SPECPRO – RULE70
00 as attorney's fees' From this decision, the defendant filed an
G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985
GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of Susana Agustin, petitioner-plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU,
respondents-defendants-appellees.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The precursor of this case was a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by
plaintiff-appellant Agustin, as adininistrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana
Agustin, against defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu.
Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by
the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated
demands an action to eject him was filed.
In his complaint, the plaintiff-appellant prayed that the defendant-appellee be
ordered to immediately vacate the place in question, to pay plaintiff-appellant
the sum of P2,300.00 representing arrearages in rentals plus the
corresponding rentals until he actually vacates the place, attorney's fees,
expenses, and costs.
In his answer, the defendant-appellee included a counter-claim alleging that
the present action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted
with malice and bad faith on the part of the plaintiff for the obvious reason that
plaintiff pretty well knows that defendant does not have any rentals in arrears
due to the estate of Susana Agustin, but notwithstanding this knowledge,
plaintiff filed the present action merely to annoy, vex, embarrass and
inconvenience the defendant." He stated, "That by virtue of the unwarranted
and malicious filing of this action by the plaintiff against the defendant, the
latter suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual and moral damages in the
amount of no less than P50,000.00; P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary
damages. In addition, defendant has been compelled to retain the services of
undersigned counsel to resist plaintiffs' reckless, malicious and frivolous claim
and to protect and enforce his rights for which he obligated himself to pay the
further sum of P3,500.00 as attorney's fees."
The City Court of Cebu subsequently rendered judgment dismissing the
counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question
and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the
1
sum of P150.
appeal with Branch Ill of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was
designated as Civil Case No. R-12430.
Availing of Republic Act 6031 which does away with trials de novo in appeals
before it, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on all the foregoing considerations, the appealed
judgment is hereby set aside. Judgment is hereby required in favor of the
defendant—
1. Ordering the plaintiff to pay.
a) P10,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
2. With costs against plaintiff.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
No appeal was taken by the plaintiff-appellant. The decision lapsed into finality
and became executory. A writ of execution was issued by virtue of which a
notice to sell at public auction real properties belonging to the estate of Susana
Agustin was issued by the Deputy Sheriff to satisfy judgment in the case.
Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, confessing his fault and
giving the reason why he failed to perfect the appeal on time. The motion was
denied.
Thereafter, with the aid of new counsel, the plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint
with Branch V, Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the
Deputy Sheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited
decision of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment case on
the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null and void from
the beginning for the following reasons:
(a) It grants relief in the total sum of P16,000.00 (exclusive of costs)
distributed thus:
P10,000.00 as moral damages
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees
which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of Cebu; Section 88
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828,
limits the jurisdiction of the city courts in civil cases to P10,000.00 as the
maximum amount of the demand (exclusive of interest and costs);
 (b) Moreover, said Decision (Annex "G") grants moral damages to the
defendant in the sum of P10,000.00 which constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there being no evidence to
support it and the subject matter of the suit in Civil Case No. R-13504 being
purely contractual where moral damages are not recoverable.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff
has no cause of action and that the court lacks jurisdiction to declare the nullity
of a decision of another branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
While rejecting the second ground for the motion to dismiss, the court
sustained the defendant and ruled:
Clearly from a reading of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks the annulment of
the decision rendered by the Third Branch of this Court because the award
exceeded the jurisdiction amount cognizable by the City Court of Cebu and
the said Branch III of this Court has no jurisdiction to award the defendants
herein (plaintiff in Civil Case No. 12430) an amount more than P10,000.00;
It is the considered opinion of this Court that this allegation of the herein
plaintiff cannot be availed of as a ground for annulment of a judgment. It may
perhaps, or at most, be a ground for a petition for certiorari. But then, the
remedy should be availed of within the reglementary period to appeal.
Nevertheless, even if the plaintiff did take his cause by certiorari, just the
same, it would have been futile....
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, this Court believes that the present complaint fails to allege a valid
cause of action as the same is only a clear attempt at utilizing the remedy for
the annulment of the judgment rendered by this Court in Civil Case No.
12430 to offset the adverse effects of failure to appeal.
Plaintiff-appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file
an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which, in a resolution, certified the
same to us on the ground that it involves pure questions of law.
We ruled in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (72
SCRA 326, citing Reyes v. Barretto-Datu, 94 Phil. 446, 448-449)-
Under our rules of procedure, the validity of a judgment or order of the court,
which has become final and executory, may he attacked only by a direct
action or proceeding to annul the same, or by motion in another case if, in
the latter case, the court had no jurisdiction to enter the order or pronounce
2
the judgment (section 44, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). The first proceeding
is a direct attack against the order or judgment, because it is not incidental
to, but is the main object of, the proceeding. The other one is the collateral
attack, in which the purpose of the proceedings is to obtain some relief, other
than the vacation or setting aside of the judgment, and the attack is only an
incident. (I Freeman on Judgments, sec. 306, pages 607-608.) A third
manner is by a petition for relief from the judgment order as authorized by the
statutes or by the rules, such as those expressly provided in Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, but in this case it is to be noted that the relief is granted by
express statutory authority in the same action or proceeding in which the
judgment or order was entered ...
The question is thus poised, whether or not the present action for the
annulment of the judgment in the ejectment case is the proper remedy after it
has become final and executory.
To this procedural dilemma, the solution lies in the determination of the validity
of the judgment sought to be annulled, for against a void judgment, plaintiff-
appellant's recourse would be proper.
There is no question as to the validity of the court's decision with respect to the
issue of physical possession of property, the defendant-appellee's right to the
same having been upheld. However, the plaintiff-appellant assails the money
judgment handed down by the court which granted damages to the defendant-
appellee. By reason thereof, he seeks the declaration of the nullity of the entire
judgment.
It is the plaintiff-appellant's contention that moral damages may not properly be
awarded in ejectment cases, the only recoverable damages therein being the
reasonable compensation for use and occupancy of the premises and the legal
measure of damages being the fair rental value of the property.
Plaintiff-appellant loses sight of the fact that the money judgment was awarded
the defendant-appellee in the concept of a counterclaim. A defending party
may set up a claim for money or any other relief which he may have against
the opposing party in a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule 6, Revised Rules of
Court). And the court may, if warranted, grant actual, moral, or exemplary
damages as prayed for. The grant of moral damages, in the case at bar, as a
counterclaim, and not as damages for the unlawful detention of property must
be upheld. However, the amount thereof is another matter.
Plaintiff-appellant raises the issue of whether or not the Court of First Instance
may, in an appeal, award the defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount
exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin.
It is well-settled that a court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a set-off
or counterclaim in excess of its jurisdiction (Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules of
Court; Ago v. Buslon, 10 SCRA 202). A counterclaim beyond the court's
jurisdiction may only be pleaded by way of defense, the purpose of which,
however, is only to defeat or weaken plaintiff's claim, but not to obtain
affirmative relief (Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules of Court). Nevertheless, the
defendant-appellee, in the case at bar, set up his claim in excess of the
jurisdiction of the city court as a compulsory counterclaim. What is the legal
effect of such a move?
Pertinent to our disposition of this question is our pronouncement in the case of
Hyson Tan, et al. v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, et al., (G.R. No. L-10096,
March 23, 1956) later adopted in Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans (6
SCRA 14) and the later case of One Heart Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (108
SCRA 416) to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
... An appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of
Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision
is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waives so
much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court;
for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice
of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in
expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction
should the decision be unfavorable. ...
Thus, by presenting his claim voluntarily before the City Court of Cebu, the
defendant-appellee submitted the same to the jurisdiction of the court. He
became bound thereby. The amount of P10,000.00 being the jurisdictional
amount assigned the City Court of Cebu, whose jurisdiction the defendant-
appellee has invoked, he is thereby deemed to have waived the excess of his
claim beyond P10,000.00. It is as though the defendant-appellee had set up a
counterclaim in the amount of P10,000.00 only. May the Court of First Instance
then, on appeal, award defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond that
amount?
The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in the inferior court cannot be
entertained in the Court of First Instance on appeal (Francisco, The Revised
Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 26, citing the cases of Bernardo v.
Genato, 11 Phil. 603 and Yu Lay v. Galmes, 40 Phil. 651). As explained in Yu
Lay v. Galmes— "Upon an appeal to a court of first instance from the judgment
of a justice of the peace, it is not possible, without changing the purpose of the
appeal, to alter the nature of the question raised by the complaint and the
answer in the original action. There can be no doubt, therefore, of the scope of
3
the doctrine laid down in the several decisions of the Court. Consequently, We
hold that, upon an appeal to the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff as well as
the defendant cannot file any pleading or allegation which raises a question
essentially distinct from that raised and decided in the justice of the peace
court. "This rule was reiterated in cases from Ng Cho Cio v. Ng Diong (1 SCRA
275) to Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (116 SCRA
636).
Thus, the defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the
jurisdictional amount of the city Court of Cebu, should be treated as having
been deemed waived. It is as though it has never been brought before trial
court. It may not be entertained on appeal.
The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee on
appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began.
Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's
counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court,
likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise.
Appellate jurisdiction being not only a continuation of the exercise of the same
judicial power which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction, also
presupposes that the original and appellate courts are capable of participating
in the exercise of the same judicial power (See 2 Am. Jur. 850; Stacey Cheese
Company v. R.E. Pipkin, Appt. 155 NC 394, 71 S.E. 442, 37 LRA 606) It is the
essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause (See
2 Am. Jur 850 citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch US, 137, 2 L. ed. 60).
It is, of course, a well-settled rule that when court transcends the limits
prescribed for it by law and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its
adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or
otherwise (Planas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 3 SCRA 395; Parades v.
Moya, 61 SCRA 526). The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having
awarded judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable award of
P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such being the case,
an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the plaintiff-appellant
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper remedy.
The nullity of such portion of the decision in question, however, is not such as
to affect the conclusions reached by the court in the main case for ejectment.
As held in Vda. de Pamintuan v. Tiglao (53 Phil. 1) where the amount set up by
the defendant was not proper as a defense and it exceeded the inferior court's
jurisdiction, it cannot be entertained therein, but the court's jurisdiction over the
main action will remain unaffected. Consequently, the decision over the main
action, in the case at bar, must stand, best remembering that a counter-claim,
by its very nature, is a cause of action separate and independent from the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III in
Civil Case No. R-12430 for ejectment is hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID
insofar as it awards damages on the defendant-appellee's counterclaim in
excess of P6,000.00 beyond its appellate jurisdiction. The decision in all other
respects is AFFIRMED. The order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch V dismissing Civil Case No. R-13462 for declaration of nullity of
judgment with preliminary injunction is hereby MODIFIED, Civil Case No. R-
13462 is ordered DISMISSED insofar as the decision sought to be annulled
upholds the defendant's right to possession of the disputed property. The
defendant's counterclaim for damages is GRANTED to the extent of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS. The grant of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS in excess of such amount is hereby declared NULL and VOID, for
having been awarded beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

SO ORDERED.

4
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 80739 August 20, 1992
GRACIA R. JOVEN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL A. PATRON, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 59, Lucena City, Roberto Paguia &
Fernando Lasala, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner was the registered owner of three parcels of land which she
mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines. Upon the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage due to her failure to pay her loan, the
properties were sold at public auction to DBP as the biggest bidder. A
certificate of sale was issued and annotated on the certificate of title on
November 17, 1982.
After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption having been made
by the petitioner, DBP sold the subject properties to Roberto Paguia, one of the
herein private respondents, through a deed of sale executed on December 17,
1985. On January 30, 1986, Paguia took possession of the properties through
his representative, Fernando Lasala, the other private respondent.
Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City (raffled later to Branch 55) for the
annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure. Named as defendants were
DBP and the private respondents. Later, when her application for preliminary
injunction and restraining order was denied, she lodged with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc complaint against the private
respondents for forcible entry with a prayer for writ of mandatory injunction.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 155.
In a decision dated May 14, 1986, the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. But on May 29, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was granted. In a resolution dated July 11, 1986, 1 the
private respondents were ordered to: 1) immediately restore and deliver
possession of the subject properties to the petitioner; 2) render to the petitioner
an accounting of all the fruits and products gathered from said property from
the time they took possession thereof until they vacate the same; and 3)
reimburse the petitioner the total cost of such accounting.
5
This resolution was reversed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City, Branch 59, 2 which held that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over the
ejectment case because of the issue of ownership raised therein and that,
assuming such jurisdiction, the decision had already become final and
executory when the resolution dated July 11, 1986, was rendered. The
petitioner elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals, which
sustained the assailed decision in toto. 3
She is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari, contending that the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case and that
the private respondents were guilty of forcible entry on the subject premises for
occupying the same without judicial authorization.
The petition has merit:
The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction
over the action for forcible entry on the principal ground that a question of
ownership was involved therein. This view does not jibe with the following
observations from Chief Justice Moran based on a consistent line of decisions
from this Court: 4
It would be a mistake to suppose that an action involves a question of title
merely because the plaintiff may allege in his complaint that he is the owner
of the land. Just as the plaintiff may introduce proof of his title in order to
show the character of his (sic) prior possession, so be may allege ownership
in himself as a material and relevant fact in the case, and the insertion of
such an allegation in the complaint cannot by any possibility place the cause
beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court, provided it otherwise
sufficiently appears that what the plaintiff really seeks is the restoration of
possession as against an intruder who has seized the property within the
period of one year. Much less can the defendant in such an action defeat the
jurisdiction of the magistrate's court by setting up title in himself. In this
connection it should be borne in mind that the factor which defeats the
jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace is the necessity to
adjudicate the question of title. The circumstance that proof of title is
introduced at the hearing or that a claim of ownership is made by either or
both of the parties is not material
This ruling is embodied in Sec. 33, (2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which vests
municipal courts with:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer; Provided, that when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
 cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership should be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for forcible entry in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc, the case for annulment of
the mortgage and foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves recovery of
ownership, was already being litigated in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City. Even so, the municipal court could, pending final adjudication of that case,
exercise its jurisdiction to determine the right of possession (only) over the
subject properties in the ejectment case.
The private respondents also contend that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had
no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry because; a) under Section
19 par. (2) of BP 129, as amended, the Regional Trial Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property or any interest therein; and b) under Section 1, par. A (1) of
the Rule on Summary Procedure, cases of forcible entry and detainer involving
the question of ownership are expressly excluded from the summary
jurisdiction of the municipal court.
Curiously, however, they also insist that an action for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure
pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129 and that the petitioner is now estopped from
assailing the applicability of that Rule.
There is no question that under Section 1, par. A (1), of the said Rule, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts have jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
except where the question of ownership is involved or where the damages or
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed P20,000.00 at the
time of the filing of the complaint. *
However, it is incorrect to say that the question of ownership was involved in
the ejectment case filed by the petitioner simply because she alleged in her
complaint that she was the original owner of the subject properties. That the
petitioner instituted a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage is not
a valid reason either for defeating the summary remedy of ejectment. On the
contrary, it only bolsters the conclusion that the ejectment case did not involve
the question of title as this was the subject of the annulment case before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The Rule on Summary Procedure was
clearly applicable because the ejectment case involved only the restoration of
possession of the subject land and not its ownership.
6
The respondent court also sustained the ruling of the Regional Trial Court that
the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court did not stop the running of the reglementary period to appeal
because such motion was a prohibited pleading under Section 15 (c) ** of the
Rule on Summary Procedure. Its conclusion was that the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court had already lost jurisdiction to issue the resolution dated July 11, 1986,
because the decision sought to be reconsidered had then become already final
and executory.
We do not agree. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not err in holding that
the motion for reconsideration was not covered by the prohibition under
Section 15 (c). The motion prohibited by this section is that which seeks
reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits
of the case. 5 The decision dismissing the petitioner's ejectment case for lack of
jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the merits. Review thereof could
therefore be sought by the petitioner through her motion for reconsideration
and this motion, which was not pro forma, had the effect of suspending the
running of the period to appeal.
Now, on the issue of possession:
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, provides that in case
of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the court *** may issue as a matter of
course a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser even during the
redemption period, provided that a proper motion has been filed, a bond is
approved, and no third person is involved.
Section 6 of the Act provides that where an extrajudicial sale is made,
"redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and
sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act."
Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by Sections
25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which in turn were
replaced by Sections 29 to 31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Section 35 provides that "if no redemption be made within twelve (12) months
after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and
the possession of property, . . . The possession of the property shall be given
to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor."
To give effect to his right of possession, the purchaser must invoke the aid of
the courts and ask for a writ of possession. He cannot simply take the law into
his own hands and enter the property without judicial authorization. 6 We have
consistently held that he need not bring a separate and independent suit for
this purpose. 7 Nevertheless, it is essential that he ask for and be granted a writ
of possession in order that he may be legally installed in the property he has
bought.
Section 63 (b) of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, requires that in case of non-redemption, the purchaser at a foreclosure
sale shall file with the Register of Deeds either a final deed of sale executed by
the person authorized by virtue of the power of attorney embodied in the deed
of mortgage or his sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption. The
Register of Deeds shall thereupon issue a new certificate in favor of the
purchaser after the owner's duplicate certificate shall have been previously
delivered and canceled.
In F. David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 8 this Court held:
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner
of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year
after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of
the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land
then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon
proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes a ministerial duty of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, there is no showing that after the lapse of the redemption
period without the petitioner having redeemed the lands, DBP executed an
affidavit of consolidation of ownership of the subject properties. Neither has it
filed with the Register of deeds a final deed of sale or a sworn statement
attesting to the fact of non-redemption. The circumstance that the properties
are still in the name of the petitioner shows that DBP has also not yet obtained
a new certificate of title in its name. And neither does it appear that DBP, on
the basis of its purchase of the lands at the foreclosure sale, ever secured a
writ of possession to authorize its entry into the said lands.
Not having done any of these, DBP had as yet not acquired any perfected right
of possession that it could transfer to the private respondents. And as the
petitioner continued in actual possession of the subject premises, she could
7
undoubtedly maintain an action for forcible entry against the private
respondents when, not being armed with a court order or a writ of possession,
they simply entered and took possession of the subject lands.
The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material
possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de
jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this
remedy of restitution, the statute seeks to prevent breaches of the peace and
criminal disorder which might ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy.
Another purpose is to discourage those persons who, believing themselves
entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some
appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. 9
Under Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, there is forcible entry when
one in physical possession of a land or building is deprived of that possession
by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The words "by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and
exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To constitute the use
of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the trespasser
does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he use
violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the
property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. 10
It is noted that the petitioner instituted the action for annulment of mortgage on
December 3, 1985, while the deed of sale in favor of the private respondent
was executed on December 17, 1985. Paguia cannot say that when he took
possession of the subject land on January 30, 1986, he was acting in good
faith. Neither can be claim that he had no knowledge of the pendency of that
litigation because he was in fact one of the defendants in that case. In any
event, the fact that the titles were still in the name of the petitioner should have
warned him of the need to ascertain the status of the properties before he took
possession of them.
The private respondents also assert that the institution of the ejectment case
resulted in the splitting of a single cause of action into two, one for the recovery
of ownership and possession and the other for recovery of possession de
facto.
In Drilon vs. Gaurana, 11 this Court held:
 It is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action (Rule 2, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court) and if two or more complaints
are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first
may be pleaded in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of
Court). However, a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action has an entirely
different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is
involved in a forcible entry case is merely the issue of material possession or
possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is
the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of
title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its
jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it
preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only
issue involved is material possession or possession de facto (De la Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520 [1984]).

While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the two actions, the
issues involved and the reliefs prayed for are not the same. In the annulment
suit, the issue is the validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure
sale whereas the issue in the ejectment case is whether, assuming the
mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, the private respondents have the
right to take possession of the property. In the former case, the relief prayed for
is recovery of ownership of the subject land while in the latter it is restoration of
possession thereof to the petitioner. Hence, the municipal court had jurisdiction
to try the ejectment case while the annulment suit was being litigated in the
regional trial court.

The contention that the petitioner was forum-shopping must also be rejected.
As an injunction cannot be a substitute for the other suits for recovery of
possession, 12 such as an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and
accion publiciana, denial of the injunction did not bar the petitioner from
availing herself of the more appropriate remedy, to wit, the action for forcible
entry. 13

In sum, the respondent court erred when it affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court declaring that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner. We find that it had.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Municipal

Circuit Trial Court of Lucban, Sampaloc dated July 11, 1986, in Civil Case No.
155 is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

8
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the
province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT No.
56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a
Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27,
1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property
covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision. Consequently,
petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding
that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter
refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the
subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private
respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside
farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the
Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled
their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D.
No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit
from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the
Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense,
subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the
owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter,
petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process of
law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing
their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees
and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and
9
intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and
threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their
respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents'
complaint for forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
On July 24,1986, said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the
decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual
possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner,
private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner moved to
reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution
dated September 26, 1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due
process to petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without
giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private
respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner. 7
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer
for due process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986
has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed
by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties,
the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its
motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to
develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can
commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in
issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the
actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the
property, private respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no
evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject
property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was
manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees
twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the
muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address
the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be
stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the
party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. 10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized
petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private
respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429
of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine
of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has
already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no
case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid
of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

