WEEK 9: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION  FACTS: Wilmon Auto Supply et Al were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas standing on

  a registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin, Lourdes C.
Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L. Jaran lla. The leases were embodied in a uniformly worded
(1) PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO v. Hon. JULIAN POGOY and A y. Ricardo Reyes deeds:
November 29, 1983 | Escolin, J.  ● S pulated fixed terms or periods
DOCTRINE:  The  period  for  filing  actions  for  forcible  entry  and  detainer  is  one  year,  and  this  period  is  ● Provided that the lessee should give the lessor 30 days prior no ce of the inten on to
counted from demand to vacate the premises.   terminate or renew the contract, and that if no such wri en no ce were given, the
lessor would consider the contract terminated on the expira on of the term;
FACTS:  Petra Vda de Borromeo seeks to stop respondent Judge Pogoy from taking cognizance of ● Contained a “reserva on of rights”- “Lessor reserves the rights to sell, mortgage,
an ejectment suit for failure of the plain ff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for hypothecate or encumber the property so long as it requires the purchaser or mortgage
concilia on.  Deceased Vito Borromeo was the original owner of the building which was leased to creditors to respect the terms of this lease contract; provided further that LESSEE shall
Petra Vda. De Borromeo for P500 per month payable within the first five days of the month. be duly informed about LESSOR's plan to sell the property."

On August 28, 1982, A y Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon pe oner a
le er demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to
September (1982), and therea er vacate the premises.
Petra Vda. De Borromeo failed to do so, thus the A y Reyes ins tuted an ejectment case against
the former. Petra Vda. De Borromeo moved to dismiss for want of jurisdic on. She points out that
the par es are from the same ci es and as such they must refer the dispute to the barangay
Court or Lupon before going through the judicial courts. Respondent’s defense was that it was
danger of prescribing under the statute of limita ons. The mo on was dismissed thus this case.
ISSUE:  WON the case was in danger of prescribing so as to afford A y Reyes the excep on to
NOT submit the case to the Barangay Lupon?
HELD: NO.  dissolving the preliminary injunc on ruling that the unlawful detainer cases fall within the
The defense of A y Reyes regarding the statute of limita ons is unacceptable because the case
was filed on September 16, 1982, less than a month before the le er of demand was served.
Forcible  entry  and  detainer  prescribes  in one year counted from demand to vacate the premises
and the law only required 60 days upon which the par es should try to reconcile in Lupon;
Respondent had more than 9 months le even if reconcilia on failed.
  
Even  though  the  private  respondent should have submitted the complaint before the Lupon, the  to a right of preemp on (or prior purchase) of the premises in ques on and wishes to have said
petition  should  still  Ibe  dismissed. The Lupon only refers to individuals—single human being
contrasted with a social group or ins tu on. It only applies to natural persons. In the case at bar,
private respondent is only a nominal party in behalf of the intestate estate. The real party in
interest is the intestate estate and thus, doesn't fall within the ambits of the provision requiring
submission of the case to concilia on proceedings with the Lupon. ACCORDINGLY, the pe on is
hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try and decide Civil Case No. R-23915 without
unnecessary delay. No costs.
(2) WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION etc. v.
COURT OF APPEALS and Star Group Resources and Development
April 10, 1992 | Narvasa, CJ.  a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposi on of
DOCTRINE:  The  lessor’s  unlawful  detainer  suits  in  the  MTC against the lessees should NOT be abated by 
the  actions  filed  in  the  RTC  by  the  latter  based  on  the  contention  that  they  are  entitled  to  a  right  of 
preemption  or  prior  purchase  of  the  leased premises. Reason is that the actions in the RTC did not involve 
physical  or  de  facto  possession,  and,  on  not  a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was 
merely  a  ploy  to  delay  disposition  of  the  ejectment  proceeding,  or that the issues presented in the former 
could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. 
A er the expira on of the period fixed in the lease agreements, lessors executed a public
instrument en tled “Deed of Absolute Sale” in virtue of which they sold the leased property to
Star Group Resources and Development Inc. The buyer, Star Group, brought separate ac ons of
unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Courts in Iloilo City against the lessees.
The lessees refused to concede, and indeed impugned, Star Group’s right to eject them. They
argued that in selling the proper es and seeking their ejectment therefrom, the lessors, and their
buyers, had violated their leasehold rights because a) they were not accorded the right of
preemp on, b) the buyer was not required to honor the leases, and c) the lessees were denied the
op on to renew their leases upon the expira on thereof.
The same proposi ons were also set out as causes of ac on in a complaint filed by some of the
lessees in the RTC of Iloilo. Judge Ilarde promulgated on the merits dismissing the pe ons and
jurisdic on of the MTC and the pendency of the case in the RTC did not warrant the suspension
of the lawful detainer cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ac on of unlawful detainer filed in the Municipal Trial Court against a
lessee — grounded on the expira on of the la er's lease — should be abated or suspended by an
ac on filed in the Regional Trial Court by the defendant lessee — on the claim that he is en tled
right judicially enforced.
HELD: NO. 
It may well be stressed in closing that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, "the defendant raises the ques on of ownership in his pleadings and the
ques on of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership," the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless
have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . . only to determine the
issue of possession."
The ac ons in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not
the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set
up as defenses in the ejectment ac on and there resolved.
DECISION:  WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals, being en rely in
accord with the facts on record and applicable law and jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED in
toto, and the pe ons are DISMISSED. Costs against pe oners.

Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 1 


(3) MIGUEL SEMIRA v. COURT OF APPEALS and Buenaventura An
March 2, 1994 | Bellosillo, J.  not merely the 822.5 sqm stated in their document of sale but the en re area circumscribed
DOCTRINE:  Where  land  is  sold  for  a  lump  sum  and  not  so  much  per  unit  of  measure  or  number,  the  within its boundaries. The fact that the area turned out to be 2,200 sqm; instead of only 822.5
boundaries  of  the  land  stated  in  the  contract  determine  the  effects  and  scope  of  the  sale,  not  the  area  sqm, is of no moment and does not en tle An to the difference because the definite object sold
thereof.  Hence,  the  vendors  are obligated to deliver all the land included within the boundaries, regardless  was Lot 4221 in its en rety and not just any unit of measure or number.
of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed.  
FACTS: Juana Gu errez sold Lot 4221 (Batangas) to Buenaventura An for P850 by means of a
“Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa.” An es mated area of 822.5 sqm appears on deed of sale. An
entered the premises observing the boundaries of the property and not the area given. (north: a
Junc on or Intersec on road; east: Sto. Niño-Pinagbayanan Road and Juana Gu errez; south: Sto.
Niño School; west: Sto. Niño-Dagatan Road.
An acquired (2) other parcels of land: Lot 4215 (8,606 sqm on the east of Lot 4221 from the
spouses Hornilla) and another lot (11,000 sqm from San ago Asi). An sold Lot 4221 to his
nephew, Cipriano Ramirez by means of another "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" for P2,500.
Ramirez occupied the lot by observing the boundaries stated in the document of sale.
Cipriano sold the lot to Miguel Semira for P20,000. However, the area stated in the "Kasulatan ng
Bilihan ng Lupa" was 2,200 sqm and not 822.5 appearing in the previous document. As delimited
by its boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than 822.5 sqm. This was confirmed by the
Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey declaring Lot 4221 having 2,200 sqm; hence, the reason for the
change.
Semira entered the same premises and began the construc on of a new rice-mill. However, a
complaint for forcible entry was filed against him by An.An claimed: area of Lot 4221 was only
822.5 sqm and the excess of 1,377 sqm forcibly occupied by Semira formed part of Lot 4215
which he acquired from the Hornillas.
During the pendency of the case, An was issued an Original Cer ficate of over the lots he
purchased from the Hornillas and that from San ago Asi with a combined area of 19,606 sqm.
However, the tle was issued for 2 hectares, 8 ares and 33 centares or 20,833 sqm. No
explana on was given for the difference.
ISSUE: Here can the the issue of possession be decided independently from the ques on of
ownership?
HELD: NO. 
The ques on of who has prior possession hinges on the ques on of who the real owner of the
disputed por on is. And the la er, in turn, depends on whether such por on is part of Lot 4215
of An or of Lot 4221 of Semira.
Semira claims he owns the en re 2,200 sqm since it is the size of Lot 4221 following its
established boundaries. An insists that he only sold 822.5 sqm, hence, his nephew could not have
transferred a bigger area to Semira.
Where land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure or number, the
boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the
area thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land included within the
boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in
the deed. This is par cularly true where the area is described as "humigit kumulang," that is, more
or less.
When An sold Lot 4221 to his nephew Ramirez by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
which incorporated both the area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the former transferred
It is unconvincing that An entered into the sale unaware that Lot 4221 actually had a much bigger
area than it purported to be. We must sustain Semira over An when the la er failed even to prove
prior possession in his favor. Absent such element, it cannot be said that he was forcibly deprived
of the disputed por on. Hence, his ac on for forcible entry must fail.
It should be emphasized, however, that the case before us is merely an ac on of forcible entry
and that the issue of ownership was decided for the sole purpose of resolving priority of
possession. Hence, any pronouncement made affec ng ownership of the disputed por on is to
be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an ac on between the same
par es involving tle to the land. Costs against Buenaventura An.
(4) IGNACIO WONG v. Hon. LUCAS CARPIO and Manuel Mercado
October 21, 1991 | Bidin, J. 
DOCTRINES: 
● It  should  be  stressed  that  “"possession  is  acquired  by the material occupation of a thing or the 
exercise  of  a  right,  or  by  the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts 
and  legal  formalities  for  acquiring  such  right."  and  that  the  execution  of  a  sale  thru  a  public 
instrument  shall  be  equivalent  to  the  delivery  of  the  thing,  unless  there  is  stipulation  to  the 
contrary…If,  however,  notwithstanding  the  execution  of  the  instrument,  the  purchaser cannot 
have  the  enjoyment  and  material  tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such 
tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected. 
● Possession  in  good  faith  ceases  from  the  moment  defects  in  the  title  are  made  known  to  the 
possessors. 
FACTS: Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in li ga on from William Giger by
virtue of a deed of sale with right of repurchase which was executed in 1972 for a considera on
of P3,500.00. In 1972, Mercado began harves ng only the coconut fruits and paid taxes on the
land for Giger. He went periodically to the land to make copra but he never placed any person on
the land to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land and put any sign or hut to show that he is
in actual possession.
In 1976, Ignacio Wong went to the land to find out if there were other people residing there or
claiming it besides the owner and he found none. He then bought the land from Giger; he asked
for the delivery of the tle to him and so he has in possession the transfer cer ficate. He then
declared it for taxa on under his name and tried to register the pacto de retro sale but could not
due to some technicali es. He later placed laborers on the land, built a small farm house a er
making some clearing and fenced the boundaries, and signboards.
On Sept 26, 1976, Mercado checked the land to which he reported to the police. On Nov 18,
1976, Wong, ordered the hooking of the coconuts and nobody disturbed him. On Nov 29, 1976,
Wong received a copy of a complaint for forcible entry with summons. The MTC favored Wong
having prior, actual and con nuous physical possession. The CFI favored Mercado; found that
Wong is an intruder and must pay rent from Aug 1976 ll the prop is returned.
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 2 
ISSUES:  Pe oner ins tuted a complaint for quie ng of tle and recovery of possession against Babol and
1. WON Wong is an intruder? Rosete before the CFI. Respondent Rosete moved to dismiss the compliant on the ground of res 
2. WON Wong must pay a monthly rental? judicata. The CFI granted this mo on.
  
HELD: YES both issues.  ISSUE:  WON a final judgment in a case for forcible entry bars another complaint for accion
Property – possession; modes of acquiring thereof   reivindicatoria.
It should be stressed that “"possession is acquired by the material occupa on of a thing or the   
exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the ac on of our will, or by the proper acts HELD: NO. 
and legal formali es for acquiring such right." and that the execu on of a sale thru a public Res  judicata  should not apply in the present case because even though there is an iden ty of
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is s pula on to the par es, there is no iden ty of cause of ac on.
contrary…If, however, notwithstanding the execu on of the instrument, the purchaser cannot
have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such Pe oner’s first complaint is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior
tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected. Property possession, regardless of who has lawful tle over the disputed property. Thus, the only issue in
possessed by two different personali es – follow Ar cle 538 an ac on for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is,
possession de  facto, and not possession de  jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that
Entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor implied the exertion of force  irrespec ve of the actual condi on of the tle to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. And, a judgment rendered in
the exer on of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the rule, entering a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the ques on of possession and not on the
upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The ownership. It does not in any way bind the tle or affect the ownership of the land or building.
founda on of the ac on is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who
has entered without right. The words "by force, in mida on, threat, strategy, or stealth" include The pe oner’s second complaint, although en tled an ac on for “quie ng of tle and recovery
every situa on or condi on under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and of possession” is in reality an ac on to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatori under Art
exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open 434 of the Civil Code, and should be dis nguished from pe oner’s firs case, which is an accion 
daylight, under the very eyes of person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the interdictal.
consent of the la er, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the
property, the ac on of forcible entry and detainer can unques onably be maintained, even In pe oner’s second complaint, she clearly sets up tle to herself and prays that respondent
though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given
acts of plan ng himself on the ground and excluding the other party. possession thereof. Certainly, the allega ons partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.
  
