Calimag vs. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R. No.

191936, June 1, 2016

Articles/Doctrines Applied:

RULE 131
Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of
anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it;
and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid
before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at
the place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is
considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall
be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence
has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the circumstances
hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for
 declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or
fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of
life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage,
has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other
and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such
contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are
equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred
days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the
contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so
printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the
country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has
actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his
successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting
from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have
survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to
have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5a)

New Civil Code 220

Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy
of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and
the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

Jurisprudence:
Civil Law; Filiation; While it is true that a person’s legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al., 559 SCRA 186 (2008),
the Supreme Court (SC) deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents’ relationship to Silvestra so as
to determine their legal rights to the subject property.—While it is true that a person’s legitimacy can only
be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA,
et al., 559 SCRA 186 (2008), this Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents’
relationship to Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the question
of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the
issues agreed upon by the parties in the pretrial.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules
on Evidence provides that: “When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, x x x.” Nevertheless, a reproduction of the
original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified
by law.—At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela, viz.: (1) fax or photocopy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage,
cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul with the Rules on
Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that:
“When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, x x x.” Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be
admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified by law.

Same; Same; Same; Canonical Certificate of Marriage; A canonical certificate of marriage is not a public
document.—A canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early as in the case of United
States v. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 (1915), it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages,
and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No.
190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private
writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with
the rules of evidence. Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of
the canonical certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in
evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate.—It is well-settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact
of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized
as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. Thus, in order to prove their legitimate
filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Live Birth; A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of
entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by
a public officer (Civil Registrar).—“A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries
(regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer (Civil Registrar).” Thus, being public documents, the respondents’ certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them. “Prima
facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment
of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim
or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.”

Civil Law; Filiation; Under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the new-born
legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the
child.—Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate
child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of
birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by
the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.’—In a catena of cases, it has been held that, “[p]ersons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.” Furthermore, as the established period of
cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage
cannot be disregarded. Thus: Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.
Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of
parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression.

Facts:

 Virginia D. Calimag co-owned the property with Silvestra Macapaz.

 Respondents are children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio Macapaz Sr. and Fidela Macapaz.
 The Subject property was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and Silvestra under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as entry no.
02671 is an annotation of adverse claim of Fidela asserting rights and interest over a portion of
the said property.
 Silvestra died on November 11, 2002, without issue.
 The Transfet Certificat of Title was cancelled and new certificate of title was issued in the name of
the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of sale dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold
her 99 sqm portion to the petitioner for 300,000.
 Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an
Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was
stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy
Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective.
 On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.
  Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of public documents under
Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner. 11 However, said criminal
charges were eventually dismissed.
 The respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for  Annulment
of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the
Register of Deeds of Makati City.
 The Petitioner averred that the respondent have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on
the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio Sr.
Issue:

W/N Anastacio Sr and Fidela were married, therefore recognizing their children as legal heirs of Silvestra.

Held:

Yes. The trial court found unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of
marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela with a certification from the NSO that their office has no
record of the certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, and further claiming the absence of a
marriage license. The Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to
Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property. The respondent presented a
Canonical Certificate of Marriage however it cannot be admitted in evidence. Notwithstanding, it is well
settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.

Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of
Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of
both documents. A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the
same parents — their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name
is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF
PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on "May 25,
1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte.

The Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed consistent with the
provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact that only the
signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as
the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.

Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had
openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children
— the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily,
such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage.

Espinosa vs. Atty. Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011

Articles/Doctrines Applied:
MARRIAGE
Requisites of Marriage

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)

New Civil Code 221

Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;

(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;

(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute
community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this Code shall govern.

Jurisprudence:
Family Law; Conjugal Partnership; Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void.—This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

Notary Public; A notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could
not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his
staff.—We can- Espinosa vs. Omaña, 659 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

Family Law; Conjugal Partnership; Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void.—This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

Notary Public; A notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could
not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his
staff.—We can- Espinosa vs. Omaña, 659 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

Facts:

 On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omana’s legal
advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately.
 Omana prepared a document entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal
started implanting the conditions of the said contract.
 Marantal took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the conjugal property.
 Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law graduate, who informed
him that the contract executed by Omana was not valid.
 They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana before the IBP-CBD.
 Omana denied that she prepared the contract.
 She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but
she told him that it was illegal.
 Omana alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed
to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her
signature and notarized the contract.
Issue:

W/N the Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay, executed by Rodolfo Espinosa and Elena Marantal is valid to nullify
their marriage.