10
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 118284 July 5, 1996
SPOUSES MAMERTO REFUGIA and FELIZA PAYAD-REFUGIA,
RODOLFO REFUGIA, and CANDELARIA REFUGIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ARTURO REFUGIA and
AURORA TIMBANG-REFUGIA, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:p
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34647 promulgated on December 9, 1994 which
reversed and set aside the judgment 2 dated April 29, 1994 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Case No. 4347-V-94
affirming with some modifications the decision 3 rendered by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81, in Civil Case No. 6089
on March 4, 1994.
The records en bloc of the aforesaid cases show that private respondent-
spouses Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia are the registered
owners of a parcel of land and a duplex apartment building constructed
thereon located at No. 16 Meriales Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218979. Apparently, said title
was issued pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on September
11, 1975 in favor of respondent Arturo Refugia, but the purchase price of
P20,000.00 was reportedly advanced by his father, herein petitioner
Mamerto Refugia. Thereafter, respondent Arturo Refugia obtained a
housing loan from the Social Security System, using the land as collateral
to secure payment thereof. In 1976, after the construction of the duplex
apartment building, herein petitioners immediately began to occupy one
door while respondents stayed in the other unit.
It appears, however, that things did not turn out well between petitioners
and private respondents, especially between petitioner Feliza Refugia and
her daughter-in-law, Aurora, such that in February of 1993, petitioners were
told by private respondents to vacate the unit that they were occupying
because, according to private respondents, the family of one of their
children who is married needed a place of their own. Petitioners refused to
leave, claiming that they own the unit they are occupying by reason of the
fact that it was actually Mamerto Refugia who bought the lot on which the
11
duplex apartment stood. Because of this, the matter was brought before the
barangay court of conciliation. No amicable settlement having been
reached between the parties, private respondents instituted an action for
ejectment on October 20, 1993 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Branch 81.
On March 4, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint for ejectment based on its finding that herein petitioners are the
lawful occupants of the premises. Thus, it held that:
Like in any other ejectment suit, the pivotal issue is whether the
defendants are unlawfully with(h)olding possession of the premises in
question. The question that perturbs the mind of the Court which is not
fully explained by plaintiffs is whether the stay of the defendants in the
premises was indeed by plaintiffs' tolerance alone. From the evidence on
hand the Court is more disposed to believe the position of the defendants
that it was Mamerto who bought the lot where the duplex apartment was
constructed by plaintiff Arturo Refugia. As stated earlier, the amount of
P20,000.00 was withdrawn on September 11, 1975, the date the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Exhibits F and F-1) was executed. The consideration of
the sale is for P20,000.00. The fact that a two-door apartment was
indeed constructed likewise regenerates the claim of defendants that
they shall be co-owners of the lot and shall dwell in one of the doors of
said apartment. If the averment of plaintiffs that they exclusively own the
property is not to be trusted — what have motivated them to construct a
two-door apartment instead of a single and a larger house? These facts
are small tributaries that lead us to the bigger lake of truth, that is, the
stay of the defendants in the premises is not on the basis of mere
tolerance.
It may also be pointed out that the certification to file action (Exhibit E)
issued by the Barangay is for Land Dispute not for ejectment. (Emphasis
ours) In the handwritten transcripts of the proceedings in the barangay, it
appears that this case is merely an off-shoot of a misunderstanding
between plaintiff Aurora Refugia and her in-laws. It was admitted by
Aurora that she offered to pay the a mount of P20,000.00 but that the
defendants refused to accept the same. Then and there plaintiff Aurora
said that she would prefer to sell the unit to another and that out of the
proceeds of the sale, she will pay the defendants. These circumstances
lead the Court to conclude that it is not true that plaintiffs' daughter is in
need of the premises.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in its
aforementioned decision, affirmed with modification the judgment of the
lower court by declaring herein petitioners and private respondents co-
owners of the lot and the two-door apartment. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, private respondents duly filed a
petition for review before respondent Court of Appeals.
On December 9, 1994, said respondent court rendered its questioned
judgment which reversed and set aside the aforestated decisions of the
Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, and thereafter
ordered petitioners and their privies to vacate the subject premises and to
surrender possession thereof to private respondents. In so ruling,
respondent court declared that the Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction over an ejectment case, had no authority to resolve
the issue of ownership and to declare herein petitioners as co-owners
because its power is limited only to a determination of the issue of
possession, that petitioners' bare allegation of ownership cannot prevail
over the transfer certificate of title and deed of sale in favor of private
respondents; and that petitioners have been occupying the subject
premises by mere tolerance.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioners aver that respondent Court of
Appeals erred: (a) in giving due course to respondents' appeal despite the
fact that it was filed beyond the fifteen (15) day reglementary period to
appeal; (b) in disregarding jurisprudence that factual findings of the trial
court should not be disturbed on appeal; (c) in holding that petitioners'
claim of co-ownership of the subject premises is a mere allegation
unsupported by any concrete evidence; (d) in ruling that the issue of
ownership, as raised by petitioners, is foreign to the issue of possession in
an ejectment case; and (e) in reversing the decisions of both lower courts
and ordering petitioners' eviction from the disputed premises.
Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that private respondents received
a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court on May 4, 1994 and thus
they had until May 19, 1994 within which to file a petition for review before
the Court of Appeals. However, private respondents filed instead a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its
Order dated June 21, 1994. Petitioners argue that since the motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure and that the filing thereof did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period, the petition for review which was filed by private
respondents only on July 21, 1994 was already way beyond the 15-day
12
reglementary period and should not have been given due course by
respondent court.
In the case of Jakihaca vs. Aquino, et al., 4
this Court categorically ruled
that:
The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section
36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Summary procedures have no
application to cases before the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the
respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the
Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the latter court.
It is thus settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the inferior courts in ejectment cases.
Accordingly, this argument of petitioners has to be rejected.
There is nonetheless appreciable merit in their contention that the petition
for review was belatedly filed in the Court of Appeals. This is because in
case of a judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court rendered in an
appeal from the judgment or final order of an inferior court, the former may
be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review within
fifteen days from receipt of said judgment or final order. If a motion for
reconsideration is filed, the losing party has only the remaining period
within which to file that petition for review. The filing, therefore, of a motion
for reconsideration has the effect of only suspending the period to appeal.
This rule has been clarified in the case of Lacsamana, et. al. vs. The
Honorable Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, et. al., 5 as follows:
3) APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS
The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the
final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court
and municipal circuit trial court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals
through a petition for review in accordance with Section 22 of BP No. 129
and Section 22 (b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court through a petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The reason for extending the period
for the filing of a record on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a
 petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The period for filing a
petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for reconsideration is filed
with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only the
remaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may
necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time
to file such petition for review. (Emphasis supplied).
It is not disputed that private respondents received a copy of the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela on May 4, 1994, and that their
motion for reconsideration was filed with said court on the fifteenth day of
the reglementary period to appeal, that is, May 19, 1994. In such a case,
the rule is that the aggrieved party has only one day from receipt of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration within which to file a petition
for review before the Court of Appeals. 6 In the case at bar, private
respondents received a copy of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 6, 1994, and, without moving for extension of time,
were able to file their petition for review only on July 21, 1994; hence their
appeal was not seasonably perfected. Strictly speaking, therefore, the
appeal should not have been given due course, following the
pronouncement in the case of Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al. 7 to the effect
that the requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
This rule, however, has been relaxed in the latter case of Tijam, et al. vs.
Sibonghanoy, et al. 8 where it was held that a party, after voluntarily
submitting a cause, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court
simply because it thereafter obtained an adverse decision on the merits.
The Court explained therein that the "party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated —
obviously for reasons of public policy." It will be noted that the jurisdictional
issue involved in the instant case was raised only for the first time in the
present petition for review on certiorari. The lack or absence of appellate
jurisdiction was never questioned by petitioners either in their Comment 9
submitted with respondent court or in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal 10
which was grounded solely on the fact that the petition for review filed
before said court was not verified.
Despite several opportunities to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the Court of
Appeals, petitioners did not challenge its appellate jurisdiction and did so
only after an adverse decision was rendered against them. To be more
precise, they raised the issue of jurisdiction, for the nullification of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, when the case was already on appeal
13
before this Court. They are now barred from doing so under the doctrine of
estoppel by laches. 11 Additionally, having participated actively in the
proceedings before the appellate court, petitioners can no longer question
its authority. 12
The main issue in this case demands the determination of whether the
Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
ownership in an action for unlawful detainer where the issue of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership. In the
affirmative, it becomes necessary to delineate the extent and legal effect of
such adjudication.
Under Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the
jurisdiction of the then municipal and city courts over actions for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer was defined as follows:
Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. — . . . In forcible entry and
detainer proceedings, the municipal judge or judge of the city court shall
have original jurisdiction, but the said municipal judge or city judge may
receive evidence upon the question of title therein, whatever may be the
value of the property, solely for the purpose of determining the character
and extent of possession and damages for detention. In forcible entry
proceedings, he may grant preliminary injunctions, in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. (As
amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828).
The law was subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 5967 13 which
vested in the city courts special jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
ownership in conjunction with the issue of possession whenever the
question of ownership is brought in issue by the pleadings, thus:
Sec. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have
jurisdiction under Section eighty-eight of Republic Act Numbered Two
hundred ninety-six, as amended, it shall likewise have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over the following:
xxx xxx xxx
 (c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue
in the pleadings. The issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in
conjunction with the issue of possession.
This special jurisdiction of city courts was differentiated from the power
ordinary accorded the inferior courts to receive evidence of title only for the
purpose of determining the character or extent of the possession in dispute.
This Court had the occasion to apply and interpret the aforequoted
statutory provision in Pelaez vs. Reyes, et al. 14 which raised the issue of
whether a decision of a city court in an ejectment case involving the
question of ownership was appealable to the Regional Trial Court or to the
Court of Appeals, in this wise:
In the light of these provisions, petitioner insists that respondents should
have appealed to the Court of First Instance. Specifically, his contention
is that the inclusion of the issue of ownership in the pleadings did not
change the character of the proceeding as an action of unlawful detainer
over which city and municipal courts have original exclusive jurisdiction.
He claims that his contention is supported by the very provision of
Section 3, just quoted, to the effect that when ownership is brought in
issue in the pleadings in an ejection case before the city courts, said
courts are to resolve the issue of ownership only "in conjunction with the
issue of possession." In other words, he posits that since the action is
one of unlawful detainer, the main issue to be settled by the city court
remains to be possession, and that to resolve the issue of ownership "in
conjunction with the issue of possession" is not the same as resolving it
in a judicial litigation where it is the sole issue.
We are not impressed. Regardless of the juridical value of the
significance petitioner is trying to thus draw from the rather peculiar
language of the statute, We are of the considered opinion that the evident
import of Section 3 above is to precisely grant to the city courts
concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over the
cases enumerated therein, which include "ejection cases where the
question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleading." To sustain
petitioner's contention about the meaning of the last phrase of paragraph
(c) of said section regarding the resolution of the issue of ownership "in
conjunction with the issue of possession" is to disregard the very
language of the main part of the section which denotes unmistakably a
conferment upon the city courts of concurrent jurisdiction with the courts
of first instance over ejection cases in which ownership is brought in
issue in the pleadings. It is to Us quite clear that the fact that the issue of
ownership is to be resolved "in conjunction with the issue of possession"
14
simply means that both the issues of possession and ownership are to be
resolved by the city courts. And the jurisdiction is concurrent with the
Courts of First Instance precisely because usually questions of title are
supposed to be resolved by superior courts. In other words, this grant of
special jurisdiction to city courts is to be distinguished from the power
ordinarily accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence of title only for
the purpose of determining the extent of the possession in dispute.
It being clear, therefore, that in the main ejection case, . . . , the issue of
ownership is involved as shown by the pleadings therein filed by the
parties, and that under Section 3 of Republic Act 5967, said city court
exercised original jurisdiction over the same concurrently with the Court
of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, the appeal of respondents was
rightly made by them to the Court of Appeals (Emphasis ours.)
However, on August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was approved and it redefined the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts.
Specifically, the new law modified the power of inferior courts to resolve the
issue of ownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, subject,
however, to the qualification that a resolution thereof shall not be for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession, to wit:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Subsequently, this Court promulgated its Interim Rules and Guidelines in
the implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 10 of which
provides:
10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. — Metropolitan trial courts, municipal
trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try
 cases of forcible entry and detainer even if the question of ownership is
raised in the pleadings and the question of possession could not be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, but the question of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296
which merely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon the question
of title solely for the purpose of determining the extent and character of
possession and damages for detention, which thereby resulted in previous
rulings of this Court to the effect that if it appears during the trial that the
principal issue relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any
question of possession which may be involved necessarily depends upon
the result of the inquiry into the title, then the jurisdiction of the municipal or
city courts is lost and the action should be dismissed. With the enactment
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over
an ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved
without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express qualification
that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. In other words, the fact that the issues
of ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not
cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on
jurisdictional grounds.
The intendment of the law was reinforced by the revision of the former Rule
on Summary Procedures involving special cases before the inferior courts,
which was promulgated pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129. The old Rule, which took effect on August 1, 1983, stated that:
Sec. 1. Scope — This Rule shall govern the procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
A. Civil Cases
(1) Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, except where the
question of ownership is involved, or where the damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) at the time of the filing of the complaint.
This Rule was revised pursuant to a resolution of the Court En Banc which
took effect on November 15, 1991, and the aforequoted provision now
reads as follows:
15
Sec. 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where
attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00).
Under the original Rule, ejectment cases were covered by the summary
rules only where the unpaid rentals do not exceed P20,000.00 and no
question of ownership is involved. As presently formulated, however, all
ejectment cases are now unqualifiedly covered by the summary procedure,
which necessarily implies that even if there is a need to resolve the issued
of ownership, such fact will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction
over these cases.
Subsequently, Republic Act No. 7691, entitled "An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the 'Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980'",
was passed and took effect on April 15, 1994. 15 The jurisdiction of the
inferior courts over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases as defined
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was retained. In addition, they now
exercise limited original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to, or
possession of, real property or any interest therein depending on the
assessed value and location of the property.
Parenthetically, it might be argued that since inferior courts are anyway
vested with jurisdiction over real actions, then it can very well resolve the
issue of ownership raised in the ejectment case, under the conditions
stated in Section 32(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691. It must not be overlooked, however, that
proceedings in ejectment cases are summary in nature, whereas actions
for recovery of ownership require a full-blown trial on the merits. The
difference in the procedure in special civil actions, like ejectment, and in
ordinary civil actions, such as accion reinvindicatoria, inveigh against the
consolidation of said cases or the joinder of the different causes of action
involved. It could also be violative under certain circumstances of the rule
on permissive joinder of causes of action since Section 6 of Rule 2 requires
inter alia due observance of the rules on jurisdiction and joinder of parties,
and that said causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or
relation between the parties.
As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, even
where the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve the issue of ownership albeit only to determine the
issue of possession. 16
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of inferior courts
was confined to receiving evidence of ownership in order to determine only
the nature and extent of possession, by reason of which such jurisdiction
was lost the moment it became apparent that the issue of possession was
intricately interwoven with that of ownership. The law, as revised, now
provides instead that when the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new
Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of
ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to
adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus
conferred on the inferior courts.
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular
issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases where the issue of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue
of ownership. It finds no proper application where it is otherwise, that is,
where ownership is not in issue, or where the principal and main issue
raised in the allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for
make out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.
In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 this Court, in
making a distinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution
of the issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may look into the
evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said
evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. It cannot,
however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who among
the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property, because the
resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is
16
not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With this as a
premise and taking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested that inferior courts are now
conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or
ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.
Withal, it will be observed, that the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
has spawned seemingly conflicting jurisprudence on the proper
interpretation and application thereof. Thus, in several cases decided by
the Court after the effectivity of this law, regardless of whether the
complaint for ejectment was filed with the inferior court prior thereto or
otherwise, it was held that the jurisdiction of the inferior court is lost and the
ejectment case should be dismissed where the issue of possession cannot
be resolved without determining the issue of ownership. 18 In all of these
cases, the Court declared that inferior courts may only admit evidence and
proof of ownership but they cannot adjudicate on the question of
ownership. Conversely, in also not a few instances, the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts to resolve the issue of ownership in order to determine the
issue of possession was upheld by this Court. 19 Apparently, it could have
been some imprecision in language or a misperception of the statutory text
which generated the ostensible doctrinal variance.
After due deliberation, we find and so hold that by virtue of the express
mandate set forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior
courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an
incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary
for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain
guidelines, however, must be observed in the implementation of this
legislative prescription, viz.:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and
that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of
ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under
consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the
preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of
possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what
the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. 20
Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs
prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not
merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the
averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental
attribute of such claim for ownership, 21 or where the issue of ownership is
the principal question to be resolved, 22 the action is not one for forcible
entry but one for title to real property.
3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where
the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the
ejectment case, 23 unless it is sufficiently established that there has been a
subsequent change in or termination of that relationship between the
parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is
that a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property and whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. 24 Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained in
some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into
the issue of ownership.
5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question
of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may
resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among
the contending parties is the real owner. 25 In the same vein, where the
resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the
validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on
which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise
pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood,
that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed
portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. 26
Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.
The interpretative rules we have herein adopted are not without
justification. It is our considered opinion that they are more in keeping with
the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
17
which have purposely been made summary in nature so that there may be
a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal
possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long
time, thereby insuring the maintenance of peace and order in the
community, as, otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might
feel the despair of long waiting and decide, as a measure of self-protection,
to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. 27
And since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of
property for they involve perturbation of social disorder which must be
restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of procedure
which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be
avoided. 28
As a matter of judicial experience, there have been cases where persons
who have failed to adduce any legal ground for their continued stay on
property belonging to another have nonetheless managed to stave off
eviction for several years through the improper use of procedural
technicalities. 29 Conformably, if we were to allow the dismissal of an
ejectment case for the reason that the question of ownership is incidentally
involved in determining the question of possession, we are in effect
providing the defendants in ejectment cases with the opportunity to prolong
their occupancy of premises, over which they have ceased to have any
valid possessory right, during the time that an action for recovery of
ownership, which involves a more tedious and lengthy court proceeding, is
actually pending in court.
It is indeed ironic that a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case which is
intended to be disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be
the most cumbersome and difficult to decide. It is thus about time that this
situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening
problem of court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving
them a full-blown treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure, and
thereby save the courts the expenditure of precious time and energy which
could otherwise be devoted to more significant and vital litigations. 30
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to the merits of the
present case. Petitioners claim to be co-owners of the subject premises on
the basis of an alleged verbal agreement between the parties to subdivide
the property, as well as the payment made by petitioner Mamerto Refugia
for the purchase of the lot in the amount of P20,000.00. On the other hand,
private respondents' property rights are supported by sufficient documents
and muniments of ownership, namely, the deed of absolute sale, transfer
certificate of title, and building permit in their names, the regularity in the
issuance of which was never controverted nor put in issue by petitioners.
The Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court are not in accord
on whether to treat the P20,000.00 as a loan or as payment for petitioners'
share in the subject premises, while respondent Court of Appeals believes
that the same is actually a loan. It bears significant notice that petitioners
never refuted nor denied, in any of their pleadings filed in this case from the
court of origin and all the way up to this Court, the allegation that private
respondents gave P5,000.00 as partial payment for the loan. No
countervailing explanation was advanced by petitioners why such payment
was made to and accepted by them as such.
Furthermore, the allegation of petitioners that there was a verbal
agreement to subdivide the property between them and private
respondents is self-serving and evidentiarily baseless at this stage. In
addition, their theory of an "implied trust" was not raised in issue in the trial
court and cannot therefore be raised for the first time in the present petition.
31
At most, it was merely alluded to in petitioners' Rejoinder filed with the
Court of Appeals, but petitioners never bothered to expound on or
substantiate the same. Consequently, it cannot now be raised as an
assignment of error in the present petition.
In sum, and as held by respondent court, the Regional Trial Court
"overstepped its bounds" in ruling that petitioners and private respondents
are co-owners of the property, which issue should be finally determined in
the separate action for specific performance reportedly pending between
the parties. At this juncture, however, the evidence conduces to a finding
that private respondents are in possession of the premises in the concept
of and consequent to their being owners thereof. Even on such prima facie
showing, therefore, private respondents can maintain the ejectment case
involved.
In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show that they were legally entitled
to continue occupying the unit in question. On the considerations
hereinbefore detailed, we agree with the position of respondent Court of
Appeals that petitioners would in effect be occupying the premises by mere
tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. 35 The status of petitioners is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant
whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. 36
It has further been held that such tolerance must be present right from the
start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action
as one of unlawful detainer. 3 7 Here, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners'
possession was by mere tolerance of private respondents from the very
beginning. At any rate, it has likewise not been denied by herein petitioners
that one of their sons also owns a residential house where they can live.
Notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and the
Metropolitan Trial Court for the matter, to qualifiedly resolve the issue of
ownership raised in the present ejectment suit, but their findings thereon
being devoid of basis in fact and in law, respondent Court of Appeals was
fully justified in decreeing a reversal of their judgments.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

While it may be argued that petitioners were able to prove prior possession,
such, however, is not the issue involved in this action for unlawful detainer.
An action for unlawful detainer is different from a forcible entry case in that
the former involves an act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the
land or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other
person after the expiration or termination of the detainer's right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, 32 and neither is prior
physical possession of the property by the plaintiff necessary; 33 whereas in
the latter, the main issue is one of priority of possession. 34

18
SPECPRO – RULE70
[G.R. No. 102693. September 23, 1992.]
SPOUSES AGOSTO MUÑOZ AND ROSARIO MUÑOZ, SPS. JESSIE
(JESUS) CAGUIOA AND EMMA FUMAR, SPS. RICARDO LOPEZ AND
APOLONIA FABIAN, ZACARIA MARCELINO, MR. CRISANTO CLARIN, MR.
HONORIO YUMUL, MR. EDUARDO YUMUL, MRS. VICTORIA CAYANAN,
MR. ALEXANDER FABIAN AND MR. DIOSDADO SANTOS, Petitioner, v.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NICOLAS P. GARCIA,
Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; FORCIBLE ENTRY;
DISTINGUISHED FROM UNLAWFUL DETAINER. — The summary actions for
unlawful detainer and forcible entry may be distinguished from each other, as
follows: "a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is
unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; while in unlawful detainer, the
possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by
reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under
his contract with the plaintiff (Dikit v. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44). "b. In forcible entry,
the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the
premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand,
which is jurisdictional in nature (Sec. 2; Medel v. Militante, 41 Phil. 44). "c). In
forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession
of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession
(Maddamu v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230; Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 666; Banayos v.
Susana Realty, Inc., L-30336, June 30, 1976; Pharma Industries, Inc. v.
Pajarillaga, Et Al., L-53788, Oct. 17, 1980). "d. In forcible entry, the one-year
period is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land; in
unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand (Sarona, Et. Al. v. Villegas, Et
Al., L-22984, Mar. 27, 1968) or last letter of demand (DBP v. Canonoy, L-
29422, Sept. 30, 1970; Calibayan v. Pascual, L-22645, Sept. 18, 1967; Racaza
v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-20330, Dec. 22, 1966). (Regalado, Florenz D.,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 5th Revised Edition, pp. 503-504)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED IN THE ACTION THEREFOR;
RULE. — The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First,
who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the
possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by
force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the
19
restoration of his possession? (Dizon v. Concina, Et Al., G.R. No. L-23756,
December 27, 1969).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO ALLEGE THE TIME WHEN
UNLAWFUL DEPRIVATION TOOK PLACE. — There was no mention in the
complaint nor in the position paper of the private respondent that he or his co-
owners were in prior possession of the property. There was an allegation that
the property "is presently tenanted" but it did not state when the tenant started
to possess the property. While it is true that possession of the tenant is
possession of the owner, the complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in
prior possession of the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And,
while the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained possession of the
premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this entry was accomplished or
when the private respondent learned of such entry. The failure of the private
respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal
because this will determine the start of the counting of the one year period for
the filing of the summary action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does
not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
action should either be accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria in the Court of First
Instance (nor Regional Trial Court) (Sarona Et. Al. v. Villegas, Et Al., supra).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE CONVERTED TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY
THE FACT THAT A DEMAND WAS MADE TO VACATE THE SUBJECT
PREMISE. — The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is
one for unlawful detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in
forcible entry, possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer,
possession is legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until
the possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession
of the premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the private
respondent for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot change
the nature of the latter’s possession of the property and convert the former’s
action from forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. The respondent
appellate court likewise erred in applying in this case the doctrine that — "a
person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is proper remedy against them" — because, as We have said here,
the possession by defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the
complaint, hence, there was no tolerance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A PROPER ACTION TO CLAIM OWNERSHIP. — If the
private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that possession
thereof was deprived from him for more than twelve years, he should present
his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana or an accion
reinvindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the owner,
possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in
possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action
for ejectment. "Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership
based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not
responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible
entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to
the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by
a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession
CAN recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may
be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria. (German Management and Services Inc. v. CA, 76216-17,
September 14, 1988, 177 SCRA 495, 499)
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This case has its origin from a complaint 1 for unlawful detainer filed by Nicolas
P. Garcia (herein respondent) on August 15, 1988 before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Masantol-Macabebe, Masantol, Pampanga. The complainant
alleged that he is a co-owner of an agricultural land identified as Lot No. 2790
of Subdivision Plan, Cad. 378-D, Macabebe, Cadastre, situated in the Barrio of
Caduang Tete (Saplad David) of the same municipality; that he and his co-
owners acquired the lot by succession from their deceased father, Pedro B.
Garcia who died on April 6, 1939; that the said lot is tenanted by Loreto Garcia;
that the defendants (herein petitioners) constructed their houses on a portion of
the lot without the knowledge and consent of the owners; that he sent letters of
demand on June 6, 1988 asking the defendants to remove their houses from
the lot within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letters and that despite the
demands made by him, the defendants refused to vacate their houses (pp. 21-
22, CA Records).
In their answer, (pp. 44-47, CA Records), the defendants denied the
allegations of Nicolas Garcia and alleged that the tenant, Loreto Garcia is
already deemed the owner of the land pursuant to P.D. 27. The answering
defendants also invoked the following alternative defenses, among others: (1)
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Trial Court, the case being an
accion publiciana which is exclusively cognizable by the Regional Trial Court;
(2) no prior conciliation before the Lupong Tagapayapa; (3) misjoinder of
parties since defendants occupy lots distinct from each other; (4) that the
differently lots they are occupying form part of the shore of a navigable river
20
and partly the shoulder of a public road, hence, of public ownership; (5) that
they are farmworkers of the lot, and are entitled to security of tenure on the
land pursuant to Section 6 of RA 6657 and that they had erected their houses
and had continuously resided on the premises in issue since 1976 or for a
period of twelve years before the filing of the complaint.
After the issues had been joined, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court heard the
case under the Rules on Summary Procedure and decided the case on the
basis of the position papers of the parties.
On December 7, 1988, the municipal court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff Nicolas Garcia, the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering:
1) The defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to remove their
houses from Lot 2790 of Subdivision Plan Cad. 378-D, Macabebe Cadastre,
situated at Saplad David, Caduang Tete, Macabebe, Pampanga; and to
surrender the possession of the same to the plaintiff;
2) Every defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) attorney’s fees; and
3) Every defendants to pay One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) reasonable monthly
rental of the land occupied by said defendants from the filing of the complaint
on August 15, 1988 up to the time the possession of the land occupied by said
defendants is vacated plus the costs." (pp. 72-73, CA Records).
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court found that the plaintiff is one of the co-owners
of Lot 2790 of Subdivision Plan Cad. 378-D of Macabebe Cadastre, consisting
of five (5) hectares. As such, he had every right to exercise his rights as owner
and possessor of the property and to demand the removal of defendants’
houses. The Municipal Court added that while the defendants assert that the
premises is of public ownership considering that their houses occupy a part of
a shore of a navigable river and part of the shoulder of the public road, this
assertion runs counter to the very claim of defendants that they are farmhands
in the landholding for more than 12 years. Finally, the Municipal Court also held
that since the issue involved in the case is mere possession and the
defendants did not claim ownership, therefore, unlawful detainer is the proper
action for plaintiff’s recovery of possession.
The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court which reversed the
decision of the municipal court and dismissed the complaint. The Regional Trial
Court held that
"From all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds that plaintiff-appellee fails
to establish his proof of prior physical possession over the land subject matter
of this case where the respective houses of the defendants-appellants were
erected, considering that the case at bar only deals with possession de facto
and not possession de jure. The Court also believes that the subject matter of
this Court is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Macabebe, Masantol-Macabebe, Pampanga is hereby reversed.
The said case is dismissed with costs against the plaintiff." (p. 82, CA Records)
On June 27, 1989, Nicolas Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision. The reconsideration sought was denied by
order of the same court dated October 11, 1989.
Nicolas Garcia filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which
rendered a decision on August 6, 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 19154 reversing
and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstating the
decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The reconsideration sought by the
defendants before the appellate court was denied on November 11, 1991.
Hence, this petition.
The principal question for resolution in this petition is whether or not the
complaint filed by the private respondent before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court was for the summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer or
an accion publiciana. In the latter case, the Regional Trial Court and not the
Municipal Trial Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and try the
complaint.
The petitioner is of the view that with the following allegations in the complaint,
to wit:
"2. That the plaintiff is a co-owner of an agricultural land located at Saplad,
David, Macabebe, Pampanga identified as lot no. 2790, of the Subdivision
Plan, Cad. 378-D, Macabebe, Cadastre, . . .;
"x x x.
"4. That the aforesaid agricultural land is presently tenanted by one farmer in
the name of Loreto Garcia with an area of more than five (5) hectares;
21
"5. That the defendants have constructed their houses on a portion of the said
lot no. 2790 without the knowledge and consent of his co-owners;
"6. That the plaintiff has sent the defendants demand letters dated June 6,
1988 asking said defendants to remove their houses from the said lot within a
period of fifteen (15) days from their receipt of said letters, . . ." (pp. 21-22,
Records).
the complaint which the private respondent filed before the municipal court was
an accion publiciana and not one for unlawful detainer as he had captioned it.
An accion publiciana is exclusively cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and
not by the Municipal Court.
For his part, the private respondent alleged that the action which he filed before
the municipal court was an action for unlawful detainer. The demand to vacate
dated June 6, 1988 which was served upon the petitioners was well within the
one (1) year period required by the rules for the filing of the summary action for
unlawful detainer the jurisdiction of which belongs to the municipal trial court.
The summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry may be
distinguished from each other, as follows:
"4. . . .
"a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful
from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth: while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the
defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the
termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with
the plaintiff (Dikit v. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44).
"b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the
defendant to vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must
first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature (Sec. 2; Medel v.
Militante, 41 Phil. 44).
"c. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in
unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession
(Maddamu v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230: Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 666; Banayos v.
Susana Realty, Inc. L-30336, June 30, 1976: Pharma Industries, Inc. v.
Pajarillaga, Et. Al. L-53788, Oct. 17, 1980).
"d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of
actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand
(Sarona, Et. Al. v. Villegas, Et Al., L-22984, Mar. 27, 1968) or last letter of
demand (DBP v. Canonoy, L-29422, Sept. 30, 1970; Calibayan v. Pascual, L-
22645, Sept. 18, 1967; Racaza v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-20330, Dec. 22,
1966). (Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 5th Revised
Edition, pp. 503-504)
The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "unlawful detainer."
However, the private respondent alleged therein that from the start, the
possession of the petitioner was unlawful as it was stated that the defendants
have constructed their houses on the questioned premises stealthily, that is,
without the knowledge and consent of his co-owners. This allegation clearly
characterized the complaint as one for forcible entry and not for unlawful
detainer.
The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First, who had
actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor
ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force,
threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the restoration
of his possession? (Dizon v. Concina, Et Al., G.R. No. L-23756, December 27,
1969).
There was no mention in the complaint nor in the position paper of the private
respondent that he or his co-owners were in prior possession of the property.
There was an allegation that the property "is presently tenanted" but did not
state when the tenant started to possess the property. While it is true that
possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the complaint failed to
state that Loreta Garcia was in prior possession of the property at the time of
entry by the petitioners. And, while the complaint stated that the petitioners
obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this
entry was accomplished or when the private respondent learned of such entry.
The failure of the private respondent to allege the time when unlawful
deprivation took place is fatal because this will determine the start of the
counting of the one year period for the filing of the summary action of forcible
entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana
or reinvindicatoria in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
(Sarona Et. Al., v. Villegas, Et Al., supra).
The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is one for
unlawful detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry,
possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is
legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until the possessor
22
does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the
premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the private respondent
for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot change the nature of
the latter’s possession of the property and convert the former’s action from
forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. The respondent appellate court
likewise erred in applying in this case the doctrine that — "a person who
occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is proper
remedy against them" — because, as We have said here, the possession by
defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, hence,
there was no tolerance. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22984,
March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1257:
"But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where there was forcible
entry at the start, but the lawful possessor did not attempt to oust the intruder
for over one year, and only thereafter filed forcible entry suit following demand
to vacate?
"x x x.
"A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word ‘tolerance’
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present
right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause
of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold
otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons. First.
Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court —
provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse
before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a
forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number
of years, then the result may well be that no action for forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession,
plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a
plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him
out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in
mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
summary in nature, and that the one year time bar to suit is but in pursuance of
the summary nature of the action.
"It is well to remember that after the lapse of the one year period, suit must be
started in the Court of First Instance in an accion publiciana.
It is also the contention of petitioners that private respondents’ claim of SO ORDERED.
ownership had no basis. He should have at least, introduced muniments of title
to show the extent and character of his possession. Moreover, mere
allegations of ownership does not ipso facto entitle a person to possession of
the property claimed.

The main issue in an action for forcible entry and detainer is one of priority of
possession. If the plaintiff can prove prior possession in himself, he may
recover such possession even from the owner

This rule however has no application in this case. It is true that the private
respondent in this case claimed that he is one of the co-owners of the lot in
question. However, he has not presented any evidence in support of such
claim of ownership by virtue of which he is entitled to its possession. Moreover,
he had not shown nor claimed in his complaint that he was in prior possession
of the property. On the contrary, it is the petitioners who claimed possession of
the property for more than twelve years.

If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that
possession thereof was deprived from him for more than twelve years, he
should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana
or an accion reinvindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a
summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the
owners possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had
been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary
action for ejectment."

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the

muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address
the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be
stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence
or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of
his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria.
(German Management and Services Inc. v. CA, 76216-17, September 14,
1988, 177 SCRA 495, 499).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Macabebe, Pampanga is REINSTATED.

23
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 169793 September 15, 2006
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner,
vs.
NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857, ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br.
20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further
proceedings.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121-B-
1, consisting of 100 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and Lot
No. 2121-B-2 consisting of 607 square meters with TCT No. T-256651, located
at District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form
part of Lot No. 2121, a single 707 square meter track of land owned by Rogelio
Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on January 18, 1982. On
March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the
death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay executed an
Affidavit of Waiver2 on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the property in favor
of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the
latter caused the subdivision of the land into two lots 3 and the issuance of titles
in his name on July 18, 1996.4
Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took
possession of a portion of the property sometime in 1985 without the
permission of the then owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said occupation by
respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 were issue
to petitioner.
Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter 5 dated Febuary 1,
2001 demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property. As
evidenced by the registry return receipt, the demand letter was delivered by
registered mail to the respondent on February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding
receipt of the demand letter, respondent still refused to vacate the subject
property. Thereafter, on March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint 6 for
24
ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV-01-030. In
his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and
occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of
Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with irregularities. 7
On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment,
which reads:
WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a JUDGMENT is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION
and against the defendant NIEVES AMIGOE (sic) as follows:
a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the parcels of land
described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 he is
now occupying and surrender it to the plaintiff;
b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) as attorney's fees, and
c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] P500.00 per
month from February, 2001 until the portion of the land occupied by him is
surrendered to the plaintiff.
COSTS against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, ruled as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case on the
ground that as the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, this
Court acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof. Costs against plaintiff-
appellee.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court before the Court of Appeals which promulgated the assailed Decision
remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to
Branch 20, Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for further proceedings.
No costs.
 SO ORDERED.11
Hence the present petition raising the sole issue:
[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT
UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER.12
The petition lacks merit.
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of
real property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a
summary action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper
inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when
the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for
the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial
Court.13
Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the
proper action to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in
this case is the length of time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the
remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express
or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the
possession to file at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against
the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.14 Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted
for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior
court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for
more than one year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which
should be brought to the proper Regional Trial Court.
25
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that
the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the proper
action in this case is accion publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case
to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further
proceedings.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its
filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the
court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are
the ones to be consulted.15 On its face, the complaint must show enough
ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 16
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the
owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights
executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2,
2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the
latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand
letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making
the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from
last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that
petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that
time deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's
dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001,
almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was
dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of an
accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the
lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the Regional Trial
Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to
possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.17
Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another person
was occupying his property way back in 1977 but the said owner only filed the
complaint for ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one for accion
publiciana and not one under the summary procedure on ejectment. As
explained by the Court:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are indeed the owners
of the subject lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession,
they should present their claim before the regional trial court in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the metropolitan trial
 court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For SO ORDERED.
even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
wrested from another who had been in physical or material possession of the
same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for
ejectment.18

Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:

The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 1985 but it
was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his
ejectment case. The respondent should have filed an accion publiciana case
which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.

Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of

jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court
may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the
ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the
merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case
shall be remanded for further proceedings.

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not
dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the
case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the
admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of
justice.

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried
on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it
has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try
the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the
evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the
admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.19

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil
Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch
20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED.

No costs.
26
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 87263 June 18, 1990
SPOUSES FLAVIO DEMAMAY AND ESTELITA DEMAMAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., LUZON
DEVELOPMENT BANK AND SPS. CESAR DE RAMOS AND CECILIA DE
RAMOS, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue as to whether or not an action for annulment of sale, reconveyance
or similar proceeding is a previous question before an action for ejectment or
unlawful detainer may proceed is the focus of the dispute in this petition.
Petitioners were the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Calamba,
Laguna covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-35475 of the Register of
Deeds of Laguna with an area of about 240 square meters. They mortgaged
the same to the Luzon Development Bank (LDB for short) for the sum of
P10,000.00 payable in installments in five years beginning July 29, 1977. As
petitioners defaulted in the payment of the loan the LDB extra judicially
foreclosed the mortgage on July 30, 1981 so the property was sold at public
auction to LDB as the highest bidder. Upon failure of the petitioners to redeem
the property within one year from the sale, title over the same was consolidated
in favor of LDB on September 13, 1982 so that petitioners' title was canceled
and TCT No. T-89122 was issued to LDB.
On July 26, 1986, LDB filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna a petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession docketed as RTC SLRC Case No. 111-83-
C. Petitioners filed an opposition thereto. On February 26, 1986, the trial court
issued an order authorizing the Clerk of Court to issue the corresponding writ
of possession which was returned unsatisfied. On June 20, 1986, LDB filed a
motion for demolition which was opposed by petitioners. Nevertheless the trial
court granted the motion. A motion for reconsideration of said order was filed
by petitioners wherein it was alleged that LDB was no longer the owner of the
property inasmuch as it had already sold the same to spouses Cecilia de
Ramos and Cesar de Ramos and the title thereto of LDB had been canceled
and replaced by TCT No. T-89122 in the name of said Ramos spouses, who
have elected to file an unlawful detainer case against petitioners. The motion
was granted.
On August 8, 1986, petitioners filed an action against the Ramos spouses and
LDB in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna for annulment of sale, reconveyance
27
of property with damages. The suit was docketed as RTC Civil Case No. 1031-
86.
On August 13, 1986, the Ramos spouses filed an action for unlawful detainer
against petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna docketed
as Civil Case No. 2405. Petitioners filed their answer with crass claim alleging
among others the pendency of the annulment case before the RTC. On motion
of LDB the said cross claim was dismissed. On June 29, 1987 a decision was
rendered ordering petitioners to vacate the property in question within sixty (60)
days from receipt thereof, to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00
and the cost of the suit. The counterclaim was dismissed. Petitioners appealed
the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna but the same was affirmed.
They filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals wherein on October 7,
1988 a decision was promulgated dismissing the petition with costs against
petitioners.1 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
appellate court in a resolution dated March 2, 1989.
Meanwhile the annulment case was dismissed by the trial court on the ground
of res judicata. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeal wherein on
September 21, 1988 a decision was rendered setting aside the appealed order
of dismissal and remanding the records to the lower court for further
proceedings and adjudication on the merits. 2 In said case the appellate court
ruled that the petition for a writ of possession is not a bar to the prosecution of
the annulment case.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein petitioners raise, as
errors allegedly committed by the appellate court in grave abuse of discretion,
namely: (1) the failure to declare that the Municipal Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case due to the failure to allege in the
complaint that private respondents Ramos spouses had prior physical
possession of the property; and (2) that the proceedings in said unlawful
detainer case should be suspended pending the resolution of the action for
annulment of the sale, reconveyance and damages pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Laguna.
On May 24, 1989 the petition was denied for failure of petitioners to sufficiently
show that the respondent court had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners to
which an opposition was filed by private respondents. The parties were then
required to submit their simultaneous memoranda. This requirement has been
complied with by the parties.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that as they continued to be in physical
possession of the property and in the absence of the jurisdictional allegation in
the complaint for unlawful detainer that private respondents had prior physical
possession of the property the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case.
In the questioned decision of the respondent court dated October 7, 1988, the
following disquisition was made:
Under the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, an unlawful detainer
case may be filed by any landlord, vendor or vendee (like herein private
respondents) against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract express or implied. Petitioners' right to
Possess the property in question terminated from the moment they ceased to
be the owners thereof and the transfer of said ownership to Luzon
Development Bank. This was bolstered by the issuance of a writ of
possession turning over the possession thereof to the Bank, which in turn
transferred its right of ownership or possession to private respondents, who
in turn became the owners thereof entitled to its possession with the
issuance in their name of the title to the property.
Premises considered. We find no reversible error of law or fact in the
decision under review. 3
We agree.
It is true that in forcible entry cases the plaintiff must allege and prove that he
was in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was
deprived thereof by the defendant. However, in unlawful detainer cases, the
plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession of the property.
The second issue is likewise devoid of merit. Pending in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Laguna is an action for the annulment of the sale to private
respondent, the foreclosure of mortgage, reconveyance and damages.
Petitioners claims that the proceedings in the ejectment case must be
suspended until after the said annulment case is resolved by the Court.
The Court takes note of the fact that some lessees, realizing that the action for
unlawful detainer will be filed against them shortly, "jump the gun" on the lessor
by going to court first. They institute, for instance, actions for consignation of
rentals, or for specific performance of alleged agreement for renewal of lease
or as in this case for annulment of the sale, etc.
The advantage of having the question of possession of the leased premises
determined in such an ordinary action of consignation, breach of contract or
annulment of sale, instead of a summary ejectment suit, are obvious. The
28
proceedings are not summary, and presumably would take longer than an
action for unlawful detainer. The judgment against the lessee is not
immediately executory and there is no need to file a supersedeas bond to stay
execution, and the remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction is not usually
available to the lessor.
The question is, may the pendency of such an action for consignation or
specific performance, or annulment of a sale, as in this case, be successfully
pleaded in abatement of an action for unlawful detainer? This Court has
invariably given a negative answer.
In Lim Si vs. Lim, 5 the lessee disagreed with the increased rental rate imposed
by the lessor and brought in the Court of First Instance (CFI) a suit for
consignation of rentals praying that the court fix the rate thereof and he be
authorized to remain in the premises in the meantime. The lessor moved to
dismiss, arguing that the issue raised should not be resolved in an action of
consignation but in an unlawful detainer suit. Later, the lessor did in fact file an
ejectment action against the lessee. The trial court dismissed the action. In
sustaining the dismissal this Court citing Pue, et al. vs. Gonzales, 6 held that
consignation —
is not the proper proceedings to determine the relation between landlord and
tenant, the period of life of the lease of tenancy, the reasonableness of the
amount of rental, the right of the tenant to keep the premises against the will
of the landlord, etc. (which) questions should be decided in a case of
ejectment or detainer.
and ruled as follows:
The principle ... exactly covers the point at issue, i.e., that the disagreement
between a lessor and a lessee as to the amount of rent to be paid by a
lessee cannot be decided in an action of consignation but in that of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer that the lessor institutes when the lessee refuses
to pay the lessor the rents that he has fixed for the property. It may also be
added that consignation is proper when there is a debt to be paid, which the
debtor desires to pay and which the creditor refuses to receive, or neglects to
receive, or cannot receive by reason of his absence. The purpose of
consignation is to have the obligation or indebtedness extinguished. In the
case at bar, plaintiff seeks to have the obligation determined and fixed,
hence his action should not be one of consignation.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that plaintiff has no cause of action
against defendant under the facts alleged in his complaint; that consignation
is not the proper remedy; that it is the defendant who has the right or cause
 of against the plaintiff because the latter refuses to pay the rents fixed but
does not leave the property; and that if the plaintiff claims that the amount of
rents demanded by the defendant is unreasonable and he desires to have it
fixed judicially, he may set forth the above facts as defenses in the action of
ejectment filed by the defendant against him. ...
The same ruling was rendered by this Court in Teodoro vs. Mirasol 7 where an
action for specific performance to compel the lessor to renew the lease was
held to be a proper defense in the ejectment suit. 8 In the same vein this Court
held that an action for reconveyance or action for reivindicatoria or quieting of
title or injunction or reformation may not be pleaded in abatement of an
ejectment suit. 9
The case of Quiambao v. Osorio, 10 invoked by petitioners cannot support their
cause. In said case, the ejectment suit was sought to be suspended on the
ground of the pendency of an administrative case in the Office of the Land
Authority where the agreement of sale of the lot in question, on which
respondents based their prior possession, had already been canceled by the
Land Authority. Thus, this Court held the prudent course for the trial court to do
is to hold the ejectment proceeding, until after the determination of the
administrative case. There is no analogy in the facts of the said case with the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. L-53788 October 17, 1980
PHARMA INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MELITON PAJARILLAGA OF THE CITY COURT OF
CABANATUAN CITY, NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH II, SERGIA A. DEL
ROSARIO AND "JOHN DOE/S", respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
29
Certiorari to review the actuations of the respondent judge in Civil Case No.
8126 of the City Court of Cabanatuan which the plaintiff, the petitioner herein,
initiated for the purpose of ejecting the private respondents from a piece of
land.
In a "Decision" dated January 7, 1980, the respondent judge dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. A motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied,
hence the present petition.
The facts and the law as understood by the respondent judge are set forth in
his "Decision" which is hereby reproduced in full:
This is a complaint for Ejectment filed by the plaintiff against the defendant.
The plaintiff in its complaint alleges that on November 12, 1977, the defendant
Sergia A. del Rosario executed in favor of the plaintiff a Deed of Sale with
Right to repurchase over a piece of land duly registered and situated at
Cabanatuan City, together with all improvements and which land is covered
with TCT No. 12481, now TCT No. 35940, that the defendant Sergia del
Rosario executed to exercise her right of redemption in accordance with the
Provision of Annex A, Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, which expired
November 12, 1978, and despite notice to her, the plaintiff was constrained to
file a petition for consolidation of ownership, Annex B; that on April 3, 1979, the
Honorable Virgilio D. Pobre-Yñigo, promulgated a decision in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant, declaring the plaintiff to be the full owner of
the property and ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City, to cancel
the old title; and issue a new title, TCT No. L-35940 in the name of the plaintiff;
that on June 8, 1979, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant and all person
claiming ownership, to vacate the premises in question; that despite receipt of
Annex E, by the defendant on June 13, 1979, she failed and refused and still
fails to vacate the premises without justification.
The defendant filed her answer, admitting the allegations on Par. 1, 2, & 3, and
denied the allegation in Par. 4, alleging that the defendant thru her
representative Alfredo del Rosario verbally agreed to the counsel of the
plaintiff, that after recomputation of the amount demanded being enormous and
unconscionable, the latter should pay her obligation but contrary to the
agreement to plaintiff thru counsel, did not honor the same and still continued
the prosecution in this case, until the decision was rendered by this Court, to
the damage and prejudice of the defendant, who is ready and able to pay her
obligation; that defendant admitted the allegation in Par. 5 of the answer of the
complaint, as far as the decision rendered for consolidation, but denies the rest
of the allegations, because of the agreement which was dishonored by the
plaintiff; that defendant also admitted the allegations in Par. 6, 7 & 8, but
denies the allegation in Par. 9.
On November 28, 1979, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the
pleading, on the ground that the defendant admitted all the material averments
of the complaint and does not tender at all an issue. The defendant filed an
opposition to the motion of judgment on the pleading, and a motion to dismiss,
on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction, and that it is the Court of First
Instance, which has jurisdiction over the action, (Roman Catholic Bishop of
Cebu versus Mangaron, 6 Philippines 286, 291). The complaint filed by the
plaintiff is for ejectment. There are three kinds of action in ejecting a person
from the land. It is clear in the complaint that the plaintiff is intending to eject
the defendant from the land under the kind of ejectment, forcible entry or
detainer, but it must be alleged in the complaint prior possession of the land by
the plaintiff. But in the complaint it is alleged that the defendant is in
possession of the land and not the plaintiff, and therefore the complaint should
be for recovery of the right to possess the land, and the action should be filed
in the Court of First Instance and not in this Court. The three kinds of action are
the following: (1) The summary action for forcible entry or detainer by
denominated action interdictal, under the former law of procedure (Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil) which seeks the recovery of only physical possession,
and is brought within one year in the Justice of the Peace Court; (2) The accion
publiciana which is intended for the recovery of the right to possess and is a
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding, before the Court of First Instance
and (3) Action de revindication which seeks the recovery of ownership which of
course included the Jus utendi and jus fruendi also brought in the Court of First
Instance. Of these three kinds of action should be brought under No. 2 which is
accion publiciana intended to recovery of the right to possess possession from
the defendant, because it is the defendant who is in possession of the
premises. The Court in its opinion, held that the complaint must be filed with
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, because it is for a recovery of
possession which is under the law, belong to the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered, dismissing this case.
We have to grant the petition. The proper remedy is ejectment under Rule 70
of the Rules of Court and not accion publiciana. Sec. 1 of said Rule provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
landlord, vendor, vendee, or other persons, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
30
action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs. The complaint must be verified.
It should be noted that the summary action provided above is one to obtain
possession only, filed in a municipal court within one year after the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession complained of has taken place. It
should also be noted that the remedy provides for two distinct causes of action:
(1) forcible entry in which the defendant's possession of the property is illegal
ab initio, and (2) unlawful detainer wherein the defendant's possession was
originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess.
The present case which is to obtain possession only is one for unlawful
detainer because Sergia A. del Rosario, the vendor a retro, failed to
repurchase the property and after the consolidation of title in favor of the
vendee a retro had been confirmed, she refused to vacate the property upon
demand and after her right to possess it had ceased to be lawful. That a
demand to vacate was made on Sergia A. del Rosario on June 13, 1979, and
the action to eject was filed on October 22, 1979, well within the one-year
period, are borne by the record.
The mistake of the respondent judge in his belief that the cause of action is
forcible entry wherein it is necessary to alleged prior possession and forcible
deprivation thereof. But as stated above, the cause of action in this case is for
unlawful detainer and it is sufficient to allege, as was done, that the defendant
was unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff. (See 3 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 302 [1970].)
Where the cause of action is unlawful detainer, prior possession is not always
a condition sine qua non. This is especially so where a vendee seeks to obtain
possession of the thing sold to him from the vendor. But if prior possession be
insisted upon, Pharma Industries, Inc. had it before the suit for unlawful
detainer was filed. Art. 531 of the Civil Code provides: "Possession is acquired
by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact
that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right. (438a)" And according to
Tolentino, "proper acts and formalities" refer "to judicial acts, or the acquisition
of possession by sufficient title, Inter vivos or mortis causa, onerous, or
lucrative. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession.
Examples of these are donations, succession, whether intestate or intestate,
contracts, such a sale with right of repurchase, judicial possession, execution
of judgments, such as when a sheriff, pursuant to a decision or order of the
court, places certain parties in possession of property, execution and
registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information
titles." (II Civil Code of the Philippines, 246-247 [1972],)

Pharma Industries, Inc. acquired possession when Sergia A. del Rosario

executed in its favor on November 12, 1977, the deed of sale with right to
repurchase over the land in question and the vendee's title was confirmed
upon failure of the vendor to repurchase the property. (Annexes A-1, A-2, and
A-3, Petition.)

Private respondent states that subsequently on August 25, 1980, Civil Case
No. 7326 was filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to declare the
deed of sale with the right to repurchase executed by Sergia A. del Rosario in
favor of Pharma Industries, Inc. as an equitable mortgage. Such a suit,
however, is not a bar to the ejectment suit.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, it is hereby granted and,

as prayed for, the respondent judge is hereby ordered to take cognizance of
Civil Case No. 8126 in his court and to resolve the petitioner's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

31
SPECPRO – RULE70 that the key given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then
already changed;
G.R. No. 93451 March 18, 1991
8. Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he
LIM KIEH TONG, INC., petitioner, incurred expenses in the sum of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for
vs. his cases;
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ROGELIO M. PIZARRO,
Presiding Judge of Branch 16 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, 9. Plaintiff was only able to contact defendant through its Officer-in-Charge,
and REGINALDO Y. LIM, respondents. Mr. Rafael Lim, the following day, October 1, 1987, but his request for him to
be provided with the appropriate key produced negative result, hence, this
GANCAYCO, J.: suit where plaintiff incurred expenses in the form of attorney's fees and costs
of suit.
The issue of whether a complaint filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
is one for forcible entry and detainer or one for specific performance is the ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY
center of this litigation. MANDATORY INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING ORDER

The facts are not disputed as related by the respondent Court of Appeals in its 10. Plaintiff repleads all the foregoing allegations by way of reference to form
questioned decision dated December 7, 1988 — part of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction;
The record reveals that on October 23, 1987, the appellee, Reginaldo Y. Lim,
had filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, in part, 11. The failure and/or refusal of defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate
alleging, as follows: key, above-cited, constitutes a violation of the substantial rights of plaintiff,
who has a clear and unmistakable right to the use and enjoyment of Room
301 of the building owned by defendant corporation, such that there is an
3. Plaintiff and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 of the
urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
building adverted to in the next preceding paragraph, until they transferred to
injunction/restraining order commanding defendant to furnish plaintiff the
their present residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City;
appropriate key in order to prevent great and and/or irreparable damages
and injury upon plaintiff.
4. The said room 301 has thereafter been utilized by plaintiff as a place
where he keeps some of his important belongings, such as his law books,
In conclusion, the said appellee prayed, as follows:
important documents, appliances, etc.;

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable

5. The aforementioned building has only one common main door through
Court that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction/restraining order
which all the occupants of the various rooms therein, including that of
commanding defendant to provide plaintiff the appropriate key or a duplicate
plaintiff, can get in and out therefrom;
key to the lock of the main door of the building be immediately issued, and,
after hearing the case on its merits, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff
6. Accordingly, each and every occupant of any and all of the rooms of the and against defendant ordering:
building including plaintiff has been given a key or a duplicate key to the
doorlock by Rafael Lim, the Officer-in-Charge of defendant corporation;
l. the injunction prayed for in the complaint;
7. When plaintiff wanted to go inside his room in the following morning of
2. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Pl,253.00 as actual compensatory
September 30, 1987 to fetch three (3) of his law books, which he needed to
damages;
read in connection with a case he is handling, he was surprised to find out

32
 3. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
and
4. the cost of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and/or remedies which the Honorable
Court may deem just and proper in the premises. (p. 13, orig. rec.)
The opening paragraphs of the questioned decision relate what had happened
in the courts below:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, grounded on pure
questions of law.
The case is simplicity itself.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation and is the owner of a
building located at 1231 Piedad Street corner Benavidez Street, Manila;
Public respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 16;
For sometime prior to the filing of this petition, Lim Eng Piao, father of private
respondent, occupied said premises as a dwelling unit at the above given
address together with all the members of his family. Lim Eng Piao
subsequently died. Said occupancy was continued by private respondent.
Later, the latter was able to acquire a house and lot at No. 3 Igdalig Street,
Quezon (sic). In spite of having transferred residence, private respondent did
not vacate Room 301 of the building in question. Instead, he utilized the
same as a place where he keeps some of his important belongings, papers,
books, documents and appliances . . .
On or about September 1987, petitioner changed the lock of the common
main door of the building.
On the morning of September 30, 1987, private respondent tried to go to
Room 301 but found that the key given him could not fit and open the main
door. As one of the occupants of the building in question, private respondent
demanded from petitioner's officer-in-charge the delivery to him of the
appropriate keys to the said common main door so that he could enter the
premises and be restored to possession of said Room No. 301 of the
33
building, but his efforts proved futile as the officer in charge did not heed his
demand . . .
On October 2, 1987, by reason of the unjustifiable ouster of private
respondent from said premises, he instituted Civil Case No. 122546 entitled
Reginaldo Y. Lim vs. Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong & Co., Inc. before the
Metropolitan Trial Court which was raffled to Branch 25. Said complaint was
denominated as an action for damages with injunction despite the allegations
contained therein . . .. The aforesaid case was subsequently dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction . . .
On October 23, 1987, private respondent again instituted another action at
the Metropolitan Trial Court docketed as Civil Case No. 122775 which was
raffled to Branch 16. The complaint reiterated the same allegations . . .
On November 2, 1987, a temporary restraining order was issued by
respondent judge pending trial on the merits, commanding petitioner to
deliver the appropriate keys to private respondent and allow him to enter the
premises and occupancy of Room No. 301 of the building . . .
On November 3, 1987, petitioners instituted the instant petition;
On the same date after an ex-parte hearing, the Executive Judge of this
Court, in order to obviate any possible injustice pending the determination of
the issuance of the injunctive writ, issued a temporary restraining order,
enjoining the enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by
respondent judge and from further taking cognizance of said Civil Case No.
122775; . . .
In ruling in favor of the private appellee, the appellee judge, in part, stated:
In this case force was used by petitioner to deprive private respondent of the
physical possession of Room 301 when the lock of the main door was
changed without his knowledge and consent.
The issued (sic) involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto)
and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership (Mercado vs.
Go Bio, 78 Phil. 279; Masallo, vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134).
The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the
title to property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be
turned out by strong hand, violence or terror . . . In affording this remedy,
breaches of the peace and criminal disorder would be minimized. A party out
 of possession must respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he
claims is his. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312).
Considering that respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule in
Summary Procedure, the motion to dismiss was correctly denied. A motion to
dismiss being one of the prohibited pleadings and motions under Section 15
of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure.
Hence, the petition must fail on this score alone.
Anent the second issue, petitioner contended that when the amount of
damages claimed is not specifically alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction over
the case would fall under the Regional Trial Courts, as the failure to so allege
would characterize the subject matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Petitioner's contentions is (sic) not well-taken.
In Singson vs. Aragon, 92 Phil. 514, the Supreme Court held that exemplary
damages must be specified and if not, the municipal trial court could still
grant it, if together with the other money claims, the amount of the total claim
does not exceed P10,000.00 (now P20,000.00).
As to moral damages, the aforesaid ruling can likewise be made to apply.
What confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal
detainer cases is NOT the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved,
but rather the nature of the action because the rents or damages are only
incidental to the main action (Vichanco vs. Laurilla, L-13935, June 30,
1960).1
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed for
lack of merit.2 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a
resolution dated May 9, 1990.3
Hence, this petition for review the main thrust of which is that the action being
one for specific performance the jurisdiction thereof is vested in the Regional
Trial Court.
The petition must fail.
A reading of the allegations of the complaint show that private respondent and
his family resided in Room 301 of the building of petitioner until they transferred
34
to their present residence at No. 3 Igdalig St., Quezon City. However, private
respondent retained possession of said room to keep his important belongings,
such as his law books, important documents, appliances, etc. The building has
only one common main door through which all the occupants of the various
rooms therein can get in and out.1âwphi1 Accordingly, all occupants including
private respondent were given a key to the main doorlock by petitioner.
However, when private respondent wanted to go inside his room on September
30, 1987 to get three (3) of his lawbooks which he needed to read in
connection with a case he was then handling, he found that the key he
possessed was no longer compatible with the lock, i.e., the same was
changed. Private respondent had to buy three (3) new lawbooks for Pl,253.00
to prepare for his cases. He requested private respondent to provide him the
appropriate key but his request was denied. Petitioner also alleges that he has
a clear and unmistakable right to the use of said room entitling him to the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction to command petitioner to provide him the
appropriate key to the lock of the main building; and to pay damages in the
amount of Pl,253.000, P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit.
From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the Court holds that the suit
is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent retained the possession of Room 301 of petitioner's
building which he claimed to have the right to use and enjoy, but petitioner
prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right of egress
and ingress through the main door of the building. Through stealth, petitioner
changed the key to the main door thus depriving private respondent of the
possession of his rented room.
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may
file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against
the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him4
This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a
lessee or tenant or any other person against whom the possession of any land
or building, or a part thereof, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully
deprived possession thereof, within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 77133 July 19, 1989
SPOUSES MARCIANO BANDOY and SEGUNDINA BANDOY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO P. EMPAYNADO respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari of the decision (pp. 27-31, Rollo) of the Court of
Appeals dated January 13, 1987 in CA G.R. SP. No. 09391 entitled "Spouses
Marciano and Segundina Bandoy, Petitioners, vs. Hon. Luis L. Victor, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch XCVI, RTC, and Domingo Empaynado,
Respondents," which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch XCVI, Quezon City, dismissing the herein petitioner's
complaint for ejectment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the lack of
demand to pay rentals and to vacate the premises.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy herein petitioners, were lessees of
a residential house and lot owned by the University of the Philippines and
located at No. 88-D, Phase 4, Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus, Quezon City.
Sometime in April 1984, petitioners sublet certain spaces of the property to
Eduardo Empaynado, herein private respondent, for a monthly rental of
P550.00. Empaynado failed to pay the rental for the month of July, 1985. Upon
demand by petitioners, Empaynado still failed and refused to pay.
Petitioners brought the matter to the office of the barangay captain for
settlement, but to no avail. On August 20, 1985, a certification to file action
against Domingo Empaynado for ejectment and non-payment of house rentals
including light and water (Annex "A" to the petition, p. 1 0, Rollo) was issued by
the office of the barangay captain.
On November 26,1985, petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against
Empaynado and attached thereto the certification to file action issued by the
barangay captain. The case was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. XXXV-48898.
35
In his answer, Empaynado admitted that he did not pay the rentals since July
1985 but denied that there was a demand to vacate and pay made upon him
by spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses. The decision, dated
March 6, 1986 reads, in part:
x x x.
At any rate, the court is of the view that a demand to vacate before the
barangay court is a substantial equivalent of the required extrajudicial
demand to pay and vacate required by the Rules of Court prior to the filing of
an ejectment case in court.
x x x.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff spouses
Marciano and Segundina Bandoy ordering the defendant Domingo
Empaynado and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the
residential house or extension thereof at the lot known as No. 88-D, Phase 4,
Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus and to surrender the same peacefully to the
plaintiffs. The defendant is likewise required to pay all unpaid rentals at the
rate of P550.00 a month from July 1985 up to the time the defendant vacates
the premises at bar; and to pay the plaintiff P700.00 as reasonable attorney's
fee and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)
Domingo Empaynado appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court which
rendered a decision dated June 2, 1986 dismissing the case for ejectment for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. The decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing disquisition, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and this
case ordered dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (p. 25, Rollo)
Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy filed a petition for review of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals. In a decision
promulgated on January 14, 1987, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case
also for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. The decision reads, in
part:
 x x x.
And where the Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction, the above
jurisprudence would hold and all we can do is to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, there having been no error committed by the Regional Trial
Court, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 30-31, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners come to Us
on a lone assignment of error, that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW AND IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
It is the contention of petitioners that no further demand to vacate was made by
petitioners after the certification to file was issued by the Barangay captain for
the reason that the case was already certified for court action. Under this
situation, any further demand to vacate was merely repetitive and
unnecessary.
There is no merit in this contention.
presentation of evidence, plaintiffs offered Exhibit "A" as evidence, which is a
notice to quit alleged to have been served upon defendants prior to the filing of
the action. This was objected to by the defendants and the objection was
sustained by the trial court. The defendants filed with the Court of First
Instance a petition for mandamus to compel the municipal court judge to admit
Exhibit "A". By virtue of a writ of mandamus issued by the Court of First
Instance, the evidence was admitted. In that case, it was held that:
even supposing without conceding, that the complaint is deficient (in not
alleging the notice to quit) the deficiency was cured by the evidence. (P. 679,
supra)
But, the above case of Co Tiamco cannot be applied in this case. In the Co
Tiamco case, it was proven that there was indeed a notice to quit or demand to
vacate served upon the defendants. The notice to vacate was offered and
admitted in evidence. In the case at bar, the complaint was defective because
of its failure to allege that there was a prior demand to vacate. The defect was
not cured because no evidence of a prior demand to vacate was presented in
the trial court. The affidavit of Empaynado relied upon by the trial judge to the
effect that: "na ako ang tinutukoy ni Marciano Tamis Bandoy dahil di umano'y
sa di magandang asal namin na gusto niyang paalisin sa kanyang extension",
does not prove that the spouses demanded that he vacate the premises. What
Empaynado admitted in the said affidavit was that the spouses intended to
expel him out of the premises ("gusto niyang paalisin') but has not actually or
definitely demanded that he vacate the premises. An intention to oust is
different from an actually or definitely demanded to vacate. It is the latter which
confers jurisdiction upon the municipal court.

