Crim Law Case Digest I

CRIMINAL LAW I (CASE DIGEST)
US v PABLO, 35 PHIL 97 (1916)
[No. 11676. October 17, 1916.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ANDRES PABLO, defendant and appellant.
DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLE INVOLVED:
Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 5

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Constitution (1987), Art VI, Sec. 1

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Sovereign Power of the State (US v. Pablo)
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the
individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the necessity for its existence has been recognized even by the
most backward peoples. At times the criticism has been made that certain penalties are cruel, barbarous, and atrocious; at others, that
they are light and inadequate to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment is admitted to be just by the
whole human race, guided by their natural perception of right and wrong, and even barbarians and savages themselves, who are ignorant
of all civilization, are no exception.
Additional note: The power of the State to punish crimes is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations provided by the
Constitution.
JURISPRUDENCE:
FALSE TESTIMONY; REPEAL OF ACT No. 1697; LAW NOW APPLICABLE.—By the mere interpretation of this court in various
decisions, Act No. 1697 was deemed to have repealed certain articles of the Penal Code relative to false testimony, notwithstanding that
the said Act did not expressly repeal them; and as the final article and section of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), paragraph 2,
has totally repealed the said Act No. 1697, without stating that the articles of the Penal Code relating to false testimony comprised
within the term of perjury were likewise repealed; and if it is undeniable that the community must necessarily punish perjury or false
testimony, and if it is impossible to conceive that crimes of, this kind may go immune and be freely committed without any punishment
at all, because the liberty to pervert the truth, in sworn testimony for the very reason that it might save a guilty party from punishment,
might also determine the conviction and punishment of an innocent party, the conclusion is inevitable that there must be some previous
and preexisting law which punishes perjury or false testimony—a punishment required by good morals and by the law, even in a society
of mediocre culture, in order to avoid incalculable harm and resultant disturbances which might affect public order.
ID. ; ID.; ID.—For the reasons above stated and in view of the provisions of Law 2, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novísima Recopilación,the
needs of society demand that articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the said Administrative Code,
in repealing the said Act on perjury, did not explicitly declare that the said articles of the Penal Code were likewise repealed.
FACTS:
● Andres Pablo went by order of his chief to raid a jueteng game in Barrio Tuyo.
● Before Andres could make an arrest, the players ran away because they were allegedly warned.
● His memorandum to the Chief of Police Jose Reyes, contained that he seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the cabecillas
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. Only the latter was arrested.
● As a consequence, the Chief of Police filed a complaint in the court of the justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo,
Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a result, the accused were
arrested, but were afterwards admitted to bail.
● At the hearing, Dato pleaded guilty while Malicsi and Rodrigo pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the chief of police presented
the memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under oath that when they arrived in the place they
saw Dato and a low table that made them suspect that a jueteng game was being held; that they did find a tambiolo and 37
bolas, but that they did not see Rodrigo and Malicsi on the scene nor did they see them scamper. Also, they learned after the
incident that Rodrigo and Malicsi was the ringleaders of the said jueteng game according to a source. This testimony was acted
upon by the court acquitting Rodrigo and Malicsi, sentencing only Dato.
● The provincial fiscal investigated further on the case and found out that before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace
court, the policeman Pablo had conference with the accused Malicsi and Rodrigo and agreed that he would exclude the
involvement of the two in the case in exchange of a bribe of fifteen pesos.
● The provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury in
violation of section 3 of Act No. 1697 declaring that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously affirmed and swore under oath in
legal form before the justice of the peace during the hearing of the case of Rodrigo and Malicsi for violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga when he excluded the two accused from involvement in the incident despite
being utterly false and material to the decision of the case.
● The court found him guilty and sentenced to suffer years of imprisonment, a fine, and disqualification to hold public office as
well as from testifying in Philippine courts, he appealed for such judgment.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of crime of perjury or of false testimony, noting that Act 1697 repealed the provisions contained
in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative to false testimony.
HELD:
The respondent was guilty of perjury.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been punished under the said articles of the said Code,
which the Court said, have not been specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but, since its enactment, have not been applied, by
the mere interpretation given to them by the Court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was repealed by the Administrative
Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the
Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said articles of the Penal Code
have likewise been repealed.
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO, 43 PHIL (1922)
[No. 17584. March 8, 1922]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant and appellant.
Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 5

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Constitution (1987), Art VI, Sec. 1

Sovereign Power: Delegation to the Philippine Government

The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty which resides in the Federal Government, but for the purpose of
punishing crimes, this power is delegated to subordinate government subdivisions such as territories. This delegation may be either
express, as in the case of the several States of the Union and incorporated territories, like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or implied, as in the
case of the Philippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional
Law, 181—205.)
JURISPRUDENCE:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 1, ACT No. 2886, CONSTRUED.—Section 1 of Act No. 2886 which provides that "All
prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands against the person charged with the offense,"
held valid and constitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO AMEND LAWS.—The procedural law in criminal matters
is not incorporated in the Constitution of the States, but is left in the hands of the legislatures, and pursuant to the Constitution of the
United States each State has authority to define and punish crimes and to establish the rules of criminal procedure. This power of the
different States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories such as the Philippine Islands.
ID. ; ID. ; DEVELOPMENT OF POWERS OF LEGISLATURE REVIEWED.—In accordance with international law and practice, the
military government of the army of occupation was vested with legislative functions and in fact did legislate; afterwards, complying with
the instructions of President McKinley, which were later ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the
Military Government were transferred to the Philippine Commission; then under the provisions of section 7 of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it functioned as a colegislative body with the Philippine Commission; finally, by
virtue of the provisions of section 12 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission
gave way to the Philippine Senate, the Philippine Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was formed the present
Legislature composed of two houses which enacted Act No. 2886. The Philippine Commission and the Philippine Legislature are the
successors of the Military Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
ID. ; ID.—The Philippine Legislature is empowered to legislate on matters relating to criminal procedure by virtue of section 7 of the
Jones Law which provides as follows: "That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with this
Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from time to
time see fit." (See also U. S. V8. Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Even before the passage by Congress of the Jones Law (August 29, 1916) the
Philippine Commission had enacted Acts Nos. 194, 440, and 590 which amend General Orders No. 58.
SOVEREIGN POWER; DELEGATION TO PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT.—The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of
sovereignty which resides in the Federal Government, but for the purpose of punishing crimes, this power is delegated to subordinate
government subdivisions such as territories. This delegation may be either express, as in the case of the several States of the Union and
incorporated territories, like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or implied, as in the case of the Philippines, which is an organized territory though
not incorporated with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, 181—205.)
LAW RELATING TO PLAINTIFF IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.—There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the
Philippines prescribing the name to be employed as party plaintiff in criminal cases. The Philippine Government is autonomous and acts
under its delegated powers in the prosecution and punishment of crimes, and Act No. 2886 was not expressly repealed by Congress and it
neither contravenes any provision of the Federal Constitution nor of the Philippine Organic Act. Therefore, its provision that all
prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands against the person charged with the offense is
valid and constitutional.
FACTS:
● Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day of
prisión correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial for the murder of a 7 year old boy, Porfirio Parondo, striking the boy with
his automobile.
● As the facts were so well established in the record that there cannot be a shade of doubt about them.
● The PH Commission enacted Act No. 2886 stating that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of
the Philippine Islands against the person charged with the offense.
● The Respondent argued that he was prosecuted in conformity with the foregoing of the Philippine Legislature and that the Act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case. Also, Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend General
Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have the character of a constitutional law.
ISSUE(S):
● Whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.
HELD:
● Act No. 2886 was valid. It was not violative of any constitutional provision.
● The PH Commission was legal successor to the Military Government as a legislative body.
● The procedure in criminal matters was not incorporated in the Constitutions of the US, but is left in the hands of the legislatures,
so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.
● General Order have the character of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is
considered only on principle.
● The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of
the principle of territoriality as applied in the suppression of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate government
subdivisions such as territories legislatures have the power to define and punish crimes,
a power also possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of section 7, already quoted, of the Jones Law.
These territorial governments are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the
territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of the authority delegated to
it by the supreme power of the Nation.
TAÑADA v TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
NCC, Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure the enforcement of a public duty (e.g. the publication in the Official Gazette of
Presidential Decrees, LOI, etc.) are real parties in interest in mandamus case.—The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private
citizen’s legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute
this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the
Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present situation where the President may on his own
issue laws.—The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Same; Same; Same.—P erhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance than at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the
diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: “Bajo la
denoroinación genérica de leyes, se comprenden también los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.”
Same; Same; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication of Presidential decrees and issuances as it uses the words “shall be
published.”—The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There shall be published in the Official Gazette
x x x.” The word “shall” used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a
list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
what must be included or excluded from such publication.
Same; Same; But administrative and executive orders and those which affect only a particular class of persons need not be
published.—The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to
all concerned.
Same; Same; Due Process; Publication of Presidential decrees and issuances of general application is a matter of due process.—It
is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees and issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force
and effect.—The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank.
Same; Same; Same; Implementation of Presidential Decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette may have
consequences which cannot be ignored.— Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is “an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.”
Same; Same; Same; Only P.D. Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278 and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been published. It is undisputed that
none of them has been implemented.—From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive. 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government.
FACTS:
● Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
● The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition.
● Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they
need not show any specific interest.
● Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders,
EOs, etc. where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates.
HELD:
YES. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern and corollarily access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its
date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of
presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.
Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one man—Marcos—are in fact laws of general application and
provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive and legislative powers. The generality of law (Civil Code, Art.
14) will never work without constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive
notice and is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.
PESIGAN v ANGELES, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)
No. L-64279. April 30, 1984.*
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, vs. JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional
Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by
JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
1987 Constitution, Art. 3 Bill of Rights
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
RULE 115
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the
judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail bond, unless his
presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the
trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused
under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date
and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel;
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall
not in any manner prejudice him;
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself;
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a
witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given
in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the
opportunity to cross-examine him;
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf;
(h) To have a speedy, impartial and public trial; and