Held:

No. SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

Mariategui vs. CA, 205 SCRA 337

 Articles/Doctrine Applied:
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Jurisprudence:

Same; Evidence; Disputable presumption; Once a man and woman have lived as husband and wife and
such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted
as a fact.—Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law x x x."

Same; Evidence; Disputable presumption; Once a man and woman have lived as husband and wife and
such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted
as a fact.—Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law x x x."
Same; Same; Wills and Succession; Repudiation; Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names
in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.—Petitioners' registration of the
properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs.
Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held: "Prescription, as a mode of
terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership).
The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other coowners; (3) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law." x x x "It is true that registration
under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the
Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration
is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of title." Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in
their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time
private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their
names the lots involved.

Facts:

 Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953.

 Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died
on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana
and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son
named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named
Cresenciana.

 Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had
three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and
Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941.

 At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was
still unmarried. These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and
156 of the Muntinglupa Estate.

 On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate.
Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the
registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the
above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said
lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to
the respective parties.

 On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with
Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that,
with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were
deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967.
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in
the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although
they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels
of land as well as the accounting of their fruit.

Issue:

W/N the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

Held:

YES. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

De Mijares vs. Villaluz, 274 SCRA 1

Articles/Doctrines Applied:

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or
his or her own spouse.

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or
over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining
the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable.
Revised Penal Code 350
Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the
provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment.

Jurisprudence:
Same; Same; Respondent’s subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a “sham” marriage will not
justify his actuations.—Respondent’s subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a “sham”
marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a
defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent’s
sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even
just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the
Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequence of a marriage celebrated with
all the necessary legal requisites.

Same; Same; The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers.—From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the
standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an
attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral
conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.

Facts:

 Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City while
respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.

 Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares. She
obtained a decree declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years.
Thus, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge Myrna
Lim Verano.

 They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that time the
Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the
death of the son of Mijares.

 During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an illicit affair
with another woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the complainant
judge. As a result, they lived separately and did not get in touch with one another and the
respondent did not bother to apologize for what happened.

 Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia Geraldez.
Complainant then filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter immorally and
bigamously entered into a second marriage while having a subsisting marriage and distorted the
truth by stating his civil status as single.

 In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham marriage”;
that he voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case for
immorality filed against her by her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he
contracted his marriage with complainant, he had a subsisting marriage with his first wife because
 the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory or
published.

 Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and later on
affirmed by the Court.

Issue:

W/N marriage of Mijares and Villaluz is valid

Held:

Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2
and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance that he was
facing criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in civil case
declaring the annulment of marriage between respondent and the first wife had not attained complete
finality, the marriage between complainant and respondent is not void but only voidable.

Hermosisima vs. CA, 109 Phil 629

Articles/Doctrines applied:

HUMAN RELATIONS (n)

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS (n)

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases
an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or
memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents:

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;

(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred
pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of
them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is
made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the
amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;

(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an
interest therein;

(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

Jurisprudence:

1.DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT ACTIONABLE. —It is the clear and manifest
intent of Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry.
2.ID.; ID.; SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES; NATURE OF SEDUCTION
CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 2219 OF NEW CIVIL CODE.—The "seduction" contemplated in Article
2219 of the New Civil Code as one of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is the crime
punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT EXIST.—Where a woman, who was an insurance
agent and former high school teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10 years older than the
man, "overwhelmed by her love" for a man approximately 10 years younger than her, had intimate
relations with him, because she "wanted to bind" him "by having a fruit of their engagement even before
they had the benefit of clergy," it cannot be said that he is morally guilty of seduction.

Facts:
 Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was then a teacher in the in Cebu, and petitioner, who was
almost 10 years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged,
although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.

 One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his
cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February,
1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.

 On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court of first instance a complaint for the
acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner, as well as for
support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise.

 Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the later, but
denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.

 The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a
month, which was, on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing defendant to pay
to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral
damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees.
Issue:

W/N moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.

Held:

No.  It has been ruled for many cases that promise to marry is not actionable. Respondent surrendered
herself because by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy.