Mo-
tors Corporation FMEA Reference Manual for both
design and process analysis of failure modes. The
Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) developed
Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (PFMEA)
Reference Manual with again, the coordination of
Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and
General Motors Corporation.
Throughout the years, the FMEA Manuals have
added key features and elements for the advance-
ments and improvements in an automotive FMEA
application. The reference guidelines have been
published to help ensure that any FMEA is interpret-
ed and developed with a consistent process.
The reference manuals and guidelines are help-
ful, but the interpretations are still broad and
objective. There is still a need to further improve
and develop this subject, especially in the areas
of prevention and detection rankings. The detec-
tion ranking is very hard to understand, very
subjective, and difficult to apply in a consistent
manner. The Risk Priority Number (RPN) will not
show the true value upon completion
12 of your analysis.

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www.asq.org/auto
There are more revisions to the reference manu-
als that will be released soon; that will help guide
the FMEA Team.
The guidelines for detection and prevention have
been used in automotive applications to help
develop consistent Process FMEAs (PFMEA)
for manufacturing and production applications.
There are a number of factors to be considered
when using these guidelines, based on the cause
or mechanism of the detected failure. Look at the
type of inspection, whether manual (visual) or
automated, and how close the failure mode is to
the cause. This is just one of the questions that
need to be asked before you start the entire
Machinery FMEA (MFMEA) process. This Lesson
learned will provide a relationship between the
FMEA and the production and manufacturing en-
vironment; and it makes the FMEA process eas-
ier to understand, and easier to use, especially
for the novice. To ensure consistency throughout
the entire document is very important. This will
also ensure better quality processes and parts
for your customers.
Your main objective, before starting the process,
is to have all D/P/M FMEA Team members prop-
erly trained and knowledgably about the entire
FMEA process.
Have you ever heard of the Forgotten FMEA
Manual?
Some people will even ask, what is a FMEA?
How do you make a FMEA? What does FMEA
stand for and how does it apply to me? Others
will tell you that FMEA helps people in national
emergencies. That FMEA is FEMA - Federal
Emergency Management Agency. Please don’t
get the two mixed up! The FMEA that this article
refers to is the Potential Failure Mode and Ef-
fects Analysis for Tooling & Equipment (Machin-
ery FMEA or MFMEA). This MFMEA is a Refer-
ence Manual and is the technical equivalent
of SAE J1739, Section 5. The Machinery FMEA
Manual should been used by all suppliers to
companies subscribing to the old QS-9000 Tool-
ing and Equipment Supplement, or an Equivalent
Document. Since there is no more QS-9000, all
organizations, and suppliers to customers sub-
scribing to ISO/TS 16949 should also be using the
Machinery FMEA Manual. You can obtain your
copy of this excellent and “Forgotten” Machin-
ery FMEA Manual from the Automotive Industry
Action Group (AIAG), Southfield, Michigan.
A little history behind the AIAG-MFMEA Manual,
First Edition: In 2000, the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) had just released their SAE
J1739 and it had Section 5 about the Tool-
ing & Equipment. Not all Suppliers make their
own tooling and equipment, and it would be a
non-functional part of the current AIAG-FMEA
Manual, Third Edition. So it was decided to
remove the tooling and equipment (Section 5),
out of the SAE J1739 Specification, and make this


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This manual is the technical equivalent of SAE
J1739, Section Five (5), Potential Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis for Machinery (MFMEA).
This reference manual is for the FMEA of Tooling
and Equipment Suppliers to Chrysler LLC, Ford
Motor Company, and General Motors Corpora-
tion and other Global OEM’s is intended to clarify
questions regarding the technical development
of Machinery FMEAs.
The Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force
Charter is consistent to the standardization
of reference manuals, procedures, reporting
formats and the technical nomenclature used by
Organizations and their Suppliers. Accordingly,
the MFMEA has been written to provide guid-
ance for the Organization and their Suppliers.
The MFMEA reference manual does not define
requirements; it does provide a baseline and
guides users to cover situations that would nor-
mally be used when preparing MFMEAs during
the machinery design phase. Also, the AIAG-MF-