It is not disputed that the complaint contains no allegation that there was a prior ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of
demand to vacate made by the petitioners upon private respondent. It is a Appeals is affirmed. No costs.
settled rule that "where the complaint contains no allegation that a demand had
been made upon the defendant to vacate the premises but only an allegation SO ORDERED.
that a demand was made for payment of the rentals agreed upon, it is held that
such allegation is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace
court" (Casilan vs. Tomassi, et al., 10 SCRA 261, 264; Santos vs. Vivas, 96
Phil. 538, 540). The certification issued by the office of the barangay captain is
not conclusive as to the jurisdiction of the court to which the case was
subsequently filed. What was certified by the barangay captain was that no
settlement was reached by the parties in the barangay level. It did not certify
that all the requisites for the filing of an unlawful detainer case had been
complied with.

In the case of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, L-7, January 22, 1946 (75 Phil. 672), relied
upon by petitioners, there was no allegation in the complaint that a notice to
quit or vacate was made upon the defendants. However, during the
36
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. L-20330 December 22, 1966
ADOLFO RACAZA, petitioner,
vs.
SUSANA REALTY, INC., respondent.
REGALA, J.:
Petitioner is the lessee of a portion of a piece of land located at San Juan St.,
Pasay City, and owned by respondent corporation. He started renting this
portion of the lot in 1952 when his wife, Evarista P. Racaza, bought an
unfinished house that had been built on it. On assurance of respondent that
petitioner's family could stay on the land by paying a monthly rent of P15,
petitioner finished the construction of the house and he and his family lived in
it. On December 16, 1955, however, petitioner was asked to vacate the land
because respondent needed it. The demand was followed by the filing on
February 10, 1956 of a complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Pasay
City. Petitioner and his family remained in the premises as the case was
dismissed for failure of respondent to proceed to trial.
On December 17, 1957, petitioner received another letter from respondent
demanding anew the surrender of the premises. On February 19, 1958,
another ejectment suit was filed against him, the complaint alleging that
respondent needed the lot "for the purpose of constructing improvements
thereon and for other uses but that despite repeated demands petitioner
refused to leave the premises.
In his answer, petitioner denied that the lease was on a month-to-month basis
and claimed that his understanding with respondent was that he would be
allowed to stay on the premises as long as he paid a monthly rent of P15. As
counterclaim, petitioner demanded the payment of P12,000 which he said he
had spent to finish the construction of his house.
After trial, the court ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and pay P15 a
month until he had done so, even as it dismissed his counterclaim for lack of
merit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pasay, reiterating his
counterclaim. He asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the municipal court to try it, claiming that the complaint was
filed more than one year after the alleged unlawful detainer. 1 According to
37
petitioner, the first complaint for ejectment was dismissed on November 23,
1956, while the complaint in this case was not filed until February 19, 1958.
Again, petitioner was ordered evicted; his counterclaim was thrown out for lack
of jurisdiction. It was held that petitioner's illegal possession should be deemed
to have started on December 17, 1957, when the second demand to vacate
was made on him, because the complaint in this case was not intended to
revive the one previously dismissed for lack of prosecution. Since the
complaint was filed on February 19, 1958, jurisdiction over the case was
properly acquired by the municipal court. At the same time, it was held that the
counterclaim was correctly dismissed as the amount of the demand (P12,000)
was beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court to grant.
Petitioner asked for a reconsideration and, failing to secure one, appealed to
the Court of Appeals. First, he contended that the municipal court did not have
jurisdiction because by respondent's own evidence rents had not been paid
since July, 1955 and it should be from this date that the one-year period should
be counted. Second, petitioner claimed that, instead of dismissing his
counterclaim, the lower court should have assumed original jurisdiction over it,
considering that evidence to support the counterclaim had been allowed
without objection from the respondent.
After stating that in actions for unlawful detainer, notice to vacate need not be
alleged but may merely be shown by evidence, the appellate court ruled that
the one year period should not be counted from July, 1955 because the parties
had stipulated that petitioner was up to date in the payment of rents. Neither
should it be reckoned from November 23, 1956 2 when the first demand to
vacate was made because it was respondent's privilege, as lessor, to waive the
right to bring an action based on the first demand. (Zobel v. Abreu, 98 Phil. 343
[1956]) Rather, the starting point should be December 17, 1958 when the
second demand to quit was made by respondent because, as held in Cruz vs.
Atencio, G.R. No. L-11276, February 28, 1959,
Where despite the lessee's failure to pay rent after the first demand, the
lessor did not choose to bring an action in court but suffered the lessee to
continue occupying the land for nearly two years, after which the lessor made
a second demand, the one-year period for bringing the detainer case in the
justice of the peace court should be counted not from the day the lessee
refused the first demand for payment of rent but from the time the second
demand for rents and surrender of possession was not complied with.
On this score, the court overruled petitioner's first assignment of error.
But the court found merit in petitioner's other contention that evidence having
been admitted without objection from respondent, the Court of First Instance,
pursuant to Rule 40, section 11, could take cognizance of the counterclaim in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Citing article 1678 of the Civil Code, the
court held that petitioner should be reimbursed one-half of what he had spent
in building his house. While petitioner claimed that he had spent P12,000 for
the improvement of his house, the appellate court found that the fair market
value of the house was P7,000 and, on the basis of this amount, awarded
P3,500 to petitioner.
Still not satisfied, petitioner asked the appellate court to reconsider its decision.
When his motion was denied, he appealed to this Court.
It is contended that respondent's complaint is defective and did not vest
jurisdiction in the municipal court because it does not state the date when the
alleged unlawful detainer started so as to afford a basis for determining
whether the case was filed within a year from the accrual of the cause of
action. In this connection, it is claimed that, according to the evidence,
petitioner stopped paying rents in July, 1955 and that it should be from this
date that the one-year period should be counted.
To begin with, this case was brought not on the theory that petitioner, as
lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the theory that the lease had expired and that
respondent had asked petitioner to vacate the land. Thus, the complaint states
that respondent needs the land but that despite his demands petitioner refused
to vacate it. The averment that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is
equivalent to an allegation that the lease expired at the end of every month. 3 It
is therefore immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955, since
what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of the lease. This
being the case, demand to vacate was unnecessary. As this Court explained in
Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 78 Phil. 672 (1946), Rule 70, section 2 requires previous
demand only when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with
the conditions of his lease." Where the action is to terminate the lease because
of the expiration of its term, no such demand is necessary. 4 In the latter case,
upon the expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord may go into the
property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an
action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even
before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70, section 2.
This brings us to petitioner's next point. As earlier stated, petitioner was twice
asked to quit the premises. The first was on December 16, 1955, but as
pointed out in the beginning, the complaint filed afterwards was dismissed for
non-suit. The second time he was asked to move out was on December 19,
1958. Petitioner insists that respondent's cause of action must be deemed to
have accrued on December 16, 1955. But, as already stated, respondent's
action is not based on non-profit of rent coupled with a demand; its action is
based on the expiration of the term of the lease and the demand made by it to
vacate the premises merely evidences its determination not to extend the
lease. Moreover, even if the action were based on non-payment of rent, the
one-year period should be reckoned from the second notice, on the theory that
respondent has the right to waive his action based on the first demand and to
let the lessee remain in the premises.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's last point that he should have been allowed full
reimbursement for what he had spent by applying to this case article 448 of the
Civil Code. It is now settled that article 448, in relation to article 546, applies
only to possessors in good faith and since lessees, like petitioner, are not
possessors in good faith, because they know that their occupation of the
premises continues only during the life of the lease, they cannot recover the
value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises
until they are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by article 1678 which
allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their useful
improvements. (Lopez, Inc. vs. Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., 98 Phil. 348
[1956]) The Court of Appeals correctly applied article 1678 to this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
petitioner.

Accordingly, upon the expiration of the lease in this case, petitioner became a
deforciant unlawfully withholding possession of the property. There was no
need for a demand to be served on him, except to negate any inference that
respondent, as lessor, had agreed to an extension of the term of the lease
under article 1687 of the Civil Code.

38
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 112734 July 7, 1994
SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR. represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES,
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUPO CALAYCAY, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The only issue to be resolved in this ejectment case is whether or not the
Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by herein
petitioner-spouses represented by their attorney-in-fact Elpidio R. Viernes.
The undisputed facts of the case as summed up by the trial court and adopted
by respondent Court of Appeals are as follows:
Subject of this controversy [are the] premises identified as 24-B Scout
Santiago Street, Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, also identified as 26-
B [South] D Street, Quezon City. It was the object of a written lease contract
executed by the late Nazario Penas in favor of [private respondent] Lupo
Calaycay on June 26, 1964, at an agreed monthly rental of One Hundred
Ten (P110.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency. The written lease contract was on
a month to month basis. Nazario Penas, Sr. died on February 5, 1976 and,
thereafter, on June 15, 1976, an extra-judicial settlement of his estate was
executed by his surviving heirs, one of whom is his son, Nazario Penas, Jr.
Likewise, after the death of plaintiff's mother Concepcion P. Penas on March
2, 1985, her children including [petitioner] Nazario Penas, Jr. executed an
extra judicial settlement of her estate. As time [went] on, the monthly rental
on the subject premises had been gradually increased by the [petitioners],
the latest of which was Six Hundred Ninety One and 20/100 (P691.20)
Pesos, Philippine Currency.
In a letter of January 18, 1990, [petitioner]-spouses Penas, through counsel
notified the [private respondent] that effective March 1990, they were
terminating the written month to month lease contract as they were no longer
interested to renew the same and demanded from the latter to vacate the
premises in question on or before February 28, 1990. In the same letter,
[petitioners] opted to allow the defendant to continue occupying the leased
premises provided he will agree to execute a new lease contract for a period
of one (1) year at an increased monthly rental of Two Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus two (2) months
deposit and, further, gave the [private respondent] up to February 28, 1990 to
39
decide, otherwise judicial action for unlawful detainer against the [private
respondent] shall ensue. [Petitioners] later finally reduced the monthly rental
to Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, only.
[Private respondent] failed to abide by the demand of the [petitioners].
However, he continued staying on the leased premises and effective March
1990, he deposited the monthly rentals in the subject premises with the PNB
in his name ITF (in trust for) spouses Lucila and Nazario Penas, Jr. under
Account No. 688930. Prior to such deposit, [private respondent] together with
others, in a letter of March 26, 1990, informed the [petitioners], inter alia, that
since [petitioners'] representative refused to accept the rentals, he will
deposit the same with a reputable bank and he will [hold] the same intact for
the [petitioners]. There was no instance that [petitioners] manifested any
desire to withdraw the same deposit in the bank.
On August 10, 1992, plaintiffs through counsel sent another letter to the
defendant to vacate the subject premises and to pay back rental arrearages
in the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, per
month from March 1990 in the total sum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency, which defendant failed to satisfy.
Accordingly, on September 25, 1992, after the corresponding Certification to
File Action was issued by Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, [petitioners]
filed the present suit for unlawful detainer on the grounds of termination of
the month to month lease contract and failure of the defendant to execute a
new lease agreement with increased rentals. [Petitioners] tried to impress the
Court that after they [had] agreed [to] a new monthly rental of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, [private respondent] refused to enter
into a new contract and insisted in paying at a lower rate; that they gave
defendant allowance of more than one (1) year within which to sign a new
contract of lease but still he refused to do so; that even if conciliation before
the barangay is unnecessary as [petitioners] reside abroad, their attorney-in-
fact referred the case to the barangay level. (reference to Annexes omitted) 1
The parties were required to submit their respective position papers after which
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City rendered a decision
dated 16 March 1993 dismissing herein petitioners' complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court based its decision on the finding that the complaint
was filed more than one (1) year after private respondent began unlawfully
occupying the premises.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the trial court decision was upheld, the
RTC ruling that herein petitioners' remedy was converted from an actio de
mero hecho to an accion publiciana since more than one (1) year had elapsed
from the demand upon defendants to vacate. The Regional Trial Court
concluded that herein petitioners could initiate a proper complaint with the WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Regional Trial Court. CA G.R. SP No. 31480 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new decision rendered:

Respondent Court of Appeals in a decision * in CA G.R. SP No. 31480 dated
19 November 1993 upheld the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that since
herein petitioners were not collecting the rentals being deposited by private
respondent, there no longer was any lease contract between the parties for two
(2) years since the first letter of petitioners to private respondent. The Court of
Appeals thus agreed that the proper remedy of the petitioners is to file an
action for recovery of possession in the Regional Trial Court.
1. Ordering private respondent Lupo Calaycay to immediately vacate the
premises located at 24-B Scout Santiago Street, Barangay Laging Handa,
Quezon City.
2. Ordering private respondent Lupo Calaycay to pay back rentals in the
amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos per month from March 1990 until
he finally vacates the leased premises.

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals, and hence set it 3. Ordering private respondent to pay Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as
aside. attorney's fees.

Petitioners correctly cite our ruling in Sy Oh v. Garcia 2 upholding the Costs against private respondent.
established rule that the one (1) year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed SO ORDERED.
should be counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate, the reason being
that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous
demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. 3

In the present case, it is of note that the first demand letter addressed by
petitioners to private respondent gave the latter the option to either vacate the
premises on or before 28 February 1990 or agree to execute a new lease
contract for one (1) year at an increased rental rate of P2,500 per month. In
Vda. de Murga v. Chan 4 we held that:

The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental
or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of
Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to
stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until
he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.

The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from said settled doctrine. It
should be noted that even if the private respondent was depositing rentals in
trust for the petitioners, what was being deposited were rentals at the old rate,
which petitioners were not bound to accept or withdraw. When private
respondent elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent him the
letter of 18 January 1990 giving him the option to vacate by 28 February 1990
or to sign a new lease contract for one (1) year at an increased rental rate of
P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) a month, he assumed the new rental
rate and could be ejected from the premises only upon default and by a proper
demand from the petitioners. The demand was made on 10 August 1992,
followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992.
40
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 76656 December 11, 1992
SPOUSES EUTIQUIANO CLUTARIO and ARACELI CLUTARIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GEORGE C. MACLI-ING, RTC Judge of
Quezon City, Branch C (100), and SPOUSES MELQUIADES GANDIA and
MARIA V. GANDIA, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Private respondents, the Spouses Melquiades Gandia and Maria V. Gandia,
are the owners of a two-storey residential apartment located at No. 56 Liberty
St., Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. Since 1961, while private respondents have
been occupying the upper storey of the house, petitioners have been staying
on the ground floor by virtue of a verbal lease agreement for a monthly rental of
P150.00.
On May 9, 1980, private respondents, through their counsel, wrote a letter to
the petitioners giving them ninety (90) days to vacate the premises. According
to them, due to their advanced age and failing health, they have decided to
occupy the entire apartment, including the ground floor leased to petitioners.
Because petitioners did not heed the demand letter, private respondents
brought the matter to the Katarungan Pambarangay for settlement, but this did
not meet with success. Another demand letter was sent by private respondents
to petitioners on January 20, 1981.
In the meantime, it appears that from August 1980, petitioners were in arrears
in the payment of their rentals. On March 4, 1981, private respondents filed a
complaint for ejectment against petitioner Araceli Clutario 1 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Quezon City citing the following two grounds:
(1) their need for the premises; and (2) non-payment of rentals by petitioners
from August 1980. Pending the proceedings before the MTC, petitioners paid
the back rentals from August 1980 until May 1981.
After trial, the MTC rendered judgment 2 on January 16, 1984 dismissing the
complaint on the ground that private respondents "failed to support their
causes of action with substantial evidence." 3
Private respondents then filed an appeal with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City. On March 29, 1985, respondent Judge George C.
Macli-ing rendered a well-written decision reversing the MTC judgment.
Respondent Judge ruled that petitioners' non-payment of rentals for more than
41
three months and private respondents' genuine need for the leased premises
are sufficient causes for petitioners' ejectment. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof, another one is rendered
and entered in favor of the appellants and against the appellees:
1. Ordering the defendants-appellees and all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate the premises, identified as the Ground Floor of No. 56 Liberty
Avenue, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City, and restore possession thereof to
plaintiffs-appellants.
2. Ordering defendants-appellees to pay rental arrearages from June, 1981,
at the rate of P150.00 per month, until such arrearages shall have been fully
paid and the premises vacated and possession thereof restored to plaintiffs-
appellants.
3. Ordering defendants-appellees to pay P2,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.4
It was then petitioners' turn to impugn this judgment by filing a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated September 18, 1986, 5
the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment but deleted the
award of attorney's fees to private respondents. Petitioners elevated the case
before this Court, on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the RTC ruling
that they can be ejected by their lessors, the private respondents.
The petition is without merit.
B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), which was the governing law at the time of the filing of the
complaint and which the parties had to rely on, provides, in section 5, six (6)
grounds for ejectment.6 In seeking to oust petitioners from the leased
premises, private respondents invoke two of those six grounds, namely: (1)
arrears in payment of rent for three (3) months at any one time; 7 and (2) need
of the lessors to repossess their property for their own use or for the use of any
immediate member of their family as residential unit. 8 Petitioners contend that
private respondents cannot avail of either ground.
No longer disputed is the rule that non-payment of rentals is a sufficient ground
for ejectment.9 Under sec. 5 (b) of B.P. Blg. 25 (1979), the arrears in rent
payment must be for at least three (3) months. Petitioners started defaulting on
their payments in August 1980. On May 15, 1981, they paid P1,500.00 for their
rents for the period August 1980 to May 15 1981 at the rate of P150.00 per
month. By then, they had been in arrears for nine (9) months. However,
petitioners contend that private respondents, by accepting the payment of the
back rentals, waived their non-payment of rentals for more than three (3)
months as a ground for ejectment.
The contention is without merit.
Case law is to the effect that the acceptance by the lessor of the payment by
the lessee of the rentals in arrears does not constitute a waiver of the default in
the payment of rentals as a valid cause of action for ejectment. 10 The Court
notes that when petitioners paid the back rentals on May 15, 1981, private
respondents had already filed the complaint for ejectment earlier, to be
specific, on March 4, 1981. The conduct of private respondents subsequent to
their acceptance of the back rentals belies any intention to waive their right to
eject petitioners as a result of the latter's failure to pay the rent for more than
three (3) months. They did not enter into an amicable settlement with
petitioners. Neither did they notify the trial court of their intention to have the
complaint dismissed. Instead, they participated actively in the proceedings
before the MTC during all the time that the case dragged on for almost three
years. 11 When the MTC decided adversely against them, private respondents
appealed the judgment to the RTC. Not only have they participated earnestly in
all subsequent proceedings even after they obtained favorable judgments from
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, but they have likewise been consistent in
their position that petitioners should be ejected, not only because they need the
leased premises, but also because of petitioners' default in the payment of
rentals for more than three (3) months.
In light of the surrounding circumstances of the case, as well as the prevailing
jurisprudence, the Court rules that the acceptance by private respondents of
the petitioners-lessees' back rentals did not constitute a waiver or
abandonment of their cause of action for ejectment against the latter.
Proof of any one of the factors enumerated in section 5 of B.P. Blg. 25 (1979)
is sufficient cause for judicial ejectment of a lessee. Having proved one of such
grounds, i.e., arrears in payment of rent for three (3) months at any one time,
private respondents may legally eject petitioners without having to prove the
other grounds for ejectment. Nevertheless, to bolster their action for ejectment,
private respondents invoked in their complaint a second ground for ejectment,
namely, their need for the leased premises. 12
Petitioners are bound by the established jurisprudence that under B.P. Blg. 25
(1979), the need by the lessor of the leased premises for his own use or that of
42
his immediate family is a valid ground for ejectment. 13 They, however, submit
that this ground for ejectment is not available to private respondents who own,
apart from the disputed premises, three other apartment units located at Nos.
56-A, 56-B and 56-C Liberty St., Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City, at least one of
which is allegedly available for occupancy by private respondents.
Indeed, for the lessor to be able to validly eject the lessee on the ground of
need for the leased property, it must be shown that there is no other available
residential unit to satisfy that need. 14 The non-availability must exist at the time
of the demand by the lessor on the lessee to vacate the property. 15 In the
instant case, petitioners allege that the other apartment units of private
respondents are vacant and available to the latter for occupancy. 16 Private
respondents deny this allegation, claiming that the other units were occupied
when they gave notice to the petitioners to vacate the disputed premises, and
remain so occupied until now.17 None of the three courts which have already
adjudicated on the controversy gave credence to petitioners' allegation. The
MTC which decided in petitioners' favor did not make a finding that the other
apartment units of private respondents were available for occupancy by the
latter. On the contrary, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled that "the other
apartments of private respondents were tenanted." 18 The Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb this finding.
The MTC, in deciding in favor of petitioners, ruled that private respondents did
not need the disputed premises which is the ground floor of the apartment unit
leased to petitioners, because they were already occupying the upper floor of
the unit. The relevant portion of the MTC decision reads:
On this score, the evidence is clear that the plaintiffs, though owners of the
residential house identified as No. 56 Liberty Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City,
occupying the upper floor thereof, are the only persons living on this upper
floor of the house. The only reason advanced by them for needing to
repossess the ground floor or lower part of the house occupied by the
defendant, is because the plaintiffs are aging and sickly, as according to the
plaintiffs' letter (Exh. "B") to the defendant, plaintiffs "personally need that
lower portion of the house for personal use and occupancy since they are
getting older and aggravated by their poor health, they get easily tired in
going up and downstairs." Obviously, plaintiffs' need of the lower portion of
the house is for convenience. It is the view of this Court that when the
framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 included "need of the premises" as a
ground for judicial eviction, personal convenience is not intended, because
the law states clearly that the repossession of the property for the use of the
owner/lessor (or immediate member) must concur with the other requisites,
one of which is that the owner / lessor does not own any other residential
unit.
 Plaintiffs' position therefore, on this ground, is not only weak but more so not
in accord with the spirit, intent and letter of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. It may
be true that plaintiffs are sickly and aging but their physical condition is not a
legal argument to effect eviction of the-defendant. 19

The need for the leased premises by the lessor as a valid ground for ejectment
has already been given a liberal interpretation in Caudal v. Court of Appeals, 20
where it was held that the conversion of the leased property into a servants'
quarters was a legitimate need within the purview of sec. 5 (c) of B.P. Blg. 25
(1979). The Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan,
made the following statements:

Observe that the law does not strictly confine the meaning of the word
"residence" mainly for habitation purposes as restrictedly interpreted by
petitioner. In a way, the definition admits a measure of liberality, albeit
limited, since a residence may also be the site of a home industry, or a retail
store or be used for business purposes so long as it is principally used for
dwelling purposes. The law in giving greater importance to the abode being
used principally for dwelling purposes, has set the limitation on the maximum
amount of capitalization to P5,000.00, which is small by present standards.

Thus, if an abode can be used for limited business purposes, we see no

reason why it cannot be used as an abode for persons rendering services
usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment of a home
and who personally minister to the personal comfort and convenience of the
members of the houses. 21

In the case at bar, it appears that the decision of private respondents to occupy
both the lower and upper portions of the property sprang not only from mere
convenience, but from necessity as well, due to their advanced age and the
poor health of respondent Melquiades Gandia. While the upper portion of the
premises may have been sufficient to satisfy private respondents' residential
needs in 1961 when they leased the lower portion to petitioners, it no longer
sufficed in 1980 or nineteen (19) years later, when they served the notice to
vacate, their personal circumstances having drastically changed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of

Appeals AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

43
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. L-50335 August 7, 1989
FLORENTINO CURSINO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, (District Judge, CFI, Branch III, Pasay City),
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR. (Presiding Judge, Mun. Court of Paranaque,
MM), and MARIA JAMES, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside (a)
the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal * (now Regional Trial
Court) dated October 30,1978 in Civil Case No. Pq-6364P affirming in toto the
decision of the then Municipal Court of Paranaque ** (now Metropolitan Trial
Court) dated April 17, 1978 in Civil Case No. 3809 entitled "Maria James vs.
Florentino Cursino ordering defendant (herein petitioner) and all persons
claiming under him to vacate plaintiffs (herein private respondent) leased
premises and to pay monthly rentals, attomey's fees and costs of suit, and (b)
the order of the then Court of First Instance dated February 28, 1979 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The factual background of this case as quoted from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City, is as follows:
From the record of tills case, it appears that plaintiff is the lawful owner and
lessor of the premises located at 4143 17 de Marzo St., Baclaran,
Paranaque, leased by defendant at a monthly rental of P100.00, payable
within the first five days of each month; that defendant defaulted in the
payment of his monthly rental for the months of October, November and
December, 1977; that defendant sent two (2) postal money orders, both
dated December 21, 1977, one bearing Money Order No. E-1162-55 in the
amount of P200.00 as payment for the months of October and November,
1977, and the other bearing Money Order No. E-1 162-56 in the amount of P
1,000.00 for the December 1977 rental; that prior to the sending of said
postal money orders, plaintiff on December 14,1977 demanded that
defendant pay the back rental and vacate the premises at 4143 17 de Marzo
St., Baclaran, Paranaque, 'within a period of five (5) days from receipt of this
letter' (Exh. A that despite the formal demand, defendant failed and refused
to vacate the subject premises without justifiable cause; that by reason
thereof, plaintiff was constrained to secure the services of counsel and
incurred expenses in this litigation.
44
The defendant contends that he has not defaulted in the payment of rents
and that it was the plaintiff who refused to accept the same. As a matter of
fact, defendant claims that he sent Postal Money Order No. E-1162-55 dated
December 21, 1977 in the amount of P200.00 as rental payment for the
months of October and November 1977, and another Postal Money Order
No. E-1162-56 also dated December 21, 1977 in the amount of P 100.00 for
the December 1977 rental. It is further contended that since the lease of the
subject dwelling place is only for P100.00 a month, it is 'protected under
Sections I and 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20."' (Rollo, pp. 40
41).lâwphî1.ñèt
Petitioner did not vacate the premises as demanded and so a complaint for
unlawful detainer dated December 27,1977 was filed by respondent before the
then Municipal Court of Paranaque. After hearing, the court rendered its
decision (Rollo, pp. 32-38) dated April 17, 1978 in favor of private respondent
(the plaintiff herein), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, ordering the latter and all persons claiming under him
to vacate plaintiffs premises situated at 17 De Marzo Street, Baclaran,
Paranaque, Metro Manila; ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount
of P 1 ,000.00 representing rental for the month of March and to pay the
same monthly rental of P100.00 commencing April, 1978 until such time that
defendant and all persons claiming under him shall have completely vacated
plaintiff's premises; ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of ONE
THOUSAND (P l,000.00) PESOS as and for attorney's fees and to pay the
costs of this suit. (Rollo, P. 38)
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed to the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal which on October 30,1978, rendered a decision (Rollo, pp.
40-43) affirming in toto the decision of the municipal court with double costs
against petitioner.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision (Rollo, p. 44-53), but
the same was denied with treble costs against petitioner in an order dated
February 28, 1979 (Rollo, pp. 5455). Hence, this instant petition filed on May
15, 1 979 (Rollo, pp. 10-23). Petitioner submits the following reasons for the
allowance of the petition:
FIRST REASON - LIKE THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT HON. PEDRO
JL. BAUTISTA OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH
III COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF SECTION 2, RULE 70, RULES OF COURT.
SECOND REASON - RESPONDENT JUDGE BAUTISTA COMMITTED
GRAVE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 20, MORE SPECIFICALLY PARAGRAPHS 1 and 4, ARE NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
THIRD REASON - RESPONDENT JUDGE BAUTISTA COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR IN RULING THAT PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE 1673 OF THE CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES IS THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE CASE AT
BAR." (Rollo, p. 14)
In a resolution dated June 20, 1 979 (Rollo, p. 62), the petition was given due
course and both parties were required to submit simultaneous memoranda. On
November 5, 1979, respondent Maria James submitted her memorandum
(Rollo, pp. 70-73), while in a manifestation dated October 31, 1979 (Rollo, pp.
7475), petitioner adopted the petition as his memorandum. In the resolution of
November 19, 1979 (Rollo, p. 77), the Court resolved to declare this case
submitted for decision.
The issue is whether or not respondent Maria James still has a cause of action
against the petitioner after she received and accepted the rentals for October,
November and December 1977 at the time of filing of the instant case.
Otherwise stated, is the possession of the lessee legitimized by the lessor's
acceptance of the payment of back rentals?
The answer is in the negative.
Private respondent exercised two unquestionable prerogatives of the owner-
lessor when a tenant-lessee defaults in the payment of the rent, i.e., to demand
that: (a) the back rentals be paid, and (b) the premises be vacated.
The records show that petitioner has defaulted in the payment of his rentals for
the months of October, November and December, 1977; that although he paid
the same on December 22, 1977 after receipt of private respondent's demand
letter, he has not paid them on time, the due date being on the first five (5)
days of each month (Rollo, p. 58); and that petitioner refused to vacate the
premises on the ground that he is protected under Sections 1 and 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 20 (Rollo, p. 41).
Under Presidential Decree No. 20, it is very clear that only paragraph (1) of
Article 1673 of the Civil Code which refers to expiration of leases of dwelling
unit or land for an indefinite period, as ground for ejectment, is suspended but
not the other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. In fact, this
Court has categorically ruled that P.D. No. 20 suspended ejectment when the
lease is for an indefinite period. It did not suspend ejectment on other grounds
45
like lack of payment of the rental stipulated (Velez v. Avelino, 127 SCRA 602
[1984]).
In the same manner, petitioner's insistence that he has not defaulted in the
payment of rents because it was private respondent who refused to accept the
same, will not help the former. As ruled by this Court, "The failure of the owners
to collect, or their refusal to accept the rentals are not valid defenses. Article
1256 of the Civil Code provides that if the creditor to whom tender of payment
has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be
released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due."
(Velez v. Avelino, supra).lâwphî1.ñèt Petitioner failed to comply with the
requisite consignation.
But petitioner further argues that in spite of his payment of back rentals with
five days from receipt of the demand letter, private respondent filed the
complaint for ejectment which allegedly is contrary to the provision of Section
2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Such argument is untenable.
It will be recalled that private respondent formally demanded from the
petitioner, the following: (a) to pay the back rentals, and (b) to vacate the
premises.
Petitioner was able to pay the back rentals but refused to vacate the premises.
Undoubtedly, petitioner's belated payments of his back rentals do not
automatically restore the contract of lease without private respondent's
consent. The terms of the contract of lease have been violated and the lessor-
owner has the unquestionable right to withdraw from said contract or
agreement whether oral or written. This Court has consistently ruled that "It is
the landlord's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has
failed to pay the rents on time and tenant's refusal or failure to vacate, which
make unlawful withholding of possession Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36
[1947]; Desbarats v. Vda. de Laureano 18 SCRA 116 [1966]; Balucanag v.
Francisco, 122 SCRA 498 [1983]). In fact, this Court stressed: "That consent,
no matter how long it may last makes lawful tenant's possession. Only when
that consent is withdrawn and the owner demands tenant to leave the property
is the owner's right of possession asserted and the tenant's refusal or failure to
move out makes his possession unlawful because it is violative of the owner's
preferential right of possession" Canaynay v. Sarmiento, supra). In the case at
bar, respondent-lessor did not consent to petitioner's possession of the leased
premises after the latters default in the payment of the monthly rents. On the
contrary, respondent demanded that petitioner pay the back rental and vacate
the premises. The refusal of the petitioner to vacate the premises after
demand, makes his withholding of possession unlawful.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and order of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal is Affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

