[ G.R. No.

L-27360, February 28, 1968 ]

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, AS CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA,
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
PEDRO PACIS, AS COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE PORT OF
MANILA, AND MARTIN ALAGAO, AS PATROLMAN OF THE
MANILA POLICE-DEPARTMENT, PETITIONERS VS. REMEDIOS
MAGO AND HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 23, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ZALDIVAR. J.:

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction,
filed by RicardoTapa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan Ponce Enrile, Commissioner of
Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin
Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago and
Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in
Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7,
1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized
and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and
Customs Code, but which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to
prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in
said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing,
enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and
from proceeding with said case.

Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to
the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the
trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966,
elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted
them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of
nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to
the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No.
147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido
Naguit.

Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks
and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary
injunction," docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that
Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from
the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks
owned by Valentin B. Lanopa to transport the goods from said place to her
residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by
members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a
competent court; that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of
counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained
therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had
illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no
longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the
goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and undervalued, were not
subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because
Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they
were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of
Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the
disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their constitutional rights would
be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence Remedios Mago
and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte,
enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their agents, from
opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return
of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary
damages in their favor.

On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex

parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the
instant case before this Court — from opening the nine bales in question, and at the
same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November
16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners,
some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in
the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and
a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.

Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in
Civil Case No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro
Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department.
Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer
with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the
alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of
their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the
case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that,
assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause
of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative
remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs
had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges thereon
had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had the
power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and that the
persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could
effect searches, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the
enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be
granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she
prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure
proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of
Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court
below for the lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.

At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the
parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the
presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of
Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On
December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the
contents of the nine bales.

Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex

parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods
seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be
released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond
that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods
in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of
the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore,
subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on
January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against
the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and
the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded
against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector
of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to
P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an
urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the
goods.

On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to
herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
1*40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding
bond.

On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond,
upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of
the seizure proceedings.

Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and
alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners allege, among
others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release
to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1)
the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no
jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action,
in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to
exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the
Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agents in
not collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the
release of the goods was grossly insufficient. In due time, the respondents filed
their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their
answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction
of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No.
67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case
No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure and identification proceedings against
the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2)
that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the
corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs
premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that
respondent Remedios Mago is a purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so
that those goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4)
that the seizure of the goods was effected by members of the Manila Police
Department at a place outside the control and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
and effected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5)
that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of
Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the
seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are
not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute
the present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they
would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer
for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that the
bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.

The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had
acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in
question.

The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1)
to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles,, and all other dues,
fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2)
to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to
enforce tariff and customs laws.[1] The goods in question were imported from
Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry."[2] As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported
goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Importation is
deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges
upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted.[3] The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and
other charges must be in full.[4]

The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the
manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General[5] wherein it is stated that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case
amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau
of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as
shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and
the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and
inventory,[6] shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably
to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and
receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters,
whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale
No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors;
in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there
were in bale No. 2 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white)
and 120 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320
dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of
men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were 224
dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale
No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles
contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under
Section 2530, pars, e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected
contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture,[7] and that goods released contrary to law
are subject to seizure and forfeiture.[8]

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought

out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same,
nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November
4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and
orders of their Chief, Ricardo G. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the
Commissioner of Customs,[9] the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and
custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon
the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon
which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid,
and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were
under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the
petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of
seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.

The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.
R. No. L-24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to
the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of
Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles
and rags, valued at "P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the
port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-
island vessel. When the goods were about to leave the customs premises in Manila,
on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and
upon examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the
cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial subsequently
demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it
is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a- local purchase was involved so
the Bureau of Customs:: had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods
came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the
Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to
compel said customs authorities to release the goods.

Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of
Customs had no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to
the port of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and taxes because the
transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands of
the importer nor subject to said importer's control, nor were the goods imported
contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the
importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs
of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On
December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as
respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The court of first instance held resolution on the
motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14,
1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of preventive and
mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of
P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the
lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their
motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12,
1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon
the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said
customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In resolving the question
raised in that case, this Court held:

"This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to
seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceeding against them? and (2) has the
Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel
the Customs authorities to release the goods?
"Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of First
Instance was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs
warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12, 1964), the Customs bureau
should yield to the jurisdiction of the said court.

"The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on
October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of
the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and
taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs
released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly
from the Cebu Port (Petition, Annex 'L'). As to goods imported illegally or released
irregularly from Customs custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530
m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).

"The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others, to collect
revenues from imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and
other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602,
Republic Act 1957).

"The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should
they be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City,
they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.

"Said proceedings should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses
therein (Pads v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966). From the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in
Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act 1125. To permit
recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would
in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff
Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate
jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937
and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon
the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in
nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is
a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the
Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities."

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive
jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs
laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if
no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case,
the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966,
and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods
for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion
of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila
have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had
issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. [10] And so, it
cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only
an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over
the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so
there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction
over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police
Department, could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This
contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo
G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could,
for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches,
seizures, and arrests,[11] and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any
cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to
forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. [12] He could
lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever
found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable
articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid.[13] It cannot be doubted, therefore, that
petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search
and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him
to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the
latter has the legal duty to render said assistance.[14] This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and
seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the
Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the
interception of the cargo.[15]

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the
seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and
Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases.[16] But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge
or justice of the peace . . ."[17]It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the
case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under
the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.

Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790,
799, wherein the court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the
Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as follows:

"Thus, contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the
first Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference
made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture,
when concealed in a dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course of
transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where they readily could be put
out of reach of a search warrant. . .."

"Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L. 231, 232, chap.
94), it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels
within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search, and examine any
vehicle, beast, or person on which or whom they should suspect there was
merchandise which was subject to duty or had been introduced into the United
States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the
vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or
merchandise thereon, which they had probable cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle
or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3
Stat. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865,
revived §2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The
substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18,
1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised
Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither
§ 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by
this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U. S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2
Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. "...
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion
policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and
their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition, in the court below
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search.
[18]
 All that they complained of was,

"That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search
warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police, where they were
detained."

But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search
warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thus, it has been held that:

"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as

recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it
is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." (47 Am.
Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S., 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45
S. Ct, 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27
A.L.R., 686.)

In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the
question raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an
automobile could be searched without search warrant or other process and the
goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the
prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the
constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court
said:

". .. Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and
seizure without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only 'unreasonable' search
and seizure is forbidden. . .

". . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the. language of

the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining
whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it
is made must be looked to.

"The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has
multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in
battalions, until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted
individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in
immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they
furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach
and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public
places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called
"bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which is itself is no small matter. While a possession
in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private
premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure
without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to
facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity,
and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an
automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view
of all the circumstances under which it is made."

Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department
of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau
of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the
present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to
discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;

(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of
respondent Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio,. dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction is sued by this Court on March
31, 1967 restraining re spondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or imple
menting his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila; and
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs. It is so
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 138081, March 30, 2000 ]
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC) AND THE ECONOMIC
INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU (EIIB),
PETITIONERS, VS. NELSON OGARIO AND MARK
MONTELIBANO, RESPONDENTS.D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

The question for decision in this case is whether the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction to enjoin forfeiture proceedings in the Bureau of Customs.  In
accordance with what is now settled law, we hold it does not.

The facts are as follows: On December 9, 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District

Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention [1] of
25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped
on board the M/V "Alberto," which was then docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The
warrant was issued on the basis of the report of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been illegally imported.
The report stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then
placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to
Cebu City on board the vessel M/V "Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings were started in
the customs office in Cebu, docketed as Cebu Seizure Identification Case No. 17-
98.

On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks
of rice, and his buyer, respondent Elson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction
(Civil Case No. CEB-23077) in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, alleging:

4.) That upon arrival of the herein-mentioned sacks of rice at the PIER 5 of Cebu
City, Philippines on the 7th day of December 1998 all of the defendants rushed to
the port with long arms commanding the plaintiff's laborer[s] to stopped [sic] the
unloading of the same from the vessel named M/V Alberto. The defendants alleged
that the herein-mentioned rice were [sic] smuggled from abroad without even proof
that the same were [sic] purchased from a particular country.

5.) By the mere suspicion of the defendants that the goods were smuggled from
abroad, they immediately put on hold the release of the goods from the ship and at
the same time they jointly barred unloading and loading activities of the plaintiffs'
laborers of the herein-mentioned rice.

6.) The plaintiffs then presented all the pertinent and necessary documents to all of
the defendants but the latter refused to believe that the same is from Palawan
because their minds are closed due to some reason or another [while] the plaintiffs
believed that the same is merely an act of harassment. The documents are as
follows: Jjjä uris

A.) Certification from the National Food Authority that the same is from Palawan.
This is hereto attached as Annex A.

B.) Bill of Lading issued by ANMA PHILIPPINES Shipping Company. This is hereto
attached as Annex B.

7.) The acts of the defendants in stopping the loading and unloading activities of
the plaintiff's laborers [have] no basis in law and in fact; thus, unlawful and illegal.
A mere suspicion which is not coupled with any proof or evidence to that effect is
[a] matter which the law prohibits.

8.) That for more than three days and despite the repeated plea of the plaintiffs
that their goods should be released to them and the defendants should stop from
barring the unloading and loading activities, the latter blindly refused [to] heed the
same.

9.) That the acts of all of the defendants which are greatly unlawful and erroneous
would caused [sic] irreparable damage, injury, and grave injustice to the plaintiffs.

10.) That by way of example or correction for the public good and to deter the
defendants from doing the same acts to other businessmen, defendants should be
held liable for exemplary damages in the amount of not less than One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

11.) That the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed in this complaint and the
whole or part of such reliefs consist in restraining perpetually the defendants from
holding the herein-mentioned twenty-five thousand sacks of rice. That defendants
should be restrained perpetually from barring the unloading and loading activities of
the plaintiffs' laborers.

12.) That allowing the defendants to continue their unlawful acts would work grave
injustice to the plaintiffs. Unless a preliminary injunction be granted ex-parte, grave
and irreparable injury and damage would result to the plaintiffs before the latter
can be heard on notice.
13.) That if the defendants be not restrained perpetually from their unlawful acts,
the herein-mentioned rice will deteriorate and turn into dusts [sic] if not properly
disposed.

14.) That a Warrant of Seizure and detention issued by the Collector of Custom[s]

dated December 9, 1998 be quashed because the defendants' act of seizing and
detaining the herein-mentioned sacks of rice are illegal.   The continuing act of
detaining the herein-mentioned sacks of rice will lead to the deterioration of the
same.  That no public auction sale of the same should be conducted by the Bureau
of Custom[s] or any government agenc[y].

15.) That plaintiffs are ready and willing to file a bond executed to the defendants
in an amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court to the effect that plaintiffs will pay
to the defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if
this Honorable Court should finally decide that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Premised on the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed before this

Honorable Court that a restraining order or temporary injunction be immediately
issued prohibiting the defendants from holding plaintiffs' above-mentioned goods.
That it is further prayed that a restraining order or temporary injunction be issued
prohibiting the defendants from barring the unloading and loading activities of the
plaintiffs' laborers. Further, the plaintiffs prayed that the warrant of seizure and
detention issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated December 9, 1998 be quashed
and no public auction sale of the same should be conducted by any government
agency or authority.

It is further prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered:

1.) Making the restraining order and/or preliminary injunction permanent.

2.) Ordering the defendants jointly to pay exemplary or corrective damages to the
plaintiff[s] in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)

Such other relief which are just and demandable under the circumstances are also
prayed for.[2]

In separate motions, petitioners Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu [3] and the
EIIB, as well as the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, sought the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction, but their motions were
denied. In its resolution, dated January 11, 1999, the RTC said:

The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs cannot
divest this court of jurisdiction since its issuance is without legal basis as it was
anchored merely on suspicion that the items in question were imported or
smuggled.  It is very clear that the defendants are bereft of any evidence to prove
that the goods were indeed imported or smuggled, that is why the plaintiffs have
very vigorously protested against the seizure of cargoes by the defendants. In fact,
as revealed by defendants' counsel, the Warrant of Seizure and Detention was
issued merely to shift the burden of proof to the shippers or owners of the goods to
prove that the bags of rice were not imported or smuggled.  However, the court
feels this is unfair because the settled rule is that he who alleges must prove the
same. Besides, at this time when our economy is not good, it would be a
[dis]service to the nation to use the strong arm of the law to make things hard or
difficult for the businessmen.[4]

The 25,000 bags of rice were ordered returned to respondents upon the posting by
them of an P8,000,000.00 bond.

Petitioners BOC and EIIB moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied
by the RTC in its order dated January 25, 1999. [5] In the same order, the RTC also
increased the amount of respondents' bond to P22,500,000.00. On certiorari to the
Court of Appeals, the resolution and order of the RTC were sustained. [6]

Accordingly, on April 26, 1999, upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the
sheriff to place in respondents' possession the 25,000 bags of rice.

Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of Cebu

(Cebu Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98), a decision was rendered, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, it is hereby ordered

and decreed that the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the 25,000 bags of rice brand
"Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks bearing Plate Nos. GCC 844 and GHZ 388 are
all FORFEITED in favor of the government to be disposed of in the manner
prescribed by law while the seven (7) trucks bearing Plate Nos. GFX 557; GFX 247;
TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 are RELEASED in favor of their
respective owners upon proper identification and compliance with pertinent laws,
rules and regulations.

Since this decision involves the release of some of the articles subject matter of
herein case which is considered adverse to the government, the same is hereby
elevated to the Commissioner of Customs for automatic review pursuant to
Republic Act 7651.[7]

The District Collector of Customs found "strong reliable, and convincing evidence"
that the 25,000 bags of rice were smuggled. Said evidence consisted of
certifications by the Philippine Coast Guard, the Philippine Ports Authority, and the
Arrastre Stevedoring Office in Palawan that M/V "Alberto" had never docked in
Palawan since November, 1998; a certification by Officer-in-Charge Elenita Ganelo
of the National Food Authority (NFA) Palawan that her signature in NFA Grains
Permit Control No. 00986, attesting that the 25,000 bags of rice originated from
Palawan, was forged; and the result of the laboratory analysis of a sample of the
subject rice by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) stating that the
sample "does not compare with any of our IRRI released varieties."

Respondent Montelibano did not take part in the proceedings before the District
Collector of Customs despite due notice sent to his counsel because he refused to
recognize the validity of the forfeiture proceedings. [8]

On April 30, 1999, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated April 15, 1999, upholding the resolution
of the RTC denying petitioners' motions to dismiss. They contend that:

I. SINCE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY DOES NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INSTANT
CONTROVERSY, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS HAD ALREADY EXERCISED
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME, THE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE EXERCISE BY THE TRIAL
JUDGE OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW AND IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL JUDGE'S RESOLUTION DATED JANUARY 11, 1999 AND ORDER DATED
JANUARY 25, 1999 IN CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-23077.

II. SINCE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT EXHAUSTED ALL THE ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DENIALS OF PETITIONERS'
SEPARATE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION. [9]

In Jao v. Court of Appeals,[10] this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line of cases,
said:

There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to
pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted
by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these
proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded
from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus.

It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and
that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating
the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation
of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions
of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose
decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.

The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is
anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's
drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more
importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export
duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it
has been instituted to perform.

Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be
proven, we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of
jurisdiction thereon.

Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular courts still
retain jurisdiction "where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause, there is
serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs jurisdiction
through seizure/forfeiture proceedings." [11] They overlook the fact, however, that
under the law, the question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the
subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs
authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on
board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad
before they may exercise the power to effect customs' searches, seizures, or
arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative hearings.[12] As the
Court held in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya:[13]

The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with

exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive
competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said
is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may
oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court
of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the above
decisions the law has not seen fit to do so.  The proceeding before the Collector of
Customs is not final.  An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter
to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate
petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus
indicated.  Certainly a court of first instance is not therein included. It is devoid of
jurisdiction.

It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate issuance of writs of injunction,

the Supreme Court issued on June 25, 1999 Administrative Circular No. 07-99 to all
judges of lower courts entitled re: exercise of utmost caution, prudence, and
judiciousness in issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction. The circular states in part:

Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in Mison v.
Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y express provision of law, amply
supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot
interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught."

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is immediately
disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby enjoined.

WHEREFORE, the temporary restraining order issued on May 17, 1999 is hereby
made permanent. The decision, dated April 15, 1999, of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and Civil Case No. CEB-23077 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,
Cebu City is DISMISSED.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 147817, August 12, 2004 ]
FELICISIMO RIETA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime. It may be proven
by the credible testimonies of witnesses, not necessarily by physical evidence. In-
court identification of the offender is not essential, as long as the identity of the
accused is determined with certainty by relevant evidence. In the present case,
there is no doubt that petitioner was the same person apprehended by the
authorities and mentioned in the Information. His possession of the smuggled
cigarettes carried the prima facie presumption that he was engaged in smuggling.
Having failed to rebut this presumption, he may thus be convicted of the crime
charged.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to

set aside the December 22, 2000 Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CR No. 17338. The CA affirmed with modification the February 18, 1994
Consolidated Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[4] of Manila (Branch 46)
in Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VI-137(79) and CCC-VI-138(79), finding Felicisimo Rieta
guilty of smuggling. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(a) The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the trial court finding Felicisimo Rieta,
Arturo Rimorin, Pacifico Teruel and Carmelo Manaois GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime charged.

(b) Appellants Ernesto Miaco, Guillermo Ferrer, Fidel Balita, Robartolo Alincastre
and Ernesto de Castro are ACQUITTED as recommended by the Solicitor
General.”[5]

Reconsideration was denied in the April 16, 2001 CA Resolution, [6] which petitioner
also assails.