(i) To have the right of appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
New Civil Code

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, or in newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626

October 21, 1980
FURTHER AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 234 DATED MAY 16, 1970, BANNING THE SLAUGHTER OF
CARABAOS AND BUFFALOES
WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 234, as amended by Executive Order No. 253, allows the slaughter of carabaos and buffaloes that are
three years old or over; and
WHEREAS, present conditions demand that the carabao and the buffalo be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
them for energy needs.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
Sec. 1. Executive Order No. 234 is further amended such that the slaughtering of carabaos and buffaloes is hereby prohibited except
under the following conditions:
a. Only carabaos and buffaloes that are seven years old or over, if male, and eleven years old or over, if female, may be
slaughtered upon issuance of the necessary slaughter permit by the authorities concerned;
b. No slaughter permit shall be issued without a certificate by the Provincial or City Veterinarian concerned, or their
authorized representatives, to the effect that the carabao or buffalo to be slaughtered is of the required age and free from any
disease.
Sec. 2. The Minister of Agriculture, upon recommendation of the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, shall issue such rules and
regulations that will effectively carry out the provisions of this Executive Order.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Statutes; Criminal Law; An Executive Order (Exec. Order No. 626-A dated Oct. 25, 1980), prohibiting and penalizing transportation of
carabaos from one province to another cannot be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.—We hold that the said executive
order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than
two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the
Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Same; Same; Same.— That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or
sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in
the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
Same; Same; Same.—I ndeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that even bureau “regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department
Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated”. (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil.
1015.)
Damages; Public Officers; The public officers who confiscated the carabaos acted in good faith enforcing Exec. Order 626-A. The
carabaos, however, have to be returned.— It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary
confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
Notes used under jurisprudence:

● Statutes generally have no retroactive effect. Only laws existing at the time of the execution of contract are applicable to
transactions executed at that time. (Philippine Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172.)
● The legal requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for effectivity of laws cannot be disregarded by the contention that
copies of election decree have been published and distributed. (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30.)
● The purpose why penal statutes are construed strictly against the state is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality, but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. (People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542.)
● A statute operates prospectively and never retroactively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by
express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 619.)
FACTS:
● On 2 April 1982, The defendant transported 26 carabao bound to Batangas.

● They were provided with health certificate, permit to transport large cattle and certificate of inspection attesting the subject
animals were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals.
● In spite of the presentation of the above documentation, Lieutenant Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda ordered the confiscation of the
carabaos, in accordance with EO 626 (A), which states that no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and
no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.
● The Pesigans filed an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos. The case was heard at Daet and was later transferred to
Caloocan City. The presiding judge dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not EO 626-A has the force and effect of the law
HELD:
The Pesigans were entitled for the return of their carabaos or the value of each carabao. They were also entitled to a reasonable rental for
each carabao from the twenty six farmers who used them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the Pesigans.
The SC held that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a
penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word “laws” in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
(People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of
Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a
penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before
violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
US v SWEET, 1 PHIL 18 (1901)

[No. 448. September 20, 1901.]
THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee, vs. PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant and appellant.
Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 1

Civil Code, Art. 14

Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
General Rule: Jurisdiction of civil courts is not affected by the military characted of the accused.
RP-US VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT

Art. 5 Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses committed within the
Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.
b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction
conferred on them by the military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating
to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses
relating to the security of the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security means:
1. treason;
2. sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United States personnel,
except in cases provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the
military law of the United States in relation to:
1. offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely against the property or person of United
States personnel; and
2. offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to waive their primary right to exercise
jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order and discipline among their forces,
Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular
importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the United
States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities of the Philippines against United States
personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth such
determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute sufficient proof of
performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In those cases where the Government of the Philippines
believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities
shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States
military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take
disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other government as soon
as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which both the
authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall assist each other in the arrest of
United States personnel in the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of United States personnel who
are subject to Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of
the arrest or detention of any United States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States
military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged. In
extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the
United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal.
Also, the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities,
after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all
necessary investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production
of evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this article and have been acquitted or have been
convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they
may not be tried again for the same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States military
authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted an
offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all
procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a
defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to have such authorities present at all
judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with Philippine law, excludes persons who have no
role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to
visits and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the
jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.
JURISPRUDENCE:
CRIMINAL LAW; JURISDICTION.—An assault committed by a military employee upon a prisoner of war is a violation of the general
penal law, and as such it imposes criminal responsibility.
ID.; ID.—Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial limits,
regardless of the military character of the accused.
ID.; ID.—The fact that the alleged offense was committed in the execution of orders of a military superior is a matter of defense and does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
Per COOPER, J., concurring:

ID.; ID.—An offense charged against a military officer in consequence of an act done in obedience to an order of his superior in good faith,
unless the illegality of the order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of
the courts of the Civil Government.
FACTS:
● Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense (Assault) against a Prisoner of War.
● His case is filed with the Court of First Instance, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for which a penalty of
more than 6 months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was “acting in the line of
duty.”
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war was not an offense under the Penal Code;
Supposing that the offense was subject to the Code, the military character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its
commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the court.
HELD:
The case is open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or
other special character of the person brought before them for trial. Unless, controlled by express legislation to the contrary.
An assault by military officer against a Prisoner of Waw is not in the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC.
Court of First Instance (CFI) has jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial limits,
regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to
prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty.
Assuming that the physical assault by military offer is included in the RPC, the military character sustained by the person charged with the
offence at the time of its commission will not exempt him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals. The application of the
general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character brought before them for
trial. The Defendant claims that the act was service connected. If this were established, it may be used as a defense, but this cannot affect
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take jurisdiction of the case.
LIANG v PEOPLE, 355 SCRA 125
[G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000]
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec 1

Civil Code, Art 14

Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
Visiting Forces Agreement, Art. 5 (see US v Sweet, 1Phil 18 (1901)
JURISPRUDENCE:
International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations; Asian Development Bank; The slander of a person, by any stretch,
cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel - slander cannot be considered
as an act performed in an official capacity. - After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner’s and intervenor’s Motions for
Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person,
by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues
that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we
merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not
petitioner’s utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:

International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations: Words and Phrases; “International Organization,” Defined. - The
term “international organizations”-“is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. Under
contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality such that they are
capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general international
business in which the member states have an interest.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; “International Public Officials,” Defined. - International public officials have been defined as: “x x x persons
who, on the basis of an international treaty constituting a particular international community, are appointed by this international
community, or by an organ of it, and are under its control to exercise, in a continuous way, functions in the interest of this particular
international community, and who are subject to a particular personal status.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Specialized Agencies,” Defined.