46
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 77648 August 7, 1989
CETUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ONG TENG, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 30, 1987
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Nos. SP-07945-50 entitled, "Cetus
Development, Inc., Petitioner vs. Hon. Conrado T. Limcaoco, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch Ederlina Navalta, et. al., respondents.
The following facts appear in the records:
The private respondents, Ederlina Navalta, Ong Teng, Jose Liwanag, Leandro
Canlas, Victoria Sudario, and Flora Nagbuya were the lessees of the premises
located at No. 512 Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, originally owned by the
Susana Realty. These individual verbal leases were on a month-to month basis
at the following rates: Ederlina Navalta at the rate of P80.50; Ong Teng at the
rate of P96.10; Jose Liwanag at the rate of P40.35; Leandro Canlas at the rate
of P80.55; Victoria Sudario at the rate of P50.45 and Flora Nagbuya at the rate
of P80.55. The payments of the rentals were paid by the lessees to a collector
of the Susana Realty who went to the premises monthly.
Sometime in March, 1984, the Susana Realty sold the leased premises to the
petitioner, Cetus Development, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines. From April to June, 1984, the private
respondents continued to pay their monthly rentals to a collector sent by the
petitioner. In the succeeding months of July, August and September 1984, the
respondents failed to pay their monthly individual rentals as no collector came.
On October 9, 1984, the petitioner sent a letter to each of the private
respondents demanding that they vacate the subject premises and to pay the
back rentals for the months of July, August and September, 1984, within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt thereof. Immediately upon the receipt of the said
demand letters on October 10, 1984, the private respondents paid their
respective arrearages in rent which were accepted by the petitioner subject to
the unilateral condition that the acceptance was without prejudice to the filing of
an ejectment suit. Subsequent monthly rental payments were likewise
accepted by the petitioner under the same condition.
47
For failure of the private respondents to vacate the premises as demanded in
the letter dated October 9, 1984, the petitioner filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila complaints for ejectment against the manner, as follows: (1)
105972-CV, against Ederlina Navalta (2) 105973-CV, against Jose Liwanag;
(3) 105974-CV, against Flora Nagbuya; (4) 105975-CV, against Leandro
Canlas; (5) 105976-CV, against Victoria Sudario and (6) 105977-CV, against
Ong Teng.
In their respective answers, the six (6) private respondents interposed a
common defense. They claimed that since the occupancy of the premises they
paid their monthly rental regularly through a collector of the lessor; that their
non-payment of the rentals for the months of July, August and September,
1984, was due to the failure of the petitioner (as the new owner) to send its
collector; that they were at a loss as to where they should pay their rentals; that
sometime later, one of the respondents called the office of the petitioner to
inquire as to where they would make such payments and he was told that a
collector would be sent to receive the same; that no collector was ever sent by
the petitioner; and that instead they received a uniform demand letter dated
October 9, 1984.
The private respondents, thru counsel, later filed a motion for consolidation of
the six cases and as a result thereof, the said cases were consolidated in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XII, presided over by Judge Eduardo
S. Quintos, Jr. On June 4, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing
the six cases, a pertinent portion of which reads, as follows:
The records of this case show that at the time of the filing of this complaint,
the rentals had all been paid. Hence, the plaintiff cannot eject the defendants
from the leased premises, because at the time these cases were instituted,
there are no rentals in arrears.
The acceptance of the back rental by the plaintiff before the filing of the
complaint, as in these case, the alleged rental arrearages were paid
immediately after receipt of the demand letter, removes its cause of action in
an unlawful detainer case, even if the acceptance was without prejudice.
x x x.
Furthermore, the court has observed that the account involved which
constitutes the rentals of the tenants are relatively small to which the
ejectment may not lie on grounds of equity and for humanitarian reasons.
Defendants' counterclaim for litigation expenses has no legal and factual
basis for assessing the same against plaintiff.
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing these cases, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Defendants' counterclaim is likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 32-33, Rollo, G.R. No. 77647)
Not satisfied with the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, the petitioner
appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila and the same was assigned to
Branch IX thereof presided over by Judge Conrado T. Limcaoco (now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals).lâwphî1.ñèt In its decision dated
November 19, 1985, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit.
In due time, a petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court was
filed by the petitioner with the Court of Appeals. Said petition was dismissed on
January 30, 1987, for lack of merit.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner now comes to Us
in this petition, assigning the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER IN THESE CASES DID NOT EXIST WHEN THE COMPLAINTS
WERE FILED BECAUSE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TENDERED, AND
PETITIONER ACCEPTED, THE PAYMENT OF THE THREE (3) MONTHS
RENTAL IN ARREARS WITHIN THE FIFTEEN (15) DAY PERIOD FROM
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' RECEIPT OF PETITIONER'S DEMAND
LETTERS TO VACATE THE SUBJECT PREMISES AND TO PAY THE
RENTALS IN ARREARS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVEABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED A
GRAVE WHEN IT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINTS IN THESE CASES NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE
OF VALID GROUNDS FOR THE JUDICIAL EJECTMENT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
III
48
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THESE CASES ARE CLASSIC EXAMPLES TO
CIRCUMVENT THE RENT CONTROL LAW. (pp. 164-165, Rollo, G.R. No.
77647)
The Court of Appeals defined the basic issue in this case as follows: whether
or not there exists a cause of action when the complaints for unlawful detainer
were filed considering the fact that upon demand by petitioner from private
respondents for payment of their back rentals, the latter immediately tendered
payment which was accepted by petitioner.
In holding that there was no cause of action, the respondent Court relied on
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Landlord to proceed against tenant only after demand. — No landlord
or his legal representative or assign, shall be such action against a tenant for
failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless
the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such conditions
for a period of fifteen (15) days or five (5) days in case of building, after
demand therefor, made upon qqqm personally, or by serving written notice of
such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such
notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon.
It interpreted the said provision as follows:
.....the right to bring an action of ejectment or unlawful detainer must be
counted from the time the defendants failed to pay rent after the demand
therefor. It is not the failure per se to pay rent as agreed in the contract, but
the failure to pay the rent after a demand therefor is made, that entitles the
lessor to bring an action for unlawful detainer. In other words, the demand
contemplated by the above-quoted provision is not a demand to vacate, but a
demand made by the landlord upon his tenant for the latter to pay the rent
due if the tenant fails to comply with the said demand with the period
provided, his possession becomes unlawful and the landlord may then bring
the action for ejectment. (p. 28, , G.R. No. 77647)
We hold that the demand required and contemplated in Section 2, aforequoted,
is a jurisdictional requirement for the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer
suit for failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of lease. It partakes of
an extrajudicial remedy that must be pursued before resorting for judicial action
so much so that when there is full compliance with the demand, there arises no
necessity for court action.
As to whether this demand is merely a demand to pay rent or comply with the
conditions of the lease or also a demand to vacate, the answer can be gleaned
from said Section 2. This section presupposes the existence of a cause of
action for unlawful detainer as it speaks of "failure to pay rent due or comply
with the conditions of the lease." The existence of said cause of action gives
the lessor the right under Article 1659 of the New Civil Code to ask for the
rescission of the contract of lease and indemnification for damages, or only the
latter, allowing the contract to remain in force. Accordingly, if the option chosen
is for specific performance, then the demand referred to is obviously to pay rent
or to comply with the conditions of the lease violated. However, if rescission is
the option chosen, the demand must be for the lessee to pay rents or to comply
with the conditions of the lease and to vacate. Accordingly, the rule that has
been followed in our jurisprudence where rescission is clearly the option taken,
is that both demands to pay rent and to vacate are necessary to make a lessee
a deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed (Casilan et al. vs.
Tomassi, L-16574, February 28,1964, 10 SCRA 261; Rickards vs. Gonzales,
109 Phil. 423, Dikit vs. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44).lâwphî1.ñèt
Thus, for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur,
namely: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of
the lease and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate
within the periods specified in Section 2, Rule 70, namely 15 days in case of
lands and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence
of the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers to the
jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be
pursued.
It is very clear that in the case at bar, no cause of action for ejectment has
accrued. There was no failure yet on the part of private respondents to pay
rents for three consecutive months. As the terms of the individual verbal leases
which were on a month-to-month basis were not alleged and proved, the
general rule on necessity of demand applies, to wit: there is default in the
fulfillment of an obligation when the creditor demands payment at the maturity
of the obligation or at anytime thereafter. This is explicit in Article 1169, New
Civil Code which provides that "(t)hose obliged to deliver or to do something
incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands
from them the fulfillment of their obligation." Petitioner has not shown that its
case falls on any of the following exceptions where demand is not required: (a)
when the obligation or the law so declares; (b) when from the nature and
circumstances of the obligation it can be inferred that time is of the essence of
the contract; and (c) when demand would be useless, as when the obligor has
rendered it beyond his power to perform.
The demand required in Article 1169 of the Civil Code may be in any form,
provided that it can be proved. The proof of this demand lies upon the creditor.
49
Without such demand, oral or written, the effects of default do not arise. This
demand is different from the demand required under Section 2, Rule 70, which
is merely a jurisdictional requirement before an existing cause of action may be
pursued.
The facts on record fail to show proof that petitioner demanded the payment of
the rentals when the obligation matured. Coupled with the fact that no collector
was sent as previously done in the past, the private respondents cannot be
held guilty of mora solvendi or delay in the payment of rentals. Thus, when
petitioner first demanded the payment of the 3-month arrearages and private
respondents lost no time in making tender and payment, which petitioner
accepted, no cause of action for ejectment accrued. Hence, its demand to
vacate was premature as it was an exercise of a non-existing right to rescind.
In contradistinction, where the right of rescission exists, payment of the
arrearages in rental after the demand to pay and to vacate under Section 2,
Rule 70 does not extinguish the cause of action for ejectment as the lessor is
not only entitled to recover the unpaid rents but also to eject the lessee.
Petitioner correctly argues that acceptance of tendered payment does not
constitute a waiver of the cause of action for ejectment especially when
accepted with the written condition that it was "without prejudice to the filing of
an ejectment suit". Indeed, it is illogical or ridiculous not to accept the tender of
payment of rentals merely to preserve the right to file an action for unlawful
detainer. However, this line of argument presupposes that a cause of action for
ejectment has already accrued, which is not true in the instant case.
Petitioner likewise claims that its failure to send a collector to collect the rentals
cannot be considered a valid defense for the reason that sending a collector is
not one of the obligations of the lessor under Article 1654. While it is true that a
lessor is not obligated to send a collector, it has been duly established that it
has been customary for private respondents to pay the rentals through a
collector. Besides Article 1257, New Civil Code provides that where no
agreement has been designated for the payment of the rentals, the place of
payment is at the domicile of the defendants. Hence, it could not be said that
they were in default in the payment of their rentals as the delay in paying the
same was not imputable to them. Rather, it was attributable to petitioner's
omission or neglect to collect.
Petitioner also argues that neither is its refused to accept the rentals a defense
for non-payment as Article 1256 provides that "[i]f the creditor to whom the
tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the
debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing
due." It bears emphasis that in this case there was no unjustified refusal on the
part of petitioner or non-acceptance without reason that would constitute mora
accipiendi and warrant consignation. There was simply lack of demand for
payment of the rentals.

In sum, We hold that respondent Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in its conclusion affirming the trial
court's decision dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of cause of action.
We do not agree, however, with the reasons relied upon.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit and the decision dated January 30, 1987 of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

50
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 75676 August 29, 1990
MANUEL CO KENG KIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth
Special Cases Division) and PLAZA ARCADE, Inc.,
respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The legal issue raised in this petition is whether the notice to
vacate required to be served on the lessee under Section 2, Rule
70 of the Revised Rules of Court in order to confer jurisdiction on
the Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for ejectment, may be
served by registered mail.
On February 23, 1982, a complaint for ejectment against
petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed by private respondent
Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that despite the expiration of the
written contract of lease over a portion of the ground floor of the
former Manila Times Building, petitioner refused to vacate the
premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt
of several letters of demand, the last of which was sent to
petitioner by registered mail.
During the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila or on August 27, 1982, petitioner voluntarily
vacated the disputed premises, turning over the key to the clerk of
court but without paying the accrued rent.
On May 17, 1984, the inferior court rendered its judgment
dismissing the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to
give probative value to the three letters of demand to vacate
which were all sent to petitioner and which he refused to receive.
The court held that since none of the demand letters was served
(1) personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand upon a
51
person found on the premises, or (3) by posting such notice on
the premises if no person can be found thereon pursuant to the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there was
no valid demand. If none was made, the case came within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Metropolitan
Trial Court. Whereupon, it ordered Plaza Arcade, Inc. to pay
petitioner P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and another P5,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages.
Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which
initially reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but
on motion for reconsideration by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal
of the ejectment case in its order of October 9, 1985. 1
A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate
Court. In its decision dated July 3, 1988 the Appellate Court
overturned the appealed order of the trial court which had earlier
sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case. Motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the aforesaid decision of the
Appellate Court was elevated to this Court on a petition for review
on certiorari.
In reversing the dismissal order, the Appellate Court took the
lower courts to task for taking a rather constricted view of Section
2, Rule 70, and declaring that the service of demand letters to
vacate on the lessee is strictly limited to the three (3) modes
enumerated therein. They failed to note the common practice of
serving said notices on the tenant by registered mail with return
card so that the registry receipt and the receipt thereof by the
addressee through the return card could be presented in evidence
to prove the fact of delivery, in the event of a litigation.
We agree and in our opinion the facts in the instant case indicate
personal service on the lessee. In arriving at this conclusion, we
have been greatly aided by respondent's citation of American
cases which, by and large, represents a practical, if not realistic,
approach to the problem.
In the cases of Nunlist vs. Motter,2 and Gehring vs. Swoll 3 the
Court held that where the notice to leave the premises is
transmitted by registered mail with a return card and thereafter
the receipt bearing the signature of the defendant was returned, a
prima facie case is established of the fact of delivery of said
notice to the defendant personally by the Postal Office
Department although he refused to accept the same. 4 Indeed,
notice by registered mail is considered an effective service on the
person concerned. It cannot be avoided by the mere expediency
of declining to accept delivery after notification thereof. The
service is deemed complete regardless of such refusal to accept if
the addressee fails to claim his mail from the postal office after
the lapse of five (5) days from the date of the first notice of the
postmaster. 5
In conclusion, we stress that the notice to vacate the leased
premises, required by the Rules to be served on the tenant before
a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action can be commenced
against him, may be served by registered mail. This is a
substantial compliance with the modes of service enumerated
under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
petitioner by registered mail which he again refused. And even on
the supposition that there was no personal service as claimed by
petitioner, this could only be due to petitioner's blatant attempts at
evasion which compelled the new landlord to resort to registered
mail. The Court cannot countenance an unfair situation where the
plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by the
unwarranted delay resulting from the obstinate refusal of the
defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid demand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the dismissal
order of the trial court is affirmed. Civil Case No. 071279-CV is
hereby ordered reinstated in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 7. This decision is immediately executory. Costs
against petitioner.
So ordered.

At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry

and unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they
involve a disturbance of social order which must be abated as
promptly as possible without any undue reliance on technical and
procedural rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate analysis,
it matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as
the lessee or his agent has personally received the written
demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a
messenger or even a postman. The undisputed facts in the
instant case show that the Manila Times Publishing Company,
through its manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade
Inc. was the new owner of the subject building; that on October
18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him to
leave the premises but petitioner refused to receive the letter; that
a second demand on January 12, 1981 elicited the same reaction;
that a final demand dated November 16, 1981 was sent to
52
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 81015 July 4, 1991
CRESENCIO VIRAY and BENJAMIN D. DE ASIS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and RUSTICO VICTOR,
respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
It is about a written lease agreement that the case at bar turns. The
lease concerns residential premises identified as Apartment A at 1836
Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Said lease was executed on April 1,
1981 by the owner of the place, Benjamin de Asis, and Rustico Victor,
as lessee.1 The agreement included stipulations (a) fixing the term of
the lease and (b) governing the lessors right of repossession, viz.:
(a. Term of Lease)
2. The term of this lease shall be for a period of three (3) months and
shall be impliedly renewable from month to month under the same
terms and conditions, unless revised by the parties in writing with
previous notice to each other of at least fifteen (15) days.
(b. Repossession by Lessor)
7. Upon failure of the Lessee to comply with any of the terms and
conditions of this lease, as well as such other terms and conditions
which may be imposed by the Lessor prior to and/or upon renewal of
this lease agreement as provided in par. 2 above, then the Lessor
shall have the right, upon five (5) days written notice to the Lessee or
in his absence, upon written notice posted at the entrance of the
premises leased, to enter and take possession of the said premises
holding in his trust and custody and such possessions and belongings
of the Lessee found therein after an inventory of the same in the
presence of a witness, all these acts being hereby agreed to by the
Lessee as tantamount to his voluntary vacation of the leased
premises without the necessity of suit in court.
A duplicate original of the contract was given to the lessee, Rustico
Victor.
53
Sometime in October, 1983, Victor and his wife left for Ontario, Canada
and did not return to the Philippines until February, 1985. They left the
apartment in the care of their son, Ramon.
Believing that the Victor spouses had abandoned the apartment — they
having been away for more than a year, and the place being occupied
by Ramon Victor, an unauthorized stranger — De Asis brought suit in
the Metropolitan Trial Court in December, 1984 to evict the latter. But as
aforestated, the spouses returned in February, 1985, and on their
representation that they did not mean to give up the apartment, the
case was dismissed on joint motion of the parties dated March 12,
1985.2
It seems, however, that Rustico Victor did not re-occupy the apartment
but continued to leave it in the care of his son, Ramon. Later, in the
second week of October 1985, Ramon himself left for Canada. He
asked his brother, Roldan, to look after the place. But Roldan Victor did
not actually move into the apartment; all he did was to install a padlock
at the main door, visit the place once a week, and sleep there
occasionally.3
When De Asis learned of this state of affairs sometime in December,
1985, he went to the place to see for himself if it was true. He saw there
was nobody in the apartment, but he could not get inside because it
was locked. De Asis then caused the cutting off of the electrical and
water service connections and, on the following day, posted at the main
door of the apartment a notice of termination of the lease, on the ground
of abandonment and failure to pay rentals in accordance with the
contract. He could not serve the notice of termination directly on the
lessee since he did not know where the latter was.
In the first week of January, 1986, De Asis returned to the apartment
and noted that the termination notice he had posted at the door was no
longer there. He posted another notice, this time announcing that he
would repossess the place after five (5) days in order to secure it from
fire, repair it to preserve its value, and inventory such of the lessee's
things as were inside which might thereafter be claimed at his residence
in Quezon City.4
De Asis also wrote on January 2, 1986 to the local barangay captain
requesting his presence at the premises on January 5, 1986 at which
time he intended to open and repossess the apartment. On January 5,
1986, as announced, and in the presence of the barangay authorities,
De Asis had the door of the apartment opened by a carpenter, and
hauled to his residence the things found inside after making an
inventory of them. Thereafter, he made repairs on the apartment at a
cost of P13,108.00, and then leased it to Cresencio C. Viray.5
Not long afterwards an action of forcible entry was instituted in the
Metropolitan Trial Court against De Asis and his new lessee, Viray, by
Roldan Victor in behalf and in the name of his father, Rustico. The
action was docketed as Civil Case No. 11635-CV and resulted in a
judgment rendered on December 29, 1986 "against the defendants . .
De Asis (owner-lessor) and Sgt. C. Viray (present occupant) ordering
the said defendants to restore plaintiff to the possession and enjoyment
of the leased premises at No. 1836-A Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and
to pay the costs of this suit."6 The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled that
Rustico Victor could not be deemed to have abandoned the premises,
and even if he had, the apartment could not be repossessed without
Judicial action, the stipulation authorizing the lessor to do so being void
as "against public policy and existing precedents."
De Asis and Viray appealed to the Regional Trial Court, without
success. That Court rendered judgment on June 15, 1987, affirming that
of the Metropolitan Trial Court.7 It adopted "by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law . . . in the Decision appealed from;" declared
the findings to be "in strict accord with the evidence presented and the
conclusions . . . so obviously correct that a detailed discussion would
serve no useful purpose;" and directed "the court of origin to issue a writ
of possession immediately in favor of the plaintiff and family, and to
issue an order directing the immediate return of the personal belongings
of plaintiff taken by defendant Benjamin De Asis inside the apartment in
question that were hauled and/or transported to his residence in
Quezon City on April 15, 1987."
De Asis and Viray then appealed to the Court of Appeals. Their appeal
met the same fate. By judgment promulgated on November 27, 1987 by
the Fifteenth Division,8 their petition for review was dismissed and the
Regional Trial Court's decision affirmed.
It is to overturn these three adverse verdicts that De Asis and Viray are
now before this Court. They ask this Court to rule favorably to them on
two questions of law, viz.: (a) whether or not the posting in the
premises, in the first week of December, 1985, of notice of termination
of the lease had legally caused its cessation or extinguishment as of
December 31, 1985; and (b) whether or not De Asis had "the legal and
54
contractual right to repossess the premises" without and independently
of prior judicial authority.9
The Court gave the petition due course by Resolution dated June 28,
1989 and required the parties to submit memoranda. The petitioners
submitted their memorandum on August 23, 1989. No memorandum
was filed by or in behalf of Rustico Victor within the time appointed.
It is indisputable that the parties' written agreement created a lease on a
month-to-month basis. Such a lease, therefore, must be construed, by
established doctrine,10 as providing a definite period and as terminable
by notice at the end of any given month.
It appears undisputed, too, that the lessor had posted a notice of
termination of the lease at the doorway of the leased apartment and
that notice had subsequently been noted and removed by the lessee's
representative. The giving of notice of termination in this manner is
explicitly authorized by Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which
pertinently provides that a demand by a landlord for payment of rent or
comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises may
inter alia be made "by posting such notice on the premises if no persons
be found thereon."
The lease having thus been licitly terminated, the lessee, Rustico Victor
and his sons became obliged to surrender the leased apartment to the
lessor. They did not. They stayed away from the place and did not show
up during the repossession undertaken by the lessor, announced in
advance through the posting of another notice on the door of the
apartment.
What the Victors eventually did was to bring a forcible entry suit against
De Asis on the theory that the stipulation in the lease contract
authorizing repossession by the lessor without court action was void as
contrary to public policy, and De Asis had perpetrated the legally
proscribed act of taking the law into his own hands.
The stipulation referred to does by its terms empower the lessor to
repossess the apartment extrajudicially. It states that —11
7. Upon failure of the Lessee to comply with any of the terms and
conditions of this lease, as well as such other terms and conditions
which may be imposed by the Lessor prior to and/or upon renewal of
this lease agreement as provided in par. 2 above, then the Lessor
 shall have the right, upon five (5) days written notice to the Lessee or
in his absence, upon written notice posted at the entrance of the
premises leased, to enter and take possession of the said premises
holding in his trust and custody and such possessions and belongings
of the Lessee found therein after an inventory of the same in the
presence of a witness, all these acts being hereby agreed to by the
Lessee as tantamount to his voluntary vacation of the leased
premises without the necessity of suit in court.
It is noteworthy that in an earlier case decided in 1975, Consing v.
Jamandre, 12 this Court sustained the validity of a substantially Identical
condition in a written lease agreement, which read as follows:13
9. That in case of the failure on the part of the SUB-LESSEE to
comply with any of the terms and conditions thereof, the SUB-
LESSEE hereby gives an authority to the SUB-LESSOR or to any of
his authorized representatives to take possession of the leased
premises, including all its improvements thereon without
compensation to the SUB-LESSEE and without necessity of resorting
to any court action but in which case the SUB-LESSEE shall be duly
advised in writing of her failure to comply with the terms and
conditions of the contract by way of reminder before the takeover.
This Court ruled that the stipulation "is in the nature of a resolutory
condition, for upon the exercise by the Sub-lessor of his right to take
possession of the leased property, the contract is deemed terminated;"
and that such a contractual provision "is not illegal, there being nothing
in the law prescribing such kind of agreement.14
Similarly, there is considerable authority in American law upholding the
validity of stipulations of this nature.15
Although the authorities are not in entire accord, the better view
seems to be, even in jurisdictions adopting the view that the landlord
cannot forcibly eject a tenant who wrongfully holds without incurring
civil liability, that nevertheless, where a lease provides that if the
tenants holds over after the expiration of his term, the landlord may
enter and take possession of the premises, using all necessary force
to obtain the actual possession thereof, and that such entry should not
be regarded as a trespass, be sued for as such, or in any wise be
considered unlawful, the landlord may forcibly expel the tenant upon
the termination of the tenancy, using no more force than is necessary,
55
and will not be liable to the tenant therefor, such a condition in a lease
being valid.
. . . although there is contrary authority, the rule supported by a
substantial number of cases is that despite the effect of forcible entry
and detainer statutes, where a lease expressly gives a landlord a right
to use such reasonable force as is necessary in making re-entry and
dispossessing a tenant, when the landlord becomes entitled to
possession because of the termination of the term, the landlord can
use force in making re-entry and dispossessing the tenant.
Be this as it may, since the lessor (De Asis) had licitly and efficaciously
terminated the month-to-month lease by notice, and had therefore
acquired an affirmative right of action to judicially eject the lessee after
giving notice to vacate, the existence of such an affirmative right of
action constitutes a valid defense against, and is fatal to any action by
the tenant who has been ousted otherwise than judicially to recover
possession. So has this Court had occasion to rule, with unassailable
logic, it might be added. In Apundar v. Andrin,16 this Court said:
In Medel v. Militante (41 Phil. 526), we held that when the tenant
denies his landlord's title this gives rise to a right of action on the part
of the landlord to recover immediate possession of the denied
premises; and it follows as a necessary corollary from this proposition
that if the landlord acquires possession peacefully, as in this case, by
the mere act of reentry, the tenant cannot maintain an action to put
the landlord out. The existence of an affirmative right of action on the
part of the landlord to oust the tenant is fatal to the maintenance of
any action by the tenant. Otherwise, the absurd result would follow
that a tenant ousted under the circumstances here revealed would be
restored to possession only himself to be immediately put out in a
possessory action instituted by the landlord. To prevent circuity of
action, therefore, we must recognize the affirmative right of action on
the part of the landlord as a complete and efficacious defense to the
maintenance of an action by the tenant. Circuitus est evitandus; et
boni prejudices est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite oriatur.
Another consideration based upon an Idea familiar to jurisprudence is
equally decisive.1âwphi1 This is found in one of the implications of the
familiar maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium, the converse of which is of
course equally true, namely: Nullum jus nullum remedium. Applying
this idea to the case before us, it is manifest that inasmuch as the
plaintiffs right of possession has been destroyed, the remedy is also
 necessarily taken away. Even under the language of the statute itself
(Sec. 80, Code of Civ. Proc.), the action of unlawful detainer does not
lie unless the property is unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff, which
imports an actual present right of possession in him.
Upon the view that the Court thus takes of the facts, the petition for
review on certiorari must be accorded merit and relief correspondingly
granted to the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of November 27,
1987 in CA-G.R. SP No. 12280, subject of the appeal, is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE, and another rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No.
115635-CV of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 6). Costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

56
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. L-42364 April 9, 1987
CITY OF MANILA and HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, CFI Judge of Manila
and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AUGUSTO SANTOS,
respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari * of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 04293-SP 1 which voided the Writ of Execution
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila.
It appears that after the expiration of its contract of lease involving two
market stalls (owned by the City of Manila) in the Lacson Underpass in
Quiapo, Manila, the lessor-City wanted to increase the lease rentals.
Despite the refusal of the lessee (herein private respondent) to agree to
the increased rates, it refused to vacate the premises, prompting the
City to file ejectment proceedings against it. The City Court rendered a
decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant
to pay for the premises referred to in the Complaint at the rate of
P3,500.00 for January 1974; beginning February up to September,
1974, at the rate of P5,000 monthly, or a total of P35,000.00, the
same to be paid within ten (10) days from the date of receipt hereof.
The rental for October, 1974 and every succeeding month should be
at the latter rate payable within the first five (5) days of the month.
Failure of the defendant to pay any rent on or before the due date
spelled out herein shall entitle the plaintiff to the issuance of a Writ of
Execution for ejectment and collection of rent.
No pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs. (Annex B, p. 15,
Rollo).
Thus the Court fixed new rental rates and allowed the eventual
ejectment of the lessee in case of non-compliance.
57
The City of Manila, as lessor of the stalls appealed to the Court of First
Instance (CFI) because it was not satisfied with the increased rentals
granted by the City Court. In the meantime, in view of the lessee's
adamant refusal to pay the increased rates, the City (without filing any
supersedeas bond), asked for immediate execution of the City Court's
judgment pending appeal. The lessee opposed this execution on the
theory that the judgment was a "conditional" one; that, there must first
be a hearing or a new action for ejectment to determine whether or not
the lessee's refusal to pay was justified; and that there can be no
execution pending appeal because the City had not filed any
supersedeas bond. The CFI granted the writ of execution prayed for.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal reversed the
CFI and set aside the writ of execution, explaining that Sec. 8, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court (execution pending appeal in ejectment cases)
does not apply for said provision operates only when it is the lessee (not
the lessor) who appeals, for in such a case, it is the lessee who is
supposed to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the monthly rentals
in court, as said rentals fall due citing the decision in CRUZ, ET AL. vs.
FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL., 77 Phil. 18-21; as authority for the ruling.
The appellate court further ruled that the proper provision to apply is
section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which ordains that generally
execution can issue only after a judgment becomes final (not during the
pendency of the appeal), unless a special reason therefor exists.
We find merit in this petition filed by the City.
We rule that Sec. 8 of Rule 70 can apply even if it is the lessor who
appeals in the sense that in such a case, if the lessee desires to prevent
execution pending appeal, he (the lessee) must still file the
supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing rentals. Our
doctrine in CRUZ, ET AL. vs. FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL, (supra) is
reversed insofar as it conflicts with the present case. The rationale for
Our ruling is simple: why should the lessee continue occupying the
premises without filing the supersedeas bond and making the
necessary deposit for ensuing rentals (particularly when, by his failure
to appeal, the lessee does not question said accrued and incoming
rents)?
And even if We were to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the very
circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraph (continued stay
on the premises, and acquiescence to the new rates) would constitute
"special reasons" for authorizing an execution pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, We hereby SET ASIDE the assailed decision and

reinstate the writ of execution issued, and We hereby render a new
decision ordering the lessee to vacate the premises and to pay the
rentals fixed by the City Court from the time the complaint was filed until
the premises are vacated and full payment is made, with twelve (12%)
per cent interest yearly. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.

