STAT CON XI ​(cont.

How is Special Over General Rule Applied in Conflicting Provisions of Different Statutes

BUTUAN SAWMILL v CITY OF BUTUAN (1966)

JURISPRUDENCE:
Statutory construction; An earlier special statute is an exception to the later general statute​.—Where there are two statutes, the earlier
special and the later general—the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special—the fact that one is
special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. [U.S.], 425; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40
Phil. 224)​.
Municipal corporations; Limitation on power to tax.​ —The Local Autonomy Act does not authorize the City of Butuan to tax the business
of electric light, heat and power of the petitioner-appellee which already pays a franchise tax. The logical construction of section 2(d) of
Republic Act No. 2264, that would not nullify section 2(j) of the same Act, is that the local government may only tax electric light and power
utilities that are not subject to franchise taxes, unless the franchise itself authorizes additional taxation by cities or municipalities.
Same; When ordinance prohibiting disconnection of electrical wire is void us depriving electric company of its property without due
process of law.​—The ordinance, which prohibits the disconnection of any electrical wire connected to any consumer’s building with the power
plant without the consent of the consumer, except in case of fire, clear and positive danger to the residents, or order of the authorities, is an
unwarranted exercise of power for the general welfare. In effect the ordinance compels the electric company to keep supplying electric
current to a customer even if the latter does not pay the bills therefore, and to that extent deprives the company of its property without due
process.

FACTS:
● The petitioner-appellee, Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted the legislative franchise (RA 399) for an electric light, heat, and power
system at Butuan and Cabadbaran Agusan.
● It was also issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission
● Ordinance No. 7 as amended by Ord. Nos. 11, 131 and 148 imposed a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business
operated in the city.
● Petitioner disputed the constitutionality of the taxing ordinance, as amended, as one that impared the obligation of contract and
deprives it of property without due process of law; it maintained that the said ordinance are ultra vires and void.
● Respondents argued that the city is empowered under its charter to “provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and
special purposes.”

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not under the existing laws involved, the inclusion of the franchise business of petitioners by the respondents within the coverage
of the taxing ordinances is beyond the city’s power of taxation.

HELD:
Examination of the laws involved shows that the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan within
the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power of the taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the power
therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise, since its charter did not expressly nor
specifically provide for such power. It must be noted that the franchise was granted by the act of the legislature on June 18, 1949 while the
city's charter was approved on June 15, 1950. Where there are two statues, the earlier special and the latter general -- and the terms of the
general broad enough to include the matter provided for the special -- the fact that the one special and the other is general that creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general as the general law of the land, the other as the law
of a particular case,

LAGMAN v CITY OF MANILA (1966)

JURISPRUDENCE:
Statutory construction; Generalia specialibus non dexogant.​—Republic Act No. 409, as amended (Revised Charter of the City of
Manila) is a special law and of later enactment than Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended) so that even if a conflict exists between the provisions of the former and the latter acts, Republic Act No. 409 should prevail.
Same; Repeal by implication is not favored.— ​ Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer an ​exclusive power or authority upon the
Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations
relating to the use of and traffic on national roads or streets. This being the case, section 18(hh) of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548, for repeals by implication are not favored, and a special
law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special circum-stances forcing a contrary
conclusion (Baga ​vs.​ Philippine National Bank, 99 Phil. 889).
Public Service Law; Manila Charter; Authority to superintend, regulate or control streets of Manila is vested in the City.​—Although the
Public Service Commission is empowered, under Section 16 (m) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, to amend, modify or revoke certificates of
public convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision which can be found in this statute vesting power in the Public Service
Commission to superintend, regulate or control the streets of the City of Manila or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy
thereof. On the other hand, this authority is conferred upon the City of Manila. The power vested in the Public Service Commission under
 Section 16(m) is, therefore/subordinate to the authority granted to the said City under section 18(hh) of its revised charter.
Same; Power of Public Service Commission is merely supplementary to those of state organs.​—The powers conferred by law upon the
Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic in the
streets subject to their control. This is evident from section 17 (j) of the Public Service Law. The very fact that the Commission is empowered,
but not required, to demand compliance with apposite laws and ordinances proves that the Commission’s power are merely supplementary to
those of state organs, such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws primarily rests.
Same; Implementation of Ordinance No. 4986 of City of Manila is not arbitrary or unreasonable.​—The implementation of the so-called
“provincial bus ban” ordinance (No. 4986, approved on 13 July 1964) of the City of Manila cannot be validly assailed as arbitrary, oppressive
and unreasonable. Aside from the fact that there is no evidence to substantiate this charge, it is not disputed that petitioner has not been
totally banned or prohibited from operating all his buses, he having been allowed to operate two (2) “shuttle” buses within the city limits.
Same; Saving clause of ordinance is not available to petitioner.​—Petitioner cannot avail of the saving clause of section 18(hh) of
Republic Act No. 409, as amended, because his buses do not merely “pass thru the city,” but are admittedly engaged in business within the
city limits by picking up passengers therein.

