Republic of the Philippines even prescribe the disclosure of certain information through appropriate
SUPREME COURT legislation, similarly, the Supreme Court may also prescribe limitations on
Manila
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 05-2-01-SC             March 13, 2007]
RE: SC ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE POOR PROJECT
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En
Banc dated March 13, 2007.
A.M. No. 05-2-01-SC – (RE: SC ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE POOR
PROJECT)
The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on
Public Information, to APPROVE the proposed Information, Education,
Communication (IEC) Guidelines for Municipal Court Information Officers,
to wit:
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE POOR PROJECT
INFORMATION, EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION (IEC) GUIDELINES
FOR MUNICIPAL COURT INFORMATION OFFICERS
WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution states that Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. II,
Sec. 28)
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. (Art. III, Sec. 7);
WHEREAS, the public's right to information must not result in the
transgression of other equally paramount individual rights and as
Congress may properly prescribe acceptable or practical limitations, or
the public's access to court information, including evidentiary matters in
its custody;
WHEREAS, the herein Information, Education, Communication (IEC)
Guidelines are in line with the attainment of the objectives of the Access
to Justice for the Poor Project (PHI/AID/2003/4980) implemented in
partnership with the Department of Social Welfare and Development,
Department of Justice, Department of the Interior and Local Government,
and Alternative Law Groups, Inc. and funded by the European
Commission;
WHEREAS, the IEC Guidelines have been formulated by the Technical
Working Group of the Access to Justice for the Poor Project created
by Memorandum Order No. 51-2005 in order to provide Municipal Court
information Officers (MCIOs) with specific standards of conduct regarding
disclosure of and access to court information pursuant to the directives of
the Court in its resolution, dated 15 February 2005, in A.M. 05-2-01-
SC, Re: SC Project: Access to Justice for the Poor Project;
WHEREAS, it is stated in the aforesaid resolution that the information
dissemination activities of the court personnel at the trial court level
should generally be conferred to court users with respect to actual cases
as well as Rules issued by the Court;
WHEREAS, the purpose of the IEC Guidelines is to provide a framework
for
(1) scoping out court information permissible for access by the
users; and
(2) disseminating the allowable court information to users.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts these IEC Guidelines for
Municipal Court Information Officers for the Access to Justice for the
Poor Project.
Article 1
DEFINITION OF TERMS
A. Court Information refers to information filed in or generated by the
courts, including all official records, documents, and decisions. Only court
information that is not confidential may be disclosed.
B. Confidential Information generally refers to information not yet made
a matter of public record relating to pending cases, such as notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussion, internal memoranda, records of
internal deliberations, and similar papers. Even after the decision,
resolution, or order is made public, such information that a justice or
judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution, or order shall remain
confidential.1
C. Municipal Court Information Officers (MCIOs) refer to the Clerks of
Court (COCs), Acting Clerks of Court, or Officers-In-Charge of the first
level courts designated as such under OCA Administrative Circular No.
16-2007 dated February 21, 2007 for the Access to Justice for the
Poor Project.
D. Users refer to people who seek and can be provided access to court
information for valid interests and objectives. They include litigants,
general public, lawyers, and the partner agencies of the Access to
Justice for the Poor Project.
Article 2
GUIDELINES FOR MCIOs IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
THEIR INFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND
COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS
A. In All Cases
(1) Communicate in a language understood by a litigant;
(2) Inform the litigant on the availability of legal assistance from
the Public Attorney's Office of the Department of Justice or any
legal assistance office;
(3) Advise the litigant on the availability of an affidavit of indigency
in lieu of payment of the filing fee;
(4) Make available court information except confidential
information herein defined;
(5) Make available information materials concerning court
processes, procedures, and rules.
B. In Applications for Temporary or Permanent Protection Orders in
Cases of Violence Against Women and their Children (VAWC) Where
There are No Family Courts in the Place Where the Offended Party
Resides2
(1) Provide the petitioner with a standard petition form written in
English with translation in the major local dialects, including the
instructions for its accomplishment;
(2) Assist the petitioner in accomplishing the petition through the
use of the checklist prescribed in the Rule on Violence Against
Women and their Children;
(3) Ensure the privacy of the offended party to the extent
practicable while the form is being accomplished;
(4) Advise the petitioner on the availability of legal assistance
from the Public Attorney's Office of the Department of Justice or
any public legal assistance office;
(5) Advise the petitioner on entitlement of support services from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development and Local
Government Units;
(6) Advise the petitioner on the availability of an affidavit of
indigency in lieu of payment of the filing fee;
(7) Provide the offended party with a certified copy of the
protection order as well as give the necessary information
regarding the process for its service and enforcement.
(8) Make available information materials on violence against
women and their children, including their rights as victims.
(9) Inform the offended party that compensation is available from
the Department of Justice Board of Claims in accordance with the
provisions of RA No. 7309 (1992), otherwise known as “An Act
Creating a Board of Claims Under the Department of justice for
Victims of Unjust Imprisonment or Detention and Victims of
 Unjust Imprisonment of Detention and Victims of Violent Crime
and for Other Purposes”; and
(10) Ascertain if there is an immediate necessity due to imminent
danger or threat of danger to act on a petition for a protection
order, and if so, accept the petition without payment of the filing
fee and other fees and of transcripts of stenographic notes.
C. In Cases of Child Witness3
Inform the parties that a videotape or audiotape in-depth investigative or
disclosure interviews of child witnesses may be accepted as evidence
under the conditions provided for in the pertinent rules.
D. In Dealing With the Media4
(1) Observe utmost caution in handling media inquiries. MCIOs
shall refer such inquiries to their judges especially in instances
where there may be a need to respond to unfair media criticism,
inaccurate reporting, and violation of the sub judice rule, in which
case, the judge or the Public information Office of the Supreme
Court may assume such task.
(2) Provide the judge as soon as possible with the appropriate
information on any matter subject of an inquiry by media
personnel in order to guide the judge in making a decision on
such an event or inquiry.
(3) Provide only factual and otherwise publicly accessible data or
information such as
(a) Name of the parties, title of case, and case number,
except in VAWC cases;
(b) Names of counsel;
(c) Name of the handling judge;
(d) Relevant dates and place concerning the incidents,
except in VAWC cases;
(e) Petitions or prayer;
(f) Laws cited in the complaint or information;
(g) Hearing schedule; and
(h) Status of case.
(4) Allow interviews as permitted by their respective judges and
only on matters that are purely informative in character without
any expression of personal views.
(5) Coordinate immediately with the Supreme Court Public
Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator
especially with regard to cases where there is extensive public
interest and media coverage.
Article 3
PROVISION FOR SHARI'A COURTS
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines and Special Rules
of Procedure in Shari'a Courts shall be observed by Shari'a Court MCIOs
in their IEC activities.
Article 5
PROHIBITIONS5
A. MCIOs shall not disclose
(1) court information outside employment not required or included
in the performance of official duties;
(2) any confidential information acquired while employed in the
judiciary;
(3) confidential information given by litigants, witnesses, or
attorneys to justices, judges or any other person, unless they are
expressly authorized; and
(4) confidential information to individuals not authorized to receive
such information by law, court rule, or administrative policy.
B. They shall not render advisory opinions and legal advice6 or
suggest a legal course of action except as otherwise provided in
these Guidelines.

C. They shall not have dealings with the public that will compromise
the independence and integrity of the judiciary.7

D. They shall not make any comment on the merits of any case
pending in their respective courts as well as in other courts.8

E. They shall not respond to any inquiry which tends to generate

controversies arising from a judgment, decision, or action of the
court.9

Article 6

PENALTIES

Violations of these IEC Guidelines shall be punishable by existing laws,

rules, and other regulations.

EFFECTIVITY

This Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) Guidelines

for Municipal Court Information Officers under the Access to Justice
for the Poor Project shall take effect
on____________________________.

Promulgated this___________________________________."

Callejo, Sr., J., on leave. (adv114)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MA. LUIS A D. VILLARAMA

                        Clerk of Court
 [A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.]
CARLITOS D. LAZO, Complainant, v. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG,
Municipal Trial Court, Bolinao, Pangasinan, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the complaint against respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong of
the Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao, Pangasinan for grave misconduct and
abuse of authority.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
Complainant Carlitos Lazo is the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
4384, entitled People of the Philippines v. Danilo D. Lazo, for falsification
and use of falsified document, which was assigned to respondent judge. In
his sworn complaint, dated December 13, 1996. 1 Carlitos Lazo alleged
that respondent scheduled the arraignment of the accused on November
14, 1996, which was a Thursday, when he knew full well that no
proceedings could be had on that date because the trial prosecutor
assigned to respondent judge’s sala was available only on Fridays.
Complainant said that because of the cancellation of the arraignment, his
time and efforts were wasted considering that he came all the way from
Las Piñas, Metro Manila. Furthermore, he claimed that the warrant of
arrest was not served on the accused, although it had been issued much
earlier, until the prosecutor called attention to this fact. In addition,
complainant charged that respondent did not inhibit himself from the case
until after two (2) months despite the fact that respondent judge and the
accused are related within the fourth degree of affinity, the wife of the
accused being the first cousin of the judge.
In his comment, dated August 7, 1997, 2 respondent stated:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
That the parties in the criminal case in an information filed by the
provincial prosecutor’s office is between two brothers, the complainant
Carlitos D. Lazo and Danilo D. Lazo.
That before Court can commence initial proceedings and/or early stage,
the complainant knowing as indeed correctly stated in his letter complaint,
the undersigned to be the first cousin of the wife of the accused, the
complaint appealed to the undersigned for his intercession in the
settlement of their case, probably on the assumption of moral ascendancy
to the accused both in his private capacity and as official capacity as a
presiding judge of the court of Bolinao.
That attempts for the settlement of their case failed, and consequently
under normal court processes and in line with the rules on criminal
procedure, after issuance of a warrant of arrest by the court with the
posting of the bailbond by the accused the amount fixed by the court, the
case was to be set for arraignment of the accused of which the practice
(SOP) of the court is for the clerk of court to set the initial proceedings of
cases filed and pending before the court, personally at his own sound
discretion if only to show trust and confidence to the clerk by the
undersigned presiding judge, as it this case between Carlitos D. Lazo and
Danilo D. Lazo.
That accordingly the case was set by the clerk of court for November 14,
1996, at 8:30 o’clock, with subpoena to the complainant dated October 28,
1996, for the arraignment of the accused, not Friday the official day
schedule of the Provincial Prosecutor in attending criminal cases before the
Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao, Bolinao, Pangasinan, and probably an
oversight of the clerk of court without knowledge of the undersigned.
That on the scheduled arraignment of the accused on November 14, 1996,
both the complainant and the accused were present in court, duly
represented by their respective legal counsels and when the calendar of
the court was read, Accused counsel manifested that they are filing a
motion to quash, praying for the deferment of the scheduled arraignment
until the resolution of the court of the said motion to quash they are to file,
with in (5) day but with no motion filed within the said period, the
arraignment of the accused was reset by the court to November 29, 1996,
in the morning which was nevertheless cancelled due to motion for
postponement filed by the accused.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
That the proceedings of November 14, 1996, in the morning, set for the
arraignment of the accused, despite the absence of the provincial
prosecutor, to the humble and honest opinion of the undersigned has a
semblance of propriety and regularity considering that the purpose of
arraignment only, it can proceed since the complainant and the accused
who are present in court are both represented by counsel of records, which
nonetheless was deferred by the court for reasons abovestated.
That notwithstanding the doubtful application in a mandatory character to
the undersigned after a careful perusal of the language and examination of
the provisions of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, but if only to give the
benefit of the doubt in favor of the complaint for their full satisfaction have
earlier announced in open court, to hold in abeyance the self inhibition of
the undersigned on or before the accused have been arraigned. An early
inhibition before the arraignment may the presiding judge be interpreted
to be remised or shrinked from the performance of his duties and
obligations attached to his office knowing pretty well, as it does, that the
evil to be avoided which is suspicion of partiality and biasness finds its vital
role only during the trial on the merits of a case. However, on January 3,
1997, before the filing of much said and awaited motion, in order to put to
rest the issue of Inhibition, an order of self inhibition of the presiding
Judge was finally issued.
 x           x           x
The accused Danilo D. Lazo is a government employee whose office is
opposite the court house across a street just a few meters apart. Time and
again from the time of knowledge of the case filed against him has
frequented the court inquiring status of his case and manifested before
hand his readiness to file his bailbond as he in fact informed the court that
he has already prepared his bailbond and further told the court of his
desired posting of the said bailbond in the amount fixed and recommended
by the office of the provincial prosecutor’s office even without first the
issuance of a warrant of arrest having been issued by the court. In all
bailable offenses the right of an accused is both a constitutional and
statutory right can be available of anytime of the day during office hours.
To deny an accused of the right is a violation of human rights. . . The
accused Danilo D. Lazo simultaneously filed bailbond on the same day the
warrant of arrest was issued by the court who of course like anybody, finds
it detastable of being arrested even a moment and jailed especially the
accused is a government employee, a law abiding citizen of good social
standing. The posting by the accused of his bailbond in connection of the
case against him was all accordance with all.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which on
November 5, 1998, submitted a report, the pertinent portion of which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The allegation that respondent Judge scheduled the arraignment of the
case on Thursday knowing fully well that the Public Prosecutor assigned in
the case appears only in his court every Fridays, was denied by
the Respondent. He claims that it was his Clerk of Court who scheduled
the arraignment on said day without his knowledge. Respondent Judge
explains that when it comes to initiatory proceedings such as arraignment
and pre-trial, he gave his Clerk of Court the discretion to calendar or
schedule the cases if only to show his trust and confidence [on]
him.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We opined that there is nothing wrong in adjudicating the function of
scheduling the cases to the Clerk of Court. A Clerk of Court is the
administrative assistant of the Presiding Judge whose duty is to assist in
the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not
involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge (Re: Report
on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 61, 134 and 137,
Makati, Metro Manila 248 SCRA 25 [1995]; Mejia v. Justice Pamaran, Et
Al., 160 SCRA 457 [1988])
Although a judge has direct supervision over his court personnel, he is
more expected to perform his judicial functions, hence, on matters not
involving the exercise of discretion such as scheduling of cases, the rule
provides that the Clerk of Court shall prepare or cause to be prepared a
daily court calendar which may include, at the discretion of the Presiding
Judge, cases scheduled for pre-trial, arraignment, trial, hearing on motions
or incidents and other matters (Sec. Q on Manual for Clerks of Courts, p.
59; Section 1, Rule 20, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In conjunction with this, a Clerk of Court can issue under the seal of the
Court all ordinary writs and processes incident to pending cases, the
issuance for (sic) which does not involve the exercise of functions
appertaining to the Court or Judge only, and may under the discretion of
the Court or Judge, make out and sign letters of administration,
appointment of guardians, trustees and receivers and all writs and
processes issuing from the Court (Section 4, Rule 136, Revised Rules of
Court).
While the Clerk of Court may have erred in calendaring the case on a
Thursday (instead of Friday) which resulted to the non-appearance of the
Public Prosecutor, who has direct control in the prosecution of criminal
cases, it appears that the private complainant (complainant herein) was
not denied his right to counsel as he was duly represented by his counsel
de parte. . . From the circumstances above, it can be said that no
substantial rights of the complainant were prejudiced.
2. On the allegation that it was only upon the Prosecution’s motion that
respondent caused the issuance of the warrant of arrest and required the
accused to post bail, it is noted from the comment of respondent Judge
that there was an attempt to settle the case between the two brothers
upon the prodding of the accused. Nevertheless, upon failure to arrive at
an amicable settlement, respondent issued the warrant of arrest and the
accused promptly posted bail. Therefore, the delay, if there is any, in the
issuance of the warrant is not entirely the fault of the respondent judge.
3. On the issue of inhibition, respondent Judge admits that he is the first
cousin of the wife of the accused. Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, on
disqualification of Judges, provides that: No judge or judicial officer shall
sit in any case in which he, inter alia, is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree computed according to the rules of the civil law. Under this
provision, the Presiding Judge is mandated to disqualify himself from
sitting in a case. He cannot exercise his discretion whether to inhibit
himself or not. In the case at bar, respondent Judge falls squarely within
the above provision. Being the first cousin of the wife of the accused to
whom he is related in the fourth civil degree by consanguinity he is related
to the accused in the same degree by affinity. At the outset, it was
therefore mandatory for him to inhibit himself from the case if only to
avoid any doubt or suspicion of bias and partiality in favor of the
accused.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommend[ed]
that respondent Judge Antonio v. Tiong be absolved of any liability as to
the charges for lack of merit except on the charge that he failed to timely
inhibit himself from the case for which this office recommends that he be
SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to inhibit himself from the case at
the outset.

The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule 137, §1 of the
Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in
the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by
them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases
in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well
cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as
respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The purpose of
the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the
appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. 3 A judge should take
no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned 4 and he should administer justice impartially and without
delay. 5

Contrary to this Rule, Judge Tiong acted in Criminal Case No. 4384 from
November 5, 1996 to January 3, 1997. He inhibited himself from further
consideration of the case only on the latter date, despite the fact that the
complainant filed a motion seeking his inhibition on November 14, 1996.

Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the
ground that he was hoping he could make complainant and the accused
settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the
wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s efforts, praiseworthy
though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first
sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the
latter should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He
cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that
complainant might relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his
brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to
make use of his good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to
bring the parties to an amicable settlement and using his moral influence
on them without success, he should have inhibited himself from the case
and continued his peace efforts in a private capacity. On the other hand,
because there is no showing that respondent’s failure to inhibit himself
from the case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any corrupt
motive, the Court thinks that reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong is hereby

REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the same or similar act or
omission will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Bellosillo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. RTJ-89-286             July 11, 1991 respondent Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents. However the TRO expired after
the lapse of twenty (20) days, without a preliminary injunction being issued.
ROAN I. LIBARIOS, complainant,
vs. Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal
JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS, respondent. Balansag was himself gunned down in cold blood while on his way to his
office. Based on the investigation conducted by the NBI linking the death of
Roan L. Libarios for and on his own behalf. Fiscal Balansag to the killing of Corvera, Sr., another formal complaint for
murder was filed against Calo. Jr. and four (4) others.
RESOLUTION
On 14 September 1988, Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the pending
motion for reconsideration, affirming the 22 June 1988 resolution finding
a prima facie case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.
PADILLA,  J.:

On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal

This is an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf
Balansag, carrying a NO BAIL recommendation, was filed before the
of his client Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F.
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch IV, docketed as Criminal Case
Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross
No. 3464. On 14 October 1988, upon motion of the prosecution and with the
misconduct and partiality, relative to Criminal Case No. 3464. The
approval of the court, the information was withdrawn for being fatally
antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
defective in form, the same having been signed by Fiscal Balansag who was
already dead at the time of the filing of said information.
On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo
Macapas inside the courtroom of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing
On 29 November 1988, a new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy
in a frustrated murder case against said Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was
carrying also a NO BAIL recommendation, was filed with the court without the
the private complainant in the aforesaid criminal case, while Mayor
necessary supporting affidavits and papers. The case was erroneously
Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as counsel of Macapas. As a result of
assigned to Branch IV of the RTC of Butuan City, where the original
the killing of Corvera Sr., a formal charge of murder (I.S. No. 88-138) was
information prior to its withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion
filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Butuan City against Pablo Macapas,
to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Without
Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard Belarmino Alloco, and
Bail, and in the alternative, accused sought the fixing of bail for their
(2) other "John Does". Macapas was a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr.
temporary release.2 Said motion was set for hearing on 15 December 1988.
On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution,
Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle on 7
finding a  prima facie case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-
December 1988. On said scheduled date for raffle, accused Calo, Jr. and his
138.1
counsel personally filed an opposition to the holding of the raffle on the
ground of lack of notice to the parties.
On 29 June 1988, the information was signed by the investigating Fiscal;
however, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution was filed by
On 6 and 8 December 1988, Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together with their
respondent Calo, Jr., which delayed the filing of the Information against Calo,
sympathizers staged a rally demanding the immediate arrest of the accused
Jr. and his co-respondents.
in Criminal Case No. 3464. After their rally in the afternoon of 8 December
1988, they personally went to see respondent judge in his chamber to
On 21 July 1988, respondents in I.S. No. 88-138 filed with the RTC Butuan reiterate their demand.
City a petition for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, to enjoin the Investigating Fiscal from acting on
After said meeting between Corvera, Jr., et al. and respondent-judge, the
their aforementioned motion for reconsideration. Then Executive Judge
latter issued an order of 8 December 19883 in his capacity as Executive
Vicente Hidalgo issued a TRO, directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain
Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due notice to the parties. Without
from acting on the said motion for reconsideration and from further
conducting any prior hearing, in the same order of 8 December 1988,
proceeding with the preliminary investigation of the murder charge against
respondent judge directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the
accused, fixing at the same time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at
P50,000.00 each; however, no bail was recommended for the temporary
release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail for the temporary
release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they were not
charged as co-principals by cooperation or inducement, and that the
evidence of guilt against them was merely circumstantial.
On 14 December 1988, a petition for certiorari was filed by herein
complainant with the Court of Appeals, assailing the 8 December 1988 order
of respondent judge, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 16383. In response to the
urgency of the petition, a resolution dated 20 December 1988 was issued by
the Court of Appeals restraining the execution and implementation of the
assailed order, pending the resolution of the petition on the merits. However,
on 26 December 1988, respondent judge and Calo, Jr. informed the Court of
Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod had already put up their
respective bail bonds of P50,000.00 as of 9 December 1988 and that both
have been released, thus rendering the primary objective of the CA
temporary restraining order moot and academic.
On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 setting aside
the questioned 8 December 1988 order as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The warrants
of arrest as well as the bail bonds filed by the accused in said Criminal Case
No. 3464 were declared void and without force and effect; the court of origin
was ordered to immediately issue and serve new warrants of arrest upon the
accused. To determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong, the trial court was ordered to conduct a heating and thus
resolve the motion for fixing the bald for the temporary release of the two (2)
accused, Calo, Jr. and Allocod. The decision of the Court of Appeals became
final and executory on 23 February 1989.5
In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that the act of
respondent judge in granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod without
a hearing, is tantamount to gross ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant
disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused charged with a capital
offense can be granted bail. The impartiality of respondent judge in issuing
the questioned warrants of arrest but allowing bail is also questioned on the
ground of his "close association" with the accused Calo, Jr.
In his defense, respondent judge argues that Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure which requires a hearing of an application for
admission to bail, filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of
a capital offense, is applicable only to cases where the accused is already in
custody, but neither of the three (3) accused in Criminal Case No. 3464 was
being detained at the time their application for bail was acted upon by
respondent judge. In his capacity as Executive Judge, respondent judge
claims that he merely followed the precedents set by his predecessors, in
issuing warrants of arrest before the raffle of a case in order to avoid delay in
the arrest of the accused.
In addition, respondent judge denied the allegation that he was a law partner
of accused Calo, Jr., claiming that he was a mere employee in the business
of said accused, and that he appeared with accused Calo, Jr. as co-counsel
in a case, but not as an associate. To justify his finding that the evidence of
guilt is circumstantial against accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, respondent
judge stated that —
Herein respondent has some doubts whether accused Tranquilino O.
Calo, Jr. could have done the acts of giving a revolver to accused
Pablo Macapas outside the courtroom and pushed Pablo Macapas
into the courtroom to shoot Mariano Corvera, Sr., which acts were
allegedly done in the presence of witness (sic) Pacifico Largonita and
Fernando Casinao, who by their own admissions, are security
personnel and companions of the late Mayor Corvera. These acts
being attributed to accused Calo as the brain behind the killing do not
appear to be a natural conduct of man. These are stupid acts and
accused Calo does not impress herein respondent as having that
kind of mental intelligence. Respondent has known accused
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. as a law practitioner and as a person for
about twenty years already.1âwphi1 Respondent finds accused Calo
to be of above-average intelligence. Thus, when respondent
reviewed the findings of the investigating fiscal regarding the
statements of P. Largonita and F. Casinao, respondent entertained
some serious doubts. Questions cropped up in respondent's mind.
Respondent asked himself the questions that if he were the
mastermind, would he give, in the presence of some individuals, the
gun to the gunman only at the vicinity where the intended victim was
to be shot moments before the appointed time of the killing and
pushed the gunman to the place where the victim was?
Respondent's answer was that he would not behave in such manner,
otherwise he would appear to be an inept mastermind and the
gunman was reluctant that the latter had to be pushed to execute the
plan.6
While it does not form part of the record of the case at bar, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16383 is quite enlightening. That
decision, as already mentioned, declared as null and void the warrants of
arrest issued by respondent judge as well as the bail fixed by him for the
temporary release of the accused, all accomplished without a hearing. The
Court of Appeals said:
 It is conventional wisdom in legal circles that the determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong in a capital offense
rests upon the sound judgment and discretion of the court which can
only be exercised and reached after due or summary hearing.
(People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522; Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil.
55). In that hearing, the fiscal must be notified and given the
opportunity to present his evidence. If the court grants bail without
affording such opportunity to the prosecution, due process is
seriously violated. (People vs. San Diego, supra; Mendoza vs. CFI of
Quezon, 51 SCRA 373). And even where the prosecutor refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail,
the Court may ask the prosecution "questions to ascertain the
strength of the state's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount
of bail." (Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756,
789).
x x x           x x x          x x x
In the petition at bar, private respondents argue that since they are
no longer in custody of the law, the respondent court having granted
and fixed their bail which they did forthwith post, the hearing to
determine whether or not their guilt is strong is no longer necessary.
The argument sounds but casuistic because in Our judgment the
respondent court acted deliberately with precipitate haste and with
grave abuse of discretion, when on December 8, 1988 it issued the
order granting and fixing the bail without any hearing at all, even as
private respondents themselves had requested their motion to be
heard on December 15, 1988 yet, when respondent court in the
same order directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against
private respondents, the act was nothing more than a superfluous
and useless ceremony because with the grant of bail the accused
could and did effectively secure their freedom at once without even
seeing a copy of the warrant of arrest itself. As a matter of fact, there
is nothing in the records before Us to show that warrants of arrest
were actually issued against private respondents.7
Respondent judge was declared by the Court of Appeals to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the accused without a hearing.
Generally, a judge cannot be held liable to account or answer criminally,
civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by
him in good faith.8 However, good faith may be negated by the circumstances
on record.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in
his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be disciplined for
inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment,
yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal
principles.9
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and
the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion
or fear of criticism.10 Respondent judge should not have allowed himself to be
swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the
accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to
established principles of law. A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles.11
The fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a rally
demanding the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused is not a
sufficient excuse for the unjustified haste of respondent judge's act of fixing
bail without a hearing.
It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person
is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a
summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue
of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing
before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of due
process.12 Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of
guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence
demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the
temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was at all justified.
Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by depriving the
prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the
accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law, which is
subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with
respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee of the said accused, prudence
and regard for his position as judge demanded that he should have refrained
from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the evidence
against him was merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his
judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the
case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve
the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should
not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity.13

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a FINE of TWENTY

THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED to exercise more care and
diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severally.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
 [A.M. No. 90-474. October 4, 1991.]
CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR., Complainant, v. JUDGE
ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, RTC, BRANCH 16, NAVAL,
LEYTE, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; A JUDGE MUST BE AN EFFECTIVE
MANAGER OF THE COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL. — Respondent,
shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Rogelio Jocobo, who,
he claims, was inefficient in the management of Court records.
Respondent forgets, however, that he sits not only to Judge
litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his
responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and
its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
provides: "A judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court
management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative
functions of other judges and court personnel." Also expected of a
Judge under Rule 3.09 is that: "A judge should organize and
supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of
high standards of public service and fidelity.
2. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE; REASON FOR ITS
REQUIREMENT. — A member of the bench can not pay mere lip
service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in fact, persevere in
its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a
means to one’s paycheck, but an instrument by which the Courts
can fulfill the Constitutional mandate of the people’s right to a
speedy disposition of cases. "The people’s faith in the
administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low
income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in
coming, more so from trial courts which unlike collegiate tribunals
where there is a need for extended deliberation, could be expected
to act with dispatch" (Magdamo v. Pahimulin, Adm. Mat. No. 662-
MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 110).
3. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE RECORDS OF CASES
INDICATIVE OF INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE. — We have to hold
respondent inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the
records of twelve (12) civil and two (2) criminal cases. "A judge is
expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his
sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative
of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a
judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose
acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose
acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and
prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out"
(Longboan v. Polig, Adm. Mat. No. 704-RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186
SCRA 557).
4. ID.; ID.; MUST REFRAIN FROM INFLUENCING IN ANY MANNER
THE OUTCOME OF LITIGATION OR DISPUTE PENDING BEFORE
ANOTHER COURT. — Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. The
Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain
from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04) Interference by
members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of
influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only
subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the
people’s faith in its integrity and impartiality (Commentaries on the
Code of Judicial Conduct).
5. ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING; MERE
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
CHARGES. — Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in
point of fact, is of no moment as Respondent’s mere act of
interference in a criminal case seals his fate. In administrative
proceedings such as this, mere preponderance of evidence suffices
to establish the charges (The Court Administrator v. Hermoso, Et
Al., A.M. No. R-97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269).
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In an Affidavit-Complaint, dated 7 March 1990, Atty. Clemencio
Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing lawyer in Naval, Biliran Subprovince,
Leyte, charged respondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, with falsification of
his monthly Certificates of Service by making it appear that he had
resolved all cases submitted for decision within the ninety-day
period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5, when
actually he had fifteen (15) cases undecided from five (5) years
back or from March, 1985.
On 7 August 1990, the Court directed Deputy Court Administrator
Juanito A. Bernad to make an on-the-spot audit of the cases
pending in the sala of Respondent Judge. On 2 October 1990,
Deputy Court Administrator Bernad reported that there were,
indeed, eighty seven (87) cases undecided beyond the ninety (90)-
day reglementary period as of 3 July 1990, consisting of six (6)
criminal cases with prisoners, 36 criminal cases without prisoners,
and forty-five (45) civil cases. Worse the records of two (2)
criminal cases and twelve (12) civil cases were missing. While the
records of six (6) criminal cases were not in the Court but
acknowledged by Respondent Judge to have been in his
possession.
Deputy Court Administrator Bernad also noted the dismal state of
the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16, which he described as
"bereft of any dignity as a court of law" showing "a lack of financial
and moral support of the local authorities," and observed that the
Municipal Court was even better housed.
On 31 October 1990, Complainant further furnished the Court with
an Affidavit of Judge Dulcisimo Pitao of the Municipal Trial Court of
Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had intervened for the
accused in Criminal Case No. 959 then pending with the said
Municipal Court. We considered the foregoing as a supplemental
charge of undue interest in a pending criminal case.
On 23 November 1990, Complainant again brought to the attention
of the Court seven (7) additional cases submitted for decision, at
the earliest since April 1986, still unresolved by Respondent (p. 44,
Rollo), even though the transcripts were ready as early as 1984 in
one (1) case.
In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed
that the Complaint was more for harassment and vengeance,
otherwise, Complainant would not have filed a criminal case
against him for Falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised
Penal Code before the Ombudsman, based on the same facts
alleged in his Complaint before this Court. Respondent further
claimed that he had not violated the 90-day rule since 1 February
1990 when the Court required the adoption of the continuous trial
system. He did not deny, however, that before said date, there
were other cases not decided within the 90-day rule, including
those listed in the Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were
incomplete. He added that he had no hand in the preparation of his
monthly reports of pending cases; that after he had ordered the
person-in-charge of preparing the Certificates of Service to explain
why she had made it appear that said cases were decided within
ninety (90) days from its submission when actually they were not,
she stated that he had nothing to do with the preparation of the
monthly report except to sign after she had prepared
them.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On 18 April 1991, acting upon a second Report from Deputy Court
Administrator Bernad, the Court resolved: (1) to refer the
supplemental charge regarding undue interest in a particular
criminal case to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation; (2) to
order Respondent to decide with dispatch cases still unresolved
beyond the 90-day-period; and (3) to inform the Court
immediately regarding steps he had taken to retrieve lost records
and to personally put his records in order.
To date, Respondent has been unheard from on those directives.
On 12 July 1991, Complainant followed up with another letter
complaint stating that the seven cases mentioned in his letter of 23
November 1990 remained undecided, adding that five (5) cases
handled by him were unresolved since January 1987, not to speak
of cases handled by other lawyers.
Judging from the Deputy Court Administrator’s two Reports, there
is validity to Complainant’s charge that Respondent had failed to
decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period
notwithstanding "Second Ex-parte Motions to Decide Case" filed by
Complainant (Annexes A to L, Complaint), and that Respondent
had falsified his Certificates of Service for 2 September 1986, 3
October 1987, 3 October 1988, 3 November 1989, and 1 March
1990 (Annexes N to R, Complaint). Respondent’s defense that
incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes dissuaded him from
deciding those cases for fear of "rendering an injustice" is
controverted by his own stenographic reporter who stated that the
transcripts in some of those cases were ready as far back as 1984
(Comment, Annex "2").
Respondent, however, shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty.
Rogelio Jocobo, who, he claims, was inefficient in the management
of Court records. Respondent forgets, however, that he sits not
only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that
his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court
and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,
maintain professional competence in court management, and
facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other
judges and court personnel."cralaw virtua1aw library
Also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 is
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require
at all times the observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity."cralaw virtua1aw library
As we held in Secretary of Justice v. Legaspi (A.M. No. 997-CFI, 10
September 1981, 107 SCRA 234):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Respondent, as the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases
submitted to him for decision, particularly those pending for more
than ninety days. As a matter of fact, he is supposed to keep his
own record of cases submitted for decision so that he could act on
them promptly and without delay, mindful of the mandate in
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 296, also known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948 . . . It is expected that he should be more diligent and
more vigilant in attending to cases submitted for decision as well
as in the preparation of his monthly certificates of service by
verifying every now and then whether there are cases pending
decision for more than ninety days; because he could be held
accountable for any error or falsification in his certificates. Thus,
respondent cannot now escape liability for falsification of his
certificates of service with the lame excuse that he has no
knowledge of those cases pending decision for more than ninety
days at the time he submitted his certificates of service. Nor could
he give the excuse that his attention was not called to the cases
pending decision ninety days because he need not be reminded of
his deadlines by a subordinate court employee like the clerk of
court. Court employees are not the guardians of a judge’s
responsibilities."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Nidua v. Lazaro (A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA
581), we maintained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in his Court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of
cases and their speedy disposition, particularly those submitted for
decision. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement by Court personnel. Proper and efficient court
management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions."cralaw
virtua1aw library
And in Cipriano v. Judge Villamor (A.M. No. RTJ-88-207, 22 June
1989, en banc, Minute Resolution) we ruled,
"The Supreme Court cannot countenance such undue delay of a
judge especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize, if
not totally eradicate, the problems of congestion and delay long
plaguing our courts. Thus, judges are called upon to exercise the
utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their duties.
It is a measure of a judge’s competence as an administrator that
he is capable of delegating to his personnel those tasks which
properly pertain to them, maintaining, likewise, their trust and
confidence in him."cralaw virtua1aw library
A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day
requirement, but should, in fact, persevere in its implementation.
The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one’s paycheck,
but an instrument by which the Courts can fulfill the Constitutional
mandate of the people’s right to a speedy disposition of cases.
"The people’s faith in the administration of justice, especially those
who belong to the low income group, would be greatly impaired if
decisions are long in coming, more so from trial courts which unlike
collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberation,
could be expected to act with dispatch" (Magdamo v. Pahimulin,
Adm. Mat. No. 662-MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 110).
Additionally, we have to hold respondent inexcusably negligent for
failure to account for the records of twelve (12) civil and two (2)
criminal cases.
"A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases
assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing
records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight
records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable
negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the
bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards
of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and
unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisite attached to said
office must be weeded out" (Longboan v. Polig, Adm. Mat. No. 704-
RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 557).
We come now to the supplemental charge of undue interest in a
pending criminal case, subject of the Investigative Report
submitted on 9 August 1991 by Justice Fermin A. Martin, who
found the imputation sufficiently substantiated, and has
recommended the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00.
From that Report, we gather that on 16 July 1987, Respondent, as
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVI, Naval,
Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, designated Judge Dulcisimo Pitao, of
the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, as Acting Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, which
was then vacant, with the directive to allocate two (2) session days
a week in his additional sala.
On 19 August 1987, while Judge Pitao was at his residence at
Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, he received a note handcarried
by a woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of Guillermo
Lipango, the accused in Criminal Case No. 959, which had long
been pending trial in the 4th MCTC of Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte.
The note (Exhibit "A"), written on Respondent’s letterhead,
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Aug. 19, 1987
"Dear Tete,
"The bearer is the wife of Guillermo Lipango who has a long
pending theft case. If you have jurisdiction hear and decide. If
none, remand it to RTC.
"Take care because I learned Big Man Egane is taking much
interest because accused is competing with his fishing but only in a
small scale. Okay? Thanks.
Sincerely,
Ading."cralaw virtua1aw library
Sometime later, Judge Pitao sought respondent, as the Executive
Judge, regarding his application for leave of absence which had to
be coursed through the latter. During their conversation,
respondent mentioned the case of "People v. Lipango," asked
Judge Pitao whether the latter had received the note, and again
warned the latter about a certain "Big Man Egane," who was
backing the complainant therein and that he (Judge Pitao) better
acquit the accused (Tsn., 15 July 1991, pp. 13-14).
On 25 August 1988, after hearing the case, Judge Pitao rendered
his decision convicting the accused, Guillermo Lipango, of the crime
of Theft (Exhibit "C") "because the evidence against the accused
was very strong" (ibid., p. 14).
On 16 November 1988, when Judge Pitao went to the boarding
house of Respondent to invite the latter to a birthday party, and
while they were walking together, Judge Pitao confided to
Respondent that he had convicted Lipango "because he could not in
conscience acquit him" (ibid., p. 17). Irked, Respondent directed
Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former’s Court (ibid., p.
18).
On 23 November 1988, the records of Criminal Case No. 959 were
elevated to the RTC, Leyte, Branch XVI, over which Respondent
presides, but the case was actually docketed thereat on 5
December 1988.
From 1 to 3 December 1988, Judge Pitao attended the National
Convention of Lawyers in Cebu City. Upon his return, he learned
that Judge Meljohn de la Peña had been designated as Acting
Judge of the 4th MCTC Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, and that his
designation had been revoked effective 30 November 1988 (ibid.,
pp. 18-19).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On 9 December 1988, Respondent promulgated his decision
acquitting accused-appellant Guillermo Lipango of the crime
charged (Exhibit "F"). This, despite the fact that the records of the
case disclosed that no notice had been sent to the parties of the
receipt of the entire record to enable them to submit their
respective memoranda.
For his part, Respondent opted to rely on his six (6)-page
Comment, dated 19 December 1990 (Exh. H, pp. 78-83, Rollo), as
his testimony-in-chief. As correctly observed by the Investigating
Justice, said Comment contains nothing more than a denial of the
charge of falsification and an attribution of ill motive to the
Complainant. He then determined that Respondent is deemed not
to have denied:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) that he sent the handwritten note dated August 19, 1987
(Exhibit "A") to Judge Dulcisimo Pitao through the wife of the
accused Guillermo Lipango;
2) that when Judge Pitao brought his application for leave of
absence to respondent as Executive Judge, respondent took up the
matter of the note he sent and the theft case against accused
Guillermo Lipango which was pending trial before Judge Pitao and
even hurried the remark "better acquit him;" and,
3) that he decided the appealed criminal case and acquitted the
appellant Guillermo Lipango although the record of the case
disclosed that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of
court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the
parties to submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines."cralaw virtua1aw library
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice came up with the following
apt observations and findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In sending his handwritten note (Exhibit "A") to Judge Pitao, and
through the wife of the accused Guillermo Lipango, respondent
failed to exercise due care. It is true that the contents of the letter
may not have directly exhorted the addressee to decide the case in
favor of one party but to have the wife of the very accused deliver
the letter to the municipal judge who will decide the case and over
whom he (respondent) exercised supervision and wielded a degree
of moral ascendancy as Executive Judge was simply a big letdown
in the required circumspection and high ideals expected of a judge.
It is a truism that a judge’s official conduct and his behavior in the
performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance
of impropriety (Aleza v. Reyes, 131 SCRA 445, 453).
Moreover, respondent Judge, while cautioning Judge Pitao to watch
out and exercise care in handling the case supposedly on account
of the interest of persons not parties to the case, made a side
remark for the acquittal of the accused. Such a statement, which
was not denied, was highly improper and was apt to create the
impression that he was for the exoneration of the accused
Guillermo Lipango. It tended to influence the trial judge who was
going to decide the case and thus did violence to the lofty principle
that "the office of a judge exists for one solemn end: to promote
justice by administering it fairly and impartially" (Gonzales-Austria
v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634, 646)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no
words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in
any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04) Interference by members of
the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing the
course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the
independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people’s
faith in its integrity and impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of
Judicial Conduct). On this point Impao v. Makilala (A.M. No. MTJ-
88-184, 13 October 1989 178 SCRA 541)
expounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is an important judicial norm that a judge’s private as well as
official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety [Lugue v. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 165; . . .]. As held by this Court in the case of De
la Paz v. Inutan, Adm. Mat. No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA
540: . . . The judge is the visible representation of the law and,
more importantly of justice. From him, the people draw their will
and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of
justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of
municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and
direct contact with the people before nobody else in the judiciary.
Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Investigating Justice gave one final and pointed observation on
respondent’s culpability, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph instrumentality of the government, including government owned or
controlled corporations.
"The clincher though came when respondent Judge decided the
same case which was appealed to his branch although he knew Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his personal record.
that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of court to the
parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the prosecution SO ORDERED.
and the defense to submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines. Respondent’s excuse was that under Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
the rules, it was (and still is) the duty of the clerk of court to notify Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Pidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino,
the parties of ,he fact that the original record of the case, together Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
with the transcripts and exhibits, had been received (Rule 21,
paragraph c, Interim Rules and Guidelines). Respondent
overlooked, however, that the same rule provides that the RTC
judge shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
briefs, as may have been filed (paragraph D, Rule 21, ibid)."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact,

is of no moment as Respondent’s mere act of interference in a
criminal case seals his fate. In administrative proceedings such as
this, mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the
charges (The Court Administrator v. Hermoso, Et Al., A.M. No. R-
97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269).

Upon the facts and the evidence, we can not but hold respondent
guilty (1) of having made untruthful statements in his Certificates
of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross inefficiency in
connection with missing records in his Sala, and of utter
indifferences to the directives of this Court; and (2) of serious
misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a
lower Court over which he exercised supervision, all in violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated condition of the
Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16, also betrays a lack of
management capabilities desired of a Presiding Judge and an
insensitiveness to the needs of a Court of Justice worthy of its
name. All told, we find him unfit to continue with his membership
in the Bench.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge

Adriano R. Villamor, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his accrued
retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or
 [Adm. Matter No. MTJ-93-888. October 24, 1994.]
MAYOR ROGER S. PADILLA, Complainant, v. HON. ROBERTO
V. ZANTUA, JR., Municipal Trial Court, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; FAILURE TO DECIDE
CASES WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD; JUSTIFIED IN CASE AT
BAR. — We agree with the dismissal of the charges with respect to
failure to decide the cases within the prescribed period and the
charges of unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases against
respondent Judge. Complainant in the instant case failed to
specifically cite any of the cases referred to in the complaint which
remained undecided after the lapse of the required 90-day period
to decide cases; hence, the dismissal of charges of violation of the
90-day period is in order. The delay in the trial of the cited cases in
the complaint, particularly Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936,
Criminal Case No. 5908 and Criminal Case No. 5998, was not
entirely the fault of herein respondent Judge. The delay was caused
by the numerous postponements both by the prosecution and the
defense. However, respondent Judge should be reminded of the
directive in Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989 requiring all
courts to conduct a mandatory continuous trial which is to be
terminated within 90 days from inception of the initial hearing.
2. ID.; ID.; FRATERNIZING WITH LAWYERS WHO HAVE PENDING
CASES IN HIS SALA; CANNOT BE FULLY COUNTENANCED BY
COURT. — as regards the allegations of manifest partiality in favor
of a litigant and fraternizing with lawyers who have pending cases
in his sala, we note that respondent Judge does not deny his close
friendship and association with Atty. Augusto Schneider.
Respondent Judge pointed out that while it is true that Atty.
Schneider has pending cases in his sala, the latter lost in these
cases which is supposed to give the impression that such close
association with Atty. Schneider has not affected his neutrality and
impartiality as a Judge. We cannot fully countenance the view of
respondent Judge. Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed
intimacy and camaraderie to the point that favors in the future may
be asked from respondent judge which he may find hard to resist.
The actuation of respondent Judge of eating and drinking in public
places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may well
arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust
of the litigants in the impartiality of the judge. This eventuality may
undermine the people’s faith in the administration of justice. It is of
no moment that Atty. Augusto Schneider is the only lawyer in the
locality. A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge.
3. ID.; ID.; MUST BE BEYOND REPROACH AND SUSPICION AND BE
FREE FROM ANY APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN THEIR
PERSONAL BEHAVIOR. — to so conduct themselves as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion, and be free from any appearance
of impropriety in their personal behavior not only in the discharge
of their official duties but also in their everyday life, for as we have
earlier stressed, ‘no position exacts greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary’ so that (a) magistrate of the law must comport himself at
all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
him as the epitome of integrity and justice." Public confidence in
the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance
thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a sworn complaint dated October 5, 1993, Mayor Roger S.
Padilla of the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
charges respondent Judge Roberto V. Zantua, Municipal Trial Court
of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte with serious irregularities and
grave misconduct in the performance of his official duties for: (1)
failure to decide cases within the prescribed period; (2)
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases which have been
prejudicial to litigants; (3) manifest partiality in favor of a litigant
and (4) fraternizing with lawyers who have pending cases in his
sala. 1
Mayor Roger S. Padilla alleges that in Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and
5936 (People v. Ventura Calzada, Et. Al.) for grave coercion and
grave threats; Criminal Case No. 5973 (People v. Efren Dalde, Et.
Al.) for highgrading; Civil Case No. 610 (Vicente Enriquez v. Zaldy
Suarez) for trespassing (sic); Criminal Case No. 5908 (People v.
Rolando Racasa) for highgrading; and Criminal Case No. 5998
(People v. Job Riel) for alarms and scandals, the opposing counsel,
Atty. Augusto B. Schneider is always seen eating and drinking in
the constant company of respondent Judge in public
establishments in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte.cralawnad
Mayor Padilla complains that these cases have been pending since
1991, some have not even been tried and because of delays in the
disposition of these cases and the perceived partiality of
respondent Judge to Atty. Augusto Schneider, the people’s
confidence in the judiciary is being eroded.
In compliance with the Resolution of this Court dated February 14,
1994, 2 respondent Judge Zantua denied the accusations against
him in his answer and comment alleging, among others, that
Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936 for grave coercion and grave
threats had been lagging for more than two (2) years because of
the numerous postponements of both the prosecution and the
defense; that he allowed the presentation of the witnesses without
the presence of opposing counsel provided that the parties and
their counsel were properly notified and the witnesses shall be
subject to cross examination pursuant to Section 2, par. (c) of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and the case of Borja v.
Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422; that Atty. Schneider has never been a
counsel in this case because the prosecutor was Pedro Vega and
the defense counsel was Freddie Venida. 3
Respondent Judge claims that in Criminal Case No. 5973 (People v.
Efren Dalde) for highgrading wherein Mayor Padilla claims that no
hearing has been conducted, records of the case will bear him out
that a hearing had actually been conducted; that the accused,
represented by a DAR lawyer, was arraigned, pre-trial was held,
and ocular inspection was made.
In Civil Case No. 610 (Vicenta Enriquez v. Zaldy Suarez) for
forcible entry (not for trespassing) wherein Mayor Padilla complains
that it was decided without a hearing, respondent Judge maintains
that the case was tried pursuant to Section 1, par. 1-A of the Rule
on Summary Procedure. After an answer was filed, the parties were
asked to submit their respective position papers with their
evidence, after which the case was decided in accordance with
Section 10 thereof.chanrobles law library : red
The delay in Criminal Case No. 5908 (People v. Rolando Racasa),
according to respondent Judge, was caused by the frequent
postponements and non-appearance of the private prosecutor
and/or defense counsel, and justice requires the presence of
lawyers in the trial of cases where the records show that the
accused had already been arraigned and the three prosecution
witnesses had already been presented.
In Criminal Case No. 5998 (People v. Job Riel), respondent Judge
claims that the delay was due to numerous postponements but
explains that the accused has already been arraigned and the last
witness is to be presented by the prosecution.
Respondent Judge denies that he is fraternizing with lawyers with
pending cases in his sala, explaining that in the case of Atty.
Schneider, he is the only lawyer in the Municipality of Jose
Panganiban and it is but natural for respondent Judge to be friendly
with him but maintains that their friendship has never been a
hindrance to the proper disposition of the cases in his sala as his
impartiality is known not only in the Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, but also in the province of Camarines Norte as shown
by his decisions in MTC Mercedes, MTC Paracale and MTC Basud.
Respondent Judge attributes the filing of the instant complaint
against him to local politics in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban,
alleging that since his appointment on February 16, 1983, he has
always been neutral and impartial in all the cases he disposed of;
that even in the case against herein complainant Mayor for slander
by deed, he displayed his position of being neutral and impartial,
for which reason he has earned the ire of Governor Roy Padilla, Sr.,
complainant’s father, and Mayor Roger Padilla because respondent
Judge refuses to succumb to their influence and pressure; that for
this reason, he requested his transfer on November 29, 1990 to
another station (MTC, Basud, Camarines Norte) as his life in Jose
Panganiban is in imminent danger brought about by the political
pressures, and this request was followed by his letter-requests
dated May 2, 1991, then August 30, 1993, and most recently, the
letter-request dated December 10, 1993 addressed to Hon.
Reynaldo L. Suarez, Deputy Court Administrator.
The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In a Memorandum dated
August 4, 1994 addressed to the Hon. Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez,
concurred in by Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pano,
recommended the dismissal of charges for failure to decide cases
within the prescribed period and for unreasonable delay in the
disposition of cases. 4
We agree with the dismissal of the charges with respect to failure
to decide the cases within the prescribed period and the charges of
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases against respondent
Judge.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Complainant in the instant case failed to specifically cite any of the
cases referred to in the complaint which remained undecided after
the lapse of the required 90-day period to decide cases; hence, the
dismissal of charges of violation of the 90-day period is in order.
The delay in the trial of the cited cases in the complaint,
particularly Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936, Criminal Case No.
5908 and Criminal Case No. 5998, was not entirely the fault of
herein respondent Judge. The delay was caused by the numerous
postponements both by the prosecution and the defense. However,
respondent Judge should be reminded of the directive in Circular
No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989 requiring all courts to conduct a
mandatory continuous trial which is to be terminated within 90
days from inception of the initial hearing.
However, as regards the allegations of manifest partiality in favor
of a litigant and fraternizing with lawyers who have pending cases
in his sala, we note that respondent Judge does not deny his close
friendship and association with Atty. Augusto Schneider.
Respondent Judge pointed out that while it is true that Atty.
Schneider has pending cases in his sala, the latter lost in these
cases which is supposed to give the impression that such close
association with Atty. Schneider has not affected his neutrality and
impartiality as a Judge.
We cannot fully countenance the view of respondent Judge.
Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and
camaraderie to the point that favors in the future may be asked
from respondent judge which he may find hard to resist. The
actuation of respondent Judge of eating and drinking in public
places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may well
arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust
of the litigants in the impartiality of the judge. This eventuality may
undermine the people’s faith in the administration of justice. It is of
no moment that Atty. Augusto Schneider is the only lawyer in the
locality.
A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 5 The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. 6
Once again, we find this case an occasion to remind members of
the Judiciary:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and
suspicion, and be free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior not only in the discharge of their official duties
but also in their everyday life, for as we have earlier stressed, ‘no
position exacts greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary’ so that (a)
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome
of integrity and justice." 7
Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and
the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public
scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen. 8
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge is
hereby ADMONISHED with a warning that a repetition of similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Respondent
Judge is reminded to be prompt in the disposition of cases pending
in his sala pursuant to Sections 3, 4, 5 of Rule 22, Rules of Court
and Administrative Circular No. 1-88 and Circular 1-89.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal records.
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563             September 8, 2004
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)
LUCILA TAN, complainant,
vs.
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete,
former Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San
Juan, Metro Manila,1 for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before Branch
58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by
respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge
allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. They met at
Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in
Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent was asking for
₱150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was
shown copies of respondent judge’s Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos.
59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against
the accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the
disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded.
The staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft
decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. Complainant, however, did not
accede to respondent’s demand because she believed that she had a
very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were
eventually dismissed by respondent judge.2
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of
complainant. He instead stated that it was complainant who attempted to
bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay
and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos.
59440 and 66120. Complainant also sought the intervention of then San
Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor
Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help
complainant. The former even called him over the phone when he was in
New Zealand, persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation of
the Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there
was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he had
already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation.
Respondent further stated that complainant kept bragging about her
close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills,
San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him get appointed to a
higher position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent
judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the
downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer.
Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave
complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He
said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal
Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left for New Zealand on study
leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter
change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any
member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions. 3
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint
to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for
investigation, report and recommendation. 4
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings
on the administrative case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her
side. She presented as documentary evidence the copy of the unsigned
Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was
allegedly handed to her by a member of respondent judge’s
staff.5 Respondent judge, on the other hand, presented four (4)
witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B.
Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad Hernandez. His documentary evidence
consists of the affidavits of his witnesses,6 copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, 7 and various documents
composed of the machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case
No. 117219, machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997,
machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides
of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated March 31, 1998,
Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and
Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by
complainant to respondent’s witness, Fernando B. Espuerta. 8
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as
follows:
COMPLAINANT’S VERSION:
1. LUCILA TAN
Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent
Judge because she had a case in Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan,
Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed two
cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutor’s
Office in Pasig. After resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC,
San Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one went to
Branch 58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding
Judge. Judge Quilatan was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57.
Upon advise of a friend, she moved for consolidation and the two
cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57.
Subsequently, in view of the Motion for Inhibition filed by
Complainant’s lawyer, Judge Quilatan inhibited himself and the
two cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent Judge
Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several
hearings, the Clerk of Court, named Joyce, called up the
Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce gave her the phone
number of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing
of March 3, 2003). Complainant then called up the Office of the
Mayor but her call was intercepted by Josie, the Mayor’s
Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked
her if she wanted to meet the Judge and when Complainant
answered in the affirmative, Josie made arrangements for
Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor
sometime in November or late October 2000 and she met the
Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met
at the Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). During the meeting, Complainant
"told the Judge regarding this matter, how this happened and that
he will convince the Accused to pay me as soon as
possible" (TSN, page 23, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she
went to the restroom for a few minutes, Respondent Judge and
Josie were left alone. After she came back, they went home. On
the way home, Josie told her to give something to [the] Judge,
"Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti para bumilis iyong kaso
mo" (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3, 2003). At first, Josie
did not mention any amount but when the Complainant asked her
how much, the former mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00). Complainant asked for a lesser amount, Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). When Josie agreed, she sent the amount of
₱20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after two days (TSN,
pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received
the money, the Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her
(Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court asked her if she
sent money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court
said that Josie went there and there was money in the
drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After
that, several hearings were on-going, and before the resolution,
Joyce called up the Complainant again around February 2001.
Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce called saying that she
had an important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After
Complainant got back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said
that she will show Complainant something. When they were in
Complainant’s car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two
unsigned Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions,
Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed and that it will be
dismissed if she will not accede to Joyce’s request (TSN, pages
30-33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant claimed that
Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for each case. "Sabi niya it [was]
for Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at
that time" (TSN, page 34, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
Complainant identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case
No. 59440 for Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001, which was
marked as Exhibit "A" for the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further alleged "Sabi
niya, if I will accede to that request of ₱150,000.00 for each case
then they will (sic) going to reverse the Decision" and "Si Judge
daw" will reverse the Decision. Complainant met with Joyce
around February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant further claimed that Joyce told her to go to
Mayor because he is a friend of the Judge. Complainant went
again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayor’s help and she
met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The Mayor called up the
Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was
called. Joyce went to the Office of the Mayor and when she
arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the country (TSN,
pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for
the phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce
gave. Mayor Estrada was able to get in touch with the Judge.
While the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with the Judge,
Complainant was in front of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor
"because his voice is very loud." He said, "Judge, Saan ka? Sabi why, "Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila
niya New Zealand. When were you coming back? I do not know ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver ng case
what is the answer and then he said, you help my friend ng promulgation." She received the decision when she sent her
naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso niya para matapos na kasi driver to pick it up. The caller said that the decision was
matagal na iyan" (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003). unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3,
After that they left the Office of the Mayor and Complainant was 2003).
not able to approach Mayor Estrada again. Since the
Complainant was still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that RESPONDENT’S VERSION:
it will be promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her
friends. The Complainant showed the decision to the Prosecutor 1. JOSEFINA RAMOS
in San Juan at that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March
3, 2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is going
She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy
to meet with the Judge when he comes back from New Zealand.
Estrada, the former Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, since he
Complainant testified that, sometime in April, in Sangkalan,
was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she was already
Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge
the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of
Rosete. She was with two (2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at
September 9, 2003). She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to
Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the evening, Judge Rosete was
the Mayor’s Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of President
already in the company of several men whom she got to know as
Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan
Fernan and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3,
went to the Office, together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking
2003). After eating and drinking, the Complainant left at around
the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a case. She did not
10:30 in the evening. While they were inside, Complainant
know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She
claimed that she did not say anything at all and it was the
could no longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to
Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid
the Office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She did not know what
all the bills which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00).
Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or how close
When Complainant left, only they, three (3) girls, left while the
Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September
Judge and his company were still there drinking. While
9, 2003). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at the Cravings
Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man came over
Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty
from behind (TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed up or
Complainant did not know him but she asked the Prosecutor later
facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only Twenty
after the man left. The Complainant said that the man asked if he
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00). She claimed that she did not
could have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and
know what Lucila Tan was talking about regarding the money.
she told the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say
There was no occasion that she suggested or even intimated to
that she already talked to the Judge. The man left and went back
Lucila Tan the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied
inside the restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
that she met with Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings
Complainant said that when she did not give the money she was
Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila. She
still scared because there will already be a promulgation and she
identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003,
did not know whether it will be in her behalf (sic) or not.
which was marked as Exhibit "1" (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of
Complainant did not give anything aside from the ₱20,000.00
September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila Tan gave anything
because her case was very strong and she had all the papers
to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).
and evidence and that she promised them that she will give them
after she was (sic) able to collect all the debts. Complainant did
not know the actual date of the promulgation but somebody from 2. RODOLFO CEA
the Office of Respondent Judge called her up in her house and
told her not to go to the promulgation. When Complainant asked
He testified that his acquaintances usually call him "Buboy" and
for about two years or more he had no occupation. Two years
before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58,
San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when he "was still
working as Clerk in San Juan, she approached me and asked if I
can introduce her to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a
favorable decision against her case." He could not remember
anymore when that was because "it was a long time ago" (TSN,
pages 6-7, Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was when he
was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. He
met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the Metropolitan Trial Court
when she approached him and asked if he can introduce her to
Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to Judge
Rosete but he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to
Judge Rosete "because aside from the introduction, she wants
me to ask Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against (sic) her
case and I told her that Judge Rosete don’t (sic) like his staff (to)
indulge on that kind of transaction" (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had
with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court in San Juan was "the
first and the last time." When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan
that he approached her and demanded from her a sum of money
to represent an advance payment for a favorable decision in her
cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he answered "I don’t
know about that, sir." (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22,
2003.) He identified the Sworn Statement, subscribed on
February 6, 2003, and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of
the contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit
"2" (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He
denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant
around 8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date (TSN, page 13,
Hearing of September 22, 2003).
3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA
He testified that he is a government employee employed at the
Supreme Court with the position Budget Officer III since
November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became
Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September
22, 2003). He recalled having met Lucila Tan sometime just
before Christmas in October or November 2000. The first time he
saw Lucila Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon City where she
was introduced to him by Fiscal Reyes. He went to the restaurant
alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because they had not
been together for a long time and they were long time friends.
They ate at the restaurant. When he arrived, Judge Rosete and
Buboy were already there. They stayed in the restaurant until
11:00 [eleven] o’clock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49,
Hearing of September 22, 2003). He met Lucila Tan in that
restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila Tan as
Fernan of the Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and
Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the three (3) girls
arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the
Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of September 22, 2003). They
ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He recalled
that Judge Rosete paid for their bill because he saw him get a
credit card and sign something. He did not know about Mrs. Tan
but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the waiter. The
incident where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City
came before the incident when she went to his Office (TSN,
pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He could not
remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he
remembers that it was nearing Christmas in 2000. "Pumunta siya
sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin, katunayan nandito
po dala ko." Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with
Alfonso Sy. "Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako
ng three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) para iabot kay
Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang
aking kaibigan. Matagal na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong
nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa kanya." He told
Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their
second meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a
Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which
was marked as Exhibit "3" (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). He presented the papers actually given to
him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox copy was the exact
same document given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his
Office. The other documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when
she went to his Office were marked as Exhibit "4" and
submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22,
2003). Lucila Tan told him the contents of the documents and
how the case against Alfonso Sy came about. When Lucila Tan
asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent Judge)
was not like that and they had been together for a long time and it
is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about that, the latter
got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew
the son of the Chief Justice (TSN, pages 64-66, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give
Judge Rosete so that her case will win but he answered that his
friend was not like that (TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of
September 22, 2003).
4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ
She testified that she was a government employee connected
with the Judiciary at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San
Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila Tan because
in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to
know Lucila Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen
Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57, who introduced
Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, "may kaso ito sa inyo,
pinapasabi ni Mayor kay Judge" (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She did not say anything but Lucila Tan
asked "may tumawag na ba sa Mayor’s Office?" and she said
"yes, ma’am." After that there was a hearing and the sister of
former President Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge
Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing and the
former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila "na
pinakikiusap ni Mayor" (TSN, page 12, Hearing of September
29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the sister
of the former President told her and that Judge Rosete said
nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant on March 3,
2003 that, sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez)
called up Lucila Tan by telephone and said that she saw money
stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and that
she asked the Complainant whether the latter was the one who
sent the money stuffed inside the drawer. What she remembers is
that Lucila Tan called her and asked if Josie went to their Office
and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She
also denied that she called up Lucila Tan sometime in February
2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan was the one who called her up
and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her
something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and
she was surprised when the former showed her the copy. When
she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter did not
answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN,
pages 13-16, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She immediately
went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor
Jinggoy talked to her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete
was and she answered that he was in New Zealand on study
leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone number
of the Judge, she gave him the telephone number in New
Zealand. She was present when the Mayor called up Respondent
Judge and talked to him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September
29, 2003). "He said ‘Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap
ko sa iyo?’ I don’t know what was your answer(ed) [sic] to him,
you were talking and then he said ‘ganun ba?’ then Mayor
Jinggoy said ‘o sige, okay na’ and then we left the Office." She
denied that she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in
Complainant’s two cases inside the latter’s parked car in San
Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one
who showed her the copy in their Office. She likewise denied the
testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded
Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before
Branch 58, which were decided by Respondent Judge, in return
for a favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the Complainant
who offered to her. She identified her Sworn Statement,
subscribed and sworn to on February 5, 2003, which was marked
as Exhibit "5," and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of all
the contents thereof (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September
29, 2003).9
The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story.
Complainant claims that respondent judge, through his staff, required her
to pay the amount of ₱150,000.00 for him to render judgment in her favor
in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent
judge, on the other hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted
to bribe him by offering to pay for the downpayment of the car he was
planning to buy, and she even sought the intervention of then San Juan
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for the complainant in
Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination
of the credibility of the parties’ evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well
as the documentary evidence presented by both parties, we find the
complainant’s version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with
clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation
the unsigned copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal
Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary
evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainant’s staff
met with her, showed her copies of respondent judge’s draft decisions in
Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of
respondent judge, that she pays ₱150,000.00 for the reversal of the
disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for complainant to obtain
a copy of a judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not
through the judge himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary
employee in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case’s
disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.
The respondent’s evidence did not overcome the facts proved by
complainant. We note that the testimonies of two of respondent’s
witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed
complainant’s claim that she met respondent judge and his two
companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan
Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied that
he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never
went out with respondent judge in non-office functions. The Investigating
Judge observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the
Respondent Judge’s two witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando
B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan Restaurant in
Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met
Respondent Judge, a certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was
with two Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified that he was
at Sangkalan Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy
(Rodolfo Cea), while the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met
the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant.10 (citations omitted)
Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainant’s version that she
met with respondent judge and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant
sometime in April 2001.
We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid
with the Court as regards the dates when he went to New Zealand and
when he came back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts that he was
already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims that he met
with her. However, the evidence he presented only shows his New
Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said country. 11 He did not
show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the
Philippines. Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4,
2001 and May 1, 2001. We may therefore infer that complainant was in
the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with
complainant’s testimony, as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she
met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in
April 2001.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest
tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be
pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because
the people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness
they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the
transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is
therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the
performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance
of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.12
Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with
complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of
meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours
violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by
members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete
is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for FOUR
(4) MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. RTJ-93-1021. January 31, 1997]
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE
GUZMAN, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
142, City of Makati, Metro Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The administration of justice is likened to that of a voyage to
nowhere-unless it is manned by honest and able magistrates, it
drifts aimlessly. Magistracy is after all-about character.
In this administrative case, the Office of the Court
Administrator1 filed against Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, Metro
Manila, for serious misconduct in connection with the lifting of the
notice of lis pendens in the case of Norvic Incorporated,
represented by its president Atty. Vicente Santos against St.
Michael International Institute of Technology, represented by its
president Erlinda M. Pealoza, and St. Michael Institute Corporation,
represented by its president Patricia M. Pealoza, docketed as Civil
Case N0. 91-1123.
From the underlying record of Civil Case No. 91-1123, its factual
backdrop may be summed up as follows:
It appears that Norvic Incorporated (Norvic, for brevity) was the
principal stockholder of Overseas Superintendence Corporation
(OSC, for brevity) which was the registered owner of a parcel of
land (Yakal property) situated in Makati, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 142203. On August 1, 1986, Atty. Vicente
Santos, acting as president of Norvic, entered with St. Michael
International Institute of Technology (SMIIT, for brevity),
represented by its president Erlinda M. Penaloza, into a contract to
sell2 the OSC shares of stock and the Yakal property. Subsequently,
OSC conveyed the Yakal property to St. Michael International
Realty and Management Corporation (SMIRM, for brevity) pursuant
to the Deed of Conveyance and Exchange dated December 21,
1989.3 The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 142203 of OSC was
consequently cancelled and a new one (TCT No. 167832)4 was
issued in the name of SMIRM.
Two years later, Norvic filed this subject case5 (Civil Case No. 91-
1123 which was assigned to the sala of Judge Cosico) for the
annulment of the Deed of Conveyance and Exchange dated
December 21, 1989 on the ground that the transfer of the Yakal
property was fraudulent. Due to the filing of this case, Norvic
caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 167832 on April
22, 1989.6 SMIIT and SMIRM, the defendants in this Civil Case No.
91-1123, filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens,7 but,
the same was denied by Judge Cosico in his order dated June 26,
1991.8 As a result of Judge Cosicos resignation from judicial service
on December 31, 1991, Norvic filed a motion to re-raffle the case
on January 20, 19929 which was granted by Executive Judge Job B.
Madayag.10 Thus, the case was referred to respondent Judge De
Guzman following the re-raffling11 of the case on February 7, 1992
before the sala of Executive Judge Job B. Madayag. Later on,
defendants SMIIT and SMIRM filed a motion for reconsideration12 of
the order of denial dated June 26, 1991 of then Judge Cosico and
for the cancellation of notice of lis pendens contending, inter alia,
that Norvic was not the proper party whose rights might be
protected by the annotation of lis pendens because it was not the
registered owner of the Yakal property before and after it was
transferred to defendant SMIRM. On August 5, 1992, respondent
De Guzman reconsidered the order of denial dated June 26, 1991
of then Judge Cosico and ordered the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens.13 A year later the parties reached a compromise
settlement, thus, a joint motion14 was filed by both parties praying
for the dismissal of the case which was granted by respondent De
Guzman in his order dated September 23, 1993.15
The administrative suit against respondent Judge de Guzman was
based on the testimony16 of former judge Manuel Cosico which was
taken during the investigation of the alleged irregularities in service
of some judges in Makati conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee
created under Administrative Order No. 11-93 which was composed
of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and retired Justices Lorenzo R.
Relova and Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera.
The Complaint dated July 5, 199317 against respondent Judge De
Guzman states, inter alia, that respondent approached at least
twice Judge Manuel Cosico, then Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 136 of Makati in whose sala the aforesaid Case
No. 91-1123 was then pending and asked him to grant the motion
to lift the notice of lis pendens filed by one of the parties in the said
case. When Judge Cosico denied the motion, respondent came
back asking him to reconsider the order of denial. Following the
resignation from the service of Judge Cosico, the said case was re-
raffled to the sala of respondent who reconsidered the order of
denial issued by then Judge Cosico and cancelled the notice of lis
pendens, thereby showing keen personal interest on the said case
to the prejudice of the administration of justice.
Respondent, in his Comment dated September 3, 1993,18 denies
having approached Judge Cosico and asking him to take any action
in connection with the said case. He asserts that Judge Cosico was
motivated by vindictiveness when he testified falsely against
respondent during the Ad Hoc Committee hearing. During their
several meetings, respondent and Judge Cosico only talked to each
other mostly on matters of law but he never asked Judge Cosico
any favor nor to act in a certain way in any case except in Civil
Case No. 90-1506 involving the respondent himself who requested
Judge Cosico to rule on his motion for execution. He alleges that he
became aware only of the Norvic case when he was informed
through telephone by the President of Norvic Incorporated, Atty.
Vicente Santos who was his former classmate in Ateneo de Manila,
that said case was re-raffled to his sala. He offered to inhibit from
trying the case because of his friendship with Atty. Santos but both
parties requested the respondent to keep the case and help in its
amicable settlement. He adds that the reversal of Judge Cosicos
order, which was done in utmost good faith after several months of
efforts in arriving at a settlement, was well-taken and accepted by
the parties.
In a Resolution dated October 4, 199319 of the First Division of this
Court, this administrative case was referred to Justice Manuel C.
Herrera for report and evaluation. Pursuant to the authority given,
he conducted hearings on November 19, 1993 and December 3,
1993. Considering however his request20 that he be allowed to
inhibit from further proceeding with the said case on the ground
that Judge Cosico, the principal witness of the case, was his
colleague in the Faculty of the Ateneo Law School, the case was
assigned to Justice Jaime N. Lantin.21 But Justice Lantin likewise
inhibited from trying the case, so, it was given to Justice Gloria C.
Paras for report and recommendation.22 On April 13, 1994, Justice
Paras asked to be relieved from the investigation of the case which
was granted by this Court. Finally, the case was re-assigned to
Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas by virtue of the Resolution dated May 18,
1994.23
In his Report dated September 14, 1994, Justice Salas found that
respondent, in reconsidering the order of denial issued by Judge
Cosico and consequently lifting the notice of lis pendens, was not
dictated by pecuniary consideration, but nevertheless held him
liable for influencing the outcome of the subject case when it asked
Judge Cosico to cancel the notice of lis pendens.24 The
recommendation of Justice Salas in his Report reads as follows:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the undersigned recommends as a
penalty, reprimand, with a warning of a more severe penalty in
case of repetition.25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon a careful scrutiny of the records, We find no clear and
convincing evidence to sustain the allegation that respondent was
moved by personal or financial interest in issuing the order dated
August 5, 1992 which cancelled the notice of lis pendens. On the
contrary, the explanation offered by respondent and the
circumstances prevailing in the subject case are sufficient to
warrant a conclusion that he in utmost good faith merely
discharged his public duty when he lifted the notice of lis pendens.
The following significant points are worth considering: first, as what
Justice Salas appropriately stated, if he (respondent) had, either, a
desire manifesting financial interest, or to favor somebody, then he
should have instead ruled against the lifting (of notice of lis
pendens), considering that Atty. Santos (the president of Norvic)
was not only his classmate but also a relative of his wife by
affinity26; second, the subject case was assigned to respondent
simply because it was re-raffled to his sala upon motion of Norvic;
third, he tried to voluntarily inhibit from the case but the parties
themselves asked him to stay on with the case and to help, as he
did help, in amicably settling the case which culminated to the
filing of a joint motion to dismiss by both parties; fourth, he issued
the order lifting the notice of lis pendens after a careful and
thorough study of the merits of the motion27 and opposition28 filed
by the parties; and, fifth, respondent was legally justified in issuing
the order cancelling the notice of lis pendens, the pertinent portion
of the said order reads as follows:
xxx
The Court subscribes to the position of defendants-movants (SMIIT
and SMIRM). Plaintiff Norvic Incorporated is manifestly not the
proper party whose rights may be protected by the annotation
of lis pendens. It is neither the previous registered owner nor the
present registered owner of the property subject matter of the
instant case and presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 167832, hence, bereft of personality to cause the annotation of
the subject notice of lis pendens on the said title. The property
owned by the plaintiff subject matter of its transaction with the
defendants are plaintiffs shares of stock in Overseas
Superintendence Corporation. x x x29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of
the party who caused it to be recorded. The cancellation order of
respondent was issued pursuant to the second ground, that is, the
notice of lis pendens was not necessary to protect the right of
Norvic which caused it to be recorded. A cautious reading of the
records of the instant case reveals that never was Norvic the owner
of the Yakal property. It was Overseas Superintendence
Corporation (OSC) that owned the Yakal property prior to its
transfer to SMIRM. The fact that Norvic was the majority
stockholder of OSC would not legally clothe it (Norvic) with
personality to cause the notice of lis pendens affecting the property
of the corporation (OSC) specially so when the corporation was not
even one of the parties to the case. Well settled is the rule that
properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by
it as an entity separate and distinct from its members.30 A
stockholder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the
corporation, nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite
portion of its property or assets; he is not a co-owner or tenant in
common of the corporate property.31
In the absence therefore of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad
faith in issuing the order lifting the notice of lis pendens, this act of
respondent which pertains to his judicial capacity is not subject to
disciplinary action.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We are convinced, however, that respondent approached Judge
Cosico at least twice asking him to cancel the notice of lis pendens,
thereby, trying to influence the course of the litigation in the
subject case in violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. to wit:
A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome
of litigation or dispute pending before another court or judge.
Justice Salas, in his Report, made the following observation, to
which We agree:
There is, on the other hand, a reason to believe that the
respondent indeed approached Judge Cosico and requested him,
from the beginning, to lift the notice of lis pendens. Moreover, the
respondent went to Judge Cosico the second or third time, on both
occasions mentioning the Norvic Case. Judge Cosico even told the
Court, the first time the respondent approached him, the former
was in white barong and even knocking the door loudly before
coming in. It is hard to consider the possibility that Judge Cosico,
in testifying before the Ad Hoc Committee, told a lie, considering
that he was facing a panel that was attended not only by the Chief
Justice, but also by Justices Relova and Herrera. Before such
Honorable Justices, certainly it will take one with bravado and
cockiness to tell a brazen lie. Secondly, by being a lawyer alone, he
knows a price of telling a lie. Even the respondent admitted, he and
Judge Cosico had been on friendly terms, and that the former
talked back against Cosico only in one isolated case involving an
ejectment on appeal from the MTC, of which the respondent was
himself a party. Admittedly, Judge Cosico is by nature a person
who is talkative, who possibly would like to be looked upon as an
idealist or reformer or as a person if not conceited or overconfident
at least looks at himself as better than anybody else. However we
can hardly reconcile having a situation where Judge Cosico then
appearing before the Ad Hoc Committee would invent a version
identifying the respondent as the person who asked him more than
once to lift a notice of lis pendens.33 x x x
Considering the foregoing, We cannot but give credence to the
testimony of former Judge Cosico who narrated the event in a clear
and straight forward manner. It is our finding that he was not in
any way motivated by enmity or bad faith when he testified against
respondent. Both Judge Cosico and respondent even admitted that
no animosity existed between them,34 in fact, during Judge Cosicos
tenure in office they used to meet and discuss with each other
about many things mostly of law.35 Contrary therefore, to
respondent's claim that Judge Cosico was motivated by
vindictiveness, it is highly improbable for Judge Cosico to
prevaricate and cause damnation to respondent who brought no
harm to the former. Well settled is the rule that in the absence of
any evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses should
have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no improper
motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.

As the visible representation of law and justice, judges are

expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance
the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system.36 It
is incumbent upon them to so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.37 Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act in
a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve faith in the
administration of justice.38 They should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.39 In the case at bar, the
act of interference by respondent De Guzman with the subject case
pending in the sala of Judge Cosico clearly tarnishes the integrity
and independence of the judiciary and subverts the peoples faith in
our judicial process. His evident misconduct collides with the
established ethical standards mandated upon those who sit in the
bench. It is significant to stress that judges are held to higher
standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other
persons not invested with the public trust. They should inspire trust
and confidence, and should bring honor to the judiciary. 40 Honos
habet onus-honor carries with it, responsibility.

WHEREFORE, this COURT finds sufficient evidence to hold

respondent GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT for influencing the
course of litigation in Civil Case No. 91-1123 in evident violation of
Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Accordingly, a
fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby imposed upon
respondent with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more SEVERELY.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663 : March 26, 2010]
ROLAND ERNEST MARIE JOSE SPELMANS, COMPLAINANT,
VS. JUDGE GAYDIFREDO T. OCAMPO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, POLOMOLOK, SOUTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This is a case about the improper conduct of an MTC judge who
kept properties owned by the complainant while conducting a
preliminary investigation.
The Facts and the Case
On April 8, 2006 complainant Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans
(Spelmans), a Belgian, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao, a complaint for theft and graft and corruption against
respondent Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo
(Judge Ocampo) of Polomolok, South Cotabato.[1]
Spelmans alleged in his affidavit that in 2002 his wife, Annalyn
Villan (Villan), filed a complaint for theft against Joelito Rencio
(Rencio) and his wife from whom Spelmans rented a house in
Polomolok, South Cotabato. Spelmans claimed, however, that this
complaint was but his wife's scheme for taking out his personal
properties from that house. In the course of the investigation of
the complaint, Judge Ocampo, together with the parties, held an
ocular inspection of that rented house and another one where
Spelmans kept some of the personal belongings of his late mother.
During the ocular inspection, Judge Ocampo allegedly took pieces
of antique, including a marble bust of Spelmans' mother, a flower
pot, a statue, and a copper scale of justice. A week later, Judge
Ocampo went back and further took six Oakwood chairs and its
table, four gold champagne glasses, and a deer horn chandelier.
[2]
 In the meantime, the Bureau of Immigration happened to detain
Spelmans in Manila and let him free only on January 28, 2003.[3]
The Ombudsman, Mindanao, referred Spelmans' complaint against
Judge Ocampo to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In
his comment of August 8, 2006[4] Judge Ocampo denied the
charge, pointing out that Spelmans' wife, Villan (the complainant in
that theft case), gave him certain household items for safekeeping
before she filed the case of theft against Rencio. On August 28,
2002, however, after conducting a preliminary investigation in the
case, Judge Ocampo dismissed Villan's complaint.
Only in 2006, according to Judge Ocampo, when he received a
copy of Spelmans' complaint for grave misconduct did he learn of
the couple's separation and his unwitting part in their legal battles.
As a last note, Judge Ocampo said that instead of hurling baseless
accusations at him, Spelmans should have thanked him because he
kept his personal properties in good condition.
In a supplemental complaint dated August 30, 2006[5] Spelmans
further alleged that Judge Ocampo requested him to sign an
affidavit which cleared the Judge and prayed for the dismissal of
the administrative complaint.[6]
On October 17, 2006 OCA found Judge Ocampo guilty of
committing acts of impropriety and maintaining close affinity with a
litigant in violation of Canons 1 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.[7] Since, under Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, a violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives, and circulars constitutes a less serious charge,
punishable either with suspension or fine, the OCA recommended
the imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 on Judge Ocampo with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.[8]
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not Judge Ocampo's taking and
keeping of the personal items belonging to Spelmans but
supposedly given to him by the latter's wife for safekeeping
constitutes a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court's Ruling
The evidence of Spelmans is that his wife, Villan, made it appear
that she filed a complaint for theft against Rencio, the lessor or
caretaker of the rented house, before Judge Ocampo's court but
that this was a mere ploy. Her true purpose was to get certain
properties belonging to Spelmans from that house. During the
preliminary investigation of the case, Judge Ocampo held an ocular
inspection of the house and another one that also belonged to
Spelmans and took some of the personal properties from these
places.
On the other hand, Judge Ocampo insists that Villan gave him the
personal items mentioned by Spelmans for safekeeping before she
filed in his court the complaint for theft against Rencio. This did not
influence him, however, since he eventually ordered the dismissal
of that complaint. But this explanation is quite unsatisfactory.
First. Judge Ocampo did not explain why, of all people in
Polomolok, South Cotabato, Spelmans' wife, Villan, would entrust
to him, a municipal judge, certain personal items for safekeeping.
This is essentially suspect because she would subsequently file,
according to Judge Ocampo, a case of theft of personal items that
Rencio supposedly took from Spelmans' houses.
Second. Judge Ocampo does not deny that he conducted an ocular
inspection of the houses that Spelmans used in Polomolok. But the
purpose of this ocular inspection is suspect. Judge Ocampo did not
explain what justified it. The charge was not robbery where he
might have an interest in personally looking at where and how the
break-in took place. It was a case of theft where it would be
sufficient for the complainant to simply state in her complaint-
affidavit where the alleged theft took place.
Third. If Judge Ocampo received the pieces of antique from Villan
for safekeeping, this meant that a relation of trust existed between
them. Consequently, Judge Ocampo had every reason to inhibit
himself from the case from the beginning. He of course claims that
he dismissed the case against Rencio eventually but this is no
excuse since his ruling could have gone the other way. Besides,
Spelmans claims that the complaint was just a scheme to enable
Villan to steal his personal properties from the two houses. This
claim seems believable given the above circumstances.
Fourth. By his admission, Judge Ocampo returned the items only
after four years when Spelmans already filed a complaint against
him. He makes no claim that he made a previous effort to return
those supposedly entrusted items either to Villan or to Spelmans.
His years of possession obviously went beyond mere safekeeping.
For the above reasons, the OCA erred in regarding Judge Ocampo's
offense as falling merely under Section 11(B), in relation to Section
9(4) of Rule 140, as amended, which is a less serious charge of
violation of Supreme Court rules, punishable by either suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but
not exceeding P20,000.00.[9] On the other hand, impropriety is
treated as a light charge and is punishable by a fine of not less
than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 or by censure,
reprimand, or admonition with warning.[10]
Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross
misconduct[11] constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1,[12] Section 1 of Canon 2,
[13]
 and Section 1 of Canon 4.[14] From the circumstances, his acts
were motivated by malice.[15] He was not a warehouseman for
personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have
kept Spelmans' properties had the latter not filed a complaint
against him. He was guilty of covetousness. It affected the
performance of his duties as an officer of the court[16] and tainted
the judiciary's integrity. He should be punished accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Gaydifredo
Ocampo GUILTY of gross misconduct and IMPOSES on him the
penalty of SUSPENSION from office without salary and other
benefits for six (6) months.[17] He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
 [Adm. Matter No. MTJ-94-985. February 21, 1995.]
APOLINARIO MUÑEZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE CIRIACO ARIÑO,
MCTC, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; USURPATION OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY; ELEMENTS. —
Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of
judicial authority involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is
an officer of the executive branch of the government; and (2) that he
assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or
decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEEMED COMMITTED WHEN A MAYOR ISSUED A
WARRANT OF ARREST; CASE AT BAR. — Any one reading the warrant in
case at bar could not have been mistaken that it was a warrant for the
arrest of the complainant Apolinario Muñez. As a matter of fact Mayor
Irisari justified his order on the basis of Section 143(3) of the former Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which expressly provided
that "in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation, the
mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the
authority to order the arrest of the accused." This provision had, however,
been repealed by Art. III, 2 of the 1987 Constitution, as this Court held in
Ponsica v. Ignalaga, (152 SCRA 647, 662-663 [1987]) in which it was
explained: No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to
conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest.
Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the
mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987
Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on
the basis thereof; warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly
exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution — who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigation and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. That there
was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not make the
order against him any less an order of arrest, contrary to the opinion of
DILG. On the other hand, the issuance of the warrant when there was
before him no criminal case, but only a land dispute as it is now being
made to appear, only made it worse for the mayor, for it would then
appear that he assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not
have done. All the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have
dismissed the criminal case against the mayor. It cannot be pretended that
Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or summon Muñez to his office
because he had precisely done this the day before he issued the warrant of
arrest, and he ordered the arrest of complainant because the latter had
refused to appear before him. The summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows
clearly that he understood the difference between a summons and a
warrant of arrest.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; RELIANCE ON THE FINDINGS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES WITHOUT GIVING AN INDEPENDENT
JUDGMENT; CONSTITUTE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. — Respondent has
previously denied the motion to dismiss which the accused Mayor Irisari
had filed on the ground that the authority (B.P. Blg. 337, 143(3)) invoked
by him as basis for his warrant of arrest had been abrogated by the
Constitution. He subsequently reversed himself on the ground that the
decision of the DILG, finding Mayor Irisari not guilty, "must be respected."
He said, "Courts are not bound by findings of administrative agencies like
the DILG as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and
there is arbitrary action or palpable serious error." Since the DILG decision
was not so tainted, "therefore, it must be respected." Respondent judge
Ciriaco Ariño should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not
before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and,
therefore, there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of
evidence. What was before him was a criminal case and he should have
considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving the
motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor
judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles, for which he should
be reminded of what this Court said in Libarios v. Dabalos (199 SCRA 49
[1991]): In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action,
even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or
errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be
conversant with basic legal principles. In every case, a judge should
endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed
by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. . . . A
judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the
law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if
there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench
cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
But there is more than just gross ignorance of legal principles shown here.
Although he denies it, what the respondent judge appears to have actually
done in this case was to rely on the opinion of DILG which found the
mayor not guilty of serious misconduct in office on the ground that he had
not really issued a warrant of arrest against the complainant but only an
invitation or a summons. To justify his reliance on the opinion of the DILG,
respondent judge invoked the rule in administrative law that the findings
of facts of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial
evidence, are binding on the courts in the absence of a showing of fraud,
imposition or dishonesty. We have already stated why that is grossly
erroneous. What we are here concerned is that relying on the opinion of
the DILG, disregarding a previous ruling he had made which was in
accordance with law, respondent judge showed lack of capacity for
independent judgment.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint 1 against respondent Judge Ciriaco C.
Ariño of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment as defined and penalized
under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was originally
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman which, after dismissing the case for
lack of probable cause for filing in court, nevertheless referred the case to
this Court "for possible administrative action
against Respondent." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It appears that on December 26, 1989, Mayor Asuero Irisari of Loreto,
Agusan del Sur summoned to his office herein complainant Apolinario S.
Muñez for conference respecting a land dispute which Muñez had with one
Tirzo Amado. As complainant failed to attend the conference, Mayor Irisari
issued a warrant of arrest against him on December 27, 1989. 2
The warrant was served on complainant by CFC Redelio Caballes and Cpl.
Rolando Limayan and by virtue of it complainant was brought before Mayor
Irisari, although no investigation was later conducted.chanrobles law
library
Complainant filed a complaint 3 against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct
and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as
well as an administrative complaint 4 for violation of the Constitution,
misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur.
After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a case 5 for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor
Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Loreto, Agusan del Sur.
Originally raffled to the judge of that court, the criminal case was later
assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño on account of the inhibition of
the first judge.
Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the
acts complained of did not constitute a crime under the law. He contended
that under § 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors were authorized to issue warrants of arrest.
6
On July 28, 1992, respondent Judge Ariño denied the motion to quash on
the ground that the power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had
ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when the Constitution took effect.
For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative
complaint against the mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and
abuse of authority and accordingly ordered him suspended for eight (8)
months without pay. On appeal, however, the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that what the mayor had
issued to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was
actually just an invitation or a summons.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 21, 1992, Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of denial of respondent judge, invoking the resolution of the
DILG.
In an order dated February 15, 1993, respondent Judge Ariño reconsidered
his previous order and dismissed the case. Respondent said in his
order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The accused, in his Motion for Reconsideration, asserts that since the
question about the warrant of arrest issued against Apolinario Muñez has
been resolved in an administrative proceedings as not the warrant of
arrest contemplated by law, it would follow then that this case now before
this Court against the accused be dismissed. The Court finds that the
subject matter in this case and that in the administrative complaint arose
from one and the same incident and it involved the same parties.
Courts are not bound by the findings of administrative agencies like the
DILG as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and there
is arbitrary action or palpable serious error.chanrobles law library : red
. . . The Court believes that the resolution by the administrative agency in
DILG-AC-60-91 is not tainted with unfairness and arbitrariness neither it
shows arbitrary action or palpable and serious error, therefore, it must be
respected (Mangubat v. de Castro, G.R. No. 33892; July 28, 1988; Blue
Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantuico, Jr., Et Al., G.R. 47051, July 29, 1988,
Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. 84592, October 27, 1988).
Upon receipt of this Order, complainant Muñez sent two letters dated July
5 and 12, 1993 to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, charging
respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari. The matter was
indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated,
referred it to this Court for possible disciplinary action against respondent
judge. 7
We agree with the Office of the Ombudsman that while respondent judge
may have acted in good faith, he should nevertheless be administratively
held liable.
The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority
involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the
executive branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes judicial
powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by
any judge within his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the
information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive
branch.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a
warrant of arrest. It was. In plain terms it stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Republic of the Philippines
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO
Office of the Mayor
27 December 1989
WARRANT OF ARREST
TO: ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW
This Municipality
G R E E T I N G S:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
You are hereby requested/ordered to effect the arrest of Apolinario Muñez
of Poblacion, Loreto, Agusan del Sur, for his refusal to acknowledge the
Summons dated December 26, 1989, and bring him before the Office of
the Municipal Mayor to answer an inquiry/investigation in connection with
the complaint of one Tirso Amado held pending before this Office.
FOR COMPLIANCE.
(Sgd) ASUERO S. IRISARI
Municipal Mayor
For and in the absence of the Municipal Circuit Judge
Any one reading the warrant could not have been mistaken that it was a
warrant for the arrest of the complainant Apolinario Muñez. As a matter of
fact Mayor Irisari justified his order on the basis of § 143(3) of the former
Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which expressly
provided that "in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary
investigation, the mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of
witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of the accused." This
provision had, however, been repealed by Art. III, § 2 of the 1987
Constitution, as this Court held in Ponsica v. Ignalaga, 8 in which it was
explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct
preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of
the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been
abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took
effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino
people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides
that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional
proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of
arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this
being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the
phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found
in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution — who, aside from
judges, might conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants of
arrest or search warrants.
That there was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not
make the order against him any less an order of arrest, contrary to the
opinion of DILG.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, the issuance of the warrant when there was before him
no criminal case, but only a land dispute as it is now being made to
appear, only made it worse for the mayor, for it would then appear that he
assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done. All
the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have dismissed the
criminal case against the mayor.
It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or
summon Muñez to his office because he had precisely done this the day
before he issued the warrant of arrest, and he ordered the arrest of
complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. The
summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the
difference between a summons and a warrant of arrest. The summons
read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Republic of the Philippines
found the mayor not guilty of serious misconduct in office on the ground
that he had really issued a warrant of arrest against the complainant but
only an invitation or a summons. To justify his reliance on the opinion of
the DILG, respondent judge invoked the rule in administrative law that the
findings of facts of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial
evidence, are binding on the courts in the absence of a showing of fraud,
imposition or dishonesty. We have already stated why that is grossly
erroneous. What we are here concerned is that by relying on the opinion of
the DILG, disregarding a previous ruling he had made which was in
accordance with law, respondent judge showed lack of capacity for
independent judgment.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Ciriaco
Ariño. He is enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO performance of his duties as a judge and warned that a repetition of the
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Office of the Mayor
SO ORDERED.
26 December 1989

SUMMON

TO: Mr. Apolinario Muñez

Loreto, Agusan del Sur

G R E E T I N G S:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

You are hereby demanded to appear before the Office of the Municipal
Mayor on 27 December 1989 at around 9:30 A.M. then and there to
answer in an inquiry/investigation in connection with a certain complaint of
Mr. Tirso Amado lodged in this office.

