PA/PHIL 323: Environmental Ethics

Fall 2019
Second Writing Assignment
Diego Marquez
I. Introduction
Climate change is a global issue that is constantly debated whether it even exist, the severity

of it, or whether we as humans can even prevent it from getting worse. This bring up the question of

if we can mitigate the severity of it, do we as individuals have a moral obligation based on virtue to

reduce greenhouse gas emissions? This paper will talk about the points made by two different

authors, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Marion Hourdequin, and the position they take on the issue.

As well as my personal opinion on the matter and whether one author has a better argument than the

other.

II. Sinnott-Armstrong’s Argument

If we as individuals have certain moral obligations in regards to climate change, we don’t

know why we should have them or what they even are. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong starts his argument

by identifying certain assumptions which he believes are mostly accurate but not certain. Some of the

examples of these assumptions are first, that global warming is a reality and is likely to increase over

the next few decades or more. Second, a significant amount of global warming is caused by humans

and the amount of greenhouse gases we emit. Third, global warming will create problems over a long

term by causing climate changes. He goes on to mention eight total assumptions but wraps up his

assumptions on the fact that United States has produced a good majority of the problem while they

are also the most able to create a solution and that if they start to adapt, other countries will follow

their lead closely. In other words, Sinnott-Armstrong believes that individual moral responsibility for

producing emissions must be grounded in a defensible moral principle, although in his opinion, he

believes there is no substantial argument supporting that.

 A key takeaway from his assumptions is that governments are morally responsible to solve

certain problems but that does not prove that an individual is equally responsible to help solve that

problem, even if that said government fails. So, it is not clear what obligations individuals have in

this regard. He uses an example of a bridge starting to deteriorate, the government has a moral

obligation to make the bridge safe. If they fail in that duty does that responsibility fall on the

individual to help fix the cracks in the bridge, even though the individual contributes to the

deterioration by driving over it? His answer is no because the government ought to fix the bridge.

Another example he uses is that the government ought to teach children arithmetic, if they fail in

teaching that does that responsibility now fall on the individual? He believes that example shows the

different scenarios in which if the government fails in their duties, sometimes as an individual you

should fill in, and sometimes you should not.

That’s where global warming starts to be compared and he uses another example scenario to

help the reader understand the point being made. His example is wasteful driving. In this scenario he

talks about driving an SUV for a joyride on a sunny Sunday afternoon. He then asks the question if it

is morally acceptable to drive in such circumstances, even though the individual will gain nothing but

pleasure from the experience. His argument for believing that it is not a moral obligation to not drive

if it isn’t necessary stems from his belief that we need a certain principle to be applied to explain why

wasteful driving is morally wrong. The first principle he discusses whether certain action causes

harm to others. Sinnott-Armstrong writes, “One plausible principle refers to causing harm. If one

person had to inhale all of the exhaust from my car, this would harm him and give me a moral

obligation not to drive my car just for fun” (Sinnott-Armstrong 297). Such a case suggests the harm

principle, Sinnott-Armstrong states this principle as, “We have a moral obligation not to perform an

act that causes harm to others” (Sinnott-Armstrong 297). In other words, one should not go on rides

for fun if it is believed that in doing so, one would cause harm to others by possibly getting one sick
by your own car’s exhaust. Although that act indirectly harms others as long as it wasn’t your

intention to go out and hurt other by conducting such an action. This leads us to another important

principle being the indirect harm principle which states that, “We have a moral obligation not to

perform an act that causes harm to others indirectly by causing someone to carry out acts that cause

harm to others” (Sinnott-Armstrong 299-300). He further elaborates on the idea of this principle by

stating one could be influenced by the actions of another which in turn, could cause harm to more

people. For example, you go on a joyride in your gas-guzzling SUV which serves no purpose but

your own pleasure. Somebody that knows you sees or hears about that decides that’s a good idea and

starts to do the same thing. When you were doing that you had not anticipated your actions to

convince others to do the same which explains why you’re indirectly harming others by creating

more situations where greenhouse gases are emitted. Sinnott-Armstrong describes these two

previously mentioned principles as Actual act principles.

Walter goes on to describe more than 10 other moral principles that can be applied to certain

situations and or perspectives which he separates in categories of Internal, Collective, and

Counterfactual principles. The internal principles are heavily based on Kantian ideas and individual

ideas that have to do with treating other merely as a means or whether they’re harming others or not

by their actions. The Collective principles have to do mainly with what is acceptable morally as a

society not just as an individual such as the legal system. The Counterfactual principles are mainly

about what would happen in possible worlds that are not actual, in other words a hypothetical.

His conclusion in his argument is that even if individuals do not have moral obligations not to

waste gas or unnecessarily put more CO2 in the air by taking joyrides for no reason, governments

have certain moral obligations to help mitigate climate change because they can actually make a

difference on a large scale. He goes on to write, “My fundamental point has been that global

warming is such a large problem that it is not individuals who cause it or who need to fix it. Instead,
governments need to fix it, and quickly” (Sinnott-Armstrong 312). Discovering a real solution

whether temporary or permanent, is ultimately the task of governments to solve this large-scale issue

while the job of the individual or environmentalist is to make sure our governing bodies are actually

doing their job to mitigate this global phenomenon. Finding and implementing a real solution is the

task of governments.