Possession in good faith; generally, does not loss its character; except in the case and from the Accion  reivindicatoria  or accion  reivindicacion is thus an ac on whereby plain ff alleges ownership
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possess the thing over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal
improperly or wrongfully(Ar cle 528).Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in or accion  publiciana where plain ff merely alleges proof of a be er right to possess without claim
the tle are made known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the of tle.
property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced
that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his tle or mode of acquisi on, it must be A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes no other issue than possession and
considered sufficient to show bad faith. Such interrup on takes place upon service of summons. declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means cons tutes a bar to an ac on for
determina on of who has the right or tle of ownership. Pe on GRANTED.
 
(5) FELICIDAD JAVIER v. Hon. REGINO VERIDIANO II and Reino Rosete
October 10, 1994 | Bellosillo, J.  (6) LIM KIEH TONG Inc. v. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Rogelio Pizarro, and Reginaldo Lim
March 18, 1991 | Gancayco, J. 
DOCTRINE:  Accion  reivindicatoria  or  accion  reivindicacion  is  thus  an  action  whereby  plaintiff  alleges 
ownership  over  a  parcel  of  land  and  seeks  recovery  of  its  full  possession.  It  is  different  from  accion  DOCTRINE:  The  purpose  of  forcible  entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the title to property, 
interdictal  or  accion  publiciana  where  plaintiff  merely  alleges  proof  of  a  better  right  to  possess  without  the  party  in  peaceable  and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. Any 
claim of title.  person  deprived  of  possession  of  any  land  or  building  may  file  an  action  for  forcible  entry  and  unlawful 
   detainer  against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him. This relief is not only 
FACTS: Pe oner ins tuted a complaint for forcible entry against before the City Court against available  to  landlord,  lessor  but  to  lessee  and  tenant  as  well  within  one  year  from  such  unlawful 
Ben Babol, alleging that he forcibly entered a por on on the southwestern part of pe oner’s deprivation or withholding of possession. 
property. The City Court dismissed he complaint finding that the area in ques on is outside
pe oner’s property. The Court of First Instance denied the appeal. FACTS:  Reginaldo Lim and his family resided in Room 301 of the building of Lim Kieh Tiong un l
they transferred to their present residence at No. 3 Igdalig St., Quezon City. However, Reginaldo
Pe oner was granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and was issued an OCT over the subject retained possession of said room to keep his important belongings, such as his law books,
property. Ben Babol had sold the property he was occupying, including the subject area, to important documents, appliances, etc. The building has only one common main door through
private respondent Reino Rosete. which all the occupants of the various rooms therein can get in and out. Accordingly, all
occupants including Reginaldo were given a key to the main doorlock by Lim Kieh Tiong.
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 3 

When Reginaldo wanted to go inside his room on September 30, 1987 to get three (3) of his
lawbooks which he needed to read in connec on with a case he was then handling, he found that
the key he possessed was no longer compa ble with the lock, i.e., the same was changed.
Reginaldo had to buy three (3) new lawbooks for Pl,253.00 to prepare for his cases.
He requested private respondent to provide him the appropriate key but his request was denied.
Reginaldo also alleges that he has a clear and unmistakable right to the use of said room en tling
him to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunc on to command Lim Kieh Tiong to provide him
the appropriate key to the lock of the main building; and to pay damages in the amount of
Pl,253.000, P5,000.00 a orney's fees and costs of the suit. Pe oner countered that since the
ac on is one for specific performance, the ac on should have been filed with the RTC
ISSUE:  WON Reginaldo is en tled to file for a Forcible Entry/ Unlawful Detainer case against Lim
Kieh Tiong?
HELD: YES. 
The suit is actually one for forcible entry and detainer. Reginaldo remained in possession of the
property but Pe oner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right of
egress and ingress through the door of the building and the room. Any person deprived of
possession of any land or building may file an ac on for forcible entry and detainer against the
person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him. This relief is not only available
to landlord, lessor but to lessee and tenant as well within one year from such unlawful
depriva on or withholding of possession. WHEREFORE, the pe on is DENIED. No costs.
(7) Sps. NAZARIO PENAS Jr. represented by Elpidio Viernes as a orney-in-fact v.
COURT OF APPEALS and Lupo Calaycay
July 7, 1994 | Padilla, J.  The Contract to Sell provides inter alia that in case of default in the payment of two or more
DOCTRINE:  The  one (1) year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a  en tled to rescind the contract and take possession of the property; the buyer will vacate the
complaint  for  unlawful  detainer  can  be filed should be counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate,  premises without the necessity of any court ac on and the down payment will be treated as
the  reason  being  that  the  lessor  has  the  right  to waive his right of action based on previous demands and  earnest money or as rental for the use of the premises.
let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. 
FACTS:  A property in QC is the subject of this case wherein Sps Penas entered into a lease
contract with the respondent Calaycay at an agreed monthly rental of P110. This contract was on
a month to month basis. Upon the death of Nazario Penas Sr. and his wife, their children executed
an extra judicial se lement of her estate.  As me went on, the monthly rental on the subject
premises had been gradually increased by the the Sps. Penas to P691.
Sps Penas no fied the respondent Calaycay that they were termina ng the wri en month to
month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew the same and demanded from
the la er to vacate the premises in ques on. The Sps. Opted to allow the defendant to con nue
occupying the leased premises provided he will agree to execute a new lease contract for a period
of 1 year at an increased monthly rental of 2,500 pesos plus 2 months deposit. This was later on
reduced to 2,000 Pesos.
Calaycay failed to abide by the demand but con nued staying on the leased premises; deposited
the monthly rentals in the subject premises with the PNB in his name in trust for sps Penas. Sps
sent another le er to Calaycay to vacate the subject premises and to pay back the rental in the
sum of 2,000 from March 1990 in the total sum of 60,000.
Sps filed the present suit for unlawful detainer on the grounds of termina on of the month to
month lease contract and failure of Calaycay to execute a new lease agreement with increased
rentals. MTC dismissed the pe on due to lack of jurisdic on. Basing its decision on the finding
that the complaint was filed more than 1 year a er Calaycay began unlawfully occupying the
premises. RTC upheld the decision of MTC
ISSUE: WON MTC had jurisdic on over the complaint filed by Sps. Penas.
HELD: YES. 
It should be noted that even if the private respondent was deposi ng rentals in trust for the
pe oners, what was being deposited were rentals at the old rate, which pe oners were not
bound to accept or withdraw. When private respondent elected to remain in the premises a er
pe oners had sent him the le er of 18 January 1990 giving him the op on to vacate by 28
February 1990 or to sign a new lease contract for one (1) year at an increased rental rate of
P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) a month, he assumed the new rental rate and could be
ejected from the premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the pe oners.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
31480 is hereby SET ASIDE.
(8) FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and Francisco Sycip
January 22, 1996 | Mendoza, J. 
DOCTRINE:  Since  the  determinative  question  is  exclusively cognizable by the HLURB, the question of the 
right of Francel must be determined by the agency. 
  