PLEASE FAIL NOT under the penalty of the law.

Loreto, Agusan del Sur, Philippines.

(SGD.) ASUERO S. IRISARI

Municipal Mayor

Indeed, respondent had previously denied the motion to dismiss which the
accused Mayor Irisari had filed on the ground that the authority (B.P. Blg.
337, § 143(3) invoked by him as basis for his warrant of arrest had been
abrogated by the Constitution. He subsequently reversed himself on the
ground that the decision of the DILG, finding Mayor Irisari not guilty,
"must be respected." He said, "Courts are not bound by findings of
administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if such to have
actually done in this case was to rely on the opinion of the DILG which

[A.M. NO. RTJ-01-1621 : September 27, 2007]
CONCERNED BOHOLANOS FOR LAW AND
ORDER, Complainants, v. JUDGE DIONISIO R. CALIBO, JR.,
RTC, BRANCH 50, LOAY, BOHOL, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In an anonymous complaint dated August 28, 2000 filed by
"Concerned Boholanos for Law and Order," Judge Dionisio R.
Calibo, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Loay,
Bohol, is charged with conduct unbecoming a judge and highly
unethical act for "publicly speaking on radio and in public fora
regarding his bias and parochial views on certain controversial
issues against public personalities and public officials."
Required to comment, respondent claimed that the complaint was
initiated by the "alter ego" of the provincial governor because of his
objection to the sale of the performing assets of the provincial
government of Bohol disadvantageous to the latter.
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo designated retired
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez of the Court of Appeals, former
Consultant in the Office of the Court Administrator, as Hearing
Officer to investigate the complaint. On August 5, 2005, he
submitted his Report and Recommendation.
After a review of Justice Ramirez's Report and Recommendation,
the Court RESOLVES to ADOPT and APPROVE his findings of facts
and conclusions of law reproduced as follows:
Respondent Judge relates the antecedents of the controversy. He
states that a very questionable and controversial project was being
pursued by the Provincial Governor which was to sell the two major
performing assets of the Province of Bohol, the Provincial Electrical
System (PES) and the Provincial Waterworks System (PWS) of the
Provincial Utilities Division (PPUD), without consulting its customers
in Tagbilaran and Dauis, Bohol, which are the places served by
these two utilities. It was shocking to the people because it was of
public knowledge that these were the only major profitable
ventures of the province. It was no surprise, therefore, that the
residents of these two towns went on the air over the three radio
stations vigorously protesting this move of the Governor.
Respondent Judge narrates that although he is one of the
consumers affected by the projected sale, he kept silent. He claims
that since his appointment, he had distanced himself from the
media even if he was previously the head of the Department of
Public Information. However, when it became apparent that the
Governor was ignoring the legitimate issues presented by the
people, he decided to take part in the debate. He studied the
documents and concluded that indeed it was a contract that would
be very disadvantageous to the province. He joined the oppositors
and admits having gone on the air. Although the Governor did not
do anything to stop him, other provincial officials tried to suppress
respondent's revelations on the air reasoning that being a Judge,
respondent should not involve himself in controversy. The
concerned consumers filed a petition to stop the projected sale at
auction and respondent admits having taken the stand for the
petitioners. As regards the statement of Judge Melicor in his order
quoted above, the respondent Judge made no mention of it in his
Comment.
It was probably because of this Order of Judge Melicor describing
the acts of respondent Judge attempting to influence another Judge
who was presiding the injunction petition that prompted DCA
Bernardo T. Ponferrada to recommend, despite the fact that the
complaint is not under oath, that an investigation be conducted to
determine the extent of Judge Calibo's liability.
xxx
x x x As it can be seen, the letter complaint is anonymous. For this
reason, the undersigned is submitting this Report based on the
pleadings extant on the record.
As regards going on the air to express one's opinion over a matter
of public concern, the undersigned believes that respondent Judge
cannot be held to answer administratively simply because he was
only exercising his constitutional right to be heard in a petition for
the redress of grievances. As a consumer and as a member of the
body politic, it was his right, nay his duty to air what he honestly
believed to be an incipient irregularity.

However, his two telephone calls to Judge Achilles L. Melicor who

was presiding the court where the petition to stop the governor
was pending, definitely violates the Code of Judicial Conduct,
particularly Section 3 of Canon I, which states that "Judges shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."

Rule 140, Section 7, classifies gross misconduct constituting

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense and
penalizes the same with "dismissal from the service, with forfeiture
of benefits and with prejudice to reemployment; suspension from
office without salary for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00."

Considering the inappropriateness of the calls made by respondent

Judge to another Judge who was presiding the Court where the
case was being heard, it is respectfully recommended that said
respondent Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr., be made to pay a fine
of P25,000.00.

We observed, however, that this is the first time respondent Judge

has been charged administratively.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl
lαω  lιbrαrÿ

This is a mitigating circumstance. Hence, the recommended

penalty of fine of P25,000.00 is reduced to only P20,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by Justice Pedro A. Ramirez,

Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr. of the RTC, Branch 50, Loay, Bohol, is
declared guilty of serious misconduct and is ordered to pay a FINE
of P20,000.00, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from
notice.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362(formerly A.M. No. 01-2-49-RTC),
February 22 : 2011]
JUDGE NAPOLEON E. INOTURAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 133, MAKATI CITY, VS. JUDGE MANUEL Q.
LIMSIACO, JR., MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
VALLADOLID, SAN ENRIQUE-PULUPANDAN, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-1945-
MTJ)
SANCHO E. GUINANAO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE MANUEL
Q. LIMSIACO, JR., MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
VALLADOLID, SAN ENRIQUE-PULUPANDAN, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us are two (2) consolidated cases filed against Judge Manuel
Q. Limsiaco, Jr. as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental. The first case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to
comply with the directives of the Court.  The second case involves
the failure of Judge Limsiaco to decide a case within the 90-day
reglementary period.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362
On September 25, 1998, a complaint was filed against Judge
Limsiaco for his issuance of a Release Order in favor of an accused
in a criminal case before him.[1]  After considering the evidence, we
then found Judge Limsiaco guilty of ignorance of the law and
procedure and of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. In the
decretal portion of our May 6, 2005 Decision, we ruled:
WHEREFORE, Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. is found GUILTY of
ignorance of the law and procedure and violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. He is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the
amount of Forty Thousand pesos (P40,000.00) upon notice, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
infractions will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to explain, within ten (10) days
from notice, why he should not be administratively charged for
approving the applications for bail of the accused and ordering their
release in the following Criminal Cases filed with other courts:
Criminal Cases Nos. 1331,1342,1362,1366 and 1368 filed with the
RTC, Branch 59, San Carlos City; 67322, 69055-69058 filed with
the MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City; 67192-67193 filed with the
MTCC, Branch 4, Bacolod City; 72866 filed with the MTCC, Branch
5, Bacolod City; 70249, 82897 to 82903, 831542, 83260 to 83268
filed with the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City; and 95-17340 filed
with the RTC, Branch 50, Bacolod City, as reported by Executive
Judge Edgardo G. Garvilles.
SO ORDERED.
Judge Limsiaco twice moved for an extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration of the above decision and to comply
with the Court's directive requiring him to submit an explanation.
Despite the extension of time given however, Judge Limsiaco
failed to file his motion for reconsideration and the required
explanation.
In the Resolution dated January 24, 2006, we issued a show cause
resolution for contempt and required Judge Limsiaco to explain his
failure to comply with the Decision dated May 6, 2005. In the
Resolution dated December 12, 2006, after noting the failure of
Judge Limsiaco to comply with the Resolution dated January 24,
2006, we resolved to impose a fine in the amount of P1,000.00
against Judge Limsiaco and to reiterate our earlier directive for him
to file an explanation to the show cause resolution.
On February 1, 2007, Judge Limsiaco filed a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Explanation wherein he
apologized to the Court and paid the P1,000.00 fine. He cited poor
health as the reason for his failure to comply with the Resolution
dated January 24, 2006.  On February 6, 2007, we resolved to
grant the motion for extension filed by Judge Limsiaco and gave
him ten (10) days from January 15, 2007 within which to file his
explanation.
Despite the grant of the extension of time, no explanation
for the show cause resolution was ever filed. Per Resolution
dated December 15, 2009, we again required Judge Limsiaco to
comply with the show cause resolution within ten (10) days from
receipt under pain of imposing a stiffer penalty. Verification made
from the postmaster showed that a copy of the December 15, 2009
Resolution was received by Judge Limsiaco on February 1, 2010.
In addition, a Report (as of August 31, 2010) from the
Documentation Division, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
showed that the directives in our Decision dated May 6, 2005
have not been complied with by Judge Limsiaco. 
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785
On September 24, 2007, Judge Limsiaco was charged with Delay in
the Disposition of a Case by complainant Sancho E. Guinanao, a
plaintiff in an ejectment case pending before Judge Limsiaco.
Guinanao claimed that Judge Limsiaco failed to seasonably decide
the subject ejectment case which had been submitted for
resolution as early as April 25, 2005. The OCA referred the matter
to us when Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment to the
administrative complaint. Under the pain of a show cause order for
contempt for failure to heed the OCA directives to file a comment,
Judge Limsiaco informed us that he had already decided the case
on February 4, 2008. Subsequently, we resolved[2] to declare Judge
Limsiaco in contempt and to impose a fine of P1,000.00 for his
continued failure to file the required comment to the administrative
complaint. The records show that Judge Limsiaco paid the
P1,000.00 fine but did not submit the required comment.
Per Resolution dated November 23, 2010, we ordered the
consolidation of the above cases, together with A.M. No. MTJ-09-
1734, entitled Florenda V. Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco,
Jr., which case was separately decided on January 19, 2011.
The Court's Ruling
We shall consider in this ruling not merely Judge Limsiaco's
conduct in connection with the discharge of judicial functions within
his territorial jurisdiction, but also the performance of his legal
duties before this Court as a member of the bench. We shall then
take both matters into account in scrutinizing his conduct as a
judge and in determining whether proper disciplinary measures
should be imposed against him under the circumstances.
A judge's duties to the Court
Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible representation of
the law, and more importantly of justice; he or she must,
therefore, be the first to follow the law and weave an example for
the others to follow.[3] Interestingly, in Julianito M. Salvador v.
Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc.,[4] a case where Judge Limsiaco
was also the respondent, we already had the occasion to impress
upon him the clear import of the directives of the Court, thus:
For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring him to
comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly and
substantially is gross misconduct, and may even be considered as
outright disrespect for the Court. The office of the judge requires
him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. After all, a
resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request and should
be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply
accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but
has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain
with, if not contempt of the judicial system.
We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine C. Martinez v.
Judge Cesar N. Zoleta[5] and emphasized that obedience to our
lawful orders and directives should not be merely selective
obedience, but must be full:
[A] resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an
administrative complaint against officials and employees of the
judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the
Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively.
Respondents in administrative complaints should comment on all
accusations or allegations against them in the administrative
complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the
judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate
future indifference of respondents to administrative complaints and
to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative
complaints.
As demonstrated by his present acts, we find it clear that Judge
Limsiaco failed to heed the above pronouncements. We observe
that in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco did not fully obey
our directives. Judge Limsiaco failed to file the required comment
to our show cause resolution despite several opportunities given to
him by the Court. His disobedience was aggravated by his insincere
representations in his motions for extension of time that he would
file the required comments.
The records also show Judge Limsiaco's failure to comply with our
decision and orders. In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco
failed to file his comment/answer to the charge of irregularity
pertaining to his approval of applications for bail in several criminal
cases before him. He also failed to pay the P40,000.00 fine which
we imposed by way of administrative penalty for his gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.  Incidentally, in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, Judge
Limsiaco failed to file his comment on the verified complaint
despite several orders issued by the Court.
We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules,
directives and circulars issued by the Court is one of the foremost
duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is
verbalized in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards
for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and
enhance the institutional and operational independence of
the Judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards
of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in
the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.
The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the institution
which he belongs to is also found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct under Rule 2.01 which mandates a judge to behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Under the circumstances, the conduct exhibited by Judge Limsiaco
constitutes no less than clear acts of defiance against the Court's
authority.  His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect and
indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by his failure to
heed our warnings and directives. Judge Limsiaco's actions further
disclose his inability to accept our instructions.  Moreover, his
conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel,
and the public as well, in placing significance to the Court's
directives and the importance of complying with them.
We cannot allow this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public
confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved when the court
personnel conduct themselves in a dignified manner befitting the
public office they are holding. They should avoid conduct or any
demeanor that may tarnish or diminish the authority of the
Supreme Court.
Under existing jurisprudence, we have held judges administratively
liable for failing to comply with our directives and circulars.
In Sinaon, Sr.,[6] we penalized a judge for his deliberate failure to
comply with our directive requiring him to file a comment. We
disciplined another judge in Noe  Cangco Zarate v. Judge Isauro M.
Balderian[7] for his refusal to comply with the Court's resolution
requiring him to file a comment on the administrative charge
against him. In Request of Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena, etc.,[8] we
dismissed the judge for his repeated violation of a circular of the
Supreme Court. In fact, we have already reprimanded and warned
Judge Limsiaco for his failure to timely heed the Court's directives
in Salvador.[9]
A judge's duty to his public office
Given the factual circumstances in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, the
considerable delay Judge Limsiaco incurred in deciding the subject
ejectment case has been clearly established by the records and by
his own admission. Judge Limsiaco admitted that he decided the
ejectment case only on February 4, 2008. In turn, the records
show that Judge Limsiaco did not deny Guinanao's claim that the
ejectment case was submitted for resolution as early as April 25,
2005. Thus, it took Judge Limsiaco more than two (2) years to
decide the subject ejectment case after it was declared submitted
for resolution.
The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period
constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct[10] which mandates judges to perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with promptness. In line with   jurisprudence, Judge
Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide
a case within the reglementary period.[11]
The Penalty
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-
8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are
categorized as less serious charges with the following sanctions:
(a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one or more than three months; or (b) a fine of more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.[12]
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider
Judge Limsiaco's work history which reflects how he performed his
judicial functions as a judge. We observed that there are several
administrative cases already decided against Judge Limsiaco that
show his inability to properly discharge his judicial duties.
In Salvador,[13] we penalized Judge Limsiaco for having been found
guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision, imposing on him
a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
In Helen Gamboa-Mijares v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,[14] we
found Judge Limsiaco guilty of gross misconduct and imposed on
him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a more severe penalty
would be imposed in case of the same of similar act in the future.
In Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,
[15]
 we resolved to impose a P20,000.00 fine on Judge Limsiaco
for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be
dealt with more severely.  The Court also resolved in the said case
to re-docket, as a regular administrative case, the charge for
oppression and grave abuse of authority relative to Judge
Limsiaco's handling of two criminal cases.
In Re: Withholding of Salary of Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc.,
[16]
 we imposed a P5,000.00 fine, with warning, against Judge
Limsiaco for his delay in the submission of the monthly report
of cases and for twice ignoring the OCA's directive to
explain the delay.
Moreover, in the recent case of Florenda Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr.,[17] where Judge Limsiaco was charged with
corruption, the Court found him liable for gross misconduct and
imposed a fine in the amount of P25,000.00.
Lastly, we also note the existence of two other administrative cases
filed against Judge Limsiaco that are presently pending with the
Court. The first case is Mario B. Tapinco v. Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr.,[18] where Judge Limsiaco is charged with grave
misconduct, obstruction of justice, and abuse of authority in
connection with his invalid issuance of an order for the provisional
release of an accused.  The second case entitled Unauthorized
Hearings Conducted by Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, et
al.,[19]  is a complaint charging Judge Limsiaco of violating  the
Court's Administrative Circular No. 3, dated July 14, 1978 which
prohibits the conduct of hearings in another station without any
authority from the Court.
We find that his conduct as a repeat offender exhibits his
unworthiness to don the judicial robes and merits a sanction
heavier than what is provided by our rules and jurisprudence.
Under the circumstances, Judge Limsiaco should be dismissed from
the service. We, however, note that on May 17, 2009, Judge
Limsiaco has retired from judicial service. We also note that Judge
Limsiaco has not yet applied for his retirement benefits. Thus, in
lieu of the penalty of dismissal for his unethical conduct and gross
inefficiency in performing his duties as a member of the bench, we
declare all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,
forfeited. Furthermore, he is barred from re-employment in any
branch or service of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr. administratively liable for unethical conduct and gross
inefficiency under the provisions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, specifically, Sections 7 and 8 of Canon 1, and Section 5 of
Canon 6. For these infractions, we DECLARE all his retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, FORFEITED. He is
likewise barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257               July 17, 2012
CRISELDA C. GACAD, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HILARION P. CLAPIS, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Criselda C. Gacad (Gacad) filed a Verified Complaint1 dated 9 June 2010
against Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. (Judge Clapis), Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, for
Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2
(Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative
to Criminal Case No. 6898 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo
Comania."
According to Gacad, on 3 November 2009, she went, together with her father
Jovenciano Cardenas and sister-in-law Agriculita Vda. De Cardenas, to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, to file
criminal charges against the suspect who gunned down her brother Gregorio
Cardenas. They met provincial prosecutor Graciano Arafol, Jr. (Arafol), who
advised them not to hire a private counsel.
The following day, Arafol informed Gacad that he filed a complaint for murder
against the suspect but the Provincial Governor kept on pressuring him about
her brother’s case. Arafol suggested that they see Judge Clapis so he would
deny the Motion for Reinvestigation to be filed by the accused Rodolfo
Comania (accused). Arafol, further, told Gacad to prepare an amount of
P50,000 for Judge Clapis.
On 23 November 2009, Arafol told Gacad that they would meet Judge Clapis
at the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City. Thus, Gacad, together with her
husband Rene Gacad and their family driver Jojo Baylosis (Baylosis),
proceeded to the Golden Palace Hotel. Inside the hotel, Gacad joined Arafol
and his wife at their table. After a while, Judge Clapis joined them. Arafol told
Judge Clapis, "Judge sya yong sinasabi kong kapitbahay ko may problema."
Judge Clapis replied, "So, what do you want me to do?" Afarol answered,
"Kailangang madeny ang reinvestigation ni Atty. Gonzaga and we proceed to
trial kasi palaging tumatawag si Governor." Arafol paused, and continued,
"Wag kang mag-alala judge, mayron syang inihanda para sa iyo." Gacad felt
terrified because she had not yet agreed to Arafol’s demands. Hence, when
Arafol asked her, "Day, kanus a nimo mahatag ang kwarta?" (When can you
give the money?), Gacad could only mumble, "Paningkamutan na ko
makakita ko ug kwarta... basin makakita ko sir." (I will try to look for money,
maybe I can find, sir.) Judge Clapis excitedly nodded and said, "Sige, kay
ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall
crush them.)
The following day, Arafol instructed his nephew Baldomero Arafol
(Baldomero) to go to Gacad’s house to accompany Baylosis. In Gacad’s
house, Gacad gave P50,000 to Baylosis in the presence of Baldomero.
Baylosis then drove with Baldomero to Jollibee in Tagum City. Upon their
arrival, Baldomero alighted and Arafol got into the passenger seat. Arafol
directed Baylosis to drive to Mikos Coffee Bar. Along the way, Arafol took the
money from Baylosis. At Mikos Coffee Bar, Arafol alighted, telling Baylosis to
wait for him. Then, Arafol went inside Mikos Coffee Bar to join Judge Clapis.
In his Sworn Affidavit dated 8 April 2010, Baylosis stated that he went out of
the vehicle and saw, through the full window glass of the Mikos Coffee Bar,
Arafol sitting at a table together with Judge Clapis. After Arafol left Mikos
Coffee Bar, he told Baylosis to bring him back to Jollibee in Tagum City.
On the second week of January 2010, Arafol showed to Gacad a copy of
Judge Clapis’ Order dated 4 January 2010 denying the Motion for
Reinvestigation filed by the accused. Subsequently, Arafol told Gacad that
Judge Clapis was borrowing P50,000 from her for his mother’s
hospitalization. Arafol handed to Gacad a postdated BPI check allegedly
issued by Judge Clapis as assurance of payment. However, Gacad failed to
produce the P50,000.
Gacad alleged that, from then on, Arafol and Judge Clapis began to "play
different hideous schemes" to prejudice their case.2 Judge Clapis set
hearings on 4 February 2010, 8 February 2010, and 1 March 2010. However,
the Notices for Hearings were mailed only on 1 March 2010 and were
received by Gacad only on 3 March 2010.
Thereafter, Judge Clapis set a hearing for a petition for bail on 29 March
2010, which Gacad came to know only inadvertently since she received no
notice for the hearing. During the 29 March 2010 hearing, Public Prosecutor
Alona Labtic moved that the petition for bail be put in writing. However, the
counsel for the accused manifested that he was not prepared for a written
petition because it was only right before the hearing that the accused
informed him of Arafol’s agreement to bail. Thus, Judge Clapis calendared
the case for speedy trial. He set a continuous hearing for the petition for bail
on 12 April 2010, 13 April 2010, and 14 April 2010.
On 8 April 2010, the accused filed a Petition For Bail while Gacad filed a
Motion For Inhibition of Judge Clapis. On 18 May 2010, Judge Clapis granted
the accused’s Petition For Bail. On 24 May 2010, Judge Clapis issued a
Notice of Preliminary Conference set on 2 December 2010. On 1 June 2010,
Judge Clapis inhibited himself.
To bolster her case of corruption against Judge Clapis, Gacad recounted her
previous encounter with Judge Clapis and Arafol in Criminal Case No. 6251
against her brother. According to Gacad, Arafol suggested that they give
Judge Clapis the P80,000 cash bond posted in the case so that her brother’s
case could be dismissed. After conceding to Arafol’s proposal, Judge Clapis
indeed dismissed the case despite the strong evidence against her brother.
In an Indorsement letter dated 21 June 2010, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) required Judge Clapis to comment. In his
Comment3 dated 26 July 2010, Judge Clapis narrated the events regarding
Criminal Case No. 6898, beginning with the arraignment set on 17 December
2009 up to his inhibition on 1 June 2010. Judge Clapis did not attach any
documents to support his narration. Judge Clapis claimed that notices were
made verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that
both sides were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all
proceedings, Gacad was in court and the orders were done in open court. He
admitted that his personnel inadvertently scheduled the preliminary
conference of the case to 2 December 2010. Finally, he denied owning an
account in BPI.
In its Resolution4 dated 15 December 2010, this Court’s Second Division
noted the recommendation of the OCA dated 3 November 2010 and resolved
to: (1) re-docket the instant administrative complaint OCA-IPI No. 10-3440-
RTJ as regular administrative matter A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257; and (2) refer the
matter to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro
City, for raffle among its Justices, and direct the Justice to whom the case is
assigned to conduct an investigation on the matter and to submit a report and
recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the records of the case.
Pursuant to the Resolution of 15 December 2010, the records of the case
were forwarded to Justice Romulo V. Borja, the Executive Justice of the
Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station, and then to the Raffle Committee. On
10 May 2011, the case was raffled to Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles
(Investigating Justice) for investigation. Thereafter, the Investigating Justice
ordered the parties to submit their respective evidence, and set the case for
hearing on 14 June 2011, 21 June 2011, and 28 June 2011. The 28 June
2011 hearing was subsequently reset to 28 July 2011.
In its Resolution dated 6 July 2011, this Court’s Second Division granted the
Investigating Justice an extension of 60 days or until 9 September 2011 to
terminate her investigation and submit her recommendation.
In her undated Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Justice ruled
that Judge Clapis committed grave misconduct for acting contrary to the
prescribed standard of conduct for judges. Although the Investigating Justice
was not convinced that Judge Clapis received P50,000, and then tried to
borrow another P50,000, from Gacad, she found Gacad’s narration of her
meeting with Judge Clapis in Golden Palace Hotel as credible. The
Investigating Justice stated:
x x x In a provincial setting such as the place where the parties come from, it
is not difficult to imagine the considerable power that persons of the
respondent’s calibre could wield in the mind of a litigant such as the
complainant herein. The substance and tenor of the complainant’s testimony
and element of possible motivation on the part of the respondent given his
unrefuted closeness with Prosecutor Arafol convince this Justice that the
complainant is telling the truth.
xxxx
x x x Respondent judge merely offered a flat denial when he could have
presented Prosecutor Arafol to buttress his disavowal of any imputed
misconduct on his part. x x x Respondent’s reaction, however, is regrettably
lackadaisical, if not abnormal, for one whose integrity was shred to pieces by
no less than the Trial Prosecutor who is his partner, in an almost daily basis,
in the task of dispensing justice. There is simply no showing indeed that
respondent herein took umbrage at Prosecutor Arafol’s alleged brazenness
and daring to sully his name.5
Furthermore, the Investigating Justice found Judge Clapis liable for gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Clapis was partial in granting bail to the accused
and in failing to set the case for hearing within a reasonable time.
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice recommended the penalties of:
(1) suspension for one year without salary and other benefits for
gross misconduct; (2) a fine of P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the
law; and
(3) reprimand for neglect of duty.
In a Memorandum dated 11 January 2012, the OCA agreed with the findings
of the Investigating Justice but disagreed with the recommended penalties.
The OCA found that Judge Clapis violated Canon 1 (Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02) and Canon 2 (Rule 2.01) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA
also found Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for failing to
observe the rules in hearing the petition for bail and to accord the prosecution
due process. Accordingly, the OCA recommended the penalties of: (1)
suspension for six months for gross misconduct; and (2) a fine of P40,000 for
gross ignorance of the law.
We have ruled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden to prove his accusations against respondent with substantial
evidence or such amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.6 This Court has consistently ruled that
charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence.7
In the present case, there is indeed no substantial evidence that Judge
Clapis received the P50,000 given by Gacad to Arafol, and that Judge Clapis
tried to borrow another P50,000 from Gacad secured by a check allegedly
signed by Judge Clapis himself. The testimony of Gacad, stating that Judge
Clapis received P50,000 and tried to borrow another P50,000 from her, both
through Arafol, cannot be given due weight for being hearsay evidence. On
the other hand, although Baylosis testified based on his personal knowledge,
he did not categorically state that he saw Arafol give the money to Judge
Clapis. In addition, the check allegedly issued by Judge Clapis was in the
account name of Arafol as attested by the BPI Business Manager’s
Certification. Hence, Gacad fell short of the required degree of proof needed
in an administrative charge of corruption.
We, however, find Judge Clapis liable for gross misconduct. In Kaw v.
Osorio,8 the Court held that while the respondent judge, in that case, may not
be held liable for extortion and corruption as it was not substantially proven,
he should be made accountable for gross misconduct.
In the present case, the Investigating Justice found Gacad’s narration, that
she met and talked with Judge Clapis in the Golden Palace Hotel, as
credible. Gacad categorically and unwaveringly narrated her conversation
with Judge Clapis and Arafol. On the other hand, Judge Clapis merely denied
Gacad’s allegation during the hearing conducted by the Investigating Justice,
but not in his Comment, and without presenting any evidence to support his
denial. It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are
generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched
opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. 9 The rule
which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of
credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases.10
Thus, the acts of Judge Clapis in meeting Gacad, a litigant in a case pending
before his sala, and telling her, "Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni
sila" (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.), both favoring Gacad,
constitute gross misconduct.
In Sevilla v. Lindo,11 where the respondent judge tolerated the unreasonable
postponements made in a case, the Court held that such conduct proceeded
from bias towards the accused, rendering such acts and omissions as gross
misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of
law or standard of behavior in connection with one’s performance of official
functions and duties.12 For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law,
or a persistent disregard of well-known rules.13 The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. 14
Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made
overt by the circumstances on record. First, the Notices of Hearings were
mailed to Gacad only after the hearing. Second, Judge Clapis started
conducting the bail hearings without an application for bail and granted bail
without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong. Third, Judge Clapis set a preliminary conference seven
months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of
speedy trial for the case. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the
blame to his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately
responsible for order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are
not the guardians of the judge’s responsibility. 15
The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to
his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly:
CANON 2. INTEGRITY IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO THE PROPER
DISCHARGE OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICE BUT ALSO TO THE PERSONAL
DEMEANOR OF JUDGES.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s
faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.
xxx
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROPER DISCHARGE
OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICE. IT APPLIES NOT ONLY TO THE DECISION
ITSELF BUT ALSO TO THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE DECISION IS TO
BE MADE.
xxx
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of
court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary.
xxx
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could
come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
xxx
CANON 4. PROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF PROPRIETY ARE
ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL THE ACTIVITIES OF A
JUDGE.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of their activities.
xxx
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also
appear to be impartial at all times.16 Being in constant scrutiny by the public,
his language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest
the best of intentions be misconstrued.17 Needless to state, any gross
misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the people in
the judiciary.
We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting
bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without
affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused
is strong.
Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that "at the hearing of an application for bail
filed by the person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. x x x." This rule
presupposes that: (1) an application for bail was filed, and
(2) the judge notified the prosecutor and conducted a bail hearing for the
prosecution to adduce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.
In the present case, the records show that Judge Clapis set the first bail
hearing on 29 March 2010 yet the Petition For Bail was filed only on 8 April
2010. Furthermore, the 12, 13 and 14 April 2010 bail hearings reveal that the
prosecution was not given the opportunity to be heard in court. During the 12
April 2010 hearing, Gacad appeared by herself because the private
prosecutor, who was to appear in her behalf, filed a Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel. Gacad requested for more time to secure a new private counsel.
Gacad also manifested that she already filed a motion for Arafol to inhibit
from the case. Judge Clapis allowed her to secure a new private counsel but
the hearing proceeded with the accused alone being given the opportunity to
present his evidence. It was only during the 14 April 2010 hearing, the last
day of hearing, that Gacad was represented by another public prosecutor
since she could not secure a new private counsel. But immediately after the
defense completed presenting its evidence in support of its bail application,
the petition for bail was submitted for resolution. The prosecution was not
given an opportunity to present evidence to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong. Judge Clapis’ Order granting bail indicates that he merely
used as basis the affidavit of one prosecution witness that was submitted
earlier. Clearly, Judge Clapis failed to observe the proper procedure in
granting bail.
As stated in the report of the Investigating Justice:
It is true that proceedings were conducted on April 12, 13 and 14, 2010 but
nowhere in these settings was the Prosecution given an ample opportunity to
oppose the Petition or to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong. There was even no inquiry from the respondent as to the character or
reputation of the accused and the probability of his flight during the trial.
These are important and basic questions to be considered by a conscientious
judge whenever a Petition for Bail in a capital offense is laid before him.
Jurisprudence clearly instructs that "in cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the Prosecution must be given the
opportunity to present within a reasonable period all the evidence it may
desire to produce before the court should resolve the Motion for Bail."
Sadly for respondent, he seemed unaware that he was duty-bound to require
the presentation of proof of guilt of the accused because without it, he would
have no basis for the exercise of his discretion on whether or not bail should
be granted. It was precipitate of him to simply consider the affidavit of one
prosecution witness and conclude that "there was no ambush but there was
merely a shootout, as to who fired first it cannot be determined because the
affidavit of the prosecution witness did not state so x x x and mainly on this
basis, the Court is convinced that the prosecution failed to establish that
evidence of guilt is strong for the Court to deny the Petition of accused
Rodolfo Comania to be admitted to Bail."18
Gacal v. Infante19 is instructive on this issue. The respondent judge in that
case was held guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules when he
granted bail to the accused charged with murder without conducting a
hearing and despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused. The
Court emphasized that bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice to the prosecution; otherwise, a
violation of due process occurs.
Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion
and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so
gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the
judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.20 If judges are allowed to wantonly
misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not only be confusion
in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.21
Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law or procedure are both classified as serious
charges, for which the imposable penalties are any of the following:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporation: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 22
Judge Clapis had already been administratively sanctioned in Humol v.
Clapis Jr.,23 where he was fined P30,000 for gross ignorance of the law. In
this previous case, the Court sanctioned Judge Clapis for his failure to hear
and consider the evidence of the prosecution in granting bail to the accused.
His order relied solely on the arguments of counsel for the accused. In
Humol,24 the Court reminded Judge Clapis of the duties of a trial judge when
an application for bail is filed, but in the present case, he ignored the same.
Therefore, we now impose upon him the extreme administrative penalty of
dismissal from the service. In Mangandingan v. Adiong, 25 the Court dismissed
Judge Santos Adiong from service upon a finding of guilt for gross ignorance
of the law as well as gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.1âwphi1
Again, judges are reminded that having accepted the exalted position of a
judge, they owe it to the public to uphold the exacting standard of conduct
demanded from them. As the Court repeatedly stressed:
The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
because the people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on
the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness
they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the
transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount
that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his
daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach.26
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley from the service for
Gross Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law, with forfeiture of all
benefits due him, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from
appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations. His position in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Nabunturan,
Compostcla Valley is declared VACANT. This Decision is immediately
executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of the Department of
Justice for the investigation of Provincial Prosecutor Graciano Arafol, Jr. for
possible serious misconduct in handling Criminal Case No. 6898 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Comania."
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1520               January 27, 2004
ROMEO T. ZACARIAS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, Tarlac City; and SHIRLEY M. VISAYA, Clerk of Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gerona, Tarlac, Respondents.
In Re: Complaint against JUDGE MARTONINO MARCOS and Clerk of
Court SHIRLEY VISAYA, Municipal Trial Court, Gerona, Tarlac.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The actions of judges and judicial personnel must not only be proper at all
times, but also appear to be so. This axiom is necessary, because the image
of the judiciary is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men
and women who compose it. Failure to adhere steadfastly to this strict
standard of conduct is a ground for administrative sanctions.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative matter arose from a Complaint1 filed by Romeo T.
Zacarias and an undated Anonymous Complaint2 of a concerned citizen of
Gerona, Tarclac. These Complaints identically charged Judge Martonino R.
Marcos (Formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City)
and Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Gerona, Tarlac) with immoral conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants.
The Complaint of Zacarias was referred by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to Executive Judge Arsenio P. Adriano of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63, for discreet investigation; 3 and
subsequently for formal investigation, report and recommendation. 4
The anonymous Complaint was likewise referred to Executive Judge Adriano
for discreet investigation on March 13, 2001.5 After conducting the
investigation, he stated in his April 16, 2001 Report to the OCA that a court
insider had confirmed the illicit relationship of respondents. He then
recommended the filing of formal charges against them.
Upon the recommendation of the OCA,6 the matter was re-assigned to Judge
Adriano, this time for formal investigation, report and recommendation. The
two administrative Complaints were consolidated on September 23,
2002,7 upon respondents' motion.8
In view, however, of the appointment/promotion of respondent judge as the
presiding judge of the RTC of Tarlac City (Branch 64), the Court, pursuant to
its Resolution in AM No. 01-8-10-SC,9 thereafter referred the matter to
Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga of the Court of Appeals (CA) for
investigation, report and recommendation.10
Justice Guevara-Salonga summarized the factual antecedents of the matter
as follows:
"In an unsworn and undated letter-complaint filed before the Office of the
Court Administrator, the complainant [Romeo T. Zacarias] charged
respondents with immorality and graft and corruption. Complainants averred
that he is the accused in x x x[C]riminal [C]ase [No. 6000-99]. Allegedly, he
went to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gerona, Tarlac, to secure a
clearance but was informed that he had already been convicted in the
criminal case pending before the said court. According to the complainant,
the respondent clerk summoned him to the chambers of the respondent
judge. While inside the judge's chambers, respondents allegedly tried to
extort money from him, or in the words used by the complainant, 'there[,] she
and Judge Martonino Marcos [were] asking money from me so that there will
be some changes in the decision before it will be promulgated.'
"Complainant confirmed that he was not able to attend the promulgation of
the decision in the criminal case against him but stressed that he did not
receive any notice of said hearing. Consequently, a warrant of arrest was
issued against him 'to serve sentence.' At the hearing, he was surprised
[when] the respondent clerk x x x asked him to post a cash bond in the
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for his provisional liberty despite
the fact th[at] he was arrested specifically to serve his sentence.
Beleaguered, complainant posted the cash bond and an Order of Release
signed by the respondent Judge was issued in his favor. Complainant
claimed that the respondent clerk again asked for money, which he, however,
declined to give. The complainant further aired his confusion since regardless
of the cash bond that he posted, he still served his sentence for fifteen (15)
days at the Gerona Municipal Jail.
"Complainant further alleged that upon some inquiries, he was informed that
the respondent Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe money and
that the respondents are engaged in an illicit love affair which is x x x
common knowledge to municipal and court personnel and as well as to the
people of Gerona."11
In his Comment12 dated May 25, 2001, respondent judge averred that the
allegations of complainant lacked factual and legal basis. He claimed that the
Complaint had been filed merely to harass him. He denied having ever
demanded money from complainant, who had allegedly approached him for
advice in the latter's criminal case.
According to the above-mentioned Comment, complainant might have
misinterpreted as bribe the amounts he had paid for his cash bond and for
the damages adjudged against him. Supposedly, he voluntarily posted on
September 28, 2000, a cash bond for his provisional liberty after manifesting
that he was applying for probation. Thereafter, he allegedly backtracked on
his plans for probation, withdrew his application therefore, voluntarily
returned to jail to serve his sentence, and at the same time paid the
damages.
As to the charge of immorality, respondent judge averred that his hectic
schedule hardly allowed him to indulge in illicit relations. He emphasized that
on top of his duties as judge, he was also a lay minister and president of the
Parish Pastoral Council of Ramos, Tarlac, as well as an active member of the
freemasonry and the cursillo movements.
Finally, to prove his innocence, he submitted copies of the Warrant of
Arrest13 against complainant dated September 21, 2000; the Release
Order14 dated September 28, 2000; the Legal Fees Form 15 showing the
posting of the cash bond and the Undertaking16 attendant thereto; the
Order17 dated October 12, 2000, ordering the release of the cash bond to
complainant; and the Receipt18 for the latter's P1,000 payment for damages.
In her Comment,19 on the other hand, respondent clerk denied having
demanded money from complainant as a consideration for changing the
court's Decision. She affirmed that he had taken up the case with respondent
judge who, however, asked him to seek the advice of counsel. She
vehemently denied having illicit relations with respondent judge, whom she
described as kind, considerate and morally upright. In support of her defense,
she adopted his Comment as well as the exhibits therein. She also submitted
a Sworn Statement20 executed by her co-employees, who vouched therein for
her integrity and uprightness. Finally, she presented a certified true copy of
the Official Receipt21 that she had issued to complainant for the cash bond
posted by him on September 28, 2000.
Evaluation and Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
In her Report,22 Justice Guevara-Salonga held that while complainant had
failed to present any direct and positive evidence of his charges of graft and
corruption against respondents, the records of the criminal case validated
and confirmed his accusations. By and large, the following facts were
established by the records: 1) he did not apply for probation; 2) although he
had been arrested to serve his sentence, he posted a cash bond and was
subsequently ordered released by respondent judge; 3) the Release Order of
September 28, 2000, as well as the Undertaking attendant thereto, did not
state that the posting of the bond was incident to complainant's application
for probation; and 4) complainant fully served his sentence from September
27 to October 12, 2000. According to her, these matters of record attested to
the fact that the cash bond had been arbitrarily required by respondents and
unduly posted by complainant when all that he needed to do was serve his
sentence.
Further, the investigating justice held that the inconsistencies in the
statements of respondents in their Comments and testimonies during the
clarificatory hearing belied their claim that complainant had voluntarily posted
the bond. In particular, continued the Report, respondent judge initially
asserted in his Comment23 that complainant had posted the cash bond
without being told to do so, only to admit later during the hearing 24 that the
former had required him to post bail. It will be recalled that respondent clerk
admitted25 that she had unilaterally required the bond.
Moreover, the investigating justice observed that nowhere in the records was
it shown that complainant had applied for probation and withdrawn it.
Assuming that he had done so, respondents should have immediately
released the cash bond, because he had already served his sentence
anyway. According to her, this fact was known to respondent judge, as
shown by his October 12, 2000 Order26 acknowledging the Certification27 from
the Gerona Police Station that complainant had served his sentence from
September 27 to October 12, 2000. She held that the failure of respondent
judge to issue a commitment order further militated against his claim that
complainant had been released after posting bond.
Another discrepancy that supported complainant's allegation, according to
Justice Guevara-Salonga, was respondent clerk's classification of the cash
bond as part of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) instead of the
Fiduciary Fund. She found this fact surprising; having been in service for 27
years, respondent clerk ought to have been aware of the latter's duty to
check the forms and to collect the cash bond for the court.
The investigating justice concluded that the foregoing were telling proofs that
the acts of respondents had been irregular, unlawful, anomalous and totally
inconsistent with any claim of good faith in the performance of their judicial
functions. As to the charge of immorality, she recommended that it be
dismissed, as it was based only on vicious rumors and unverified reports.
Accordingly, she recommended that respondents be penalized with severe
reprimand and suspension from office for a period of one (1) month for grave
misconduct.
The Court's Ruling
We affirm the findings of the investigating justice with some modifications, by
increasing the penalty of respondents consistent with Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court and Civil Service Rules.
Administrative Liability
Exacting standards of rectitude and propriety are demanded of respondent
judge. As the epitome of integrity and justice, he should comport himself at all
times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear
searching public scrutiny.28 Such is the high price for the honor bestowed
upon those who occupy exalted positions in the administration of justice. 29
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate "should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities"; 30 and "should
be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." 31 Since
appearance and reality fuse in the performance of judicial functions, the
judge -- like Caesar's wife -- must not only be pure, but also be beyond
suspicion.32
In this case, respondent judge's September 28, 2000 Order 33 releasing
complainant after he had been arrested "to serve sentence" 34 finds no
support in the records. It must be noted that Section 4 of Rule 114 35 of the
Rules of Court grants bail, as a matter of right, to all persons in custody even
after conviction by the municipal trial court. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that "[a] judgment in a criminal
case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
accused has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, or the accused
has applied for probation."
On September 28, 2000, the reglementary period for filing an appeal 36 of a
judgment of conviction had not yet lapsed. Under the circumstances, it
cannot be said that complainant commenced serving his sentence when he
was arrested and confined on September 27. Where the one accused has
not voluntarily and knowingly commenced the service of one's sentence, but
has been confined merely by order of the court after the promulgation of
judgment, such sentence cannot be considered final or the service thereof
commenced.37
Complainant could have very well applied for probation, therefore, on
September 28. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law, 38 such application must
be filed by a qualified defendant, like complainant, within the period for
perfecting an appeal.
Be that as it may, there is regrettably nothing in the records to show that an
application for probation was filed by complainant. 39 Neither did the Release
Order indicate that he had been discharged upon his application for
probation.
Moreover, when complainant returned to jail to serve his sentence,
respondent judge failed to substantiate the latter's alleged issuance of a
Commitment Order. Observed the investigating justice:
"x x x. Furthermore, respondent Judge's omission in issuing a Commitment
Order poses severe implications against their stance of innocence and
compliant performance of duties. Surely, if we are to be impressed that the
complainant was released and thereafter voluntarily returned to jail, the
respondent Judge should have issued a Commitment Order to the jail
warden. But then, the certification that complainant started to serve the
sentence on 27 September 2000 is a clear indication that he was not
released at all after his arrest."40
Indeed, the actions of respondent judge were not free from all appearances
of impropriety. His conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of one ever
mindful of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It is the kind of
behavior for which he must be administratively dealt with, as it erodes public
confidence in the judicial system.41
As to respondent clerk, we find that she was equally remiss in the
performance of her duties.1âwphi1 By her own admission, she required
complainant to post the cash bond, even though she had not been instructed
to do so by respondent judge. She thereby arrogated judicial power unto
herself. The determination of whether to require a cash bond, like the
approval of bail or the release of the accused, is purely a judicial function. 42 It
was certainly not among the mandated duties of respondent clerk. 43
Her reported oversight in declaring the cash bond as part of the JDF, rather
than of the Fiduciary Fund, also showed her negligence. Following this
Court's Circulars,44 the cash bond should have been declared as court
fiduciary fund and held in trust for the litigants in a savings account with the
authorized depository bank. Her attempt to pass the buck to her subordinates
cannot be countenanced. As the court's administrative officer, she had
control and supervision over all court records, exhibits, documents,
properties and supplies. Furthermore, she had to see to it that her
subordinates performed their functions well.45 Respondent judge claims that
the records of the application of complainant for probation 46 were withdrawn
by the latter from the court during the clarificatory hearing. This allegation
certainly does not speak well of respondent clerk's management and
safekeeping of court records.
It has been stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with
the dispensation of justice is circumscribed by the trust and confidence
reposed in a public office.47 The image of a court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work therein, from the judge to the lowliest clerk.48
She is also found guilty of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance
of her official duties, a grave offense that is punishable with suspension from
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year.57 This being the more serious
infraction, we deem it proper to impose the minimum penalty of suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day, after considering her 27 years of service
in the government.
WHEREFORE, Judge Martonino R. Marcos is hereby found GUILTY of
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and is SUSPENDED without pay for
four months. Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya, on the other hand, is
found GUILTY of simple misconduct as well as inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, for which she
is SUSPENDED without pay for six (6) months and one (1) day. Both are
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Clerks of court are key figures in the judicial system.49 For this reason, they
must be assiduous in performing their official duties and in supervising and
managing court dockets and records. They cannot slacken in their jobs under
one pretext or another.50

The laxity of respondent clerk in the supervision of court personnel was

repugnant to her role as an adjudicative and administrative officer of the
court. Hence, she is subject to disciplinary action.

While the investigating justice merely recommended that respondents be

suspended for one (1) month, we believe that the nature of their infraction
calls for a heavier sanction. Although the charge of undue solicitation against
respondent judge was not sufficiently proven, he had unquestionably violated
Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.51 This violation52 carries with
it a penalty of dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months,
or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000. 53

Undue solicitation by respondent clerk was not sufficiently established. While

she admitted to having acted on her own in directing complainant to post the
cash bond -- thereby arrogating judicial authority unto herself --there is no
ample evidence that, in so doing, she had been propelled by a less than
laudable motive, a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of an
established rule.54 Hence, her action constituted simple misconduct.55 Under
Section 52 (B) (2) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,56 simple misconduct is punishable with suspension from one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

[A.M. No. 707-MJ. July 21, 1978.]
RURAL BANK OF BAROTAC NUEVO, INC., Complainant, v.
SERGIO CARTAGENA, Municipal Judge of Dumangas,
Iloilo, Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant bank charged respondent for failure to make good
his promise to pay within the stipulated period the agricultural
loan granted in his favor by the former despite repeated
demands and notwithstanding a writ of execution issued against
him. Pending resolution of this complaint, however, respondent
submitted to the Supreme Court two receipts showing full
payment of the loan with a manifestation that "the delay in
settling his obligation was not intentional but predicated on the
resolution of the previous understanding between him and the
previous manager of the bank." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Supreme Court dismissed the charges for being moot and
academic with an admonition to respondent against the
repetition of the same act.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES; MOOT AND ACADEMIC;
DISMISSAL. — Where an administrative complaint charges
respondent with non-payment of his debt but pending resolution
thereof respondent makes good his promise to pay, the
Supreme Court will dismiss the complaint for being moot and
academic, the raison d’etre for complainant’s grievance having
ceased to exist, with an admonition to respondent however,
against the repetition of the same act.
2. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGE MUST BE UPRIGHT IN HIS
OFFICIAL AS WELL AS PERSONAL ACTUATIONS. — An
incumbent member of the Judiciary is expected to be a model of
uprightness, fairness, and honesty not only in all his official
conduct but also in his personal actuations, including business
and commercial transactions.
RESOLUTION
GUERRERO, J.:
This administrative matter arose from a verified complaint dated
February 10, 1973 of the Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc.
(Bank for short) through counsel. The complaint charged the
respondent, Judge Sergio Cartagena of Dumangas, Iloilo with
dishonesty and irresponsibility for failure, despite repeated
demands, to make good his promise to pay within the stipulated
period, the agricultural loan granted in his favor by the Bank.
The bank in its complaint alleges: (1) That respondent in
consideration of the P300.00 agricultural loan granted him on
February 5, 1965, executed in favor of the Bank a promissory
note dated on the same day, and secured by a chattel mortgage
for 90 piculs of sugar quedan for his production on 1.5 hectares
of sugar plantation; (2) that respondent having failed despite
repeated demands to make good his promise to pay, the Bank
on April 16, 1970 filed a complaint for collection in the Municipal
Court of Barotac Nuevo docketed as Civil Case No. 494; (3) that
on June 18, 1970 decision was rendered ordering respondent to
pay said loan; (4) that the decision having become final and
executory, a Writ of Execution dated June 29, 1970 was issued
and furnished respondent; (5) that respondent failed to pay his
loan up to the time this complaint was filed; and (6) that the
acts and behavior of respondent in not paying a single centavo
as interest of P619.87 constitutes an act of dishonesty and
irresponsibility.
The records show that the complaint was forwarded to the
Secretary of Justice on April 25, 1972 and in answer to the
Bank’s charges against him, respondent stated that sometime in
October, 1972 he offered to make a partial payment, the
balance to be paid in two months’ time, but the Bank’s counsel
refused to settle for less than the full amount.

Enclosing a xerox copy of the receipt No. 12908 for P200.00

issued by the Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo indicating partial
payment of the loan, respondent on June 15, 1973 informed
this Court that he and the Bank had already reached an
arrangement regarding the payment of the loan.

On June 14, 1974, respondent submitted to this Court Official

Receipt No. 1347 showing full payment of the loan and
manifested that "the delay in settling his obligation with the
Bank was not intentional but rather predicated on the resolution
of the previous understanding between him and the previous
manager of the Bank." cralaw virtua1aw library

This case may be dismissed for being moot and academic. The
raison d’etre for complainant’s grievance has ceased to exist.

However, respondent must be admonished against a repetition

of the same act for, being an incumbent member of the
Judiciary he is expected to be a model of uprightness, fairness
and honesty not only in all his official conduct but also in his
personal actuations, including business and commercial
transactions.

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint, having become

moot and academic, is hereby dismissed with the admonition
that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734               January 19, 2011
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1933-MTJ]
FLORENDA V. TOBIAS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by complainant
Florenda V. Tobias against respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. Complainant
charged respondent with corruption for allegedly offering "package deals" to
litigants who plan to file cases in his court.
In her verified Complaint1 dated June 6, 2007, complainant alleged that
respondent Judge Limsiaco, Jr. offers "package deals" for cases filed in the
court where he presides. She stated that sometime in June 2006, she
requested her sister, Lorna V. Vollmer, to inquire from the Fourth MCTC of
Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental about the
requirements needed in filing an ejectment case. Court Stenographer
Salvacion Fegidero2 allegedly proposed to Vollmer that for the sum of
₱30,000.00, respondent would provide the lawyer, prepare the necessary
pleadings, and ensure a favorable decision in the ejectment case which they
contemplated to file against the spouses Raymundo and Francisca Batalla.
Fegidero allegedly required them to pay the initial amount of ₱10,000.00 and
the remaining balance would be paid in the course of the proceedings. It was
made clear that they would not get any judicial relief from their squatter
problem unless they accepted the package deal.
Further, complainant alleged that on June 23, 2006, Lorna Vollmer,
accompanied by Salvacion Fegidero, delivered the amount of ₱10,000.00 to
respondent at his residence. Subsequently, an ejectment case was filed in
respondent’s court, entitled Reynold V. Tobias, represented by his Attorney–
in-fact Lorna V. Vollmer v. Spouses Raymundo Batalla and Francisca
Batalla, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-007-V.3 Respondent allegedly
assigned a certain Atty. Robert G. Juanillo to represent the complainant in
the ejectment case. Complainant stated that respondent, however,
immediately demanded for an additional payment of ₱10,000.00. She
allegedly refused to give the additional amount and earned the ire of
respondent. She asked her sister, Lorna Vollmer, to request Atty. Robert
Juanillo to voluntarily withdraw as counsel,4 which he did on April 16, 2007.
Complainant also asked Vollmer to withdraw the case.5 Respondent granted
the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on April 23, 2007 and the Motion to
Withdraw Case on May 3, 2007.6
In his Comment,7 respondent denounced the allegation that he offers
"package deals" to prospective litigants as malicious, baseless and a lie. He
denied that he demanded from complainant the additional payment of
₱10,000.00. He alleged that he does not know complainant and she is a total
stranger to him.
Respondent attached to his Comment the Affidavit8 dated September 29,
2007 of Atty. Robert G. Juanillo, who stated therein that he received as
counsel of the complainant in the ejectment case the sum of ₱10,000.00 from
complainant’s sister, Lorna Vollmer. From the ₱10,000.00, he paid filing fees
and miscellaneous fees in the amount of ₱3,707.00, while the remaining
balance of ₱6,293.00 was paid to him for his services, consisting of the
preparation and filing of the complaint for ejectment, including acceptance
fee.
Respondent also attached to his Comment the Affidavit 9 dated September
29, 2007 of Court Stenographer Salvacion B. Fegidero, denying the
allegation that she offered a "package deal" to complainant’s sister, Lorna
Vollmer. She declared that the allegations of complainant were malicious and
unfair, and that complainant and her sister could have been misled by some
people who lost cases in the said court.
Meanwhile, the ejectment case was assigned to Judge Herminigildo S.
Octaviano, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Negros Occidental, in
view of respondent’s inhibition on July 30, 2007.10
On February 20, 2008, the Court issued a Resolution, 11 which noted the
Report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the complaint
against respondent. Due to the conflicting allegations of the parties, the OCA
opined that a formal investigation was necessary to afford the parties
opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and to determine the
alleged participation of court employee Salvacion Fegidero. Upon
recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the complaint to Executive
Judge Frances V. Guanzon, Regional Trial Court, Bago City, Negros
Occidental for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from
receipt thereof.
On May 20, 2008, the parties were summoned for a formal investigation
before Investigating Judge Frances V. Guanzon. Those who appeared before
the Investigating Judge were complainant Florenda V. Tobias, respondent
Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero and
respondent’s witness, Atty. Robert Juanillo. Complainant’s witness, Lorna
Vollmer, did not attend the investigation, because per information of
complainant, Vollmer was in Germany and she was expected to be back in
the country in December 2008.
In his Report dated June 2, 2008, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that
complainant testified that it was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who informed her
about the alleged "package deal" through long distance telephone call.
Complainant testified that she met Salvacion Fegidero only after the filing of
the instant administrative complaint and that she did not talk with her even
once.12 Complainant further claimed that she had no personal dealings with
respondent or with Salvacion Fegidero, and that she met respondent only
after the filing of the ejectment case.13
Moreover, complainant testified that respondent neither personally received
from her the initial payment of ₱10,000.00 for the alleged package deal nor
personally asked from her for an additional payment of ₱10,000.00. 14 It was
her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who told her through telephone about the demand
for an additional ₱10,000.00, but she (complainant) did not send the
money.15
Complainant testified that she was the one who went to the house of Atty.
Robert Juanillo, bringing with her the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
prepared by respondent for Atty. Juanillo to sign.16
Respondent and Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero categorically
denied the accusation that they had a package deal with Lorna Vollmer.
Respondent testified that he met and talked with Vollmer when she went to
his court to inquire about the filing of an ejectment case against the spouses
Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Respondent advised Vollmer that since
there was no lawyer in Valladolid, Negros Occidental, she had to choose the
nearest town lawyer as it would lessen expenses in transportation and
appearance fee, and respondent mentioned the name of Atty. Robert
Juanillo.17 Moreover, respondent testified that Vollmer, together with her
husband and Salvacion Fegidero, went to his house once to ask him for the
direction to the house of Atty. Robert Juanillo. Respondent denied that he
received the amount of ₱10,000.00 from Vollmer.18
Further, respondent testified that he met with complainant after the ejectment
case was filed, when she went to his court and told him that she was
withdrawing the services of Atty. Robert Juanillo. Respondent admitted that
he prepared the motion for the withdrawal of appearance of Atty. Juanillo,
since respondent wanted to help complainant as she said it was urgent, but
respondent did not charge her.19
Atty. Robert Juanillo testified that he received the amount of ₱10,000.00 from
Lorna Vollmer at the Municipal Court of Valladolid, Negros Occidental. From
the amount, he paid filing fees amounting to ₱3,707.00 to the Clerk of Court
of the Municipal Circuit Court of Valladolid-Pulupandan and San Enrique,
which payment was evidenced by five official receipts. Atty. Juanillo testified
that the balance of ₱6,293.00 was payment for his legal services.
Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero denied that she was involved in the
alleged package deal complained of by Florenda Tobias. She testified that
she met Lorna Vollmer for the first time when Vollmer went to the court in
Villadolid and asked if there was a lawyer in Valladolid, because she was
intending to file an ejectment suit. She referred Vollmer to respondent Judge
Limsiaco, since there was no lawyer in the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros
Occidental. The courtroom of Valladolid, Negros Occidental consists only of
one room where everybody holds office, including respondent. She saw
respondent talk with Vollmer for 15 minutes, but she did not hear what they
were talking about.20
Investigating Judge Guanzon found that the complainant did not have
personal knowledge of the alleged "package deals" to litigants who file cases
in the court of respondent. The allegations in the Complaint were all based
on the information relayed to complainant though telephone by her sister,
Lorna Vollmer. During the investigation, complainant admitted that
respondent did not personally receive from her the amount of ₱10,000.00 as
payment for the alleged package deal, and respondent did not ask from her
an additional ₱10,000.00.
According to Investigating Judge Guanzon, the only person who could have
shed light on the alleged offer of package deals to litigants was Lorna
Vollmer, complainant’s sister. Unfortunately, Vollmer was not present during
the investigation. Per manifestation of complainant, Vollmer was then in
Germany and she was expected to return to the Philippines in December
2008. Hence, the complaint of corruption was unsubstantiated.
Nevertheless, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that although the alleged
offer of package deals by respondent to litigants was unsubstantiated, it was
improper for respondent to talk to prospective litigants in his court and to
recommend lawyers to handle cases. Likewise, Judge Guanzon found
respondent’s act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty.
Robert Juanillo to be improper and unethical.
Investigating Judge Guanzon recommended the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against respondent as regards the alleged offer of
package deals to litigants who plan to file cases in his court. However, Judge
Guanzon recommended that respondent be reprimanded for talking to a
prospective litigant in his court, recommending the counsel to handle the
case, and preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert
Juanillo, which pleading was filed in respondent’s court and was acted upon
by him.
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court referred the Report of
Investigating Judge Guanzon to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation within 30 days from notice.
The OCA found respondent’s acts, consisting of (1) advising Lorna Vollmer
about the ejectment case she was about to file before his court; (2)
recommending Atty. Robert Juanillo as counsel of the complainant in the
ejectment case; and (3) helping complainant to prepare the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel, to be violative of the rules on
integrity,21 impartiality,22 and propriety23 contained in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA recommended that the case
be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be
found guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.00.
In a Resolution dated February 25, 2009, the Court required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision, on the
basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, within 10 days
from notice.
On August 18, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution resolving to inform the
parties that they are deemed to have submitted the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, considering that
they have not submitted their respective manifestations required in the
Resolution dated February 25, 2009, despite receipt thereof on April 1, 2010.
The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Judge Guanzon that
complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence her allegation that
respondent offers "package deals" to prospective litigants in his court.
However, the investigation revealed that respondent committed acts
unbecoming of a judge, in particular, talking to a prospective litigant in his
court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and preparing the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading was filed in his
court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge should be beyond
reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office. Indeed, as stated by the
OCA, the said acts of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity),
Section 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, 24 thus:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
xxxx
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies
not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is
made.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

The aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross misconduct.

"Misconduct" means a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. 25 "Gross" has been
defined as "out of all measure, beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such
conduct as is not to be excused."26 Respondent’s act of preparing the Motion
to Withdraw the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as counsel of complainant is
inexcusable. In so doing, respondent exhibited improper conduct that
tarnished the integrity and impartiality of his court, considering that the said
motion was filed in his own sala and was acted upon by him.1avvphi1

Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a

serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. 27 Under
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the sanctions against a
respondent guilty of a serious charge may be any of the following:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits

as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

In imposing the proper sanction against respondent, the Court takes note that
respondent had been found guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. MTJ-03-
150928 and was fined ₱20,000.00, with a warning against repetition of the
same or similar act. Moreover, per verification from court records, respondent
compulsorily retired from the service on May 17, 2009.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., former Presiding

Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valladolid-San Enrique-
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct for
which he is FINED in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos
(₱25,000.00). The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to deduct
the fine of ₱25,000.00 from the retirement benefits due to Judge Limsiaco, Jr.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1821             August 12, 2004
JOSE E. FERNANDEZ, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JAIME T. HAMOY, Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, Caloocan
City, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint against Judge Jaime T. Hamoy for Abuse
of Authority, Dereliction of Duty and Violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.1
Complainant Jose E. Fernandez is the counsel for plaintiff in Civil Case No.
3645 entitled, "Hadji Adil Musahari, Plaintiff versus Shop-O-Rama, et al.,
Defendants," and Civil Case No. 2744 entitled, "Philippine International
Development, Inc., Plaintiff versus Associate Citizens Bank, Defendant," both
of which were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch
15, then presided by respondent Judge. Despite the lapse of more than ten
years, respondent Judge failed to render judgment in the said cases. After
respondent Judge was transferred to the RTC of Caloocan City, complainant
learned that he brought the records of the subject cases to his new station.
On January 7, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to the Court Administrator
seeking help in the speedy disposition of his clients' cases. 2 Senior Deputy
Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez referred the letter to respondent
Judge for comment or appropriate action.3
When nothing was heard from respondent Judge, then Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo directed respondent to comment on the complaint within
ten days from receipt. Again, respondent Judge failed to comply. 4
On April 3, 2001, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez sent a First
Tracer to respondent Judge reiterating the directive for him to file comment
within five days from receipt. Still, respondent Judge failed to do so.
For his repeated failure to comply with the directives of the Office of the Court
Administrator, a Resolution was issued requiring respondent Judge to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to file comment;
and to submit the said comment within ten days from notice. 5
Respondent Judge finally filed an Explanation/Compliance, alleging that he
simply forgot to submit his comment; that he misplaced the records of Civil
Cases Nos. 3645 and 2744; that his Utility Aide in Caloocan City mixed up
the records of the said cases with the records of cases assigned to the
Caloocan court; that the missing case records were found only when the old
records were transferred to the newly-acquired storage/filing cabinets; that he
was unable to act on the cases notwithstanding the discovery of the records
because he had to attend to the many family-related cases, being then the
only designated Family Court; that his docket became more congested when
the other courts forwarded to his sala cases falling under the jurisdiction of
the Family Court; and that he had no intention of disregarding the directives
of the Court Administrator or of this Court.6
Subsequently, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation that he had already
decided Civil Case No. 2744 on July 11, 2003 and Civil Case No. 3645 on
June 20, 2003.7
In compliance with the directive of this Court, respondent Judge manifested
his willingness to submit the administrative complaint against him for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.8
The Office of the Court Administrator, after evaluation, recommended that
respondent Judge be fined the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) for his failure to decide the subject cases within the
reglementary period, with warning that any further delay in the disposition of
cases will subject him to a more severe penalty of either suspension or
dismissal from service.
We agree with the recommendation of the Court Administrator that
respondent is administratively liable for gross inefficiency, dereliction of duty
and violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
However, we find the recommended penalty not commensurate to the gravity
of the nonfeasance and malfeasance committed.
In his Comment, respondent Judge attributes the delay in the resolution of
Civil Cases Nos. 2744 and 3645 to the mix-up of the records with those of
the other cases assigned to his court.
Such an excuse hardly merits serious consideration. Respondent Judge
cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his court
personnel.9 Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of
organizing and supervising his court personnel to secure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity.10 Indeed, he is ultimately responsible
for ensuring that court personnel perform their tasks and that the parties are
promptly notified of his orders and decisions.11 It is his duty to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court to enable him to monitor the
flow of cases and to manage their speedy and timely disposition. 12
More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the
reglementary period. On meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional
time. It must be stressed, however, that their application for extension must
be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period. 13 A close scrutiny of
the records does not disclose any attempt by respondent Judge to request
for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the aforementioned cases.
Not only did he consign the cases in limbo for an unreasonable period of 13
years, worse, respondent Judge brought the records of the unresolved cases
to his new station without clearance from the Office of the Court
Administrator. Upon his transfer to another post, respondent Judge should
have asked the permission of the Court Administrator to bring the records of
the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the parties of his
action with respect thereto. This way, the Office of the Court Administrator
and the parties involved are aware of the progress of the cases instead of
leaving them in the dark. More importantly, this would dispel any suspicion
that the respondent Judge was unduly holding on to the records for corrupt or
ill motives.
Members of the judiciary have the sworn duty to administer justice without
undue delay. A judge who failed to do so has to suffer the consequences of
his omission. Any delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's
faith in the judiciary.
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end – to promote the ends of
justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person
presiding over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice.
These are self-evident dogmas which do not even have to be emphasized
but which we always advert to when some members of the judiciary commit
legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics. 14 More importantly,
failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law
constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases.15
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and without
delay.
In line with this, the Court has laid down administrative guidelines to ensure
that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied
with. Thus, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 states, in pertinent part:
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by
Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication
and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their
courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved
within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate
courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months
to do so. . . (emphasis and italics supplied)
A judge's inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions.16 A judge should, at all times, remain in full control of the
proceedings in his sala and, more importantly, should follow the time limit set
for deciding cases.17
Furthermore, respondent Judge should be held liable for his failure to obey
directives from this Court and the Court Administrator.
In his Comment, respondent Judge admitted that he received the directives
from the OCA and from this Court but that he "forgot" to comply.
Needless to say, judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher
tribunals, much more so this Court from which all other courts should take
their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a
mere request and should not be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively.18 Respondent Judge's impious defiance of the directives of the
OCA and of this Court borders on contumacy which deserves no
compassion. He cannot simply shrug off his non-compliance and pass the
blame to his faltering memory to justify his inaction. His explanation displays
a cavalier attitude which mocks the lawful authority of this Court.
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a
necessity.19 Respondent Judge must bear in mind that the exacting standards
of conduct demanded of judges are designed to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes
the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in
the integrity of the judiciary itself.20
Aside from respondent Judge's gross inefficiency, the records show that
despite the pendency of the cases subject hereof, he was able to collect his
salaries upon his certification that he has no pending cases to resolve. A
certificate of service is an instrument essential to the fulfillment by the judges
of their duty to speedily dispose of their cases as mandated by the
Constitution. A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period
but collects his salary upon a false certificate is guilty of dishonesty
amounting to gross misconduct and deserves the condemnation of all right SO ORDERED.
thinking men.21 In view of the primordial role of judges in the administration of
justice, only those with irreproachable integrity and probity must be entrusted
with judicial powers.

In fine, the Court holds that respondent Judge committed gross misconduct
and gross inefficiency under Rule 140, Section 8(3) of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, which are classified as a serious offense punishable by
any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule, to wit:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious

charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits

as the Court may determine and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

It appears that this is not respondent Judge's first offense. He had been
previously admonished by the Court in a Resolution dated March 20, 2002
for failure to decide motions and pending incidents within the reglementary
period, and was warned that any subsequent transgressions he commits
would be dealt with more severely.22

All told, respondent Judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of his
office. The magnitude of his transgressions, taken collectively, renders him
unfit to don the judicial robe and to perform the functions of a magistrate.
Therefore, the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the
service is warranted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy

of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 130, is DISMISSED
from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Respondent Judge shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from
performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service
on him of this decision.
 [A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697. October 15, 2003.]
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1153-RTJ)
EUGENIO K. CHAN, Complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE S.
MAJADUCON, Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 23, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are complaints for non-feasance, impropriety, partiality, and
inefficiency filed against respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former 1
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos
City.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Facts
In an undated letter, a "concerned citizen" charged respondent
Judge Jose S. Majaducon ("respondent judge") with "not wearing
[a] black robe during court sessions" and with being habitually
tardy. 2
In another complaint, dated 3 November 2000, complainant
Eugenio K. Chan ("complainant") charged respondent judge with
committing "acts of improprieties [and] irregularities." Complainant
alleged that respondent judge —
1. . . . starts his hearings at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and
2:30-3:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
2. . . . does not wear his robe despite the requirement of the
Supreme Court . . .;
3. . . . entertains lawyer[s] in his sala despite the absence of the
opposing lawyer[s];
4. . . . continued to hear cases despite obvious appearance of
impartiality [sic]. He insist [sic] to hear the case despite the fact
that her [sic] daughter being [sic] involved in the defendant bank;
5. . . . was already reprimanded by the Honorable Supreme Court
and he is a subject of adverse write ups in the newspapers;
6. . . . does not prepare or study the cases. He reads the cases
during the hearing time. 3
The Court required respondent judge to submit his Comment on
the complaints. In his Indorsement dated 5 February 2001,
respondent judge controverts the allegations against him as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. On his refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions.
Respondent judge states that upon his doctor’s advice, he stopped
wearing the judge’s robe during court sessions because doing so
allegedly triggers and aggravates his hypertension. He promised to
resume wearing the robe once his blood pressure had stabilized.
2. On conducting hearings behind schedule. Respondent judge
admits that he takes breaks from court sessions at 10 a.m. and
3:30 p.m. to take merienda or attend to personal needs. However,
respondent judge claims that he starts the hearings in his court on
time and that his sessions sometimes even last for more than eight
hours in a day. According to respondent judge, if ever his hearings
started late, it was either because he had to attend to other equally
pressing matters such as signing/revising Orders/Resolutions or
because the litigants and/or their counsels were late.
3. On entertaining counsels/litigants in his chambers. Respondent
admits entertaining litigants and their counsels with pending cases
in his sala as his "chamber’s two doors are always open." He
claims, however, that he never discusses with his visitors the
merits of their cases and that he has never been "influenced" by
them.
4. On "studying" cases during hearings. Respondent judge explains
that while he does consult the records of cases during hearings, it
is only to verify contested matters. He states that this is necessary,
as he cannot memorize all the details of cases, especially the
voluminous ones that he had inherited from the previous judge.
Respondent judge claims that complainant, who had sought his
inhibition from a case, 4 may have wanted to get back at him
(respondent judge) for his refusal to inhibit himself. Respondent
judge also suspects that complainant’s counsel, a certain Atty.
Fontanilla, is the "concerned citizen" who filed the anonymous
complaint against him. 5
On 30 January 2001, complainant withdrew his complaint against
respondent judge, stating that he had "realized that [respondent
judge] is only rightly doing his job." 6
On 16 May 2001, respondent judge informed the Court that since
February 2001, he had resumed wearing the judicial robe as his
blood pressure had stabilized. 7
In his Memorandum of 27 February 2003, respondent judge
reiterated the reasons for his earlier refusal to wear the judicial
robe during court sessions.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report of 11 March 2002 ("Report"), the Office of the Court
Administrator ("OCA") found respondent judge liable for violation of
Administrative Circular No. 25 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. However; the OCA recommends the dismissal of the other
charges against respondent judge for lack of merit. The OCA
recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000. The Report
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Complainant herein accuses respondent Judge of starting the
hearings late at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 o’clock
in the afternoon. In his comment, respondent Judge denies the
same contending that he conducts hearings [for] four (4) hours,
mornings and afternoons. In view of the absence of proof in
support of the accusation against him, respondent Judge enjoys
the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty.
As regards the non-wearing of a black robe during trials,
respondent Judge should be reminded of Administrative Circular
No. 25 dated 9 June 19[8]9 Re: Use of Black Robes by Trial Judges
...
Based on the aforecited circular, trial judges are enjoined to wear
the black robe during court sessions. In the instant case, prudence
dictates that respondent Judge should have informed the [C]ourt,
through the Office of the Court Administrator, of his health
problems and requested exemption from said circular. Admittedly,
he took it upon himself to dispense with the wearing of a black
robe due to hypertension. Although his reason may be considered
in his favor, it could not entirely exculpate him from administrative
responsibility for clear violation of the circular.
As to the charge that respondent entertains lawyers in his sala
despite [the] absence of the opposing lawyer, respondent candidly
admits the same by saying that for purposes of transparency he
allows lawyers and litigants to freely enter his chambers to ask
about their cases without however discussing the merits thereof.
This is [a] highly . . . improper practice. In-chambers sessions
without the presence of the other party and his counsel must be
avoided (Capuno v. Jaramillo, 243 SCRA 213). The prohibition is to
maintain impartiality. Judges should not only be impartial but
should appear impartial (Fernandez v. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 60).
The court should administer justice free from suspicion of bias and
prejudice; otherwise, parties-litigants might lose confidence in the
judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum (Nestle Phils., Inc.
v. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The charge that respondent continues to hear cases despite
obvious appearance of partiality must fail as complainant failed to
specify the cases being alluded to and in what manner respondent
appeared to be partial.
Finally, as to the charge that respondent does not prepare for or
study the cases and merely reads the cases during trial, we find his
explanation thereon satisfactory because referral to court records
are at times unavoidable.
In sum, respondent is found to have violated Circular No. 25 . . .,
but the fact that he had been suffering from hypertension shall be
taken in his favor. He is also found to have violated Rule 1.02 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct for his act of allowing in-chamber
sessions without the presence of the other party and his counsel. 8
The Ruling of the Court
Except for the recommended penalty, the Court finds the Report
well taken.
On Respondent Judge’s Refusal to Wear the Mandated Judicial Robe
Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, ("Circular No. 25")
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and
in order to heighten public consciousness on the solemnity of
judicial proceedings, it is hereby directed that beginning Tuesday,
August 1, 1989, all Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear
black robes during sessions of their respective Courts.
Respondent judge admits violating Circular No. 25. Nevertheless,
he seeks exculpation from administrative liability for his non-
compliance because of his illness. Respondent judge’s plea is futile.
The wearing of robes by judges during official proceedings, which
harks back to the 14th century, 9 is not an idle ceremony. Such
practice serves the dual purpose of "heighten[ing] public
consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings," as Circular
No. 25 states, and of impressing upon the judge the exacting
obligations of his office. As well put by an eminent jurist of another
jurisdiction:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[J]udges [are] . . . clothed in robes, not only, that they who
witness the administration of justice should be properly advised
that the function performed is one different from, and higher, than
that which a man discharges as a citizen in the ordinary walks of
life; but also, in order to impress the judge himself with the
constant consciousness that he is a high priest in the temple of
justice and is surrounded with obligations of a sacred character
that he cannot escape and that require his utmost care, attention
and self-suppression. 10
Consequently, a judge must take care not only to remain true to
the high ideals of competence and integrity his robe represents,
but also that he wears one in the first place.
While circumstances, such as the medical condition claimed by
respondent judge, may exempt one from complying with Circular
No. 25, he must first secure the Court’s permission for such
exemption. He cannot simply excuse himself, like respondent
judge, from complying with the requirement. Neither does the fact
that respondent judge, if he is to be believed, has resumed wearing
the robe exculpate him from liability. Such does not alter the fact
that at the time the complaints in the present case were filed,
respondent judge was openly violating Circular No. 25. Respondent
judge’s medical condition and his subsequent compliance serve
only to mitigate his liability.
On Respondent Judge’s Practice of Entertaining Lawyers and
Litigants with Pending Cases in his Sala
The Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code") provides:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Rule 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.
CANON 2 — A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. — A judge should behave at all times so as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court
judges play in the promotion of the people’s faith in the judiciary.
Unlike the appellate court justices, they are the so-called "front-
liners" who give human face to the judicial branch at the
"grassroots" level in their interaction with litigants and those who
do business with the courts. 11 The admonition in Canon 2 that
judges must not only "avoid impropriety [but also] the appearance
of impropriety" is more sternly applied to them. 12 It is in this light
that the Court frowns upon the holding by trial court judges of in-
chamber meetings with litigants or their counsels without the
presence of the adverse party. 13
Instead of taking heed of this ethical prohibition, respondent judge
readily admitted transgressing it. Worse, he reveals his ignorance
of the prohibition’s purpose by claiming that his in-chamber
dealings are above-board as nothing illegal or improper transpires
during those meetings. Respondent judge should have realized that
his very conduct of entertaining litigants and their counsels in his
chamber without the presence of the adverse party or his counsel
constitutes an impropriety. While judges are not expected to shun
the world, neither are they supposed to make themselves freely
accessible under such circumstances as to invite suspicions of
impropriety if not bias. Respondent judge should have borne in
mind — and all those in the bench who are similarly disposed as
him are reminded — that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
[N]o position is more demanding as regards . . . uprightness of any
individual than a seat on the Bench . . .. Occupying as he does an
exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a
high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must
comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, . . .
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
him as the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench
from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of
life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar’s wife, should be above
suspicion. 14
On the Other Charges Against Respondent Judge
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos
City guilty of violating Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, Rules
1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Jose S. Majaducon is ordered to pay a fine of P10,000,
the same to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he is
entitled.
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Court subscribes to the OCA’s finding that complainant failed

to substantiate the other charges against respondent judge. Mere
allegation that respondent judge was habitually tardy or had shown
partiality in a case, without more, does not suffice to hold
respondent judge administratively liable. On the other hand, there
is nothing improper in consulting case records during hearings to
clarify contested matters. It is usual for judges to do so, especially
for lower court judges who, in addition to their heavy caseloads,
have to conduct marathon hearings and thus need to consult the
records of each case more frequently.

On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed Against Respondent

Judge

The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000.

However, in Gallo v. Judge Cordero, 15 the Court imposed a fine of
P10,000 on a judge for impropriety in meeting with a litigant in his
office and for other irregular conduct. Under the circumstances, the
Court deems it appropriate to impose similarly a fine of P10,000 on
respondent judge.