III. Hourdequin’s Argument

Going into the next part of this essay, Marion Hourdequin draws a strong contrast to the ideas

proposed by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Her argument is split up into four part being an intro and

conclusion, a point touching on Johnson’s argument over the tragedy of the commons, and a

discussion for integrity as a ground for an obligation to reduce personal emissions. Before she gets to

her conclusion she talks about Confucianism and collective action. She starts off by comparing

Sinnott-Armstrong’s and Baylor Johnson’s views on climate change and how they argue that under

certain circumstance individuals are not morally obligated to reduce their own greenhouse gas

emissions. Hourdequin states, “Johnson argues that climate change has the structure of a tragedy of

the commons, and that there is no unilateral obligation to reduce emissions in a common”

(Hourdequin 443). She then goes on to mention how she will discuss moral integrity and Confucian

conceptions to offer an analysis of the collective action/tragedy of the commons. Although we as

individuals have moral obligations to work towards a collective agreement in combating climate

change, it’s also true that individuals have an obligation to reduce their own personal emissions for as

infinitesimal as they may be, they are still contributing to the problem.

When going through Johnson’s argument, Hourdequin touches on the fact that he and

Sinnott-Armstrong both deny that there in personal obligation in reducing emissions. Although in

Johnson’s argument, a certain theoretical ground is placed in order to reestablish that lack of personal

obligation. She then goes on to say that between the two arguments, Sinnott-Armstrong’s is far from
decisive and Johnson’s is more instructive. She explains by stating that Johnson does delve into the

idea of why climate change ought to be understood as a collective action and why it doesn’t

necessarily translate into personal obligations. Johnson argues that it would be unethical to sacrifice

well-being or self interest in the unilateral effort to reduce emissions. The main point of her counters

towards Johnson’s and Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments is that nevertheless it is wrong to commit acts

that produce greenhouse gases because no matter how small a certain act may be, it is still

contributing to the problem even if that particular act causes no immediate harm to an individual. She

then goes on to consider whether there is a reason to reduce personal emissions even if the argument

that individual acts will change nothing is true.

In the section talking about how integrity can be used as a ground for an obligation to reduce

personal emissions, she believes that Sinnott-Armstrong and Johnson both lack integrity because they

both agree that there should be something done to mitigate climate change in a collective effort.

According to Hourdequin, that idea itself is hypocritical or lacks integrity because in reducing

personal emissions, one is also contributing to the collective action of mitigating climate change. She

then goes on to discuss that integrity is a virtue and uses integrity as a characteristic people desire of

their politicians. Hourdequin mentions integrity, “Integrity is a virtue for both intrapersonal and

interpersonal reasons” (Hourdequin 451). At the intrapersonal level it is a virtue based on it

acknowledging certain benefits and integrating that into a whole collective idea. At the interpersonal

level, Hourdequins quotes, “Interpersonally, integrity is a virtue from the perspective of

intersubjective intelligibility and in affirming to others the authenticity of one's commitments”

(Hourdequin 451). Hourdequin mentions the indirect harm principle and her defense against that is

developing a relational Confucian model of a person. She believes that the Confucian perspective

supports the idea that individuals are personally obligated to reduce one's emissions. Hourdequin

concludes her argument by stating again the argument of Sinnott-Armstrong and Johnson that there is
no personal obligation in reducing emissions and then stating that she believes personal reductions

can make a difference to mitigate climate change, hence there is an obligation. Although there is an

obligation, she mentions that in order to be most effective, we may need to conceptualize people

relationally.

IV. Personal Position

After thoroughly reading and going through each argument, I personally believe that the

argument Hourdequin brings to the table to more applicable to our current climate change situation.

For me, it seemed counterintuitive to not view one’s own personal emissions as a contribution to the

problem. Yes, Sinnott-Armstrong is right when he mentioned that me driving my car may not

directly harm others, in usual circumstances, but it doesn’t make sense to me to rule that action out as

part of the problem. Yes, I also agree with Sinnott-Armstrong when he mentions ideas such as

collective efforts to engage with politicians who could actually make policies that could significantly

reduce emissions. However, my biggest reason for agreeing with Hourdequin in that we do have

personal obligations to reduce carbon emissions stems from her argument that the other two authors

act hypocritically when they say we must do something as a collective action to mitigate climate

change but if we do things individually nothing will get done. Where the truth of the matter is that

nothing will be accomplished if we sit and wait other to do something as well. I think it obvious that

government intervention could significantly reduce emission more than any certain individual would,

but government intervention cannot happen overnight, nor can we get all our politicians to even

agree that climate change is happening. So, before that can happen, a certain culture of mitigation

needs to be created and I believe this can only be created by starting among individual actions.

Where those actions can be become commonplace which in turn could convince others to do the

same by either societal pressure or just cultural norms that are established.
 Works Cited Page

Hourdequin, Marion. “Climate, Collective Action, and Individual Moral Obligation,”

Environmental Values 19 (2010): 443-464.

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral

Obligation.” In Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics, edited by

W. Sinnott-Armstrong and R. Howath: 293-315. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005.