nd18 nc – kant

1nc
framework
 contention
1] Privacy – candidates should have the right to privacy of personal information – that
is an extension of their free will in choosing who knows what about their personal
identity.
DeCew and Zalta 15 [Judith DeCew and Edward N. Zalta. “Privacy” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Spring 2015 Edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/privacy/]

Control how info is disseminated to have a conception of ourself A more common view has been to argue that privacy and intimacy
are deeply related. On one account, privacy is valuable because intimacy would be impossible without it
(Fried, 1970; Gerety 1977; Gerstein, 1978; Cohen, 2002). Fried, for example, defines privacy narrowly as control over
information about oneself. He extends this definition, however, arguing that privacy has intrinsic value, and is
necessarily related to and fundamental for one's development as an individual with a moral and social
personality able to form intimate relationships involving respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is
valuable because it allows one control over information about oneself, which allows one to maintain
varying degrees of intimacy. Indeed, love, friendship and trust are only possible if persons enjoy privacy
and accord it to each other. Privacy is essential for such relationships on Fried's view, and this helps explain why a
threat to privacy is a threat to our very integrity as persons. By characterizing privacy as a necessary context for love,
friendship and trust, Fried is basing his account on a moral conception of persons and their personalities , on a
Kantian notion of the person with basic rights and the need to define and pursue one's own values
free from the impingement of others. Privacy allows one the freedom to define one's relations with
others and to define oneself. In this way, privacy is also closely connected with respect and self respect.
Gerstein (1978) argues as well that privacy is necessary for intimacy, and intimacy in communication and
interpersonal relationships is required for us to fully experience our lives. Intimacy without intrusion or
observation is required for us to have experiences with spontaneity and without shame . Shoeman (1984)
endorses these views and stresses that privacy provides a way to control intimate information about oneself and that
has many other benefits, not only for relationships with others, but also for the development of one's
personality and inner self. Julie Inness (1992) has identified intimacy as the defining feature of intrusions
properly called privacy invasions. Inness argues that intimacy is based not on behavior, but on motivation. Inness believes that
intimate information or activity is that which draws its meaning from love, liking, or care. It is privacy that protects one's ability
to retain intimate information and activity so that one can fulfill one's needs of loving and caring .

2] Materiality – any claim about the right to know presupposes a standard of what
information is relevant for the public, but this conception presupposes an arbitrary
standard which can never be reconciled.
Schauer 2k [Can Public Figures Have Private Lives?, Frederick Schauer, Social Philosophy and Policy 17
(2):293 (2000)]

In most of the debates about the issue of disclosing facts about the lives of candidates or officeholders who wish to keep
those facts secret, the issue is framed around the question of the relevance of the facts at issue. Typically, as
with the 1992 debates about the extramarital sexual activities of President Clinton or about his alleged drug use or other "minor" crimes that
took place in the distant past, some people
argue that facts ought not be disclosed when they are irrelevant to
an individual's performance of a job. Regardless of whether people want the information, the argument goes, information that is
not relevant to job performance has no place in public discussion of political candidates.

continued
In all of these cases, the argument was not that no one should disobey the law. Rather, it was that people occupying certain kinds of public
offices—Supreme Court justice and attorney general of the United States, for example—should have an exceptional proclivity to obey the law
just because it is law. Their proclivity to do this, it was argued, should be greater than that we would expect from other citizens, and greater
than that we would or should expect from people holding public office in general. It is, of course, possible to debate the materiality question of
whether this exceptional obedience to law simpliciter should be part of the job description of a Supreme Court justice or the attorney general
of the United States, but I do not want to get bogged down in the particulars of this case. Rather, my point is a general one: that a
claim of
immateriality presupposes some standard of materiality, and a standard of materiality in turn
presupposes a conception of the position to which the asserted trait is either causally or indicatively
related. While we may have debates over which conception of some position is the correct one, it is nevertheless the case that denials of
materiality often mask narrow conceptions of the position and its responsibilities, conceptions with which
others might reasonably disagree. The claim that marital infidelity is immaterial to the office of president of the United States
presupposes that the role of president should not include the role of being an exemplar of marital fidelity. Many people claim that it should not,
but many others claim that it should, and
debates about its materiality to the job are commonly smoke screens
for debates about just what it is that the job really entails.

That negates under Kant – a) any claim that there is a certain standard for what
information is permissible or impermissible to distribute is arbitrary since it’s based in
the empirical world and can never be proven intrinsic to the ultimate end of voting
someone into office b) the right to know relies on empirical circumstances of
relevance which can never be a sound basis for making moral judgments if empiricism
fails.
3] The right to know is an impossible obligation since it’s infinite – candidates can’t
have an obligation to understand their background conditions since there is an infinite
amount of information to know to satisfy the ends of the public, meaning they’ll
always be fulfilling an infinitely smaller part of our obligation.
2nr: xt contention
 Right to privacy
The resolution violates the right to privacy – people should be able to rationally
choose which individuals know what about their identity. To fore disclosure is an act
of coercion against the politicans
A2: they were never forced.
Ov
 A2; publicity principle
1] no link – the publicity principle applies in the context of gvoernemntal policies. This would require the
candidates to be transpernet in what they advocate for, but it DOES not have anything to do with their
private life