Petitioner and his six co-accused -- Arturo Rimorin, Fidel Balita, Gonzalo Vargas,
Robartolo Alincastre, Guillermo Ferrer and Ernesto Miaco -- were charged in an
Information, which reads:

“That on or about October 15, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with the
evident intent to defraud the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the
legitimate duties accruing to it from merchandise imported into this country, did
then and there [willfully], unlawfully [and] fraudulently import or bring into the
Philippines or assist in so doing contrary to law, three hundred five (305) cases of
assorted brands of blue seal cigarettes which are foreign articles valued at
P513,663.47 including duties and taxes, and/or buy, sell, transport or assist and
facilitate the buying, selling and transporting of the above-named foreign articles
after importation knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law which
was found in the possession of said accused and under their control which articles
said accused fully well knew have not been properly declared and that the duties
and specific taxes thereon have not been paid to the proper authorities in violation
of said Sec. 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 34, in relation to Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of
the National Internal Revenue Code.”[7]

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution (Respondent)

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)[8] presents the prosecution’s version of the
facts as follows:

“On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, the[n] Chief of the Police Intelligence
Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group (MISG for brevity),
received information that certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling
activities somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further revealed that the activities
[were being] done at nighttime and the smuggled goods in a delivery panel and
delivery truck [were] being escorted by some police and military personnel. He
fielded three surveillance stake-out teams the following night along Roxas
Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they were to watch out
for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of
it. On the basis of his investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck was
registered in the name of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City.

“At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his
men returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the immediate
vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per
information given to him, the said cargo truck will come out from the premises of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment. COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime
Battalion. The night watch lasted till the wee hours of the following morning. About
3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2 nd COSAC Detachment. It
returned before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same day.

“At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o’clock that morning, a green cargo truck with
Plate No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and
escorted closely by a light brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with
4 men on board. At that time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information
whatsoever about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his men to intercept only
the cargo truck. The cargo truck was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the
Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn towards the
North, unlike the cargo truck [that] was going south. Almost by impulse, Col.
Lacson’s car also made a U-turn and gave chase to the speeding Toyota car, which
was running between 100 KPH to 120 KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The
chase lasted for less than 5 minutes until said car made a stop along Bonifacio
Drive, at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car and
they found several firearms, particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistols and one (1)
armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of
the Toyota car, and his companions inside the car were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt.
Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, [all] belonging to the 2 nd COSAC
Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission orders.

“When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue
seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside. The cargo truck driver known only as
‘Boy’ was able to escape while the other passengers or riders of said truck were
apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat.
Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.
 “x x x x x x x x x

“Lacson’s men hauled the intercepted vehicles, the arrested men and confiscated
goods to Camp Crame, Quezon City. All the 371 cases (305 + 66) of blue seal
cigarettes were turned over to the Bureau of Customs. Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
executed an Affidavit of Arrest together with Arnel Acuba. The Booking and
Information Sheet of Ernesto de Castro showed that he was arrested by the MISG
after delivering assorted blue seal cigarettes at 185 Sanciangco St., Tonsuya,
Malabon.”[9]
Version of the Defense (Petitioner)

Petitioner, on the other hand, denied any knowledge of the alleged smuggling of
the blue-seal cigarettes. He sets forth his version of the facts as follows:

“Petitioner Rieta testified that he was a policeman assigned at Kawit Cavite. In the
early morning of October 15, 1979, he was in Manila together with Boy. He met Boy
in 1978 when the latter figured in a vehicular accident in Kawit, Cavite. x x x After
a week, Boy visited him at the Kawit Police Station and thereafter, met him four to
five times. He learned that Boy was a businessman hauling slippers, fish and
vegetables from Divisoria. For several times, he had accompanied Boy on his
business trips when [the latter] hauled fish, vegetables and slippers from Divisoria
to Cavite. He was requested by Boy to accompany him on his various trips because
there were times when policemen on patrol were demanding money from [the
latter]. At other times, other policemen accompanied Boy aside from him, on his
trips.

“In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he met Boy in front of the Kawit Town
Hall. He learned that Boy will haul household appliances from Divisoria. They
boarded a jeep driven by Boy and they proceeded to Cartimar, Pasay City. At
Cartimar, Boy left him at a gasoline station, and told him to standby because Boy
will get the cargo truck they will use. When Boy returned, he had companions, who
were introduced to him as Gonzalo Vargas and Sgt. Rimorin, the petitioner’s co-
accused in Criminal Case No. CC-VI-138 (79). From Cartimar, the four (4) of them
proceeded to Divisoria and they passed under the Del Pan Bridge. While passing
therein, he told Boy that he was hungry, so that when they passed by a small
restaurant, he alighted and Sgt. Rimorin followed. Boy told them that he and
Gonzalo will proceed to the Port Area and will be back. After thirty to forty five
minutes, Boy and Gonzalo returned, and he and Sgt. Rimorin boarded the truck and
proceeded to Roxas Boulevard. While they were along Roxas Boulevard near the
Daily Express Building, two (2) vehicles intercepted them and ordered them to pull-
over. The passengers of the said vehicles introduced themselves as Metrocom
soldiers, and ordered them to alight and to raise their hands while poking guns at
them. They were ordered to l[ie down] flat on their belly on the pavement and were
bodily frisked and searched. The Metrocom soldiers did not find anything from their
bodies. Thereafter, they (Rieta, Rimorin and Gonzalo) were ordered by the
Metrocom soldiers to transfer to a jeep. While they were aboard the jeep, he
overheard from the Metrocom soldiers that their driver was able to escape.
Likewise, they were also informed by the Metrocom soldiers that the cargo truck
was loaded with blue seal cigarettes. The cargo truck was not opened in their
presence, nor were the contents thereof shown to them upon their apprehension.
From the time he boarded the cargo truck in Cartimar until he and Sgt. Rimorin
alighted to take their snacks, up to the time they were apprehended by the
Metrocom soldiers, he had not seen a pack of blue cigarette in the cargo truck. He
did not notice whether the Metrocom soldiers opened the cargo truck. At Camp
Crame, he was investigated without the benefit of counsel, but, nonetheless, he
executed and signed a statement because as far as he was concerned he has done
nothing wrong. He was detained at Bicutan for more than a year.

“In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he was not carrying any firearm because
he has no mission order to do so, and besides Manila was not his jurisdiction. He
was suspended from the service, but was reinstated in January 1981. After he was
released from Bicutan, he looked for Boy so that he could clear the matter, but he
[did not find] Boy anymore.

“In corroboration with the testimony of petitioner Rieta, accused Rimorin, a

policeman assigned at Pasay City, testified that the first time he met Boy was in
1978 in the wake and internment of the Late Police Officer Ricardo Escobal.
Thereafter, Boy dropped by on several occasions at the Pasay Police Station to
request for assistance. Prior to October 15, 1979, Boy again dropped by at the
police station and asked him if he had an appointment on the next day. He told Boy
that he had no appointment, and the latter requested to accompany him to Sta.
Maria, Bulacan to get some rice. Prior thereto, in one of their casual conversations,
he learned that Boy was a businessman engaged in hauling various merchandise.
He agreed to the request of Boy to accompany him to Sta. Maria, Bulacan. At Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, they proceeded to a warehouse containing bags of rice, and they
hauled several bags into a truck, and thereafter, proceed[ed] to Quezon City. As
compensation Boy gave him a sack of rice. The said transaction was followed by
another on October 15, 1979. In the afternoon of October 14, 1979, Boy again
dropped by at the police station and requested him to accompany him to haul
household fixtures. They usually haul vegetables and rice early in the morning to
avoid the traffic and that was the reason why they met in the early morning of
October 15, 1979. He told [Boy] that he will see if he will have [the] time, but just
the same they made arrangements that they will see each other at Cartimar, Pasay
City not later than 2:30 a.m. in the early morning of October 15, 1979. At the
appointed time and place, he met Boy with a companion, who was introduced to
him as Gonzalo Vargas, his co-accused in the instant case. Thereafter, they
proceeded to a gasoline station nearby. At the gasoline station, at the corner of
Taylo and Taft Avenue, near Cartimar, they picked up another person who was later
on introduced to him as Felicisimo Rieta. Then the four of them (Boy, Gonzalo,
Rieta and Rimorin) boarded the cargo truck and they proceeded to Divisoria. It was
Boy who drove the cargo truck, while petitioner was seated next to Boy while
accused Rimorin and Gonzalo to his right. While enroute to Divisoria, along Roxas
Boulevard before reaching Del Pan Bridge, Boy turned right under the bridge. He
commented that it was not the route to Divisoria, and Boy answered ‘meron lang
ikakarga dito’. On the other hand, Rieta told Boy that he was hungry, and thus, Boy
pulled-over at a carinderia at Del Pan Bridge near Delgado Bros. When Rieta
alighted he followed, while Boy and Gonzalo proceeded. After less than an hour,
Boy and Gonzalo returned. They then proceeded towards Roxas Boulevard,
Bonifacio Drive, and Boy drove straight at the corner of Aduana to Roxas
Boulevard. When he noticed that the truck was not bound for Divisoria as earlier
informed, he asked Boy why they were not taking the route going to Divisoria. Boy
replied ‘bukas na lang wala ng espasyo’. Immediately, they were intercepted by two
vehicles and one of the occupants thereof ordered the driver to pull over. The driver
pulled over, and they were ordered to raise their hands and to lay flat on their belly
on the pavement right in front of the truck, and they were bodily frisked but they
found nothing. He asked the Metrocom soldiers what was it all about, but the
Metrocom soldiers were shouting ‘asan ang blue seal’. Then they were ordered to
board a jeep owned by the Metrocom soldiers, and they were brought to Camp
Crame. Before they left the area, he did not see the Metrocom soldiers open the
cargo truck. He was brought to the MISG at Camp Crame. When they arrived at
Camp Crame, the soldiers thereat were clapping their hands, thus he asked ‘ano ba
talaga ito’ and he got an answer from Barrameda, ‘yun ang dahilan kung bakit ka
makukulong’, pointing to a truck. When he saw the truck, it was not the same truck
they boarded in the early morning of October 15, 1979. The truck they boarded was
galvanized iron pale sheet covered with canvass while the one at Camp Crame was
color red and not covered. He entertained the idea that they were being framed-up.
Two days after, he was interrogated and the alleged blue seal cigarettes were
shown to him, and he was informed by the investigator that the same blue seal
cigarettes were the contents of the cargo truck. When the alleged blue seal
cigarettes were taken out of the cargo truck, he was not asked to be present. He
asked for the whereabouts of Boy, but he was informed that the latter escaped. The
more he believed that there was something fishy or wrong in their apprehension. It
was very [conspicuous] that the driver was able to escape because at the time they
were apprehended they were the only people at Bonifacio Drive, and thus the
possibility of escape was very remote, considering that they were unarmed and the
Metrocom soldiers were all fully armed. In both cases at bar, there were about
three Pasay policemen who were apprehended. He was detained at Camp Bagong
Diwa for more than a year. He knew nothing about the charge against him. When
he was at Camp Crame he tried getting in touch with a lawyer and his family, but
the MISG did not let him use the telephone.” [10]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the RTC, the CA noted that while petitioner and his co-accused had mainly
raised questions of fact, they had nonetheless failed to point out specific errors
committed by the trial court in upholding the credibility of the prosecution’s
witnesses. The defense of denial proffered by petitioner was considered weak and
incapable of overturning the overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence
of respondent. Further, the appellate court ruled that the non-presentation in court
of the seized blue-seal cigarettes was not fatal to respondent’s cause, since the
crime had sufficiently been established by other competent evidence.

The CA rejected the belated claim of petitioner that his arrest was irregular. It ruled
that the alleged defect could not be raised for the first time on appeal, especially in
the light of his voluntary submission to and participation in the proceedings before
the trial court.

The appellate court, however, found no sufficient evidence against the other co-
accused who, unlike petitioner, had not been found to be in possession of blue-seal
cigarettes.

Hence, this Petition.[11]

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the Court’s
consideration:

“1. The respondents trial and appellate courts committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when [they] convicted herein
petitioner notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to prove the guilt of the
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

“2. The evidence obtained against the accused is inadmissible in evidence because
petitioner and his co-accused were arrested without a warrant but by virtue of an
arrest and seizure order (ASSO) which was subsequently declared illegal and invalid
by this Honorable Supreme Court.”[12]

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner contends that the existence of the untaxed blue seal cigarettes was not
established, because the prosecution had not presented them as evidence. He
further argues that there was no crime committed, as the corpus delicti was never
proven during the trial.

Corpus Delicti Established

by Other Evidence

We do not agree. Corpus delicti refers to the specific injury or loss sustained.[13] It is

the fact of the commission of the crime[14] that may be proved by the testimony of
eyewitnesses.[15] In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to the
body of the person murdered,[16] to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the
use of unlicensed firearms,[17] to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom,[18] or -- in the present case -- to the seized contraband cigarettes. [19]

In Rimorin v. People,[20] the petitioner therein similarly equated the actual physical

evidence -- 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti. The
appellate court allegedly erred in not acquitting him on reasonable doubt arising
from the non-presentation in court of the confiscated contraband cigarettes.
Holding that corpus delicti could be established by circumstantial evidence, the
Court debunked his argument thus:

“Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has
ruled that even a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice
to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be
established by circumstantial evidence.

“Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently
established by respondent’s evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible
witnesses and the Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the
confiscated goods.
“Col. Panfilo Lacson’s testimony on the apprehension of petitioner and on the
seizure of the blue seal cigarettes was clear and straightforward. He categorically
testified as follows:

Q Let us go back to the truck after you apprehended the COSAC soldiers on board the [C]orona
car, what did you do thereafter?

A We took them to the place where the cargo truck was intercepted, Sir.

Q What did you notice thereat?

A Inside the truck were hundreds of cases of blue seal cigarettes, and I also found out that my
men were able to apprehend the occupants of the cargo truck although they reported to me
that the driver managed to make good escape, Sir.

Q Now you stated that a search was made on the truck and you found how many cases of blue
seal cigarettes?

A Three hundred five (305) cases, Sir.

Q Blue seal cigarettes?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What do you mean by blue seal cigarettes?

A Blue seal cigarettes are untaxed cigarettes, Sir.

Q Did you find out how many were there on board the truck which was intercepted by your men
per your order?

A Yes, Sir, [there] were three.

Q Who?

A They were P/Sgt. Arturo Rimorin, Sr.

Q P/Sgt. Of what department?

A Of Pasay City Police Force, Sir, and Pat. Felicisimo Rieta.

Q Of that police department?

A Of Kawit, Cavite Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, Sir.

Q Who is this Gonzalo Vargas?

A Civilian Sir.
 x x x     x x x     x x x

Fiscal Macaraeg:

I am showing to you a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979, which states:
Received from Lt. Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, AC of S, M2/CC, MISG. PC METROCOM

(Thru S/Sgt. Rodolfo Bucao, PC) THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (371) cases of
assorted brands of ‘Blue Seal’ Cigarettes, which were intercepted and confiscated
by elements of the MISG, PC METROCOM on or about 0400 15 October 79 along
Bonifacio Drive, Manila, which for [purposes] of identification we respectfully
request that it be marked [on] evidence as Exhibit ‘A’.

COURT:

Mark it Exhibit ‘A’.

Fiscal Macaraeg:

Q Will you please do examine Exhibit ‘A’ and tell us whether this is the same receipt?

A This is the same receipt, Sir.

Q By the way, were photographs taken of the car as well as the vehicle involved in this case,
together with the blue seal cigarettes that were confiscated?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Do you have copies of these photographs?

A The copies are with our evidence custodian, Sir.

Q Can you bring those pictures if required next time?

A Yes, Sir.

“So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo –customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau –
categorically testify that the MISG had turned over to him the seized blue seal
cigarettes, for which he issued a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979.

“We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving credence to
the narration of prosecution witnesses, especially when they are public officers who
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.” [21]
Petitioner argues that the receipt issued by Abrigo, a customs official, was beset
with doubt because: 1) it did not state specifically that the blue-seal cigarettes
identified therein had been confiscated from petitioner and turned over to Abrigo by
Colonel Lacson and/or his men; and 2) it mentioned 371 (instead of 305) cases of
confiscated blue-seal cigarettes.

We note, however, that Colonel Lacson himself identified the Custody Receipt as
the same one issued for the 305 cases of cigarettes found in the cargo truck, in
which petitioner and his co-accused rode, and from which the 66 cases of cigarettes
-- subject of Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-138(79) -- were confiscated in Malabon,
Metro Manila.[22] This fact (305 plus 66) explains why 371 cases were indicated
therein. At any rate, petitioner argues on minor discrepancies that do not affect the
integrity of the Receipt, issued in due course by a customs official who was duty-
bound to put the seized contraband cigarettes in safekeeping.

The existence of the 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes found in the possession of
petitioner and his co-accused was duly proven by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses -- Lacson and Abrigo. They had testified in compliance with their duty as
enforcers of the law. Their testimonies were rightly entitled to full faith and credit,
especially because there was no showing of any improper motive [23] on their part to
testify falsely against petitioner. Further, the Court accords great respect to the
factual conclusions drawn by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court as in this case.[24]

Absurd is the claim of petitioner that, because Colonel Lacson was not the officer
who had actually intercepted the cargo truck in which the former rode, the latter’s
testimony was therefore hearsay. The testimony of the colonel on his participation
in the apprehension of the truck sufficiently rebutted this contention.

Lacson testified that he had personally received information regarding the

smuggling activities being conducted by a syndicated group in that place. He was
also informed that smuggled items would be transported from the 2 nd COSAC
Detachment in the Port Area to Malabon by a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167.
During the stakeout surveillance on the night of October 14, 1979, he saw -- from
his post within the vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment -- the identified cargo
truck coming out of the Port Area. While trailing behind, he radioed his men posted
along Roxas Boulevard to stop the truck. Later in court, he described how his men
had actually intercepted it.[25]

Petitioner insists that Colonel Lacson, who had given chase to a Toyota car and was
not among the officers who had intercepted the truck, could not have seen him as
one of the passengers of the latter vehicle. Notably, however, the chase of the
Toyota car had lasted no more than 5 minutes, and the colonel’s team immediately
returned to the subject truck after the chase.[26] Lacson, however, categorically said
that he had seen 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes inside the cargo vehicle, and
that petitioner was one of its passengers.

It should be borne in mind that Colonel Lacson -- as head of that particular

surveillance operation -- had full knowledge, control and supervision of the whole
process. He had organized the surveillance teams and given orders to his men prior
to the apprehension of the vehicles suspected of carrying smuggled items.
Furthermore, he was present during the surveillance operations until the
apprehension of the cargo truck. Thus, he was clearly competent to testify on the
matter.

The denial by petitioner that he was among the occupants of the truck is highly
self-serving and riddled with inconsistencies. He had been directly identified as one
of its passengers. Besides, he himself admitted that he had been on board the
vehicle when it was intercepted, and that there were no other person in the area.

Courtroom Identification
Unnecessary

Next, petitioner belabors the failure of the prosecution to ask Colonel Lacson to
identify him in open court. However, the colonel’s positive and categorical
testimony pointing to him as one of the passengers of the cargo truck, as well as
petitioner’s own admission of his presence therein, dispelled the need for a
courtroom identification. In People v. Quezada, the Court said:

“x x x. While positive identification by a witness is required by the law to convict an

accused, it need not always be by means of a physical courtroom identification. As
the Court held in People v. Paglinawan:

‘x x x. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses to point out the accused in

open court by way of identification, the fact that the witness x x x did not do so in
this case was because the public prosecutor failed to ask her to point out appellant,
hence such omission does not in any way affect or diminish the truth or weight of
her testimony.’

“In-court identification of the offender is essential only when there is a question or

doubt on whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the same person
who is charged in the information and subject of the trial.” [27]

In the present case, there is no doubt that petitioner was a passenger of the truck,
that he was apprehended by the authorities, and that he was the same individual
charged under the Information in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-137(79).

Prima Facie Proof of

Nonpayment of Taxes Sufficient

There is no merit, either, in the claim of petitioner that the prosecution failed to
prove the nonpayment of the taxes and duties on the confiscated cigarettes. There
is an exception to the general rule requiring the prosecution to prove a criminal
charge predicated on a negative allegation, or a negative averment constituting an
essential element of a crime. In People v. Julian-Fernandez, we held:

“Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts
are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests
upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to
adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of
which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue,
could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendant’s knowledge or control. For example, where a
charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a license x x
x, the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiar[ly] within his
knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction.” [28] (Emphasis
supplied)

The truth of the negative averment that the duties and specific taxes on the
cigarettes were not paid to the proper authorities is fairly indicated by the following
circumstances that have been established: (1) the cargo truck, which carried the
contraband cigarettes and some passengers including petitioner, immediately came
from the 2nd COSAC Detachment; (2) the truck was intercepted at the unholy hour
of 4:00 a.m.; (3) it fitted the undisclosed informer’s earlier description of it as one
that was carrying contraband; and (4) the driver ran away. Hence, it was up to
petitioner to disprove these damning circumstances, simply by presenting the
receipts showing payment of the taxes. But he did not do so; all that he could offer
was his bare and self-serving denial.

Knowledge of the Illegal

Nature of Goods

The fact that 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes were found in the cargo truck, in
which petitioner and his co-accused were riding, was properly established.
Nonetheless, he insists that his presence there was not enough to convict him of
smuggling, because the element of illegal possession had not been duly proved. He
adds that he had no knowledge that untaxed cigarettes were in the truck.
Petitioner’s contention is untenable. Persons found to be in possession of smuggled
items are presumed to be engaged in smuggling, pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.[29] The burden of proof is thus shifted
to them. To rebut this presumption, it is not enough for petitioner to claim good
faith and lack of knowledge of the unlawful source of the cigarettes. He should have
presented evidence to support his claim and to convince the court of his non-
complicity.

In the case adverted to earlier, Rimorin v. People, we held thus:

“In his discussion of a similarly worded provision of Republic Act No. 455, a criminal
law authority explained thus:

‘In order that a person may be deemed guilty of smuggling or illegal importation
under the foregoing statute three requisites must concur: (1) that the merchandise
must have been fraudulently or knowingly imported contrary to law; (2) that the
defendant, if he is not the importer himself, must have received, concealed,
bought, sold or in any manner facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of
the merchandise; and (3) that the defendant must be shown to have knowledge
that the merchandise had been illegally imported. If the defendant, however, is
shown to have had possession of the illegally imported merchandise, without
satisfactory explanation, such possession shall be deemed sufficient to authorize
conviction.’”[30] (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the explanation given by petitioner was found to be

unacceptable and incredible by both the RTC and the CA, which said:

“Now on the explanations of Police Sgt. Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force and Pat.
Rieta of Kawit Police Force, riders in the loaded cargo truck driven by ‘Boy.’ Their
claim that they did not have any knowledge about the cargo of blue seal cigarettes
is not given credence by the court. They tried to show lack of knowledge by
claiming that along the way, ‘Boy’ and Gonzalo Vargas left them behind at a certain
point for snacks and picked them up later after the cargo had been loaded. The
Court cannot see its way through how two policemen, joining ‘Boy’ in the dead of
the night, explicitly to give him and his goods some protection, which service would
be paid, yet would not know what they are out to protect. And neither could the
Court see reason in ‘Boy’s’ leaving them behind when he was going to pick up and
load the blue seal cigarettes. ‘Boy’ knew the risks. He wanted them for protection,
so why will he discard them? How so unnatural and so contrary to reason.” [31]

Being contrary to human experience, his version of the facts is too pat and
stereotyped to be accepted at face value. Evidence, to be believed, not only must
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must also be credible in itself, as
when it conforms to common experience and observation of humankind. [32]
The absence of any suspicious reaction on the part of petitioner was not in
accordance with human nature. The involvement or participation he and his co-
accused had in the smuggling of the goods was confirmed by their lack of proper
and reasonable justification for the fact that they had been found inside the cargo
truck, seated in front, when it was intercepted by the authorities. Despite his
protestation, it is obvious that petitioner was aware of the strange nature of the
transaction, and that he was willing to do his part in furtherance thereof. The
evidence presented by the prosecution established his work of guarding and
escorting the contraband to facilitate its transportation from the Port Area to
Malabon, an act punishable under Section 3601 of the Tax Code.

Second Issue:
Validity of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order
(ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as the law upon which it was predicated -- General
Order No. 60, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos -- was subsequently
declared by the Court, in Tañada v. Tuvera,[33] to have no force and effect. Thus, he
asserts, any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible in evidence.

We do not agree. In Tañada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its
declaration of the invalidity of various presidential issuances. Discussing therein
how such a declaration might affect acts done on a presumption of their validity,
the Court said:

“x x x. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:

‘The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. x x x It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect
of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects –
with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed
to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state
and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.’

xxxxxxxxx

“Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their

publication in the Official Gazette is ‘an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.’”[34]

The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a

statute, there is an imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence
as an operative fact negating the acceptance of “a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity.” Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in
operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects. [35] The
ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 -- long before our
Decision in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that can no
longer be disturbed or simply ignored.

Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been introduced
into the country in violation of customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally
accepted exceptions[36] to the constitutional provision. Such provision mandates that
no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge
who has personally determined the existence of probable cause. [37]

Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be made even
without a warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without
mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows
police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse,
store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law.[38]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs

against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 146706, August 15, 2005 ]
TOMAS SALVADOR, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

At bar is the petition for review on certiorari [1] filed by Tomas Salvador assailing the
Decision[2] dated August 9, 2000 and Resolution dated January 9, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 20186.

On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner
Tomas Salvador, then aircraft mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL)
and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and Manila Domestic
Airport, were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for
possessing thirteen (13) packets containing assorted smuggled watches and
jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos.

Consequently, they were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
117, Pasay City with violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5843.  The Information reads:

“That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity,
Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and felonious assist in the concealment and unlawful
importation of the following items:

198 pieces of means watches……………   P187,110.00

76 pieces of men’s diving watches………          8,640.00
32 pieces of ladies watches………………    11,600.00
1600 grams of assorted jewelry………….  322,000.00

with a total market value of P537,500.00 FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN

THOUSAND THREEE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS, more or less, Philippine Currency,
without authority or permit from proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[3]

When arraigned, all the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.  Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution established the following facts:

On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations
Squadron, headed by Major Gerardo B. Pagcaliuangan and composed of Sgts.
Rodolfo A. Teves, Geronimo G. Escarola, Virgilio M. Sindac and Edwin B. Ople,
conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check
on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL
personnel.

Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople to keep close watch on the
second airplane parked inside the Domestic Airport terminal.  This aircraft is an
Airbus 300 with tail number RPC-3001.  It arrived at the NAIA at 10:25 in the
evening of June 3, 1994 from Hong Kong as Flight No. PR-311.  After its passengers
disembarked and its cargo unloaded, it was towed by the PAL ground crew and
parked at the ramp area of the Domestic Airport terminal.

At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves reported over his radio that three
(3) persons had boarded the Airbus 300.  The team did not move, but continued its
surveillance.

At 12:15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported that the three (3)
persons who earlier boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal
areas bulging.  They then boarded an airplane tow truck with its lights off.

The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles and followed the aircraft
tow truck.  At the Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped
the tow truck.  Sgt. Teves then got off, identified himself and asked the four (4)
persons on board to alight.  They were later identified as Tomas Salvador,
petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the
tow truck.

Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin.  He noticed that Mandin’s uniform was
partly open, showing a girdle.  While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a
package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell.  Suspecting that the package
contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates, “Positive!”
Thereupon, the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who
surrendered without a fight.  The team searched their bodies and found that the
three were wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped
in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while petitioner and Santos had
four (4) each.  The team confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to the
PAFSECOM Office.

At around 8:00 o’clock the following morning, Emilen Balatbat, an examiner of the
Bureau of Customs, arrived at the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the
packets and on seeing that it contained dutiable goods, she proceeded to weigh the
thirteen (13) packets seized from the accused.  She then prepared an inventory of
the items seized and listed the weight of the packets. [4] Thereafter, she brought the
seized packets to the In-Board Section, Bureau of Customs, Airport Office where
their contents were identified and appraised.  The Bureau of Customs found 248
pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat (14K) gold jewelries valued as
follows:
 

QTY. UNIT DESCRIPTION APPRAISED   

VALUE
10 pcs. Half-bangles with    122.8    gms.
Charms Tricolors
6 pcs. Bracelet with Charms    52.4    gms.
Tricolors
8 pcs. Bracelet (Tricolor) 64.2    gms.
5 pcs. Bangles (3 pcs./set)    155.3    gms.
Tricolor
    Baby’s    Bangles with 18.2 gms.
charm
    L-Bangles    with charm 68.5 gms.
    L-Bangles 112.3 gms.
    L-Creolla    Earrings 901.56 gms.
    TOTAL    +P    299,052.00
GRAMS   1,495 x
P200.00/g
    Assorted Watches  
204 pcs. Citizen M watches    with  
black dial with gold metal
bracelet (-1) x    $25 $2,600.00
4 pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies    watches  
with blue dial with white
metal bracelet (-1) x $25    600.00
16 pcs. Seiko Divers Watch     
Mens- Black dial with
 rubberized bracelet (-1) x
$50 800.00
4 pcs. Seiko 5 Ladies    watches  
with yellow dial with gold
metal bracelet (1) x $25 100.00
4 pcs. Citizen L-watches    with 80.00
white dial (4) x $20
62 pcs. Seiko 5 Men’s    watches        
with yellow dial with gold
metal bracelet (1) x $25 1,550.00
34 pcs. Seiko    5 Men’s watches  
with black dial with gold
metal bracelet (1) x $25 850.00
248 pcs.    

        $6,580.00

The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted an inquest and thereafter

recommended that petitioner and his co-accused be charged with violating Section
3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.  Accordingly, the Information, mentioned
earlier, was filed with the RTC.

After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Joint Demurrer to
Evidence.

In an Order dated October 12, 1995, the trial court denied the demurrer and
directed the accused to present their evidence.

All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were framed-
up by the military.

Danilo Santos testified that on the night of June 3, 1994, he was assigned to the
Airbus 300 with tail No. RPC-3001, joining three junior mechanics who were then
working on said aircraft.  He was conducting a visual check of the plane when a tow
truck arrived on its way to Nichols Airfield.  He told one of the junior mechanics that
he would take a break and be back in an hour.  He then boarded the tow truck. 
When it was near the Lima Gate, a jeep with four (4) men in civilian attire aboard
approached him. The four pointed their firearms at him and, after searching him for
drugs, he was frisked but nothing was found.  He was nonetheless brought by the
men to the PAFSECOM Office, then to Villamor Airbase Hospital for a medical
examination and alcohol test.  Thereafter, he was brought back to the PAFSECOM
Office.  There, another military man arrived and brought out a box containing
packets.  Then he and his companions were told to put on their mechanic’s
uniforms and to wear girdles.  The packets were placed on their bodies, after which
they were photographed.  He further testified that he was asked to sign a certain
paper but was not allowed to read it thoroughly.  During the investigation, he was
not apprised of his rights nor assisted by a counsel.

Petitioner Tomas Salvador likewise denied any knowledge of the questioned items
seized from him.  He testified that during the incident in question, he only boarded
the tow truck to take a break at the PAL canteen.  He saw a box on the tow truck
but was not aware of its contents.  After his arrest, he was made to sign a
document under duress.

Aurelio Mandin also denied committing the offense charged. He declared that after
his arrest, he was made to sign a document by the PAF personnel, the contents of
which he was not able to read.  He signed it because he was struck with a .45
caliber handgun by one of the military men and threatened him with summary
execution if he would not do so.  He was not informed of his rights nor given the
services of counsel during the investigation.

After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting all the accused of the
offense charged, thus:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Aurelio Mandin
y Liston, Danilo Santos y Antonio and Tomas Salvador y Magno GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines (TCCP). There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court sentences each of the accused
to an indeterminate term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor,
as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine
of EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P8,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.  The court also orders the forfeiture of the
confiscated articles in favor of the Government.

SO ORDERED.”[5]

All the accused then seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20186.

On August 9, 2000, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the trial
court’s Decision, thus:

“We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested Decision.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.”[6]

They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated
January 9, 2001.[7]

Only Tomas Salvador opted to elevate his case to this Court by way of the instant
petition for review on certiorari.  He submits for our consideration the following
assignments of error:

“I

THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION LIKE

UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION, POSSESSION OF UNLAWFULLY IMPORTED ARTICLES
AND CONSPIRACY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME, WERE NEVER PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE
PERSONS OF THE ACCUSED.

III

THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE APPELLATE
COURT OF THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, AS WELL AS ALL ITS
DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE APPARENTLY
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
WERE UNLAWFUL.

IV

THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE CONCURRENCE BY THE APPELLATE
COURT OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WERE ALSO WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS.” [8]

The above assignments of error boil down to these issues:  (1) whether the seized
items are admissible in evidence; and (2) whether the prosecution has proved the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

On the first issue, petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure
conducted by the PAF operatives is illegal.  Citing People v. Burgos,[9] he maintains
that at the time he and his co-accused were stopped by the PAF law enforces, they
were unaware that a crime was being committed.  Accordingly, the law enforcers
were actually engaged in a fishing expedition in violation of his Constitutional right
against unlawful search and seizure.  Thus, the seized items should not have been
admitted in evidence against him.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual
circumstances of the case at bar, there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF
surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and his companions.  They boarded
the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no other PAL
personnel working therein.  They stayed inside the plane for sometime and
surprisingly, came out with bulging waists.  They then stopped and looked around
and made apparent signals.  All these acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable
suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to something illegal.  Moreover,
the search and seizure was conducted in connection with the enforcement of
customs law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding a motor vehicle. 
In addition, the search was conducted at the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila
Domestic Airport which, like every gate in the airport perimeter, has a checkpoint. 
Finally, the petitioner and his companions agreed to the search after one of them
was caught with a suspicious-looking packet. Under these circumstances, the
search and seizure is legal and the seized items are admissible in evidence.

We agree with the OSG.

As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law enforcers to a person’s
body, personal effects or residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a
valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure mandated by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.  Thus, Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution provide:

“SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

SEC. 3.

xxx

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
x x x.”

The above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only
such as are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where
searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant.  These
recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain
view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk
situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.[10]

Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of
the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug
trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport.  In
other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused
was in the nature of a customs search.  As such, the team properly effected the
search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority
under the customs law.[11]

In Papa vs. Mago[12] involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who
are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized
to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or other movable
property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been
introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may
likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of
holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.

In short, Mago  clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent
schemes resorted to by importers who evade payment of customs duties.  The
Government’s policy to combat the serious malady of smuggling cannot be reduced
to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty has
not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individual’s
private papers and effects.  Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy
which we have continued to affirm.[13]

Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused
were on board a moving PAL aircraft tow truck.  As stated earlier, the search of a
moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
requirement for a search warrant.  Such exception is easy to understand.  A search
warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling
house or other immobile structure.  But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant
when the search is conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since
they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must
be sought.[14] Verily, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in holding that the articles involved in the instant controversy were validly
seized by the authorities even without a search warrant, hence, admissible in
evidence against petitioner and his co-accused.

On the second issue, petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for readily sustaining
the trial court’s finding that the witnesses for the prosecution were credible,
notwithstanding that their testimonies contain glaring inconsistencies which tend to
detract from their veracity.  Petitioner submits that these inconsistencies create
serious doubt which should have been resolved in his favor.

We are not persuaded.

After a careful examination of the purported inconsistencies mentioned by

petitioner, we find that they do not relate with the elements of the offense
charged.  Rather, they tend to focus on minor and insignificant matters as for
instance: which PAF operative was in possession of the hand-held radio; how the
girdles (garters) were removed; and what time the aircraft in question arrived.

It bears stressing that these inconsistencies detract from the fact that all members
of the special PAF team who conducted the search positively identified the
petitioner and his co-accused as the same persons who boarded the PAL plane;
stayed therein for a significant length of time; disembarked in a manner which
stirred suspicion from the team; and with unusually bulging uniforms, rode an
aircraft tow truck towards Lima Gate where they were caught in flagrante delicto.

As a rule, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to trivial and

insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. [15] Moreover, minor
inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution’s case as
they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby
negating any misgivings that the same were perjured.[16]

Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in part:

“SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. – Any person who shall fraudulently import or

bring into the Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article contrary to law, or shall
receive, conceal, buy, seal or in any manner facilitate the importation, concealment
or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported
contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling…

xxx

When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have
had possession of the article in question, possession shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant shall
explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court: Provided,
however, That payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a
valid defense in any prosecution under this section.”

Smuggling is thus committed by any person who (1) fraudulently imports or brings
into the Philippines or assists in importing or bringing into the Philippines any
article, contrary to law, or (2) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any manner
facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation,
knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law. [17] Importation
commences when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the
Philippines with intention to unload and is deemed terminated upon payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges due upon the articles and the legal permit for
withdrawal has been issued, or where the articles are duty-free, once the articles
have left the jurisdiction of the customs. [18]

In the instant case, the prosecution established by positive, strong, and convincing
evidence that petitioner and his co-accused were caught red-handed by a team
from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, while in the possession of highly
dutiable articles inside the premises of the airport. The contraband items were
taken by petitioner and his co-accused from a PAL plane which arrived from Hong
Kong on the night of June 3, 1994. Petitioner and his colleagues then attempted to
bring out these items in the cover of darkness by concealing them inside their
uniforms.  When confronted by the PAF team, they were unable to satisfactorily
explain why the questioned articles were in their possession.  They could not
present any document to prove lawful importation.  Thus, their conviction must
necessarily be upheld.  Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
in affirming the trial court’s Decision convicting petitioner and his co-accused.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The appealed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20186 are AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS.  Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales,  and Garcia, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 180597, November 07, 2008 ]
 RAUL BASILIO D. BOAC, RAMON B. GOLONG, CESAR F.
BELTRAN, AND ROGER A. BASADRE, PETITIONERS, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

This appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to set aside the August 16, 2007
Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied by the court through its November 14, 2007 Resolution.
[2]

The Facts

Raul Basilio Boac, Ramon Betuin Golong, Cesar Fantone Beltran, Roger Alcantara
Basadre, and Benjamin Castaneda Alfonso are members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG).  They hold the
ranks of Police Senior Superintendent, Police Inspector, Senior Police Officer II,
Senior Police Officer II, and Senior Police Officer I, respectively.  In an information
dated October 18, 2005, they were charged with violation of Sec. 2203 in relation
to Sec. 3612 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as follows:

That on or before July 27, 2004 or prior or subsequent thereto in Cagayan de Oro
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused
P/SR. SUPT. RAUL BASILIO DONIDA BOAC, SG-26, P/INSP. RAMON BETUIN
GOLONG, SG-22, SPO2 CESAR FANTONE BELTRAN, SG-17, SPO2 ROGER
ALCANTARA BASADRE, SG-17, SPO1 BENJAMIN CASTANEDA ALFONSO, SG-16, all
public officers being then members of the Philippine National Police, taking
advantage of their official positions, while committing the offense in relation to
office, with grave abuse thereof, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, without lawful
authority or delegation from the Collector of Customs, flag down, search and seize
three (3) container vans consigned to Japan Trak surplus (Kakiage Surplus).

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Boac, Golong, and Beltran pleaded not guilty on January 23, 2006; Basadre entered
the same plea on February 20, 2006. Alfonso remained at large.  At pretrial, the
prosecution and defense stipulated that in the evening of July 27, 2004, Golong,
Beltran, Basadre, and Alfonso, upon the order of Boac, but without the authority
from and coordination with the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Collection District X,
Cagayan de Oro City, flagged down three container vans consigned to Kakiage
Surplus. The said vans were allowed to be brought to the warehouse of the
consignee and the actual search was done on July 28, 2004. [4]

Atty. Lourdes V. Mangaoang, then Customs District Collector of Cagayan de Oro

City, testified that the CIDG operatives (herein petitioners) did not have a written
authority from the Commissioner of Customs or the District Collector.  According to
her, Golong claimed that they had clear orders from Boac to open and search the
vans.  She instructed her personnel to open the vans only to show that there was
nothing illegal in their contents.  She prepared a letter of protest addressed to Boac
but it was ignored; hence, she filed the instant case.[5]

Dario C. Amolata, license customs broker, testified that he went to see the vans
after learning that they were flagged down by petitioners.  The following day, he
went to the warehouse with Melvin Yamit and Richard Godoy of the Enforcement
and Security Services of the BOC, Region X to witness the inspection of the vans. 
No contrabands were found upon inspection.  Yamit corroborated the testimony of
Amolata.[6]

For the defense, Boac testified that on July 27, 2004, he was in Manila on leave. 
Beltran allegedly informed him that three container vans with contrabands were
released by the BOC; thus, Boac instructed Golong and his team to flag down the
subject vans.  After the inspection of the vans and without finding any contraband,
Boac directed Golong to leave the premises.  Golong corroborated Boac's
testimony, adding that he and his team did not open the vans on July 27, 2004
because there were no representatives from the BOC. Beltran testified that in the
morning of July 27, 2004, Voltaire Sabelina, an appraiser from the BOC, informed
him that three container vans will be released from the pier around 5:00 p.m. It
was alleged that inside the two of the uninspected containers were television sets
from Japan.[7]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In convicting petitioners, the Sandiganbayan applied the following provisions of the

Tariff and Customs Code:

Section 602.  The Bureau of Customs, headed by a Commissioner, has, among

other things, the following general duties, powers and jurisdiction, in respect to the
levy of customs duties, to wit:
xxxx

b. The prevention and suppression of smuggling and other frauds upon the
customs;

xxxx

j. The enforcement of the tariff and customs laws and all other laws, rules and
regulations in relation to the tariff and customs administration.

Sec. 2203.  Persons Having Police Authority. - For the enforcement of the tariff and
customs laws, the following persons are authorized to effect searches, seizures and
arrests conformably with the provisions of said laws.

xxxx

d. Officers generally empowered by law to effect arrests and execute processes of

the courts, when acting under the direction of the Collector.

Sec. 3612. Violations of Tariff and Customs Laws and Regulations in General. - Any
person who violates a provision of this Code or regulations pursuant thereto, for
which delinquency no specific penalty is provided, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than one thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both.  If the offender is an alien, he shall be deported after serving the sentence;
and if the offender is a public official or employee, he shall suffer disqualification to
hold public office, to vote and participate in any public election for ten years.

The anti-graft court ruled that petitioners belong to the category of officers in Sec.
2203(d); thus, they needed a written authority from the Commissioner of Customs
or District Collector in order to conduct searches, seizures and arrests.  In this case,
the court said, the prosecution established the lack of said written authority; even
Beltran and Golong admitted that they did not have any authorization to search the
vans.  The court stated:

Verily, it was evident in the above-quoted provisions of Sec. 602 and Sec. 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code that indeed the Tariff and Customs Code vested upon
the Bureau of Customs the authority to enforce the tariff and customs laws,
including the prevention and suppression of smuggling and other frauds committed
against it.

The PNP-CIDG cannot arrogate upon itself the power which, under the law, is
exclusively vested to the Collector of Customs.  The PNP-CIDG can only effect
search and seizure upon the direction of the Collector of Customs.  Hence, it cannot
on its own effect search and seizure.[8]

On August 16, 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed judgment,

the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused P/Sr. Supt. Raul Basilio Donida Boac, P/Insp.
Ramon Betuin Golong, SPO2 Cesar Fantone Beltran and SPO2 Roger Alcantara
Basadre GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of Section 2203 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, and, pursuant to Section 3612 thereof, are hereby
sentenced each to suffer the penalty of:

(A) imprisonment of one (1) year;

(B) pay the fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00); and

(C) disqualification to hold public office, to vote and participate in any public
election for ten years.

SO ORDERED.[9]

On November 14, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' motion for

reconsideration. Thus, we have this petition.

Assigned Errors

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 2203 OF THE TARIFF AND
CUSTOMS CODE DESPITE THE ABSENCE IN ITS OWN FINDINGS THAT THE
PETITIONERS/ACCUSED CONDUCTED SEARCH, SEIZURE OR ARREST AND DESPITE
THE EVIDENCE FROM BOTH PARTIES THAT THE PETITIONERS DID NOT CONDUCT
SEARCH, SEIZURE OR ARREST IN THE INSTANT CASE.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT AUTHORITY OR DELEGATION FROM

THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS IS REQUIRED WHEN THE PETITIONERS FLAGGED
DOWN THE CONTAINER VANS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES AS
POLICE OFFICERS.

Petitioners assert that they did not conduct any search, seizure, or arrest; hence,
there was no violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.  During the search
conducted in the consignee's warehouse on July 28, 2004, the employees of the
owner of the shipment unloaded the goods under BOC personnel supervision.
Petitioners allege that they only witnessed the search; they did not make any
seizures or arrests.  After searching the first van and half of the second van without
any contraband being found, Customs Police Yamit and Godoy decided to stop the
search despite the request of petitioners to continue.  Since the Customs Police
were already leaving the area, Boac instructed his team to leave the vicinity. [10]

Petitioners further claim that the police's authority to stop, search, and effect
seizure and arrest, if necessary, is no longer exclusively vested on the Collector of
Customs.  Regular PNP members are generally empowered by law to effect arrests
in accordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 6975, to wit:

Section 24. Powers and Functions.   The PNP shall have the following powers and
functions:

(a) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties;

(b) Maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety;

(c) Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice
and assist in their prosecution;

(d) Exercise the general powers to make arrest, search and seizure in accordance with the Constitution
and pertinent laws;

xxxx

In addition, the PNP shall absorb the office of the National Action Committee on
Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) of the Department of National Defense, all the functions of
the present Philippine Air Force Security Command (PAFSECOM), as well as the
police functions of the Coast Guard.  In order to perform its powers and functions
efficiently and effectively, the PNP shall be provided with adequate land, sea, and
air capabilities and all necessary material means of resources. [11]
Petitioners, as members of the PNP-CIDG, also have the following functions under
RA 6975:

Section 35. Support Units.  The PNP shall be supported by administrative and

operational support units. The administrative support units shall consist of x x x

xxxx

(4) Criminal Investigation Unit.  Headed by a Director with the rank of chief
superintendent, the Criminal Investigation Unit shall undertake the monitoring,
investigation and prosecution of all crimes involving economic sabotage, and other
crimes of such magnitude and extent as to indicate their commission by highly
placed or professional criminal syndicates and organizations.

This unit shall likewise investigate all major cases involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code and operate against organized crime groups, unless the
President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Petitioners contend that they were investigating a possible connivance of smugglers

with some corrupt customs personnel. They maintained that their act of flagging
down the container vans was not connected with the enforcement of the tariff and
customs laws, smuggling being a form of economic sabotage which is within the
powers of the PNP-CIDG to monitor and investigate. Thus, according to them, no
prior authority from the Collector of Customs is required in performing their duties
as police officers.  Besides, they said they immediately coordinated with the
Customs Police for the latter to conduct the actual search of the container vans;
hence, there was no violation of Sec. 2203.[12]

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.  Petitioners should be acquitted of the charge.

The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.  In this case, it is clear that petitioners neither searched the
container vans nor effected seizure and arrest.  The testimony of Customs Broker
Amolata, the prosecution witness, supports this finding:

Atty. Llamas:

Q: Did the PNP-CIDG personnel open the container vans?

A: No, Sir.

Q: They did not open the container vans?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: You mentioned that you were able to talk with the PNP-CIDG personnel and they agreed to
bring the trucks or the container vans to the warehouse of the consignee. Is that correct?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Were the container vans opened in the evening of July 27, 2004 after the trucks were brought
to the place of the consignee, were they opened?

Prosecutor Lubigan:
 Your Honors, what particular time and date is he referring to, Your Honors?

Atty. Llamas:

In the evening, Your Honors, after the container vans were brought to the warehouse of the
consignee on July 27, 2004 whether the container vans were opened in the evening of July 27,
2004, Your Honors.

Witness: No, Sir.[13]

It should be noted that the container vans were brought to the consignee's
warehouse and not to the CIDG headquarters.  On July 28, 2004, the container
vans were searched but not by petitioners, as testified to by petitioners Beltran and
Golong, as follows:

(SPO2 Cesar Beltran)

Q: Okay, what happened when Yamit and Godoy arrived?

A: They talked with the owner of the container vans and they opened the container vans.

Q: Who ordered the opening of the container vans?

A: The persons from the Bureau of Customs and Mr. Bernales, the owner.

Q: What happened, after it was opened?

A: They unloaded the cargoes.

Q: Where were you during that time?

A: We were just there watching the unloading of the contents. [14]

(Police Inspector Ramon Golong)

Q: So, what happened there?

A: One of the container vans was being unloaded when I arrived while we act as observers
during the stripping of the contents. The employees of the owner of the shipment were
unloading the shipment while the Customs people were supervising them. [15]

The prosecution does not rebut the above testimonies of petitioners.  In fact, when
questioned by Associate Justice Norberto Y. Geraldez, the prosecution witness,
Customs Broker Amolata, attested to the same fact as follows:

Justice Geraldez:

Q: Who brought out the items from the container vans?

A: The employees of the consignee, Your Honors.

Q: The PNP-CIDG personnel or the accused did not search, they were just witnessing the bringing
out of the items?

A: They were witnessing also, Your Honors, similar of what were being done by the employees or
personnel of the Environment and Security Services of the Bureau of Customs as well as
myself, Your Honors.

Q: Did they search the items as if they were looking for something?

A: I cannot remember anymore, Your Honors. [16]

When examined by the prosecutor, Amolata testified:

Q: Did the PNP-CIDG personnel seize any equipment on that shipment? Did they seize any
equipment inside the container vans? Did they seize anything, did they take anything, did
they get anything inside those three container vans?

A: No, Sir.

Q: So there was no seizure, Mr. Witness? They did not seize anything?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Did they make any arrest, did they arrest anybody who were there on the 27th and on the
28th of July 2004?

A: No, Sir.

Q: And the searching was--the opening and the taking out of the equipment were done by the
employees of Kakiage Surplus. Am I right, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: It was not done by the PNP-CIDG personnel?

A: Yes, Sir.[17]

The search was actually conducted by Customs Police Yamit and Godoy on July 28,
2004.  The Customs Police held the keys of the vans, as attested to by Amolata:

Q: Who has the keys to these container vans, if you know?

A: The keys of the container vans were kept by Captain Capacite of the Enforcement and
Security Services of the Bureau of Customs, Sir.

Q: And what is the business of this Captain Capacite, Mr. Witness, who is from the Bureau of
customs in holding that keys despite the fact that the container vans were already released by
the Bureau of customs Region 10?

A: He requested to have the keys of the container vans to be kept to him because according to
 him, the following morning he should also be there inside the premises of the consignee to
also witness the stripping or taking out of the contents of the container vans, Sir.

xxxx

Q: Would you agree with me, Mr. Witness, that Yamit and Godoy has the keys with them on July
28, 2004?

A: I do not know, Sir, whether the keys were being given by Captain Capacite to them.

Q: And Yamit and Godoy were direct subordinates of this Captain Capacite. Would you confirm
that?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And the keys were with Capacite?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Is it normal procedure despite the fact that the container vans were already released by the
Bureau of Customs, the keys to the container are still held by Captain Capacite?

xxxx

A: Not normal procedure, Sir.

Q: Not normal procedure, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, Sir.[18]

Furthermore, the vans were opened without the presence of the PNP-CIDG's team
leader, Inspector Golong.  Golong testified:

Q: During the next day, July 28, 2004, could you tell us what happened?

A: The following day when I arrived at Barangay Agusan, the container vans were already
opened. The Bureau of Customs people and the owner were already there. [19]

The search was under the direction of the Customs Police because when the
Customs Police decided to stop the search, petitioners acceded and left the
premises.  Boac testified:

Q: What happened next?

A: About after lunch already about 1:30 to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon he called me again
informing me that the customs personnel are already leaving the premises and I asked him
what happened. He told me that the customs personnel are leaving and were satisfied that
there are no contents on the container vans, however, he told me that the third container van
was not stripped off of its contents and I asked Mr. Golong why and I told Inspector Golong to
 talk to one of the customs personnel to continue stripping the container van.

xxxx

I talked to Mr. Yamit since Inspector Golong told me that they are already stripping the
contents of the third container van and they were already leaving the place, so I instructed
Inspector Golong if I could talk to Yamit and ask Yamit if they could continue the stripping of
the vans, so he gave me the phone and I talked to Mr. Yamit and told him to continue
stripping the third container van up to the last contents. He told me they are already satisfied
that there are no contraband items in the container vans but I insisted to just continue
stripping the contents of the container van and he told me that they are already being called
by their customs collector in Region 10, sir.

Q: After this conversation, what did you do?

A: So, when they are already leaving the place, the customs people, I also ordered Inspector
Golong to immediately leave the place because customs personnel are already leaving and
they don't have anymore business being there since customs personnel are leaving the place.
[20]

The foregoing testimony, which Golong corroborated, was not disputed by the
prosecution.  It is thus very clear that the search was not done by petitioners but
by the Customs Police.  Petitioners did not seize anything nor arrested anybody. 
They merely observed the search which they requested to be undertaken to check
for contrabands. Notably, the consignee did not file any complaint against
petitioners.

The information charged petitioners for illegally flagging down, searching, and
seizing the three container vans on July 27, 2004.  Petitioners, however, could not
also be held liable for these acts.  It is a fact that no search and seizure of the vans
was done on the night of July 27, 2004.  The act of flagging down the vehicles is
not among those proscribed by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code.  Mere
flagging down of the container vans is not punishable under the said law.