FACTS:
● Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission to operate 15 autotruck with 6 routes
and regular terminals for transportation of passengers and freight from Bocaue to Baclaran within Manila bridge, Plaza Lawton, P.
Burgos, and Taft Avenue.
● The Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila enacted Ord. No. 4986 rerouting traffic on roads and streets within the City of
Manila.
● Under the Ord. No. 4986, the petitioner’s buses were classified as “provincial passenger’s buses” and as such, were allowed to
enter the streets of Manila only within designated routes.
● Petitioner claims the ordinance is unconstitutional, saying that the routes within Manila through which he has been authorized to
operate his buses are national roads or streets and the regulation and control relating to the use and traffic of which are vested
under Commonwealth Act. No. 548 in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
● Furthermore, he also contends that the power conferred upon respondent City of Manila under RA 409 does not include the right to
enact such ordinance, which has the effect of amending or modifying a Certificate of Public Convenience grated by the Public
Service Commission.
● Respondents City of Manila, however, maintained that the power to prohibit and regulate the entrance of the provincial public utility
vehicles into the city, except those passing through the city, as provided for in its Charter, is an explicit delegation of police power
which is superior both with respect to the administrative power of the Director of Public Works and the administrative authority of the
Public Service Commission under the Public Service Act.
● Respondents add that Ord. No. 4968 does ot contravene Comm. Act. No. 548 because, even assuming that the conflict exist
between this Act and RA 409, the latter provisions prevail over the former, RA 409 being a special law and of later enactment.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not RA 409 prevails over CA 548 and the Public Service Law.

HELD:
Petition denied​, as correctly maintained by respondents, RA 409 , as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, is a special law and of later enactment that CA 146, so that even conflict exist between the provisions of the former act and the latter
act, RA 409 should prevail over both CA Nos. 548 and 14. It is a rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy
between a general and special law, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passages. And because repeals
by implication are not favored, a special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law.

ARAYATA v JOYA (1928)

JURISPRUDENCE:

FRIAR LANDS; TRANSFER; REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY OF.—The holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands, who has not fully paid the
purchase price, may transfer and convey his rights, but the transferee or grantee is- not subrogated to all the transferor's rights until the
transfer has been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the registry book of the Bureau of Public Lands.
ID.; TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION; LEGACIES,—The holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands has no right to dispose by will of his
rights to said lands to the prejudice of his surviving widow and children, notwithstanding the Civil Code provisions with respect to the conjugal
partnership, which cannot be applied in the instant case, which is governed by a special law, to wit, Act No. 1120.
ID.; SUCCESSION; ADMINISTRATION ; LEGATEES; FRUITS; GOOD FAITH.—While a legatee is entitled to the legacy from the moment of
the death of his predecessor, yet when an administrator is appointed in the testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate, the latter
acquires the possession, being obliged to render account of the fruits, which are subject to the payment of the expenses, and therefore said
legatees cannot allege possession in good faith so as to acquire the fruits according to the Civil Code, and consequently they are bound to
return them to the estate after deducting the necessary expenses for cultivation and preservation.
ID.; ID.; WIDOW'S RIGHTS.—The widow of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands acquired by the Government has an exclusive right
to said lands and their fruits from her husband's death, provided that the deceased has not conveyed them to another during his lifetime and
she fulfills the requirements prescribed by the law for the purchase of the same.

FACTS:
 ● Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of lease to the friar lands in Sta. Cruz de Malabon,
which he continued leasing the insular government acquired the said land.
● While married to plaintiff, Cecilio Joya purchased the lots he was leasing on installments from the government under Act. No. 1120.
● After Cecilio Joya’s death, several dispositions were made by means of his last will and testament.
● Plaintiff opposed the partition of the estate of the decreased on the ground that as the surviving spouse and under Act. No. 1120,
she had an exclusive rights to all the lots in question.
● The Act provides that in the case of the death of the holder of the title of friar lands, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to receive
the title to the land, upon compliance with the requirement to the law.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the dispositions made by Cecilio Joya in his will pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code are valid and effective.

HELD:
The holder of the certificate of the sales of friar lands cannot dispose of his right to said lands by will to the prejudice of his widow and
children. The provisions of the Civil Code referring to conjugal property cannot be applied in this case, because the Law regulating the
acquisition, disposition, and transmission of rights to friar lands acquired by the Insular government lays down rules in conflict with the
aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code: and as the said Code is of a general character, while Act No. 1120 is a special law, the latter should
prevail.