FACTS: Francel Realty filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Sycip. Francel alleged that it
had executed a Contract to Sell to Sycip Lot 16, Building No. 14 of the Francel Townhomes in
Cavite, for P451,000.00.
installments, the whole obliga on will become due and demandable and the seller will then be
Francel alleged that Sycip failed to pay the monthly amor za on despite demands to update his
payments and to vacate the premises. Francel prayed that Sycip be ordered to vacate the
premises and pay a monthly rental un l he shall have vacated the premises, and P25,000.00 as
a orney's fees plus appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and expenses of li ga on.
Sycip alleged that he had stopped paying the monthly amor za ons because the townhouse unit
sold to him by Francel was of defec ve construc on. He alleged that he had in fact filed a
complaint for "unsound real estate business prac ce" in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board against Francel. Sycip prayed that Francel be ordered to pay P500,000.00 as moral
damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, P75,000.00 as a orney's fees and that he be given
"all other remedies just and equitable."
ISSUE: Despite the Contract to Sell containing the provision that Francel will take possession of
the property upon default payment of Sycip, should Francel’s complaint for unlawful detainer
prosper?
HELD: NO. 
Complaint against Sycip is dismissed. Sycip’s counterclaim is also dismissed. MTC has no
jurisdic on over the unlawful detainer case. Although generally, unlawful detainer falls within the
original and exclusive jurisdic on of the MTC, the determina on of the ground for ejectment
requires a considera on of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property.
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 4 
Sycip has a right under P.D. No. 957, § 23 to stop paying monthly amor za ons because of
Francel’s alleged failure to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the me for complying with the same.
Sycip has in fact filed a complaint against Francel for unsound real estate business prac ce with
the HLURB. This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer. Since the determina ve
ques on is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB, the ques on of the right of Francel must be
determined by the agency. Francel’s cause of ac on against Sycip should instead be filed as a
counterclaim in HLURB Case. A mo on to dismiss should be granted on the ground that the
regular court (MTC) has no jurisdic on to take cognizance of the complaint.
But it was error for the MTC to grant Sycip’s counterclaim for damages for expenses incurred and
inconveniences allegedly suffered by him as a result of the filing of the ejectment case. A party
may file a counterclaim only if the court has jurisdic on to entertain the claim. Otherwise the
counterclaim cannot be filed.
(9) Sps. MARCOS & VICTORIA ESMAQUEL v. MARIA COPRADA  subject to collateral a ack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled, except in a direct
December 15, 2010 | Peralta, J.  proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the tle of the
DOCTRINE:  As  a  registered  owner,  petitioner  has  a  right  to  eject  any  person  illegally  occupying  his  pe oners can only be assailed in an ac on expressly ins tuted for that purpose. Whether or not
property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches.  the respondent has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
FACTS:  Pe oners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla filed an ejectment case
against respondent Maria Coprada before the MCTC. In 1945, Maria and her family were allowed
by the pe oners to use and occupy the land for their residence, under the condi on that they
will vacate the premises should pe oners need to use the same. They were also allowed to
construct their residen al house. Since then, the pe oners never made an a empt to drive them
away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her 8 children have no place to live in. Respondent
have been occupying the subject premises free of rent, including payment of realty taxes.
When Maria’s present circumstances improved, the pe oners verbally demanded that Maria
vacate the subject land but refused to. Pe oners were forced to send a demand le er and gave
me for Maria to vacate the premises. However, respondent s ll ignored said demand, which
prompted pe oners to bring a complaint before the barangay authori es. No se lement was
reached, hence a cer fica on to file in court was issued. Pe oners then filed an ejectment case.
The respondent admi ed that pe oners are the registered owners of the land and she averred
that in 1945 it was Emiliana Coprada, mother of Victoria, who gave permission to her husband.
She alleged that some me in the early 1960’s, Victoria offered the said lot for sale for 2k to which
they agreed on but was never reduced to wri ng. The price was paid in installments and was fully
paid in 1962. Respondent maintained that since the execu on of the oral sale, she had been
paying the realty taxes due, and also built a semi-concrete structure. She further claims that
pe oners are barred by laches. Even gran ng, w/o admi ed, that respondent's claim of
ownership over the property is improper because pe oners are the registered owners thereof,
respondent argued that she is a builder in good faith, because she was able to build the structure
on the subject lot with the prior permission of the owner.
The MCTC dismissed the complaint and it held that laches already set in. The RTC reversed the
MCTC’s judgment ruling that respondent’s occupa on of the property was by virtue of
pe oners’ tolerance and permission. Hence, respondent is bound by an implied promise that she
will vacate the property upon demand. Thus, her possession over the subject property became
unlawful a er the pe oners demanded her to vacate the property. The CA, reversed the RTC
decision and affirmed the MCTC.
ISSUE: WON pe oners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject property?
HELD: YES. 
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession
was permi ed by the plain ff on account of an express or implied contract between them.
However, defendant's possession became illegal when the plain ff demanded that defendant
vacate the subject property due to the expira on or termina on of the right to possess under
their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.
Pe oners’ tle over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a
fundamental principle in land registra on that the cer ficate of tle serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrover ble tle to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens tle over a land is
en tled to possession thereof.
The validity of pe oners’ cer ficate of tle cannot be a acked by respondent in this case for
ejectment. Under Sec on 48 of Presiden al Decree No. 1529, a cer ficate of tle shall not be
trial court to determine in an ac on for unlawful detainer.
Pe oners’ right to eject any person illegally occupying their property is not barred by laches.
Respondent first acquired possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance. From 1945 un l the
filing of the complaint for ejectment in 1997, the nature of that possession has never changed.
Pe oners allowed the respondent to possess the property with the knowledge that the
respondent will vacate the same upon demand. Hence, un l such demand to vacate was
communicated by the pe oners to the respondent, pe oners are not required to do any act to
recover the subject land, precisely because they knew of the nature of the respondent's
possession, i.e., possession by mere tolerance.
Thus, it cannot be said that pe oners are guilty of failure or neglect to assert a right within a
reasonable me. Further, a er the pe oners gave a demand le er to the respondent giving the
la er un l November 30, 1996 to vacate the subject premises, which respondent failed to heed,
they immediately filed a complaint before the barangay authori es and, therea er, lodged an
ejectment case before the MCTC on February 24, 1997. In sum, We find that pe oners are not
guilty of laches as would bar their claim to the property in ques on.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the pe on is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolu on of the
Court of Appeals, dated April 6, 2001 and February 15, 2002, respec vely, in CA-G.R. SP No.
49994, affirming the Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1875, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
Branch 26, in Civil Case No. SC-3580, is REINSTATED.
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 5 
 (10) LEONARDO & MANUEL AZARCON and Esteban Abobo v. VICTOR EUSEBIO  (11) MANGULON CALAGAN et. al. v. CFI OF DAVAO Branch II and Petra Sandoval
April 29, 1959 | Labrador, J.  January 28, 1980 | Melencio-Herrera, J.
DOCTRINE:  A  person  who  has  been  ordered  to  leave  certain  premises  is  ordinarily  not  prohibited  from  DOCTRINES:
taking with him his own effects and possession, unless there is an express prohibition to this effect.  ●
  