- “Specialized agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular fields, such as posts, telecommunications, railways,
canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees.
Same; Same; Same; The nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is. - A perusal of the immunities provisions
in various international conventions and agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the
recipient is.
Same; Same: Same; “Diplomatic Immunities” and “International Immunities,” Distinguished. - There are three major differences between
diplomatic and international immunities. Firstly, one of the recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the
diplomatic staff of a mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the receiving State only with the express consent of that State;
apart from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of their functions, nationals
enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by the receiving State. International immunities may be especially important
in relation to the State of which the official is a national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving
State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State; in the case of international immunities there is no sending State and an
equivalent for the jurisdiction of the sending State therefore has to be found either in waiver of immunity or in some international
disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly, the effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of
reciprocity and the danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international immunities enjoy no similar protection.
Same; Same; Same; Methods of Granting Privileges and Immunities to Personnel of International Organizations. - Positive international
law has devised three methods of granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of international organizations. The first is by simple
conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The second is by internal legislation whereby the
government of a state, upon whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions, recognizes the international character
of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the
organization and its personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case
with the Central Commission of the Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The third is a combination
of the first two. In this third method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an international organization and its
personnel, but the status is described in broad and general terms. The specific definition and application of those general terms are
determined by an accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the
Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations. The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under this third category.
Same; Same; Same; The legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different from the
relationship between the international official and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his functions - the privileges and
immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations. - There is a connection between
diplomatic privileges and immunities and those extended to international officials. The connection consists in the granting, by contractual
provisions, of the relatively well-established body of diplomatic privileges and immunities to international functionaries. This connection is
purely historical. Both types of officials find the basis of their special status in the necessity of retaining functional independence and
freedom from interference by the state of residence. However, the legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to which he is
accredited is entirely different from the relationship between the international official and those states upon whose territory he might carry
out his functions. The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations.
Whereas those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending state based on customary international law, those granted
to international officials are based on treaty or conventional law. Customary international law places no obligation on a state to recognize a
special status of an international official or to grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only result from specific treaty
provisions.
Same; Same; Same; The present tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of international organizations to a minimum.
- Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of international organizations, it is clear that they were
accorded a wide scope of protection in the exercise of their functions - The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire and France
which provided “all the rights of neutrality” to persons employed in regulating navigation in the international interest; The Treaty of Berlin
of 1878 which granted the European Commission of the Danube “complete independence of territorial authorities” in the exercise of its
functions; The Covenant of the League which granted “diplomatic immunities and privileges.” Today, the age of the United Nations finds
the scope of protection narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of international organizations to
a minimum. The tendency cannot be considered as a lowering of the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on the privileges
and immunities of international officials is new. The solution to the problem presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives to
international functionaries lies in the general reduction of the special position of both types of agents in that the special status of each agent
is granted in the interest of function. The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the
proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. While the current direction of the law seems
to be to narrow the prerogatives of the personnel of international organizations, the reverse is true with respect to the prerogatives of the
organizations themselves, considered as legal entities. Historically, states have been more generous in granting privileges and immunities to
organizations than they have to the personnel of these organizations.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their
official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity. - On the other hand, international officials are governed
by a different rule. Section 18(a) of the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of the
United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official
capacity. The Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of the ADB provides under Article 55(i)
that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and
staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their
official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity.
Same; Same; Same; The current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for
acts of their private lives. - Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials of the specified categories
are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their private life and empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases
without the necessity of waiver. It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international officials were granted diplomatic privileges and
immunities and were thus considered immune for both private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was
curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for
its officials. Thus, the current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts
of their private lives. This much is explicit from the Charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially similar
provisions to that of the General Convention.
Same; Same; Same; The inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as private or official in the courts of the
state concerned. - It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as private or official in the
courts of the state concerned. That the prevalent notion seems to be to leave to the local courts determination of whether or not a given act
is official or private does not necessarily mean that such determination is final. If the United Nations questions the decision of the Court, it
may invoke proceedings for settlement of disputes between the organization and the member states as provided in Section 30 of the General
Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is official or private is made by the national courts in the first instance, but it may
be subjected to review in the international level if questioned by the United Nations.
Same; Same; Same; Asian Development Bank; Officials of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those
necessary for the exercise of their functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes; Officials and employees of the Asian
Development Bank are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of
immunity. - Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may
commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy “functional”
immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is the
reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees
only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and
employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of
immunity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The immunity of the Asian Development Bank is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees
is restricted only to official acts. - Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of “immunity from every form of legal process”
accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is
restricted only to official acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law which seeks to narrow the scope of
protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to personnel of international organizations, while at the same time aims to
increase the prerogatives of international organizations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs, or even the Asian Development Bank for that matter, to
certify that the Bank’s officials and employees are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. - Considering
that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity only for their official acts, the necessary inference is that the authority of the
Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their
official capacity. Stated otherwise, it is not within the power of the DFA, as the agency in charge of the executive department’s foreign
relations, nor the ADB, as the international organization vested with the right to waive immunity, to invoke immunity for private acts of
bank officials and employees, since no such prerogative exists in the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify.
FACTS:
● Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation.
● Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC.
● After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of
ADB.
● The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
● Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases.
● The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
● When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
● After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court viaa petition for review arguing that he
is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement
HELD:
NO. The petition is not impressed with merit. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has
no binding effect in courts. dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was
violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. he rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
US v AH SING, 36 PHIL 978 (1917)
[G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
RPC, Art. 2
Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be
enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its
jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of
the Philippine Islands; chan robles virtual law library
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding
number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
Constitution (1987), Art 1
NATIONAL TERRITORY. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
Visiting Force Agreement, Art. V (see US v Sweet)
JURISPRUDENCE:
OPIUM LAW; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION, WHEN EXISTS.—Section 4, Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law) construed as follows: Any
person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands when the prohibited drug is found under this person's
control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such
case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. United States
vs. Look Chaw ([1910],P hil., 573), and United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), distinguished.
ID: ID.—Defendant purchased opium in Saigon, brought it on ' 'board a foreign vessel, and had it under his control when that vessel
arrived after direct voyage in the port of Cebu. Held: To constitute illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine
Islands.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No.
2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
● The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang.
● The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of
Saigon.
● The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his
possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
● When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of
opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine.
● The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon.
● He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands.
● Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the intimation that there exists inconsistently
between the doctrines laid down in the two cases. However, neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us.
● In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw in the opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found — That, although the
mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as
a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension
of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the
land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court
established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
● A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the present instance is readily observable. In the
Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale of opium — in the present case the charge as illegal importation
of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in the present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in
the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil —in the present case the opium was not landed
by the defendant.
● In the case of United States vs. Jose the one on which resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal importation
of opium or other prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel
from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country w ith the drug on board.
● In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the opium was imported from a foreign country; in
the present case there is no question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.
HELD:
YES. It is criminally liable. As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person’s control on a vessel which has come direct from a
foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction
is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation
of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these
statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being
within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
MIQUIBAS v COMMANDING GENERAL, 80 PHIL 262 (1948)
[G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948]
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, respondents.
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.