What is the Rule in Case of Conflict Between a Special Provision of a General Law and a General Provision of a Special Law?

BAGATSING v RAMIREZ (1976)

JURISPRUDENCE:
Statutory interpretation; Taxation; Local Government; Where a special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in
particular, the provision of the latter, in case of conflict, will prevail.—The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption
that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute
treats in particular. That exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
speaks of “ordinance” in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to
“ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of “ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here as always, a general provision must give way to
a particular provision. Special provision governs. This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later
than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax Code
which was decreed on June 1, 1973.
Same; Same; Same; No rule prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad one.—In fact,
there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad one. A charter provision may be
impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any
particular charter provision. A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the
reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the State.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative law; The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where issue is purely a legal
one.—Exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exceptions. Where the
question litigated upon is purely a legal one, the rule does not apply. The principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage.
Same; Same; Same; Raising of revenues is the principal object of taxation. An ordinance which imposes rentals, permit fees, tolls and
other fees is a tax ordinance.​—It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a “tax ordinance”, because the
imposition of rentals, permit fees, toils and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function, so that the procedure for
publication under the local Tax Code finds no application. The pretense bears its own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is the
principal object of taxation.
Same; Same; Same; An ordinance of the City of Manila which regulates the operation of public markets and prescribes fees for the
rentals of stalls thereon does not violate Presidential Decree No, 7 which regulates the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal
products.— ​ It is a feeble attempt to argue that the ordinance violates Presidential Decree No. 7, dated September 30, 1972, insofar as it affects
livestock and animal products, because the said decree prescribes the collection of other fees and charges thereon “with the exception of
ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection fees, as well as the delivery, stockyard and slaughter fees as may be authorized by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.” Clearly, even the exception clause of the decree itself permits the collection of the proper fees for
livestock. And the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231, July I, 1973) authorizes in its Section 31: “Local governments may collect fees for the slaughter
of animals and the use of corrals. x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; The function of the Market Committee created under the City Charter of Manila is purely recommendatory and its
non-participation in the enactment of a tax ordinance prescribing fees for operation of market stalls does not vitiate the said ordinance.— ​ The
non-participation of the Market Committee in the enactment of Ordinance No. 7522 supposedly in accordance with Republic Act No. 6039, an
amendment to the City Charter of Manila, providing that “the market committee shall formulate, recommend and adopt, subject to the
ratification of the municipal board, and approval of the mayor, policies and rules or regulation repealing or amending existing provisions of the
market code” does not infect the ordinance with any germ of invalidity. The function of the committee is purely recommendatory as the
underscored phrase suggests, its recommendation is without effect on the Municipal Board and the City Mayor. Its prior acquiescence of an
intended or proposed city ordinance is not a condition sine qua non before the Municipal Board could enact such ordinance. The native power
of the Municipal Board to legislate remains undisturbed even in the slightest degree. It can move in its own initiative and the Market Committee
cannot demur.
 Same; Same; Same; The entrusting of the collection of market stall fees to a private firm does not destroy the public purpose of a tax
ordinance.​—Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use
of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a
“Management and Operating Contract.” The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected, do not go direct to the
private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city.
That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. x x x The people
may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Once it is determined that an ordinance is within the power of a municipal
corporation to enact, the measure may not be invalidated because of consequences that may arise from its enforcement, such as that the
increase rates on market. stall fees will necessarily inure to the benefit of 11 private corporation.​—Nor can the ordinance be stricken down as
violative of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the increased rates of market stall fees as levied by the ordinance
will necessarily inure to the unwarranted benefit and advantage of the corporation. We are concerned only with the issue of whether the
ordinance in question is intra vires. Once determined in the affirmative, the measure may not be invalidated because of consequences that
may arise from its enforcement.

FACTS:
● On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ord. No. 7522 “ AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF
PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS X X X” which was subsequently approved by the
city mayor.
● On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. filed an action with the CFI of Manila seeking the
declaration of nullity of the above ordinance on the ground, among others, that it did not comply with the Revised City Charter ( R.A.
No. 409) which requires ordinance to be published before their enactment and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of
general circulation in the city.
● Petitioners contended that the law has been fully complied with under the Local Tax Code which prescribes for publication only after
the approval of “ordinance levying or imposing taxes, fees, or other charges” either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated
within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or its premises and in two other
conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government.
● After due hearing the merits, the trial court declared Ord. No. 7522 null and void, primarily because it did not comply with the
requirements in the City Charter.
● Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE(S):
Was Ord. No. 7522 validly enacted, even if petitioners only complied with the Local Tax Code and not with the Revised Charter of Manila?

