Wesleyan University

Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical Explanation

Author(s): John R. Hall
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Oct., 2000), pp. 331-347
Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2678015 .
Accessed: 21/06/2014 18:34

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and Wesleyan University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History
and Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
History and Theory39 (October2000), 331-347 ? WesleyanUniversity2000 ISSN: 0018-2656

FORUM ON CULTUREAND EXPLANATIONIN HISTORICALINQUIRY

3.

CULTURAL MEANINGS AND CULTURAL STRUCTURES

IN HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

JOHN R. HALL

ABSTRACT

One way to recastthe problemof culturalexplanationin historicalinquiryis to distinguish

two conceptualizationsinvolving culture:(1) cultural meanings as contents of significa-
tion (howevertheorized)that inform meaningfulcourses of action in historicallyunfold-
ing circumstances; and(2) cultural structuresas institutionalizedpatterns of sociallife
that may be elaboratedin more than one concrete constructionof meaning.This distinc-
tion helps to suggest how explanationcan operatein accountingfor culturalprocesses of
meaning-formation,as well as in other ways that transcendspecific meanings, yet are
nonetheless cultural. Examples of historical explanation involving each construct are
offered, and theirpotentialexamined.

Because culture is concerned in part with symbols and meanings, the problem of
how (indeed, whether) to theorize culture is a particularly difficult one for histor-
ical analysis, felt more acutely than the parallel problem for seemingly more tan-
gible "structural"features of the social world. One conventional solution has been
to enforce a division of labor between cultural history on the one hand, and social,
economic, and political histories on the other. In the latter histories, especially
beginning in the 1960s, formal social theories of causes and processes could be
brought to bear in the analysis of such subjects as demographic change, family
form, industrialization, and revolution, leaving the realm of cultural (intellectual,
art, music) histories as the sites of a thoroughgoing historicism which claimed to
eschew all general theoretical concepts. But more recently, efforts to draw a sharp
distinction between culture and structure have been undermined by the cultural
turn. Now, scholars specifically look to the ways that culture and structure are
mutually instantiated, as "cultural structures."' Yet despite the reinvigoration of
cultural history over the past two decades, as Mark Poster has argued, its practi-
tioners have not widely embraced the theoretically sophisticated poststructuralist
and reflexive critiques that have become so important in broader social and
humanistic inquiry.2 Insofar as cultural historians do take such critiques serious-

1. John R. Hall, "Social Organizationand Pathwaysof Commitment:Types of CommunalGroups,

RationalChoice Theory,and the KanterThesis,"AmericanSociological Review 53 (1988), 679-692;
cf. William H. Sewell, Jr., "A Theory of Structure:Duality,Agency, and Transformation,"
American
Journal of Sociology 98 (1992), 1-29; RichardBiernacki, The Fabrication of Labor: Germanyand
Britain, 1640-1914 (Berkeley, 1995).
2. MarkPoster,CulturalHistory and Postmodernity:DisciplinaryReadings and Challenges (New
York, 1997).

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
332 JOHN R. HALL

ly, they have given greatestcriticalemphasisto the ontological deconstructionof

historyas telos capturedin metanarratives.On the otherhand,the critiqueof cul-
turehas mainly centeredon the shift in objects of historicalanalysis from high to
popularculture,and from nationalculturesto subculturesand interculturalcon-
tacts.3Apartfrom Lynn Hunt's exemplaryuse of Freud in studying The Family
Romanceof the FrenchRevolution,preciouslittle attentionhas been given by his-
toriansto the problemof how to theorizeculture-in any of its manifestations.4
However,even after the culturalturn, and with it the waning hope for some
general social theory or battery of universal concepts, the problem of theory
remainsparamount.5This problemis felt all the more keenly in the study of cul-
ture. For culture itself involves meaning, and thereforerepresentation,and cul-
turalanalysis thus inevitablybringsproblemsof reflexivityand standpointto the
fore, since it necessarily involves formulatingmeanings about meanings, repre-
sentationsaboutrepresentations.The resistanceby historiansto theorizingabout
meaning yields what may seem like a comfortablepractice for culturalhistory,
but its consequenceis thatwhen any one of the multipleapproachesto the analy-
sis of meaning is deployed, any theoreticalaccount of how this is accomplished
remainsonly implicit.
Culturalhistorycan be defined as the study of culturalmeaningsin their shift-
ing temporalconnectednessto enacted social life. The challenge of the genre is
to avoid succumbingto: (1) idealism, which would reducehistory to its symbol-
ic representations;(2) historicism, which a priori refuses to countenancetheo-
rizationof patternedsocial processes; or (3) teleology, which narrateshistory in
relation to some presumed ultimate outcome. Social phenomenology offers a
basis to avoid these difficulties.It can be used to theorize multiple temporalities,
and thus breakout of the assumptionsof temporallinearityin historical writing
that have been the object of poststructural critique. A phenomenological
approachdoes not deny either the historicalspecificities of culturalmeanings or
the reflexive standpointof theory, yet nevertheless salvages the potential for
describingpatternsof culturalprocess that transcendculturally specific mean-
ings. To pursuethis approachentails positing a distinctionbetween, on the one
hand, the social actions wherein cultureis created,invoked, revised, and repro-
duced, and on the otherhand, abstractanalytic constructsthat describerelation-
ships between generic culturalmeaningsand social processes. On this basis, cul-
ture can be theorized at two different "levels"-specific cultural meanings and
generic cultural structures.6Yet this very distinctionrequiresan account of the
relationshipbetween the specific and the generic, at least if general concepts are
to have any utility.This is an enduringproblem,of course, but my hope is to cast

3. Peter Burke, Varietiesof CulturalHistory (Ithaca,N.Y., 1997).

4. Lynn Hunt, The FamilyRomance of the FrenchRevolution(Berkeley, 1992).
5. MartinJay, "ForTheory,"Theoryand Society 25 (1996), 167-183.
6. Hall, "Social Organizationand Pathways of Commitment";John R. Hall and Mary Jo Neitz,
Culture:Sociological Perspectives(EnglewoodCliffs, N.J., 1993), 11; see also Anne Kane, "Cultural
Analysis and Historical Sociology: The Analytic and ConcreteForms of the Autonomy of Culture,"
Sociological Theory9 (1991), 53-69.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURESTRUCTURES 333

it in a clear light here by use of the phenomenologicalapproach.In this essay I

will, first, locate the dual characterof culturalhistory in alternative-"intrinsic"
versus "extrinsic"-methodological approaches;second, employ a phenomenol-
ogy of time and abstractionto suggest why this differencein practicesexists; and
third,use these findings to reflect on a substantiveexample, by exploringcultur-
al histories of five contemporaryapocalypticreligious movements in relationto
a phenomenologyof temporalityand action.
In the end, my analysis reaffirmsWeber'suse of ideal types in culturalhisto-
ry, but en route I hope it will clarify the relationshipbetween two kinds of ideal
types: models of institutionalizedculturalstructuresand models of enacted cul-
turalmeanings.My largeraim is to show how historiansmight use general con-
cepts in culturalexplanationwithout sacrificingthe nuances of history.