J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
RPC, Art. 2 (see US v Ah Sing)
Constitution (1987), Art 1 (see US v Ah Sing)
Visiting Force Agreement, Art. V (see US v Sweet)
JURISPRUDENCE:
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF PHILIPPINES OVER ALL OFFENSES COMMITTED WlTHIN ITS
TERRITORY; JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES OR OTHER FOREIGN NATIONS OVER CERTAIN
OFFENSES COMMITTED WlTHIN CERTAIN PORTIONS.—The Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has
jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the
United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed within certain
portions of said territory
2. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; AGREEMENT WITH UNITED STATES.—The agreement of March 14, 1947, between the Republic
of the Philippines and the Government of the United States concerning military bases, enumerates in Article XIII the
offenses over which theUnited States, by consent of the Philippines, shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POET OF MANILA AREA NOT A BASE OF UNITED STATES.—The Port of Manila Area is not
one of the bases of the United States under the Agreement of March 14, 1947.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE NOT MEMBER OF ARMED FORCES OF UNITED
STATES.—Under the terms of the Agreement of March 14, 1947, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a
member of the armed forces the United States.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION, WHEN NOT WAIVABLE.—Respondent maintains that petitioner has no
cause of action because the Secretary of Justice had not notified the officer holding the petitioner in custody whether or
not the Philippines desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 3, of the Military Base Agreement. It is
sufficient to state that in cases where the offender is a civilian employee and not a member of the United States armed
forces, no waiver can be made either by the prosecuting attorney or by the Secretary of Justice, under paragraphs 2 and
4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph 3 of Article XXI, of the agreement.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.—Petitioner a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United
States armed forces, allegedly committed an offense by disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the
United States Army in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States. Held, That the General Court-Martial
appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him and,
consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void
for lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
● Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines, who has been charged with
disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the
United States.
● He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found him guilty and
sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.
● This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.
● As a rule, that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it
may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain
offenses committed within certain portions of said territory.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the case has been committed within a US base thus giving US the jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not, the petitioner is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States
HELD:
1. Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that "bases are those areas named in Annex A and Annex B and such additional areas as
may be acquired for military purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." Among the areas specified in Annexes A and B,
there is none that has reference to the Port Area of Manila where the offense has allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it
appears in Annex A that "army communications system" is included, but with "the deletion of all stations in the Port of Manila
Area."
Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but without, a base, since it has been committed in the
Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement and is merely temporary
quarters located within the present limits of the City of Manila.
2. Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a member of the armed forces of the United
States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from members of the armed
forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian
employees.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try
petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing the
petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any criminal action which may be
instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.
GUMABON v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)
[G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971]
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO
PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for
respondent.
RPC, Art. 21
Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
RPC, Art. 22
Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Civil Code, Art. 4

Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Remedial law; Special proceedings; Habeas corpus; When habeas corpus proper. – Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to
exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of the detention.
Constitutional law; Equal protection of law; When applied at the case at bar. – What is required under the equal protection of law is the
uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
ORIGINAL PETITION IN THE SUPREME COURT. HABEAS CORPUS.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua f or the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
● Along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third
on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners
have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.
● Each of them has served more than 13 years.
● Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez, t his Court ruled that the information against the accused in that case for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no such
complex offense.
● Hernandez was only entitled to 10 years imprisonment and was thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal.
● Petitioners seeks for retroactivity application of Hernandez’s doctrine
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case
HELD:
YES. Petitioners properly invoked in their favor the provisions of Article 22 of the RPC - R etroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same.
Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the sentencing courts, the case at bar presents a clear case of an excess in penalty
imposed beyond twelve years of prision mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that the crime of
rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. On this ground, as well as on the further and more fundamental ground that to
hold them liable to continue serving life sentences for a crime that the law—at the time of their conviction as well as now—punishes only
with prision mayor which they have more than fully served, would be to deny them their constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection of the law.
Any further detention of petitioners, in my view as above discussed, is illegal and unconstitutional and the petition for habeas
corpus should be granted and petitioners forthwith set at liberty.
BERNARDO v PEOPLE, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)
G.R. No. L-62114 July 5, 1983

ISIDRO BERNARDO and CAYETANO BERNARDO, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RPC Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is a fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
RPC Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 772 August 20, 1975

PENALIZING SQUATTING AND OTHER SIMILAR ACTS
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the
Secretaries of National Defense, Public Works and Communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC
General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City
and District Engineers, "to remove all illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along
railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property, "squatting is still a major problem in urban communities
all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensity the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby decree and order:
Section 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more
than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
If the offender is a corporation or association, the maximum penalty of five years and the fine of five thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon the president, director, manager or managing partners thereof.
Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Land Titles; Squatting; P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands, but only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions.—Indeed, in the case of People vs. Echaves, supra, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, held that
Presidential Decree No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands. x x x The intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only
to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The Solicitor General in his comment to the petition manifests that “the
intent and purpose of PD 772 is to prohibit and penalize squatting or similar acts on public and private lands located in. urban
communities. x x x [T]hat no person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, nor should
any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute (US vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243). x x x Consequently,
the decision of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 3022-M, convicting herein petitioners of the offense of violation of PD No. 772,
is null and void and should, therefore, be set aside.”
FACTS:
● Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa in her riceland in Plaridel, Bulacan from October 1972 to August 1974. At
the time, petitioner constructed a house therein for his family's dwelling. His son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, was
staying with him in said house as his helper in tilling the land. Subsequently, Isidro left the landholding and transferred to San
Nicolas, Bulacan without the knowledge of the landowner Ledda Sta. Rosa. Before leaving the landholding, however, Isidro
transferred his tenancy rights to his son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, who continued to reside in subject house.
Eventually, Ledda Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole riceland, through her overseer Dr. Patricio E. Cruz.
● A case of forcible entry was filed by Ledda Sta. Rosa against herein petitioners, Isidro Bernardo and Cayetano Bernardo,
before the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan. Petitioners lost before the inferior court as well as in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Likewise, petitioners lost in their petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals.
● Thereafter, Ledda Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling them to vacate the house and the land. When the
latter failed to leave, a criminal complaint was filed against them for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 with the fiscal's
office.
● Upon arraignment, herein petitioners, father and son, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits of the case proceeded
and, after both parties have submitted their cases, herein petitioners, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the court to entertain a case for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, inasmuch as the same
applies to squatters in urban communities only and not to agricultural lands.
● The motion to dismiss was denied and the trial court rendered judgment convicting herein petitioners of the crime charged
and sentencing them to pay a fine of P2,500.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the Presidential Decree No. 772 substantiate the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, since it only covers urban
communities and not agricultural lands.
HELD:
● Yes. No person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be
pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. The intent of the Presidential Decree No. 772 is
unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.
PEOPLE v PIMENTEL, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)
G.R. No. 100210 April 1, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE INVOLVED:
RPC Article 3. (see Bernardo v People)
Article 21. (see Bernardo v People)
Presidential Decree 1866
Amended by RA 9516 "Section 3 and 4" CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE,
DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS
USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES
FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES"
WHEREAS, there has been an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed
and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives;
WHEREAS, these criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of the
country;
WHEREAS, there are various laws and presidential decrees which penalized illegal possession and manufacture of firearms,
ammunition and explosives;
WHEREAS, there is a need to consolidate, codify and integrate said laws and presidential decrees to harmonize their provisions;
WHEREAS, there are some provisions in said laws and presidential decrees which must be updated and revised in order to more
effectively deter violators of the law on firearms, ammunition and explosives.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the
Constitution, do hereby decree:1awphi1©
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly
allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without
legal authority therefor.
Section 2. Presumption of Illegal Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The possession of any machinery, tool or instrument used
directly in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition, by any person whose business or employment does not lawfully deal with the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition, shall be prima facie evidence that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful/illegal
manufacture of firearms or ammunition.
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in,
acquire, dispose or possess handgrenade(s), rifle grenade(s) and other explosives, including but not limited to "philbox bombs",
"molotov cocktail bomb", "fire-bombs", or other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or
causing injury or death to any person.1awphi1©ITC
Any person who commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use of the aforementioned
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or persons shall be punished with the
penalty of death.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly
allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
Section 4. Presumption of Unlawful Manufacture. - The possession of any machinery, tool or instrument directly used in the
manufacture of explosives, by any person whose business or employment does not lawfully deal with the manufacture of explosives
shall be prima facie evidence that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful/illegal manufacture of explosives.
Section 5. Tampering of Firearm's Serial Number. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number of any firearm.
Section 6. Repacking or Altering the Composition of Lawfully Manufactured Explosives. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or modify the composition of any lawfully manufactured explosives.
Section 7. Unauthorized Issuance of Authority to Carry Firearm and/or Ammunition Outside of Residence. - The penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed upon any person, civilian or military, who shall issue authority to carry firearm and/or ammunition
outside of residence, without authority therefore.
RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law)
AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS, PENALIZING
MEMBERSHIP THEREIN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
WHEREAS, the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;
WHEREAS, the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave
danger to the security of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international in direction, posed
by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing
menace to the freedom and security of the country: Now, therefore,
Section 1. This Act shall be known as Anti-Subversion Act.