HELD:
YES​, there is no question that the CIty Charter (1949) is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code
(1973) is general law because it applies universally to all local governments. And it is a common rule that a prior special law is not ordinarily
repealed by subsequently general law. The fact that no one is special and other general creates a presumption that the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the general. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where a special statute refers to a subject
in general which the general statute treats in particular. (City of Manila vs. Teotico [1968]). Section 17 of the City Charter speaks of
“ordinance” in general, irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, section 43 of the LTC relates to “ordinance levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. Here as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. This is specially true
where the law containing the general provision was enacted later that containing the general provisions.

TEOTICO v CITY OF MANILA (1968)

JURISPRUDENCE:
Civil Law; Damages; Liability of the City of Manila for damages suffered by reason of defective condition of streets and other public works
under their control or supervision; Case at bar.​—Where a person "fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos
Avenue," wh​i​ch street is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila, the latter is liable for damages for the injuries suffered by the
former. The liability of the City of Manila in the case at bar is governed by Article 2189 of the Civil Code which provides that: "Provinces, cities
and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision."
Same; Section 4 of Republic Act 409 (Charter of Manila) and Article 2189 of the Civil Code distinguished.​—Section 4 of Republic Act 409
refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability
due to "defective streets," in particular.
Same; Article 2189 of the Civil Code does not require that the defective roads should belong to the province, city or municipality.​—Under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets ​belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either
"control or supervision" over said street or road.

FACTS:
● On January 27, 1968 at about 8:00 p.m., Teotico was at the corner of old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, waiting for a jeepney
to take him downtown.
● After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail to a jeepney that came to a stop.
● As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, he took a few steps and fell into an uncovered manhole.
● He sustained a lacerated wound on his left eyelid and contusions on his left thigh.
● Teotico subsequently filed an action for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the mayor, city engineer, city health
officer, city treasurer, and chief of police
 ● Teotico cited Article 2189 of the Civil Code which provides: “provinces, cities,and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.”
● The defense, however, contended that it was Section 4 of R.A. No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) which should prevail. Said
Section provides: “ The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the
Mayor, Municipal Board or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this Chapter, or any other law or ordinance or negligence
of said Mayor, Municipal Board or other officers will enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.”
● The trial court sustained the city’s position and dismissed the complaint.
● On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was modified and the city was ordered to pay Teotico the sum of P6,750.00 in
damages.
● The case was further appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE(S):
Which provision of law should apply?

HELD:
It is true that insofar as its territorial application is concerned, R.A. No. 409 is a special law and a Civil Code, a general legislation. But as
regards subject matter, Section 4 ( R.A. No. 409) establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the city to negligence in general,
regardless of the object thereof, while Article 2189 of Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making cities liable for injuries sustained
due to “defective streets” in particular.

DAVID v COMELEC (1997)

JURISPRUDENCE:

FACTS:
● Alex David, Barangay Chairman of Brgy. 7, Zone 7 of Caloocan City, questioned before the Supreme Court COMELEC’s scheduling
of the barangay elections for the 2nd Monday of May, 1997. RA 7160 (The Local Government Code) sets it as 3 years while the
earlier law, RA 6679 sets it at 5 years.
● COMELEC interpreted it as 3 years, and thus, sets the elections for May 12, 1997.

ISSUE(S):
How long is the term of barangay officials?

HELD:
Sec.2 of RA 6653 (May 6, 1988) provided that “(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years.” However, RA 7160 was
later enacted which reduced the term of “all local effective officials” to three years.

David argues that RA 7160, while it is a later enactment, is a general law as it applies to all local elective officials while RA 6679 applies
specifically to barangay officials. David further argues that RA 7160 violates the constitution which mandate a term for barangay officials of a
term to other other that three (3) years.

First of all, the Supreme Court has already ruled (although indirectly) in Paras vs. COMELEC, G.R No. 123169, Nov. 4, 1996, 76 SCAD 40,
when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled
in May 1997.” Also, Congress has confirmed this interpretation when it passes the general Appropriations Act which provided for a budget for
barangay elections for May 1997.

Further, David is estopped from questioning RA 7160. He was elected directly as barangay captain pursuant to RA 7160. Under No. 6653,
there was no provision for the direct election of barangay captain.