58
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. L-44806 March 31, 1977
BIENVENIDO ONCE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CARLOS Y. GONZALES, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo Branch VI; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Iloilo,
and JUANITO PEÑA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
The city court of Iloilo City, in a decision dated April 29, 1976, ordered
Bienvenido Once to vacate an apartment in a building owned by Juanita
Peña and to pay a monthly rental of P290 until the premises have been
vacated, plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. It was not indicated in the
decision when the payment of the monthly rental should commence. No
back rentals were adjudged (Civil Case No 11312).
Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He alleged that he
had been occupying the apartment (one of the four doors of the said
building made of cement hollow blocks and wood, with galvanized iron
roofing) since 1966; that he was the only one singled out for ejectment;
that the commissioner's report on the alleged dilapidated condition of
the building was not set for hearing, that he occupied the apartment as
residence and for use as a carinderia which allegedly was his sole
means of livelihood, and that he should be given a preference to
reoccupy the apartment after the completion of the repairs.
The city court denied the motion in its order of June 2, 1976. Bienvenido
Once appealed. He deposited in the city court on June 17, 1976 P580
as rentals for April and May, 1976, Official Receipt No. 4763496. In the
Court of First Instance, he deposited P290 on July 16, 1976 as rental for
June, 1976, Official Receipt No. 1257740; P290 on August 11, 1976 as
rental for July, 1976, Official Receipt No. 1977508, and P290 on
September 9, 1976, as rental for August, 1976, Official Receipt No.
198832.
Juanito Peña, the owner of the apartment, filed in the Court of First
Instance a motion dated July 9, 1976 for immediate execution of the city
court's judgment. He invoked, as grounds, Once's alleged failure to file
59
a supersedeas bond and the supposed untenantable condition of the
apartment.
Bienvenido Once, through his lawyer, Marietta J. Homena Valencia, an
employee of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), opposed the
motion for execution. Once alleged that he had deposited the current
rentals; that the apartment occupied by him was not in danger or
collapsing, that the building was stable, as shown by the fact that the
owner, Peña, and his family occupied the apartment adjoining the door
leased to Once; that, if repairs were needed, all the occupants of the
building should vacate it, and that the commissioner, who reported on
the condition of the building, was not competent to assess its tenantable
condition since he is not an engineer but a court interpreter.
Executive Judge Valerio V. Rovira granted the motion for execution in
this terse order of August 9, 1976, which reads:
It appearing that the defendant has not filed the supersedeas bond
and considering the provisions of section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, let a writ of execution issue to effect the ejectment of the
defendant from the premises.
Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He reiterated his
contention that the execution was improper because he had deposited
in court the current rentals. He cited the rule that a supersedeas bond is
not necessary in case the tenant had deposited in court the rentals due
(Mischiener vs. Barrios, 76 Phil. 55; Bagtas vs. Tan, 93 Phil. 804).
The lower court denied the motion. It issued a writ of execution dated
September 21, 1976. Bienvenido Once filed a motion for suspension of
the execution. He offered to file a supersedeas bond. He stressed that
he had occupied the apartment for ten years and that his ejection was in
contravention of Presidential Decree No. 20. The motion was denied.
On October 14, 1976 Bienvenido Once, through three CLAO lawyers,
filed in this Court the instant special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition in order to set aside the order and writ of execution. A
temporary restraining order was issued by this Court but before it could
be implemented Bienvenido Once was constrained to vacate the
apartment in litigation.
The issue is whether the lower court erred in ordering execution of the
city court's judgment pending appeal.

We hold that the lower court committed a patent error in ordering

execution of the city court's judgment on the ground that Bienvenido
Once did not file a supersedeas bond. No such bond was necessary
because no back rentals were adjudged in the city court's judgment.
The attorney's fees of P1,000 need not be covered by a supersedeas
bond. (De Laureano vs. Adil, L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 148,
155).

Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July and
August, 1976 stayed the execution of the judgment pending appeal. In
such a situation, no supersedeas bond was required to stay execution
of the city court's judgment. (Sison vs. Bayona, 109 Phil. 557, 561).

Consequently, the order of execution was groundless. It was not

justified under section 8, Rule 70 of the Rule of Court. Section 8
requires a supersedeas bond only if there are accrued rentals in
arrears. It dispenses with that bond if the defeated tenant deposits in
court the rentals due from time to time. The execution proceeding
already mentioned is void.

It may be noted that according to Once's manifestation of March 22,

1977, the lower court in its decision of February 5, 1977 reversed the
city court's judgment and ordered that Once be allowed to reoccupy the
leased premises.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of August 9 and September 14,

1976 are set aside with costs against respondent Peña .

SO ORDERED.

60
SPECPRO – RULE70
A.M. No. MTJ-93-892 October 25, 1995
SAN MANUEL WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RAMON B. TUPAS and CITY SHERIFF FIDEL CASUYON,
both of 2nd Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
In a sworn Complaint,1 dated October 29, 1993, San Manuel Wood
Products, Inc., charged Judge Ramon B. Tupas and City Sheriff Fidel
Casuyon, both of the 2nd Municipal Trial Court in Cities (Branch II),
Davao City, with grave partiality, serious misconduct, abuse of authority
and/or ignorance of the law.
Complainant is the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as
Civil Case No. 424-B-92.2
On June 3, 1993, respondent judge rendered a decision 3 in Civil Case
No. 424-B-92, in favor of the plaintiffs therein and against herein
complainant. The parties received their copies of the decision on June
14, 1993.4
Within the reglementary period to appeal, the plaintiffs filed a "Motion
for Immediate Execution," dated June 21, 1993, of the MTCC decision.
The motion was opposed by complainant.
On June 24, 1993, while the motion for immediate execution was
pending in the MTCC, complainant filed a "Notice of Appeal and
Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond" 5 to stay the execution of the June
3, 1993 Decision. The notice of appeal and the supersedeas bond were
approved by respondent judge in an Order,6 dated July 16, 1993, thus:
ORDER
Notice of Appeal in the above-entitled case having been filed within
due time, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, in degree (sic) of appeal.
The supersedeas bond in the sum of Forty-One Thousand Pesos
(P41,000.00) in cash executed to the plaintiff is hereby APPROVED to
enter action (sic) in the Regional Trial Court to pay the rents covering
the period of thirteen (13) months from May 6, 1992, up to June 6,
61
1993, and the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) for
attorney's fees, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
judgment appealed from. During the pendency of the appeal,
defendant shall deposit with the Court the further amount of monthly
rental due from time to time for the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises.
The supersedeas bond is ordered transmitted with the records of this
case to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, to
which the action is appealed from (sic).
SO ORDERED.
On September 3, 1993, complainant deposited with the clerk of court
the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00), the rentals due from
June 6, 1993 to October 5, 1993.7
The records disclose that the plaintiffs filed a "Supplemental Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal," dated June 30, 1993, in the MTCC. The
supplemental motion was opposed by complainant in its "Comment or
Opposition to Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,"
dated July 14, 1993.
On August 11, 1993, respondent judge issued a special order, 8 granting
plaintiffs' motion for a writ of execution pending appeal. The impugned
special order reads:
This has reference to the Motion for Immediate Execution and
Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by plaintiffs
within the period to appeal, citing among others, the compelling
reasons why immediate execution be granted. Copies of plaintiffs'
motions were furnished to counsel for defendant and the latter filed
its opposition thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs alleged in their motion for immediate execution,
supplemental motion for execution pending appeal and
supplemental allegations on the motion for immediate execution the
following reasons, to wit:
That lessor is authorized by law, upon the expiration of the lease,
to eject the tenant, to repossess his property for his own use, or
for the use of any members of his families, under paragraph (c) of
 BP Blg. 877 (Rental Law). Similarly, a land-owner bonafide
intention to cultivate the land personally thru employment of
machineries, section 50 (a) RA 1149, as amended by RA 2268,
and that defendant, which already owned more than ten hectares,
is prohibited from acquiring the lot in question. That renders
defendants' appeal dilatory.
xxx xxx xxx
To hold that, in the present case, the mere filing of the notice of
appeal, and the filing or deposit of cash bond with the clerk of
court has automatically deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction
over this case, would be to practically nullify the discretionary
power granted said court by section 2, Rule 39, to order, upon
good reasons, the execution of its judgment before the expiration
of the time to appeal; because in all cases, the judgment debtor
may, on the very day the judgment is rendered or notified to him,
file notice of appeal and deposit of P60.00 as cash bond with the
clerk of court . . . .
b) plaintiffs as shown in the complaint are badly in need of the
land for legitimate needs as they are only renting lots and houses
where they are presently residing, as per the affidavit of merit
attached to plaintiffs' motion.
After a careful perusal of plaintiffs' motion for execution pending
appeal and the opposition thereof (sic), the Court is of the view that,
indeed, the special reasons alleged by plaintiffs are meritorious.
The filing of the Notice of Appeal by the defendant has no other
justifiable reasons than to frustrate the decision of the Court and
that the defendant's continued stay in the premises renders the
decision illusory.
Premises considered, let, therefore, issue a writ of execution
pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39, upon plaintiffs' filing of a
bond which this Court fixed at One Hundred Thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to answer for any lawful obligations that maybe (sic)
adjudged against plaintiffs, if any, later on. (emphasis supplied)
Resolution of plaintiffs' supplemental allegations on motion for
immediate execution filed on August 11, 1993, on the ground that
defendant has failed to pay or deposit the rentals for the periods
62
from June 7, 1993 to July 6, 1993, and from July 7, 1993 to August
6, 1993, is hereby withheld as the matter can be appropriately
addressed to the appellate court for its consideration and resolution.
SO ORDERED.
The foregoing special order was received by complainant on
September 7, 1993. The plaintiffs received their copies on September
7 and 8, 1993.
In compliance with the August 11, 1993 Special Order, the plaintiffs
posted a bond of P100,000.00. The bond was approved by
respondent judge in an Order, dated September 8, 1993. 9 On its part,
complainant moved for a reconsideration of the August 11, 1993
Special Order and the September 8, 1993 Order and requested the
clerk of court to hold in abeyance the implementation of the writ of
execution. Respondent judge failed to act on the motion for
reconsideration.
On September 10, 1993, respondent City Sheriff Fidel Casuyon
served the writ to complainant. It was returned unsatisfied. 10
Complainant now accuses respondent judge of grave partiality, serious
misconduct, abuse of authority and/or ignorance of the law for issuing
the August 11, 1993 Special Order and the September 8, 1993 Order.
Complainant contends that, upon perfection of its appeal on July 16,
1993, (sic) respondent judge lost its jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the
Special Order, dated August 11, 1993, ordering the issuance of the writ
of execution pending appeal, is null and void. Complainant argues,
further, that the issuance of the July 16, 1993 Order should be
considered as a denial of the motion for execution pending appeal filed
by the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, complainant points out that the rule governing execution
of judgment in ejectment cases is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, not Section 2 of Rule 39, the provision relied upon by respondent
judge. Complainant also assails the immediate implementation of the
writ of execution by respondent City Sheriff.
In their joint Comment, 11 dated March 10, 1994, respondents aver that
the motion for execution pending appeal was filed on June 21, 1993,
three (3) days before the filing of the Notice of Appeal and Approval of
Cash/Supersedeas Bond. Hence, respondent judge insists he had not
lost jurisdiction to act on the motion for execution. Allegedly,
complainant deposited the supersedeas bond but not the accruing
rentals as directed in the judgment. In view of complainant's failure to
deposit the rentals due, respondent judge claims that the appeal had
not been perfected.
Respondents aver, further, that complainant refused to sign the writ and
even constructed three (3) houses on the subject lot despite the
issuance of the writ of execution. They charge that the appeal is a
dilatory tactic of the complainant. Finally, they claim that complainant is
guilty of forum shopping when it filed an action before the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, assailing the validity of the respondent judge's
August 11, 1993 Special Order and the September 8, 1993 Order.
Considering the allegations in the joint comment of the respondents, we
required complainant to file its reply. 12 It did not file any reply. We
referred the present administrative complaint at bar to the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 13 In a
Memorandum, dated May 5, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
found the complaint meritorious. The relevant portion of the
memorandum reads:
xxx xxx xxx
It is well settled that to stay the immediate execution in an ejectment
proceeding, it is required that the defendant must (a) perfect his
appeal; (b) file the supersedeas bond and (c) periodically deposit the
rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.
As to the perfection of the appeal, with the advent of BP 129, it is now
settled that the perfection of appeal is upon the expiration of the last
day to appeal by ANY party contrary to Judge Tupas' thinking that he
has to approve the Notice of Appeal.
Since both plaintiffs and defendant (complainant in this case) received
their respective copies of the decision on June 14, 1993, the last day
to appeal was June 29, 1993 and, by operation of law, the appeal of
complainant was perfected on June 30, 1993, it having filed its Notice
of Appeal on June 24, 1993.
The complainant deposited with the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Davao City
the correct amount of P41,000 to cover the rentals for thirteen (13)
63
months at P2,000.00 a month and (a)ttorney's fees of P15,000.00. . . .
.
It is clear that immediate execution was thus stayed.
Complainant, however, did not deposit periodically — in this case,
monthly — (the) P2,000.00 a month (rental) with the Clerk of Court.
This is clear from complainant's own Annex "C" which shows that the
amount of P8,000.00 was paid only on September 3, 1993 to the
Clerk of Court, RTC, Davao City to cover the rental due from June 6,
1993 to October 5, 1993.
The rule is:
Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed
from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate
court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have
notice, and upon proof of such failure shall order the execution of
the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal
taking its course until the final disposition thereof on its merits.
(emphasis supplied)
Judge Tupas had, therefore, NO jurisdiction and authority to issue his
Special Order of August 11, 1993; He should have dismissed all of the
plaintiffs' motion for execution pending appeal because Section 8,
Rule 70 and not Section 2, Rule 39 is what is applicable as this is an
ejectment case.
It is only the appellate court — the RTC for ejectment cases — which
can order the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal but
only for the EXPLICIT reason that the periodic rentals as found in the
inferior court decision were not paid, with notice and hearing
mandated.
It does not appear that Judge Tupas acted out of malice or a corrupt
motive but rather a misapprehension of the law on ejectment.
As for Sheriff Casuyon, it appears that the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Complainant's general manager refused to sign the same.
While he may have agreed to a formal delineation of the boundaries,
this was because the complainant was buying time as it had planned
to purchase the lot in question but failed.
 In view of all the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that: (a)
Retired Judge Ramon B. Tupas, MTCC, Branch 2, Davao City, be
FINED the amount of P10,000.00, for Gross Ignorance of the Law; (b)
the said amount be TAKEN from the P20,000.00 withheld from his
terminal leave credits by virtue of Resolution of the Court, dated
February 2, 1994, and (c) the charges against Sheriff Casuyon be
dismissed the same being without merit.
We agree with the legal disquisition of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
This is an ejectment case, hence, the applicable rule is Section 8, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court. It states:
Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay the same. — If
judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant,
to stay execution, files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or
city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) and to pay the rents,
damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to
time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the
municipal or city court to exist.
All money so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited in the
provincial or city treasury, and shall be held there until the final
disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the
interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of
opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall
decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments
above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal,
the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the
defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall
order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the
restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the
appeal from taking its course until the final disposition thereof on its
merits. . . . (emphasis supplied)
Respondent judge missed the foregoing rule when it applied Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It reads:
64
Sec. 2 Execution pending appeal — On motion of the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party the court may, in its discretion,
order execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to
appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a
record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the special order
shall be included therein.
It ought to be mentioned that Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
applies to execution pending appeal in ordinary civil actions. This rule
requires good reasons before a writ of execution can be issued in
favor of the prevailing party. Its issuance is subject to the sound
discretion of the court and is usually not favored because it affects the
rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal.
In stark contrast, under section 8 of Rule 70, it is not necessary to show
good reasons for the immediate execution of the judgment against the
defendant. 14 The judgment is executed immediately in favor of the
plaintiff, as a matter of right, to prevent further damage arising from the
loss of possession. 15
It is settled that to stay the execution of judgment of an inferior court,
the losing defendant in an ejectment case must: (a) perfect his appeal;
(b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) make a periodic deposit of the
rentals due or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites
must concur. 16
In the case at bar, complainant filed his appeal on time and deposited
the required supersedeas bond in the inferior court, but it failed to
comply with the third requisite as related above. As borne by the
records, the rentals accruing for the months of June, July and August
were deposited only on September 3, 1993. Upon its failure to meet the
third requisite prescribed under the rules, the plaintiffs have the right to
move for execution of the judgment appealed from. The order of
execution, however, has to be issued by the appellate court, in this case
the Regional Trial Court, since the respondent judge had lost his
jurisdiction over the ejectment case after the appeal to the RTC had
been perfected. 17 In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence,
the respondent judge showed gross ignorance, albeit without any
malice or corrupt motive.
We now come to the immediate implementation of the writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 424-B-92 by respondent Sheriff Fidel Casuyon. The
records show that the August 11, 1993 Special Order, granting the
motion for immediate execution, was received by complainant on
September 7, 1993. The writ of execution was issued on September 9,
1993. 18 The following day, the writ was served by respondent sheriff
against the complainant.
We have ruled that "the immediate enforcement of a writ of ejectment
execution is carried out by giving the defendant a notice of such writ
and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within a
reasonable period, normally from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only
after such period that the sheriff enforces the writ by the bodily removal
of the defendant and his personal belongings. 19 This was disregarded
by respondent sheriff. Thus, respondent sheriff should be sternly
warned for his infraction to avoid a repetition of similar arbitrariness on
his part. 20
IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Holding respondent Judge Ramon B. Tupas administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the rules. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a fine of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); and
2. Warning respondent Sheriff Fidel Casuyon against committing similar
violations of the rules in implementing the writ of execution.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of Sheriff
Fidel Casuyon.
SO ORDERED.