FACTS:  Respondent Eusebio and pe oners had a dispute over the possession of a certain parcel
of public land. Respondent has filed a lease applica on for a parcel of land, a por on of which was
occupied by pe oners, under a homestead applica on.
Respondent filed a complaint in the CFI, praying that pe oners ordered to vacate the por on of
his property. CFI rendered judgment in favor of respondents; ordering pe oners to restore
possession of the land to respondents. It was appealed to the CA.
A writ of execu on of the judgment of the lower court was issued. The said writ of execu on was
set aside, authorizing pe oners to file a supersedeas bond instead, to be approved by the CFI.
The CA, not having been no fied of the fact that the pe oners have already secured the
approval of their supersedeas bond, set aside the order to stay execu on.
In spite of the receipt by the pe oners of the no ce of writ of execu on, they nevertheless
entered the land to gather palay which was pending harvest. The CA found them guilty of
contempt of court. Hence, this appeal.
  
ISSUE:  WON the ac ons of pe oner in entering the land to gather palay despite the order of
execu on was jus fied.
  
HELD: YES.  constructed on a coconut land is not necessary. It is only useful.
The rice found on the disputed land at the me of the service of the order of execu on ha been
planted by pe oners, who appear to be in possession of the land before issuance of such order.
While the court ordered pe oners to move out from the premises, it did not prohibit them from
gathering the crop then exis ng thereon. Under the law a person who is in possession and who is
being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest, has the right
to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Art. 545 if the Civil Code.
As the order of execu on did not expressly prohibit the pe oner from gathering the pending
fruits, which fruits were the result of their possession and cul va on of the land, it cannot be said
that the pe oners commi ed an act which is in clear viola on of the courts order.
Their act in harves ng the pending fruits was not only jus fied by law but was not expressly
prohibited by the court’s order, and was even ra fied when the court ordered the suspension of
the execu on. There was, therefore, no open, clear, contumacious refusal to obey a definite order
of the court such as would cons tute contempt.
A person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from taking
with him his own effects and possession, unless there is an express prohibi on to this effect. No
such prohibi on was contained in the order for the pe oners to leave the land. Pe on
GRANTED.
 
 
Useful  expense  is  defined  as  that  which  increases  the  value  or  augments  the  income  of  the 
property,  as  compared  to  a  necessary  expense,  which  is  incurred  for  the  preservation  of  the 
thing. 
● To  allow  a  vendee  a  retro  of  a  homestead,  however,  the  right  of  retention  until  payment  of 
useful  expenses  is  made  by  the  redemptioner  would  be  to  render  nugatory  the  right  of 
repurchase  granted  by  law  to  a  homesteader  because  all  a  vendee  a  retro  can  do  to  prevent 
repurchase  is  to  build  something  on  the  homestead  beyond  the  capacity  to  pay  of  the 
homesteader who seeks to repurchase. 
FACTS:  Calagan and his wife Takura was granted a homestead applica on over a parcel of land.
Takura died and was survived by her husband and their children. On August 8, 1961, Mangulon
and his daughter, Paula sold a por on of 9,230 square meters of their homestead to private
respondent, Petra Sandoval in considera on of the sum of P2,340.00.
Therea er, Calagan offered to repurchase the land but Sandoval didn't agree. She con nuously
refused and was only willing to comply if Calagan  would  reimburse  the  value  of  the  house 
constructed  on  the  parcel  of  land. This prompted pe oners to file an ac on for reconveyance,
on which the trial court ruled in their favor, given that they pay for the value of the house built on
good faith by Sandoval.
CFI ordered the Heirs of Calagan to pay Sandoval the the value of the house constructed in “good
faith”. The heirs argue that only necessary expenses are subject to reimbursement. House
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs must reimburse Sandoval for the house?
HELD: NO.  
Under Ar cle 1616, the vendor a retro cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without
returning to the vendee the price of the sale, the expenses of the contract and other legi mate
payments, and the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. Article 1616 should be 
read with Article 456 and 457. 
Applying Ar cle 547, the homesteader desiring to repurchase should be given the op on to
require the vendee a retro to remove the useful improvements on the land subject of the sale a
retro, which op on is not granted the vendor a retro under Ar cle 1616. Under  the  latter  Article 
(1616),  the  vendor  a  retro  must  pay  for  the  useful  improvements  introduced  by  the  vendee  a  retro, 
otherwise, the latter may retain possession of the property until reimbursement is made. 
HOWEVER  To  allow  a  vendee  a  retro  of  a  homestead,  however,  the  right  of  retention  until 
payment  of  useful  expenses  is  made  by the redemptioner would be to render nugatory the right 
of  repurchase  granted  by  law  to  a  homesteader  because  all  a  vendee  a  retro  can  do to prevent 
repurchase  is  to  build  something  on  the  homestead  beyond  the  capacity  to  pay  of  the 
homesteader who seeks to repurchase.
It is obvious that the heirs of Calagan are not exercising the op on to refund the amount of the
expenses incurred by private respondent for the house that the la er built as provided for in
Ar cle 546. (Sandoval, as the vendee a retro, may remove her house since this can be done
without damage to the principal thing – land)
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 6 
In other words, since the heirs didn't exercise the op on to refund the amount of the expenses
incurred by Sandoval for the house he built, and not to pay the increase in value acquired by the (13) JOSE AZNAR v. RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO 
land by reason of such expenses… Sandoval  may  remove  her  house  since  this  can  be  done  March 31, 1965 | Regala, J. 
without  damage. The heirs should not, as opined by the trial Court, be made to refund the value DOCTRINE:  Art.  559  should  be  applied in this case. The rule is that if the owner has lost the thing, or if he 
of that house to Sandoval. has  been  unlawfully  deprived  of  it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but 
also  from  the  third  person  who  may  have  acquired  it  in  good  faith  from  such  finder,  thief  or  robber.  The 
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified by elimina ng that por on said  article  establishes  two  exceptions  to  the  general  rule of irrevindicability: when the owner (1) has lost 
requiring pe oners to pay private respondent the amount of P3,000.00 represen ng the value the  thing,  or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing 
of the house constructed by her. Private respondent, however, is given the right to remove her as  against  the  owner,  who  may  recover  it  without  paying  any  indemnity,  except  when  the  possessor 
house without damage to the land on which it is built. In all other respects, the judgment of the acquired it in a public sale. 
trial Court is affirmed.   
FACTS: Santos adver sed in 2 metropolitan papers the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500. One
(12) JOSE CRUZ v. REYNALDO PAHATI et. al. a ernoon, a certain L. De Dios went to the Santos residence and talked to Irineo Santos (son)
April 13, 1956 | Bau sta Angelo, J.  saying his uncle, Vicente Marella, was interested to buy the adver sed car.

DOCTRINE:  Under  Article  559  of  the  new  Civil  Code,  a  person  illegally  deprived  of  any  movable  may  One morning, Ireneo went to Vicente Marella at his given address in Sampaloc, Manila. Ireneo and
recover  it  from  the  person  in  possession  of  the  same  and  the only defense the latter may have is if he has  Marella agreed to buy the car for P14,700 on the understanding that the price would be paid only
acquired  it  in  good  faith  at  a  public  sale,  in  which  case,  the  owner  cannot  obtain  its  return  without  a er the car had been registered in his name. Irineo, Teodoro, and De Dios, went to the office of a
reimbursing the price paid therefor.  certain A y. Jose Padolina where the deed of sale for the car was executed in Marella's favor.

FACTS:  Plain ff Cruz filed an ac on for replevin in the CFI of Manila to recover the possession of
an automobile and certain amount as damages and A y’s fees. Paha admi ed having bought the
automobile from Bulahan, for the sum of 4,900 which he paid in check.
Bulahan claimed that he acquired the automobile from Belizo for value without having any
knowledge of any defect in the tle of the la er; alleged that it is evidenced by a deed of sale
executed; Cruz delivered the automobile to Belizo for resale and to facilitate if he gave the la er a
le er of authority to secure a new cer ficate of registra on and clothed Belizo authority to sell
the automobile.
Lower court found out that the le er delivered to Belizo was falsified and converted into an
authorized deed of sale in favor of Belizo by erasing a por on thereof and adding in its place the
words “sold the above car to Mr. Jesusito Belizo”
ISSUE: Who has a be er right of the car between Cruz and Bulahan?
The Motor Vehicles' Office in Quezon City then registered the car in Marella's name. Santos gave
the registra on papers and a copy of the deed of sale to Irineo, and instructed him not to part
with them un l Marella shall have given the full payment. In Sampaloc, Marella said that the
amount he had on hand then was short by some P2,000 and begged off to be allowed to secure
the shortage from a sister supposedly living somewhere also in Manila.
At the same me, he requested for the registra on papers and the deed of sale from Ireneo on
the pretext that he would like to show them to his lawyers. Ireneo handed over the same to the
la er and thereupon, in the company of L. De Dios and another uniden fied person, proceeded
to the alleged house of Marella's sister.
Once they arrived the alleged sister’s house, Ireneo and De Dios alighted, and a er, it was the last
Ireneo saw of De Dios as well as Marella. Santos alerted the police. That very same a ernoon,
Marella was able to sell the car to Aznar, for P15,000, who bought it in good faith, for a valuable
considera on and without no ce of the defect appertaining to the vendor's tle.

HELD: CRUZ.  Agents of the Philippine Constabulary seized and confiscated the car in consequence of the
One is inevitably led to the conclusion that plain ff has a be er right to the car in ques on than
defendant Bulahan for it cannot be disputed that plain ff had been illegally deprived thereof
because of the ingenious scheme u lized by Belizo to enable him to dispose of it as if he were the
owner thereof. Plain ff therefore can s ll recover the possession of the car even if defendant
Bulahan had acted in good faith in purchasing it from Belizo. Nor can it be pretended that the
conduct of plain ff in giving Belizo a le er to secure the issuance of a new cer ficate of
registra on cons tutes a sufficient defense that would preclude recovery because of the
undisputed fact that le er was falsified and this fact can be clearly seen by a cursory examina on
of the document. If Bulahan had been more diligent he could have seen that the per nent por on
of the le er had been erased which would have placed him on guard to make an inquiry as
regards the authority of Belizo to sell the car. This he failed to do.
report to them by Santos that the said car was unlawfully taken from him. Aznar filed a complaint
for replevin against Captain Yapdiangco, the head of the Philippine Constabulary unit. Claiming
ownership of the vehicle, he prayed for its delivery to him. In the course of the li ga on, Santos
moved and was allowed to intervene by the lower court.
ISSUE: Between Santos and Aznar, who has a be er right to the possession of the car?
HELD: SANTOS. 
Costs against Aznar. Aznar contends Art. 1506 applies, however, under the provision, it is
essen al that the seller should have a voidable tle at least. It is inapplicable where, as in this
case, the seller had no tle at all.