I. INTRINSICVERSUS EXTRINSICCULTURALHISTORY

Historianstypically direct inquiry to what Max Webercalled a "historicalindi-

vidual,"thatis, events, sequences, patterns,and outcomes renderedas a relative-
ly self-containedset by identifying the principle of their meaningful coherence
(for example, "thecold war").The degree to which the meaningfulcoherence of
a historicalindividualas an object of inquiryis constitutedintrinsically(that is,
in terms of social actors'invocationsof events) or extrinsically(that is, in terms
of the historian'sown objective frame of reference),is both a philosophicalissue
and an empiricalquestion of how inquiryis carriedout. The practiceof "specif-
ic history" can be defined as investigation of an object's "intrinsic"meaning,
whereas "configurationalhistory"is directedtowardextrinsic, theoreticallycon-
structedobjects. That is, specific history is based on the verstehendeproject of
identifying sociohistoricalobjects in termsof their meaningto historicallylocat-
ed individuals who participatedin the events being emplotted. The boundary
between specific and configurationalhistory can be located by examining the
point at which it becomes difficultto arguethat an object of inquiryis constitut-
ed in relationto intrinsicmeanings.7
For questions of culture, determiningwhetherinquiryis intrinsic or extrinsic
amountsto asking whetherits object consists of individualsand groups drawing
upon, reworking,and transmittingculturalmeanings, techniques, tools, and the
like in ways that can be reconstructedthroughnarrativeplot linkages. Intrinsic
culturalhistoryis a variantof specific history thatconcentrateson socially medi-
ated historical lineages of cultural replication, innovation, and diffusion, and
their consequences in unfolding time. Culturedoes not float amorphously;it is
tied to its bearers,their predecessors,and successors. For example, in my study
of Jim Jones's Peoples Temple as an apocalypticreligious social movement that
ended in mass suicide, I traceda numberof meaningful culturalelements (such
as the idea of a "promisedland")not only in relationto their historical sources,

7. For the elaborationof this argument,see John R. Hall, Culturesof Inquiry:FromEpistemology

to Discourse in Sociohistorical Research (Cambridge,Eng., 1999), chapter3.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
334 JOHN R. HALL

but more importantly,in relationto the specific conduits by which they became
transmutedas they were adoptedwithin Peoples Temple.8The hallmarkof such
specific culturalhistories can be fixed precisely as the analysis of events held to
be interconnectedintrinsically-in action conduits of culturaltransmissionand
diffusion. By contrast,extrinsic culturalhistory does not identify such conduits
of action. Therefore,it must employ some other structuraldevice of plot, series,
or analysis to arrangea discussion of culturalobjects and practices(for example,
cultural histories of privacy in different historical epochs, sexuality over cen-
turies, dieting in heterogeneouscircumstances).9
In light of this contrast,Lynn Hunt's study of the FrenchRevolution of 1789,
Politics, Culture,and Class in the French Revolution,representsa transitional
case.10 Basically, Hunt argues that the transformationof political culture during
the French revolutionaryperiod producednew, essentially ideological, ways of
thinkingand acting.As a culturalhistory of a revolutionarymovement,the study
describes widespread changes within a short time. But Hunt does not narrate
these changes as a single coherentplot. Instead,she uses a series of hermeneutic
and structuralanalyses of specific materials,such as the writings of the Marquis
de Sade, to illustratethematicshifts in rhetoric,symbols, images, and the social
stratathatbecame politically mobilized duringthe revolutionaryperiod.In place
of a narrativethatlinks diverseevents, Huntadvancesa theoreticalmetanarrative
to link her various analyses of the revolutionarypolitical unconscious and its
social bearers.Hunt's study thus is a demonstrationthat detailed event history
can employ a metastructureof extrinsic analysis even though the phenomena
describedmight reasonablybe assertedto have intrinsic linkages. Perhapswith
richer data, Hunt would have pursued a specific history more concerned with
intrinsic linkages. In any case, her study employs a procedurethat addresses a
recurrentproblem of specific history. Often, the historical record is too thin for
inquiry to tell "whathappened"throughnarrative,even though an intrinsically
orderedplot could be constructedif adequatehistoricalevidence were available.
Under conditions of limited access to detailed information,a theoreticalmeta-
narrativeoffers an alternativenarrativestrategythat can maintainspecific histo-
ry's primacyof plot, but in a way thatbegins to approximatea differentpractice.
Use of a theoreticalmetanarrativethus marksa passage from specific to con-
figurational history, where the convergence of independenthistorical develop-
ments is theorized in a way which transcendsmeaningful connections among
events. Here, sociohistoricalmodels are constructedin relationto epochal shifts,
transitions,or transformations.Such models theorize phenomena in terms that
range in scale from world-historicalchange, such as the consolidationof indus-

8. John R. Hall, Gone from the Promised Land: Jonestown in American CulturalHistory (New
Brunswick,N.J., 1987).
9. John R. Hall, "Social Interaction,Culture,and HistoricalStudies,"in SymbolicInteractionand
CulturalStudies,ed. Michal M. McCall and HowardS. Becker (Chicago, 1990), 16-45; John R. Hall,
"TheorizingHermeneuticCulturalHistory,"in The CulturalTurn,ed. Roger Friedlandand JohnMohr
(Cambridge,Eng., forthcoming).
10. Lynn Hunt,Politics, Culture,and Class in the FrenchRevolution(Berkeley, 1984), 219.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURESTRUCTURES 335

trial capitalismor world systems, to more narrowshifts, such as the emergence

of a particularconstellation of gender roles in Brazil or the emergence of con-
sumerculturein the United States.
The differencebetweenconfigurationalhistoryandspecifichistoryis not a mat-
ter of scale but of approach.Whereasspecific historyproceedsby way of intrin-
sic narrative,configurationalhistory is concerned with extrinsic objects of
inquiry-structures and processes that may be theorized independentlyof the
intentionalactionsof particularagentsand groups.Whereasthe balanceof inquiry
in specific historyis tippedtowardusing narrativeto analyzeunfoldingsituations
as they are meaningfulto the actorsinvolved, configurationalhistory tilts toward
analyzingthe structuralinterplayof diverseevents andphenomenaand theirunin-
tended consequences.Under this dispensation,meaningfulsocial action may be
relevant to analysis, but its relevance becomes established not on the basis of
intrinsicmeaningfulconnectionsamong events, but in relationto an extrinsically
defined analyticpuzzle. In short,the object of inquiryought to be understoodas
a theoreticalconstruction.Thus, whateverthe validity of Weber'sfamous argu-
ment about the relation between the spirit of capitalism and Protestantinner-
worldly asceticism, we must understandthe characterof the argument:it is not
just about a sociohistoricalworld made meaningful by its participants;rather,
Weberpresentsus with an analyticalconstructionof historicalculturalshifts that
transcendany set of intrinsicallyinterconnectedhistoricalevents.
Specifichistoriesand configurational ones use differentways of constructingthe
historicalobject of inquiry-intrinsic versus extrinsic.This point in turnposes an
opportunityto deepenourunderstanding of the relationshipbetweentwo approaches
to studyingculture-throughintrinsic(specific-historical) versusextrinsic(configu-
rational-historical)analysis.The differencebetweenthe two approachesis centered
on culturalmeaningandhow it is to be conceptualizedon the one handin relationto
social action,andon the otherhandin relationto enduringpatternsof social life.

II. THE WEBER/SCHUTZCONFLICTOVERTHE CHARACTEROF MEANING

Much intellectualenergy has been wasted in efforts to employ structuralistcon-

cepts of social theoryin historicalanalysis withoutacknowledgingthe "contami-
nation"of structureby culture;or, to put the matterin a more optimistic frame,
withoutconceptualizingstructuresin culturalterms.The problem,as some histo-
rianshave relentlesslyinformedsocial scientists, is that social phenomenafail to
be "subsumed"under the analytic categories devised by theorists.For example,
"capitalism"is a far more variegatedphenomenonhistoricallythan can be sub-
sumed by the concept "capitalistmode of production."Perhapsthe most striking
admissionof this failureof structuralistconcepts came in the 1970s, when Barry
Hindess and Paul Hirst acknowledgedthat no purely economic theorizationof
"modesof production"was adequate.11
11. Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, Pre-CapitalistModes of Production (London, 1975); and
Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, Mode of Production and Social Formation:An Auto-Critiqueof
Pre-CapitalistModes of Production(Atlantic Highlands,N.J., 1977).

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
336 JOHN R. HALL

The alternativeto structuralistconcept-formationis an approachthat admits

historicalvariation,but analyzes empiricallyvariablesociohistoricalphenomena
in relationto what Max Webercalled ideal types. In terms of culturalmeanings,
to pursueour theme here, this approachacknowledgesthat any specific instance
of meaningis unique,but uses a batteryof typificationsto shed light on instances,
the variationsamong them, and their meaningfuland causal significance.
Yet lurkingbehindWeber'sapproachis a controversyover the problemof con-
ceptualizingmeaning, a problemraised in the 1930s by social phenomenologist
Alfred Schutz, who drew on the work on time consciousness by Edmund
Husserl.Weber'sown approachis well known. He assertedthat interpretationof
subjectively meaningful action is the cornerstoneof sociohistorical inquiry.By
way of advancingthat principle, he rejectedpsychological reductionism,social
organicism and holism, evolutionism, and idealist and materialist teleologies.
Centralto Weber'sposition was the principleof Verstehen-the observer'sinter-
pretiveunderstandingof subjectivelymeaningfulaction-as a basis both for ana-
lyzing individualaction in its concrete social context and for investigatinghis-
torically enduring"structural"social phenomena.In Weber'sview, inquiry may
drawon social and otherlaw-like generalizations,but the meaningfulaspects of
social existence also permita sort of inquirythatis unavailableto the naturalsci-
ences-understanding sociohistoricalphenomenain relation to "intentionsand
(true and false) beliefs.""2Whetheran observercan discern meanings is a sepa-
rate issue, one that depends on adequacy of data and interpretation.But for
Weber,Verstehenis not a researchmethod;it is an epistemological requirement
for sociohistoricalinquiry.
The requirementof Verstehenposed for Webera significantproblem in con-
cept-formation.He held thatconcepts aboutsocial action must evidence "adequa-
cy on the level of meaning."However,no single meaningfulaction, much less a
complex of social interaction,seems open to unambiguousrepresentation,even by
use of "meaningfullyadequate"concepts. Concepts about social action must
reflect the possibility that empirical meanings (for example, of "work")may
"shadeoff' from or mix together theoreticallyclear meanings, or indeed, may
make concreteonly half-consciousintentions.Given the complex concretesocial
interweavingsof meanings,concepts concernedwith meaningcould not drawon
the "correspondence"approach to conceptualizationfound in, for example,
physics, where all specific instances, for example, of mass or temperature,are
completely subsumedundercorrespondinggeneral concepts (here, of "mass"or
"temperature"). In order to acknowledge the potential ambiguities in empirical
meanings yet maintainunambiguousconcepts, Weber constructedconcepts by
pulling togetherclearly defined meaningfulelements of a hypotheticalconcrete
phenomenon,such as Protestant"inner-worldlyasceticism"or "charisma."Such
"idealtypes" (or sociohistoricalmodels) could be used to describeactions, situa-
tions, and patternsof association.Any given ideal type's adequacy of meaning

12. Max Weber,Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics (New York,
1975), 127.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURESTRUCTURES 337

would be attainedin theoreticalterms if the concept's elements were internally

consistentwith referenceto either "typical"culturalconstellationsof meaningor
rationally "correct"considerations.Thus, an importantmeaningful element of
"romanticlove" (a culturalconstruct)involves social trust.Similarly,rule-bound
procedureis a salientbasis of "legal-rationalbureaucracy." Weberwould not argue
thatactuallove relationshipsareequivalentto the ideal type, any morethanempir-
ical bureaucracieswill takethe form of the ideal typical"bureaucracy." Ideal types
are not based on the assertionof a correspondencebetween concept and empiri-
cal referent,and they thus have no standingby which it would make any sense to
"prove"or "disprove"them empirically.Instead,ideal types serve as meaningful-
ly specified "benchmarks"to be used interpretively,to examine the degree to
which empiricalsocial situationsapproximatetheirvarioustheoreticalaccounts.
Here,Alfred Schutz'suse of social phenomenologyto critiqueWeberbecomes
relevant.In Schutz's view, Weber'sformulationof Verstehenmoved too casually
from the problem of understandingsubjectively meaningful action to analysis
based on observed meanings. Borrowing basic conclusions from Edmund
Husserl'stranscendentalphenomenologicalanalysis of subjectiveconsciousness,
Schutz arguedthat lifeworldly meaning and action involve a temporallyunfold-
ing streamof consciousnessof a personsituatedin a concretelylocatedhere-and-
now. Schutz's phenomenology describes the relations between the temporal
streamof consciousness and the possibilities of subjectivemeaning.
To summarize, Schutz showed that Weber's concept of subjective meaning
does not refer to any simple or unambiguousevent of consciousness on a partic-
ular occasion (for example, the moment of mentally looking forwardto eating
dinner with a friend this evening). Instead, Weber's concept glosses over dis-
tinctly different ways that meaning might be formulated.In Schutz's analysis,
there are three broadpossibilities of subjectivelymeaningfulaction. It can con-
sist (1) of "the special way in which the subject attendsto his [sic] lived experi-
ence" in the here-and-now(for example, the complex moment-to-momentactiv-
ity of chopping wood). In more formed-up ways, the subjective meaning of
action is either (2) directed toward action in relation to a goal projectedto be
accomplishedin the future-in which case meaning takes the form of an "in-
order-tomotive" (chopping wood to lay in a supply of fuel); or (3) directed
towarddevelopinga retrospectiveaccountof the genetic events that led up to an
already-completedaction-in which case meaning is given througha "because
motive"(choppingwood because of receiving a requestto do so).13For the act-
ing subject,even in relationto "the same"events, meaningis unstable,contextu-
al, and dependenton temporalperspective.It may refer to the particularambi-
ence with which an individuallives throughexperience,to the meaning given to
action in relation to the future, or to the constructionof genetic accounts of
events "afterthe fact" and withoutreferenceto goals or anticipatedoutcomes. In
all such possibilities, meanings are constitutedand actions initiatedin temporal-

13. Alfred Schutz, ThePhenomenologyof the Social World[1932] (Evanston,II., 1967), 215 (quo-
tation), 86-95.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
338 JOHN R. HALL

ly unfolding lifeworldly momentsin specific places, in relationto specific other

people and objects.
According to Schutz, each person makes subjectivemeaning richly and more
or less continuouslyin the flow of everydayexperienceand action-directed not
only to the immediatepresent,but also to anticipatedfutures, to memories, and
to dreamsand fantasies.Each person is simultaneouslyorientedas both an actor
and an observer, interpretingexperienceby referenceto his or her own stock of
knowledge. Meaningful cognition is thus a complexly orchestratedmelange of
differentmental acts in the course of unfolding life. However,analytically,three
component frames of reference of these acts can be identified: (1) the social
actor's lifeworldorientationas "author"or "agent"in the conductof life through
meaningfulsocial action and interaction;(2) an observer's lifeworld orientation
that seeks to apprehendoriginal ("subjective")meanings held by other social
actors in their own situations;and (3) an observer's objective orientation that
apprehendssocial and other phenomenavia some interpretationalmatrix avail-
able to the individualthrougha general stock of knowledge-for example, reli-
gious norms, historical memory, psychoanalyticinterpretation,business proce-
dures,political ideology, and on and on (see table 1).14
FRAME OF REFERENCE
Social actor's Observer's Observer's
Lifeworld Lifeworld Objective
Orientation Orientation Orientation

TYPE OF Subjective Observer's Observer's

MEANING Meaning Subjective Interpretationof
Interpretation Meaning in
ObjectiveContext
Table 1. Types of meaning produced via alternative frames of reference.15

Importantly,Schutz's phenomenologydoes not apply only to social actorsand

events that are the objects of inquiry:inquiryitself is faced with the same array
of interpretiveframes. The objective frame of reference, informedby manifold
objective analytic schema, yields multiple possibilities for both objective analy-
sis of meaningas well as non-meaningfulanalysis. In addition,Schutz identified
an alternativeapproach:the observermay try to look "behind"the externalized
action as object to learnaboutthe subjectivemeaning of an action, "themeaning
context within which the productstandsor stood in the mind of the producer."'6
What is the differencebetween observers'subjectiveversus objective interpreta-
tions? Recall Schutz's identification of subjective meaning about action as a
mental event within an inner temporally unfolding stream of consciousness.
Because subjectively meaningful action is temporallystructured,any adequate
typificationof it must specify how it is formed within an individual'stemporal

14. Ibid.;Alfred Schutz, Reflectionson the Problem of Relevance (New Haven, 1970).
15. Hall, Cultutesof Inquity, 18.
16. Schutz, Phenomenology, 133.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURESTRUCTURES 339

streamof consciousness. Three broad alternativetypificationscan be identified

as kinds of temporalizedsubjectivemeaningalreadydescribed:(1) the "ambient"
meanings that comprise paying-attention-to-the-worldin the here-and-now;(2)
meaning in the context of an "in-order-tomotive"; and (3) reflected meaning
given as a "becausemotive"or genesis of an action.
On the basis of the typology given in Table 1, it should be possible to identify
the referenceframe, and hence type of meaning, of any concept used in inquiry.
Religious ritual,industrialproduction,love, and war all takeplace within the life-
world throughsocial enactmentsand the operationsof their products(for exam-
ple, machinesand computers).Insofaras sociohistoricalconcepts are orientedto
lifeworldly interpretation,we may expect them to describe patternsof interplay
amongdifferentkinds of subjectivetemporalhorizons,knowledge, meaning,and
action on the parts of (typified or actual) people located in socially organized
places. With this standard,it should be possible to clarify the status of concepts
such as those that refer to instrumentalrational action, charisma,bureaucracy,
and sociohistorical objects like medieval European monasticism, patrimonial
capitalism,fascism, and so on.
To the degree that a given conceptualization(itself an atemporalabstraction)
entails a lifeworldlyobserver'sorientationtowardmeaningfulaction, an elabora-
tion of it shouldbe capableof describinga distinctivetemporallymeaningfullife-
worldly situation.The empiricalpossibilities of meaningful(as opposed to objec-
tive) temporalityare obviously diverse.Nevertheless,theirrange can be suggest-
ed by four ideal types that identify basic phenomenologicalpossibilities of life-
worldly temporality.First, a phenomenologicalsynchronictemporalorientation
refersto thatfull presenttime of the lifeworldly"here-and-now"-as the locus of
individual and collective attention to the world within immediate perceptual
reach.Second, a diachronicorientationde-emphasizesthe here-and-nowin favor
of a combined reproductionfrom sedimentedmemory of the past and anticipa-
tion of the future.With the historicaldevelopmentof temporalmeasurement,the
diachronicorientationincreasinglyinvokes objective temporalstandardssuch as
the calendar and clock as external analogues to subjectively meaningfully
diachrony,and temporalitybecomes ever more rationalized and diffused into
everydayexistence as a "commodity"that can be "saved"and "spent."The two
other ideal typical temporalorientationsderive, respectively,from emphasis on
the futureand the past. The thirdis the strategic temporalorientationthat comes
into play in totally goal-directedaction:an anticipatedfuturedefines the meaning
of presentaction. In strategictime, social actors seek to build upon or respondto
events. In the fourthorientation,the presentis meaningfullyorientedtowardthe
past;eternaltime becomes constructedas a mythicalenduringrealitythat attains
an abstractcharacterof timeless re-creation,"now and forevermore."17
Even thoughempiricalsociohistoricalphenomenaare more complex than any
ideal type, ideal types provide conceptual tools for theorizing about them. In
termsof the distinctionthat I made earlier-between culturalmeanings and cul-

17. JohnR. Hall, The WaysOut: Utopian CommunalGroupsin an Age of Babylon (Boston, 1978).

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
340 JOHN R. HALL

turalstructures-because lifeworldly meaning is inherentlytemporalin its con-

structionof social action in relationto past, present, and future (as Husserl and
Schutz showed), concepts of cultural structurethat are well founded should
reflect temporal structuresof lifeworldly meaning. Any concept intended to
describe culturallystructuredpatternsof social life (as opposed to abstractcul-
turalsymbols, binaryoppositions, and so on) should be open to phenomenolog-
ical assessment of its meaning-adequacyby examining whether it describes an
(abstracted)temporallystructuredconstitutionof meanings in the lifeworld. To
take one example, the historicaldevelopmentof diachronymay be tracedin rela-
tion to the subjectiveand institutionaltemporalitiesof capitalism-specifically,
the "elective affinity"between a capitalist process of productionthat depends
increasinglyon routinized,repetitiveactivity,and a subjectivetemporalorienta-
tion embodiedin Protestantinner-worldlyasceticism.18A differentprojectof the-
orizing historicity might explore how the continuities of a diachronicallyorga-
nized social world are "shot throughwith chips of Messianic time," as Walter
Benjaminso aptlyput it.19It is this latterexample thatI will now pursue,by look-
ing at the problem of how to account for "mass suicide" in messianic religious
movementsof the past quarter-century.

III. CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURALSTRUCTURES

IN THE STUDY OF MASS SUICIDE

One of the enduringproblemsof social science concernshow to decide when two

cases are the same or differentwith respectto a given dimension.A study of reli-
gious violence that I and my coauthors recently completed, Apocalypse
Observed,suggests that "mass suicide" is not really a coherent "thing."Rather,
there is complex varietyto extremereligious violence.20
Under these analytic circumstances, close comparativeexamination of the
majorrecentcases where significantviolence occurredoffers an alternativeboth
to the historicistrefusal of generalizationsand to general social theorizing that
fails to acknowledgeinterdependenceand social complexity.Ratherthan simply
comparingcases as whole entities, close comparativeinquiry searches for what
ArthurStinchcombehas called "deep analogies"of processes at work in multi-
ple cases, while avoiding generalizing from single instances or cases that have
mutuallyinfluencedone another.21Takingthis tack, our culturalanalysis of the
meanings attachedto collective religious violence moved inexorably toward a
strikingconclusion about the violence that we examined, one that would prove
elusive to any nonculturalanalysis thathypostatized"violence"versus "absence
18. Ibid., 40-42; cf. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York,
1958); E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline,and IndustrialCapitalism,"Past and Present 38
(1967), 56-97.
19. WalterBenjamin,"Theseson the Philosophy of History"[1955], in Illuminations,ed. Hannah
Arendt(New York 1969), 263.
20. John R. Hall, Philip D. Schuyler, and Sylvaine Trinh, Apocalypse Observed: Religious
Movementsand Violencein NorthAmerica, Europe,and Japan (London,2000).
21. ArthurL. Stinchcombe,TheoreticalMethods in Social History (New York, 1978).

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURESTRUCTURES 341
of violence" as the "dependentvariable"and comparedviolent to nonviolentout-
comes. Even though the five cases of extreme religious violence-four of them
ending in collective suicides-bear a superficialresemblanceto one another,two
differentprocesses seem to be at work in them ratherthan one.
Recently, social scientists have made much of what historians have long
known-that social processes are "contingent"and "pathdependent":what hap-
pens at any given point affects the range of futurepossibilities. Often "culture"
is invokedas influentialin the play of contingency.In makingsuch a claim, how-
ever, it is importantto avoid the old-fashionednotion of Cultureas some sort of
primordialessence thatcan be invokedin reductionistculturalexplanations(that
substitutefor reductioniststructuralistones). But how might this trapof contin-
gent culturalreductionismbe avoided?
The approachI am proposing depends on fleshing out the distinctionI posed
earlierbetween concreteculturalmeanings and abstractedgeneric culturalstruc-
tures. Culturalmeanings are the invented,received, synthesized, reworked,and
otherwiseimprovisedidea-patternsby which individualsand social groupsattach
significanceto theiractions. In a social group,such culturalmeaningsare neither
monolithicnor immutable,and they are specific in theircontentand sources.The
idea of "revolutionarysuicide" invoked at Jonestown,for instance, was neither
an invention of Peoples Temple nor a generic construct available from some
Storehouseof WesternCulture.It had a specific genealogy thattracedfrom Huey
Newton's doctrineformulatedin the Black PantherPartyof the 1960s.22
But beyond situated cultural meanings, it is possible to ask whether events
such as the mass suicide of Peoples Temple involved generic culturalstructures
thatundergirdthe specific meaningsat work.When we do so, by focusing on the
range of culturalmeanings associated with the apocalypse and with mysticism,
it becomes apparentthat certain "culturallogics" are associated with religious
violence. Cultureis not simply a function of the historicalplay of contingency,
much less a randomphenomenon.Nor is it primordialessence. Yet as Max Weber
arguednearly a centuryago, coherentpatternsof culturecan have causal social
significance.23When these patternedlogics have identifiablegeneric featuresthat
encompassdiverselysituatedculturalmeanings,we can call them "culturalstruc-
tures."In culturallystructuredsituations where meanings parallel one another,
events play out in enacted dramaswith remarkablysimilarplots.
In the study of religious violence, I and my co-authors initially proposed a
general model that explained mass suicide as the outcome of an escalating con-
flict between (1) a solidary religious sect already organized internally on the
basis of apocalypticideas, and (2) an alliance of ideological detractorsof "cults"
within the society at large.24In this scenario,the autonomyand legitimacy of an
apocalypticsect is seriously threatenedas a consequence of escalating conflict
with external opponents. Once we acknowledge that violence may take many

22. Hall, Schuyler,and Trinh,Apocalypse Observed,chapter 1.

23. Weber,The ProtestantEthic.
24. Hall, Schuyler,and Trinh, Apocalypse Observed, 10-13.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
342 JOHN R. HALL

forms, not always resulting in physical injury,25it becomes obvious that oppo-
nents sometimesact violently themselves, occasionally threateningthe very abil-
ity of the religiousmovementto persist.Underthese conditions,the sect unleash-
es a response of deadly violence.
In the analysis of Apocalypse Observed,this model comes close to a generic
descriptionof what happenedat Jonestown,in the conflagrationat Waco, and, in
a somewhatdifferentway, with Aum Shinrikybin Japan.It also brings to light
importantfactorsnecessary to any explanationof the initial murdersand collec-
tive suicide of the groupcalled the SolarTemple,in Quebec and Switzerland.Of
course, genealogical connections exist among these episodes, as well as striking
differences.Most notable among the differences,Aum directedits violence only
towardinternaldissentersand externalopponents,never pursuingan act of col-
lective suicide.Anotherimportantvariationcame in the case of the SolarTemple,
where the murdersand collective suicide only occurredmore than a year after a
dramaticconfrontationbetween the group and external opponents. These are
importantdifferences.They seem, however,like ones of degree ratherthankind.
Jonestown,MountCarmel,Aum Shinrikyo,and the initial murdersand ritualsui-
cide of the Solar Temple are all analogic variationson one culturalstructure-
apocalyptic religious warfare.
The different ways in which the warring apocalypse played out in these
episodes have a great deal to do with how the groups construed the temporal
meanings of their relationshipsto the apocalypse. For Peoples Temple, Jones-
town was to have been their heaven on earth,where its memberscould develop
their socialist utopia without the direct interferenceof a capitaliststate. Yet this
post-apocalyptictableau was never established free of the conflicts with their
opponents.In effect, the leadershipat Jonestownfinally unleashed a murderous
act against those opponents,carriedout in the pre-apocalypticstrategictime of
war.Then they departedfrom theirpromisedland-in collective death.
The scenariofor the BranchDavidians at Mount Carmel was similar,but the
Davidians never presumedto escape the Apocalypse. Rather,they intended to
survive it, defending themselves against enemies duringthe last days, if neces-
sary,so thatthey could inheritthe earthlykingdom of God and replenishit with
His chosen people. Like Peoples Temple,the Davidiansmobilized for apocalyp-
tic struggle,but in this struggletheirdirectopponents-the BATFand the FBI-
unleashed what really did look like a holy war against them. In the minds of
many people, the Branch Davidians were victims as well as perpetratorsof
extremeviolence.
As for Aum Shinrikyb,although they had a broad stratumof members who
expectedto achieve a post-apocalypticstateof grace, the centralleadershipof the
organizationtook a far more militant approachto apocalyptic war than either
Peoples Temple or the Branch Davidians. Ratherthan entertainingthe conceit
thatthey had escaped the Apocalypse or were simply preparingto survive it, the

25. Mary Jackman, "Violence and Legitimacy in ExpropriativeIntergroupRelations,"in The

Psychologyof Legitimacy,ed. JohnT. Jost and BrendaMajor(Cambridge,Eng., forthcoming).