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted.  This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause
of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges
that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would
be entitled to an acquittal.  Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course,
mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute
certainty.  Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.  The conscience must be satisfied that the
accused is responsible for the offense charged.[21]

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must
rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on
the accused to prove his innocence.[22]  In this case, the prosecution failed to show
that petitioners committed the acts prohibited by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code.  There is no such evidence, testimonial or otherwise, that identifies
petitioners as responsible for the alleged illegal search.  Hence, acquittal is in order.

As regards the second issue, there is no conflict between the aforequoted provisions
of the Tariff and Customs Code and RA 6975, as amended.  The jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Customs is clearly with regard to customs duties.  Should the PNP
suspect anything, it should coordinate with the BOC and obtain the written
authority from the Collector of Customs in order to conduct searches, seizures, or
arrests.  Coordination is emphasized in the laws.  While it is an admitted fact that
there was no such coordination initiated by the PNP-CIDG in this instance,
nevertheless, petitioners cannot be convicted under the Tariff and Customs Code
since there is no evidence that they did actually search the container vans.

WHEREFORE, the August 16, 2007 Decision and November 14, 2007 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  Petitioners
are ACQUITTED of the charge against them.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016 ]
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without
search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions
protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable
safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated

September 28, 2012 and the Resolution[3] dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City.[4] The Court of Appeals affirmed[5] the trial court's
Judgment[6] finding petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of possessing unlicensed firearms under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 7764[7] in relation to Section 261[8] of Batas Pambansa Big.
881[9] during the 2007 election period.[10]

Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently

traveled, "coming back and forth taking a vessel."[12] At around 12:00 noon of May
11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo.
[13] 
While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. [14] It
took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. [15]

Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the
x-ray scanning machine for inspection.[16] The operator of the x-ray machine saw
firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag.[17]

Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007.
[18]
 She saw the impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela
Cruz's bag.[19] Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called the attention of port
personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then. [20]

Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag. [21] Dela Cruz answered
Igot in the affirmative and consented to Igot's manual inspection of the bag. [22]

"Port Police Officer Adolfo Abregana [(Officer Abregana)] was on duty at the
terminal of the Cebu Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his attention was called by ...
Igot."[23] Igot told Officer Abregana that there were firearms in a bag owned by a
certain person.[24] Igot then pointed to the person.[25] That person was later
identified as Dela Cruz.[26]

Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag.[27] The bag was then inspected
and the following items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance;
seaman's book; other personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside
the cylinder.[28] When asked whether he had the proper documents for the firearms,
Dela Cruz answered in the negative.[29]

Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by
law.[30] He was also informed of his constitutional rights.[31]

In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela Cruz was charged with violation
of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms: [32]
 Criminal Case No. CBU -80084

That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 p.m. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with the deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there
possess and carry outside his residence one (1) Cal. 38 Simith [sic] & Wesson
revolver without serial number; one (1) .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver
without serial number; one (1) North American Black Widow magnum revolver
without serial number and four rounds of live ammunitions for cal. 38 without first
securing the necessary license to possess and permit to carry from the proper
authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[33]

Subsequently, another Information was filed charging Dela Cruz with the violation
of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881:[34]

Criminal Case No. CBU 80085

That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 in the afternoon, which
is within the election period for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, in
the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there possess and carry outside
his residence the following:

One (1) cal. .38 Simith [sic] & Wesson revolver without serial number; One (1)
cal. .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver without serial number; One (1) North
American Black Widow magnum revolver without serial number and four (4) rounds
of live ammunitions for cal. 38.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[35]

Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment. [36]

After trial, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 in
Criminal Case No. CBU 80085.[37] Dela Cruz was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of one (1) year with disqualification from holding public office and the right to
suffrage.[38]

According to the trial court, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Dela Cruz committed illegal possession of firearms. [39] It proved the
following elements: "(a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to
possess the same."[40] The prosecution presented the firearms and live ammunitions
found in Dela Cruz's possession.[41] It also presented three (3) prosecution
witnesses who testified that the firearms were found inside Dela Cruz's bag. [42] The
prosecution also presented a Certification that Dela Cruz did not file any application
for license to possess a firearm, and he was not given authority to carry a firearm
outside his residence.[43]

The trial court also held that the search conducted by the port authorities was
reasonable and, thus, valid:[44]

Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search conducted by
the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused's
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed
the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante
delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the
course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the] accused.
[45]

The trial court did not give credence to Dela Cruz's claim that the firearms were
"planted" inside his bag by the porter or anyone who could have accessed his bag
while he was buying a ticket.[46] According to the trial court, Dela Cruz's argument
was "easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove."[47] Dela Cruz also did not
show improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to discredit their
testimonies.[48]

The trial court dismissed the case for violation of Republic Act No. 8294. [49] It held
that "Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that the person arrested committed 'no other crime.'"[50] Dela Cruz, who had been
charged with illegal possession of firearms, was also charged with violating the Gun
Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764. [51]

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Consolidated Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP Blg. 881
in Criminal Case No. CBU-80085, and hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment for a period of one (1) year, and to suffer disqualification to hold
public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage.

While Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for Violation of RA 8294 is

hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the cash bond posted by accused therein for his
provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and released to said accused.

The subject firearms (Exhs. "H", "I" & "J"), and the live ammunitions (Exhs. "K to
K-2"") shall, however, remain in custodia legis for proper disposition of the
appropriate government agency.

SO ORDERED.[52] (Emphasis in the original)

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment. [53] It held that
the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper
motive; thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. [54] The acts of
government authorities were found to be regular. [55]

The Court of Appeals did not find Dela Cruz's defense of denial meritorious.
[56]
 "Denial as a defense has been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to
the ease with which it can be concocted."[57] Dela Cruz did not present any evidence
"to show that he had authority to carry outside of residence firearms and
ammunition during the period of effectivity of the Gun Ban [during] election time."
The prosecution was able to prove Dela Cruz's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed

January 27, 2010 Consolidated Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
12 of Cebu City in Criminal Case CBU-59434 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs on
accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[59] (Emphasis in the original)

Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[60] which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated August 23, 2013.[61]

Dela Cruz filed this Petition on November 4, 2013.[62] In the Resolution[63] dated

December 9, 2013, this court required respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, to submit its Comment on the Petition. Respondent submitted its
Comment[64] on March 6, 2014, which this court noted in the Resolution [65] dated
March 19, 2014.

Dela Cruz claims that he was an on-the-job trainee for an inter-island vessel. [66] He
was "well[-]acquainted with [the] inspection scheme [at the] ports." [67] He would
not have risked placing prohibited items such as unlicensed firearms inside his
luggage knowing fully the consequences of such an action. [68]

According to Dela Cruz, when he arrived at the port on May 11, 2007, he left his
luggage with a porter to buy a ticket.[69] "A considerable time of fifteen minutes
went by before he could secure the ticket while his luggage was left sitting on the
floor with only the porter standing beside it." [70] He claims that someone must have
placed the unlicensed firearms inside his bag during the period he was away from
it.[71] He was surprised when his attention was called by the x-ray machine operator
after the firearms were detected.[72]

Considering the circumstances, Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary
waiver against warrantless search:[73]
In petitioner's case, it may well be said that, with the circumstances attending the
search of his luggage, he had no actual intention to relinquish his right against
warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief that when his luggage would
pass through the routine x-ray examination, nothing incriminating would be
recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the examination
of his luggage. . . . [H]e believed that no incriminating evidence wfouldj be
found. He knew he did not place those items. But what is strikingly unique about
his situation is that a considerable time interval lapsed, creating an opportunity for
someone else to place inside his luggage those incriminating items. [74] (Emphasis in
the original)

Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz's right to
unreasonable search and seizure, thus warranting his conviction. [75] Dela Cruz was
"caught in flagrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers and four (4) live
ammunitions when his bag went through the x-ray machine in the Cebu Domestic
Port on May 11, 2007, well within the election period." [76] The firearms were seized
during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security
procedure.[77]

According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and

seizures conducted by airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security
procedures.[78]

Records are also clear that Dela Cruz voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable
searches and seizure.[79] The trial court found that Dela Cruz voluntarily gave his
consent to the search.[80]

Dela Cruz's claim that his bag was switched is also baseless.[81] The witnesses
categorically testified that Dela Cruz was "in possession of the bag before it went
through the x-ray machine, and he was also in possession of the same bag that
contained the firearms when he was apprehended."[82]

Dela Cruz raised the lone issue of "whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
finding [him] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt[.]" [83]

The issues for resolution in this case are:

First, whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of the illegal
firearms within the meaning of the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in
relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;

Second, whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; and

Lastly, assuming that there was no waiver, whether there was a valid search and
seizure in this case.
We deny the Petition.

The present criminal case was brought to this court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The penalty imposed on petitioner by the trial court is material in
determining the mode of appeal to this court. A petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 must be differentiated from appeals under Rule 124, Section
13[84] involving cases where the lower court imposed on the accused the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or, previously, death.[85]

In Mercado v. People:[86]

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case
brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment,
then it should impose such penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify
the case and elevate the entire records to this Court for review. This will obviate
the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between
this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction
over the case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of
Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the
case.

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than
reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may be had only by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 where only errors or questions of law may be raised.
[87]
 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law are
reviewed by this court.[88] The rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 is based on sound and practical policy
considerations stemming from the differing natures of a question of law and a
question of fact:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses,
the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. [89]

Concomitantly, factual findings of the lower courts as affirmed by the Court of

Appeals are binding on this court.[90]

In contrast, an appeal in a criminal case "throws the whole case open for
review[.]"[91] The underlying principle is that errors in an appealed judgment, even
if not specifically assigned, may be corrected motu propio by the court if the
consideration of these errors is necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the case.
[92]
 Nevertheless, "the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the
manner provided for by law[.]"[93]

II

Petitioner argues that the firearms found in his bag were not his. Thus, he could not
be liable for possessing the contraband. Key to the resolution of this case is
whether petitioner possessed firearms without the necessary authorization from the
Commission on Elections. Petitioner was charged under special laws: Republic Act
No. 8294 and Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section
261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The law applicable is Section 2(a) of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764,
which provides:

SECTION 2. Prohibitions. During the election period from January 14, 2007 it shall
be unlawful for:

a. Any person, including those possessing a permit to carry firearms outside of

residence or place of business, to bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons in public places including any building, street, park, private
vehicle or public conveyance. For the purpose firearm includes airgun, while
deadly weapons include hand grenades or other explosives, except
pyrotechnics[.]

Section 261 (q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 states:

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
....

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. - Any person who,
although possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his
residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized in
writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall
not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof. (Par. (1),
Id.)

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the
performance of their duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties,
profession, business or occupation habitually carry large sums of money or
valuables.

For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, we will
examine three (3) points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of petitioner:
first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-ray scanning to port authorities; second,
when the baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the Port Authority
Police; and third, when the police officer opened the bag to search, retrieve, and
seize the firearms and ammunition.

III

The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection
to port personnel—the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the
x-ray machine station.[94] With regard to searches and seizures, the standard
imposed on private persons is different from that imposed on state agents or
authorized government authorities.

In People v. Marti,[95] the private forwarding and shipping company, following

standard operating procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for
shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and detected a peculiar odor from the packages.
[96]
 The representative from the company found dried marijuana leaves in the
packages.[97] He reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation and
brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory
examination.[98] Agents from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took
custody of the illegal drugs.[99] Andre Marti was charged with and was found guilty
of violating Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
[100]

This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. [101] The evidence
obtained against the accused was not procured by the state acting through its
police officers or authorized government agencies. [102] The Bill of Rights does not
govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of
private individuals:[103]

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.[104]

Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted

by private persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule. [105]

To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in this case was
committed by private or public persons, we revisit the history and organizational
structure of the Philippine Ports Authority.
Port security measures are consistent with the country's aim to develop
transportation and trade in conjunction with national and economic growth. In
1974, the Philippine Ports Authority was created for the reorganization of port
administration and operation functions.[106] The Philippine Ports Authority's Charter
was later revised through Presidential Decree No. 857. The Revised Charter
provided that the Authority may:

after consultation with relevant Government agencies, make rules or regulations for
the planning, development, construction, maintenance, control, supervision and
management of any Port or Port District and the services to be provided therein,
and for the maintenance of good order therein, and generally for carrying out the
process of this Decree.[107]

The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given police authority through
Executive Order No. 513,[108] which provides:

Sec. 2. Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as follows:

Section 6-c. Police Authority - The Authority shall have such police authority within
the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and
functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise
of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within
the area. Such police authority shall include the following:

a) To provide security to cargoes, port equipment, structure, facilities, personnel

and documents: Provided, however, That in ports of entry, physical security to
import and export cargoes shall be exercised jointly with the Bureau of Customs;

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons
and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft;

c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in coordination with local police
authorities;

d) To supervise private security agencies operating within the port area; and

e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority pursuant to law.

(Emphasis supplied)

In 1992, the Cebu Port Authority was created to specifically administer all ports
located in the Province of Cebu.[109] The Cebu Port Authority is a "public-benefit
corporation . . . under the supervision of the Department of Transportation and
Communications for purposes of policy coordination." [110] Control of the ports was
transferred to the Cebu Port Authority on January 1, 1996, when its operations
officially began.[111]

In 2004, the Office for Transportation Security was designated as the "single
authority responsible for the security of the transportation systems [in] the
country[.]"[112] Its powers and functions included providing security measures for all
transportation systems in the country:

b. Exercise operational control and supervision over all units of law enforcement
agencies and agency personnel providing security services in the transportation
systems, except for motor vehicles in land transportation, jointly with the heads of
the bureaus or agencies to which the units or personnel organically belong or are
assigned;

c. Exercise responsibility for transportation security operations including, but not

limited to, security screening of passengers, baggage and cargoes, and hiring,
retention, training and testing of security screening personnel;

d. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and/or instrumentalities of the

government, formulate, develop, promulgate and implement comprehensive
security plans, policies, measures, strategies and programs to ably and decisively
deal with any threat to the security of transportation systems, and continually
review, assess and upgrade such security plans, policies, measures, strategies and
programs, to improve and enhance transportation security and ensure the
adequacy of these security measures;

e. Examine and audit the performance of transportation security personnel,

equipment and facilities, and, thereafter, establish, on a continuing basis,
performance standards for such personnel, equipment and facilities, including for
the training of personnel;

f. Prepare a security manual/master plan or programme which shall prescribe the

rules and regulations for the efficient and safe operation of all transportation
systems, including standards for security screening procedures, prior screening or
profiling of individuals for the issuance of security access passes, and determination
of levels of security clearances for personnel of the OTS, the DOTC and its attached
agencies, and other agencies of the government;

g. Prescribe security and safety standards for all transportation systems in

accordance with existing laws, rules, regulations and international conventions;

h. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC, issue Transportation

Security Regulations/Rules and amend, rescind or revise such regulations or rules
as may be necessary for the security of the transportation systems of the country[.]
[113]
 (Emphasis supplied)

The Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures imposed by the Office for
Transportation Security, including the National Security Programme for Sea
Transport and Maritime Infrastructure.[114]

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the
security of persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction
between port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering that port
personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents of
government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel
during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

In People v. Malngan,[115] barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed

as law enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution.
[116]
 In People v. Lauga,[117] this court held that a "bantay bayan," in relation to the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation under Article III, Section 12 [118] of the
Constitution, "has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]" [119]

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related
functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present
case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not
unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in
domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

In People v. Suzuki,[120] the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod

Airport Terminal."[121] He was "bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine
Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked 'Bongbong's
piaya."[122] The accused "proceeded to the 'walk through metal detector,' a machine
which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic
substance or object."[123] "Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm
sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the
box he was carrying."[124] When the accused was asked to open the content of the
box, he answered "open, open."[125] Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops
were then found inside the box.[126] Suzuki argued that the box was only given to
him as "pasalubong" by a certain Pinky, whom he had sexual relations with the
night before.[127] He did not know the contents of the box.[128]

This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid
exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a
routine airport security procedure:[129]

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed

formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Given the
circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted by the airport
authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting
tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his
arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid search are
thus admissible as evidence against appellant.[130] (Citations omitted)

The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy

when coming into airports or ports of travel:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest
the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable,
given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and
the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.  Indeed, travelers
are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
[131]
 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People.[132] This court in Sales
upheld the validity of the search conducted as part of the routine security check at
the old Manila Domestic Airport—now Terminal 1 of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport.[133]

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray
scanning machines for inspection of passengers' bags. [134] When the results of the
x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had
probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner did not
contest the results of the x-ray scan.

IV

Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion—when the
baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called the attention of the port
police officer?

We rule in the negative.

The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the
safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already
submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray
scanning machine.

The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner
had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel
if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual
inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been
committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers
passing through ports or terminals. Probable cause is:

reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in

themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that
can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.
[135]

It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person's

right to travel if weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the
port facility.

As one philosopher said, the balance between authority and an individual's liberty
may be confined within the harm that the individual may cause others. John Stuart
Mill's "harm principle" provides:

[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it
is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The
only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign.[136]

Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects
for port security measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured
against the possible harm to society caused by lawless persons.

A third point of intrusion to petitioner's right to privacy occurred during petitioner's

submission to port security measures. This court should determine whether the
requirements for a valid waiver against unreasonable searches and seizures were
met.

After detection of the firearms through the x-ray scanning machine and inspection
by the baggage inspector, Officer Abregana was called to inspect petitioner's bag.
The Constitution safeguards a person's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[137] A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable.[138] However,
this court lays down the exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed
legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain
view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
[139]

In Caballes v. Court of Appeals:[140]

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against

obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right.[141]

Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly consent to the
search conducted by the port authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual
intention to relinquish his right against a warrantless search.