Neither complainant’s desistance nor respondent judge’s retirement

precludes the Court from holding respondent judge liable and
imposing on him the penalty of P10,000 fine. A complainant’s
desistance from an administrative complaint against a member of
the bench will not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the case. 16
This is especially true in the instances where, as in the present
case, the respondent judge admits some if not all of the material
allegations in the complaint. 17 Similarly, the Court is not ousted of
its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that
the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the
pendency of his case. 18
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144 July 22, 1998
FLORIDE DAWA, NORALIZ L. JORGENSEN, FEMENINA LAZARO-
BARRETO, complainants, vs. Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan City, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1148 July 22, 1998
Clerk of Court MONA LISA A. BUENCAMINO, complainant ,vs.
Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 51,
Caloocan City, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting
executive judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was
charged with "sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness" in a
letter-complaint   dated August 15, 1997, filed by Floride
1
Dawa,   Femenina Lazaro-Barreto   and Noraliz L. Jorgensen.   In view of
2 3 4
the allegations in the Complaint, this Court, in a Resolution dated
December 10, 1997, placed respondent judge under preventive
suspension; and referred the case to retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, a
consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation,
report and recommendation.  5
Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino,   who assisted the
6
aforementioned complainants, also filed, on September 5, 1997, an
affidavit-complaint   against Judge Armando C. de Asa, for "sexual
7
harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/ acts of lasciviousness, grave
or serious misconduct, and [for] violation [of] the high standard of moral[s]
demanded by judicial
ethics . . . ." In our Resolution dated March 18, 1998,   we resolved to
8
consolidate her Complaint with the earlier one and to refer it likewise to
Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for inclusion in his investigation, report and
recommendation.
After conducting a thorough investigation the investigating officer
submitted his Report, dated March 16, 1998, which contained the
following exhaustive and detailed summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses for both the complainants and the respondent:
1. Floride Y. Dawa is a 24 year-old single girl employed
as a stenographic reporter in Branch 52 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC for brevity) of Caloocan
City. She affirmed under oath the sworn statement
(Exhibit A, Record, pp. 2-3 of the Record) she executed
August 15, 1997. She related that on August 8, 1997,
while on her way to the ladies' toilet, she had seen
respondent, Judge Armando C. De Asa, talking with a
man at the backdoor of his chamber. Out of respect for
respondent, being the Acting Executive Judge of the
MeTC, she had nodded to him before entering the ladies
comfort room. When she emerged from the same, she
saw that respondent was still at the backdoor of his office
although this time he was alone. Upon seeing Dawa,
respondent casually asked her whether the toilet was
clean. She answered that it was dirty. Respondent called
her and she approached him. When she neared the
respondent, the latter put his arm on her shoulder and led
her into his chamber. Once inside and while she was
standing near the edge of respondent's office table, he
placed his arm around her shoulder and suddenly held
her jaw and kissed her on the lips.
Dawa was taken by surprise and was shocked by the act
of the respondent. Before she could recover herself,
respondent once again held her shoulder and chin and
kissed her on the lips. She forcibly pushed the respondent
away. Respondent asked her where she lived and with
whom but she hurriedly left respondent's office.
Upon Dawa's return to the staff room of Branch 52, Maria
Teresa Carpio, who also works in Branch 52, asked her
what the matter was because she noticed that Dawa
looked dazed ("tulala"). She first said that nothing was the
matter but upon [Carpio's] insistent questioning, she
haltingly related her harrowing experience in respondent's
office.
That same day, she related the incident to Judge Delfina
Hernandez-Santiago, the presiding judge of Branch 52
who, although [she] was then on leave, had gone to her
office on the invitation of Danilo Silverio, one of her
coworkers in Branch 52, who was celebrating his birthday.
Judge Santiago, after listening to Dawa's story, advised
her to go home and relate the incident to her parents
before deciding to do anything further. Dawa went home
but did not tell her parents who were sickly. Instead, she
told her sister.
The next Tuesday (she had absented herself on Monday),
Dawa went to see Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, the Clerk
of Court, and related her story. She was told that she was
not respondent's first victim but that Noraliz Jorgensen
and the Clerk of Court herself had been objects of
respondent's amorous advances.
Dawa saw Noraliz Jorgensen. The latter assured her that
if Dawa would file a complaint, she would follow suit.
Dawa and Jorgensen decided to file charges against the
respondent. Upon the advice of Atty. Buencamino, the
two complainants saw Atty. Calalang, a city councilor. The
latter advised them to go to the police and have their
complaints entered in the police blotter. Calalang brought
them to the office of Councilor Manlapig, a former police
colonel. The latter called for a police investigator and
SPO2 Rey Domingo came and interviewed them. That
same afternoon, the two complainants went to the police
station to have their complaints recorded in the police
blotter (Exhibits 7 and 7-A; Record, pp. 16-17).
Dawa came to the Supreme Court with Atty. Buencamino,
Noraliz Jorgensen and Femenina Lazaro-Barreto where
they filed the letter complaint (Exhibit "X").
Respondent personally cross-examined Dawa. She
insisted on her story although she admitted that
respondent had gone to Branch 52 that same day.
2. Noraliz L. Jorgensen is 28 years old and married to a
policeman. She affirmed under oath her sworn statement
(Exhibit C, pp. 6-7 of the Record). The following is her
story:
Jorgensen was and still is a casual employee in the Office
of the Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the Office of
the Clerk of Court, (OCC for short), MeTC, Caloocan City.
Among her duties was the preparation and follow up of
the payrolls for RATA and gasoline allowances of the
Metropolitan Trial Judges. Upon the approval of said
payrolls, it was her duty to receive the cash from the
cashier and deliver them to the individual judges.
Sometime on January 3, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock in
the morning, she had gone to the office of respondent
Judge Armando C. de Asa, who presides Branch 51 of
the Court, for the purpose of securing his signature on the
payroll for the judges' allowances. Upon entering the
respondent's office, the latter approached her and
suddenly kissed her on the cheek. Jorgensen immediately
left respondent's office after having secured his signature
on the payroll.
Again, on March 31, 1997, at about 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Jorgensen had returned to the respondent's
office to deliver the cash representing his allowances for
the months of January, February and March. Upon
entering the respondent's office, the latter immediately
stood up, held her two arms, and suddenly kissed her and
licked her left ear, saying "I love you". Jorgensen was
surprised and afraid. She asked respondent, "Judge, what
is this", at the same time endeavoring to free herself from
his hold but she could not because his grip was strong.
Respondent then said, "Don't make noise lest we be
heard outside". At the same time, respondent held her jaw
and kissed her on the lips. He said, "Open your mouth" as
her continued to hug and kiss her while she tried to free
herself. He did not heed her pleas although she was then
trembling with fear.
On May 26, 1997, Jorgensen again entered respondent's
office to secure his signature on the payroll for June.
Again he kissed her before he signed it. After he had
signed the payroll, respondent invited Jorgensen to eat
with him at the Max Restaurant on EDSA the next
Saturday. When she asked him why he was inviting her,
he answered, "You are no longer a child, you ought to
know".
Jorgensen could only cry. She asked Atty. Buencamino
not to send her again to the respondent and she told
Buencamino of what had happened to her. Atty.
Buencamino told Jorgensen that if she wanted to
complain, Buencamino would support her. Jorgensen was
afraid that nothing would come out of any complaint
because respondent was a Judge and powerful.
On August 4, 1997, having delivered the allowances of all
judges except the respondent, Jorgensen tried to look for
someone who could deliver the money to him but she
could find no one. So she waited until she knew that
someone else was inside respondent's office. At about
3:00 o'clock, while Roderick Corral was inside
respondent's office, she entered but respondent
immediately threw to Corral the paper he had brought for
his signature, in effect dismissing him. Corral immediately
stepped out leaving Jorgensen alone in respondent's
chambers. When they were alone, respondent stood up
and held Jorgensen's jaw kissing her on her lips at the
same time saying "Open your mouth". Jorgensen
immediately left respondent's office in tears.
On August 8, 1997, Jorgensen learned that Floride Dawa,
a stenographer in Branch 52, was the latest victim of the
respondent. Jorgensen reported her experience to Judge
Santiago, the Executive Judge, and she informed the
good judge that she was ready to file a complaint against
respondent in order to obtain justice.
Respondent personally cross examined Jorgensen who
admitted that before August, 1997, she had gone to
respondent's office with Baby Mapue in response to his
call and while there they were shown an anonymous letter
(Exhibit 2) which mentioned [the] alleged misconduct on
her part.
3. Femenina Lazaro-Barreto is a thirty-year-old married
woman who is a Court Stenographer II in Branch 53 of the
Caloocan City MeTC. During her direct examination by
Atty. Roberto Abad, she identified her sworn statement
(Exhibit E found on pp. 4-5 of the Record).
On July 22, 1997, she was assigned to Branch 51
because Judge Romanito Amatong of Branch 53 was on
leave. While attending the session at Branch 51,
respondent dictated an "Order" in open court. Her
stenographic notes are found in Exhibit "F". She
transcribed these notes (Exhibit F-1) and left them with
the Branch Clerk Gina Amatong. When she returned after
lunch, Gina told her there were some corrections so she
again typed and submitted Exhibit "F-2". After typing one
more draft (Exhibit F-3), she brought the final draft
(Exhibit F-4) to respondent's office for his signature. After
respondent signed the "Order", he stood up and while
Barreto was looking at the "Order", he held her chin and
kissed her. Barreto asked, "What are you doing?"
Respondent kissed her again and tapped her shoulder
saying, "Sigue na, Nina. Okay na, dismissing her. Barreto
went out of the office and wiped her lips with her hand.
Margo, a stenographer in Branch 51 saw her. She did not
relate the incident to her husband but he learned about it
from the newspapers.
4. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino is an unmarried forty-
year-old lawyer who is presently the Clerk of Court of
Caloocan City MeTC. Her first appointment was on June
18, 1987 as Branch Clerk of Court for Branch 51,
presided by Judge Filemon Mendoza, now retired. After
she became a lawyer in 1996, she was promoted to her
present position as Clerk of Court.
Buencamino is acquainted with the three complainants.
She first came to know Jorgensen when she assumed
office as Clerk of Court because Jorgensen was detailed
to her office. She had known Barreto since 1992 or 1993
and she personally came to know Dawa when the latter,
accompanied by Jorgensen, approached her on August
12, 1997 and related her harrowing experience in the
office of respondent. Jorgensen herself related similar
experiences. Buencamino advised the two ladies that she
would refer that matter to Judge Santiago, the executive
judge, who was then on leave. She reasoned that being a
woman and the executive judge, Judge Santiago would
understand the complainant's situation. Dawa and
Jorgensen told Atty. Buencamino that they had already
seen Judge Santiago and the latter had advised them to
consult their families before taking any step. They further
told the Clerk of Court that they had consulted their
families and were decided to file an administrative case
against respondent judge. At this juncture, sheriff Noli
Calalang informed the complainants Dawa and Jorgensen
that his brother, Councilor Gil Calalang, was willing to
help them.
On August 13, 1997, at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, complainants Dawa and Jorgensen were
advised that Atty. Gil Calalang was in his office.
Buencamino and the two complainants proceeded to
Calalang's office who, after hearing their stories, advised
them to report the matter to the police. Atty. Calalang was
willing to handle their case provided permission was
obtained from Mayor Malonzo. Buencamino and the two
complainants were brought to the office of Councilor
Manlapig, a former police colonel, and there they were
interviewed by SPO2 Santiago. The latter asked what
cases could be filed against the judge and Atty.
Buencamino answered that a case for violation of the new
"Anti-Sexual Harassment Law" or for Acts of
Lasciviousness under the Penal Code could be filed
against respondent. At 5:30 o'clock that same afternoon,
Dawa and Jorgensen repaired to the Caloocan Police
Station to have their complaints logged (Exhibits 7 and 7-
A; Record; pp. 46-47).
On August 14, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto,
accompanied by her sister, saw Atty. Buencamino and
told her that she, too, was one of respondent's victims.
Ms. Barreto decided to file an administrative charge
against respondent and requested David Maniquis, the
deputy clerk of court, to accompany her to the police
station to have her complaint recorded. (Exhibits 7-B and
7-C, Record, pp. 48-49).
Buencamino admitted that she had accompanied the
three complainants to the Office of the Court
Administrator to file the present case. Upon request of
Atty. Perez of the Office of the Court Administrator, she
had administered the oaths of the three complainants and
had signed the original complaint.
5. Cielito M. Mapue, 33 years old, married and employed
as Clerk III, OCC, MeTC, Caloocan City, took the stand
for the complainants to corroborate their testimonies. She
declared that —
She was in charge of releasing the cash bonds to the
bondsmen when they were no longer needed. In this
connection, she had to prepare the vouchers and the
breakdown of checks and she had to go to the office of
the respondent in order to secure his signature. In 1997,
she remembers having been requested once by
Jorgensen to bring a payroll for the signature of
respondent. After respondent signed the documents she
had brought to him, respondent stood up, went around his
table and abruptly kissed her. She immediately left with
Emily Rose Clemente, staff member of Branch 51 and
never again went to see respondent alone. Mapue
admitted that she and Jorgensen had been called by
respondent in relation to a complaint of Judge Santiago.
Asked by respondent where he had kissed her, she
retorted in the vernacular, "Sa bibig, hindi mo ba
natatanda-an?" Made to explain why she had not
complained, she answered that she did not want anyone
to know. As a matter of fact, her husband did not know of
the incident even as she was testifying.
6. Maria Teresa G. Carpio, 37 years old, married, a
casual employee of the City Mayor's office and detailed to
Branch 52 of the MeTC had the following to say:
She had known Floride Dawa to be a happy girl. On
August 8, 1997, she was rather in good spirits because it
was the birthday of one of their officemates and there was
some sort of a party. At about 10:00 o'clock that morning,
Dawa had gone to the women's comfort room. When
Dawa returned a few minutes later, Carpio noticed that
she was pale and fidgety. She kept wringing her hands
and was on the verge of tears. Carpio asked her what the
matter was but Dawa answered that nothing was the
matter. After some prodding, Carpio asked Dawa to go
with her to the court room and there asked what really the
matter was as she was no longer her gay self. Dawa cried
and told the story of how the respondent had twice kissed
her on the lips.
At lunch time, Judge Delfina H. Santiago, the presiding
judge of Branch 52, came to join the birthday party. She
was told by Esper Cabiling, another stenographer in
Branch 52, that Floride Dawa wanted to see her in
private. Judge Santiago brought Dawa to her private
chambers.
On cross examination, Carpio admitted that respondent
appeared at Branch 52 and asked if everything was okay,
at which juncture, Dawa, accompanied by Rowena Martin,
went to the courtroom.
7. David Maniquiz, deputy clerk of court, Caloocan City
MeTC, declared that on August 14, 1997, he had been
requested by Femenina L. Barreto, to accompany her to
police headquarters to lodge a complaint against the
respondent. Noli Calalang, Joselito Bedana, Noraliz
Jorgensen and Floride Dawa were with them in the police
station.
8. Ma. Victoria Soriano-Cruz, an interpreter in
respondent's court, was originally reluctant to testify. She,
however, appeared in the afternoon of February 18, 1998,
to give testimony. She declared that she knew the
complaints and that she [was] directly under the
respondent who preside[d] Branch 51. On August 12,
1997, she learned from others that Floride Dawa was
kissed by the respondent. She also learned that
Jorgensen had also been kissed by respondent. She
admitted that the respondent has the inclination for
imposing fines on employees who were late or made
mistakes. She identified Exhibit "G" as an order where
[sic] requiring her to pay a fine.
9. Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago the presiding judge
of Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City,
was the last witness to testify for the complainants. The
following is her story:
She had been sick and had been on leave since March of
last year. For this reason, the respondent, who had been
designated Vice Executive Judge, had to act in her stead.
Judge Santiago affirmed the contents of a verified eight-
page letter (Exhibit I, I-1 to I-7; Record, pp. 17 to 24)
which she had sent to the Court Administrator. This was
submitted as her direct testimony.
In her letter, Judge Santiago stated that five ladies had
unburdened themselves to her not only in her capacity as
executive judge but because she was a woman. On
Friday, August 8, 1997, she had gone to her office
because she had been invited to lunch by birthday
celebrants, Danilo Silverio and Esperancilla Kabiling.
Upon her arrival, Ms. Kabiling had approached her and
told her that Floride Dawa, one of her stenographers,
urgently wanted to tell her something in confidence. Dawa
entered the judge's office "red[-]eyed, red-faced and with
a shiny nose". She kept clasping and unclasping her
hands and could not stand still. She spoke in an
incoherent and shaking voice which Judge Santiago could
scarcely understand. She asked Dawa to sit down and
compose herself. Dawa sat down and began to cry, so
that her story could hardly be understood. Between sobs,
the judge was able to piece out the fact that Dawa had
been embraced and forcibly kissed twice on her lips by
the respondent sometime that morning.
Dawa sought Judge Santiago's help to transfer to another
court and she wanted her to talk to the respondent in
order that the incident would not be repeated. Judge
Santiago could not promise Dawa but she advised her to
go home as she obviously was not herself. She further
advised Dawa to think the matter over during the
weekend and to talk to her parents about it. Judge
Santiago promised to talk to Dawa again the next week.
After Dawa had left, Judge Santiago learned that Noraliz
Jorgensen, a casual employee detailed to the OCC had
the same experience. To verify the truth, the judge went
to the Office of the Clerk of Court and bluntly asked
Noraliz Jorgensen whether it was true that she had been
kissed by the respondent. Noraliz blushed and became
red[-]eyed and told the judge of the several instances that
the respondent had forcibly embraced and kissed her on
the lips.
Judge Santiago sought out Judge Belen Ortiz who
presides Branch 49. She related the stories of Dawa and
Noraliz and asked Judge Ortiz whether she knew of
anyone from her branch who may have undergone the
same experience. Judge Ortiz asked Jean Marie Lazaro
 and the latter told them that there was one instance when
she and Zenaida Reyes, another employee of the court,
were seated on a bench near the door of their court and
respondent sat between them and placed his arms on
their shoulders and kissed them both on the cheeks.
Jorgensen informed Judge Santiago that if Dawa would
complain, she too would file a complaint. Judge Santiago
advised her to seek the counsel of her parents and her
husband and to see her again the next week.
In the afternoon of August 13, 1997, Femenina Lazaro-
Barreto, a court stenographer in Branch 53, accompanied
by her sister, Jean Marie, came to see Judge Santiago.
Femenina confessed to Judge Santiago that she, too, had
been kissed and embraced by the respondent twice. In
between sobs and with her handkerchief almost torn to
shreds by her shaking hands, she related how she had
harbored her shame in silence and her guilt at not being
able to tell her husband.
That same week, Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino also
related her own story to Judge Santiago — how she was
forcibly embraced and kissed on the lips by the
respondent.
Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz was the last one to tell judge
Santiago about the instances that the respondent had
kissed her on her cheeks. Mrs. Cruz sought the
assistance of Judge Santiago to transfer to another
branch to escape the respondent.  9
The investigating justice summarized the testimonies of respondent's
witnesses in this wise:
1. Arniel Apostol, is 38 years old, married and the sheriff
in respondent's branch. He affirmed the contents of his
sworn statement (Exhibits 9 and 9-A; Record, pp. 56-57).
He declared that he had been with the MeTC, Caloocan
City, since 1980. In 1995, he was detailed to Branch 51
and later became its permanent sheriff.
In his sworn statement, Apostol declared that the
respondent was an official who was faithful to his job. He
observed office hours religiously. He was friendly and
helpful to his personnel and was very approachable
whenever they needed anything. The workers in his
branch were free to enter his office, it being always open.
It [was] not soundproof such that if anything improper
happened inside, it could be heard outside.
Apostol further declared that since the respondent
assumed office as judge, he had not heard of him being
guilty of any improper conduct. On the other hand, he was
the object of praise in his work even as a lawyer and as a
fiscal.
Apostol continued saying he was surprised to learn that
the respondent had been charged administratively by
Nina (Femenina Barreto), Nora (Noraliz Jorgensen) and
Flor (Floride Dawa) because he had not seen the
respondent do anything indelicate to the three women.
Whenever Nina came to Branch 51 to see the
respondent, she would greet him with a "Hello Judge, I
am sexy now". On the other hand, whenever Noraliz
brought in documents for respondent's signature, she was
always smiling going in and coming out of respondent's
office. Apostol declared that he had seen Floride Dawa go
to respondents' office only once and she was in company
with other employees of Branch 52.
On cross examination, Apostol admitted that respondent's
office ha[d] a back door and the same [was] locked with a
main lock and two barrel bolts. It was his daily chore to
open this back door from the inside by unlocking the
barrel bolts. After he had done this he would go down to
the street to await the arrival of the respondent.
2. Liza Moreno, 47 years old, married, was respondent's
second witness. She is a court stenographer in Branch 51
presided by respondent. She had been with the MeTC
since January 2, 1969. She affirmed the sworn statement
consisting of two pages (Exhibits 10 and 10-A) which she
had jointly executed with Lina V. Cara, a clerk in the same
branch who had been in the service for 17 years.
She said that during the almost five years that she had
been under the respondent, no one had charged him
administratively. She described him as friendly and helpful
to those working under him. His office was always open to
his subordinates. The same is not sound proof such that if
anything untoward happened inside or [if there was] any
loud conversation [it] would be noticed by those in the
staff room.
During these past days she was stunned to learn that
Judge de Asa had been charged [with] sexual
harassment by Nina, Nora and Flor because she had not
seen the respondent do anything indecent to these three
women. Everytime Nina saw the judge, she would
smilingly greet him with such remarks as "Hi, Judge" or
sometimes "Hello, I'm sexy now".
She learned about the charges on August 8, 1997 when
she [went] to the Office of the Clerk of Court to fetch Fe
Apostol. She [was] told by the employees thereat about
the incident. She said that she [went] up to Branch 51 [o]n
the third floor to ask her co-workers whether they had
heard the news that the respondent had kissed someone.
Those who were still in replied that they had not.
Moreno further declared that Barreto used to come to
Branch 51 to have papers signed by respondent and
sometimes she came to cut the hair of certain employees,
including the respondent himself. On the other hand, she
had seen Dawa only once when she came with her co-
employees at Branch 52 to have their daily time records
signed.
3. Mario Muncal, respondent's third witness is 47 years
old and single. He affirmed the contents of his sworn
statement (Exhibit 11; Record p. 53).
Muncal stated that on August 7, 1997, he had gone to see
the respondent about a job in the MeTC. When he
entered respondent's office, Atty. Buencamino was with
him. De Asa introduced Muncal to Buencamino telling her
about his application for a job in the court. Atty.
Buencamino told Muncal to wait for her at her office.
When Muncal saw Buencamino, the latter told him that he
would have to undergo an observation period of one to
two weeks. She further told him that although he had
been recommended by respondent, she would be his
direct superior and he was admonished not to relate
anywhere else whatever he heard or saw in her office.
Muncal was "taken aback" by this admonition knowing
that respondent, as executive judge, was her superior and
was entitled to know everything that happened in the clerk
of court's office. He left after Buencamino had told him to
return on August 11 to begin his observation period. He
returned to the respondent to thank him for his
assistance.
Muncal learned that Atty. Buencamino had another
candidate for the vacant position so that he had second
thoughts about returning to her. However, on August
16,1997, after reading in the papers that respondent was
being charged with sexual harassment upon the
instigation of Atty. Buencamino, he decided to see
respondent and relate to him what had happened on
August 11, 1997.
4. Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa, took the stand
in the afternoon of February 24, 1998. He affirmed his
nine-page answer to the present charges (Exhibit "12";
Record, pp. 37-45).
Respondent declared that while there [was] a back door
to his private office, the same [was] locked from the inside
with two barrel bolts besides a main lock. Every day, he
would use this door for entering his office as well as going
out of it in order to avoid "ambush talks" with people. It
was the duty of Arnel Apostol to draw the barrel bolts
before respondent arrived at his office so that when he
came, he could open the main lock with his key and have
no difficulty in entering the said office. Whenever Apostol
was absent, it was Fernandez who did the opening for
respondent.
In his written answer to the charges, respondent claimed
that all these charges "were obviously instigated and
altogether orchestrated". He accused the Clerk of Court,
Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, as the "prime mover of this
cabal" and that aside from her there were "other people
behind the conspiracy" who ha[d] yet to be uncovered.
Respondent further claimed that "the complaints were set
up, hatched and designed, to destabilize and destroy the
good image of the undersigned created in the minds of
party litigants, government, local as well as private
concerns, in Caloocan City. Although, known to be strict
[in] fining lawyers, litigants, court personnel and even
himself, for unsatisfactory and unexpected justifications
for violations of court rules and procedures, he had
gained respect and admiration for his reasonable,
well[-]balance[d], compassionate and well[-]meant
application of the rule of law".
As a possible reason for the animosity of Atty.
Buencamino toward him, the respondent stated in his
Answer, the following:
Accordingly, as acting executive judge,
work concerns and attitudes, were honed
up if not altogether dramatically changed.
Misconceptions have been straightened
up. It was emphasized that the Office of
the Clerk of Court [was] not an
independent body. It must be the
secretariat or unit that should serve and
cater not only to its own concern, but that
of all the administrative as well as
functional requirements of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, thereat. Not
because, it is called the Office of the Clerk
of Court, would mean that the clerk of
court installed, is a co-equal of the judges
thereat. It was made clear that it was for
this reason why an Executive Judge/Vice
Executive Judge is designated, to fill up
this impasse. Further, as clerk of court,
functionally, such a position is under the
direct control and supervision of all judges
thereat. Accordingly, except those as
provided for under the rules and
applicable circulars, when a clerk of court
can act independently, any action,
movement, process and exercise, taken,
with national, local as well as private
agencies must bear the imprimatur of the
Executive Judge. This directive apparently
was not observed. Either it was
misunderstood, taken lightly, seriously
resisted or even disregarded. But its non-
observance cannot be excused or
countenanced.
Monthly meeting[s] with all clerks of court
were scheduled and designed to update
and enhance their working knowledge on
assigned task[s]. Important concerns and
problems of their offices [were] supposed
to be taken up.
Hours of work were strictly implemented,
loitering/roaming around during office
hours was prohibited, time records of the
Clerk of Court, Clerks of Court of
branches including its [sic] personnel, with
presiding judges on leave or vacant, must
after, its being authenticated, must [sic] be
signed by the Executive Judge.
Reports of immoral acts and loose moral
values were received, specifically in the
office of the clerk of court. Ms.
Buencamino was apprised and directed to
closely monitor such problem. Before the
staging of this hatch-up, the undersigned
received reports of its unabated
occurrences. However, either these were
treated with tolerance or viewed with blind
eyes.
Most importantly, for purposes of effective
control, an installation of an office for the
Executive Judge was conceived. This
project was apparently disliked. It was
about the last week of July or first week of
August, 1997, that Judge Santiago
informed the undersigned, that we ha[d] to
implement such a scheme. The plan was
to get the room of Atty. Buencamino, to
house the Executive Judge['s] office, as its
perimeter, appeared easily organizable
with least renovation and expense, for a
conference room and a library, folded into
one. Buencamino, in turn, would take the
room of David Maniquis, deputy clerk of
court, who should occupy the executive
table used by the former, located outside,
along with OCC personnel for proper
monitoring and active control of the affairs
in the office
As related to me by Judge Santiago, she
told Mona Lisa about it and insinuated to
her, to follow first before talking with me,
have the room vacated, place pertinent
documents/papers, to be signed and
attended to, locked [sic] it, if the Executive
Judge, [was] not around. Atty.
Buencamino approached me in disgust,
proposing an alternative. She submitted a
plan for renovation, as she insisted in
maintaining her present location. She
suggested to move the Executive Judge[s]
office in the middle, the end part, housing
the office of Maniquis, [to] be the one to
be converted as conference room and
library. For her to occupy David
Maniquis['] office was "bad punsoy" (feng
shui). However, Judge Santiago's directive
was firm. Mona Lisa, must have to comply
first. The matter of renovation, to be
further studied. The suggested sketch
plan with scribblings from Judge Delfina
Santiago dated August 6, 1997, is likewise
hereto attached as annex "7". Mrs.
Buencamino vacated her office, refused
David Maniquis' room and stayed [at] her
table outside with the OCC's personnel.
Also during the occasion, as there was a
vacancy for the position of a sheriff in the
said office, the undersigned
recommended one Mario Muncal, Jr. y de
Castro, telling Ms. Buencamino that for
the more than four (4) years that he
stayed in the office, he was not given the
privilege of appointing one of his own
choice. She retorted to try Muncal as an
understudy for about one (1) to two (2)
weeks. The undersigned acceded. Mr.
Muncal followed Ms. Buencamino to her
office where he was interviewed, advised
and instructed by the latter. He came back
before he left and informed me of the
developments but he never showed up at
the designated time. He reappeared after
reading the accounts in the newspapers
about the complaints lodged against me,
with revealing statements why he gave a
second thought [about] returning or not.
His affidavit is attached as Annex "8" (pp.
3-5, Exhibit 12; pp. 39-41 of the Record).
(Emphasis supplied).
Considering the above, respondent believed that "Ms.
Mona Lisa Buencamino, took all my actions, with disdain,
suspicion, more so, with resistance. On her face, she
regretted the fact of my designation as Acting Executive
Judge. She is not used to being controlled. She would
want to maintain her "madrina" and "godmother" (i.e.
influential, wealthy, etc.) image not only among the
employees but also among the judges as well. Thus,
these pathos, comics." (p.5, Exhibit 12, Record, p. 41).
On the witness stand respondent vehemently denied the
story of Floride Dawa. He stated that on August 8, 1997,
he had come to work between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock in
the morning. Neither Apostol nor Fernandez met him. He
found that his back door was still closed and could not be
opened with his key. For this reason he had to enter
through his courtroom. He said he did not see Floride
Dawa near the comfort room that morning. He saw her at
11:45 when he made his rounds as executive judge.
The above testimony is also in respondent's Exhibit "12"
where he stated that:
The Floride Dawa story, that she was
seen by the undersigned after coming
from the public toilet located along the
third floor hallway obliquely facing the
backdoor exit of the undersigned's
chamber, asking her whether said comfort
room was cleaned, to which she retorted
in the negative, thereafter calling her up,
placing the judge's arm around her
shoulders, led her to his room and twice
kissed her, to which she reportedly
resisted. Afterwards, conversing with him,
answering questions, as the latter sat
comfortably at his seat, as though nothing
had transpired. This is quite indeed a long
process to lend credence to such
prevarication. Aside from the fact, that the
backdoor of the undersigned's office was
not shown to have been closed on the
date the alleged sham had happened, a
verification of the site where the reported
incident took place would show that the
backdoor of the undersigned's office leads
to a wide public hallway fronting directly
the stairs servicing the second and third
floor[s] of said building, where people
come and go. The circumstances of
persons, time and place cannot fit under
such a frame set. (pp. 6-7, Exhibit 12; pp.
42-43 of the Record).
As regards the charges of Noraliz Jorgensen, he
expressed surprise that Buencamino believed her story.
The following is what he said:
["]Surprisingly, Mona Lisa coddled Noraliz
L. Jorgensen, a casual employee, . . .
detailed at the office of the Clerk of Court,
and believed her story. Ms. Jorgensen is
reportedly separated from her husband.
Her credibility throughout the court's
environs appears highly questionable,
especially among her staff in the Office of
the Clerk of Court. In fact, an unsigned
letter was sent not only to the undersigned
but also with Judge Santiago, divulging,
her unchaste relationship with a co-
employee, also assigned in the office of
the Clerk of Court. . . . Ms. Buencamino,
as her immediate superior, was advised,
to closely monitor on [sic] this. Despite
thereof [sic], the illicit relationship
appeared to have continued. Nonetheless,
she was convinced by Buencamino to
execute and swear to a statement, which
[was] maliciously and boldly
concocted. . . . . Be that as it may, the
story of "victim" Noraliz borders the realm
of illusion and fiction. In no less than three
(3) occasions, the dates of which, to lend
credibility, were fixed to coincide when the
allowances were allegedly released and
given to the respective judges, she
claimed to have been licked at her ear,
her mouth forced open, and kissed by the
undersigned. If one was indeed a victim of
such sexual harassment or lascivious
conduct, why would she, after the first
incident (January 31, 1997) return for the
second (May 26, 1997) and third time
(August 4, 1997) and allow herself to
suffer the same fate[?] This indeed, is
preposterous. It does not have the rings of
truth to it. Her lame excuse, that no one
could do her assigned chore, does not
have any legal as well as factual leg to
lean on. As far as the undersigned can
remember, there was Roderick Corral
(Odi) who can do it. One Baby Mapue had
occasion to do the same chore. Even
others in the OCC can perform such feat.
Such signing is not the exclusive affair of
Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Even the August 4,
1977 incident, would not dissuade [sic] a
person in her right mind, that she will still
 allow herself to be left behind by a co-
employee (Roderick Corral) whom she
saw ahead of her inside the judge's office
and be subjected to the same alleged
indignant act. This is plainly ABSURD."
(pp. 5-6, Exhibit 12, pp. 41-42 of the
Record).
Regarding the story of Femenina Lazaro, respondent said
the following:
["]Lastly, the Femenina Lazaro Barreto
account appear[s] to be a mere patch up.
Under the principle that in numbers there
is strength, they blended another scenario
consistently claiming that they were
kissed, their mouths forcibly opened. In
Barreto's version, she claimed that she
went to the office of the undersigned to
have an order signed as their Presiding
Judge was then, on leave. Immediately
thereafter, the judge stood up,
approached her and kissed her. This was
allegedly repeated[,] she reportedly
resisted. Then she left.
The size and arrangement of the
undersigned's chamber, would rule out
such hallucination. The undersigned ha[s]
developed the attitude of transparency, in
his dealings with the public and his
personnel. His room [is] always open.
Everybody come[s] and go[es]. His staff
can go inside, any time they wish, without
even knocking at his door, [get] cold water
and even [use] his private comfort room.
How then could this be possible.
In all these instances, nothing unusual
was seen or heard, much less
substantiated, except the self serving
narrations of the alleged offended parties
themselves. If there was really any
commotion or resistance that occurred,
the same could not escape the ears of my
personnel, whose tables are constrictedly
[sic] placed and immediately outside. In
fact, even the dates alluded to, were even
tailored to fit and coincide, just to give
credence, to the presence of the
complainants, in the alleged places of
incident.["] (p. 7, Exhibit 12; p. 43,
Record). 10
After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the parties,
Justice Romulo S. Quimbo arrived at a conclusion, the salient portions of
which are reproduced below:
1. There is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty
that respondent committed the acts he is charged with.
The testimonies of the three complainants were not in any
manner emasculated by the lengthy and thorough cross
examination personally conducted by the respondent.
Incidentally, the undersigned had to recess the
investigation several times to give complainants time to
compose themselves as they invariably broke down in
tears as they were required to relate the repeated
violations of their persons and their honors by
respondent.
Complainants' declarations were also fully corroborated
by the persuasive testimony of Judge Santiago who had
the opportunity of hearing Dawa's story soon after it had
occurred and the uninhibited retelling by the other
complainants. Judge Santiago, on her own accord, wrote
a verified letter to the Court Administrator (Exhibits I, I-1 to
I-7; Record; pp. 17-24), wherein she narrated all that she
knew of the different incident. . . . .  11
x x x           x x x          x x x
2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for
complainants to invent their stories. It is highly improbable
that the three complainants would perjure themselves
only to accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have
had some real or imagined resentment against
respondent. Moreover, the reason given by respondent
for the ill will that Atty. Buencamino felt against him is too
superficial to genuinely cause such malevolence,
specially because it was Judge Santiago who insisted on
the relocation of Atty. Buencamino so that her office could
be used by the executive judge.  12
x x x           x x x          x x x
The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the
employees of the court to perform their duties and to
observe office hours and his prohibition against loitering
and idleness in the premises of the court is not enough to
motivate [the] three women into exposing themselves to
ridicule and chastisement, not to mention criminal
prosecution, by relating false stories that would also be
derogatory to them.
Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at
respondent's calling her attention to an anonymous letter
which mentioned her indiscretions with another
employees of the OCC who was also married. We are not
convinced that this would move her into fabricating a story
as shocking as the one she related under oath. . . . .  13
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent may have committed an error of judgment
when he misjudged the young Floride Dawa to be fair
game. Feeling perhaps that the nod Dawa gave him,
when she saw him as she was about to enter the comfort
room, was an invitation, he took advantage of the young
maiden and forced himself on her. Perhaps because
Dawa was naive and innocent, she panicked and became
near hysterical prompting Carpio to question her. This
broke the dam, so to speak. When it became known that
Floride Dawa was going to file a case against respondent,
a slew of indignant women surfaced also wanting to file
charges against respondent for his many indiscretions.
How many more remain who prefer to suffer their
humiliation in silence, we can only speculate. 14
3. Respondent's denials cannot overcome the probative
value of the positive assertions of complainants and their
witnesses. This is elementary. Neither were the negative
observations of respondent's witnesses sufficient to belie
the complainants' declarations. All his witnesses could
attest to was that they had not seen respondent do
anything obscene to the complainants nor to others. The
fact that they did not see such lewd acts is not proof that
they did not occur specially so because they were all
done in the privacy of respondent's chambers.  15
x x x           x x x          x x x
PREMISES CONSIDERED and in line with the decisions
in Junio vs. Rivera, Jr., supra and Talens-Dabon vs.
Arceo, supra, we regretfully recommend that respondent
be dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and
immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government, including government owned or controlled
corporations. 16
The Court reviewed the entire record of the instant administrative case
and found the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the
investigating justice to be adequately substantiated by the evidence
presented by the parties and anchored on applicable law and
jurisprudence. Thus, with no need to rehash the reprehensible
indiscretions of the respondent judge, we adopt the conclusion and
recommendation of the investigating justice.
The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness
they are expected to possess.   More than simply projecting an image of
17
probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good judge"; he must also
appear to be a "good person."   It is towards this sacrosanct goal of
18
ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code
of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.
 RULE 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence.
x x x           x x x          x x x
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPRORIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.02. — A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: "A judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are
required to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his
official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his
external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal
behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life, be
free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.   For 19
this reason, "[t]he Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times."   This
20
mandate has special import for municipal and metropolitan trial court
judges, like herein respondent, since they are the "front-liners" of the
judiciary who serve more people at the "grass-roots" level of society.  21
In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity of the
respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all,
to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only
do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for
members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the
standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and
outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute
sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for theemployee[s]."   Let it
22
be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority
over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is
an officer.
In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and
official responsibility over the complainants, who were his subordinates in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, the Court concludes with
moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a
place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal
from office.   In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt to
23
iterate our pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting
standards. He has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a
judge as a model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed
the people's high expectations and diminished the esteem
in which they hold the judiciary in general.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact
that the complainant is one of his subordinates over
whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the
executive judge. He took advantage of his position and
power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious
desires. Instead of being in loco parentis over his
subordinate employees, respondent was the one who
preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior
position. 
24
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby
DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2438 MTJ)              pointing to disgruntled professionals, supporters and local candidates who
February 27, 2013
ANONYMOUS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz
City, Misamis Occidental, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is an anonymous letter-complaint,1 dated August 2, 2010,
alleging immorality and conduct unbecoming of a judge against respondent
Judge Rio C. Achas (Judge Achas),  Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental.
The letter calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge
Achas and alleges that: (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge
Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives
beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his
connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he comes to court very
untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material
and monetary consideration; and (6) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling.
In the Indorsement,2 dated September 30, 2010, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) referred the matter to Executive Judge Miriam
Orquieza-Angot (Judge Angot)  for Discreet Investigation and Report.
In her Report,3 dated November 26, 2010, Judge Angot found that Judge
Achas had been separated from his legal wife for quite some time and they
are living apart; and that he found for himself a young woman with whom he
would occasionally go out with in public and it was not a secret around town.
Anent the allegations that Judge Achas was living beyond his means and
was involved in illegal activities, Judge Angot reported that she could not be
certain whether such were true, and only ascertained that he had established
friendships or alliances with people of different social standings from around
the city. Judge Angot opined that the allegation that Judge Achas would
come to court untidy and dirty was a matter of personal hygiene and in the
eye of the beholder. Lastly, she found the charge that Judge Achas decided
cases unfairly in exchange for consideration to be vague and
unsubstantiated.
In his Comment,4 dated February 4, 2011, Judge Achas denied all the
allegations against him and claimed that they were hatched to harass him,
lost during the May 2010 elections. He asserted that after 28 years in the
government service, he had remained loyal to his work and conducted
himself in a righteous manner.
In the Resolution, dated December 14, 2011, the Court resolved to redocket
the case as a regular administrative matter and to refer the same to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz City for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In her Report,5 dated April 4, 2012, Executive Judge Salome P.
Dungog (Judge Dungog)  stated that an investigation was conducted. Judge
Achas and his two witnesses testified in his defense, namely, his Branch
Clerk of Court, Renato Zapatos; and his Process Server, Michael Del
Rosario. The anonymous complainant never appeared to testify. During the
investigation, Judge Achas again denied all the charges but admitted that he
was married and only separated de facto  from his legal wife for 26 years, and
that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having inherited
such from his forefathers. Judge Dungog found that "it is not commendable,
proper or moral per Canons of Judicial Ethics to be perceived as going out
with a woman not his wife,"6 and for him to be involved in rearing game
cocks.
In its Memorandum, dated December 17, 2012, the OCA recommended that
Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the charge of immorality. It was further
recommended that he be ordered to refrain from going to cockpits or avoid
such places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. The other charges were
recommended to be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court agrees, with modification.
Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints
may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for
anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings
which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable
public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If
the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his defense.7
In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The
complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth
during the investigation. Respondent Judge Achas denied all the charges
made against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto  from his
wife and that he reared fighting cocks.
The charges that he (1) lives beyond his means, (2) is involved with illegal
activities through his connection with the kuratongs, (3) comes to court very
untidy and dirty, and (4) decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material
and monetary consideration were, therefore, properly recommended
dismissed by the OCA for lack of evidence.
The charges that (1) it is of public knowledge that he is living scandalously
with a woman not his wife and that (2) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling are, however, another matter.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently
provides:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith
in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also
be seen to be done.
x x x           x x x          x x x
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Judge Angot’s discreet investigation revealed that the respondent judge
found "for himself a suitable young lass whom he occasionally goes out with
in public and such a fact is not a secret around town." 8 Judge Achas denied
this and no evidence was presented to prove the contrary. He did admit,
however, that he had been estranged from his wife for the last 26 years.
Notwithstanding his admission, the fact remains that he is still legally married
to his wife. The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in finding that it
is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out
with a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as
well as to that of the Judiciary.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly
failed to abide by the above-cited Canons of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.
Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear
evidence.1âwphi1 Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and betting.
He admitted, however, that he reared fighting cocks for leisure, having
inherited the practice from his forefathers. While gamecocks are bred and
kept primarily for gambling, there is no proof that he goes to cockpits and
gambles. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should
avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it
undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon
himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
The Court further notes that in A.M. No. MTJ-04-1564, 9 Judge Achas was
charged with immorality for cohabiting with a woman not his wife, and with
gross misconduct and dishonesty for personally accepting a cash bond in
relation to a case and not depositing it with the clerk of court, and for
maintaining a flock of fighting cocks and actively participating in cockfights.
The Court, in 2005, found him guilty of gross misconduct for personally
receiving the cash bond and fined him in the amount of ₱15,000.00 with a
stern warning. The charge of immorality was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Although the Court, at the same time, noted that the charge of maintaining a
flock of fighting cocks and participating in cockfights was denied by the
respondent judge, it made no ruling on the charge.
Seven years later, similar charges of immoral cohabitation and cockfighting
have again been levelled against Judge Achas. Considering that his immoral
behaviour is not a secret around town, it is apparent that respondent judge
has failed to ensure that his conduct is perceived  to be above reproach by
the reasonable observer, and has failed to avoid the appearance of
impropriety in his activities, to the detriment of the judiciary as a whole.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its

occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be
individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave
at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all his activities. His personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while
in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is
perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning
act of a judge degrades the institution he represents. 10

Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C (1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of

Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is classified as a light charge,
punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than
Pl,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand;
( 4) admonition with warning. The Court, thus, finds that the penalty of a fine
in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and reprimand are proper under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent

Judge Rio Concepcion Achas is REPRlMANDED and FINED in the amount
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00), ADMONISHED not to socially
mingle with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC               January 12, 2011
IN RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 45, URDANETA CITY,
PANGASINAN, AND REPORT ON THE INCIDENT AT BRANCH 49, SAME
COURT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), routinely
conducts an audit of the caseload and performance of a retiring trial judge.
The Court will unhesitatingly impose appropriate sanctions despite the
intervening retirement of the judge or member of the staff should the audit
establish any inefficiency on the part of the retiring trial judge or of any
member of the staff.
Here, we sanction a judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and his Branch
Clerk of Court, despite the former’s intervening retirement, for the inefficient
management of their court records and caseload. The sanction should serve
as a timely reminder yet again to all incumbent trial judges and court
personnel to handle court records and to manage caseloads efficiently and
systematically, or else they suffer the appropriate sanctions.
ANTECEDENTS
A.
Findings on Caseload and Docket Inventory of Branch 45
On September 18-19, 2007, the OCA conducted a judicial audit of the
caseload of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC Branch 45) in
Urdaneta City in view of the compulsory retirement of Presiding Judge Joven
F. Costales (Judge Costales) by November 21, 2007.
As its preliminary findings,1 the judicial audit team reported that RTC Branch
45’s caseload totaled 465 cases (i.e., 197 civil cases and 268 criminal
cases), of which:
(a) 16 were submitted for decision or resolution but still unresolved;
(b) 14 included unresolved incidents;
(c) 11 had no action taken since their filing;
(d) Three were criminal cases awaiting compliance relative to the last
incidents;
(e) 39 underwent no further hearings or actions;
(f) Seven were civil cases awaiting ex parte reception of evidence;
and
(g) 14 were criminal cases with unserved warrants or alias warrants
of arrest.
Further, the judicial audit team concluded that the docket inventory of RTC
Branch 45 was inaccurate, because:
(a) The docket inventory contained numerous typographical errors
that led to the confusion about whether some cases were reported or
not;
(b) The form prescribed in Administrative Circular No. 10-94 dated
June 29, 1994 was not adopted;
(c) Some case records had no dates of receipt; and
(d) In Criminal Case No. U-13095, Branch 45 issued an order dated
July 27, 2007 resetting the trial notwithstanding that one of the
accused had not been arraigned.2
On November 19, 2007, the OCA, through then Deputy Court Administrator
(DCA) Jose P. Perez,3 issued a memorandum to Atty. Max Pascua (Atty.
Pascua), the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 45, 4 directing him
thuswise:
In view of the compulsory retirement of Judge Joven F. Costales on
November 21, 2007, you are DIRECTED to (a) bring these cases to the
attention of your pairing/acting judge for his/her guidance and appropriate
action; and (b) inform this Office, within ten (10) days from notice, if there
were any changes in the status of the listed cases in Annex "A" attaching
thereto certified true copies of the orders/decisions.
Further, you are DIRECTED to (a) COMMENT, within ten (10) days from
notice, on the following findings: civil cases for reception of evidence ex-parte
listed under Table 10; inaccurate Docket Inventory Report described in letter
H.2; and case records with no date of receipt; and (b) henceforth ADOPT
THE PRESCRIBED FORM under Administrative Circular No. 10-94 dated
June 29, 1994 re: Submission of Semestral Docket Inventory Report.
In partial compliance with the memorandum, Atty. Pascua replied by letter
dated January 4, 2008 (accompanied by a report on the status of criminal
and civil cases and on other matters), 5 explaining:
Regarding the inaccurate Docket Inventory and the typographical errors in
criminal cases records as observed by the audit team (letter H-2 of the
memorandum), rest assured Your Honor that undersigned is arranging things
in its (sic) proper order and have instructed the civil and criminal records
clerk-in-charge regarding the matter, including the adoption of the prescribed
form under Adm. Circular No. 10-94 in submission of Semestral Docket
Inventory Report.
It appears that on January 8, 2008,6 the OCA informed Judge Costales that
(a) the clearance necessary for the approval of his claim for compulsory
retirement benefits could not issue pending his compliance with the
memorandum dated November 19, 2007; and (b) his request for the release
of his retirement benefits, less the amount that might answer for any liability,
was still under evaluation by the Court.
In his letter dated January 8, 2008,7 Judge Costales wrote to the OCA, viz:
This is in connection with your letter dated November 19, 2007 which the
undersigned received on November 20, 2007, directing him to conduct an
investigation regarding the irregularity in the punching of Bundy clock of the
employees of RTC, Branch 49, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan and to submit his
report within ten (10) days thereof.
I am awfully sorry for failing to comply the same (sic) on the following
grounds:
1. I received said memorandum only on November 20, 2007, the
date of my compulsory retirement.
2. That a week before my retirement on November 21, 2007, I was
too busy reading and signing decisions and resolutions of motions in
order that at the time of my retirement all cases submitted for
decision are decided and all motions for resolutions are resolved,
which I was able to do so.
3. That during my last day of the service, November 20, 2007, I
instructed my Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Max Pascua to write your
Honor to inform you that as much as I am already retired after
November 21, 2007, the Executive Judge should be the one to
conduct such investigation. However, I only learned yesterday that
the Branch Clerk of Court was unable to do what I directed him to do
by writing you on the matter.
4. Anent my comments on the findings of the Audit Team regarding
the cases pending before Branch 45, I have also ordered Atty.
Pascua to make the necessary reply, comment and/or explanations
on the matter, as I am no longer in the Judiciary after November 21,
2007. Nonetheless, I was told by Atty. Pascua that he would submit
said comments, reply and/or explanations by next week.
5. That I have not gone to Branch 45 Office since I retired last
November 21, 2007, and I was of the notion and belief that Atty.
Pascua had written you on the matter.
On the above reasons, as I am no longer connected with the Judiciary, my
failure to comply with the said memorandum dated November 10, 2007
earlier is reasonable and well-founded.
Again, I would like to reiterate my apology for what happened.
Thank you, Sir!
Judge Costales sent to the OCA another letter dated January 26, 2008, 8 as
follows:
The undersigned received last January 23, 2008 the following:
1. Memorandum dated November 19, 2007 directing me to submit
my report and recommendation relative to the irregularity in the
punching of Bundy clock at RTC, Branch 49 when I was the Acting
Executive Judge of the RTC, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.
2. A letter dated November 19, 2007 directing me to give my
comment on the findings of the Judicial Audit Team conducted in my
sala, RTC, Branch 45.
3. Annex "A", re findings of the Audit Team.
4. Memorandum dated November 19, 2007, addressed to Atty. Max
Pascua, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 45, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan.
Anent No. 1, Please be informed that I sent to Your Honor a letter last
January 8, 2008, explaining my failure to submit my comments on the matter,
a copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A".
With regards (sic) to No. 2, my explanation is also contained in my letter
dated January 8, 2008. Nonetheless, if I am directed to personally submit my
comment, I would like then to state that on Tables 1 and 2: A. CASES
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION on Civil and Criminal Cases, I have already
decided all said cases, a Certification issued by the Branch Clerk of Court
Atty. Max Pascua, marked as Annex "B" is hereto attached. Likewise, a copy
of the letter-comment of Atty. Pascua marked as Annex "C" is hereto
attached. In said comments, Annex "C", of Atty. Pascua, all the comments
and/or explanations on the findings of the Audit Team from Table 1 to Table
11 are sufficiently indicated therein. I am adopting thereof, the comments
and/or explanations of Atty. Pascua as my comments and/or explanation on
the matter.
I hope Your Honor, that the above comments and/or explanations on my part
would suffice on the matter/s I am directed to do.
Your Honor, it is indeed regrettable, that up to this time or more two months
since I retired after rendering continuous or almost 40 years of Government
service, I have not yet received a single centavo of the Retirement Benefits I
am supposed to receive. It is true that an Administrative Case was filed
against me, however, a Letter of Retention in order that I can also receive the
benefits accorded to me was also submitted by me. I hope that the
resolution/decision of my administrative case be resolved/decided by the
Honorable Supreme Court at the soonest.
In the interest of justice, I should be given my Retirement Benefits as soon as
possible. I am earnestly requesting Your Honor, to please help me on the
matter for the early release of my Retirement Benefits.
Thank you very much, Your Honor!
B.
Failure of Judge Costales to investigate
and to report on bundy clock incident
In addition to being the Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 45, Judge Costales
served as the acting Executive Judge in the absence of the Executive Judge.
In that capacity, he discharged duties, among them the investigation of
administrative complaints brought against court personnel within his
administrative area; and the submission of his findings and recommendations
to the Court.9
On September 19, 2007, in the course of the judicial audit of Branch 45,
Fernando S. Agbulos, Jr. (Agbulos, Jr.), team leader of the judicial audit,
visited RTC Branch 49 to remind the Branch Clerk of Court on the monthly
report of cases to be submitted to the OCA. After finding only two employees
actually present in Branch 49, he inspected the bundy cards and discovered
that all of the court personnel of Branch 49 except two – Helen Lim and
Rowena Espinosa – had punched in on that day. He immediately referred his
discovery (bundy-cards incident) to the attention of Judge Costales as acting
Executive Judge.
When nothing was heard from Judge Costales about his action on the bundy-
cards incident, the OCA issued to him a memorandum on November 19,
2007 to remind him that his report on the incident was already overdue, and
to direct him to submit his report within ten days from notice. However, Judge
Costales still did not comply with the directive of the OCA.
Later on, Judge Costales explained through his aforecited letter dated
January 8, 2008 that he had instructed Atty. Pascua upon his receipt of the
memorandum on November 20, 2007 to advise the OCA of his forthcoming
retirement, but that Atty. Pascua had failed to so inform the OCA; that in the
week prior to his retirement on November 21, 2007, he had been too busy
reading and signing decisions and resolutions to conduct the investigation of
the bundy-cards incident; and that his intervening retirement had left to the
new Executive Judge the duty to investigate and report on the bundy-cards
incident.
C.
OCA’s Final Findings and Recommendations
In their memorandum dated April 22, 2008 for the Chief Justice, 10 Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño and DCA Perez rendered the following
findings, namely:
(a) Some case records bore no dates of receipt by Branch 45;
(b) Several case records did not contain the latest court actions/court
processes taken;
(c) No action was taken in some cases since their filing;
(d) The case record of Criminal Case No. U-12848 was not
immediately transmitted to the Office of the Prosecutor, although the
transmittal had been ordered as early as January 19, 2005;
 (e) Some cases were not set for further hearing, or had no further
actions taken on them;
(f) The issuance of summonses and alias summonses by the Branch
Clerk of Court was delayed despite the corresponding orders by the
judge;
(g) No actions were taken on cases set for ex parte reception of
evidence; and
(h) Criminal Case No. U-13095 was set for trial with respect to one of
the accused who had not been arraigned.
Court Administrator Elepaño and DCA Perez further found that despite his
submission of the report on the status of cases on January 4, 2008 and
February 18, 2008, Atty. Pascua did not furnish to the OCA copies of the
orders and relevant papers showing the status of four criminal cases (i.e.,
Criminal Case No. U-15010, Criminal Case No. U-15183, Criminal Case No.
U-13095, and Criminal Case No. U-14936) and two civil cases (i.e., Civil
Case No. U-2377 and Civil Case No. U-8793).
Anent the bundy-cards incident in RTC Branch 49, Court Administrator.
Elepaño and DCA Perez stated as follows:11
On September 19, 2007, the second day of this judicial audit, Mr. Fernando
S. Agbulos, Jr., team member, went to Branch 49, same court, to remind the
Clerk of Court of the Monthly Reports of Cases due for submission to the
Office of the Court Administrator. He was surprised to see only two (2)
employees inside the office. An inspection of the bundy cards would show,
however, that only Ms. Helen Q. Lim and Ms. Rowena Espinosa did not
punch in their cards on the said day. The team immediately reported the
incident and referred the same to Judge Costales, then Acting Executive
Judge of RTC, Urdaneta City, for his investigation, report and
recommendation.
On November 19, 2007, this Office reminded Judge Costales of his overdue
report on the investigation conducted in September 2007. Thus:
"In the course of the judicial audit conducted in your court on September 19,
2007, the audit team discovered an appearance of irregularity in the
punching of bundy cards at Branch 49, same court. This was immediately
referred to you, in your then capacity as Acting Executive Judge, for
investigation.
In view thereof, you are hereby DIRECTED, within ten (10) days from notice,
to submit your report and recommendation thereon."
No response was received from his end. After his retirement on November
21, 2007, he wrote:
"I am awfully sorry for failing to comply xxx on the following grounds:
1. I received said memorandum only on November 20, 2007, the
date of my compulsory retirement;
2. That a week before my retirement on November 21, 2007, I
instructed my Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Max Pascua to write your
Honor to inform you that as much as I am already retired after
November 21, 2007, the Executive Judge should be the one to
conduct such investigation. However, I only learned yesterday that
the Branch Clerk of Court was unable to do what I directed him to do
by writing you on the matter.
3. xxx
xxx
On the above reasons (sic), as I am no longer connected with the Judiciary,
my failure to comply with the said memorandum dated November 10, 2007
earlier is reasonable and well-founded."
The explanation is unmeritorious. The assignment was given to him long
before his retirement. The Memorandum dated November 19, 2007, even if
received on November 20, 2007, a day before his compulsory retirement
(contrary to his statement that his compulsory retirement was on November
20, 2007), is a mere reminder.
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that failure to comply
with the directives of the Court is tantamount to insubordination. In the case
at bar, Judge Costales failed to comply with the Memorandum dated
November 19, 2007 directing him to submit his report and recommendation
on the investigation conducted in September 2007.
Accordingly, Court Administrator Elepaño and DCA Perez recommended
that:
1. Retired Judge Joven F. Costales, Regional Trial Court, Branch 45,
Urdaneta City be HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE for the
 omissions brought about by records and caseflow mismanagement
and insubordination in connection with the non-submission of his
report and recommendation on the investigation on the irregularities
in the punching of bundy cards at Branch 49, same court;
2. Atty. Max G. Pascua, Branch Clerk of Court, same court, Judge
Costales be likewise HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE for the
omissions brought about by records and caseflow mismanagement
and his failure to submit all the requirements in connection with the
evaluation of the findings during the judicial audit;
3. Judge Costales and Atty. Pascua be FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) each;
4. Atty. Pascua be DIRECTED to DEVICE (sic) an efficient system of
record management to ensure that all pending cases are included in
the calendar of hearing and that the actual status of each case is
reflected in each case record, with a STERN WARNING that similar
infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely; and
4. Atty. Pascua be DIRECTED to APPRISE, within ten (10) days
from notice, the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 45 of the status of
the following cases by furnishing the judge copies of the latest
Orders or court processes in (a) Criminal Cases Nos. U-15010, U-
15183, U-13095 (transmittal letter to the Office of the Prosecutor)
and U-14936 and Civil Cases Nos. U-2377 and U-8793; and (b)
Criminal Case No. U-13095 insofar as the arraignment of accused J.
Suetus is concerned; and
5. The Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan be DIRECTED to ENSURE that no irregularities in the
punching of bundy cards in her station could, henceforth, be
contrived.
RULING
We adopt the well-substantiated findings of Court Administrator Elepaño and
DCA Perez, but we impose higher penalties on Judge Costales and Atty.
Pascua.
A.
Efficient Handling and Physical Inventory of Cases,
Important and Necessary in the Administration of Justice
All judges discharge administrative responsibilities in addition to their
adjudicative responsibilities. They should do so by maintaining professional
competence in court management and by facilitating the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel. 12
An orderly and efficient case management system is no doubt essential in
the expeditious disposition of judicial caseloads, because only thereby can
the judges, branch clerks of courts, and the clerks-in-charge of the civil and
criminal dockets ensure that the court records, which will be the bases for
rendering the judgments and dispositions, and the review of the judgments
and dispositions on appeal, if any, are intact, complete, updated, and current.
Such a system necessarily includes the regular and continuing physical
inventory of cases to enable the judge to keep abreast of the status of the
pending cases and to be informed that everything in the court is in proper
order.13 In contrast, mismanaged or incomplete records, and the lack of
periodic inventory definitely cause unwanted delays in litigations and inflict
unnecessary expenses on the parties and the State.
Although the presiding judge and his or her staff share the duty of taking a
continuing and regular inventory of cases, the responsibility primarily resides
in the presiding judge. The continuity and regularity of the inventory are
designed to invest the judge and the court staff with the actual knowledge of
the movements, number, and ages of the cases in the docket of their court, a
knowledge essential to the efficient management of caseload. The judge
should not forget that he or she is duty-bound to perform efficiently, fairly,
and with reasonable promptness all his or her judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions.14 Thus, the judge must devise an efficient
recording and filing system for his or her court that enables him or her to
quickly monitor cases and to manage the speedy and timely disposition of
the cases.15
B.
Inefficiency and Mismanagement of
Records of Branch 45
The OCA uncovered the mismanagement of the records of Branch 45 of the
RTC in Urdaneta City, while still presided by Judge Costales, with Atty.
Pascua as the Branch Clerk of Court. The mismanagement included the
following, to wit: (a) some case records bore no dates of receipt by the
branch; (b) several case records did not contain the latest court actions and
court processes taken; (c) action had not been taken in some cases from the
time of their filing; (d) the case record of Criminal Case No. U-12848 had not
been immediately transmitted to the Office of the Prosecutor, despite the
transmittal having been ordered as early as January 19, 2005; (e) some
cases
had not been set for further hearing, or had had no further actions taken on
them; (f) the issuances of summonses and alias summonses by the Branch
Clerk of Court had been delayed despite the corresponding orders for that
purpose; (g) action had not been taken on cases set for ex parte reception of
evidence; and (h) Criminal Case No. U-13095 had been set for trial with
respect to one of the accused who had not been arraigned.
Aside from the foregoing findings being based on the actual records of
Branch 45 of the RTC in Urdaneta City, we note that neither Judge Costales
nor Atty. Pascua have refuted the findings of the OCA. Hence, we declare
both of them to be administratively liable and subject to appropriate
sanctions.
1. Judge Costales
The sins of Judge Costales consisted of omissions. To start with, he failed to
act on some cases from the time of their receipt at Branch 45 until the period
of the audit. And, secondly, he did not properly supervise the court
personnel, as borne by the records of some cases either not containing the
latest court actions and court processes taken, or not showing the actions
taken from the time of their filing, or not being set for further hearing or
action, or revealing the delayed issuances of summonses and alias
summonses despite the corresponding orders towards that end, or by
inaction on cases set for ex parte reception of evidence.
Judge Costales uncharacteristically ignored that he discharged judicial and
administrative duties as the Presiding Judge of Branch 45. He seemingly
forgot that his responsibility of efficiently and systematically managing his
caseload was the inseparable twin to his responsibility of justly and speedily
deciding the cases assigned to his court. He should have remembered all too
easily that he had assumed both responsibilities upon entering into office as
Presiding Judge, and that he was bound to competently and capably
discharge them from then on until his compulsory retirement. His failure to
discharge them properly by organizing and supervising his court personnel
with the end in view of bringing them to the prompt dispatch of the court’s
business in anticipation of his forced retirement reflected his inefficiency and
breached his obligation to observe at all times the high standards of public
service and fidelity.16
In this regard, Judge Costales could not deflect the blame to Atty. Pascua as
his Branch Clerk of Court. The responsibility of organizing and coordinating
the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient performance of the
court’s business was direct and primary for him as the judge. Truly, the duty
to devise an efficient recording and filing system that would have enabled
himself and his personnel to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their
speedy and timely disposition pertained to him first and foremost. 17 Moreover,
he should know that his subordinates were not the guardians of his
responsibilities as the judge.18 Being in legal contemplation the head of his
branch,19 he was the master of his own domain who should be ready and
willing to take the responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects, 20 as well as
to be ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in his court. He could not
hide behind the inefficiency or the incompetence of any of his subordinates.
2. Atty. Pascua
As with Judge Costales, omissions made up Atty. Pascua’s myriad faults.
Atty. Pascua bore the responsibility for the non-issuance of summonses or
alias summonses in some cases, for the failure to indicate the dates of
receipt of case records by Branch 45, for the failure to receive evidence ex
parte despite the orders to that effect, for the failure to prepare and submit (or
cause the submission of) the monthly inventories, and for the failure to report
and update the records of the cases of the branch. Such omissions involved
matters that he should have routinely and regularly performed. His duty as
the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 45 required him to receive and file all
pleadings and other papers properly presented to the branch, endorsing on
each such paper the time when it was filed.21
Atty. Pascua was equally accountable with Judge Costales for the inefficient
handling of the court records of Branch 45. His being the Branch Clerk of
Court made him the custodian of such records (i.e., pleadings, papers, files,
exhibits, and the public properties pertaining to the branch and committed to
his charge) with the sworn obligation of safely keeping all of them. Like his
Presiding Judge, he carried on his shoulders the burden to see to the orderly
and proper keeping and management of the court records, by which he was
required to exercise close supervision of the court personnel directly charged
with the handling of court records.22 His position of Branch Clerk of Court
rendered him an essential and ranking officer of the judicial system
performing delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice.23 Alas, he failed to so perform.
3. Both Judge Costales and Atty. Pascua, Liable
Based on the foregoing, the OCA properly found that Judge Costales and
Atty. Pascua were individually and collectively guilty of mismanagement of
the case records of Branch 45, for their omissions led to their Branch’s
inability to dispose of many pending matters, causing the litigants concerned
and even the Government to suffer needless delay and incur unnecessary
expense.
However, the recommendation of the OCA to impose a fine of ₱5,000.00 on
each of Judge Costales and Atty. Pascua trivializes their omissions as a light
charge. We cannot concur with such recommendation, because the
character and magnitude of the omissions indicated that Judge Costales and
Atty. Pascua had been inefficient over a long period of time and had failed to
devise and put in place any proper system of records management in that
length of time. They were really guilty of violating Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars, a violation that Section 9, Rule 140, of the Rules of
Court treats as a less serious charge, viz:
Section 9. Less Serious Charges. – Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the
records of a case;
2. Frequent and unjustified absences without leave or habitual
tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically
authorized by law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple Misconduct.
The sanctions on a less serious charge are stated in Section 11, Rule 140, of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 11. Sanctions. – xxx
xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
xxx
Accordingly, the fine to be imposed on Judge Costales is in the maximum of
₱20,000.00, by reason of his higher and primary responsibility, and that on
Atty. Pascua is ₱8,000.00, in view of his subordinate but non-judicial position.
C.
Insubordination further rendered Judge Costales
Guilty of Simple Misconduct
The records established that Judge Costales did not investigate the bundy-
cards incident in RTC Branch 49 from the time the leader of the judicial audit
team had reported it to him in his capacity as the Acting Executive Judge. His
inaction was even surprising and inexplicable, because the incident
concerned the probable falsification of daily time records by subordinate
court employees, a very serious matter that when properly established might
have merited for those concerned their dismissal from the service. 24 He still
needed to be prodded to investigate by the OCA, but all that he could offer
thereafter by way of explaining his inaction was that his forthcoming
retirement on November 21, 2007 left him no more time and space to look
into the incident.
We cannot exculpate Judge Costales from insubordination.
Section 3, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary directs a judge to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may have become aware. This imperative duty becomes the more
urgent when the act or omission the court personnel has supposedly
committed is in the nature of a grave offense, like the bundy-cards incident
involved herein. It would have been surely demanded in the best interest of
the public service, if not of the court itself, that the act or omission reported
by the judicial audit team to Judge Costales as the Acting Executive Judge
be investigated and properly dealt with promptly.
The explanation of Judge Costales of having no more time and space to look
into the bundy-cards incident was implausible. Having been informed of the
anomaly on September 19, 2007, he had at least two months prior to
November 21, 2007, his retirement date, within which to carry out his
investigation, and to render a report thereon. That length of time was ample,
if only he had acted promptly to investigate the incident.
Moreover, Judge Costales could not reasonably claim that he had not been
aware of the need for him to investigate.1avvphi1 Although it is true that he
received the OCA’s memorandum dated November 19, 2007 only on
November 20, 2007, it is equally true that the memorandum was only a
reminder to him about his investigation report and recommendation being
already overdue. His inaction from the time when Agbulos, Jr. brought the
incident to his official attention indicated his having ignored the need for him
as an Acting Executive Judge to investigate. That he did not even bother to
explain his inaction or his non-compliance with the reminder aggravated his
insubordination. Indeed, the attitude he thereby displayed smacked of an
uncharacteristic indifference towards his judicial office and towards the Court.
Criminal Case No. U-13095 (regarding the arraignment of the
accused).
The incumbent Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan is directed: (a) to immediately investigate and determine the
court personnel involved in the bundy clock irregularity committed on
September 19, 2007; (b) to report in writing on the investigation to the Office
of the Court Administrator within ten (10) days from completion; and (c) to
ensure that no similar irregularities are committed in the station.

For disobeying or ignoring the directive to investigate the bundy-cards SO ORDERED.

incident, Judge Costales was guilty of insubordination, an omission that
constituted simple misconduct, classified under Section 9, no. 4, Rule 140, of
the Rules of Court, supra, as a less serious charge, and is thus punished with
a fine of ₱12,000.00, conformably with Section 11, Rule 140, Rules of Court,
supra.

WHEREFORE, we find and pronounce:

1. Retired JUDGE JOVEN F. COSTALES and BRANCH CLERK OF

COURT ATTY. MAX G. PASCUA guilty of the less serious charge of
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and are
respectively ordered to pay fines of ₱20,000.00 and ₱8,000.00; and

2. Retired JUDGE JOVEN F. COSTALES guilty of the less serious

charge of simple misconduct, and is fined in the amount of
₱12,000.00.

The fines imposed on JUDGE COSTALES shall be deducted from any

retirement benefits due to him.

The Court directs ATTY. MAX G. PASCUA:

1. To devise an efficient system of record management that ensures

that: (a) all pending case are immediately included in the calendar of
hearing; and (b) the actual status of every case is reflected in the
respective case record; and

2. To apprise the Presiding Judge of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial

Court in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan within ten (10) days from notice
on the status of the following cases and furnishing copies of the
latest orders or court processes therein, namely: (a) Criminal Case
Nos. U-15010, U-15183, U-13095 (transmittal letter to the Office of
the Prosecutor) and Civil Case Nos. U-2377 and U-8793; and (b)
[A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1860 : September 8, 2004]
SPOUSES FLORENCIO & ESTHER CAUSIN, Complainants, v. JUDGE
LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 24,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint filed on August 24, 2001
by spouses Florencio and Esther Causin, charging respondent Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo, Branch 24 of Cagayan de
Oro City, with bias and partiality, violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
for allowing another RTC judge to participate in a case pending before
his sala  as counsel for the plaintiff without authority from this Court, and
for knowingly rendering an unjust decision.
The complaint stemmed from a 1994 case for quieting of title 1 filed by Raul
F. Lim, represented by his attorney-in fact Rita Lim, and Pryce Properties
Corporation against complainant-spouses and one Omero T. Dampal. The
case which involved the overlapping of boundaries of the adjacent lots of
the parties was raffled off to the RTC, Branch 24 of Cagayan de Oro City,
presided by respondent judge.
Complainant-spouses alleged that Judge Rodrigo Lim, Jr., then RTC Acting
Judge of Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City and a brother of plaintiff Raul
Lim, acted as the latter's counsel in the civil case for quieting of title. They
claim that Judge Lim attended the hearings in the case, cross-examined
the witnesses, interposed objections at the trials, chose the hearing dates,
and delivered oral arguments in court - - - all without special authority
from this Court; that when confronted by them, Judge Lim refused to
confirm whether he was hired by the plaintiffs to represent them in said
case; and, that respondent judge allowed Judge Lim to actively participate
and intervene in the proceedings although he knew that the latter was not
authorized by this Court to do so.
As to the charge of bias and partiality in favor of the plaintiffs and Judge
Lim, complainant-spouses alleged that during the trial, respondent judge
extended unwarranted consideration to the plaintiffs as follows: he would
wait for the arrival of Judge Lim in court whenever the latter would be late
for a hearing in said case; a scheduled hearing in the morning would be
transferred by respondent judge in the afternoon when he would learn that
Judge Lim could not make it in the morning session; respondent judge
would reset the hearings based solely on the convenience of Judge Lim; all
the unreasonable objections interposed by Judge Lim during the trial were
sustained by respondent judge; and, when complainants moved for an
ocular inspection of the subject lots to show to the court the actual
location of the disputed boundary, respondent judge denied their request
and sustained the objection of Judge Lim.
Finally, complainant-spouses charged that respondent judge knowingly
rendered an unjust decision in the case when he awarded the disputed
portion of the land to plaintiff Lim without considering the merits of their
evidence.2
In answer to the complaint,3 respondent judge denied the charges. He
explained that he allowed Judge Lim to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs
as he presumed that the latter had sought prior authority to do so from
this Court. He pointed out that under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears. Respondent judge also argued that the
complainants failed to file a motion questioning the authority of Judge Lim
to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs in said case.
On the charge of bias and partiality, respondent judge explained that:
firstly, it has been his practice to move to the afternoon a hearing that is
scheduled in the morning upon the request of either party rather than
postpone or reset it to another day; secondly, he did not consider solely
the convenience of Judge Lim in scheduling the hearing dates as he asked
the parties to find a trial date convenient to them, as borne out by the
transcripts of said case; finally, he did not grant complainants' request for
an ocular inspection of the subject lots as he believed that the relocation
survey of a licensed inspector would better determine if the two (2)-
hectare disputed land belonged to the land of the plaintiffs or the
defendants.
On the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent
judge stressed that he decided the case against the complainants based on
the evidence and the law, guided by his deep sense of justice. He
explained that he did not consider complainants' defense of prescription
and laches for the following reasons: these were not put in issue in the
pre-trial order; acquisitive prescription could not defeat the title of the
registered owner of the land; and, the complainants failed to prove that
plaintiffs incurred in delay in asserting their rights despite knowledge of
the complainants' encroachment on their land.
Finally, respondent judge argued that if complainant-spouses doubted his
impartiality, they should have filed a motion to inhibit him and he would
have readily granted it. Likewise, he pointed out that if they had objected
to the participation of Judge Lim in the proceedings, it would have given
him reason to inquire from Judge Lim whether he was authorized to
appear in said case. Respondent judge stressed that complainant-spouses
did neither and put the blame on him after losing their case.
In their Reply,4 complainant-spouses reiterated their charge that
respondent judge was guilty of bias and partiality when he allowed RTC
Judge Lim to actively participate in the trial of said case without entering
his appearance as plaintiffs' counsel. They stressed that there was no
special purpose for Judge Lim to appear as counsel for his brother, plaintiff
Raul Lim, as the latter had already sold his land, subject of the case, to co-
plaintiff Pryce Properties Corporation. Thus, they charged that the
participation of Judge Lim in the proceedings served no other purpose than
to influence respondent judge in deciding the case in plaintiffs' favor. They
insisted that respondent judge should not have allowed Judge Lim to be
involved in the proceedings as he was not a party to the case, he was not
hired by the plaintiffs to represent them and he was not authorized by this
Court to do so. It was not incumbent upon them to inquire into Judge
Lim's authority as, being laymen, they did not know that a member of the
bench is not allowed to practice his profession.
For his part, Executive Judge Rodrigo Lim, Jr. admitted that he did not
secure from this Court an authority to appear in the proceedings of the
case. He explained that his appearance at the trial of September 20, 1995
was only for the purpose of cross-examining the complainants' witness,
Pedro Tellafer, who was a tenant of his father, the original owner of
plaintiffs' lot. He allegedly participated in the hearings of said case in good
faith as he had personal knowledge of the witness' background. Moreover,
it was a family case - - - his brother was one of the plaintiffs and his wife
acted as his brother's attorney-in-fact. He argued that he did not engage
in the illegal practice of law as the phrase connotes payment of a fee and
he did not receive remuneration for his participation in the case. Finally, he
claimed that the complaint was ill-motivated and was filed by disgruntled
litigants to get even with the Lim family after losing the case, as evidenced
by the fact that it was only filed six (6) years later. 5
with the case that it escaped his attention that Judge Lim was an
incumbent RTC judge, prohibited from appearing as counsel in the case.
Thus, the investigating Justice recommended: (1) that the charges of bias
and partiality, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment be dismissed
for lack of merit; and, (2) that a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed against
respondent judge for violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct for allowing the unauthorized appearance of
Judge Lim in the trial of the case, with a stern warning that a repetition
of similar act of impropriety or any misconduct shall be dealt with more
severely.7
We uphold the findings of the investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals.
On the charge of bias and partiality, we rule that there is a dearth of
evidence on record to prove complainant-spouses' charge. The transcript
of records attached by complainant-spouses to their complaint clearly
shows that in ruling on the objections during the trial, respondent judge
would at times sustain or overrule the objection of the lawyer of either
party. Thus, from the records, we cannot discern any pattern of partiality
committed by respondent judge in favor of the plaintiff or Judge Lim. The
questions sparingly propounded by respondent judge to the witnesses
were mostly clarificatory in nature. We quote the pertinent portions of the
September 20, 1995 TSN of said case, thus:

After the issues were joined, the Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. At the hearings
conducted, complainant-spouses and respondent judge testified. The case
was then submitted for decision.6
After evaluating the case, the investigating Justice made the following
observations:
ATTY. JARDIN
We offer the testimony of our witness, Mr. Tellaper, Your Honor, to prove
that he is the brother of Salvacion Tellaper Relano, and her husband
Miguel Relano, as the caretaker of the land owned by the late Rodrigo Lim,
Sr., and he will also testify that Miguel Relano told him to plant
monuments at the boundary per instruction of Rodrigo Lim, Sr. to Miguel
Relano.

(1) On the charge of bias and partiality, there is no basis to warrant

COURT
disciplinary action against respondent judge as complainants failed to
prove their charge by convincing evidence.
Any comment, Pañero?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) On the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision, the
respondent judge cannot be held liable as the impugned decision was ATTY. ACHAS: [plaintiffs' counsel of record]
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals and this Court.
We object [to] the offer of the testimony of witness, on the aspect
(3) On the charge of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent that he was told by the late Rodrigo Lim, Sr. to plant the
judge is liable as he allowed a fellow RTC judge to appear as counsel for monuments is a hearsay.
one of the parties in a case pending before his sala without authority from
this Court. He rejected respondent judge's explanation that he was busy ATTY. JARDIN
He was the one [who] told to plant the monuments. Lay the basis, Pañero.

ATTY. ACHAS ATTY. JARDIN

The person who allegedly told him is already dead. Q You said earlier, that you resided in the land of Sr. Lim for 30 years, do
you confirm that Mr. Witness?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. JARDIN
A Yes, sir.
He was instructed and he planted the Ipil-Ipil trees.
Q Mr. Witness, did you know the owners of the land adjoining the land of
COURT Sr. Lim?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

What are you trying to prove, Pañero?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ATTY. ACHAS

ATTY. JARDIN We object, no basis.

The Ipil-Ipil trees were planted among the monuments at the boundary of ATTY. JARDIN
the land.
He is a resident of that place.
JUDGE LIM
JUDGE LIM
Why not present the sister?
He has to lay the basis.
ATTY. JARDIN
ATTY. JARDIN
He was the one who planted, and in fact there was no dispute prior to this
case. If the witness knows, Your Honor.

COURT JUDGE LIM

Alright, we will hear from the witness. He do[es] not know the boundary.

xxx COURT

Q Mr. Witness, you said earlier that in the land owned by Sr. Lim, there is If witness knows
an adjoining land owned by the defendants Causin, did you not know the
boundary of Causin and Lim?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary A Yes, sir.

JUDGE LIM xxx

No basis, Your Honor. A Sr. Lim instructed that the boundary should be planted with Ipil-Ipil
trees.
COURT
Q Who was told to plant Ipil-Ipil trees along the boundaries, Mr. Witness? Q What about now?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A As of now, there is a conflict.
A My brother-in-law, Miguel Relano.
Q Did you know when the conflict started, Mr. Witness?
Q And, who did the planting of Ipil-Ipil trees along the boundary? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I did not know.
A The two of us.
Q But in your 30 years of stay in that area, was there a conflict in that
ATTY. ACHAS area?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

May we petition that the previous answer of witness be [stricken] JUDGE LIM
off the record because it is only a hearsay?
Already answered, "I did not know."
COURT
ATTY. JARDIN
Q Alright, do you know who planted the Ipil-Ipil seeds?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Q Mr. Witness, what is the thing that you do not know about the conflict?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Miguel was the one who plowed and I was the one who sowed the Ipil-
Ipil trees. JUDGE LIM

xxx Counsel is trying to cross-examine his own witness.

Q Mr. Witness, in your 30 years that you stayed in that area, was there a ATTY. JARDIN
boundary dispute between [the] adjoining owners, Lim and Causin?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Witness, Your Honor, is not highly educated.

ATTY. ACHAS
COURT

Incompetent, your Honor.

He does not know, Pañero.

ATTY. JARDIN
xxx

If he knows.
JUDGE LIM

COURT
May I conduct the cross-examination, Your Honor.

Q Alright, is that boundary not the subject of the conflict?

COURT

A Before there was none.

Proceed, Pañero.

ATTY. JARDIN
 xxx Proceed, Pañero.

ATTY. JARDIN JUDGE LIM

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION RE-CROSS

Q Mr. Witness, did you ask for a compensation when you left the area? Q You said that you were paid or compensated for the plants that you
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary were able to plant on that land, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, we asked. A Yes, sir.

Q Please tell the Honorable Court, why you asked for compensation? Q And the total amount that you, your sister Salvacion Relano and Miguel
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Relano, and the rest of your relatives, and the relatives of the husband of
your sister, was so high that the Lims refused to pay it?
A Because of our plants. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q Aside from the plants, did you ask for compensation? ATTY. JARDIN
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Objection, Your Honor.
JUDGE LIM
COURT
There was already an answer.
Q How much did you ask?
COURT
xxx
Q Alright, aside from the plants?
JUDGE LIM
A No more, sir.
That is all, Your Honor.
ATTY. JARDIN
COURT
That would be all, You Honor.
Any more witnesses to be presented?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT
ATTY. JARDIN
Any re-cross?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Yes, Your Honor, in the person of Domingo Gilot.
JUDGE LIM
xxx
Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. JARDIN
COURT
DIRECT EXAMINATION
 xxx Q And you did not ask Causin the owner of the property?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. ACHAS
A Because at that time the Causins were not here.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Q Because he was staying abroad?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxx
A I do not know, but at that time, Causin was not here.
ATTY. JARDIN
Q So, you never got to ask him?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Objection, Your Honor, it is vague.
A I have asked his eldest son.
COURT
ATTY. ACHAS
Q Alright, why [were you] dismissed by the Causins?
We move to strike off from the record the answer of witness as
xxx irresponsive.

Q And, this land that you said where Dampal took over was located in COURT
Maitom, Mambatangan?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As to tenor, let it remain.
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ACHAS
Q And not in Cagayan de Oro?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q And this Rey Causin, do you know him?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. JARDIN
A Yes, sir.
Objection, Your Honor, witness is incompetent.
Q How old was he in 1978?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT
ATTY. JARDIN
Is this area in Bukidnon or in Cagayan de Oro?
Objection, Your Honor, witness is incompetent.
A The address there is Mambatangan, Bukidnon.
COURT
xxx
He is not competent, Pañero.
Q Mr. Witness, you said that you were only informed by Mencede that
these Ipil-Ipil trees at the boundary between the lands of Lims and ATTY. ACHAS
Causins, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q But, he was very young at that time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, because I asked them where the boundary is.
A He was not the one I asked at that time, it was his elder brother.
Q You said that you asked Mencede of the boundary? COURT
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Alright, fifteen days.
ATTY. JARDIN
xxx
Already answered, Your Honor.
ATTY. JARDIN
COURT
We would like also to move, Your Honor, for an ocular inspection to
Already answered, Pañero. be made by this Court.

xxx JUDGE LIM

Q But this is only the belief of Mencede not of Arnold, the older brother of
Rey?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, I also inquired the Lims through Salvacion and Miguel Relano, and
they told me that that was the boundary.
What is the purpose, it is already testified to by the witness'
ATTY. JARDIN
We will just see the monuments and the Ipil-Ipil trees, Your Honor.

Q But you never got to ask the Causins, because they were not around at JUDGE LIM
that time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We object, Your Honor, there is already a sketch plan and it has
ATTY. JARDIN been surveyed, there is no need for an ocular inspection
considering that these documents had been presented to this
Misleading, Your Honor, at the first question, he answered that he Court.
was not able to ask'
ATTY. JARDIN
COURT
I don't think the documents will suffice.
You did not ask him, because they were not there but when they
returned, you asked them? COURT

A When they returned, I was no longer there.
xxx
COURT
Are you still presenting another witness, Pañero?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. JARDIN
We have no more witness to present, Your Honor, however, may we ask
time to submit our written offer of exhibits.
Alright, make your motion in writing, Pañero, and we will
resolve.8 (emphases supplied)
Indeed, from a reading of the transcript, we cannot evince bias or
partiality on the part of respondent judge during the proceedings in the
case.
As to the denial of the request of complainant-spouses for an ocular
inspection of the lots, respondent judge reasonably exercised his discretion
in ordering instead the conduct of a relocation survey by a licensed
inspector. It is the better means to determine who between the parties
encroached on the boundary of the adjacent lands. Bias and partiality can
never be presumed. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in the
absence of clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption
that the judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without
fear or favor.9
Neither is there basis to hold respondent judge liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust decision in said case. The key word is "knowingly." For
liability to attach, the assailed decision must not only be found erroneous.
As a rule, the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not
subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.10 To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.11
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as an epitome of
integrity and justice. This Court has stressed in countless cases that
judges ought not only to be impartial but should also appear to be
impartial.15 They should continuously encourage and uphold safeguards for
the discharge of judicial duties to reinforce public confidence in the judicial
process which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial integrity.
Be that as it may, we approve the recommendation of the OCA that the
penalty of fine in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) and a
warning be imposed against respondent judge. The records disclose that
the same penalty was meted by this Court to Judge Lim in the separate
administrative case filed against him by the complainant-spouses for his
active participation as counsel in the civil case which was decided by
respondent judge.

In the case at bar, complainant-spouses failed to prove that the judgment
is contrary to law or unsupported by evidence. The records disclose that
the assailed decision of respondent judge had been affirmed on appeal by
the Court of Appeals12 and by this Court.13 Neither was it shown that the
judgment was made with deliberate malice or injustice. Thus, their claim is
more speculative than a product of concrete proof. Delayed filing of the
complaint against respondent judge after complainants lost the case on
appeal likewise casts doubt on the motive of the complainants.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo is meted
the penalty of fine in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, with a stern warning that a repetition of similar infractions shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Nonetheless, we find respondent judge guilty of violating Canon 2 of the

Code of Judicial Conduct which prescribes that a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01
provides that a judge should behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. In the case at
bar, the records reveal that respondent judge allowed Judge Lim, then
acting RTC Judge of Branch 21 of Cagayan de Oro City, to actively
participate and intervene in the case for quieting of title pending in Branch
24 of the same court, without authority from this Court. The prohibition for
a judge to appear in a case as counsel for one of the parties is based on
public policy. In allowing Judge Lim to actively involve himself in the trial
of the case, represent the interests of the plaintiff therein, cross-examine
the witnesses and register his objections during the trial, the complainants
and the public were given the impression that Judge Lim might or could
unduly influence the conduct and outcome of the litigation. It undermined
and compromised in the eyes of the public the integrity and independence A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864             December 16, 2004
of his court. It was incumbent upon respondent judge to inquire from
Judge Lim whether he obtained authority from this Court to appear in said
ATTY. ANTONIO D. SELUDO, complainant,
case. The rule that a lawyer is presumed to be authorized to appear before vs.
a court applies only to lawyers, not judges. Judges are prohibited from JUDGE ANTONIO J. FINEZA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 131, Caloocan
being personally involved in a case unless he himself is a party thereto. City, respondent.
Respondent judge transgressed the rule pertaining to the avoidance, not
only of actual impropriety, but even the appearance of impropriety. 14 He
DECISION
failed to comport himself in a manner that his conduct could bear the most
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: ‘That the undersigned has taken steps to prevent a recurrence of
the lapses in the notarial registry.’ An informal inquiry made by this
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that Judge this afternoon from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the reply
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety1 and self-restraint which are was that the respondent has not filed any notarial report for the
indispensable qualities of every judge.2 A judge should be the last person to be year 2003, x x x.
perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant. Sadly, respondent judge failed to live up
to such standards of judicial conduct. Court:
You want to put that on record?
In a complaint3 dated July 24, 2003 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator Judge Fineza:
(OCA), Atty. Antonio D. Seludo charged Judge Antonio J. Fineza of the Regional Trial Not only to put on record . . . , and courtesy calls that when someone is speaking, a
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code courtesy should require. May I ask the Judge to remind him . . .
of Judicial Conduct. Court:
Let him finish first, Atty. Seludo.
Atty. Seludo:
In his complaint, Atty. Antonio D. Seludo alleged inter alia that on June 28, 2003, Yes, Your Honor.
respondent judge filed with the same court (Branch 128), a complaint for revocation of Judge Fineza: (continuation)
notarial commission against him (complainant), docketed as Revocation of Before the Executive Judge or Investigating Judge finally inhibits himself, he should
Commission No. C-001-(2003). order the Office of the Clerk of Court to issue a certification to the effect that for the
year 2003, no notarial report has been made by the respondent which is a ground for
During the hearing on July 8, 2003, respondent judge uttered "vulgar and insulting cancellation of his notarial commission. That’s why I raised this, so that while the case
words" against complainant, thus: is pending, he should be suspended from the practice of . . . . and may I ask that he
be declared in contempt for laughing?
"Court: Court:
Judge Fineza, will you please stay calm.
Judge Fineza: (to respondent)
Do you have anything to say Atty. Seludo? ‘Putang-ina mo eh!’
Court:
Atty. Seludo: Please be just civil with each other, Judge Fineza.
Judge Fineza:
Why is he laughing? Let it be put on record that he has a moronic attitude. That’s
Yes, Your Honor. May we know also, under what authority is the
why he was laughing.
complainant appearing in this case, Your Honor? Is he going to
Court:
prosecute this case?
Judge Fineza, are you making an additional manifestation or additional charge
against the respondent because of the information that you got now from the Office of
Court: the Clerk of Court?
Judge Fineza:
He is appearing for himself as petitioner. No, Your Honor. It is in accordance with my petition, that during the pendency of this
case, the respondent should be suspended.
Court:
Atty. Seludo:
He should be suspended because of the non-compliance?
Judge Fineza:
Under what authority, Your Honor? Yes, Your Honor. He promised in his answer, that he has remedied the situation.
xxx
Judge Fineza: Atty. Seludo:
Yes, Your Honor. I just want that all the manifestations of the complainant be put on
record, Your Honor.
If the respondent knows how to read English, he would find in Judge Fineza:
the petition itself that under the rule, we are obligated to bring to the If Your Honor please, I don’t know if this guy is really stupid. This is a court
court any anomaly or dishonesty or dereliction in the performance proceeding and everything that is being taken is recorded. If you want to use that for
of a duty of a Court Officer. And may I point out and make it on libel, you cannot. This is a Court proceeding, we should have privileged
record that this time, despite the fact of respondent’s answer, last communication.
paragraph of page 1 states and I quote; I think page 2, and I read:
Court: On January 9, 2004, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint6 on the ground
Judge Fineza, will you please refrain from calling the other person, who is a brother in that he is no longer interested in pursuing the case since respondent has retired from
profession? the judiciary.7
Judge Fineza:
I’m just telling the truth, Your Honor. In his Report and Recommendation,8 Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco made
Court: the following evaluation:
But I would like to ask you to use temperate words. You are brother lawyers. If you
have nothing more to say, I would like to adjourn this preliminary conference. I will
indorse all the records to the 1st Vice Executive Judge who will notify you of the "EVALUATION: We will dwell first on the issue of desistance of complainant
schedule for the continuation of the investigation. to pursue instant complaint. The settled rule is that the complainant’s
continuation . . . withdrawal of his complaint, or desistance from pursuing the same, does not
We will prepare the minutes and we will let you sign, Judge Fineza. necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative case. The outcome of
Judge Fineza: an administrative action cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the
Where is the minutes? This is not the prescribed form for minutes, Your Honor? Okay. complainant who, for reasons of his own, may condone what may be
Court: detestable. Certainly, complainant’s desistance cannot divest this Court of its
I have not yet adjourned, Judge Fineza? I hope you will be more civil to everybody jurisdiction, under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, to investigate
here just like anybody who is civil with you. and decide complaints against erring employees of the judiciary. Otherwise
Judge Fineza: stated, such unilateral act does not bind this Court on a matter relating to its
Okay, okay. My apologies, Your Honor. disciplinary power.
Court:
Accepted. As to the fact that respondent has already retired from the service, the Court
Judge Fineza: has pointed out in several cases that the retirement of a judge or any judicial
And now you adjourn? officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative
Court: liability to which he shall still be answerable. The Court retains its jurisdiction
You are requesting for that? I will give you copy so that you can be satisfied. What do either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or
you say, Atty. Basa? You are the collaborating counsel. Probably, you are being more declare him guilty thereof.
civil with us.
Atty. Basa: Proceeding thereon with the issues, we find ourselves in accord with
May we just ask for the adjournment of the session, Your Honor. complainant’s observation that respondent has indeed consciously
Judge Fineza: ignored to heed the Court’s advice and warning when he was
You will give me the minutes now? admonished for using intemperate language in A.M. No. P-01-1522. A
Court: careful scrutiny of the transcripts taken on that unfateful day reveals
We will provide you including with the copy of the Order of the Court inhibiting itself."4 that respondent has precisely uttered the following vitriolic language
against complainant:
In his comment5 dated September 8, 2003, respondent judge admitted that he uttered
derogatory words during the proceeding held on July 8, 2003. He, however, explained a) ‘Putang ina mo!’
that he has been suffering from a heart ailment and diabetes since November, 2002,
causing him considerable anxiety and pain. This must be the reason why he could not
control his outburst. Besides, the incident was precipitated by the conduct of the b) ‘If respondent knows how to read English.’
complainant and the Executive Judge. Complainant was unkind and impolite to him.
He kept on interrupting him. In fact, after his oral manifestation, complainant began to c) ‘Let it be put on record, that he has a moronic attitude.’
laugh and ridicule him. Moreover, when he (respondent) asked the Executive Judge
to cite complainant in contempt of court, the latter stood up with clenched fists and
d) ‘If Your Honor plese, I don’t know if this guy is really stupid.’
acted in a menacing manner.

As shown by the records, respondent’s attention was called several

Respondent further admitted in his answer that he is aware that there is no
times by the Investigating Executive Judge to stay calm and be civil. In
justification for his use of improper language, and for this, he is sincerely contrite and
fact, his attitude was generally antagonistic not only to complainant
penitent. But as a member of the bench for over twenty years, he expected the
but also to the Executive Judge who dared to question his
complainant to respect him, to treat him with politeness, dignity and courtesy, and to
motives/oppose his view. Such, is a glaring display of haughtiness and
give him his due as a magistrate.
arrogance of respondent. His disgraceful behavior reflected adversely on
the good image of the judiciary and fell short of the standards expected of a
 magistrate of the law. His justifications of "provocation" (which we found
none), discourtesy of complainant and the various illnesses he professed to
be suffering should not be viewed to exculpate him from liability. As a
member of the bench he should have adhered to that standard of behavior
expected of all those who don the judicial robe. His choice of words, aside
from being inflammatory and uncalled for, betrays a lack of judicial
decorum. The respect and dignity of the court has to be upheld hence,
respondent should not have acted with anger and shouted at complainant
who must have suffered embarrassment in front of many people. He should
have maintained his composure for patience and courtesy are marks of
culture and good-breeding.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of official
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. The Code dictates that a judge must behave with propriety
at all times.
Because respondent has already retired from the service, dismissal or
suspension is no longer feasible as a penalty for the present charges.
Therefore, we opine that a fine is appropriate under the circumstances.
Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is classified as a serious
charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the penalty of which is either
dismissal, suspension for 3 to 6 months without salary and benefits or a fine
of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00. Considering that
this is not the first offense of similar nature committed by respondent, we
believe a penalty of P20,000.00 is commensurate, to the acts complained of,
which amount should be taken from his retirement benefits."
Court Administrator Velasco recommended that (1) the instant administrative case be
re-docketed as an administrative matter; and that (2) respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P20,000.00 for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the amount to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
In our Resolution9 dated June 21, 2004, we required the parties to manifest whether
they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and records
filed.
On August 12, 2004, respondent submitted a Manifestation10 requesting a formal
hearing of this case. In our Resolution dated September 20, 2004, 11 we denied his
request for lack of merit.
For his part, complainant, in his Manifestation dated August 12, 2004,12 stated that he
is submitting the matter to our sound discretion.
Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
"Canon 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
xxx
Canon 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBLITIES
xxx
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers,
especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing
before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude
of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the
litigants."
In ascribing the words "moronic attitude," "stupid", "if he knows how to read
English" and "putang ina mo" to complainant during the proceeding before the
Executive Judge, respondent displayed a conduct so unbecoming of a magistrate.
The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and outrageous. That respondent was
suffering from heart ailment and diabetes is not an excuse. He could have asked the
assistance of a lawyer to represent him in prosecuting the case. As correctly
observed by the Court Administrator, his disgraceful behavior tainted the good image
of the judiciary he is expected to uphold at all times.
We have admonished judges to observe judicial decorum which requires that they
must at all times be temperate in their language,13 refraining from inflammatory
or excessive rhetoric14 or from resorting "to the language of vilification."15 In the
same vein, in Fidel vs. Caraos,16 we held  that although, respondent judge may
attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench
nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are
demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in
language.
Respondent judge’s behavior is incompatible with judicial temperament expected of
him. He was discourteous, not only to complainant, but also to the trial judge. His
actuation constitutes palpable violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01, and Canon 3, Rule
3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not respondent's first offense. In A.M. No. P-01-1522,17 we reprimanded him
for failing to exercise prudence and restraint in his language. Obviously, he has not
reformed.
We thus find respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct constituting violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, this administrative offense is considered serious,18 punishable under
Section 8, paragraph 1(3), and Section 11, paragraph A(3), thus:

"Sec. 8. Serious charges. – Serious charges include:

1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law

(R.A. No. 3019);

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial

Conduct;

4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a

competent court in an appropriate proceeding;

5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

x x x."

"Sec.11. Sanctions.- A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of

the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however,  That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00."

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio J. Fineza is hereby found GUILTY of gross

violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY A.M. No. RTJ-08-2145               June 18, 2010
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

JUDGE MONA LISA T. TABORA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

SO ORDERED.
San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, Complainant,
vs.
(Ret.) JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, former Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch
27, Respondent.
 DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October
2006 filed by Caridad S. Tabisula (Tabisula) against Judge Mona Lisa T.
Tabora (Judge Tabora), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, and Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr.
(Lacsamana), Officer-in-Charge, Branch Clerk of Court (OIC-BCOC) of the
same court. Tabisula charged Judge Tabora with (1) violation of Section
3(e)1 of Republic Act No. 30192 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; (2) violation of Section 1, Canon 3 3 and Section 2, Canon 54 of
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC5 or the New Code of Judicial Conduct; (3) violation of
Republic Act No. 67136 (RA 6713) or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees; and (4) gross ignorance of the
law, grave abuse of authority, oppression, serious neglect of duty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Further, Tabisula
charged Lacsamana with (1) violation of Sections 3(e)7 and (f)8 of RA 3019;
(2) violation of Articles 2269 and 315(3)(c)10 of Act No. 381511 or the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) violation of Sections 5(a),12 (d),13 and (e)14 of RA 6713.
The Facts
In her Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 submitted to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), Tabisula stated that she was the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 6840 entitled "Caridad S. Tabisula v. Rang-ay Rural Bank,
Inc." for specific performance with accounting and damages. This case was
raffled to the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26 presided by
Judge Tabora. Tabisula narrated that due to the prolonged absence of Judge
Tabora caused by a serious illness, Judge Antonio A. Carbonell (Judge
Carbonell), now retired but then pairing/vice-executive judge of the RTC of
San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, took over and heard the case from
the beginning up to its termination.
Later, Tabisula found out that a decision had already been rendered by
Judge Carbonell so she requested from Lacsamana a copy of the decision.
However, despite several requests, Lacsamana allegedly refused to furnish
Tabisula with a copy of the decision upon the instruction of Judge Tabora,
who at that time had already reported back to work. Tabisula sent a Letter-
Request dated 24 August 2006 addressed to the RTC asking Judge Tabora
to direct Lacsamana to give a copy of the decision rendered by Judge
Carbonell. However, instead of granting the request, Judge Tabora issued an
Order dated 30 August 2006, informing Tabisula that an Order dated 8
August 2006 was issued by the RTC requiring the parties to submit their
respective memorandum within 15 days from receipt of the Order. Also,
Judge Tabora informed Tabisula that even if the pairing judge was the one
who heard the case from beginning to end, the prerogative of rendering the
decision still rests entirely on the presiding judge.
On 18 September 2006, Judge Tabora rendered a decision in the case
adverse to Tabisula. Tabisula then wrote a Letter dated 2 October 2006 to
Judge Carbonell requesting for a copy of his decision. On 9 October 2006,
Judge Carbonell replied to Tabisula’s letter and attached a copy of his
decision which favored Tabisula.
Tabisula then filed this case against Judge Tabora for maliciously and
deliberately changing, altering and reversing a validly rendered decision of a
court of equal and concurrent jurisdiction. Tabisula added that this has
caused her undue injury since the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840, Rang-
Ay Rural Bank Inc., represented by its President, Ives Q. Nisce, was
allegedly a relative of Judge Tabora’s husband.
Tabisula also charged Lacsamana for alleged manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, and gross inexcusable negligence for refusing to furnish a copy of the
decision rendered by Judge Carbonell despite several verbal and written
demands.
In an undated Comment submitted to the OCA, Lacsamana clarified that his
official designation is Sheriff IV and he was only designated as OIC-BCOC by
Judge Tabora on 1 August 2006. Lacsamana explained that Judge Carbonell
handed him a copy of his decision in Civil Case No. 6840 on 11 August 2006.
However, that day being a Friday, Lacsamana was able to submit the
decision to Judge Tabora only on the next working day, 14 August 2006.
Judge Tabora informed him to just leave a copy of the decision at her table.
From then on, Lacsamana had no more knowledge of what happened to the
decision.
Lacsamana added that he was the one who received Tabisula’s Letter dated
24 August 2006 addressed to Judge Tabora. Lacsamana reasoned that he
was not the person in charge of releasing decisions, orders, and other
documents relative to a pending case and it was not within his functions to
release a decision without the presiding judge’s authority.
Judge Tabora then filed her Comment dated 26 February 2007 with the OCA.
Judge Tabora indicated that she underwent surgery on 15 May 2006 and
was later diagnosed with a serious illness. Prior to her surgery, she
conducted a hearing in Civil Case No. 6840 on 21 April 2006. However, the
same had been reset due to the absence of Tabisula’s counsel.
On 18 May 2006, Tabisula filed a Motion for the pairing judge to hear Civil
Case No. 6840 on the basis of Judge Tabora’s absence. On 26 May 2006,
while Judge Tabora was on leave, Judge Carbonell proceeded to hear the
testimony of the lone witness for the defendant in the case without first
issuing an order granting the motion filed by Tabisula.
On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work. However, on 19
June 2006, Judge Carbonell still acted on the formal offer of evidence by the
defendants and issued an Order submitting the case for resolution.
On 8 August 2006, in the course of her inventory of court records, Judge
Tabora noticed that Civil Case No. 6840 had been submitted for decision on
19 June 2006 by Judge Carbonell. Since the 90-day period for rendering a
decision was soon to expire, she immediately issued an Order dated 8
August 2006 directing the parties to submit their respective memorandum.
Three days later, on 11 August 2006, Judge Carbonell issued in Civil Case
No. 6840 a decision which was received by Lacsamana. On 14 August 2006,
Lacsamana turned over a copy of the decision to Judge Tabora.
After receipt of the decision, Judge Tabora immediately went to Judge
Carbonell and informed him that she issued an Order dated 8 August 2006
requiring the parties to submit their respective memorandum. Judge
Carbonell immediately cut her off and told her to just recall her earlier order.
Judge Tabora then carefully studied the entire records of the case and found
out that Judge Carbonell’s decision was not in accordance with the facts of
the case and the applicable law and appeared to have unjustly favored
Tabisula.
Judge Tabora also wondered how Tabisula came to know of the
unpromulgated decision of Judge Carbonell. Judge Carbonell’s decision was
never officially released to any of the parties and did not form part of the
records of the case.
Judge Tabora pointed out that it was Judge Carbonell who directly furnished
Tabisula with a copy of his decision a month after the decision of Judge
Tabora had already been released to the parties. Also, Tabisula’s insistence
for the release of Judge Carbonell’s decision made her determined to
exercise her judicial independence since such decision would result in a
miscarriage of justice.
Judge Tabora also clarified that the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840 was a
bank, a corporate entity with a distinct personality. She was not disqualified
from sitting in the case since under Section 1, Rule 137 15 of the Rules of
Court her husband’s relation with the bank’s representative was remote or
way beyond the 6th degree. Thus, the relationship has absolutely no bearing
on the outcome of the case. Judge Tabora prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On 14 August 2007, the OCA submitted its Report finding no sufficient and
factual legal basis to hold Judge Tabora and Lacsamana liable for any of the
charges filed by Tabisula. The OCA stated that Judge Tabora, in rendering
her own decision in Civil Case No. 6840, was well within her power to decide
the case since she had full authority over all cases pending in her official
station. As for Lacsamana, the OCA found that he could not be faulted for his
failure to comply with Tabisula’s request since he was only obeying the lawful
order of Judge Tabora, his superior. Also, Judge Carbonell’s decision in Civil
Case No. 6840 was not even promulgated and did not form part of the official
records of the case. Thus, there was no "prior existing valid decision."
The OCA also found that there is a need to scrutinize the actuations of Judge
Carbonell since he overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge
for Branch 26 and has shown unusual interest in the disposition of Civil Case
No. 6840.
The OCA recommended that:
(1) that the instant complaint be DISMISSED as against respondents
Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora and OIC Branch Clerk of Court Alfredo
V. Lacsamana for lack of merit;
(2) that the COMMENT of respondent Judge be considered as a
complaint against Judge Antonio A. Carbonell, and that Judge
Carbonell be furnished with a copy of such comment and, be in turn
REQUIRED to COMMENT thereon.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2007, the Court resolved to (1) dismiss the
administrative complaint against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana for lack of
merit; and (2) consider the Comment dated 26 February 2007 of Judge
Tabora as a complaint against Judge Carbonell and require Judge Carbonell
to file his Comment within 10 days from notice.
In his Comment dated 29 October 2007, Judge Carbonell admitted the facts
of the case as stated by Judge Tabora in her Comment dated 26 February
2007 from the time he took over Civil Case No. 6840 until he submitted his
decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana. However, he disagreed with Judge
Tabora’s contention that the decision he rendered in Civil Case No. 6840 was
not validly promulgated and released to the parties. Judge Carbonell
maintained that the act of filing the decision with the clerk of court already
constituted a rendition of judgment or promulgation and not its
pronouncement in open court or release to the parties.
Judge Carbonell added that he was not aware of what subsequently
transpired after he turned over the records of the case but admitted that after
receipt of the letter-request of Tabisula asking for a copy of his decision, he
immediately responded by furnishing Tabisula with a copy.
Judge Carbonell further stated that the instant administrative matter does not
involve him. The dispute was originally between Tabisula against Judge
Tabora and Lacsamana. The only issue between him and Judge Tabora was
a divergence of legal opinion.
Thereafter, Tabisula filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November
2007 on the Court’s Resolution dated 1 October 2007. Tabisula stated that
the Court erred in dismissing the complaint she filed against Judge Tabora
and Lacsamana.
In a Letter dated 5 March 2008, Lacsamana and seven other employees of
the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, wrote the OCA and
narrated their negative experience toward a co-employee, Olympia Elena O.
Dacanay-Queddeng (Queddeng), Legal Researcher II of the same court. In
the same letter, they also gave their support in an unrelated administrative
complaint filed by Judge Tabora against Queddeng.
In a Resolution dated 25 June 2008, the Court referred the case to the OCA
for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
On 18 September 2008, the OCA submitted its Report finding Judge
Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA reiterated that Judge Carbonell
overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge of Branch 26 when
he prepared the decision in Civil Case No. 6840 and furnished Tabisula with
a copy of such decision. As a result, Judge Carbonell created the impression
that he had taken a special interest in the case.
The OCA recommended that:
(1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 27, 2007 of Mrs.
Caridad S. Tabisula on the Resolution dated October 1, 2007, be
DENIED for lack of merit;
(2) this case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter
and Judge Antonio A. Carbonell be FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) to be deducted from the retirement
benefits that he may receive; and
(3) the Letter dated March 5, 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., Court
Sheriff, and seven (7) other employees of RTC, Branch 26, San
Fernando City, La Union, against Mrs. Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng,
Legal Researcher, same court, be DETACHED from the records of
this administrative matter and the same be included in A.M. No. P-
07-2371 (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ms. Olympia Elena D.
Queddeng, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds the report of the OCA well-taken.
The authority of a pairing judge to take cognizance of matters of another
branch in case the presiding judge is absent can be found in two circulars
issued by the Court: (1) Circular No. 716 effective 23 September 1974 and (2)
Circular No. 19-9817 effective 18 February 1998.1avvphi1
Judge Carbonell, as the pairing judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La
Union, Branch 26, assumed cognizance of Civil Case No. 6840 upon Judge
Tabora’s leave of absence in May 2006 due to a serious illness. Judge
Carbonell fulfilled his duties by conducting hearings in the said case from
May until June 2006. On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work
as presiding judge of Branch 26. However, even though Judge Carbonell
knew that Judge Tabora had already re-assumed her duties, he still issued
an Order submitting the case for resolution on 19 June 2006 and even
submitted a written decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana on 11 August 2006.
Clearly, Judge Carbonell fell short of the exacting standards set in Section 2,
Canon 318 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It
applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which
the decision is made.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. (Emphasis
supplied)
Lower court judges play a pivotal role in the promotion of the people’s faith in
the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch
at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do
business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not
only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly
applied to them.19
As correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Carbonell should have sought the
conformity of Judge Tabora in rendering his own decision to the case as a
matter of judicial courtesy and respect. Judge Carbonell tried justifying his act
by reasoning that the act of filing a decision with the clerk of court already
constituted a rendition of judgment or promulgation. We find this explanation
unsatisfactory. Judge Carbonell had no authority to render a decision on the
subject civil case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98, the pairing
judge shall take cognizance of all cases until the assumption to duty of the
regular judge. Since Judge Tabora was already present and performing her
functions in court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to have rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 6840 without the approval of the regular presiding
judge.
Also, Judge Carbonell should have extended the same judicial deference in
referring the letter of Tabisula requesting for a copy of his decision to Branch
26 for appropriate action. Instead, Judge Carbonell directly furnished
Tabisula with a copy knowing fully well that she was the plaintiff in the subject
case. Judge Carbonell not only disregarded the functions of the clerk of court
as custodian of court records but also undermined the integrity and
confidentiality of the court.
For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, we
find Judge Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has
been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established
rules of conduct for public officers.20 We adhere to the OCA’s
recommendation of a fine of ₱10,000.00 to be deducted from Judge
Carbonell’s retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the
Court’s Resolution dated 24 September 2008, which granted the payment of
his disability retirement benefits subject to the withholding of ₱200,000.00
pending final resolution of the administrative cases against him.
Further, we adopt the other recommendations of the OCA in its Report dated
18 September 2008. We deny for lack of merit the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007 filed by Tabisula on this Court’s
Resolution dated 1 October 2007. We also direct the OCA to detach from the
records of this administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of
Lacsamana and seven other employees of the RTC of San Fernando City, La
Union, Branch 26, against Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the same court.
The Letter is to be included in A.M. No. P-07-2371 entitled "Office of the
Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court Legal
Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union."
WHEREFORE, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November
2007 filed by Caridad S. Tabisula for lack of merit. We find respondent Judge
Antonio A. Carbonell, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, GUILTY of simple misconduct
and FINE him ₱10,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits which
have been withheld pursuant to the Court’s Resolution dated 24 September
2008.
We DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator  to detach from the records
of this administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr. and seven other employees of the Regional Trial Court, San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, against Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng,
Legal Researcher of the same court and include the Letter in A.M. No. P-07-
2371 entitled "Office of the Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D.
Queddeng, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La
Union."
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC October 30, 1998
RE: INHIBITION OF JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS, RTC-Branch 39,
Polomolok, South Cotabato in Crim. Case No. 09-5668.
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the order of inhibition, dated April 13, 1998, which respondent
Judge Eddie R. Rojas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Polomolok,
South Cotabato issued in Criminal Case No. 09-5668, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Rosalina Tauro,  et al., a copy of which was furnished this Court
on May 8, 1998. It appears that the case was initially tried in the RTC, with
Judge Rojas as public prosecutor. While the case was pending, respondent
was appointed judge of the trial court on November 12, 1996. As the original
counsel for the accused did not interpose any objection, Judge Rojas tried
the case. On April 13, 1998, however, Judge Rojas decided to inhibit himself
from the case. In inhibiting himself, respondent judge explained: 1
When this case is (sic) called for the turn of the defense to
present their evidence with their new counsel Atty. Yolanda
Ogena of the PAO, who manifested that she is not ready and
she is requesting for (the) postponement of this case, but the
Presiding Judge (Rojas) after closed (sic) reflection of the
records, although the previous counsel for the accused, Atty.
Rosalie Cariño, was confronted by the Presiding Judge
whether (s)he will interpose objection to the continuous
sitting of this Judge in this case considering that years back
when this case was initially tried, the Presiding Judge was
the prosecutor in this case, to avoid legal implications and/or
any doubt, the Presiding Judge has to voluntarily inhibit
himself in this case.
Taking note of the aforesaid order of inhibition, this Court on July 7, 1998
required Judge Rojas to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for sitting in a case in which he had previously acted as
counsel for one of the parties.
In his letter dated July 28, 1998, 2 Judge Rojas explains:
The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the
undersigned upon assumption to office as Presiding Judge
of this sala last November 12, 1996. On February 18, 1997,
he issued an Order addressed to the Stenographic Reporter
concerned of Branch 22. Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City (where this case originated) directing said
employee to transmit a copy of the transcript of the
stenographic notes (TSN) to this sala (Annex A).
Despite the lapse of four (4) months from the said Order, the
TSN was not forwarded to this Court (Annex B).
In her letter-explanation to the undersigned, Stenographic
Reporter Asuncion A. Denaga, informed the former that her
failure to transmit said TSN was due to the fact that the
same were hat sent back to her by this Court's personnel for
transcription (Annex C).
It was only after a close scrutiny of the transcribed TSN
when herein undersigned discovered and remembered that
he handled the aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor
years back. Thus, the aforementioned Order emanating from
this Court dated April 13, 1998 declaring the undersigned's
inhibition from this case (Annex D).
To clarify matters, there was never a full-blown trial
conducted by the undersigned in this case since the time he
assumed as Presiding Judge of this sala up to the present,
as the scheduled hearings of this case were always
postponed (the same not being attributable to this Court)
(see Annexes E, F, G, and H).
Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the time he
discovered his previous participation in the above-cited
criminal case, up to the present, the undersigned never
heard nor tried nor conducted any full-blown trial in the
same.
Thus, Judge Rojas tries to justify his failure to inhibit himself from the
beginning by the flimsy excuse that it was only after a close scrutiny of the
TSN that he discovered and remembered that he had handled the criminal
case as public prosecutor years ago and tries to minimize the seriousness of
his breach of judicial ethics by claiming that anyway he did not conduct a
"full-blown trial."
In his order of April 13, 1998, Judge Rojas stated that he had not inhibited
himself because the previous counsel of the accused, Atty. Rosalie Cariño,
did not object to his sitting in the case as the judge. Certainly, he would not
have asked Atty. Cariño for any objection if he had not known that he could
not sit in the case as judge because he had previously acted as public
prosecutor therein. Indeed, the Court is at a loss how Judge Rojas could
have missed noticing that the case was one in which he had appeared as
public prosecutor considering that the records indicate the appearances of
counsels.
Judge Rojas contends that, in any case, he never conducted any full-blown
trial in the case, and, therefore, there was no need for his immediate
inhibition from the case. Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court expressly states,
however, that "no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he . . .
has been counsel [for a party] without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record." According to  Black's
Law Dictionary,3 to "sit" in a case means "to hold court; to do any act of a
judicial nature. To hold a session, as of a court, grand jury, legislative
body, etc. To be formally organized and proceeding with the transaction of
business." The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a
judge hears  the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases where
he  acts  by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has
done in the criminal case. The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a
conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the
judge.4 A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. 5 He should administer justice impartially
and without delay.6 In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in
Criminal Case No. 09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998
without securing the written consent of both the prosecution and the defense
and entering the same upon the record of the case. For almost one and a
half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and of
the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution 7 and for the
defense.8 Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted on the case. The
failure of Judge Rojas to observe these elementary rules of judicial conduct
betrays his interest in the case which he allowed to prevail over his sworn
duty to administer the law impartially without any fear or favor.

In Lorenza v. Marquez,9 a judge was dismissed from the service for sitting in
a case in which he had previously acted as counsel for the plaintiff without
the written consent of all the parties in interest, in violation of Rule 137, §1,
and for illegally issuing a subpoena for the appearance of a prison inmate at
the trial of a criminal case before him. In the instant case, the Office of the
Court Administrator recommends that Judge Rojas be fined in the amount of
P10,000.00 for violating Rule 137, §1. The Court believes that the penalty
recommended is appropriate, given the fact that unlike the judge in Lorenzo
v. Marquez, Judge Rojas' breach of judicial ethics is confined to his failure to
inhibit himself from the case in which he had previously acted as public
prosecutor.
[G.R. No. 88105. December 18, 1989.]
WHEREFORE; a fine of P10,000.00 is hereby imposed on Judge Eddie R.
Rojas for violation of Rule 137, §1. He is WARNED that repetition of the NICOLAS FECUNDO, Petitioner, v. HON. RAMON BERJAMEN,
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 20 and JULIUS
SALCEDO, Respondents.
SO ORDERED.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTIONS; SERVICE OF COPY
CONTAINING NOTICE OF TIME AND PLACE OF HEARING; MANDATORY. —
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court requires that notice of a motion be
served by the movant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing thereof. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that the
notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time
and place for the hearing of the motion. A motion which does not meet the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is
considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to
receive and the court has no authority to act upon. Service of copy of a
motion containing notice of the time and place of hearing of said motion is
a mandatory requirement.
2. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS; JUDGES; TARDINESS
OR DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF ELECTION CASES DOES NOT
CONNOTE PARTIALITY. — Tardiness or delay in the disposition of election
cases in other courts does not connote partiality of the presiding judge in
election cases speedily disposed of. Sec. 258 of the Omnibus Election Code
(BP Blg. 881) provides for the preferential disposition of election contests
within six (6) months after filing. If judges in the four (4) provinces of
Panay island hearing election cases are indeed taking their time in deciding
such election cases, as alluded to by counsel, then they are not certainly
complying with the election law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE ALL TIMES MAINTAIN THE APPEARANCE OF
FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY. — The language employed by the
respondent judge in his 10 February 1988 order and even in his comment
on the petition at bar, manifests at the very least an exasperation
bordering on indignation at petitioner and his tactics, which may
unnecessarily cloud his impartiality in deciding the election case at hand. A
spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision
rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must, at all
times, maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language,
both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a restraining
order seeking to inhibit respondent judge, Hon. Ramon Berjamen, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Mambusao, Capiz from continuing with
the trial of an election protest (Election Case No. M-944) filed by herein
private respondent Julius Salcedo against herein petitioner. The grounds
invoked for the inhibition of respondent judge are his alleged partiality and
bias against petitioner. Said acts of alleged partiality and bias may be
summarized as follows:1
a) Use of unbecoming language in the order dated 10 February 1988
stating therein . . . "that the implementation of the order of this Court is
being vehemently opposed by the municipal mayor (herein petitioner) and
his cohorts. Ours is a government of laws and not a government of rascals.
To give in to this kind of behavior of the respondent and his cohorts, we
are just like savages in the jungle might is might [sic right]." (Emphasis
supplied)
b) Severely reprimanding and scolding in open court petitioner’s secretary
when the latter filed on behalf of the petitioner a motion to dismiss the
election protest, then angrily adding that non-lawyers/couriers are not
entertained by the court, thereby subjecting the petitioner’s representative
to the mockery and ridicule of private respondent’s supporters who
jampacked the courtroom.
c) Personal interest of respondent judge shown by inquiring from Arcadio
Hernandez (one of the commissioners in the revision of ballots) about the
procedural maneuvers of petitioner’s counsel.
d) Respondent judge, beholden to Congressman Villareal whose life size
(half body) picture is displayed in the former’s office. Villareal is a known
supporter of private respondent who engaged the services of the Villareal
law office in the election protest before the respondent judge.
Congressman Villareal allegedly had worked for Judge Berjamen’s
appointment to the Bench.
e) Statement of respondent judge in open court that a motion for
reconsideration (of the denial of the motion to exhibit him) to be filed by
petitioner will be denied.
Petitioner’s recourse to this Court is basically founded on the contention
that public respondent’s above described conduct, particularly in the
election case pending before him, involving petitioner (as protestee) and
private respondent (as protestant) is not in consonance with the standard
of cold neutrality of an impartial judge and thus he cannot render a fair
and impartial decision in the case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The incidents leading to this petition started when petitioner, Nicolas
Fecundo, mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Dumalag, Capiz,
during the 1988 local elections, won over private respondent Julius
Salcedo with a margin of 100 votes. On 29 January 1988, private
respondent Salcedo filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No.
M-944; a supplemental petition followed on 4 February 1988. The case
was assigned to Branch 20, RTC of Mambusao, Capiz presided over by
respondent judge, Hon. Ramon Berjamen. After the filing of the answer
with counter protest, respondent judge issued an order, dated 1 February
1988, directing the Municipal Treasurer of Dumalag, Capiz to deliver to the
court the ballot boxes subject of the protest. On 10 February 1988, the
Municipal Treasurer of Dumalag addressed a letter to respondent judge
stating:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
This is to inform you that I cannot execute the order of this court dated
February 1, 1988, because the Municipal Mayor of Dumalag, Capiz, and his
cohorts are preventing and threatening me if I insist to bring the ballot
boxes mentioned in your order to your court. My life is presently in danger
so I ask your assistance.
In view of this circumstance, I would like to request that the Provincial
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, Loctugan Hills, Roxas City, be
ordered to secure me or to get by themselves the ballot boxes in question.
Thank you." 2
The same day, 10 February 1988, respondent judge issued the order
already adverted to. On 3 March 1988, petitioner filed a motion to
withdraw his counter protest. Another order dated 23 February 1988 was
issued for delivery of the ballot boxes and keys covered by the
supplemental petition. 3
After several hearings before three (3) commissioners, and based on the
view that a protestant must first be required to present and mark his
evidence before the opening and revision of ballots involved in protestee’s
counter protest, a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by petitioner with this Court on 27 June 1988 4
seeking to prohibit the respondent court from proceeding with the election
case. A temporary restraining order was issued on 13 July 1988 by the
First Division of this Court but the petition was ultimately dismissed in a
resolution dated 25 January 1989 for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion or lack or excess of jurisdiction, the questioned order of
respondent court being in accordance with law and conducive to the
expeditious disposition of the election contest. 5
Hearings were resumed before respondent judge.
Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition before the same judge on 18 April
1989 with notice of hearing set on 20 April 1989. Both parties failed to
indicate in the records of this case whether a hearing actually took place
on the motion but an order of 2 May 1989 issued by respondent judge,
denied the motion for noncompliance with the three (3) day notice rule. No
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner due to respondent
judge’s statement in open court on 8 May 1989
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If you intend to file another pleadings, [sic] you can do and the Court will
cross the bridge when it comes to it, without considering the merits and
demerits of this motion, the Court resolved to deny said motion. So, if you
file another one, the Court will just deny when it received (sic) it." 6
These manifestations of alleged partiality to private respondent (or
perhaps, antipathy to petitioner) and the fact that petitioner’s counsel was
not allegedly furnished a copy of the 10 February 1988 order, having
accidentally discovered the same from the records of the case only
sometime in May 1989, 7 are cited in support of the present petition.
As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court in its
resolution of 23 May 1989 ordering the respondent judge to cease and
desist from hearing Election Case No. M-944, until further orders from the
Court, simultaneously requiring respondents to file their comments to the
petition. 8
Private respondent Julius Salcedo contends that petitioner is guilty of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the election contest. This petition,
according to private respondent, is his (petitioner’s) second attempt. The
first was also thru a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 83779) which was
ultimately dismissed by the Court’s First Division. Now that the probability
of his losing the election case is apparent, petitioner moves for the
disqualification of the judge.
Petitioner’s charges are moreover pure inventions, according to
private Respondent. The incidents constituting alleged bias or prejudice of
respondent judge occurred prior to the filing of the first petition before the
Supreme Court; the present petition is thus a violation of the omnibus
motion rule. Furthermore, according to private respondent, in bad faith,
petitioner has concealed from the respondent judge the procedural
remedies he has availed of.chanrobles law library
Respondent judge, for his part, denies all the accusations, imputing them
to petitioner’s wild imagination, political immaturity and childish mentality.
Some words used in the order (10 February 1988) were merely taken from
the letter of the Municipal treasurer; the others were reminders and advice
to petitioner to respect and recognize the authority of the court. This
petition, according to respondent judge, is part of a scheme to delay the
disposition of the election case in violation of the Election Law, which
respondent judge is seeking to uphold. He disclaims any utang na loob
(debt of gratitude) to Congressman Villareal, and almost proudly
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .. If this fact is true, Cong. Villareal was just paying the favors he owed
the undersigned so that Cong. Villareal could not influence this
representation as to how to decide a case no matter who the parties are.
With the almost three years in office of this representation, not even one
case could the petitioner cite an instance where Cong. Villareal had
influenced the undersigned in his decisions. . . .." 9
Petitioner’s reply and supplement to the reply insist that his first petition
for certiorari with this Court had a valid reason, i.e. to prevent private
respondent from fishing for evidence with the tolerance and support of the
respondent judge. The present petition arises from the conviction that
there is partiality and bias of respondent judge. There is no objection to
the speedy disposition of the election case provided that due process is
observed, according to the petitioner.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
A motion to allow petitioner to file a reply to the comment of public
respondent was received on 16 September 1989; the reply was filed on 12
October 1989. Without requiring other pleadings, the Court treated the
comments as answers and gave due course to the petition.
The filing of a previous petition for certiorari with this Court (ultimately
dismissed) is raised by private respondent as an affirmative defense to the
present petition. An examination of the records is thus unavoidable. The
prayer of the petition in G.R. No. 83779 reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered it is respectfully prayed that
Restraining Order as prayed, be issued and after hearing an Order be
issued declaring the Order dated June 21, 1988 of the public respondent
as null and void, ordering him to require private respondent to formally
mark or identify as exhibits those ballots subject of the protest, present
evidence in support of the petitioner [sic] and further ordering the public
respondent, to defer the opening of the ballots boxes of the counter
protested precincts until the private respondent has presented its [sic]
evidence and has rested its [sic] case on the basis of his Petition."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The present petition, on the other hand, moves for inhibition of the
respondent judge, on grounds of bias and partiality, invoking an alleged
gross disregard of the Rules of Court.
Rule 137, Sec. 2 states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Rule 137 — DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS.
x           x           x
SEC. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. — If it be
claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the
party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his
objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon
proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be
forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but
no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in
favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.
Petitioner submits that respondent judge should have met the issues
raised by him, one by one, in his motion to inhibit, instead of rejecting said
motion on a technicality (non-compliance with three (3) day notice rule).
We do not, however, find any grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction in respondent judge’s denial of the motion to inhibit for non-
compliance with the three (3) day notice rule. Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court requires that notice of a motion be served by the movant on
all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof.
Section 5 of the same Rule provides that the notice shall be directed to the
parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion. A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper
which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to
act upon. 10 Service of copy of a motion containing notice of the time and
place of hearing of said motion is a mandatory requirement. 11
Further, we have to correct the statement of petitioner’s counsel in the
supplement to his reply which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Petitioner is also aware of the fact that although there are several election
protests pending in the various Regional Trial Courts in the four Provinces
of Panay, it is only in this election contest where the revision of the
protested ballots were already finished and has reached the stage of
presentation of evidence. In short the proceedings so far reached is way
ahead as compared with the other election contests." 12
This contention or observation is a non-sequitur. Tardiness or delay in the
disposition of election cases in other courts does not connote partiality of
the presiding judge in election cases speedily disposed of.
Sec. 258 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) provides for the
preferential disposition of election contests within six (6) months after
filing. If judges in the four (4) provinces of Panay island hearing election
cases are indeed taking their time in deciding such election cases, as
alluded to by counsel, then they are not certainly complying with the
election law.
Moving to the issue of bias and partiality as grounds for disqualification,
recently, in Genoblazo v. CA, 13 it was enunciated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While it is true that partiality and prejudgment may constitute a just or
valid reason for the trial judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing
the case, it is not enough that the same be merely alleged. It is now
settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties to
the case is not enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge
(Beltran v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30868, September 31, 1971, 41 SCRA
158.)"
But, we still have to heed the sound admonition in Santos v. Gutierrez: 14
"Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty
of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness
and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true
intention of the law stated in general terms -that no judge shall preside in
a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because —
‘. . . However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest
inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or
prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex-parte may still linger to
affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or
swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be
revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No
effort of the will can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We
cannot be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine
unaffected by that which it knows, but which it should forget in that
process.’" (Ann. Cas. 1917 A, p. 1235).
In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee in Beltran v. Garcia, 15
he said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This case should impress upon respondents the intangible imperatives of
not only being actually impartial but also maintaining the appearance of
strict impartiality, so as not to arouse needlessly the suspicions of either of
the parties, as in the case of herein petitioners.
While bias and prejudice are not to be presumed especially if weighed
against a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer
justice without respect to person, the Court has at the same time
admonished judges to so conduct themselves and exercise their discretion
in a way that the peoples’ and litigants’ ‘all-important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary’ is ever nurtured and upheld."cralaw virtua1aw
library
While the procedural tactics and/or motives of petitioner’s counsel may not
be all too laudable, as it was, for instance, impossible for him to be
unaware of the 10 February 1988 order, until sometime in May 1989,
because on p. 3, par. 1 of his petition in G.R. No. 83779 filed on 27 June
1988, he already alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The aforementioned Orders for the delivery of the ballot boxes of the 11
precincts subject of the protest were duly implemented and as a result of
which the officials mentioned in the aforesaid Orders delivered those ballot
boxes and the public respondent took custody of the same."cralaw
virtua1aw library
yet, the language employed by the respondent judge in his 10 February
1988 order and even in his comment on the petition at bar, manifests at
the very least an exasperation bordering on indignation at petitioner and
his tactics, which may unnecessarily cloud his impartiality in deciding the
election case at hand. A spotless dispensation of justice requires not only
that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering
it must, at all times, maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality.
His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured,
lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.
To erase any doubt whatsoever as to the judge’s bias and/or prejudice
against petitioner in Election Case No. M-944, the Court believes it prudent
and better to serve the ends of justice to transfer the said case to Branch
21, Mambusao, Capiz, presided over by the newly appointed Judge
thereof, Hon. Julius L. Abella.
Considering also that this is an election contest, Judge Abella is hereby
directed to terminate the proceedings and decide the case within three (3)
months from notice of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The restraining order issued on 23
May 1989 is made permanent. Let election case No. M-944 be transferred
from Branch 20 to Branch 21, Mambusao, Capiz, presided over by Judge
Julius L. Abella who shall terminate proceedings therein and decide the
case within three (3) months from notice of this
decision.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163155             July 21, 2006
ALFREDO HILADO, MANUEL LACSON, JOSE MA. TUVILLA, JOAQUIN
LIMJAP LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE AMOR A. REYES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA
CAMPOS BENEDICTO, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition is one for mandamus and prohibition.
Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), the surviving spouse of the
deceased Roberto S. Benedicto, filed on May 25, 2000 a petition for issuance
of letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 00-
97505, "Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto"  (the case), before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 21
presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes (public respondent).
Private respondent was, by Order1 of August 2, 2000, appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Benedicto (the estate), and letters of
administration were thereafter issued in her favor.
Herein petitioners, Alfredo Hilado, Manuel Lacson, Jose M. Tuvilla, Joaquin
Limjap, Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation had,
during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the Bacolod City RTC two
complaints for damages or collection of sums of money, docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No. 111718, against Roberto Benedicto et
al.2
In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted on
January 18, 20013 in the case before the Manila RTC, she listed, among
other liabilities of the estate, the claims of petitioners subject of the above-
said Bacolod RTC cases as follows:
LIST OF LIABILITIES
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of
Branch 21 of the Manila RTC allowed petitioners through counsel Sedigo and
Associates to regularly and periodically examine the records of the case and
to secure certified true copies thereof.
By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of
petitioners' counsel, was denied access to the last folder-record of the case
which, according to the court's clerical staff, could not be located and was
probably inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping. 5
Petitioners' counsel thus requested public respondent, by letter 6 of January
15, 2004, to allow Atty. Paredes to personally check the records of the case.
Acting on the letter, the Officer-In- Charge/Legal Researcher of Branch 21
advised petitioners' counsel in writing that "per instruction of the Hon.
Presiding Judge[,] only parties or those with authority from the parties are
allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case pending in this Court," and
that they may be "allowed to go over the records of the above-entitled case
upon presentation of written authority from the [administratrix]." 7
On February 2, 2004, petitioners' counsel was served with a notice of hearing
of the case on February 13, 2004.8 Petitioners' counsel thus attended such
scheduled hearing during which he filed a Motion for Inhibition9 of public
respondent on the ground of gross ignorance, dereliction of duty, and
manifest partiality towards the administratrix. Public respondent, noting that
an error was committed in the service to petitioners of the notice of hearing,
ignored the motion of petitioners' counsel.10
Intending to compare the list of properties in the estate's inventory all of
which properties were appraised at a fair value of P100 million with the list of
assets valued at P1 Billion said to have been ceded in 1990 to the decedent
under his Compromise Agreement with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government,11 petitioners' counsel sent the Branch Clerk of Court of
Branch 21 of the Manila RTC a letter12 requesting to be furnished
with certified true copies of the "updated inventory."
By still another letter,13 petitioners' counsel requested to be furnished
with certified true copies of the order issued by the court during the hearing
of February 13, 2004, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken
thereon.14
By Order15 of March 2, 2004, public respondent indicated why petitioners had
no standing to file the Motion for Inhibition as well as to request for certified
true copies of the above-indicated documents. Read the Order of March 2,
2004:
Perusal of the motion shows that the movant is asking this Court to
act on their motion despite the denial of their Omnibus Motion to
Intervene which to date remains pending resolution with the Court of
Appeals.
As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix, said motion is filed
by persons/entities who have no legal standing in the above-entitled
 case, hence they cannot ask anything from this Court, much more for
this Court to act on pleadings filed or soon to be filed.
For the record, the Court received two (2) letters dated February 17
and 27, 2004 addressed to Atty. Maria Luisa Lesle G. Gonzales, the
Branch Clerk of Court…asking that he be furnished with certified true
copies of the updated inventory and Order issued by this Court on
February 13, 2004 hearing as well as the corresponding transcript of
stenographic notes within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said
letters.
Considering that the movants were not allowed to intervene in the
proceedings per order of this Court dated January 2, 2002, copies of
all pleadings/orders filed/issued relative to this case may only be
secured from the [Administratrix] and/or counsel.16 (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners thus filed on April 30, 2004 before this Court the present petition
for mandamus and prohibition to compel public respondent to allow them to
access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of
the records of the case and disqualify public respondent from further
presiding thereover.
In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public
records to which the public has the right to access, inspect and obtain official
copies thereof,17 recognition of which right is enjoined under Section 7, Article
III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of
the Rules of Court.
Petitioners further contend that public respondent manifested her
arbitrariness, malice and partiality through her blatant disregard of basic rules
in the disposition and safekeeping of court records, and her denial of their
right to access the records suffices to bar her from presiding over the
case;18 and public respondent's incompetence, malice, bad faith and partiality
are underscored by her failure to enforce for more than three years the
requirement of the Rules of Court on the prompt submission by the
administratrix of her final inventory and the filing of a periodic accounting of
her administration.19
By Comment20 filed on September 21, 2004, private respondent submits that
the petition is fatally defective since petitioners failed to disclose in their
certification of non-forum shopping that they had earlier instituted an
administrative complaint against public respondent which prayed for the
same reliefs21 — for the disqualification of public respondent from presiding
over the case and for the court docket to be opened for examination.
Private respondent further submits that the petition for prohibition should be
dismissed since petitioners are not parties to the case, hence, they have no
personality to file a motion for inhibition.22
As to the alleged denial of petitioners' right to examine court records and
participate in the proceedings, private respondent submits that this is not
unqualifiedly true for petitioners must have secured a copy of the inventory of
the assets and liabilities of the estate, they being aware of the declared fair
value of the estate and their counsel was present during the February 13,
2004 hearing.23
For consideration then are the following issues: (1) whether the present
petition is fatally defective for failure of petitioners to disclose in the certificate
of non-forum shopping that they had priorly instituted an administrative
complaint against public respondent which prays for the same reliefs; (2)
whether a writ of mandamus may issue to compel public respondent to allow
petitioners to examine and obtain copies of any or all documents forming part
of the records of the case; and (3) whether a writ of prohibition will issue in
favor of petitioners, who are not parties to the case, to inhibit public
respondent from presiding over the case.
As reflected above, petitioners had, before the filing of the present petition,
filed an administrative complaint before this Court against public respondent,
"Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding
Corporation v. Judge Amor A. Reyes, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21," docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910.
Petitioners subsequently filed a supplemental24 and a second supplemental
administrative complaint25 praying for 1) the imposition of appropriate
disciplinary sanctions against public respondent for, among other things,
denying them their right to access the docket of the case, and 2) the
disqualification of public respondent from presiding over the case, which
latter prayer was, however, subsequently withdrawn in a motion 26 filed on
April 30, 2004, the same day that the present petition was filed.
Denying the existence of forum shopping, petitioners argue that it "exists only
where the elements of litis pendencia are present, or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other."27
It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. 28
The non-existence of forum shopping notwithstanding, this Court proscribes
the filing of an administrative complaint before the exhaustion of judicial
remedies against questioned errors of a judge in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking
of, among other measures, an administrative complaint against the person of
the judge concerned. So Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis29 teaches:
x x x [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities
which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation
or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a
motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in
character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or
neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a
petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
x x x Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as
the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding,
are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with
finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
x x x Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies
are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where
such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof" Indeed,
since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence
from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to
intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for
acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions; x x x30 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
It is thus only after a questioned action of a judge in a pending case has been
judicially resolved with finality that the door to an inquiry into his or her
administrative liability may be said to have opened.
Parenthetically, during the pendency of the present petition or on April 15,
2005, the Second Division of this Court rendered a decision 31 on the above-
said administrative complaint filed by petitioners against public respondent.
On the merits of the petition for mandamus, Section 7 of Article III of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted constitutional provision guarantees a general right –
the right to information on matters of "public concern" and, as an accessory
thereto, the right of access to "official records" and the like. The right to
information on "matters of public concern or of public interest" is both the
purpose and the limit of the constitutional right of access to public
documents.32
Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records, an understanding
of the term "judicial record" or "court record" is in order.
The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders,
judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all
papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and
returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony 33 which
took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or
control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court
decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book,
other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court
reporter's notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in
physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in
connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and
includes all evidence it has received in a case.34
In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is
no right test. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance as it
relates to or affect the public.35
It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to
transparency in the administration of justice, to the end that it will serve to
enhance the basic fairness of the judicial proceedings, safeguard the integrity
of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed public discussion of
governmental affairs. Thus in Barretto v. Philippine Publishing Co., 36 this
Court held:
x x x The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going
on in the courts is not the fact that the public, or a portion of it, is
curious, or that what is going on in the court is news, or would be
interesting, or would furnish topics of conversation; but is simply that
it has a right to know whether a public officer is properly performing
his duty. In other words, the right of the public to be informed of the
proceedings in court is not founded in the desire or necessity of
people to know about the doing of others, but in the  necessity of
knowing whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing
his duty. x x x
The case in Cowley vs. Pulsifer (137 Mass. 392) is so pertinent to
the questions presented for our decision in the case at bar that we
cannot refrain from quoting extensively therefrom. x x x
x x x "The general advantage to the country in having these
proceedings made public more than counterbalances the
inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may
be the subject of such proceedings." x x x
"The chief advantage to the country to which we can discern,
and that which we understand to be intended by the
foregoing passage, is the security which publicity gives for
the proper administration of justice. x x x It is desirable that
the trial of causes should take place under the public eye,
not because the controversies of one citizen with another are
of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment
that those who administer justice should act under the
sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen
should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to
the mode in which a public duty is performed."
From this quotation it is obvious that it was not the idea of the
supreme court of Massachusetts to lay down the proposition that
simply because a pleading happened to be filed in a public office it
becomes public property that any individual, whether interested or
not, had the right to publish its contents, or that any newspaper was
privileged to scatter the allegations contained therein to the four
corners of the country. The right of the public to know the contents of
the paper is the basis of the privilege, which is, as we have said, the
right to determine by its own senses that its servant, the judge, is
performing his duties according to law. x x x37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or
interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the
laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with
knowledge.38 Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the
opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy
to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the
public.39 Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas,40 this Court found a
judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
furnish Lantaco et al.  a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they
were even the therein private complainants, the decision being "already part
of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize."
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents
filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or interest.
For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the
court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be
accessed to, the purpose for which the parties filed them is to be considered.
In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the
purpose of establishing their right to a share of the estate. As for the
creditors, their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid
therefor before the disposition of the estate.
Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his
death and the manner by which his private estate may ultimately be settled is
not a matter of general, public concern or one in which a citizen or the public
has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities maybe affected. Granting
unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial information may
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may
have an interest in limiting its disclosure or dissemination.
If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest,
denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen's constitutional right to
information.
Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern,
the accessory right of access to official records, including judicial records, are
open to the public.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be restricted on
a showing of good cause. How "good cause" can be determined, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Republican Company v.
Appeals Court teaches:41
The public's right of access to judicial records, including transcripts,
evidence, memoranda, and court orders, maybe restricted, but only
on a showing of "good cause." "To determine whether good cause is
shown, a judge must balance the rights of the parties based on
the particular facts of each case." In so doing, the judge "must
take into account all relevant factors, 'including, but not limited to, the
nature of the parties and the controversy, the type of information and
the privacy interests involved, the extent of community interest, and
the reason for the request.'"42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and protective
powers of every court over its own records and files. 43
The Supreme Court of Canada, expounding on the right of the court to
exercise supervisory powers over materials surrendered into its care, held:
It follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound to
inquire into the use that is to be made of them and, in my view, is
fully entitled to regulate that use by securing appropriate
undertakings and assurances if those be advisable to protect
competing interests. x x x
In exercising its supervisory powers over materials surrendered into
its care, the court may regulate the use made of it. In an application
of this nature, the court must protect the respondent and
accommodate public interest in access. x x x In an application of this
nature the court must protect the respondent and accommodate the
public interest in access. This can only be done in terms of the actual
purpose, and in the face of obvious prejudice and the absence of a
specific purpose, the order for unrestricted access and reproduction
should not have been made.44 (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion45 and
subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court, 46 after
considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is
based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the exercise of
such discretion, the following issues may be relevant: "whether parties have
interest in privacy, whether information is being sought for legitimate
purpose or for improper purpose, whether there is threat of particularly
serious embarrassment to party, whether information is important to public
health and safety, whether sharing of information among litigants would
promote fairness and efficiency, whether party benefiting from confidentiality
order is public entity or official, and whether case involves issues important to
the public."47
By the administratrix-private respondent's own information, petitioners are
the plaintiffs in two complaints (against Roberto Benedicto et al.) for
damages and/or sums of money, Civil Case No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No.
11178, filed before the Bacolod RTC. She contends, however, that "if the
motion to dismiss [these RTC Bacolod cases is] granted, . . . petitioners
would have absolutely no interest of any kind [over] the [e]state of the
[d]eceased Roberto S. Benedicto."48
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records — to monitor
prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper
disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting49 — appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for
sum of money against Roberto Benedicto et al., they have an interest over
the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested
persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court reading:
Rule 135, SEC. 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. – x x x x The
records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be
available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper
business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of
such records, unless the court shall, in any special case, have
forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency.
(Underscoring supplied),
entitled to be informed of the inventory as well as other records which are
relevant to their claims against Benedicto.
As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have
a copy of court records and pays court fees,50 a court may not deny access to
such records. Of course as this Court held in Beegan v.
Borja,51 precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration must be
observed:
We are not unaware of the common practice in the courts with
respect to the photocopying or xeroxing of portions of case records
as long as the same are not confidential or disallowed by the rules to
be reproduced. The judge need not be bothered as long as the
permission of the Clerk of Court has been sought and as long as a
 duly authorized representative of the court takes charge of the
reproduction within the court premises if warranted or if not, the said
court representative must bring along the case records where
reproduction takes place and return the same intact to the Clerk of
Court.52
In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners
being "interested persons" who have a legitimate reason or purpose for
accessing the records of the case.
Respecting the prohibition aspect of the petition, the same fails.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which govern
disqualification of judges provide:
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent
is ORDERED to allow petitioners to access, examine, and obtain copies of
any and all documents-part of the records of Special Proceeding No. 00-
97505 bearing on
the inventory of assets and liabilities of the estate and the hearing conducted
by the trial court on February 13, 2004, subject to precautionary measures to
prevent tampering or alteration thereof.
The petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer

shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he was presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify

himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.

SECTION 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and

effect.  - If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as
above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in
writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor,
and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw
therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and
filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be
allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own
competency, until after final judgment in the case. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1195 February 26, 1997
Since petitioners are not parties to the case, they may not seek public
respondent's inhibition, whether under the first paragraph of above-quoted
Section 1 which constitutes grounds for mandatory disqualification, or under Spouses ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELISA A.
the second paragraph of the same section on voluntary disqualification. NAZARENO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ENRIQUE M. ALMARIO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint dated 28 February 1994 for gross misconduct or acts
unbecoming a judge filed against Judge Enrique M. Almario, then presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, the spouses
Romeo Y. Nazareno and Elisa A. Nazareno averred:
We would like to narrate some instances where Judge
Enrique M Almario took advantage of our situation in order to
force us to accede to his demands. They are as follows:
1. Sometime in the middle of 1990, when Judge Almario was
still holding his office in Trece Martires City, he saw me
(Elisa) in the office of his Court and he invited me to his
chamber. After a short conversation, Judge Almario said to
me that he was near to retire (sic) and so he needed plenty
of money (Inday malapit no ako magretire, kailangan ko ng
maraming pera). Mrs. Nazareno was surprised and shocked
to hear what the judge said, but could not say anything but
just smiled. However, before I (Mrs. Nazareno) left his
chamber, Judge Almario said to her to help him with this,
and I (Mrs. Nazareno) assured him that she will raise some
money for him.
2. Then another incident happened when the Judge saw us
(Romeo & Elisa Nazareno) in the offfice of his Court, again
Judge Almario invited us to his chamber. His office was still
in Trece Martires City Hall. There, he told my husband
(Romeo Nazareno, the estate administrator) that he will
change him as administrator of the estate because of his
conviction in a criminal case filed against him by his sister
Natividad. Bur Romeo told Judge Almario that it had nothing
to do with the case as it was the same issue the other parry
raised even before the former Judge Gustilo of the same
sala. Then he said that we have to be prepared for it. Then
we left.
3. In 1992 when the office of Judge Almario was transferred
to Naic, I was told that the Judge was at Rochelle
Restaurant. Thinking of the incident, I suspected that (Judge)
was waiting for the money he was asking for. I got
P10,000.00 from my husband Romeo, wrapped it in a
newspaper and I personally delivered the money to Judge
Almario at Rochelle Restaurant. He (Judge) asked me, (Mrs.
Nazareno) how much was the money, I replied, "P10,000.00
Judge". Seeing the Judge's facial expression (not contented,
I (Mrs. Nazareno) promised again to raise some money next
time and he (judge) replied, "O, sige".
4. Sometime in the month of November, 1992, in Naic,
Cavite, Judge Almario sent for us (sic) his employee Joe to
our place, Naic Cinema, and told us that the Judge was
asking for food to be taken to the Seaside Beach belonging
to Mr. Dualan, because the one who promised him to bring
food did not arrive. At about 6:30 P.M. of that day, my
husband (Romeo) and I went to Seaside Beach with the food
Judge had asked. We ordered the food at Rochelle
Restaurant and it cost us no less than P2,500.00. There in
the beach, he introduced us to Mr. Dualan and to some of
his visitors there. And after a while, silently handed the
Judge the P10,000.00 as I promised him the last time.
The following morning, a woman from Seaside Beach came
to our place, Naic Cinema, and said, "Ate Naty, Ate Naty,
[n]adala ni Judge Almario "yung susi ng cottage, pakikuha
n'yo nalang sa kanya." Surprised, I (Mrs. Nazareno) replied.
"Hindi ako si Ate Naty mo, siya "yung kalaban namin sa
kaso, nandoon siya sa Dalisay Theatre". Immediately the
woman left. "Ate Naty" refers to Narividad P. Nazareno, the
defendant in the case heard by Judge Almario which was
filed by the Estate, through Romeo P. Nazareno, as
administrator.
5. During the month of December, 1992, also in Naic, Cavite,
another employee of Judge Almario, by the name of Roldan,
came to our place, Naic Cinema, telling me that the Judge
wanted to see me. So, I went with Roldan. And when we
reached the office of the Judge, he told Roldan to step out
and closed the door. Judge Almario again asked [for] some
food, at least three (3) kinds, for the gathering of his staff at
Aroma Beach. He mentioned the time when he needed the
food (lunch time). I told him (Judge) to pick-up the food.
But before I left, the Judge asked to change his salary check
because he needed cash on that day. He asked for the
amount of P7,500. 00.00. So I went back to my place and
get [sic] the amount from my husband (Romeo) and returned
to the office of Judge Almario. I gave the P7,500.00 for his
 check, but Judge Almario did not hand over to me his check.
I waited for the said check, but the Judge seemed to know
nothing about the check and did not bother to say something
about the P7,500.00 but just received it. I was then shy to
ask from him the check in exchange of the cash I gave him,
so I asked permission to leave which he okayed.
6. One time, Judge Almario asked us to change our lawyer
because according to him, our lawyer has no "pakikisama" to
him. We did not follow his advice because we believe in our
lawyer. For this reason, Judge Almario always deny our
motions and pleadings and he even dismissed Mr. Romeo
Nazareno's appeal in a criminal case on the ground that the
notice of appeal was filed out of time, but which the court of
origin or municipal trial court has approved and granted by
transmitting all the records of the criminal case to his sala.
The criminal case now is pending before the Hon. Supreme
Court.
In spite of our compliance of [sic] his personal demands,
Judge Almario has repeatedly shown his bias acts and
partiality against us.1
In his comment, respondent judge denied all the charges against him. 2
The spouses affirmed the truth of the averments in their complaint in a reply
dated 24 May 1994.3
On 14 June 1994, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) based on
findings that the matters/issues raised in the complaint are factual in nature
recommended that the charges against Judge Almario be assigned to an
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for a full blown investigation.
On 27 July 1994, the Court approved the OCA recommendation and
designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales to
conduct an investigation and submit a report and recommendation.
The following persons appeared before Justice Uarpio Morales:
1. Elisa Nazareno — she testified and affirmed the truth of the allegations in
the complaint..
She first narrated how respondent Judge Almario, on one occasion, asked
her to enter his chamber after which he told Elisa, in the Visayan dialect, how
he needed money since he was nearing his retirement age and that she
should help him ("tulungan mo ako"). She told the judge that she would see
what she could do. Elisa then recounted that she later gave Judge Almario
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) on two (2) separate occasions. 4
She testified having given food for respondent judge on two (2) occasions;
first, for, for a gathering of respondent judge's family and friends at the
Seaside Beach resort and another, for the Christmas party of the judge's
court staff at the Aroma Beach resort.5
Elisa also recounted how Judge Almario asked her to encash his salary
check for P7,500.00 which she did but respondent judge did not give her the
salary check and she was hesitant to ask him to give it to her. 6
Finally, Elisa testified about the incident when respondent judge talked to
them about replacing her husband (herein co-complainant Romeo Nazareno)
as administrator of the property subject of a pending case before respondent
judge.
2. Romeo Nazareno — he testified that they had at least four (4) pending
cases before respondent Judge Almario.7
Romeo corroborated the testimony of Elisa that Judge Almario met with them
to discuss his decision to replace him as administrator. Romeo added that
respondent judge made them believe that he wanted the spouses to offer
something to him.
Romeo also affirmed Elisa's testimony that they were forced to give a total of
P20,000.00 to respondent Judge.9
Romeo likewise testified about the incident when they brought food to the
Seaside Beach Resort upon the request of respondent judge as well as her
wife having given P7,500.00 in cash to Judge Almario for the latter's salary
check which he never delivered. 10
3. Remedios Antipuesto — she testified that she worked as a helper for
complainant Mrs. Elisa Nazareno.
She recalled a time when Mrs. Nazareno asked her to help cook some food
which respondent judge was asking for. She could not remember the exact
date but she recalled that an employee of the court where the judge was
assigned, a certain "Joe", picked up the food. 11
4. Roldan Alcantara — he testified that as a utility worker assigned to the
sala of respondent judge, he sometimes encashed the salary checks of
Judge Almario.
Alcantara also testified having seen the Nazareno spouses at the Seaside
Beach Resort on at least one occasion when respondent judge and his
sister-in-law were there. Alcantara stated that the Nazareno spouses brought
food which they handed over to the sister-in-law ("hipag") of respondent
Judge Almario. 12
5. Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. — he stated that he worked as a legal researcher in
the sala of Judge Almario.
He recalled an occasion when respondent judge asked him to go with him to
the Seaside Beach Resort. At the resort he saw the judge's sister-in-law
talking with complainant Elisa Nazareno. He stated that Mrs.Nazareno left
but returned after about half an hour with a "casserola" (cooking pot)
apparently containing what he supposed was "pansit". Mrs. Nazareno took
the "casserola" to the cottage occupied by the family of respondent judge.
Finally, Salvadora admitted having picked up some food from the food stall of
Mrs. Nazareno for the Christmas party of respondent judge's court staff at the
aroma Beach Resort. 13
6. Respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario — he denied ever receiving any
money from the Nazareno spouses. He maintained that the allegations in the
complaint against him are all fabricated and were filed because the
Nazarenos had been receiving adverse rulings and orders from him inseveral
cases.
Judge Almario stated that he never talked to litigants without the counsel of
all other parties being present. He added that he felt that Atty. Dominguez,
counsel of the Nazarenos, was trying to blackmail him into inhibiting himself
from hearing their cases. 14
Finally, Judge Almario denied ever receiving any food from the Nazarenos.
He stated that the food for the Christmas party of his staff at the Aroma
Beach Resort was contributed by friends and relatives of staff members.
7. Jacinto P. Dominguez — he testified that as counsel for the Nazarenos in
cases pending before Judge Almario, there was an occasion when he asked
for a meeting with the latter inside his chambers in the presence of opposing
counsel Atty. Roman C. Cabading. The purpose of said meeting was to
inform the judge that his clients (the Nazarenos) had talked to then Justice
Secretary Franklin L)rilon about the possibility of filing administrative charges
against Judge Almario. Atty. Dominguez specifically referred to charges that
Judge Almario had: a) asked Mrs. Nazareno to encash a check which he did
not give to the latter; b) accepted a total of P20,000.00 from the Nazarenos;
and c) requested for food for a Christmas party. 15
8. Roman C. Cabading — he testified that as counsel for the opposing party
in the cases involving the Nazareno spouses, there was an occasion when
opposing counsel Atty. Jacinto P. Dominguez asked to see Judge Almario in
his presence. Atty. Cabading testified that Atty. Dominguez showed Judge
Almario and himself a letter written by the spouses addressed to then Justice
Secretary Drilon about an alleged demand made by respondent judge for
some amount of money. 16
After a close and careful study of the records of the proceedings before
investigating Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Court finds sufficient
evidence to find respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario liable for gross
dishonesty and misconduct. His conduct undoubtedly is unbecoming a
member of the bench.
The time honored rule is that a public official whose duty is to apply the law
and dispense justice, be he a judge of a lower court or tribunal or a justice of
the appellate courts, should not only be impartial, independent and honest
but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and
honest.
It has to be stressed once more to all who are sworn to render decisions in
actual controversies that a decision which correctly applies the law and
jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when
rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and
honest. It is thus the duty of members of the bench to avoid any impression
of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in
recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.
In the present case, respondent's denial of the charges leveled by
complainants that he had asked for and accepted food contributions on at
least two (2) occasions from litigants (herein complainants) is contradicted by
his own witnesses, Roldan Alcantara and Jose R. Salvadora, Jr., who are
both employees of the court. Nothing in the testimonies of these two (2) court
employees shows any motivation other than to tell the truth.
On the charge of having accepted P20,000.00 from the Nazareno spouses
and receiving cash in exchange for his salary check which he never gave to
Mrs. Nazareno, the Court agrees with the conclusions of Justice Morales that
complainant Elisa Nazareno had convincingly proven having given: a)
P10,000.00 to respondent judge on two (2) occasions and b) cash for
respondent's salary check. As correctly observed by Justice Morales, the
testimony of Mrs. Nazareno was undented even when subjected to an
extended cross examination by respondent judge. 17

In sum, the Court finds the charges of gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming a judge as having been sufficiently substantiated. Judge
Enrique M. Almario deserves no less than the penalty of dismissal from the
service.

However, based on the records of this case, respondent judge had already
compulsorily retired in July 1995. The proper penalty, therefore, in lieu of his
removal from office, is forfeiture of all his retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Enrique M. Almario is hereby found

GUILTY of gross misconduct and dishonesty, while in office. The Court
hereby ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits to
which he may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment in the
government service, including government owned or controlled agencies or
corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,

Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[ AM No. 2360-MJ, Aug 31, 1981 ]

SPS. TEODORICO MARFIL v. JUDGE ORLANDO CUACHON +

DECISION
194 Phil. 41
DE CASTRO, J.:
In a verified complaint dated March 17, 1980 complainants charged
respondent Judge Orlando Cuachon of the 5th Judicial Circuit Court of
Isabela - Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, with "gross ignorance of the law
and acts unbecoming a Judge."
The complaint alleged that on December 10, 1979, Maria Soto Vda. de
Gonzales, an aunt of the wife of respondent, filed a criminal complaint
against herein complainant Teodorico Marfil, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law), before the sala of respondent
Judge.  Respondent allegedly took cognizance of the case, and after
conducting the first stage of the preliminary examination wherein the
aggrieved party Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales and her witnesses were
investigated, respondent on January 8, 1980 , issued a warrant for the arrest
of Teodorico Marfil and fixed the bail at P1,000.00; that on the basis of such
warrant complainant Marfil was apprehended on January 18, 1980 and
detained.  It was also alleged that on February 22, 1980 the accused-
complainant hired the services of a counsel who, on the same day, filed a
petition for referral of the criminal case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform due
to the tenancy aspect of the case, with prayer that the accused-complainant
who is under detention be released.  For failure of respondent to order the
release of accused-complainant, an urgent motion to quash the criminal
action dated March 6, 1980, was filed by the latter's counsel, which motion
was however, not favorably acted upon by respondent.  Complainants
prayed that respondent be removed from his office.
In his comment and answer dated May 16, 1980 respondent Judge averred
that when a complaint is filed in court, it becomes a routinary matter to accept
the same and conduct a preliminary examination for the purpose of the
issuance of a warrant of arrest; that on January 8, 1980 he issued a warrant
of arrest; that on January 23, 1980 he issued a subpoena for the parties to
appear on February 12, 1980, and on the latter date, the aggrieved party and
the Station Commander of Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, were present,
but the accused appeared without counsel.  Respondent Judge further
alleged that, being aware of the relationship of the wife to the aggrieved
party, he announced during the said hearing that the case was called for a
possible amicable settlement; that when he found that there was no
possibility for an amicable settlement, he issued an order on the same date
inhibiting himself from trying the case; that having inhibited himself, he could
no longer act on the petition for referral dated February 22, 1980 and motion
to quash, dated March 6, 1980, or order the release of the accused.
The complaint is meritorious.  Paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Revised Rules of Court clearly provides:
"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record."
The above rule is mandatory.  Strict compliance with the stringent rule on
disqualification on account of relationship between the judge and one of the
parties serves not only to protect the rights of the parties and assure an
impartial administration of justice but also to prevent erosion of the people's
confidence in the judiciary.[1] It is in the essence of due process that a judge,
sitting in a case, be at all times wholly free, impartial and independent.
It is an admitted fact that the aggrieved party in Criminal Case No. 449 is the
aunt of respondent's wife.  However, notwithstanding such relationship and
the above-quoted prohibition, respondent took cognizance of the case,
conducted a preliminary examination, issued a warrant of arrest by virtue of
which complainant was detained and set the case for hearing on February
12, 1980.  These actuations of respondent Judge opened to question his
ability to act with the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge.  We cannot, but
censure him for these acts.  His alleged effort to settle the case amicably
could, therefore, be a mere guise to persuade the complainant to leave the
land in question, to favor the suffered aggrieved party in the Criminal Case,
with the added disadvantage on the part of complainant who was then under
detention.
The fact that respondent judge subsequently inhibited himself after it became
evident that no possible amicable settlement could be reached by the parties
does not extenuate his culpability.  Respondent judge has violated the
salutary norm that a judge should always strive to preserve judicial integrity
and discharge his task with deep concern to the cause of justice in
accordance with the legal norms, which is the manifestation of the rule above
cited, of which respondent counsel pretend ignorance of; otherwise such
ignorance is inexcusable.
In the case of Hurtado vs. Judalena and Judge Bonong, [2] this Court held
that:
"Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates without
ambiguity the cases in which any judge or judicial officer is disqualified from
acting as such.  The said section, in no uncertain terms, expressly prohibits a
judge or judicial officer from sitting in a case where he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity.  This is
mandatory.  In the case at bar, it is not denied that the respondent judge is
the brother of the respondent Isabel G. Judalena and their close relationship
notwithstanding, and despite the prohibition mentioned above, the
respondent judge took cognizance of the case and issued the controversial
order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after which he
inhibited himself from sitting on the case for the same reasons.  Such action,
to our mind, is reprehensible as it erodes the all important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby
REPRIMANDED with warning that a repetition of similar act will be dealt with
more severely.  Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal
record.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045               January 19, 2010

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE HARUN B. ISMAEL, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch
22, presided over by respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael.
The judicial audit resulted in the issuance of a memorandum dated
June 9, 2005 by the Office of Court Administrator (OCA)1 directing
respondent to explain his failure to decide and act on current and
inherited cases, as well as to resolve incidents in various cases
pending before him, within the reglementary period provided by
law.2 Respondent was likewise directed to inform the OCA if cases
already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided
or resolved within the reglementary period.3
Consequently, respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing
cases in his sala and confine himself to deciding or resolving cases
submitted for decision or resolution. In respondent’s stead, Judge
Edilberto G. Absin was directed to handle active cases, other than
cases submitted for decision, until respondent could comply with the
directives or until he retired.
The OCA likewise directed Atty. Insor A. Pantaran to explain the
results of the audit, as was required of respondent. Atty. Pantaran
was the clerk of court of the RTC of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 22 during respondent’s tenure. Atty. Pantaran complied with
the June 9, 2005 memorandum in a letter dated May 19, 2006.4
In its memorandum dated February 26, 2007,5 the OCA noted that
respondent failed to fully comply with its directives in the June 9, 2005
memorandum. Neither did he ask for extensions of time within which
to comply with the subject directives.
On examination of Atty. Pantaran’s May 19, 2006 letter/compliance,
the OCA found that respondent had partially complied with the
directives of the June 9, 2005 memorandum, having already decided
or resolved some of the cases he was directed to act on.
Nonetheless, the OCA established that respondent committed gross
inefficiency when he unduly delayed actions in a huge number of
cases. The OCA recommended that respondent be fined ₱20,000.
Furthermore, the OCA recommended that Judge Absin be directed to
decide and resolve the cases pending in respondent’s sala. The OCA
likewise directed the designation of Judge Loreto C. Quinto6 as
assisting judge.
The factual findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, we vary the
penalty imposed in the light of the circumstances of the case.
It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency7 and is not
excusable. It is a less serious charge8 and is punishable by either
suspension from office without salaries and benefits for not less than
one month but not more than three months, or a fine of more than
₱10,000 but not exceeding ₱20,000.91avvphi1
The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform
all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.10 Rule 3.05, Canon
3 of the Code11 admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases12 within the period specified in
Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.13
We emphasize that the administration of justice is a joint responsibility
of the judge and the lawyer.14 As aptly held in Salvador v. Judge
Limsiaco:15
A judge’s foremost consideration is the administration of justice. Thus,
he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. xxx Failure to
comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of
the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their
cases. It also undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. Decision
making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a member
of the bench. (citations omitted)
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,16 this administrative case against
respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the bar.17 Violation of the basic tenets of
judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a
breach of Canons 118 and 1219 as well as Rules 1.0320 and 12.0421 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael is hereby

found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violation of Section 5, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for
which he is FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.

Respondent is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12

as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount of ₱10,000.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of

respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, the Office of the
Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. NO. RTJ-08-2127 : September 25, 2008]

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2697-RTJ)
 CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, Complainant, v. JUDGE ERNESTO P.
PAGAYATAN, EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
46, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Cita Borromeo-Garcia (complainant) filed a Complaint before the Court
dated June 14, 2007 charging Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan (respondent),
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro with falsification, partiality, dishonesty, gross
incompetence, evident bad faith, immorality and grave misconduct.
Complainant avers: Respondent committed falsification when, serving as
Register of Deeds (RD) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, he cooperated
with Soledad Ulayao (Ulayao) and Soledad Ortega Olano (Olano) in
transferring 165 titles from the name of her father's mistress Blandina
Garcia (Blandina) to her father Salvador S. Borromeo, Sr. (Borromeo, Sr.),
even though respondent was fully aware that the signature appearing
thereon was falsified. As payment for their services, Borromeo, Sr. gave
Ulayao, Olano and respondent, 20 of the 165 titles which Ulayao kept until
a judge from another branch, pursuant to another case, ordered to have
said titles kept in custodia legis.1
Complainant further claims that: respondent was guilty of falsification and
perjury when he granted the petition of her half-brother, Salvador G.
Borromeo, Jr. (Borromeo, Jr.) for the issuance of owner's duplicate copies
of 62 Transfer Certificate of Title (TCTs) knowing that Borromeo, Jr.,
illegitimate son of Borromeo, Sr. with Blandina, was not the owner of the
same; respondent hastily ruled for a commissioner's hearing, decided for
the issuance of new owner's certificates of titles, without requiring the
production of certified true copies of all the titles being petitioned or
requiring the Officer in Charge (OIC) Registrar to produce the book of
titles; respondent also keeps a mistress, Elsa Aguirre (Elsa), Borromeo,
Jr.'s former wife, which could explain the swift decision in favor of
Borromeo, Jr.; Elsa wielded power in the RTC, as acting clerk of court and
sheriff, even though she is not a lawyer; Elsa together with Asst.
Prosecutor Luduvico Salcedo, also acted as respondent's bagman. 2
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the Complaint to
respondent for his Comment in a 1st Indorsement dated June 29, 2007. 3
In his Comment4 dated July 30, 2007, respondent denied the charges
against him, claiming the same to be unfounded, hearsay and malicious.
He avers that: he does not know complainant and that the latter is not a
resident of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; at the time the first falsification
allegedly took place, respondent was an Asst. Provincial Prosecutor who
acted as an Ex-Officio Registrar of Deeds, putting in extra hours to
perform his added assignment; the documents allegedly falsified were
"sales" leading to the registration and transfer of TCTs from Blandina to
Borromeo, Sr.; he affixed his signatures to the TCTs after all pertinent
documents were evaluated by Land Examiner Ulayao and were found to be
complete and in order; if indeed signatures were falsified, respondent had
nothing to do with the falsification or had any knowledge of the same;
respondent never conspired with Olano and Ulayao and there was no
agreement for them to split the 20 titles among themselves; as to the
second charge of falsification, he rendered the decision on the petition of
Borromeo, Jr. after due notice and hearing and all jurisdictional
requirements were complied with; contrary to complainant's assertion,
certified true copies of the 62 TCTs to be reconstituted were attached to
the petition; Borromeo, Jr. also submitted a certification from the RD
stating that the original copies of the TCTs were intact in said office; there
was also no opposition during the hearing, hence, it was subject to an ex-
parte hearing before the Clerk of Court as commissioner; he did not
declare Borromeo, Jr. to be the owner of the properties but merely quoted
Borromeo, Jr.'s testimony; moreover, the reconstituted titles are still in
the name of Borromeo, Sr.; the allegation that Elsa is his mistress is false;
whatever dealings he has with Elsa, who is the Acting Clerk of Court of the
RTC, is strictly related to their respective official duties; it is also not true
that Elsa and Prosecutor Salcedo are respondent's bagmen; in all his years
as prosecutor and later as judge, respondent never asked anyone to be his
bagman and neither has he resolved or decided any case for any
consideration; he has no unexplained or hidden wealth and is living a
simple and modest life.5
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court in the Resolution dated
January 23, 2008 referred the instant case to Associate Justice Jose C.
Reyes, Jr. of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, for investigation, report
and recommendation.6
Hearings were conducted and in his Report dated July 31, 2008,
Investigating Justice Reyes found that complainant failed to substantiate
her allegations. As stated in his Report:
x x x [T]he investigating justice finds that aside from bare assertion
complainant failed to present any evidence to substantiate her charges.
She even admitted during her testimony that she had no direct knowledge
of the facts constituting her allegations but that she derived her knowledge
from other persons, that is, she had no direct knowledge of the facts
constituting the alleged irregularities.
xxx
As to the charges of immorality and grave misconduct which stemmed
from the alleged illicit affair of respondent judge with Ms. Aguirre, the
undersigned finds that complainant's own testimony showed that she
based her allegation on what someone else had told her.
xxx
The charges of partiality, dishonesty, and gross incompetence are all tied
up to the petition for re-issuance of owner's duplicate certificate of titles
filed by Salvador, Jr. From the same petition arose the allegation of
falsification. Complainant claimed that respondent judge was partial,
dishonest and had acted in bad faith because he granted Salvador, Jr.'s
petition knowing that he was not the registered owner. She also claimed
that this decision showed that respondent judge was grossly incompetent
because the decision was not supported by facts and the law. By the same
token she claimed that respondent judge was guilty of falsification.
xxx
[Based on Sec. 109 of Pres. Dec. No. 1529] it is clear that not only the
registered owner but any person in interest may file a petition for re-
issuance of the owner's duplicate title. In the present case, petitioner
Salvador, Jr. is admittedly the illegitimate son of the deceased Salvador,
Sr. and as such is an heir. As explained by respondent judge he believed
that an heir has the right to file the petition. Other than the fact that the
case was granted, complainant failed to adduce any concrete evidence of
partiality, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of the respondent judge. It
should be remembered that good faith is always presumed and
complainant's bare testimony failed to rebut this presumption.
As to the charge of falsification, complainant herself admitted that the
misrepresentation was done by Salvador, Jr. and not by the respondent
judge. He cannot, therefore, by any stretch of imagination be held
responsible for such falsification.
The only remaining charge against respondent judge is the falsification
regarding the twenty (20) TCTs held by Ms. Ulayao and now in custodia
legis in Branch 45 of the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Again, the
undersigned finds that aside from complainant's bare testimony that she
was informed by Ms. Ulayao of the falsification she utterly failed to present
any evidence to buttress her assertion. She does not even have a copy of
the alleged forged deed of sale allegedly used to transfer said titles in the
name of Salvador, Sr.7
While Justice Reyes found the complaint to be without merit, he still found
respondent liable however for failing to prevent any appearance of
impartiality on his part. Justice Reyes held in his report:
x x x the investigating justice finds it necessary to deal on another matter
which the respondent judge himself testified on. The reception of evidence
for Spec. Proc. No. R-936 was performed by Ms. Aguirre. Although the fact
that Ms. Aguirre was the former wife of the petitioner, this fact alone
should be considered unprocedural. However, what the investigating
justice finds disturbing is that Ms. Aguirre was not the OIC Branch Clerk of
Court of Branch 46 but rather she was the OIC Clerk of Court. Respondent
judge explained that his OIC Branch Clerk of Court Asuncion Pabellano was
busy, hence, unable to conduct the ex-parte reception of evidence. Under
the circumstances what respondent judge should have done was to
dispense with the ex-parte reception of evidence and to conduct the
hearing himself instead of appointing the OIC Clerk of Court. This would
have avoided any appearance of partiality. However, the undersigned does
not find this infraction grave enough to warrant a severe penalty.
Considering that respondent had already filed his application for optional
retirement and only to stress that all judges should at all times be
circumspect especially in their official functions, the investigating justice
deems it appropriate to recommend the imposition of a fine of P5,000.00
on respondent judge.8
Justice Reyes then recommended that:
x x x the complaint against respondent Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan be
DISMISSED. However, in view of the finding that Judge Pagayatan failed to
prevent any appearance of impartiality on his part, it is recommended that
he be FINED in the amount of P5,000.00.9
The Court agrees with the report of the Investigating Justice but finds that
the recommended fine should be modified.
Administrative complaints leveled against judges must always be
examined with a discriminating eye for its consequential effects are, by
their nature, highly penal, such that respondents stand to face the
sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. 10 While the Court will not shirk
from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, neither
will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that disrupt rather than
promote the orderly administration of justice.11 When the complainant
relies on mere conjectures and suppositions and fails to substantiate her
claim, such as in the case at bar, the administrative complaint against the
judge must be dismissed for lack of merit. 12
In this case, complainant charged respondent with two acts of falsification.
First, for allegedly authorizing the transfer of titles from the name of
Blandina to that of Borromeo, Sr. based on forged signatures, when
respondent was still Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro; and second,
for granting Borromeo, Jr.'s petition for issuance of owner's duplicate copy
of 62 TCTs, knowing that Borromeo, Jr. was not the owner thereof. She
also charged respondent with having an illicit relationship with Elsa, Acting
Clerk of Court and ex-wife of Borromeo, Jr., allowing her to exert influence
over the decisions of the court, and for keeping Elsa and Prosecutor
Salcedo as respondent's 'bagmen.'
Complainant however was not able present proof of her allegations. As to
the first charge of falsification, she claims that it was Ulayao, former OIC
Registrar of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, who told her about the
circumstances surrounding the transfer of titles from the name of Blandina
to that of Borromeo, Sr. and the supposed agreement among Borromeo,
Sr., Ulayao, Olano and respondent regarding the said transfer. 13 Ulayao
however died on July 31, 200714 and could neither refute nor corroborate
complainant's story. When asked by the Investigating Justice, complainant
also could not present copies of the alleged falsified deeds of sale which,
according to her, were the basis for the issuance of the titles in favor of
Borromeo, Sr.15
Anent the second charge of falsification, complainant claims that
respondent granted Borromeo, Jr.'s petition even though he knew that
Borromeo, Jr. was not the owner of the subject properties. She agreed
however, before the Investigating Justice, that respondent's decision in
S.P. No. R-936 did not order that new owner's copies of the 62 titles be
registered in the name of Borromeo, Jr., and that the same were in fact
still in the name of Borromeo, Sr.16
As to the charge that respondent was having an immoral relationship with
Elsa, complainant admits that she has no personal knowledge about the
same, and that her basis for alleging such offense is the "fact" that it is
known to everyone in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. 17 Complainant failed
to present any witness, however, to support her charge of
immorality.18 She also failed to present any evidence to substantiate her
charge that Prosecutor Salcedo and Elsa were receiving money as
"bagmen" of respondent.
The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation.19 It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint
with substantial evidence, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the presumption is that respondent has regularly performed his
duties.20 Indeed, in the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of
misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions.21 As the charges herein being hurled by
complainant against respondent are grave in nature, in order for him to be
disciplined therefor, the evidence against him should be competent and
derived from direct knowledge.22 With the failure of complainant to
substantiate her claims, the complaint against respondent should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The dismissal of the charges of complainant against respondent,
notwithstanding, respondent should still be disciplined for failure to avoid
the appearance of partiality, which offense the Investigating Justice
correctly appreciated.
When asked during the investigation why Elsa, who is the ex-wife of the
petitioner therein, Borromeo, Jr., was designated to receive evidence ex-
parte in SP No. R-936, when she was not the acting Branch Clerk of Court,
but the acting Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC),
respondent only answered that it had been their practice to refer ex-
parte proceedings to the acting clerk of court of the OCC and not to the
acting branch clerk of court, because such proceedings were simple; and
the branch clerk of court had too much work, while those in the OCC had
lesser load.23 Respondent also said that he didn't see any conflict with the
fact that Elsa was the ex-wife of petitioner in S.P. No. R-936, Borromeo,
Jr.24
The Court has held that a judge must at all times not only be impartial,
but maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus, it is provided in Canons
3 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary, which took
effect on June 1, 2004, that:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It
applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the
decision is made.
xxx
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of
court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
For indeed, the appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to
public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or
prejudice.25

Lower court judges, such as respondent, play a pivotal role in the

promotion of the people's faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who
give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their
interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus,
the admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the
appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them. 26

Respondent was previously imposed a fine of P5,000.00 for gross

ignorance of the law in Domingo v. Pagayatan.27 In the present case, the
Court finds that for his failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety, a
penalty of P10,000.00 is proper.28 Such fine is to be deducted from his
retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Court's
Resolution in A.M. No. 12967-Ret. entitled Re: Application for Optional
Retirement under R.A. 910, as amended by R.A. 5095 and P.D. 1438, of
Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, RTC, Br. 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
dated July 7, 2008 which approved respondent's application for optional
retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No.
5095 and Presidential Decree No. 1438 effective at the close of office
hours of December 31, 2007 with the proviso that the payment of his
retirement benefits shall be held in abeyance pending final resolution of
the administrative complaint in AM No. RTJ-07-2089, AM No. RTJ-07-2058,
OCA IPI No. 07-2697-RTJ, 07-2698-RTJ and 08-2482-RTJ. The Court, in
the same resolution, also granted Judge Pagayatan's request for payment
of his terminal leave pay subject to the availability of funds and the usual
clearance requirements.

WHEREFORE, the charges filed by Cita Borromeo-Garcia are

hereby DISMISSED for lack of competent evidence. However, the Court
finds Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan, former Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, GUILTY of violating
Canon 3, Section 2 and Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Judiciary for which he is FINED in the amount
of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits which have
been withheld pursuant to the Court's Resolution in A.M. No. 12967-Ret.
entitled Re: Application for Optional Retirement under R.A. 910, as
amended by R.A. 5095 and P.D. 1438, of Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, RTC,
Br. 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, dated July 7, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189               January 18, 2011

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2837-RTJ)
VICTORIANO SY, Complainant,
vs.
Judge OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve in this Decision the Verified Complaint, dated March 11, 2008,1 filed by
Victoriano Sy against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 24, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, for Conduct Unbecoming a Member of
the Judiciary and for Gross Ignorance of the Law, in relation to Civil Case No. 1403-
24, entitled Sps. Victoriano Sy and Loreta Sy v. Metrobank, for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage, and Misc. Case No. 1440-24, entitled
Metrobank v. Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
The Antecedents Facts
The facts are set out in the memorandum/report, dated May 25, 2009,2 of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), and are summarized below.
The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) was the mortgagee in good
faith and for value of twenty-three (23) parcels of land all located in Koronadal City.
The mortgagors were Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto
Parts, Inc. and/or Sps. Victoriano Sy and Loreta Cabaies-Sy and/or Sps. Vicente and
Antonia Mandanas.
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms and conditions of the
mortgage agreement. At the public auction on August 31, 1998, the mortgaged
parcels of land were sold to Metrobank as the highest bidder. Metrobank was issued
a certificate of sale which was registered on September 18, 1998 with the Register of
Deeds of South Cotabato. The mortgagors failed to redeem the 23 parcels of land
within the redemption period.
Thereafter, Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto
Parts, Inc. filed with the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided over by Judge
Dinopol, a complaint against Metrobank for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Real Estate Mortgage, Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certificate of Sale,
with Damages and Attorney’s Fees and with prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
1403-24.
On April 16, 2004, Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further acting on the case3 on
the ground that he received a call, on April 12, 2004, from a ranking officer of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf of the defendant bank and an
earlier call (July 2003) from a ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of
the plaintiffs. He claimed he wanted to avoid being charged with partiality either way
he acted on the case.
On September 15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, South Cotabato, a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Possession  over the parcels of land subject of the
foreclosed mortgage against Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and
Auto Parts, Inc., and/or Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and
Antonia Mandanas, docketed as Misc. Case No. 1440-24,4 and assigned to the RTC,
Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided by Judge Dinopol.
On July 13, 2006, Judge Dinopol issued an Order granting the petition,5 and issued
the writ of possession on July 21, 2006.6
Meanwhile, or on May 22, 2006, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed
with the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, a petition, entitled In the Matter of: Petition for
the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan, docketed as Corp. Case No. 1585-06.7
On June 26, 2006, the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, issued an Order8 staying the
enforcement of all claims against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily
liable with the debtor. The same court subsequently approved the rehabilitation plan.
In the meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to implement the writ of
possession issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was returned unsatisfied in view of the
stay order issued by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, in Corp. Case No. 1585-06.9
Consequently, the respondents in Misc. Case No. 1440-24 filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings due to the issuance of the stay order and the approval of the
rehabilitation plan by the Rehabilitation Court, and a motion for inhibition on grounds
of bias and partiality on the part of Judge Dinopol. Judge Dinopol denied the motions
in an Order dated February 11, 2008, and directed Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Publico
to re-implement the writ of execution of July 31, 2006.10
Shortly thereafter, Sy filed the present administrative complaint11 charging Judge
Dinopol of gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the
judiciary.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Sy alleged in his complaint that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 (in which he and his
wife sought the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings against
Metrobank) was pending before Judge Dinopol’s sala, the judge inhibited himself from
acting on the case. This notwithstanding, and to Sy’s surprise, Judge Dinopol still
handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
filed by Metrobank, a matter closely intertwined with Civil Case No. 1403-24. Judge
Dinopol then issued an order granting Metrobank the right to possess the foreclosed
properties.12
Sy further alleged that despite the issuance by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, of a
stay order13 and the approval of the rehabilitation plan, as well as the pendency of
Metrobank’s petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) Twenty-Third Division in
Cagayan De Oro City (CA G.R. SP No. 01824) assailing the validity of the stay order,
Judge Dinopol ordered that the writ of possession be implemented.14
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was pending
in Judge Dinopol’s sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of
construction materials to be used in the construction of the judge’s house. The
transaction was evidenced by delivery receipt no. 15178 (March 8, 2005),15 and
charge invoices no. 9817 (March 8, 2005) for ₱16,000.00,16 no. 9826 (March 9, 2005)
for ₱850.00,17 and no. 9838 (March 10, 2005) for ₱780.00.18
Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash
loans from him on various occasions between December 2, 2005 to July 14, 2006, in
the total amount of ₱121,000.00, and Judge Dinopol borrowed from him his Suzuki
Multi-cab and returned it after the judge was suspended in September 2007. Sy
presented disbursement vouchers, official receipts and an acknowledgement to prove
his claim.19
Judge Dinopol’s Comment
In a 1st indorsement dated March 18, 2008,20 the OCA required Judge Dinopol to
comment on the complaint, which he did on April 21, 2008.21
Judge Dinopol denied Sy’s accusations. He stressed that he inhibited himself from
Civil Case No. 1403-24 on April 16, 2004 and had not acted on the case since then;
nobody intervened and pleaded in behalf of Metrobank after Misc. Case No. 1440-24
was filed. He was not aware nor had he been given notice that Metrobank filed a
petition before the CA (CA G.R. SP No. 01824), nor did he receive any order from the
appellate tribunal enjoining him to desist from performing or acting on the incidents
pending in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
Judge Dinopol denied that he committed any breach of procedural rules that could be
characterized as gross ignorance of the basic rules of civil procedures. He maintained
that Sy did not allege any specific actuations of deceit, malice or intent to cause injury
to Sy, and that he had acted fairly and objectively. He added that he observed the
requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a lawyer, relative to his
handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
With respect to the alleged accommodations he received from Sy at the time his
house was under construction, Judge Dinopol claimed that when he obtained the
commodity loans from Sy in March 2005, he had already inhibited himself from
handling Civil Case No. 1403-24; he did so on April 16, 2004. He explained that Misc.
Case No. 1440-24 was filed only on September 15, 2005, and was assigned to his
sala on September 22, 2005. He denied that he received from Sy cash loans in the
amount of ₱121,000.00. He also denied borrowing Sy’s Suzuki Multi-cab and claimed
that it was Rogelio Villanueva who borrowed it.
Judge Dinopol countered that it was Sy who acted with sinister design and employed
deceit and cunning to frustrate the administration of justice in the cases he handled.
In a Resolution dated July 15, 2009, the Court resolved to: (1) note Sy’s complaint
and Judge Dinopol’s answer/comment; (2) re-docket the complaint as a regular
administrative matter; and (3) require the parties to manifest whether they were willing
to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. The Court also noted
the OCA Report dated May 25, 2009,22 which found no basis for the charge of
ignorance of the law on the part of Judge Dinopol, but found him liable for conduct
unbecoming a judge.
The Court’s Ruling
The OCA evaluation is well-founded. Judge Dinopol cannot be disciplined for
ignorance of the law and of procedure in his handling of Civil Case No. 1403-24
(for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage) filed by Sps.
Victoriano and Loreta Sy against Metrobank, as he inhibited himself from the case,
nor in his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24 (Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession) filed by Metrobank against Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., because of the
essential nature of the proceeding itself.
In issuing the writ of possession and in directing its re-implementation when it was
returned unsatisfied the first time it was enforced, Judge Dinopol acted in accordance
with the rules and jurisprudence on the matter.
As the Court held in Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc.,23 the
proceeding in a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte and
summary in nature. It is brought for the benefit of one party only and may be granted
even without notice to the mortgagor, in this case, complainant Sy. Moreover, the duty
of the court to grant a writ of possession is a ministerial function. The court does not
exercise its official discretion or judgment.24 Judge Dinopol, before whom the petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed, had no discretion on whether to
issue the writ of possession or not. It cannot be said, therefore, that Judge Dinopol
exposed himself or exhibited bias in favor of Metrobank when he issued the writ of
possession.
Further, regardless of whether there is a pending suit for the annulment of the
mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession,
without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of the annulment case. Once the
writ of possession is issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ
without delay.25
From another perspective, a stay order only affects claims filed against the assets
and properties belonging to a debtor. Properties that have already been foreclosed,
and those whose titles have already passed on to the winning bidder are no longer
considered properties of the debtor.26 In such case, it is a ministerial duty on the part
of the trial court to grant a possessory writ over the foreclosed properties.27
Clearly, Judge Dinopol was well within his authority and committed no impropriety in
directing the re-implementation of the writ of execution in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing with regard to Sy’s charge
of conduct unbecoming against Judge Dinopol. The latter’s denial of having
committed the acts complained of flies in the face of indications in the records and
documentary evidence that he obtained commodity loans from Sy in the form of
building materials for the construction of his house in Koronadal City. There was also
Sy’s claim of cash loans to Judge Dinopol on various occasions, between December
2, 2005 and July 14, 2006, amounting to ₱121,000.00, as well as the loan of Sy’s
Suzuki Multi-cab to the Judge.
The commodity loans were evidenced by receipts28 indicating delivery of construction
materials to Judge Dinopol’s residence. The cash loans appear to have been covered
by disbursement vouchers,29 and the borrowed multicab is the subject of an
"acknowledgement"30 from Judge Dinopol’s driver Rogelio Villanueva.
There is substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol obtained the commodity
loans from Sy. The judge himself admitted that he wrote Sy, on March 4, 2005,
regarding the purchase of materials for his house which was then under construction,
although he claimed that it was his wife who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself
who offered to deliver the materials to his residence.31 Judge Dinopol pleaded
innocence regarding the commodity loans or even the cash loans saying that the
transaction with Sy regarding the construction materials occurred when there was no
case pending in his sala where Sy was a party.
The above disclaimer notwithstanding, we find Judge Dinopol to have committed a
serious impropriety in his or his family’s financial or business dealings with Sy.
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judge’s impartiality
provides, inter alia, as follows:
Sec. 2. – Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary.
Sec. 3. – Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize
the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or
deciding cases.
Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from
Sy for the building materials he needed for the construction of his house. He
compromised his position as a judge. Although at the time he and his family had
business dealings with Sy there was no pending case involving the businessman, he
should have been more circumspect in securing the construction materials. The
sphere of Sy’s business operations was within his territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA
aptly noted, "it is neither impossible nor remote that a case might be filed in his court
with complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent) business and financial
dealings with complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in
deciding the case and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court."32
In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of Canon 1, Canon 2
and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1 of Canon 1 highlights the independence of a judge in performing his official
duties, thus:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the
law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Canon 2 requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of his official functions:
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
Moreover, Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain proper decorum and
its appearance in his public office:
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
By his own admissions, Judge Dinopol failed to observe these ethical standards. In
his Answer/Comment, Judge Dinopol admitted that he talked with Sy on several
occasions to discuss Misc. Case No. 1440-24.33 Judge Dinopol also admitted that Sy,
in at least two instances, requested him to delay the resolution of the writ of
possession.34 Judge Dinopol’s actions no doubt created the inference that at some
point, he acceded to Sy’s requests to delay the proceedings. This conclusion, is in
fact, bolstered by Judge Dinopol’s knowledge that the counsel for Metrobank was
instructed to immediately secure the order for the issuance of the writ of
possession.35 Regardless of the representations allegedly made to him by Sy, Judge
Dinopol should have immediately issued the writ of possession in Metrobank’s favor.
From these inappropriate actions, we find that Judge Dinopol compromised not only
his impartiality in handling Misc. Case No. 1440-24 but also his independence and
integrity as a judge. His actions no doubt diminished public confidence and public
trust in him as a judge. His actions gave the public the impression and the
appearance that he can be influenced by extraneous factors - other than the legal
arguments and the court evidence – in discharging his judicial functions.
In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in talking with litigants
outside court proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by the fact
that these conversations took place in the absence of the opposing litigants and/or
the opposing counsel. In Agustin v. Mercado,36 we declared that employees of the
court have no business meeting with litigants or their representatives under any
circumstance. In Re: Affidavit of Frankie N. Calabines,37 the Court minced no words in
explaining that such unethical conduct constitutes "a brazen and outrageous betrayal
of public trust."38 The Court further declared in the said case:
x x x The Court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part
of all those who are in the service of the judiciary. x x x
The image of a court as a bastion of justice depends to a large extent on the personal
and official conduct of its employees. Thus, from the judge to the lowest clerk, judicial
personnel have the sacred duty to maintain the good name of the Judiciary.
All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and
efficiency. As officers of the court and agents of the law, they must discharge their
duties with due care and utmost diligence. Any conduct they exhibit tending to
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary will not be condoned.39
Certainly, these responsibilities become more exacting when one occupies the
position of a judge. Time and again, we have emphasized that judges are expected to
conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the
people in the judicial system.40 The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity
and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality,
which may erode the people’s faith in the Judiciary.41 These standards apply not only
to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.42
Without a doubt, Judge Dinopol is liable for gross misconduct in office and deserves
to be sanctioned under the above findings. His track record as a judge, in this regard,
is far from exemplary.1âwphi1 He is a repeat offender, as demonstrated by the
following cases where we penalized him for questionable conduct:
First, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969 decided on June 15, 2006, Judge Dinopol was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was fined ₱20,000.00. 43
Second, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 decided on September 20, 2006, he was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority, and was fined
₱20,000.00. 44
Third, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003 decided on August 23, 2007, he was found liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision or order and for violating the clear provisions of
A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC, and was fined ₱11,000.00.45
Fourth, in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2173-RTJ decided on August 28, 2006, he was
strongly admonished, even as the complainant desisted from pursuing the complaint
against the judge for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and
discretion.46
And more recently, in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2052 decided on March 30, 2009, Judge
Dinopol had been reminded and warned against entertaining litigants outside court
premises.47
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the
same Rule, the respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the
following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
reappointment to any public office;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
Considering his repeated infractions and numerous breaches of the standard ethical
conduct demanded of judges, we find Judge Dinopol unfit to discharge the functions
of a judge. We impose upon him the severest penalty of dismissal from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.48
Lastly, as we sanction Judge Dinopol, we remind the members of the bench that:
[a]lthough every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
in the [J]udiciary. A magistrate of the law must compose himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, official and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny
of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.49
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Koronadal City, is declared GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT and is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or
service of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1762             December 17, 2008
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1422-RTJ)
SERGIO & GRACELDA N. ANDRES, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, ELMER
D. LASTIMOSA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff, RTC-
OCC, and NASIL S. PALATI, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
General Santos City, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This administrative case arose from the complaint-affidavit 1 dated February
21, 2002 of Sergio N. Andres, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres charging
respondents Judge Jose S. Majaducon, Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), General Santos City, and Presiding Judge, Branch 23, with
violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7, Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Misconduct, and both Elmer D. Lastimosa, Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of South Cotabato, and Nasil S. Palati, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, with Abuse of Authority, Ignorance of
the Law and Grave Misconduct.
The complaint stemmed from the Special Order of Demolition 2 issued by
Judge Majaducon on August 22, 2001 in connection with the consolidated
Civil Case Nos. 12913 and 4647,4 an action for declaration of nullity of
documents and recovery of possession of real property with writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages. The said order directed the
provincial sheriff of General Santos City to demolish the improvements
erected by the heirs of John Sycip and Yard Urban Homeowners Association
on the land belonging to spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga.
Pursuant to the Order of Demolition, a Notice to Vacate 5 dated September
12, 2001 was issued by Sheriff Palati and noted by Provincial Sheriff
Lastimosa. The said notice was addressed to the heirs of John Sycip, all
members of Yard Urban Homeowners Association, and "all adverse
claimants and actual occupants" of Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, the land subject
of Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647.
To forestall the demolition of their houses, complainants, who claimed an
interest over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, filed a Special Appearance with Urgent
Ex-Parte Manifestation6 informing the court of the pending protest between
them and the heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga before the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), docketed as
RED Claim No. 3735.7 In the Ex-Parte Manifestation, complainants alleged
that they and their predecessor-in-interest Concepcion Non Andres
introduced improvements and authorized the construction of several
improvements on Lot No. 2, Psu-135740. They also averred that they are not
bound by the judgment rendered in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 because
neither they nor their predecessor-in-interest were impleaded as parties
therein. They prayed that the provincial sheriff or any of his deputies be
enjoined from implementing the special order of demolition on the
improvements they made. They also wrote a letter8 addressed to
respondents Lastimosa and Palati enjoining them from executing the order of
demolition under pain of administrative sanction.
On February 6, 2002, notwithstanding complainants’ manifestation and letter,
Lastimosa and Palati proceeded with the demolition of the improvements
erected by the complainants and their predecessor-in-interest.
Thus, on February 18, 2002, complainants instituted, with the RTC of
General Santos City, Civil Case No. 7066, an action for Specific
Performance, Reconveyance and Damages against the heirs of Melencio Yu
and impleaded Judge Majaducon, Lastimosa and Palati as co-defendants.
The complaint alleged that complainants’ title over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740
was valid, that they had been occupying the property since 1957 and that the
reckless and arbitrary demolition of their improvements had unlawfully
disturbed their peaceful occupation of the property. 9 Complainants also filed
an Urgent Motion for Special Raffle of said Civil Case No. 7066.
In an Order10 dated February 18, 2002, Judge Majaducon, acting as the
Executive Judge of RTC, General Santos City, denied the Urgent Motion for
Special Raffle and dismissed outright Civil Case No. 7066. On the same day,
respondent judge issued another Order11 declaring complainants in direct
contempt of court for allegedly filing a complaint based on a quitclaim that
had already been pronounced null and void by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, complainants were ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days.
This prompted complainants to file the instant administrative complaint. They
averred that the actions of herein respondents constitute bad faith, malicious
motive, serious partiality, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
They also alleged that prior to his appointment in the judiciary, Judge
Majaducon was the former counsel of Melencio Yu and his mother Dominga
Pinagawang.
In his Comment12 dated April 16, 2002, respondent judge vehemently denied
the accusations hurled against him. He explained that he issued the special
order of demolition in the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 after a
decision13 was rendered and a resolution14 was issued by the Supreme Court
affirming the judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals (CA) declaring
spouses Melencio Uy and Talinanap Matualaga as the rightful owners of Lot
No. 2, Psu-135740 and ordering all occupants to vacate the premises. This
was also the reason why he ordered the outright dismissal of Civil Case No.
7066 filed by herein complainants. He believed that complainants had no
cause of action because the courts had already decided that the quitclaim
upon which complainants based their action was null and void. Thus, to
entertain the complaint would be just a waste of time on the part of the court.
Anent the contempt order, he maintained that the same was justified because
complainants had instituted an unfounded suit based on a falsified document,
thereby demonstrating an obvious defiance and disrespect of the authority
and dignity of the court.
As to the charge of partiality, respondent judge denied being the former
counsel of Melencio Yu’s mother, Dominga Pinagawang. He explained that
his real client was Cesar Bañas who requested him to write a letter
demanding the squatters to vacate the lot owned by Dominga. He asserted
that after writing the letter, another counsel took over the case.
Respondents Lastimosa and Palati filed their own Comment 15 on April 9,
2002 and averred that they faithfully observed the correct procedure in the
implementation of the order of demolition, including the twin requirements of
notice and hearing. According to them, they were extra careful in
implementing the same especially because it was, by far, the biggest
demolition undertaken by their office as it involved a 12-hectare property and
about 1,500 persons. It also generated interest among the media, thus they
made sure that they consulted with respondent judge all issues and
questions relative to its implementation.
In the Agenda Report16 dated December 12, 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00 for violation of the rules governing the raffle of cases,
and that the administrative case against him be redocketed as a regular
administrative matter. The OCA, however, found that respondents Lastimosa
and Palati did not abuse their authority in the implementation of the order of
demolition and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against them.
In the Resolution dated March 5, 2003, the Court required the parties to
manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.17 Pursuant to respondents’ manifestation,18 they filed their
memorandum with additional exhibits on April 22, 2003. 19 Complainants, on
the other hand, manifested that they would no longer file a memorandum and
that they were submitting the case for resolution.
Complainants assailed the respondent judge’s issuance of a special order of
dismissal in connection with Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 despite their
pending protest before the DENR. To complainants, the issuance of said
order of demolition constituted gross ignorance of the law.
We are not persuaded. The evidence on hand shows that respondent judge
issued the special order of demolition only after carefully determining that
there was no more hindrance to issue the same. For one, the trial court, in
Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, had already adjudged that the land in
question belonged to spouses Yu and Matualaga and even nullified the
quitclaim and all documents of conveyance of sale in favor of complainants’
predecessor-in-interest.20 In fact, the records of the case disclosed that the
decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 69000 21 and
CA-G.R. CV No. 5400322 and ultimately by this Court via its decision dated
November 9, 1990 in G.R. No. 7648723 and resolution dated July 19, 1999 in
G.R. No. 138132.24
It is thus beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647
had already attained finality. The special order of demolition was issued by
respondent judge so that the final judgment could be fully implemented and
executed, in accordance with the principle that the execution of a final
judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party, and
mandatory and ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal issuing the
judgment.25 To be sure, it is essential to the effective administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 26
However, respondent judge abused his authority in dealing with Civil Case
No. 7066 which cast serious doubt as to his impartiality. Respondent judge’s
outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 entitled "Heirs of Concepcion Non
Andres, namely Sergio, Sergio Jr., and Sofronio and Gracelda, all surnamed
Andres v. Heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga, namely Eduardo,
Leonora, Virgilio, Vilma, Cynthia, Imelda and Nancy, all surnamed Yu, and
represented by Virgilio Yu and Cynthia Yu Abo, Atty. Elmer Lastimosa, in his
capacity as Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of South Cotobato, Mr. Nasil Palati,
in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General
Santos City, and Hon. Jose S. Majaducon, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City" was irregular. As correctly found
by the OCA, respondent judge completely ignored the procedure for the
raffling of cases mandated by Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated
September 23, 1974, which we reproduce hereunder:
I. RAFFLING OF CASES
 All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are
two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different
branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch without
being raffled. The raffle of cases should be regularly conducted at
the hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive Judge.
Only the maximum number of cases, according to their dates of
filing, as can be equally distributed to all branches in the particular
station or grouping shall be included in the raffle. x x x
Clearly, respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of the Court when he
took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two
defendants and instantly dismissed it without first conducting the requisite
raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the raffling of cases, held in
the case of Ang Kek Chen v. Bello27:
The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court Circular
No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it
is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling
the cases, public suspicion regarding the assignment of cases to
predetermined judges is obviated. A violation or disregard of the
Court’s circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not
to be countenanced.
Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge
by dispensing with the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the
pretext that it would be just a waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain
the case. As Executive Judge, he ought to know that raffling of cases is his
personal duty and responsibility. He is expected to keep abreast and be
conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of
cases before him and strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide
by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect
for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that they are
not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law. 28
By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them
to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten
(10) days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a
judge acting judicially, or such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the
court and the administration of justice into disrepute or disrespect. 29 Here,
respondent judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a
complaint (Civil Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had
already been declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein
he was one of the defendants, raffled to the court which could properly act on
the case. While the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as
to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of
justice, still, judges must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic
power must be used judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow
himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties.30
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised
on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish
for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise.31
It has time and again been stressed that besides the basic equipment of
possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to
be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. 32
Indeed, Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states
that:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before
the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in
an official capacity.
Respondent judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct
contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested
upon him by law.
Respondent judge also took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 despite the
fact that prior to his appointment as judge, respondent served as counsel for
Melencio Yu and his mother, Dominga Pinagawang.
Respondent’s explanation that it was Cesar Bañas who was his client and
not Melencio and Dominga was belied by the demand letter 33 dated June 20,
1980, which was signed by him.
Respondent judge clearly acted as counsel not only for Cesar Bañas but for
Melencio and Dominga as well. Section 2 of Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct specifically provides that "judges shall ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of
the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary." Section 5 of the same Canon further states that "judges
shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which
they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially.
Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where (b) the
judge previously served as lawyer in the matter in controversy."
Respondent judge violated the above canon when he dispensed with the
raffle and took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its
outright dismissal and cited the complainants in contempt of court. He thus
created the impression that he intended to favor his former clients, Melencio
and Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his
impartiality and objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. He has both the duty of rendering a
just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity.34 Well-known is the judicial
norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal, for all the other elements of due process, like
notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would
come from a partial and biased judge.35
We take this occasion once more to impress upon a trial judge that he must
at all times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the court's
impartiality. When he exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to
perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no
choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. It is basic that a judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear
that will induce the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and probity in
favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is
to disqualify himself.36
Respondent judge was a party defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was
enough reason not to act on the same and just leave the matter to the Vice-
Executive Judge. His reluctance to let go of the case all the more induced
doubts and suspicions as to his honest actuations, probity and objectivity.
Evidently, respondent judge violated the clear injunction embodied in the
aforecited Canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Be that as it may, we rule that there is no merit in complainants’ charge of
gross ignorance of the law leveled against respondent judge. For liability to
attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation must
not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, it
must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
and corruption.37 Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a
person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the
grounds for the accusation.
The violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 by respondent judge is
classified as a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court. Section 11(B) of the same Rule provides the following sanctions for
less serious offenses:
Sec. 11. Sanctions.
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the
following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
Finally, as regards the charge against Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff Elmer
Lastimosa and Sheriff IV Palati, complainants maintain that they abused their
authority when they enforced the order of demolition against complainants
even though they were not impleaded as parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and
4647 where the order of demolition was issued.
The dispositive portion of the order of demolition issued by respondent judge
reads:
NOW THEREFORE, we command you to demolish the
improvements erected by the defendants HEIRS OF JOHN SYCIP
(namely: NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, JOSE SYCIP, JR., ALFONSO
SYCIP II, ROSE MARIE SYCIP, JAMES SYCIP & GRACE SYCIP),
Represented by NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, in Civil Case No. 1291 and
the plaintiffs YARD URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
ET AL. in Civil Case No. 4647, on that portion of land belonging to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1291 and defendants in Civil Case No.
4647, MELENCIO YU and TALINANAP MATUALAGA, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. (V-14496) (P-2331) P-523, located in
Apopong, General Santos City.
This Special Order of Demolition shall be returned by you to this
Court within ten (10) days from the date of receipt hereof, together
with your proceedings indorsed hereon.38
Clearly, respondent judge neither ordered the eviction of any other person
occupying the property of spouses Yu and Matualaga other than the parties
in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, nor directed the Ex-Officio Sheriff to
demolish the houses or structures of any person other than the said parties.
However, the notice to vacate issued by Palati and noted by Lastimosa was
addressed not just to the parties but to "all adverse claimants and actual
occupants of the land subject of the case." It directed that the houses and
improvements of the parties, as well as those of adverse claimants including
complainants who were not parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, would
be demolished.
Worth quoting here is the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 54003,
which decided the appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. 4647, viz:
Finally, the appellants’ assertion that they are not bound by the
decision in Civil Case No. 1291 because they are not parties therein
and that the appellees should first institute an action for ejectment in
order to acquire possession of the property is without merit. The
appellants’ failure to establish a vested and better right, either
derivative or personal, to the land in question as against the
appellees, forecloses any posturing of exemption from the legal force
and effect of the writ of execution issued by the trial court to enforce
a final judgment under the guise of denial of due process. A
judgment pertaining to ownership and/or possession of real
property is binding upon the defendants and all persons
claiming right of possession or ownership from the said
defendant and the prevailing party need not file a separate
action for ejectment to evict the said privies from the premises.
(Emphasis supplied)39
property and about 1,500 persons. Despite the controversy, they were able to
carry out the demolition peacefully and successfully.
It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his
ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in
accordance with its mandate. The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute
judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It must be stressed
that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the
prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and
is very aptly called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most
difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the
officers charged with this delicate task must act with considerable dispatch so
as not to unduly delay the administration of justice, otherwise, the decisions,
orders, or other processes of the courts of justice would be futile. 41
We take note of the fact that respondent judge had compulsorily retired from
the service on February 24, 2001.42
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Jose
Majaducon GUILTY of abuse of his authority for which he is meted a fine
of P20,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
For lack of merit, the charge of grave abuse of authority against Elmer
Lastimosa and Nasil Palati is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Evidently, the decision in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, which had long
become final and executory, can be enforced against herein complainants
although they were not parties thereto. There is no question that
complainants merely relied on the title of their predecessor-in-interest who
was privy to John Sycip, the defendant in Civil Case No. 1291. As such,
complainants and their predecessor-in-interest can be reached by the order
of demolition.40

Respondent sheriffs cannot be faulted with grave misconduct and abuse of

authority in implementing the order of demolition. The records before us are
simply bereft of any indication supportive of the allegation. Quite the contrary,
we find Lastimosa and Palati to have faithfully observed the correct
procedure in the implementation of respondent judge’s order. In fact, they
were extra careful in the enforcement of the same knowing that a lot of
attention was given to it by the media, involving as it did a 12-hectare
 [A.M. NO. MTJ-02-1452 : April 06, 2005]
EDITHA O. CATBAGAN, Complainant, v. JUDGE FELIXBERTO P.
BARTE, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tobias Fornier,
Antique, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint1 dated September 17, 2001 addressed to the
Honorable Chief Justice, through the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), complainant Editha O. Catbagan charged respondent Judge
Felixberto P. Barte of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Tobias
Fornier, Antique with "grave and serious misconduct."2
In the first week of May 1999, complainant received information that the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. (Church) was interested
in buying land in the Province of Antique.   She immediately approached
respondent judge and requested him to assist her in the prospective
transaction.   Together with a certain Abraham Pedriña, the three agreed
that in case they succeeded in brokering the sale of the properties to the
Church, their commission would be divided in this manner:
x x x   the three of us agreed in the house of Judge Barte that for every
sale transaction if the purchase price exceed One Million Pesos, the two of
us will receive a commission of P100,000.00 each while the remaining
amount or net gain be retained by Judge Barte as his commission based
on his agreement with the vendors.3
When requested to put their agreement in writing, respondent judge
allegedly answered: "A municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the
judicial arm that is the closest in reach to the public he serves and he
must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity."
Complainant did not insist on her request after hearing this.
The three of them subsequently conferred with Bobby J. Villalobos, the
district president of the Church. They offered the parcels of land owned by
Bitoon Cezar and Aurea Clarin in Sibalom, Antique. 4
Thereafter, on January 18, 2001, the Church agreed to purchase lots 336-
A and 336-B owned by Bitoon Cezar for P1,120,300.5
Lot 334 owned by Aurea Clarin was also sold for P2,199,000 on February
19, 2001.6
Meanwhile, lot 5555 located in Hamtic, Antique owned by Eleanor M.
Checa-Santos was sold on February 12, 2001 for P2,300,000.7
For the first two sales, complainant claimed she was entitled to a P300,000
commission.
Since the Church transacted with respondent only, it paid the price of the
properties to him.   Respondent then delivered the amount due to the
vendors.
When complainant heard that the vendors had been paid, she demanded
her commission from respondent. However, respondent offered her
only P25,000 for the two transactions, excluding the one in Hamtic.
Complainant later learned that respondent received a P435,226.55
commission from the Aurea Clarin transaction alone. 8
Complainant reminded respondent of their agreement but respondent
challenged complainant "to go to court." Instead of pursuing her claim in a
civil suit, however, complainant opted to file the present administrative
case against respondent on September 17, 2001.
In a 1st Indorsement9 dated October 18, 2001, Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. referred the complaint to respondent for his
comment on the charge of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
In his comment,10 respondent denied the charge against him and asked for
the dismissal of the administrative case on the following grounds:
First, there was ambiguity in the charge of grave and serious misconduct
in the complaint and conduct unbecoming of a judge in the OCA
indorsement. Because of this confusion, he was deprived of his right to be
informed of the real charge against him. Consequently, he was not able to
properly prepare his defense.
Second, complainant's allegations were baseless and designed merely to
harass and dishonor respondent. According to him, complainant and
Pedriña went to his house and told him about the intention of the Church
to buy land in Antique.   Subsequently, he informed the chapter president
of the Church that there were several parcels of land in the Municipality of
Sibalom that met their requirements. For two years, he spent after-office
hours and weekends to consummate the transaction. He labored hard
because the transaction could augment his meager income and enable him
to send his three children to good colleges in Iloilo City. He admitted that
Pedriña assisted him but maintained that complainant had no
involvement in the transaction other than attending the initial meeting
with the chapter president. He claimed that it was he, not the complainant,
who looked for the land to be sold to the Church. He submitted the sworn
affidavit11 of the vendor's lawyer, Atty. Francisco Javier, who never met
the complainant nor transacted with her.   Respondent also claimed that
the agreement was for him to shoulder all the expenses relative to the
transaction, including its documentation.   Pedriña's affidavit supported
respondent's claim that they never agreed on a commission scheme,
contrary to complainant's assertion.   If ever respondent gave money for
any information or assistance in the transaction, the amount depended
entirely on his discretion.
In a report and recommendation12 dated June 13, 2002, the OCA found
respondent not guilty of the charges against him but recommended a fine
of P5,000 for violating Canon 5, Rule 5.0213 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.   It also warned respondent against directly engaging in any
private business even outside office hours, otherwise a more severe
penalty would be imposed upon him. The OCA further noted that another
administrative case, entitled Jose Berin and Merly Alorro v. Judge
Felixberto P. Barte,14 had been filed against respondent.   It involved a
transaction similar to the one in this complaint.
Initially, we will discuss respondent's assertion that this administrative
case should be dismissed for being ambiguous.   According to respondent,
the confusion denied him the opportunity to properly defend himself.
Despite the apparent confusion brought about by the charge of (1) "grave
and serious misconduct" in the complaint and (2) "conduct unbecoming of
a judge" in the OCA indorsement, the dismissal of the complaint is not
warranted.   The records show that respondent refuted both charges in his
comment and manifestation.15 The OCA could not be faulted for describing
the charge as "conduct unbecoming of a judge" (instead of "grave and
serious misconduct") because the allegations pointed to none other but
that offense. Noticeably, in complainant's reply16 and letter-request17 for
early resolution, she consistently described her charge against respondent
as "conduct unbecoming of a judge." We therefore cannot dismiss outright
the administrative case on this ground alone, considering that respondent
knew fully well what he was being charged with.   In fact, he defended
himself against the charges.
In a long line of cases, we have held that the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to explain one's
side.18
The question of whether complainant was or was not entitled to a
commission for her efforts in the sale of the parcels of land to the Church
should be threshed out in a proper civil case.
What is therefore left for us to thresh out is respondent's administrative
liability for his admitted financial and business dealings.
We note the OCA's observation that this is not the first time an
administrative case of the same nature has been filed against respondent.
In Jose Berin and Merly Alorro v. Judge Felixberto P. Barte,19 respondent
judge was also charged with grave and serious misconduct for refusing to
give the complainants therein their respective commissions in the sale of
land to the Manila Mission of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, Inc.   The Court, in that case, found respondent guilty of violating
Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of the subject property,
respondent judge has increased the possibility of his disqualification to act
as an impartial judge in the event that a dispute involving the said
contract of sale arises. Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale
might plead before his court is not remote and his business dealings with
them might not only create suspicion as to his fairness but also to his
ability to render it in a manner that is free from any suspicion as to its
fairness and impartiality and also as to the judge's integrity.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "[a] judge shall refrain from
financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the
court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests
as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification." 20
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also cautions a judge from "x x x
making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation in his court x x x."
As observed by the OCA, respondent judge should have refrained from
participating in the transaction. By allowing himself to act as an agent in
the sale of the properties, respondent increased the possibility of his
disqualification in the event that a dispute involving the said contracts of
sale arose. Moreover, the possibility that the parties in the sale might have
appeared before his court was not remote and his business dealings with
them would have then created a doubt about his fairness and impartiality.
Respondent submits that the jurisdiction of the 1 st MCTC covers the
Municipalities of Tobias Fornier, Hamtic and Aniniy. The 2 nd MCTC, on the
other hand, covers Sibalom, San Remigio and Belison. Hence, since the
parties and subject matter involved in the controversy were not within the
jurisdiction of the 1st MCTC, his judicial authority could have never been
invoked had a case arisen from the transaction.
We find, however, that his claim is not exactly correct.   Respondent He is hereby warned that another complaint of this kind will merit a
himself emphasized to this Court in his manifestation 21 dated February 23, penalty beyond mere suspension from public office.
2004 that, aside from his duties in the 1st MCTC, he was also designated as
Acting Presiding Judge of the 5th MCTC and in several cases in the SO ORDERED.
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Jose, Antique. Considering this, the
likelihood that he could have also been designated in the 2 nd MCTC (with
jurisdiction over Sibalom) was neither remote nor impossible.   Had any of
the parties in the subject transaction filed suit, his inhibition would have
been called for because of his aforecited business dealings.

Given these circumstances, respondent judge ought perhaps to seriously

consider leaving the judiciary and becoming a full-time real estate broker
instead.   The latter calling appears to have a special appeal to him.

Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position

exacts greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must
comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up
to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. 22

We acknowledge that respondent has been in judicial service since 1990

up to the present. We find his declaration that no criminal or civil case has
ever been filed against him to be true.   However, the present
administrative case and an earlier decided case with similar facts are too
glaring to ignore.   In that case, we reminded him that judges must not
only be "good judges" but must also "appear to be good persons." 23 In the
judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue; it is a necessity. 24

In Poso v. Mijares,25 we held that "public interest in an adept and honest

judiciary dictates that notice of future harsher penalties should not be
followed by another forewarning of the same kind, ad infinitum, but by
discipline through appropriate penalties."

As already mentioned, respondent was previously sanctioned for an

identical infraction involving the sale of land to the Church of Jesus Christ
of the Latter Day Saints, Inc.   We ordered him to pay a fine of P2,000,
admonished him to be more discreet and prudent in his private dealings
and warned him that a similar infraction would be sanctioned more
severely.26 This second administrative case therefore reveals a certain kind
of avarice on the part of respondent.   Hence, we are constrained to
impose upon him a heavier penalty than the OCA-recommended fine.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte is hereby found guilty

of violating Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.   Considering that
this is his second offense, he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months.  
 A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1833. June 28, 2005]
ALEXANDER B. ORTIZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE IBARRA B.
JACULBE, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DUMAGUETE
CITY, BRANCH 42, Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Alexander B. Ortiz
against Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe, Jr.1 Ï‚rνll
In a verified letter-complaint2 dated March 20, 2003, Ortiz averred
the following: That he is a respondent in a case filed before the
sala of Judge Jaculbe; that Atty. Richard Enojo, who is the son-in-
law of Judge Jaculbe, represents the plaintiff in the same case; that
a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties; that
pursuant to the compromise agreement, plaintiff filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution; and that the motion was hastily
granted by Judge Jaculbe without holding a hearing to prove the
failure of defendants to comply with the compromise agreement.
Complainant cites Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which reads, as follows:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl
lαω  lιbrαrÿ
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include,
among others, proceedings where:
.. .
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party
litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth
degree.
Complainant further claims that the relationship between Judge
Jaculbe and Atty. Richard Enojo is within the third degree of affinity
and thus covered by the rule.
In his Comment,3 Judge Jaculbe alleges that it has been his
practice to voluntarily inhibit himself when a case handled by his
son-in-law is raffled to his sala or, alternatively, for his son-in-law
to withdraw his appearance. In support of his assertion, he
attached as annexes to his Comment some orders of inhibition he
issued and some withdrawals of appearance filed by his son-in-law.
The Judge further claims that there is only one exception to his
above-stated practice and that is the case now subject of this
complaint. He contends, however, that:ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
.. . there is no legal, equitable and reasonable necessity to inhibit
himself and the case can be counted as a disposal from his court,
in view of the following cogent and valid grounds:ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
1. No factual and legal issue [had] been resolved by the
undersigned in rendering the judgment based on the compromise
agreement, and, there was no issue being resolved by the
undersigned in issuing the order for the Writ of Execution, for
which issue undersigned could have possibly been biased in favor
of his son-in-law;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. Atty. Richard Enojo (son-in-law of undersigned) participated and
appeared very much later and ONLY AS ADDITIONAL COUNSEL for
plaintiff, because, Atty. Jose Arbas since the start of the case
consistently appeared as the only counsel for plaintiff for several
years;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. During the FIRST court appearance of Atty. Richard Enojo, he
immediately manifested that his client is accepting and willing to
sign the pending and proposed compromise agreement already
submitted by the defendants, which compromise agreement was
eventually finalized and submitted to the court for approval;
therefore, the appearance of his son-in-law was instead favorable
to the defendants and [is] without [the] possibility of partiality and
undue influence by the judge;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. The Judgment was rendered in accordance with the Compromise
Agreement, no more[,] no less;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5. The order for issuance of a Writ of Execution as a ministerial
duty only of the court was in accordance with the procedure of the
Rules of Court, after hearing the same with no
opposition and no motion for reconsideration and/or other legal
remedies availed of by the defendants; andcralawlibrary
6. The appearance of his son-in-law as additional counsel for
plaintiff, has long been with the express conformity and
acquiescence by the defendants; therefore, the defendants are in
estoppel [and] thus cannot now question and complain as to the
conduct of this Presiding Judge.
In a Manifestation and Comment,4 Judge Jaculbe likewise takes
exception to the narration of facts by the complainant, as follows'
The apparent and deliberate misrepresentation of facts briefly
states that: undersigned Judge 'x x x immediately granted the
motion and as a matter of fact, issued [a] writ of execution on April
29, 2002 without conducting a hearing xxx. 'Worst is the fact that
Hon. Ibarra B. Jaculbe had ordered for the issuance of a writ of
execution not in conformity to its decision. [T]he only reason why
the same was expedited by the court is the fact that Atty. Richard
Enojo, plaintiff's counsel is his son-in-law. Also, complainant falsely
alleged that undersigned Judge 'ordered for the issuance of a writ
of execution not in conformity to its decision.
Upon referral of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator
made the following evaluation and
recommendation:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically
provides that 'a judge should take no part in any proceeding where
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Paragraph
(d) of said Rule provides [as an instance thereof] the
following:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party
litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth
degree.
Clearly, respondent violated the above canon by deciding Civil Case
No. 12320 since his son-in-law, who is related to him in the first
degree of affinity, was a counsel for the plaintiff. At least
respondent does not pretend to be ignorant of the provisions of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and he can not deny that he had violated
the same. However, his excuse that his son-in-law was not an
original counsel but had only entered his appearance after the case
had been pending for over a year and only to announce that his
client was ready to sign the compromise agreement is
unacceptable. What he should have done the moment his son-in-
law entered his appearance was to forthwith disqualify himself and
have the case reraffled to another branch. His reluctance to let go
of the case, according to him, was [due to] his desire to include the
same case among his disposals and considering that it was nearly
finished he preferred not to unload it. This[,] again, is a poor
excuse for violating the clear injunction written in the Code.
Under Rule 140, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may be
classified as simple misconduct which is punished by suspension
from office without salary for not less than one (1) month nor more
than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended that this
case be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and
considering that respondent had earlier been reprimanded in RTJ-
97-1393, he should be made to pay a fine [of] P11,000.00 for
simple misconduct.5 Ï‚rνll
As indicated by the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Jaculbe
does not dispute the fact that Atty. Richard Enojo is his son-in-law
and is, therefore, related to him by affinity in the first degree.
The prohibition against the Judge's sitting in the case is found in
the Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as quoted
above and in Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which
states:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
The prohibition under the rules is clear. Therefore, Judge Jaculbe's
failure to inhibit himself when his son-in-law appeared as counsel
in a case he was trying is a patent violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Rules of Court. In Sales v. Calvan,6 the Court
found that Judge Calvan violated the rule on disqualification of
judges as set out in the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of
Court when he conducted the preliminary investigation of a
criminal case where his wife was the niece of the private
complainant. The Court articulated therein, as follows -
In Garcia v. De la Pea, we explained the rationale for this
disqualification:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case
where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity
rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion
as to his fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively
presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such
a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his
authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of
all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith
and confidence in the courts of justice.
The disqualification is mandatory, and respondent has no option
other than to inhibit himself from the criminal case. The
appropriate step for respondent to take would have been to
immediately desist from hearing the case, even at the preliminary
investigation stage. His failure to do so is a glaring violation not
only of the Rules of Court but also of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which mandates in Canon 3, Rule 3.12:ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Rule 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases
include, among others, proceedings where:
.. .
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party
litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth
degree;
.. .
Even in Perez v. Suller, which respondent cites in support of his
arguments, we ruled that respondent Judge Suller should have
refrained from handling the preliminary investigation of the case
involving his nephew, a relative by consanguinity within the sixth
degree and thus covered by the prohibition in Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court. We further held:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed
strictly as "sitting in a case," the underlying reason behind
disqualification under Rule 3.12 [of Canon 3] of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the same.
We have time and again reminded judges of their obligation to
keep the image of the judiciary unsullied and worthy of the
people's trust. Respondent clearly failed to uphold this duty.
In that case, the Court imposed a fine of P10,000 on Judge Calvan
for violation of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and of
Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation
of Supreme Court rules falls under a Less Serious Charge. Section
11 of the same rule states that the following sanctions may be
imposed for Less Serious Charges: '1. Suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00.
In the present case, since Judge Jaculbe was earlier reprimanded
by the Court in RTJ-97-1393, the recommendation of the Office of
the Court Administrator to impose a fine of P11,000 is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, Judge Ibarra B. Jaculbe Jr., presiding judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 42, is found
GUILTY of violating Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and
Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and a FINE
of P11,000 is hereby imposed on him.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149               March 9, 2011
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2787-RTJ)
LYDIA A. BENANCILLO, Complainant,
vs.
Judge VENANCIO J. AMILA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran
City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a Verified-Complaint1 dated November 29, 2007 filed by
complainant Lydia A. Benancillo (Lydia) charging respondent Judge
Venancio J. Amila (Judge Amila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Tagbilaran City with Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, Partiality
and Impropriety relative to Civil Case No. 7268 entitled "Lydia A. Benancillo
v. Paul John Belot," a Petition for Temporary Protection Order and
Permanent Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262.
The facts as culled from the Report2 of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) are as follow:
1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT
The complainant, the petitioner in Sp. Civil Case No. 7268, avers that Branch
1 of RTC Tagbilaran City, acting as then Family Court in Tagbilaran City,
issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her live-in partner, Paul
John Belot (Belot). The TPO included a directive to Belot to turn over to her
personal effects, including properties in their diving business called the
Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc. (Underworld). Belot sought the
reconsideration of the issuance of the TPO. Meanwhile, their business
partners, Paz Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin, filed a motion for
intervention with respect to the properties of Underworld. The complainant
filed an opposition to the motion for intervention with prayer for preliminary
injunction.
The complainant alleges that when Branch 2 of RTC Tagbilaran City,
presided by the respondent judge, was designated as the new Family Court
in Tagbilaran City, Sp. Civil Case No. 7268 was transferred to the said court.
Acting on the pending incidents, the respondent judge denied both Belot’s
motion for reconsideration and the intervenors’ motion for intervention in an
Order dated July 16, 2007. The respondent judge incorporated in the
resolution a cease-and-desist order prohibiting the intervenors from taking
possession of the properties of Underworld.
The complainant further alleges that the respondent judge reiterated his
Order of July 16, 2007 in an Order dated August 14, 2007. Subsequently, the
respondent judge denied the intervenors’ motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated October 2, 2007.
The complainant states that the respondent judge constantly ruled in her
favor as he consistently held that the intervenors had no legal personality in
the case. However, the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO.
The complainant claims that on October 8, 2007, the respondent judge called
her and her counsel to a meeting in his chambers on October 9, 2007. They
agreed to the meeting but they did not proceed when they learned that the
intervenors were joining them. Subsequent to the respondent judge’s
meeting with the intervenors, he issued an Order dated October 18, 2007
which rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007. Then, in an Order dated
October 25, 2007, he denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration.
According to the complainant, the respondent judge’s conduct smacks of
impropriety and partiality. She further charges the respondent judge with
grave abuse of discretion, gross ignorance of the law and procedure and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order for issuing the questioned
Orders of October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
The complainant further observed that the respondent judge revoked his
Order of October 2, 2007, without any motion being filed by any of the
parties. Moreover, the Order of October 18, 2007 was based on an inexistent
ground as the respondent judge mentioned in this Order a petition for
certiorari supposedly filed by Belot which had not yet been x x x filed with the
Court of Appeals.
The complainant alleged that the respondent judge’s Order of October 25,
2007 ruling on the complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the Order of
October 18, 2007 introduced a new issue on the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of Belot. The respondent judge also ruled on maintaining the
status quo, a position inconsistent with the preliminary injunction he had
previously issued.
2. COMMENT of Judge Venancio J. Amila dated February 8, 2008 wherein
he denies the charges against him.
The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her
"insatiable greed to have exclusive control and possession pending trial of
the case [of] all the properties of the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. of
respondent Paul John Belot." x x x [H]e added that the "complainant . . . is
only a live-in partner of respondent with no specific address who was
branded repeatedly by Belot as a ‘prostitute’ and one ‘only after his money’."
According to the respondent judge, he rescinded his Order of October 2,
2007 because the complainant had no right to her alleged shares in the
corporation being merely a dummy owner of Belot’s shares. He was "fearful
of the consequence in the event that complainant would stealthily dispose of
or abscond [with] the properties. . . because of the illegitimate status of their
relationship, more so, with their present feud caused by the arrival of Belot’s
son and the alleged coming of the legitimate wife."
The respondent judge averred that the complainant "masterminded all [the]
legal manipulations [and] moved heaven and earth x x x to get possession of
all the properties of Belot to the extent of filing the instant administrative
charge and a petition for certiorari lately with the Court of Appeals, dated
December 21, 2007 using the same offensive and disrespectful language in
her arguments.
The respondent asserted he had the authority to motu proprio rectify an error
to restore things to their status quo during the pendency of the case in order
to avoid damage or loss. x x x [T]he complainant refused to attend the
meeting he called with the intervenor in chambers to explain the
Order.1avvphi1
Respondent Judge Amila incorporated in his submission his comment to a
similar administrative complaint filed earlier by the complainant. x x x [H]e
alleged that he set aside his Order of October 2, 2007 because the Petition
for Certiorari filed by Belot before the Court of Appeals had placed the
jurisdiction of the court under question.
3. REPLY-AFFIDAVIT dated February 29, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant claimed that she suffered psychological and emotional
violence as the respondent judge echoed Belot’s verbal and psychological
abuse against her that she was "only a live-in partner" "in an illegitimate
relation" and a "prostitute." The respondent judge’s remarks revealed his
prejudice and lack of gender sensitivity and this was unbecoming of a family
court judge. His remarks also manifested his lack of knowledge and/or utter
disregard of the law on the equal protection to women-victims in intimate
relationships under the anti- VAWC law which he was mandated to uphold as
a family court judge.
The complainant averred that the respondent judge refused to enforce the
TPO under the Anti-VAWC law because of his prejudiced view that she
would abscond with the contested properties due to the "illegitimate status" of
their "relationship." His personal bias against the complainant reflects his
utter lack of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The complainant denied the respondent judge’s accusation that she and her
counsel "masterminded all these legal manipulations." She added that the
accusation implies that the respondent judge was not in control of the
proceedings and that he could be manipulated by the parties.
The complainant alleged that as the respondent judge still refused to
implement the TPO despite the dismissal of Belot’s petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, she filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court for the annulment of the Orders dated October 18, 2007 and October
25, 2007.
The complainant asserted that while the respondent judge can change his
mind, he could no longer do so when the Order already became final and
executory and was not questioned anymore by the parties. Moreover, there
was no reason for the respondent judge to call for a meeting with the
intervenors because he already ruled that intervention was not allowed in the
case.
4. AFFIDAVIT-MANIFESTATION dated May 27, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant manifested that the Court of Appeals of Cebu City already
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Belot which petition the
respondent Judge cited as reason for rescinding his Order dated [October] 2,
2007, the petition being a prohibited pleading under Section 22 of RA 9262
(Anti-VAWC).3
In its Report4 dated September 11, 2008, the OCA found that Judge Amila
acted inappropriately in calling the intervenors to a meeting in his chambers.
It was also noted that he used derogatory and irreverent language in
presenting complainant in his Comment as an opportunist, a mistress in an
illegitimate relationship and that she was motivated by insatiable greed. As
regards the charge for gross ignorance of the law, the OCA noted that the
same is premature considering that complainant filed before this Court a
petition assailing the October 18 and 25, 2007 Orders of respondent Judge. 5
The OCA thus recommended:
1. That the case be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. That the charges of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Procedure and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order
relative to the issuance of the Order[s] dated October 18, 2007 and October
25, 2007 be DISMISSED for being premature;
3. [That r]espondent Judge Venancio J. Amila, Regional Trial Court (Branch
3), Tagbilaran City, be found guilty of impropriety for the use of intemperate
language and unbecoming conduct and be FINED in the amount of
₱10,000.00 with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense x
x x shall be dealt with more severely.6
We adopt the findings and the recommendations of the OCA.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts
members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of
propriety at all times.
Judge Amila should be reminded of Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.7
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights,
they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
Judiciary.
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of
impropriety but even acts which have the appearance of impropriety. The
Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can
nevertheless be perceived by the larger community as such. "Be it stressed
that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than
attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust."8
In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the
complainant and the intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers. His
explanation that he called the said meeting to advice the parties that he will
rescind his October 2, 2007 Order is not acceptable. Why would a judge give
the parties advance notice that he is going to issue an Order, more so
rescind his previous Order? Worse, why would he call on the intervenors
whom he had earlier ruled as not having any legal personality in this case?
This act of respondent judge would logically create an impression to
complainant that the meeting of the judge with the intervenors had turned his
views around towards issuing a revocation of the October 2, 2007 Order.
In his Comment, respondent judge used degoratory and irreverent language
in relation to complainant. The former in effect maliciously besmirched the
character of complainant by calling her as "only a live-in partner of Belot" and
presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress in an illegitimate
relationship. The judge also called her a prostitute. The judge’s accusations
that complainant was motivated by insatiable greed and would abscond with
the contested property are unfair and unwarranted. His depiction of
complainant is also inconsistent with the Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
he issued in her favor as a victim of domestic violence. Verily, we hold that
Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his language.
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The
act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all
times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or
spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.9
Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10,10 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section
11C11 thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but
not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition
with warning.
In as much as Judge Amila was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law in connection with his Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 14988 and
14989 which was docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-07-2071 where he was ordered
to pay a fine of ₱20,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely, the penalty of fine of
₱21,000.00 is deemed appropriate in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Venancio J. Amila GUILTY of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him ₱21,000.00.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062*               January 18, 2011
IMELDA R. MARCOS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
The judiciary cannot keep those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity. This being so, in the performance of the functions of their office,
judges must endeavor to act in a manner that puts them and their conduct above
reproach and beyond suspicion. They must act with extreme care for their office
indeed is burdened with a heavy load of responsibility.1
At bench is an administrative case filed by Imelda R. Marcos (Marcos) against Judge
Fernando Vil Pamintuan (Judge Pamintuan), Presiding Judge, Branch 3, Regional
Trial Court, Baguio City (RTC), for Gross Ignorance of the Law.
THE FACTS:
From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-
affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing
motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio
Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May 30, 1996 (and modified in the September 2, 1996
order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled "Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the
exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the
Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al."
Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to comply
with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on forum
shopping, the petition is DISMISSED.
It is further ORDERED that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be
immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry
Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the
estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.
SO ORDERED.
The parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the said order but both
motions were denied by the RTC for lack of merit in its June 24, 1996 Order.
On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for
reconsideration which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996.
Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case
for hearing on June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden
Buddha to its rightful owner. Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a
person with interest in the case.
On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated
September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate
of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be
under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas,
or upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.
This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere
replica of the original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has been
missing since 1971 up to the present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now,
and has been in unlawful possession of persons who do not have title over it, nor any
right at all to possess this original Golden Buddha.
Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory
order constituted gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-
696-0, she argued that final and executory judgments of lower courts were not
reviewable even by the Supreme Court. Judge Pamintuan reversed a final and
executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R
but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that
the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a "mere replica." Marcos claimed that his
order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that a judgment or final order shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it (his order) is based xxx."
In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a
pleading manifesting lack of interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she
did not. In fact, her counsel, Atty. Robert Sison, entered his appearance and actually
appeared in court. With her appearance through counsel, she subjected herself to the
jurisdiction of the court. She should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an administrative complaint. As she did not,
Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies could not be substituted with
the filing of this case.
Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-
R, hence, she could not file a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule
37 which provides that only the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration
within the period for taking an appeal.
In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the
service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and
disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government
owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for "violation of
Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct." The OCA pointed out that:
As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment,
if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.
Bearing this in mind, respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006,
the pertinent text of which reads:
Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years ago, the estate of the late
Rogelio Roxas has not taken possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha
replica from the Court, thus, this incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing the necessity of
finally disposing of the Buddha Statuette physically, and finding out the present statue
of the late Rogelio Roxas, ordered the hearing on June 29, 2006. (Italics supplied)
x x x           x x x          x x x
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated
September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate
of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under
custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or
upon the appointment of his estate’s administrator.
Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its previous
Order dated May 30, 1996, which provides:
It is further ORDERED that the Buddha Statuette in custody of this Court be
immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry
Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to the decedent’s brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR
the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.
And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is
DENIED. The Order of this Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha
statuette is awarded to the state of the late Rogelio Roxas and is at the same time
MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha statuette shall be under the custodia legis
until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas or upon the
appointment of his estate’s administrator."
x x x           x x x          x x x
A normal course of proceedings would have been that respondent Judge waits for the
proper party to go to court to ask for the release of the Buddha statuette. x x x.
However, respondent was being overzealous when he ruled that the Golden Buddha
in its custody is a "fake one, or a mere replica." Notwithstanding that the same may
be his’ and the litigants’ opinion during the hearing of June 29, 2006. (sic) He should
have borne in mind that there were no issues nor controversies left for consideration
in Civil Case No. 3383-R. It must be noted that the Order dated May 30, 1996 (and
modified on September 2, 1996) has become final and executory. Hence, issues have
been settled and the matter laid to rest. As repeatedly ruled by this Court, a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower courts – which may
normally be subject to review by higher tribunals – become final and executory
before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way
modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by Supreme Court, much
less by any other official, branch or department of government.
It is inexcusable for respondent Judge to have overlooked such an elementary legal
principle."
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its July 31, 2007 Resolution,
preventively suspended Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of this administrative
case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan
moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion
for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision.
The matter was referred again to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In its Memorandum dated November 22, 2007, the OCA
recommended that "the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent be GRANTED
and that the Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 31, 2007, be LIFTED." Thus,
in its December 11, 2007 Resolution, the Court granted the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Judge Pamintuan and lifted the Order of Preventive
Suspension effective immediately.
Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering
the period of his preventive suspension from August to December 13, 2007. In its
June 3, 2008 Resolution, following the recommendation of the OCA, the Court denied
said request for being premature and for lack of merit.
Now, the Court resolves the complaint against Judge Pamintuan.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and
recommendation of the OCA.
Doubtless, the May 30, 1996 Order, which was modified on September 2, 1996, in
Civil Case No. 3383-R, has long become final and executory. In his assailed August
15, 2006 Order, Judge Pamintuan made express declarations that were not
embodied either in the May 30, 1996 Order or in the September 2, 1996 Order. He
ruled that the Golden Buddha in the custody of the court was a "fake one, or a mere
replica" of the original. This may be his opinion or the litigants’ during the hearing of
June 29, 2006 but Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did not
rule on that point in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order).
Insofar as this issue is concerned, the May 30, 1996 Order pertinently reads:
Albert Umali anchors his claim on the supposed Memorandum of Agreement between
him and the late Rogelio Roxas executed on November 25, 1988. He claims that
under this agreement, he and Rogelio Roxas will share in the profits of their business
venture, that is, treasure hunting and claim for lost treasure.
He adds, however, that the Buddha with this Court is not the genuine Buddha.
According to him, he has photographs to prove the existence of the real and genuine
golden Buddha. To be sure, this Court is baffled by the foregoing submission of Mr.
Umali, if the subject Buddha is not the genuine golden Buddha, and therefore a fake
one, it cannot be covered by the memorandum of Agreement.
Be it noted that the Memorandum of Agreement speaks of treasure hunting and lost
treasure which could refer to things of great value. Based on Mr. Umali’s own claim
the subject Buddha has no appreciable material value. It is therefore outside the
scope of the Memorandum of Agreement. This being the case, what right then does
Albert Umali have to demand the return of the subject Buddha to him? On this score
alone, this Court should already reject the claim of Mr. Umali over the Buddha now in
this Court’s custody.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Now, as to whether or not there is that controversial golden Buddha different from the
one now in custody of this Court, there is none. X x x.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conducthttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/A. M. No. RTJ-05-
1920.htm - _ftn provides:
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. [Emphases ours]
Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in
the challenged order.
It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which
rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a
final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration
of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business;
and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.2
It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle
no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be
well-informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural
rules at all times. When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.3
The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross
ignorance of the law in issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he
failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that:
Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence.
Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-
how with the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the public’s confidence in
the competence of our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the
law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to
know, excuses no one - not even judges.4
Notably, this is not Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative case. In The
Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benguet
Chapter v. Pamintuan,5 Judge Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and
Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for one (1) year.
In the case of Atty. Gacayan v. Hon.  Pamintuan,6 he was found guilty of violating
Canons 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics
which amounted to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He was
reprimanded and was sternly warned that a repetition of the foregoing or similar
transgressions would be dealt with more severely. He was also meted a fine of
₱10,000.00.
In a much recent case, Biggel v. Pamintuan,7 he was charged with manifest partiality,
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, and unjust and malicious delay in the
resolution of the incidents in Criminal Case No. 25383-R entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Emil Biggel," a case for estafa. He was found guilty of violating Rule
3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of court
business promptly. The Court imposed upon him a fine in the amount of ₱20,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with
more severely.
As of this time, there is another administrative case yet to be resolved against Judge
Pamintuan filed by one Peter Cosalan for gross ignorance of the law.8 Although, this
is not pertinent in the resolution of this case, it is clear from the other undisputed
records that Judge Pamintuan has failed to meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and place SO ORDERED.
of honor reserved for guardians of justice. As held in the case of Malabed v. Asis:9

Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes
one’s personal conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful
observance of which is the price one has to pay for holding such a distinguished
position. x x x His conduct must be able to withstand the most searching public
scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to
the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system lest public confidence in
the judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent
conduct of judges.

The Court has held time and again that a judge is expected to demonstrate more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is essential that he
be familiar with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled doctrines.10

As fittingly stated in the case of Borromeo v. Mariano,11 "Our conception of good

judges has been, and is, of men who has a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law." Thus, this Court has had the occasion
to hold that:

When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule,
a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent
and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority. In both instances, the judge’s dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the
administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of
the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.12

In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the
law.1âwphi1 He could have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot
take his previous infractions lightly. His violations are serious in character. Having
been previously warned and punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now
deserves the ultimate administrative penalty − dismissal from service.

The Court doubts if he ever took seriously its previous warnings that a repetition of his
offenses would merit a more severe sanction from this Court. His conduct in this case
and his prior infractions are grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As
shown from the cited administrative cases filed against Judge Pamintuan, he was
liable not only for gross ignorance of the law but for other equally serious
transgressions.1âwphi1 This Court should, therefore, refrain from being lenient, when
doing so would give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated
offenders are tolerated in the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall
forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or function appurtenant
to his office upon service on him of this decision.
A.M. No. MTJ-91-619 January 29, 1993
ATTY. HUGOLINO V. BALAYON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE GAYDIFREDO O. OCAMPO, respondent.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
For our consideration is a letter-complaint of Atty. Hugolino V. Balayon, Jr.,
dated October 9, 1991, charging Judge Gaydifredo O. Ocampo of the
Metropolitan, Trial Court, Tupi, South Cotabato with gross ignorance of the
law and grave misconduct. The charge is grounded on eight complaints,
separately discussed as follows:
FIRST COMPLAINT:
The first complaint charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the
law and grave misconduct. The charge arose when one Ronilo Hijastro
complained to respondent Judge about a certain Romeo Panes
(complainant's client) who allegedly was withholding possession of some
sacks of copra from Ronilo Hijastro. Hijastro sought the help of respondent
Judge for protection while his dispute with Romeo Panes was ongoing.
Ronilo Hijastro was not interested in the services of a lawyer. What
respondent Judge did was to write one Lt. Sulam, the Police Station
Commander of Tupi, South Cotabato, to wit:
December 7, 1989
Dear Lt. Sulam,
Bearer went to me for legal advice affecting the sacks of copras and other
produce of the land in possession by Mr. Ronilo Hijastro but who appears to
be an illegitimate son of the late Mr. Juan Panes.
Mr. Romeo Panes is allegedly claiming the land and its produce as brother of
Mr. Juan Panes. Romeo has no right on it as he has no papers on the land
notwithstanding being a brother of Juan Panes.
So, if Romeo shall force Ronilo or his tenant on the land to give the produce
and possession of the land, your Office can lend assistance to Mr. Ronilo
Hijastro.
Thanks.
(SGD.) JUDGE GAYDIFREDO OCAMPO 1
Complainant contends that what respondent Judge did amounts to private
practice which is in conflict with his position of being a municipal judge.
Complainant further accuses respondent Judge of using his influence as
incumbent Judge to pressure the Police Station Commander as a result of
which the sacks of copra were sold with respondent Judge reportedly having
been given a share in the proceeds.
In his Comment, respondent Judge admits having written the aforequoted
letter, but vehemently denies the express insinuations by complainant of any
ulterior motive on his part. He does not personally know said Ronilo Hijastro
as that was the first time respondent Judge met him in his sala. He advised
him to see a counsel who could lend him legal assistance on any proper case
that may be filed, if he so desired, but Hijastro, according to him, just wanted
police assistance. While he might have fallen short of using his discretion in
writing the letter, he contends that he did the same in full and absolute good
faith. He denies having gotten a share of the sale of the sacks of copra.
We do not find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct: In the case
of Babatio vs. Tan, 2 this Court ruled that "(f)or serious misconduct to exist,
there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of
were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in
persistent disregard of all well-known legal rules".
In the case at bar, although respondent Judge admitted having written the
letter dated December 7, 1989, there is no showing that he did so with the
intention to violate the law. Neither is the charge that he was reportedly given
a share of the sale substantiated. Mere suspicion without proof cannot be a
basis for conviction. It should be pointed out, however, that under Cannon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Hence, respondent Judge is
advised to conduct himself accordingly.
SECOND COMPLAINT:
On January 4, 1990, a Criminal Complaint for Qualified Theft as Principals
and Accessories After-the-Fact, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5016
entitled, "People vs. Mario Sanso, Fernando Manggubat and Tony Joven",
was filed by Lt. Sulam before respondent Judge's sala.
Tony Joven was charged as an accessory after-the-fact for allegedly having
bought two (2) piglets which were the proceeds of the crime.
On the same date, Lt. Sulam filed an application for search warrant attaching
thereto the affidavit of one Mario Lim as witness. Respondent Judge took the
sworn statements of Lt. Sulam and Mario Lim and on the basis thereof issued
the search warrant.
The implementation of the search warrant resulted in the seizure of two
piglets found at Tony Joven's backyard. Thereafter, respondent Judge issued
a warrant of arrest against Tony Joven who was later arrested and
imprisoned but was released after posting the necessary bail.
It was only after his release that Tony Joven engaged the legal services of
complainant.
On January 29, 1990, complainant filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and Warrant of Arrest alleging that the same were illegally issued on
the ground that the applicant and his witness have no personal knowledge of
the facts and circumstances which formed the basis for the issuance of said
warrants. Hence, in violation of his client's constitutional rights.
On February 16, 1990, respondent Judge issued a resolution annulling the
subject search warrant and the proceedings held thereon after finding that
the applicant and his witness did not have the personal knowledge as
required by law. With respect to the warrant of arrest, the same stood.
Respondent Judge scheduled the arraignment and trial of complainant's
client.
Complainant charges respondent Judge for alleged illegal issuance of a
search warrant and warrant of arrest.
In his Comment, respondent Judge contends that: "Notwithstanding the fact
that the respondent in the resolution . . . quashed the said search warrant, it
does not mean that the (same was) at the outset illegally and improvidently
issued as it found a basis for its issuance as aforestated. The said resolution
was accomplished not solely on the basis of the said motion of
complainant . . . but on the inherent power of the Court to amend its orders
and processes to conform to law and justice. Besides, the resolution of
respondent speaks for itself. Affecting the warrant of arrest which the
complainant argued should have been cancelled also together with the
search warrant, respondent does not find basis in his judicial discretion to do
so. Complainant's allegation of gross ignorance of law on the part of
respondent is therefore only his self-serving assertions of his personal
view". 3
Respondent Judge further states that after complainant filed his said Urgent
Motion, he inhibited himself from continuing with the further proceedings of
this case in the exercise of his sound discretion. He added that the subject
case had long been terminated by the Judge designated by Executive Judge
Rodolfo Soledad, RTC, Marbel, South Cotabato.
Complainant failed to show that there was malice or bad faith on the part of
respondent Judge in issuing the subject warrants.
Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review and amend or
reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any
error or defect therein. 4 In the case at bar, the motion to quash the search
warrant and warrant of arrest filed by complainant was favorably considered
by respondent Judge which resulted in the quashal of the search warrant.
The
non-quashal of the warrant of arrest was due to the fact that complainant's
client has already posted bail. Absent any showing that respondent judge
acted with malice or bad faith in the issuance of the subject warrants, the
presumption is that official duty has been regularly performed by him.
THIRD COMPLAINT:
On December 4, 1990, a Criminal Complaint for Theft, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 5123, entitled, "People vs. Norberto Solis and Jose Catapang",
was filed by Lt. Sulam on the basis of the sworn statements of two
prosecution witnesses, namely, Antonio Dacayo and Buenaventura Condova,
against Jose Catapang and Norberto Solis accusing them of stealing
pineapples belonging to DOLEFIL plantation before the respondent Judge's
court.
Although respondent Judge was satisfied that there existed probable cause
based on the sworn statements of the prosecution witnesses, on December
20, 1990, respondent Judge conducted a summary clarificatory examination
of Romulo Severino, a jeepney driver, and one of the accused, Jose
Catapang. Thereafter, respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against
Jose Catapang and Norberto Solis.
On January 15, 1991, as shown in the return of the warrant of arrest, Jose
Catapang was arrested and detained at the municipal jail of Tupi. Norberto
Solis was at large.
On January 23, 1991, the case was called for arraignment but was
postponed since the accused had no counsel. Complainant was appointed
as his counsel-de-oficio.
On February 11, 1991, complainant filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement
of the arraignment.
On February 12, 1991, accused posted bail and was released.
On February 21, 1991, Jose Catapang, with the assistance of complainant,
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After the arraignment, complainant
manifested that he was filing a Motion to Dismiss.
On March 5, 1991, complainant filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the arrest of complainant's client was unlawful.
On March 6, 1991, respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the case.
On March 19, 1991, private prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of Dismissal.
Per Order of the same date, respondent Judge reconsidered his Order of
dismissal.
On April 2, 1991, respondent Judge reiterated his previous Order of
dismissal.
Private prosecutor filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari which was
pending resolution at the time this complaint was filed.
Complainant comes to this Court charging respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in ordering the arrest of accused Jose Catapang on
mere suspicion, hence, resulting in the illegal arrest and arbitrary detention of
the accused because the sworn statements of the two prosecution witnesses
were not based on their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances.
Neither did the clarificatory examinations conducted by respondent Judge on
Romulo Severino and Jose Catapang point to the accused as the persons
who stole the pineapples.
Again, there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the issuance of
the warrant of arrest by the respondent Judge.
As earlier mentioned, every court has the power and indeed the duty to
amend or reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely
called to any error or defect therein. 5 Let it be noted, though, that this is the
second complaint charging respondent Judge of issuing a search warrant
and/or warrant of arrest in violation of the requirement of personal knowledge
of the facts and circumstances by the applicant and his witnesses. This does
not speak well of respondent Judge's appreciation and application of the law.
It would be beneficial for both respondent Judge and those whose cases
would fall within his jurisdiction, if respondent updated himself with the law
and latest jurisprudence.
Respondent Judge is admonished to exercise more prudence and
circumspection in the issuance of the aforementioned warrants so as not to
trample on the rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
FOURTH COMPLAINT:
The complaint states that respondent Judge, with gross ignorance of the law,
allowed a witness to testify during the trial without previously submitting his
affidavit as required under Section 14 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. 6
In People vs. Esther Ante, Criminal Case No. 5226 for Slight Physical
Injuries, a prosecution witness who had not previously submitted his affidavit
was allowed by respondent Judge to testify during the trial, over and above
the objection of complainant. Complainant alleged that Section 14 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibits any witness, without
exception, from testifying during the trial without previously submitting his
affidavit, citing the case of Gonzales v. Presiding Judge of Branch 1, RTC of
Bohol. 7
In Orino vs. Judge Gervasio, 8 the Supreme Court ruled in a Minute
Resolution that even if a witness has not properly submitted his/her affidavit,
he may be called to testify in connection with a specific factual matter
relevant to the issue. Thus, a medical doctor whose medical certificate is
among the evidence on record may be called to testify. This also applies to a
Register of Deeds or Provincial Assessor in connection with official
documents issued by his office. Respondent Judge may not therefore be held
guilty of ignorance of the law.
FIFTH COMPLAINT:
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge continuously notarized
documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and thus
earning extra money out of the same, even if there were two duly
commissioned notaries public in the municipality, contrary to the Resolution
of the Court En Banc dated December 19, 1989.
In his Comment, respondent Judge contends that the power of the MTC and
MCTC judges to act as notaries public ex-officio, contained in Circular No. 1-
90 dated February 26, 1990, was received by him on March 30, 1990.
Respondent Judge vehemently denies the alleged continuous notarization.
He admits that he had notarized six documents in 1990 and three documents
in 1991. The aforesaid documents were notarized by respondent Judge by
reason of the unavailability of notaries public and the urgent need by the
parties therein. The fees thereon were paid to the Government as certified to
by the Clerk of Court. 9
Respondent Judge admits that there are two lawyers and notaries public in
his station at Tupi. They are Atty. Neptali Solilapsi and the herein
complainant. Although Atty. Solilapsi is a resident of Tupi and with a law
office thereat, he is rarely present by reason of almost daily appearances in
the courts of the province of South Cotabato and General Santos City, not to
mention his occasional trips to Manila. On the other hand, herein
complainant, although residing in Tupi holds a law office at Marbel, South
Cotabato and goes home late in the afternoon or evening. They are therefore
not in a position to render regular legal services that may be asked of them in
Tupi.
The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their
judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of
law.10
It is well settled that municipal judges may not engage in notarial work except
as notaries public ex-officio. As notaries public ex-officio, they may engage
only in the notarization of documents connected with the exercise of their
official functions. They may not, as such notaries public ex-officio, undertake
the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and
other acts of conveyance, which bear no relation to the performance of their
functions as judges.
However, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities
which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, the Supreme Court ruled that
MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers
or notaries public may, in their capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all
notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned-over
to the municipal treasurer and (2) certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit. 11
In the case at bar, there are two notaries public in respondent's station at
Tupi. That these two notaries public do not appear to be stationed regularly
at Tupi, as respondent Judge claims, does not suffice to qualify under the
exception. It is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the
exception applies.
For the unauthorized notarization of nine private documents, respondent
Judge is hereby ordered to pay the fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) with a warning that the commission of similar acts in the future
will warrant a more severe sanction. 12
SIXTH COMPLAINT:
On May 15, 1989, a Criminal Complaint for grave threats against Joe Maliang
was filed with the respondent Judge's sala. After the submission of the
affidavits and counter-affidavits, respondent Judge rendered a decision dated
October 4, 1989 convicting the accused of light threats as defined and
penalized under Article 285, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. On
October 16, 1989, accused appealed to the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 25, Koronadal, South Cotabato. The Regional Trial
Court rendered its decision dated July 19, 1990 reversing the respondent
Judge and acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt.
Complainant now contends that with the acquittal of his client in the grave
threats case, respondent Judge had shown his utter lack of correct
appreciation of evidence. It is also a manifestation of respondent Judge's
habit of deciding cases on his own personal view and not based on the
evidence adduced.
There is no showing that respondent Judge decided the case in bad faith. It
will be noted that complainant's client was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Hence, there was evidence indicating that he committed the crime but that
the evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to convict
complainant's client beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaran, 13 this Court had the occasion to
pronounce that mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross
and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith, or that the
judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision are irrelevant and immaterial in
an administrative proceeding against him.
SEVENTH COMPLAINT:
A letter-complaint 14 for theft, dated July 2, 1991, was filed by Rodolfo L.
Lizada, in his capacity as Tupi Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, against
Feliciano Angeles, et. al . This was based on the alleged illegal taking by the
accused of the galvanized iron roofing sheets of a government warehouse.
Attached to the letter-complaint were the affidavits and sworn statements of
witnesses. 15
On July 17, 1991, respondent Judge conducted an ocular inspection and
found the following:
1. The galvanized iron roofings of the government
warehouse were indeed missing.
 2. A total of eighty-eight used galvanized iron sheets were
found in the premises of accused Feliciano Angeles. He was
not around when the inspection team arrived.
3. Feliciano Angeles' wife was present during the inspection.
She informed the members of the inspection team that five of
the used galvanized iron sheets were used in roofing their
house. However, when Feliciano Angeles arrived, he
corrected his wife's statement, saying that a total of eight
was instead used by them.
On August 6, 1991, respondent Judge issued a resolution dismissing the
case and remanded the records thereof to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor at Marbel, South Cotabato.
In dismissing the case, the respondent Judge ruled as follows:
For all these acts of the accused, the Court does not find
a prima facie case for Theft. The elements of Theft are clear
and firm. All must be present. Intent to gain as one of its
basic elements was not satisfactorily established as the
subject GI sheets were not taken away from the premises
but rather found and kept therein by the accused for cogent
reason of prevailing thievery (sic) at the place which the
prosecution did not dispute. The Court neither finds a case
for malicious mischief as assuming a damage was caused
by the accused, there is no evidence that he deliberately and
maliciously removed the GI sheet roofings of the subject
bodega but rather he did it with cogent reason as herein
before stated. The liability of the accused, if any, is civil in
nature. The private complainant has other provisional
remedies to protect its interest.16
In this seventh complaint, respondent Judge is being charged with gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. Complainant alleges that
respondent Judge abused his discretion in dismissing the case for theft and
had no jurisdiction in ruling that no malicious mischief was committed
considering that the case at bar was for theft and that another one for
malicious mischief was pending in his sala. Complainant further accuses
respondent Judge of having dismissed the case on the ground that one of the
accused, Normita Cornejo, is the daughter-in-law of respondent Judge's
good friend.
A reading of the ocular inspection report shows that all the elements of theft
are present in the case. Contrary to respondent Judge's basis for dismissal,
the element of intent to gain was present therein. The wife of the accused
admitted having used five galvanized iron sheets for their house. This was
reiterated by the accused Feliciano Angeles that not only five, but eight
galvanized iron sheets, were appropriated for their house. Hence, the
dismissal of the case was not proper. However, complainant still has the
remedy of review by the provincial fiscal.
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for an
error of judgment or lack of awareness of the appropriate legal rules, that
does not mean that he should not exercise due care in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives. He should study the principles of law and be
diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts.17
Respondent Judge is therefore admonished to exercise more prudence and
circumspection in the performance of his duties as municipal judge.
EIGHTH COMPLAINT:
A Criminal Complaint for Theft docketed, as Criminal Case No. 5180,
entitled, "People vs. Julio Relative and Miller Estigoy", was filed before
respondent Judge's sala charging accused of stealing coconut trees.
After the prosecution had rested its case, complainant, as defense counsel,
instead of presenting his evidence, filed a Demurrer to the Evidence on June
4, 1991 alleging that the private complainant in said case had no legal
personality to sue because he was no longer the owner of the land where the
coconut trees were stolen, having failed to redeem the land from the
Development Bank of the Philippines.
An Opposition to Demurrer to the Evidence, dated June 4, 1991, was filed by
the prosecution.
On June 18, 1991, respondent Judge issued an Order denying the said
Demurrer to the Evidence.
On June 29, 1991, complainant filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 1, 1991, the prosecution was ordered to file its Comment on the
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 11, 1991, the prosecution filed its Comment and Opposition to the
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 17, 1991, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent
Judge.
On August 12, 1991, complainant filed a Special Action for Certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court contending that respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
complainant's Demurrer to the Evidence.
Complainant now charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law
and/or grave misconduct in denying his Demurrer to the Evidence.
The charge of gross ignorance of the law and/or grave misconduct has no
factual basis. Not every error of judgment can be attributable to a judge's
ignorance of the law. Until the alleged error shall have been properly raised
on appeal and resolved by the proper appellate court, it is generally
premature to say that the error was due to the Judge's ignorance of the law. 18
Judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to the evidence is left to
the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a grave abuse
thereof, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a motion to
dismiss may not be disturbed.19
It will be noted that complainant had already filed a petition for certiorari with
the Regional Trial Court.
IN SUMMARY, We resolved the eight complaints filed against respondent
Judge as follows:
FIRST COMPLAINT: Under Cannon 2 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct,
respondent Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities. While respondent Judge was found to have
written the police station Commander of Tupi, South Cotabato, in good faith,
he should refrain from engaging in such activity, and other similar ones, so as
not to tarnish the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
SECOND COMPLAINT: There is no basis for the charge against respondent
Judge of improperly issuing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest in
relation to Criminal Case No. 5016. The issuance was not attended with
malice or bad faith. The complaint is therefore hereby dismissed.
THIRD COMPLAINT: This being the second complaint against respondent
Judge for alleged issuance of a search warrant and/or a warrant of arrest in
Criminal Case No. 5123 in violation of the requirement of personal
knowledge, respondent Judge is hereby admonished to exercise more
circumspection and prudence in the issuance of the said warrants so as not
to unwittingly trample on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused.
FOURTH COMPLAINT: This complaint is dismissed. We hold respondent
Judge not guilty of ignorance of the law when he allowed a witness to testify
despite his non-submission of an affidavit. This is well within the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
FIFTH COMPLAINT:  For the unauthorized notarization of nine private
documents, respondent Judge is fined TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) with warning that the commission of similar acts in the future
will warrant a more severe sanction.
SIXTH COMPLAINT: This complaint is dismissed. That respondent Judge's
decision of convicting accused in a criminal complaint for light threats was
reversed on appeal on reasonable doubt is not an indication of respondent
Judge's lack of correct appreciation of facts. A mere error in judgment is
immaterial in an administrative complaint against a judge absent any
showing of bad faith.
SEVENTH COMPLAINT:  There is enough evidence to hold respondent
Judge remiss in the performance of his duties as municipal judge when he
dismissed a criminal case for theft filed with his sala for preliminary
investigation despite his own finding that there was intent to gain on the part
of the accused when they appropriated the galvanized iron sheets. Thus,
respondent Judge is again admonished to exercise more prudence and
circumspection in the performance of his duties as municipal judge.
EIGHTH COMPLAINT: The denial of a demurrer to the evidence is left to the
sound discretion of the Court, rather than an indication of ignorance of the
law. It was well within the respondent Judge's discretion, absent any showing
of bad faith or excess of jurisdiction, for him to have denied complainant's
Demurrer to the Evidence in Criminal Case No. 5180. The complaint is
therefore dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. R-592-RTJ. September 17, 1987.]
JUANITO L. HAW TAY, Complainant, v. HON. EDUARDO
SINGAYAO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn Administrative Complaint filed with this Court on 4 April 1986,
Mr. Juanito L. Haw Tay charged Judge Eduardo Singayao of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City, with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended) and with gross
ignorance of the law.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The respondent Judge filed his Answer, denying the allegations of the
complaint and claiming instead that complainant had subjected him to
systematic harassment. By a Resolution dated 20 January 1987, this Court
referred this matter to Associate Justice Eduardo R. Bengzon of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendations, and at the
same time, suspended respondent Judge from office pending the
investigation and until further orders from the Court.
The Report dated 29 June 1987, of Mr. Justice Bengzon shows that the
hearings held in this administrative matter had in effect to be conducted
ex-parte because respondent Judge never appeared at the scheduled
hearings to present his defense, if any. At the outset, hearings were
scheduled on 25, 26, and 27 March 1987 at 1:30 P.M. However,
respondent Judge moved for deferment of the hearings, stating that he
was experiencing financial difficulties as a result of the acceptance by the
President of his courtesy resignation as Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cotabato City. Thus, hearings were reset to 22, 23, and 24
April 1987, at 1:30 P.M. Respondent Judge did not appear on 22 April
1987. At the instance of the complainant, hearings were reset once more
to 4, 5, and 6 May 1987, again at 1:30 P.M. to afford respondent Judge
once more an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine the witnesses
of the complainant.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On 4 May 1987, however, only complainant and his lawyer appeared. In
order not to take advantage of respondent’s absence, complainant moved
that the hearing be reset to 5 May 1987 as previously scheduled. Once
more, on 5 May 1987, respondent Judge failed to appear. The
Investigating Justice thereupon considered respondent, in his Resolution
dated 5 May 1987, to have waived his right to cross-examine
complainant’s witnesses, without prejudice, however, to his (respondent’s)
right, to present evidence. A copy of the Investigator’s Resolution was sent
to the respondent by registered mail on 14 May 1987. To date, respondent
Judge has not questioned this Resolution nor moved for its
reconsideration.
In respect of the charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, the Report of the Investigating Justice shows that on several
occasions in 1983, respondent Judge, either by himself or through his
Court Interpreter, Mr. Benjamin Pascual, asked for and received from
complainant differing sums of money and a round trip airplane ticket
(Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato). The details of the findings are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The evidence presented during the hearings conducted on May 5, 6
and 7, 1987 shows: that Juanito Haw Tay is the complainant in this case
(administrative matter No. R-592-RTJ-Exh. A) against respondent Judge
Eduardo Singayao for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and for Gross
Ignorance of the Law filed on April 11, 1986; that complainant is one of
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 140, for Certiorari and Prohibition and one of
the defendants in Civ. Case No. 411 for Damages. Both cases are assigned
to the sala of respondent; that when complainant filed his petition
for certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for a restraining order before the
Court of respondent on June 16, 1983, he was approached by Mr.
Benjamin Pascual, an Interpreter, who has known both the complainant
and the respondent for about 15 years. Mr. Pascual informed complainant
that the respondent was demanding P1,000.00 for filing fee. So
complainant borrowed P1,000.00 and on the following day June 17, 1983
gave it to Pascual who in turn delivered it to respondent Judge;
that on June 17, 1983, in the afternoon, Mr. Pascual informed complainant
that the Judge was asking for P3,000.00 so that complainant will no longer
be required to post a bond. On June 18, 1983 complainant again gave the
money to Mr. Pascual who delivered the same to Respondent. On June 22,
1983 respondent issued the restraining order without the filing of a bond;
that on July 22, 1983, while jogging with his son in front of Farmacia
Victoria, complainant was approached by respondent who was also jogging
with some friends. Respondent told him he needed P1,000.00 very badly
on that day. Complainant borrowed P1,000.00 from a friend who issued a
check. After encashing the check, complainant gave the P1,000.00
personally to respondent in his chambers where respondent acknowledged
having received the P1,000.00 and P3,000.00;
that on August 1, 1983, after the scheduled hearing of his petition
for Certiorari was postponed, respondent again asked complainant for a
round trip ticket for Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato flight. Complainant raised
the amount and bought the ticket from Miss Cecile Domines at the PAL
Office at Cotabato City. Complainant delivered the round trip ticket to the
respondent on the same day; that the purchase and use of said ticket
(coupon) was confirmed by Rolando Corcuera, PAL Records Custodian, who
produced the flight/coupon (Cotabato-Manila) of Ticket No. 9120205-3
issued to Judge Eduardo Singayao on August 1, 1983 (Exh., G). Said flight
coupon was perforated, which means that it was used. Appearing on said
coupon is the name of the agent Cecile Domines;
that on October 20, 1983 before the hearing of the certiorari case,
respondent called complainant inside his chambers and told him that he
needed P1,500.00. Complainant borrowed the amount from his brother
and gave it to respondent in his house at the Vilo Subdivision;
x       x       x"
In respect of the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the Investigating
Justice found that respondent Judge had issued a writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 411 although the party granted such injunction
posted not the bond required under the Rules of Court but rather a check
issued by such party and payable to himself. The Report of Justice
Bengzon sets out the following details:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x
that in Civil Case No, 411 entitled Eusebio Tanghal, plaintiff versus
Spouses Juanito Haw Tay, which case was also filed in the sale of
respondent plaintiff Tanghal was ordered to post a bond of P1,000.00
which was done by way of a check payable to plaintiff. Respondent then
issued a preliminary injunction (Exh. "D"). Complainant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the improper posting of the bond. On November
27, 1985 respondent issued an order requiring plaintiff to modify, amend,
or post another bond in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
From the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice reached the
following conclusions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x
From the evidence, it would appear that the complainant was able to
substantiate the allegation in his complaint, and to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that respondent demanded and received money on
several occasions, i.e. on June 17, 1983-P1,000.00; on June 18, 1983-
P3,000.00; on July 22, 1983-P1,000.00; on August 1, 1983-plane ticket
worth P1,348.00 and on October 20, 1983-P1,500.00 from the defendants
who had two pending cases before his sala.
It would also appear that the respondent erred in approving the injunction
bond which was posted by way of a check in the name of the plaintiff and
not the defendants. To correct this error, respondent issued an order on
November 27, 1985 requiring the plaintiff to modify, amend or post
another bond strictly in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
We agree with the conclusions of the Investigating Justice. The acts of
respondent Judge in demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant
before his court constitute serious misconduct in office. This Court
condemns in the strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent
Judge. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those
who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect for law
and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears
apart the very bonds of our polity. The respondent’s ignorance of the
requirements of the Rules of Court and of elementary rules of Commercial
Law, is equally conspicuous. Respondent Judge combines in himself the
twin evils of corruption and ignorance of the law and thus constitutes a
deseased member which must be decisively severed from the body of the
judiciary and cast aside.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Accordingly, this Court makes clear that had respondent Judge’s
resignation not been accepted by the President, respondent Judge would
be dismissed from the service forthwith. In addition, the Court RESOLVES
to declare respondent disqualified from re-employment in any position in
any branch, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and as having forfeited all
his accrued retirement benefits and leave and other privileges, if any.
The Court also RESOLVES to require respondent to show cause, within 10
days from notice hereof, why he should not be disbarred for the acts of
which he has been found guilty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Special Prosecutor, Office of
the Tanodbayan, for appropriate action on the probable violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by the respondent, with the request
that the Court be informed of the action taken.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999.]
LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, Complainant, v. JUDGE PATERNO H.
LUSTRE, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba,
Laguna, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a
letter to the Court 1 praying that respondent Judge Paterno H.
Lustre be dismissed from the service due to "gross immorality and
grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession." 2 Attached to her
letter was a sworn statements reproduced verbatim hereunder,
which details how respondent allegedly molested her sexually.
SWORN STATEMENT
I, LUALHATI LIWANAG. of legal age, Filipino and a resident of
Karunungan Road, Pamana Homes, Calamba, Laguna, after being
duly sworn, according to law, hereby depose and state:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1. Prior to July, 1994, my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12)
counts of violation of B.P. 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and
Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to approximately 3.5
million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment.
2. On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna
filed twelve (12) informations for violation of BP 22 against Oscar
Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua, charging each of them with
three (3) counts of Violation of BP 22. Copies of the informations
are hereto attached for reference.
3. The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna presided by Judge Paterno Lustre.
4. After the information were filed, the accused posted bail.
However, their arraignment were (sic) postponed several times at
the instance of the accused.
5. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However,
when the date came, Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the
hearing was reset to December 15, 1994.
6. On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 A.M., I went to see Judge
Lustre at his chamber to inquire about the case filed by my
husband, why the accused have not yet been arraigned. At that
point, I asked Judge Lustre if it is possible to schedule hearings in
January and February, 1995 and every month thereafter and to
order the arraignment of the accused. He responded in the
affirmative and told me to come back after the hearing on
December 15, 1994, at about 7:00 A.M. in his chamber.
7. The date of the hearing arrived, Dec. 15, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. The
representative of Atty. Buted, counsel for the accused, arrived with
a Motion to Transfer the scheduled hearing. Judge Lustre then
reset the hearing on Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995.
8. As requested, on December 16, 1994, one day after the hearing,
at about 7:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber.
There, he told me that he prepared an order for the accused. I
thanked him and I told him that if the accused will pay us, my
husband and I will give him five (5%) percent of it as token of
gratitude. At that point, he stood up and told me he does not need
money. While he was giving me a copy of the order, he touched my
shoulder, down to my breast. I froze and could not do anything. He
was telling me that he acceded to my request. Later, he told one
that he is available during Mondays and Fridays as there are no
scheduled hearings and for me to come back to him before the
hearing on January 17, 1995.
9. I did not go back to see Judge Lustre as per his request before
the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995 because of what he did to me, he
took advantage of the situation to molest me.
10. Came the date of the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995. Despite the
previous order setting the case for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23,
1995. he cancelled hearings on all dates as per request of the
counsel for the accused. Instead, he reset the same on Feb. 22, 28
and March 7, 1995.
11. When the hearing on Feb. 22, 1995 came, Judge Lustre
cancelled the one set on Feb. 28, 1995.
12. By the way things were going, I could sense that Judge Lustre
is delaying the case, granting postponement after postponement,
despite objections from our lawyer. The case was already dragging
and nothing was happening. We were running out of money and we
needed to have the case terminated right away in order to get paid
for the money the accused have swindled us. Because of this
dilemma, I decided to see Judge Lustre.
13. On March 6, 1995, Monday, at about 10:00 A.M., I went to see
Judge Lustre. I asked him why he cancelled the hearings. He
responded that I fooled him since I did not come to him as per his
request, whereas he acceded to my earlier request. He then told
me that I must obey his wishes if I want our case to go smoothly
since he is the only one who will decide our cases. After that, he
told me that he was already free and for me to wait for him outside
the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No.
PLN-513 and he brought me to Canlubang Tollway. While in the
car, he kissed me on the lips and caressed my breast. I was
repulsed and disgusted but I could not do anything since our cases
are with him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings. At that
instant, I told him to set hearings for April and May, 1995 since
according to his staff, there would be no hearings in May and in
April. He told me, he will take care of it and ordered me to come to
his office on March 13, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. and we will talk about
the settings.
14. On March 13, 1995, Monday, as ordered, I went to see Judge
Lustre at his office at around 7:10 A.M. There was no one there
except him. I saw him waiting just outside his chamber. He
ushered me inside, but I had barely entered the room, when he
kissed me on the lips and caressed my body, particularly my
breast. He exposed his penis and ordered me to masturbate him. I
could not do anything but obey. There was a fluid that oozed from
his penis, which was somewhat bloody. I felt dirty. While doing
that, he told me to tell my lawyer to file a motion to set hearing for
April and May, 1995. He then asked me to go with him to Laguna
de Bay Inn. I refused, he got angry. He retorted that the fate of
our case is on his hands and told me to see him on March 23, 1995
at 7:00 A.M. at Laguna de Bay Inn in Sucat since his house is near
the area.
15. After that, my lawyer filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing.
But I did not go and see Judge Lustre at Laguna de Bay Inn. Thus,
on March 28, 1995 hearing, no schedule was set for April and May.
Instead, he made the setting in June, 1995.
16. On April 10, 1995 I received a new Subpoena for pre-trial and
arraignment of the new cases we filed, scheduling the same for
May 3, 1995. The following day, April 11, Tuesday, I went to see
Judge Lustre to inquire why our case was not scheduled on May 3,
at any rate, there is arraignment of our new case filed on the same
date. He responded that he was early at Laguna de Bay Inn on
March 23, and he waited for me at 7:00 A.M. but I did not come.
He told me not to fool him, "masama daw siyang magalit."cralaw
virtua1aw library
17. The June 6 hearing proceeded, that of June 13 was cancelled at
the instance of the accused’s lawyer.
18. On June 15, 1995, Thursday, at around 7:00 A.M., I went to
Judge Lustre in his office because I was told that our next hearing
would be in September despite previous settings. I requested
Judge Lustre to give us monthly hearings, in July and August. He
told me that he would oblige if I would follow his wishes. As he was
saying that, he was already touching my breast. He exposed his
penis at told me to perform "fellatio." I refused. I was then told to
return the following day, the same time and he will wait for
me.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
19. I came backs on June 16, around 7:00 A.M. As ordered, I
proceeded to the Calamba Church to wait for Judge Lustre. He
fetch (sic) me from there on board his white Toyota car and he
brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing,
Calamba, Laguna. I could not refuse because of the threat about
our case. Inside the room at Riverview, he told me there will be a
setting for July and August. Then he undressed himself and
ordered me to do the same. I knew I was selling myself to the devil
but our blood money is at stake. It is for the future of my son and I
was willing to do anything for my family. Perhaps I was too stupid
to do it, but at that time, I felt. helpless. He ordered me to perform
"fellatio" on him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his
penis. I also saw black rashes on his body, especially on his legs.
Before we left, he told me to see him again on July 10 in his Office.
20. On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. I went to his
office at 7:00 A.M. Judge Lustre brought me to Riverview Resort
and Sports Complex and I was again ordered to perform "fellatio"
on him.
21. The June 28 hearing proceeded. But I did not go and see Judge
Lustre on July 10 as requested. I just called him and presented an
alibi. He told me to just come the following day, July 11 at 7:00
A.M. at Jollibee, Calamba and he will wait for me. As parting words,
he told me not to fool him.
22. I did not see him on July 11 because I already felt so dirty and
used. I never realized before I was capable of doing such a thing
for my family, until the time came. But I could not take it anymore.
23. On July 27, the hearing proceeded. But the previous schedules
were cancelled and instead hearing was set in November, 1995.
24. On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. I went to his office to get an
order for the referral of the specimen signatures of Rowena Chua
to the NBI. Again, he Kissed me and touched me. I could not
refuse for fear of retaliation.
25. I could see that Judge Paterno H. Lustre is deliberately delaying
the prosecution of our cases to prolong his abusive acts towards
me. As can be seen front the transcript of the hearings, he is not
leaning in our favor. What we are asking only is for the continuous
setting of the trial because we cannot afford a long drawn out
proceedings. But instead, he is delaying the trial. He has even
shown hostility towards my husband when he was testifying and
towards my lawyer, allegedly because he was jealous.
26. This kind of judge gives the judiciary a bad name. There must
be a stop to this evil doings. I am not the only victim of Judge
Lustre. I know at least two (2) other women who are similarly
situated are being used and abused by him. But they do not want
to complain because of fear and the possible consequence to their
cases. As for me, I am emboldened by disgust and frustration. I
now seek the intervention of the Honorable Supreme Court to give
justice to the victims and rid the judiciary of the likes of Judge
Paterno H. Lustre.
27. I know the shame I have to bear but I have to expose the
wrong doings of a judge who is supposed to uphold the law and
morality. But instead, he preys on hapless and those who are not
learned in law as his victims.
28. What I have narrated here are true, which I would never have
revealed were it not for my better sense of judgment. I know I
made a mistake by becoming a willing victim. But I did it for my
family as I thought that is the only way I can help my husband get
back his money for our future. 3
A part from the letter and the sworn statements complainant also
sent the Court 11 photographs showing her and respondent
together in various Places. Five of these were allegedly taken at
the Riverview Resort in, Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a
receipt issued by said resort dated June 23, 1995 and two
transcripts of phone conversations she had with Respondent. 4
Respondent’s defense is anchored on denial. In a "2nd
Indorsement" 5 he sent to the Court, by way of answer to the
complaint, he "strongly denie(d)" 6 the charges leveled against him
and dismissed them as "the vile products of (complainant’s)
malicious and prejudiced mind" 7 According to him. complainant
and her common-law husband thought of filing charges against him
when he "refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty
and arrogant demands . . .to hastily schedule, try continuously,
finish and decide arbitrarily within a very short period of time" 8
the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by complainant’s
husband. The complaint was, according to respondent, likewise
prompted by respondent’s refusal to accept complainant’s offer to
"reward" him with five percent of the P3.5 million her husband
seeks to recover.
Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers
as early as 7:00 in the morning as alleged by complainant since he
usually arrives for work some five to ten minutes before 8:00 in
the morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never
locked — thus, the impossibility of him engaging in illicit sexual
conduct within its confines — since the only comfort room in the
courtroom is inside his room and anyone who wants to use it may
enter his room freely.
Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, With a heart
ailment and diabetes," (s)ex is beyond (his) physical capacity." 9
He said he is "no longer capable of what ordinary men indulge in,
lest (he) die in the attempt." 10 He sought the dismissal of the
complaint filed against him.
In support of his claims respondent submitted the following
documentary evidence: (1) affidavit executed by Rodelio A Alcaraz,
a utility worker, stating that respondent usually arrives at the office
at 7:45 in the morning; (2) affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A.
Alonzo, Sr., a private practitioner based in Calamba, attesting to
respondent’s fine work ethics and moral uprightness; and (3)
certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc stating that respondent is
being treated for coronary artery diseases, a trial fibrillation, and
diabetes mellitus. 11
In response to respondent’s averments, complainant alleged that
respondent had set their meetings at 7:00 in the morning since he
since he knew that nobody from his staff reported for work that
early. She said respondent was very particular about the time she
left his office, which must be before 7:30 in the morning. As for
respondent’s health condition, complainant pointed out that,
indeed, he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her but only
engaged in foreplay and asked her to perform oral sex on him; and
while diabetes might haze diminished respondent’s sexual urge, it
did not totally erase the same. 12
In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer
the matter to Judge Norberto Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, for investigation, report and
recommendation. In the same resolution, respondent was directed
to inhibit himself from hearing the B.P. 22 cases filed by
complainant’s husband.
On January 8 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed
to inhibit himself from hearing the case because complainant raised
the matter of his friendship with Respondent. 13 The Court,
however in a Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request
and directed him to resolve the case with dispatch. 14
In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez recommended
dismissal of the complaint against respondent since complainant
failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Judge Geraldez observed that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the B.P. 22 cases pending before Judge Lustre, Jose Zafra was
never assured that he could recover the amount of P3.5 million
even if the sexual demands were satisfied. Jose Zafra and Ms.
Liwanag were aware of this. Consequently, it is surprising why the
complainant, no matter how desperate she may have been, would
submit to oral sex. And, why Jose Zafra allowed it.
The B.P. 22 cases are simply not classic cases where the court’s
decision would be so vital, that the judge can demand his "price" .
There is a rather large disparity in the value of the "B.P. 22’’ cases
vis-a-vis the seriousness and mess of the sexual demand. Ms.
Liwanag’s allegations are beyond comprehension. It borders on the
very credibility of the sexual allegations. This is specially true with
respect to the allegations of oral sex with its blood secretions. And,
according to her she did it more than once. If indeed there were
"blood secretions" the first time, the claim of a second time is
beyond relief (sic),
Ms. Liwanag claimed that Judge Lustre, on August 15, 1995, simply
kissed and touched her. But human nature would demand another
oral sex as they had done before. Moreover, in her complaint dated
September 19, 1995, Ms. Liwanag failed to advance any reason
why they stopped at oral sex. 15
Judge Geraldez concluded that the evidence presented by
complainant is not credible in itself.
Moreover, Judge Geraldez pointed out that complainant merely
relied on the photographs showing her and respondent together,
which, however, do not establish the acts complained of. Despite
having the opportunity to do so, according to the report,
complainant failed to testify to substantiate her claims, thereby
depriving respondent of his right to cross-examine her.
Judge Geraldez recommended that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of evidence.
The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
The OCA, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took a
position directly, opposite that of Judge Geraldez.
The OCA noted that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . we cannot help discerning here an effort to gloss over a
charge against respondent which the investigating judge himself
admitted to be serious. His investigative work and his subsequent
report reveal a perfunctory treatment and analysis of the
submissions of the parties, particularly the complainant herein, and
an egregious misapplication of the law and jurisprudence.
x       x       x

We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M.
Liwanag. Her narration bears the earmarks of truth, of truth, for
the incidents giving rise to the acts complained of are so finely
etched by her as to preclude any suspicion of wild imagining or
other similar fictive handiwork. It is an essential baring of rage,
revulsion and disgust: . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an
administrative complaint and that respondent be dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned and — controlled corporations.
Clearly, we have to review the records of this case for a
comprehensive view of the entire controversy. Moreover, it is
essential to lay stress on basic canons of conduct applicable to
judges, in whatever level of the judicial hierarchy they may be.
As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in
deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is
required, 16 as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence: 17
"SECTION 5. Substantial Evidence. — In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion."cralaw virtua1aw library
Given this requirement, we find that there is enough evidence on
record to sufficiently establish complainant’s case
against Respondent.
The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her
and respondent in various places. The first two show them talking
beside an outlet of Andok’s Litson Manok, another shows
respondent’s car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door
open. The car is seen leaving in the next photograph. In the next
two photographs, the car is seen in the driveway of what appears
to be one of a row of room. On top of this room’s doorway is the
letter "D." Next are five photographs which show complainant and
respondent coming out of the room together and heading towards
respondent’s parked car. 18
Complainant claims that the photographs were taken when
respondent took her to the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna.
In a Manifestation dated September 2, 1996, respondent pointed
out that nothing indecent is portrayed in the photographs. They did
not show any act constituting immorality or grave misconduct. He
denied that the pictures showing him and complainant leaving a
room together were taken at the Riverview Resort. He added that
the receipt issued by the resort did not indicate that he was with
complainant at said resort.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent took his own set of photographs at the Riverview
Resort. 19 On the basis of his own pictures, he concluded
complainant’s photographs could not have been taken at that
resort. When he testified on his behalf, he
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . when I went to the place those letters were not there, I have
photographs there because I personally went there to have these
photographs but this (sic) sign boards were not there, sir." 20
A sign prohibiting vandalism, noticeable in complainant’s pictures,
was missing in respondent’s pictures.
Respondent avers that the real intention of complainant in filing the
complaint — which she has denied — is to extort money from him
as she allegedly made an "outrageous demand" 21 for P3.5 million
to settle the case.
We are not convinced however, that respondent’s conduct in this
case is entirely blameless, nor that complainant’s alleged intent
would excuse respondent’s wrongdoing.
It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and
complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual congress.
However, this is understandable since by their very nature, such
acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case,
what is available to us is only the narration of the parties involved.
Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview.
He took pictures of the resort himself to prove his contention. He
said his pictures are different from those of complainant’s.

We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the
one appearing with complainant in the photographs. He
conveniently testified that somebody else had posed for the
photograph, 22 but this is obviously an afterthought. Respondent
made this assertion almost a year after complainant filed her
complaint. He could have done it as early as October 1995 in his
comment to complainant’s charges.
If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken
and why was respondent with complainant at that time? If, indeed,
there was a legitimate reason for complainant and respondent to
be seen together at the time and place depicted in the
photographs, respondent would have wasted no time explaining
where they were taken and under what circumstances, in order to
extricate himself from his present predicament. This, he failed to
do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer
any plausible explanation why he was seen with complainant
coming out of what is apparently a private room.
Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are
products of complainant’s vindictiveness. Again, this claim raises
more questions than it answers. It opens the door to undue
speculations. Thus, why should she resent his actions? Was it only
because of repeated postponements of the hearing of her cases?
Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent
due to the unjustifiable delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases.
But would she falsely accuse respondent with sexual molestation
only to get back at him? This goes against the grain of human
nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing
her sexual misadventures with respondent, graphically describing
each and every detail, she would only be exposing herself and her
family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from
the exercise save the hope that her dignity may somehow be
vindicated in the process.
As for complainant’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of
no moments Complainant’s affidavit stands in lieu of her
testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and
re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part
of complainant’s evidence. 23
Complainant could have been cross-examined based on her
affidavit. That she was not cross-examined by respondent is not
her fault but respondent’s.
As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the
Court Administrator’s assessment that respondent has failed to live
up to the high standard of conduct required of members of the
bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary and to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his
private life as well. 24 All to the grave prejudice of the
administration of justice, indeed.
The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of
the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which
erodes rather than enhances the public’s faith and trust in the
judiciary. Respondent’s disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions
even if he has already retired as of November 1, 1998. 25 For the
serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule
140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the
maximum amount should be imposed. 26
We are not in accord with the OCA’s recommendation, however, as
regards forfeiture of all retirement benefits due Respondent. We
note that implementation of this penalty, while directed at
respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family,
who are dependent on him and his retirement gratuity. It is our
considered view that, given the circumstances of this case, the
maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be sufficient penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent
GUILTY of gross misconduct. As he has already retired from the
service and thus could no longer be dismissed nor suspended, we
hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to
be deducted from his retirement benefits. Further, he is hereby
barred from any employment in all branches of the government
including government-owned and-controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891. July 28, 2005
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 123.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On November 21, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a
Letter1 dated November 3, 2003 from "Concerned citizens of the lower court"
reporting the alleged "practices" of Judge Edmundo T. Acuña, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City, Branch 123. According to the letter, the respondent Judge conducted
trials, signed orders and even sentenced accused while on official leave from August
15, 2001 to September 15, 2001. Among the decided cases were as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. C-63250 People v. Alex Sabayan;
2. Crim. Case No. C-63261-62 People v. Renato Simo;
3. Crim. Case No. C-61323 People v. Elizabeth Canaberal;
4. Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Narciso Asistio, et al.; and
5. Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Marlon Duritan.
The letter went on to question whether the respondent had authority to impose such
sentences, issue orders and conduct hearings. Aside from listing the respondent’s
"dialogues," his "favorite expressions" were likewise listed, as follows:
1. Putris
2. Anak ng pating
3. Putang Ina
4. Pogi, beauty
5. Tulungan nyo naman ako, hirap na hirap na ko.
6. Mali ka na naman.
According to the unknown complainants, the respondent Judge also "spends much of
his energy talking" and loves to berate and embarrass people, not caring whether he
speaks in open court, as long as he has an audience. The complainants further stated
that the respondent’s decisions usually take about seven to ten drafts, as he
"changes his mind so many times." It was further alleged that the respondent loves to
"glorify himself," and that his behavior was weird.
In his comment, the respondent averred that the writers of the letter were actuated by
improper motive, and sent the letter with no other purpose than to harass him.
Furthermore, the allegations in the letter were fabricated, exaggerated, or misquoted.
Anent the allegation that he conducted trials, signed orders and issued sentences
while he was on official leave, the respondent alleged that he was issued an Authority
to Travel2 dated August 14, 2001 duly approved and signed by then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida Elepaño allowing him to travel to Toronto, Canada to visit his
brother, who unfortunately passed away before he could leave. As evidenced by the
entries in the daily time records/logbook,3 he was not yet on leave from August 15,
2001 to August 21, 2001. As such, he had the "right and duty to come to court and
conduct trials, sign orders and issue sentences." His application4 for a thirty-day leave
was from August 21, 2001 to September 21, 2001, duly approved by Deputy Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez.
On the allegation that he exhibited weird behavior, he explained that he was still
mourning the loss of his eldest son who died of a fatal aneurism last December 21,
2002. His son, who was at the prime of his life, had just taken the 2002 bar
examinations and was employed at a law firm. The respondent Judge surmised that
the unknown complainants may have seen and observed him at the "second phase of
his recovery," a time when he was depressed and angry.
As to the alleged humiliating statements that he made, the respondent Judge
admitted having made some of them while he was discussing the performance ratings
of his staff. He insisted, however, that he had been misquoted, and dismissed as
mere fabrication some of the statements attributed to him. He admitted, however, that
"putris, putang-ina, beauty and pogi" were among his favorite expressions, but
clarified that he did not use them often, certainly not in open court.
In its Report dated September 17, 2004, the OCA recommended that the instant
administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that the
respondent be reprimanded for ignorance of a policy on leave of absence expressed
through the ruling of the Court in Paz v. Tiong,5 where it was held that a judge on
leave of absence "would have absolutely no authority to discharge his duties or
exercise the powers of a judge." The OCA made the following evaluation:
Official records culled from the OCA Office of Administrative Services indicate that
Judge Acuña had an approved application for leave covering the period from 21
August 2001 to 21 September 2001. This application for leave of absence was
approved on 3 August 2001. In view of this approved application for leave, it was a
natural expectation that Judge Acuña would cease from exercising his functions
during the said period.
However, per verification with the clerk-in-charge at RTC Branch 123, Caloocan City,
respondent Judge Acuña presided over the following cases on 21 August 2001:
1. Criminal Case No. C-63250 entitled "People v. Alex Sibayan";
2. Criminal Case No. 63261-62 entitled "People v. Renato Simo"; and
3. Criminal Case No. 61323 entitled "People v. Canaberal".
In his Comment dated 19 January 2004, the respondent judge admitted reporting for
work on 21 August 2001 and presiding over two (2) criminal cases. He even took
pride in the fact that he did not go on leave that day, pointing to the court’s logbook as
proof of his attendance.
The admission by Judge Acuña confirms the allegation in the anonymous letter that
he performed his functions on a day when he was already on leave of absence. The
reference made by the respondent judge to the logbook only serves to establish that
he indeed performed his duties on 21 August 2001 – the first day of his official leave.
We state that not even his overzealousness to work can shield him from
administrative liability for ignorance of the consequences of his approved application
for leave of absence.6
In a Resolution7 dated December 8, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa for investigation, report
and recommendation. The respondent manifested that he was going to file an
extended comment, which the Investigating Justice allowed.
In his supplemental comment, the respondent alleged that he decided to defer his
leave for another week as his siblings who would be going with him to Canada had
not yet secured their visas. The respondent alleged that he was even uncertain if this
could be done by amending his travel authority. Jenny Rivera-Baliton, the clerk in
charge of criminal cases in the respondent’s sala, informed him that this would take
another week or so. Ms. Rivera-Baliton executed an affidavit attesting to the veracity
of the respondent’s claim. Thus, the respondent decided not to defer his leave
anymore, and no longer reported for work beginning August 22, 2001. On the issue of
hearing cases on August 21, 2001 despite his approved travel authority and approved
leave, the respondent claimed, thus:
… I was not actuated by any evil or improper motive. Neither was I motivated by any
monetary consideration or otherwise except by my desire to discharge my sworn duty
to administer justice expeditiously. I acted in good faith and in the honest belief that I
had the right to defer the effectivity of my leave chargeable against the 30-day
forfeitable leave benefit. I wish to reiterate at this juncture what I stated in my original
comment that the leave I applied for in 2001 was my first full availment of the 30-day
forfeitable leave. Previously, and even after 2001, I went on forfeitable leave only for
several days and never consumed the complete 30 days leave accorded to judges. In
hearing cases on August 21, 2001, I did not receive any extra remuneration for it. The
public service was not prejudiced thereby. I had in mind only the interest of the
accused who were in detention. I had no intention of violating any rule, nor was it ever
my intention to prejudice anybody. On that day, as in the past, I had a heavy case
load, involving detention prisoners as I [my court is] a Drugs Court. (My court is also a
commercial [law] and [Intellectual Property Law] Court, the only branch in Caloocan
City which is that). Had I not heard the cases of the accused who pleaded guilty on
that day, they would have waited for my return after 30 days.
If I committed any infraction of the rules on leave, in all sincerity, to reiterate, there
was no intention at all on my part to so disregard the rules. If I committed any
infraction, I plead for the leniency of this Court with a promise that I will not commit a
repetition thereof anymore.8
The Investigating Justice thereafter submitted her Report, recommending that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. She ratiocinated that while the respondent
Judge admitted having performed his functions on August 21, 2001, the date of the
commencement of his approved leave, there was nothing repulsive in deferring the
date of his leave. Moreover, there was no showing that the respondent was actuated
by any ulterior motive other than to lessen his workload. According to the
Investigating Justice, the respondent’s decision to report for work that day appears to
have been motivated by his honest belief that he could defer his leave and make the
necessary adjustments later; he had no clear intent to deliberately ignore the rules
regarding vacation leaves. The Investigating Justice further pointed out that nobody
was prejudiced by the respondent’s appearance during that day, and went on to state:
However, respondent should bear in mind that approved leaves are filed through
official documents and in the future, such act may obliterate the validity of the
issuances he made while on official leave when his orders, decisions and other
promulgations reflect a date when he is already supposed to be on leave. Thus, he
should exercise utmost caution regarding these matters.
Therefore, in our consideration, the act of respondent does not constitute such a
gross ignorance of the rules that will warrant an administrative liability. In view of the
lack of malice and improper motive in reporting for work and discharging his functions
and taking into account his desire to dispense justice promptly, respondent cannot be
said to have been grossly ignorant of the rules as to be deemed administratively
liable.9
As to the use of humiliating and insensitive expressions, the Investigating Justice
agreed with the OCA that the use of "putris" and "putang ina" were unfit expressions
for men of the robe. It did not matter that they were not directed to any person in
particular, as they give the impression of a person’s ill manners. Considering that the
respondent is not an ordinary citizen, such intemperate language detracts from how a
judge should conduct himself. The Investigating Justice made the following
conclusion:
In sum, we find that the allegations in the anonymous complaint, some of which were
admitted with qualifications by the respondent, are not sufficient to warrant a penalty
other than to remind him of the rules regarding official leaves and of proper conduct of
judges.
As a final note, respondent is reminded that as a judge, it is paramount that a judge’s
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of his official duties, but also
in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This includes following simple rules
as well as conducting himself in the most respectable and honorable manner
possible. Only through such kind of demeanor of the members of the judiciary that the
institution earns the respect and faith of our people in the administration of justice.10

The Court agrees with the Investigating Justice’s observation that the respondent’s
use of such expletives is improper for the extolled office of a magistrate of the law. By
virtue of the very office he holds, the public expects more of the respondent as he
undeniably occupies an exalted yet delicate niche in the administration of justice.
Those who don the judicial robe and wield the judicial gavel ought to impress in their
consciousness that appearance is an essential manifestation of reality.11 Thus, the
respondent’s claim that his "favorite expressions" were not directed at anyone in
particular is unacceptable.

Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct
and in language.12 Indeed, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.13 Propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.14 We recognize, of course, that judges are also human beings, with their own
burdens and private affairs. However, having accepted the esteemed position of
judge, the respondent ought to have known that more is expected of him than an
ordinary citizen. As subjects of constant public scrutiny, personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen should be freely and willingly
accepted by a judge. In particular, he or she must exhibit conduct consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.15 Indeed, a judge’s personal behavior, not only while in
the performance of official duties, must be beyond reproach, being the visible
personification of law and of justice.16

Thus, while we commiserate with the respondent Judge for the loss of his brother and
son, we cannot spare him from the consequences of his unacceptable behavior.

In Ignacio v. Valenzuela,17 a judge who heard a motion while he was on vacation was
held guilty of impropriety and was meted a fine of one month’s salary. To reiterate, a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.18 Thus, in conducting hearings and promulgation of decisions on the day
when his official leave of absence was to commence, the respondent Judge was
guilty of impropriety. Considering, however, that no bad faith or ill motive can be
attributed to the respondent, the Court deems it proper to reprimand him for his
actuations.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edmundo T. Acuña is found GUILTY of impropriety

and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is STERNLY WARNED that the repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055               December 17, 2009
HEIRS OF THE LATE REV. FR. JOSE O. ASPIRAS, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE CLIFTON U. GANAY, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 31, AGOO, LA UNION, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from an unsigned letter-complaint1 dated
June 6, 2005, filed by the heirs of the late Reverend Father Jose O. Aspiras
addressed to the Court Administrator, requesting that an investigation be conducted
by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the alleged abuse of authority of
respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
31, Agoo, La Union in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, entitled
"In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras."
In the letter, the heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras state the following:
That the judge in the above mentioned case has been abusing his authority as
observed by the Heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras as he previously ordered to
withdraw the amount of P50,000.00 in his favor from the bank account of the late
Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras on December 17, 2004 for him to purchase law books. As
per his order, he alleged that, ‘In the spirit of this Yuletide season and considering the
efforts of the Judge of this Court, the guardians in the above entitled case deemed it
best to give him fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of law books to aid him in his
work as a judge.’ The truth of the matter is that this has been the idea of Judge
Ganay, himself, and was never consented by the guardians. For your reference,
attached is a photocopy of this order.
There are still other orders issued by Judge Ganay ordering the bank to release
certain amounts from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras in his
favor without the written consent of the guardians. Unfortunately, photocopies of
these orders cannot be attached for your reference as no copies of these orders were
sent to the guardians. The copies can be found in the records of the case being kept
by the said court.
The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and examination of the records of SP
Case No. A-1026 from August 30 to September 2, 2005. The investigating team
selected pertinent documents relative to the anonymous complaint in order to verify
the irregularities allegedly committed by respondent Judge Ganay.
From the documents gathered, the investigating team found that the Order2 dated
December 17, 2004 was indeed issued by respondent Judge Ganay. For the money
received from the said order, respondent Judge Ganay even issued an
Acknowledgement Receipt3 dated December 22, 2004. The team also discovered that
on several occasions, respondent Judge Ganay issued numerous orders4 directing
the manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Agoo, La Union Branch, to draw
checks from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras amounting to several thousands
of pesos in the name of the Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia
P. Eslao (OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao) for the purpose of purchasing cellular phone
prepaid cards. The said cards were received by respondent Judge Ganay and OIC-
Clerk of Court Eslao as evidenced by acknowledgement receipts5 signed by them on
several dates.
The investigating team also discovered two other orders6 issued by respondent Judge
Ganay directing the manager of PNB, Agoo, La Union Branch to draw from the
account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras checks in the amount of forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000.00) each for the purpose of purchasing three (3) cellular phones.
Thereafter, OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao submitted a Report on Expenses7 dated March
1, 2005 enumerating in detail how the money was spent for buying three (3) cellular
phones.
In a Resolution8 dated January 17, 2006, this Court resolved to:
(a) DIRECT Judge Clifton S. Ganay and Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court
Precilla Olympia P. Eslao, both of RTC, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union, to submit their
respective comments on the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 of the Heirs of the
Late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras and the report dated September 22, 2005 of Attys.
Reynan M. Dollison and Kenneth P. Fulton, Legal Office, OCA, and to show cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against them, both within ten (10) days
from notice hereof;
(b) AUTHORIZE the Office of the Court Administrator to secure the complete records
of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, entitled In the Matter of the Guardianship of
Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras; and
(c) DIRECT Executive Judge Samuel R. Martires, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union,
to safekeep immediately the case records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026,
consisting of three (3) volumes, and thereafter, surrender the same to a duly
authorized representative of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Respondent Judge Ganay sent a letter9 dated March 3, 2006 to the Clerk of Court
stating that he had yet to receive a copy of the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 of
the heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras against him and the report dated September 22,
2005 made by the OCA lawyers who conducted a surprise inspection and
examination of the records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026. He further stated
that he should be given a medal for effecting a speedy settlement of the estate of the
late Rev. Fr. Aspiras among his heirs. Respondent Judge Ganay maintained that all
his actions merely implemented the orders of the two (2) property guardians of the
late Rev. Fr. Aspiras.
Respondent Judge Ganay, together with OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao, subsequently filed
a Motion to Furnish Copies dated March 13, 2006 reiterating his earlier manifestation
that he had not yet received copies of the documents that he was directed to
comment on through the Resolution dated January 17, 2006. Respondent Judge
Ganay again moved that they be furnished copies of the said documents so that they
could properly and intelligently comment thereon.
And again on March 22, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay filed a Manifestation10 dated
March 21, 2006, submitting an Advance Comment11 dated March 21, 2006, despite
the fact that he had not yet received copies of the documents that he was directed to
comment on. According to respondent Judge Ganay, he was submitting his Advance
Comment "to show to the Supreme Court that its foot soldier of Branch 31, RTC,
AGOO, La Union deserves a MEDAL, not a disciplinary action."
In his Advance Comment dated March 21, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay explained
that the cellular phones were purchased upon the orders of the two (2) property
guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras. He further explained that the communication
devices were for the fast networking of information for the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras who
was then the ward of the court. Respondent Judge Ganay also narrated that the
property guardians persistently asked him to take a vacation in the United States,
which he declined. According to him, they kept on asking him what they could do to
help the court. He, in reply, mentioned that lawbooks would enhance the appearance
of his office and make it look scholarly and presentable. They then appropriated fifty
thousand (₱50,000.00) pesos for the purchase of books.
Respondent Judge Ganay expounded on the system of checks and balances that he
devised for the handling of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras’ funds, thus:
I am just the implementor of the orders of the guardians. In the case of the property
guardians, I only implement if the order is unanimous, i.e., if both property guardians
assent.
Why? Because in order to safeguard Reverend Aspiras[’] wealth, one property
guardian not taking advantage of the other, it was arranged that I would be the
implementor of their orders. And so if the guardian over the ward’s person says that
the ward should have a wheelchair and the property guardians say okay, I issue an
order directed to the bank manager where the ward’s moneys are to release the
stated amount (after a choice of wheel-chair was made by the guardian over the
ward’s person). The bank issues a check and have it delivered to the OIC-Branch
Clerk of Court, from which the guardian over the person retrieves. That way there will
be no lamangan, no gulangan between the two (2) property guardians belonging to
opposite camps.
In a Resolution12 dated April 18, 2006, this Court granted respondent Judge Ganay’s
motion that he be furnished with copies of the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005
and the report dated September 22, 2005.
In another Manifestation13 dated May 16, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay again stated
that he and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao had not yet received copies of the documents
they were required to comment on. This prompted the Court to issue another
Resolution14 dated July 11, 2006, directing the Office of the Clerk of Court to furnish
respondent Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao copies of the said documents.
OIC Clerk of Court Eslao submitted her Comment15 dated August 22, 2006 and
explained, thus:
The prepaid cell cards were purchased upon the knowledge and approval of the
property guardians.
There were 7 cellphones which were regularly fed with prepaid cell cards. These were
automatic expenses on a regular basis. The regularity was every 2 months because
the lifetime of a prepaid card is 60 days. Hence, the amount of regular expenses for
prepaid cards was something like P21,000.00 annually. For 2 years, the regular
amount was something like P42,000.00.
The 3 cellphones mentioned in the Memorandum (November 2004) were the
replacement cellphones of the 3 guardians.
My position as OIC-Branch Clerk of Court functioned as the clearinghouse so that
there could be monitoring of the activities regarding the ward in this special
proceeding.
There was nothing irregular in all these purchases because they were upon the
written orders of Judge Ganay, who, in turn, was himself requested-ordered by the
property guardians.
BESIDES, the parties had long ago buried the hatchet as of August 22, 2005 even
before the 2 OCA lawyers came to this Court (August 31, 2005).
This is a case of a false alarm.
Respondent Judge Ganay again submitted an Extended Comment16 dated August 22,
2006 and narrated the peculiar circumstances in connection with Special Proceeding
Case No. A-1026, entitled "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O.
Aspiras," to wit:
When Father Aspiras suffered a stroke sometime in September of 2001, paralyzing a
portion of his body, his sister Gloria Aspiras Mamaril filed a petition for guardianship
asking the Court that she be appointed guardian primarily because she is a sister.
This was opposed by Helen Grace Canlas, a daughter of Alejandro Aspiras (brother
of Father Aspiras). After several hearings that established the legal incompetency of
Father Aspiras, the heirs including those with stakes to protect (numbering more than
25 in all) agreed that the personal guardian should be, as she was appointed by the
Court eventually, HELEN GRACE CANLAS. The property guardians who were
appointed were the living brother and sister of Father Aspiras, namely Gloria Aspiras
Mamaril and Alejandro Aspiras. Both Gloria Aspiras Mamaril and Alejandro Aspiras
are retired public servants, Gloria, being a retired DEPed elementary school teacher
while Alejandro, a retired Navy man. After 2 years or so as one of the property
guardians, because he could no longer come up to the third floor where Branch 31
RTC holds office, Alejandro Aspiras begged off, to be substituted by one of his
learned daughters, Professor Mercedita A. Mabutas. She was appointed later in lieu
of her father. She is a Professor of Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University
(DMMMSU) based in AGOO, La Union.
Normally, a ward of a Court has only one guardian. But the ward of this Court, Father
Jose Aspiras, had three (3) guardians. This is because I had to accommodate both
warring camps to avert a continuing war that would not redound to the benefit of the
ward of the Court.
xxx
It was agreed that no withdrawals from the bank account of Father Aspiras shall be
allowed without a written order from me.
In order that not one of the 3 guardians could act independently of the other, a system
was developed whereby the judge (and that’s me) only could order the manager of
the bank to issue a check in such amount that will cover and answer for a certain
need (see, also pages 8-9, ADVANCE COMMENT, March 21, 2006).
In other words, I and I alone, by agreement with the guardians, held the key to the
bank vault.
While I held the key to the bank, the property guardians were the ones who could
request-order me to instruct the manager of the bank to draw or issue a check.
xxx
Contrary to what the writer of that Letter-Complaint dated June 6, 2005, every order
for the withdrawal of moneys have been all highly REGULAR. There was nothing that
was irregular.
That’s why after the heirs have chosen to peacefully settle among themselves in the
last week of July 2005, I was prevailed upon by the heirs to stay a little longer so that
I can make orders to the bank manager for the eventual, which was a certainty,
distribution of the moneys for the heirs. On August 22, 2005, after the filing of the
inventory of properties by the property guardians, on the same date (August 22,
2005), the heirs executed an EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND
ARRANGEMENT OF ESTATE, which wrote finis to the squabble among the heirs and
the sub-heirs. Eventually their shares in money were distributed. I was hailed as a
hero, savior, Santa Claus, godfather. Some of the heirs adopted me a member of
their family. All of them gave balatos one way or another all due to the fast distribution
of their shares. Those who came from Australia, Tarlac and outlying areas beyond the
Province of La Union were most grateful.
Respondent Judge Ganay also addressed the allegation that he and his cohorts were
attempting to "withdraw at least the amount of about FOUR MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS (₱4,400.00.00)" (sic) from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr.
Aspiras. According to him, he could do it since he held the key to the bank, but he
could not and would not do it for the following reasons:
xxx First, I fear God and the Supreme Court. Second, I was not raised that way by my
poor but dignified parents (mother: retired DEPed public school principal;
father: deceased, municipal employee). Third, I am satisfied with my present
earning. Fourth, I have no need for that kind of sum. Fifth, I have a name to protect,
being the recipient of many awards. And sixth, I am an automatic applicant to the
Court of Appeals by virtue of R.A. 6713.
In a Resolution17 dated August 29, 2006, this Court referred the instant case to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Report18 dated March 12, 2007, the OCA rejected the explanations of
respondent Judge Ganay and found him guilty of violating Sections 13 and 14 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
recommended the following actions:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable
Court are our recommendations that:
a) the instant administrative case be REDOCKETED;
b) Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
31, Agoo, La Union, be FINED the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00);
c) Likewise, OIC-Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P[.] Eslao, be FINED the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); [and]
d) The records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of three
(3) volumes, under the custody of the Office of the Court Administrator, (per
resolution dated January 17, 2006) shall be returned back to the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 31, Agoo, La Union.
After a judicious review of the record of this administrative matter, we find that
respondent Judge Ganay has indeed violated Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section
15, of Canon 4 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.19 The
aforesaid provisions on Propriety state:
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any
gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be
done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their
influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their
duties or functions.
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges
may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is
made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as
intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give
rise to an appearance of partiality.
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. Lower court judges, such as respondent Judge Ganay, play an
important role in the promotion of the people's faith in the judiciary. They are front-
liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their
interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the
admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of
impropriety is more sternly applied to them.20
In Dulay v. Lelina, Jr.,21 the Court held:
Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary. A magistrate of law must comport himself at all times in such manner that
his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges
shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are mandated not
to allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment,
nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge. The Code clearly prohibits judges or members of their
families from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with
the performance of judicial duties.
Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks
worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards
from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the
court, constitute impropriety which the Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge
Ganay’s act of issuing Orders directing the manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to
draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of the late Rev. Fr.
Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the court to suspicion of
irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings.
This Court finds unsatisfactory the explanations propounded by respondent Judge
Ganay for his actuations in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026. He
tried justifying his act of receiving cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid
cards from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras as necessary for the
networking of information about the ward of the court. He likewise rationalized his
acceptance of the lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos from the property guardians
as his way of showing them that he "appreciate[d] their show of appreciation of [his]
judicial work for the ward and to all other cases." Respondent Judge Ganay explained
that he did not want the property guardians "to feel resentful (‘tampo’), frustrated or
shamed (‘mapahiya’) if [he] would refuse their generosity."1avvphi1
This Court has always stressed that a judge should avoid impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety in all activities, and that he should perform his duties
honestly and with impartiality and diligence. Also, a judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.22 Since respondent Judge Ganay occupied an exalted position in the
administration of justice, he should pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him;
and his official, as well as his private, conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety23.
As held in Edaño v. Asdala:24
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent,
are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and
confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. Integrity
and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in
the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which
the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ‘ensure
that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of reasonable observers.’ Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that
independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected
in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the
eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus,
judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in
the dispensation of justice. xxx
With regard to the recommendation of the OCA to impose a fine of Five Thousand
(₱5,000.00) Pesos on OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao, this Court finds the same to be
without basis. In her Comment dated August 22, 2006, OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao
sufficiently explained that she merely followed the official orders of respondent Judge
Ganay in issuing the Acknowledgment Receipts for the prepaid cards for the cellular
phones. Moreover, nowhere in the OCA Report dated March 12, 2007 is a discussion
regarding OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao’s participation in the alleged irregularities in
Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026.
WHEREFORE, for violating Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay is
FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) with a stern warning
that a repetition of similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.
Let the records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of three (3)
volumes, under the custody of the Office of the Court Administrator (per resolution
dated January 17, 2006), be returned to Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of
Agoo, La Union.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184487               February 27, 2013
HON. MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, 4th Judicial Region, Calamba
City, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEF ALBERTS COMILANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated July 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101081 finding petitioner Medel Arnaldo Belen (Judge Belen) guilty
of indirect contempt in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Calamba City, Laguna, Branch 36, and imposing upon him the penalty of
fine in the amount of ₱30,000.00.
Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution dated August 27, 20082 denying
reconsideration.
The Facts
The antecedents of the instant controversy are the same as the ensuing factual milieu
that gave rise to A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216,3 an administrative case filed by respondent
State Prosecutor Josef Albert Comilang (State Prosecutor Comilang) against Judge
Belen, viz:
State Prosecutor Comilang, by virtue of Office of the Regional State Prosecutor
(ORSP) Order No. 05-07 dated February 7, 2005, was designated to assist the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Calamba City in the prosecution of cases. On February 16,
2005, he appeared before Judge Belen of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36,
manifesting his inability to appear on Thursdays because of his inquest duties in the
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Laguna. Thus, on February 21, 2005, he moved that
all cases scheduled for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge Belen be deferred
because he was set to appear for preliminary investigation in the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office on the same day.
Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his February 24, 2005 Order in
Criminal Case No. 12654-2003-C entitled People of the Philippines v. Jenelyn Estacio
("Estacio Case")  requiring him to (1) explain why he did not inform the court of his
previously-scheduled preliminary investigation and (2) pay a fine of ₱500.00 for the
cancellation of all the scheduled hearings.
In response, State Prosecutor Comilang filed his Explanation with Motion for
Reconsideration, followed by a Reiterative Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
with Early Resolution. On May 30, 2005, Judge Belen directed him to explain why
he should not be cited for contempt for the unsubstantiated, callous and
reckless charges extant in his Reiterative Supplemental Motion, and to pay the
postponement fee in the amount of ₱1,200.00 for the 12 postponed cases
during the February 17, 2005 hearing.
In his comment/explanation, State Prosecutor Comilang explained that the contents
of his Reiterative Supplemental Motion were based on "his personal belief made in
good faith and with grain of truth." Nonetheless, Judge Belen rendered a Decision
dated December 12, 2005 finding State Prosecutor Comilang liable for contempt
of court and for payment of ₱20,000.00 as penalty. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied on February 16, 2006, he filed a motion to
post a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the said Decision, which
Judge Belen granted and fixed in the amount of ₱20,000.00.
On April 12, 2006, State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for certiorari  and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94069 assailing Judge
Belen’s May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in the Estacio Case.
On April 24, 2006, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining
Judge Belen from executing and enforcing his assailed Order and Decision for a
period of 60 days, which was subsequently extended with the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued an Order on September 6, 2007
requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the
supersedeas bond and to appear on September 26, 2007 to explain why he
should not be cited indirect contempt of court. In his Compliance, State
Prosecutor Comilang cited the CA’s injunctive writ putting on hold all actions of the
RTC relative to its May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94069. He also manifested that he was waiving his
appearance on the scheduled hearing for the indirect contempt charge against him.
Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order dated September 26, 2007 directing
State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his defiance of the subpoena  and why he
should not be cited for indirect contempt. Judge Belen likewise ordered the
Branch Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena  for him to appear in the October 1,
2007 hearing regarding his failure to comply with previously-issued subpoenas  on
September 18, 2007, and on October 8, 2007 for the hearing on the non-filing of his
supersedeas bond. State Prosecutor Comilang moved to quash the subpoenas  for
having been issued without jurisdiction and in defiance to the lawful order of the CA,
and for the inhibition of Judge Belen.
In an Order dated October 1, 2007, Judge Belen denied the motion to
quash subpoenas, held State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt of court
for his failure to obey a duly served subpoena, and sentenced him to pay a fine of
₱30,000.00 and to suffer two days’ imprisonment. He was also required to post a
supersedeas bond amounting to ₱30,000.00 to stay the execution of the December
12, 2005 Decision.
Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit on October 18, 2007
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Belen with
manifest partiality and malice, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and
gross ignorance of the law in issuing the show cause orders, subpoenas and
contempt citations, in grave defiance to the injunctive writ issued by the CA. x x
x.4 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
On June 26, 2012, the Court resolved A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216 finding Judge Belen
guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, and meting upon
him the penalty of dismissal from service.5
Simultaneous with the filing of the administrative case, State Prosecutor Comilang
also filed before the CA a petition to cite Judge Belen in contempt of court docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 101081. State Prosecutor Comilang averred that by issuing the
Orders dated September 6, 2007, requiring him to explain his failure to post a
supersedeas bond, and September 26, 2007, requiring him to explain why he should
not be cited for contempt for such refusal, Judge Belen openly defied the CA’s
injunctive writ restraining him from implementing the RTC issuances of May 30, 2005
and December 12, 2005 which cited State Prosecutor Comilang for contempt.
On July 3, 2008, the CA found Judge Belen guilty of indirect contempt for his
disobedience of or resistance to lawful court orders as sanctioned in Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. Judge Belen moved for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied. Hence, the present recourse.
Judge Belen asserts that he was deprived of his right to due process because the CA
proceeded to rule on the petition for contempt without considering his Comment
thereon.1âwphi1
He further argues that he did not intend to disrespect the authority of the CA as he
merely misinterpreted the import of the injunctive writ. According to him, the writ
enjoined him from enforcing, executing and implementing the RTC Order dated May
30, 2005 and Decision dated December 12, 2005; it did not prohibit or restrain him
from asking an explanation from State Prosecutor Comilang for his non-compliance
with the order for the posting of a supersedeas bond which he himself sought in order
to hold in abeyance the RTC Decision of December 12, 2005 pending appellate
review.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has partial merit.
It must be stressed that Judge Belen’s dismissal from service as adjudged in A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2216 cannot serve to bar a review of his conviction for indirect contempt.
A single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law and
thus give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.6 A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216
was the administrative aspect while the instant case is the criminal facet of Judge
Belen’s act of issuing the Orders dated September 6, 2007 and September 26, 2007.
Both proceedings are distinct and independent from the other such that the
disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s
and vice versa.7
Nonetheless, the Court stands by its pronouncement in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216 that
the subject act of Judge Belen was contemptuous, for the reason that:
(I)n requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas
bond, in issuing subpoenas  to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to
the contempt proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his
non-compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated
the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to preserve.
xxxx
x x x Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes
contempt, x x x.8 (Citations omitted)
However, the Court finds that his conviction for indirect contempt was procedurally
defective because he was not afforded an opportunity to rebut the contempt charges
against him.
Under Sections 39 and 410 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the following procedural
requisites must be satisfied before the accused may be punished for indirect
contempt: (1) there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt; (2) the respondent must be given the opportunity to
comment on the charge against him; and (3) there must be a hearing and the court
must investigate the charge and consider respondent’s answer. Of these requisites,
the law accords utmost importance to the third as it embodies one’s right to due
process. Hence, it is essential that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity
to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses.11
Prior to the issuance of its Decision dated July 3, 2008 convicting Judge Belen of
indirect contempt, the CA issued a Resolution on February 15, 2008, which succinctly
reads: "Considering the report of the Judicial Records Division dated February 07,
2008 that no comment has been filed as per docket book entry, the Court
RESOLVES to consider the Petition to Cite for Contempt SUBMITTED for
resolution."12
The records, however, reveal the contrary. As certified by CA Clerk of Court, Atty.
Teresita R. Marigomen, the Comment of Judge Belen is appended in the rollo of CA-
G.R. SP No. 101081 commencing on page 56 thereof.13 Registry Receipt No. 140 of
the Calamba Post Office further shows that the Comment was filed on January 29,
2008.14 In fact, upon receipt of the CA Resolution dated February 15, 2008, Judge
Belen submitted on March 3, 2008 a Manifestation to the CA clarifying that he has
already filed his Comment.15
Even if the Resolution dated February 15, 2008 can be justified by the fact that the
Comment reached the CA's receiving section only on February 28, 2008,16 the CA
judgment convicting Judge Belen was rendered on July 3, 2008 or at a time when the
Comment was already at the Court's wherewithal. There was thus no reason for the
CA to disregard the Comment by reiterating in its Decision dated July 3, 2008 that "on
February 15, 2008, the instant Petition was considered submitted for decision without
[Judge Belen's] comment."17

While the essence of due process consists in giving the parties an opportunity to be
heard, it also entails that when the party concerned has been so notified and
thereafter complied with such notification by explaining his side, it behooves the court
to admit the explanation and duly consider it in resolving the case. Despite the patent
evidence, however, that the petitioner submitted his Comment and that it has been
incorporated in the rolla  ofCA-G.R. SP No. 101081, theCA unjustifiably ignored the
same.

The conclusive declaration in A.M. RTJ-1 0-2216 that Judge Belen's disobedience to
the CA's injunctive writ constitutes indirect contempt of court cannot serve as a basis
for the Court to be indifferent to or ignore the obvious violation of his right to be heard,
state his defenses and explain his side. The power to punish for contempt is not
limitless; it must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation,
and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the
individual.18

All told, based on the circumstances disclosed in the records, the CA failed to dutifully
afford Judge Belen his right to be heard. Such failure consists of a serious procedural
defect that effectively nullifies the indirect contempt proceedings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated July 3, 2008 and Resolution dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101081 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136               September 21, 2010
SUSAN O. REYES, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL N. DUQUE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Piñas
City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Facts
In her Verified Complaint, Susan O. Reyes (Reyes) charged respondent Judge
Manuel N. Duque (Judge Duque) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Piñas
City (RTC-Branch 197), with Impropriety, Corruption and Gross Misconduct. Reyes
alleged that she was a party-in-intervention in Land Registration Case No. 06-005
entitled "In re: Petition of Philippine Savings Bank for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession under Act No. 3135 over Properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172 and
T-84847" filed by the Philippine Savings Bank (bank) against the spouses Carolyn
Choi and Nak San Choi (spouses Choi). In a Decision dated 6 November 2006,
Judge Duque granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the bank and ordered the spouses Choi and all those claiming rights under them to
vacate the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172, T-84848, and T-84847 situated
in BF Resort Village, Talon 2, Las Piñas. On 13 August 2007, Reyes filed an "Urgent
Petition for Lifting and Setting Aside of Writ of Possession and Quashal of Notice to
Vacate" claiming that she bought the subject property covered by TCT No. T-85172
from the spouses Choi and that she was in actual possession of the property with full
knowledge of the bank.
At the hearing of Reyes’ petition, Atty. Herminio Ubana, Sr., (Atty. Ubana) the lawyer
of Reyes, introduced her to Judge Duque who allegedly gave Reyes 30 days to settle
matters with the bank. Reyes was unable to re-negotiate with the bank. On the first
week of December 2007, Reyes allegedly received a phone call from Judge Duque
and the latter instructed Reyes to go "to his house and bring some money in order
that he can deny the pending motion to break open." As she did not have the money
yet, Reyes allegedly told Judge Duque that she would see him the following day as
her allotment might arrive by that time. The following day, when her allotment arrived,
Reyes went to the PNB Cubao Branch in Quezon City to withdraw ₱20,000. She, her
secretary, and driver went to the house of Judge Duque at No. 9 CRM Corazon, BF
Almanza, Las Piñas. The son of Judge Duque opened the gate. At his house, Judge
Duque demanded ₱100,000. Reyes gave him ₱20,000 and she asked for time to give
him the balance. After a week, Atty. Ubana called Reyes telling her that Judge Duque
was asking for her and waiting for the balance he demanded. On 21 December 2007,
Reyes went to the house of Judge Duque with ₱18,000 on hand. Judge Duque
allegedly scolded her for not bringing the whole amount of ₱80,000. Reyes explained
that she had difficulty raising the amount. Judge Duque locked the main door of his
house and asked Reyes to step into his office. Judge Duque pointed to a calendar
posted on the wall and pointed to December 26 as the date when she should
complete the amount. All of a sudden, Judge Duque held the waist of Reyes,
embraced and kissed her. Reyes tried to struggle and free herself. Judge Duque
raised her skirt, opened her blouse and sucked her breasts. He touched her private
parts and attempted to have sexual intercourse with Reyes. Reyes shouted for help
but the TV was too loud. As a desperate move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque
saying: "kung gusto mo, huwag dito. Sa hotel, sasama ako sayo." Judge Duque
suddenly stopped his sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her hair.
In his Comment,1 Judge Duque averred that since the complaint of Reyes was filed
after he retired on 21 February 2008, he was no longer under the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He denied the charges hurled against him
and claimed the allegations were "fabricated, false and malicious."
In its Report dated 26 June 2008,2 the OCA found that Reyes actually filed four
identical complaints. First, Reyes filed a complaint dated 16 January 2008 duly
subscribed on 23 January 2008. Reyes was directed to comply with the requirement
of verification and she complied by filing on 20 February 2008 verified complaints with
the Office of the Chief Justice and the OCA. On 12 March 2008, Reyes filed for the
third time another verified complaint with the OCA which was a mere reiteration of her
previous complaints. The OCA opined that the jurisdiction of the Court at the time of
the filing of the complaint was not lost by the mere fact that Judge Duque had ceased
to be in office during the pendency of the case. Thus, as recommended by the OCA,
the case was referred to a Court of Appeals’ Justice3 for investigation, report and
recommendation per Resolution dated 6 August 2008.4
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
On the charge of graft and corruption, Reyes presented photocopies of ₱1,000 bills to
prove that Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration of
a favorable ruling. The Investigating Justice, however, found no compelling evidence
to corroborate Reyes’ accusation as it was doubtful whether these were the same bills
used to pay off Judge Duque.5
On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, the Investigating Justice opined
that the act of Judge Duque in embracing and kissing Reyes, sucking her breasts and
touching her most intimate parts were certainly acts of lewdness that were downright
obscene, detestable, and unwelcome. These acts were established by substantial
evidence. The Investigating Justice, however, stated that Reyes’ description of the
sexual assault could not be deemed as attempted rape.6
The Investigating Justice found Judge Duque guilty of impropriety and gross
misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended
the imposition of fine of ₱40,000 which should be deducted from the retirement
benefits of Judge Duque.
Report of the Court Administrator
In his Memorandum,7 the Court Administrator8 confirmed that Judge Duque
compulsorily retired from the judiciary on 21 February 2008. He opined that the
conduct of Judge Duque bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. The actions of
Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary. Judge
Duque failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary.
The Court Administrator recommended that a ₱40,000 fine be imposed on Judge
Duque which should be deducted from his retirement benefits.
The Court’s Ruling
but also in their everyday lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges
are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times expected to
observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. We have
adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency, which every
member of the judiciary must observe. A magistrate is judged not only by his official
acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are
externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise
possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.

We agree with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA for
the imposition of a fine of ₱40,000 on Judge Duque.
First, on the question of jurisdiction as Judge Duque is no longer a member of the
judiciary having retired from the service on 21 February 2008, the records show that
Reyes filed four similar complaints against Judge Duque. A complaint dated 18
January 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and subscribed on
19 February 2008 was received by the OCA on 20 February 20089 and by the Office
of the Chief Justice also on 20 February 2008,10 or one day before the date of
retirement of Judge Duque. A similar complaint subscribed on 19 February 2008 was
received by the OCA on 12 March 2008.11 An identical complaint addressed to the
OCA and subscribed on 23 January 2008 was filed and received by the OCA on 25
January 2008.12 As pointed out by the OCA, Judge Duque was "inadvertently sent" a
copy of the complaint that was filed and received on 12 March 2008.13 The filing of
similar and identical complaints on different dates was due to the directive of the OCA
requiring that the complaint be "verified" or that the "original copy of the verified
complaint" be filed.14 Nonetheless, it is clear from the records that Reyes filed her
intended complaint before Judge Duque retired. Consequently, the Court no doubt
has jurisdiction over this administrative case.
Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.19 Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.20 Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they
should always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.21
The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the
judiciary. He failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the
judiciary. Considering that a judge is a visible representation of the law and of
justice,22 he is naturally expected to be the epitome of integrity and should be beyond
reproach. Judge Duque’s conduct indubitably bore the marks of impropriety and
immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary and even
transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge Duque not retired,
his misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Manuel N.
Duque GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and GROSS MISCONDUCT. We FINE him
₱40,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

On the charge of graft and corruption, the Investigating Justice and the OCA found SO ORDERED.
insufficient evidence to sustain Reyes’ allegation that Judge Duque demanded and
received money from her in consideration of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge
should be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.1avvphi1

On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, and after a thorough

investigation conducted by the Investigating Justice, it was established, and Judge
Duque admitted, that Reyes went to his house.15 Substantial evidence also pointed to
Judge Duque’s liability for impropriety and gross misconduct when he sexually
assaulted Reyes.16 There is no need to detail again the lewd acts of Judge Duque.
The Investigating Justice’s narration was sufficient and thorough. The Investigating
Justice likewise observed that Judge Duque merely attempted to destroy the
credibility of Reyes when he insinuated that she could be a "woman of ill repute or a
high class prostitute" or one whose "moral value is at its lowest level." However, no
judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant even from a woman of
loose morals.17 In Tan v. Pacuribot,18 this Court further stressed:

We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as

to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of
impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270               January 31, 2011
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3380-RTJ)
ELADIO D. PERFECTO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO DESALES-ESIDERA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Catarman, Northern Samar, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Eladio D. Perfecto (complainant), in a Complaint1 which was received at the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) on March 5, 2010, charges Judge Alma Consuelo
Esidera (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Northern
Samar, Branch 20, of soliciting and receiving on January 6, 2010 at the Prosecutor’s
Office the amount of One Thousand (₱1,000.00) from practitioner Atty. Albert Yruma
(Atty. Yruma), and the same amount from Public Prosecutor Rosario Diaz (Prosecutor
Diaz), purportedly to defray expenses for a religious celebration and barangay fiesta.
To prove her charge, complainant attached the Affidavit2 dated February 16, 2010 of
Public Prosecutor Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching (Prosecutor Ching) who claimed to have
witnessed the first incident, without respondent issuing any receipt. In the same
Affidavit, Prosecutor Ching added that she "heard" that respondent also solicited the
same amount from Prosecutor Diaz.
Complainant also questions the conduct of respondent in Special Proceedings No. C-
360, "for Cancellation of Birth Registration of Alpha Acibar," in which she issued a
January 5, 2010 Order directing the therein petitioner to publish said Order in a
newspaper of general circulation, instead of in the Catarman Weekly Tribune (of
which complainant is the publisher), the only accredited newspaper in the province.
Furthermore, complainant charges respondent with acts of impropriety ─ scolding her
staff in open court and treating in an "inhuman and hostile" manner practitioners "who
are not her friends." He adds that respondent even arrogantly treats public
prosecutors assigned to her sala, citing instances of this charge in his complaint.
To the first charge, respondent explains that when she went to the Prosecutor’s office,
she was merely following up the pledge of Adelaida Taldo, a member of a Catholic
charismatic group of which she (respondent) belongs, to donate a Sto. Niño image
when Atty. Yruma, who had received a solicitation letter countersigned by Father
Alwin Legaspi, the parish priest of San Jose, overheard her (respondent) and
requested her to receive his donation of ₱1,000.00 through her.
Respondent brushes off the above-stated Affidavit of Prosecutor Ching who, she
opines, is of "dubious personality" and has a "narcissistic personality disorder," the
details of the bases of which she narrates in her Comment.3
Respecting the complaint against her Order of publication, respondent claims that the
Catarman Weekly Tribune is "not in circulation." Respondent echoes her Comment in
A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3340-RTJ, a complaint previously filed by complainant bearing
on his claim that all orders of the court should be published in Catarman Weekly
Tribune, in which Comment she listed pending cases the hearing of which had to be
reset for failure of the Catarman Weekly Tribune to publish her orders on time.
As for the charge of impropriety, respondent denies the instances thereof cited by
complainant in his complaint and claims that she has been maintaining a professional
relationship with her staff and the lawyers who appear in her court.
The OCA has come up with the following:
EVALUATION: There is merit in the allegation of impropriety against respondent
Judge Esidera.
xxxx
The fact that she is not the principal author of the solicitation letter or that the
solicitation is for a religious cause is immaterial. Respondent Judge Esidera should
have known that going to the Prosecutor’s Office to receive "donations" from a
private lawyer and a public prosecutor does not bode well for the image of the
judiciary. Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-
01-SC; date of effectivity: 1 June 2004) explicitly provides that "judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."
xxxx
Soliciting donations from lawyers is not the only act of impropriety from
respondent Judge Esidera. In a 27 May 2010 Comment, respondent Judge
Esidera virtually gave Public Prosecutor Atty. Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching a verbal
lashing for the affidavit the latter executed relative to the solicitation incident. To
quote pertinent portions of the Comment of respondent Judge Esidera:
"The affidavit of Fiscal Ruth Arlene Ching should not be believed and accepted simply
because she is a fiscal. Not all prosecutors are credible and have integrity and are in
possession of their normal mental faculties. x x x Fiscal Ching is one whose
personality is dubious."
"I get the impression that she (Prosecutor Ching) is suffering from some sort of
personality disorder and should be subjected to neurological, psychiatric or
psychological examination before she gets worse x x x Having read enough
psychological examination reports of psychologists/psychiatrists submitted in
annulment cases, it is my non-expert opinion that the character of Fiscal Ching falls
under the category of narcissistic personality disorder."
"She was one of my students in Taxation in the UEP, College of Law, I was not a
judge then. I gave her a ‘3’ because when I checked her finals test booklet, her
‘codigo’ was still inserted in the examination booklet. Until now, that is one of the
gossips she is spreading around."
xxxx
The use of acerbic words was uncalled for considering the status of respondent
Judge Esidera. In Atty. Guanzon, et al. v. Judge Rufon (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038; 19
October 2007), the Court found respondent Judge Rufon guilty of vulgar and
unbecoming conduct for uttering discriminatory remarks against women lawyers and
litigants.
"Although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty,
his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in
and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and
courteous both in conduct and in language," held the Court in the Guanzon case.
Anent the allegations of ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority against
respondent Judge Esidera, for issuing a directive to the petitioner in a special
proceedings case to cause the publication of her order in a newspaper of general
publication, this Office finds the same devoid of merit.
Complainant Perfecto had made a similar allegation in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ,
insisting that all orders from the courts of Northern Samar should only be published in
the Catarman Weekly Tribune, the only accredited newspaper in the area.
xxxx
[T]hat Catarman Weekly Tribune is the only accredited newspaper of general
publication in Catarman does not bar the publication of judicial orders and notices in a
newspaper of national circulation. A judicial notice/order may be published in a
newspaper of national circulation and said newspaper does not even have to be
accredited.
Section 1 of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC thus provides:
SECTION 1. Scope of application. ─ These Guidelines apply only in cases where
judicial or legal notices are to be published in newspapers or periodicals that are of
general circulation in a particular province or city.
Publication of notices for national dissemination may be published in newspapers or
periodicals with national circulation without need of accreditation.
Adopting the comments she made in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ to the instant case,
respondent Judge Esidera claims that she only arrived at the decision to direct the
publication of her orders in a newspaper of national circulation after repeated failure
of the Catarman Weekly Tribune to meet the publication requirements in other
pending cases in the court. Respondent Judge Esidera even presented a list of cases
where the hearings therein had to be reset because of the failure of the Catarman
Weekly Tribune to publish the pertinent orders on time.
Moreover, the petitioner in the subject special proceedings case where respondent
Judge Esidera issued the directive did not contest the order calling for the publication
of the court’s order in a newspaper of national circulation. 4 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the OCA RECOMMENDS that respondent be faulted for Impropriety and
Unbecoming Conduct for which a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(₱5,000.00) should be imposed, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
While the Court finds the Evaluation and Recommendation of the OCA that
respondent be charged with Impropriety and Unbecoming Conduct to be well-taken, it
deems the recommendation for the imposition of a fine in the amount of ₱5,000.00 to
be insufficient as would impress upon her the gravity of the indictment. Respondent’s
improprieties as manifested in, among other things, her lack of discretion and the
vicious attack upon the person of Prosecutor Ching as characterized by her use of
uncalled for offensive language prompts this Court to raise the fine to Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱10,000.00).5
Specifically with respect to respondent’s alleged solicitation from Prosecutor Diaz,
albeit Prosecutor Ching merely claimed to have "heard" of it, respondent did not deny
it categorically as she merely, as reflected above, brushed off Prosecutor’s Ching’s
Affidavit as coming from one with a "dubious personality" and possessed of a
"narcissistic personality disorder." With respect to the alleged solicitation from
Prosecutor Diaz, respondent never disclaimed or disavowed the same.
Respondent’s admission of having received the sum of P1,000.00 from Atty. Yruma –
albeit allegedly as a mere accommodation to the latter, and her failure to disclaim the
same act with respect to Prosecutor Diaz, only confirms her lack of understanding of
the notion of propriety under which judges must be measured.1âwphi1
In his Annotation on Judges Fraternizing with Lawyers and Litigants,6 Jorge C.
Coquia7 commented on the Spirit and Philosophy of Canon 2 on Impropriety of
Judges, viz:
In Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 (1991), the Supreme Court said that the
Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality. A public official is also judged by his private morality being the subject of
constant public scrutiny. A judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Respondent’s act of proceeding to the Prosecutor’s Office under the guise of soliciting
for a religious cause betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of
understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high
esteem and respect by the local community, which must be preserved at all times. It
spawns the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or pressure
Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into
donating money through her charismatic group for religious purposes.1âwphi1

To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a
magistrate’s activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife -
above suspicion and beyond reproach.8 Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in
prudence and discretion that a member of the judiciary must exercise in the
performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual.

It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech

and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always
under constant observation.9

WHEREFORE, Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera is, for Impropriety and

Unbecoming Conduct, ORDERED to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00)
and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802             September 21, 2004
J. KING & SONS COMPANY, INC., represented by its President, Richard L.
King, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 16,
Cebu City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc., represented by its
President, Richard L. King, against Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Cebu City (RTC for brevity).
Complainant alleges: It is the plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance with
Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-27870,1 pending before the RTC presided over by respondent. On July 2, 2002,
respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment
upon applicant’s filing of a bond in the amount of ₱35,973,600.00. An urgent motion
to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the
respondent on July 5, 2002 and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting
the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order dated July 5, 2002 was issued sans
proper notice and hearing as required by section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge that
the bonding company’s Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum
net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency of ₱22,541,463.69. At a
meeting in his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay
₱250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a
motion for reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is
the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he
uses said facilities "gratis et amore."
In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator, respondent filed his
Comment, dated August 22, 2002, wherein he vehemently denies soliciting money
from the King brothers. He contends that complainant is merely a dissatisfied litigant
which cannot accept an unfavorable court ruling; and that the questioned orders
relative to Civil Case No. CEB-27870 were issued by him in the exercise of lawful
judicial discretion in accordance with the rules of procedure, the evidence on record,
and with the dictates of justice and equity.
Complainant then filed a Reply where it pointed out that respondent failed to squarely
meet the issues of the administrative complaint. It emphasized that there was actually
no hearing on the motion to lift the writ of attachment allegedly conducted on July 5,
2002.
Respondent filed a Supplemental Comment alleging that complainant has also filed a
complaint against him with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), attaching his
counter-affidavit thereto. He further claims that it is clear that Richard King and Atty.
Renecio Espiritu sought another forum to further expose him to public ridicule thru the
print media and air waves thereby eroding public trust and confidence of the people in
the judiciary.
The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), had forwarded to this Court the complete
records of King vs. Hontanosas, pursuant to Section 23(2) of Republic Act No. 6670.
On September 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the herein
administrative matter to Associate Justice Jose Reyes, Jr., Court of Appeals, for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Justice conducted hearings where complainant presented the
testimonies of witnesses, Richard L. King, Rafael L. King, and the waiters at
complainant’s karaoke bar, namely: Antonio Cabigon and Axel Reyes.
Richard King testified that he is the president of complainant corporation. He adopted
the joint affidavit executed by him together with Rafael King as part of his direct
examination. In said joint affidavit, Richard states as follows: He and Rafael are the
President and Treasurer, respectively, of J. King and Sons Co., Inc., the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. CEB-27870 pending before herein respondent. On July 2, 2002,
respondent issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants in the
aforementioned case for specific performance. Thereafter, respondent approved the
counter-bond despite knowledge of the fact that the clearance was valid only until
June 28, 2002, the maximum net retention of the bonding company was only
₱13,432,136.31, thus, causing a deficiency of ₱22,541,436.69. On July 5, 2002,
respondent lifted the writ of preliminary attachment without notice and hearing in
violation of Rule 13 and 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The calendar of
cases of the court showed that the motion to lift attachment filed by defendants in the
subject case was not scheduled for hearing on said date of July 5, 2002. The minutes
presented by respondent showing that there was a hearing held after 11 o’clock and
before 12 o’clock of July 5, 2002, could be easily manufactured. Previous to the
aforementioned incidents, respondent had been a frequent visitor of the corporation’s
music lounge where respondent would entertain himself, his guests and friends for
free; Rafael King would entertain respondent when he visited said music lounge; on
July 5, 2002, Rafael received a telephone call from respondent, telling him to see him
(respondent) at his residence. Richard and Rafael King obliged but they were
shocked when respondent asked them to equal the defendants’ offer of ₱250,000.00
so he would reconsider his order lifting the attachment. The King brothers told
respondent they could not comply with said demand since they are suffering a
financial crisis. Thus, respondent denied the motion for reconsideration filed by J.
King & Sons Company, Inc.2 Richard King further testified that they filed a motion to
inhibit respondent from further hearing the subject case and when said motion was
granted, the case was re-raffled to a new judge who then reinstated the writ of
attachment against the defendants in the subject case.
On cross-examination, Richard testified: Respondent and his brother, Rafael, are
friends. At the behest of respondent, he and his brother went to the house of
respondent at around 7 or 8 o’clock in the evening. Due to the fact that Rafael and
respondent were friends, respondent frankly told Rafael that he (respondent) needed
money and if Rafael could match the offer of the opposing party and come up with
P250,000.00, respondent would reverse his order lifting the attachment upon
complainant’s filing of a motion for reconsideration. Their conversation lasted no more
than twenty minutes and because Richard and Rafael were shocked by respondent’s
actuation, they immediately left respondent’s house. Richard King further pointed out
that he is a very busy businessman and by the filing of the present administrative
case against respondent, he has nothing to gain.3
Witness Rafael King likewise adopted the joint affidavit he executed with his brother,
Richard King, as part of his direct testimony. Rafael further stated that respondent
had been his friend for 3 to 4 years and in that span of time, he had never asked for
any favors from respondent regarding cases of complainant corporation pending
before the sala of respondent. Respondent did not ask for money from him for the
granting of the writ of attachment. However, after the order lifting the attachment had
been issued on July 5, 2002, at around 2 or 3 o’clock in the afternoon, respondent
called him up on the phone and asked him to go to his (respondent’s) house. Since
this was the first time that Rafael would go to respondent’s house, it was even
respondent who gave him (Rafael) directions on how to reach said house. Rafael
denied respondent’s claim that he was the one who called respondent’s son, Butch,
to ask for a meeting with him. Rafael admitted that he knows the wife of respondent
since she often uses the music lounge owned by complainant corporation. Before
July 5, 2002, respondent had often called Rafael on the phone to tell the latter that he
and his family will use said music lounge. Upon the Investigating Justice’s
questioning, Rafael stated that they filed the present administrative case against
respondent because it was an injustice for respondent to demand money from them.4
Antonio Cabigon and Axel Reyes, corroborated each other’s testimonies. They
testified that: they work as waiters at the karaoke bar owned by complainant and they
often saw respondent and his wife, sometimes also with some of their friends, at said
bar; respondent and his wife did not have to pay for the use of the facilities of said
bar, per instruction of the bar’s management; however, for record purposes, they
would still give the bill or order slips to respondent for his signature, but it was
respondent’s wife who signed the same in their presence.
Respondent, on the other hand, testified as follows: A hearing on the defendants’
motion to lift the preliminary attachment was actually held on July 5, 2002 between
eleven o’clock in the morning and twelve o’clock noon as shown by the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during said hearing. He held the hearing because the
motion was urgent in nature, and he did it in the spirit of equity and justice.
Furthermore, he asked from counsel for defendants whether counsel for complainant
had been notified of the hearing and the former assured respondent that counsel for
complainant had been notified of the hearing. With regard to the claim that he
demanded ₱250,000.00 from the Kings, he denied ever calling Rafael King or
demand any money from the Kings; instead, it was Rafael King who called up his
(respondent’s) son Butch and asked that they be allowed to meet with him at his
residence. While the Kings were at his house, the Kings tried to bully him into
reconsidering his Order dated July 5, 2002, but he told them to just file a motion for
reconsideration. Complainant filed the motion for reconsideration but after hearing the
same, he denied the motion in his Order dated July 17, 2002. He pointed out that at
the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, the defendants were able to present a
Certification from the Supreme Court that the authority of the bonding company was
up to August 3, and so he denied the Motion for Reconsideration. With regard to the
claim that he frequently used complainant’s karaoke bar without paying for said
facilities, respondent insisted that his wife offered to pay but the bar’s management
would not allow her to pay.5
On June 14, 2004, the Investigating Justice submitted his Investigation Report
together with his recommendation which reads as follows:
RECOMMENDATION:
The complaint may be divided into four (4) issues. First, would be the alleged
demand for ₱250,000.0 in exchange for a favorable action regarding
complainant’s motion for reconsideration. The second, the use of
complainant’s karaoke bar at the Metropolis Hotel by respondent and his
family for free. The third, the alleged impropriety regarding the issuance of
the Order of July 5, 2002, and lastly, the sufficiency of the counterbond.
A. AS TO THE ALLEGED DEMAND FOR ₱250,000.00
The investigating justice finds that the same had not been sufficiently
substantiated. Other than the bare assertion of Rafael and Richard King
there was no other evidence presented. Although the visit of the King
brothers to the house of respondent in the evening of July 5, 2002 is
admitted, this by itself would not prove that a demand for money was made.
However, the investigating justice finds that it was inappropriate for
respondent to have entertained a litigant in his home particularly when the
case is still pending before his sala. As held in De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison (355
SCRA 69 [2001]) patronizing with litigants tarnishes the appearance of
propriety, to wit:
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he
must also appear to be impartial. Hence, the judge must, at all
times, maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His
language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured
lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. A judge’s conduct must
be above reproach. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be
pure but above suspicion. A judge’s private as well as official
 conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of
impropriety and be beyond reproach.
Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. It was, thus, held that it
is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the
presence of the complainant. (at 89-90)
B. AS TO THE USE OF COMPLAINANT’S KARAOKE BAR AT THE
METROPOLIS HOTEL
The investigating justice notes that this was not denied by respondent but
interposes the defense that during the time he used the bar, his friends
would pay the bill (See: TSN, April 27, 2004, p. 29). He also claimed that at
one time the owners of the karaoke bar would not allow his wife to pay. He
testified, thus:
Atty. Cortez:
Mr. Respondent, the complainant thru its witnesses Richard King
and Rafael King have accused you of taking advantage of the
amenities in their karaoke joint and according to them you were not
charged, what can you say to this? Did you abuse?
Witness:
I did not. Because that is an open place. I went there together with
my wife to entertain some judge friends and then my wife was
suppose to pay and the management did not allow my wife to pay.
(TSN, April 27, 2004, p. 20)
Although there is a question of whether or not respondent had used
the facilities free of charge, the investigating justice nevertheless
finds that respondent judge should have not frequented the place to
prevent any appearance of impropriety considering that, as
admitted by respondent, there are at least three (3) cases filed by
complainant which are pending before his court. This is a violation
of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Thus, it has been held time and again that the judges must avoid all
appearances of impropriety. In Calilung v. Suriaga (339 SCRA 340 [2000]), it
was held:
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY
AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the
appearance must concur. Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of
restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and occupying an
exalted position in the administration of justice. The irresponsible or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It is thus the
duty of the members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to
protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and
regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial
front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the
people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should remain free from
any appearance of impropriety and should be beyond reproach.
Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court does not
hesitate to conclude that respondent Judge tainted the image of the judiciary
to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it all times unsullied and
worthy of the people’s trust. A judge should conduct himself at all times in a
manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the
people for he is the visible representation of the law. (at 361-362)
C. AS TO THE ALLEGED IMPROPRIETY REGARDING THE ISSUANCE
OF THE ORDER OF JULY 5, 2002
For clarity, the undisputed facts leading to the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction are reiterated, thus: On July 2, 2002, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued. On July 5, 2002 defendants filed an urgent motion to
lift writ of preliminary injunction and on the same day an order lifting the writ
of preliminary injunction was issued.
...
Respondent on the other hand, countered in his testimony that he granted
the motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment because he thought that it
was the most equitable thing to do . . .
The investigating justice is not persuaded by respondent’s explanation. As
held in the case of Peroxide Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals (199
SCRA 882 [1991]) before a writ of attachment may be lifted, a hearing and
an opportunity to oppose the motion should be given to the attaching
creditor, to wit:
Now, it is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged for
having been illegally or improperly issued, there must be a hearing
 with the burden of proof to sustain the writ of being on the attaching
creditor. That hearing embraces not only the right to present
evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of
the opposing parties and meet them. The right to submit arguments
implies that opportunity, otherwise the right would be a barren one.
It means a fair and open hearing. And, as provided by the
aforecited Section 13 of Rule 57, the attaching creditor should be
allowed to oppose the application for the discharge of the
attachment by counter-affidavit or other evidence, in addition to that
on which the attachment was made. (at 890)
In the present administrative case, no opportunity was given to complainant
to even oppose the motion to lift attachment. Respondent failed to persuade
the investigating justice of the alleged urgency to grant the motion to lift the
writ of preliminary attachment as a justification for granting the motion
without a full-blown hearing. It may also be said that the July 5, 2002 Order
may have been too hastily issued considering the fact that a copy of the said
motion was mailed only on July 3, 2002 (Exhibit "5"). Hence, as argued by
complainant, the motion could not have been set for hearing earlier than July
6, 2002 without doing violence to the 3-day notice rule.
The respondent judge, having ignored settled jurisprudence, is GUILTY of
gross ignorance of law.
As held in Gozum v. Liangco (339 SCRA 253 [2001]):
When the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or observe it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (at 259)
There could be nothing more basic under Philippine Law than the
aforementioned 3-day notice rule:
D. AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COUNTER-BOND
In this regard, complainant alleged that:
That there is no better evidence of the insufficiency of the counter-
bond submitted and lack of clearance from the Supreme Court on
the date the counter-bond was approved on July 4, 2002 than the
Certification of the Clerk of Court VII, Joeffrey S. Joaquino, Office of
the Clerk of Court, Cebu City, that the said counter-bond its (sic)
Supreme Court Clearance was valid up to June 28, 2002. That its
maximum net retention is only ₱13,432,136.31, but was issuing a
counter-bond worth ₱35,973,600.00 to answer for damages to
petitioner. What is material was the date the counter-bond was
approved not any other date thereafter. (Rollo, pp. 15-16)
Respondent, upon the other hand, testified that he did not notice that the
clearance had already expired and that the bond was over the legal retention
...
On this matter, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge was
negligent. The Indorsement issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cebu
dated July 5, 2002 contained the following Information (Exhibit "F").
a) The signature of the bonding officer is genuine as compared to
his specimen signature on file.
b) The company’s Supreme Court Clearance is valid until June 28,
2002.
c) The company’s Maximum Net Retention Per Subject of
Insurance is only THIRTEEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX & 31/100 PESOS
(₱13,432,136.13), per its OIC Form No. 1 on file with this Office.
Had respondent carefully examined the aforesaid Indorsement it would have
been immediately apparent to him that the insurance company’s clearance
had already expired and that the bond issued exceeded its net retention.
Because of this negligence, damage resulted to the litigant in the case. The
position of a judge is a sensitive one, he should have been more
circumspect and careful in his actions, granting that his actions may have
been motivated with the desire to act equitably.
To recapitulate, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge
is GUILTY of:
a). IMPROPER CONDUCT when he entertained the litigant in his
residence as well as when he used complainant’s karaoke bar;
b). GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW when he failed to hold a
hearing regarding the lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment as
mandated in the case of Peroxide Philippines Corporation v. Court
of Appeals (supra) as well as when he heard the motion to lift the
writ of preliminary attachment in violation of the 3-day notice rule;
and
c). NEGLIGENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY when
he approved the patently defective counter-bond.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
respondent judge be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay and be
issued a warning that a more severe penalty shall be imposed in case of
another infraction.6
We do not fully agree with the evaluation and recommendation of the Investigating
Justice.
On the alleged demand for ₱250,000.00.
The Investigating Justice finds that the charges of extortion had not been sufficiently
substantiated because "other than the bare assertions of Rafael and Richard King
there was no other evidence presented." The following questions come to mind. May
we, considering that we are not a trier of facts, review the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses? Should the testimonies of both Rafael and Richard King be
automatically disregarded simply because there is no other evidence presented by
complainant? May the testimonies of such witnesses suffice to establish the guilt of
respondent?
It is a well-entrenched rule that the trial judge’s, in this case, the investigating justice’s
findings of facts and assessment of the credibility of witnesses are accorded finality.
However, such rule is not without exceptions. Such findings may be reviewed if there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may
have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case.7 Among the circumstances which had
been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to reexamine the trial court or
appellate court’s findings of facts are, when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the
finding of fact of the trial court or appellate court is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.8
In the present case, we find that such circumstances exist to make this case come
under those aforementioned exceptions. A re-assessment of the Investigating
Justice’s ruling on the sufficiency of evidence against respondent is warranted. We
find that the Investigating Justice’s inference that the evidence on record is
insufficient to hold respondent liable is erroneous, a patent mistake. The Investigating
Justice seriously overlooked the fact that to require the King brothers to present
evidence other than their corroborating testimonies that respondent made such a
demand would be unrealistic. Human experience tells us that extortion would be done
in utmost secrecy, minimizing possible witnesses. Hence, respondent required the
King brothers to meet him at his house, where everything would be under his control.
In this case, complainant is quite fortunate to even have two witnesses to corroborate
each other. Verily, to require that there be any documentary evidence or a paper trail
of the commission of extortion would be quite absurd for, naturally, respondent would
not allow such incriminating evidence to exist. In Velez vs. Flores,9 we observed that
being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough to document his
extortion activities on paper. Therefore, the King brothers’ testimonies cannot be
automatically disregarded simply because there is no additional evidence presented
by complainant.
It should be noted that the Investigating Justice did not categorically state that the
King brothers are not credible witnesses or that their testimonies are not worthy of
belief. Thus, we closely examined the testimonies of Richard and Rafael King and
found the same to be very candid, forthright, unwavering, and bereft of any material
or significant inconsistencies. Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by Richard King, they
actually have nothing to gain from the filing of the present administrative case. If
anything, their having to appear at the hearings of this case was even a burden, as
they had to squeeze in such hearings into their already busy schedules. They even
had to travel from Cebu City, where they reside, to Manila just to give their
testimonies before the Investigating Justice. Moreover, respondent failed to present
evidence that Richard and Rafael King had any ill motives in leveling such grave
accusations of extortion against him. Furthermore, respondent’s admission that he did
entertain the King brothers at his home bolsters the credibility of their averment that
he demanded P250,000.00 from them for a favorable ruling on the motion for
reconsideration that they would file. Thus, we find the King brothers’ testimonies to be
entitled to full faith and credit and sufficient proof that respondent demanded
₱250,000.00 in exchange for a ruling in their favor.
In Avancena vs. Liwanag,10 we considered the mere testimony of complainant that
respondent judge therein was demanding ₱1,000,000.00 for a favorable judgment in
her favor and the testimony of an NBI agent that they tried to entrap respondent
therein but their operation was unsuccessful, as sufficient evidence to find respondent
therein guilty of extortion. Imposing the penalty of dismissal on respondent therein,
we held that:
. . . in the instant proceeding, respondent is being held to account for serious
misconduct or malfeasance in office in violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The quantum
of proof required to establish respondent’s misconduct in the administrative
complaint is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence,
which is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Again, in Office of the Court Administrator vs. Morante,11 we emphasized that:
. . . in administrative proceedings only substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conviction, is required. Evidence to support a conviction in a
criminal case is not necessary, as the standard of integrity demanded of
members of the Bench is not satisfied which merely allows one to escape
the penalties of criminal law.
In Villaros vs. Orpiano,12 we found the testimony of complainant therein and his
mother that respondent Stenographer and Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial
Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 32, had solicited P1,500.00 from them, as
sufficient evidence to hold him guilty of improper solicitation, and held thus:
The Court finds the respondent administratively liable for improper
solicitation and thus imposes the penalty prescribed by prevailing rules and
jurisprudence, which is dismissal from service on the first offense.
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees
and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most
junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must
 be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and
maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say,
all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying
integrity, honesty and uprightness.
The respondent’s act of demanding money from the complainant hardly
meets the foregoing standard. Improper solicitation from litigants is a grave
offense that carries an equally grave penalty.
In the present case, we likewise hold that the credible testimonies of the
King brothers meet the required quantum of evidence which justifies our
conclusion that respondent indeed demanded P250,000.00 from them. Such
conduct is a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial conduct, which provide that:
Canon 1 – A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of
the judiciary
Rule 1.01. – A judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence.
Canon 2 – A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities
Rule 2.01. – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
On the Investigating Justice’s finding of gross ignorance of the law for not
holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating
the three-day notice rule.
We agree with the Investigating Justice’s finding that respondent is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift
attachment and for violating the three-day notice rule.
Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. - . . .
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three
(3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice.
A perusal of the motion to lift attachment shows that a copy of the same was mailed
to plaintiff’s counsel only on July 3, 2002. The court’s receiving stamp showed that
said motion was filed in court only at 11:02 in the morning of July 5, 2002, despite the
fact that the notice of hearing for said motion stated that said motion would be set for
hearing at 8:30 in the morning of July 5, 2002. The proximity of the date of mailing of
the copy of the motion to the other party and the hearing date indicated in the notice
of hearing clearly shows that it is impossible for the other party to receive said motion
at least three days before the date of hearing. Evidently, the party filing the motion to
lift attachment had already violated the three-day notice rule. Such circumstances
should have already warned respondent that plaintiff in the subject case had not yet
been apprised of the filing of such a motion, much less the holding of a hearing for
said motion. Yet, despite said patent defects in the motion, respondent consented to
hold a hearing on the motion at 11:20 of the very same morning of July 5, 2002.
Although Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
court, for good cause, may set the hearing on shorter notice, the rule is explicit that
notice of the hearing cannot be altogether dispensed with. In this case, common
knowledge dictates that it would be impossible for a copy of the motion, mailed only
on July 3, 2002, to be delivered by registered mail to counsel for the plaintiff on or
before July 5, 2002. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff had no notice whatsoever of the
filing of the motion and the hearing date for the same.
Section 12, Rule 5713 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, also provides that the
court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if
the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the attaching
party with the clerk of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to
that fixed by the court in the order of attachment. Although it is true that respondent
was able to present a transcript of stenographic notes14 to prove that a hearing on the
motion to lift attachment was conducted on July 5, 2002, the same only highlighted
the fact that respondent failed to give herein complainant, the plaintiff and attaching
party in subject case, due notice and the opportunity to be heard, as mandated by
the aforementioned rule. The transcripts of stenographic notes of July 5, 2002, in fact
shows that respondent already had strong suspicions that the plaintiff had not yet
been notified of the filing of the motion when he propounded the following questions
to the counsel of defendants in the subject case, to wit:
COURT:
Where is the proof that the counsel for the plaintiff received this?
ATTY. SENO:
It was mailed, Your Honor. Our basis that he received this is the registry
receipt which is the proof of mailing, and there is an explanation why no
personal service could be made because of time constrained (sic), Your
Honor. As we can recall, we filed our Answer last July 3, Your Honor, and it
was about that time that we received the summons and it was also about
that time that we filed this motion, Your Honor. At any rate, this is only a
counterbond which is a mere ministerial procedure. It is just a matter of
paying the surety of the counterbond and to submit it to the Honorable Court
to prove that there is already a bond which may answer for any loss that the
plaintiffs may suffer.
COURT:
But are you sure that Atty. Navarro was aware of that?
ATTY. SENO:
Yes, because we met him, Your Honor. He had a case here and we met at
the hallway. Before he left, I told him that I filed a motion and he was
furnished a copy through mail, Your Honor.
COURT:
You should have let him signed (sic) this pleading here as a copy furnished,
since you were already talking to him at that time.
ATTY. SENO:
Yes, Your Honor, precisely there is an explanation why no personal service
could be had. Under the rules, if no personal service could be had, then it
should be mailed by registered mail. But there is already an explanation why
no personal service could be made and we believe that is already sufficient,
Your Honor.
COURT:
Because this is a very urgent motion and considering that the counsel for the
plaintiffs was around, you should have furnished him a copy and let him sign
to prove that he received a copy. At that time, was he willing to receive the
copy? Perhaps, he was not willing to receive a copy.
ATTY. SENO:
No, no, we had a talk, Your Honor. He may not be willing to receive the copy
at that time, but we have mailed to him already a copy and we believe that it
is already suffice (sic), Your Honor.
COURT:
But it was easy for you to serve him a copy personally. Why do you have to
mail it, when you could have serve (sic) it to him personally?
ATTY. SENO:
No, because my office, Your Honor, is in Mandaue City. The office of Atty.
Navarro is in Capitol and it’s so hard to travel from Mandaue to Capitol in just
a matter of 30 minutes especially during school days, Your Honor. As a
matter of fact, we can even file an ex-parte motion, Your Honor.
COURT:
Anyway, the incident is now considered submitted for resolution.
Despite such misgivings on the lack of due notice on counsel for plaintiff in
subject case, respondent still conducted an ex-parte hearing on the motion
and hastily considered the same submitted for resolution and on the very
same day of July 5, 2002, respondent approved the counter-bond.
Complainant is not quite accurate in stating that respondent approved said
counter-bond on July 4, 2002. The stamp of approval of the bond was
affixed onto the bond without any date thereof. The date of execution by the
President of the bonding company was July 4, 2002; but this does not mean
that respondent also approved said counter-bond on the same date of July
4, 2002. The Indorsement of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City was dated July 5, 2002, thus, respondent could not have received
subject counter-bond any earlier than the date of said indorsement.
Just the same, respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing
on the motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in
considering the same submitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ
of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the same day of
July 5, 2002, without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter.
We agree with the Investigating Justice that respondent’s defense that he
immediately heard the motion even in the absence of counsel for the other party
because of the urgency of the lifting of the attachment, is not persuasive. The
transcripts of stenographic notes for the hearing on July 5, 2002 shows that counsel
for defendants in subject case presented no argument whatsoever showing the
urgency of the motion.
It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally,
civilly or administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in
good faith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption.15 However, it has also
been held that when the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary
action.16 The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that respondent’s
inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we
believe that respondent’s actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we find
respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice rule
and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard on
the matter as mandated by Section 12, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On respondent’s negligence in the performance of his duty
As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to
exercise due care in examining the supporting papers therefor. The respondent
should know the basic requirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond
such as counter-bond. In Mangalindan vs. Court of Appeals,17 the Court enumerated
the requirements for accepting a surety bond as bail. Since surety bail bonds are
closely analogous to judicial bonds and counter-bonds required for the issuance of
writs of attachment or the lifting thereof, the respondent should know that the
requirements for acceptance of said surety bail bonds are the same for all other
bonds such as acceptance bonds or counter-bonds except the requirement for
photographs of the accused. Said requirements are: (1) affidavit of justification,
including a statement that the company has no pending obligation demandable and
outstanding in any amount to the Government or any of its agencies as of the last day
of the month preceding the date the bond is issued or posted; (2) Clearance from the
Supreme Court, valid only for thirty days from the date of issuance; (3) Certificate of
compliance with the Circular from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner; (4)
Authority of the agent in case the bond is issued through a branch office or through
an agent; and (5) current certificate of authority issued by the Insurance Commission
with the financial statement showing the maximum underwriting capacity of the
company.18 The Court imposed these requirements for very good reason, and that is,
to ensure that the bonding company has the capacity to pay whatever liability it may
have under the bond it issued. The bonding company’s ability to pay is all too
important in this case where the counter-bond it issued is supposed to answer for
whatever amount may ultimately be adjudged in favor of the party who applied for the
writ of attachment. It is, therefore, indispensable for a judge to review these
documents before he approves the bond.
Notably, among the requisites for the bond to be acceptable are a clearance from the
Supreme Court and the current certificate of authority showing the maximum
underwriting capacity of the company.
The Clerk of Court’s Indorsement dated July 5, 2002, clearly showed that the bonding
company’s Supreme Court Clearance was valid only until June 28, 2002, and its
Maximum Net Retention is only ₱13,432,136.31. A simple perusal thereof would have
alerted respondent that at the time the counter-bond was submitted to him for
approval on July 5, 2002, the bonding company did not have enough properties to
answer for the counter-bond it issued in the amount of ₱35,973,600.00. Thus, we
agree with the Investigating Justice that respondent acted negligently in approving the
counter-bond.
On respondent’s improper conduct in entertaining litigants at his home and
using litigant’s karaoke bar for free.
It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to
frequent the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free.
Respondent thereby received benefits from a litigant appearing in his court.
Respondent’s defense that his wife offered to pay but the management of the karaoke
bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said bar are
quite clear that respondent’s wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever
given by respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted on paying,
especially considering that complainant has a total of three cases pending before his
court. Nothing on record shows that respondent even exerted any effort to so insist.
He appeared only too ready and willing to enjoy the facilities of complainant’s karaoke
for free. In Cañeda vs. Alaan,19 we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for
appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground
for reproach.
[Respondent’s] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept
himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance
himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.
.........
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal
conduct, a price one has to pay for occupying an exalted position in
the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his
activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct
himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis
supplied),
By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by said litigant,
respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.
A judge must assiduously protect the image of his exalted office as we have
previously emphasized in Spouses Makadaya Sadik and Usodan Sadik vs. Judge
Abdallah Casar,20 to wit:
It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to promote justice.
However, the reality of justice depends, above all, on the intellectual, moral
and personal quality of the men and women who are called to serve as our
judges. In a piece written by Rosenberg, this point was emphasized, thus:
Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as Roscoe
Pound remarked, "men count more than machinery." Assume the
clearest rules, the most enlightened procedures, the most
sophisticated court techniques; the key factor is still the judge. In
the long run, "There is no guarantee of justice except the
personality of the judge." The reason the judge makes or breaks
the system of justice is that rules are not self-declaring or self-
applying. Even in a government of laws, men make the decisions.
In the recent case of Jocelyn Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin E. Arceo, the Court
emphasized the importance of the role played by judges in the judicial system, thus:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times,
the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may
 not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is
served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the
judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both
the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly,
they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral
uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people
be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and
equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for
judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the
damage that can be done to the legal order by judicial corruption. The rationale for
this was succinctly put by Jones, thus:
If a physician or a professor or a businessman is discovered to be a thief or
an influence peddler, the disclosure will not put medicine, higher education,
or business into general disrepute. But judges are different and more
representative; revelations of judicial corruption create suspicion and loss of
confidence in legal processes generally and endanger public respect for law.
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of exceptional
integrity and honesty. The special urgency for requiring these qualities in a
judge is not hard to understand for the judge acts directly upon the property,
liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence, being in a position of such grave
responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must conduct himself in
a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office.21
Finally, it cannot be said that complainant is guilty of forum-shopping in filing a
criminal complaint against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
We held in Bejarasco, Jr. vs. Judge Buenconsejo22 that:
. . . it is a settled rule that administrative cases may proceed independently
of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the latter
charges. As the disciplining arm of the judiciary, it is the Court’s duty to
investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in complaints
against judges and to mete the necessary penalties therefor.
In sum, we find respondent guilty of the serious charges of two counts of Gross
Misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct under Section 8(3) of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, for demanding ₱250,000.00 from complainant and
using complainant’s karaoke bar and entertaining litigants at his home. Respondent is
likewise guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure under Section 8(9) Rule
140 of the same Rules for failing to accord complainant the due notice and hearing it
was entitled to under the rules. Lastly, respondent is guilty of the less serious charge
of Simple Misconduct under Section 9(7), also under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended, for his negligence in approving the subject counter-bond.
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be
penalized as follows:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any
of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
while Section 11(B) of said Rule, dealing with sanctions that may be
imposed on the respondent found guilty of less serious charges,
provide thus:
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) or more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
Consequently, we find the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that
respondent be suspended for only three (3) months without pay to be
inappropriate.
We note further that respondent had been previously administratively sanctioned
in City Government of Tagbilaran vs. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.23 for violating Circular
No. 4 issued on August 27, 1980, enjoining judges of inferior courts from playing in or
being present in gambling casinos. Thus, the fact that respondent is guilty of three
counts of serious offenses, i.e., two counts of Gross Misconduct and one count Gross
Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and also of one count of Simple Misconduct,
further aggravated by the finding of guilt in a previous administrative case against
him, justifies the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr. is hereby
found GUILTY of two counts of Gross Misconduct, one count of Gross Ignorance of
the Law or Procedure, and, Simple Misconduct. He is DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits except as to accrued leave credits and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge is further ordered to
cease and desist from discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this
Decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the personnel records of respondent.
Further, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on October 1, 2002,
respondent is required to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should
not be disbarred from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming of a member of the
bar. SO ORDERED.
[A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1501. March 14, 2005]
JAIME LIM CO, Complainant, v. JUDGE RUBEN R. PLATA, MTCC,
BRANCH 1, SANTIAGO CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:
Jaime Lim Co filed before this Court a Complaint, 1 dated 13 May 2002,
against Hon. Ruben R. Plata, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1 of Santiago City, Isabela, for gross
partiality, serious misconduct, and inefficiency in office. Respondent Judge
filed his Comment2 and Additional Comment3 on the said Complaint, dated
11 September 2002 and 2 April 2003, respectively.
On 09 July 2003, this Court resolved to re-docket the case as a regular
administrative matter4 and to refer the administrative matter to Executive
Judge Fe Albano Madrid of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City,
Isabela, for investigation, report, and recommendation. 5 Counsel for the
respondent Judge, Atty. Emerito Agcaoili, however, moved for the
inhibition of Executive Judge Madrid from hearing the administrative
matter since she was supposedly a bosom friend of Eva T. Co, the wife of
complainant Co.6 Executive Judge Madrid decided to grant the motion and
inhibit herself because she believed that it would be hard to dispel the
suspicion that she might be prejudiced against the respondent Judge just
because his counsel, Atty. Agcaoili, filed a previous administrative case
against her.7 Thus, this Court designated Executive Judge Bonifacio T. Ong
of RTC, Branch 24 of Echague, Isabela, to investigate the administrative
matter in place of Executive Judge Madrid.8
In his Report,9 dated 19 May 2004, the investigating Judge made the
following findings and recommendations on the administrative matter: (1)
respondent Judge was guilty of negligence rather than partiality, and
should be meted a fine of P1,000; (2) respondent Judge was culpable of
simple misconduct, instead of gross misconduct, and should pay a fine
of P1,000; and (3) the charge of inefficiency against respondent Judge
should be dismissed for lack of merit.
After reviewing the Report of the investigating Judge, dated 19 May 2004,
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made its own findings and
recommendations in its Memorandum,10 dated 12 October 2004,
summarized as follows: (1) adopting the recommendation of the
investigating Judge that respondent Judge was not guilty of partiality, but
of simple negligence, and imposing the penalty of censure; (2) finding that
although respondent Judge was not guilty of gross misconduct, he still
failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety, for which he should be
reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely; and (3) dismissing the charge of inefficiency in office
for lack of merit.
I
The Charge of Gross Partiality
Complainant Co was the private offended party in Criminal Cases No. 1-
4210 and No. 1-4211, filed against spouses Milagros and Jose Villaceran,
respectively, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as
the Bouncing Checks Law. The accused Villacerans, in the said criminal
cases, allegedly issued separately two postdated checks, each for the
amount of P1,000,000, payable to complainant Co, which were
subsequently dishonored by the drawee banks.
The two criminal cases were raffled to Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, presided
over by the respondent Judge. Respondent Judge issued a Warrant of
Arrest for the accused Villacerans and fixed their bail at P100,000 each, as
recommended by the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Before the warrant of arrest could be served upon them, the accused
Villacerans voluntarily appeared before the respondent Judge and
separately filed Applications for Bail. Respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused Villacerans in the reduced amount of P50,000 each. By virtue of
the property bonds posted by the accused Villacerans, respondent Judge
recalled the Warrant of Arrest issued against them.
Complainant Co charged respondent Judge with gross partiality by pointing
out the following irregularities in the Applications for Bail filed by the
accused Villacerans, and the grant thereof by the respondent Judge, which
allegedly demonstrated respondent Judge's gross partiality for the said
accused:
1. The Applications for Bail failed to state the amount of bail applied for
and the exact date of application.
2. A duplicate of the Application for Bail of accused Milagros Villaceran was
signed by respondent Judge himself.
3. The Applications for Bail were not properly received by the Santiago City
MTCC Br. I.
4. Respondent Judge signed an undated Order, reducing the amount of
bail from the original amount of P100,000 each to P50,000 each, even
though the accused Villacerans did not file any Application to Reduce Bail.
5. The Order signed by the respondent Judge for the recall of the Warrant
of Arrest for the accused Villacerans again failed to state important
information such as the values of the property bonds posted, and the time
and date of approval of the said property bonds.
According to complainant Co, respondent Judge purposely left blank the
values of the property bonds in the above-mentioned documents because
he was aware of the insufficiency of the property bonds posted by the
accused Villacerans. The property bonds posted by the accused
Villacerans, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 263647
and No. 264847, had assessed values of only P6,200 and P6,900,
respectively. The values of the said property bonds failed to comply even
with the reduced amount of bail, fixed by respondent Judge himself,
at P50,000 for each of the accused.
6. Only upon the insistence of complainant Co did respondent Judge order
the accused Villacerans to post additional bail bonds. The accused
Villacerans complied with the order by posting Surety Bonds No. 25746
and No. 25747, dated 20 June 2000, in the amount of P40,000 each, and
issued by Wellington Insurance Company, Inc. (WICI). Said surety bonds,
however, were good for only one year. During the joint hearing conducted
on 06 December 2001 of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211, the
private prosecutor, Atty. Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., informed the respondent
Judge that the said surety bonds had already expired. He also questioned
the present standing of WICI as a bonding company duly accredited by the
Supreme Court, considering that the certification submitted before the
Santiago City MTCC Br. I was dated 1999. Atty. Bala thus requested the
respondent Judge to order the arrest of the accused Villacerans until they
were able to post new bonds. Respondent Judge refused to order the
arrest of the accused Villacerans and merely said that, "[t]he Court will
look into that."
7. Complainant Co observed that accused Milagros Villaceran would often
go in and out of the respondent Judge's chambers before and after court
hearing.
Convinced that the respondent Judge was biased and sympathetic to the
accused Villacerans, complainant Co filed a motion 11 for the respondent
Judge to inhibit himself from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211.
In his Order,12 dated 21 February 2002, the respondent Judge granted
complainant Co's Motion to Inhibit "[s]o as not to erode the public's faith in
the capability of the Court to render fair and impartial justice without the
element of suspicion or bias."
Despite having inhibited himself from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No.
1-4211, respondent Judge maintained that he had not been partial and
biased in favor of the accused Villacerans to the detriment of complainant
Co, who was the private offended party in the said criminal cases.
According to the respondent Judge, the accused Villacerans appeared at
the Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, before the Warrant of Arrest could be
served upon them. The accused Villacerans manifested that they came to
learn about the criminal cases filed against them and they wanted to post
bail.
The accused Villacerans pleaded with the respondent Judge for the
reduction of the amount of bail bond, which respondent Judge approved.
The bail bond for each of the accused was originally fixed at P100,000.
Respondent Judge agreed to reduce the bail bond to P50,000 each. Since
the accused Villacerans did not have enough cash, they instead offered
two pieces of their real property, located in the Municipality of Echague,
Isabela, as property bonds.
Respondent Judge asked the accused Villacerans to file Applications for
Bail so that he could act on them officially. When the accused Villacerans
informed him that they did not yet have a lawyer, respondent Judge
instructed them to request for the usual form of an Application for Bail
from his own staff. The accused Villacerans, however, prevailed upon
respondent Judge's staff to do more than just provide the required form,
but also to help the accused Villacerans prepare their Applications for Bail,
the Property Bond Form, and other supporting documents. The respondent
Judge's staff immediately submitted the prepared documents to
respondent Judge for his signature.
Addressing the alleged irregularities in the Applications for Bail of the
accused Villacerans and his grant thereof, respondent Judge explained in
his Comment, dated 11 September 2002, that:
1.10. Upon verifying that the accused have accomplished all the necessary
documents in relation to their property bond and have submitted the
originals of the Transfer Certificate of Title to their properties, Judge Plata
approved the bail for property bond at P50,000.00 each.
A. Judge Plata then signed the order for the recall of their warrant of arrest
and accordingly returned the papers to his staff for further processing and
promulgation, as it is the usual job of the clerical staff.
b. Judge Plata was not aware that one of the papers that he had signed
was one of the applications for bail of Milagros Villaceran until he received
a copy of the complaint of Mr. Jaime Lim Co.
c. Judge Plata was likewise not aware that his staff failed to completely fill
up all the necessary data in the forms in accordance with his instructions
prior to filing them.
d. Judge Plata had to contend with the volume of work as
presiding/executive judge of MTCC Br. 1 and Br. 2 of Santiago City and
that of the MTC Cordon, Isabela.13
This Court upholds the findings of both the investigating Judge and the
OCA that the above-stated facts demonstrated the negligence of the
respondent Judge rather than his gross partiality.
As stated in the OCA Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004:
We find that respondent Judge was remiss in scrutinizing the documents
which he signed. We agree with the investigating Judge's observation that
respondent was negligent in this aspect. That his signature above the
printed name of the accused was made inadvertently is credible as it would
be the height of folly if he deliberately signed the bail for and in behalf of
the accused.14
Given that the documents herein had been prepared by his staff,
respondent Judge had the responsibility of reviewing the said documents
when submitted to him, before affixing his signature thereon. Respondent
Judge's signature carried a lot of weight and could turn an ordinary piece
of paper into an official act of the court, thus, he should have checked, and
if necessary, double-checked, whether the forms were properly filled-out
and the information therein were correct, in order to avoid similar
controversies in the future.
Respondent Judge defended his decision to reduce the bail bond
from P100,000 to P50,000 for each of the accused Villacerans as a
legitimate exercise of his judicial discretion. According to respondent
Judge, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, allowed the reduction of
the amount of bail upon certain overriding considerations, i.e., (a) financial
ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstance of the
offense; (c) penalty of the offense charged; and (d) character and
reputation of the accused.
Respondent Judge also invoked paragraph 2(o) of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 89, dated 29 August 2000, otherwise known as
The 2000 Bail Bond Guide, which stated that:
For violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, bail shall be P2,000.00 for the
first P40,000.00 face value of the check and an additional P1,000.00 for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P40,000.00, but bail shall not exceed
P30,000.00.
The two checks involved in Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211,
allegedly issued by the accused Villacerans, each had a face value
of P1,000,000. Respondent Judge argued that the reduced amount of bail
bond, amounting to P50,000 for each of the accused Villacerans, was still
substantial, considering that he could have further reduced the said
amount to P30,000, as provided under The 2000 Bail Bond Guide.
Worth reiterating herein is the finding of the OCA, in its Memorandum,
dated 12 October 2004, which reads as follows'
As reported by the Investigating Judge, respondent was negligent in
reducing motu proprio the bail recommended by the public prosecutor
not because the accused are not entitled to it but because respondent
failed to comply with the time tested safeguard against arbitrariness. As
held in AM No. MTJ-00-1286 (21 January 2002), "[I]n all cases, whether
bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation."
Respondent's infraction is procedural in nature, that is, reducing the bail
without the benefit of hearing. The court in AM No. RTJ-03-1767, 3-28-03
enunciated that under the present rules, a hearing is required in granting
bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion'15
The rights of the accused Villacerans to bail and to the reduction thereof to
a reasonable amount were not questioned herein; rather, at issue was the
manner the reduction of the bail was granted. In the cases of Te v.
Perez16 and Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas,17 referred to by the OCA in its
Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004, this Court held that there should be
a hearing before granting bail, whether bail was a matter of right or
discretion; and the Judge should notify the prosecutor of the date of the
hearing or require the prosecutor to submit his recommendation.
Such procedural requirements were laid down by jurisprudence precisely to
avoid accusations of arbitrariness against the Judges in fixing the amount
of the bail for the accused, as what happened herein. Respondent Judge
was negligent for failing to comply with a very elementary rule of criminal
procedure, and this Court believes that such negligence actually merits a
stiffer penalty than those recommended by the investigating Judge (a fine
of P1,000) and OCA (censure). This Court therefore imposes upon
respondent Judge a fine of P2,000.
Respondent Judge approved the provisional release of the accused
Villacerans upon acceptance of their property bonds because respondent
Judge believed that, notwithstanding the assessed values stated in their
respective Tax Declarations, the two pieces of agricultural lands covered
by TCTs No. 263647 and No. 264847 had an area of 1.0014 and 1.0127
hectares, respectively, which were actually worth more than the P100,000
bail bond for both of the accused Villacerans. At any rate, respondent
Judge, upon the insistence of complainant Co, required the accused
Villacerans to post additional bail bonds. The accused Villacerans complied
with the said order by posting the WICI surety bonds.
As for the respondent Judge's refusal to order the arrest of the accused
Villacerans after the expiration of the WICI surety bonds, respondent
Judge was of the opinion that once a surety bond was posted by an
accused, the same remained effective until it was ordered released by the
court. He further maintained that in case of nonpayment of the premium
on the surety bond, it was up to the bondsmen to complain and to request
for the release of the bond upon surrendering the body of the accused.
Nonetheless, in order to address the concerns of the private prosecutor,
Atty. Bala, respondent Judge issued an Order,18 dated 20 December 2001,
directing WICI, the bonding company, to submit an updated certification of
good standing from the Supreme Court.
However, even before WICI could comply with the said Order, dated 20
December 2001, complainant Co already filed a Motion to Inhibit Presiding
Judge19 on 21 January 2002. Respondent Judge, in his Order, 20 dated 21
February 2002, granted the said Motion. Respondent Judge, therefore, had
no more opportunity to resolve the issue concerning the expiration of the
WICI surety bonds. In the words used by the investigating Judge and the
OCA, the said issue was "overtaken" by the filing of the Motion to Inhibit.
Respondent Judge cannot be held accountable when his failure to fully
resolve the matter was impeded by subsequent events in the criminal
cases, instigated by complainant Co himself.
II
The Charge of Grave Misconduct
Complainant Co also accused respondent Judge of grave misconduct
because the respondent Judge had allegedly demanded tikoy from
complainant Co in consideration for respondent Judge's voluntary inhibition
from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211; and when complainant
Co was unable to give tikoy, respondent Judge asked for P500 instead.
According to complainant Co, he never received a copy of the respondent
Judge's Order, dated 21 February 2002, granting his Motion to Inhibit, so
on 07 March 2002, he went to see the respondent Judge at Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. I, to personally follow-up on the status of the said Motion. He
did not find respondent Judge at the office of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I,
but instead, saw him at the adjoining office of Santiago City, MTCC, Br.
II.21
Respondent Judge informed him that the Motion had already been
approved. Thereafter, respondent Judge allegedly told complainant Co,
"Magkaibigan pa tayo' And to prove that you still love me, give me tikoy."
When complainant Co replied that he did not know where to buy tikoy,
respondent Judge supposedly said, "Magbigay ka ng pera, kami na ang
bibili." Complainant Co then handed P500 to respondent Judge.22
Respondent Judge disputed the charge of gross misconduct against him.
According to the respondent Judge, he had already issued the Order
inhibiting himself from hearing Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211
on 21 February 2002, or almost two weeks before he saw complainant Co
on 07 March 2002; hence, he did not need to demand for anything from
complainant Co in exchange for granting the latter's Motion to Inhibit.
Records of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 were transferred to
Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, the very same day.
Respondent Judge submitted affidavits and oral testimonies of several
witnesses, including court officers and staff members of Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. I and Br. II, to support his version of the events that transpired
on 07 March 2002, during complainant Co's visit.
Among respondent Judge's witnesses was Mr. Roger Ruma, the former
Branch Clerk of Court of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II. On 07 March 2002,
respondent Judge was at Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, talking to Mr. Ruma,
when complainant Co intruded to inquire about his Motion to Inhibit. Mr.
Ruma recounted the exchange between respondent Judge and complainant
Co as follows:
Jaime Co Judge, anong nangyari sa Motion ko?cralawlibrary
Judge Plata : Nandon na sa Branch 2, napirmahan ko na, matagal na.
Jaime Co : Nandon na pala, sige. He looks glad.
Judge Plata : Oh Jaime trabaho lang yan; Magkaibigan pa ba tayo?
cralawlibrary
Jaime Co : Oo naman!
Judge Plata : Papaano ko malaman kung mahal mo kami?cralawlibrary
Jaime Co : Eh di magpabili ako ng tikoy!
Judge Plata : Huwag! Bawal, nagbibiro lang ako.23
The conversation was interrupted at this point by a court staff member
who informed the respondent Judge that there was a telephone call for
him. After respondent Judge left the room to answer the telephone call,
complainant Co gave P500 to another court staff member who used the
money to buy pizza when he could not find any tikoy. The court staff and
student trainees shared the pizza among themselves.
Respondent Judge also discredited the two witnesses presented by
complainant Co, namely Eugenio Taguba and Maripi A. Apolonio, both
employees of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II. Respondent Judge alleged that
Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio had an ax to grind against him. Respondent
Judge complained to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that staff
members of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, were gambling in the court
premises during office hours, instigating the NBI to conduct a raid of
Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II. In the raid, which happened at around 3:00
p.m., the NBI actually caught several staff members, including Mr. Taguba
and Ms. Apolonio, in the act of gambling. An administrative case was filed
against the staff members caught in the raid, wherein they were
subsequently found guilty by this Court of simple misconduct, and were
meted the penalty of suspension for one month and one day, without
pay.24
Respondent Judge, in addition, presented evidence that during the time he
was talking to complainant Co, there was an on-going session at Santiago
City, MTCC, Br. II, and Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio were in the
courtroom attending to their duties. Thus, they could not have been
present in the office of Mr. Ruma where complainant Co and respondent
Judge were talking.
Furthermore, it could be expected that Ms. Apolonio would support
complainant Co because he was her Ninong or godfather at her wedding.25
Evidence on the issue of gross misconduct weighs heavily in favor of the
innocence of the respondent Judge. The respondent Judge's version of the
events that transpired on 07 March 2002 was corroborated by a greater
number of witnesses whose characters were not put into question. They
generally appeared to be disinterested parties to the case with no reason
or motive to protect respondent Judge. Respondent Judge was also able to
present documentary evidence to further support the affidavits and oral
testimonies of his witnesses.
Moreover, this Court agrees in the findings of the OCA in its Memorandum
dated 12 October 2004, that:
It is hard to believe that respondent would risk his reputation and position
as a judge by asking tikoy in front of other people. Besides, the case had
already ceased to be in his sala and had already been transferred to the
other branch long before complainant had a talk with respondent.
Also, it must be considered that said conversation was cut short when
respondent was called to answer a phone call, that ceased him to control
(sic) the events that later on ensued.26
This Court, however, also agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge
committed an indiscretion when he commented to complainant Co,
"Papaano ko malaman kung mahal mo kami?" Although respondent Judge
made the comment jokingly, it was also very understandable how
complainant Co had construed it as an insinuation to do some act or to
give something to prove that he had no hard feelings towards respondent
Judge.
For making such a comment, respondent Judge violated Canon 2 of the
then Code of Judicial Ethics, which provided that, "A Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." 27 Since
respondent Judge occupied an exalted position in the administration of
justice, he should pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him; and
his private, as well as his official, conduct must at all times be free from
the appearance of impropriety.28
Although respondent Judge cannot be enjoined from sharing jokes, he
must be more prudent in this regard. As a Judge, respondent herein is the
subject of constant scrutiny. He must freely and willingly impose upon
himself certain restrictions, which might be viewed as burdensome on an
ordinary citizen, because he must conduct himself in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of his judicial office. 29
III
The Charge of Inefficiency in Office
As to his charge of inefficiency in office, complainant Co alleged that
Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 had been pending for a long
time before Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I. Respondent Judge did not assert
his authority to try and resolve these cases as soon as possible. The cases
were often called at 11:30 a.m., just to be reset for lack of material time
to hear the cases.
This Court finds no basis for this charge of inefficiency against respondent
Judge. Respondent Judge had satisfactorily explained in his
Memorandum,30 dated 04 May 2004, that the delay in the resolution of
Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 were attributable to reasons
other than respondent Judge's alleged inefficiency.

Respondent Judge was present during all the scheduled hearings of the
said criminal cases. The records of the criminal cases supported
respondent Judge's claim that hearings of the cases were reset three times
because of the absence of the private prosecutor; five times because of
the absence of the public prosecutor; and two times because of the
absence of the counsel for the accused. 31

At other times, respondent Judge was unable to hear the said criminal
cases since there were at least 30 criminal cases set for hearing on every
hearing date. Due to the sheer number of cases, there was barely enough
time to call all the cases in the calendar, much less, to hear the testimony
of the witnesses in all of the cases scheduled.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that: (1) the respondent
Judge is guilty of simple negligence for his failure to scrutinize the
documents he had signed and to follow the proper procedure for fixing the
amount of bail, for which he is meted a fine of P2,000.00; (2) the
respondent Judge is guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Ethics for his failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety, for which he
is reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely; and (3) the charge of inefficiency in office against
respondent Judge to be without basis and is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666               September 5, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1761-MTJ)
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for "gross ignorance of the
law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and
unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys
Gerlie2 M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Erwin3 B. Javellana
(Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint:
First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several occasions as examples: (a)
In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge
Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) In Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled
People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the
motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18
and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was
a prohibited pleading; (c) Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to
dismiss outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or
merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay
evidence; and (d) In Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for
Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary
investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set
the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant
and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their
affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.Second, Judge
Javellana gave the impression that he was a co-agent in a surety company with a
certain Leilani "Lani" Manunag (Manunag). Judge Javellana had conveyed to the
public on several occasions that Manunag was in a special position to influence him
in granting provisional liberty to the accused.4 In different cases, Judge Javellana (a)
instructed the wife of an accused to file the Motion to Reduce Bond prepared by the
PAO with Manunag, leading the wife to believe that Manunag was a court personnel,
hence, said Motion was never filed with the MTC and, instead of the cash bond the
accused intended to post, the accused was released on a surety bond issued by
Manunag’s company for which the accused still had to pay premium;5 (b) reduced the
bail from ₱ 40,000.00 to ₱ 30,000.00, consistent with the reduced bail amount
Manunag instructed the representative of the accused to seek, not to ₱ 10,000.00 as
prayed for by the PAO in the Motion for Reduction of Bail or to ₱ 20,000.00 as
recommended by the Chief of Police;6 (c) did not warn Manunag against getting
involved in court processes as she was engaged in surety insurance and did not even
question a counter-affidavit of an accused prepared by "Lani;"7 (d) instructed the
relatives of the accused to go to Manunag who knew how to "process" an affidavit of
desistance, and when said relatives did approach Manunag, the latter charged them
fees;8 (e) did not set the Motion to Reduce Bail for hearing but granted the same
because it was filed by "the intimate friend of judge who is an agent of surety" and
took cognizance of the amount of premium for the surety bond in determining the
amount of bail;9 (f) denied the Motion to Extend Time to File Counter-Affidavit for
violation of the three-day notice rule, but granted the Motion to Reduce Bail facilitated
by Manunag even when it was filed in violation of the same rule;10 and (g) issued
warrants of arrest under questionable circumstances, more particularly described in
the immediately succeeding paragraph, in which cases, the bail bonds of the accused
were facilitated by Manunag.
Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching
questions to the complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of
placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana issued
warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or
when a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as
stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case
No. 03-097, entitled People v. Bautista,11 for preliminary investigation even when the
accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation without informing the
accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel.
Fifth, Judge Javellana was habitually tardy. The subpoena in Civil Case No. 05-001,
entitled Villanueva v. Regalado,12 only stated that the hearing would be "in the
morning," without indicating the time. Judge Javellana failed to arrive for the pre-trial
of the case set in the morning of April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana was still a no-show
when the pre-trial was reset in the morning of April 15, 2005 and May 3, 2005. Finally,
anticipating Judge Javellana’s tardiness, the pre-trial was rescheduled at 1:30 in the
afternoon of another date.
Sixth, Judge Javellana whimsically or inconsistently implemented laws and rules
depending on stature of the parties, persons accompanying the parties, lawyers of the
parties, and his personal relations with the parties/lawyers. Judge Javellana, in
several cases,13 denied or refused to receive Motions for Extension of Time to File
Counter-Affidavits signed only by the accused, yet in other cases,14 granted such
motions. In another case,15 Judge Javellana denied the Motion to Extend Time to File
Counter-Affidavit for violation of the three-day notice rule, but granted the Motion to
Reduce Bail, which was in violation of the same rule. Judge Javellana’s inconsistent
and irregular ruling could be due to the fact that the former motion was filed by Public
Attorney Bascug, with whom Judge Javellana had an axe to grind, while the latter
motion was facilitated by Manunag.
Seventh, Judge Javellana also adopted the mantra that the "litigants are made for the
courts" instead of "courts for the litigants." In Crim. Case No. 03-104, entitled People
v. Fermin, the accused, assisted by Public Attorney Uy, pleaded guilty to the crime of
attempted homicide. The accused filed a Petition/Application for Probation, prepared
by the PAO but signed only by the accused. Judge Javellana refused to accept said
Petition/Application and required the father of the accused to return the
Petition/Application all the way from the MTC in La Castellana to the PAO in La
Carlota, despite the great distance between these two cities. The PAO already
adopted the practice of preparing the motions for extension of time to file counter-
affidavit, motions for release of minor, or applications for probation, but letting the
accused themselves or their parents (in case the accused were minors) sign the
motions/applications, thus, enabling the PAO to serve as many clients as possible
despite the lack of lawyers. Such practice is not prohibited considering that under
Rule 138, Section 34 of the Rules of Court, a party may conduct his litigation in a
municipal court "in person, with an aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the
purpose or with aid of an attorney."16
Eighth, Judge Javellana did not observe the proper procedure in airing his complaints
against public attorneys. Judge Javellana rebuked the public attorneys in the Orders
he issued. In one such Order,17 Judge Javellana misleadingly stated that Public
Attorney Uy "has already expressed her desire not to attend today’s hearing," when
Public Attorney Uy actually waived her personal appearance at said hearing as she
had to attend the hearing of a criminal case at the MTC of Pontevedra. In another
Order,18 Judge Javellana reported, prior to confirmation, that the PAO lawyer refused
to prepare the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavit, thus, prompting the
accused to hire a special counsel. Additionally, Judge Javellana improperly filed his
complaints against the public attorneys appearing before his court with the
Department of Justice or the District Public Attorney (DPA) of Bacolod City, instead of
the appropriate authorities, namely, the DPA of La Carlota City or the PAO Regional
Director. Moreover, Judge Javellana had required Public Attorney Bascug to explain
why she allowed the accused in Crim. Case No. 03-090, entitled People v. Earnshaw,
to sign the Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavits, even when she
was the one who prepared said Motion. Judge Javellana did not verify first whether it
was indeed Public Attorney Bascug who prepared the Motion in question, thus,
violating her right to due process. Also, Judge Javellana was already encroaching
upon the domain of the PAO. It is the concern of the PAO and not the court "as to
how the Public Attorney’s Office will be managed, specifically, what policies to use in
the acceptance of cases brought to its Office, how one could avail of its legal
services, at what point in time one is considered a client of said Office x x x ."19
Lastly, to support their complaint, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug attached a hand-
written note20 relating the observations of an anonymous member of Judge
Javellana’s staff, viz:
Page One
1. Honorable Judge reports to duty at past 11:00 A.M. and hurriedly
conducts preliminary investigations or preliminary examinations after making
party litigants wait from 8:00 A.M. until 11:00 A.M. There had been
occasions when litigants became impatient for waiting for several hours for
the Judge’s arrival and would leave the court. Judge then would forego the
examination.
2. Judge spends more time conversing in cafeterias than stay in the court.
Litigants who are in a hurry to go home would bring the affidavits to the
cafeteria for Judge’s signature.
3. Most of the time, in Court, in front of litigants as audience and even while
solemnizing civil marriage Judge would keep repeating these remarks:
I am a criminal lawyer.
I did not come from the DAR or the COMELEC.
I am an intelligent Judge.
I am the counsel of the famous Gargar-Lumangyao and Spider
Hunter cases and I have caused the execution of Col. Torres.
I am not under the Mayor or the Chief of Police.
and other remarks as if he is the only intelligent, credible and
qualified judge in the whole world.
4. Judge tolerates the negligence of duty of his court utility worker. Said
utility worker never reports to open or close the court; he never cleans the
courtroom; most of the time he stays in his Karaoke bar which is some few
meters away from the MTC of La Castellana. As a matter of fact the MTC of
La Castellana is the dirtiest of all the courtrooms in the whole province.
Page Two
5. Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter Affidavit in CC 03-090-Pp.
vs. Efraim Earnshaw made by Atty. Bascug was denied by Judge on the
ground that it was the accused who signed the Motion and Atty. Bascug was
ordered to explain. Other motions had been denied for not meeting the 3-day
rule but others were granted.
6. Motion to Reduce Bail received by court on January 7, 2004 was not set
for hearing but was ordered granted because it was filed by the intimate
friend of the judge who is an agent of Surety. This did not meet the 3-day
rule CC 03-108 Pp. vs. Lowell Panaguiton for "Homicide."
 Page Three
1. Criminal Case No. 03-102- Julius Villanueva "Frustrated
Homicide" Urgent Motion to Stay Transfer to Provincial Jail - Filed
1/21/2004 was not heard but order was issued January 21, 2004
also.
2. Criminal Case No. 03-090- Efraim Earnshaw "Less Serious
Physical Injuries" January 26, 2004 - Scheduled for arraignment but
upon order of Judge on affidavit of Desistance of Melanie Pabon
and Motion to Dismiss was filed and case dismissed.
3. Deonaldo Lopez Case - Motion for Extension of Time to File
Counter Affidavit dated 10-3-02 was signed by accused namely
Deonaldo Lopez, Jojo Balansag, Junnel Jorge, and Bernie Bello -
granted by judge.21
Based on the foregoing, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug prayed that Judge Javellana
be removed from the MTC of La Castellana.
In his Comment22 on the complaint against him, Judge Javellana discounted the
allegations of Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug as "baseless, untruthful, intrigues,
malicious and a harassment tending to intimidate him," and countered as follows:
First, Judge Javellana asserted that he was not grossly ignorant of the rules of
procedure and explained his actions in particular cases: (a) In People v. Cornelio,
Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest for the two accused charged with
Malicious Mischief in the exercise of his judicial discretion, and the necessity of
holding the accused in detention became evident when it was revealed during trial
that the same accused were wanted for Attempted Homicide in Crim. Case No. 04-
096; (b) In People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana insisted that referral of the
dispute (involving an alleged Trespass to Dwelling) to the Lupong Tagapamayapa
was not a jurisdictional requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on said ground was a
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (c) Still in
People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint as
prayed for by Public Attorney Uy as the Judge had to accord due process to the
complainant in said case; and (d) In People v. Lopez, et al. another case for Malicious
Mischief, Judge Javellana reiterated that a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and added that he could not dismiss
the case outright since the prosecution has not yet fully presented its evidence.
Second, Judge Javellana denied acting as the co-agent of Manunag. Manunag was
an Authorized Surety Bond Agent of Commonwealth Insurance and Surety Bond
Company, a bonding company duly accredited by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). The relationship between Judge Javellana and Manunag was
"purely on official business." That Manunag influenced Judge Javellana in fixing the
amount of bail in several cases was a malicious and deliberate lie, based on mere
speculation and suspicion. Judge Javellana had consistently granted the reduction of
the amount of bail to only 75%, and not as low as 25%, of the amount stated in
Department Circular No. 89 dated August 29, 2000 of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Judge Javellana even chided Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug that as officers
of the court, said public attorneys were duty bound not to demand outrageous
reduction of bail. In addition, Judge Javellana could not warn Manunag to stay away
from "the processes (sic) premises in the Court" because "everybody are allowed to
attend Court proceedings unless otherwise the attendance of the public is
prohibited."23 Judge Javellana likewise stated that he could not interfere with the
processing of surety insurance and bond for such was a private matter between the
insurance and bonding company and its authorized agents. Referring to case records,
Judge Javellana pointed out that he only granted the motions to reduce bail that
complied with the three-day notice rule.
Third, Judge Javellana claimed to have conducted preliminary examination, asking
the complainants and their witnesses searching questions, before issuing warrants of
arrest. According to Judge Javellana, he would sign the official form of the warrant of
arrest right after the preliminary examination. In some cases, Judge Javellana was
not aware that the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or was already taken
into custody by virtue of a warrantless arrest because police officers did not timely
inform the court of such fact.
Fourth, Judge Javellana did not violate the constitutional rights of the accused in
People v. Bautista. Judge Javellana argued that while a judge can ask clarificatory
questions during the preliminary investigation, a preliminary investigation is
mandatory only when the law imposes the penalty of imprisonment of at least four
years, two months, and one day. Judge Javellana further averred that he always
advised litigants to secure the services of a counsel or that of a public attorney from
the PAO. However, even when the public attorney failed or refused to appear before
the court, Judge Javellana still proceeded with his clarificatory questions since there
was yet no full blown trial for which the accused already needed the services of a
competent lawyer.
Fifth, Judge Javellana explained his failure to arrive for the pre-trial in Villanueva v.
Regalado scheduled on April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana averred that he had been
suffering from diabetes, as evinced by his medical records from the Supreme Court
Health and Welfare Plan, and on said date, his blood sugar rose to 300, which
caused him to be lethargic, weak, and drowsy.
Sixth, Judge Javellana repudiated the allegation that he applied the law and ruled
whimsically and inconsistently. Judge Javellana asserted that he "applied the law and
the rules according to what he believes is fair, just and equitable in the exercise of his
judicial discretion."24 Judge Javellana never favored Manunag and in all criminal cases
involving homicide, he had granted the reduction of bail to ₱ 30,000.00 (75% of the
recommended bail of ₱ 40,000.00).
Seventh, Judge Javellana admitted not accepting petitions, applications, and motions
prepared by the PAO but signed only by the accused, asseverating that public
attorneys should affix their signatures and state their Roll of Attorneys number in
every pleading they file in court. Judge Javellana asked that "if all courts admits (sic)
any pleading filed by any litigant then what will happen to the practice of law?"25
Eighth, Judge Javellana emphasized that government lawyers, such as Public
Attorneys Uy and Bascug, are paid with people’s money, so they should be sincere
and dedicated to their work and, whenever possible, go the extra mile to serve poor
litigants. Thus, Judge Javellana reported Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug to higher
PAO officials to guide said public attorneys and not to interfere with the performance
of their functions.
said Rule; and (2) gross misconduct when he got involved in business relations with
Manunag, implemented the law inconsistently, and mentioned his accomplishments
for publicity. The OCA thus recommended that:
1. The instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter; and

And ninth, Judge Javellana identified the member of his staff who wrote the note 2. Judge Edwin B. Javellana, MTC, La Castellana, Negros Occidental be
containing more allegations against him as Mr. Ray D. Pineda (Pineda), Process SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for three (3)
Server. Judge Javellana described Pineda as "very abnormal, eccentric and queer in months with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts
his relationship with his fellow staff as shown by his quarrelsome attitude and fond of in the future shall be dealt with more severely.28
inciting litigants to criticize the Clerk of Court and other personnel and most of all his
loyalty to the Official of the Municipality rather than to this Court x x x."26 Judge
Javellana clarified that he often mentioned the Gargar-Lumangyao Kidnapping with In a Resolution29 dated February 5, 2007, the Court re-docketed the complaint as a
Double Murder Case and the Spider Hunters Multiple Murder and Multiple Frustrated regular administrative matter and required parties to manifest their willingness to
Murder Case not to boast but to relay the impression that he meant business as submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.
Presiding Judge. These cases were dubbed as the "Case of the Century" by then
Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City On separate dates,30 the parties manifested their willingness to submit the case for
(who later became Deputy Court Administrator) because the same involved big time resolution based on the pleadings already filed.
personalities. Judge Javellana mentioned the said cases even when solemnizing
marriages because he would then be reading the Holy Scriptures and he had to We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except for the penalty
highlight that he survived the trials and threats to his life because of the Holy Bible. imposed.
Judge Javellana also did not have a Court Aide who owned a Karaoke Bar whose
negligence the judge was tolerating. Pineda was just "jealous" because he was not
designated by Judge Javellana as Acting Docket Clerk in lieu of Mr. Vee Caballero I
who was already on terminal leave prior to retirement. Judge Javellana further
narrated that he had reprimanded Pineda several times, even in open court. In one of Gross Ignorance of the Law
these instances, it was because Pineda submitted a falsified information sheet to the
Supreme Court Personnel Division, stating therein that he had never been charged
The Revised Rule of Summary Procedure shall govern the following criminal cases:
with a criminal offense, when in truth, he was previously charged with "Physical
Injury." Judge Javellana advised Pineda to rectify the latter’s records by executing an
affidavit to be submitted to the Supreme Court Personnel Division, but Pineda did not SECTION 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
heed the same. Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction.
In the end, Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and
malicious; and the acts being complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus,
judicial in nature and not the proper subject of an administrative complaint. Judge xxxx
Javellana hinted about a conspiracy between the Municipal Mayor, on one hand, and
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug, on the other. The Municipal Mayor was purportedly B. Criminal Cases:
angry at Judge Javellana because the latter caused the arrest of and heard the cases
against the former’s supporters and employees; while Public Attorney Bascug was
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
suffering from a "Losing Litigant’s Syndrome" and "Prosecution Complex," and was
influencing Public Attorney Uy, a neophyte lawyer.
(2) Violations of the rental law;
Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint against
him. (3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report27 dated January 2, 2006, (4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did
not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by
 (5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not
exceeding one thousand pesos (₱ 1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising
therefrom: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine
does not exceed ten thousand pesos (₱ 10,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
The cases People v. Cornelio31 and People v. Lopez, et al.32 pending before Judge
Javellana were both for malicious mischief.
The crime of malicious mischief is committed by any person who deliberately causes
damage to the property of another through means not constituting arson.33 There are
special cases of malicious mischief which are specifically covered by Article 328 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
ART. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. – Any person who shall cause
damage to obstruct the performance of public functions, or using any poisonous or
corrosive substance; or spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who
causes damage to the property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any
archive or registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in common
by the public, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor, if such value does not exceed the above- mentioned
amount but is over 200 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos. (Emphasis
ours.)
All other cases of malicious mischief shall be governed by Article 329 of the same
Code, which reads:
ART. 329. Other mischiefs. – The mischiefs not included in the next preceding article
shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage caused
and not more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does not exceed 200
pesos or cannot be estimated. (Emphasis ours.)
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et
al. were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in
Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code, then Article 329 of the same Code should be
applied. If the amounts of the alleged damage to property in People v. Cornelio and
People v. Lopez, et al., ₱ 6,000.0034 and ₱ 3,000.00,35 respectively, are proven, the
appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be
imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two
cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v.
Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
categorically stating that "the court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for
failure to appear whenever required." Judge Javellana never claimed that the
accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted
for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-
096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v.
Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellana’s court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for
malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is
for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same accused.
Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be
extended or made applicable to the other.
In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even
when it was not required or justified.36
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case
within the scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the following manner:
SEC. 11. How commenced. – The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of
this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus
two (2) copies for the court’s files. If this requirement is not complied with within five
(5) days from date of filing, the case may be dismissed.
SEC. 12. Duty of Court. –
(a) If commenced by complaint. – On the basis of the complaint and the
affidavits and other evidence accompanying the same, the court may
dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit and order
the release of the accused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. – When the case is commenced by
information, or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph,
 the court shall issue an order which, together with copies of the affidavits
and other evidence submitted by the prosecution, shall require the accused
to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as
any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or
prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The
prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the
counter-affidavits of the defense.
SEC. 13. Arraignment and trial. – Should the court, upon a consideration of the
complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or
ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise,
the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned
and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a
preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information
for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously
established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People
v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a
preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants
to the speedy disposition of cases.37
Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those
specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby
lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose
of said Rule.
We further agree with the OCA that Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in
denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in
insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never
previously referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure read:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision
shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the
preceding section. (Emphases ours.)
We see no ambiguity in the aforequoted provisions. A case which has not been
previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without
prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon
requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellana’s argument that referral to the Lupon is
not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v.
Celeste, et al. was not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to
Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the
Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste,
et al.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15,
1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases pending
before Judge Javellana’s court. Judge Javellana cannot claim to be unfamiliar with
the same.
Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not
to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.38
In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles,39 we called the attention of Judge Tresvalles to
Section 2 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which states that a "patently
erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action." We went on further to interpret said
provision as follows:
Although the said provision states that "patently erroneous determination to avoid the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary
action," the provision cannot be read as applicable only where the failure to apply the
rule is deliberate or malicious. Otherwise, the policy of the law to provide for the
expeditious and summary disposition of cases covered by it could easily be frustrated.
Hence, requiring judges to make the determination of the applicability of the rule on
summary procedure upon the filing of the case is the only guaranty that the policy of
the law will be fully realized. x x x.40 (Emphasis ours.)
Resultantly, Judge Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of deliberate or
malicious intent as a defense. His repeated failure to apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure in cases so obviously covered by the same is detrimental to the
expedient and efficient administration of justice, for which we hold him
administratively liable.
As for Judge Javellana’s refusal to dismiss People v. Lopez, et al. and People v.
Celeste, et al., however, we exonerate him of the administrative charges for the
same. Judge Javellana is correct that the appreciation of evidence is already within
his judicial discretion.41 Any alleged error he might have committed in this regard is
the proper subject of an appeal but not an administrative complaint. We remind Judge
Javellana though to adhere closely to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in
hearing and resolving said cases.
II
Gross Misconduct
Judges are enjoined by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary42 to act and behave, in and out of court, in a manner befitting their office, to
wit:
Canon 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to
be done.
xxxx
Canon 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only
to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
xxxx
Canon 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should
do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that
is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
xxxx
SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance
their private interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall
they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special
position improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.
xxxx
SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their
influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their
duties or functions.
xxxx
Canon 5
EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due
performance of the judicial office.
xxxx
SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or by
conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant
grounds.
xxxx
SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant
grounds.
SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for
all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties.
xxxx
Canon 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.
Judge Javellana had violated the aforequoted canons/standards in several instances.
Judge Javellana did not admit having a business relationship with Manunag, contrary
to the finding of the OCA. What Judge Javellana stated in his Comment was that his
relationship with Manunag was "purely on official business," since Manunag was a
duly authorized agent of a credited bonding company. Nonetheless, Judge Javellana,
by referring the accused who appeared before his court directly to Manunag for
processing of the bail bond of said accused, gave the impression that he favored
Manunag and Manunag’s bonding company, as well as the reasonable suspicion that
he benefitted financially from such referrals. Judge Javellana should remember that
he must not only avoid impropriety, but the "appearance of impropriety" as well.
Moreover, Judge Javellana was conspicuously inconsistent in Granting43 or
denying44 motions for extension of time to file pleadings which were signed only by the
accused. Judge Javellana reasoned in his Comment that the PAO lawyers who
prepared the motions should have signed the same as counsels for the accused, but
this only explained Judge Javellana’s denial of said motions. It did not address why,
in other cases, Judge Javellana had granted similar motions signed only by the
accused. Without any satisfactory basis for the difference in his ruling on these
motions, Judge Javellana had acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the PAO lawyers.
Judge Javellana himself admitted that he often mentioned his previous
accomplishments as counsel in big and controversial cases, claiming that he only did
so to impress upon the parties that he meant business and that he relied greatly upon
God to survive the trials and threats to his life. We are not persuaded.
The previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically warned the judges against seeking
publicity for personal vainglory.45 Vainglory, in its ordinary meaning, refers to an
individual’s excessive or ostentatious pride especially in one’s own
achievements.46 Even no longer explicitly stated in the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
judges are still proscribed from engaging in self-promotion and indulging their vanity
and pride by Canons 1 (on Integrity) and 2 (on Propriety) of the New Code.
We have previously strongly reminded judges in that:
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a
judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this
time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means that lawyers and judges
alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the
same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a
leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x
using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding
their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility),
with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or
self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by
publicity.47
Judge Javellana’s actuations as described above run counter to the mandate that
judges behave at all times in such a manner as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.48 We cannot stress enough that "judges are
the visible representations of law and justice. They ought to be embodiments of
competence, integrity and independence. In particular, municipal judges are frontline
officers in the administration of justice. It is therefore essential that they live up to the
high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct."49
For his violations of the New Code of Professional Conduct, Judge Javellana
committed gross misconduct. We have defined gross misconduct as a "transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer."50
There is no sufficient evidence to hold Judge Javellana administratively liable for the
other charges against him contained in the complaint. Yet, we call Judge Javellana’s
attention to several matters pointed out by the OCA, that if left unchecked, may again
result in another administrative complaint against the judge: (1) notices of hearing
issued by Judge Javellana’s court must state the specific time, date, and place51 ; (2)
in case Judge Javellana is unable to attend a hearing for any reason, he must inform
his Clerk of Court as soon as possible so that the latter can already cancel the
hearing and spare the parties, counsels, and witnesses from waiting52 ; and (3) he
must take care in ascertaining the facts and according due process to the parties
concerned before levying charges of incompetence or indifference against the PAO
lawyers appearing before his court.53
 III
Penalty

Gross ignorance of the law54 and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct55 are classified as serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of
the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Rule 140, Section 11(a) of the same
Rules by:

1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;

2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3) A fine of more than ₱ 20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱ 40,000.00

The OCA recommended that Judge Javellana be suspended without salary and
benefits for three months.1ªvvph!1 Given the gravity and number of violations
committed by Judge Javellana, we deem it appropriate to impose suspension without
salary and benefits for a period of three months and one day.

WHEREFORE, Judge Erwin B. Javellana is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the

law and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other
benefits for a period of three (3) months and one (1) day with a STERN WARNING
that the repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his records with this Court.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1762             December 17, 2008
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1422-RTJ)
SERGIO & GRACELDA N. ANDRES, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, ELMER
D. LASTIMOSA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff, RTC-
OCC, and NASIL S. PALATI, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
General Santos City, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This administrative case arose from the complaint-affidavit 1 dated February
21, 2002 of Sergio N. Andres, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres charging
respondents Judge Jose S. Majaducon, Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), General Santos City, and Presiding Judge, Branch 23, with
violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7, Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Misconduct, and both Elmer D. Lastimosa, Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of South Cotabato, and Nasil S. Palati, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, with Abuse of Authority, Ignorance of
the Law and Grave Misconduct.
The complaint stemmed from the Special Order of Demolition 2 issued by
Judge Majaducon on August 22, 2001 in connection with the consolidated
Civil Case Nos. 12913 and 4647,4 an action for declaration of nullity of
documents and recovery of possession of real property with writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages. The said order directed the
provincial sheriff of General Santos City to demolish the improvements
erected by the heirs of John Sycip and Yard Urban Homeowners Association
on the land belonging to spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga.
Pursuant to the Order of Demolition, a Notice to Vacate 5 dated September
12, 2001 was issued by Sheriff Palati and noted by Provincial Sheriff
Lastimosa. The said notice was addressed to the heirs of John Sycip, all
members of Yard Urban Homeowners Association, and "all adverse
claimants and actual occupants" of Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, the land subject
of Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647.
To forestall the demolition of their houses, complainants, who claimed an
interest over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, filed a Special Appearance with Urgent
Ex-Parte Manifestation6 informing the court of the pending protest between
them and the heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga before the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), docketed as
RED Claim No. 3735.7 In the Ex-Parte Manifestation, complainants alleged
that they and their predecessor-in-interest Concepcion Non Andres
introduced improvements and authorized the construction of several
improvements on Lot No. 2, Psu-135740. They also averred that they are not
bound by the judgment rendered in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 because
neither they nor their predecessor-in-interest were impleaded as parties
therein. They prayed that the provincial sheriff or any of his deputies be
enjoined from implementing the special order of demolition on the
improvements they made. They also wrote a letter8 addressed to
respondents Lastimosa and Palati enjoining them from executing the order of
demolition under pain of administrative sanction.
On February 6, 2002, notwithstanding complainants’ manifestation and letter,
Lastimosa and Palati proceeded with the demolition of the improvements
erected by the complainants and their predecessor-in-interest.
Thus, on February 18, 2002, complainants instituted, with the RTC of
General Santos City, Civil Case No. 7066, an action for Specific
Performance, Reconveyance and Damages against the heirs of Melencio Yu
and impleaded Judge Majaducon, Lastimosa and Palati as co-defendants.
The complaint alleged that complainants’ title over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740
was valid, that they had been occupying the property since 1957 and that the
reckless and arbitrary demolition of their improvements had unlawfully
disturbed their peaceful occupation of the property. 9 Complainants also filed
an Urgent Motion for Special Raffle of said Civil Case No. 7066.
In an Order10 dated February 18, 2002, Judge Majaducon, acting as the
Executive Judge of RTC, General Santos City, denied the Urgent Motion for
Special Raffle and dismissed outright Civil Case No. 7066. On the same day,
respondent judge issued another Order11 declaring complainants in direct
contempt of court for allegedly filing a complaint based on a quitclaim that
had already been pronounced null and void by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, complainants were ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days.
This prompted complainants to file the instant administrative complaint. They
averred that the actions of herein respondents constitute bad faith, malicious
motive, serious partiality, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
They also alleged that prior to his appointment in the judiciary, Judge
Majaducon was the former counsel of Melencio Yu and his mother Dominga
Pinagawang.
In his Comment12 dated April 16, 2002, respondent judge vehemently denied
the accusations hurled against him. He explained that he issued the special
order of demolition in the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 after a
decision13 was rendered and a resolution14 was issued by the Supreme Court
affirming the judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals (CA) declaring
spouses Melencio Uy and Talinanap Matualaga as the rightful owners of Lot
No. 2, Psu-135740 and ordering all occupants to vacate the premises. This
was also the reason why he ordered the outright dismissal of Civil Case No.
7066 filed by herein complainants. He believed that complainants had no
cause of action because the courts had already decided that the quitclaim
upon which complainants based their action was null and void. Thus, to
entertain the complaint would be just a waste of time on the part of the court.
Anent the contempt order, he maintained that the same was justified because
complainants had instituted an unfounded suit based on a falsified document,
thereby demonstrating an obvious defiance and disrespect of the authority
and dignity of the court.
As to the charge of partiality, respondent judge denied being the former
counsel of Melencio Yu’s mother, Dominga Pinagawang. He explained that
his real client was Cesar Bañas who requested him to write a letter
demanding the squatters to vacate the lot owned by Dominga. He asserted
that after writing the letter, another counsel took over the case.
Respondents Lastimosa and Palati filed their own Comment 15 on April 9,
2002 and averred that they faithfully observed the correct procedure in the
implementation of the order of demolition, including the twin requirements of
notice and hearing. According to them, they were extra careful in
implementing the same especially because it was, by far, the biggest
demolition undertaken by their office as it involved a 12-hectare property and
about 1,500 persons. It also generated interest among the media, thus they
made sure that they consulted with respondent judge all issues and
questions relative to its implementation.
In the Agenda Report16 dated December 12, 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00 for violation of the rules governing the raffle of cases,
and that the administrative case against him be redocketed as a regular
administrative matter. The OCA, however, found that respondents Lastimosa
and Palati did not abuse their authority in the implementation of the order of
demolition and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against them.
In the Resolution dated March 5, 2003, the Court required the parties to
manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.17 Pursuant to respondents’ manifestation,18 they filed their
memorandum with additional exhibits on April 22, 2003. 19 Complainants, on
the other hand, manifested that they would no longer file a memorandum and
that they were submitting the case for resolution.
Complainants assailed the respondent judge’s issuance of a special order of
dismissal in connection with Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 despite their
pending protest before the DENR. To complainants, the issuance of said
order of demolition constituted gross ignorance of the law.
We are not persuaded. The evidence on hand shows that respondent judge
issued the special order of demolition only after carefully determining that
there was no more hindrance to issue the same. For one, the trial court, in
Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, had already adjudged that the land in
question belonged to spouses Yu and Matualaga and even nullified the
quitclaim and all documents of conveyance of sale in favor of complainants’
predecessor-in-interest.20 In fact, the records of the case disclosed that the
decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 69000 21 and
CA-G.R. CV No. 5400322 and ultimately by this Court via its decision dated
November 9, 1990 in G.R. No. 7648723 and resolution dated July 19, 1999 in
G.R. No. 138132.24
It is thus beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647
had already attained finality. The special order of demolition was issued by
respondent judge so that the final judgment could be fully implemented and
executed, in accordance with the principle that the execution of a final
judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party, and
mandatory and ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal issuing the
judgment.25 To be sure, it is essential to the effective administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 26
However, respondent judge abused his authority in dealing with Civil Case
No. 7066 which cast serious doubt as to his impartiality. Respondent judge’s
outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 entitled "Heirs of Concepcion Non
Andres, namely Sergio, Sergio Jr., and Sofronio and Gracelda, all surnamed
Andres v. Heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga, namely Eduardo,
Leonora, Virgilio, Vilma, Cynthia, Imelda and Nancy, all surnamed Yu, and
represented by Virgilio Yu and Cynthia Yu Abo, Atty. Elmer Lastimosa, in his
capacity as Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of South Cotobato, Mr. Nasil Palati,
in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General
Santos City, and Hon. Jose S. Majaducon, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City" was irregular. As correctly found
by the OCA, respondent judge completely ignored the procedure for the
raffling of cases mandated by Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated
September 23, 1974, which we reproduce hereunder:
I. RAFFLING OF CASES
 All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are
two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different
branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch without
being raffled. The raffle of cases should be regularly conducted at
the hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive Judge.
Only the maximum number of cases, according to their dates of
filing, as can be equally distributed to all branches in the particular
station or grouping shall be included in the raffle. x x x
Clearly, respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of the Court when he
took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two
defendants and instantly dismissed it without first conducting the requisite
raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the raffling of cases, held in
the case of Ang Kek Chen v. Bello27:
The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court Circular
No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it
is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling
the cases, public suspicion regarding the assignment of cases to
predetermined judges is obviated. A violation or disregard of the
Court’s circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not
to be countenanced.
Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge
by dispensing with the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the
pretext that it would be just a waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain
the case. As Executive Judge, he ought to know that raffling of cases is his
personal duty and responsibility. He is expected to keep abreast and be
conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of
cases before him and strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide
by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect
for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that they are
not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law. 28
By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them
to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten
(10) days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a
judge acting judicially, or such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the
court and the administration of justice into disrepute or disrespect. 29 Here,
respondent judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a
complaint (Civil Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had
already been declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein
he was one of the defendants, raffled to the court which could properly act on
the case. While the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as
to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of
justice, still, judges must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic
power must be used judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow
himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties.30
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised
on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish
for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise.31
It has time and again been stressed that besides the basic equipment of
possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to
be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. 32
Indeed, Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states
that:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before
the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in
an official capacity.
Respondent judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct
contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested
upon him by law.
Respondent judge also took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 despite the
fact that prior to his appointment as judge, respondent served as counsel for
Melencio Yu and his mother, Dominga Pinagawang.
Respondent’s explanation that it was Cesar Bañas who was his client and
not Melencio and Dominga was belied by the demand letter 33 dated June 20,
1980, which was signed by him.
Respondent judge clearly acted as counsel not only for Cesar Bañas but for
Melencio and Dominga as well. Section 2 of Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct specifically provides that "judges shall ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of
the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary." Section 5 of the same Canon further states that "judges
shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which
they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially.
Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where (b) the
judge previously served as lawyer in the matter in controversy."
Respondent judge violated the above canon when he dispensed with the
raffle and took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its
outright dismissal and cited the complainants in contempt of court. He thus
created the impression that he intended to favor his former clients, Melencio
and Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his
impartiality and objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. He has both the duty of rendering a
just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity.34 Well-known is the judicial
norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal, for all the other elements of due process, like
notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would
come from a partial and biased judge.35
We take this occasion once more to impress upon a trial judge that he must
at all times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the court's
impartiality. When he exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to
perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no
choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. It is basic that a judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear
that will induce the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and probity in
favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is
to disqualify himself.36
Respondent judge was a party defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was
enough reason not to act on the same and just leave the matter to the Vice-
Executive Judge. His reluctance to let go of the case all the more induced
doubts and suspicions as to his honest actuations, probity and objectivity.
Evidently, respondent judge violated the clear injunction embodied in the
aforecited Canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Be that as it may, we rule that there is no merit in complainants’ charge of
gross ignorance of the law leveled against respondent judge. For liability to
attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation must
not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, it
must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
and corruption.37 Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a
person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the
grounds for the accusation.
The violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 by respondent judge is
classified as a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court. Section 11(B) of the same Rule provides the following sanctions for
less serious offenses:
Sec. 11. Sanctions.
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the
following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
Finally, as regards the charge against Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff Elmer
Lastimosa and Sheriff IV Palati, complainants maintain that they abused their
authority when they enforced the order of demolition against complainants
even though they were not impleaded as parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and
4647 where the order of demolition was issued.
The dispositive portion of the order of demolition issued by respondent judge
reads:
NOW THEREFORE, we command you to demolish the
improvements erected by the defendants HEIRS OF JOHN SYCIP
(namely: NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, JOSE SYCIP, JR., ALFONSO
SYCIP II, ROSE MARIE SYCIP, JAMES SYCIP & GRACE SYCIP),
Represented by NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, in Civil Case No. 1291 and
the plaintiffs YARD URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
ET AL. in Civil Case No. 4647, on that portion of land belonging to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1291 and defendants in Civil Case No.
4647, MELENCIO YU and TALINANAP MATUALAGA, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. (V-14496) (P-2331) P-523, located in
Apopong, General Santos City.
This Special Order of Demolition shall be returned by you to this
Court within ten (10) days from the date of receipt hereof, together
with your proceedings indorsed hereon.38
Clearly, respondent judge neither ordered the eviction of any other person
occupying the property of spouses Yu and Matualaga other than the parties
in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, nor directed the Ex-Officio Sheriff to
demolish the houses or structures of any person other than the said parties.
However, the notice to vacate issued by Palati and noted by Lastimosa was
addressed not just to the parties but to "all adverse claimants and actual
occupants of the land subject of the case." It directed that the houses and
improvements of the parties, as well as those of adverse claimants including
complainants who were not parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, would
be demolished.
Worth quoting here is the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 54003,
which decided the appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. 4647, viz:
Finally, the appellants’ assertion that they are not bound by the
decision in Civil Case No. 1291 because they are not parties therein
and that the appellees should first institute an action for ejectment in
order to acquire possession of the property is without merit. The
appellants’ failure to establish a vested and better right, either
derivative or personal, to the land in question as against the
appellees, forecloses any posturing of exemption from the legal force
and effect of the writ of execution issued by the trial court to enforce
a final judgment under the guise of denial of due process. A
judgment pertaining to ownership and/or possession of real
property is binding upon the defendants and all persons
claiming right of possession or ownership from the said
defendant and the prevailing party need not file a separate
action for ejectment to evict the said privies from the premises.
(Emphasis supplied)39
property and about 1,500 persons. Despite the controversy, they were able to
carry out the demolition peacefully and successfully.
It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his
ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in
accordance with its mandate. The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute
judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It must be stressed
that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the
prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and
is very aptly called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most
difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the
officers charged with this delicate task must act with considerable dispatch so
as not to unduly delay the administration of justice, otherwise, the decisions,
orders, or other processes of the courts of justice would be futile. 41
We take note of the fact that respondent judge had compulsorily retired from
the service on February 24, 2001.42
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Jose
Majaducon GUILTY of abuse of his authority for which he is meted a fine
of P20,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
For lack of merit, the charge of grave abuse of authority against Elmer
Lastimosa and Nasil Palati is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Evidently, the decision in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, which had long
become final and executory, can be enforced against herein complainants
although they were not parties thereto. There is no question that
complainants merely relied on the title of their predecessor-in-interest who
was privy to John Sycip, the defendant in Civil Case No. 1291. As such,
complainants and their predecessor-in-interest can be reached by the order
of demolition.40

Respondent sheriffs cannot be faulted with grave misconduct and abuse of

authority in implementing the order of demolition. The records before us are
simply bereft of any indication supportive of the allegation. Quite the contrary,
we find Lastimosa and Palati to have faithfully observed the correct
procedure in the implementation of respondent judge’s order. In fact, they
were extra careful in the enforcement of the same knowing that a lot of
attention was given to it by the media, involving as it did a 12-hectare
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1631 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1744-MTJ)            MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Dinalupihan, Bataan, presided by Judge
September 30, 2008 Tanciongco.

FENINA R. SANTOS, Complainant, Santos accused Judge Tanciongco of uncalled for liberality in accepting
vs defendant's Answer which was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period.
JUDGE ERASTO D. TANCIONGCO, Respondent. She also alleged that Judge Tanciongco reset the case for hearing several
times for the period February 5 to December 7, 2004. This was despite her
RESOLUTION pleas to cause the appearance of defendants in court. On three (3)
occasions, Judge Tanciongco promised to act on her request, but defendants
still failed to appear in court for the hearings of the case.
REYES, R.T., J.:

In view of defendants' continued non-appearance in court, Santos moved for

Fenina R. Santos' verified letter-complaint1 to the Office of the Court
the court to render judgment on the case. However, Judge Tanciongco
Administrator (OCA) initiated this administrative case against Judge Erasto
allegedly suggested resetting the hearing of the case. Santos' counsel, Atty.
D. Tanciongco of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Dinalupihan-
Leopoldo C. Lacambra, withdrew from the case after filing the motion to
Hermosa, Dinalupihan, Bataan for manifest bias, partiality and neglect of duty
render judgment.
relative to Civil Case No. 1334.

On February 1, 2005, the counsel for defendants appeared for the first time
On June 22, 2005, the OCA required Judge Tanciongco to submit a
in court. Santos was also present, and she manifested before Judge
comment relative to the complaint. Judge Tanciongco filed his comment to
Tanciongco that she no longer had a counsel and that she wanted to know
the letter-complaint on September 2, 2005. On April 19, 2006, the Court's
the outcome of the motion to render judgment. However, Judge Tanciongco
First Division referred this case to Hon. Jose Ener S. Fernando, Executive
ordered the start of the preliminary hearing of the case in the next hearing.
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Dinalupihan, Bataan, for investigation.

In contrast, Judge Tanciongco, in his Comment and testimony before the

The case was immediately set for hearing. On July 17, 2006, Judge
investigating Judge, denied the allegations of Santos. He maintained that he
Fernando voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the case due to doubts
conducted hearings in accordance with law and observed due process by
raised by Santos about the former's impartiality, since Judge Tanciongco had
giving the parties and their respective lawyers enough time and opportunity
been the public prosecutor assigned to his sala from 1992 to 2002.
to be heard in court. He asserted that the delays were attributable to non-
appearance of counsel and the parties.
The OCA found that Santos failed to prove Judge Fernando's bias and
prejudice with clear and convincing evidence, to be considered a valid
Judge Tanciongco further explained that he did not act on the motion to
justification for his inhibition. On July 26, 2006, the Court noted Judge
render judgment because of his earnest desire for the parties to settle their
Fernando's order inhibiting himself from the case, but directed him to
dispute amicably. However, his efforts were in vain. Moreover, in view of the
proceed with the investigation and strictly comply with the Court's April 19,
complaint against him, he voluntarily inhibited himself and requested the
2006 Resolution.
Supreme Court to designate another judge.
On December 18, 2006, Judge Fernando terminated the investigation and
After hearing, the investigating Judge found Judge Tanciongco guilty of gross
submitted the case for resolution upon agreement of the parties. On March
ignorance of the law and inefficiency tantamount to neglect of duty relative to
12, 2007, Judge Fernando submitted his investigation report and
Civil Case No. 1334. The pertinent portion of his report and recommendation
recommendation.
reads:
The evidence for the complainant consists of Santos' letter, attached affidavit
The culpability of respondent Judge lies on the propriety or impropriety of his
and testimony. Santos narrated that on December 16, 2003, she and her
acts. Respondent Judge was accused of manifest bias, partiality and neglect
husband filed an action for forcible entry, temporary restraining order and
of duty relative to his actions in connection with Civil Case No. 1334. As a
injunction against Dominador Jimenez, Maria Jimenez, Herminia Salenga
matter of policy the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
Tan, and Purita Salenga Pinpin, docketed as Civil Case No. 1334, before the
disciplinary action – only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross
ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned. While a judge is a man subject to the frailties of
other men, his office is an exalted position in the administration of justice,
thus, it behooves him to act with circumspection at all times in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Records reveal that the complainant filed her complaint for forcible entry with
TRO and injunction on December 16, 2003. All cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals
sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the rules on summary
procedure. Section 6, Rule 70 of the Revised rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the defendant shall file his answer within ten (10) days from the
service of the summons and his failure to answer the complaint within the
said period, the court, motu proprio or motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
Summons were issued on January 7, 2004. In their Answer, defendants
Dominador and Maria Jimenez averred that they received the complaint on
January 15, 2004. A close scrutiny of the Answer reveals that it was prepared
on January 26, 2004, verified only on January 27, 2004 and received by the
MCTC on the same date. Surely, the ten (10)-day reglementary period fixed
by law had already lapsed. Complainant filed her comment with motion to
strike out answer, but this was not even acted upon by respondent Judge,
claiming that he was trying to settle the issues amicably between the parties,
but despite his efforts, the same failed and that the complainant filed her pre-
trial brief which was tantamount to abandonment of the motion to strike out
answer. The filing of the pre-trial brief does not necessarily mean that the
complainant is abandoning her motion to strike out answer. Respondent
Judge should have acted on it just the same. Unfortunately, he chose to
ignore it.
Granting for the sake of liberality that the aforementioned acts of respondent
Judge are justifiable, the undersigned would like to point at respondent
Judge's ignorance of the law which was manifested when he required
defendants to file their answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
summons, considering that this case is governed by the rules on summary
procedure. This fact was even argued by Atty. Lacambra, but respondent
Judge was relentless in his stance. When the law is so elementary, such as
the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the rules on summary
procedure, not knowing it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and
inefficiency are characteristics impermissible in a judge.
Respondent Judge's leniency towards the cause of the defendants, while it
may not be erroneous, transgresses the constitutional right of the
complainant to a speedy disposition of her case. It is the noble office of a
judge to render justice not only impartially but expeditiously as well, for delay
in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lower its standards and brings it into disrepute.
On the issue of partiality and manifest bias, the rule is that mere suspicion
that a judge is partial is not enough. Clear and convincing evidence to prove
the charge is required. The burden to prove that respondent Judge
committed the acts complained of rest on the complainant. It is complainant's
asseveration that respondent Judge was protecting the defendants who are
rich and influential; that some of them are townmates of the respondent
judge; and they were sometimes seen together. These allegations remain as
mere allegations without any evidence to support them. Complainant averred
that her sister and relatives saw the respondent Judge with the defendants
talking and eating in a restaurant. However, said sister and relatives were not
presented to testify on that allegation. Mere allegation of partiality and bias
without more cannot discharge the burden bestowed upon the complainant to
prove respondent Judge's partiality and bias. Charges against any member
of the judiciary must be supported at least by substantial evidence. Applying
the foregoing principles to this case, the undersigned finds that the charges
of the complainant against respondent Judge for partiality and bias failed to
measure up to the yardstick of substantial evidence.
On the charge of neglect of duty
This case has been pending before respondent Judge's sala for so long. As
stated earlier, this case was filed on December 16, 2003, yet, the preliminary
conference was set only on February 1, 2005. Considering that this case is
governed by the rules on summary procedure, the undersigned could not find
any justifiable reason on what took respondent Judge so long to act on it. His
explanations that he tried to settle the case amicably and that the parties
failed to appear at the scheduled hearings are but flimsy excuses for the long
delay incurred. The delay could have been avoided had he exercised more
diligence and determination in disposing the case.
Complainant also pointed out that there had been several settings of the
case, particularly February 5 and 13, 2004 which were not documented. No
order or minutes of these hearings appear on the records of the case and
respondent Judge did not offer any explanation nor rebut complainant's
allegations regarding this matter.
The filing of a motion to cancel hearing by the defendants one day before the
scheduled hearing was prejudicial to the complainant's cause. Said dilatory
motion for postponement is a violation of Section 19 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
On the scheduled hearing on July 21, 2004, the proceedings of said hearing The investigating Judge found Judge Tanciongco guilty of gross ignorance of
are not found in the records of the case. According to the respondent Judge, the law and inefficiency tantamount to neglect of duty relative to Civil Case
they were in the possession of OIC Evelyn Roncal. Be that as it may, as an No. 1334 and recommended two (2) months suspension 2-a and a fine in the
officer of the court having control and supervision over his staff, respondent amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Judge should organize and supervise his staff to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, as well as the observance of high standards of The OCA concurred with the findings of the investigating Judge but
public service and fidelity at all times. He should adopt a system of records recommended that the fine be increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos
management, so that files are kept intact despite the temporary absence of (P30,000.00).
the person primarily responsible for their custody.
We accept the findings of the investigating Judge. The rules on summary
When asked why he did not resolve the complainant's counsel motion to procedure require that an answer be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of
render judgment, respondent Judge averred that said motion was considered summons. Judge Tanciongco instead gave defendants fifteen (15) days from
abandoned when Atty. Lacambra withdrew as counsel for the complainant. receipt of summons. Apparently, Judge Tanciongco overlooked a summary
Fact is, said motion to render judgment was filed on October 8, 2004 (per rule. It is a lapse in procedure made without bad faith or corrupt motive.
registry receipt attached to it) while Atty. Lacambra's withdrawal as counsel
was received by the MCTC on March 21, 2005, or around five (5) months However, the Court is mindful of the fact that Judge Tanciongco is merely
had already lapsed. The failure of respondent Judge to act on the motion with human and this Court has forgiven human errors in the past. 3 Thus, the fine
reasonable dispatch constitutes gross inefficiency. of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) recommended by the investigating
Judge is more reasonable and appropriate.
To recapitulate, respondent Judge was quite liberal in his dealings with
defendants which greatly contributed to the delay in the disposition of this WHEREFORE, a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is imposed
case. He cannot take refuge behind defendants' non-appearance in court. on Judge Tanciongco, the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Delay in the disposition of cases not only deprives litigants of their right to
speedy disposition of their cases but also tarnishes the image of the judiciary.
Failure to dispose the court's business promptly within the periods prescribed SO ORDERED.
by law and the rules constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
administrative sanction on the erring judge like respondent. It seems that
respondent Judge developed a bad working habit, as evidenced by the
resolution of the Supreme Court, Second Division, dated June 15, 2005 in
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1592 (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Erasto D.
Tanciongco, Virgilio P. Mejia, et al. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan) wherein he was admonished for his failure to
exercise due diligence in the supervision of his subordinates and to
implement an effective and efficient records management system for prompt
disposition of the court's business. He was also given a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar lapses in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. His inhibition later in this case does not absolve him from liability

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that respondent Judge Erasto

Tanciongco be found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and inefficiency
tantamount to neglect of duty relative to Civil Case No. 1334, hence, it is
respectfully recommended that he be suspended for two (2) months and be
fined in the amount of P20,000.00.

Dinalupihan, Bataan, March 12, 2007.2

A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J               August 24, 2010
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-
RODRIGUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN. Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman initiated this
administrative matter by filing an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008
to charge Sandiganbayan Justices Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong); Jose R.
Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice
Ponferrada), who composed the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan
(Fourth Division), with Justice Ong as Chairman, at the time material to the
complaint, with (1) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of
public documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest
partiality and gross ignorance of the law.1
Before anything more, the Court clarifies that this decision is limited to the
determination of the administrative culpability of the respondent Justices, and
does not extend to the ascertainment of whatever might be the effects of any
irregularity they committed as members of the Fourth Division on the trial
proceedings. This clarification stresses that the proceedings, if procedurally
infirm, resulted from the acts of the Sandiganbayan as a collegial body, not
from their acts as individual Justices. The remedy against any procedural
infirmity is not administrative but judicial.
Details of the Charges
A.
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Interest
of the Service, and Falsification of Public Documents
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, cases originating from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao shall
be heard in the region of origin, except only when the greater convenience of
the parties and of the witnesses or other compelling considerations require
the contrary.2 Thus, for the period from April 24 to April 28, 2006, the
Fourth Division scheduled sessions for the trial of several cases in the Hall of
Justice in Davao City.
Prior to the scheduled sessions, or on April 17, 2006, the complainant sent a
memorandum to Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio (Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio) to invite his attention to the irregular arrangement
being adopted by the Fourth Division in conducting its provincial
hearings.3 The memorandum reads as follows:
The Prosecution Bureau IV is due to leave for Davao City on April 23, 2006
for their scheduled hearing which will be held on April 24 to 28, 2006. In
conducting provincial hearing, the Fourth Division has adopted a different
procedure. They do not sit as collegial body, instead they divide the division
into two. In such a manner, the Chairman will hear some of the cases alone
and the other members will hear other cases, conducting hearing separately
and simultaneously.
We find this procedure to be advantageous to the Prosecution and also
commendable on the part of the Justices. While there are no objections
manifested by the defense lawyers, we are apprehensive of the
consequences, considering that this constitutes procedural lapses. In a case
decided by the Supreme Court, the conviction of the accused by the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was invalidated by the court when it was
shown that the members of the court who heard his case were constantly
changing. The Petitioner assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in its
capacity as a trial court.
In one of her hearings, the undersigned has already called the attention of
the Hon. Chairman and expresses (sic) her concern on the matter, and even
opined that they might be charged of falsification, by issuing orders that they
heard the cases as a collegial body, when in fact only the Chairman was
present during the trial and the other members are hearing cases in the other
chamber.
The Chairman, however, welcomes any question on the procedure they are
presently adopting.
We do not want to take chances. In cases where conviction are issued, the
accused would surely assail this procedure.
For your information and appropriate action.4
The complainant stated in her affidavit-complaint that Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio responded to her memorandum by instructing her and the other
Prosecutors to object to the arrangement and to place their objections on
record.
During the hearing in Davao City, the Fourth Division did not sit as a collegial
body. Instead, Justice Ong heard cases by himself, while Justice Hernandez
and Justice Ponferrada heard the other cases together. Complying with
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio’s instructions, the complainant objected to
the arrangement, but her objections were brushed aside. 5
The complainant averred that her recording of her continuing objections
incurred for her the ire of the Justices; and that faced with such predicament
and out of her desire to avoid any procedural defects, she decided to forego
the presentation of NBI Investigator Atty. Roel Plando as her witness in
Criminal Cases Nos. 28103 to 28104 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Payakan Tilendo in the last hearing date of April 27, 2006. Instead, she
requested another Prosecutor to inform the Fourth Division that she was then
suffering from migraine, and to request the cancellation of the hearing.
The complainant was surprised to learn later on that the Fourth Division had
issued a warrant for the arrest of Atty. Plando for his non-appearance at the
hearing.
On May 8, 2006, Atty. Plando filed a motion to lift bench warrant,6 in which he
explained that he had arrived in Davao City in the morning of April 27, 2006
in order to appear in court, and had called up the complainant, who had told
him that she would not be presenting him as a witness due to lack of time for
the necessary conference; and that she had also told him about her having
migraine on that morning.
On May 15, 2006, the Fourth Division directed the complainant to comment
on Atty. Plando’s motion. In her comment dated May 24, 2006,7 the
complainant averred that she had decided "not to proceed with the
presentation of Mr. Plando on April 27, 2006 due to her apprehension that
the Honorable Court might again conduct the hearing in division"; and that
incurring the ire of the Justices by her continuing objections to the hearing
procedure had been a stressful situation that had induced her migraine.
Although lifting the warrant of arrest issued against Atty. Plando through the
order dated May 26, 2006,8 the Fourth Division directed the complainant in
the same order to answer questions from the court itself on June 6, 2006
"relative to statements made in [her] Comment dated May 24, 2006."
For the June 6, 2006 hearing, the complainant was accompanied by Acting
Director Elvira Chua of Bureau IX, Director Somido, and Stenographer
Yolanda Pineda. According to the complainant, Justice Hernandez berated
her for bringing her own stenographer. The Fourth Division then directed
Stenographer Pineda to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt
for taking notes without prior leave of court.9
Complying with the directive to show cause, Pineda submitted
an explanation/compliance,10 explaining that Director Chua had asked her to
attend the hearing on June 6, 2006, and to take stenographic notes of the
proceedings.
Director Chua confirmed Pineda’s explanation in her own manifestation and
explanation,11 stating that the complainant had requested that a stenographer
from the Office of the Special Prosecutor be tasked to take notes at the
hearing; and that "on 27 April 2006 when Prosecutor Rohermia Rodriguez
was supposed to present her NBI Agent witness in Davao City, she left
Davao at 4:30 in the morning of the said date so that it would be physically
impossible for her to be in court at 8:30 in the morning."
The Fourth Division issued an order on June 20, 2006, 12 directing the
complainant to comment on Director Chua’s manifestation and
explanation, and to explain why she should not be cited in contempt of court
for failing to present the NBI agent as a witness on April 26 and 27, 2006.
She complied by submitting her compliance on July 10, 2006.13 The incident
has remained unresolved by the Fourth Division.
The complainant contended that by not acting as a collegial body,
respondent Justices not only contravened Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1606, but also committed acts of falsification by signing their orders, thereby
making it appear that they had all been present during the hearing when in
truth and in fact they were not.
B.
Improprieties During Hearings Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial
Authority and Grave Misconduct
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made the following
intemperate and discriminatory utterances during hearings.
Firstly, the complainant alleged that Justice Ong uttered towards the
complainant during the hearing held in Cebu City in September 2006 the
following:
We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal,
by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
Secondly, Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had
graduated, and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice
Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated was better than his
(Justice Ong’s) own alma mater. The complainant opined that the query was
manifestly intended to emphasize that the San Beda College of Law, the
alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP College of Law, that of Justice
Hernandez, were the best law schools.
Thirdly, on another occasion in that hearing in Cebu City in September 2006,
Justice Hernandez discourteously shouted at Prosecutor Hazelina Tujan-
Militante, who was then observing trial from the gallery: You are better than
Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here to
supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is
doing nothing.
Finally, Justice Hernandez berated Atty. Pangalangan, the father of former
UP Law Dean Raul Pangalangan, thus:
Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you
are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of
their (sic) mother.
C.
Justices Ong, Hernandez, and Ponferrada’s Gross Ignorance of the Law
Amounting to Manifest Partiality for Dismissing Criminal Case No. 25801,
Entitled People v. Puno, upon a Demurrer to Evidence
In imputing manifest partiality to respondent Justices, the complainant cited
the Fourth Division’s resolution granting accused Ronaldo V. Puno’s
demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801, and dismissing the case
upon a finding that the assailed contracts had never been perfected, 14 which
finding was contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.
The complainant insisted that the conclusion that the assailed contracts had
never been perfected was based on a National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) resolution, which the Fourth Division appreciated in the guise
of taking judicial notice. She contended that taking judicial notice of the
NAPOLCOM resolution upon a demurrer to evidence was highly erroneous,
and constituted gross ignorance of the law.
Comments of Respondents
Maintaining their innocence of the charges, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez filed their joint comment.15 Although admitting having tried cases
in the provinces by apportioning or assigning the cases scheduled for
hearing among themselves, they emphasized that they had nonetheless
ensured at the outset that: first, there was a quorum, i.e., all the three
members of the Division were present in the same courtroom or venue,
thereby preserving the collegial nature of the Division as required by law,
specifically Section 3 of PD 1606; second, the members of the Division were
within hearing or communicating distance of one another, such that they
could readily confer with each other in order to address or resolve any issue
that arose in the cases separately being heard by them; and, third, the
parties did not object to the arrangement, and thus could not later on assail
the proceedings to which they had given their full assent, based on the
equitable principle of estoppel.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their arrangement had been
adopted in the best interest of the service, because they had thereby
expedited the disposition of their cases, resulting in considerable savings in
time, effort, and financial resources of the litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and
the court itself; but that they had meanwhile discontinued the arrangement
after it had piled up so much work at a much faster pace than the Fourth
Division could cope with. They argued that even assuming, arguendo, that
the arrangement had been irregular, it could only be the subject of a petition
for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, not an administrative complaint, due to its amounting
only to a mere procedural lapse.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the complainant’s allegation on
their use of intemperate and discriminatory language by attaching the
transcript of stenographic notes to prove that there was no record of the
intemperate and discriminatory utterances on the date specified by the
complainant.16 Justice Ong dared the complainant to produce a copy of the
order that contained his following alleged utterance:
We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal,
by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted having asked the lawyers
appearing before them about the law schools they had graduated from, but
explained that they had done so casually and conversationally, with the
scenario playing out between two Justices teasing each other from time to
time. They claimed that their queries were usually made in jest, and were
intended to break the monotony and seriousness of the courtroom setting.
Justice Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor Tujan-Militante, but
conceded the possibility of having observed that her presence in Cebu City
was a waste of government funds, because she was not one of the
Prosecutors assigned to prosecute any of the scheduled cases.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting to manifest partiality
(relating to the grant of the demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No.
25801), Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pointed out that the Supreme
Court had already sustained their action by dismissing the petition for review
of the Special Prosecutor through the resolution issued in G.R. No. 171116
on June 5, 2006.17
Justice Ponferrada’s separate comment18 echoed his co-respondents’
assertions in their joint comment.
Report of the Court Administrator
In our resolution dated January 20, 2009,19 we noted the comments of
respondent Justices, and referred the matter to the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In his report dated October 6, 2009,20 then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez,
now a Member of the Court, recommended the dismissal of the charges for
lack of merit, because:
Viewed in the foregoing light, the charge of grave misconduct cannot stand. It
is understood that grave misconduct is such which affects a public officer’s
performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which affects his
character as a private individual and requires reliable evidence showing that
the judicial act complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law. Our perusal of the record shows that respondent’s adoption
of the assailed practice was not motivated by corruption and/or an illegal
purpose. Indeed, the best interest of the service was clearly aimed at. To
justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, the law requires that the error
or mistake if there be such must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or
in bad faith.
For the very same reasons, respondents cannot likewise be held liable for
falsification of public documents arising out of the alleged falsity of the
collegiality reflected in the minutes and/or stenographic notes taken during
the proceedings in which the assailed practice was adopted. For liability to be
assessed for the offense of falsification of official documents thru untruthful
narration of the facts, the rule is settled that the following elements should
concur, viz: (a) the offender makes in a document an untruthful statement in
a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was
made with wrongful intent to injure a third person. The absence of the
enumerated elements clearly discounts respondents’ liability for said offense.
Inasmuch as mere allegation is not evidence, it is a fundamental evidentiary
rule that the party who alleges a fact must prove the same. For all of
complainant’s imputations against respondents, the record is bereft of any
showing that the latter are guilty of oppressive conduct and/or grave
misconduct, particularly with reference to the comment the former was
required to file regarding the motion to lift bench warrant filed by the witness
Roel Plando in Criminal Case Nos. 28103-104. Given the variance between
the allegations in said motion and the reasons complainant initially advanced
for the non-presentation of said witness at the April 27, 2006 hearing in said
cases, respondents were clearly acting within their prerogative when they
decided to clarify the matter from the former and her colleague, Prosecutor
Almira Abella-Orfanel. Although subsequently required to explain why she
should not be cited for contempt in the June 20, 2006 order issued in the
case, the record is, more importantly, bereft of any showing that complainant
was, in fact, declared in contempt of court or actually fined in the sum of
P18,000.00 as purportedly threatened by respondents.
Squarely refuted in the affidavits executed by her colleagues, namely,
Prosecutors Cornelio Somido, Almira Abella-Orfanel, Elvira Chua and
Rabenranath Uy, complainant’s bare allegations clearly deserve scant
consideration insofar as they impute such further irregularities against
respondents as threatening or humiliating her during the hearing/s conducted
in the aforesaid cases and/or causing disrespect to Special Prosecutor
Dennis Villa-Ignacio or otherwise allowing interference in the latter’s handling
of a case. Because administrative proceedings like the one at bench are
governed by the substantial evidence rule, the same may be said of the
disparaging comments respondents are supposed to have made regarding
the barong and/or intelligence of practitioners appearing before them which
are, on the whole, devoid of any bases in the record outside of complainant’s
averments and the affidavit belatedly executed by Assistant Special
Prosecutor Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante. By substantial evidence is meant
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to
support a conclusion and does not mean just any evidence in the record of
the case for, otherwise, no finding of fact would be wanting in basis. The test
is whether a reasonable mind, after considering all the relevant evidence in
the record of a case, would accept the findings of fact as adequate.
As regards the charge of improprieties, it appears that the complainant has
not discharged the onus of proof by substantial evidence. The intemperate
and immoderate statements attributed to respondents are, to repeat, without
sufficient substantiation. What comes near to but is not equivalent to
impropriety is the jocular banter admitted by respondents about their
respective alma maters, the intention being to break the usual monotony and
seriousness of the courtroom setting or to put practitioners appearing before
them at ease. It cannot be said that public confidence in the Judiciary was
eroded by the conduct. No discourtesy was shown towards either the parties
or to each other.
As for the charge of manifest partiality insofar as the grant of the demurrer in
Criminal Case No. 25801 is concerned, suffice it to say that members of the
bench like respondents are presumed to have acted regularly and in the
manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Because notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of
a judge’s function, the rule is settled that bias, prejudice and undue interest
cannot be presumed lightly. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party
is, consequently, not enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove
the charge. As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action- he cannot be subject to civil, criminal or
administrative liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as
long as he acts in good faith. These principles find resonance in the case at
bench where, in addition to the total dearth of evidence to prove the charge
of manifest partiality, it appears that respondents’ grant of the demurrer in
Criminal Case No. 25801 was affirmed in the following wise in the June 5,
2006 resolution issued by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 171116, to wit:
"G.R. No. 171116 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REYNALDO
PUNO). xx xx On the basis thereof, the Court resolves to DENY the petition
for review on certiorari dated 2 March 2006 assailing the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan for petitioner’s failure to submit a valid affidavit of service of
copies of the petition on respondent and the Sandiganbayan in accordance
with Sections 3 and 5, Rule 45 and Section 5(d), Rule 56 in relation to
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules, there being no jurat and signature of the
affiant in the attached affidavit of service of the petition.
"In any event, the petition is an improper remedy and failed to sufficiently
show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case x x x." (emphasis supplied)
Ruling of the Court
The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Court
Administrator.
A.
Respondents’ Violation of the provisions of PD 1606
and Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the
Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted hearings,
considering that the three of them were in the same venue and were acting
within hearing and communicating distance of one another.
The contention is not well-taken.
Section 3 of PD 1606,21 the law establishing the Sandiganbayan, provides:
Section 3. Division of the Courts; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in
three divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the
same time.
Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in division;
Provided, that when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be
had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a
vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate
Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the
reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with
all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial
and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation
of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall,
upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or
Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.
An implementing rule is Section 3, Rule II of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, viz:
Section 3. Constitution of the Divisions. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in
five (5) Divisions of three (3) Justices each, including the Presiding
Justice. The five (5) Divisions may sit separately at the same time. Each of
the five (5) most senior Associate Justices including the Presiding Justice,
shall be the Chairman of a Division; each of the five (5) Associate Justices
next in rank shall be the Senior Member of a Division; and each of the last
five (5) Associate Justices shall be the Junior Member of a Division.
Under the foregoing provisions, the Sandiganbayan is a collegial
court. Collegial is defined as relating to a collegium or group of colleagues. In
turn, a collegium is "an executive body with each member having
approximately equal power and authority."22 In a collegial court, therefore, the
members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. Thus, PD 1606, as
amended, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, supra, call
for the actual presence of the three Justices composing the Division to
constitute a quorum to conduct business and to hold trial proceedings.
Necessarily, the exclusion or absence of any member of a Division from the
conduct of its business and from the trial proceedings negates the existence
of a quorum and precludes collegiality.
As if underscoring the need for all three members to be actually present and
in attendance during sessions, Section 3 of PD 1606, as amended, further
requires that:-
xxx when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to
the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy
occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice
of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse
order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the
rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and
determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of
the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall, upon
the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or
Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of
them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division "in the trial and
determination of a case or cases assigned thereto." The information and
evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other
judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to
each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This
necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and
adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three
members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating
distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in
hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together
in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body
became impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial
proceedings. The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of
such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or
objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be
made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be
complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing
of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other
respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in
the hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondents’ non-observance of collegiality contravened the
very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a
Division of all three Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving
public officials and employees triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as
amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to
try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the
accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the
former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are
naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader
circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due
in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme
Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via
ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still
undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if
at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,23 the Court delved
on the nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though
he may be its head, done without the participation of the others, cannot be
considered the act of the collegial body itself. There, the question presented
was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and
bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two other commissioners as members.
The Court ruled:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a
majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to
validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone
of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming
from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at
a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The
NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the
commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning
a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the
NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into
the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which
organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of
all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under
Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the
NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it
was acting as a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of
respondent Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no
consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent
Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers,
they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to
the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their
provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the
Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even
worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a
hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the
affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and
efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a
hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the
very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time
forgets.24 They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules.25 For this reason alone, respondent
Justices’ adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere
deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be
treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross
misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not
liable for gross misconduct – defined as the transgression of some
established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence,26 or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or
disregard of well-known legal rules27 – considering that the explanations they
have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they
strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within
sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross
ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that
the act complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to
violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules; 28 on the
contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the
respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-
motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in
adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby
expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their
proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their
insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of
provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if
no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure. They could
have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent,
not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid
adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity. They knew as well
that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief
objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded judges in State
Prosecutors v. Muro,29 viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy
trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial.
Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more
important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all
parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on important questions, and a
zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a
good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty
disposal of cases.
x x x           x x x          x x x
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary
does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they
please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform
their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits
are substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate
at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the
"primordial necessity of order in the social life."
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices’ signing of the orders
issued during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty,
in that they thereby made it appear that they had all been physically present
when the truth was different. Such act merely ensued from the flawed
proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense.
 B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrator’s finding and recommendation
that no evidence supported the complainant’s charge that Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez had uttered the improper and intemperate statements
attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which
the offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to
substantiate the complainant’s charge. In the absence of a clear showing to
the contrary, the Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful and true
record of the proceedings, because they bear the certification of correctness
executed by the stenographers who had prepared them.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the
counsels appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated,
and their engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their
respective law schools. They thereby publicized their professional
qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of
public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view
their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum,
which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during
their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or
engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter
how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to
believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act
with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having
studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how
prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was
impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid
situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of
favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of
the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In
performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by
word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. 30 It is
very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble
position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section
3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for
all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the
proper performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of
unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance.
Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules
not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method."31
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the
demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is
dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution
on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently
show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction."
At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will be held administratively
liable for rendering an unjust judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice,
revenge, or some other similar motive.32
D.
Penalties
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10
SC, classifies the offense of simple misconduct as a less serious charge, viz:
Section 9. Less Serious Charges. – Less serious charges include:
x x x           x x x          x x x
7. Simple Misconduct.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court alternatively prescribes the
sanctions on judges and justices guilty of a less serious charge, as follows:
Section 11. Sanctions. – xxx
x x x           x x x          x x x
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱ 20,000.00.
x x x           x x x          x x x
On the other hand, unbecoming conduct is a light charge under Section 10,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Section 10. Light Charges. – Light charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
x x x           x x x          x x x
and is punishable under Section 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by a
fine of not less than ₱1,000.00, but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; and/or
censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning.
Analogizing from Section 55 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, in an instance where the respondent is guilty of two or more
charges, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious charge, and
the rest of the charges are considered as aggravating circumstances.
That respondent Justices’ responsibilities as members of a Division were
different compels us to differentiate their individual liabilities.
1.
Justice Ong
Without doubt, the Chairman, as head of the Division under the internal rules
of the Sandiganbayan, is primus inter pares.33 He possesses and wields
powers of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the
proceedings coming before the Division.
In exercising his powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong
exuded an unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of
the complainant, and steered his Division into the path of procedural
irregularity. He thereby wittingly failed to guarantee that his Division’s
proceedings came within the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. We
cannot, of course, presume that he was unaware of or unfamiliar with the
pertinent law and correct procedure, considering his already long tenure and
experience as of then as a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, having risen from
Associate Justice to Chairman of his Division.
We hold that the condign and commensurate penalty to impose on Justice
Ong is a fine of ₱15,000.00, after taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance that this administrative offense was his first and the
aggravating circumstance of the light charge of unbecoming conduct. The
penalty goes with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar of
such offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
2.
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada
As mere members of the Fourth Division, Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada had no direction and control of how the proceedings of the
Division were conducted. Direction and control was vested in Justice Ong, as
the Chairman. Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada simply relied
without malice on the soundness and wisdom of Justice Ong’s discretion as
their Chairman, which reliance without malice lulled them into traveling the
path of reluctance to halt Justice Ong from his irregular leadership. We hold
that their liabilities ought to be much diminished by their lack of malice.
In addition, the fact that this is the first case for Justice Hernandez and
Justice Ponferrada is a mitigating circumstance in their favor.
Although Justice Hernandez is liable for the less serious charge of simple
misconduct, aggravated by a light charge but appreciating his reliance
without malice and the mitigating circumstance of this offense being his first,
the Court admonishes him with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1

The liability of Justice Ponferrada for the less serious charge of simple
misconduct, without any aggravating circumstance, is obliterated by his
reliance without malice and the mitigating circumstance of its being a first
offense. However, he is warned to be more cautious about the proper
procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.

Final Note

It becomes timely to reiterate that an honorable, competent and independent

Judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government and the well-being of the people.34 We warn, therefore, that no
conduct, act, or omission on the part of anyone involved in the administration
of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the
faith of the people in the Judiciary shall be countenanced. 35 Public confidence
in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the Judiciary
is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society; hence, it is essential
for all judges, individually and collectively, to respect and honor the judicial
office as a public trust and to strive to enhance and maintain confidence in
the judicial system.36

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:

1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a

fine of ₱15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely;

2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished

with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall
be dealt with more severely; and

3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to

be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in
proceedings before his court.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1488 : October 13, 2004]
ADARLINA G. MATAGA, Complainant, v. JUDGE MAXWELL S.
ROSETE, Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Santiago City and
Process Server GASAT M. PAYOYO, Municipal Trial Court,
Cordon, Isabela, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court
is to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of
justice.1 The Court condemns and would never countenance any
conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary.2 
cralawred
When asked to comment,8 respondent judge denied the
complainants allegations.He stated that complainant has not been
to his house in Quezon City, nor has he given the complainant the
sum of P44,000.00 as her terminal pay.Respondent judge,
however, admitted that the check representing the retirement
benefits of the complainant was indeed turned over to him by the
Supreme Court security guard after it was misplaced by his co-
respondent, Payoyo.Upon his receipt of complainants check,
respondent judge immediately handed the same to Payoyo because
he knew that complainant had requested the latter to follow up her
check.
For his part, respondent process server Payoyo denied the
accusations against him. He claimed that he did not know
complainant personally.Respondent judge instructed him to claim
complainants disability check, which he did.Respondent judge then
told him to encash the check at the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Taft Avenue Branch and to proceed to the formers house to meet
complainant and her son.There, he turned over the full amount of

complainants disability benefit.

In a verified complaint dated June 12, 2002, Adarlina G. Mataga, a
retired Court Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Trial Court of
The case was referred to Judge Fe Albano Madrid, the Executive
Santiago City, Isabela, charged Judge Maxwel S. Rosete and
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, for
Process Server Gasat M. Payoyo with Dishonesty and Misconduct in
investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On July 9, 2003, Judge
connection with the encashing of the check representing her
Madrid submitted her report,10 wherein she recommended that the
terminal pay.3 
complaint be dismissed in view of the admission of the complainant
cralawred

that she has received the full amount of her benefits as early as
Complainant alleged that she applied for disability retirement March 17, 1996, as evidenced by a receipt which bore her
because she was suffering from Organic Brain Syndrome Moderate signature.11 
to Severe Secondary to Cerebro-Vascular Accident (Thrombosis)
cralawred

.Complainants application was approved on January 30, 1996,4 and

After noting the report of Judge Albano Madrid, we resolved to
consequently, Disbursement Voucher No. 101-96-03-89245 for One
refer the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Five Hundred Thirty and 8/100 Pesos
evaluation, report and recommendation.12 The OCA recommended
(P165,530.08) and the corresponding Land Bank Check No.
that, in view of the failure to thresh out the material contradictions
370216 were prepared in the name of complainant.The check was
between the allegations of the complainant and the assertions of
released to respondent Payoyo who turned it over to Judge
the respondent, the case be returned to the investigating judge for
Rosete.7 
further investigation, report and recommendation. 13 On December
cralawred

10, 2003, we resolved to return the case to Judge Albano

Sometime in March 1996, respondent Payoyo brought complainant Madrid.14 
to the house of respondent Judge Rosete, where she was given the
cralawred

amount of P44,000.00 as her terminal pay.It was only

After conducting another investigation of the case, Judge Albano
subsequently that complainant came to know that the disability
Madrid submitted her report, stating that during the second
retirement benefit granted to her was in the amount of
investigation, complainant made it clear that she had no more
P165,530.08, which respondents did not deliver to her.
complaint against respondent judge provided that the latter will
give her the money.Rather, the complaint was directed at the
dishonesty of respondent Payoyo in his dealings with the
complainant.
After reviewing the records of this case, we hold that the complaint
against respondent judge should be dismissed.
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always
be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effect
are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge
stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. 15 Mere
imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof
to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should
be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be
competent.
When an administrative charge against a judge is determined to
have no basis whatsoever, we will not hesitate to protect him
against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial process.
We will not shirk from our responsibility of imposing discipline upon
employees of the Judiciary but neither shall we hesitate to shield
the same employees from unfounded suits that only serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.16  cralawred
On the other hand, respondent Payoyo should be held
administratively liable.As correctly pointed out by the investigating
judge:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
x x xx x xx x x
From the conduct and actuations of Mr. Gasat Payoyo, together
with his confusing testimony, it is clear that he was not honest
enough when he gave the proceeds of the terminal leave benefits
of the complainant. He was able to collect P165,530.00. He lost the
check. It was found and given to the security guard of the Supreme
Court who in turn gave it to Judge Rosete who gave it back to
Gasat Payoyo who he knew was the one authorized by Ms. Mataga
to release it from the Supreme Court. By virtue of his special
power-of-attorney Mr. Payoyo encashed the check but he did not
give all of it to the complainant. But the complainant must have
accepted the amount given to her pursuant to an agreement she
had with Mr. Payoyo. It is hard to imagine that Ms. Mataga
authorized Mr. Payoyo to follow-up her retirement benefits without
any consideration whatsoever.
Six years later the complainants daughter complained why her
mother accepted a lesser amount than what was indicated in the
check. She urged her mother to file a complaint with the Supreme
Court against both Gasat Payoyo and Judge Rosete.The daughter
must have suspected that Judge Rosete had something to do with
the lesser amount delivered to her mother because she found out
that the lost check had been given to Judge Roseteand yet the
latter did not give the check to her mother but instead returned it
to Payoyo for encashment.
When Gasat Payoyo was apprised that the complaint was
scheduled for investigation, he got scared. Before the scheduled
date of hearing on June 11, 2003 he went to talk to the
complainant and agreed to give her P100,000.00 provided she will
sign a receipt antedated March 17, 1996 to show that he actually
deliveredthe full amount of the check to her. He presented this as
evidence during the investigation. Because of their agreement
about the receipt, the complainant gave a vague and confusing
testimony regarding it.
It is clear that the complainant did not receive the full amount of
her terminal leave benefits. As to how much she received, the
complainant said she only received P40,000.00. But Gasat Payoyo
said he gave it all. Nevertheless there was an agreement between
the complainant and Payoyo regarding the amount received by the
complainant which was satisfactory to both of them. Thus Ms.
Mataga should not have any cause to complain. But her daughter
believed that her mother was taken advantage of because of her
illness.
Judge Maxwell Rosete denied any participation in the follow-up and
encashment of the check representing the terminal leave benefits
of the complainant. There is no reason to doubt this inspite of the
statements given by Gasat Payoyo in his supplemental affidavit
which he admitted were not true. To absolve himself, the
respondent Payoyo by himself or upon the advice of others, tried to
put the blame on Judge Rosete.x x x
Subsequently M. Payoyo became more worried and became more SO ORDERED.
scared of what he did. He could not face Judge Rosete. So he
refused to appear in the scheduled investigation. But finally he
appeared and admitted that the contents of his supplemental
affidavit are not true.

The Investigating Judge believes that it was the initial dishonesty

of the respondent Mr. Gasat Payoyo in not delivering to the
complainant the full amount of her terminal leave benefits minus
only a reasonable amount for his efforts in following it up, that led
to the filing of the complaint. His efforts to cover up what he did by
paying the complainant and falsifying the date of a receipt
compounded his fault. He aggravated it more when he attempted
to maliciously implicate his co-respondent in the commission of his
dishonesty. x x x.17 
cralawred

The behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with

the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of
lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of
responsibility.18 The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women who work thereat. Judicial personnel are expected to be
living examples of uprightness in the performance of official duties
to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts
in the community.19  cralawred

The acts of the respondent Payoyo in not giving to the complainant

the full amount of her terminal leave benefits minus reasonable
expenses that he incurred in making a follow-up of its release; his
efforts at covering the same by paying the complainant and by
falsifying the date of the receipt for such payment and his aborted
attempt to maliciously implicate his co-respondent judge, all fall
short of the measure of uprightness expected of judicial
personnel.For respondent Payoyos dishonesty, he should be
suspended for a period of six months.

WHEREFORE, the complaint filed against respondent Judge

Maxwell S. Rosete is DISMISSED for lack of merit.Respondent
Process Server, Gasat M. Payoyo, is found GUILTY of Dishonesty
and is SUSPENDED for a period of SIX MONTHS.Respondent
Payoyo is WARNED that a repetition of this or any similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920             April 26, 2006
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1141-RTJ)
CONCERNED TRIAL LAWYERS OF MANILA, Complainant,
vs
JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch
47, Respondent.
Re: Application for Optional Retirement under RA 910 of Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before us are consolidated administrative cases against retired Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion, then presiding judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.5
In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, a letter6 dated February 8, 1999 was referred to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) by the Ombudsman.7 It contained allegations of
misconduct and tardiness against respondent Judge Veneracion by the Concerned
Trial Lawyers of Manila8.
Complainants assailed the apparent reluctance of Judge Veneracion to grant petitions
for the declaration of nullity of marriage despite their alleged merit. Instead, he would
lecture litigants in open court that the declaration of nullity of marriage was not the
proper remedy. Lawyers were often embarrassed by his emphasis on legal
technicalities allegedly designed to prevent them from presenting evidence in favor of
their clients. Complainants were often harassed whenever respondent would force
them to read and interpret verses from the Bible. There were occasions when he
would castigate them for their failure to give the interpretation he wanted. The fact
that a number of cases for declaration of nullity of marriage assigned to respondent
judge’s sala were later withdrawn allegedly proved complainants’ claim.
Complainants further assailed respondent judge’s habitual tardiness which caused
the delay in the disposition of cases assigned to him.
In a 1st Indorsement9 dated September 20, 1999, the anonymous letter-complaint
was referred by the OCA to Executive Judge Rebecca de Guia Salvador of the Manila
RTC for discreet investigation. Judge Salvador required Judge Veneracion to
comment on the complaint. She believed that a discreet investigation was
unnecessary since it was well-known that respondent judge encouraged litigants,
particularly in cases of nullity of marriage, to read verses from the Bible. She likewise
verified if there were cases withdrawn from respondent’s sala. She found out that 27
cases for declaration of nullity of marriage were indeed withdrawn, all of which were
handled by a certain Atty. Rizalino Simbillo.10
In his comment11 dated October 21, 1999, Judge Veneracion vehemently denied the
allegation that he was against the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage despite their merit. He alleged that from the time he was designated as
presiding judge of Branch 47, RTC Manila, not more than two such cases filed in his
sala were dismissed for lack of merit.
He denied the allegation that he harassed parties during hearings. On the contrary,
the letters12 he received from previous litigants showed how much they appreciated
the way he shared the words of the Lord with them and how this practice greatly
improved their lives.
Judge Veneracion maintained that the person who sent the letter-complaint did not
represent the concerned trial lawyers of Manila. He only represented himself. The
docket books of his sala revealed that only Atty. Simbillo had consistently withdrawn
cases for declaration of nullity of marriage every time these were raffled to his
sala.13 Atty. Simbillo had once been enjoined by respondent judge to amend his
petition for annulment of marriage to his wife.14 Apparently, this was not well taken by
the said lawyer as the latter had since then moved for the withdrawal of similar
petitions before his sala.
In A. M. No. RTJ-01-1623, a report15 on the judicial audit and physical inventory of
cases conducted in Branch 47, Manila RTC, from June 19 to 26, 2000, challenged the
efficiency of respondent Judge Veneracion and his Clerk of Court, Rogelio M.
Linatoc16.
As summarized by Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock in his
memorandum17 dated September 5, 2002, the audit report showed:
1) Regional Trial Court, Branch [47], Manila has not been submitting the
required monthly report of cases. The latest monthly report submitted by said
Branch [was] for the month of February 2000;
2) Out of the 60 cases submitted for decision (7 criminal and 53 civil), 41
cases (6 criminal and 35 civil) were beyond the [90-day] reglementary
period, although there were draft decisions in several of these cases. These
cases were submitted for decision upon certification from the Branch Clerk of
Court that all stenographic notes have been transcribed;
3) Out of the 41 cases undecided beyond the 90-day period, 7 were
appealed and 33 cases were fully tried by Judge Veneracion and submitted
before him for decision;
4) There were cases with motions or incidents pending resolution for an
unreasonable length of time, although there [were] draft orders in most of
them;
5) There were 14 criminal cases and 28 civil cases found with no further
action or proceeding or with no further setting of trial for a considerable
length of time;
6) There were two (2) records of cases, Crim. Cases Nos. 95-144694 and
95-144695 [Falsification of Public Documents], found in Branch 45, which
were supposedly transmitted to the [Office of the Clerk of Court] RTC Pasay
City pursuant to the order issued by respondent judge dated March 14,
1996[;]
7) In three (3) criminal cases, Nos. 00-18138, 00-182163 and 00-181414, no
warrants of arrest were issued since the filing of the information; and in two
(2) criminal cases, Nos. 98-169423 and 99-174851, no setting for
arraignment despite the arrest of the accused and posting of bail bond;
8) In Civil Cases Nos. 00-96423, 00-96254, 00-97156, 00-97298, 99-95304,
99-95126, 00-97329, 00-97176, no action was taken on the complaint such
as issuance of summons to defendants since the filing thereof; while in Civil
Cases Nos. 99-95466, appealed on 31 October 1999, and 99-96749
appealed on 13 March 2000, no action was likewise taken; and in Civil
Cases Nos. 99-93433, 00-96666, 00-96744, the same were not set for pre-
trial despite receipt of the defendant’s answer;
9) The record of an appealed case, Civil Case No. 95-74880, [unlawful
detainer], which was decided on 14 December 1995 was ordered by
respondent Judge Veneracion returned to the court of origin for execution
only on June 21, 2000, after the lapse of almost five (5) years;
10) There were cases which have not been acted upon for failure of the
parties to comply with the order requiring compliance;
11) There were 44 civil cases with pending summonses which can be
archived pursuant to Adm. Order No. 7-A-92 since six (6) months have
[lapsed] without the summons being served [to the defendants] thru no fault
of the plaintiff; and there were 192 out of the 321 criminal cases with
warrants of arrest issued, which can be archived because accused [have not
been] apprehended for more than six (6) months from date of issuance of
the warrants, some of which were issued as early as 1996;
12) There were cases dismissed for alleged failure of the plaintiff or
petitioner to pursue the case despite the fact that the court has not taken any
action on the complaint or petition since the filing thereof several years ago;
that is, no summonses were issued or that the cases were not set for trial;
13) There were cases where alleged summonses were issued but were
returned unserved, which were dismissed without prejudice, instead of
archiving the same pursuant to Adm. Circular No. 7-A-92;
14) The entries in the separate criminal and docket books were not updated;
the Semestral Docket Inventory Reports were erroneous because the 1st
and 2nd semester of 1999 inventory included only cases filed in 1999 but not
those filed in the previous years yet still pending trial and/or for decision; and
the cases found to be submitted for decision for several years already were
not reflected in the monthly report of February 2000.
In respondent judge’s explanation18, he averred that Branch 47 was one of the five
branches in the Manila RTC originally designated to handle and try family relations
cases. It was also designated as a special tax court in Manila as well as a special
criminal court to handle heinous crimes and drug cases.
When the Family Code was amended, all cases involving youth offenders pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila were transferred to the special Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts in Manila, which included Branch 47.
Despite these special assignments and designations, additional personnel were not
assigned to Branch 47. The docket clerks had a hard time managing the records,
some of which may have been misfiled due to lack of space and filing cabinets.
On March 4, 1993, he suffered a mild stroke which affected his handwriting. He could
no longer take notes on the proceedings/testimonies in court. He had to rely on the
stenographic notes for the preparation of his resolutions and decisions. Hence, until
the branch clerk of court certified that the stenographic notes had been transcribed,
cases were not deemed submitted for decision.
Respondent judge declared that he had already dictated his decisions in several
cases reported unresolved but the stenographers had not yet transcribed them. Some
of the reported cases19 were not Branch 47’s but were assigned to other branches.
There were also cases included in the report of pending cases which had already
been decided. Other cases already had drafts but were not yet signed.
Respondent judge did not deny that he read verses from the Bible during hearings of
annulment, adoption and criminal cases. This was meant to share the word of God
with those who came before his court and who were in a quandary about their
purpose in life. He only wished to remind litigants in these cases that God had given
them a manual to serve as a guide in conducting their lives. In his comment, he
begged us to allow him to avail of optional retirement in case we found that his
actuation violated his responsibilities as a judge.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct20 provides:
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall
always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. (emphasis ours)
In this canon, judges are given the freedom to express their beliefs as long as it does
not interfere with their judicial functions. Respondent judge’s practice of reading
verses from the Bible during hearings was an exercise of his religious freedom. We
would have preferred that he refrained from such practice. Nevertheless, we hesitate
to castigate him lest we trample on this right.
As DCA Lock stressed in his memorandum21 dated September 5, 2002:
xxx The respondent judge’s act of reading verses from the [Bible] and relating
them to petitioner’s lives may well be considered merely as a guide for
petitioners in declaration of nullity cases. It could not be said that by reason of
the respondent’s act of reading verses from the [Bible], he frowns upon cases
of such nature. As argued, from the time the respondent was designated as
presiding judge of [Branch 47], there were no more than one or two such nullity
cases, which were dismissed for lack of merit. xxx (emphasis ours)
The position which a judge holds opens him to much criticism and cynicism. He
cannot please everyone who has business in his court. In this case, both Executive
Judge de Guia and DCA Lock found that the complainant in this case was not the
purported association of trial lawyers of Manila but only a certain Atty. Simbillo.
Apparently, Atty. Simbillo was displeased when he was asked by respondent judge if
he read the Bible. He was embarrassed and from then on, he withdrew all his
annulment cases whenever they were raffled to respondent judge’s sala.
Contrary to complainant’s various allegations of harassment, we find that respondent
judge observed Section 1 of Canon 5:
SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and
differences arising from various sources, including but not limited to race, color,
sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation,
social and economic status and other like causes. (emphasis ours)
The letters from a number of litigants, attached to the records of this case, belie the
claim that respondent judge inappropriately expressed his beliefs and convictions to
the point of harassing or embarrassing litigants and counsels in his court. We cannot
ignore the sincere words of appreciation in the numerous letters that have been sent
to respondent judge, all alluding to his practice of reading verses from the Bible. The
outpouring of kind words cannot be mere exaggeration. They were sincerely
extended by persons previously lost but who had since found their way in life through
respondent judge’s guidance.
Aside from that, there was no compulsion involved whenever respondent judge
questioned litigants as to whether they read the Bible or not. He did not impose his
religious convictions on them but merely suggested the benefits of reading the Bible.
Surely, this practice alone was not sufficient to hold respondent judge guilty of
misconduct. His judicial functions, duties and responsibilities were not impaired by his
religious beliefs and convictions.
Nevertheless, this is a most opportune time to remind judges that their actions in court
should always be seen by the public as guided by the law and not by thier personal or
religious beliefs. This is the only way to prevent the public from seeing a display of
religiosity as an encroachment on or an interference with our system of justice.
As to respondent judge’s alleged tardiness, complainant failed to adduce evidence in
support thereof. We cannot therefore impute the delay in the disposition of his cases
to his unconfirmed tardiness. Besides, respondent judge adequately explained the
reasons for the delay in A.M. No. RTJ-01-1623.
With respect to the charge of gross inefficiency, we find that respondent judge failed
to decide certain cases within the three-month period mandated by Section 15(1)22,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the prescribed periods.23 Any delay in the
disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary.
It is for this reason that Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct24 mandates that:
Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
No less than the 1987 Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be
resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision. Undue
delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is still
the bane of the judiciary.25 Failure to decide/resolve cases within the period
prescribed by law constitutes gross inefficiency which is a ground for an
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.26
The Code of Judicial Conduct further provides:
RULE 3.09. – A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure
the prompt and efficient dispatch of business and require at all times the observance
of high standards of public service and fidelity.
The fact that no additional personnel were assigned to Branch 47 despite its
additional assignments does not justify misfiling of case records. A judge ought to
know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution. Respondent judge was
expected to keep his own record of cases so that he could act thereon without undue
delay. He ought to have devised an efficient recording and filing system in his court
so that no disorderliness could affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.
Proper and efficient court management was his responsibility. He was the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.27
DCA Lock was correct when he mentioned in his memorandum28 that:
While serious illness may justify the inability of the respondent judge to perform his
official duties and functions, nevertheless, it is incumbent upon him to request the
Honorable Court, thru this Office for additional time within which to decide/resolve
cases which he could not seasonably act upon. Further, a heavy caseload may
excuse the respondent judge’s failure to decide/resolve cases within the reglementary
period, but not his failure to request for extension of time within which to
decide/resolve the same. xxx

It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in meritorious cases, to
grant judges of lower courts additional time to decide cases beyond the three-month
period. All that a judge should do, in cases of great difficulty, is to request an
extension of time. To this, the Court has, almost invariably, been
sympathetic.29 Respondent judge fell short of expectations in this regard.

Although Judge Veneracion retired from the service on September 23, 2000,30 his
retirement did not render these administrative complaints moot and academic. In
the Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez,31 we held:

Cessation from office of respondent judge because of death or retirement does not
warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was
still in the service or render the said administrative case moot and academic. The
jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint
was not lost by mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case. Indeed, the retirement of a judge or any judicial
officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to
which he shall still be answerable.

Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies as a less serious charge the undue
delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case.32 The
penalty for such infraction is suspension from office for not less than one nor more
than three months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.33

Considering that respondent judge has already retired after suffering a stroke, we
impose upon him a fine of P11,000, to be deducted from the amount withheld from his
retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) DISMISSING for lack of merit the charge of misconduct and tardiness

against Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920; and

(2) Finding Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion LIABLE for gross inefficiency in

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1623 for which he is hereby FINED P11,000 to be
deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. RTJ-89-406. July 18, 1991.]
ENRIQUETA GARGAR DE JULIO, Complainant, v. JUDGE BENJAMIN
A.G. VEGA, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; CHARGES AGAINST JUDGES OF FIRST INSTANCE;
OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT AND WILLFUL DELAY IN PAYING A JUST DEBT;
RESPONDENT FINED AND WARNED IN CASE AT BAR. — Respondent judge
was sued in an ejectment complaint by the complainant for failure to pay
rentals. Trial lasted ten(10) years on account of respondent judge’s
dilatory tactics. Judgment was rendered against respondent in the amount
of P4,500 but the decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court and
when it was affirmed, the respondent took the case to the Court of Appeals
which dismissed his petition for review. After the decision had become
final, he delayed payment for two more years. He came across only after
the complainant, in exasperation, had filed this administrative charge
against him. HELD: Respondent judge’s conduct toward the complainant
was oppressive and unbecoming a member of the judiciary. He used his
position and his legal knowledge to welsh on a just debt and to harass his
creditor. His example erodes public faith in the capacity of courts to
administer justice. He violated Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
conduct which requires that "a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
He is guilty of oppressive conduct and willful delay in paying a just debt
(Section 5, Rule 140, Rules of Court as amended). He is ordered to pay a
fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and warned that a repetition of
this misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; CHARGES AGAINST JUDGES OF FIRST INSTANCE;
WILLFUL DELAY IN PAYING JUST DEBT; USE OF LEGAL EXPERTISE TO
AVOID PAYMENT MUST BE PENALIZED WITH DISMISSAL FROM BENCH. —
I believe that the conduct of respondent Judge, a public official tasked with
upholding the law, but who used his legal knowledge and expertise to
delay and avoid the payment of a relatively measly sum of Four Thousand
Five Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P4,500.00) which, in the first place, was his
just debt, to the prejudice of another, is a dastardly act which deserves
the extreme penalty of expulsion or dismissal from the Bench, not just a
mere fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Enriqueta Gargar de Julio filed a complaint on June 15, 1989 charging
Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega (formerly of the City Court of Olongapo City,
now of the Regional Trial Court in Manila) with conduct unbecoming a
judge ("hindi karapat-dapat gawain ng isang na nunungkulan huwes, na
nagbibigay ng walang pagtitiwala at deskumpiyansa sa mamamayan"). (p.
1, Rollo.)
The records show that in 1977 Judge Benjamin Vega and his wife,
Carmelita Vega, leased for a monthly rental of P500, the complainant’s
building at No. 2706-A Rizal Avenue, Olongapo City, where they operated
a bake shop and hot pandesal business on the premises. The lessees used
to pay the rent regularly but defaulted beginning July 16, 1977. The owner
made verbal demands for payment but the lessees did not heed them. On
November 25, 1977, a demand letter was sent by the complainant,
through counsel, to the lessees. As the Vegas failed to comply with the
lessors’ demands, the latter filed an ejectment complaint on January 23,
1978 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Olongapo City (Civil
Case No. 1690, entitled: "Enrique A. Gargar and Juan de Julio, plaintiffs v.
Carmelita Vega, joined by her husband, Benjamin Vega, defendants").
Answering the ejectment complaint, the defendants alleged that no rents
were due after July 15, 1977 for they stopped the operation of their bake
shop on that date after Judge Vega was promoted to the Court of First
Instance of Palawan.
The trial lasted ten (10) years on account of Judge Vega’s dilatory tactics
compounded by his over-extended testimony (he took the witness stand
seven times) while a succession of four different judges took turns
presiding over the court. Judgment was rendered by Municipal Judge
Emet. B. Manalo on February 18, 1987, the dispositive part of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to
pay the plaintiffs the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred (P2,5000.00)
Pesos representing payment of rentals for five (5) months at the rate of
P500.00 a month, from December 5, 1977 (the date when plaintiffs’
demand letter was received by the defendants) up to April 5, 1978 the
date more or less when the defendants actually vacated the leased
premises, plus interest computed at legal rate reckoned from the dates
they became due, plus attorney’s fee in the amount of P500.00." (p. 12,
MTC, Judgment.).
The amount due on the judgment, including legal rate of interest (over a
period of ten years) and attorney’s fees, was only P4,500, but respondent
would not give his lessors the satisfaction of recovering what was due
them. He appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City which affirmed it. From the Regional Trial Court, he took the case to
the Court of Appeals which dismissed his petition for review.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Even after the judgment had become final, its execution was delayed
because Judge Vega questioned the computation of the amount due
(P4,500). When the writ of execution was presented to him in his office at
Malolos, Bulacan (from Palawan, he was transferred to the Regional Trial
Court in Malolos, Bulacan), he advised the sheriff to serve it at his house in
Quezon City. Neither the original nor the alias writ of execution was
satisfied. It was only after the complainant filed this administrative case
against him on June 15, 1989 that Judge Vega paid through the Assistant
Clerk of Court on July 21, 1989 the sum of P4,500 on the judgment in Civil
Case No. 1690 (Annex 1).
The facts of this case limn an unflattering picture of a judge who, by abuse
of his legal expertise and through dilatory maneuvers, managed to evade
and delay the payment of a just debt.
Willful failure to pay a just debt is a serious offense under Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by the resolution of this Court dated July 25,
1974. The amount involved (P4,500) is not big. He could easily have paid
it, but it appears that he was bent on frustrating the complainant’s best
efforts to obtain satisfaction of her lawful claim, apparently for no other
reason than to annoy and oppress her for having haled him and his wife
into court. While an ejectment case is supposed to be summary in nature,
respondent Judge, through dilatory tactics, stretched the trial over a
period of ten (10) years, and dragged the case all the way from the
municipal court to the Court of Appeals. After the decision had become
final, he delayed payment for two more years. He came across only after
the complainant, in exasperation, had filed this administrative charge
against him.
There is no doubt in the mind of this Court that respondent judge’s
conduct toward the complainant was oppressive and unbecoming a
member of the judiciary. He used his position and his legal knowledge to
welsh on just debt and to harrass his creditor. His example erodes public
faith in the capacity of courts to administer justice. He violated Rule 2.01,
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires that "a judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega guilty
of oppressive conduct and willful delay in paying a just debt (Section 5,
Rule 140, Rules of Court as amended). He is ordered to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and is hereby warned that a repetition
of this misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C . J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur with the majority opinion in its finding that respondent Judge
Benjamin A.G. Vega is guilty of oppressive conduct (in promoting his own
personal interest) and of wilful delay in paying a just debt. However, I
disagree as to the penalty it imposes on the Respondent. I believe that the
conduct of respondent Judge, a public official tasked with upholding the
law, but who used his legal knowledge and expertise to delay and avoid
the payment of a relatively measly sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred
and Fifty Pesos (P4,550.00) which, in the first place, was his just debt, to
the prejudice of another, is a dastardly act which deserves the extreme
penalty of expulsion or dismissal from the Bench, not just a mere fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Judiciary is one of the three (3) main pillars of our government. It is
the last bastion where one seeking justice should find fulfillment. Its
members must possess courage, character and conviction in order to
inspire public confidence in the courts. In the words of former Chief Justice
Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 1 "there is no surer guarantee of
judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those
appointed to the Bench."cralaw virtua1aw library
The office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is, as the
Constitution in no uncertain terms speaks, a public trust. This is more than
a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. 2
Mr. Justice Malcolm identified good judges with "men who have a mastery
of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law,
who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by
outside influence, and who are independent self-respecting human units in
a judicial system equal and coordinate to the two other departments of
government." 3
Judge Vega’s conduct, as described in the majority opinion, is, to say the
least, reprehensible for he used his legal knowledge to unduly perpetuate
his selfish material interest. He lost all awareness that "a judge must be
the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. He
should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the
law." 4 "A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such
a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice." 5 Respondent judge, by his oppressive conduct, has
clearly demonstrated his unfitness to dispense justice without fear or
favor, as he would not hesitate to cause injury to others to promote his
own misplaced personal interest.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Our Judiciary has undergone two (2) reorganizations, namely: the first,
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in 1980, and the second, by force of
"people power" in 1986. These reorganizations had one underlying
purpose, i.e., to weed out the bad from the good, so that what might
emerge is a Judiciary truly deserving to be called the last bulwark of
democracy.

There should be no reason — or is there? — for yet another reorganization

to weed out the unfit and undeserving. In this case, we are faced with a
judge who had the audacity to use the very same legal tools intended to
serve the ends of justice, to create injustice. He should not be able to get
away with just a fine or what may be likened to a mere slap on the hand.
He deserves to be expelled from such an exalted position, for to let him
remain will greatly undermine the dignity and credibility of the Judiciary.
The felt necessities of time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, dictate that
there should be no more delay for if no step be taken and at the earliest
opportunity, it will not be too much to say that the people’s faith in the
administration of justice could be shaken. 6

I vote for respondent Judge’s dismissal from the Judiciary.

Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2004               October 19, 2007
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2145-RTJ)
DOROTEO M. SALAZAR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO D. MARIGOMEN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Bogo,
Cebu, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Complaint1 dated November 10, 2004, Doroteo M. Salazar (complainant) charged
Judge Antonio D. Marigomen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 61, Regional
Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu, with gross ignorance of the law, bias, conduct prejudicial to
the interest of the service and rendering a decision violative of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the Constitution in connection with
Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789.
Zenaida F. Salazar, wife of complainant, and a mayoralty candidate in the
Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu in the May 2001 elections, filed on July 4, 2001 an
election protest against the proclaimed winner Lety2 Mancio (Mancio) before the
Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu where it was docketed as Election SPC Case No.
BOGO-00789.
The election case was first heard by then Acting Presiding Judge Jesus S. dela Peña
who, on April 1, 2002, issued an order directing the revision of the contested ballots in
the premises of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) where the
ballot boxes were being kept. Respondent took over and started presiding over the
election case on June 3, 2002.
By Decision3 of August 8, 2003, respondent dismissed the election protest and
declared Mancio as the duly elected municipal mayor of Madridejos, Cebu with total
votes of 5,214.4
On appeal, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution5 of March 25, 2004, reversed
and set aside the August 8, 2003 Decision of respondent and declared complainant’s
wife Zenaida Salazar as the duly elected mayor.6
Thus, spawned the filing of the complaint at bar.
By complainant’s claim, respondent admitted in evidence uncertified photocopies of
the contested ballots,7 the original copies of which were in the custody of the HRET,
contrary to Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court8 which provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied);
and respondent considered the uncertified photocopies-exhibits for Mancio in
deciding the case. Hence, the charge of gross ignorance of the law.9
Respondent’s partiality was, by complainant’s claim, shown in several instances, viz:
When protestant Zenaida Salazar objected to the presentation of the plain
photocopies of the contested ballots, respondent ordered his Clerk of Court to
coordinate with counsel for protestee and to testify for her; and respondent allowed
Atty. Reinerio Roeles, the co-counsel for the protestee, to testify despite the
protestant’s objection on the ground that his testifying would be a violation of
professional ethics10 and despite respondent’s citation of authorities on the matter.11
Complainant further claims that respondent was acting as if he were the counsel for
the protestee, demonstrated during the testimony of the Clerk of Court when
protestee’s counsel had difficulty explaining the nature of the clerk’s testimony and
respondent laid the basis thereof.12
Complainant additionally claims that respondent was "too liberal and tolerant of the
maneuverings and manipulations of the protestee,"13 thereby dragging the
proceedings which started on July 4, 2001 (when it was filed) up to August 8, 2003
(when it was decided), in violation of the period provided by the Omnibus Election
Code.
Furthermore, complainant claims that despite the parties’ agreement to follow the
Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated March 12, 2002 executed between the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP)14 allowing the submission of affidavits of witnesses in lieu of their testifying in
court, subject to cross examination, respondent allowed protestee to present
witnesses to give oral testimonies.15
Finally, complainant claims that respondent violated the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as well as the Constitution for not clearly and distinctly stating the facts
and the law on which his decision was based.16
In his Comment,17 respondent proffers that complainant is not the real party in interest
and, in any event, the complaint is moot and academic as the election protest had
been decided on appeal by the COMELEC; and if errors were committed, "they
pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions [which] cannot be corrected
through administrative proceedings."18
As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law, respondent cites Section 5,19 Rule 130
of the Rules of Court as his legal basis for the admission of the uncertified
photocopies.
Denying complainant’s claim that he was biased in favor of the protestee relative to
the presentation of her counsel Atty. Roeles as a witness, respondent claims that
despite the counsel for the protestant’s commitment to submit a memorandum of
authorities to support his objection to Atty. Roeles’ presentation, no memorandum
was submitted.20
Respecting his having propounded questions in the course of the testimony of the
witnesses, respondent claims that he did so in good faith "in order to ascertain the
falsity or truth of the subject matter."21
On the charge of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service, respondent
disclaims any intentional delay of the proceedings on his part. As for the non-
observance of the Memorandum on Policy Guidelines, he argues that if the protestant
had agreed to observe the memorandum, he could not compel the protestee to also
observe the same as the policy guidelines are merely recommendatory and not
compulsory.22
Finally, respondent maintains that his decision clearly stated the facts and the law on
which it was based, and if there are errors therein, they are correctible by judicial
remedies and not by administrative proceedings.23
The OCA, by Report24 of April 4, 2006, found the complaint meritorious in light of the
following evaluation:
. . . Administrative matter involves the exercise of the Court’s power to discipline
judges. It is undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, that is, to
maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government. Thus, unlike in
ordinary cases, there is no private offended party in administrative proceedings who
may be entitled to judicial relief. The complainant need not be a real party in interest,
as anyone may file an administrative complaint against a judge, the only requirement
being that the complaint be verified and it "be in writing and shall state clearly and
concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct
prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct."
The admission of the uncertified or plain photocopies of the contested ballots by
respondent Judge in favor of Mancio betrays his ignorance of Section 7, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. The Rule, otherwise known as the Best Evidence Rule, simply
provides that as long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not
receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the
absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court. In this case, the original copies of the contested ballots
have neither been lost nor destroyed. They are in the custody of the HRET, and had
respondent judge wanted to examine them, he could have easily ordered the transfer
of their custody to the court.
His invocation of Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to justify his admission of
the plain copies of the contested ballots is misplaced. The Rule allows the admission
of secondary evidence when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be found. However, the offeror is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a)
the loss or destruction of the original was without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices
of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of
evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original
copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search
has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
Verily, as the original copies of the contested ballots are in the custody of the HRET,
which fact was known to respondent judge, there was no occasion to apply Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. When the law is so elementary, not to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge took special interest in the presentation of Atty. Caayon as a
witness for Mancio. The purpose of Atty. Caayon’s testimony was to show that the
photocopies of the ballots were the same as the original ballots in the custody of the
HRET. When the counsel for Salazar, Atty. Manuel S. Paradela, refused to stipulate
on the faithful reproduction of the original ballots, the counsel for Mancio declared that
they could request HRET to bring the original ballots to the court for comparison.
Respondent judge, however, ignored the manifestation, and proceeded to ask Atty.
Paradela if the latter was represented during the photocopying of the original ballots.
Nonetheless, the counsel for Mancio, Atty. Nathaniel Clarus, requested for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to bring the original ballots
to the court. Despite that manifestation, respondent judge allowed Atty. Caayon to
affirm the veracity of the photocopies in his possession, thus:
xxxx
[Judge Marigomen]: We will present the Clerk of Court (Atty. Caayon) to affirm the
veracity of those ballots in his possession of the tribunal copy and now existence (sic)
in the possession of the Clerk of Court. x x x
Clearly, respondent judge was more interested in presenting Atty. Caayon as a
witness than the party (Mancio) who would have benefited from the testimony. His
actuations did not speak well of the cold neutrality required of an impartial judge,
as he showed his manifest bias for one party over the other.
The bias of respondent judge for Mancio was further demonstrated when Atty.
Caayon was being qualified as a witness. After every objection raised by Atty.
Paradela to the questions propounded by Atty. Clarus to Atty. Caayon, respondent
judge would always propound questions himself to Atty. Caayon, instead of ruling on
the objections . . .
xxxx
Respondent judge’s bias for Mancio was further shown by respondent judge when he
allowed one of the counsels for Mancio, Atty. Reinerio Roiles, to testify despite the
vigorous objection of Salazar through his counsel, as the testimony was in violation of
Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. The Rule
prohibits a lawyer from testifying in behalf of his client, except on formal matters such
as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, or on substantial matters,
in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice. In this case, Atty.
Roeles was allowed to testify on matters not contemplated by the exceptions. As
admitted by respondent judge, he allowed Atty. Roeles to testify "to prove that he is
one of the legal panel (sic) of the protestee; that he was at the Municipality of
Madridejos last May 12, 2001 to May [1]5, 2001; and that there was (sic) no goons,
terrorism and other election activities as alleged by the protestant." Surely, the
matters testified to by Atty. Roeles are neither formal matters nor essential to the
ends of justice; rather, they were self-serving declarations intended to strengthen
Mancio’s cause.
In his attempt at justifying his act in allowing Atty. Roeles to testify, respondent judge
committed falsehood when he declared in his comment that he allowed Atty. Roeles
to testify over the objection of Salazar after the latter, through counsel, failed to
submit a memorandum in support of her objection. However, the records of this case
belie that claim. It appears that Salazar through Atty. Paradela filed a Manifestation
dated February 24, 2003, calling attention to the unethical presentation of Atty.
Roeles as a witness for his own client, Mancio. The manifestation was filed with, and
received by, the court on the same day, as evidenced by the stamp "RECEIVED"
appearing on the upper right hand corner of the first page of the Manifestation.
There is also merit in the complaint that respondent judge failed to abide by the
express mandate of the COMELEC Rules and Procedure and the Constitution to
state clearly and distinctly in every decision the facts and the law on which it is based.
The questioned decision dismissing for lack of merit the election protest filed by
Salazar against Mancio, and declaring the latter to be the duly elected municipal
mayor of Madridejos, Cebu, with a total votes of 5,214 as against the 5,144 votes
garnered by Salazar, or a difference of 70 votes. The final tabulation of votes came
about after the respondent judge declared on the penultimate page of the 22-page
decision, thus:
After reviewing or re-appreciating the ballots of the contested precincts, the Court
invalidated ninety (90) votes of the protestant and has not validated stray votes in her
favor as she has not formally offered the claimed stray votes or ballots. The court
shall only consider ballots which are presented and formally offered.
After a thorough examination of the questioned decision, it became obvious that the
invalidation of the 90 votes against Salazar was made without indicating in the
decision the factual and legal bases therefor. Expectedly, the COMELEC First
Division, in its Resolution promulgated on March 25, 2004, reversed and set aside the
August 8, 2003 Decision of respondent judge, and declared Salazar as the duly
elected mayor of Madridejos, Cebu.
Time and again, the Court had instructed judges to exert effort to ensure the
decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal
findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties. Respondent
failed in this respect.
xxxx
In fine, respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and
deliberate falsehood or dishonesty. Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious charge. Similarly, bias and
deliberate falsehood, which are tantamount to grave misconduct, are considered
serious charges under the same Rule. The penalty imposable for serious charges
ranges from fine to dismissal.25 (Italics in the original, emphasis supplied; and
underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied)
The OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of (a) gross ignorance of the
law and fined in the amount of ₱20,000, and (b) bias and dishonesty, amounting to
grave misconduct and suspended for six months without pay.26
In compliance with this Court’s Resolution27 of June 19, 2006 requiring them to
manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
pleadings/records already filed and submitted, complainant and respondent
manifested in the affirmative.
The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA in order. Respondent’s
questioned acts do not conform to the following pertinent canons of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which took effect on June 1, 2004.
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not
only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
xxxx
CANON 5
EQUALITY
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct,
manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
And respondent indeed committed falsehood, as found by the OCA. Respondent’s
claim that he allowed the protestee’s counsel, Atty. Roeles, to testify over the
objection of the protestant’s counsel because the latter failed to submit a
memorandum in support of the objection, is belied by the records of the case. Thus,
in a pleading captioned "Manifestation," the protestant’s counsel submitted a
memorandum of authorities on the matter.

In Re: Compliance of Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC), Santiago City, Isabela,28 this Court observed:

. . . [T]he lack of candor he has shown by the misrepresentation which he made

before the Court is incongruent with the primordial character which a magistrate must
possess, especially so in this case where the act of dishonesty was committed
against the Court. A member of the bar owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the
Court. He must not do any falsehood or consent to the doing of any in court; neither
shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. The moral standard
of honesty is equally, if not much more, expected from members of the
Judiciary, as they are the agents through which the Court ensures that the end
of justice is served. Dishonesty is anathema to the very nature of functions
which a magistrate performs.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent also indeed failed to state in his decision why he invalidated 90 ballots in
favor of the protestant and to specify the ballots being set aside, thereby violating the
Constitution.30

This Court modifies the recommendation of the OCA, however, given the number of
infractions committed by respondent.1avvphi1 Instead of suspension, it imposes on
respondent a fine of Twenty Five Thousand (₱25,000) Pesos for manifest bias and
dishonesty. And it increases the recommended fine of Twenty Thousand (₱20,000)
Pesos for gross ignorance of law or procedure to Twenty Five Thousand (₱25,000)
Pesos.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent, JUDGE ANTONIO D. MARIGOMEN,

GUILTY of 1) gross ignorance of the law or procedure and is FINED in the amount of
Twenty Five Thousand (₱25,000) Pesos, and 2) manifest bias and dishonesty
amounting to grave misconduct and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand
(₱25,000) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242               August 6, 2010
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-3149-RTJ]
ATTY. RAUL L. CORREA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Verified-Complaint dated February 20, 2009 filed by
complainant Atty. Raul L. Correa charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo
B. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, Laguna of
Misconduct.
Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by
the court in Special Proceedings No. 660-01C, entitled "Intestate Estate of
Hector Tan." He revealed that during the hearing of the case, respondent
Judge Belen disagreed with various items in the Administrator’s Report,
including the audited Financial Report covering the said estate, and
immediately ruled that they should be disallowed. Complainant added that
respondent Judge Belen scolded their accountant, branded her as an
incompetent, and threatened to sue her before the regulatory body
overseeing all certified public accountants.
Complainant further claimed that, in the course of the proceedings, he was
asked by respondent Judge Belen to stand up while the latter dictated his
order on their Administrator’s Report. Respondent Judge Belen even rebuked
him for some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate, adding that it is
regrettable "because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar
Topnotcher at that." Complainant regrets the actuations and statements of
respondent Judge Belen, especially because the remark was uncalled for, a
left-handed compliment, and a grave insult to his Alma Mater. Worse,
respondent Judge Belen ousted complainant as co-administrator of the
estate of Hector Tan.
On June 18, 2008, respondent Judge Belen issued an Order citing
complainant for indirect contempt, allegedly with administrator Rose Ang
Tee, for surreptitiously and unlawfully withdrawing from and emptying the
account of the estate of Hector Tan. The June 18, 2008 Order contained
snide remarks, viz—
x x x. The action of Rose Tee and Atty. Raul Correa is contumacious and
direct challenge to lawful orders, and judicial process of this [c]ourt and
malicious assault to the orderly administration of justice, more specifically
abhorrent the act and deed of Atty. Raul Correa, a U.P. Law alumnus and
Bar Topnotcher, who as a lawyer knows very well and fully understands that
such action violates his oath of office which the Court cannot countenance. x
xx
Lastly, complainant insisted that he should not have been cited for indirect
contempt because he had fully explained to the court that he had done his
part as co-administrator in good faith, and that, through his efforts, the estate
was able to meet the deadline for the latest Tax Amnesty Program of the
government, consequently saving the estate the amount of no less than ₱35
Million.
In his Comment dated August 18, 2009, respondent Judge Belen argued that
a judge, having the heavy burden to always conduct himself in accordance
with the ethical tenets of honesty, probity and integrity, is duty bound to
remind counsel of their duties to the court, to their clients, to the adverse
party, and to the opposing counsel.
Respondent Judge Belen claimed that the conduct of complainant in
handling the settlement of the estate of Hector Tan violated and breached the
tenets and standards of the legal profession and of the Lawyer’s Oath. He
alleged that, despite the clear tenor of a lawyer-client relationship,
complainant associated himself as corresponding counsel and member of the
Ongkiko Law Office, the counsel of the opposing party in the settlement
proceedings.
Respondent Judge Belen further alleged that complainant, in connivance
with Rose Ang Tee, surreptitiously released millions of pesos for the now
deceased Purification Tee Tan and to themselves, in clear violation of
complainant’s legal and fiduciary relationship and responsibilities as court-
appointed co-administrator.
Both the Verified-Complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
In its Report dated March 10, 2010, the OCA found respondent Judge Belen
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for his use of intemperate language
and inappropriate actions in dealing with counsels, such as complainant,
appearing in his sala. The OCA said that respondent Judge Belen should
have just ruled on the motion filed by complainant instead of opting for a
conceited display of arrogance. The OCA also noted that the incidents
subject of this administrative matter were not the first time that respondent
Judge Belen had uttered intemperate remarks towards lawyers appearing
before him. It noted that in Mane v. Belen,1 the Court found respondent
Judge Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and was reprimanded
for engaging in a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
Based on its evaluation, the OCA recommended that (a) the administrative
case against respondent Judge Belen be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and (b) respondent Judge Belen be fined in the
amount of ₱10,000.00 for conduct unbecoming of a judge, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
The findings and the recommendations of the OCA are well taken and, thus,
should be upheld.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts
members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of
propriety at all times. Canon 4 mandates –
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall
always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before
the courts. More specifically, Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality provides –
SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration
for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and
judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
We join the OCA in noting that the incidents narrated by complainant were
never denied by respondent Judge Belen, who merely offered his justification
and asserted counter accusations against complainant.
Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be more circumspect in
his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge is the visible
representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most
searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a
judge are essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial
system.2
A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent
Judge Belen’s insulting statements, tending to project complainant’s
ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from his inconsiderate belief
that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly
insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse of power and authority
could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the public. Patience is
one virtue that members of the bench should practice at all times, and
courtesy to everyone is always called for.1avvphi1
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c)
thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning. Inasmuch as this is not respondent Judge Belen’s first offense, the
penalty of fine of ₱10,000.00 is deemed appropriate.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him ₱10,000.00, with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1582             February 28, 2005
ANTONIO OCENAR, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ODELON S. MABUTIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In a verified Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
Antonio Ocenar charges Judge Odelon S. Mabutin, Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, with grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. In support
thereof, Ocenar narrates: On 05 November 2002 at 10:30 p.m., Raymund Monsanto
was arrested by the police officers of Catbalogan, Samar, in a buy-bust operation.
Confiscated from him were shabu paraphernalia, money, and 3.8 grams of shabu. A
case for violation of Section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against Monsanto
who was held behind bars. Respondent judge conducted the preliminary investigation
of the case which was terminated on 07 January 2003. However, even before the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation, respondent judge approved the motion for
bail of Monsanto in the amount of P150,000 on 26 December 2002. A motion to
reduce bailbond filed by Monsanto was again granted by the respondent and bail was
reduced to P120,000; whereupon, accused was released from prison.
From the point of view of the Complainant, Monsanto is not entitled to bail and the
granting thereof was a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002) inasmuch as Section 5 provides that the penalty for the alleged
crime is life imprisonment to death. Complainant submits that the Respondent gave
undue favor to Monsanto because the latter is a grandson of Judge Sinforiano A.
Monsanto who is the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar. In contrast, in another criminal case (Crim. Case No. Y3-H-330
entitled, People v. Felix Bantugan), likewise for violation of Section 5 of Rep. Act No.
9165, the accused therein, Felix Bantugan, who was arrested in a police buy-bust
operation and caught in possession of 0.06 grams of shabu, was denied his bail by
respondent. In sum, Complainant challenges the propriety of the grant of bail by the
respondent to the accused Monsanto.
Per 1st indorsement of the OCA dated 23 October 2003,2 respondent judge was
required to Comment on the Complaint.
In his Comment,3 respondent judge takes exception to the accusation of the
complainant stating, first and foremost, that the instant administrative complaint is not
the first time the Complainant dragged the respondent to an unnecessary suit.
Previously, in OCA I.P.I. No./Adm. Matter No. 99-778- MTJ, complainant filed against
respondent a case for partiality, incompetence and ignorance of the law which this
Court dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution dated 05 February
2001.4 Respondent surmised that the first complaint was an offshoot of a case of
which complainant was a party as judgment-obligor whose assets were subjected to
execution and where respondent presided at the execution stage.
Respondent stated that in view of Monsanto’s application for bail, the case was heard
on 12, 17, 19 and 20 December 2003. While respondent admits that initially there was
no notice given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Samar, there was
really no irregularity of procedure taken inasmuch as clarificatory hearings (i.e., cases
for preliminary investigations) are heard without the appearance of the prosecutor
considering that the MTC and the prosecutor’s office are on equal footing in
conducting preliminary investigations. Respondent points out that on 12 December
2002, during the initial hearing of Monsanto’s application for admission to bail, it was
Judge Salvador Jakosalem - as Presiding Judge designate – who presided over the
case as he (respondent) was on leave. As the Order5 of the Court on that day would
bear out, Police Senior Inspector Joseph N. Pensotes, representing the prosecution,
sought for and was granted additional time to consult the OPP which has control and
supervision over the prosecution of the case. At the next hearing on 17 December
2002, respondent informed the prosecutor assigned to the court, Prosecutor Dhida L.
Lim, regarding Monsanto’s application for bail. Lim merely stated that she would not
appear and intervene in the application for bail because the case was only in the
preliminary investigation stage, as such, any and all incidents will ultimately be
subject to their review in the OPP.1awphi1.nét
On the authority of the respondent to grant bail, he cites Rule 114, Sections 4 and
17(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to justify his action.
On the charge of partiality due to the grant of bail to Monsanto and the denial of bail
to Bantugan, the reason proffered by respondent is simply because no bail was
applied for by Bantugan. The fact of non-application for bail is attested by a
certification, to that effort issued by Mr. Alfredo Bardaje, Administrative Officer III of
the OPP of Samar.6
Relative to the allegation that he is a protégé of Judge Monsanto, respondent denies
the same and instead claims that he comes from another town in Samar, Sta.
Margarita, while Judge Monsanto hails from Calbayog City. He never had any
dealings with Judge Monsanto except on a purely professional basis such as when
"he had to go to Judge Monsanto’s office to research, the IBP officers induction, their
attendance in judge’s seminars, Christmas party of the trial court, encounters during
town fiestas, and the blow-out of Judge Monsanto when he was chosen as centennial
judge for Region VIII." Other than those instances, there was never any time where
respondent dealt with Judge Monsanto personally. Neither have they asked any
favors from one another and certainly not in the criminal case involving the accused
Monsanto.
Referred to the OCA, the OCA recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack
of merit.7
We concur in the recommendation of the OCA.
Evidence for the prosecution presented during the hearings conducted for the
purpose of determining accused Monsanto’s right to bail shows that on 05 November
2002, accused Monsanto was arrested at Purok 1, Barangay 13, Catbalogan, Samar,
in a buy-bust operation. Recovered from him were one (1) piece heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance locally known as
shabu weighing more or less 4.0 grams and buy-bust money of Seven Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P7,500).8 A complaint dated 06 November 2002 for violation of
Sections 5 and 15 both of Rep. Act No. 9165, The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, specifically for illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs was filed against
accused Monsanto before the MTC where respondent judge is presiding.9 On 02
December 2002, accused Monsanto, through counsel, filed an application for
admission to bail.10 As earlier stated, the preliminary hearing on the application for
admission to bail took place on 12 December 2002 where a judge-designate, Judge
Salvador P. Jakosalem presided owing to the absence of the respondent. A
subsequent hearing was held on 17 December 2002 where Prosecutor Dhida L. Lim
manifested that she would not intervene in the application for bail considering that the
case is only in the preliminary investigation stage and the same would ultimately be
subject to their review.11 Another hearing was held on 19 December 2002 where the
services of Atty. Jorge L. Almaden, a lawyer from the Philippine National Police
Regional Legal Services, appeared for the prosecution, engaged by Inspector
Pensotes, team leader of the group that conducted the buy-bust operation on
Monsanto.12 Atty. Almaden appeared during the hearings and presented evidence for
the prosecution.
In Te v. Perez,13 this Court held:
. . . We reiterate the following duties of judges in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied.14
Restated in the more recent case of Managuelod v. Judge Paclibon, Jr.:15
The duties of a judge, in case an application for bail is filed, are to: (1) notify the
prosecutor of the hearing on the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation; (2) conduct a hearing on the application for bail whether or not the
prosecution presents evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, to
enable the court to exercise its discretion; (3) decide whether the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and (4)
if the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond.
Applying the foregoing, this Court finds that Respondent has more than sufficiently
complied with the requirements of the law before his approval of the bail application of
accused Monsanto, negating a charge that he was remiss in his duty. Clearly, the
prosecutor assigned to the court to appear in behalf of the People was notified of the
hearing on the application for bail and directed to make a recommendation. The bail
application was heard on different occasions before the same was granted. The
Order allowing the accused to be released on bail on the ground that the evidence of
his guilt was not strong was based on and contained a summary of the evidence of
the prosecution as required by the law.
Conspicuously, the recommendation of the respondent was in fact upheld by the
reviewing prosecutors, Edilberto G. Morales and Manuel F. Torrevillas, Jr., Provincial
Prosecutors of Samar, who made a review resolution without questioning the grant of
bail to the accused by the respondent.16 1awphi1.nét
On the authority of the respondent to grant bail, the long settled rule is that a
municipal judge conducting a preliminary investigation of a person in custody and
charged with a capital offense has the authority to grant bail.17 Rule 114, Section 17 of
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. – (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge therein.
In sum, the acts of respondent judge were all in accordance with law and settled
jurisprudence.l^vvphi1.net
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence,18 i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.19 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a judge enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions.20
While it is our duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in
complaints against judges and other court personnel, it is also our duty to see to it
that they are protected and exonerated from baseless administrative charges. The
Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates,
but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.21
WHEREFORE, the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 [Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-876. December 11, 1995.]
STATE PROSECUTORS, Complainants, v. JUDGE MANUEL T.
MURO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a PER CURIAM Decision dated September 19, 1994, the Court declared
that respondent judge Manuel T. Muro’s motu propio dismissal of eleven
(11) criminal cases filed against Mrs. Imelda Marcos for violation of Central
Bank foreign exchange restrictions, admittedly prompted by mere
newspaper reports of the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions which
are characterized as "hearsay evidence, twice removed" 1 and therefore
not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether
objected to or not, 2 and without waiting for the defense to file a motion to
quash nor at least affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on
the matter, constitutes gross ignorance of the law calling for his dismissal
from the service with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits
and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the
government service.
Respondent filed the instant motion for reconsideration of said decision to
which complainants (state prosecutors) filed a comment. Respondent’s
reply thereto was further opposed by complainants’ rejoinder. Meanwhile,
the Regional Trial Court Judges Association of Manila, Inc. and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.
(MABINI) filed separate petitions." . . For Leave To Intervene As Amicus
Curiae." Both petitions were however denied by the Court in its
Resolutions of October 18, 1994 and November 8, 1994, respectively.
In pressing for the dismissal of the complaint against him, respondent, in a
nutshell, maintains that his dismissal of the criminal charges against Mrs.
Marcos in the aforedescribed manner was not motivated by bad faith or by
any corrupt and insidious intent. And to further belie his imputed "gross
ignorance of the law, respondent stresses that "he graduated from the law
school, magna cum laude, the valedictorian of his class and placed 6th in
the Bar examination." 3
It may be conceded that respondent, in acting the way he did, committed
a legal error which usually is remediable by appeal or by any other modes
sanctioned by the Rules of Court 4 and "does not raise a question of
improper judicial conduct subject to judicial discipline." 5 But egregious
legal error, legal error motivated by bad faith, or a continuing pattern of
legal error do amount to misconduct subject to discipline, ranging from
admonishment to removal from office. 6 And legal error is egregious and
serious enough to amount to misconduct when judges deny individuals
their basic or fundamental rights, such as when defendants were not
advised of their constitutional right to counsel, coerced to plead guilty,
sentenced to jail when only a fine is provided by law, sentenced to jail for
a period longer than the maximum sentence allowed by law, or particularly
similar to this case when defendants were denied a full and fair hearing 7
— a constitutional right equally afforded to the prosecution but
unceremoniously ignored by Respondent. The gravity of his actuation
cannot be shrugged off casually. Respondent has followed a course of
judicial conduct which is in utter disregard of the law, established rules of
practice and basic notions of fair play, and his impressive scholastic record
as student of law all the more punctuates his blunder rather than temper
it. Thus, we reiterate with the same fervor that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation
of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua
sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having
been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment
or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process
to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as
early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion,
nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the
prosecution’s right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law.
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which
respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a
hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably
opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused.
Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual
situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper
report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance
whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the
accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its
right to due process. More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the President’s
announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not
he should dismiss the cases, he nonetheless deliberately refrained from
requiring the prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his
action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could
have been given? That the President was talking ‘through his hat’ and
should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then
nonexistent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination
cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the
patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to
present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor’s proofs might not
be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of
petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct
which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." At the
very least, respondent judge acted unjudiciously and with unjustified haste
in the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his
actuation highly dubious." 8
However, certain notable matters and turn of events since the filing of
respondent’s motion for reconsideration stir the Court to undertake a
reexamination of the penalty of dismissal originally imposed on him.
Respondent attests to his unsullied name and service record prior to this
administrative case and further displays a humble and contrite gesture by
making a "solemn commitment" that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) he will avoid creating a situation that spawns suspicion of arbitrary and
improper conduct (Canon of Judicial Ethics, par. 17);
b) he would ‘adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice and not
seek to be extreme or peculiar in his Judgment or spectacular or
sensational in the conduct of the court.’ (Ibid, par. 19);
c) he would avoid all appearances of impropriety, specially those that
create suspicion of partiality, bias or improper motive. (Ibid, par. 3; Code
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2)." 9
And as if moved by the verity of respondent’s attestation and the sincerity
of his renewed pledge, complainants, in their Comment 10 to the motion
for reconsideration and Rejoinder 11 to respondent’s reply to their
Comment have mellowed down in pushing for respondent’s removal from
the service and now leave to these Court’s sound discretion whether to
lessen or modify respondent’s penalty.
These indeed are favorable considerations warranting the commutation of
respondent’s penalty of dismissal, if only to give him the chance to redeem
himself from an error of this magnitude which he committed only for the
first time. After all, this Court is not bereft of compassion and mercy. But
respondent ought to be reminded of certain fundamental legal precepts
which just might have escaped him momentarily and which will keep him
guarded against committing the same or similar mistake a second time.
"Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a
speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief
objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A
genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration
before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just
administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge, which
are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases." 12
"In every litigation, . . ., the manner and attitude of a trial judge are
crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the
accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of
catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is
to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would
be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to
feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own
sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as
the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring
that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk
of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he
should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to
hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid
any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not
merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional
significance." 13
"What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent
judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely
as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way
judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and
the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law." 14
"The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit
of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration
from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinate to the ‘primordial necessity of order in the social life’." 15
In line with the Court’s pronouncement in "In Re: Petition for the Dismissal
from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon" 16 and
borrowing the words therein, the decision to dismiss respondent judge
took effect on September 19, 1994. On the basis of the foregoing
considerations, we feel he has been sufficiently punished for the
administrative infraction. We, therefore, order his reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration
is hereby GRANTED. The Court’s September 19, 1994 Decision is
MODIFIED. Respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro is considered suspended
from office without pay for the period from September 19, 1994 to the
date this Resolution is promulgated. He may, therefore, be REINSTATED to
office immediately. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the
respondent’s personal record.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I am glad that the majority finally decided to reconsider the Decision
dismissing respondent judge from the service. Truly he does not deserve
to be out of the judiciary.
However I disagree with the majority opinion, hence my dissent, insofar as
it suspends him from office — and for more than one (1) year — for which
reason I reiterate and incorporate herein my Dissenting Opinion in the
Decision of the Court.
I find it extremely difficult to attribute bad faith on the part of respondent
judge for dismissing the eleven criminal cases against the accused therein.
As I have said, I see no insidious intentions on his part. For —
[D]ismissing motu propio the eleven criminal cases without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though
it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate
dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that
since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an
elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the
repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons
charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the
crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old
law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed. 1
Bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an
honest mistake, but by some interested or sinister motive. 2 It implies
breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood
obligation. 3 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will. 4
None of these is respondent guilty of.
I do not agree with the findings of the majority that respondent judge
committed an egregious legal error "serious enough to amount to
misconduct." It was a simple case of believing in good faith that the basis
for the criminal charges against the accused had been eliminated, having
heard the public announcement of no less than the President himself that
among the beneficiaries of the lifting of the foreign exchange restrictions
was the accused herself. Hence there was no reason for the cases to
remain pending in the calendar having in mind the desire of the Court to
unclog court dockets.
Thus, as I said in my dissent, where the conclusions of the judge in his
decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is
incompetent or grossly ignorant to call for an administrative sanction. 5
Accordingly, if respondent judge committed any error at all it was a "legal
error" rectifiable by appeal, not by administrative sanction. Let it be
emphasized that the policy of the Court as regards administrative cases is
to dismiss the charge if the remedy is judicial, as in the case before us.
Why then should we single out respondent judge among all other judges
whose cases against them have been dismissed on the ground that the
remedy of complainants was judicial and not administrative?
Time and again this Court has ruled that a judge cannot be subjected to
liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of his official acts, no
matter how erroneous, so long as he acts in good faith. He cannot be held
to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous
decision rendered by him in good faith. As a matter of public policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous. 6
There is no showing whatsoever that respondent judge issued the assailed
order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an
injustice. Consequently, I have no choice but to maintain my vote to
exonerate him.
But assuming arguendo that respondent judge committed a "legal error"
which would make him liable to judicial discipline, I find too excessive the
commuted penalty, i.e., suspension from office from 19 September 1994
until the resolution of this Court commuting his dismissal is promulgated.
By that time respondent judge would have been suspended from office for
more than one (1) year which is quite disproportionate to the "infraction"
committed.
The severity of the penalty should be commensurate with the gravity of
the offense. The period of suspension arrived at by the majority may be a
convenient device to do away with a hiatus that would be created were a
shorter period of suspension be imposed by the Court, with the respondent
judge having served his penalty and yet unable to assume office in the
meantime that the instant motion for reconsideration is being resolved. I
maintain that if a shorter period of suspension is called for because it is
just and fair, then let it be so imposed, even if a time fracture is created.
For under this circumstance, respondent judge could very well be
considered simply as being on leave from office for that period. After all, a
verification from the Leave Section of this Court reveals that he has
sufficient leave credits to offset the period he is out of the service.

There should be no question that in the imposition of an administrative

sanction the primary consideration is not facility or convenience but the
proper and fair administration of justice.

To this extent, I must dissent.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

My vote is to deny the respondents motion for reconsiderations.