DECISION: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The Court declares plain ff to be
en tled to recover the car in ques on, and orders defendant Jesusito Belizo to pay him the sum
of P5,000 as moral damages, plus P2,000 as a orney's fees. The Court absolves defendants
Bulahan and Paha from the complaint as regards the claim for damages, reserving to Bulahan
whatever ac on he may deem proper to take against Jesusito Belizo. No costs.
Marella did not have any tle to the property under li ga on because the same was never
delivered to him. Under Art. 712, "ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and
transmi ed by law, by dona on, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of
certain contracts, by tradi on."
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 7 
Ownership is not transferred by contract merely but by tradi on or delivery. Contracts only
cons tute tles or rights to the transfer or acquisi on of ownership. Delivery or tradi on is the
mode of accomplishing the same. The car was never delivered to the vendee by the vendor as to
complete or consummate the transfer of ownership by virtue of the contract.
While there was a contract of sale between Marella and Santos, the former, as vendee, took
possession of the subject ma er thereof by stealing the same while it was in the custody of the
la er's son.There is no adequate evidence as to whether Irineo voluntarily delivered the key to
the car to the uniden fied person who went with him and De Dios to the alleged residence of
Marella’s sister.
But even if Irineo did, it was not the delivery contemplated by Art. 712. It would be indisputable
that he turned it over to the uniden fied companion only so that he may drive Irineo and De Dios
to the said residence and not vest the tle to the said vehicle to him as agent of Marella. Art. 712
contemplates that the act be coupled with the intent of delivering the thing.
Art. 559 should be applied in this case. The rule is that if the owner has lost the thing, or if he has
been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or
robber, but also from the third person who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder,
thief or robber.
The said ar cle establishes two excep ons to the general rule of irrevindicability: when the owner
(1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor
cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity,
except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.
(14) CONSUELO DE GARCIA and Anastacio Garcia
v. COURT OF APPEALS and Angelina & Juan Guevara
January 30, 1971 | Fernando, J.  possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price.
DOCTRINE:  One  who  has  been  unlawfully  deprived  of  a  thing,  is  entitled  to  recover  it  from  whoever  is  FACTS:  Respondent Suntay was the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring.  Suntay entered into a
found  in  possession  of  the  same.  The  only  exception  the  law  allows  is  when  there  is  acquisition  in  good  transac on wherein the ring was delivered to a Clarita Sison for sale on commission. 3 days a er
faith  of  the  possessor  at  a  public  sale,  in  which  case  the  owner  cannot  obtain  its  return  without  receipt of said ring, without knowledge of respondent, Sison, through the niece of her husband,
reimbursing the price.  pledged the ring with pe oner’s pawnshop.
FACTS:  Private respondent, Angelina Guevara, sought to recover one (1) lady's diamond ring 18
cts. white gold moun ng, with one (1) 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. total
weight' which she bought on Oct 27, 1947 from R. Rebullida, Inc.
Guevara claimed that on Oct 11, 1953 while talking to Conseulo de Garcia (pe oner), owner of
La Bulakeña restaurant, she recognized her ring in the finger of Garcia and inquired where she
bought it, which the la er answered from her comadre. She explained that the ring was stolen
from her house in Feb, 1952.
Two or three days later, they showed the ring to Mr. Rebullida who examined the ring and
consulted the stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that Guevara bought in
1947. The ring was returned to Garcia who despite wri en request failed to deliver the ring.
Guevara lost in the lower court but the CA reversed the lower court’s decision. The CA ordered
Garcia to return Guevara’s ring or fact value of P1,000.00 and costs, as well as a orney’s fee and
exemplary damages.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in their decision to give back the ring to Guevara?
HELD: YES. 
The controlling provision is Ar cle 559. One who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a
movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in
ques on, was en tled to recover it from pe oner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in
possession of the same. The only excep on the law allows is when there is acquisi on in good
faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price.
Art. 559 is only a presump ve tle sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisi ve prescrip on, that
the clause immediately following provides that 'one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.' As stated
by the Honorable Jus ce Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court in So o vs. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz.
5075, Dec. 1947: 'Ar cle 559 in fact assumes that possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is
obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire indefeasible tle by, let us say, adverse
possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal depriva on could avail the former
owner of the cha el. He would no longer be en tled to recover it under any condi on.'
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 6, 1962 is
hereby affirmed. With costs.
(15) DOMINADOR DIZON v. LOURDES SUNTAY 
September 29, 1972 | Fernando, J. 
DOCTRINE:  The  owner  of  a  personal  property,  having  been  unlawfully  deprived,  is  entitled  to  recover  it 
from  the  possessor.  The  only  exception  the  law  allows  is  when  there  is  acquisition  on  good  faith  of  the 
 
Sison eventually delivered the pawnshop cket to respondent. Respondent filed the present
ac on against pe oner with the CFI for the recovery of said ring by way of the provisional
remedy of replevin.
The lower court issued the writ of replevin and rendered judgment declaring that respondent had
the right to the possession of the ring in ques on. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
  
ISSUE: WON lower court’s decision gran ng respondent the right to recover the ring was proper.
  
HELD: YES. 
Art 559 of the Civil Code provide that: “The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a tle. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof may recoer it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a
movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.”
Respondent, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in ques on, was en tled to
recover it from pe oner who was found in possession of the same. The only excep on the law
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 8 
allows is when there is acquisi on on good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price.
The right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good faith in the
acquisi on by the possessor. This right is based on the owner being dispossessed without his
consent.
Pe oner’s conten on invoking the principle of estoppel does not stand. There is clearly the
absence of an act or omission, as a result of which a posi on had been assumed by pe oner,
who if such elements were not lacking, could not therea er in law be prejudiced by his belief in
what had been misrepresented to him.
Furthermore, pe oner is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would
manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a
pledge is en tled to do so. If no such care be take, perhaps because of the difficulty of resis ng
opportunity for profit, he should be the last to complain if therea er the right of the true owner
of such jewelry should be recognized. Pe on DENIED.
(16) EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP. v. Sps. LEONOR & GERARDO SANTOS  a.
(Santos Bookstore) and Court of Appeals
April 26, 1990 | Cruz, J.  c.
DOCTRINE:  Possession  of  movable  property  acquired  in  GF  is  equivalent  to  title.  There  is  no  need  to  FACTS:  A person represen ng himself to be Jojo Consunji, purchased, purchased purportedly for
produce a receipt.  his father, 2 brand new motor vehicles from Ci wide Motors Inc., a) Isuzu Gemini 2-door valued
FACTS:  EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz (who will later turn out
to be an impostor) who ordered these by telephone, which was agreed to be payable on delivery.
The books were subsequently delivered to him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with a
personal check.  Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verifica on,
and was then showed the invoice for the books.
EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books even before his check cleared.
Upon inves ga on, EDCA found that he wasn’t the person he claimed to be (Dean in DLSU).
EDCA had the police capture Cruz, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in recovery of the
books bought from it. They forced their way inside Santos’ store and seized the books without
any warrant. RTC granted the writ of preliminary a achment.
ISSUE: WON EDCA has been unlawfully deprived of the books they claim to STILL lawfully own?
HELD: NO.   Ledesma claims that he purchased and paid for the subject vehicle in good faith from its
First, the conten on of pe oner that Santos has not established ownership over the disputed
books because they have not even shown the receipt evidencing the purchase, is without merit.
The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title.  
Second, Santos acquired the books in good faith as found by the lower courts. She first
ascertained the ownership and relied on the invoice shown to her by de la Pena. Santos was in
the business of buying and selling books and o en deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to
part with their books at reduced prices. She did not have to go beyond that invoice to sa sfy
herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the
tle of Cruz was presumed under Ar cle 559 by his mere possession of the books, these being
movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy
them.
Third, and on the real issue, on whether Edca had been unlawfully deprived of the books, Edca
argued that the impostor acquired no tle to the books because of the lack of funds in the check
issued and want of considera on. This is without merit. Actual delivery of the books having been
made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a ma er between him and
EDCA and did not impair the tle acquired by the private respondents to the books.
Nonpayment  of  purchase  price  only  gives  rise  to  the  right  to  demand  payment  or  rescission  of 
the  contract.  Actual  delivery  was  made  to  the  impostor  and  thus,  ownership  was  acquired  by 
him.  Non-payment was a ma er privy to him and Edca and doesn't involve Santos who later
acquired the books. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the pe on is
DENIED, with costs against the pe oner.
(17) JAIME LEDESMA v. COURT OF APPEALS and Ci wide Motors Inc.
September 1, 1992 | Davide Jr., J. 
DOCTRINE:  There  are  three  (3)  requisites  to  make  possession  of  movable  property  equivalent  to  title, 
namely:  
the possession should be in good faith; 
b. the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and 
the possession is in the concept of owner. 
at 42,200; b) Holden Premier valued at 58,800.
Ci wide Motors delivered the motor vehicles to Jojo, in turn issued Manager’s check with the
amount of 101K as full payment for the value of the 2 vehicles. When the check was deposited, it
was dishonored by the bank on the ground that it was tampered.
Ci wide reported to the Philippine Constabulary the criminal act perpetrated by the person who
misrepresented himself as Jojo and in the course of inves ga on, Ci wide learned that the real
iden ty of the imposter is Armando Suarez who has a long line of criminal cases against him for
estafa using this similar modus operandi.
Ci wide was able to recover the Holden Premier but the Isuzu Gemini was transferred by
Armando to third persons and was in the possession of one Jaime Ledesma at the me Ci wide
ins tuted this ac on for replevin.
registered owner, one Pedro Neyra, as evidenced by the Land Transporta on Commission
Registra on
ISSUE: WON CA erred in applying ART 559 in the case despite the fact that Ci wide was not
unlawfully deprived of the subject car, as in fact Ci wide voluntarily parted with the tle and
possession
HELD: YES. 
There was a perfected uncondi onal contract of sale between private respondent and the original
vendee. The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the cer ficate of registra on of the vehicle
in the name of the first vendee — even if the said vendee was represented by someone who used
a fic ous name — and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the cer ficate of registra on to
the vendee's alleged representa ve. Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the vendee. The
subsequent dishonor of the check because of the altera on merely amounted to a failure of
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 9 
considera on which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced
party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract, and to prosecute the impostor
for estafa under Ar cle 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of 22
September 1988 and its Resolu on of 12 December 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 05955 are hereby
SET ASIDE and the Decision of the trial court of 3 September 1979 and its Final Order of 26 June
1980 in Civil Case No. Q-24200 are hereby REINSTATED, with costs against private respondent
Ci wide Motors, Inc.
case must first be finally disposed of before res tu on of the goods swindled can be ordered
returned to the owner.
The delivery to the MPD was by virtue of the order of the court, because the said sheets were
the subject of or are the instruments of the commission of the crime of estafa, and the court had
the power to order the return thereof to the owner a er it had sa sfied itself of the ownership
thereof by the offended party.
ISSUE: Whether Chua has the right to retain possession