Finally, there is a violation of the Constitution. Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution states: ​“The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x”. ​This simply means that the term of local officials other than
barangay officials has been set by the Constitution as three years. As to barangay officials, this will be set by Congress. There is no logical
reason why the Constitution would prohibit a term of three (3) years for the barangay officials

EXTERNAL AIDS

Rule:​ if after all the intrinsic aids have been availed of and the ambiguity in the statute still exists, resort may then be had to outside or extrinsic
aids. This step is permitted only if an examination of the statute itself, which furnishes the best means for its exposition, is of no avail.
Historical Setting:​ the general rule which is applicable to the construction of all other documents is equally applicable to statutes, that the
interpreter should so far put himself in the position of those whose words he is interpreting as to be able to see what those words relate.
Origin of the Statute

CAROLINA INDUSTRIES v CMS STOCKBROKERAGE (1980)

 JURISPRUDENCE:

FACTS:
● Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing, carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati
stock exchange.
● Within three months, the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission.
● Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice to prove such consent.
● Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes
are interpreted, the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision.

ISSUE(S):
WON there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading.

HELD:
If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself, it is the duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreign
case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States.

US v DE GUZMAN (1915)

JURISPRUDENCE:
CRIMINAL LAW; DEFENDANT DISCHARGED IN ORDER TO TESTIFY; SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION.—​Held, That an order discharging
one of several defendants charged in a complaint or information with the commission of a crime, in order that he may be called to testify
against his co-defendants, entered before this defendant has been arraigned and brought to trial, under an agreement with the fiscal that he
would appear at the trial of his co-defendants and truthfully testify as to certain facts within his knowledge, does not exempt the defendant
thus discharged from future prosecution for the same offense, when it is made to appear that he failed to comply with his agreement to appear
and testify, or that having appeared he testified falsely.
ID.; ID.; ID.—The court not having arrived at an agreement as to the effect of an order of discharge entered after the defendant has been
arraigned and entered upon his trial, in cases of failure faithfully to comply with such agreement, expressly reserves its opinion in that regard.
STATUTES; CONSTRUCTION WITH REFERENCE TO THEIR HISTORY.—In construing the statutes which the courts are called upon to
administer and apply, judicial notice may be taken of their origin and history, and of the facts which affect their derivation, validity and
operation.
ID.; CONSTRUCTION WITH REFERENCE TO AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LEGISLATION.—For the proper construction and application of
the terms and provisions of legislative enactments which have been borrowed from or modelled upon Anglo-American precedents, it is proper
and ofttimes essential to review the legislative history of such enactments and to find an authoritative guide for their interpretation and
application in the decisions ofAmerican and English courts of last resort construing and applying similar legislation in those countries. (Kepner
vs.​ U. S., 195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil. Rep., 669; Serra ​vs.​ Mortiga, 204 U. S., 470; 11 Phil. Rep., 762; Alzua ​vs.​ Johnson, 21 Phil. Rep., 308.)
CRIMINAL LAW; MOTION TO DISCHARGE; REASONS.—It would appear that trial courts may and perhaps should require a written
statement of the reasons upon which a prosecuting officer bases his motion to discharge a defendant in a particular case, in the absence of
statutory enactment or rules of court prescribing the procedure in this regard.

FACTS:
● De Guzman and two other persons were charged with murder.
● On agreement with the fiscal that he would turn as state witness, de Guzman was dropped from the information.
● During the trial, however, he did not testify for the government but against it.
● The fiscal filed a new information against him for the same offense.
● De Guzman claimed double jeopardy.

ISSUE(S):
Can de Guzman be subsequently charged?

HELD:
The law authorizing defendant’s discharge from prosecution is Gen. Orders No. 58 (now Secs. 9 and 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of the Court),
which is largely Anglo-American in origin. To properly costrue the law, the legislative history and the decisions of American and English courts
applicable must be received and examined. The court cited previous cases construing the law and found out that the agreement to turn state
witness can be a bar to another and subsequent prosecution, the defendant must comply with said agreement. In this case, De Guzman had
not complied with that agreement.

ORTIGAS v FEATI (1979)

JURISPRUDENCE:
Appeal; The appellee has no duty to make assignments of error.—T ​ he defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors. In
this connection, We already had occasion to hold in ​Relativo v. Castro that “(I)t is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies a purely
defensive position, and is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error.”
Same; An assignment of error can include only questions that were raised in the trial court.—I​ n the first place, the validity of the said
resolution was never questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant’s assignment
of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and are within the issues framed by the parties. The object of requiring the
parties to present all questions and issues to the lower court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable the lower court to
pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal may determine whether or not such ruling was erroneous.
Local Governments; Municipalities are empowered by law to adopt zoning ordinances and regulations.— ​ Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264
otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council” to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or ​regulations” for
the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27
is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word “regulation” under the provision. As a
matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists “(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding x x x.”
Same; An exception to the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of it’s powers will conflict with vested
rights arising from its contracts.—T ​ he only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between a “a
province, City or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other,” in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract
should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do no apply in the case at bar.
Same; Police Power; Contracts; Land Registration; The police power is superior to contractual stipulations between parties on the use of
lands sold by subdivisions even if said conditions are annotated on the Torrens Title.—W ​ ith regard to the contention that said resolution
cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee—referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale
and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee—it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
“the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.”
Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government,” the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Same; Same; Same; Same;​—Resolution No. 27, S-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6
are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a
main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila are, supports an endless stream of traffic and the
resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly
granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council,
was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Foreign Jurisprudence; American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in the
Philippines.—​ In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not ​per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws
of which must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the
language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto.