Section 2. The Congress hereby declares the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the
Government under the control and domination of an alien power. The said party and any other organization having the same purpose
and their successors are hereby declared illegal and outlawed.
Section 3. As used in this Act, the term "Communist Party of the Philippines" shall mean and include the organizations now known as
the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, formerly known as
HUKBALAHAPS, and any successors of such organizations.
Section 4. After the approval of this Act, whoever knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive association as defined in section two
hereof shall be punished by the penalty of arresto mayor and shall be disqualified permanently from holding any public office,
appointive and elective, and from exercising the right to vote; in case of a second conviction, the principal penalty shall be prision
correctional, and in all subsequent convictions the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed; and any alien convicted under this Act
shall be deported immediately after he shall have served the sentence imposed upon him: Provided, That if such member is an officer
or a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any subversive association as defined in section two hereof, or if
such member takes up arms against the Government, he shall be punished by prision mayor to death with all the accessory penalties
provided therefor in the Revised Penal Code: And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines or the government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit,
subversion or other illegal means, for the purpose of placing such Government or political subdivision under the control and
domination of any alien power, shall be punished by prision correctional to prision mayor with all the accessory penalties provided
therefor in the same Code.
Section 5. No prosecution under this Act shall be made unless the city or provincial fiscal, or any special attorney or prosecutor duly
designated by the Secretary of Justice, as the case may be, finds after due investigation of the facts, that a prima facie case for violation
of this Act exists against the accused, and thereafter presents an information in court against the said accused in due form, and certifies
under oath that he has conducted a proper preliminary investigation thereof, with notice, whenever it is possible to give the same, to the
party concerned, who shall have the right to be represented by counsel, to testify, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to cross-examine witnesses against him: Provided, That the preliminary investigation of any offense defined and
penalized herein by prision mayor to death shall be conducted by the proper Court of First Instance.
Section 6. Any person who knowingly furnishes false evidence in any action brought under this Act shall be punished by prision
correctional.
Section 7. No person shall be convicted of any of the offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death unless on the testimony of
at least two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.
Section 8. Within thirty days after the approval of this Act, any person who is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines or
of any such association or conspiracy, who desires to renounce such membership, may do so in writing and under oath before a
municipal or city mayor, a provincial governor, or a person authorized by law to administer oaths. Such renunciation shall exempt such
person or persons from the penal sanction of this Act, but the same shall in no way exempt him from liability for criminal acts or for
any violation of the existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines committed before this Act takes effect.
RA 7636
AN ACT REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Seven Hundred (R.A. No. 1700), otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, as
revived by Executive Order Numbered One Hundred Sixty-Seven (E.O. No. 167) and subsequently amended by Executive Order
Numbered Two Hundred Seventy-Six (E.O. No. 276) is hereby repealed.
Section 2. This Act does not in any manner repeal, amend or modify the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 3. Presidential Decrees Nos. 885, 1736, 1835 and 1975 remain repealed, and all other laws, presidential decrees, letters of
instruction, and other issuances, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby likewise repealed.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Presidential Decree 1866; Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866,
the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and the third paragraph of the same Section makes the use of said firearm and ammunition “in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion” a circumstance to increase the
penalty to death.— The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and simple. Under the first paragraph of Section 1, the
mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is the crime itself w hich carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of the same Section makes the use o f said firearm and ammunition “in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion” a circumstance to increase the
penalty to death. Thus, the allegation in the Information in Criminal Case No. 1789 that the unlicensed firearm found in the possession
of Antonio Tujan, “a member of the communist party of the Philippines and its front organization,” was used “in furtherance of or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion” does not charge him with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in
the same Information, but simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was committed so
as to qualify the penalty to death.
Same; Same; Same; There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically or by
implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the very acts that are being penalized.— There is, therefore,
only one offense charged in the questioned information, that is, the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its being
used in furtherance of subversion. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which decrees categorically or by
implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion are the very acts that are being penalized. This is clear from the title
of the law itself which boldly indicates the specific acts penalized under it: “CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND
IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.”
FACTS:
● As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC
Manila.
● A warrant for his arrest was issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not be found.
● Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed
revolver and six rounds of live ammunition was found in his possession.
● On June 1990, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion under
PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati.
● Tujan filed a motion to quash the information invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he claims that alleged
possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was granted by RTC and CA. The above Information recommended no
bail for Antonio Tujan, which recommendation was approved by the trial court in an Order dated June 19, 1990.7 The same
order also directed the continued detention of Antonio Tujan at MIG 15 of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP), Bago Bantay, Quezon City, while his case is pending.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the respondent can be still retroactively held liable with the repealed law R.A no. 1700.
HELD:
● No. it would be illogical for the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that no longer
exists. With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent has no more
legal basis and should be dismissed. The charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by subversion, this
charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition since, as earlier discussed, subversion is no
longer a crime.
PEOPLE v BON, G.R. NO. 166401, OCT. 30, 1996
G.R. No. 166401

October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Rights of accused; Rights against self-incrimination; Applies to administrative
proceedings.—The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or
penal aspect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Applies to administrative hearing against a doctor.— In an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, x x x the x x x Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason.— A proceeding for malpractice possesses a criminal or penal aspect in the sense
that the respondent would suffer the revocation of
his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extends to right not to take the witness stand.—The right against self-incrimination extends not only to
the right to refuse to answer questions put to the accused while on the witness stand, but also to forego testimony, to remain silent and
refuse to take the witness stand when called as a witness by the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason.— The reason is that, the right against self-incrimination, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality.
FACTS:
● Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older
brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was
accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G. All these cases were consolidated for
trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years.
● Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them. During
trial, their respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were
entered as documentary evidence.
● AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with
her grandmother. She recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant
touched her thighs and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened that she and
her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her
grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually abused by
appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.
● AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time, again at the house of her
grandmother. The following year, when she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she
was raped in an outdoor clearing after having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables. While at the clearing,
appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant
allegedly stopped.
● It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC, the brutish acts appellant had done to her. Her
mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary
evidence her birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.
● The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no external sign of physical injury found
on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was
admitting two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock"
which might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr. Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual
penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times.
● AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no external physical injuries apparent on her body.
AAA's labia majora and minora were well coapted and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that
it could happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person having an elastic hymen. On the
other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the
labia of the pudendum of AAA.
ISSUE(S):
W/N the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted
rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces.
HELD:
● The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the
appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended. By reasons of R.A no. 9346, he is spared from the death penalty, and
downgraded the penalty to, for the 6 counts of raped to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole in pursuant to R.A no.
9346, for 2 counts of attempted rape was downgraded to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccionalas minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) of prision mayor as maximum for each count of
attempted rape. In addition, the appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape in
the amounts of 30,000.00 as civil indemnity, 25,000.00 as moral damages and 10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
PASCUAL v BOARD OF EXAMINERS, 28 SCRA 344
G.R. No. L-25018