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURESTRUCTURES 343

principalsof Aum took the firstsign of oppositionas the basis for initiatingapoc-
alyptic war themselves.Whatat firstwas aimed againstany opponentswho stood
in their way eventually became a grotesquelyquixotic attemptto create a soci-
etal disasteron an apocalypticscale.
By comparisonwith any of these episodes, the Solar Temple embarkedon its
original "Departure"under a more complex hybrid of meanings than the line
connecting pre-apocalypticwar and post-apocalypticgrace. On the one hand,
their theology of soul migrationhad long preparedthem for the possibility of a
"Transit"to eternitythathad a mystical cast. On the otherhand, this Transitwas
framedin millennialistand apocalypticterms,keyed both to survivingthe end of
the second millenniumand to the ecological apocalypseof the planet.Yet beyond
mystical Transit and apocalyptic survivalism, there were specific incidents of
conflict with opponents-a gun sting operation,media exposes, and subsequent
governmentinvestigations,and the SolarTemplarsclearly undertookmurderand
collective suicide in October 1994 in relationto these conflicts.
Despite importantdifferences in timing, intensity, and circumstance, all of
these four episodes in one way or anotherapproximatewarringapocalypticreli-
gious conflict, markedby a sect's apocalypticideology and externalconflict with
culturalopponents,hostile media, and the state in strategictime. The distinctive
characterof such conflict can be found by contrastingthese cases with two sub-
sequentcollective suicides of SolarTemplars-at the winter solstice of 1995 and
the spring equinox of 1997-and the 1997 deaths of Do (ne MarshallApple-
white) and his Heaven's Gate followers at Rancho Santa Fe, California.In nei-
ther the second or third Solar Temple collective suicide nor Heaven's Gate was
any violence directed outward.Thus, outward extreme violence, typically fol-
lowed by collective suicide, can be taken as the hallmarkof the first four inci-
dents-of apocalypticreligious war.
What, then, of the second and third Solar Temple suicides and the Heaven's
Gate deaths?These episodes hardlylacked apocalypticelements, and all of them
resultedin unnaturaldeath. But the elements were composed in a differentcon-
stellationthan apocalypticreligious conflict. What was it?
The mystical theology of the SolarTempleprovidesa clue. This theology sug-
gested the possibility of journeyingback and forthbetween eternityand the tem-
poral world, and it theorized that doing so dependedon aligning with key uni-
versal forces of energy,themselves mappedonto earthlytemporalcycles marked
by the Apocalypse as the moment of a critical shift between one earthlytempo-
ral era and another.However,there was nothing in this theology that requireda
war either to survive the onslaught of civilization's decay or to produce the tri-
umph of good. Cosmic forces assured the transition,and those who harnessed
those forces throughritual could transcendany merely human apocalypse. The
only earthlyproblemthatbelievers faced was escaping the clutches of the wider
society. And this, indeed, was a central motif duringthe days and months after
the initial Solar Temple transitin October 1994. In reflecting on the second and
third transitsin June 1997, Vivienne Giacobino, the former wife of one of the

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
people murderedat Cheiry, Switzerland,speculated that the participantsin the
second and thirdtransitsmight have taken their own lives both because with the
stigma of the first transit,after October 1994 there was no place for them in the
wider society, and further,because, amid rumorsabout more suicides, they felt
hemmed in by police surveillanceof the sect and occasional roundupsof mem-
bers. Pursuedby adversarieswho might interfere,the participantsin the second
and thirdtransitsdid not engage in any outwardlydirectedviolence. Instead,they
acted out a narrativeof escape, making the ritual voyage that they had been
taughtwould take them across the barrierfrom this world to eternity.
The parallels between the Solar Temple and Heaven's Gate are striking. In
effect, both offered space-age versions of a salvation story dominant in the
Western cultural tradition,in which a prophet appears to redeem believers by
showing them the path to rebirthinto a promisedland beyond the travailsof this
world. Both groups invoked the possibility of moving beyond earthlyexistence
into an eternaltranscendence,and both settled on a space voyage as the device
of transition. Both groups offered metaphysical notions of the relationship
between time and eternity,but in neithercase did they pursuea programof med-
itation within a mystical association that transcendsthis world throughenlight-
enmentwhile remainingphysically in it. Instead,in both groupsthe mystical idea
of transcendencewas mappedonto apocalypticmotifs of passage from this world
to the beyond. Redemptionrequireddeparturefrom Earthby beings whose con-
sciousness was alien to it. In both groups, believers received informationabout
the windows of opportunityfor makingthis journeybeyond the fallen world-in
the Solar Temple from a redeeming mystagogue, and in Heaven's Gate from a
savior-teacher.
Finally,in both groupstherewas an apocalypticnarrativeof escape. This motif
is obvious in the second and third Solar Temple departures,whose participants
took elaboratesteps to elude the efforts of authoritiesand other outsiders seek-
ing to preventfurtherritualTransitdeaths.But the same motif of flight operated
over a much more extendedtime in the grouparoundDo and his partnerTi (who
died a naturaldeathsome years before the collective suicide at RanchoSantaFe).
Early on, Bo and Peep (as they called themselves at the time) had feared that
assassinationand what they called "theDemonstration"might come too soon-
before they could "harvest"all the "ripefruit."The subsequentmodus operandi
over the entire history of the group was to act out a departurefrom this world
based on extreme ascetic self-perfectionas a demonstrationof readiness.As the
followers workedto preparethemselves for the voyage, they kept moving, avoid-
ing any entanglementswith the world, staying one step aheadof any pursuitthat
might interfere with their religious quest. Their final flight came, like the first
SolarTempleTransit,at a time when the world was deemed not receptiveto their
message, leaving them no furtherwork to accomplishon Earth.Travellingto the
Next EvolutionaryLevel Above Human,they left behind their human "contain-
ers" and the world dominatedby the Luciferians.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURESTRUCTURES 345

My co-authorsand I began our study of apocalypticreligious violence think-

ing that there was only one pathwayof apocalypticreligious violence. Extreme
acts such as murderand collective suicide would only occur in a countercultural
sect thatlashed out in an apocalypticholy war againstthe putativeforces of evil,
namely, their own opponents.It is now apparent,however, that neither the later
Solar Temple Transitsnor the voyage to Heaven's Gate fit this model. Instead,
these episodes involved a mystical apocalypseof deathlytranscendencein which
flight from the Apocalypse on Earththroughthe ritualizedpractice of collective
suicide supposedly would achieve other-worldlygrace. As these events show,
flight from externaloppositioncan become a strongfixationwithin a group,even
when real opponentsare lacking, or ineffectual.These cases of minimal or only
imagined opposition are not apocalypticwar. Instead, they chart a second path-
way of religious violence. In this cultural structure-mystical apocalyptic
death-ideas of eternal transcendence through ecstasy or inner illumination
become mediated by an apocalyptic theology of time. Themes of escape from
pursuitand escape from this world bear apocalypticovertones that align mysti-
cal transcendencewith death in this life and rebirthin another.
Collective religious suicide is not a singularsocial phenomenonwith parallel
dynamics in all cases. Rather,two alternativeculturalstructuresmark different
social processes thatresultin the "same"outcome of collective death.To be sure,
not all apocalypticallytinged mysticism ends in suicidal escape, any more than
conflict between an apocalypticgroup, culturalopponents,media, and the state
necessarilyspiralsinto murderand suicidalmartyrdom.In this light, the two tem-
porally specified apocalyptic cultural structuresare interpretivemodels rather
thancausal explanations.Nevertheless,the commonalitiesamong the episodes of
religious violence that we examined are striking.All five of them approximate
one or the other (or both) of the cultural structures-those of apocalyptic reli-
gious warfareand mystical apocalyptic death. By its own distinctive pathway,
each heightens the potentialfor extremereligious violence.