tion Reference Manuals should be used together,
to reduce the possibility of any failures used
during the design and process of any production
or manufacturing facility and its suppliers. The
Fourth Edition MFMEA Reference Manual should
be available later this summer. Once this new
edition has been released, it is recommended
for each Team Member to be retrained to the
new Fourth Edition MFMEA Reference Manual,
and then complete your MFMEA requirements.
The Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
for Tooling & Equipment (MFMEA) concepts
should be applied to machinery to reduce the
likelihoods and the probability of possible or
potential failure modes related to machinery. The
MFMEA supports the machinery design process
from design development through the design
approval process. The MFMEA should be a thor-
ough review of each element, function or step,
in the overall operation of the machinery. The
MFMEA manual addresses the design concepts
used to develop an effective MFMEA.
During the development of the build and instal-
lation process MFMEA, covers concepts by
all Global OEM’s, and therefore, the MFMEA
manual should be considered and followed. The
build and installation process FMEA should be
initiated prior to the creation of any machinery.
Machinery is considered any and all tooling and
equipment combined to process or manufacture,
fabricate, machine or assemble of all hardware.
This includes all tooling, fixtures, conveyors,
equipment, components, details, electrical
motors and wiring, switches, or any possible
combination. Additional examples include:
gages, stamping presses, injection molding,
metal cutting tools, welding, painting, and
cleaning equipment, all of which contribute to
the manufacturing process, including the
necessary operational computer hardware and
software.

Also take into consideration:

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a) the human element;
b) training related to the operational content of each
element and
c) the process step related to the process.
These three items also include documentation,
manuals, procedures, and employee training re-
cords. Remember 100% inspection is not an effective
way to catch all nonconformances.
The Design MFMEA should be used as a continuous
improvement process and should be used to evalu-
ate the reliability, availability, maintainability, and
durability of the tooling, equipment and machinery.
MFMEAs are living documents and should be
reviewed and updated at regular intervals and as
process changes occur. Don’t forget the supporting
documents used during the machinery operations
and the development process.
When you start the MFMEA process, you should
have a cross-functional team lead by the machinery
responsible engineer and is expected to involve all
areas at the manufacturing site. The manufacturing
facility should include plant & product engineers,
safety, quality, maintenance, production, support
personnel and the customer. This also includes
supplier engineering and their MFMEA from the ma-
chinery system, subsystem and all components. The
customer of the MFMEA is the manufacturing facility
where the tooling and equipment will be installed for
the production process.
A starting point should be defined; and become a
catalyst to simulate and stimulate the interactive
and interchange of ideas between all parties. There
should be a team approach during the activities
and include all commercial components and their
responsible engineer from each supplier. Each com-
ponent should be reviewed in detail for their
MFMEA criteria. The responsible machinery
œ˜ÌÀœÊ>˜`Ê œœŽ°
engineer should be experienced with FMEA to help
facilitate and to help assist the team.
The Potential Machinery FMEA (Process) should be
used by the responsible machinery engineer and the
team as an analytical tool to evaluate any possible
failures during the design, install, manufacture,
or operation on all tooling and equipment. These
techniques should take in consideration all potential
failure modes and their possible causes and/or
mechanisms of failure, related to the operation of
the machinery as a means to ensure that all failures
are considered and addressed. The MFMEA should
be used as an input to the manufacturing facilities
preventative maintenance program and should be
used to determine the machinery controls that may
be used during the operation, manufacturing and
production processes. There will also be a need
to review all outside suppliers operations with the
causes and effects of any possible failures. Other
considerations: I recommend having the customer
preventative maintenance and supplier field service
represented on the MFMEA Team. Otherwise, it will
be impossible to develop an effective MFMEA.
The MFMEA Team should concentrate on
improving the reliability, availability, maintainabil-
ity, and durability of the tooling, equipment and
machinery while conducting the analysis. During
the deep dive process, the MFMEA Teams ques-
tions, thoughts, documentation, lessons learned,
and analysis of each line element, should be
based on items that could potentially fail by their
associated causes and/or mechanisms of fail-
ures related to the operation of the machinery.
This should also be considered on the basis on
their past experiences concerns regarding the
entire operating production environment and
performance of the machinery. The MFMEA
improves the reliability, availability, maintain-
ability, and durability of the machinery. It helps
in the evaluation and understanding of the line
elements and steps of the device’s, it aids in the
objective evaluation and helps provide the nec-
essary information to aid in the planning of an
effective and efficient process for the supplier
preventative maintenance programs.
When the process of the MFMEA had been initi-
ated and implemented, the results are reduced
life cycle costs, improved machinery repair
and maintenance, and reduction in mean time
to repair. The MFMEA shows the probability of
their potential failure modes and all the effects
of the shop floor should be considered before
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completion of the process, the MFMEA Team has
a ranked list of the potential failure modes and
their potential causes and mechanisms. The list
will be ranked accordingly, and then establish a
priority system for preventative and corrective
actions.
Once the MFMEA Team has assembled and all
pertinent back up information prepared, the
machinery responsible engineer should lead
the group in the MFMEA development process.
The process begins with the preparation of all
documents and each member should have a full
understanding of what the entire process can
and will do, during the manufacturing and pro-
duction processes. Each Team member should
be trained prior to the start of the development of
the MFMEA process as to what the machinery is
expected to do or not do, in the production and
manufacturing environment, under the specified
conditions and for the required time period. (e.g.
hot, cold, humidity, oil, water, cutting fluids, ma-
chining chips, etc…..). This criteria is expected
from sources such as design requirements,
validation testing, preventative maintenance
programs, program and performance criteria,
reliability, maintainability, availability and durabil-
ity results, contract and engineering specifica-
tions, production and ongoing testing, including
lot control testing, traceability requirements,
prevention, detection and corrective actions.
This would also include the lessons learned,
preventative maintenance historical records
of the same machines, and possible federal,
state and/or local regulatory laws.
SUMMER 2008
ivœÀiÊ̅iÊ
opment process, the MFMEA Team should have
access to the process flow diagram, sequence
of steps of the operation of the machinery and
detailed descriptions. The tooling and equipment
machinery brochures, with engineering draw-
ings, detail prints and machinery reliability data
and capability studies. The responsible machin-
ery engineer leads the Team, to help facilitate
all of the documented results and analysis of the
potential failure modes and cause mechanism
of failures, and their possible consequences and
recommended actions.
This is just the tip of the iceberg, and I could
write another 20 pages of this fantastic FMEA
material. It can be a very dry subject, but I
would like you to get excited about new AIAG
Fourth Edition FMEA Reference Manual, and
please don’t forget about “The Forgotten FMEA
Manual”, about Machinery FMEA’s.
Steven C. Leggett is a General Motors Corpora-
tion, Senior APQP Supplier Quality Engineer. In
his current position, Mr. Leggett is responsible
for Cradle to Grave APQP Functions and War-
ranty regarding Chassis Components. He has
been and is active in the development of quality
publications by the Automotive Industry Action
Group (AIAG). He is the co-author of the AIAG-
FMEA Manual-Third Edition and is Chair of the
AIAG-PPAP Manual-Fourth Edition, as well as a
Speaker at various local and national confer-
ences. Steve is also active within the Automotive
Division and Detroit Section of ASQ, he can be
reached at steve-leggett@sbcglobal.net.
Reference Information can be found on the links
below:
SAE J1739, AIAG-FMEA, MFMEA, PPAP, APQP,
MSA, SPC, ISO/TS 16949, and Juran’s Quality
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
www.sae.org
Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG)
www.aiag.org
American Society for Quality (ASQ)
www.asq.org
13
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
 PRSRT STD
US POSTAGE

PAID
LIVONIA, MI
PERMIT # 1165

Published by Mirus Graphic Solutions and ASQ Automotive Division

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