May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
ART 3. BILL OF RIGHTS (see People v Bon)
Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code
ART. 51. — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon
the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Law; Rape; Witnesses; Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience
too painful to recall; Inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of
testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions.— It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she
was raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited
while BBB was testifying in open court. Our observations in People v. Perez, 270 SCRA 526 (1997), on the appreciation of alleged
inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive, thus: We note that these alleged
inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the commission of the crime
of rape of which accused-appellant was convicted. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee’s Brief, the seeming
inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim’s direct examination and
cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience
too painful to recall. The rape victim was testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter,
which, more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that her narration was less
than letter-perfect. “Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the
accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions.”
Same; Same; Same; Alibis and Denials; A categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of
ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.—Well-settled is the rule that a
categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial. The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the prosecution has strong,
clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator. In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of
appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of
such identification.
Same; Same; Same; It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of
coming before the court and narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It
lazy.—
is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and
narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC’s father-in-law had
died several years before the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the
reputation of her father-in-law, she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victim’s family would
dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such accusation is against a member of
the family, unless the crime was in fact committed.
Same; Same; Same; Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.—No sane woman, least of all a child,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has
not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-victims are normally
given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The weight of
such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or indubitable proof that the accused could not have
committed the rape, but in the absence of such countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
Same; Same; Same; Delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.—The delay in
reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly threatened
to kill them and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and again that delay in revealing the
commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim’s perception
and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces
a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment, or even
thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she would report the incident.
FACTS:
● Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.for alleged immorality.
At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness.
● Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
● The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime
he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
● Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the Board of Medical Examiners.
● The lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing
or further proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter.
● Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the
Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his
consent and against himself." Hence, the Board appealed.
ISSUE(S):
W/N the Arsenio Pascual charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness
against himself.
HELD:
● Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative in character possesses
a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice
medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer questions put to the accused while on the
witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called as a witness by
the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self-incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused,
stands for a belief that while a crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective
should not be accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the human
personality.
MANUEL V PEOPLE 476 SCRA 461 (2005
MANUEL V PEOPLE 476 SCRA 461 (2005)
Article 3 Revised Penal Code

Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by laws are felonies (delitos)
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) b ut also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is a fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, and lack of skill.
Article 19, 20, 21 Civil Code of the Philippines - Human Relations

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for
the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Articles 2219 Civil Code of the Philippines - Moral Damages

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the
order named.
Article 2220 Civil Code of the Philippines

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under
the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Criminal Law; Bigamy; The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure
the juridical tie of marriage established by law.—The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were
of the impression that “in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of
years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriageshould be a justification for bigamy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements; Family Code; Declaration of Nullity; Bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the
second or subsequent marriage; Under the Family Code, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.— For
the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b)
he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on
the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. Viada avers that a
third element of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an
essential element of a felony by dolo. On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1)
the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of
competent jurisdiction. As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Mercado v. Tan, under the Family Code of the
Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act
and an evil intent—actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.—As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged
with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional
felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words “with malice” do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase
is included in the word “voluntary.” Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man
intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must
prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. For one to be criminally liable for a felony by
dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for
a felony by dolo—such defense negates malice or criminal intent.—T he petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake offact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; One accused of bigamy has the burden of adducing in evidence a decision of a
competent court declaring the presumptive death of the first spouse as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article 41 of the Family Code; The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless
words.— It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the
well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should
have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden. The phrase
“or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith
based on mere testimony is found incredible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement of judicial declaration of presumptive death is also for the benefit of the State—the
laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community
and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.—The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the
benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the “State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.” Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest
of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed
and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage
anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage—two willing spouses and an
approving State.—In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means
calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a
competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a
well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, “men readily believe what they wish to be true,” is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by
the subjective condition of individuals. Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.
Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of
parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death
of the absent spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance
of the absentee spouse; The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second
marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy.—With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v.
Calisterio: In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered
valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the
time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike
the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code. The Court rejects
petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one
charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest
the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.—The Committee tasked to prepare the
Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conformto Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the
present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is
later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; Requisites; Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in
criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases.— Moral damages
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there
must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of
the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in
Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party, the guilty party is liable to the
offended party for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.— The law does not
intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral
anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or
omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 and analogous
cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in
form, proportion, relation, etc.) Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which
the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to
the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Rights; Elements.— According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This provision
contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set
forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.— Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. If the provision does not
provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
Article 20 provides that “every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the
latter for the same.” On the other hand, Article 21 provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.” The latter provision is
adopted to remedy “the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it
is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes.” Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The accused’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate, and with malice and caused injury to the latter, and the fact that she did not
sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.—In the present case, the petitioner courted the private
complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private
complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance—that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry
the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed
her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly
abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before theywere married. Thus, the
private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single
act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private
complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her
lawful husband. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the
private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical
injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she
is not barred from claiming moral damages.—Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she
is notbarred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As
held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald: Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in
consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a
right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows
v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false
representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her
a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently
committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to
one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for
such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am.
Rep. 336.
FACTS:
● Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. He met Tina Gandalera in 1996. Eduardo proposed on several
occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. They were married on April 22, 1996
before Judge Antonio C. Reyes. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single”. However, starting 1999,
Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever
she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. In January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return.
Worse, he stopped giving financial support. In August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the NSO in
Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
● For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a GRO. He fell in love with
her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him.
Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a “love-bite” on her neck. He then
abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was “single” in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek the nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer
valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
● The lower court found Eduardo guilty of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten
(10) months, as a minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. Eduardo appealed the decision to the
CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in
good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was
of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower court’s decision in awarding a moral damage when it has no basis in fact
and in law.
HELD:
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the
following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the
petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s
duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for
abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
In the present case, the Eduardo courted Tina and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his
parents to Tina’s house where he and his parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, Tina agreed to marry him, who
even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with Eduardo and dutifully performed her duties as his wife,
believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until Eduardo heartlessly abandoned her, Tina had no
inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, Tina was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consists not of a single act alone,
but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could
have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.
The Court rules that Eduardo's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with Tina were willful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for
moral damages. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family
as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
PEOPLE V DELOS SANTOS 403 SCRA 153 (2003)
PEOPLE V DELOS SANTOS 403 SCRA 153 (2003)
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
RPC ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty
of murder and shall be punished by reclusión temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car
or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person
or corpse.
RA 7659 Sec. 6
Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Settled is the rule that when it comes to the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not
overturn the findings of trial courts. —The first assigned error involves a determination of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Settled is the rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not overturn the findings of trial courts.
The latter are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation
of the witnesses’ manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in court.
Same; Same; Motive; Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively
identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. —Appellant argues that since the prosecution witnesses
testified that there was no altercation between him and Flores, it follows that no motive to kill can be attributed to him. This is an
inconsequential argument. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively
identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. In People vs. Galano, we ruled that in the crime of
murder, motive is not an element of the offense, it becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and
there is some doubt on whether the accused had committed it. In the case before us, no such doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate
positively identified appellant.
Same; Same; Two-month delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted story—it is but natural for witnesses to avoid being
involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the
perpetrator. —In a last-ditch attempt to cast doubt on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant questions why their
statements were taken only on January 29, 1998 when the incident happened on November 6, 1997. The two-month delay is hardly
an indicium of a concocted story. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the
crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the perpetrator. Born of human experience, the fear of retaliation can
have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses. Thus, in People vs. Dacibar, we held that the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case is of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility,
especially when a valid reason exists for such hesitance.
Same; Same; Alibis and Denials; For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the
physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.— As earlier mentioned,
appellant’s defenses are mere alibi and denial. He testified that at the time the crime took place, he was in his aunt's house in Muson,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. When probed by the trial court, he categorically stated that the house is only 40 meters away from the
scene of the crime and may be traveled in about three or five minutes. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be convincing
enough to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the
incident. Certainly, the required impossibility does not exist here.
Same; Same; Same; Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part
of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.—Weighing the evidence of the prosecution vis-à-vis that of the
defense, the scale of justice must tilt in favor of the former. Time and again, we ruled that positive identification, where categorical
and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
With marked relevance is the fact that appellant did not present any evidence to show that the prosecution witnesses, in testifying
against him, have improper motive.
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Where the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack
from behind with no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could only be described as treacherous.—The prosecution was able to establish
that appellant’s attack on Flores was from behind without any slightest provocation on his part and that it was sudden and
unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery. Where the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no
weapon to resist it, the stabbing could only be described as treacherous. There being treachery, appellant’s conviction for murder is in
order.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
every Information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.— In the imposition of penalty, we
cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of cruelty considered by the trial court. Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, every information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This rule may be
given retroactive effect in the light of the well-established rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The aggravating circumstance of cruelty, not having
been alleged in the Information, may not be appreciated to enhance the liability of appellant.
FACTS:
● Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of November 6, 1997, he saw Rod Flores drinking gin with Narciso
Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainier at the latters house in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.4 As he
was about to fetch water from a nearby faucet, he approached them and borrowed Flores cart.5 While waiting for the cart, he
stood across Flores who was then seated and conversing with the group.6 Suddenly, appellant emerged from the back of
Flores and stabbed him with a knife,7 making an upward and downward thrust.8 Flores ran after he was stabbed twice.
Appellant pursued him and stabbed him many times.10 As a result, Flores intestines bulged out of his stomach. Appellant
ceased stabbing Flores only after he saw him dead. Thereafter, he turned his ire against Jayvee Rainier and chased him.
Fearful for his life, witness De Leon hid himself and later reported the incident to the police.
● Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leons testimony. On cross-examination, Tablate testified that he tried to help Flores by
separating him from the appellant who ran away. He also testified that the latter joined his group at about 11:00 a.m. and
kept on coming back and forth.
● Dr. Caballero declared on the witness stand that Flores suffered twenty-one (21) stab wounds in the frontal, posterior and
lateral side of his body, eleven (11) of which were fatal. Dr. Caballero said it was possible that appellant was behind Flores
considering the stab wounds inflicted at his back.14 According to the doctor, Flores died because of massive external/internal
hemorrhages due to multiple stab wounds in the thorax and abdomen penetrating both lungs, heart, stomach, liver, spleen
and intestines.
● Romeo Flores testified that his son Rod Flores was then working at Vitarich, Marilao, Bulacan, earning P600.00 every 15th
day of the month;that he spent P100,000.00 for his sons burial and wake; that he has receipts in the amount of P19,110.00
spent for the funeral services and the cost of the cemetery lot and a list of other expenses in the amount of P35,960.00; and
that his family has been grieving for the loss of a loved one.
● Appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the accusation and declared that on November 6, 1997 at 8:00
p.m, he was in his aunties house in Muson, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, forty (40) meters away from the scene of the
crime. He was then fetching water. Earlier, at about 5:30 p.m., he and Flores met but they did not greet each other. There
was no altercation between them. Hence, he could not understand why De Leon and Tablate testified against him.
● Sonny Bautista testified that on that particular date and time, he and appellant were in their aunties house in San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. They watched television up to 8:30 p.m. and then went home. At about 10:00 p.m., appellant was arrested.
Bautista did not inform the policemen that they were watching television in their aunties house at the time the crime took
place. Neither did he accompany appellant to the police station.
● On October 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
All premises considered, this Court resolves and so holds that the prosecution has been able to establish the
criminal culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Danny delos Santos is hereby found
guilty of the crime of Murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
● In the imposition of the penalty, the Court hereby takes into account the brutality in the manner by which the life of the
victim was taken, and if only to serve as deterrent to others who might be similarly obsessed, it is believed that the higher of
the two penalties provided should be meted to the accused herein. Absent any circumstance that would mitigate the severity
of his criminal act and pursuant to Articles 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6, Republic Act no. 7659,
the accused Danny delos Santos y Fernandez is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death by lethal injection.
ISSUE(S):
WON the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even after the two-month period.
HELD:
YES. It is natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is as such
gravity as to show the cruelty of perpetrator, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses. Besides, settled is
the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial. Decision is affirmed with modification.
GUIYAB V PEOPLE 473 SCRA 533 (2005)
GUIYAB V PEOPLE 473 SCRA 533 (2005)
RPC Art. 3 (see Manuel v People)
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Appeals; As a rule, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
passing upon the credibility of a witness, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which
has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted or misapprehended.— As a rule, appellate courts will not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of a witness, unless there appears in the record some facts
or circumstances of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted or
misapprehended. That general rule holds true in this case.
Same; Witnesses; There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive
identification of a felon by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally.— We do not doubt
Joseph’s identification of Joey Guiyab. Even if he did not know the name of the petitioner prior to the incident, he was able to
identify him in open court. Besides, Joseph maintained that although he did not know the name of the petitioner, he knew him by his
face. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive identification of a felon
by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally. The witness need not have to know the name
of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face. We ruled that “knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his
name. Hence, the positive identification of the malefactor should not be disregarded just because his name was supplied to the
eyewitness. The weight of the eyewitness account is premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused commit the crime,
and not because he knew his name.”
FACTS:
● On December 12, 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., victim Rafael Bacani and witness Joseph Madriaga were in front of the
Community Center in Tumauini. Juan Sanchez kicked them. They posed for a fight but Joey Guiyab said “You try and you
will see” while holding a knife. Madriaga hit Sanchez with a stone, and so Guiyab chased him. According to Madriaga,
Guiyab failed to catch him so Guiyab instead attacked Bacani, stabbing him once on the right chest. Bacani was brought to
the hospital and died a day after. SP04 Romeo Tumolava also testified that he saw Guiyab near the Community Center at
the night of the incident.
● According to Guiyab, he was not at Tumauini Cultural and Sports Center at the time the incident happened. He was farming
until 5:00 p.m. at Sitio Bayabo, Camasi, and slept at around 9:00 p.m. in their house. This was corroborated by his neighbor
Domingo Gumaru, and his parents, Silvino and Vicenta Guiyab.
● Both the TC and CA found Guiyab guilty. Guiyab appealed to the SC, alleging his identification was tainted, since his name
was only fed to the witness Madriaga.
ISSUE(S):
WON the identification of the petitioner was tainted with conjecture and speculation
HELD:
NO. The SC found Madriaga’s identification of Joey Guiyab credible. Even if he did not know the name of Guiyab prior to the
incident, he was able to identify him in open court when he was asked to point out the person responsible for the stabbing. Besides,
Madriaga maintained that although he did not know Guiyab by name, he knew him by his face as part of the community. There is
nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive identification of a felon by a
prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally. The witness need not have to know the name of
the accused for so long as he recognizes his face. “Knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his name. Hence,
the positive identification of the malefactor should not be disregarded just because his name was supplied to the eyewitness. The
weight of the eyewitness account is premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused commit the crime, and not because he
knew his name.
PEOPLE v TEMBLOR, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)
[No. 66884, May 28, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, VS. VICENTE TEMBLOR ALIAS "RONALD."' defendant-appellant.
Doctrines/Principles Involved
RPC, Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
RPC, Art. 3. (see Manuel v People)
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Law; Evidence; Murder; Witnesses; Rule that the trial court’s assessment of credibility of witnesses while testifying is
generally binding on the appellate court; Reason.—The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively identified as the killer
of Cagampang? The settled rule is that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding
on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by
convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA 582).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witness did not diminish her credibility;
Reason.— The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish her
credibility, especially because she had positively identified the accused as her husband’s assailant, and her testimony is corroborated
by the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and entirely in accord with human experience.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by prosecution, witnesses; Rule for alibi to
be acceptable as a defense.—Appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made
by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime. Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an
alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be
demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol’s
house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter
of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony of the witnesses who had positively identified him could not be overcome by the defendant’s
alibi. (People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258,)
Same; Same; Same; Motive; Lack of motive for the killing by appellant, rejected; Proof of motive, not essential when the culprit
Appellant’s alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined that
was positively identified.—
the defendant’s knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of
the New People’s Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in
Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA’s “agaw armas” campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not
essential when the culprit has been positively identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
The records further show that the accused and his

Same; Same; Same; Flight of the accused was an implied admission of guilt—
companion fled after killing Cagampang and taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an
implied admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).
FACTS:
● 7:30 in the evening of December, while Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store adjacent
to their house in Barangay Talo-ao, the accused Vicente Temblor, asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While
Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor,
wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's
name "Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later Identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the store through the
main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim.
Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to
the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
● Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980,
he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as
"pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
● Trial Court - defendant was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
● He appealed.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the court a qou erred:

1. In finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the deceased Julius Cagampang;
2. In rejecting his defense of alibi.
HELD:
The appeal deserves no merit. The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is
generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings,
when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal.
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined that the defendant's knowledge
that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for
the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in
the country. It is known as the NPA's "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been
positively identified.
PEOPLE v HASSAN, 157 SCRA 261 (1988)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
RPC Article 12
ARTICLE 12. Circumstances Which Exempt from Criminal Liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall
order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall
be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformity with the provisions of this and the
preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance
and education; otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said article 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause.
RPC Article 80
ARTICLE 80. Suspension of Sentence of Minor Delinquents. — Whenever a minor under eighteen years of age, of either sex, be
accused of a crime, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment, shall suspend
all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable
institution, established under the law for the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective and delinquent children,
or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Public
Welfare Commissioner or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of public schools
or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed hereinbelow, until such minor shall have reached his majority or
for such less period as the court may deem proper.
The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration the religion of such minor, his parents or next
of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the religious sect or
denomination to which they belong.
The Public Welfare Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the superintendent of public schools or his
representatives, or the person to whose custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the Court every two months
or as often as required, a written report on the good or bad conduct of said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by
him.
The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by the court on the recommendation of the Public
Welfare Commissioner or his authorized representatives or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his representatives,
according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed
upon him. The provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by those contained herein.
If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with
the approval of the Public Welfare Commissioner and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance with the law may
deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under the care of a responsible person.
If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his confinement, in accordance
with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release.
In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the institution to which he has been committed or
with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be found
incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same
may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him.
The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to which he has been committed, shall be borne
totally or partially by his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the discretion of the
court.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Guilt of the accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.—We hold that the
evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt—required by the
Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict an accused person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty
which would allow us to pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased
Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted
felons in which he would be a very young stranger. In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the
prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence. When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the scales must be
tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the constitutional presumption of innocence the accused enjoys as a counterfoil to
the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him. The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against
the inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of the
uncorroborated statement of the two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore suspect.
Same; Same; Prosecution’s evidence weak and unconvincing.— The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak
and unconvincing. And so with the evidence sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the
expert testimony of the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the
prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on the
witness stand that he saw the assailant stab the deceased “from behind on his chest” only once, the NBI medicolegal officer
identified two stab wounds one “at the front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another stab wound located at
the left arm posterior aspect.” The same medical expert also concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound, which was
the cause of death, that the same was “inflicted on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him.”
Same; Same; Same; Investigation conducted by police investigator not satisfactory.—The investigation of this case by the
Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police Section, at Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio
P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one, we are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the
identification of the accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was “presented” alone to Jose Samson by the
police investigator and prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at the office of the La Merced
Funeral Homes on Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very evidence of the prosecution, the procedure adopted by the
police investigators was a “confrontation” between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio
testified that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on
cross-examination, Carpio made a turnabout by saying that the accused was identified by Samson in a “police line-up”; this
tergiversation, we daresay, was an afterthought, more the result of an over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the leading
questions of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness, if not sincerity, on the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct
erroneous statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocally that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as the police
investigator claimed on second thought.
Same; Same; Same; Confrontation and identification of the accused at the funeral parlor by the lone eyewitness improper and
is as tainted as an uncounselled confession.—The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and identify the
accused alone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in a police line-up, was “pointedly suggestive, generated confidence
where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subverted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and
highly singular method of identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the
esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance.” Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police
investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of
the investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage—the identification of the accused. As it turned
out, the method of identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped
unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused
was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an
uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this infringement
alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
Same; Same; Motive; Motive essential when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.— And now as a penultimate
observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to
him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind,
procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true
where there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit as when “the identification is extremely tenuous,” as in this case.
FACTS:
● Respondent was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro. At the time of his death on July
23,1981, the deceased was employed as manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan
was an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador.
● In the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and his family had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His
existence in this world has not even been officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the Registry of Births
because the Samal tribe, to which he belongs, does not see the importance of registering births and deaths.
● Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of the prosecution and the sloppiness of the investigation conducted
by the police investigator, Police Carpio of the Homicide and Arson Section, who also testified for the prosecution.
● The sole eyewitness, Jose Samson, recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the motorcycle
with both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from behind on his chest while
the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able to see the assailant because it was very bright there
that Ramon was facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of the fruit stand a — distance of
about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Respondent guilty of murder
HELD:
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing.
Also, the element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from
its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the two policemen which, as
previously observed, is flawed and therefore suspect. We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not
satisfy the quantum of proof — beyond reasonable doubt. The decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman
Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Crim Law Case Digest I

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CRIMINAL LAW I (CASE DIGEST)

US v PABLO, 35 PHIL 97 (1916)

[No. 11676. October 17, 1916.]

Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 5

Constitution (1987), Art VI, Sec. 1

Sovereign Power of the State (US v. Pablo)

The respondent was guilty of perjury.

[No. 17584. March 8, 1922]

Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 5

Constitution (1987), Art VI, Sec. 1

Sovereign Power: Delegation to the Philippine Government

TAÑADA v TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

PESIGAN v ANGELES, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)

No. L-64279. April 30, 1984.​*

1987 Constitution, Art. 3 Bill of Rights

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself;

(h) To have a speedy, impartial and public trial; and

New Civil Code

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 626

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Notes used under jurisprudence:

● On 2 April 1982, The defendant transported 26 carabao bound to Batangas.

US v SWEET, 1 PHIL 18 (1901)

Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 1

Civil Code, Art. 14

RP-US VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT

1. Subject to the provisions of this article:

(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;

(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;

Per COOPER, ​J.,​ concurring:

[G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG),​ petitioner,

Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec 1

Civil Code, Art 14

Visiting Forces Agreement, Art. 5 ​(see US v Sweet, 1Phil 18 (1901)

PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:

Same; Same; Same; Same; “Specialized Agencies,” Defined.

WHEREFORE, the petition is​ DENIED​.

US v AH SING, 36 PHIL 978 (1917)

[G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917]

THE UNITED STATES,​ plaintiff-appellee,

Antonio Sanz for appellant.

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship

Constitution (1987), Art 1

Visiting Force Agreement, Art. V ​(see US v Sweet)

MIQUIBAS v COMMANDING GENERAL, 80 PHIL 262 (1948)

[G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948]

JESUS MIQUIABAS,​ petitioner,

Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner.

RPC, Art. 2 ​(see US v Ah Sing)

Constitution (1987), Art 1 ​(see US v Ah Sing)

Visiting Force Agreement, Art. V ​(see US v Sweet)

GUMABON v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

[G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971​]

Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.

Civil Code, Art. 4

ORIGINAL PETITION IN THE SUPREME COURT. HABEAS CORPUS.

BERNARDO v PEOPLE, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)

G.R. No. L-62114 July 5, 1983

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 772 August 20, 1975

No. L-64279. April 30, 1984.*

Per COOPER, J., concurring:

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

Visiting Forces Agreement, Art. 5 (see US v Sweet, 1Phil 18 (1901)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Visiting Force Agreement, Art. V (see US v Sweet)

JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,

RPC, Art. 2 (see US v Ah Sing)

Constitution (1987), Art 1 (see US v Ah Sing)

Visiting Force Agreement, Art. V (see US v Sweet)

[G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971]

Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.

RPC Article 3. (see Bernardo v People)

Article 21. (see Bernardo v People)

ART 3. BILL OF RIGHTS (see People v Bon)

RPC Art. 3 (see Manuel v People)

[No. 66884, May 28, 1988.]

RPC, Art. 3. (see Manuel v People)

The records further show that the accused and his