FACTS:
● Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking
purposes.
● Appellant demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots.
● The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations,
defendant having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

ISSUE(S):
WON the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and
industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question and if
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by the Municipal
Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that the same rendered "ineffective and
unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant.

Resolution No. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality.

Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs
the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27.

MANILA JOCKEY CLUB v GAMES AND AMUSEMENT BOARD (1960)

JURISPRUDENCE:

FACTS:
● The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is
an infringement of their right.
● Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983, that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private
individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and
races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run, the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to
private individuals and entities by six.

ISSUE(S):
 WON the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.

HELD:
NO​. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and
entities are not entitled to the use of such days. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to
be run on the same day are untenable. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or
Senate. Also, Petitioner’s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable
because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO.

PRESUMPTIONS

What is the Presumption in Favor of Validity of Legislative Acts?

NHA v REYES (1983)

JURISPRUDENCE:

Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is presumed that an act of the law-making body is valid and constitutional.​—One of the basic postulates in
constitutional law is the presumption of validity of legislative or executive acts. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, the leading case on the
subject until now, Justice Laurel, in speaking of judicial review, made clear that it is not for the judiciary to “pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation.” His landmark opinion continues: “More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives
in the executive and legislative departments of the government.”

Same; Same; A law that speaks clearly and unequivocally calls for obedience.—​As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm:
“The presumption is all in favor of validity * * *.” As of this stage in this particular case, there is a failure to challenge the validity of such
legislation. Both public and private respondents in their comments considered as answers raised no such constitutional question. Even for it,
therefore, as of this stage of litigation, and under the conceded facts, there should be a recognition that the law as it stands must be applied.
The Decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally calls for obedience. It is repeating a common place to state that on a matter where the
applicable law speaks in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its command.

Same; Property; Expropriation; There being no question raised as to the validity of P.D. 757, P.D. 42, P.D. 464 and P.D. 1224. The
respondent judge should have followed the rule of valuation therein stated on matters of just compensation in expropriation cases, that the
lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing said just price.— ​ In view of the urgency of the housing problem the various
decrees mentioned earlier were issued for the purpose of assuring that the government would be in a financial position to cope with such basic
human need which in the Philippines, under the welfare state concept, and according to the express language of the Constitution, is an
obligation cast upon the State. The memorandum for petitioner submitted by Government Corporate Counsel, now likewise the Presidential
Legal Assistant, Justice Manuel M. Lazaro, pursues the matter further in prose impressed with force and clarity: ‘The issue in this petition for
certiorari and mandamus involves the application of a rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees that not only
promotes social justice but also ends the baneful and one-sided practice abetted by the collusive acquiescence of government officials and
employees, of under declaring properties for the purpose of taxation but ballooning the price thereof when the same properties are to be
acquired by the government for public purposes. Put to the test, therefore, is the power of the government to introduce rationality in the laws
and to discourage a deceitful practice that is not only ruinous to the government coffers but also undermines its efforts at awakening a
democratic responsiveness of the citizenry toward good government and its economic and social programs. The courts should recognize that
the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the
constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property.”

FACTS:
● Private respondent owned a parcel of land which was being expropriated by the National Housing Authority (NHA)..
● The land was registered in the name of Austria.
● NHA was able to obtain an order of possession in their favor.
● Thereafter, Austria withdrew P6,600, the amount equivalent to the value of the assessed property, which money was deposited
following the requirement pursuant PD No. 42.
● Petitioner opposed such a withdrawal stating that it was too much.
● Petitioner’s basis is PD No. which provides that just compensation is equivalent to and shall not exceed the market value declared by
the owner, administrator or the market value determined by an assessor ​whichever is lower.
● Because the owner’s declaration was P1,400, petitioner claims that respondents’ just compensation is the same amount and the
amount withdrawn is excessive.

ISSUE(S):
Is PD No. 464 valid?

HELD:
One of the basic postulates in Constitutional Law is the presumption of validity of legislative or executive acts. In ​Angara vs. Electoral
Commissions​, the leading case on the subject until now, Justice Laurel, in speaking of judicial review, made clear that it is not for the judiciary
to pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. His landmark opinion continues: “​More than that, courts must accord
 the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.”

What is the Presumption in Favor of Beneficial Operation of Statutes?