HELD: YES. 
(18) CHUA HAI v. Hon. RUPERTO KAPUNAN Jr. and Ong Shu The case is meritorious, since Chua Hai’s good faith is not ques oned. To deprive the possessor in
June 30, 1958 | Reyes JBL, J.  good faith, even temporarily and provisionally, of the cha els possessed, violates the rule of Art.
DOCTRINES:  559. Possession of cha els in good faith is equivalent to tle; i.e., that for all intents and
● That  the  acquirer  and  possessor in good faith, of a chattel or movable property is entitled to be  purposes, the possessor is the owner, un l ordered by the proper court to restore the thing to the
respected  and  protected  in  his  possession,  as  if  he  were  the  true  owner  thereof,  until  a  one who was illegally deprived thereof.
competent court rules otherwise; 
● That  being  considered,  in  the  meantime,  as the true owner, the possessor in good faith can not  Un l such decree is rendered (and it can not be rendered in a criminal proceeding in which the
be  compelled  to  surrender  possession  nor  to  be required to institute an action for the recovery  possessor is not a party), the possessor, as presump ve owner, is en tled to hold and enjoy the
of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor;  thing; and "every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be
● That  the filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa  disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established
from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the  by the laws and the Rules of Court" (Art. 539).
possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor; and 
● That  the  judge  taking  cognizance  of  the  criminal  case  against  the  vendor  of  the  possessor  in  The CFI decision, instead of conforming to Arts. 559 and 539, directs the possessor to surrender
good  faith  has  no  right  to  interfere  with  the  possession  of  the  latter,  who  is not a party to the  the cha el to the claimant Ong Shu before the la er has proved that he was illegally deprived
criminal  proceedings,  and  such  unwarranted  interference is not made justifiable by requiring a  thereof, without taking into account that the mere filing of a criminal ac on for estafa is no proof
bond to answer for damages caused to the possessor.  that estafa was in fact commi ed. Instead of regarding the possessor as the owner of the cha el
   un l illegal depriva on is shown, the CFI regarded the possessor of the cha el not as an owner,
FACTS:  Roberto Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware, owned by Ong Shu, 700 corrugated but as a usurper, and compels him to surrender possession even before the illegal depriva on is
galvanized iron sheets and 249 pieces of round iron bar for P6,137.70. Soto issued a check drawn proved. We see no warrant for such a reversal of legal rules.
against Security Bank for P7,000. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. Soto sold 165 sheets in Pangasinan and 535 sheets in Calapan, It cannot be assumed that Ong Shu is s ll the owner of the property. To do so it take for granted
Mindoro. Of those sold in Pangasinan, 100 were sold to pe oner Chua Hai. that the estafa was in fact commi ed, when so far, the trial on the merits has not even started,
and the presump on of innocence holds full sway.
When the case was led in CFI Manila against Roberto Soto, for estafa, the offended party led a
pe on asking that the 700 galvanized iron sheets, which were deposited with the Manila Police The civil liability of the offender to make res tu on, under RPC 105, does not arise un l his
Department, be returned to him, as owner of the Youngstown Hardware. Chua Hai opposed the criminal liability is finally declared, since the former is a consequence of the la er. RPC 105
mo on with respect to the 100 sheets that he had bought from Soto. But, the court ordered the therefore, can not be invoked to jus fy the CFI order since that very ar cle recognizes the tle of
return of the galvanized iron sheets to Ong Shu. an innocent purchaser. “This  provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by 
the third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.” 
Chua Hai then said that the return to Ong Shu amounted to a depriva on of his property without
due process of law. It is also claimed that RPC 105, under whose authority the return was It is not denied that Ong Shu delivered the sheets to Solo upon a perfected contract of sale, and
ordered, can be invoked only a er the termina on of the criminal case and not while said criminal such delivery transferred tle or ownership to the purchaser. Un l the contract of Ong Shu with
case is s ll pending trial. Soto is set aside by a competent court (assuming that the fraud is established to its sa sfac on),
the validity of appellant's claim to the property in ques on can not be disputed, and his right to
In answer to the pe on, it is claimed that as Ong Shu is the owner of the property, he has the the possession thereof should be respected.
right to recover possession thereof even if said property appears to have fallen into the
possession of a third party who acquired it by legal means and that even if the property was DECISION:  Writ of cer orari granted. CFI order in criminal case is revoked. Costs against Ong
acquired in good faith, the owner who has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from Shu.
the person in possession of the same unless a person in possession acquired it in good faith at a
public sale. (Art. 559).

It is also claimed that under RPC 105, the galvanized iron sheets in ques on should be returned
to the offended party, the owner, and that there is no provision of law requiring that the criminal
Property | Week 9 Cases | Page 10