In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The trial court's findings show that
petitioner presented his bag for scanning in the x-ray machine. [142] When his bag
went through the x-ray machine and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily
submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities:

Prosecutor Narido:

Q. What did he tell you?

A. I asked him if I can check his bag?

Q. What was his response?

A. He consented and cooperated. I checked the bag.[143]

It was after the port personnel's inspection that Officer Abregana's attention was
called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner's consent. [144]

"[A]ppellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment of witnesses'

credibility by the trial court, because the latter was in a better position to observe
their demeanor and deportment on the witness stand." We do not find anything
erroneous as to the findings of fact of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the
search of his personal effects. As the trial court found:
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search conducted by
the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused's
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed
the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante
delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the
course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the] accused.
[146]

Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui[174] and People v.

Omaweng[148] who permitted authorities to search their persons and premises
without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from claiming an invalid warrantless
search when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In addition,
petitioner's consent to the search at the domestic port was not given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances.[149]

This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on

Elections,[150] which involved the search of a moving vehicle at a checkpoint.[151] In
that case, there was no implied acquiescence to the search since the checkpoint set
up by the police authorities was conducted without proper consultation, and it left
motorists without any choice except to subject themselves to the checkpoint:

It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search

constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of
the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.

While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however

stressed that "guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and
political rights results from the implementation of this authority," and that "the
places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation
with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5,
Resolution No. 2323." The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five
o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter,
or thirty minutes later. It was not shown that news of impending checkpoints
without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for the same have been
announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint
that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a
result, motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the
reason behind the instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and
search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the
PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would raise
suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist and to
conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped
for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose
of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the
operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not
have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive
search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if
there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part
to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is
no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. [152] (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

We also cannot subscribe to petitioner's argument that there was no . valid consent
to the search because his consent was premised on his belief that there were no
prohibited items in his bag. The defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found does not automatically negate valid consent to the search when
incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be measured against the
totality of the circumstances.[153] Again, petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to
port security measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was familiar with the
security measures since he had been traveling back and forth through the sea port.

Consequently, we find respondent's argument that the present petition falls under a
valid consented search and during routine port security procedures meritorious. The
search conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.

VI

The consented search conducted on petitioner's bag is different from a customs

search.

Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are

allowed when "persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect
search and seizure ... in the enforcement of customs laws." [154] The Tariff and
Customs Code provides the authority for such warrantless search, as this court
ruled in Papa, et at. v. Mago, et al.:[155]

The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the
Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope
or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases.[156] (Citation omitted)

The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People,[157] in that the state's policy to
combat smuggling must not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on whether
the state has the duty to accord constitutional protection to dutiable articles on
which duty has not been paid, as with a person's papers and/or effects. [158]

Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s
conducting the search was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2)
the search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is
not a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of
routine port security measures. The search was not conducted by persons
authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the
Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches usually
occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the search must be for the
enforcement of customs laws.

VII

In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in possession of a firearm . . .
outside of his residence within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the
COMELEC sans authority[.]"[159]

In Abenes v. Court of Appeals,[160] this court enumerated the elements for a

violation of the Gun Ban: "1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting
firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election
period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place."[161] This court also ruled
that under the Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a
written authority to possess a firearm is on the accused. [162]

We find that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation of
the Gun Ban. The firearms were found inside petitioner's bag. Petitioner did not
present any valid authorization to carry the firearms outside his residence during
the period designated by the Commission on Elections. He was carrying the
firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place.

However, petitioner raised the following circumstances in his defense: (1) that he
was a frequent traveler and was, thus, knowledgeable about the security measures
at the terminal; (2) that he left his bag with a porter for a certain amount of time;
and (3) that he voluntarily put his bag on the x-ray machine for voluntary
inspection. All these circumstances were left uncontested by the prosecution.

This court is now asked to determine whether these circumstances are sufficient to
raise reasonable doubt on petitioner's guilt.

When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in his bag, the
burden of evidence to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the burden of
evidence does not equate to the reversal of the presumption of innocence.
In People v. Villanueva,[163] this court discussed the difference between burden of
proof and burden of evidence, and when the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused:

Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond
reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish,
with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible
therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the
prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in
discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the
court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has established a prima
facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making
it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to
overthrow, that prima facie case.[164] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution's evidence that he had animus

possidendi or the intent to possess the illegal firearms. In People v. De Gracia, this
court elucidated on the concept of animus possidendi and the importance of the
intent to commit an act prohibited by law as differentiated from criminal intent.
[166]
 The accused was charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 resulting
from the coup d'etat staged in 1989 by the Reform Armed Forces Movement -
Soldiers of the Filipino People.[167] This court held that the actions of the accused
established his intent to possess the illegal firearms:

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime
is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the
act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to
perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by
the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime),
there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is
enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and
intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to
convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there
was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such
intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious
intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal
intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use
of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license
to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of

a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of
this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is
physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent,
there is no offense committed.

Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De
Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms,
explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor.
Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first
one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same,
and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives
marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. At first, appellant denied any knowledge
about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the
explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession
thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was
merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or
indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.

Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case

basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and
the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of thought is often
disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a
former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his
separation from the service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). We do not
hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and
knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of
ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a
former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance
on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and
ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a
military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be
stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man
would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place
intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all,
directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition. [168] (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

The disquisition in De Gracia on the distinction between criminal intent and intent to
possess, which is relevant to convictions for illegal possession of firearms, was
reiterated in Del Rosario v. People.[169] This court ruled that "[i]n the absence
of animus possidendi, the possessor of a Firearms incurs no criminal liability.” [170]

In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his possession of the illegal firearms
seized from his bag was “temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless
possession[.]”[171] As put by the trial court, petitioner’s claim that anyone could
have planted the firearms in his bag while it was unattended is flimsy. [172] There are
dire consequences in accepting this claim at face value, particularly that no one will
be caught and convicted of illegal possession of firearms.

Courts must also weigh the accused’s claim against the totality of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. This includes determination of: (1) the motive of
whoever allegedly planted the illegal firearms(s); (2) whether there was
opportunity to plant the illegal firearms(s); and (3) reasonableness of the situation
creating the opportunity.

Petitioner merely claims that someone must have planted the firearms when he left
his bag with the porter. He did not identify who this person could have been and he
did not state any motive for this person to plant the firearms in his possession,
even if there was indeed an opportunity to plant the firearms.

However, this court is mindful that, owing to the nature of his work, petitioner was
a frequent traveler who is well-versed with port security measure. We cannot
accept that an average reasonable person aware of travel security measures would
leave his belongings with a stranger for a relatively long period of time. Also,
records show that petitioner had only (1) bag. There was no evidence to show that
a robust young man like petitioner would have been need of the porter’s services.
The defense did not identify nor present this porter with whom petitioner left his
bag.

VIII

The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for
violation of Republic Act no. 8294, otherwise known as illegal possession of
firearms. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294 provides:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32
and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied)

Agote v. Judge Lorenzo[173] already settled the question of whether there can be a

"separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there is
another crime committed[.]"[174] In that case, the petitioner was charged with both
illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Gun Ban under Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 2826.[175] This court acquitted petitioner in the case for
illegal possession of firearms since he simultaneously violated the Gun Ban. [176] This
court also held that the unlicensed firearm need not be actually used in the course
of committing the other crime for the application of Section 1 of Republic Act No.
8294.[177]

Similarly, Madrigal v. People[178] applied the ruling in Agote and held that Section 1

of Republic Act No. 8294 is express in its terms that a person may not be convicted
for illegal possession of firearms if another crime was committed. [179]

IX

We note that the trial court imposed the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
one (1) year and to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of
the right to suffrage. Under Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, persons found
guilty of an election offense "shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than
one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation." [180] The
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by both the Revised
Penal Code and special laws.[181]

The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts must follow. The trial court
should have provided minimum and maximum terms for petitioner's penalty of
imprisonment as required by the Indeterminate Sentence Law. [182] Accordingly, we
modify the penalty imposed by the trial court. Based on the facts, we deem it
reasonable that petitioner be penalized with imprisonment of one (1) year as
minimum to two (2) years as maximum.[183]

The records are unclear whether petitioner is currently detained by the state or is
out on bail. Petitioner's detention is relevant in determining whether he has already
served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court as modified by
this court, or whether he is qualified to the credit of his preventive imprisonment
with his service of sentence.

Article 29[184] of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. -

Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the
full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects
thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times
of any crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed
to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a
counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the
time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
deducted from thirty (30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to

the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on
appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for
purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the
accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may
motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists,
habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the
accused may be sentenced is lestierro [sic], he shall be released after thirty (30)
days of preventive imprisonment.

In case credit of preventive imprisonment is due, petitioner must first signify his
agreement to the conditions set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. [185] If
petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial
court, then his immediate release from custody is in order unless detained for some
other lawful cause.[186]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

September 8, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No.
01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz
is sentenced to imprisonment of one (1) year as minimum to two (2) years as
maximum in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The period of his
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor if he has given his written
conformity to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and if he is not
out on bail.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 06, 1994 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON AND JOHN DOES,
ACCUSED.  ROLANDO DE GRACIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged
in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed
Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps
in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-
tora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of
the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took
over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and
Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine
Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San
Juan, Metro Manila.[1]

Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for

illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for
attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-
11756, respectively, which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 103.

In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several
John Does whose true names and identities have not as yet been ascertained, were
charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO
MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and control, the
following to wit:

Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites

Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each

One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs

without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from
the proper authorities, and armed with said dynamites, ammunition and explosives
and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by
common designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of
rebellion, by then and there participating therein and publicly taking arms against
the duly constituted authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and
removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof."[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto
Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were charged with attempted homicide
allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon City upon the person of
Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.

Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion,

but was acquitted of attempted homicide.

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he
admitted that he is not authorized to possess any firearms, ammunition and/or
explosive.[3] The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the
period from November 30 up to December 9, 1989. [4]

The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria
of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on
board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office
located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team
composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one
S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the
night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an
intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being
occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.

Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen
meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino
had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was
then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near
Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from
the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment,
Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and
immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they
passed by the group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew
their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt.
Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate
because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or
bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.

As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team

composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion,
Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col.
delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate
six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia,
the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office
of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia
was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of
Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested
appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the
Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of
the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant
was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there
was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being
mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity
of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr.
Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.

Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims
that on November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col.
Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 1, 1989.
Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office
on December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent
to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano
which is located at the right side of the building. He denies, however, that he was
inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had
explosives in his possession. He testified that when the military raided the office, he
was ordered to get out of his house and made to lie on the ground face down,
together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. He avers that
he does not know anything about the explosives and insists that when they were
asked to stand up, the explosives were already there.

Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), and that he knew
Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the 1987 coup d'etat.
In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no job. Col.
Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the
marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant
worked for Matillano.

De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against
him because "bata raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col.
Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin."

On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment [5] acquitting appellant
Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and
sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, it made a
recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely
executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd
paragraph of Art. 135, R.P.C., the court recommends that Rolando de Gracia be
extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good
behavior."

That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of
firearms for the reason that he did not have either physical or constructive
possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the same; he is
neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and
explosives were found; he was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand
boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did
not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to possess,
which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866,
was not present in the case at bar.

Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:

"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of
firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the

penalty of death shall be imposed.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection

with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall
be imposed."

Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally
affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and
manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which criminal acts have
resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable
resources of the country. The series of coup d'etats unleashed in the country during
the first few years of the transitional government under then President Corazon P.
Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree
No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or
acts which tend to disturb public peace and order.

I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential

element of the offense punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so,
whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and
ammunition.

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of

firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which
includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and management. [6] This has to be so if the
manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to
public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law
the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. [7]

But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a

person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to
constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense
of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law,
[8]
 in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. [9]

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime
is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the
act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to
perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by
the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime),
there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is
enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. [10]

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and
intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to
convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there
was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.[11] Such
intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious
intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal
intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use
of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license
to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of

a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of
this kind of weapon,[12] such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there
is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the  animus
possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.

Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De
Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms,
explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor.
Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first
one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same,
and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives
marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4.[13] At first, appellant denied any knowledge
about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the
explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession
thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was
merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or
indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.

Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case

basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and
the surrounding circumstances. What exists in the realm of thought is often
disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a
former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his
separation from the service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). [14] We do
not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and
knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of
ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a
former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance
on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and
ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a
military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be
stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man
would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place
intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all,
directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.

On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that

appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles confiscated from his
person.

II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search
and seizure in this case. While the matter has not been squarely put in issue, we
deem it our bounden duty, in light of advertence thereto by the parties, to delve
into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by the raiding team,
considering the gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be
convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed.

It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were
not armed with a search warrant at that time.[15] The raid was actually precipitated
by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM.
[16]
 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to
open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to
break into the Office.[17] The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it
is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for
explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there
was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was
under attack by rebel forces.[18] The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.

Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant
their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had
no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted,
his court was closed.[19] Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search
warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was
amply explained in People vs. Malmstedt[20] and bears reiteration:

"While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers
to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

"Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.

"Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this
Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.

"Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their
Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

"When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of
herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was
carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, against
persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied
by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out
by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held
that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly
and there was no time to secure a search warrant.

"It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine
check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no
extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a
bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused
was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion
of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular
norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily
present his identification papers when required to do so?

"The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to
produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch
bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity
by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society."

In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al. vs. Ramos, et al.,
[21]
 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:

"The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to
quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court
for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure
in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by
the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence
against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are)
of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contigencies continues cannot be less justified."

III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from
November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a
rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of
the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was
for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.

The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in
a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The
court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal
needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the Government,
particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding
the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this
finding of the lower court.

The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by
the court below as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the
penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that appellant is charged with
the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of
rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are
two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The
Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson,
or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be
committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and
punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms
committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.[22]

As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of

Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court has explained that said provision of the law
will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is penalized under two
different statutes with different penalties, even if considered highly advantageous
to the prosecution and onerous to the accused.[23] It follows that, subject to the
presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate
prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a
violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double
jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by
a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code,
[24]
 with variant elements.

It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision
of the Revised Penal Code in this prosecution for a crime under a special law.
Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for executive clemency in
favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with
good behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the
President whose decision thereon should be insulated against any tenuous
importunity.

Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition
confiscated from appellant De Gracia were illegally possessed by him in furtherance
of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. In the words of the court a
quo:

"2. the nature and quantity of the items - 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of
M-16 ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports received by
the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the rebels was not
without basis. Those items are clearly not for one's personal defense. They are for
offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that per instruction of Col. Matillano he
went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to stay guard there.

"His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in
that office is not credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the
birthday party of Col. Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-
soldiers were present which self-evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the company
of his boss, was still very much at home and constantly in touch with soldiers and
the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989 was a military
coup d'etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with caretaking (sic)
there in the Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand man
of Col. Matillano; and (d) as heretofore discussed, de Gracia was earlier seen with
some men who fired upon a car of the AFP intelligence agents." [25]

Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At
the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the governance of
that law, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution.
Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty
of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court, albeit with
an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but
its recommendation therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof
are hereby DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, VS.
ANDRE MARTI, ACCUSED/APPELLANT.

DECISION

BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision[*] rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila

(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of a violation of
Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i),
Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

"On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila, Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift-wrapped packages.  Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation
to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.  The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he
was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.  Appellant filled up the
contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number,
the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)

“Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages.  Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich.  In view
of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages.  The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box
one by two feet in size (1' x 2').  Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top
of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box
ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).

"Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of

Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (propietor and husband of Anita Reyes), following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection.   When he opened
appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom.  His curiosity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside.  Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding
from the opening of one of the gloves.  He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-
30, October 6, 1987; Underscoring supplied).

"Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).

"He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987.  He was interviewed by the Chief of
Narcotics Section.  Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office.  Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a
photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6,
1987).

"Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in
the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and
took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves.  Dried marijuana leaves
were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38,
October 6, 1987; Underscoring supplied).

"The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. 
He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana
leaves.  The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. 
It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars
(tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).

"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn,
pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail.  Appellant's
stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents
requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security.  On August 27, 1987,
appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI
to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves.  On the same
day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic
Chemistry Section for laboratory examination.  It turned out that the dried leaves
were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist.  (Appellee's
Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425,

otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY

SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE

UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER
CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF

THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3. Art. III, Constitution) and
therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 [2],
Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

"Section 2.  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
"Section 3.  (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

"(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search

and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows.:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment [*] to the United
States Constitution.  As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the
United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are
considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal
Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 [1961]), this Court, in
Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence
obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the
process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948])
wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its
seizure.  The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized
the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the
1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has
struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.  (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc.,
v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People
v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]: Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also
Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so
obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State
authorities.  Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? 
Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative.  In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties

guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]):

"1.  This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the

immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included an which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. 
xxx

"xxx There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle.  Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life.  xxx" (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Underscoring supplied).

In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 574; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the
Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
declared that:

"(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action.  Its
origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities
of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than
governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his
dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by
process duly served."

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a
parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof
found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that
the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents,
not upon private individuals, (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal.App.2d 621, 49 Cap.
Rptr. 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965):  State v. Olsen,
Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Barnes v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967).  The Court
there said:

"The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen -
the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left
behind a travel case containing the evidence[*] complained of.  The search was
made on the motel owner's own initiative.  Because of it, he became suspicious,
called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available
to the authorities.

"The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of
evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.  Rather, the amendment
only proscribes governmental action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted
against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal
search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which
resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two ways.  In

both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition
that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited
merchandise.  Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. 
Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of
Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of
Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8;
Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he
took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of
business.  Thereafter, he opened the parcels containing the rest of the shipment
and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents.  Clearly, the NBI
agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution.  Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.  Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135).  Where
the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274
US 559,, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d.
726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the
property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager
and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable
search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.  True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law
of the land must always be subject to protection.  But protection against whom? 
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:

"First, the general reflections.  The protection of fundamental liberties in the

essence of constitutional democracy.  Protection against whom?  Protection against
the state.  The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
state.  Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals.  What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder."
(Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas; Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Underscoring supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore

applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law.  Thus, it could only be invoked against the State
to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.  However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.  In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has
been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly
declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence
was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8,
Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable.  For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not
govern relationships between individuals.  Moreover, it must be emphasized that
the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to
the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the
responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30,
1987].  The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the
restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed
against.  The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be
invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of
sovereign authority.  To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
violation of the Bill of the Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected

through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-
governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.