SESBRENO v CBAA (1997)

(book):
It is a familiar rule in statutory construction that “the legal provision being therefore susceptible of two interpretations, we adopt the one that in
consonance with the presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments the most reasonable and beneficial construction, the one that
will render them operative and effective and harmonious with other provisions of law.”

JURISPRUDENCE:

WHERE A LEGAL PROVISION IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF TWO INTERPRETATIONS, ONE WHICH IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE
PRESUMED INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD BE ADOPTED.

If Section 24 is the only applicable provision in cases where a taxpayer has eluded the payment of the correct amount of taxes for
more than nine (9) years, as in this case, Section 25 of PD 464 which requires the payment of back taxes will be rendered superfluous and
nugatory. Such interpretation could not have been intended by the law. It is a familiar rule in statutory construction that "the legal provision
being therefore susceptible of two interpretations, we adopt the one in consonance with the presumed intention of the legislature to give its
enactments the most reasonable and beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective and harmonious with other
provisions of law."

SECTION 25 THEREOF NOT PENAL IN CHARACTER, HENCE MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AN EX POST FACTO LAW.

When both Public Respondents CBAA and City Assessor imposed back taxes on petitioner’s property, they did not violate the rule
that laws shall have only prospective applicability. Respondents were only applying PD 464 which had been in effect since 1974. Besides,
Section 25 of PD 464 is not penal in character; hence, it may not be considered as an ex post facto law.

Section 24 and 25 of P.D. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 464 (June 1, 1974) "ENACTING A REAL PROPERTY TAX CODE"

Section 24. ​Date of Effectivity of Assessment or Reassessment​. All assessments or reassessments made after the first day of January of any
year shall take effect on the first day of January of the succeeding year: Provided, however, That the reassessment of real property due to its
partial or total destruction, or to a major change in its actual use, or to any great and sudden inflation or deflation of real property values, or to
the gross illegality of the assessment when made or to any other abnormal cause, shall be made within ninety days from the date any such
cause or causes occurred, the same to take effect at the beginning of the quarter following the reassessment.

Section 25. ​Assessment of Property Subject to Back Taxes​. Real property declared for the first time shall have back taxes assessed against it
for the period during which it would have been liable if assessed from the first in proper course but in no case for more than ten years prior to
the year of initial assessment; Provided, however, that the back taxes shall be computed on the basis of the applicable schedule of values in
force during the corresponding period.

If said taxes are paid before the expiration of the tax collection period next ensuing, no penalty for delinquency shall be imposed, otherwise the
taxes shall be subject to all the penalties to which they would have been liable and had they originally become delinquent after assessment of
the property in the usual course.

FACTS:

● On April 3, 1980, petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Tan two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-55917 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City 3 and described in the deed of sale as follows:

"A parcel of land (Lot 308 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu), with the improvements thereon, situated in the City of Cebu (formerly
Municipality of Cebu), containing an area of Forty Nine (49) square meters, more or less . . .”

“A parcel of land (Lot 309 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu), with the improvements thereon, situated in the City of Cebu, containing
an area of Forty Eight (48) square meters, more or less . . ."

● The conveyance included "a residential house of strong materials constructed on the lots above-mentioned" located in Cebu City.
● Thereafter, petitioner declared the real property constructed on the said lots for purposes of tax assessment as a residential house of
strong materials with a floor area of sixty (60) square meters. Effective in the year 1980, the declared property was assessed by
Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City under Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 at a market value of P60,000.00 and an assessed value
of P36,900.00.
● During a tax-mapping operation conducted in February 1989, the field inspectors of the Cebu City Assessor discovered that the real
 property declared has excess portion not declared by the petitioner that's why when they re-assessed the property value, it increased
to P499,860.00, of which the petitioner protested for being "excessive and unconscionable".
● The petitioner claims that Respondent CBAA err in considering the issue of back taxes, the same being closely related to an error
properly raised. The Respondent CBAA applied Section 25 of PD 464 which had authorized the imposition of back taxes.
● The petitioner claims that Section 25 of PD 464 "refers solely to real estate declared for the first time and does not apply to the area
which, upon revision, has been shown to be in excess of that which was formerly declared." The CBAA held that the area in excess of
that declared by the taxpayer was deemed declared for the first time upon its discovery​.

ISSUE(S):
Did Respondent CBAA gravely erred in misinterpreting or misapplying Section 24 and 25 of P.D. 464.

HELD:
No, the CBAA is correct in interpreting and applying Section 24 and 25 of P.D. 464.