65
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 100626 November 29, 1991
CITY OF MANILA, represented by Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr.,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE ARMY & NAVY CLUB, INC.,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Respondent Court of Appeals is faulted in this action for certiorari for
having set aside the order of execution dated June 10, 1991, and the
writ of execution issued by Judge Wilfredo Reyes of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 9156335.
This was a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the City of Manila
against private respondent Army and Navy Club for violation of the
lease agreement between them over a parcel of land on Roxas
Boulevard in the said city. A summary judgment in favor of the petitioner
was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila 1 and
seasonably elevated to the Regional Trial Court. To stay its execution,
ANC filed a supersedes bond in the amount of P2,700,000.00, which
was approved by Judge Reyes. 2 He subsequently affirmed the
appealed judgment on June 7, 1991. 3
On June 10, 1991, the petitioner filed an ex parte motion for execution
on the ground that the judgment had already become final and
executory under RA 6031. Judge Reyes granted the motion the same
day 4 and at 4:00 o'clock that afternoon the writ of execution was
served on ANC.
ANC moved to quash the writ on June 11, 1991, but hours later,
sensing that the motion could not be acted upon, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
On July 3, 1991, that court issued the questioned decision, 5
prompting
the filing of the present petition for certiorari.
66
The petitioner assails the action of the respondent court and contends
that decisions of the regional trial court in cases exclusively cognizable
by inferior courts and are final and executory under RA 6031. Thus:
Sec. 1. . . .
In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal
and city courts which are appealed to the courts of first instance, the
decision of the latter shall be final: Provided, That the findings of facts
contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as
basis thereof, and the conclusions are not clearly against the law and
jurisprudence; in cases falling under the concurrent jurisdictions of the
municipal and city courts with the courts of first instance, the appeal
shall be made directly to the Court of Appeals whose decision shall be
final: Provided, however, that the Supreme Court in its direction may,
in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the party
aggrieved by the decision and under rules and conditions that it may
prescribe, require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for review
and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents argue on the other hand that under BP 129, decisions
of the regional trial court in cases originating from and within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts are not
final but subject to appeal in a petition for review to the Court of
Appeals. Such decisions cannot be executed where the period of time
for the defendant to perfect his appeal has not yet expired. Thus:
Sec. 22. (BP 129) — Appellate jurisdiction. — Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdiction. Such cases shall
be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The
decision of the RTC in such cases shall be appealable by petition for
review to the Intermediate Appellate Court which may give it due
course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court
has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modifications of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is useful at this point to review the distinction between a "final"
judgment and one which has become "final and executory."
In PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Free Telephone Workers Union,
the Court observed:
. . . (A)n order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of
the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial
court. In other words, a final order is that which gives an end to the
litigation . . . when the order or judgment does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is
merely interlocutory.
The case of Antonio v. Samonte 7 elaborated on this matter thus:
A final order of judgment finally disposes of, adjudicates, or
determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on
the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch
thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside . . .Where
no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance
or non-compliance with the terms of the judgment or order, such
judgment or order is final and appealable.
By contrast, in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 8 we declared:
Now, a "final judgment" in the sense just described becomes final
"upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected" or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the
judgment of the appellate tribunal in turn becomes final and the
records of the case are returned to the Court of origin. The "final"
judgment is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory
judgment" in respect to which, as the law explicitly provides,
"execution shall issue as a matter of right." It bears stressing that only
a final judgment or order, i.e., "a judgment or order that finally dispose
of the action of proceeding" can become final and executory.
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality
of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period
to appeal if no appeal is perfected. In such a situation, the prevailing
party is entitled to a writ of execution, and issuance thereof is a
ministerial duty of the court.
Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the regional trial
court in its appellate capacity may be elevated to the Court of Appeals
in a petition for review. In effect, both laws recognize that such
6 judgments are "final" in the sense that they finally dispose of,
adjudicate, or determine the rights of the parties in the case. But such
judgments are not yet "final and executory" pending the expiration of the
reglementary period for appeal. During that period, execution of the
judgment cannot yet be demanded by the winning party as a matter of
right.
In the present case, the private respondent had up to June 25, 1991, to
appeal the decision of the regional trial court. The motion for execution
was filed by the petitioner on June 10, 1991, before the expiration of the
said reglementary period. As the decision had not yet become final and
executory on that date, the motion was premature and should therefore
not have been granted. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, what the
trial court authorized was an execution pending appeal.
While it is true that execution pending appeal is allowed under Rule 39,
Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court, this provision must be strictly construed,
being an exception to the general rule. The reason allowing this kind of
execution must be of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage
of the losing party should it secure a reversal of the judgment on
appeal. Absent any such justification, the order of execution must be
struck down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion. 9
We see no such justification in the case before us.
It is worth remarking that as the case was not tried under the Rule on
Summary procedure, the writ of execution did not even fall under the
following Section 18 thereof :
d) Sec. 18. Appeal. — The judgment or final order, including that
rendered under Section 5 hereof, shall be appealable to the
appropriate regional trial court which shall decide the same on the
basis of the records, in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in such
civil cases shall be immediately executory.
To stay the execution, a supersedes bond is necessary except where
one has already been filed in the lower court. This bond continues to be
67
effective if the judgment of the regional trial court is appealed. But
during the pendency of the appeal, the defendant-appellant must
continue to depositing with the appellate court the payments required in
the appealed judgment. The rentals accruing during the pendency of
the appeal must be deposited on or before the date stipulated, if there is
one, and in the absence thereof, on or before the dates provided for in
Sec. 8 of Rule 70. Failure to make such deposits or payments is ground
for execution of the judgment. 10
Since the private respondent in the case at bar has filed a supersedeas
bond and the stipulated rental is yearly, 11 execution may issue only
when it fails to make the yearly deposit of the rental, and after notice
and hearing. Such default has not yet been established.
The Court notes with disapproval the arbitrary manner in which Sheriff
Dominador Cacpal and Deputy Sheriff Reynaldo Cordero acted in
delivering possession of the leased premises to the petitioner. The
evidence shows that they enforced the writ of execution on the same
date they received it, forcibly taking out movables from the said
premises, including chandeliers, furniture and furnishings, music
organs, stereo components, lighting fixtures and computers. They
turned off the water, cut off the electricity and disconnected the
telephones. They also unreasonably prevented ANC members from
entering the premises to get their personal belongings.
Cacpal and Cordero are hereby sternly reprimanded and warned that a
repetition of similar arbitrariness will be dealt with more severely. Their
conduct was a clear violation of the requirement that:
Under the Rules of Court the immediate enforcement of a writ of
ejectment execution is carried out by giving the defendant notice of
such writ, and making a demand that defendants comply therewith
within a reasonable period, normally from three (3) to five (5) days,
and it is only after such period that the sheriff enforces the writ by the
bodily removal of the defendant and his personal belonging. 12
On the issue of the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari to
assail an order of execution pending appeal, this Court has held that —
. . . Although Sec. 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the
special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the (ordinary)
68
course of law" this rule is not without exception. The availability of the
ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to
prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy — not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without merit that usually determines the propriety of certiorari. 13
While appeal is normally employed to question an order or writ which
varies the terms of the decision being executed, it is nevertheless not
the sole and exclusive remedy. The special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 was available to the private respondent on the
allegation that the regional trial court, in issuing the writ of execution,
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond its jurisdiction
and that the ordinary remedy of appeal was inadequate.
The last question to be resolved is, assuming that the decision of the
regional trial court had already become "final and executory," could the
said court order its execution?
The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed
to the regional trial court and the decision of the latter is itself elevated
to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter became final, the
case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the
metropolitan trial court for execution. 14 The only exception is the
execution pending appeal, which can be issued by the regional trial
court under Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court under Sec. 10 of the same Rule.
As previously observed, the petitioner has shown no weighty
justification for the application of the exception. Hence, the respondent
court committed no error in reversing the Regional Trial Court of Manila
and annulling the writ of execution issued by it on June 10, 1991,
pending appeal of its decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED, and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. L-57348 May 16, 1985
FRANCISCO DEPRA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGUSTIN DUMLAO, defendant-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo to
the then Court of Appeals, which the latter certified to this instance as involving
pure questions of law
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in
the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of approximately 8,870
square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot,
designated as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the
kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of
DEPRA's property, After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation
survey of DEPRA's lot made on November 2,1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra
after writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from his
encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973
against DUMLAO in the Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as Civil
Case No 1, Said complaint was later amended to include DEPRA as a party
plain. plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith,
and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment on September
29, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs,
as lessors, and the defendants as lessees, over the disputed portion with an
area of thirty four (34) square meters, the rent to be paid is five (P5.00)
pesos a month, payable by the lessee to the lessors within the first five (5)
days of the month the rent is due; and the lease shall commence on the day
that this decision shall have become final.
From the foregoing judgment, neither party appeal so that, ff it were a valid
judgment, it would have ordinarily lapsed into finality, but even then, DEPRA
69
did not accept payment of rentals so that DUMLAO deposited such rentals with
the Municipal Court.
On July 15,1974, DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against
DUMLAO before the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV (Trial
Court), involving the very same 34 square meters, which was the bone of
contention in the Municipal Court. DUMLAO, in his Answer, admitted the
encroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present suit is barred by res
judicata by virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Court, which had become
final and executory.
After the case had been set for pre-trial, the parties submitted a Joint Motion
for Judgment based on the Stipulation of Facts attached thereto. Premised
thereon, the Trial Court on October 31, 1974, issued the assailed Order,
decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that the thirty four (34) square
meters subject of this litigation is part and parcel of Lot 685 of the Cadastral
Survey of Dumangas of which the plaintiff is owner as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3087 and such plaintiff is entitled to possess the same.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA
claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null and void ab initio
because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession, whereas
decisions affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on real property, may only
be rendered by Courts of First Instance.
Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the Municipal
Court, we hold the same to be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is
effective in respect of possession only (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). 1 The
Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds when it imposed upon the parties a
situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in
law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which
belongs to Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b),
Judiciary Act of 1948; 2 Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). 3 Since the
Municipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and
cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title.
Besides, even if the Decision were valid, the rule on res judicata would not
apply due to difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of
action was the deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the
cause of action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar
an action between the same parties respecting title to the land. " 4
Conceded in the Stipulation of Facts between the parties is that DUMLAO was
a builder in good faith. Thus,
8. That the subject matter in the unlawful detainer case, Civil Case No. 1,
before the Municipal Court of Dumangas, Iloilo involves the same subject
matter in the present case, the Thirty-four (34) square meters portion of land
and built thereon in good faith is a portion of defendant's kitchen and has
been in the possession of the defendant since 1952 continuously up to the
present; ... (Emphasis ours)
Consistent with the principle that our Court system, like any other, must be a
dispute resolving mechanism, we accord legal effect to the agreement of the
parties, within the context of their mutual concession and stipulation. They
have, thereby, chosen a legal formula to resolve their dispute to appeal ply to
DUMLAO the rights of a "builder in good faith" and to DEPRA those of a
"landowner in good faith" as prescribed in Article 448. Hence, we shall refrain
from further examining whether the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRA
conform to the juridical positions respectively defined by law, for a "builder in
good faith" under Article 448, a "possessor in good faith" under Article 526 and
a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price
of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof (Paragraphing supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the
encroaching part of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square
meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part
of the building, and to sell the encroached part of his land, 5 as he had
70
manifested before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding
because it was made in a void proceeding.
However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the
Court of First Instance. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that
DEPRA is "entitled to possession," without more, of the disputed portion
implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchen removed. He is entitled
to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his encroached land,
DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. 6 In this case, DUMLAO had expressed his
willingness to pay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another,
is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his
building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the
other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay
for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot
as respondents here did refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the
land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it
erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to
sell his land. the other party fails to pay for the same (italics ours).
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-
petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-
respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings
nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment
sought to be executed and is. furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now
Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario,
76 Phil. 605, 608[1946]).
A word anent the philosophy behind Article 448 of the Civil rode.
The original provision was found in Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code; which
provided:
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work,
sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in Articles 453
and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
As will be seen, the Article favors the owner of the land, by giving him one of
the two options mentioned in the Article. Some commentators have questioned
the preference in favor of the owner of the land, but Manresa's opinion is that
the Article is just and fair.
 . . . es justa la facultad que el codigo da al dueno del suelo en el articulo 361,
en el caso de edificacion o plantacion? Algunos comentaristas la conceptuan
injusta, y como un extraordinario privilegio en favor de la propiedad territorial.
Entienden que impone el Codigo una pena al poseedor de buena fe y como
advierte uno de los comentaristas aludidos 'no se ve claro el por que de tal
pena . . . al obligar al que obro de buena fe a quedarse con el edificio o
plantacion, previo el pago del terreno que ocupa, porque si bien es verdad
que cuando edifico o planto demostro con este hecho, que queria para si el
edificio o plantio tambien lo es que el que edifico o planto de buena fe lo hizo
en la erronea inteligencia de creerse dueno del terreno Posible es que, de
saber lo contrario, y de tener noticia de que habia que comprar y pagar el
terreno, no se hubiera decidido a plantar ni a edificar. La ley obligandole a
hacerlo fuerza su voluntad, y la fuerza por un hecho inocente de que no
debe ser responsable'. Asi podra suceder pero la realidad es que con ese
hecho voluntario, aunque sea inocente, se ha enriquecido torticeramente con
perjuicio de otro a quien es justo indemnizarle,
En nuestra opinion, el Codigo ha resuelto el conflicto de la manera mas justa
y equitativa y respetando en lo possible el principio que para la accesion se
establece en el art. 358. 7
Our own Code Commission must have taken account of the objections to
Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code. Hence, the Commission provided a
modification thereof, and Article 448 of our Code has been made to provide:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price
of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner retained his
options.
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of
rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the
owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land.
In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the
law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to
71
acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper
rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option,
because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213; Bernardo
vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico, G.R. No. 49167,
April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs. Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz.
217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off. Gaz. 2050). 8
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this
case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further
proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the
kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square
meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of
the kitchen built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the
Regional, Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within
which to exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether
to appropriate the kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the
amount of tile expenses spent by DUMLAO f or the building of the kitchen, or
the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters
may have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price
of said area. The amounts to be respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA,
in accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other
party and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days
from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor
of the party entitled to receive it;
b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to
oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such
purchase because, as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is
 considerably more than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice
of such rejection to DEPRA and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of DEPRA's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be
given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within which
to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice
of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the
parties, the trial Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination
of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease,
provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less
than Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month, payable within the first five (5) days of
each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than
two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long
period of time since 1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The
rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year
of the forced lease. DUMLAO shall not make any further constructions or
improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the two-year period, or
upon default by DUMLAO in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive
months, DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his
land, and to have the kitchen removed by DUMLAO or at the latter's
expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to the
Court for payment to DEPRA, and such tender shall constitute evidence of
whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the Court.
c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten
Pesos (P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of
DEPRA's land for the period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied
the subject area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred
to in the preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Precision shall be
inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court
the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be
entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the
amount due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by
the prestation due the obligee. No costs, SO ORDERED.
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994
FELICIDAD JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of
First Instance of Zambales and REINO ROSETE, respondents.
72
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us the order of a regional
trial court citing the final decision of the city court previously dismissing
her complaint for forcible entry, and on the basis thereof, dismissed her
petition to quiet title on the ground of res judicata. We summon the time-
honored remedies accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion to resolve the issues
presented in the petition.
It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous
Sales Application for Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite
Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, with the District Land
Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970,
alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the land by a
certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry before
the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 926, stating
in pars. 2 and 3 therein that —
. . . plaintiff is the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical possession
of a certain parcel of land situated at Lower Kalaklan, City of
Olongapo, said lot being designated as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the
Olongapo Townsite Subdivision since 1961 and up to the present
time, until the day and incidents hereinafter narrated. . . . Sometime
on December 12, 1970, the defendant, without express consent of
plaintiff and without lawful authority, through scheme, strategy and
stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the southwestern part of Lot No.
1641, Ts-308, with the assistance of hired helpers, started
construction of riprap along the Kalaklan River perimeter of said
portion of land; said entry was further augmented by removing
plaintiff's chain link, fence with galvanized iron posts embedded in
concrete, likewise destroying plants introduced by plaintiff by
removing existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments thereon, and by
these actions, defendant started exercising illegal possession of said
portion of land which contains an area of 200 square meters, more or
less. 1
On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4, 2 dismissed
Civil Case No. 926 on the ground that "it appears to the Court that the
Bureau of Lands has considered the area in question to be outside Lot
1641 of the plaintiff. . . ."3 The Decision of the City Court of Olongapo
City became final and executory on 30 April 1973 when the then Court
of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Br. 3, 4 dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the findings and conclusions of the City Court
holding that appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient
evidence to prove that the area in question was within the boundaries of
Lot No. 1641. 5
Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and issued Original Certificate of
Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol who
was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had
sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200
square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner
demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete
who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand.
On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 926, petitioner instituted a complaint for
quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Ben
Babol and Reino Rosete before the then Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0,
alleging in pars. 2 and 3 therein that —
. . . plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo Townsite Subdivision . .
. covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259, issued by the
Register of Deeds for the province of Zambales. . . . Sometime in
December, 1970, and until present, defendants, relying on an
application filed on December 23, 1969, with the Bureau of Lands,
however have squatted, illegally occupied and unlawfully possessed
the southwestern portion of plaintiff's above-described property of
about 200 square meters, then by defendant BEN BABOL and now by
defendant REINO ROSETE, the former having sold the entirety of his
property to the latter, including the portion in question. . . . 6
Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete
(private respondent herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol did not file any pleading.
In its Order dated 27 January 1978,7 the then Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Br. 1,8 sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his
73
motion to dismiss. Thereafter, petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied.9 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case
since there is no identity of parties and causes of action between her
complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and executory,
and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. She argues that private
respondent Reino Rosete, who invokes the defense or res judicata, was
never impleaded in the forcible entry case, which is an action in
personam; neither was he a purchaser pendente lite who, perhaps,
could have validly invoked the defense of res judicata. With regard to
the cause of action, she maintains that there is no identity of causes of
action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely
concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent
case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the
disputed land.
Private respondent however submits that there is identity of parties in
the two cases since he is a successor in interest by title of the
defendant in the first case after the commencement of the first action.
On the issue of identity of causes of action, he simply states that neither
of the two cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the
subsequent petition for quieting of title, alleges a cause of action. Thus,
private respondent continues, both cases have to be dismissed.
Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the
institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must concur:
(1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the
judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first
and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes
of action. 10 The presence of the first three requirements and the identity
of subject matter in the fourth requirement are not disputed. Hence, the
only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 926 and
Civil Case No. 2203-0 there is identity of parties and of causes of action
which would bar the institution of Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two
actions is without merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata
to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of
parties. 11 It is fundamental that the application of res judicata may not
be evaded by simply including additional parties in a subsequent
litigation. In fact we have said that there is still identity of parties
although in the second action there is one party who was not joined in
the first action, if it appears that such party is not
a necessary party either in the first or second action, 12 or is a mere
nominal party. 13 Thus, Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of Court,
provides that ". . . the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors
in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity."
In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete
is a successor in interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the
commencement and termination of the first action. Hence, there is
actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties between the two actions.
But, there is merit in petitioner's argument that there is no identity of
causes of action between Civil Case
No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at
issue is prior possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the
disputed property. 14 Thus, "[t]he only issue in an action for forcible
entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy
underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." 15 And, a judgment
rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the
question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any
way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. 16
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned
as an action for "Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with
Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion
reivindicatoria under Art. 434 17 of the Civil Code, and should be
distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal.
From the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff
therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that
respondent Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be
74
declared the owner and given possession thereof. Certainly, the
allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria. 18
The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, 19, decided more than twenty-five years
ago, is still good law and has preserved the age-old remedies available
under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of real
property, namely accion interdictal, which is the summary action for
forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of the
property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer
(desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but
ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which
must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case
of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan
trial court; 20 accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of
the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional
trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year;
and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the
recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi
brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action
whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession. 21 It is different from accion interdictal or
accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to
possess without claim of title. 22
In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior
possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It
should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she
expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she be declared
the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed portion. Hence,
in Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true,
lawful (possessor) and in actual, prior physical possession" of the
subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil Case
No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee
simple" of the parcel of land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of
Title No. P-3259." The complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0 definitely
raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants therein
notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including
the right to possess which is an elemental attribute of such ownership.
Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry or detainer
case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who
has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. 23

And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la

Victoria, 24 even if we treat Civil Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet
title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action different from
that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of
action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior
complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery,
or petition to quiet title.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January

1978 of the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station
in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0, and its subsequent
Order denying reconsideration of the dismissal are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately to the

court of a quo and the latter to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No.
2203-0 with deliberate dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

75
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 117389 May 11, 1995
ROMEO V. OBLEA and RAMON S. MELENCIO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN S, ESTEBAN, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition and denying
the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the order of 6 April
1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Br. 27, which lifted
and cancelled the temporary restraining order issued by Judge Lydia B.
Hipolito of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Br. 9. 1
The controverted lot, designated as Lot 1, Block 2, was formerly a part
of a mother lot covered by TCT No. 26604 of the Register of Deeds of
Cabanatuan City, containing an area of 83,325 square meters and
registered in the names of Manuel Melencio (1/3), Pura Melencio (1/3)
and Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle M. Wico (1/3). Subsequently, TCT
No. 26604 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 65031 was issued
in the name of petitioner Ramon S. Melencio who became a co-owner
with Pura Melencio and the Wicos by virtue of a deed of sale executed
in his favor by his now deceased father Manuel Melencio.
On 6 June 1958 subject lot was bought by private respondent Juan S.
Esteban from Mauricio Ramos who claimed to have acquired the
property from Ursula Melencio, the alleged administratrix of the estate
of Manuel and Pura Melencio.2
Meanwhile, petitioner Romeo V. Oblea leased a building located on the
subject lot from a certain Marius Esteban, an alleged son of private
respondent Juan S. Esteban. Oblea eventually bought from Marius the
lot on which the building stood.3 As a consequence, on 4 July 1991
Esteban filed an ejectment suit against petitioner Oblea in the Municipal
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City docketed as Civil Case No. 10588. On 3
April 1992, the case was decided by Judge Romeo G. Mauricio in favor
of Esteban and against petitioner Oblea who was ordered to vacate the
premises and pay rental arrears from January 1983, as well as litigation
expenses and attorney's fees in the total sum of P8,000.00.
76
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered
judgment on 26 March 1993 modifying the MTC decision by ordering
Oblea to pay rentals only from 2 March 1988, but sustaining the MTC in
other respects.
On 3 June 1993, the registered owners 4 sold the disputed lot to
petitioner Oblea. Afterwards, Oblea together with Ramon Melencio,
Pura Melencio and Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle Wico filed before the
Regional Trial Court an action for quieting of title against Esteban,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1536. They contended that the deeds of
sale executed by Mauricio Ramos in favor of Juan Esteban and by
Ursula Melencio in favor of Mauricio Ramos were a nullity.
The ejectment case, Civil Case No. 10588, was in the meantime
appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review, which
petition was dismissed by the appellate court on 2 July 1993. Upon
remand of the records to the court of origin, and on motion of Esteban,
the prevailing party, MTC Judge Hipolito directed execution and issued
the corresponding writ to enforce the final and executory judgment in
the ejectment suit.
The execution was however thwarted when petitioners Romeo Oblea
and Ramon Melencio filed another petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City for certiorari and prohibition with application
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, docketed as
Civil Case No. 1676-AF. On 22 November 1993 the Executive Judge
thereof issued a temporary restraining order to stop the enforcement of
the writ of execution issued by Judge Hipolito. On 6 April 1994 however
Judge Adriano I. Tuason, Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 27, lifted and
canceled the restraining order earlier issued, thus paving the way for
the execution of the judgment in the ejectment case.
Undeterred by the reversal, petitioners elevated their case to the
appellate court which on 27 September 1994 dismissed their appeal,
the reason being that the eviction case had long become final and
executory and that the various actions taken by petitioners were merely
designed to delay execution.
We agree with respondent Court of Appeals.
The main argument of petitioners is that in view of the subsequent sale
of the controversial lot to them on 3 June 1993, and under the mistaken
notion of "doctrine of supervening event," they have acquired a better
right of possession and ownership. Hence, they argue that with this
"supervening event," the judgment evicting them can no longer be
enforced.

The argument is untenable. It must be stressed that the sole issue in an

action for unlawful detainer is physical or material possession, i.e.,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. This is settled doctrine.
Resultantly, the pendency of an action for quieting of title before the
Regional Trial Court does not divest the city or municipal trial court of its
jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment case over the same property.
The subsequent acquisition of ownership by petitioners is not a
supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in said
unlawful detainer case, the fact remaining that when judgment was
rendered by the MTC in the ejectment case, petitioner Oblea was a
mere possessor of the subject lot.

Similarly, the fact that petitioners instituted a separate action for quieting
of title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution of the summary
remedy of ejectment. On the contrary., it bolsters the conclusion that the
eviction case did not deal with the issue of ownership which was
precisely the subject matter of the action for quieting of title before the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City. 5 With the finality of the
decision in the ejectment case, execution in favor of the prevailing party
has become a matter of right; its implementation mandatory. It cannot
be avoided.6

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in upholding
the order of 6 April 1994 which lifted the temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution in favor of private
respondent Esteban. Simply put, the petition is a desperate attempt on
the part of petitioners to unduly prolong the litigation of an issue which
has been settled and should have been long laid to rest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

77
[no sevilla v. ca]
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 99846 May 22, 1995
BELEN CRUZ and HON. LUCIANO G. ELIZAGA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 101 RTC — Bulacan, petitioners,
vs.
FE ESPERANZA LEABRES, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 1991 which (1) annulled and set aside the
injunction order of Judge Luciano G. Elizaga of the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 624-M-88, and (2) ordered the Municipal
Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan to reinstate the writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 87-1377.
The facts show that private respondent Fe Esperanza Leabres acquired
a parcel of land with a two-door apartment on December 31, 1981 from
its registered owners, the spouses Roque David and Concordia
Regoso. The latter executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of private
respondent and a corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
in her name. No lis pendens or encumbrance of whatever form or
nature was annotated at the back of the title. Petitioner Belen Cruz
Regoso, widow of Concordia Regoso's father was an occupant of one
of the units of the said apartment at the time of the sale and continues
to occupy the same up to the present.
On September 26, 1986, private respondent asked petitioner to vacate
the unit she was occupying because private respondent needed to use
it. Petitioner refused to vacate the same and, as a consequence, private
respondent filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court
of Bulacan, branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-1377.
On March 28, 1988, the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
78
WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff ordering:
1. the defendant and those claiming rights under her to vacate the
premises in question and restore possession to plaintiff;
2. the defendant to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of
P2,000.00 exclusive of expenses in case of appeal;
3. the defendant to pay the sum of P5,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees plus P300.00 as court appearance fees for every court
attendance of herein plaintiff's retained counsel; and
4. the costs of suit.
Further, the counterclaim of defendant is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 193-M-88. On June 14, 1988, the said court
rendered its decision affirming in toto the decision of the Municipal
Court.
Petitioner received the aforesaid decision on June 22, 1988 and on July
8, 1988, she filed her motion for reconsideration, which was denied on
September 6, 1988.
On September 21, 1988, petitioner filed a notice of appeal but the same
was denied. The decision having become final and executory, the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 22 issued an order dated
October 5, 1988 remanding the case to the court of origin.
On November 23, 1988, petitioner filed a civil action for the rescission of
the sale between the spouses Roque David and Concordia Regoso and
Fe Esperanza Leabres with damages and preliminary injunction with the
RTC of Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 624-M-88. On September
5, 1989, upon motion of private respondent, the Municipal Trial Court of
Meycauayan issued an order for the execution of its judgment. The RTC
issued a restraining order dated November 24, 1989 enjoining the
Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, from issuing a writ of execution of
the ejectment case.
On January 8, 1990, the RTC of Bulacan issued the assailed order for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for is hereby
granted and
1. The Presiding Judge of Branch I of the Municipal Trial Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan is enjoined from taking further action in the
implementation of its decision dated March 8, 1988 in Civil Case No.
87-1377 entitled "Fe Esperanza Leabres vs. Belen Regoso"; and
2. If a writ of execution has already been issued, the ex-oficio
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan or any of her Deputies is enjoined from
enforcing/implementing any writ of execution issued in connection
with the aforementioned MTC case and not to molest or otherwise
disturb plaintiff in the peaceful enjoyment and possession of the
property in question until further orders from this court.
SO ORDERED.
At this juncture, certain antecedent facts have become material. On
February 14, 1969, petitioner purchased a parcel of land from the
spouses Emmanuel Galang and Rosalina Villegas. Petitioner caused
the registration of the Deed of Sale, and accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-108088 was issued in the name of Belen Cruz
married to Maximo Regoso.
In July 1969, petitioner was made to sign a "Kasulatan ng
Pagwawalang-bahala ng Karapatan" renouncing whatever rights she
had in her property and transferred the same to her husband and
Maximo Regoso.
A new Transfer Certificate of Title was then issued in the name of
Maximo Regoso married to Belen Cruz-Regoso. On October 23, 1979,
he sold the property to the spouses Roque David and Concordia
Regoso, who in turn sold the property to private respondent Leabres on
79
December 31, 1981. The two-door apartment standing on the said
property was constructed out of the conjugal funds of petitioner and
Maximo Regoso. One door was leased since 1972 while the other was
occupied by petitioner up to the present.
While her husband was still alive, petitioner filed a case against him with
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan on October 12, 1981 for partition with
accounting and damages. He died on January 17, 1985 while the case
was pending.
On November 14, 1988, the court rendered a decision 2 in said case
finding that the subject property now being litigated is paraphernal, and
the improvement thereon (the two-door apartment), conjugal. The said
court also found that the "Kasulatan" executed in July 1969 is a nullity
as it runs counter to the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, namely
Article 1333 and Article 14904 which provides, respectively, that all
donation's between spouses made during marriage shall be void and
which prohibits the husband and wife from selling their property to each
other.
Since the "Kasulatan" could not have validly transferred the property in
favor of Maximo Regoso, the court held that he could not, in turn, sell
the same in favor of his daughter Concordia Regoso-David because the
transfer to him was void.
When the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the Heirs of
Maximo Regoso, the same was dismissed by the appellate court on
January 30, 1990.
The Heirs of Maximo Regoso then filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 91879. We denied the said petition
in a Decision promulgated on July 6, 1992; hence the RTC decision of
November 14, 1988 declaring the property in question as paraphernal
property of the petitioner is now final.
Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 624-M-88 for rescission was filed on
November 23, 1988 by petitioner with the RTC of Bulacan, the same
court which issued the now assailed order of injunction.
After said order was issued, private respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On April 30, 1991, the appellate
court annulled and set aside the injunction order and ordered the
Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan to reinstate the writ of execution of the
ejectment case against petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that when the Court of Appeals rendered the decision
appealed from, it failed to consider the supervening facts that occurred
before and after the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Branch I
issued a writ of execution and that these facts, if properly considered
and evaluated, would result in a decision in her favor.
We find the petition meritorious.
The principal issue to be resolved here is whether or not the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminary injunction which
enjoined implementation of the writ of execution issued by the Municipal
Court.
Petitioner admits that the ejectment suit against her became final and
executory on September 21, 1988. However, she argues that the facts
and circumstances that occurred before and after the Municipal Court
judgment make the case an exception to Sec. 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court5 where the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to the
issuance of a writ of execution.
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the
suspension of its execution (Vecine vs. Geronimo, 59 O.G. 579);
whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual
vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances
transpired after the judgment became final which could render the
execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias vs. Adil, 135 SCRA 354).
In the instant case, the stay of execution of the judgment ejecting
petitioner from where she is staying is warranted by the fact that the
transfer to her husband of the said property and his subsequent sale
thereof to his son-in-law and daughter had been earlier declared null
and void. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioner would result in
an injustice, considering that the decision of November 14, 1988
declaring the property in question as her paraphernal property has
already become final.
Accordingly, respondent Judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
issuing the assailed injunction order which was necessary to preserve
the status quo between the parties while the action for rescission of the
sale was still being tried.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

In Lee v. De Guzman Jr.,6 we said:

It is well-settled that when after a judgment has become final and

executory, facts and circumstances transpire which render its
execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask a
competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement.

In Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal,7 we enumerated the

exceptions to the general rule:

The rule that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain
exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it

80
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 83959 April 8, 1991
RUPERTO DE GUZMAN, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION)
and DR. FORTUNATO V. CORREA, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated May 11, 1988 (p. 17. Rollo) in CA-G.R. SP No.
11639 entitled "Ruperto de Guzman vs. Hon. Gualberto J. dela Llana, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan and Fortunato V. Correa," and its
resolution dated June 22, 1988, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of said decision which sustained the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
which in turn, affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat,
Bulacan ordering the ejectment of herein petitioner (p. 25, Rollo).
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioner was the tenant of the late Teodora Villarama, mother of herein
private respondent, over a rice mill and a warehouse located in Angat,
Bulacan. After the expiration of the written lease contract on April 29, 1975,
private respondent allegedly took over the management of the premises and
orally agreed with petitioner that the lease over said premises shall be on a
month to month basis. Petitioner continued to occupy the premises but he
failed to pay the monthly rentals for May and June, 1977. Subsequently, private
respondent notified petitioner that he was terminating their agreement and
demanded from petitioner the return of the subject premises. Because of
petitioner's failure to comply with his demand, private respondent filed an
ejectment case against the former before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat,
Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 183. On June 29, 1978, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of private respondent and on December 28, 1978,
the trial court issued an order declaring the said decision final and executory.
On June 29, 1979, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan a petition for relief from judgment and order
with prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued. On the date set for the hearing for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, petitioner filed with the same trial court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with restraining order, injuction and
damages against private respondent, docketed as Special Civil Action SM-960.
81
Pending resolution of said petition, a restraining order was issued and
petitioner was ordered to post an injunction bond and to deposit rentals. Acting
on said petition, the trial court declared null and void, the proceedings held in
Civil Case No. 183 and ordered the dismissal of the case in view of the lack of
the requisite demand under Section 2, Rule 70, Rules of Court.
Subsequently, private respondent again filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Angat, Bulacan, another ejectment case against petitioner, this time docketed
as Civil Case No. 286. The trial court, in a decision dated October 16, 1984,
ordered petitioner to vacate the leased premises; to pay private respondent a
monthly rental in the amount of P175.00 starting May 1977 until petitioner
vacates the premises with 14% interest per annum until fully paid; to pay
private respondent the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of the
proceedings.
On November 14, 1984, petitioner filed in Special Civil Action No. SM-960,
which was reassigned to Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan
after the judicial reorganization, a petition for contempt with restraining order
and injunction to prevent the execution of the above decision. This petition was
considered by said court as a petition for certiorari, prohibition and restraining
order with damages, and on the same date, it issued an order restraining the
execution of the decision until further orders (p. 21, Rollo)
Meanwhile, petitioner's appeal from the aforesaid decision docketed as Civil
Case No. 7903-M was also raffled to the same branch of the Regional Trial
Court, presided by then Judge Gualberto dela Llana, who, in a decision dated
April 11, 1986, sustained the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
After petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the April 11, 1986 decision was
denied, he filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus wherein he alleged that, in affirming the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or, was without or, in excess of
jurisdiction, considering that Civil Case No. 286 should have been dismissed
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendencia, and lack of cause of
action.
In a decision dated May 11, 1988, respondent court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit (Annex "A", p. 17, Rollo). In dismissing the petition, respondent
court held that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action
No. SM-960 was not an adjudication on the merits as the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 183 was by reason of lack of demand as required in Section 2, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, hence the Municipal Trial Court had no jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it said that litis pendencia cannot act as a bar to a new complaint
when the judge who took cognizance of the former complaint was disqualified
by reason of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and in order that
the defense of litis pendencia may be set up, it is necessary that the judge who
took cognizance of the first case should also have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the same. Respondent court also found out that the written lease
contract was never renewed up to the death of the mother of private
respondent. This being so, it ruled that said contract automatically expired at
the end of the period covered without need of demand. It also held that
petitioner failed to show by what right he continued to occupy the premises as
private respondent owned the premises by virtue of TCT No. 178491, issued to
him on February 9, 1973. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner is now before this Court for a review of the above adverse decision.
Contending once again that the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in the
second ejectment case which was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and
respondent court was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, petitioner
alleged that the premises and the deposited rentals were the same matters
pending disposition in Special Civil Action No. SM-960 before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 16 of Malolos, Bulacan where the motions filed by private
respondent for the delivery to him of the deposited rentals were denied by the
Regional Trial Court. He argued that the Municipal Court, therefore, did not
have jurisdiction to pre-empt the former court from disposing of those matters
and to reverse the Regional Trial Court's rulings to the effect that the estate of
the late Teodora Villarama was entitled to receive the premises and the rentals.
This contention is entirely devoid of merit, if not misleading.1âwphi1 It must be
stressed that Special Civil Action No. SM-960 was an independent action
brought to annul or modify the proceedings held in the first ejectment case and
to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution on the ground that the
decision of the Municipal Court was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. True, the petition was granted
and the first ejectment case was dismissed. However, its dismissal in SM-960
cannot be pleaded as a bar to the second ejectment case as the dismissal was
only due to non-compliance with the jurisdictional requisite of demand under
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The fact that petitioner was ready and
willing to return the leased premises and to have the deposited rentals
delivered to the private respondent in said SM-960 provided private respondent
submits a quitclaim executed by all the other heirs of the lessor, Teodora
Villarama, cannot prevent respondent from taking the proper legal action to
obtain whatever cause of action he may have against petitioner. The matter of
disposition of rentals in SM-960 is a personal undertaking of petitioner that is
distinct and separable from the issue in said case. It is, therefore, incorrect for
petitioner to argue that said court still had jurisdiction over the matter which
bars other courts from taking cognizance. SM-960 is already a terminated
case. Thus, neither can the defense of litis pendencia be pleaded.
82
Equally untenable is petitioner's argument that private respondent did not have
a cause of action against him because the written lease contract was between
him and the deceased mother of the former. Private respondent holds absolute
title over the subject premises by virtue of TCT No. 178491 issued to him in
February 9, 1973. Clearly then, the essential elements of a valid cause of
action existed in favor of private respondent namely: 1) his right to demand
from petitioner payment of rent for the use and occupation of the premises; 2)
the correlative obligation of petitioner to pay rent; 3) the act of petitioner in
refusing to pay rent and vacate the premises in violation of said right.
Petitioner's argument that he is not unlawfully withholding possession of the
leased premises from private respondent and that he has acted in good faith as
an officious manager under the concept of negotiorum qestio, entitled to an
honorium of P200.00 a month from May, 1980 until the proper parties, the
successors-in-interest of Teodora Villarama, or her estate receive the property
was correctly brushed aside by respondent Court of Appeals. Indeed, if this
Court were to sustain said claim, it would bring about the anomalous and
absurd situation wherein petitioner would continue occupying and enjoying the
leased premises while getting paid for it.
Petitioner further claims that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction
to decide the appeal because he had abandoned the same when he failed to
set aside the decision rendered in the second ejectment case, which was given
due course by the issuance of a restraining order. He said that the appeal (Civil
Case No. 7903,) was originally assigned to the Regional Trial Court Branch X
but was consolidated with SM-960 without any order of consolidation and it
was decided without notice for oral arguments or to file memoranda in lieu
thereof.
This claim deserves scant consideration. Under the pretext of having filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and contempt (which is false
because what petitioner filed in SM-960 was a petition for contempt with
restraining order and injunction; p. 76, Rollo), he now professed to have
abandoned the appeal he had perfected earlier. Petitioner's inconsistent
positions unraveled his true intention and that was to delay the early execution
of the decision in the second ejectment case. Even assuming that he filed said
petition in SM-960, said remedy was ineffective to obtain relief from the effects
of the decision in the second ejectment case considering that SM-960 was
already terminated.
The lack of an approved order for the consolidation of his appeal and that of
SM-960 did not also affect the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to decide
the appeal. It must be stressed that these remedies are distinct and separate in
nature and purpose. Basically, petitioner's appeal from the decision in the
second ejectment case involved a review of said decision on the merits while
SM-960 was intended to correct the jurisdictional error of the Municipal Trial
Court, in taking cognizance of the first ejectment case and to compel dismissal
of the same by reason of said error.
Lastly, petitioner assails the appealed decision as requiring him to pay double
rent and also to pay rent from 1980 when he was ready to turn over the
premises to the legal representative of the late Teodora Villarama. He further
questioned the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees as
contrary to prevailing jurisprudence in ejectment cases.
The matter of payment of double rent is utterly baseless.1âwphi1 The
injunction bond which was required of petitioner in Special Civil Action No. SM-
960 was cancelled in the decision rendered in said case, dated January 11,
1980 (see Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 25-26, Rollo).
However, the affirmed award of moral and exemplary damages is erroneous.
The only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real
property (Felisida vs. Judge Villanueva, No. 60372, October 29, 1985, 139
SCRA 431; Reyes vs. CA, L-28466, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 138; Ramirez
vs. Chit, L-22032, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1364).
The petitioner failed to rebut the propriety of the award of attorney's fees before
the Municipal Trial Court on the ground that private respondent was compelled
to incur expenses to protect his interest as a result of petitioner's failure to
vacate the premises (Article 2208 (2) Civil Code). The simple allegation that
private respondent was represented by a brother-in-law does not prove
anything. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the questioned
decision is AFFIRMED but with the modification that the award of moral and
exemplary damages be deleted. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 116665 March 20, 1996
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:p
Under a one (1) year lease contract commencing on July 1, 1992 and
ending on June 30, 1993 but renewable upon agreement, herein
petitioner Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied three (3) units (C, E and F)
of the building owned by private respondent Barcelona's family. Came
expiration date of the lease without an agreed renewal thereof and
83
coupled by petitioner's failure to surrender the leased units despite
private respondent's demands, private respondent filed before the
Municipal Trial Court an ejectment case against petitioner. Judgment of
that inferior court, affirmed in its entirety by the Regional Trial Court and
herein public respondent Court of Appeals on subsequent appeals
taken by petitioner, favored private respondent, the decretal portion of
which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, Ernesto E. Barcelona, ordering the defendant Melquiades
D. Azcuna, Jr., and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the
premises known as Units C, E and F, in the building owned by
plaintiff's family located along Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.
Defendant is likewise ordered to pay the following:
1. The sum of P25,000.00 monthly as rental for continued use by
defendant of the three (3) units of leased premises in question
starting July 1, 1993 less the amount that have been deposited or
given by the defendant to the plaintiff up to such time the
defendant and all persons claiming rights under him finally vacate
the aforesaid premises;
2. The further sum of P3,000.00 per day, by way of damages for his
failure to turn over peacefully the three (3) commercial spaces to
the plaintiff from July 1, 1993 until such time the defendant and all
persons claiming rights under him vacate the premises;
3. The further sum of P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; and
4. The cost of this suit. The counter-claim of the defendant is hereby
Dismissed, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner now comes to the Court via the instant petition not to contest
his ouster from the leased premises nor the amount monthly rental he
was adjudged to pay until he vacates the same, but only to take
particular exception to respondent CA's decision insofar as it affirmed
the municipal trial court's award of P3,000.00 per day as damages (sub-
paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion just quoted). It is petitioner's claim
that such award, in addition to the fair rental value or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises (sub-
paragraph 1), is improper in the light of the doctrine enunciated in the
cases of "Felesilda v. Villanueva,"1 "Shoemart, Inc. v. CA"2 and "Hualam
Construction and Development Corp. v. CA"3 cited by petitioner, that
"the only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the Instance of Rizal affirmed the judgment of the then justice of the peace
fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and court of Caloocan in a detainer case ordering defendant-appellant
occupation of the real property. Other damages must be claimed in an Barrameda to pay complainant Gozon the sum of P1,622.43 as rentals
ordinary action". due up to July 3, 1958 plus P5,000.00 as liquidated damages, and
costs. Appellant Barrameda likewise assailed the propriety of the
Petitioner's reliance on such doctrine is misplaced, inasmuch as the P5,000.00 award in addition to the rentals. The Court upheld the then
"Felesilda," "Shoemart" and "Hualam" cases dealt with additional CFI's affirmatory decision by disposing of appellant Barrameda's
damages and charges other than liquidated damages, defined as ". . . protestation in this wise:
those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of
breach thereof ".4 Here, the municipal trial court, in making the This Court has often stated that inferior courts have exclusive
"P3,000.00 per day" award, was merely enforcing what was stipulated jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and detainer regardless of the
upon in black and white by private respondent-lessor and petitioner- value of damages demanded. It has also ruled that the damages that
lessee appearing in paragraph 10 of the lease contract which reads: may be recovered in actions for ejectment are those equivalent to a
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises
That after the termination of the Lease, the LESSEE shall peaceably by defendant. Nonetheless, this latter legal proposition is not pertinent
deliver to the LESSOR the leased premises vacant and to the issue raised in the instant case because here, the damage
unencumbered and in good tenantable conditions minus the sought to be recovered had previously been agreed to by lessee (in
ordinary wear and tear. In case the LESSEE's failure or inability to the contract of lease) and imposed by lessor by way of damages.
do so, LESSOR has the right to charge the LESSEE P1,000.00 per Besides, nobody can affirm that the liquidated amount of damages
day as damages without prejudice to other remedies which stipulated in the lease contract was not due to occupation or loss of
LESSOR is entitled in the premise. (Emphasis supplied). possession of the premises and non-compliance with the contract.
This is clearly an agreement for liquidated damages — entitling (Emphasis supplied).
private respondent to claim a stipulated amount by way of damages WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review by way of certiorari is
(correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were three (3) units hereby DENIED.
being leased by petitioner) over and above other damages still legally
due him, i.e., the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the SO ORDERED.
property as provided for in Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The freedom of the contracting parties to make stipulations in their
contract provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy is so settled, and the Court finds nothing
immoral or illegal with the indemnity/penalty clause of the lease
contract (paragraph 10) which does not appear to have been forced
upon or fraudulently foisted on petitioner. Petitioner cannot now evade
further liability for liquidated damages, for "after entering into such an
agreement, petitioner cannot thereafter turn his back on his word with
a plea that on him was inflicted a penalty shocking to the conscience
and impressed with iniquity as to call for the relief sought on the part
of a judicial tribunal."5
The controlling case here is, as correctly invoked by private respondent,
"Gozon v. Vda. de Barrameda"6 which involved similar facts and the
same issue raised by herein petitioner. There, the then Court of First
84
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 123555 January 22, 1999
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET, INC. respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an action
for forcible entry with damages against its lessor file a separate suit with the
Regional Trial Court against the same lessor for moral and exemplary
damages plus actual and compensatory damages based on the same forcible
entry?
On grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping petitioner invokes
established jurisprudence that a party cannot by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case evade the principle that the
same cause of action shall not be litigated twice between the same parties or
their privies. 1 Petitioner therefore prays for reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 27 May 1995, as well as its Resolution dated 17 January
1996 denying reconsideration, which upheld the denial by the Regional Trial
Court of petitioner's motion to dismiss private respondent's damage suit.
The antecedents: On 27 May 1991 petitioner leased to private, respondent
Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a commercial building
thereon located at Aranet Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of nine (9)
years and three (3) months, i.e., from 2 January 1989 to 30 April 1998, with a
monhtly rental of approximately P600,000.00. The contract contained, among
others, the following pertinent terms and conditions:
EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS
25. LESSEE hereby agrees that all the provisions contained in this Contract
shall be deemed as conditions, as-well as covenants, and that this Contract
shall be automatically terminated and cancelled without resorting to court
action should LESSEE violate any or all said conditions, including the
payment of Rent, CUSA and other charges indicated in the FLP when due
within the time herein stipulated and in any such cases, LESSEE hereby
irrevocably appoints LESSOR, its authorized agents, employees and/or
representatives as his duly authorized attorney-in-fact, even after the
termination, expiration or cancellation of this Contract, with full power and
authority to open, enter, repossess, secure, enclose, fence and otherwise
85
take full and complete physical possession and control of the leased
premises and its contents without resorting to court action and/or to
summarily disconnect electrical and/or water services thereof, and that
LESSEE hereby irrevocably empowers LESSOR, his authorized agents,
employees and/or representatives to take inventory and possession of
whatever equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances, etc., found
therein belonging to LESSEE, consignors and/or to any other persons and to
place the same in LESSOR's warehouse or any other place at LESSOR's
discretion for safekeeping; charging LESSEE the corresponding storage fees
therefor; that in case LESSEE fails to claim-said equipment, furniture,
articles, merchandise, appliances, etc. from storage and simultaneously
liquidate any liability with LESSOR within seven (7) days from date of said
transfer to LESSOR's warehouse, LESSOR is likewise hereby expressly
authorized and empowered by LESSEE to dispose of said
property/properties in a public sale through a Notary Public of LESSOR's
choice and to apply the proceeds thereof to whatever liability and/or
indebtedness LESSEE may have to LESSOR plus reasonable expenses for
the same, including storage fees, and the balance, if any, shall be turned
over to LESSEE; that LESSEE hereby expressly agrees that any or all acts
performed by LESSOR, his authorized agents, employees and/or
representatives under the provisions of this Section may not be the subject of
any petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Mandatory Injunction in
court, and that LESSOR and/or his authorized agents, employees, and/or
representatives shall be free from any civil and/or criminal liability or
responsibility whatsoever therefor.
TERMINATION OF LEASE
26. Upon-the automatic termination of this lease contract, as the case may
be, LESSEE shall immediately vacate and redeliver physical possession of
the leased premises, including the keys appertaining thereto, to LESSOR in
good, clean and sanitary condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted,
devoid of all occupants,. equipment, furnitures articles, merchandise, etc.,
belonging to LESSEE or to any other person except those belonging to
LESSOR; that should LESSEE fail to comply with this provision, LESSOR is
hereby given the same rights and power to proceed against LESSEE as
expressly granted in the immediately; preceding section.
Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner.
As of 19 October 1992 the arrearages amounted to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly,
non-payment of rentals constituted breach of their contract; thus, pursuant to
the express authority granted petitioner under the above-quoted Secs. 25 and
26 of the lease agreement, petitioner on 31 October 1992 repossessed the
leased premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and owned
by private respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale of the
movables on 19 August 1993 with notice to private respondent.
On 26 November 1992 private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with
damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. 2 The case was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by
Judge Guillermo L. Loja Jr. who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
petitioner from selling private respondent's properties at a public auction.
On 9 December 1992 Judge Loja inhibited himself from trying the case and
directed its transfer to Branch 34 presided over by Judge Joselito SD
Generoso. Soon after, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the inhibition of
Judge Generoso and the immediate reraffle of the case arguing that the
summary transfer of the case to Judge Generoso was irregular as it was not
done by raffle.
The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36 presided over by
Judge Francisco D. Villanueva. Thereafter, on 22 December 1992, at the
continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a writ preliminary mandatory
injunction, the parties agreed, among others, on the following: (a) private
respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
in the name of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, the amount of
P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back rentals; (b) petitioner
would defer the sale of the personal properties of the Westin Seafood Market,
Inc., until a final settlement of the case had been arrived, at; (c) petitioner shall
allow private respondent to retrieve all the perishable goods from inside the
leased premises like frozen meat, vegetables and fish, all properly receipted
for; (d) petitioner shall allow three (3) maintenance personnel of private
respondent to enter the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the
restaurant equipment; and (e) the parties shall negotiate for the restoration of
the premises to private respondent, and if no settlement be arrived at on or
before January 8, 1993, the hearing on the merits of the case shall proceed
and the disposition of the amount deposited representing the rental arrearages
shall be left to the. discretion of the court.
This agreement was incorporated in the order of the court dated 22 December
1992 3 which in effect terminated for all intents and purposes the incident on
the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction.
Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the
designated bank the amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with the
forcible entry case still pending with the MeTC, private respondent instituted on
9 June 1993 another action for damages against petitioner with the Regional
86
Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 101 presided over
by Judge Pedro T. Santiago. 4
Petitioner filed a motion, to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis
pendencia and forum shopping. On 2 July 1993, instead of ruling on the
motion, Judge Santiago issued an order archiving the case pending the
outcome of the forcible entry case being heard at the MeTC for the reason that
"the damages is (sic) principally anchored on whether or not the defendants
(petitioner herein) have committed forcible entry." 5 On 2 August 1993
petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order and reiterated its motion to
dismiss the suit for damages.
Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved, private respondent filed
with the RTC on 18 August 1993 an amended complaint for damages. On 14
September 1993 it also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for the Grant of a Preliminary
Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. On the very same day,
Judge Santiago issued an order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b)
admitting private respondent's amended complaint, and (c) granting private
respondent's application for a temporary restraining order against petitioner.
Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition on the ground that Judge Santjago acted in excess of
his jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in admitting, the amended complaint of private respondent and
issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in allowing private respondent to
engage in forum shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action; for damages
despite lack of jurisdiction. 6
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the failure of petitioner
to file a motion for reconsideration of Judge Santiago's order of 14 September
1993 which, it explained, was a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. It also found that the elements of litis pendencia were
lacking to justify the dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC because
despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the only
damages recoverable thereat were those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property and not the kind of damages being claimed before
the RTC which had no direct relation to loss of material possession. It clarified
that since the damages prayed for in the amended complaint with the RTC
were those caused by the alleged high-handed manner with which petitioner
reacquired possession of the leased premises and the sale of private
respondent's movables found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had
jurisdiction over the action of damages. 7
Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that
it erred in (a) finding that petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and
adequate remedy of a prior motion for reconsideration with the RTC; (b) ruling
that, the trial judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of the action for damages and injunction despite the pendency of
the forcible entry case with the MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private respondent
did not commit forum shopping since the causes of action before the RTC and
MeTC were not identical with each other.
There is merit in the petition. While generally a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an
opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it 8 this rule admits of exceptions
and is not intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the
case. 9 The filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the
remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of
law, 10 or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, 11 or the
questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely
presented to and passed upon by the lower court
In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner
raised the ground that another action for forcible entry was pending at the
MeTC between the same parties involving the same matter and cause of
action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue was elevated by
petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the
prevailing circumstance, any motion for reconsideration of the trial court would
have been a pointless exercise. 12
We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages filed with the
Regional Trial Court by the lessee against the lessor should be dismissed on
the ground of pendency of another action for forcible entry and damages earlier
filed by the same lessee against the same lessor before the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, or against whom thepossession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld, may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, together
with damages and costs. The mandate under this rule is categorical: that all
cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal
Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession
but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise
expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful
87
detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration
of possession.
This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court which states that the pendency of another action between
the same parties for the same cause is a ground for dismissal of an action. Res
adjudicata requires that there must be between the action sought to be
dismissed and the other action the following elements: (a) identity of parties or
at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) preceding particulars should be such
that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration. 13
It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or
others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission
by which a party violates a right of another. 14 These premises obtaining, there
is no question at all that private respondent's cause of action in the forcible
entry case and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking of
possession of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, from which
all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the restoration of possession and demand
for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand for damages
with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry
by petitioner into the least premises.
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent
against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the
elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and
compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages —
moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory — constitutes
splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs counter to the rule against
multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations —
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered, into a contract of lease with
defendant PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market
(hereinafter "Subject Premises") situated at the corner of EDSA, corner
MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten
(10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.
 2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the
Subject Premises, plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now
famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual,
continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject Premises until
31 October 1992.
xxx xxx xxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the
peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion
of all others, including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants' resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of
the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through
the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior
number of men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own
hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants' act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject
Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it of possession
thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be
condemned and declared illegal for being contrary; to public order and policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their
illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and restore
possession thereof, together with its contents, to plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
4.07 Considering that defendants' act of forcibly grabbing possession of the
Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should
be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which
plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges
basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief
prayed for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of
Lease for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998
over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter
referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner
McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease
contract is attached hereto as Annex "A".
88
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of
Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous "Seafood Market
Restaurant."
xxx xxx xxx
7 On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the
benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of
approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the
supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises
through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force and
in a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiff's will, unceremoniously drew
away all of plaintiff's men out of the subject premises, thereby depriving
herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject
premises. The illegal, high-handed manner and gestapo like take-over by
defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as follows: . . .
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject
Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and
equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation,
seizure and taking of property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse,
defendants are threatening to sell at public auction and without the consent
of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and
equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below the market value thereof.
Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex "B" the letter from defendants dated
August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the former
intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the
plaintiff presently in defendants' possession.
xxx xxx xxx
12. Defendants' unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of
its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to
maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the
entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for
the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code. . . .
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action,
namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of
which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as is causes of
action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the
possession of the leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual
damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent such as the
deterioration of perishable foodstuff stored inside the premises and the
deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c)
the claim for attoney's fees and cost of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award
consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of
another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000,000.00 and
compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and,
(c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible
takeover of the leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory
damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it
is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by
reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed
considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the
MeTC. Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is
committed — like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of the another
— there is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of rights
that may have been violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single
complaint as constituting one single cause of action. 15 In a forcible entry case,
the real issue is the physical possession of the real property. The question of
damages is merely secondary or incidental, so much so that the amount
thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the unlawful
act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means of force
and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is
a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies,
namely, the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising from the
loss of possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both remedies
cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and independent actions, one for
recovery of posssession only, and the other, for the recovery of damages. That
would inevitably lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action.
16
In David v. de la Cruz 17 we observed —
Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their landlord, their
illegal ejectment or removal from their landholdings, which cause of action
however entitles them to two (2) claims or remedies — for reinstatement of
damages. As both claims arise from the same cause of action, they should
be alleged in a single complaint.
A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages
may be recovered in one case and the rest, in another. 18 In Bacharach v.
Icarangal 19 we explained that the rule was aimed at preventing repeated
litigations betweent the same parties in regard to the same subject of the
89
controversy and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo
debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.
What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is
that all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without
saying that those not therein included cannot be the subject of subsequent
complaints for they are barred forever. 20 If a suit is brought for a part of a
claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a
second action for the residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second
form of action is not identical with the first or different grounds for relief are set
for the second suit. This principle not only embraces what was actually
determined, but also extends to every matter which the parties might have
litigated in the case. 21 This is why the legal basis upon which private
respondent anchored its second claim for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to
Art. 1654 of the Civil Code, 22 not otherwise raised and cited by private
respondent in the forcible entry case, cannot be used as justification for the
second suit for damages. We note, not without some degree of displeasure,
that by filing a second suit for damages, private respondent was not only able
to press a claim for moral and exemplary damages which by its failure to allege
the same in its suit before the MeTC foreclosed its right to sue on it, but it was
also able to obtain from the RTC, by way of another temporary restraining
order, a second reprieve from an impending public auction sale of its movables
which could not anymore secure from the MeTC before which the matter of the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction was already closed.
The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to petitioner's charge that
private respondent and its counsel in the trial courts committed forum
shopping. In Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission 23 we ruled
—
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies . . . with respect to suits filed in the courts . . .
in connection with litigations commenced in the court . . . in anticipation of an
unfavorable . . . ruling and a favorable case where the court in which the
second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission 24 that there is forum-shopping when the actions
involve the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances.
The reason behind the proscription of forum shopping is obvious. This
unnecessarily burdens our courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the
manpower and financial resources of the judiciary and trifles with and mocks
our judicial processes, thereby adversely affecting the efficient administration
of justice. This condemnable conduct has prompted the Court to issue circulars
25
ordering among others that a violation thereof shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case or cases without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
action against the counsel or party concerned.

The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged, by private respondent
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained no certification of non-
forum shopping. When petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case raising
among others the ground of forum shopping it pointed out the absence of the
required certification. The amended complaint, as well as the second and third
amended complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that
there was no other action pending between the parties involving the same
causes of action although there was actually a forcible entry case pending
before the MTC of Quezon City. By its admission of a pending forcible entry
case, it is obvious that private respondent was indulging in forum shopping.
While private respondent conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had
likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry,
the fact remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem was being duplicated
in the second case. This is a compelling reason to dismiss the second case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 27 September 1995 and the Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City dated 24 September 1993 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to dismiss Civil
Case No. Q-93-16409, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive
Development Corporation, et al.," and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City to proceed with the proper disposition of Civil Case No. 6589, "Westin
Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation, et al.," with
dispacth considering the summary nature of the case. Treble costs against
private respondent.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

90
SPECPRO – RULE70
G.R. No. 117051 January 22, 1996
FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Francel Realty Corporation filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against private respondent Francisco T. Sycip. The case was filed in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite.
In its complaint, petitioner alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to
private respondent Lot 16, Building No. 14 of the Francel Townhomes, at 22
Real Street, Maliksi, Bacoor, Cavite, for P451,000.00. The Contract to Sell
provides inter alia that in case of default in the payment of two or more
installments, the whole obligation will become due and demandable and the
seller will then be entitled to rescind the contract and take possession of the
property; the buyer will vacate the premises without the necessity of any court
action and the downpayment will be treated as earnest money or as rental for
the use of the premises. Petitioner alleged that private respondent failed to pay
the monthly amortization of P9,303.00 since October 30, 1990 despite
demands to update his payments and to vacate the premises, the latest of
which was the demand made in the letter dated September 26, 1992, and that
because of private respondent's unjust refusal to vacate, petitioner was
constrained to engage the services of counsel. Petitioner prayed that private
respondent be ordered to vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental of
P9,303.00 beginning October 30, 1990 until he shall have vacated the
premises, and P25,000.00 as attorney's fees plus appearance fee of P1,000.00
per hearing and expenses of litigation.
On November 9, 1992, private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint but
his motion was denied by the MTC. On January 20, 1993 he filed his answer, 1
in which he alleged that he had stopped paying the monthly amortizations
because the townhouse unit sold to him by petitioner was of defective
construction. He alleged that he had in fact filed a complaint for "unsound real
estate business practice" in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80) against petitioner. Private respondent
prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay P500,000.00 as moral damages,
91
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, P75,000.00 as attorney's fees and that
he be given "all other remedies just and equitable."
In its resolution dated February 24, 1993, the MTC ruled that the answer was
filed out of time on the ground that it was filed more than ten days after the
service of summons.2 On March 17, 1993, however, it dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. The MTC held that the case was cognizable by the
HLURB. But it also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent P10,000.00 as
moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, P3,000.00 as attorney's
fees, and to pay costs.
On appeal the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the MTC. It held
that the case was exclusively cognizable by the HLURB which had jurisdiction
not only over complaints of buyers against subdivision developers but also over
actions filed by developers for the unpaid price of the lots or units.
Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals, alleging that:
(a) The amounts of damages prayed for by the private respondent in his
Answer are enormous and way beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court;
and
(b) Since the inferior court and the respondent court ruled that it has no
jurisdiction over this case, then it has no reason, much more jurisdiction to
award damages in excess of the P20,000.00 jurisdiction of the inferior court. 3
The appellate court dismissed the petition, holding that the MTC had
jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the
amount of damages on unpaid rentals sought to be recovered in view of §1A(1)
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It contended that since the MTC had
ruled that it had no jurisdiction over this case, then it had no jurisdiction either
to grant the counterclaim for damages in the total sum of P23,000.00. Its
motion was, however, denied for lack of any "cogent reason" to reverse the
appellate court's resolution of June 15, 1994. 5
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
It is important to first determine whether the MTC has jurisdiction over
petitioner's complaint. For if it has no jurisdiction, then the award of damages
made by it in its decision is indeed without any basis. It is only if the MTC has
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action that it is necessary to determine
the correctness of the award of damages, including attorney's fees.
Petitioner's complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally speaking such Accordingly, we hold that the MTC correctly held itself to be without jurisdiction
action falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the over petitioner's complaint. But it was error for the MTC to grant private
determination of the ground for ejectment requires a consideration of the rights respondent's counterclaim for damages for expenses incurred and
of a buyer on installment basis of real property. Indeed private respondent inconveniences allegedly suffered by him as a result of the filing of the
claims that he has a right under P.D. No. 957, §23 to stop paying monthly ejectment case.7
amortizations after giving due notice to the owner or developer of his decision
to do so because of petitioner's alleged failure to develop the subdivision or Pursuant to Rule 6, §8 a party may file a counterclaim only if the court has
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time for jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Otherwise the counterclaim cannot be filed. 8
complying with the same. The case thus involves a determination of the rights
and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957, Private Even assuming that the MTC had jurisdiction, however the award of damages
respondent has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for unsound real to private respondent must be disallowed for the following reasons:
estate business practice with the HLURB.
(1) The MTC decision itself stated that the answer with its counterclaim was
This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer arising from the
filed out of time or more than 10 days from private respondent's receipt of
failure of the lessee to pay the rents, comply with the conditions of a lease summons. In effect, therefore, private respondent did not make any
agreement or vacate the premises after the expiration of the lease. Since the counterclaim.
determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB, the question of
the right of petitioner must be determined by the agency.
(2) Moreover, a reading of the MTC decision showed no justification for the
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. As held in Buan
Petitioner's cause of action against private respondent should instead be filed v. Camaganacan,9 an award of attorney's fees without justification is a
as a counterclaim in HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80 in accordance with "conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
Rule 6, §6 of the Rules of Court which is of suppletory application to the 1987 conjecture." It should accordingly be stricken out. With respect to the award of
HLURB Rules of Procedure per §3 of the same. In the case of Estate moral and exemplary damages, the record is bereft of any proof that petitioner
Developers and Investors Corporation v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte6 the acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the present action which would warrant
developer filed a complaint to collect the balance of the price of a lot bought on such an award.10
installment basis, but its complaint was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court
for lack of jurisdiction. It appealed the order to this Court. In dismissing the
appeal, we held: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the
complaint against private respondent is DISMISSED. The private respondent's
counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a
complaint to collect amortization payments arising from or in connection with
a sale of a subdivision lot under PD Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly falls SO ORDERED.
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real
estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real
estate business practices. Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is still
pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no order
from the HLURB authorizing suspension of payments on account of the
failure of plaintiff developer to make good its warranties, there is no question
to our mind that the matter of collecting amortizations for the sale of the
subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to the complaint against the plaintiff and
it affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a subdivision lot as
regulated by NHA pursuant to PD 957 as amended. It must accordingly fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that
the motion to dismiss was properly granted on the ground that the regular
court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint.
92