2.  In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred
in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution
while under custodial investigation were not observed.

Again, the contention is without merit.  We have carefully examined the records of
the case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was
not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the
assistance of counsel.  The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was
informed of his constitutional rights.  It is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given
full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.  What is clear from
the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written
statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI. 
Thus:

"Fiscal Formoso:

"You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes.  What about the accused
here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl?

"WITNESS:

"Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused
availed of his constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir." (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the
defense on cross-examination.  As borne out by the records, neither was there any
proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounseled confession while being
investigated.  What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial
court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while
under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. 
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.

3.  Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to
believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited
drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a
pub along Ermita, Manila; that in the course of their 30-minute conversation. 
Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of
the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next
day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as

incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience.  It can easily be
fabricated.  An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could
not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents.  As stated by the trial court, "(a)
person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as
the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused.  The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply
accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91).  As to why he
readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain.  Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters
(People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People v. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records
of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve
Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the
consignee of the frustrated shipment,  Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was
likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's
residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p.
244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People
v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also
People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]);
Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]).  As records further show, appellant did not
even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. 
Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise,
appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original
Records, p. 40).  On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and
shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule
131).  At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the
assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED.  No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997 ]
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION AND MS. EMMA CO,
PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

DAVIDE, JR. J.:

This petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare
private respondent Antonia Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a “true
Servant,” thereby assailing the 30 September 1993 decision [2] and 2 December
1993 Resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR
CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the reinstatement and monetary awards in
favor of private respondent[4] and denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
[5]

The facts are as follows:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation

(hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.

On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum[6] from WATEROUS Vice

President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to
employees chargeable to the latter’s accounts because the same was a prohibited
practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum [7] to Catolico warning
her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing
Department, as this would impair the company’s control of purchases and, besides
she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.

As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but
explained that her act was “due to negligence,” since fellow employee Irene Soliven
“obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she
claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept.” Catolico then
asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. [8]

In a memorandum[9] dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda

E. Bautro warned Catolico against the “rush delivery of medicines without the
proper documents.”

On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he

noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(hereafter YSP), which he described as follows:

… A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045
with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren
tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previous P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the
price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over
price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of
P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988. Verification
was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost
per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita
Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten
bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check voucher no.
629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China
Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989....

The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having
received it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation
with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check
amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact,
Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the
check but Ms. Saldana answered her “talagang ganyan, bukas.” It appears that the
amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. [10]

Forthwith, in her memorandum[11] dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to

explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico
asked for additional time to give her explanation,[12] and she was granted a 48-hour
extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was
informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. [13]

In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing
Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said
letter she protested Saldaña’s invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an
envelope addressed to Catolico.[14]

In a letter[15] to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel,

explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a
“refund of overprice.” She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-
motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co’s secretary,
Irene Soliven.

On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a

memorandum[16] notifying Catolico of her termination; thus:

We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990
and Feb. 10, 1990 respectively regarding our imposition of preventive suspension
on you for acts of dishonesty. However, said letters failed to rebut the evidences
[sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at
Espana Branch, you actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles
of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with previous price of P320.00/bottle only. A
check which you received in the amount of P640.00 actually represents the refund
of over price of said medicines and this was confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP
Phils., Inc. Accounting Department.

Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the

company. Accordingly, you are hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.

On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension.[17]

In his decision[18] of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof
of unfair labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of
Catolico because petitioners failed to “prove what [they] alleged as complainant’s
dishonesty,” and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the
dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal
and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best
interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico
computed at one-half month’s pay for every year of service; back wages for one
year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension “representing 30
days work.” Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as follows:

30 days Preventive Suspension P 2,000.00

Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21

Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15

TOTAL AWARD: P35,401.86

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it
aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due
process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.

In its decision[19] of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the
Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for
Catolico’s dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner’s evidence
consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which
her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the
check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article
III of the Constitution.[20] It concluded:

With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by

virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents’ case falls
apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for
complainant’s dismissal.

The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive
portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the
same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in
the amount of P35,401.86.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special
civil action for certiorari, which is anchored on the following grounds:

I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of facts.

II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.

III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been
receiving “commissions” from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the
check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also
maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico’s receipt
of YSP’s check, aggravated by her “propensity to violate company rules,”
constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was
given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.

Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People
v. Marti,[21] the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot
be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
disagreed with the NLRC's decision, as it was of the persuasion that (a) the
conclusions reached by public respondent are inconsistent with its findings of fact;
and (b) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to private
respondent does not warrant the application of the constitutional provisions. It
observed that Catolico was given “several opportunities” to explain her side of the
check controversy, and concluded that the opportunities granted her and her
subsequent explanation “satisfy the requirements of just cause and due process.”
The OSG was also convinced that Catolico’s dismissal was based on just cause and
that Catolico’s admission of the existence of the check, as well as her “lame excuse”
that it was a Christmas gift from YSP, constituted substantial evidence of
dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners’ argument that there was no
violation of the right of privacy of communication in this case, [22] adding that
petitioner WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular
suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in which
it had an interest.

In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the
OSG, the NLRC contends that petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim that it
committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we
dismiss this petition.

In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners’ evidence is too “flimsy” to justify
her dismissal. The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it
over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting
gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was
meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in
violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication;
hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners’ claim that the audit report and her initial
response that she never received a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal.
When she denied having received a check from YSP, she meant that she did not
receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her position that what she received
was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the audit report is that there was
apparently an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the
amount in collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a
mere suspicion.

Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of
WATEROUS because, being merely a pharmacist, she did not handle “confidential
information or sensitive properties.” She was doing the task of a saleslady: selling
drugs and making requisitions when supplies were low.

A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except
as to the third ground, the instant petition must fail.

Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that
an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to
answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and
assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. [23] Ample opportunity
connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to
enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. [24]

In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side,
she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by
her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor’s
memorandum spoke of “evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession,” which were
not, however, submitted. What the “evidences” [sic] other than the sales invoice
and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.

Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the
employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure
to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
[25]
 Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.

It is evident from the Supervisor’s memorandum that Catolico was dismissed

because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for
petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. Control
Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolico’s inappropriate
transaction, stated in his affidavit:[26]
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico
in violation of the [company] procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP
Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of
P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00;

5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out
that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP
Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice and
she said that the difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552
which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank
Check No. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.

It clearly appears then that Catolico’s dismissal was based on hearsay information.
Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus,
we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence
carries no probative value.[27]

Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While
Valdez informed Co, through the former’s memorandum [28] of 29 January 1990, that
WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 “thru MBTC Check No. 222832,” the said check was
never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners.

Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do
not indicate an overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989 [29] stated
that the Voren tablets cost P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated 5
October 1989[30] priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in
price may then be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase
order.

Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren
tablets were recommended by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-
MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co.
The purchase orders were silent as to Catolico’s participation in the purchase. If the
price increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers should have
disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for
their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly
incredible situation proposed by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning
Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she
ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said
suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in
the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much
less benefit from, what Valdez called an “under the table deal” with YSP.

Catolico’s dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no

case can justify an employee’s dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes
provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; [31] and even the
dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.
[32]
 Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of
employees the term “trust and confidence” is restricted. [33]

As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision,
we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti [34] that the Bill
of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that
the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.

Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico’s
reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded
separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at
one month’s salary for every year of service.[35] In this case, however, Labor Arbiter
Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month’s salary for every year of
service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the
award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged

decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30
September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-
93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter’s
decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set
aside.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 109279-80, January 18, 1999 ]
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
OCTAVIO MENDOZA Y LANDICHO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to
death.  The trial court found her husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her
death.  However, the real victim of this unfortunate occurrence is the spouses’ only
minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the care of her maternal
grandparents.

For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was
separately charge with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
under two Informations, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 636

That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable motive, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a .38
caliber revolver one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her
serious and mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 637

That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm one .38 caliber revolver, Colt
with Serial No. 41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide,
without first securing the necessary license or permit therefor.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 38-39, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the
merits commenced, following which, a judgment of conviction was rendered,
disposing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

1. In Criminal Case No. 636, and finding accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE, defined and penalized under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties attendant thereto.

He is further ordered to pay to Alipio Eusebio the amount of P66,000.00 for the
funeral, wake, burial and incidental expenses that said Alipio Eusebio spent by
reason of the death of his daughter Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza.

And to Charmaine Mendoza the accused is hereby ordered to pay her the following

1. P50,000.00 for causing the death of her mother Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza;

2. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3. P25,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees.

Plus costs of the proceedings.

Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental
rights over his child Charmaine Mendoza and he cannot inherit from her.

2. In Criminal Case No. 637, and finding the accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho 
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunitions, used in the Commission of Parricide, defined and penalized under
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Presidential decree No.
1878-A said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law.

The firearms and ammunitions used, a Colt Revolver Cal. 38, with a Serial Number
41001 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government together with all the
ammunitions.

With costs against the accused.

Conformably with the Circular of the Honorable Supreme Court, the accused is
hereby ordered committed to the Bureau of Corrections.

The accused, if he appeals the decision is not entitled to Bail.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 76-77, Rollo.)

Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal, arguing that the
trial court erred in –

. . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or

inadmissible, unauthenticated, questionable documents, in grave violation of
accused’s constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his
right against unreasonable search and seizure.

II

. . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredible coached and unreliable
direct testimony of the minor daughter of accused and victim, Charmaine Mendoza,
despite the evident grave conflicts or contradictions thereof to the facts clearly and
decisively testified by and/or findings of the police investigators.

III

. . . not believing the decisively clear and straight forward testimony of the accused
as corroborated by his witness.

IV

. . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal
Possession of Firearms despite the police investigator’s undisturbed findings of a
shooting and stabbing incident, a situation consistent with the decisively clear
postulate of the defense.

. . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without
conceding, that the crime of parricide was committed, the law and doctrine that if a
firearm is used in the commission of a killing (Homicide, parricide, etc.) the same,
as now mandated by Republic Act No. 8294 (known as Revilla Law) must only be
considered an aggravating circumstance.  This is consistent to the rule that Penal
laws favorable to the accused shall have retroactive effects.

The facts as established by the evidence for the prosecution are as follows:

On November 11, 1988, accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then
10-year-old daughter attended the birthday party of a relative of accused-appellant
held at McDonald’s in Harrison Plaza.  While the party was going on, accused-
appellant left and proceeded to Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant where he had
some beer.  When it was time for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could not
find accused-appellant, hence, they decided to just leave, proceeding directly to
their residence at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las
Piñas (p. 4, Appellee’s Brief.).

Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home at around 7 o’clock in the evening but
accused-appellant was not yet there.  After a while, mother and daughter left for
the house of Cecilia’s parents in Bacoor, Cavite to bring some perfume for Cecilia’s
brother, Francisco (p. 5, Ibid.).

At about 9 o’clock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor.  They rode a
jeepney and at the gate of the subdivision where they live, they saw the car of
Rowena Hernandez, Cecilia’s god-daughter, and they hitched a ride home.  Finally
home, they saw their car already parked in the garage of their neighbor.  All the
lights in their house were on but the screen door was locked.  They knocked at the
window but accused-appellant did not respond.  A moment later, however, accused-
appellant opened the back door and mother and daughter went straight to the
master’s bedroom (Ibid.).

While inside the master’s bedroom, accused-appellant who was drunk instructed
Charmaine to get cold water and to douse him.  She willingly obliged, after which
she was told to go to her room.  She change her clothes and readied herself for
bed.  While in her room, Charmaine heard her parents quarrelling over the issue of
Cecilia and Charmaine having left accused-appellant at the party.  Thereafter,
Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots.  Running out of her room, Charmaine
saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room, bleeding profusely. 
Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding a gun under the bed in her parents’ room
(pp. 5-6, Ibid.).

Charmaine ran towards her gasping and bleeding mother and held her.  Then,
accused-appellant asked Charmaine to call her Aunt Dolores Mendoza to inform her
of the death of Cecilia.  Dolores could not believe Charmaine and talked to accused-
appellant instead (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, the victim bled to death on the floor.

Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and

told him that Cecilia had been shot and is already dead.  Gabac, on the other line,
told accused-appellant not to touch anything and that he would be arriving shortly. 
When Gabac finally arrived, he and accused-appellant carried the lifeless body of
Cecilia into accused-appellant’s car and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.

Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced dead on arrival.  The autopsy report indicated the
cause of death as follows:

Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds of the back and left shoulder

Upon receiving information about the shooting incident, Chief Investigator Cpl.
Leopoldo Africa, together with investigators Cpl. Prudencio Parejas, Cpl. Gorgonio
Nortales and Pfc. Rolando Almario, proceeded to the hospital to investigate the
incident, but accused-appellant refused to give any statement or comment. 
Thereafter , the policemen invited Antonio Gabac to accompany them to the crime
scene at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Piñas. 
While they were inspecting the premises, Cpl. Africa noticed something tucked
inside Gabac’s waist.  He promptly told Gabac “Pare pakisurrender mo nga iyong
baril.”  Gabac immediately handed Cpl. Africa a .38 caliber revolver with Serial No.
41001 and with two empty shells and two live rounds.  Gabac informed Africa that
the gun was handed to him by accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at the crime
scene to respond to the call of accused-appellant for assistance (p. 7, Ibid.)

Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughter’s death, and
that valuables were being taken out of his daughter’s house, decided to remove,
together with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including accused-
appellant’s personal effects (p. 8, Ibid.)

From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission

Order No. 86-580-893 dated November 7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col.
Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Central
Warning Wing, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, which authorized accused-appellant to
carry a Colt Revolver, .38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to
December 15, 1986.  There was also a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated
November 10, 1986, approved by Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the Philippine Air
Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain,
PAF, Assistant Director for Personnel which described the firearm as “One Colt
Revolver SN 41001” (p. 52, Rollo).
Accused-appellant tested positive for the presence of nitrates (p. 50, Ibid.).

Accused-appellant’s own account of the incident is to the effect that before the
shooting incident on the night of November 11, 1988, he and his wife Cecilia were
arguing about the latter carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver, and that a few
weeks earlier they likewise argued because he found out that his wife was still
supporting her parents as well as her brothers and sisters.

Further, accused-appellant claimed that he saw men roaming near their house and
that he had received death threats over the telephone because Cecilia owed
$35,000.00 to some people, in relation to her jewelry and perfumes business.  She
also allegedly owed people some cash which was coursed through her by workers
from Saudi Arabia to be sent to their relatives in the Philippines (tsn, November 16,
1992, pp. 14-19).

Accused-appellant claimed that he went home at around 7 o’clock on the night of

November 11, 1988, after his wife, Cecilia, and daughter, Charmaine, had left him
at the party.  When his wife and Charmaine arrived, they proceeded to the master’s
bedroom, after which, her daughter kissed him goodnight.  He and his wife were
then left alone in their room and at that moment, his wife showed him some money
and uttered “Dad, okey na”.  She also brought out the .38 caliber revolver from her
bag then changed her clothes, and went to the bathroom, and he fell asleep (tsn,
November 16, 1992, pp. 21-28).

Thereafter, accused-appellant declared, he was suddenly awakened by an unusual

sound or shot outside their room.  When he went out, he saw his wife wounded and
bleeding, and he felt and heard somebody run from the backdoor of their house
which banged.  Consequently, he ran outside and pursue the intruder who ran from
the backdoor, but accused-appellant claimed that he only went up to their gate
because of his concern over his wife’s condition.

When he went back, he woke up Charmaine, and seeing the condition of Cecilia,
both of them cried.  After a while, he called up his brother-in-law, policeman
Antonio Gabac (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 32, p. 34, p. 37) and the two of them
then brought Cecilia to the hospital.

In the hospital, some police investigators from the Las Piñas Police Station asked
accused-appellant about the incident, but he refused to comment.  He was later
invited to the police station for investigation, but due to the advice of his relative,
Fiscal Castillo, he never gave any statement to the police about the incident.

Accused-appellant denied the charges against him.  While he admitted having been
married to Cecilia on February 28, 1976, he claimed that his wife was killed by
somebody else.  Further, even as he denied possession of a .38 caliber revolver, he
admitted to have been authorized to carry a .45 caliber between the years 1968
and 1969 (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 7 and 68).

Accused-appellant swore that he had no reason to kill his wife because he loved
her.  However, he admitted to have sired children by another woman (tsn,
November 16, 1992, p. 51).

The trial court did not give credence and weight to the defense’s theory that the
victim was engaged in illegal activities which supposedly led to her death.  Rather,
the trial court found that accused-appellant had the opportunity and the propensity
to commit the crime (pp. 66-67, Rollo).

Accordingly, although the evidence was partly circumstantial, the trial court made a
pronouncement that all elements which were needed to arrive at a conclusion that
accused-appellant killed his wife were present and that no proof had been
established by him to overturn its findings (p. 67, Ibid.).

After going through the evidentiary record, we find no reasons to disagree with the
trial court and are convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza
has been duly established.

Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction

is proper if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996]).  Direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt (People vs. Damao, 253 SCRA 146
[1996]).

During the trial of the case, it was duly established that the only persons residing at
No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Piñas, were the
Mendozas, namely, accused-appellant Octavio, his daughter Charmaine, and his
now deceased wife Cecilia.  On the night Cecilia was shot to death, no one was
there except these three persons.  Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the
trial court of his innocence by denying that he killed his wife, insinuating that
another person is the killer.  This stance of denial is negative self-serving evidence
which deserves no evidentiary weight (People vs. Gondora,  265 SCRA 408
[1996]).  The insinuation of accused-appellant that some convenient intruder
perpetrated the killing is absolutely without basis and unsubstantiated.  It is plainly
an afterthought, a devised plot to escape just punishment.  In fact, accused-
appellant even refused to give any statement or comment to the police
investigators to enlighten them about the shooting incident.  If indeed, Cecilia was
shot and killed by somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely
have been but natural for him, as a husband to cooperate with police authorities for
the speedy apprehension of the gunman, by informing them immediately of the
alleged intruder-killer.  But he did not and instead, he took the advice of his
relative, Fiscal Castillo, to keep silent about the incident when the police conducted
the investigation, which is rather odd if he really were innocent.  Verily it was only
on November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the incident that he came out with the
story about the handy intruder.  He kept silent for two long years.

Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court erred in giving full
credence to the testimony of his father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own
daughter, Charmaine Mendoza.  But having been in a better position to observe the
witnesses, the trial court’s appreciation of their testimony, truthfulness, honesty,
and candor, deserves the highest respect (People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731
[1996]).

As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even

before he and his family went to the birthday party of his relative, he and the victim
had already several occasions of altercation.  Such fact was shown when accused-
appellant left his wife and daughter at the party without informing them where he
would be.  The victim’s father, Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accused-
appellant and his daughter, Cecilia, had been quarrelling.  Accused-appellant
suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit relationship with another man.  He
contends that Alipio is not a credible witness for the prosecution in view of his
relationship with the victim and that Alipio resents him on account of his having
children with another woman.

It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not
necessarily mean he is biased.  The Court finds improbable and contrary to human
experience accused-appellant’s claim that Alipio testified for no other purpose but
revenge.  It was not shown that Alipio was actuated by improper motive, thus, his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

The testimony of Charmaine that she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun
under his bed, leads us to believe that accused-appellant killed his own wife. 
Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal liability on his theory that when
Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did not appear to be a
naturally spontaneous narration, but rather evidently a coached one.  According to
to him, this theory was bolstered when she cried and suddenly, embraced accused-
appellant in public view.
On the contrary, the fact that Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute
evidence of her credibility, this, being in accord with human behavior and nature. 
It must have been a most traumatic and painful experience for her, at a very
tender age, to testify in court against her own father whom she loves and respects
as shown by the act of embracing him.

Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaine’s retraction.  But the

trial court correctly disregarded the same.  The first time Charmaine took the
witness stand was in December, 1988, barely a month after her mother’s death. 
Her recantation was made two years later when she was already in the custody of
accused-appellant who was allowed to go out on bail.  Charmaine’s first testimony
was to the effect that she saw her father, accused-appellant, hiding a gun under
the bed, and her subsequent testimony was that she saw no such act.  Such
contradictory statements should not discredit Charmaine as a witness.  The present
rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part,
depending upon the corroborative evidence and probabilities and improbabilities of
the case (People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234 [1995]).  Moreover, mere retraction by a
prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony.  Testimony
solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before
this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be
carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made
carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change
discriminatingly analyzed (Molina vs. People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]).

The trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did
not alter her former testimony for the prosecution.  The second declaration was
received with caution, and it did not impressed the trial court.  Neither are we
persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in mind that Charmaine was living
with and dependent upon her father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her
second declaration.

Another fact which militates against accused-appellant’s denial that he killed his
wife is that the paraffin test conducted on him yielded positive results.  Notably,
this test was conducted a day after the shooting incident.

Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with
Serial Number 41001, the fatal weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to
the victim.  According to accused-appellant, there had been a dispute between him
and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she
went, and not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with
another man.
But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant
as the possessor of the fatal weapon.  Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when
exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her mother was shot.  And
weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. 
Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Piñas police investigators
to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him by accused-
appellant shortly after the shooting incident.  The possession of the fatal gun by
accused-appellant is further established by the memorandum receipt signed by
accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry the said
weapon (p. 66, Rollo).  But accused-appellant claims that these documents were
illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of
communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and
seizure (p. 154, ibid.).

The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies.  The case in point is People
vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the occasion to rule that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of one’s person from interference by government and it cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion.

In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by
accused-appellant’s father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen.  Certainly, a
search warrant is dispensable.

Finally, contrary to accused-appellant’s claim that he was licensed and authorized

to carry a .45 caliber pistol, the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief,
Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and Explosive Unit, dated
December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant is not a licensed firearm holder
of any kind (p. 69, Rollo).

While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the

killing of Cecilia by accused-appellant, the established circumstances abovestated,
however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and with the
hypothesis that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypotheses
that he is not.  And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of
natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome
by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused (People vs. Verano,
264 SCRA 546 [1996]).  The unbelievable story of accused-appellant that the killing
was perpetrated by the “smuggling syndicate’s man” is all too plainly a mere
concoction of accused-appellant designed to exculpate himself from criminal
liability.

Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of
firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was committed, fortunately for
accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997
amended the said decree and the law now merely considers the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not
as a separate offense (People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998).

Withal, accused-appellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special
aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm.  This notwithstanding,
that is, despite the presence of such aggravating circumstance, the penalty
imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may no longer be
increased.  The death penalty cannot be imposed upon accused-appellant since the
killing occurred in November, 1988, when the imposition of the capital penalty was
still proscribed.

WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED,

without special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN Y MACARAMBON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision  dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial
[1]

Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher
Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425  as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
[2]

penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which
reads, thus:

“That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing
approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or prescription.

Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.”[3]

During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger
ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March
13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer,
Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing
jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit.
Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to
search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section.  The suspect was
[4]

identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the
complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily
searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents
back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite
suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the
accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing
white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,” the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the
accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance.  At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque,
[5]

CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard
arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items--the Samsonite suitcase,
a brown bag  and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance.  When
[6] [7]

asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just requested
by a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter’s brother in Iligan
City.  The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to
[8]

the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano
Mijares and his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters,  while the [9]

packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan
de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later
confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
“shabu,” weighing 399.3266 grams. [10]

The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00
p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican “Alex” Macapudi, a neighbor who
has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite
suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi’s
brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying
a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or “maleta” containing the sunglasses and
brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi.  He stayed [11]

at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock
at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to
be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari
Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security force and a
woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told him
that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to
cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage,
so he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi’s
Samsonite suitcase. He left the small “maleta” containing sunglasses and brushes for
fear that they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When requested, he
voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite
suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security
personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance
inside which they suspected to be “shabu.” They took pictures of him with the
merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the
Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF. [12]

On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No.
6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period
of such preventive detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his
sentence.

The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered

to the National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.”[13]

Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:

“I.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS

ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE
CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.“[14]

On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite
suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” was forcibly opened
and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such
unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also
contends that People v. Marti  is not applicable in this case because a vessel security
[15]

personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.

The contentions are devoid of merit.

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution.  Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for
[16]

any purpose in any proceeding.  Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may
[17]

choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is
against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court
in the case of People v. Marti,  “[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties
[18]

guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.”  The [19]

constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint

directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. [20]

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the
suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by
the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain
peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee
and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law.
Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.

On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the
owner of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained
“shabu.” He submits that without knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he
cannot be convicted of the crime charged. [21]

We are not persuaded.

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object
identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.  The [22]

first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We
are left with the third.

As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,  this Court has ruled that to
[23]

warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the
accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of
such articles.  It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs
[24]

constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict

an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.  Hence, [25]

the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge
or animus possidendi. [26]

In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated,
self-serving and incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We find no
reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court’s evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.  Moreover, evidence must be
[27]

credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-
appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be
inspected.  Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which
[28]

had a combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that
he did not present his small “maleta” for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of
expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated,  but he brought the [29]

Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and
even watches. [30]

The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.  To [31]

overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to

the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi as the
owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly
observed by the trial judge:

“First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment
of the imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has
a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is
such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the
Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and
acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused.”[32]

Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the
keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It
will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of
dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in
Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
is AFFIRMED.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017 ]
JEFFREY MIGUEL Y REMEGIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated October

21, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35318, which affirmed the Decision [4] dated October 1,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64 (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 10-912 convicting petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio (petitioner) of the crime
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Facts

On May 27, 2010, an Information[5] was filed before the RTC charging petitioner of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[6] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," the accusatory portion of which reads:

On the 24th day of May 2010, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not
being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control, and custody a total of one point ten
(1.10) grams of dried Marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24, 2010,
a Bantay Bayan operative of Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati City named
Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo) was doing his rounds when he purportedly received
a report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo and
fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony Velasquez (BB Velasquez) then went
to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which they later identified as
herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front
of a gate enclosing an empty lot. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez approached
petitioner and asked him where he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street. BB
Bahoyo then said that he also lived in the same street but petitioner looked
unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an identification card, but petitioner failed to
produce one. BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification card, but
instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing
one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried
marijuana leaves, among others. This prompted BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez to
seize the foregoing items, take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well
as the seized items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo (SPO3 Castillo). SPO3 Castillo then
inventoried, marked, and photographed the seized items, all in the presence of BB
Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, and thereafter, prepared an inventory report and a
request for qualitative examination of the seized two (2) pieces of rolled paper and
for petitioner to undergo drug testing. After examination, it was confirmed that the
aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that petitioner was positive for the
presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both dangerous
drugs.[8]

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different
version of the facts. According to him, he was just urinating in front of his
workplace when two (2) Bantay Bayan operatives, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB
Velasquez, approached and asked him where he lived. Upon responding that he
lived in Kaong Street, BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez then frisked him, took away his
belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought him to the barangay hall. He
was then detained for about an hour before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati
and to another office where a bald police officer questioned him. Thereafter, he was
taken back to the barangay hall where they showed him two (2) sticks of marijuana
joints allegedly recovered from him.[9]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[10] dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime charged and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.[11]

The RTC found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid warrantless
arrest, as petitioner was scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his
arrest. Therefore, the resultant search incidental to such arrest which yielded the
seized marijuana in petitioner's possession was also lawful. In this regard, since the
prosecution has adequately shown that petitioner freely and consciously possessed
such marijuana without authority by law, then he must be convicted for violating
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.[12]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[13] to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[14] dated October 21, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.

[15]
 It held that the search made on petitioner which yielded the seized marijuana
was validly made as it was done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private
parts on public. As such, the said seized marijuana is admissible in evidence and,
thus, sufficient to convict him for the crime charged.[16] The CA likewise held that
the rule on chain of custody was duly complied with and, thus, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs were not compromised.[17]

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[18] which was, however, denied in

a Resolution[19] dated September 5, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld
petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment,
or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that
the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law."[20]

Proceeding from the foregoing, and as will be explained hereunder, petitioner's

conviction must be set aside.

One of the arguments presented in the instant petition is that the search and arrest
made on petitioner were illegal and, thus, the marijuana purportedly seized from
him is inadmissible in evidence.[21] In this relation, it is worth noting that his
arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, are mere Bantay
Bayan operatives of Makati City. Strictly speaking, they are not government agents
like the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of Investigation in
charge of law enforcement; but rather, they are civilian volunteers who act as
"force multipliers" to assist the aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining
peace and security within their designated areas. [22] Particularly, jurisprudence
described the nature of Bantay Bayan as "a group of male residents living in [the]
area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[, which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."[23] In the case of Dela Cruz v.
People[24] involving civilian port personnel conducting security checks, the Court
thoroughly discussed that while the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987
Constitution generally cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals, the
same may nevertheless be applicable if such individuals act under the color of a
state-related function, viz.:

With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons

is different from that imposed on state agents or authorized government
authorities.

In People v. Marti, the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard
operating procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to
Zurich, Switzerland and detected a peculiar odor from the packages. The
representative from the company found dried marijuana leaves in the packages. He
reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation and brought the
samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory examination. Agents
from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal
drugs. Andre Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence
obtained against the accused was not procured by the state acting through its
police officers or authorized government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not
govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the
acts of private individuals:

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within
the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

xxxx

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the
security of persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction
between port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering
that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be
considered agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The
actions of port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the
color of a state-related function.

In People v. Malngan, barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed as
law enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of the
Constitution. In People v. Lauga, this court held that a "bantav bayan," in
relation to the authority to conduct a custodial investigation under Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights[.]"

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-

related functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is inapplicable
in the present case. x x x.[25] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this light, the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan or any
barangay-based or other volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups -
relating to the preservation of peace and order in their respective areas have the
color of a state-related function. As such, they should be deemed as law
enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under Article
III of the 1987 Constitution to them.[26]

Having established that the Bill of Rights may be applied to the Bantay

Bayan operatives who arrested and subsequently searched petitioner, the Court
shall now determine whether such arrest and search were validly made.

Section 2,[27] Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2),[28] Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches
and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree.[29]

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may
be [e]ffected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made
- the process cannot be reversed.[30]

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the
latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should as a general rule be complied with:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless

arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.[31]

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements
must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused had committed it.[32]

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the

commission of an offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while
in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.[33]

In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez simply
responded to a purported report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong
Street which led to petitioner's arrest. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that
he was just urinating in front of his workplace when the Bantay Bayan operatives
suddenly approached and questioned him, and thereafter, frisked and arrested him.
BB Bahoyo's testimony on direct and cross-examinations is enlightening on this
matter, to wit:

PROSECUTOR: x x x
xxxx

So, upon seeing Jeffrey Miguel, what did you do?

WITNESS: We approached him and we asked him what was he doing in

that place and he appears to be intoxicated, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: After questioning him, what did you do?

WITNESS: We asked him from where he is residing and he told us that he

is from Caong Street.

PROSECUTOR: What you do next?

WITNESS: Because I also live in Caong and he is not familiar to me, I asked for his
I.D, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: Was he able to produce an I.D.?

WITNESS: He was not able to produce any I.D., ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: When he failed to produce any I.D., what did you do?

WITNESS: One of my companions asked him if he has any I.D. with him.

PROSECUTOR: Who was this companion of yours?

WITNESS: Mark Anthony Velasquez, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: What was the response of Jeffrey to the request of Mark Anthony
Velasquez?

WITNESS: He brought out the contents of his pocket and he brought out one pack
of Fortune with one stick inside and another pack, Marlboro light pack with one
stick of cigarette and two sticks of marijuana.

xxxx

[on cross examination]

ATTY. PUZON: When you saw certain Jeffrey, you were not familiar with him, is that
correct?
WITNESS: No, sir, I am not familiar with him.

ATTY. PUZON: And when you saw him, he was already showing his private parts, is
that correct?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

ATTY. PUZON: In your "Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay" you stated that when
you saw Jeffrey, his back was turned to you and it seemed that he was peeing. Do
you remember saying that in your "Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay"?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

ATTY. PUZON: So, is it not true that when you saw him, he was already showing his
private parts?

WITNESS: He was showing his private parts, sir.

ATTY. PUZON: While his back turned to you?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

ATTY. PUZON: How could you see his private parts if his back was turned against
you?

WITNESS: He faced us, sir.

xxxx

COURT: Did you charge the accused for urinating in a public place or for
showing his private parts?

WITNESS: No, Your Honor.

ATTY. PUZON: And in fact, only a drug case was filed against Jeffrey?

WITNESS: I have no idea, sir. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)[34]

On the other hand, pertinent portions of petitioner's Judicial Affidavit [35] containing

his direct testimony read:
Q: Naaalala mo pa ba ang petsang 24 May 2010?

A: Opo. lyon pa ang araw nang aka ay dakpin ng dalawang bantaybayan.

Q: Ano ang naaalala mo bago ka mahuli, kung mayroan man?

A: Mga bandang pasado alas dose ng hating gabi ako ay umihi sa tapat ng
pinagtatrabahuhan ko ng may biglang lumapit sa akin na dalawang bantay-bayan.

Q: Ano ang sumunod na nangvari x x x, kung mayroon man?

A: Nagtanong po sila kung saan ako nakatira at sinagot ko 110 nakatira

ako sa Kaong St., Brgy. San Antonio Village, Makati City at pagkatapos ay
kinapkapan nila ako.

Q: May nakuha ba sila sa iyo pakatapos kang kapkapan, kung mayroon

man?

A: Opo. Nakuha nila ang aking charger, cellphone, lighter at

sigarilyong Fortune.

Q: Ano ang sumunod na nangyari, kung mayroon man?

A: Pinosasan nila ako at dinala sa barangay.[36] (Emphases and underscoring

supplied)

On cross-examination, petitioner testified, as follows:

PROSECUTOR: x x x Mr. Witness, you said that at past 12:00 in the midnight of
May 24, 2010 you were arrested by two Bantay Bayan, do you affirm that Mr.
Witness?

WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: And how did you know that they are Bantay Bayan complement?

WITNESS: They told me that they were Bantay Bayan personnel, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: What were you doing then, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: Urinating in front of my place of work, ma'am.

xxxx
PROSECUTOR: And you were working at that time that you were allegedly arrested
by these two Bantay Bayan complement, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: Not anymore because I was staying in at the company, ma'am. x x x x

PROSECUTOR: You urinated outside because you do not have a comfort

room inside, is it not a fact, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR: What is this Fine Home Incorporation doing, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS: I am a caretaker at Fine Home Incorporation I guard the steels, ma'am.

[37]
 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe that at
around past 12 o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 2010, petitioner went out to
the street to urinate when the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon him. The
latter then approached and questioned petitioner, and thereafter, went on to search
his person, which purportedly yielded the marijuana seized from him. Verily, the
prosecution's claim that petitioner was showing off his private parts was belied by
the aforesaid testimonies. Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of
an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting a
crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. Neither do these circumstances necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless
arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan operatives do not have any personal
knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed an offense.

More importantly, the Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's claim
that a valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on account of the alleged
public display of his private parts because if it was indeed the case, then the proper
charge should have been filed against him. However, records are bereft of any
showing that such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view that no prior arrest
was made on petitioner which led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier,
there must first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such
process cannot be reversed.

All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of

petitioner. Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of
such search is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule
under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated
marijuana is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petitioner must
necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability. [38]

WHEREFORE, the petitiOn is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2015 and
the Resolution dated September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
35318 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Jeffrey
Miguel y Remegio is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release,
unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.