If Section 24 is the only applicable provision in cases where a taxpayer has eluded the payment of the correct amount of taxes for more than
nine (9) years, as in this case, Section 25 of PD 464 which requires the payment of back taxes will be rendered superfluous and nugatory.
Such interpretation could not have been intended by the law. It is a familiar rule in statutory construction that" (t)he legal provision being
therefore susceptible of two interpretations, we adopt the one in consonance with the presumed intention of the legislature to give its
enactments the most reasonable and beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective and harmonious with other
provisions of law."

Section 24 merely lays down the general rule that assessments under PD 464 are to be given prospective application. It cannot be construed
in such a manner as to eliminate the imposition of back taxes. If Section 24, instead of Section 25, were made to apply as suggested by
petitioner, he would in effect be excused from the payment of back taxes on the undeclared excess area of his property. The Court, clearly,
cannot allow a taxpayer to evade his obligation to the government by letting him pay taxes on a property based on its gross undervaluation at
P60,000.00, when the same had then a current market value of P449,860.00.

What os the Presumption Against Retrospective Operation?

DBP v CA (1996)

JURISPRUDENCE:

FACTS:
● The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its employees who shall pay for them in
monthly installments for 20 years.
● However, the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending
approval by the Bureau of Lands, the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for
registration by the DBP.
● DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the
light of the then Sec. 13 of RA 85.
● However, without the knowledge of the DBP, a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were segregated and a
separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever
to the title.
● Then, RA 3147 was enacted, amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85), among which was Sec. 13.

ISSUE(S):
WON there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 13 of RA 85, by RA 3147.

HELD:
YES​. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147, by amending Sec. 13 of RA 85, was to erase any doubts regarding the
legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who
did not yet have houses of their own. It is, therefore, a curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the
PHHC.

REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN (1997)

JURISPRUDENCE:

FACTS:

ISSUE(S):

HELD:
What is the Presumption of Constitutionality?

IN RE GUARINA (1913)

JURISPRUDENCE:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; ACT No. 1597; ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW.—Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed
as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring discretion, is to be determined in each case from the apparent
intention of the statute as gathered from the context as well as from the language of the particular provision. The question in each case is
whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of a
legislator to enact a law mandatory in its character.

AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT.—This court is vested with authority and charged with the duty to pass upon the "moral character"
and the "qualifications and ability" of all candidates for admission to the bar

LIMIT UPON LEGISLATIVE POWER.—Any Act of the Philippine Legislature repugnant to the Act of Congress which created it, or which is
repugnant to any other lawful Act of Congress defining, prescribing or limiting its authority is invalid and void as transcending its rightful limits
and authority.

BASIS OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.—The various Acts of .Congress conferring power upon the Philippine Legislature, and defining,
prescribing and limiting this power, especially the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, are to that Legislature in the nature of an organic act with
its amendments, binding on it in like manner as is the Constitution of the United States upon Congress itself.

SOURCE OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.—The Acts of Congress of the United States are to the Commission, or rather to all the
Departments of the Philippine Government, what a law is to individuals; they constitute not only a rule of action to the various branches of the
Government, but it is from them that the very existence of the power of the Government flows, and it is by virtue of the Acts of Congress that
the powers (or portions of the right to govern) which may have been committed to this Government are prescribed.

SUPREME COURT CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF ITS POWERS.—Section 9 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, placed it beyond the
power of the Philippine Legislature to deprive the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands of the jurisdiction or power theretofore granted to it;
leaving, however, to local legislative authority the right to confer additional jurisdiction or to change the practice and the method of procedure.

DUTY OF COURTS IN CONSTRUING LAWS.—It is the duty of the courts in construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission, not
to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another
construction not in conflict with the higher law; and in doing so, contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator will be
disregarded which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of an Act of Congress.

DOUBTFUL LANGUAGE OF A STATUTE.—If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislator, if the words or provisions of
the statute are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will
avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of
the language employed. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 93.)

CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORD "MAY," ACT No 1597.—The word "may" as used in the concluding paragraph of section 2 of Act No.
1597, construed so as to give it its permissive and not its mandatory effect; and as conferring a discretion and not as imposing a duty upon
the Supreme Court. to grant licenses to the officials mentioned in the Act to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without taking
the examination prescribed by general rule.

FACTS:
Mario Guarina wanted to be admitted to the Bar without taking an examination since he is a fiscal of Batanes. He relied on Act No. 1597 Sec.
2 stating that provincial fiscals may be licensed to practice law without taking the exam.

ISSUE(S):

HELD:
Said provision should be construed in relation to the organic act (Philippine Bill of 1902). PB of 1902 prohibited Congress from depriving
jurisdiction from the court. Since prior to PB of 1902, the Organic Act (Act No. 136) and the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) granted the
Court the jurisdiction to deny admission to the Bar, the word “may” should be construed as permissive so as not to decrease the discretion of
the Court regarding admission to the Bar.