IV. CONCLUSION

The possibilities of meaningful social action, organization,and process, I have

argued,are bound up with the actions of conscious subjects who live "in"time
but simultaneouslyconstructtime by the ways in which they pay attentionto, and
live in relationto, the immediatepresent,the past, and anticipatedfutures.26Their
deploymentsof culturein the course of social action dependupon the invocation,
elaboration,and revision of one or more meaningful scripts, myths, traditions,
stories, accounts, and scenarios about who we are, what we are doing, and why.
Culturein enactmentthus involves situatedmeanings constructedpartlyin rela-
tion to culturalmeanings which by diverse routes have become diffused into the
lifeworlds of social actors.

26. For a more generalaccount of enacted time in relationto history,see John R. Hall, "TheTime
of History and the History of Times,"History and Theory 19 (1980), 113-131.

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
346 JOHN R. HALL

Sociohistoricalinquirycan aspireto describethese situatedculturalmeanings,

theirsources, and theircausal and culturalsignificance.But it can also engage in
a second task-of describingtypical culturalstructuresof social action, organi-
zation, and process. Phenomenologically,these typificationsof culturalstructure
can be assessed as to their internalmeaning-adequacyby determiningwhether
they reflect social constructionsof temporalityin lifeworldlyaction. In turn,ver-
stehende analysis can describe dynamic processes in unfolding time that ensue
from one or more playings-outof culturalscripts in relationto lifeworldly con-
ditions. The "warringapocalypse"of religious conflict and the "mysticalapoca-
lypse" of deathly transcendenceare two examples of cultural structures,con-
structed on the basis of more fundamentalphenomenological considerations
about (1) the lifeworldly structuresof temporality,and (2) fundamentallyalter-
native social constructionsof reality.27
The extremelyunusualcharacterof the events theorizedby these sociohistori-
cal models demonstratesthe potential for theorizing even highly contingent
sociohistoricalphenomena.Dependingon the degree of theirdiffusion,reinvoca-
tion throughhistoricalmemory,or independentdevelopment,culturalstructures
may come into play only rarely,or they may establishenduringpathwaysof cul-
turally infused social patterns,emerging across diverse civilizational contexts.
But no matterwhethertheirrange is wide or narrow,culturalstructuresdescribe
schematicsociohistoricalpatternsthatshapesocial actionsinsofaras social actors
animatethem by way of existentialculturalmeanings.It is in partfor this reason
that models of culturalstructuresare necessarily "ideal"types. With meanings,
thereis always the potentialfor nuance,for "shadingoff," and for the incorpora-
tion of more than one "culturallogic" within any given social situation.
Ideal types thus are at best "benchmarks"as GuentherRoth called them, use-
ful for comparativeanalysis with situated,culturallyspecific sociohistoricalfor-
mations.28They thereforeshould not be confused with transhistoricalsociologi-
cal concepts such as Georg Simmel's "forms"of social interaction(for example,
the party,the dyad, or the secret), which may be deployed in efforts to identify
non-culturalstructuralregularitiesin sociohistoricalpatterns.29The conceptual-
ization of culturalstructuresin sociohistoricalinquiryoffers an opportunitythat
is not availableto formal structuralismalone-the possibility of examininghow
situated meanings structuresocial action in organizationally,processually, and
institutionallypatternedways. As Webershowed in a differentcontext-when he
theorizedphenomenasuch as bureaucracyandthe routinizationof charisma-the
concept of a "culturalstructure"implies that culturedoes not operateas a Geist
in some materialvacuum.30Rather,the play of events in relationto culturalstruc-

27. Hall, The WaysOut, 10-14.

28. GuentherRoth, "Sociological Typology and HistoricalExplanation,"in ReinhardBendix and
GuentherRoth, Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber(Berkeley, 1971), 109-128;
GuentherRoth, "Historyand Sociology in the Workof Max Weber,"British Journal of Sociology 27
(1976), 306-318.
29. Hall, Culturesof Inquiry,chapter4.
30. Max Weber,Economyand Society, ed. GuentherRoth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, 1978).

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 CULTURALMEANINGSAND CULTURESTRUCTURES 347

tures is in partshapedby realities such as the social careerinterestsof individu-

als, the instability of extraordinarysocial demands in the face of daily human
needs and interests,and the passing of generations.
Analysis of culturalstructureswill never achieve the transhistoricalgenerality
that positivists once proclaimed (and to which neo-positivists still aspire).
Because concepts of culturalstructuretheorizemeaningfulcontent,they lack the
transhistoricalgeneralityof purely formal concepts, and they are thus limited in
the ranges of their relevance. However, culturalrelevance is an importantvalue
informinginquiry;furthermore,the rangeof relevanceof a give culturalstructure
(for example,bureaucracy)can be quite broad.Thus, lack of transhistoricalgen-
erality is not the curse that the positivists sought to avoid. Using ideal types of
culturalstructures-such as the apocalypticones I have describedhere-makes
it possible to theorize patternedways in which social processes saturatedwith
generic meaningsplay out. Explanationin culturalhistory may therebyaspireto
something more than culturalhistoricism. It can seek to understandboth local
meanings and theirdialecticalinterplaywith more generalsocioculturalprocess-
es theorizedas culturalstructures.

Universityof California,Davis

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 18:34:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions