NCSU Response

RESPONSE OF NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY
TO
DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS’
PETITION TO REFER CASE NO. 00935
TO THE INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY RESOLUTION STRUCTURE
APRIL 8, 2020
By:
Mike Glazier Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC

Jason Montgomery Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC
Todd Blanche Cadwalader Wikersham & Taft, LLP
Anne Tompkins Cadwalader Wikersham & Taft, LLP
Loretta Lynch Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP
David Brown Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP
Chand Edwards-Balfour Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Response to Referral Petition, Case No. 00935
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
Case History and Background ......................................................................................... 1
Response ....................................................................................................................... 2
A. Remaining before the COI would likely prejudice NC State ................................. 2
B. The IARP structure raises fairness concerns for NC State and Other NCAA
Members .............................................................................................................. 5
Commitment to Cooperation ........................................................................................... 6
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 6
39819.1 4/7/2020
INTRODUCTION
Through this response, North Carolina State University (“NC State” or the “University”) answers
the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions’ (“COI”) petition requesting referral of this case to
the newly-created Independent Accountability Resolution Process (“IARP”) (the “Referral
Petition”). We believe the Referral Petition prejudges NC State on material, open issues of fact,
and raises serious questions as to whether the COI process would generate a fair and impartial
hearing for the University. As a result, NC State reluctantly accedes to the COI’s referral to the
IARP. The reasons for our reluctance are described in further detail below, not just to highlight
NC State’s due process concerns, but in an effort to ensure that the new IARP structure is fair
and transparent to all members, and perceived as such. Finally, despite these disagreements,
we emphasize that NC State remains committed to continuing to work collaboratively with the
NCAA to resolve the remaining issues in this matter.
CASE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
This case arose out of an investigation by the FBI and the Office of the United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”) charging several individuals in September 2017 with
federal crimes arising out of schemes to bribe potential student athletes and their families to
induce them to attend certain universities. Former Adidas employees James Gatto and Merl Code
were ultimately convicted in October 2018 of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud
following a jury trial (“SDNY case”). As the charges relate to NC State, Gatto and his co-defendant
were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, as set forth as Count One of the superseding
indictment, in which NC State and other member institutions were identified by the government
as victims of the defendants’ criminal scheme.
On October 11, 2017, while the SDNY case was proceeding through the federal courts, and
subsequent to the actions that arise in this case, the NCAA convened a commission chaired by
former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to examine the state of men’s college basketball
(“Rice Commission”). In April 2018, the Rice Commission issued its Report and
Recommendations to Address the Issues Facing Collegiate Basketball. Among other
recommendations, with respect to NCAA infractions, the Rice Commission proposed a new track
for “complex cases” to supplement the existing track for all others. The new process for complex
cases as proposed by the Rice Commission would be wholly independent from the NCAA
structure. The proposed structure provided for adjudication by a “panel of paid independent
decision makers, such as lawyers, arbitrators and retired judges” operating under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association or analogous rules, and for review of the panel’s decisions under
the Federal Arbitration Act. See Exhibit 1, p. 39.
Instead of adopting the Rice Commission recommendations as submitted, the NCAA Board of
Directors adopted a version of an independent review wherein independent committee members
were appointed, trained and supported by the NCAA staff in much the same way as the COI.
Unfortunately, the new group does not operate under any set of rules promulgated by the
American Arbitration Association (or any analogous rules), nor are the decisions from the new
group subject to review under the Federal Arbitration Act. Rather, decisions of the new
independent committee are not subject to review by any appellate body, either internal or external
to the NCAA.
On July 9, 2019, the NCAA enforcement staff issued a notice of allegations (“NOA”) to NC State.
See Exhibit 2. On September 19, 2019, the COI chair designee stayed all SDNY infractions
cases for 60 days. See Exhibit 3. On November 21, 2019, the COI chair designee lifted the stay.
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See Exhibit 4. On December 9, 2019, NC State and the former head men’s basketball coach
submitted their responses. See Exhibit 5. On December 19, 2019, the COI chair designee
identified a potential hearing date for the case of February 28, 2020. See Exhibit 6. Shortly
thereafter, counsel for former head men’s basketball coach Mark Gottfried informed the COI chair
designee that he could not attend a February 28, 2020 hearing because of a scheduling conflict.
On February 7, 2020, the NCAA enforcement staff submitted its written reply (“Enforcement
Written Reply”). See Exhibit 7. On February 14, 2020, the COI submitted the Referral Petition.
RESPONSE
THE REFERRAL PETITION AND THE INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY RESOLUTION

PROCESS RAISE FAIRNESS CONCERNS FOR NC STATE
NCAA governing principles are rooted in promoting fairness and equality among member
institutions engaged in intercollegiate athletics competition, including those member institutions
that are subject to the infractions process. Bylaw 19.01.1 includes an unequivocal affirmation of
the importance of member institutions receiving the benefits of a fair process for infractions cases.
This Bylaw applies to infractions matters resolved by either the COI or the Independent Resolution
Panel (“IRP”).
By submitting a referral petition that prejudges open issues of fact, uses legitimate procedural
inquiry as a basis for an adverse finding against NC State, and pushes a member institution into
a process that causes it to lose a substantive right, the COI has not been faithful to the principles
of fairness. In doing so, the COI may have tainted the adjudication of this case, whether by the
COI or the IRP.1 When legitimate issues of fact and concerns about the application of an untested
and untried procedural bylaw are taken as challenges instead of an opportunity for discussion
and resolution, questions as to fundamental fairness arise. Moreover, for any new process to be
both fair and perceived as fair, the IARP fact finders and adjudicators must receive matters without
biased or incorrect determinations of disputed facts and rules as contained in the Referral Petition.
A. Remaining before the COI would likely prejudice NC State.
As an initial matter, NC State does not believe that this is a unique case requiring referral to the
IARP, or a case in which the NCAA’s interests are best served by further delaying resolution.2
1 Note, whether or not the Referral Petition is included as part of the record, as a public institution, NC State
will more likely than not be required to produce the Referral Petition, based on an open records request.
This is especially true considering that any referral to the IARP is publicly announced by the NCAA.
2 Bylaw 19.11.3.1 sets forth the standard for referral of a case by the Infractions Referral Committee. It
states: “[t]he Infractions Referral Committee shall refer select cases to the independent accountability
resolution structure if it determines the NCAA’s interests are best served by resolving the case under the
independent accountability structure, including when a case involves unique policy issues or factors that,
when weighed in totality; could impede accurate and effective resolution of the case under the internal
infractions structure.” NC State disagrees these referral factors are applicable in this case. In total, the
NOA includes nine separate and distinct allegations of NCAA rules violations in the sport of men’s
basketball. Of the nine allegations, NC State has questioned the factual accuracy of only a single subpart
of Allegation 1, Allegation 1-(c), regarding whether $40,000 was provided to Dennis Smith Jr. as an
inducement from Adidas in order for Smith, Jr. to enroll at NC State. See Exhibit 5, p 14. The COI has
been adjudicating impermissible inducement cases since the inception of the infractions process and in the
past two years alone, the COI has heard multiple cases related to potential impermissible benefits. Simply
put, this case does not present a “major policy issue,” nor is it factually complex. In addition, neither the
breaches of confidentiality by the NCAA executive staff nor outside counsel for the former head men’s
basketball coach require referral of this case IARP.
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Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed further below, the University is left with little choice but
to accede to referral to the IARP.
1. NC State embraces the core principle of self-governance and has not taken an
adversarial posture.
A significant reason why NC State is one of the first of the so-called “SDNY cases” to be ripe for
resolution is the University’s commitment to NCAA rules compliance, as shown by its
extraordinary cooperation in the SDNY cases, and with the NCAA during and at the conclusion of
those cases. NC State took affirmative steps to expedite the resolution of this case. As a result,
on July 9, 2019, less than nine months after the SDNY case, the NCAA enforcement staff issued
its NOA. The processing of this case in such an expedient manner could only have been
accomplished through NC State’s full cooperation with the enforcement staff. Now, despite NC
State’s efforts, the COI asserts that because the University does not agree in totality with its
factual allegations or the application of the new importation of facts bylaw, NC State has engaged
in “adversarial posturing.”
In particular, the COI takes issue with NC State’s position on “importation of facts” and whether
Adidas, simply by virtue of being a corporate sponsor of NC State, is also a booster of NC State.
Neither of NC State’s positions on these issues is adversarial to the process. Instead, the factual
and procedural concerns raised by the University in its Response are legitimate ones that require
well-reasoned resolution by an unbiased adjudicator. We question the COI’s objectivity because
it took legitimate issues of fact and procedural concerns as inappropriate challenges instead of
an opportunity for discussion and resolution.
(a) The COI’s incorrect application of the importation bylaw
From the outset, it should be noted that both NC State and the NCAA enforcement staff agree to
the appropriate application of Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 in this case. See Exhibit 7, pp 14 - 15. The
enforcement staff noted as follows in its reply brief:
The enforcement staff agrees with the institution that evidence and testimony from
the Gatto case may be considered by the hearing panel pursuant to Bylaw
19.7.8.3.1. This is consistent with the rationale provided in the adoption of NCAA
Proposal No. 2018-15, which was to increase efficiency in the infractions process
by saving time and resources. Additionally, the importation legislation, like much
of NCAA Article 19, was adopted to help the committee make fully informed
decisions by giving hearing panel members access to all available and relevant
information. See Exhibit 7, p. 14.
In the Referral Petition, however, the COI chair designee entertains a much more expansive
interpretation of Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1, which is contrary to not only NC State’s understanding of the
application of the new rule, but also the NCAA enforcement staff’s use of the bylaw. In doing so,
the chair designee embraces the testimony of TJ Gassnola, a cooperating government witness,
but fails to consider the testimony or any of the significant physical evidence offered at trial or
evidence that would appear to contradict key aspects of the alleged NCAA violation, e.g. the
source of the alleged $40,000. It is inappropriate to cherry-pick certain trial evidence without
considering the context in which it was received or without considering other relevant evidence
from the same proceeding. Moreover, the chair designee fails to recognize the significance of
the fact that NC State was not a party to the SDNY case, so it was not in a position to present
evidence or cross examine witnesses. See Referral Petition, pp. 5 - 6 and Exhibit 5, p. 9.
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The COI’s apparent ruling on the use of the new “importation of facts” bylaw is misguided in two
significant ways. First, as described below, the COI has conflated “facts established,” which may
be accepted as true in the infractions process, subject to any appeal, with “evidence submitted
and positions taken,” which may only be considered in the infractions process. Although the COI
pays lip service to the latter standard, it is apparent that it accepts TJ Gassnola’s trial testimony
in an uncritical manner, treating it as a “fact established,” and not merely as “evidence submitted.”
Moreover, it certainly is not appropriate to use parts of the trial that do not even constitute
“evidence” as “facts established.” For example, what a lawyer says in opening statements is not
evidence. Indeed, the judge in the Gatto trial instructed the jury repeatedly that the lawyer’s
statements are not evidence. Yet, the COI refers to lawyers’ arguments as tantamount to “facts
established.”
(b) The COI’s improper interpretive ruling.
In addition to making a ruling on a procedural argument in the Referral Petition related to

importation of facts, the COI also appears to prejudge another substantive issue in the case
without hearing from the parties: that Adidas and Gassnola are NC State “boosters.” The COI
asserts that this position is based on “longstanding interpretive guidance relied upon by the NCAA
membership.” See Referral Petition, p. 6 FN 6 and FN 3 Infra
However, the COI chair designee has taken this position without having heard from the parties.
The notion that Gassnola and Adidas are “boosters” is a point on which the University and the
NCAA enforcement staff disagree. NC State also disagrees with the assertion that such a
conclusion is based on “longstanding interpretive guidance relied upon by the NCAA
membership.” At a minimum, a fair adjudicator must hear NC State’s position on this issue before
making a decision. Setting forth a position that potentially differs from the COI chair designee
does not mean that NC State is engaging in “adversarial posturing.” Disagreements on
interpretive issues are common in hearings brought before the COI, and those interpretations
often depend on a determination of the facts at a hearing before a conclusion can be reached.
2. There remains one single subpart of an NCAA allegation at issue – an alleged

impermissible inducement – which does not require supplemental
investigation
The COI claims that due to the scope, scale and factual complexity of the case, it is not adequately
suited to hear and decide the matter. The chair designee identifies two items to support this
assertion: (1) the size of the case record and (2) the enforcement staff’s reply brief that discusses
Gassnola’s September 2015 trip.
With respect to (1), although the case record is large, the sole remaining issue in dispute in this
case is whether sufficient evidence exists to establish that the $40,000 that Gassnola testified
that he provided to Early was from Adidas and subsequently provided to Dennis Smith, Jr. in order
to induce Smith Jr. to attend NC State. All of the other facts and circumstances in the case are
largely agreed upon by NC State and the enforcement staff.
With respect to (2), the chair designee suggests that the staff may have intended to charge NC
State with another violation related to a $40,000 withdrawal from Gassnola’s account in
September 2015 and subsequent trip to Raleigh. The chair designee asserts that the Complex
Case Unit (“CCU”) may be the best entity to review this issue. However, Gassnola testified at
trial that he did not recall the September 2015 trip to Raleigh and has refused to cooperate with
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the NCAA’s investigation. Accordingly, it appears that further investigation is unlikely to materially
change the record.
Therefore, the remaining issues in the case do not involve vast scope, scale, or complexity, since
only a single issue need be resolved. In fact, the COI has been adjudicating impermissible
inducement cases since the inception of the infractions process. Accordingly, should this matter
be referred to the IARP, there is no need for the CCU to conduct a supplemental investigation,
which would delay this process even further.
B. The IARP structure raises fairness concerns for NC State and Other NCAA Members
While NC State has concerns about receiving an objective or fair hearing before the COI at this
stage, and therefore does not oppose referral to the IARP, it does so reluctantly and under protest
due to concerns with the new IARP structure described further below. NC State highlights these
concerns to ensure that the new, untested IARP structure is both fair and transparent to all
members, and perceived as such. We urge the NCAA to take these concerns seriously and
address them so that all members can receive fair treatment required pursuant to Article 19.
1. An appellate body is a necessary check particularly when any entity is attempting to

implement new rules, policies or procedures.
Within the peer-review model, the Infractions Appeals Committee (“IAC”) has authority to consider
appeals from decisions of a hearing panel of the COI and affirm, reverse, or vacate and/or remand
the panel’s findings, conclusions, penalties, corrective actions, requirements and/or other
conditions and obligations of membership prescribed for violations of the NCAA constitution and
bylaws. See Bylaw 19.4.5. Therefore, the IAC ensures that member institutions are not
prejudiced by errors committed by the COI.
A check on the authority of an adjudicative body is particularly important where, as here, an entity
is implementing new rules that materially affect involved individuals or member institutions. Here,
the manner in which the NCAA may “import facts” per Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1, adopted less than two
years ago in August 2018, in order to find NCAA violations is central to this case. See Referral
Petition, pp. 4 - 6. Likewise, the notion that a member institution is strictly liable for the acts of
its apparel sponsor or the apparel sponsor’s employees is a new application of a rule that has
either never been applied in this manner or never been enforced.3 See Referral Petition, p. 6
FN 6.
Should the IRP articulate similar positions as the Chair’s decision, despite information presented
to it that is clearly contrary to the finding, cite facts that do not constitute a violation or commit a
procedural error, the University is without recourse because there is no appeal opportunity within
the IARP. However, the opportunity for further review of any final determinations on these and
3 The chair designee of the COI cites “longstanding interpretive guidance relied upon by the NCAA
membership” for the premise that both Adidas and Gassnola are automatically boosters of the institution
because Adidas is an apparel sponsor. However, in doing so, the COI fails to acknowledge other
contradictory legislation that suggests that Adidas, Nike and Under Armour are not ipso facto boosters of
the institutions with which they have sponsorship agreements. See Bylaw 12.1.2.1.4.3 (Expenses from
an outside sponsor). If the rule is applied as set forth by the enforcement staff and apparently adopted
by the COI, virtually all Division I men’s basketball student-athletes would be ineligible because they
received benefits, shoes, apparel, and actual and necessary expenses, when they participated in non-
scholastic (AAU) basketball from a “booster” – Adidas, Nike or Under Armour.
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other issues the IRP will consider is paramount to not only ensure fairness, but to permit another
NCAA membership body to correct any interpretive or other errors.
2. Fundamental fairness includes both fairness of procedures and timely resolution.
Referral of this case to the IARP, a new structure that only became effective on August 1, 2019,
and did not exist at the inception of this case, and doing so only after NC State spent nearly two
years working collaboratively with the NCAA enforcement staff to address the actions ultimately
raised in the NOA, also presents questions of procedural fairness for NC State. Initiating
proceedings under one set of rules, and then changing those rules prior to a final resolution raise
fundamental fairness concerns, particularly where the new rules result in loss of substantial rights.
Furthermore, one aspect of the new IARP structure process is the potential for additional
investigation of the facts by a newly created CCU, which includes a member of the enforcement
staff. Any such investigation necessarily would be initiated nearly one year after the NCAA
enforcement staff concluded its first review, and well over a year after the SDNY case in question
concluded.
As discussed further above, since the inception of the “SDNY cases” and the NCAA’s
investigation, NC State has been fully cooperative, thus expediting the resolution of this case.
However, referral to the IARP risks expanding the scope of the existing investigation and unduly
delaying any final resolution of the allegations that have been leveled against NC State.
COMMITMENT TO COOPERATION
NC State fully accepts the responsibility of operating its athletic programs in accord with NCAA
and ACC rules, and cooperating with the NCAA when potential NCAA rules issues arise. In this
matter, NC State worked cooperatively with the FBI, SDNY and NCAA. During the SDNY
investigation, NC State responded to several inquiries from prosecutors and made numerous NC
State employees available to the SDNY, ultimately resulting in our Senior Associate Athletics
Director for Compliance testifying as a key witness for the government at the trial. Her testimony
included details about NC State’s extensive systems that are in place to detect, deter and report
NCAA violations. As the NCAA is well-aware, the University also extensively cooperated and
worked with outside counsel for the NCAA (WilmerHale) and the NCAA enforcement staff to arrive
at a fair resolution after a fair process.
In raising the procedural and factual concerns detailed herein, NC State is by no means
prejudging the objectivity of the IARP fact finders or adjudicators, and it remains committed to
working collaboratively with the NCAA to resolve the few remaining outstanding issues in this
matter. If the referral Petition is granted, and since the IARP is new and untested, NC State
remains willing and ready to work with the NCAA and the committees and panel within the IARP
to ensure a fair process for reviewing this matter.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the Referral Petition, NC State believes it cannot receive an objective or fair hearing
before the COI. It is clear that legitimate procedural and factual issues exist in this case. NC
State appropriately raised these issues in its Response. Now, several months later, NC State
has been met with a preemptive decision on these issues by the COI before there has even been
a hearing on the merits. The Referral Petition not only confirms and highlights NC State’s
concerns about the fairness of the NCAA process, but also taints this case from moving forward
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in a meaningfully fair manner for NC State. As a result, NC State is left with little choice but to
reluctantly accede to the referral of this case to the IARP.
NC State has a long history of working cooperatively and collaboratively with the NCAA on matters
large and small, and it remains open to working collaboratively as part of the IARP to address its
concerns, and to resolve this matter as efficiently as possible. However, by conceding to referral,
NC State does not concede its substantive right to appeal. Further, in light of the various concerns
described herein, NC State also reserves all rights and remedies, both within and outside of the
NCAA structure.
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EXHIBITS LIST
Response to Referral Petition, Case No. 00935
Exhibit 1 Rice Commission Report, April 2018
Exhibit 2 NCAA Notice of Allegations
Exhibit 3 Committee on Infractions Stay of All SDNY Cases
Exhibit 4 Committee on Infractions Lift of Stay
Exhibit 5 NC State Response to Notice of Allegations
Exhibit 6 Committee on Infractions Proposed Hearing Date
Exhibit 7 Enforcement Written Reply
39820.1 3/12/2020
EXHIBIT
1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 1

APRIL 2018
COMMISSION ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO NCAA BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, DIVISION I BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND NCAA
PRESIDENT EMMERT
Executive Summary
The Independent Commission on College Basketball was established on October

11, 2017, to assess the state of the enterprise and to recommend transformational
changes to address multiple issues and challenges.
In brief, it is the overwhelming assessment of the Commission that the state of

men’s college basketball is deeply troubled. The levels of corruption and deception
are now at a point that they threaten the very survival of the college game as we know
it. It has taken some time to get here, and it will take time to change course. The
Commission offers its recommendations knowing that the road ahead is long – but
that the first steps must be taken – and they must be bold. The indictments handed
down by the Justice Department and the ongoing FBI investigation spurred the NCAA
to ask for this report. Whatever the outcome of the legal process, radical changes are
long overdue. We the commissioners believe that this is a final opportunity to turn the
course of college basketball in the right direction. Every stakeholder will have to accept
responsibility for what has happened in the past and commit to a new future if we are to
succeed.
The commissioners want to be very clear: There is much to admire about college
basketball even with its significant challenges. The commitment and hard work of
student-athletes is seen on basketball courts across the country. At tournament time,
underdogs rise up, defeat favorites, and become national darlings. The skill and
determination of these young student-athletes reminds all of us what it means to work
hard, prepare and perform under pressure. We experience deeply their triumphs and
their failures. College communities – including students, faculty, staff and alumni – are
bound together in pride and excitement as they support, cheer – live and die – with their
teams.
We know too that many young men who would otherwise have little chance of
attending college are able to take advantage of their talents to achieve something of great
value in our society and economy – a college degree. The scholarships themselves are
valuable, as students who finance their own education will attest; the in-kind benefits are
worth tens of thousands of dollars more. The lifetime financial benefit of a baccalaureate
degree can approach $1 million, and can change the recipient’s family for generations. See
Section 1.D. Of course, student-athletes must earn that degree to receive these benefits.

APRIL 2018
Lost in the talk of big money and corruption is colleges’ central mission to provide
higher education to students. There is debate about how to measure the graduation
rate for college students, including student-athletes. There is, however, general
agreement that the graduation rate for men’s Division I basketball players lags behind
that of other student-athletes, perhaps significantly.1 NCAA schools must take seriously
the obligation to help all student-athletes obtain the education they are promised.
The Commission believes that the answer to many of college basketball’s

problems lies in a renewed commitment to the college degree as the centerpiece of
intercollegiate athletics. Intercollegiate athletics is a trust based on a promise: athletes
play for their schools and receive a realistic chance to complete a college degree in
return. Any policy or action that violates that trust is morally wrong.
College basketball, like college sports generally, is to be played by student-

athletes who are members of the collegiate community, not paid professionals. Over
several decades, however, trends have emerged that call this understanding into
question. Millions of dollars are now generated by television contracts and apparel
sponsorship for the NCAA, universities and coaches. The financial stake in success has
grown exponentially; and thus, there is an arms race to recruit the best talent – and if
you are a coach – to keep your job. Future stars and their families know their value –
and can be tempted to monetize their worth as soon as possible since they will not be
compensated in college. Some agents, summer coaches and other third parties act as
intermediaries and facilitators. In other words, the environment surrounding college
basketball is a toxic mix of perverse incentives to cheat.
The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement functions were designed for a simpler
time, when rule violations did not put so much at stake. As a result, the NCAA, as an
enforcement entity, has little credibility with the public and its members, and what it has
continues to dwindle. There are multiple cases of compromised academic standards and
institutional integrity to keep the money and talent flowing. The NCAA and its member
institutions have been unable to adequately deter or punish bad behavior.
Given the undeniable impact of “big money” on the college game, it is fair to ask
whether the ideal of college basketball played by student-athletes who are part of the
academic community – not hired guns for a season or two – is still viable. The answer
is yes, and the effort is worth making. Transformative changes are necessary, but the
1 The two most utilized measures of graduation rate are the Department of Education’s Federal Graduation Rate (FGR) and the NCAA’s
Graduation Success Rate (GSR). The FGR and the GSR treat transferring students differently, and their differing cohorts result in dramatically
different graduation rates: The 2017 FGR is 68% for all student-athletes and 48% for men’s Division I basketball players. The 2017 GSR is 87%
for all student-athletes and 82% for men’s Division I basketball players. The meaningful graduation rate is likely somewhere between the FGR
and GSR. See NCAA Research, Trends in Graduation Success Rates and Federal Graduation Rates at NCAA Division I Institutions (Nov. 2017);
T. Petr & J. McArdle, Academic Research and Reform: A History of the Empirical Basis for NCAA Academic Policy in Journal of Intercollegiate
Sport 2012, pp. 39-40; College Sport Research Institute, 2017 Adjusted Graduation Gap Report: NCAA Division-I Basketball, found at http://
csri-sc.org.

APRIL 2018
goal should not be to turn college basketball into another professional league. Rather,
we must change fundamentally the current culture and rules to address the effect that
money has had on college basketball, the NCAA and its member institutions.
To this end, the Commission makes a number of recommendations set forth

below. To ensure that we take advantage of the current momentum for change,
the Commission further calls on the NCAA to draw up its plan to implement the
Commission’s recommendations, including draft legislation, by early August 2018. The
Commission will promptly reconvene and review the NCAA’s plans to provide its input
for the NCAA’s concrete measures to renew college basketball.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Section 1:
Realistic Pathways for Student-Athlete Success
A. Separate The Collegiate Track From The Professional Track By Ending

One-And-Done.
The Commission calls on the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the
National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) again to make 18-year-olds eligible for
the NBA draft, so that high school players who are drafted may proceed to the NBA.
The NCAA lacks the legal power to change one-and-done on its own; the power to
make this change lies exclusively with the NBA and the NBPA.
The one-and-done regime may have provided some benefits for the NBA and
the NCAA in the past, but all stakeholders agree that the downsides now outweigh any
benefits. One-and-done has played a significant role in corrupting and destabilizing
college basketball, restricting the freedom of choice of players, and undermining the
relationship of college basketball to the mission of higher education. Elite high school
players with NBA prospects and no interest in a college degree should not be “forced”
to attend college, often for less than a year. These uniquely talented players are the
focus of agents, apparel companies, investment advisors, college coaches and others
seeking to profit from their skills and offering them cash and other benefits in hope
of future gain. If they are allowed to turn professional, some of the pressure on the
collegiate model will be reduced. Moreover, the recent commitment of the NBA to
improve the G League may enhance its appeal as a professional option for elite players
who are 18 and do not wish to attend college.
The Commission seriously considered, but is not recommending, the NBA’s and
NBPA’s adoption of a version of the “baseball rule” which would make student-athletes
who attend college ineligible for the draft or the G League for two or three years. By

APRIL 2018
requiring students who choose the collegiate path to make a long-term commitment
to their education, the baseball rule increases the number of student-athletes who
ultimately earn degrees. However, it would also keep collegiate players ready for the
NBA in school against their will, where they will be potentially disgruntled magnets for
corrupt money and the undermining of the collegiate model. Players with professional
earning power should be able to choose a professional path. The Commission’s
additional recommendations will make it easier for them to return and complete their
degrees.
The Commission is concerned about one unintended consequence of ending

one-and-done, specifically the potential abuse of the NCAA’s current practice of granting
immediate collegiate eligibility to high school players who “reclassify”— i.e., those who
make themselves eligible to enter college prior to the graduation date of their high
school class. We fear that, should the NBA and the NBPA make 18 the minimum age
for entry into the NBA, the growing trend of reclassification will accelerate, creating a
new generation of 17-year-old one-and-done players. The Commission urges the NCAA
to monitor this situation and to enact appropriate rule changes if that potential abuse
occurs with the end of one-and-done.
We must emphasize that only the NBA and the NBPA can change the one-and-
done rule. If they choose not to do so by the end of 2018, the NCAA must still find a
way to address this situation. In that circumstance, the Commission will reconvene and
consider the other tools at its disposal. These could range from the baseball rule, to
freshman ineligibility, to “locking up” scholarships for three or four years if the recipient
leaves the program for the NBA after a single year. That would be a disincentive
to recruit an athlete for a one-year run at the title. In short, the current situation is
untenable.
B. Allow Student-Athletes To Test Their Professional Prospects And

Maintain Their Eligibility If They Do Not Sign A Professional Contract.
The Commission recommends that high school and college players who declare
for the draft and are not drafted remain eligible for college basketball unless and until
they sign a professional contract. Specifically, players who are not drafted should be
permitted to change their minds and attend college or return to college, provided
they remain academically and otherwise eligible. The Commission also recommends
imposing two additional conditions on this retention of eligibility: The player must
return to the same school, and the player must request an evaluation from the NBA’s
Undergraduate Advisory Committee before entering the draft. The NBA has unique
credibility with elite players who should have the benefit of the NBA evaluation in
deciding whether to enter the draft.

APRIL 2018
Elite high school and college basketball players tend to misjudge their
professional prospects. Players who think they are surefire professionals are often
mistaken. The numbers tell this story: Only a very small percentage of NCAA men’s
basketball players make it to the NBA (around 1.2%), let alone have successful careers.2
Yet, an NCAA Survey we commissioned showed that 59% of Division I players believe
that they will play professionally,3 and NCAA research suggests that 76% of Division I
players, 48% of Division II players and 21% of Division III players believe that they have
a chance to play at the next level.4 Erroneously entering the NBA draft is not the kind
of misjudgment that should deprive student-athletes of the valuable opportunity to
enter college or to continue in college while playing basketball. While this rule change
may inconvenience coaches seeking to set their rosters for the following season, we
conclude that the student-athletes’ interest should govern here. A player chagrined to
discover that he lacks an NBA future may grow into his collegiate experience and adopt
a different plan for the future. This change, along with several others recommended,
will demonstrate that the NCAA is serious about the value and importance of college for
student-athletes, and committed to helping them attend and work towards a degree.
The Commission again seeks assistance from the NBA and NBPA to make this
recommendation work. Players who enter the draft and are not drafted are free agents
under the NBA’s current rules, and can sign with an NBA team at any time. To avoid this
outcome, the Commission requests that the NBA and NBPA agree that players who are
not drafted, and then return to school, lose their eligibility to play in the NBA until they
re-enter through the next draft.
For similar reasons, the Commission also has concluded that one aspect of the
current transfer rule – the requirement that a player who transfers sit out for a year –
remain in place. Even under the current rule, an astounding 600-plus Division I men’s
basketball players transferred this year, in the hope of greener basketball pastures. Forty
percent of players who enter Division I basketball from high school leave their original
schools by sophomore year.5 Players who transfer are less likely to complete their
degrees.6 Third parties often influence transfer decisions for their own purposes and
without thought to the impact of transfer on the student-athlete. The detrimental effect
of transfer on a student-athlete’s education means that transferring should not be made
easier for basketball’s sake.
2 NCAA Research, So, you’re telling me there’s a chance (Dec. 2013).
3 NCAA Research, Division I Men’s Basketball Study on Youth Sport, Recruiting and College Choice, prepared for the Commission on College
Basketball, Dec. 2017.
4 NCAA Research, So, you’re telling me there’s a chance (Dec. 2013).
5 NCAA Research, Tracking Transfer in Division I Men’s Basketball (Dec. 2017).
6 T. Paskus, A Summary and Commentary on the Quantitative Results of Current NCAA Academic Reforms in Journal of Intercollegiate Support
2012, pp. 44-45 (describing transfer as “hav[ing] a long-term negative outcome on the student-athlete” and citing research indicating that
“even after we control for academic preparation, the act of transferring itself impacts the time to and probability of obtaining an undergraduate
degree”); Community College Research Center, What We Know About Transfer (Jan. 2015) (only 17% of community college students who
transfer complete a degree).

APRIL 2018
The Commission also discussed the graduate transfer rule. The NCAA enacted
the rule in 2006 to assist academically high-achieving students who had graduated
from college with remaining athletic eligibility by allowing them to transfer in order to
pursue a graduate degree. In recent years, graduating student-athletes, including in
men’s basketball, increasingly appear to make transfer decisions for reasons other than
academics. In 2011, there were 15 men’s basketball graduate transfers; in 2016, there
were 87.7 Only 34% of these transfers graduate from their graduate school programs.8
We heard that recruiting and tampering related to potential graduate transfers is rising.
We understand that the NCAA’s Transfer Working Group is currently considering

this issue and potential responses, including “locking down” scholarships for the period
of a degree program and imposing an enhanced penalty on a team’s Academic Progress
Rate if the recipient leaves before completing his graduate program. We ask the NCAA
to monitor this issue and develop appropriate legislation to ensure that the rule is
serving its intent.
In sum, student-athletes should have more information about their professional

prospects and more flexibility to test those prospects and return to school. This change
and other related changes should make it easier for them to do so without losing their
collegiate eligibility.
C. Permit Students To Receive Meaningful Assessment of Professional

Prospects Earlier With Assistance From Certified Agents.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA and its member institutions develop
strict standards for certifying agents and allow NCAA-certified agents to engage with
student-athletes at an appropriate point in their high school careers to be determined
by the NCAA. The NCAA must appoint a Vice-President level executive to develop
meaningful standards for NCAA certification and administer the program. Among
other requirements, the rules should mandate that agents notify colleges when they are
retained by a matriculating student-athlete. The program should also educate student-
athletes about eligibility rules and requirements.
Elite high school and college players need earlier professional advice, including
whether to declare for the draft or whether college basketball offers a superior pathway.
If NCAA rules do not allow them to receive that advice openly, they will often seek it
illicitly. The NCAA rules should provide that student-athletes may meet and contract
with NCAA-certified agents and that they will not lose their eligibility by doing so.
7 See NCAA Research, Changes in the Number of Division I Graduate Transfers (June 2017).
8 See NCAA Research, Division I Committee on Academics, Academic Attainment of Division I Student-Athletes Who Compete as
Postgraduates (Oct. 2015).

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The Commission further recommends that the NCAA incentivize better behavior
from agents. This can be done through making clear the benefits of certification and the
cost of the loss of certification. An agent who participates in an NCAA rules violation
must lose his or her certification. A student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or
whose family members enter into an agreement, with a non-certified agent will lose his
eligibility. In addition, the NCAA and the NBPA should report to each other agents’
violations of their respective rules, increasing the potential costs of violating NCAA rules.
As described below, in its specific recommendations about non-scholastic

basketball, the Commission urges additional efforts at educating high school players
about their professional and collegiate prospects, NCAA eligibility rules, their health
and more. Student-athletes must have the information they need to understand their
real choices and be better positioned to take advantage of either the collegiate or the
professional path they choose.
D. Provide Resources To Make The Promise of A College Education

Real.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial

fund and commit to paying for the degree completion of student-athletes with athletic
scholarships who leave member institutions after progress of at least two years towards
a degree. Colleges and universities must fulfill their commitments to student-athletes
to provide not just a venue for athletic competition, but also an education. They must
promise student-athletes that the option to receive an education will be there, even after
the athlete is finished with his athletic career. This will be expensive, but it is necessary
to restore credibility to the phrase student-athlete.
Many NCAA member institutions already provide Degree Completion Programs.

NCAA rules should standardize this offering. The NCAA must also define a category of
relatively disadvantaged schools for which this requirement would impose a substantial
burden, and create a fund to provide the benefit for students at those institutions, using
the revenues of the NCAA Basketball tournament.
The NCAA is frequently criticized for not permitting payment to student-athletes,

on the ground that these young people are engaged in an activity that generates
billions of dollars and yet they do not benefit. The debate is longstanding; views are
entrenched; and both sides make important points. One significant counter to that
argument is that many Division I student-athletes benefit enormously from engaging
in intercollegiate sports. In addition to receiving full scholarships up to the cost of
attendance (ranging from $13,392 to $71,585 for in-state students and from $18,125-
$71,585 for out-of-state students depending on the institution),9 student-athletes often
9 See NCAA Financial Reporting System.

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receive benefits such as academic support, meals, travel, coaching, trainers, career
advice and more. The value of these extra benefits may be tens of thousands of dollars
annually.10 As noted above, for student-athletes who receive a degree, the enhanced
value of their lifetime earnings averages $1 million.11 Again, the Commission agrees
that for these benefits to be realized, colleges must make good on their commitment to
assist student-athletes in earning their degrees.
The Commission is familiar with the related debate about whether student-
athletes should earn some financial benefit from the marketing of their names, images
and likenesses (NIL). Many argue that allowing these payments would be analogous
to the receipt of funds by collegiate Olympians and thus consistent with the collegiate
model, particularly if students did not receive the funds until after college. The NCAA
is a defendant in litigation involving such payments, which appears to raise fundamental
questions about whether these and similar payments are consistent with the collegiate
model. The court stated that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes
education-related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational
expenses is not minor: it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis
for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon v.
NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
If a college or university is using a student-athlete’s NIL for commercial purposes,

the school must ask that student-athlete for consent, which must be voluntarily given.
See also NCAA Bylaw 12.5 (Promotional Activities) (describing permissible and non-
permissible uses). When the legal parameters relevant to this issue are clearer,12 the
Commission also believes that the NCAA should reconsider its treatment of student-
athletes’ NIL. In the current uncertain legal setting, however, the Commission has
decided to focus its recommendations on supporting the college model. It seeks to
address the charge of player exploitation in other ways – specifically, by opening and
keeping open a player’s professional pathway, by welcoming the return of undrafted
players, by funding degree completion by athletes who return to school, by providing
benefits that allow student-athletes to be both students and athletes and by imposing
10 See, e.g., USA Today analysis finds $120K value in men’s basketball scholarship, USA TODAY (March 30, 2011).
11 Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, The Economic Value of College Majors, Executive Summary, p. 5, Figure 3
(2015); Pew Research Center, The Rising Cost of Not Going to College, (Feb. 11, 2014) (“Millennial college graduates ages 25 to 32 who are
working full time earn more annually – about $17,500 more – than employed young adults holding only a high school diploma”); (“College-
educated Millennials are also more likely to be employed full time than their less-educated counterparts (89% vs. 82%) and significantly less
likely to be unemployed (3.8% vs. 12.2%)”).
12 In O’Bannon, the court of appeals vacated the district court’s requirement that the NCAA allow payments of limited deferred compensation
related to use of student-athletes’ NIL. The court of appeals held that “allowing students to be paid NIL compensation unrelated to their
education expenses” does not promote the NCAA’s procompetitive purposes as effectively as a rule forbidding cash compensation, even if
payments are limited and in a trust fund. 802 F.3d at 1076. And, the NCAA continues to be in the midst of substantial litigation challenging
the collegiate model, including multi-district litigation alleging more broadly that the NCAA and eleven of its conferences “fixed prices for
the payments and benefits that the students may receive in return for their elite athletic services.” See Order Granting in Part and Denying In
Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 1, In re: National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., Nos.
14-md-02541-CW, 14-cv-02758-CW (Mar. 28, 2018). See also infra, n. 17 (citing a number of cases challenging the college model). Again, the
Commission strongly recommends that the NCAA reconsider its rules in this area once the legal context is clarified.

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significant punishment on those who undermine the premise that student-athletes must
receive an education that is valuable, not a pretense. The NCAA will have to incur
substantial costs for several of these recommendations. But it will be money well spent.
Section 2:
Establish Professional Neutral Investigation and Adjudication of Serious

Infractions and Hold Institutions and Individuals Accountable
A. Implement Independent Investigation and Adjudication of Complex

Cases.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA create independent investigative

and adjudicative arms to address and resolve complex and serious cases (hereafter
“complex cases”) involving violations of NCAA rules.
Stakeholders informed the Commission that when the stakes are high, colleges
are not complying with the NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative principles
and NCAA rules often are not enforced. Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and
enforcement powers are inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious
violations of NCAA rules in consequential situations. No stakeholder supported the
current system for handling high-stakes infractions. Many informed us that when the
U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges that led to this Commission, the reaction
was that “everyone knows” that these payments occur. That state of affairs – where the
entire community knows of significant rule breaking and yet the governance body lacks
the power or will to investigate and act – breeds cynicism and contempt.
The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement processes require a complete overhaul.

Complex cases must be thoroughly investigated, and resolved by neutral professional
adjudicators, with authority to impose punishment that will have a significant deterrent
effect. The investigative arm must be independent and empowered to require
the cooperation of witnesses and the production of documents, including financial
information, from NCAA member institutions and their employees and contractors, with
significant penalties for non-cooperation. In addition, these and all NCAA investigators
must exercise reasonable prosecutorial discretion and common sense so that resources
are focused on serious infractions and punishment is appropriately calibrated and
consistently administered. There are multiple examples of minor infractions that are not
worth the time and effort that the NCAA now spends on them.
Volunteers who are members of fellow NCAA member institutions should not
resolve cases. Instead, a panel of professional adjudicators, appointed for a term of
years, must make final and binding decisions and must have the authority to impose

APRIL 2018
substantial punishments, including the loss of post-season play and the revenues from
post-season play. To restore credibility to this process, the investigation, enforcement
and resolution of high stakes cases must be placed in the hands of independent
professionals and neutrals.
B. Enact and Impose Core Punishments With Significant Deterrent

Effect.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA enact significant increases in the
penalties imposed on institutions and individuals for violations of NCAA rules. Currently,
the rewards for violating the rules far outweigh the risks. To reverse this calculation, the
Commission recommends a number of changes in the NCAA’s penalty structure.
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year
post-season ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss of
all revenue sharing in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the entire
period of the ban; (iii) increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time
bans; (iv) increase the penalties for head coach restrictions to allow bans of more than
one season; and (v) increase the penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full-year
visit bans.
In addition, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ

a coach or athletic director under a show cause order for a previous violation of NCAA
rules be subject to significantly increased penalties if that individual’s program re-
offends, up to and including a ban of up to five years from post-season tournaments,
including the NCAA tournament, and a loss of revenues from those tournaments for that
same period. There must be significant risk associated with employing an individual who
is under a show cause order.
Relatedly, the Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual

accountability for rules violations for coaches, athletic directors and college presidents.
The NCAA must amend its rules to require colleges to include in contracts with
administrators and coaches individual contractual obligations to cooperate with NCAA
investigations, including financial disclosure, and individual agreement to submission
to NCAA enforcement proceedings, decisions and discipline, up to and including
discharge.
Moreover, the Commission recommends that the NCAA enact a rule requiring
coaches, athletic directors, and college presidents to certify annually that they
have conducted due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with NCAA

APRIL 2018
rules.13 These individuals will find it much easier to do so if they enact comprehensive
compliance programs at their institutions. The costs of compliance may be significant,
but they should be small by comparison to the costs of being found in violation of NCAA
rules. The NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for those individuals
if they knew or should have known of violations and did not address them, up to and
including termination. These penalties should be mitigated or enhanced depending up
the presence and effectiveness of the institution’s compliance program.
Coaches are the public focus of blame for NCAA violations. For too long, college
presidents and administrators have not been viewed as accountable for the conduct
of their athletic programs. That will have to change. College presidents and high-
level administrators cannot be permitted to turn a blind eye to the infractions in those
programs.
Finally, among other substantive rules changes, the Commission recommends

that the NCAA revise and clarify its role in addressing academic fraud or misconduct by
member institutions and make application of those rules consistent. The NCAA must
have jurisdiction to address academic fraud and misconduct to the extent it affects
student-athletes’ eligibility. Member institutions cannot be permitted to defend a fraud
or misconduct case on the ground that all students, not just athletes, were permitted
to “benefit” from that fraud or misconduct. Coaches, athletic directors and university
presidents must be held accountable for academic fraud about which they knew or
should have known. The standards and punishment for academic fraud must be clarified
and then enforced consistently.
Section 3:
Mitigating Non-Scholastic Basketball’s Harmful Influence on College
Basketball
Virtually all of the top recruits for each collegiate recruiting class participate in
non-scholastic basketball. The Commission recommends that the NCAA take short and
long-term actions to reform non-scholastic basketball and disassociate the NCAA and
its member institutions from the aspects of non-scholastic basketball where transparency
and ethical behavior cannot be assured. As part of this effort, the Commission
recommends that the NCAA partner with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA and others
to create and administer new resources and programs for youth basketball development,
including substantial regional camps for collegiate prospects in July where NCAA
coaches would evaluate players.
13 This rule would be analogous to the Sarbanes Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. §7241, Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports (2006), which
requires the Chief Executive officers of public companies to personally certify their financial reports.

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A. Reform Non-Scholastic Basketball and Make Its Finances
Transparent.
In the near term, the Commission recommends that the NCAA promptly adopt
and enforce rigorous criteria for certifying the non-scholastic basketball events that its
coaches attend. In order for the NCAA to certify a non-scholastic basketball event, the
owners, event operators, sponsors, and coaches for the event must agree to financial
transparency about all events they run, including those that are not certified by the
NCAA. This requirement includes agreement (i) to be subject to audit and to provide all
required IRS and other tax filings upon request; (ii) to disclose all sources of financing
and other payments and the recipients of all funds provided for or collected in relation
to the event; and (iii) to disclose any financial relationship between the event sponsors
and coaches with any administrator, coach or booster at any NCAA school. The money
flowing from apparel companies and other third parties into non-scholastic basketball
must be disclosed and accounted for, in order to address the corruption arising from
non-scholastic basketball.
Further, the NCAA’s rules already require NCAA-certified events to have

educational components; the NCAA must immediately implement and enforce that
requirement more effectively. All benefits provided to participants and their families,
including travel, meals, accommodations, gear of any sort, and any other benefit, must
be disclosed to the NCAA, along with the source of their provision. The NCAA must
enforce the requirement that such benefits be reasonable and appropriate and assure
that these restrictions are not circumvented by delaying the timing or providing the
benefits to another.
Currently, non-scholastic basketball is an ungoverned space with coaches,

players and their families, agents and sponsors exchanging money and goods in the
hope of future benefits and without accountability. Of particular importance to the
Commission are the cases in which non-scholastic basketball event operators and
coaches seek benefits from colleges and college coaches in exchange for influencing
their players’ college choices. To recruit effectively, many NCAA coaches need to attend
non-scholastic basketball events in which large numbers of elite players participate.
In turn, these events, leagues and teams attract high school players by giving them
the opportunity to be seen and evaluated annually by college coaches. Thus, using
its certification requirement, the NCAA has some leverage to impose the financial
transparency requirements and other reforms that the Commission recommends above.
B. Enlist the Apparel Companies in Transparency and Accountability

Efforts.
The apparel companies that actively sponsor non-scholastic basketball are public

APRIL 2018
companies. It appears, however, that they do not have effective controls in place in their
spending in non-scholastic basketball. The Commission calls on the boards of these
companies to publicly support and implement financial transparency and accountability
with respect to their own investments in non-scholastic basketball. Particularly in light
of the facts uncovered in the recent FBI investigation, these public companies should
be concerned about how their money is used in non-scholastic basketball. We expect
that these companies will insist that all employees provide detailed accountability about
such expenditures and cooperate with new NCAA rules about financial transparency and
accountability.
C. In Cooperation with Partners, Establish NCAA Youth Basketball

Programs.
With respect to the longer term, the Commission recommends that with a goal
of 2019, the NCAA work with USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA and others to
establish and administer new youth basketball programs. We would expect the NCAA
to devote significant resources and attention to these programs. Briefly, the Commission
proposes that youth basketball players be identified and developed at three levels:
Level 1, players with National Team potential; Level 2, players with Highest Collegiate
potential; and Level 3, players with Collegiate potential. At each level, players would
have to be identified, developed and evaluated by appropriate stakeholders. Critically,
that development would include not only basketball, but also academic and life skills,
health and collegiate eligibility. One centerpiece of this program would be NCAA-
administered regional non-scholastic basketball events in July that NCAA coaches would
exclusively attend. The Commission also recommends that the NCAA – in collaboration
with USA Basketball, the NBA, the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA – consider similar
initiatives to enhance the development of young women basketball players.
In sum, the NCAA and NCAA coaches may no longer associate with non-
scholastic basketball events that are not financially transparent and otherwise compliant
with NCAA requirements regardless of when they are held. Moreover, in light of
the recommendation that players be permitted to choose a professional pathway at
an earlier time, the NCAA and others should devote significant resources to earlier
development, including education, for players in youth basketball. The corruption
we observe in college basketball has its roots in youth basketball. The reforms
recommended by the Commission will be fruitless unless the NCAA gives serious
attention to regulating summer programs.
D. Enact Changes in Rules Governing Recruiting and Coaches’

Interaction with Recruits and Student-Athletes
The Commission also endorses and recommends adoption of a number of the rule

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changes recommended by the National Association of Basketball Coaches and other
organizations to reduce the influence of third parties and increase the ability of college
coaches to interact with recruits and current players.
Section 4:
Add A Significant Cadre of Public Members To
The NCAA’s Board of Governors.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA restructure its highest governance
body, the Board of Governors, to include at least five public members with the
experience, stature and objectivity to assist the NCAA in re-establishing itself as an
effective and respected leader and regulator of college sports. One of these public
members should also serve on the NCAA’s Executive Board. The current Board of
Governors includes 16 institutional presidents or chancellors, the chairs of the Division
I Council and the Division II and III Management Councils, and the NCAA president.
NCAA Constitution 4.1.1 (Composition). Like public companies, major non-profit
associations usually include outside board members to provide objectivity, relevant
experience, perspective and wisdom. Board members with those qualities will provide
valuable insight to the NCAA generally, and as it works towards the restoration of
college basketball. The NCAA should promptly identify candidates with the appropriate
stature and characteristics, and change its rules to require public voting members on
its highest governing body. The Commission will make independent board member
recommendations to the NCAA to assist it in assembling a first-rate list of candidates.
****
The NCAA has often failed to carry out its responsibilities to “maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete
as an integral part of the student body.” NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic Purpose). But,
the NCAA is not really Indianapolis: It is the sum total of its member institutions. When
those institutions and those responsible for leading them short-circuit rules, ethics and
norms in order to achieve on-court success, they alone are responsible. Too often,
these individuals hide behind the NCAA when they are the ones most responsible
for the degraded state of intercollegiate athletics, in general, and college basketball
in particular. The Commission makes these recommendations to support fulfillment
of the NCAA’s purposes and to impose accountability on institutions and individuals
undermining their achievement.

APRIL 2018
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
Introduction
On September 26, 2017, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York announced the arrest of ten persons for involvement in fraud
and corruption schemes related to college basketball – four NCAA Division I college
basketball coaches, a senior executive and two employees at a major athletic apparel
company, and three athlete advisors. The first scheme involved allegations that college
coaches took cash payments from athlete advisors to steer players and their families
to the advisors making the payments. The second scheme involved allegations that a
senior executive at a sports apparel company worked with athlete advisors to funnel
payments to high-school players and their families to obtain their commitment to attend
universities sponsored by the apparel company.
After the announcement of these charges, the NCAA’s President, Mark Emmert,
stated that it is “very clear the NCAA needs to make substantive changes to the way
we operate, and [to] do so quickly.” Statement from Pres. Mark Emmert, Oct. 11,
2017. He continued: “[w]hile I believe the vast majority of coaches follow the rules, the
culture of silence in college basketball enables bad actors, and we need them out of the
game. We must take decisive action. This is not a time for half-measures or incremental
change.” As a first step, he announced that the NCAA Board of Governors, the
Division I Board of Directors and the NCAA President had established an independent
Commission on College Basketball, chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice. The Commission
was to “examin[e] critical aspects of a system that clearly is not working” and focus on
three areas:
• The relationship between the NCAA national office, its members, their student-
athletes and coaches and third parties, including apparel companies, non-
scholastic basketball and athlete agents and advisors.
• The relationship between the NCAA and the NBA, including the challenging
effect of the NBA’s current age eligibility rule which created the one-and-done
phenomenon in men’s college basketball.
• The creation of the right relationship between the NCAA’s member institutions
and its national office to promote transparency and accountability.
The NCAA appointed the following additional members of the Commission:
• Mary Sue Coleman, President, Association of American Universities
• General Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. Army, Retired, Chairman, USA Basketball

APRIL 2018
• Jeremy Foley, Athletic Director Emeritus, University of Florida Athletic
Association
• Jeffrey Hathaway, Vice President/Director of Athletics, Hofstra University
• Grant Hill, Owner/Vice Chairman, Atlanta Hawks
• Rev. John I. Jenkins, C.S.C., President, University of Notre Dame
• Mike Montgomery, Retired Basketball Coach, Analyst, PAC-12 Networks
• David Robinson, Founder, Admiral Capital Group
• Kathryn Ruemmler, Former White House Counsel, Partner, Latham & Watkins
LLP
• Gene Smith, Sr., Vice President and Wolfe Foundation Endowed Athletics
Director, Ohio State University
• John Thompson III, Board of Directors, National Association of Basketball

Coaches
The Commission was charged with gathering information and expert opinions
for making “transformative recommendations” to the Division I Board of Directors and
NCAA Board of Governors on “legislation, policies, actions and structure(s) to protect
the integrity of college sports, with a focus on Division I men’s basketball.” Members
of the Commission were appointed for an initial six-month term. The Commission’s
goal was the completion of its work and a report to the NCAA Boards for action at their
April 2018 meetings. This document is that report, and it contains the Commission’s
recommendations with respect to the challenges currently facing college basketball.
Before going further, however, the Commission believes it is important to

confront the uncomfortable fact that the challenges identified in this report have been
part of the landscape of pre-professional basketball for many years, and that others
have previously made serious efforts to address them with only limited success. To
be sure, these challenges have become more prominent in the past decade as elite
basketball – pre-college, in-college and post-college – has become exponentially more
lucrative. The fact remains, however, that today’s issues have been around a long
time, and their existence is widely acknowledged. Virtually all stakeholders and others
providing information to the Commission at some point uttered the discouraging phrase:
“Everyone knows what’s been going on.”

APRIL 2018
The Commission now recommends that the NCAA seeks changes from other
organizations, such as the NBA and the NBPA, and that it make significant internal
changes, including fundamental changes to the process, rules and penalties related to
compliance. However, the Commission recognizes that some humility is required in light
of past failures and the size of the challenge. Stakeholders do not agree about either
the causes or the potential solutions to the current challenges that face pre-professional
basketball. The Commission believes that these challenges will persist unless all
stakeholders accept responsibility for the credibility of the game, the reputations of the
schools who field teams and the integrity of the athletes who compete.
The Commission’s Process
A. Information Gathering: Conversations with Stakeholders
From mid-October 2017 through early April 2018, the Commission sought the
views of stakeholders. In meetings, the Commission directly heard the views of a
number of parties. In addition, the Commission opened a portal and solicited public
comment on its work, receiving numerous helpful written responses. The Commission
heard directly from the NBA, the NBPA, USA Basketball, numerous NCAA offices and
departments, multiple athletic conferences, several apparel companies and agents,
college and high school coaches associations, student and faculty associations, athletic
directors’ associations, other interested associations and groups, the Uniform Law
Commission, athletes and other individuals. The Commission appreciates all of this
helpful input into its work.
B. Information Gathering: Briefings from the NCAA, Its Agents and

Others
The Commission also benefited from the following briefings:
• Path of an elite men’s basketball player, Dan Gavitt, Senior Vice

President of Basketball, NCAA;
• Current NCAA eligibility, accountability and infractions framework,

Donald Remy, Executive Vice President of Law, Policy & Governance
and Chief Legal Officer, NCAA; Oliver Luck, Executive Vice President
of Regulatory Affairs, NCAA;
• NCAA Compliance and Infractions Model, Kay Norton, President,

University of Northern Colorado; Greg Christopher, Director of
Athletics, Xavier University;

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• Prosecutions Involving NCAA Division I Coaches, Ron Machen,
Partner, Wilmer Hale, outside counsel to the NCAA;
• Division I Men’s Basketball Study on Youth Sport, Recruiting and

College Choice, NCAA Research, presented by Lydia Bell, NCAA.
C. Deliberations
In its meetings, the Commission spent close to 70% of its time in executive
session to discuss its dialogue with stakeholders and the materials and presentations it
had received. The Commission’s discussions were enhanced by the varied and deep
experience of its members, including former student-athletes, former professional
athletes, coaches, athletic directors, university presidents and provosts and NBA
owners. The Commission also benefited from the insights, experience and expertise of
its members who are “outsiders,” and brought to bear their unique perspectives from
government and the military on the current problems of men’s Division I basketball.
Through executive session discussions, the Commission was able to assess how the
information it received and the perspectives of stakeholders might affect potential NCAA
actions to address the issues identified for the Commission’s consideration.
SUMMARY IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUES
Both Division I men’s basketball and the NBA are multi-billion dollar enterprises.
Many individuals and entities earn a living and more by direct and indirect association
with these entities. Thus, the financial stakes are high for elite players, 14 coaches, athletic
directors, colleges and universities, apparel companies, agents and athlete advisors of
all stripes. Where this much money is at stake, the incentives to break rules are high. To
identify issues and craft potential recommended responses, the Commission was asked
to focus on three categories of relationships in college basketball: (1) the relationships
between college basketball and the NBA and NBPA; (2) the relationships between the
NCAA and its member institutions; and (3) the relationships between college basketball
and apparel companies, non-scholastic basketball (coaches and leagues), agents and
other third parties.
A. The Relationships Among College Basketball, The NBA and The

NBPA
In 2006, the NBA and the NBPA first entered into a collective bargaining
agreement that made high school players ineligible for the NBA draft. There is,
14 There is no single definition of elite. There is a small group of players each year considered to have the potential to jump from high school
to the NBA (single digits); a larger group of 25-30 players heavily recruited by prominent Division I programs; and still a larger group playing in
the elite apparel companies’ circuits (perhaps 800 spread over four recruiting classes). All told, Division I schools recruit roughly 1125 basketball
players each year. Each of these categories may be referred to as “elite.”

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however, a small group of elite players who would prefer to bypass college and play in
the NBA after high school and who would be drafted, were it permitted under the NBA’s
and NBPA’s collectively bargained rules. These players often do not find the alternative
professional options – such as the G League or non-U.S. leagues – as desirable as
making a name for themselves in Division I men’s basketball. Thus, these players,
colloquially referred to as one-and-done players, attend college for a single year – and
sometimes only until the day their schools are eliminated from the NCAA tournament.
Since 2006, NBA teams have drafted an average of eight college freshman each
year. Most of these one-and-done players attended one of six schools.15 However, the
small numbers mask a large issue with respect to third-party influence and corruption, as
well as the corruption of academic standards.
Many who number among elite players while in high school believe and expect
that they will play professional basketball. See Executive Summary (ES) Section 1.B.
Many third parties – e.g., agents, apparel companies and other athlete advisors – see
some high school players’ potential for a professional career, and the potential for
earnings for themselves, and are willing to invest in a significant number of players
in the hope that some will be drafted and yield returns. Thus, the incentives for third
parties to make improper payments to players and others with influence over players
exist beyond the small group of players who may be one-and-done, and extend into the
slightly larger group of players who will play additional years of college basketball before
playing professionally. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that substantial third-party attention,
including financial attention, will focus on one-and-done players and a relatively small
additional group.
For a subset of these players who have no intention of spending more than a year
or two in college or whose time is fully consumed by basketball, maintaining academic
eligibility to play may be a challenge. If that player is good enough, however, the school
may be strongly motivated to assist that student-athlete in maintaining his eligibility. This
situation creates another opening for corruption – the manipulation and dilution of academic
standards by school officials, along with other academic misconduct. A series of recent cases
involve this phenomenon. Other cases illustrate the lack of clarity about the NCAA’s rules
and the likely punishment for academic misconduct, as well as inconsistency in the NCAA’s
application of the rules.16 This problem of corruption of college standards clearly is not
15 Over the past decade, the number of one-and-done players has ranged from five to 18. In the past four years, the range is 9-18 (9 in 2014,
13 in 2015, 14 in 2016, and 18 in 2017). Backup Information Regarding “One-and-Done” Players, Dec. 6, 2017.
16 See, e.g., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Public Infractions Decision, Oct. 13, 2017 (holding that only member institutions – not
the NCAA – can determine whether academic fraud has occurred and that student-athletes did not receive extra benefits because the sham
courses at issue were available to all students); University of Notre Dame Infractions Decision, Feb. 13, 2018 (upholding decision that Notre
Dame must vacate all records in which student-athletes participated while ineligible due to academic misconduct in which a full-time student
working a part-time job as a student trainer was involved); Georgia Southern Univ. Public Infractions Decision, July 7, 2016 (finding that
institutional staff members provided impermissible academic assistance where one gave a student-athlete a flash drive containing completed
coursework and another wrote and submitted extra credit papers for student-athletes).

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restricted to one-and-done players, but these players effectively illustrate one issue created
by the matriculation of student-athletes who enroll in school solely to play basketball.
The one-and-done phenomenon has provided some benefits to colleges and

universities and to elite high school basketball players. Schools achieve national notice
and prominence with athletic success and championships due to the presence of these
players, with associated financial and reputational benefits. As for players, many believe
that they will have the opportunity to play professional basketball if they can draw the
attention of professional coaches and scouts. Playing Division I men’s basketball allows
players to make a name for themselves among professional leagues and teams. Further,
these players receive some of the educational and other benefits associated with a year
in college.
In addition, elite high school players currently understand that in order to play
Division I basketball, they must meet the eligibility requirements to attend a Division I
school. See NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.3 (Freshman Academic Requirements). Because
numerous players who will not play professional basketball nonetheless believe that
they will, these players gain the benefit of educational levels and opportunities that they
might otherwise have forgone. The Commission takes these benefits seriously and, in
particular, does not underestimate the transformative possibilities in attaining academic
eligibility for college or in spending a year or more in college.
Finally, many high school and collegiate student-athletes do not receive the
information and assistance they need to accurately determine whether and when to
pursue professional basketball. The NCAA’s current rules on amateurism place limits on
the ability of those players to test the professional market for their services and to obtain
assistance from an agent in assessing their potential value. This, in turn, may prevent
student-athletes from taking full advantage of their collegiate opportunities.
B. The NCAA’s Relationship With Member Institutions
The Commission heard from many commenters who identified both the NCAA’s
enforcement process and the substance of the NCAA’s rules as inadequate to deal with
the challenges presented by Division I men’s basketball.
1. Process
There appears to be a strong consensus that when the stakes are high – i.e.,
when violations are serious and the potential penalties are substantial – the NCAA’s
member institutions are not complying with the NCAA’s shared governance and
cooperative principles and NCAA rules are not being effectively enforced. See NCAA
Division I Bylaw 19.2 (Expectations and Shared Responsibility); NCAA Division I Bylaw

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19.2.3 (Responsibility to Cooperate); NCAA Constitution 2.8 (The Principle of Rules
Compliance). Specifically, the NCAA’s investigative and enforcement powers are limited
and often appear inadequate to effectively investigate and address serious violations
of NCAA rules in consequential situations. The Commission did not hear from a single
stakeholder who supported the current system in addressing high-stakes infractions.
In support of the allegation that the NCAA’s investigative powers are insufficient,
many stakeholders noted that when the U.S. Attorney’s Office announced the charges
that prompted the NCAA to establish this Commission, no one in the relevant
community expressed surprise and many stated that “everyone knows” that these kinds
of payments occur. Where an entire community is aware of substantial rule breaking and
the governance body fails to act, the result is cynicism and contempt.
Virtually all stakeholders, including NCAA staff, expressed the view that the current
model for adjudication of NCAA rules violations should not continue. Representatives of
member institutions that have crosscutting and potentially self-interested incentives with
respect to punishment administer the NCAA’s current adjudication process. While many
stakeholders expressed gratitude and respect for the hard work of the volunteers who
administer the current infractions process, all expressed the belief that the current system
is not working in cases involving serious violations.
2. Substance, Including Penalties
Stakeholders further suggested that the Commission consider whether the

substantive content of certain NCAA rules is contributing to the problems identified
above. Stakeholders identified numerous issues with the NCAA’s current rules governing
eligibility, amateurism and recruiting. As noted above, they also expressed the view that
the consequences for rule violators were insufficient in many instances and excessive in
others.
Eligibility and Academic Misconduct. The Commission heard criticism of the

NCAA’s rules related to academic eligibility. See NCAA Bylaws, Art. 14. With respect
to post-enrollment academic performance, the NCAA’s “progress towards degree”
requirements determine whether individuals remain eligible to play. Stakeholders did
not take issue with the substance of these rules. Instead, the Commission heard criticism
about the NCAA’s relationship with member institutions’ course offerings and academic
requirements.
Some stakeholders believe that the NCAA should not be in the business of
enforcing academic standards. However, many others assert that the NCAA’s current rules
with respect to academic standards undermine the integrity of the collegiate experience
and game. All agree that the NCAA’s jurisdiction to address academic fraud and

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misconduct as related to athletic eligibility must be clarified and become more consistent.
Amateurism. The Commission also heard from critics of current NCAA rules
regarding amateurism. NCAA rules require that students who play for college teams
qualify as “amateurs” and continue to be so qualified throughout their collegiate years.
Although there are exceptions and complexities, the Bylaws forbid college athletes to
receive compensation in any form in the sport, to accept a promise of pay, to sign a
contract or commitment to play professional athletics, to receive consideration from a
professional sports organization, to compete on a professional team and to enter into
an agreement with an agent. In addition, a student-athlete cannot receive preferential
treatment, benefits or services because of his athletic reputation or skill, unless
specifically permitted by NCAA rules. NCAA Division I Bylaws 12.1.1.2.1 (Amateur
Status After Certification); 12.1.1.1.3 (Eligibility for Practice or Competition), 12.1.2
(Amateur Status); 12.1.2.1.6 (Preferential Treatment, Benefits or Services).
Some stakeholders note that many elite players receive some form of payment to
play basketball before attending college; that student-athletes are bringing substantial
sums into NCAA and collegiate coffers; and that playing Division I men’s college
basketball is essentially a full time job that does not leave room for a normal college
experience. They conclude for some or all of these reasons that players should receive
some recompense (beyond the full value of their education) for playing basketball.17
Others recognize the validity of some of these points, but contend the student-
athletes receive significant benefits from their college experiences, including the value
of the scholarship (the full cost of a college education), the associated training, coaching
and benefits of being on a collegiate team, and the lifelong incremental increase in
earning power resulting from a college degree. See ES Section 1.D. Many believe that
paying players is not financially or legally feasible and that doing so would fundamentally
alter the nature of the collegiate game. They support a variety of means – other than
payment – to address the economic circumstances and equities of student-athletes in
high-revenue sports, and to ensure that they receive the education that the college
promises. In addition, they support continued enforcement of the amateurism rules.
17 The NCAA has faced and continues to face legal challenges to its amateurism rules under antitrust and employment theories. Northwestern
Univ. and College Athletes Players Ass’n, Case 13-RC-12135, 362 NLRB No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015) (declining to accept jurisdiction over bargaining
unit of Division I FBS football players who receive scholarships); In re: National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litigation, Case No. 4:14-md-2541-CW (N.D. CA 2014) (challenging failure to pay Division I men’s and women’s basketball and FBS football
players the difference in the value of an athletic scholarship and the full cost of attendance); Jenkins et al. v. NCAA, Civil Action 14-CV-3:33-
av-0001 (D.N.J. 2014) (challenging agreement not to compete for services of Division I men’s basketball and FBS football players as violation of
the antitrust laws without legitimate pro-competitive purposes); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2011) (challenging NCAA’s bylaws
limitation precluding compensation for student-athletes’ images and likenesses in violation of the antitrust laws); Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285
(7th Cir. 2016) (alleging that all Division I student-athletes are entitled to minimum wage for practice and competition as employees regardless of
whether they receive athletic-related scholarships).

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Still others believe that the NCAA rules are so focused on pre-professional sports
that the NCAA has failed to create a system that makes sense for the majority of student-
athletes who will not make a living at their sports. Under these rules, stakeholders
assert, student-athletes who accept any “benefit,” no matter how small, risk losing
their eligibility to compete. The NCAA’s administration of the “no benefit” rule, see
NCAA Bylaw 16.11.2 (Nonpermissible), was criticized as penalizing student-athletes and
preventing them from engaging in normal interactions with friends and mentors. Those
holding this view suggest that the NCAA should engage in common sense calibration of
the “no benefit” rule for particular contexts.
Agents. NCAA rules further forbid collegiate athletes to enter into any agreement
(oral or written) with agents for purposes of marketing their athletic ability or reputation
for financial gain, even if that agreement is limited to future representation. Prohibited
marketing includes negotiations with professional teams, seeking product endorsements
and efforts to place an athlete at a particular school. The rules likewise forbid family
members or other representatives to enter into such an agreement on behalf of an
athlete. In addition, athletes may not accept benefits from agents even if those benefits
do not have strings visibly attached. NCAA Division I Bylaws 12.3.1 (General Rule);
12.3.1.2 (Representation for Future Negotiations); 12.02.1 (Agent); 12.3.3 (Athletics
Scholarship Agent); 12.3.1.3 (Benefits from Prospective Agents).18
Some stakeholders expressed the view that agents should be permitted to have
earlier access to athletes, potentially as early as during high school, and certainly at the
beginning of each academic year in college. Agents opined that parents, families and
students are eager for knowledge about their collegiate, professional and post-collegiate
options and that they will find that information one way or another. They assert that
student-athletes routinely misunderstand their own professional prospects and their best
path to success and that agents and advisors could assist student-athletes in making
the best choices about eligibility, including choices that would result in higher levels of
educational achievement.
In addition, many stakeholders, including agents, told the Commission that agents
are determined to develop relationships with professional prospects and, whatever
the rules provide, will find ways to make contact with student-athletes and those who
influence them. Most stakeholders believe that many agents are already communicating
with elite high school players and with collegiate players with professional prospects,
18 There are some exceptions to this prohibition. For example, a student-athlete may use the services of an attorney or other individual to
evaluate a professional sports contract (though that person may not be present for or otherwise represent the athlete in negotiations with a
professional team). NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.3.2 (Legal Counsel). A school’s professional sports counseling panel is permitted to review a
proposed professional contract and provide other services to student-athletes considering a professional career, NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.3.4
(Professional Sports Counseling Panel). An athlete may also engage and pay a recruiting service to provide information to colleges on the
athlete’s behalf, provided the fee paid to such a service is not based on placement of the prospective student-athlete in a college as a recipient
of institutional financial aid. NCAA Division I Bylaws 12.3.3 (Athletics Scholarship Agent); 12.3.1 (Talent Evaluation Services and Agents).

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often in violation of NCAA and school rules. It would be better, stakeholders argue,
if these contacts were in the open and regulated by the NCAA, including by requiring
NCAA certification and registration with schools and by restricting contact to specific
times and places.
Still other stakeholders, including a number of agents, took the position that
allowing agents to have contact with high school students will result in even earlier
agent involvement in student-athletes’ decision making, including their selection of
a grassroots or non-scholastic basketball coach, a high school, a college, etc. These
stakeholders maintain that the barriers to entry for professional agents should be higher
(while recognizing that the NBPA has recently taken important steps to improve the
quality of the agent cadre), and that the penalties for agents who violate NCAA rules
should be higher (either through enforcement of state laws or through reporting of
violations to the NBPA or other unspecified rule changes).
Recruiting. In the view of many Division I coaches, the NCAA rules hamstring
college coaches and allow non-scholastic coaches and other third parties to become
the primary influences over elite high school players. For example, Division I coaches
have limited opportunities to evaluate high school players in both scholastic and non-
scholastic settings, and those players cannot officially visit colleges and universities until
late in their junior year. See generally NCAA Division I Bylaws, Art. 13. Indeed, Division
I coaches complain that they are dependent on non-scholastic coaches, leagues and
events for opportunities to view players, giving those third parties even more leverage
over high school players. In the interim, high school players are playing non-scholastic
basketball sponsored by apparel companies who provide those high school players with
gear, travel and experiences. Division I coaches seek to increase their direct contact with
high school players at critical junctures, and to limit their dependence on non-scholastic
coaches, leagues and apparel companies for access to high school players.
Penalties. Finally, most stakeholders believe that the NCAA must have authority to
impose harsher penalties on schools, coaches and administrators (including presidents)
who violate the rules or know of rules violations and do nothing or who fail to cooperate
with NCAA investigators. There was a strong sentiment that the NCAA must have the
ability to impose loss of post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, and loss of
revenue from post-season play on those who commit serious infractions and those who
decline to cooperate with NCAA investigations. They believe that the availability – and
utilization – of these penalties would get presidential and board-level attention at colleges.
These persons further note that administrators, athletic directors and coaches who violate
the rules often move on to other member institutions, and do not pay a significant price
for violations that occur on their watch. Moreover, the institutions that hire individuals who
have violated the rules pay no significant price for taking the risk of hiring past offenders.

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3. The Relationships Among College Basketball, Non-Scholastic
Basketball, Apparel Companies, Agents and Other Third Parties
Currently, the NCAA “certifies” some non-scholastic or non-scholastic basketball

events and leagues. NCAA Division I Bylaws 13.18 (Basketball Event Certification);
17.31.4.1 (Summer Basketball Leagues). Coaches at NCAA member institutions can
attend these summer events only if the NCAA certifies them. Unfortunately, however,
the requirements for NCAA certification are minimal, to be generous; and some of the
requirements are poorly implemented while others are not enforced. Non-scholastic
basketball is largely unregulated.
While an elite basketball player is in high school, he will virtually always develop
a relationship with a non-scholastic basketball team and coach and with an apparel
company – most likely one of Nike, Adidas or Under Armour. Specifically, apparel
companies sponsor elite high school teams that participate in NCAA-certified and
other events around the country, including all-star games, camps, and other so-called
elite experiences. In addition, Nike sponsors the USA Basketball Men’s Developmental
National Team. By funding non-scholastic basketball, the apparel companies receive
valuable input about their products, important exposure and credibility through their
products’ use, and an opportunity to form early relationships with future college and
professional athletes. In connection with participating in these events and experiences,
elite players (and their families) may receive luxury travel, gear and other benefits.
Sometimes the apparel companies pay the non-scholastic basketball coaches for working
with these teams and/or participating in their events.
In addition to coaching, experience, gear and travel, these non-scholastic

basketball teams and events offer players exposure, including to Division I coaches. For
example, Division I coaches attend and recruit at the NCAA-certified events which are
held in April and July each year. Many summer coaches have ongoing relationships
with Division I coaches. They can thus bring “their” players to the attention of Division I
coaches and potentially influence players to attend particular schools, including schools
where “their” apparel company is a sponsor.
The Commission heard varying views on whether the NCAA should be more or
less or differently involved in non-scholastic basketball. All stakeholders agreed that
non-scholastic basketball has provided substantial benefits to many student-athletes
– competition, gear, travel and similar enriching experiences, coaching, exposure to
college coaches and an opportunity to receive a college scholarship, among other
things. In addition, many college coaches use the events at which significant numbers
of high school players gather to evaluate potential recruits efficiently and economically.
Coaches at less advantaged schools rely on these large gatherings to scout the numbers

APRIL 2018
of players they must see in order to put their teams together.
That said, virtually all stakeholders expressed the view that currently, non-
scholastic basketball lacks sufficient regulation, with detrimental effects on college
basketball. For example, significant money flows into summer ball from apparel
companies, agents, investment advisers and other sources, and there is little
accountability or transparency about many of the sources and expenditures of those
funds. Many state that it is well known that student-athletes are paid – either directly or
indirectly (through family members or otherwise) – to play for particular summer teams.
Almost all elite basketball players participate in non-scholastic basketball. Thus, as
noted above, many players and their families are accustomed to being paid before they
attend college.
Many stakeholders further observed that non-scholastic event operators and

coaches are sometimes paid to influence student-athletes on their teams to attend
particular schools or to work with particular agents and advisors. Players and their
families often are not aware of these relationships, and thus not aware that the coach
has a financial interest in the player’s decisions about school or representation. Further,
college coaches seeking to recruit a player with a relationship to a non-scholastic
basketball event operator or coach may have to pay or provide benefits to that operator
or coach to be successful in recruiting that player.19
A number of stakeholders expressed the view that one way to lessen the negative
influence of non-scholastic basketball event operators and coaches would be for the
NCAA to administer its own regional non-scholastic basketball camps in July and to
restrict NCAA coaches to those NCAA camps for July. Coaches would be able to see
numerous elite high school players in one location, in theory without the need for an
advance blessing from a non-scholastic basketball coach.
Even putting non-scholastic basketball aside, an elite high school player will
develop relationships with a variety of other third parties who may affect his college
eligibility and career. Most notably, as already discussed, many of these players will
have relationships with agents, often through a “runner” for an agent who is hoping
(and perhaps paying) to secure the player as a future client. Sometimes a player’s family
members have substantial influence with the player; and they, too, may be paid by
agents or other third parties hoping to develop relationships with a future professional.
Thus, when a college coach first reaches out to a high school player, that player
may already have a coach to whom he is loyal, and that coach may have relationships
19 Sports journalists have recounted the stories of non-scholastic basketball, as summarized in the Pac-12 Men’s Basketball Task Force Report
& Recommendations, pp. 16, 19-22 (Mar. 2018) (citing G. Dohrmann, Play Their Hearts Out (Ballentine Books 2010); K. McNutt, Playing Time:
Tough Truths About AAU Basketball, Youth Sports, Parents and Athletes, African American Images, ch. 2 (2015)).

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with other Division I coaches. The player will also be on a team associated with and loyal
to a particular apparel company, and be at the center of a web of other influences and
loyalties beyond family and friends, often including an agent. Of course, the college
coach too may have a contract with an agent or apparel company. This context makes
college recruiting complex and challenging.
Under the current system, Division I men’s basketball players are amateurs
(student-athletes) and may receive a scholarship to matriculate and play basketball for
their institution, but may not be paid for doing so. In the context described above,
however, a player may be strongly tempted to break NCAA rules and enter into a
relationship with an agent or attend a particular college in order to be paid. Similarly,
coaches and other college representatives may be strongly tempted to pay players,
family members and others who can influence players to attend particular schools. As
illustrated by the recent charges brought by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, this possibility is
not merely theoretical.
This situation is exacerbated for elite players who have solid professional
prospects in the NBA, and thus potential future earnings in the tens or hundreds of
millions. Apparel companies and agents will be highly motivated to start paying a player
(and those who may influence the player) even before he attends college to develop as
deep a relationship as possible.
Many of these incentives for third-party conduct are present not only when
high school players enter college, but also when college players consider transferring
to another institution. As noted above, roughly 40% of freshmen in Division I men’s
basketball depart the institution they choose to attend by the end of their sophomore
year. Third parties influence many of these transfers. The question of improper
influence, accordingly, clearly extends to transfers.
In sum, numerous players provide value to their schools and to third parties who
may benefit from their success, and they and/or their families may receive offers of
financial support for choices that they make. Some players and/or their families may
be in challenging financial circumstances; others may become accustomed to receiving
financial support and benefits even before attending a college or university. Student-
athletes are currently restricted in their ability to earn income related to their status as
student-athletes while matriculating. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.1.2 (Amateur
Status). Thus, players or their families may be offered and receive money the NCAA
rules prohibit them from taking, and coaches and others associated with NCAA member
institutions may be involved in those payments or themselves take payments to influence
players in a variety of ways.

APRIL 2018
Development of a Framework and Commission Recommendations
As it gathered information and listened to stakeholders, the Commission heard

numerous recommendations for specific reforms to address the issues in Division I
men’s basketball described above. In assessing both the challenges and the potential
reforms, the Commission accepted as its foundational principle the collegiate model
of athletic competition. The NCAA’s basic purpose is “to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral
part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.” NCAA Constitution 1.3.1 (Basic
Purpose). Member institutions are responsible for controlling their intercollegiate
athletics program “in compliance with the rules and regulations of” the NCAA. NCAA
Constitution 2.1.1 (Responsibility for Control). “It is the responsibility of each member
institution to establish and maintain an environment in which a student-athlete’s activities
are conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete’s educational experience.”
NCAA Constitution 2.2.1 (Overall Educational Experience). The Commission’s
recommendations seek to support and further both the NCAA’s purpose and its
members’ acceptance of responsibility for its achievement.
The Commission recognizes that Division I men’s college basketball is just one
part of a much larger ecosystem that includes Youth, High School, Non-Scholastic and
Professional Basketball. Stakeholders include student-athletes, parents and extended
families, coaches, trainers, agents and other advisers, apparel companies, colleges and
universities, professional leagues and players’ associations and others. In making its
recommendations, the Commission sought to take into account these other parts of the
basketball ecosystem.
The issues currently confronting the NCAA and Division I men’s college basketball
are long standing and complex. The Commission believes, however, that implementing
the recommendations below will support the integrity of the collegiate game and the
NCAA’s member institutions without unduly limiting the individual opportunities of
student-athletes.

APRIL 2018
RECOMMENDATIONS
Section 1: Realistic Pathways for Student-Athlete Success
A. Separate The Collegiate Pathway And The Professional Pathway By

Ending One-And-Done.
The Commission concludes that requiring elite high school players whom the
NBA would draft to attend college contributes significantly to the corruption of college
basketball and higher educational institutions generally. Holding college players
with professional prospects captive, and depriving them of the opportunity to earn
professional salaries, also fuels the firestorm of complaints that the NCAA and its
member institutions are exploiting college players. Only the NBA and the NBPA can
change this rule. Thus, the Commission calls on the NBA and the NBPA promptly to
negotiate NBA eligibility for players who are 18 years old.
Before 2006, extraordinary high school graduates such as Kevin Garnett, Kobe
Bryant and LeBron James bypassed college and went directly to the NBA. Numerous
other high school players, however, were drafted and struggled. The NBA began to
push for a minimum age requirement – to provide teams with more time to evaluate
developing young talent – and this effort succeeded in 2006. Starting with the 2006
draft, elite basketball players graduating from high school who are capable of playing
in the NBA have not been eligible to do so because they are not 19 years old. Thus, to
complete at a high level, these players must either attend a Division I school with a high
quality basketball program or play professional basketball overseas. The vast majority
do not view the international professional option as viable and choose to attend college.
The Commission concludes that elite high school athletes should be able to choose a
professional pathway if one is available.
In the Commission’s view, preventing young athletes capable of and preferring to

play in the NBA from doing so, and pushing them into enrolling in college for a single
year (or less), is doing more harm than good for college basketball and college. The
potential earning power of marquee college players who can win championships for their
schools is an irresistible draw for third-party attention and money, most notably from
athlete advisors. Their game-changing potential for a college team creates the strongest
motivation for improper payments from third parties and violations of NCAA rules by
school administrators, coaches and other persons associated with member institutions.
The Commission heard from many stakeholders that agents and associated
advisers are the primary source of money used for direct and indirect payments
to players and their families and for payments to coaches and other persons of
influence with players. To state the obvious, agents receive enormous commissions

APRIL 2018
for negotiating the NBA, shoe and apparel, and other endorsement contracts of
professional players. Financial advisers earn significant commissions for investing
professional players’ funds. Competition to sign potential professional players is
cutthroat. Agents and other advisers seek to enter into relationships with potential
professionals when those players are in high school and in college, and they do so by
paying the players and those with influence over the players, including family members
and coaches, in violation of NCAA rules. Agents and other advisers also appear to
have (and many actually have) valuable information and access to opportunities, such
as coaching, training and exposure to college coaches. Agents and other advisers thus
form early relationships with potential professional players and their “influencers,” and
players and their “influencers” become accustomed to being paid.
Eliminating one-and-done players from college basketball will remove the group
of most likely future professionals, and the associated potential for corrupt payments
from agents. Allowing collegiate players who become clear professional prospects to
depart when they choose to do so should similarly lessen the temptation to cheat while
in college.
Student-athletes, of course, are not the only ones subject to these financial
temptations. The potential financial benefits that these players bring to a college can
also corrupt the school’s academic program and standards; schools might offer special
benefits to these athletes in violation of NCAA rules or dilute the education of all
students. Finally, the matriculation of players virtually certain to attend school for a short
time primarily to play Division I basketball is a public acknowledgement that certain
student-athletes will not, as a practical matter, be college students.
The Commission is not naïve. It understands that implementation of this

recommendation will not eliminate the problems described above, most notably third-
party payments to athletes to attend particular colleges and the resulting potential
for corruption of collegiate programs. Many Division I college basketball players who
will never play in the NBA will bring championships and money to their schools and,
as a result, may be offered payment by those who would benefit or by boosters. In
addition, many of those players will have professional potential and receive payments
based on the mistaken hopes of third parties for eventual rewards. Colleges, too, will
reap enormous benefits from the attendance of players unlikely to make it to the NBA,
and thus may be motivated to compromise academic standards. Many student-athletes
who play Division I college basketball have the “student” part of their student-athlete
experience diluted so they can focus on basketball, without regard to their professional
potential.
Nonetheless, the Commission believes that its recommendation both expands

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opportunity for individuals and significantly reduces the incentives for improper payments,
and is thus one important part of an overall effort to limit corruption in college basketball
and to support the collegiate model. The Commission recognizes that this change will
be most effective in combination with the other recommendations it is making, including
reformed and improved NCAA investigative and adjudicative processes, higher penalties
for infractions, and new requirements for financial transparency and accountability in
member institutions’ athletic programs and in non-scholastic basketball.20
The Commission considered alternatives to the recommendation above. In light

of the value and importance of staying in college for more than a year, the Commission
carefully considered recommending adoption of the so-called baseball rule.21 To
oversimplify, that rule would provide that if a player enrolls in college, his eligibility
terminates on the first day of matriculation and he remains ineligible to play in the NBA
or G League until he is at least 21 years old or his entering class completes its third year
in college. This rule offers some significant benefits. It would require students who
choose the collegiate path to understand that they are making a serious commitment to
their education, and it would create a context in which athletes are ultimately more likely
to receive their degrees.
However, the baseball rule would also force collegiate players who could sign with
an NBA team to remain in school, with the negative consequences that would entail.
Moreover, both the culture and professional path of a major league baseball player differ
dramatically from that of an NBA player. Baseball has a tiered, large-scale minor league
system, and even elite players often spend years developing in the minors. In addition,
one baseball player generally cannot change the fortunes of a baseball team. As a
result, the baseball rule does not translate perfectly to basketball.
If the NBA and the NBPA were to adopt the “baseball rule,” we believe that the
challenges created by the presence of one-and-done players would simply migrate
to older future NBA players unhappily captive in their second and third collegiate
years. Holding players with NBA opportunities hostage also feeds the narrative of
collegiate player exploitation, putting pressure on the NCAA’s commitment to the
collegiate model. Players with professional earning power should have the freedom to
choose a professional path. The Commission believes that student-athletes should be
encouraged but not forced to remain in college.
The Commission also considered ending freshman eligibility. This change would
penalize many student-athletes ready to play Division I college basketball in their first
years (and their schools) in order to address a problem created by a small group. As
20 As noted in the Executive Summary, Section 1.A., the NCAA should also monitor the impact of this change in areas such as reclassification in
case further action is required.
21 Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, Rule 4-First-Year Player Draft.

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an alternative to the blanket elimination of freshman eligibility, the Commission also
considered conditioning such eligibility on some additional measure of Freshman
Readiness, a demonstration that a student-athlete’s high school experience has prepared
him for college academic requirements. As a less drastic measure, the Commission
considered making all Division I basketball scholarships three or four year scholarships
such that colleges would be required to “lock up” scholarships if they recruited a
player unlikely to matriculate for more than a year or did so regularly. There are serious
downsides to each of these alternatives.
The Commission is optimistic that the NBA and the NBPA will agree with its
assessment. If the NBA and the NBPA are unable to negotiate an end to one-and-done
by the end of 2018, however, the Commission will reconvene and reassess the viability of
some of these alternative tools. The current situation is unacceptable.
B. Allow Student-Athletes To Test Their Professional Prospects And

Maintain Eligibility If They Do Not Sign A Professional Contract.
The Commission recommends that student-athletes be permitted to enter the

draft and retain their collegiate eligibility if they are not drafted, provided they otherwise
remain eligible to do so and they return to the same school.
The NCAA should provide high school and college players with additional
flexibility in retaining collegiate eligibility while assessing their professional prospects.
Under current NCAA rules, players may apply for an NBA Undergraduate Advisory
Committee evaluation and participate in the NBA Combine, but players lose their
collegiate eligibility if they do not remove their names from the draft within ten days
after the NBA Combine. NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.2.4.2.1 (Exception – Basketball). It
is easy to say that young players should know that they will not be drafted and that
they “make their own beds” when they fail to withdraw from the draft. But, this kind
of misjudgment is widespread, and the penalty for it should not be so high, if we are
serious about the value and importance of college. The quality and value of the college
experience increases with the amount of time a student-athlete spends on campus. With
the completion of each academic year, a student will face a lower hurdle to earning
a degree. Student-athletes who are wrong about their professional prospects should
retain the opportunity to work toward the degree they were promised.
We recognize that this regime has some downsides. Under current collectively
bargained rules, a player who declares for the draft, but is not drafted, is a free agent
and may sign with any NBA team at any time, including the middle of the next college
season. To address this problem, the Commission requests that the NBA and the NBPA
agree that players who are not drafted become ineligible for the NBA until they enter
the draft again.

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In addition, if players remain in the draft until it occurs, college coaches will not
know until June which players are eligible for, or remain on, their rosters for the next
season. However, the NBA draft is two rounds and involves only 60 players. Data
show that international players will take approximately 40% of these slots. Thus, this
uncertainty implicates very few players (around 36), and we believe that college coaches
are sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable to accurately predict whether a young
player is, in fact, likely to be drafted. Student-athletes may make some decisions that
cost them collegiate eligibility, but the Commission recommends that these points of no
return be modified in light of current realities.
The Commission also has concluded that the NCAA should retain one aspect
of the current transfer rule, which provides that players who transfer must sit out a
season before returning to college basketball competition. NCAA Division I Bylaw
14.5.1 (Residence Requirement – General Principle). Students who transfer face serious
disadvantages in completing their degrees, and are less likely to do so. Despite this
issue, over the last few years, hundreds of players transfer each year, and the trend is
upward.22 Division I basketball players who transfer overwhelmingly do so in order to be
in a better “basketball situation,” without regard for earning their degrees. Moreover,
third parties influence many transfers for their own purposes, often without the best
interests of the player in mind. Thus, the Commission recommends that the “residence
requirement” of the transfer rule remain in place, whatever other changes are made in
the NCAA’s transfer rules.23
The Commission believes that this and other rule changes will provide student-
athletes with better information about their likely professional careers and a greater
likelihood of ultimately achieving a college degree.
C. Permit Students To Receive Meaningful Assessment of Professional

Prospects Earlier With Assistance From Certified Agents.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA and its member institutions develop
strict standards for the certification of agents, and authorize and make opportunities
for those certified agents to engage with student-athletes at school at specific times
during the calendar year. To implement this requirement, the NCAA must appoint a
Vice-President level executive to develop detailed standards for NCAA certification and
administer the program. The NCAA’s program should also educate elite student-athletes
at member institutions about NCAA eligibility rules and requirements and professional
prospects.
22 NCAA Research, Tracking Transfer in Division I Men’s Basketball (Dec. 2017).

23 The Commission further recommends that the NCAA and its Transfer Working Group examine the growing trend in graduate transfers, along
with their falling degree completion rate, to ensure that the graduate transfer rule continues to serve its purposes. See ES Section 1.B.

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The NCAA’s rules already allow student-athletes to retain lawyers and advisors to
provide professional advice at market value, provided the lawyer or advisor does not
engage in the representational activities of agents. NCAA-certified agents should also
be permitted to provide such advice. Further, high school players considering entering
the draft should be allowed to engage NCAA-certified agents and advisors just as
high school baseball players may engage agents for advice about the draft. Cf. NCAA
Division I Bylaw 12.3.1 (Exception – Baseball and Men’s Ice Hockey – Prior to Full-Time
Collegiate Enrollment).
As stated above, both high school and college students misjudge – that is, over
rate – their chances of a professional basketball career. Very few high school players will
play professional basketball. Yet, many high school student-athletes believe they have
professional prospects, and they work hard in high school to maintain eligibility to play
that one-and-done year in college. The concern is that, with the end of one-and-done,
misguided high school players will assume that their NBA careers will start at 18 without
a backup plan to attend college. College students, too, misunderstand their prospects.
In addition, the families of players lack objective, credible sources of information about
the professional and collegiate paths. All of these students need timely, reliable and
trusted sources of information about their likelihood of professional success.
Current NCAA rules forbid players, their families and their associates to enter into
written or oral agreements with, or to receive benefits from, individuals whom NCAA
rules define as “agents”24 or their employees. However, the Commission was advised
that agents court elite players from an early age, and that many such players are paid,
either directly or indirectly.25 Yet, virtually all agents with whom the Commission met
advised the Commission not to allow high school or collegiate athletes to enter into
agreements with agents in advance of their professional careers. They generally thought
that this would simply increase the influence of corrupt agents at an even earlier age.
Instead, agents recommended creating opportunities for “good” agents to talk with
high school and collegiate players and make their cases so that players would have all
available options before they enter the professional market. The Commission intends
NCAA-certification to provide these opportunities for “good” agents.
Players and families desperate for information are entering into relationships with
agents, sometimes as early as the player’s sophomore year of high school. The NCAA
should bring these conversations into the light and allow elite players to discuss their
prospects with agents whom it certifies under NCAA-approved standards. This would
24 An agent is any person who either directly or indirectly represents a prospective or current student-athlete in marketing his athletic ability or
reputation for financial gain or seeks to obtain any kind of financial gain or benefit from securing a student-athlete’s enrollment at an institution
or potential earnings as a professional athlete. NCAA Division I Bylaws 12.02.1 (Agent); 12.02.1.1 (Application).
25 Virtually all such payments, including those involved in the indictments that led to appointment of the Commission, would be unlawful under
the Revised Uniform Athlete Agent Act. See Uniform Law Commission, Acts, Athlete Agents Act, www.uniformlaws.org. More than forty states
have adopted either the Revised or original Act, but it is rarely enforced.

APRIL 2018
provide a channel through which information about a player’s professional prospects and
value could flow.26
The Commission understands that contact with agents can lead to illicit payments
and other rule violations. It thus recommends serious consequences for NCAA-
certified agents who participate in violations of NCAA rules. For example, such agents
should lose their NCAA certification and be barred from non-scholastic basketball
events certified by the NCAA (see Section 3, infra). In addition, agents who the NCAA
decertifies may not pass along representation of their student-athlete clients to other
agents at the same agency. Such agents should also be reported to the NBPA. Finally,
a student-athlete who enters into an agreement, or whose family members enter into an
agreement, with a non-certified agent should lose his eligibility.
The Commission also recommends that the NCAA work with the NBA and the
NBPA to establish additional venues for representatives of those entities to meet with
collegiate players and provide information about professional status and opportunities.
The NBA and the NBPA have unique credibility with collegiate athletes. Players would
make more informed choices about college if they had additional opportunities to hear
from the NBA and its players.
D. Provide Resources To Make The Promise Of A College Education

Real.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial

fund and commit to paying for degree completion for student-athletes with athletic
scholarships who leave college after progress of two years towards a degree. The NCAA
must require Division I programs to establish a Degree Completion Program to support
degree completion by student-athletes who compete and complete two years of college
and then leave school, but later seek to return to college to finish their education. The
NCAA and its member institutions must keep focused on the prize here – a college
degree.
As described above, the Commission starts from the premise that students
who are athletes – not paid professionals – play college sports. It is worth noting that
student-athletes choose the collegiate path, and we want to enhance their ability to
decide whether to do so. But they are making a choice; if it is not the right choice and a
professional path is more desirable, they should take it.
We recognize that many do not accept that premise, and instead argue that those
who play men’s Division I football and basketball earn substantial revenues for their
26 The Commission also recommends that the NCAA itself make additional educational efforts directed at high school players during NCAA
non-scholastic basketball camps. See Section 3.C., infra.

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schools, cannot participate fully in the academic and social experience of college, and
therefore should be treated as professional athletes and paid more than the full cost
of their college educations. Proponents of pay-for-play contend that it is past time to
recognize that men’s Division I football and basketball players are not student-athletes,
but are instead professional athletes who are not receiving a college education. As a
matter of fairness, they contend, the players who earn these massive revenues should
share in them, rather than seeing the money flow to coaches, athletic directors, excessive
facilities and elsewhere. Thus, the argument continues, colleges should openly bid for
players’ services, instead of obtaining their services through a corrupt process as they are
alleged to do now.27
Opponents of pay-for-play strongly believe that college basketball should remain

a game played by student-athletes that has unique value and appeal. They also strongly
resist the argument that student-athletes do not benefit from attending college and
participating in intercollegiate basketball. Their counter is simple. Student-athletes in
fact benefit enormously. They receive full scholarships up to the cost of attendance,
see ES Section 1.D. Students with demonstrated financial need are also eligible for Pell
grants of $5,800 annually. Student-athletes often receive benefits such as meals, special
academic support, travel expenses, coaching, training and nutritional advice, career
guidance and more, worth tens of thousands of dollars annually. Obviously, student-
athletes who remain in school for four years receive four times this value, along with the
increased earning power of a college degree, which is roughly $1 million over a lifetime.
See ES Section 1.D.
In addition, all agree that the complexities of developing a lawful and fair pay-
for-play system are staggering. In an open market for player services, payments would
vary based on the talent of the individual, the revenue that he or she would generate,
the local sports market, etc. It is unclear what happens to the players who are not worth
that much in a pay-for-play model, or whether colleges can compete for players’ services
annually. Opponents of pay-for-play also point out that no system would be fair to all
students, sports and schools, and that many programs would cease to exist, depriving
large numbers of student-athletes without professional potential of an opportunity to
attend college. They also observe that if players were paid a salary instead of the full
cost of attendance at college, they would pay taxes on that salary, and thus receive little
benefit. Paying student-athletes, others assert, would erode the associations between
athletes and their schools, athletes and their teammates, and athletes and their fellow
students.
27 The public argument about pay-for-play includes hundreds of articles and opinion pieces. Here is a small sample: J. Thelin, Paying College
Athletes: How will colleges pay the price? in Inside Higher Education (Feb. 2018); M. Lemmons, College Athletes Getting Paid? Here Are Some
Pros and Cons in HuffPost (March 29, 2017); J. Nocera, A Way to Start Paying College Athletes in The New York Times (Jan. 8, 2016); T. Ross,
Cracking the Cartel: Don’t Pay NCAA Football and Basketball Players, in The New Republic (Sept. 2, 2015); J. Solomon, NCAA Critics Offer Way
to Begin Paying College Players in CBS Sports (2014); P. Hruby, Should College Athletes Get Paid? Ending the Debate Once and For All in The
Atlantic (Apr. 2011); T. Branch, The Shame of College Sports in The Atlantic (Oct. 2011).

APRIL 2018
This debate is longstanding, and many have entrenched views. College basketball
has earned billions for NCAA institutions. Indeed, the major, revenue-generating
college sports have supported the inter-collegiate athletic experiences of thousands
of athletes in sports that are not profitable and have provided a multitude of other
benefits to member institutions. However, those billions have also been used to finance
breathtaking salaries for some coaches in revenue-generating sports and extravagant
athletic facilities, while some colleges reduce academic offerings. Many, including some
members of this Commission, wonder whether colleges and universities are making the
right choices about their institutions’ educational missions.
The Commission has already expressed its view that student-athletes receive
valuable benefits by pursuing a degree and participating in intercollegiate sports. In
addition to the economic benefits detailed above, college sports is a valuable part of
a college education, as illustrated by numerous student-athletes who study, train and
compete with no thought or possibility of “going pro.” But the Commission shares the
concerns of those who believe that the athletes generating these billions in revenues
for NCAA colleges and universities and their coaches and administrators often are not
receiving the benefit of the college education that they are promised. This problem is
compounded when players with professional options are not permitted to leave college
and play professionally. The Commission likewise believes that the large sums of money
and the prestige that accompany college basketball championships can corrupt colleges’
admission standards, academic offerings and integrity.
One aspect of this debate is particularly relevant to the Commission’s mandate.

Paying modest salaries to Division I basketball players will not address the particular
corruption the Commission confronts; nor will providing student-athletes a modest
post-graduation trust fund based on licensing of names, images and likenesses. None
of the contemplated payments would be sufficient to reduce the corrupt incentives of
third parties who pay certain uniquely talented players in the hope of latching onto their
professional futures, of coaches and boosters seeking to secure the success of their
programs, or of colleges willing to undermine their education mission to ensure the
eligibility of players. One would have to adopt a full-scale professional model to forestall
that corruption or, as the Commission recommends, try instead to revitalize the college
model.
Finally, the Commission is also aware of many voices suggesting that allowing
student athletes to earn some financial benefit from the marketing of their names, image
and likenesses (NIL) is consistent with the collegiate model, particularly if students do not
receive those funds until after college. Notably, the NCAA is a defendant in litigation
involving the NCAA’s refusal to allow students to do so. The court suggested that if the
NCAA allowed students to benefit financially from NIL marketing, plaintiffs would then

APRIL 2018
be able to argue that all restrictions on income are anti-competitive. The court stated
that “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes education-related compensation
and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor: it is
a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of
amateurism and no defined stopping point.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078
(9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
A number of members of the Commission were drawn to the idea of reforms

in this arena. However, given the lack of legal clarity on this matter, the Commission
was concerned about the unintended consequences of such changes. See ES Section
1.D. The Commission recommends that if the legal context changes or clarifies, the
NCAA should remain open to rule changes addressing student-athletes and NIL. But,
in the current legal circumstances, the Commission decided to address the charge
of exploitation by providing individual student-athletes with access to professional
opportunities, and ensuring that the student portion of student-athlete is real.
Specifically, the Commission recommends allowing student-athletes with a professional
pathway to make the choice to leave college every year, creating resources so that they
can make an informed choice whether to do so, welcoming back student-athletes whom
the NBA does not draft, making a serious financial commitment to degree completion
and severely punishing those who undermine the premise that student-athletes must
receive a valuable – not a sham – education.
In sum, the Commission recognizes that the money generated by Division I

basketball makes its task extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends
changes intended to expand the professional opportunities of high school athletes
who do not wish to attend college, to blunt the incentives to corrupt major college
sports, to increase the likelihood that colleges, coaches and administrators participating
in corruption will be punished, and to help student-athletes receive the college
education they are promised. To meet the latter obligation, the NCAA must establish
a substantial fund to assist its member institutions in fulfilling their commitment to
student-athletes and mandate that its members establish degree completion programs.
This recommendation will be expensive; but in today’s world, it is necessary to provide
meaning to the phrase student-athlete.
Section 2:
Establish Professional Neutral Investigation and Adjudication of Serious
Infractions and Hold Institutions and Individuals Accountable
1. Implement Independent Investigation and Adjudication of

Complex Cases.
The Commission recommends a prompt radical transformation of the NCAA’s

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investigative and enforcement process for cases involving complex or serious violations
(hereafter “complex cases”).
The consensus view – including within the NCAA – is that the NCAA investigative
and enforcement process is broken. The NCAA’s shared governance and cooperative
principles do not work in situations when large sums of money and serious reputational
damage is at stake. Schools and individuals “lawyer up” to protect their financial
and reputational interests. The current NCAA system does not provide its personnel
with the tools and authority necessary to investigate complex cases and effectively
prosecute violators of the rules. Decision makers are volunteers and NCAA members;
they face perceived conflicts of interest in adjudicating complex cases with adverse
consequences for the credibility of the process. Punishment is often unpredictable and
inadequate to deter violations. In many cases, the process takes years, and the NCAA
imposes punishment long after the departure of bad actors. Prominent coaches and
administrators escape accountability for what they knew or should have known was
occurring in their programs. A significant institutional overhaul is required.
First, the Commission recommends that the NCAA establish two tracks for
addressing rules violations – one track for complex cases28 and a second for all others.
The current NCAA process would remain in place for the second category of cases,
but the NCAA must create an entirely new process for investigating and deciding
complex cases. Most significantly, the Commission recommends that the Committee
on Infractions appoint a panel of paid independent decision makers, such as lawyers,
arbitrators and retired judges. These decision makers would form a pool from which
three adjudicators would be randomly selected to resolve each complex case. Members
of the panel would serve for a term of five years (with some shorter and longer terms
initially so that the entire panel does not turn over simultaneously). The panel would
operate under the rules of the American Arbitration Association or analogous rules;
its decisions would be final and binding, subject to review only under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Volunteers and members should not decide whether fellow member
institutions have violated NCAA rules, nor the appropriate punishment for those
violations. It is time for independent adjudication of the NCAA’s complex cases.
The Commission recognizes that instituting an adversary process may further delay
a process already criticized as too slow. The Commission recommends two measures
to address this issue. First, the NCAA should adopt rules authorizing the independent
panel of adjudicators to grant preliminary injunctive relief – that is, to forbid or require
certain action while the adjudication is taking place – against institutions and individuals
where the NCAA’s investigator and advocate demonstrates a substantial likelihood of
28 One threshold question is how to define the cases subject to the new process. The Commission recommends that both the NCAA and the
alleged violator be empowered to designate a case as “complex,” provided the panel of adjudicators may disagree and return the case to the
second track. In addition, the NCAA may wish to designate cases with certain potential penalties as complex as a matter of rule.

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success on the merits and the balance of harms favors immediate relief. This mechanism
may be particularly relevant in cases of failure to cooperate. Second, the NCAA should
establish reasonable time limits for submission and decision of a case, which must be
enforced except in extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the panel.
Second, the Commission recommends that the NCAA ensure professional

investigation and prosecution of serious violations. There are at least two ways to do
so. After its appointment, the independent adjudication panel could create a panel of
outside counsel (not the NCAA’s usual counsel who would be in a conflict of interest) to
investigate and advocate in complex cases. In the alternative, the NCAA could establish
a separate investigation and advocacy office, with rules guaranteeing its independence.
The Commission also recommends that the newly formed investigative office
(or appointed law firm) and, indeed, all relevant NCAA investigative bodies, be
instructed to exercise appropriate enforcement discretion and common sense – that
is, to set appropriate priorities for enforcement, to make reasonable decisions about
punishment, and not to expend excessive resources on violations that are de minimis.
This investigative entity should give serious infractions substantial attention and seek
punishments that will deter future violations. But it should also recognize that certain
kinds of minor violations should be handled differently, both in terms of resources
expended and punishment recommended. In the exercise of such discretion, plainly
self-reporting and other indicia of cooperation should be considered.
The NCAA Bylaws require member institutions, their staff and student-athletes
to cooperate in NCAA investigations. See, e.g., NCAA Division I Bylaw 19.2.3
(Responsibility to Cooperate). A failure to cooperate is one factor the NCAA can
consider in assessing penalties. NCAA Division I Bylaw 19.9.2 (Factors Affecting
Penalties). This regime has proved insufficient. The NCAA also must adopt rules that
require member institutions and their personnel to cooperate with NCAA investigations,
with a failure to respond to investigators’ requests promptly bearing significant
consequences, including loss of post-season eligibility and revenues. Specifically,
to participate in Division I basketball, member institutions and their presidents,
administrators, and coaches must agree to cooperate with NCAA investigations,
including by providing documents and testimony where sought by NCAA investigators.
In addition, while the NCAA does not have subpoena power, it can adopt rules
requiring as a condition of membership, that member institutions enter into contractual
agreements to cooperate in investigations and that member institutions contractually
impose the same requirement of cooperation on presidents, administrators and coaches.
NCAA rules should specifically protect whistleblowers who report and provide evidence
of violations.

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Relatedly, the independent panel of adjudicators must have the authority, on
a motion to show cause, promptly to impose consequences for failure to cooperate
in investigations of complex matters, including, where appropriate, loss of the right
to participate in post-season tournaments and other NCAA events and the loss of
associated revenues.
In a related point, the NCAA must authorize its investigators and advocates to
submit and rely on the evidence admitted in judicial and administrative tribunals and
on the decisions of those tribunals. There is no reason to require the NCAA to redo
the work of other tribunals. The independent panel of adjudicators can determine the
reliability of the evidence and the preclusive effect of other decisions.
B. Enact and Impose Increased Core Punishments With Significant

Deterrent Effects.
The Commission recommends significant changes in the penalty structure and the
nature of penalties imposed on NCAA member institutions for certain violations. The
Commission considers non-cooperation a separate serious offense that should receive
substantial penalties, including the loss of participation in and revenues from the NCAA
tournament for up to five years. In addition, the Commission believes that serious
repeated violations of NCAA rules must be subject to these same severe penalties.
Current core penalties for violations of NCAA rules are set out in the Division I
Manual, Article 19, Figure 19.1. The NCAA adopted these penalties in October 2012,
effective August 2013. Due to the length of the NCAA’s adjudication process, the first
cases in which the current penalty matrix applies have only recently been resolved. (The
penalty matrix in effect at the time of a violation applies to that violation without regard
to subsequent amendments.) The matrix provides appropriate types of penalties for
violations by institutions – i.e., probation, fines, suspensions, scholarship reductions,
forfeitures, post-season bans, head-coach restrictions, recruiting visit restrictions.
The Commission considered whether the core institutional penalties are sufficiently
severe to have the desired deterrent effect. The Commission believes that many at
NCAA member institutions consider the rewards of NCAA rule violations to outweigh the
risks, and thus it recommends the following changes in the NCAA’s institutional penalties
and penalty structure:
First, the Commission recommends the following increases in the core penalty
structure: (i) increase the competition penalties for Level I violations to allow a five-year
post-season ban; (ii) increase the financial penalties for Level I violations to allow loss
of all sharing in post-season play, including the NCAA tournament, for the same five-
year period; (iii) increase the penalties for a show-cause order to allow life-time bans; (iv)

APRIL 2018
increase the penalties for head coach restrictions to allow imposition of more than one
season; and (v) increase the penalties for recruiting visit violations to allow full year visit
bans. Colleges with comprehensive, effective compliance programs should see their
penalties mitigated; those without such programs may see their penalties enhanced.
Second, the Commission recommends that the NCAA inform members that past
penalties imposed for particular violations have no precedential value, and that the
independent panel shall conduct a de novo assessment of the appropriate penalties
for violations with the need for deterrence in mind. The panel must be free to calibrate
punishment without regard to past practice.
Third, the Commission recommends that member institutions that employ a

coach, athletic director or other administrator under a show cause order for a previous
violation of NCAA rules must receive enhanced penalties if that individual’s program re-
offends. Institutions that hire an individual under a show cause order must be aware that
they are taking a significant risk.
Fourth, the Commission recommends that the NCAA highlight the availability
of a five-year ban from the NCAA tournament and the loss of all revenues from the
tournament for that same period for member institutions’ programs found to have
engaged in systematic, severe and repeated violations of NCAA rules. The Commission
acknowledges that imposing this penalty will result in significant punishment of innocent
members of the college community and beyond, and that it must be limited to the
extreme circumstances. Nonetheless, the NCAA should use this punishment where
necessary to address sufficiently grave patterns of misconduct.
In its current enforcement structure, the NCAA addresses individuals who

participate in rules violations through punishments imposed on member institutions.
The Commission recommends a significant expansion in individual accountability for
rules violations for presidents, administrators and coaches:
a. As noted, the NCAA must require member institutions’ contracts with

their coaches, athletic directors and other administrators associated with
the athletic department to provide that these individuals must cooperate
with NCAA investigations and enforcement proceedings.
b. The NCAA must require member institutions’ contracts with these

individuals to include agreement to be subject to NCAA enforcement
investigations and infractions decisions and discipline, up to and including
discharge.
c. The NCAA must enact a rule requiring college presidents, athletic

APRIL 2018
department directors and coaches to certify annually that they have
conducted due diligence and that their athletic programs comply with
NCAA rules. The NCAA rules should provide for significant penalties for
those individuals if they knew or should have known of violations and did
not address them, up to and including termination.
The NCAA is certainly not blameless for its failure to address the corruption in
college basketball that led to the recent prosecutions, but the primary failures belong to
the individuals at colleges and universities who allowed their programs to be corrupted,
averting their eyes to keep the money flowing. With enhanced individual accountability,
the Commission believes that more college presidents and athletic directors will find it
beneficial to adopt and enforce comprehensive compliance programs. See also NCAA
Constitution 2.1 (Principle of Institutional Control and Responsibility).
In terms of substantive rules changes, the NCAA’s jurisdiction with respect to

academic issues must be clarified, stated in amended rules and communicated to
member institutions. The rules must be amended to allow the NCAA to address all
academic fraud and cheating to the extent it is used to corrupt athletic eligibility.
Member institutions should not be able to shield academic fraud to ensure athletic
eligibility by extending that fraud to the entire student body. In addition, the NCAA’s
imposition of discipline for academic fraud and misconduct has been inconsistent and
untimely. The relationship between punishment and the school’s involvement, including
its self-reporting, is unclear. Member institutions do not fulfill their commitment to
student-athletes when they allow them to maintain eligibility through academic fraud or
misconduct. The NCAA must also amend its rules to clarify the standard for academic
fraud and misconduct and to establish consistent punishments for the violations of these
rules. Going forward, the NCAA must apply a revised standard consistently across
member institutions.
Finally, in connection with its certification of agents who may engage in sanctioned
on-campus meetings with high school and college students, the NCAA must enact rules to
ensure that agents who participate in rules violations are punished. As noted above, agents
who participate in violations of NCAA rules must lose their certification and be banned
from NCAA-certified non-scholastic basketball events. Decertified agents may not pass
along their student-athlete clients to others in their agencies. In addition, the Commission
recommends that the NCAA report any agents’ participation in NCAA rule violations to the
NBPA. The Commission believes that the NBPA would be willing to punish and potentially
decertify agents who participate in violations of NCAA rules. Indeed, the NBPA is currently
focused on improving the quality and ethics of the agents it certifies. The NBPA has a large
stick and its efforts in increasing the standards for certification and in regulating agents will
be invaluable to the NCAA’s efforts to limit the influence of corrupt agents.

APRIL 2018
Putting to one side agents paying large sums of money to players, the
Commission heard comments that collegiate players or their families may receive from
agents a meal or minor travel expenses or some other small benefit that those with
limited financial means are strongly tempted to accept. The Commission concludes that
the NCAA and its member institutions must enhance the resources of Student Assistance
Funds and educate student-athletes about the benefits that it can provide to address the
legitimate school-related needs of student-athletes. NCAA Division I Bylaws 15.01.6.1,
16.11.1.8 (Student Assistance Fund). Specifically, the Commission believes that the
Fund should be increased and used for additional purposes, such as providing Division
I schools with the resources to assist parents and families to travel to student-athletes’
games, subject to means testing.
Finally, the Commission is aware of the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act
(“RUAAA”) developed by the Uniform Law Commission, in response to an NCAA request
that state law address agents’ provision of cash and other economic benefits to student-
athletes. Forty-two states, DC, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted
the Uniform Athlete Agents Act and eight have adopted the RUAAA. The Uniform
Law Commission provided useful input to the Commission and sought its support
in encouraging states to adopt the RUAAA. Unfortunately, while a number of states
have enacted state laws regulating sports agents, the Commission is not aware of any
significant number of enforcement actions. The Commission encourages States to both
enact and enforce state laws regulating sports agents.
Section 3:
Mitigating Non-Scholastic Basketball’s
Damaging Influence on College Basketball
The NCAA must adopt rules that will reform non-scholastic basketball or
disassociate college basketball from the corrupt aspects of non-scholastic basketball.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA take both short and long-term action. In
the short term, the NCAA must adopt rigorous certification criteria for non-scholastic
basketball events its coaches may attend, including significant measures to ensure
financial transparency and accountability. In the long term, the NCAA should administer
its own regional camps for high school players in the group subject to college recruiting
in July of each year.
A. Reform Non-Scholastic Basketball and Make Its Finances

Transparent.
The Commission heard from numerous stakeholders that non-scholastic basketball

provides recreation, competition and gear for thousands of children who will never play
elite high school or college basketball, let alone play professionally. The Commission

APRIL 2018
further heard about many selfless individuals who volunteer to administer and coach
non-scholastic basketball, investing their skill and countless hours without thought of
remuneration or benefit. However, the Commission also heard from many that because
non-scholastic basketball is unregulated, some teams, events and tournaments have
damaging consequences for college basketball.
The NCAA certifies non-scholastic basketball events and leagues, but the
requirements for certification are minimal and those that exist appear to be poorly
implemented and inadequately enforced. At the elite levels, apparel companies,
agents and other sponsors finance leagues, events and teams, without accounting for
the expenditure of the funds. The Commission spoke with several apparel companies
that sponsor substantial non-scholastic basketball events and leagues as part of their
community partnerships and brand marketing. It did not appear to the Commission that
any of these entities carefully followed the money or sought a complete understanding
of the financial arrangements of the event operators and coaches of non-scholastic
basketball for elite players. The Commission learned that non-scholastic basketball
event operators and coaches steer elite players to the agents and advisors who pay them
or otherwise provide “favors,” and to the collegiate programs with which they develop
relationships. In turn, players (and those who influence them) may be paid or receive
excessive travel and other benefits to select particular teams or leagues.
The NCAA must manage its relationships with non-scholastic basketball, with the
objective of preventing the corruption of college basketball. The Commission believes
that the elimination of one-and-done players from college basketball will diminish
the influence of non-scholastic basketball event organizers and coaches with college
programs. Clearly, however, problems will remain. College coaches recruit roughly 1125
high school players to Division I programs every year. To the extent college coaches and
non-scholastic basketball event organizers and coaches are scratching each other’s backs
for personal gain, they are corrupting college basketball. To the extent non-scholastic
basketball event organizers and coaches are paying – or arranging for the payment of
– players and their families to participate in or enter particular summer programs, they
are creating a culture that contributes to the expectation of continued payment while in
college.
The NCAA and its member institutions have some leverage in their relationship
with non-scholastic basketball. Players whom the NBA will not draft from high school –
that is, most players – seek to play college basketball. To do so, they must be seen and
evaluated by college coaches. Most college coaches cannot see sufficient players by
attending high school games, involving only one or two players whom they are recruiting
at a time. Instead, they assess players at summer events where numerous players with
the potential to play college basketball compete against each other. Put differently,

APRIL 2018
non-scholastic basketball needs NCAA coaches, and NCAA coaches need non-scholastic
basketball. The Commission’s guiding principle in this area is that the NCAA should not
certify, and NCAA coaches should not participate in, non-scholastic basketball events
involving coaches, leagues or sponsors who are not fully transparent about the sources
and amounts of their financial support.
More specifically, while NCAA coaches are forbidden to attend non-scholastic

basketball events not certified by the NCAA, the NCAA’s current criteria for certification
are plainly insufficient. The new criteria for certification must include detailed
requirements for financial transparency. Any person or entity that sponsors a summer
league, team or event must disclose any payments made to or received from any coach,
event operator, owner or any other entity associated with that league, team or event.
Any coach, event operator, owner or other entity associated with that summer league,
team or event must disclose any payment received that is related to the event and how
the payments will be expended. The Commission leaves to the NCAA the design of the
disclosure forms and the details of the requirements, but it must require the provision
of any non-profit organization’s financial filings with the government and full financial
transparency – going both ways – for non-scholastic basketball sponsors, event operators
and coaches.
The Commission further recommends that the NCAA enforce existing

requirements and impose additional prerequisites for certification of non-scholastic
basketball events. Current NCAA rules require as a condition of certification that non-
scholastic basketball events contain an educational component. That requirement is
not effectively administered and enforced – a missed opportunity. Moreover, the NCAA
should enforce limits on the paid travel and other benefits associated with the events,
and require commercially standard charges for admission (where allowed) and programs
(rather than allowing individualized expensive arrangements for college coaches).
Further, the certification should specifically state that NCAA enforcement personnel have
unfettered access to any event, including physical access to the venue and the ability to
inspect all financial documentation associated with the event.
B. Enlist the Apparel Companies in Transparency and Accountability

Efforts.
The Commission notes that during its meetings with representatives of

several apparel companies with high profiles in professional and college basketball,
all expressed a commitment to a culture of compliance at their companies. This
commitment included respect for and adherence to NCAA rules and a willingness to be
transparent about their relationships with college coaches and professional agents and
about their expenditures in non-scholastic basketball.

APRIL 2018
While these statements were welcome, the Commission does not believe that
the apparel companies have always delivered on this promise. In fact, it was difficult
to ascertain how closely these companies track funding for non-scholastic basketball
and associated activities. The Commission will formally ask the boards and leadership
in these companies to make a commitment to transparency and accountability for the
expenditure of company funds in college and non-scholastic basketball, particularly
in light of the recent indictments in the Southern District of New York. Indeed, the
Commission looks forward to statements but more importantly actions by these public
companies that demonstrate their commitment to integrity and accountability in this
space.
C. In Cooperation with Partners, Establish NCAA Youth Development

Programs.
In this section, the Commission recommends significant changes to the resources

and programs available for the development of young, pre-collegiate players, ideally
by the summer of 2019. Allowing players to enter the professional ranks earlier brings
with it the responsibility to provide appropriate resources for earlier development. We
acknowledge that institutional influence—by USA Basketball, the NCAA, and the NBA
and the NBPA—has been largely missing in this space for the past 20 years and that non-
scholastic basketball has been largely ungoverned. We strongly recommend that the
named institutions lend their expertise and, wherever possible, work together to provide
an alternative to the individual and corporate influences which currently dominate pre-
collegiate youth basketball particularly in the summer. In the Commission’s view, the
NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA all have significant institutional interests
in developing prominent roles in non-scholastic basketball, particularly in the areas of
player identification, development and evaluation. There is a great deal of work to be
done in the development of pre-collegiate players, and the three institutions should also
welcome partners and sponsors willing to work within the standards, disciplines, and
accountability these institutions will bring to youth development.
The Commission makes distinctions among three levels of players in addressing

pre-collegiate youth development: Level 1 for those players across the four high school
years with identified National Team Potential, Level 2 for those players across the four
high school years with identified Highest Collegiate Potential, and Level 3 for those
players across the four high school years with identified Collegiate Potential.

APRIL 2018
Every year, the number of players to be identified, evaluated and developed at
each level follows:
Level 1 (National Team Potential) 80-100
Level 2 (Highest Collegiate Potential) 400-500
Level 3 (Collegiate Potential) 2,000-2,500
It is important to note that the Commission believes developing players at each

level will require a collaboration among USA Basketball, the NCAA, the NBA and the
NBPA. The absence of any one of these stakeholders in the youth development space
will exacerbate the current problems with recruiting and development.
While the NCAA, USA Basketball, the NBA and the NBPA should work out the
details, the Commission believes that there is a role for each organization to play at each
of the three Levels—although the degree to which each organization takes a leadership
role should naturally vary by level. At Level 1, USA Basketball with the NBA should take
the lead in organizing and implementing a program targeting this tier of players. USA
Basketball with the NCAA should take the lead in organizing and implementing Level
2, and the NCAA should take the lead in organizing and implementing Level 3. Each of
the stakeholders will need to bring commitment, experience, financial resources, and the
necessary authorities to this shared effort.
The tasks to be accomplished in youth development include:
• Player identification. USA Basketball will be primarily responsible for the

identification of those players with the highest potential for Level 1 (Junior
National Teams). The NCAA will be primarily responsible for identification of
those players with the highest potential for Levels 2 and 3. The Commission
understands that college coaches annually identify the prospects they seek
to recruit using electronic databases and recruiting services. Based on these
systems, players can be assigned to an appropriate level based on the interest
shown in them. As a further step to ensure that players are properly identified,
the Commission recommends that USA Basketball, the NCAA, and the NBA
and NBPA establish a “collaborative advisory group” to annually review and
validate the player identification and player evaluation processes.
• Player development. Player development must expand well beyond

basketball to include academic, health, wellness, and life skills. The
Commission recommends four physical interactions with pre-collegiate players
at each level annually (camps, clinics and tournaments) with continuing on-line

APRIL 2018
education and mentoring throughout the year. The Commission recommends
that one of these contacts occur at NCAA-administered regional camps each
summer during July, which NCAA coaches would exclusively attend during
that time, and that current NCAA-directed recruiting windows be adjusted
to account for these events. The Commission also recommends that events
organized and implemented under this youth development initiative be
required to adhere to USA Basketball licensing requirements for coaches and
the October 2016 Youth Development Guidelines for safe play published
by the USA Basketball and the NBA. Finally, the Committee recommends
that participation in NCAA summer events be limited to students making
appropriate academic progress towards initial college eligibility.
• Player evaluation. The most important outcome of player evaluation is a

realistic assessment of a player’s potential. The Commission recommends that
a “collaborative advisory group” among the NCAA, USA Basketball and the
NBA and NBPA be established to provide a realistic assessment of professional
potential to players in Levels 1 and 2. Importantly, the Commission believes
these evaluations must be transparent and accessible.
The Commission further recommends that working with USA Basketball, the NBA,
the NBPA, the WNBA and the WNBPA, as appropriate, the NCAA also consider creating
analogous programs and initiatives for the development of young women basketball
players for the collegiate and professional levels.
In conclusion, the Commission received extensive commentary about the

corruption prevalent in youth basketball organized outside the high school academic
setting. We believe that the only way to mitigate the influence of third parties (who may
not be working in the best interest of young, talented players) is to introduce financial
transparency and accountability to all such entities, establish NCAA youth development
programs and provide regulated access to expert player evaluation for students and
their families. Individually, none of these reforms is sufficient, but taken together
the Commission hopes they will improve the corrosive culture of youth basketball.
Protecting, educating and developing youthful players – from the time they first enter
high school – is likely to be among the most challenging and important tasks ahead.
D. Enact Changes in Rules Governing Recruiting and Coaches’

Interaction with Recruits and Student-Athletes.
The Commission endorses NCAA consideration of some of the recommendations

made by the National Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC) and other stakeholders
with respect to recruiting and coaches’ interaction with their players and recruits. These

APRIL 2018
recommendations are intended to strengthen the relationships between NCAA coaches
and prospective and current student-athletes so that these coaches are not required to
recruit and instruct through third parties.
First, the Commission supports the NABC’s recommendation that the summer
recruiting calendar for evaluating college prospects be modified to allow college
coaches to attend two weekends of scholastic-sponsored events in June and to attend
three weekends of NCAA-sponsored events in July (once established). The Commission
further supports the requirement that once NCAA-sponsored events for July are
established, NCAA coaches be limited to recruiting at those events during that time.
Many of the problems associated with non-scholastic basketball occur in the summer.
Second, the Commission supports NABC’s recommendation that official visits

be permitted to begin during the summer between a prospective student-athlete’s
sophomore and junior years. The rules should allow five official visits before completion
of the junior year and five additional visits during the senior year, and limit the student to
one visit per year per institution. Prospective student-athletes are visiting colleges earlier
in their development, and third parties may fund those visits where families cannot afford
the trips. The Commission agrees that allowing earlier official visits may alleviate some
of this pressure.
Third, the Commission further supports the recommendation that coaches be

permitted to provide more than two hours of skills instruction per week in the off-season.
We are informed that an unintended consequence of current limits on NCAA coaches’
hours of skills instruction is that agents and other third parties pay for trainers, and we
agree that allowing coaches additional time to work with players would be preferable.
Finally, to establish additional points of interaction between college coaches and

student-athletes, the Commission supports the recommendation that video operators
and other “staff’ be permitted to coach their teams. The Commission was informed that
NCAA schools are not doing enough to develop the next generation of coaches; in any
event, this restriction sets artificial limits on relationships between coaching staffs and
team members.
The Commission believes that additional recommendations of the NABC and

others are worthy of NCAA study. It also supports the NABC’s intent to reinvigorate its
Code of Ethics and disciplinary rules and enforcement.

APRIL 2018
Section 4:
Add A Significant Cadre of Public Members
To The NCAA Board of Governors.
The Commission recommends that the NCAA restructure its Board of Governors
to include at least five public voting members with the experience, stature and
objectivity to assist the NCAA in re-establishing itself as an effective and respected
leader and regulator of college sports. It further recommends that at least one of these
public members also be a member of the NCAA’s Executive Board.
The NCAA Board of Governors is currently composed of presidents or chancellors

of NCAA colleges and universities, chairs of NCAA division governance bodies and the
NCAA president. NCAA Constitution 4.1.1. Each of these Board members wears a
second hat for a school, conference or NCAA division or body that creates at least an
appearance that he or she cannot be entirely objective in determining the direction of
the Association.
The NCAA administers what is effectively a public trust in the United States —
athletic competition among college athletes. Public members of boards serve important
functions. They provide objectivity, fresh perspectives and independent viewpoints and
judgments. Many non-profit associations utilize public board members for precisely
these reasons. The NCAA Board needs excellent public members, with the benefits
that such members provide. The NCAA should promptly amend its Constitution to
restructure the Board to include public voting members, while simultaneously creating a
slate of candidates with the appropriate stature and characteristics. The Commission will
provide recommendations to assist the NCAA in ensuring compilation of a high-quality
slate of potential public board members.

APRIL 2018
CONCLUSION
The Commission calls on the NCAA to draw up draft legislation and plans to
implement its recommendations for Commission review by early August 2018. The
Commission will promptly reconvene and provide its input.
The Commission has made a number of important recommendations. Some call

for action by third parties, such as the NBA, the NBPA, apparel companies and member
institutions. Most call for substantial NCAA action. Some are simple in concept, but not
in execution — such as creating independent investigative and adjudicative systems.
Others should be easy to execute — specific changes in the available punishments under
Article 19 and in the recruiting rules. Some do not require rules changes, but instead
the devotion of financial and administrative resource to planning, for example, the
creation of NCAA non-scholastic basketball camps. The Commission is committed to
completing the task that its recommendations will start. It must have a chance to review
the responsive draft legislation and action plan, to provide its viewpoint and, hopefully,
its affirmation of the NCAA’s plan to help ensure the success of this important effort to
renew college basketball.

APRIL 2018
NOTICE OF ALLEGATIONS
EXHIBIT
to the 2
Chancellor of North Carolina State University
A. Processing Level of Case.
Based on the information contained within the following allegation, the NCAA enforcement
staff believes this case should be reviewed by a hearing panel of the NCAA Division I
Committee on Infractions pursuant to procedures applicable to a severe breach of conduct
(Level I violation).
B. Allegations.
1. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaws 11.5.1, 11.7.6, 13.1.2.4, 13.2.1 and 13.7.2.1.6 (2014-
15); 10.01.1, 10.1, 10.1-(b) and 13.2.1 (2015-16); 12.11.1, 13.8.1, 16.2.1.1, 16.8.1 and
16.11.2.1 (2016-17)]
It is alleged that from September 2014 through March 2017, Orlando Early (Early), then
men's basketball assistant coach and lead recruiter, violated the NCAA principles of ethical
conduct when he and members of the men's basketball staff committed multiple recruiting
violations and provided extra benefits during the recruitment and subsequent enrollment of
then men's basketball prospective student-athlete Dennis Smith Jr. (Smith). Early and the
men's basketball staff members arranged for and/or provided Smith and individuals
associated with him approximately $46,700 in impermissible inducements and benefits. As
a result, Smith competed in 32 contests and received actual and necessary expenses while
ineligible. Specifically:
a. In September 2014, the then director of basketball operations arranged for

approximately $80 in impermissible recruiting inducements in the form of special
parking in the loading dock of PNC Arena for Smith and three other prospects to use
during their unofficial visits to attend the institution's September 27, 2014, football
contest versus Florida State University. [NCAA Bylaws 13.2.1 and 13.7.2.1.6 (2014-
15)]
b. On September 29, 2014, the then head men's basketball coach allowed a former
colleague, who was not a countable coach or certified to recruit off-campus, to
accompany him to an evaluation of Smith at an off-campus recruiting event at the John
D. Fuller Recreational Center in Fayetteville, North Carolina. [NCAA Bylaws 11.5.1,
11.7.6 and 13.1.2.4 (2014-15)]
c. In November 2015, Early violated the NCAA principles of ethical conduct when he
knowingly arranged for and/or provided an impermissible recruiting inducement of
$40,000 to an individual associated with Smith. Specifically, Early arranged for TJ
Gassnola (Gassnola), a representative of the institution's athletics interests and then
outside consultant for Adidas, which was also a representative of the institution's
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 2
__________
athletics interests, to provide Early with $40,000 in cash to ensure Smith's commitment
to the institution. 1 Early informed Gassnola that he intended to provide the money to
Shawn Farmer (Farmer), an individual responsible for teaching or directing an activity
in which a prospective student-athlete is involved and the trainer of then student-athlete
Smith. who would then provide the money to the Smith family. [NCAA Bylaws
10.01.1, 10.1, 10.1-(b) and 13.2.1 (2015-16)]
d. On 26 occasions between January 2016 through March 2017, Early violated the
principles of ethical conduct when he knowingly provided approximately $2,119 in
impermissible recruiting entertainment benefits in the form of 44 complimentary
admissions on the men's basketball office pass list to Farmer. [NCAA Bylaws 10.01.1,
10.1, 10.1-(b) and 13.8.1 (2015-16 through 2016-17)]
e. On 13 occasions between November 2016 and February 2017, Early violated the
impermissible benefits in the form of 106 impermissible complimentary admissions on
the men's basketball office pass list to then student-athlete Smith's family and friends.
[NCAA Bylaws 10.01.1, 10.1, 10.1-(b), 16.2.1.1 and 16.11.2.1 (2016-17)]
This allegation serves as part of the basis for Allegation Nos. 3 and 4.
Level of Allegation No. 1:
The NCAA enforcement staff believes a hearing panel of the NCAA Division I Committee
on Infractions could conclude that Allegation No. 1 is a severe breach of conduct (Level I)
because the violation (1) provided or was intended to provide a substantial or extensive
recruiting advantage; (2) provided or was intended to provide a substantial or extensive
impermissible benefit; (3) involved third-parties in recruiting violations about which
institutional officials knew or should have known; (4) involved cash payments intended to
secure, and which resulted in, the enrollment of a prospect; (5) was intentional or showed
reckless indifference to the NCAA constitution and bylaws; and (6) involved unethical or
dishonest conduct, which seriously undermined or threatened the integrity of the NCAA
Collegiate Model. [NCAA Bylaws 19.1.1, 19.1.1-(d), 19.1.1-(f), 19.1.1-(g) and 19.1.1-(h)
(2018-19)]
1
Adidas is a corporate entity (e.g., apparel or equipment manufacturer) which was known by members of the
institution's men's basketball staff and athletics department to have participated in promoting the institution's
intercollegiate athletics program. [NCAA Bylaw 6.4.1] Gassnola, as an outside consultant for Adidas, was known by
members of the institution's men's basketball staff to be a member of an agency or organization promoting the
institution's intercollegiate athletics program, and was known by a member of the institution's men's basketball staff
to be assisting in the recruitment of then prospective student-athlete Smith. [NCAA Bylaw 6.4.2]
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 3
__________
Involved Individual:
The enforcement staff believes a hearing panel could enter a show-cause order pursuant
to Bylaw 19.9.5.4 regarding Early's involvement in Allegation No. 1.
2. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaw 13.8.1 (2015-16)]
It is alleged that on nine occasions from January through March 2016, men's basketball
staff members violated NCAA recruiting restrictions when they provided approximately
$862 in impermissible benefits in the form of 14 complimentary admissions. Specifically:
a. On seven occasions during January and February 2016, men's basketball staff provided
approximately $436 in impermissible benefits in the form of eight impermissible
complimentary admissions on the men's basketball office pass list to Stanley Bland
(Bland), an individual responsible for teaching or directing an activity in which a
prospective student-athlete is involved. [NCAA Bylaw 13.8.1 (2015-16)]
b. On March 8 and 9, 2016, the men's basketball staff provided approximately $426 in
impermissible benefits in the form of six impermissible complimentary admissions on
the men's basketball office pass list to Keith Stevens (Stevens), an individual
responsible for teaching or directing an activity in which a prospective student-athlete
is involved. Specifically, the men's basketball staff provided Stevens three
complimentary admissions to each of the men's basketball Atlantic Coast Conference
Tournament contests against Wake Forest University and Duke University. [NCAA
Bylaw 13.8.1 (2015-16)]
This allegation serves as part of the basis for Allegation Nos. 3 and 4.
on Infractions could conclude that Allegation No. 2 is a significant breach of conduct
(Level II) because the violations (1) were not isolated or limited in nature, (2) provided or
were intended to provide more than a minimal recruiting or other advantage, (3) included
more than minimal impermissible benefits and (4) compromised the integrity of the NCAA
Collegiate Model. [NCAA Bylaw 19.1.2 (2018-19)]
None
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 4
__________
3. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaw 11.1.1.1 (2015-16 and 2016-17)]
It is alleged that during the 2015-16 and 2016-17 academic years, Mark Gottfried
(Gottfried), then men's basketball head coach, is presumed responsible for the violations
detailed in Allegation Nos. 1-(c), 1-(d), 1-(e) and 2 and did not rebut the presumption of
responsibility. Specifically, Gottfried did not demonstrate that he monitored his direct
report, Orlando Early (Early), then men's basketball assistant coach and lead recruiter, for
compliance as it pertained to Early involving TJ Gassnola (Gassnola), a representative of
the institution's athletics interests and then outside consultant for Adidas, and Shawn
Farmer (Farmer), an individual associated with then men's basketball prospective student-
athlete Dennis Smith Jr. (Smith), in Early's recruitment of Smith, which involved the
arrangement and/or provision of a $40,000 recruiting inducement. Additionally, Gottfried
did not demonstrate that he monitored his staff's provision of complimentary admissions
on the men's basketball office pass list, which involved the provision of 164 impermissible
complimentary admissions to individuals associated with prospects and Smith's family and
friends.
on Infractions could conclude that Allegation No. 3 is a severe breach of conduct (Level I)
because it is a head coach responsibility violation resulting from underlying Level I and II
violations and seriously undermined or threatened the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate
Model. [NCAA Bylaws 19.1.1 and 19.1.1-(e) (2018-19)]
The enforcement staff believes a hearing panel could enter a show-cause order pursuant to
NCAA Bylaw 19.9.5.4 regarding Gottfried's involvement in Allegation No. 3.
4. [NCAA Division I Manual Constitution 2.8.1 (2015-16 and 2016-17)]
It is alleged that during the 2015-16 and 2016-17 academic years, the scope and nature of
the violations detailed in Allegation Nos. 1-(d), 1-(e) and 2 demonstrate that the institution
violated the NCAA principle of rules compliance when it failed to adequately monitor its
men's basketball program's provision of complimentary admissions on the men's basketball
office pass list by its failure to establish an adequate system for ensuring compliance with
NCAA legislation.
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 5
__________
on Infractions could conclude that Allegation No. 4 is a significant breach of conduct
(Level II) because the violation (a) is a failure to monitor, which is presumed Level II; (b)
resulted from the subparts of underlying violations that could be considered Level II
violations; and (c) compromised the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model. [NCAA
Bylaws 19.1.2 and 19.1.2-(b) (2018-19)]
None.
C. Potential Aggravating and Mitigating Factors.
Pursuant to NCAA Bylaw 19.7.1, the NCAA enforcement staff has identified the following
potential aggravating and mitigating factors that a hearing panel of the NCAA Division I
Committee on Infractions may consider.
1. Institution:
a. Aggravating factors. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3]
(1) Multiple Level I and Level II violations by the institution. [NCAA Bylaws 19.9.3-
(a) and 19.9.3-(g)]
The NCAA enforcement staff identified the violations in Allegation Nos. 1 and 3
as Level I. The enforcement staff identified the violations in Allegation Nos. 2 and
4 as Level II.
(2) A history of Level I, Level II or major violations by the institution. [NCAA Bylaw
19.9.3-(b)]
January 7, 1955 – Improper recruiting transportation and tryouts in football and

men's basketball programs.
January 11, 1957 – Improper recruiting inducements in football and men's

basketball programs.
October 24, 1972 – Improper recruiting employment, inducements, lodging and

transportation in its men's basketball program.
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 6
__________
March 21, 1983 – Improper recruiting contacts, entertainment, lodging,

transportation and excessive number of official visits in its football program.
December 12, 1989 – Extra benefits and lack of institutional control in its men's
basketball program.
(3) Persons of authority condoned, participated in or negligently disregarded the

violation or related wrongful conduct. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3-(h)]
As outlined in Allegation No. 1, Orlando Early (Early), then men's basketball

assistant coach and lead recruiter, was a person of authority and was personally
involved in the violations.
(4) A pattern of noncompliance within the sport program involved. [NCAA Bylaw
19.9.3-(k)]
As outlined in Allegation Nos. 1 through 3, the men's basketball program, under

Mark Gottfried, then head men's basketball coach, failed to comply with recruiting,
benefits and complimentary admissions legislation as they pertained to the
recruitment and enrollment of then men's basketball prospective student-athlete
Dennis Smith Jr., and the head men's basketball coach failed to monitor compliance
in these areas.
b. Mitigating factor. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.4]
An established history of self-reporting Level III or secondary violations. [NCAA

Bylaw 19.9.4-(d)]
The institution has self-reported 91 Level III violations over the previous five years,
approximately 18 violations each year.
2. Involved Individual [Orlando Early (Early), then men's basketball assistant coach
and lead recruiter]:
a. Aggravating factors. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3]
(1) Unethical conduct. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3-(e)]
As outlined in Allegation No. 1, Early engaged in unethical conduct when he

knowingly arranged for the provision of an improper inducement to a prospective
student-athlete.
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 7
__________
(2) Violations were premeditated, deliberate or committed after substantial planning.

[NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3-(f)]
As detailed in Allegation No. 1, Early deliberately planned for an outside third party
to provide him with monies to then provide to an individual associated with then
men's basketball prospective student-athlete Dennis Smith Jr. (Smith) with the
belief that the monies would be funneled to Smith's family.
(3) Persons of authority condoned, participated in or negligently disregarded the

violation or related wrongful conduct. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3-(h)]
As outlined in Allegation No. 1, Early, then men's basketball assistant coach and
lead recruiter, was a person of authority and was personally involved in the
violations.
(4) Intentional, willful or blatant disregard for the NCAA constitution and bylaws.
[NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3-(m)]
As detailed in Allegation No. 1, Early intentionally disregarded NCAA rules when

he arranged for an outside third party to provide him with monies to then provide
to the trainer of Smith with the belief that the monies would be funneled to Smith's
family to secure Smith's commitment to the institution.
The absence of prior Level I, Level II or major violations committed by the involved
individual. [ NCAA Bylaw 19.9.4-(h)]
Early has not been named as an involved individual in any Level I, Level II or major
infractions cases during his 25-year career as a collegiate basketball coach.
3. Involved Individual [Mark Gottfried (Gottfried), former head men's basketball

coach]:
a. Aggravating factor. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3]
A pattern of noncompliance within the sport program involved. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3-
(k)]
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 8
__________
As outlined in Allegation Nos. 1 through 3, the men's basketball program, under

Gottfried, failed to comply with recruiting, benefits and complimentary admissions
legislation as they pertained to the recruitment and enrollment of then men's basketball
prospective student-athlete Dennis Smith Jr., and the head men's basketball coach
failed to monitor compliance in these areas.
The absence of prior Level I, Level II or major violations committed by the involved
individual. [NCAA Bylaw 19.9.4-(h)]
Gottfried has not been named as an involved individual in any Level I, Level II or major
infractions cases during his 32-year career as a collegiate men's basketball coach.
D. Hearing Attendance.
In addition to the involved individuals and institutional representatives as outlined in NCAA

Division I Bylaw 19.7.7.5.2, the hearing panel of the NCAA Division I Committee on
Infractions may benefit from asking the following individual(s) to attend the hearing pursuant
to Bylaw 19.7.7.5: None.
E. Factual Information.
The attached exhibit details the factual information on which the enforcement staff relies for
Allegation Nos. 1 through 4. The enforcement staff incorporates the factual information
referenced throughout this document, its exhibits and all other documents in the secure filing
system.
F. Response to Allegations.
1. Please indicate whether the information contained within these allegations is substantially
correct and whether the institution and involved individuals identified in these allegations
believe violations of NCAA legislation occurred. Submit materials to support your
response.
2. If the institution and involved individuals believe NCAA violations occurred, please
indicate whether there is substantial agreement on the level of the violation. Submit
materials to support your response.
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 9
__________
3. Please indicate whether the factual information is substantially correct and whether the
institution and involved individuals have additional pertinent information and/or facts.
Submit facts in support of your response.
G. Request for Supplemental Information.
1. Provide mailing and email addresses for all necessary parties to receive communications
from the hearing panel of the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions related to this
matter.
2. Indicate how the violations were discovered.
3. Provide a detailed description of any corrective or punitive actions implemented by the

institution as a result of the violations acknowledged in this inquiry. In that regard, explain
the reasons the institution believes these actions to be appropriate and identify the
violations on which the actions were based. Additionally, indicate the date that any
corrective or punitive actions were implemented.
4. Provide a detailed description of all disciplinary actions taken against any current or former
athletics department staff members as a result of violations acknowledged in this inquiry.
In that regard, explain the reasons the institution believes these actions to be appropriate
and identify the violations on which the actions were based. Additionally, indicate the date
that any disciplinary actions were taken and submit copies of all correspondence from the
institution to each individual describing these disciplinary actions.
5. Provide a short summary of every past Level I, Level II or major infractions case involving
the institution or individuals named in this notice. In this summary, provide the date of the
infractions report(s), a description of the violations found by the Committee on
Infractions/hearing panel, the individuals involved, and the penalties and corrective
actions. Additionally, provide a copy of any major infractions reports involving the
institution or individuals named in this notice that were issued by the Committee on
Infractions/hearing panel within the last 10 years.
6. Provide a chart depicting the institution's reporting history of Level III and secondary
violations for the past five years. In this chart, please indicate for each academic year the
number of total Level III and secondary violations reported involving the institution or
individuals named in this notice. Also include the applicable bylaws for each violation, and
then indicate the number of Level III and secondary violations involving just the sports
team(s) named in this notice for the same five-year time period.
7. Provide the institution's overall conference affiliation, as well as the total enrollment on
campus and the number of men's and women's sports sponsored.
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
Page No. 10
__________
8. Provide a statement describing the general organization and structure of the institution's
intercollegiate athletics department, including the identities of those individuals in the
athletics department who were responsible for the supervision of all sport programs during
the previous four years.
9. State when the institution has conducted systematic reviews of NCAA and institutional
regulations for its athletics department employees. Also, identify the agencies, individuals
or committees responsible for these reviews and describe their responsibilities and
functions.
10. Provide the following information concerning the sports program(s) identified in this
inquiry:
• The average number of initial and total grants-in-aid awarded during the past four
academic years.
• The number of initial and total grants-in-aid in effect for the current academic year (or
upcoming academic year if the regular academic year is not in session) and the number
anticipated for the following academic year.
• The average number of official paid visits provided by the institution to prospective
student-athletes during the past four years.
• Copies of the institution's squad lists for the past four academic years.
• Copies of the institution's media guides, either in hard copy or through electronic links,
for the past four academic years.
• A statement indicating whether the provisions of NCAA Bylaws 31.2.2.3 and 31.2.2.4
apply to the institution as a result of the involvement of student-athletes in violations
noted in this inquiry.
• A statement indicating whether the provisions of Bylaw 19.9.7-(g) apply to the

institution as a result of the involvement of student-athletes in violations noted in this
inquiry.
11. Consistent with the Committee on Infractions IOP 4-16-2-1 (Total Budget for Sport
Program) and 4-16-2-2 (Submission of Total Budget for Sport Program), please submit the
three previous fiscal years' total budgets for all involved sport programs. At a minimum, a
sport program's total budget shall include: (a) all contractual compensation including
salaries, benefits and bonuses paid by the institution or related entities for coaching,
Case No. 00935
July 9, 2019
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__________
operations, administrative and support staff tied to the sport program; (b) all recruiting
expenses; (c) all team travel, entertainment and meals; (d) all expenses associated with
equipment, uniforms and supplies; (e) game expenses; and (f) any guarantees paid
associated with the sport program.
Any additional information or comments regarding this case are welcome.
National Collegiate Athletic Association

July 9, 2019 SJM:kde
September 19, 2019
VIA EMAIL
Mr. Jon Duncan EXHIBIT

Vice President of Enforcement 3
P.O Box 6222
Indianapolis, Indiana 46206
RE: Infractions Cases Related to the Southern District of New York Investigations.
Dear Mr. Duncan:
The Chair of the Division I Committee on Infractions (COI), Greg Christopher,

designated me to address hearing procedural matters for infractions cases connected
to the basketball-related criminal matters in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (SDNY). The enforcement staff has submitted one such case
to the COI for processing, and through normal docket management, I understand
more cases will follow in the coming months. Accordingly, I issue this master letter
to apply to all infractions cases connected to the SDNY litigation in order to better
manage these cases. This letter offers observations regarding the processing of
these cases in three areas: (1) inclusion and presentation of information for
resolution; (2) potential processing options for the COI; and (3) a short stay.
With respect to the first area, these cases must be presented in a manner in which
the COI can resolve them in a fair and efficient manner. Thus, the enforcement
staff should utilize stipulated facts where practicable.
If cases derive from potentially overlapping or related conduct and actors, the
enforcement staff is in the best position to identify those threads and ensure that the
resolution of any one case does not subsequently contradict others. In that way, the
order in which notices of allegations (NOAs) are issued may be important.
The enforcement staff should also ensure that case records are transparent and
manageable. Factual Information (FIs) should be well-organized. The purpose for
the items included in the record should be clear. This request applies to all FIs but
is particularly important for FIs imported pursuant to NCAA Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1.
Information utilizing the importation bylaw should be evidence from an appropriate
adjudication, which is relevant and material to the infractions case. Likewise, the
enforcement staff should be clear if its position is that a fact has been adjudicated
as final and determinative.
Mr. Jon Duncan
SDNY-related cases letter
September 19, 2019
Page No. 2
_________
With regard to the second area, the COI is considering strategic procedural options that best
position the COI to absorb cases and decide them in a fair and efficient manner. To meet this goal,
the COI may identify a subset of COI members to serve as a pool from which panels will be
generated pursuant to Bylaw 19.3.3. Preliminarily, that pool will consist of 14 members—a
number that balances the need for consistency in subject matter across panels while preserving the
COI's commitment to generated panels based on experience, diversity and a lack of conflicts of
interest. Further, a petition to refer a case or cases to the Independent Accountability Resolution
Process remains an option pursuant to Bylaw 19.11.3.
Finally, in order to allow the enforcement staff and parties to consider how to apply these
observations, the COI will not act on any SDNY-related cases until November 20, 2019. For the
currently issued NOA, all briefing deadlines are now stayed. The COI's preference is that no
NOAs will be issued during this time period. However, should the enforcement staff choose to
issue any NOAs, the COI will not act on them and all briefing deadlines will be stayed. After
November 20, 2019, I will assess the status of any NOAs before the COI and inform the parties of
next steps. Because this master letter applies across all SDNY-related cases, the enforcement staff
should provide it to all institutions and, where appropriate, potential parties and include it in the
case record.
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Joel McGormley, managing director of the
Office of the Committees on Infractions, at 317-917-6774 or jmcgormley@ncaa.org or Matt
Mikrut, director, at 317-917-6838 or mmikrut@ncaa.org.
Sincerely,
Dr. Carol Cartwright, President Emerita

Bowling Green and Kent State Universities
Chair designee
NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions
CC: mjm
cc: Selected NCAA Staff Members

November 21, 2019
VIA EMAIL
EXHIBIT
4
Mr. Jon Duncan
Vice President for Enforcement
NCAA
P.O. Box 6222
Indianapolis, Indiana 46206
RE: Infractions Cases Related to the Southern District of New York

Investigations
Dear Mr. Duncan:
The Chair of the Division I Committee on Infractions (COI), Greg Christopher,

designated me to address procedural matters for infractions cases connected to the
basketball-related criminal matters in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (SDNY). The enforcement staff has submitted three such
cases to the COI for processing. This letter confirms the expiration of the stay on
briefing deadlines in these cases and clarifies deadlines to respond to the notices of
allegations.
On September 19, 2019, I stayed all COI action on SDNY-related cases, including
briefing deadlines, through November 20, 2019. As explained in my September
19, 2019, correspondence, I stayed the deadlines to allow the parties sufficient time
to consider my observations related to the inclusion and presentation of information
by the enforcement staff in these cases and potential processing options for the COI.
The stay period has now expired. Accordingly, for any case in which the
enforcement staff filed a notice of allegations before the stay, the parties have their
90-day response period minus any time that ran before the stay to respond to the
allegations (e.g., if 30 days of the 90-day response period ran before the stay, a
party would have 60 days from today to respond). Likewise, for any case in which
the enforcement staff filed a notice of allegations after the stay, the deadline for the
parties to respond to the allegations is 90 days from today.
Because this master letter applies across all SDNY-related cases, the enforcement
staff should provide it to all parties in SDNY-related cases in which the
enforcement staff has issued allegations and include it in the case record. This,
however, is the last letter that will apply globally to all SDNY-related cases. All
future correspondence in SDNY-related cases will be addressed within each
respective case.
Mr. Jon Duncan
SDNY-Related Cases
November 21, 2019
Page No. 2
_________
If you have any questions, please contact Joel McGormley, managing director of the NCAA Office
of the Committees on Infractions, at (317) 917-6774 or jmcgormley@ncaa.org.
Sincerely,
Dr. Carol Cartwright, President Emerita

Chair designee
CC:clm
cc: Selected NCAA Staff Members

EXHIBIT
5
NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY
RESPONSE
TO
NCAA NOTICE OF ALLEGATIONS
December 9, 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
KEY RECORDS LIST .......................................................................................................... KR-1
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1
POSITION ON IMPORTATION OF FACTS .......................................................................... 7
SUMMARY OF NC STATE’S POSITIONS ON ALLEGATIONS............................................. 9
NC STATE’S ANALYSIS OF ALLEGATION 1-(C) – THE ALLEGED $40,000 PAYMENT FROM

TJ GASSNOLA TO ORLANDO EARLY ................................................................................... 11
UNIVERSITY’S ANALYSIS OF THE REMAINING LEVEL II AND LEVEL III ALLEGATIONS.. 24
ALLEGATION 1-a ........................................................................................................... 25
ALLEGATION 1-b .................................................................................................................... 27
ALLEGATION 1-d .................................................................................................................... 28
ALLEGATION 1-e .................................................................................................................... 30
ALLEGATION 2........................................................................................................................ 31
ALLEGATION 3........................................................................................................................ 35
ALLEGATION 4........................................................................................................................ 36
RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL AGGRAVATING & MITIGATING FACTORS ............................ 40
REQUESTS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ............................................................ G-1

KEY RECORDS LIST
Ex.
and FI Name Description
Nos.
Ex. 1 Timeline 2012 to March 2018 Steps taken by NC State leading up to receipt of
produced to NCAA enforcement the superseding indictment and demonstration of
staff the institution’s monitoring, institutional control and
affirmative steps to expedite resolution of this
matter. Allegation 1-(c)
Ex. 4 U.S. v. James Gatto, et. al. Original complaint against Gatto and Merl Code,
Unsealed Complaint former Adidas employees, and Christian Dawkins,
Brad Augustine and Munish Sood. The original
complaint included wire fraud conspiracy charges
but did not initially name NC State as a victim of
the crime. Allegation 1-(c)
Ex. 5 NC State Disassociation of Agent September 19, 2012, letter of disassociation from
Andy Miller NC State’s intercollegiate athletics program to
basketball agent Andy Miller for a period of 10
years. Dawkins and TJ Gassanola, a grassroots
basketball operator and government witness, were
both employed by Miller and his ASM basketball
agency. Allegation 1-(c)
Ex. 6 Gatto Trial – Verdict Sheet Gatto and his co-defendants were convicted of
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud identified as
Count 1 for which NC State was a victim.
Allegation 1-(c)
Ex. 7 Gassnola Judgement Gassnola pled to one count of Conspiracy to
Commit Wire Fraud. Gassnola did not plead to
wire fraud itself, in other words the completion of
the crime, in relation to Count 1 for which NC State
was a victim. Allegation 1-(c)
Ex. 10 Gatto Trial – Jury Charge In the context of the SDNY case, jury instructions
from the Court describing the difference between
a conspiracy to commit wire fraud versus the
substantive act. With respect to NC State, in
reaching its conclusion the jury had to find that
either (1) Early was not involved in the alleged
conspiracy or (2) Early was engaging in activities
outside the scope of his employment at NC State.
Allegation 1-(c)
Ex. 11 Memorandum Opinion and Order September 4, 2019, Order from the U.S. District
on NCAA Motion to Intervene Court for the Southern District of New York
denying the NCAA’s motion to intervene and
unseal certain documents. The Court stated, “We
agree with the government that the information in
these documents consists of hearsay, speculation
and rumor…” Allegation 1-(c)
KR-1
Ex. 13 U.S. v. James Gatto, et. al. Trial Testimony from Munish Sood, a cooperating
Transcript – October 3, 2018, pp. witness for the government, testifying that Shawn
320-321. Farmer was affiliated with then prospective
student-athlete Bam Adebayo, and that Farmer
and a basketball agent from Andy Miller’s ASM
Sports agency attempted to obtain money from
Sood, allegedly on behalf of Abedbayo. Adebayo
committed to and did attend the University of
Kentucky, a Nike sponsored institution.
Allegation 1-(c)
Ex. 14 Boston Globe Article, July 23, Article that discusses TJ Gassnola’s involvement
2006, Ethical questions raised as in amateur basketball, his operation of the New
amateur basketball recruiters England Playaz nonscholastic/AAU boys’
engage in high stakes battle for basketball team and his background. Gassnola
blue chip recruits has a self-described “degree in bull.” Allegation
1-(c)
Ex-16 Complimentary Admissions Determination that all but approximately 10 tickets
Analysis 2015-16 and 2016-17 could have permissibly been provided to
individuals, including but not limited to friends and
relatives of Dennis Smith Jr., through the student-
athlete complimentary admissions process.
Allegations 1-(d), 1-(e), 2, 4
FI-10 MFord_TR_021419_NorthCarolin Ford’s detail of compliance oversight of men’s
aSt_00935 basketball program’s complimentary admissions.
Allegations 1-(d), 1-(e), 2, 4
FI-11 JHarrick_TR_050219_NorthCaroli Harrick’s indication that he did not have any
naSt_00935 contact with Dennis Smith, Jr. or assist then head
men’s basketball coach Mark Gottfried with the
evaluation of Smith, Jr. Allegation 1-(b)
FI-12 JDunlap_TR_050819_NorthCaroli Dunlap’s detail regarding men’s basketball
naSt_00935 complimentary admissions, education and
oversight by athletics compliance. Allegations 1-
(a), 1-(d), 1-(e), 2, 4
FI-13 MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCar Gottfried’s oversight of Smith Jr.’s recruitment and
olinaSt_00935 report that former assistant men’s basketball
coach Orlando Early stated “that never happened”
(referring to the testimony from Gassnola about
the alleged payment to solidify Smith, Jr.’s
commitment to NC State). Allegations 1, 2, 3
FI-15 CDoyle_TR_062119_NorthCarolin Doyle’s detail of NC State’s extensive athletics
aSt_00935 compliance efforts and monitoring of the men’s
basketball program. Allegations 1-(d), 1-(e), 2, 4
FI-19 Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimo Gassnola’s testimony at trial wherein he confirms
ny_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_009 that $40,000 that he allegedly took to North
35 Carolina in November 2015 was wired to his
account from an individual named Martin Fox, and
that Fox had wired him a separate $40,000 two
months early in September 2015. Allegation 1-(c)
FI-23 Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit309A_ Trial exhibit documenting Gassnola’s air travel,
112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 rental car and gas purchases related to travel to
KR-2
Raleigh, North Carolina, in November 2015
totaling $957.59 – not including food or other
charges. Allegation 1-(c)
FI-26 Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit306D1 Trial exhibit documenting a deposit from Adidas for
_112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 $30,000 on November 12, 2015. Allegation 1-(c)
FI-27 Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit1116_ Trial exhibit documenting reimbursement request
112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 from Gassnola to Gatto for $30,000 for October
and November. Allegation 1-(c)
FI-28 Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit1118_ Trial exhibit documenting reimbursement request
112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 from Adidas for $10,221.67. FI-26, FI-27 and FI-
28 together account for only $221.67 for
Gassnola’s expenses, not including food or other
charges. This means Gassnola would have spent
at least $735.92 during the November 2015 trip to
Raleigh, North Carolina, for which he would not
have been reimbursed. Allegation 1-(c)
FI-71 JDunlapLoadingDockEmail_0923 September 23, 2014, email from Dunlap
14_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 requesting parking in the PNC Arena loading dock
area. Allegation 1-(a)
FI-89 Memo_Dsmith_050619_NorthCar Doyle memorandum detailing interview of Smith,
olinaSt_00935 Jr. wherein Smith Jr. denies ever receiving cash or
any other impermissible benefits from anyone at
NC State or Farmer. Allegation 1-(c)
FI-111 DYowStatement_070219_NorthC Statement from former director of athletics
arolinaSt_00935 regarding NC State’s culture of compliance and
efforts taken by the athletics department to ensure
NCAA rules compliance. Allegations 1, 2, 3, 4
KR-3
INTRODUCTION
This is North Carolina State University’s (NC State, the University) Response to the enforcement
staff’s Notice of Allegations (NOA) dated July 9, 2019.
For the University, this case began in earnest on January 16, 2018, when the Office of General
Counsel was contacted by an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY
or the U.S. Attorney’s office) to advise of a forthcoming grand jury subpoena. The subpoena was
received the following day (January 17, 2018). It sought “all documents regarding the recruitment
and enrollment of Dennis Smith Jr.” (Smith Jr.) See Exhibit 1.
Background
Smith Jr. signed a National Letter of Intent with the University on November 11, 2015 and enrolled
in January 2016 for the spring 2016 semester. See FI-16. Before enrolling, Smith Jr. had suffered
a season-ending knee injury that required surgery early in his final high school basketball season
(2015-16). Because his high school basketball career ended prematurely, Smith Jr. completed
his high school graduation requirements during the fall 2015 semester so that he could enroll
early at NC State and rehabilitate his injured knee under the supervision of NC State’s athletics
training staff. See Exhibit 2.
Smith Jr.’s successful recruitment had been considered a relatively foregone conclusion for NC
State because his grandmother, a very influential figure in his life, was a life-long NC State fan.
See FI-13, p. 18. Essentially everyone knowledgeable of his situation believed he was destined
for NC State. Smith Jr. played one season at NC State, the 2016-17 season, before declaring for
the 2017 NBA draft. See Exhibit 3.
1
On September 26, 2017, approximately four months before the aforementioned SDNY subpoena
was issued to the University, the U.S. Attorneys’ office for SDNY announced a series of criminal
complaints against individuals associated with Adidas. See Exhibit 4. The complaints named
several NCAA member institutions and prospective student-athletes, but no mention of NC State
or athletes associated with the NC State men’s basketball program were included in those
complaints. See Id. Nevertheless, consistent with direction from the NCAA Board of Governors,
the NC State athletics compliance office contacted both current and former men’s basketball
coaching staff members and asked whether they had any knowledge of or involvement in any
activity related to the SDNY matter. See Exhibit 1. All coaches contacted, including former head
coach Mark Gottfried (Gottfried) and former assistant coach Orlando Early (Early), responded that
they had neither knowledge nor involvement. See Id. The University also searched email records
but did not locate any relevant information. See Id.
In October 2017, an athlete agent registered in North Carolina contacted the University’s Office
of General Counsel and reported that he believed Smith Jr.’s enrollment had been influenced by
Adidas through Smith Jr.’s father, Dennis Smith Sr. See Id. Athletics compliance staff conducted
a face-to-face interview with the agent, but the agent declined to share details or any additional
names of alleged involved parties. The agent stated that he had no information that Smith Jr.
was involved. See Id. The General Counsel relayed the information to the Raleigh FBI office,
which later relayed the information to FBI agents working with the SDNY. See Id. As previously
referenced, on January 16, 2018, an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the SDNY contacted the Office
of General Counsel to give notice that the University would receive a grand jury subpoena. NC
State received that subpoena on January 17, 2018, and immediately began collecting records.
See Id. The University also communicated with the U.S. Attorney’s office about boundaries
imposed by that office related to any independent investigation NC State could conduct.
2
On February 23, 2018, Yahoo Sports published an article about the sports representation agency
operated by Andy Miller (ASM Sports/ASM). See FI-34. The article included documentation
suggesting that a “loan” had been made to Smith Jr. and a screenshot of an email from Christian
Dawkins, a one-time associate of ASM, to Miller referencing phone calls to and from former NC
State coaches Gottfried, Early and Butch Pierre. See Id. This was of particular concern because
in September 2012, then Director of Athletics Debbie Yow had disassociated Miller and his
agency from NC State for 10 years due to Miller’s conduct in an unrelated matter (Miller had not
been truthful when NC State questioned him about his connection with an AAU coach (Desmond
Eastman) who had been decertified by the NCAA). See Exhibit 5. All NC State men’s basketball
coaches were made aware of Miller’s disassociation.
In light of the Yahoo Sports article, the University searched records of basketball staff members
for communications with Miller and ASM Sports. See Exhibit 1. No relevant email records
associated with Miller, ASM Sports, and/or Dawkins were found. See Id. NC State also contacted
the NCAA enforcement staff to advise of the University’s inquiries and results, and to seek
direction and recommendations on additional inquiries. See Id.
On April 10, 2018, a prosecutor with the SDNY notified the Office of General Counsel by telephone
that his office intended to issue a superseding indictment that would identify NC State as a victim
of a conspiracy to commit fraud related to the men’s basketball program, but that no current or
former NC State employees would be a subject of the indictment. However, the superseding
indictment referenced an unidentified “former NC State coach” and alleged that the former coach
transported money to the father of an unidentified prospective student-athlete in October 2015.
See FI-17. NC State now knows that the alleged unidentified former coach was Early, and the
alleged unidentified prospect was Smith Jr. The superseding indictment prompted the University
to contact the NCAA enforcement staff. At that point, regular communication between the
3
University and the NCAA enforcement staff began and a joint, cooperative investigation ensued
which culminated in the July 9, 2019 NOA.
Case Overview
Within the NOA, various violations of NCAA legislation are alleged, but only one of which,
Allegation 1-(c), if standing alone, would be charged as a Level I violation. The other alleged
violations are a mix of Level II and Level III violations. NC State disputes the allegations in
Allegation 1-(c) and, accordingly, also strenuously disagrees that this case is a Level I case for
the institution.
Allegation 1-(c) arises from the federal criminal investigation and subsequent SDNY prosecution
(SDNY case) of James Gatto (Gatto), Merl Code (Code) and Christian Dawkins (Dawkins). Gatto
and Code were both associated with Adidas. All three defendants were convicted of wire fraud
and conspiracy to commit wire fraud arising from allegations that they were involved in using
Adidas-sourced money to pay prospective student-athletes (and/or family members of those
athletes) to sign National Letter of Intents (NLIs) and scholarship agreements with Adidas-
sponsored colleges and universities. See Exhibit 6. The government’s theory was that the
alleged payments rendered the athletes ineligible to receive athletics scholarship money from their
NCAA member institutions thereby making their institutions victims of fraud.1 See Id. Gatto, Code,
and Dawkins were convicted of Count One: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (against NC State
et al.), Count Two: Wire Fraud (University of Louisville). See Id. Gatto was convicted of Count
1 In the original indictment, there were only two university “victims” (Louisville and Miami) and only one
count charging conspiracy to commit fraud and no substantive counts for committing fraud itself. In the two
superseding indictments, there were four university “victims” (Louisville, Miami, Kansas and NC State) in the first count
for conspiracy and two additional substantive counts for actually defrauding Louisville and Kansas. NC State
and Miami were not included in the substantive counts and were only identified in the conspiracy count. The likely
reason for this is because the Government could not prove any substantive crimes were committed against NC State
and Miami, i.e., they could not prove the student athlete being recruited to NC State actually received the money.
4
Three: Wire Fraud (University of Kansas). See Id. Their convictions are currently on appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Testimony in the SDNY case by a single cooperating witness, TJ Gassnola, serves as the sole
basis for Allegation 1-(c). Specifically, Gassnola testified that he offered and delivered, $40,000
to Early to “calm the situation” involving Smith Jr., and that Early informed Gassnola that he
intended to provide the money to Shawn Farmer (Farmer), a friend of the Smith family. See FI-
19, pp. 999-1000. However, there is no evidence in the trial record, including Gassnola’s
testimony, nor evidence developed by the NCAA enforcement staff, that;
• Early provided money to Farmer; and/or
• Farmer provided money to the Smith family.2
Furthermore, there is no evidence as to what the “situation” was that Gassnola believed (or
claimed to believe) needed to be “calm(ed).” Gassnola pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and was sentenced to one-year of probation. See Exhibit 7.
NC State’s Overarching Positions
NC State takes its responsibility for NCAA rules compliance and the integrity of its intercollegiate
athletics programs seriously. The athletics department has implemented extensive policies,
procedures and systems designed to detect, deter and prevent potential NCAA rules violations
and, if violations nonetheless occur, to detect and report them. NCAA rules education provided
to the former men’s basketball staff by the athletics compliance office and monitoring of the men’s
basketball program has always been thorough and extensive. That was true during the time
period the alleged violations occurred. Indeed, nearly all allegations of potential NCAA rules
violations in this case are the result of the actions of Early. If the allegations in this case are
2 On April 30, 2019, Smith Jr. reported to the University’s deputy director of athletics, senior associate athletics director
for compliance, and assistant athletics director for compliance that he was unaware of any payment from Gassnola to
Early and that Smith Jr. had not accepted money in exchange for attending NC State. See FI-89.
5
substantiated, the violations were committed knowingly by Early, and only Early, and contrary to
NCAA and University ethical standards and expectations of compliance.
The University respects the NCAA infractions process and expects it to help achieve a fair
resolution for the NCAA and the University. But public statements made by NCAA executive staff
appeared to foreshadow a pre-determined outcome in this and other cases arising from the SDNY
criminal matter3, and there are legitimate factual questions in this matter that a hearing panel of
the Committee on Infractions must review and resolve. We trust that the panel will perform its
duties without influence from senior NCAA officials.
NC State remains committed to the integrity of its intercollegiate athletics programs and ensuring
that all of its coaches, student-athletes and athletics programs comply with NCAA, Conference
and University rules, policies and expectations. In this case, if the University’s former employees
acted unethically, those employees did so for their own benefit and kept their actions hidden from
the University. Therefore, the Level I unethical conduct allegation involving Early identified in
Allegation 1-(c) should be weighed in that context when deciding any penalties on the University
or its men’s basketball program.4 The University appreciates the anticipated thorough review of
this case by the panel.
NC State’s Response will address each allegation, but first the University sets forth its analysis of
the application of NCAA Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 – Importation of Facts to this case. Thereafter, because
3 On May 22, 2019, well before the enforcement staff’s investigation had been completed, the NCAA vice president of
governance informed an ESPN reporter following a meeting of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics that
notices of allegations “will be coming.” See Exhibit 8. Thereafter, on June 12, 2019, again well before the investigation
had been completed, the NCAA vice president for regulatory affairs informed CBS Sports that two-high profile programs
would receive notices of allegations in early July (clearly referencing NC State’s case) and was quoted as stating, “The
main thing is that we’re up and ready. We’re moving forward and you’ll see consequences.” See Exhibit 9.
4 In the context of the SDNY case it is important to note that with respect to NC State, the jury found only a conspiracy
to commit wire fraud and not the substantive act of wire fraud. In making this finding the jury could have come to one
of two conclusions: (1) Early was not involved in the alleged conspiracy, or (2) Early was involved in the alleged
conspiracy, but Early was engaging in activities outside of the course of his employment and potentially to profit
personally. Although it is unclear which conclusion the jury reached, the jury could not have concluded as it did if it
believed that Early was operating in the course and scope of his employment at NC State. See Exhibit 10.
6
the evaluation of Allegation 1-(c) is of paramount importance to the processing level of the case
for NC State, the Response addresses Allegation 1-(c) first, followed by the remaining
subparagraphs in Allegation 1, and then Allegations 2 through 4.
POSITION ON IMPORTATION OF FACTS

(NCAA Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 and Use of SDNY Evidence)
NC State understands that this is one of the first cases where NCAA Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 – Importation
of Facts – may be cited with respect to the use of information presented in a criminal trial in an
NCAA infractions case. As written, Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 is narrow and does not permit the wholesale
use of ANY information or evidence provided to a court, but rather establishes parameters and
criteria when information is ripe and appropriate for use in the infractions process. The University
acknowledges that Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 provides that NCAA hearing panels may consider evidence
submitted and positions taken in the SDNY trial. Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 also provides, however, that
the panel cannot accept as a fact any testimony from a court proceeding unless: (1) the testimony
was established as a true fact in a decision or judgment, and (2) that decision or judgment is not
on appeal. It is clear in this case that neither Gassnola’s testimony, nor the subsequent
convictions of Gatto, Code and Dawkins, are “facts” that may be “accepted as true” in this
infractions case in order to conclude that NC State violated NCAA rules.
The parameters of Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 are particularly important to ensuring a fair process for NC
State, as a member institution, in this infractions case. Superimposing elements of the criminal
system on the NCAA infractions process – a wholly different system of adjudication – creates
inherent limitations and biases when using overlapping information.
Therefore, even though Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 allows that Gassnola’s testimony may be considered,
its veracity must be stringently evaluated by the hearing panel consistent with Bylaw 19.7.8.3 –
Basis of Decision. In other words, just because Gassnola testified at the SDNY trial as a witness
7
for the government, his testimony may not be accepted as true, absent additional corroborative
evidence that the hearing panel deems to be “credible, persuasive and of a kind on which
reasonably prudent persons would rely in the conduct of serious affairs.”
Moreover, the evidence in the SDNY trial record consisted of sworn testimony and documents
that were relied upon to secure convictions in a criminal trial. The prosecution relied on
Gassnola’s testimony to support its theory that a crime associated with wire fraud had occurred.
In NC State’s situation, Gatto was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and not the
commission of the act itself. However, the enforcement staff now seeks to use that evidence in
this infractions matter for a different purpose – to support allegations of NCAA rules violations that
were not the focus of the matters at issue in the criminal trial and not subjected to the usual cross-
examination and testing that would normally accompany such testimony.5 Here, the enforcement
staff is incorrectly attempting to use SDNY’s conviction of a conspiracy to commit wire fraud as
evidence that the alleged funds were delivered to Early and then to the Smith family without factual
evidence that these actions actually occurred. However, using that same evidence in this
infractions matter requires the hearing panel carefully analyzing the credibility and sufficiency of
the evidence on NCAA rules issues, which are separate and independent from the criminal trial.
5 The University also notes the September 4, 2019 Order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, denying the NCAA’s motion to intervene and unseal certain documents and evidence that was presented at the
trial in the SDNY. In that Order, Judge Kaplan made clear that seeking to unseal evidence not admitted into the record
in the criminal proceeding was not an appropriate way for the NCAA to gather information it needed for its own purposes
separate from the criminal trial, i.e., to investigate potential rules violations. In denying the NCAA’s motion to intervene,
the Court stated:
We agree with the government that the information in these documents consists of hearsay,
speculation and rumor. Furthermore, the individuals referred to in these documents are not standing
trial. They will not have the opportunity to test the reliability of the information contained in these
materials nor respond adequately to any inferences that might be drawn on the basis of this
information. In other words, the documents are of a sensitive nature, and the degree of potential
injury is high. See Exhibit 11, p. 19.
While the University recognizes that the evidence at issue in the NCAA’s motion and the Court’s order was evidence
involving third parties who were not parties or witnesses in the trial, similar reasoning in the September 4 Order should
also apply to Gassnola’s testimony. See Id.
8
Neither NC State nor the NCAA has ever been a party to the SDNY criminal proceedings. Neither
NC State nor the enforcement staff had the opportunity to cross-examine Gassnola to test the
veracity and credibility of his testimony and to focus on specific NCAA rules issues as they related
to NC State. For these reasons, there is evidence in the record that calls critical parts of
Gassnola’s trial testimony into question. Accordingly, as set forth in more detail in the University’s
response to Allegation 1-(c), Gassnola’s testimony cannot be accepted without independent
corroboration. Notably, the U.S. Attorney’s Office took great pains to corroborate Gassnola’s
testimony on the issues that mattered to the prosecution of that case because they knew that
without corroboration Gassnola’s testimony was of limited relevance.
SUMMARY OF NC STATE’S POSITIONS ON ALLEGATIONS
Only one allegation – Allegation 1(c) – is a potential Level I violation. With respect to Allegation
1-(c), the narrative promulgated by the enforcement staff is that Adidas helped secure the
commitment of Smith Jr. to NC State by facilitating a payment of $40,000 through Gassnola to
Early, who was then going to provide that money to a friend of Smith Jr.’s family. However, a
thorough review of the SDNY trial record shows that the evidence does not support key parts of
Allegation 1-(c). First, there is no evidence that the alleged $40,000 payment was provided to
Smith Jr. or his family. Second, the weight of the evidence supports that: (1) the source of the
alleged $40,000 payment from Gassnola to Early was not Adidas, but was Martin Fox (Fox), an
individual affiliated with professional basketball player agents and business managers and who
had no known relationship with Adidas, and (2) Gassnola was acting on his own behalf or on
behalf of Fox, an agent or business manager when Gassnola allegedly provided $40,000 to Early.
Therefore, the University disagrees with Allegation 1-(c).
Without Allegation 1-(c), this is not a Level I case. Instead, this case can appropriately be
designated as, at most, a Level II for NC State. The remaining Allegations 1-(a), 1-(b), 1-(d), 1-
9
(e), 2 and 4 all involve Level II or Level III violations. With respect to Allegations 1-(a) and 1-(b),
NC State agrees with the cited underlying facts of both allegations. However, the University notes
that the same or similar conduct identified in Allegation 1-(a) would typically be processed as a
Level III violation. In addition, the facts set forth in Allegation 1-(b) do not constitute a violation of
NCAA rules. Finally, the NCAA four-year statute of limitations (Bylaw 19.5.11) bars both
allegations 1-(a) and 1-(b) because the cited activities occurred four years prior to the verbal
Notice of Inquiry in this case, which was delivered on October 1, 2018.
Allegations 1-(d), 1-(e), 2 and 4, all involve the impermissible provision of complimentary men’s
basketball admissions to Farmer, members of Smith Jr.’s family, and two nonscholastic basketball
coaches who coached other student-athletes. NC State acknowledges that the violations
occurred. However, in most of the situations cited, there was a way for the individuals to
permissibly receive the complimentary admissions. That significantly lessens the impact of the
violation and any real “benefit” provided to the individuals. For example, the University
determined that out of the alleged 160 impermissible admissions, only approximately 10
admissions could not otherwise have been permissibly provided through available student-athlete
complimentary admissions. These complimentary admissions violations were primarily the result
of the then-men’s basketball coaching staff ignoring rules and well-established processes
regarding complimentary admissions, even though NC State educated the coaches on those
rules. The University has implemented corrective actions to ensure the same or similar conduct
will not occur now or in the future.
10
NC State’s Analysis of Allegation 1-(c) – The alleged $40,000 payment from TJ Gassnola
to Orlando Early
1. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaws 11.5.1, 11.7.6, 13.1.2.4, 13.2.1 and 13.7.2.1.6 (2014-15);
10.01.1, 10.1, 10.1-(b) and 13.2.1 (2015-16); 12.11.1, 13.8.1, 16.2.1.1, 16.8.1 and 16.11.2.1
(2016-17)]
It is alleged that from September 2014 through March 2017, Orlando Early (Early), then
men's basketball assistant coach and lead recruiter, violated the NCAA principles of ethical
conduct when he and members of the men's basketball staff committed multiple recruiting
violations and provided extra benefits during the recruitment and subsequent enrollment of
then men's basketball prospective student-athlete Dennis Smith Jr. (Smith). Early and the
men's basketball staff members arranged for and/or provided Smith and individuals
associated with him approximately $46,700 in impermissible inducements and benefits. As
a result, Smith competed in 32 contests and received actual and necessary expenses while
ineligible. Specifically:
(c) In November 2015, Early violated the NCAA principles of ethical conduct when he
knowingly arranged for and/or provided an impermissible recruiting inducement of
$40,000 to an individual associated with Smith. Specifically, Early arranged for TJ
Gassnola (Gassnola), a representative of the institution's athletics interests and
then outside consultant for Adidas, which was also a representative of the
institution's athletics interests, to provide Early with $40,000 in cash to ensure
Smith's commitment to the institution. Early informed Gassnola that he intended to
provide the money to Shawn Farmer (Farmer), an individual responsible for
teaching or directing an activity in which a prospective student-athlete is involved
and the trainer of then student-athlete Smith who would then provide the money to
the Smith family. [NCAA Bylaws 10.01.1, 10.1, 10.1-(b) and 13.2.1 (2015-16)]
EVIDENTIARY OVERVIEW
As referenced above, the enforcement staff has based Allegation 1-(c) entirely on evidence
obtained from the SDNY trial of Gatto, Code and Dawkins, as well as the plea agreement of T.J.
Gassnola (Gassnola), a cooperating witness who received no prison time in exchange for testifying
as a government witness. Also, as addressed in the Introduction, based on the authority granted
to NCAA hearing panels through Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 – Importation of Facts – the Panel may consider
evidence submitted and positions taken in the SDNY trial. However, Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 also
mandates that the Panel may not accept as true any facts (i.e., evidence) from the SDNY trial
unless (1) the facts were established in a decision or judgment and (2) that decision or judgment
is not on appeal. Neither of these requirements have been met.
11
Evidence submitted during the SDNY trial included the testimony of Gassnola that he provided
money to the families of multiple prospective student-athletes on behalf of Adidas6 to assist the
recruiting efforts of several NCAA member institutions. As it pertains to NC State, Gassnola
testified that “Orlando Early (Early) reached out to me, that there were some issues surrounding
Dennis [Smith Jr.] and the people around him. There were certain things that were promised to
the family, from whom I don’t know...” See FI-19, p. 998. Gassnola did not identify what Early
claimed had been promised, and he was not told the identity of the person who allegedly made
the “promises.” Smith Jr. had announced his commitment to NC State on September 10, 2015,
approximately two months prior to the alleged conversation between Gassnola and Early that
Gassnola described at trial. See Exhibit 12. Gassnola did not assert that Early (or anyone else)
told him the money was to maintain Smith Jr.’s prior commitment to NC State. Instead, Gassnola
testified that he decided entirely on his own to offer Early $40,000 because he (Gassnola) was
“nervous” that Smith Jr. would back out of his commitment to NC State (see FI-19, p. 1002); that
he flew to Raleigh, North Carolina, in November 2015; and that he provided $40,000 to Early.
See FI-19, pp. 998-99. Gassnola stated that when he gave Early $40,000, Early said he was
going to give the money to Shawn Farmer, an associate of Smith Jr. and Smith Jr.’s family.7 See
FI-19, pp. 1000. While Gassnola’s testimony may be considered by the panel, it may not be
6 Adidas is the apparel sponsor for NC State and many other NCAA Division I member institutions. The fact that Adidas
and NC State have a contractual relationship does not, in and of itself, make Adidas a representative of the University’s
athletics interests, nor is NC State responsible for the conduct of all persons the University knew or should have known
were affiliated with Adidas. This is especially true when individuals, like Gassnola, operate independent of Adidas and
with independent motivations outside of the individual’s employment responsibilities.
7 Farmer also affiliated himself with other prospective student-athletes in North Carolina who committed to and attended
other institutions sponsored by shoe and apparel companies other than Adidas. In at least one of those situations,
Farmer acted on behalf of an agent – not in an effort to ensure that the prospect committed or maintained a commitment
to an institution. Specifically, Munish Sood, another government witness at the SDNY trial, testified that Farmer and
Stephen Pina, a basketball agent from Andy Miller’s ASM Sports agency, attempted to obtain money from Sood
allegedly on behalf of Bam Adebayo, who was a prospective student-athlete in the same class as Smith Jr., and was
committed to and did attend the University of Kentucky, a Nike sponsored institution. See Exhibit 13, pp. 320-321.
12
accepted as true or as a fact. Rather, it must be evaluated under the legislated standard of Bylaw
19.7.8.3.8
UNIVERSITY’S CONCLUSIONS
NC State acknowledges that documentary evidence exists supporting that Gassnola traveled to
Raleigh in November 2015. See FI-23. The University also acknowledges that Gassnola testified
that prior to his November 2015 trip to Raleigh, he offered to provide Early with $40,000, and
thereafter delivered that amount of money to Early at a later time. See FI-19, p. 1000.
For the reasons detailed below, the University agrees that any receipt of money by Early from
Gassnola would have constituted a violation of NCAA Bylaws 10.01.1 and 10.1, as to the conduct
of Early.9 However, NC State does not agree that this alleged conduct should be imputed to the
University as a Level I violation of NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1 because, contrary to Allegation 1-(c), there
is no evidence in the SDNY trial, and there is no other evidence in the record of this infractions
case, that:
• Early actually provided $40,000 (or any amount of money) to Farmer;
• Farmer provided any amount of money to Smith Jr.’s family; or
• Farmer provided any amount of money to Smith Jr.
In the absence of this evidence, there is no factual basis on which this panel can conclude that if
Gassnola delivered $40,000 to Early, the $40,000 (or any portion of the $40,000) went beyond
8 Bylaw 19.7.8.3 – Basis of Decision – directs the hearing panel to base its decision on information presented to it that
it determines to be credible, persuasive and of a kind on which reasonably prudent persons rely in the conduct of
serious affairs.
9 Early was no longer employed by the University during the time of the investigation in this matter and he refused to
respond to requests submitted by the enforcement staff and by the University to participate in an interview. Pursuant
to Bylaws 19.7.8.3.2 and 19.7.8.3.3, Early’s failure to participate in an investigation (and to respond to a notice of
allegations against him) can be viewed by a hearing panel as an admission of the alleged violation for purposes of the
penalties against him (the former employee). However, those bylaws do not permit the panel to use a former
employee’s failure to participate in an interview or respond to a notice of allegations as an admission against his former
employer, NC State.
13
Early. Indeed, as detailed below, the evidence contradicts such a conclusion. Specifically, the
evidence in the record demonstrates that Smith Jr. did not receive any money and that he was
unaware of any money being provided to Farmer and/or to his family by Adidas, Gassnola or Early.
For these reasons, the evidence does not support a finding of violations of Bylaws 10.1-(b)10 and
13.2.1 of the 2015-16 NCAA Manual.
In addition, the weight of the evidence does not support the enforcement staff’s allegations that (1)
the $40,000 (or any amount of money) that Gassnola claimed he provided to Early came from
Adidas, NC State’s apparel provider, or (2) the alleged money was intended to ensure Smith Jr.’s
commitment to NC State. To the contrary, credible and persuasive evidence demonstrates that
Adidas was not the source of the $40,000 and that the money was not used to ensure Smith Jr.’s
commitment to NC State. The $40,000 allegedly delivered by Gassnola to Early was from, and
was provided on behalf of, a professional agent (or business manager working on the agent’s
behalf). For these reasons, the evidence does not support a finding of violations of Bylaws 10.1-
(b)11 and 13.2.1 of the 2015-16 NCAA Manual.
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Gassnola is not a credible witness and his statements must have independent
corroboration to be credited
Again, Allegation 1-(c) is based solely on the testimony of Gassnola (and related records) in the
SDNY trial.12 Because Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 does not permit the panel to accept Gassnola’s testimony
10 Allegation 1-(c) cites NCAA Bylaw 10.1-(b) of the 2015-16 NCAA Manual; however, it appears that the NCAA
intended to cite 10.1-(c) of the 2015-16 Manual which provides that unethical conduct includes “Knowing involvement
in offering or providing a prospective or an enrolled student-athlete an improper inducement or extra benefit or improper
financial aid.”
11 10.1-(c) of the 2015-16 NCAA Manual, 10.1-(b) of the 2019-20 NCAA Manual.
12 There were documents entered into evidence in the SDNY trial that indicate that (1) Gassnola withdrew $40,000
from his bank account on October 30, 2015, and (2) Gassnola traveled to Raleigh Durham on November 2, 2015 (and
apparently returned the next day). See FI-19, pp. 1005-07. In addition, there are documents pertaining to multiple
deposits into Gassnola’s bank account.
14
in the SDNY trial as true, an assessment of Gassnola’s credibility is essential in determining
whether his testimony in the SDNY trial is credible and persuasive evidence for purposes of this
infractions matter. For the reasons set forth below, the University respectfully submits that
Gassnola is not a credible witness and his testimony, for purposes of establishing a Level I
recruiting-inducement violation on the part of NC State, cannot substantiate a finding.
Gassnola is an individual with a self-described “degree in bull,” who has an extensive criminal
history that includes assault, larceny, receipt of stolen property, tax evasion and habitual traffic
offenses. See FI-19, pp. 916-18, 926-29 and Exhibit 14. Gassnola’s primary occupation over
the years leading up to his plea agreement has been founder and operator of New England
Playaz, a 501-(c)(3) nonprofit organization, that operates nonscholastic/AAU boys basketball
teams. See FI-19, pp 916-18, 926-29, 978 and Exhibit 14. Despite its legal status as a charitable
organization, Gassnola regularly funneled money through New England Playaz for improper
purposes. Specifically, Gassnola arranged for money from agents, business managers and an
apparel company, among others, to flow through New England Playaz to him to personally enrich
himself based on his affiliations with prospective student-athletes and involvement in
nonscholastic/AAU boys’ basketball. See e.g., FI-19, p. 1034 and Exhibit 15. Gassnola’s failure
to report his “earnings” from New England Playaz resulted in the federal government uncovering
Gassnola’s tax fraud. Gassnola was also charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud based on
efforts to conceal payments that he arranged to the families of athletes associated with several
institutions. See FI-19, pp. 913-14. He subsequently became a government witness in the SDNY
trial to reduce or eliminate his potential federal jail sentence.13 See FI-19, p. 935. In short,
Gassnola has a long history of dishonest and criminal conduct, his testimony in the SDNY trial
13
Gassnola was sentenced to one-year supervised release, including two months of home confinement and electronic
monitoring, and a $100 fine. See Exhibit 7.
15
was motivated by self-interest, and his statements should not be accepted as credible and
persuasive in this NCAA infractions matter.
NC State has carefully reviewed Gassnola’s testimony and the other evidence submitted in the
SDNY trial that is relevant to Allegation 1-(c). While there is supporting evidence for certain parts
of Gassnola’s testimony, the University concludes that Gassnola’s testimony as a whole as it
pertains to Adidas and NC State is not consistent with the weight of the evidence. Therefore, this
panel should find that there is not sufficient credible and persuasive evidence to support a Level
I recruiting-related violation against the institution. Specifically, the weight of the evidence does
not support the premise of Allegation 1-(c) – that Adidas, through Gassnola, was assisting with
NC State’s recruitment of Smith Jr. In addition, there is no evidence to support various other
portions of Allegation 1-(c).
B. The Available Evidence Does Not Support Allegation 1-(c) or a Level I Violation.
There are multiple subparts to Allegation 1-(c): (1) that Gassnola provided $40,000 to Early; (2)
that Early provided $40,000 to Farmer; (3) that Farmer provided $40,000 to Smith Jr. and/or his
family; (4) that Adidas supplied the $40,000 to Gassnola; and (5) that the purpose of the $40,000
payment was to ensure Smith Jr.’s commitment to NC State. Each subpart is discussed in detail
below. Each of these items must be supported by credible and persuasive evidence for the panel
to find that the alleged violations of Bylaws 10.1-(b)14 and 13.2.1 occurred.
1. Evidence that Gassnola Provided $40,000 to Early.
Gassnola stated that in the fall of 2015, Early contacted him regarding an unspecified issue with
Smith Jr. and allegedly indicated that “certain things were promised to the family.” See FI-19,
p. 998. Neither Gassnola nor anyone else identified what alleged promises had been made or
14 10.1-(c) of the 2015-16 NCAA Manual, 10.1-(b) of the 2019-20 NCAA Manual.
16
who made those promises, and Gassnola never indicated that Early requested money. Instead,
Gassnola stated that he unilaterally “offered to bring $40,000 (to Early) to calm the situation,” and
that Early did not turn down his offer. See FI-19, p. 999. Gassnola did not explain why $40,000
was the amount of money necessary to “calm the situation.” It is not credible on its face or
possible that Gassnola and Early failed to discuss the amount of money necessary to “calm the
situation.” Regardless, Gassnola’s vague testimony is the only evidence in the record of the
extent of the alleged conversation. Gassnola reported that he flew to Raleigh with $40,000, met
Early at his house and delivered the money to Early. See Id.
Gassnola’s statements about taking money to Raleigh were supported by (1) his bank statement
showing that he withdrew $40,000 on October 30, 2015, (2) his credit card statement showing
that he purchased an airline ticket to fly to the Raleigh-Durham International Airport on
November 2, 2015, and (3) his credit card statement showing that he rented a car at the Raleigh-
Durham International Airport on November 2, 2015, and returned the rental car the same day.
See FI-19, pp. 1105-07, FI-26 and FI-23. But this evidence only demonstrates that Gassnola
likely took $40,000 to North Carolina. It does not corroborate other parts of his testimony about
the phone conversation with Early, specifically why he gave money to Early.
2. There is No Evidence that Early Actually Provided the $40,000 to Farmer
The record lacks any evidence that the money allegedly provided by Gassnola to Early was
passed on by Early to Farmer. At the SDNY trial, Gassnola claimed that when he gave the
$40,000 to Early, he (Early) stated that he “was giving the money to Shawn Farmer.” See FI-19,
p. 1000. Neither Early nor Farmer were defendants or witnesses in the SDNY trial and neither
were interviewed in the NCAA investigation. As a result, this purported statement by Early was
inadmissible hearsay and no independent corroboration of the statement exists in the trial record
or in the record of this infractions case. For all these reasons, particularly Gassnola’s background
17
of dishonesty and criminal conduct, the panel should not consider Gassnola’s hearsay statement
about what Early would do with the money as credible and persuasive.15
Even accepting Gassnola’s hearsay account of Early’s purported future intent, no evidence of any
kind was presented at the SDNY trial or during the NCAA investigation and infractions proceeding
demonstrating that Early provided the $40,000 to Farmer. Without any evidence Farmer received
the money, or any credible and persuasive evidence of an “arrangement” by Early for a
prospective student-athlete, his family or friends, to receive a benefit, the panel cannot find that a
violation of Bylaw 13.2.1 occurred.
3. There is No Evidence that Farmer Provided the $40,000 to Smith Jr. or His Family
In addition to there being no evidence that Farmer received money from Early, no evidence of
any kind was submitted in the SDNY trial or in the NCAA enforcement investigation that Farmer
provided $40,000 (or any other amount) to Smith Jr. or his family.
In fact, the only evidence obtained and submitted in the NCAA enforcement investigation
suggests the opposite. On April 30, 2019, Smith Jr. reported to the NC State’s deputy director
of athletics, senior associate athletics director for compliance, and assistant athletics director for
compliance that he was unaware of any payment from Gassnola to Early and that he (and/or his
family) had not accepted money in exchange for attending NC State. See FI-89. Likewise, head
men’s basketball coach Mark Gottfried reported that Early informed him that Early did not do
anything wrong and that Gottfried had nothing to worry about because “that never happened”
(referencing the alleged payment to solidify Smith Jr.’s commitment). See FI-13, p. 31. This is
15 Early was no longer employed by the University during the time of the investigation in this matter. Pursuant to Bylaws
19.7.8.3.2 and 19.7.8.3.3, Early’s failure to participate in an investigation and to respond to a notice of allegations
against him can be used as an admission of the alleged violation for purposes of the penalties against him (the former
employee). However, those bylaws do not permit the panel to use a former employee’s failure to participate in an
interview or respond to a notice of allegations as an admission against his former employer, NC State.
18
the only evidence in the record of this case that directly addresses the question of whether anyone
provided money to Smith Jr. or his family.
Nevertheless, the enforcement staff has proposed to the University that “circumstantial evidence”
suggests that the Smith family received some type of unidentified income in January 2016
because Dennis Smith Sr. moved from government housing in Fayetteville, North Carolina, to a
rental home. See FI-88. This evidence is insufficient for any conclusion related to the source of
Smith Sr.’s rental payments. First, under the enforcement staff’s theory that Smith Jr.’s family
must have received some unearned money to afford this move, there is no basis to conclude that
any money that may have been used for the move derived from Early. Second, neither the
enforcement staff nor NC State possess bank account records or other information about other
possible funds that the Smith family might have had available to them in the fall and/or winter of
2015. Absent proof that no other funds were available, there is no basis to find that Smith Jr.
received a cash payment to attend NC State as alleged. To the extent that the panel is inclined
to consider this “circumstantial evidence,” such evidence does not establish that the Smith family
received unearned money, and it does not establish the source of any such money. To cobble
together this “circumstantial evidence” and make the leap to a serious bylaw violation is without
merit and unjust.
For all the foregoing reasons, the enforcement staff’s theory – based only on “circumstantial
evidence” – is nothing more than sheer speculation and does not provide credible and persuasive
evidence upon which the panel can conclude that $40,000 or any amount of funding was ever
provided to Smith Jr. or his family.
19
4. Adidas was not the Source of the Alleged $40,000 Payment from Gassnola to Early and
the Payment did not Ensure Smith Jr.’s Commitment to NC State
a. There Is Credible and Persuasive Evidence that Gassnola Obtained the $40,000 from
the Representative of an Agent and it was used in an Effort to Have Smith Jr. Sign
with the Agent
Prior to his alleged discussion with Early about some unspecified promises to Smith Jr.’s family,
Gassnola communicated with Martin Fox about arranging a meeting amongst Smith Sr., Farmer
and Lester Knipsel, a business manager who represents athletes and celebrities. See FI-19, pp.
1131-1132, citing Defense Exhibit 185A. Like Gassnola, Fox “wore many hats” including
working for basketball agent Andy Miller. See FI-19, pp. 1122, 1164-66. Fox has no known
relationship with Adidas. On October 20, 2015, Fox wired exactly $40,000 into Gassnola’s
account. See FI-19, pp. 1121-1122. There is absolutely no evidence that money was from
Adidas, and it appears that the only reason Gassnola had $40,000 available to withdraw on
October 30, 2015, was the deposit from Fox. After Gassnola withdrew $40,000 from his account
on October 30, 2015, his account balance dwindled to $2,917.83. See FI-26. Thus, the record
is clear that the $40,000 Gassnola withdrew from his account on October 30, 2015, and allegedly
took to Raleigh and gave to Early, was money that Gassnola received from Fox.
Even more, this was not the first time Fox provided money to Gassnola. Specifically, on
September 1, 2015, seven weeks before the above-referenced $40,000 transfer from Fox to
Gassnola, Gassnola received a separate $40,000 from Fox. See FI-19, 1129-1133. After
receiving that $40,000 from Fox, Gassnola withdrew the money from his bank account on
September 4, 2015, and traveled to Raleigh, North Carolina, on September 7. See Id. This trip
mirrored the subsequent November 2015 trip that Gassnola made to Raleigh. Unconvincingly,
Gassnola testified, “I don’t recall any of that” when asked specifically about the purpose of the
20
September 2015 trip to Raleigh and why he withdrew $40,000 from his bank account prior to that
trip.16 This testimony underscores that Gassnola is not credible.
In both the September and November 2015 circumstances, the evidence demonstrates that the
$40,000 in question in this case came from Fox and not Adidas. The logical conclusion is that
Fox attempted to secure Smith Jr. as a client once he turned professional.
b. Gassnola’s Payment to Early is Inconsistent with His Pattern of Payments to the

Families of Other Prospective Student-Athletes.
The manner in which Gassnola allegedly received the money in this circumstance was
inconsistent with Gassnola’s process of providing illicit payments to prospective student-athletes
on behalf of Adidas at other NCAA member institutions. Specifically, in all other circumstances
covered in the SDNY trial that involved Gassnola allegedly providing money to individuals
associated with other NCAA schools, Gassnola testified that he first communicated with Gatto to
explain why he needed funds, submitted a fraudulent invoice to Adidas and finally received
payment from Adidas in advance of providing money to prospective student-athletes or their
family members. See FI-19, pp. 1027-1033. In most circumstances, Gassnola also kept a portion
of the money for his own personal use for gambling or tickets to sporting events.
The following chart illustrates Gassnola’s consistent course of action related to Adidas payments
to other prospects’ families, which most importantly included prepayment by Adidas to Gassnola
and the use of some of the prepaid funds for Gassnola’s own benefit:
DATE NARRATIVE SUPPORTING INFORMATION

10/15/16 Gassnola submits invoice to Adidas for $50,000 for FI-19, pp. 1027-1028, Exhibit
tournament fee. Gassnola testified that $30,000 of 16, Government Exhibit 1023
$50,000 to be provided to the mother of a
prospective student-athlete who enrolled at another
involved institution.
16If true, no evidence exists that Gassnola provided this $40,000 to a NC State coach, employee, recruit or student-
athlete on this September 2015 trip to Raleigh.
21
10/21/16 $50,000 invoice paid by Adidas to Gassnola through FI-19, pp. 1028-1030, Exhibit
New England Playaz bank account. 16, Government Exhibit 306A-1
10/31/16 Gassnola withdraws $50,000 from New England FI-19, pp. 1028-1030, Exhibit
Playaz bank account. 16, Government Exhibit 306A-1
11/1/16 Gassnola provided $30,000 in cash to mother of a FI-19, p. 1030, Exhibit 16,
prospective student-athlete who enrolled at another Government Exhibit 309C
involved institution. Gassnola testified that he
bought Super Bowl tickets and College Football
Playoff tickets with the remainder of the money.
1/18/17 $90,000 wire transfer to New England Playaz bank FI-19, p. 1033, Exhibit 16,
account. Government Exhibit 306A-2
1/19/17 $27,500 withdrawal from New England Playaz bank FI-19, p. 1034, Exhibit 16,
account. Gassnola testified that $20,000 was to be Government Exhibit 306A-2
provided to the mother of a prospective student-
athlete who enrolled at another involved institution
and $7,500 was for Gassnola’s personal spending
and gambling.
1/19/17 $20,000 in cash provided to mother of a prospective FI-19, pp. 1032-1033. Exhibit
student-athlete who enrolled at another involved 16, Government Exhibit 309D
institution.
In the NC State case, however, Gassnola does not claim (and did not testify) that he spoke with
Gatto prior to the payment to Early, and Gassnola did not receive money from Adidas in advance
of allegedly paying Early. Rather, as discussed above, Gassnola received exactly $40,000 from
Fox only days before his alleged payment to Early.
Despite the foregoing, Gassnola asserted that the $40,000 that he claims he gave to Early on
November 2, 2015, was Adidas money that he advanced out of his own funds and then sought
reimbursement. This version is not credible or persuasive for the reason set forth above, and
again highlights the persistent credibility issues inherent in Gassnola’s testimony overall.
Moreover, the evidence shows that Gassnola never sought reimbursement from Adidas for
$40,000. Rather, on November 12, 2015, Gassnola received reimbursement of $30,000,
allegedly for “Monthly Consultant Fee, travel expenses for October & November,” and on
November 17, 2015, he separately sought reimbursement for “Consultant Fee/Travel expenses”
in the amount of $10,221.67. See FI-26, FI-27, FI-28. If these payments, cobbled together, were
intended to be reimbursements for an alleged payment of $40,000, they somehow only accounted
for $221.67 for Gassnola’s last minute air travel, rental car and gasoline bill in Raleigh. However,
22
the documents show that these expenses total $957.59 —not including food or other charges.
See FI-23. That leaves $735.92 that Gassnola would have spent for which he would not have
been reimbursed. Moreover, under this theory, Gassnola would have received no compensation
at all for his “consultant fee.” This would not have benefitted Gassnola, and he would have lost
money. In short, Gassnola’s story does not add up in multiple ways.
In summary, the credible and persuasive evidence does not support the enforcement staff’s
theory that the November 2, 2015, $40,000 payment, both in source and function, was made
using Adidas funds, or that payment served to ensure the enrollment of Smith Jr. at NC State.17
Instead, Fox was the source of the funds, and the payment was likely made in anticipation of
Smith Jr.’s pay-back potential as a professional athlete and his retention of Fox as his agent or
business manager. The University acknowledges that these payments would have compromised
Smith Jr.’s eligibility, if the payments were in fact ever were provided to Smith Jr. or his family,
which the evidence does not support. Regardless, the evidence here does not support a Bylaw
13.2.1 violation.
17 As first noted in the Introduction section, Smith Jr.’s successful recruitment had been a relatively foregone conclusion
for NC State because his grandmother, a very influential figure in his life, was a lifelong NC State fan. Virtually everyone
knowledgeable of his situation believed he was destined for NC State, and no evidence that he seriously considered
any other institution exists.
23
CONCLUSION
NC State acknowledges that Gassnola’s uncorroborated testimony suggests that Early was offered
a $40,000 payment and that $40,000 was delivered by Gassnola to Early. However, there is no
evidence that the alleged $40,000 payment was provided to Farmer, Smith Jr. or the Smith family.
Because Early refused to participate in an interview as part of the enforcement staff’s and the
University’s investigation into the allegation made by Gassnola, NCAA Bylaw 19.7.8.3.3 allows the
hearing panel to view Early’s refusal as an admission that he received money from Gassnola.
However, it does not mean that the remainder of the unsubstantiated allegation may be deemed
credible for purposes of a Level I finding against the University. To do so, given the serious
inconsistencies identified herein would not only be unfair to NC State, but contradict the credible
and persuasive evidence in the record.
Most importantly, the weight of the evidence does not support the conclusion that the $40,000
payment originated from Adidas or that Gassnola was acting as a representative of the institution’s
athletics interests at the time of the payment. Rather, NC State concludes, and respectfully
submits to the Panel, that credible and persuasive evidence supports a finding that the $40,000
delivered by Gassnola to Early was from, and was provided on behalf of, a professional agent or
business manager, and not on behalf of Adidas and not for the purpose of securing Smith Jr.’s
enrollment at NC State. Therefore, a 13.2.1 violation cannot be substantiated in this case.
University’s Analysis of the Remaining Level II and Level III Allegations
Without Allegation 1-(c), this is not a Level I case and none of the remaining allegations are of the
type that should be categorized as Level I “severe breaches of conduct.” Specifically, none of the
remaining allegations include a substantial recruiting or competitive advantage, or substantial or
extensive benefits provided to a student-athlete or prospective student-athlete in order to gain a
recruiting advantage. Rather, the remaining allegations suggest a failure by one assistant men’s
24
basketball coach, who no longer works for NC State, to follow necessary and established
processes with respect to complimentary admissions. The former assistant men’s basketball
coach acted contrary to NC State policies, rules education and directives related to providing
individuals with tickets to some basketball contests – the majority of which the individuals could
have received in a permissible way.
1-a. In September 2014, the then director of basketball operations arranged for approximately
$80 in impermissible recruiting inducements in the form of special parking in the loading
dock of PNC Arena for Smith and three other prospects to use during their unofficial visits
to attend the institution's September 27, 2014, football contest versus Florida State
University. [NCAA Bylaws 13.2.1 and 13.7.2.1.6 (2014-15)]
UNIVERSITY’S CONCLUSION
NC State agrees that the weight of the evidence supports a conclusion that the facts and
circumstances described in Allegation 1-a occurred and as it relates to then prospective student-
athlete Dennis Smith Jr. constitute a violation of NCAA legislation. However, the University notes
that the NCAA four-year statute of limitations bars this allegation because the event occurred more
than four years prior to the verbal Notice of Inquiry on October 1, 2018. Even if the statute of
limitations did not bar the allegation, this isolated violation related to a parking spot at a football
game constitutes a minimal benefit at most. Thus, the violation should be characterized as Level
III.
On September 23, 2014, then NC State men’s basketball director of operations Jeff Dunlap sent
an email to the PNC Arena director of production that requested access for “a couple coaches
and couple recruits” to park in the PNC Arena dock driveway during a football contest. See FI-
71. PNC Arena is the location of NC State men’s basketball home contests, and the University
shares PNC Arena with a professional hockey team that manages the arena. PNC Arena is
25
located adjacent to the NC State football stadium and parking at PNC Arena is also used for NC
State home football contests.
Dunlap reported that he made a September 23, 2014 parking request so that he and then
assistant men’s basketball coach Orlando Early could access the secure parking area with
prospective student-athletes who were on a permissible unofficial visit. See FI-12, p. 37. Dunlap
stated that basketball recruits who visit the University typically do not have their own vehicles;
thus, coaches will transport the recruits around campus, including to the site of home football
contests when campus visits occur on the weekend of a home football contest. See Id. Dunlap
indicated that in the instance referenced in the allegation, he provided the recruits names to PNC
Arena staff to allow the recruits to get through security when entering PNC Arena, not to
individually park their vehicles. See Id. Early and Smith Jr. refused to cooperate and be
interviewed regarding this matter.
However, Dunlap’s testimony is not supported by the available evidence. Specifically, a
contemporaneous unofficial visit compliance form shows that then prospective student-athlete
Dennis Smith Jr. was transported to the game on September 27, 2014, by his friend Brian
Scarborough. See FI-72. Despite Dunlap’s testimony, the September 23, 2014, email combined
with the unofficial visit form suggests to the University that Smith Jr. was transported to the game
in question by Scarborough and that Smith Jr. and Scarborough rode in their own vehicle to the
football contest. Accordingly, it is more likely than not that at least Smith Jr. received
impermissible parking at the PNC Arena loading dock. However, NC State does not have
sufficient evidence to conclude whether any other prospects received the same parking benefit.
26
1-(b) On September 29, 2014, the then head men's basketball coach allowed a former
colleague, who was not a countable coach or certified to recruit off-campus, to accompany
him to an evaluation of Smith at an off-campus recruiting event at the John D. Fuller
Recreational Center in Fayetteville, North Carolina. [NCAA Bylaws 11.5.1, 11.7.6 and
13.1.2.4 (2014-15)]
NC State agrees with the underlying facts of the allegation, but the facts do not constitute a violation
of NCAA rules. Specifically, the former colleague and mentor of the then head men’s basketball
coach identified in this allegation was a then 76-year-old retired basketball coach who was visiting
the former head men’s basketball coach in a personal capacity. The former colleague and mentor
did not meet the legislated criteria to be considered a coach or a representative of the University’s
athletics interests such that the provisions of NCAA Bylaws 11.5.1, 11.7.6 and 13.1.2.4 are
applicable. At the same time, like Allegation 1-(a), the University notes that the NCAA four-year
statute of limitations applies in this circumstance because the event occurred more than four years
prior to the verbal Notice of Inquiry on October 1, 2018. Even if the statute of limitations did not
bar the allegation, and the hearing panel finds a violation, this was an inadvertent violation that
was isolated and limited in nature and should be characterized as Level III.
Early in former head men’s basketball coach Mark Gottfried’s coaching career, Jim Harrick hired
Gottfried in various capacities. See FI-13, p. 9-10. Harrick has since served as a mentor to
Gottfried both professionally and personally. See Id. At the time of Gottfried’s drive to Fayetteville
to observe Smith Jr., Harrick was 76 years old and had been retired as a collegiate and
professional basketball coach for seven years. See Id. Gottfried reported that after retirement,
Harrick annually visited Gottfried and stayed in Gottfried’s home. See FI-13, pp. 11-13. On the
date in question, Gottfried stated that rather than leave Harrick at the Gottfried home by himself,
27
he invited Harrick to join him on the one- plus hour car ride to Smith Jr.’s high school, where
Gottfried planned to watch Smith Jr.’s practice, which was open to the public. See FI-13, p. 13.
Harrick reported that he did not have any contact with Smith Jr., nor did he assist Gottfried with
the evaluation. See FI-11, pp. 9 and 13.
1-(d) On 26 occasions between January 2016 through March 2017, Early violated the principles
of ethical conduct when he knowingly provided approximately $2,119 in impermissible
recruiting entertainment benefits in the form of 44 complimentary admissions on the men's
basketball office pass list to Farmer. [NCAA Bylaws 10.01.1, 10.1, 10.1-(b) and 13.8.1
(2015-16 through 2016-17)]
NC State agrees that the means utilized by Early to provide complimentary admissions to Farmer
constitute a violation of NCAA Bylaw 13.8.1.18 However, a comprehensive review of the overall
complimentary admissions records for men’s basketball revealed that Farmer did not receive a
benefit that he could not have otherwise received in a permissible manner. These complimentary
admissions would have been permissible if Early simply had directed Farmer and then student-
athlete Dennis Smith Jr. to coordinate Farmer’s admission through the student-athlete
complimentary admissions list. Therefore, although Early did not follow proper procedures, NC
State does not agree that the evidence and circumstances warrant a finding of unethical conduct
on the part of Early.
Shawn Farmer, who owned a car detailing business, was a friend of Dennis Smith Jr. and his
family. See FI-13, pp. 22 and 26. NC State believes that Farmer’s interest in attending the
games in question was to watch Smith Jr. play, and not because Farmer occasionally earned
18A full discussion of the applicable NCAA rules and men’s basketball office pass list is set forth in NC State’s
response to Allegation 2 beginning on pages 32-33.
28
money as a basketball trainer. NCAA Bylaw 13.8.1 permits the University to provide up to two
complimentary admissions to any individual responsible for teaching or directing an activity in
which a prospective student-athlete is involved (e.g., AAU coach, trainer, etc.). NCAA Bylaw
16.2.2.1 permits student-athletes to provide up to four complimentary admissions to regular-
season (home or away) competitions and up to six complimentary admissions for postseason
competitions in the student-athlete’s sport. There is no restriction on who can use a student-
athlete’s complimentary admissions, nor is there a limit on the number of complimentary
admissions that can be transferred from one student-athlete to a teammate.
Here, rather than have Farmer seek complimentary admissions through Smith Jr., which was the
appropriate method of providing Farmer admission, it appears that Early placed Farmer on the
men’s basketball office pass list. Early and all members of the men’s basketball coaching staff
were educated extensively regarding the permissible use of complimentary admissions. See FI-
15, pp. 63-75. Specifically, coaches knew that AAU coaches and trainers could only receive two
complimentary admissions, and that family members of student-athletes needed to obtain
complimentary admissions through the involved student-athletes. See FI-15, p. 5.
The University conducted a comprehensive review of the impermissible complimentary
admissions outlined in Allegations 1-(d), 1-(e) and 2. The University determined that out of the
total alleged impermissible admissions, only 10 admissions could not have been accounted for
as permissible complimentary admissions from student-athletes. See FI-15, p. 29 and Exhibit
16.
CONCLUSION
NC State agrees that the circumstances of Allegation 1-(d) constitute a violation of NCAA rules.
Early, on his own accord, added Farmer to the men’s basketball office pass list rather than have
Farmer and Smith Jr. arrange admissions for Farmer. However, the actual benefit provided in
29
this situation was one of convenience and not the underlying value of the ticket. NC State has
implemented corrective actions to ensure that the same or similar violations will not occur in the
future.
1-(e) On 13 occasions between November 2016 and February 2017, Early violated the
impermissible benefits in the form of 106 impermissible complimentary admissions on the
men's basketball office pass list to then student-athlete Smith's family and friends. [NCAA
Bylaws 10.01.1, 10.1, 10.1-(b), 16.2.1.1 and 16.11.2.1 (2016-17)]
NC State agrees that the means utilized by Early to provide complimentary admissions to members
of Smith Jr.’s family constitutes a violation of NCAA Bylaws 16.2.1.1 and 16.11.2.1.19 However, a
full review of men’s basketball student-athletes’ complimentary admissions during this time period
indicates that Smith Jr.’s family could have received the same admissions in a permissible manner
through the student-athlete complimentary admissions list. Thus, although Early did not follow
proper procedures, the evidence and circumstances do not warrant a finding of unethical conduct
on the part of Early.
NC State directs the hearing panel to its response to Allegation 1-(d) for a discussion of Early’s
use of the men’s basketball office pass list. Similar to Allegation 1-(d), Early knew or should have
known to direct members of Smith Jr.’s family to the student-athlete complimentary admissions
list. In nearly every situation, complimentary tickets could have been provided to Smith Jr.’s family
through the student-athlete complimentary admissions list in a permissible manner. See Exhibit
16.
19A full discussion of the applicable NCAA rules and men’s basketball office pass list is set forth in NC State’s
response to Allegation 2 beginning on pages 32-33.
30
CONCLUSION
NC State agrees that the facts and circumstances of Allegation 1-(e) constitute a violation of
NCAA legislation. Early added members of Smith Jr.’s family to the men’s basketball office pass
list rather than requiring that family members request available tickets from Smith Jr. However,
the actual benefit provided in this circumstance, as in Allegation 1-(d), was one of convenience
and not the underlying value of the ticket. In nearly every situation, there was a permissible way
for Smith Jr.’s family to attend games through the student-athlete complimentary admissions list.
NC State has implemented corrective actions to ensure that the same or similar violations will not
occur in the future.
2. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaw 13.8.1 (2015-16)]
It is alleged that on nine occasions from January through March 2016, men's basketball staff
members violated NCAA recruiting restrictions when they provided approximately $862 in
impermissible benefits in the form of 14 complimentary admissions. Specifically:
a. On seven occasions during January and February 2016, men's basketball staff provided
approximately $436 in impermissible benefits in the form of eight impermissible
complimentary admissions on the men's basketball office pass list to Stanley Bland
(Bland), an individual responsible for teaching or directing an activity in which a
prospective student-athlete is involved. [NCAA Bylaw 13.8.1 (2015-16)]
b. On March 8 and 9, 2016, the men's basketball staff provided approximately $426 in
impermissible benefits in the form of six impermissible complimentary admissions on the
men's basketball office pass list to Keith Stevens (Stevens), an individual responsible
for teaching or directing an activity in which a prospective student-athlete is involved.
Specifically, the men's basketball staff provided Stevens three complimentary
admissions to each of the men's basketball Atlantic Coast Conference Tournament
contests against Wake Forest University and Duke University. [NCAA Bylaw 13.8.1
(2015-16)]
NC State agrees that the means by which complimentary admissions were provided to Bland and
Stevens constitute a violation of NCAA legislation. However, like Allegations 1-(d) and 1-(e), a
review of the facts and circumstances of Allegations 2-(a) and 2-(b) demonstrates that Bland and
31
Stevens did not receive a benefit that they could not have otherwise received in a permissible
manner because both individuals had coached student-athletes on the men’s basketball team from
whom they could have permissibly received tickets.
Applicable NCAA Rules
As noted in the University’s responses to Allegations 1-(d) and 1-(e), NCAA legislation permits
institutions to provide student-athletes with up to four complimentary admissions for regular-
season (home or away) competitions and up to six complimentary admissions for postseason
competitions in the student-athlete’s sport. See NCAA Bylaw 16.2.1.1 and NCAA Bylaw
16.2.1.1.1. There are no restrictions as to whom a student-athlete may designate to use a
complimentary admission (e.g., friends, relatives, trainers and agents), provided the student-
athlete does not receive payment or anything of value in exchange for the complimentary
admission and does not designate the complimentary admission at the direction of an institutional
staff member. See NCAA Bylaw 16.2.2.1 and FI-078. Student-athletes may also transfer
unused complimentary admissions to a teammate, and he or she can provide additional tickets to
their own guests. NCAA rules separately allow for individuals responsible for teaching or directing
an activity in which a prospective student-athlete is involved (e.g., AAU coach, basketball trainer,
etc.) to receive up to two complimentary admissions per regular season home athletics contests
directly from the institution. See NCAA Bylaw 13.8.1.
The Men’s Basketball Office Pass List
The men’s basketball coaches received four hard tickets for their personal use (e.g., to provide to
family and personal friends), and were required to use the men’s basketball office pass list if
coaches wanted additional tickets. See FI-12, p. 16. Jeff Dunlap (Dunlap), former director of
men’s basketball operations, reported that he received calls from athletics compliance regarding
32
the individuals on the men’s basketball office pass list to ensure that the tickets were being
provided permissibly, i.e., in accord with NCAA rules. See Id. Generally, the men’s basketball
office pass list was to be used on a limited basis for business contacts of the men’s basketball
program, including vendors, former players and potential donors, in addition to being used to
provide tickets consistent with NCAA Bylaw 13.8.1. See FI-15, p. 5.
Maggie Burge (Burge), men’s basketball administrative assistant, and Dunlap were responsible
for adding names to the men’s basketball office pass list. Coaches would share their ticket
requests with Burge or Dunlap and were required to designate or categorize the relationship of
the individual to be placed on the list. See FI-5, pp. 15-18. Often, the guests would simply be
listed as a guest of Dunlap, as he became the default or “rollover” name, even for guests he did
not know. See FI-12, p. 26.
The men’s basketball staff was provided rules education by athletics compliance and the ticket
office prior to the season regarding the proper procedure for the pass list and was aware of the
limitations related to the provision of complimentary tickets to AAU coaches, high school coaches
and any individuals associated with prospects. See FI-12, pp. 19-20, pp. 26-27 and FI-15, p. 5.
NC State compliance emphasized that limitation and the men’s basketball staff understood that
AAU coaches, high school coaches, or any individual who coached prospects could not be
provided with more than two tickets to a home competition and could not receive any
complimentary tickets to away contests or tournament competition. See FI-12, p. 26-27 and FI-
15, p. 5.
2-(a) – The Provision of Eight Impermissible Complimentary Admissions to Stanley Bland
Stanley Bland was an AAU coach for then NC State men’s basketball student-athlete Cat Barber.
See FI-15, p. 19. Therefore, he could have permissibly received complimentary admissions from
Barber. See FI-78. It was also permissible for Bland, who was an individual responsible for
33
teaching or directing an activity involving a prospective student-athlete, to receive two
complimentary admissions to a home competition from NC State. Bland was provided one extra
complimentary admission to six home contests, and two extra complimentary admissions to one
home contest. Specifically, Bland received a total of three complimentary admissions to the
Louisville, Florida State, Duke, Georgia Tech, Clemson, and North Carolina competitions, and a
total of four complimentary admissions to the Wake Forest competition. See FI-62 and FI-67.
2-(b) – The Provision of Six Impermissible Complimentary Admissions to Keith Stevens
Like Bland, Keith Stevens was the AAU coach for then NC State men’s basketball student-
athletes Leenard Freeman and Beejay Anya and could have permissibly received complimentary
admissions to the postseason contests in question from either student-athlete. See FI-15, p. 15
and FI-78. However, Stevens was considered an individual responsible for teaching or directing
an activity in which a prospective student-athlete is involved, and could not receive any
complimentary admissions from the University to a postseason competition. Stevens received
three complimentary admissions to each of the men's basketball Atlantic Coast Conference
Tournament contests against Wake Forest University on March 8, 2016, and Duke University on
March 9, 2016. Stevens was listed as a guest of Jeff Dunlap for each of the competitions. See
FI-62. According to Dunlap, it is likely that Rob Moxley, a former men’s basketball assistant
coach, requested that Stevens be placed on the coaches’ pass list for the tournament games, as
Moxley recruited prospective student-athletes who participated on Stevens’ AAU team. See FI-
12, pp. 27 and 29.
With respect to both Allegations 2-(a) and 2-(b), the University determined that student-athlete
complimentary admissions were available for each of the identified contests and could have been
provided to Bland and Stevens. See Exhibit 16.
34
CONCLUSION
NC State agrees that the facts and circumstances of Allegation 2 resulted in a violation of NCAA
legislation. However, Bland and Stevens could have permissibly complimentary admissions.
Each individual was a then student-athlete’s former AAU coach and had a logical nexus to those
student-athletes. Therefore, Bland and Stevens were eligible to receive complimentary
admissions from the respective student-athletes they had coached. The violations in this instance
occurred as a result of the coaches’ inattention to the rules concerning the men’s basketball office
pass list. NC State has implemented corrective actions to ensure the same or similar violations
will not occur in the future.
3. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaw 11.1.1.1 (2015-16 and 2016-17)]
It is alleged that during the 2015-16 and 2016-17 academic years, Mark Gottfried (Gottfried),
then men's basketball head coach, is presumed responsible for the violations detailed in
Allegation Nos. 1-(c), 1-(d), 1-(e) and 2 and did not rebut the presumption of responsibility.
Specifically, Gottfried did not demonstrate that he monitored his direct report, Orlando Early
(Early), then men's basketball assistant coach and lead recruiter, for compliance as it
pertained to Early involving TJ Gassnola (Gassnola), a representative of the institution's
athletics interests and then outside consultant for Adidas, and Shawn Farmer (Farmer), an
individual associated with then men's basketball prospective student-athlete Dennis Smith
Jr. (Smith), in Early's recruitment of Smith, which involved the arrangement and/or provision
of a $40,000 recruiting inducement. Additionally, Gottfried did not demonstrate that he
monitored his staff's provision of complimentary admissions on the men's basketball office
pass list, which involved the provision of 164 impermissible complimentary admissions to
individuals associated with prospects and Smith's family and friends.
NC State requires its head coaches to adhere to all NCAA rules, monitor their assistant coaches
and report potential areas of NCAA compliance risk to the University. All the allegations in this
case were the result of the actions or inactions of former assistant men’s basketball coach Early
and former head men’s basketball coach Mark Gottfried. With respect to Allegations 1-(d), 1-(e)
and 2, Gottfried failed to ensure that his coaches were using the men’s basketball office pass list
consistent with NCAA rules and in accordance with the extensive education provided by NC State.
35
With respect to Allegation 1-(c), Gottfried failed to adequately monitor Early’s interactions with third
parties who, for their own benefit, inserted themselves into the recruiting process of then
prospective student-athlete Dennis Smith Jr.
4. [NCAA Division I Manual Constitution 2.8.1 (2015-16 and 2016-17)]
It is alleged that during the 2015-16 and 2016-17 academic years, the scope and nature of
the violations detailed in Allegation Nos. 1-(d), 1-(e) and 2 demonstrate that the institution
violated the NCAA principle of rules compliance when it failed to adequately monitor its
men's basketball program's provision of complimentary admissions on the men's basketball
office pass list by its failure to establish an adequate system for ensuring compliance with
NCAA legislation.
NC State agrees that in limited instances, it failed to adequately monitor the men’s basketball office
pass list.20 NC State has a robust compliance function, and takes seriously its obligation to educate
about, monitor for, and report on NCAA rules violations. NC State had significant education and
monitoring efforts related to complimentary ticket lists that were consistent with the National
Association for Athletics Compliance (NAAC) reasonable standards. In response to these
violations, the University has implemented corrective actions to ensure that the same or similar
violations do not occur in the future.
In its responses to Allegations 1-(d), 1-(e) and 2, the University established that with respect to
all but 10 of the impermissible complimentary admissions at issue, the individuals could have
permissibly received complimentary tickets directly from a student-athlete. See Exhibit 16.
Therefore, any actual impermissible benefit provided was minimal. Had the University identified
these situations contemporaneously, the tickets would have been reassigned to a different list
20 The University refers the hearing panel to the University’s review of the evidence in Allegations 1-(d), 1-(e) and 2 for
a full discussion of the underlying facts.
36
and then distributed permissibly. In fact, reassignment occurred on at least one occasion when
members of Smith Jr.’s family were moved from the men’s basketball office pass list to permissible
slots available for student-athlete complimentary admissions. See FI-15, p. 80.
Further, the University maintained written policies and procedures related to complimentary
admissions, engaged both coaches and other constituents in comprehensive rules education
related to complimentary admissions, and regularly monitored complimentary admissions lists.
The violations resulting from the men’s basketball office pass list was an anomaly in an otherwise
compliant program.
Written Policies and Procedures
The NC State athletics department’s guiding principle as articulated by the former director of
athletics was “E.R.A.” – an acronym for how the athletics department would Establish a culture of
NCAA rules compliance, Reinforce the culture, and Act with integrity if the culture was threatened.
See FI-111. This was regularly communicated to all athletics staff and it was through this lens
that the athletics department implemented compliance systems. The University maintained
written policies and procedures related to the permissible manner with which complimentary
admissions could be provided and the processes for providing complimentary admissions that
were distributed to all coaching staffs and updated on an annual basis. See FI-10, p. 6. The
ticket office also maintained a system, policies and procedures to prevent violations and to handle
complimentary admissions consistent with NCAA rules (e.g., requiring an ID, ensuring there was
a signature, etc.). See FI-10, p. 33. These systems worked efficiently for student-athlete and
recruit tickets.
Rules Education
The men’s basketball staff was provided NCAA rules education on complimentary admissions
prior to the season and regularly throughout the academic year. See FI-12, p. 19. In addition,
37
student-athletes and the ticket office staff also received regular rules education. See FI-15, p. 33.
Further, via email communications, compliance staff frequently reminded athletics department
staff and men’s basketball coaches and staff about complimentary admissions rules and policies.
See FI-15, pp. 63-74. Every former men’s basketball coach and staff member interviewed by the
NCAA indicated that they understood NCAA rules related to complimentary admission for
coaches and families.
Monitoring
The NC State athletics compliance office monitored the complimentary ticket lists for irregularities
or potential violations by using athletics compliance software and by checking the number of
tickets provided to student-athletes’ guests and recruits. See FI-10, p. 29. The athletics
compliance staff also created a list of known agents and third parties that it used to cross-check
with the student-athlete complimentary admissions list. See FI-15, pp. 6-7. The enhanced
monitoring of student-athlete complimentary admissions was an effort to identify situations where
known agents or their associates attempted to connect themselves with student-athletes. That
gave the University the opportunity to identify situations with known bad actors, intervene and
prevent violations. See Id. The athletics compliance office focused primarily on student-athletes
and recruits lists, along with the potential involvement of agents and other third parties because
the perceived risks associated with the men’s basketball coaches pass list was minimal. See FI-
10, pp. 30-31.
CONCLUSION
Although NC State acknowledges that it failed to adequately monitor one isolated aspect of the
complimentary admission process in the men’s basketball program, the men’s basketball office
pass list, the University nevertheless maintained practices consistent with NAAC Reasonable
standards in all other areas regarding complimentary admissions. NC State educated men’s
38
basketball coaches on the permissible complimentary admissions, and the athletics compliance
office implemented a system to identify agents and intervene if agents or other outside influences
involved themselves with student-athletes. In response to this violation, the University has
implemented corrective actions to ensure that the same or similar actions do not occur in the
future.
39
C. Response to Potential Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Aggravating Factors
Asserted by University’s
Enforcement Staff Positions Rationale
As set forth in its responses to Allegations 1, 2, and

4, the University acknowledges that Level II
violations occurred with respect to Allegations 1-(d),
1-(e), 2, and 4. However, the University asserts that
Allegation 1-(c) is the only potential underlying Level
I violation in this case. Further, the information
articulated in Allegation 1-(c) that alleges the
involvement of a representative of the institution’s
Multiple Level I and II
athletics interests and a recruiting violation,
violations by the Agrees in part
therefore implicating institutional culpability is
institution. NCAA – Disagrees in
disputed. The remaining allegations set forth in the
Bylaw 19.9.3-(a) and part.
subparts of Allegation 1 are either Level II or Level
–(g)
III violations, and with respect to Allegation 1-(b) it is
disputed whether a violation occurred. While the
University acknowledges the panel may find the
former head men’s basketball coach culpable with
respect to Allegation 3, the University does not
believe the failure to monitor Level II and Level III
violations by the former head men’s basketball
coach warrants a Level I finding.
The University acknowledges the five major

A history of Level I, Acknowledges infractions cases identified by the staff, but notes the
Level II or major history, but most recent case occurred in 1989, some 30 years
violations by the history is a ago. However, the University believes that this
institution. NCAA mitigating record – 30 years without a major infraction – should
Bylaw 19.9.3-(b) factor be weighed as a mitigating factor by the hearing
panel.
There is one former assistant men’s basketball

coach involved in Allegation 1-(c), 1-(d) and 1-(e).
Persons of authority
The University did not consider the former assistant
condoned,
men’s basketball coach to be a “person of authority”
participated in or
during his time at the University – nor did the
negligently
government in the SDNY case, which determined
disregarded the Disagrees
that the University did not know about the assistant
violation or related
coach’s alleged involvement. The former assistant
wrongful conduct.
coach had no hiring or firing authority, had no control
NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3-
of the University, men’s basketball or athletics
(h)
budgets, and was not responsible for any other
employees.
40
This case primarily involves one student-athlete and
one Level I allegation that involved a single former
A pattern of assistant men’s basketball coach’s alleged unethical
noncompliance within conduct and limited complimentary ticket violations.
the sport program Disagrees This is not evidence of a pattern of noncompliance
involved. NCAA in the men’s basketball program, but rather suggests
Bylaw 19.9.3-(k) carelessness with respect to preventable
complimentary admissions violations and actions of
a former assistant coach that resulted in violations.
Mitigating Factors
Asserted by University’s
Enforcement Staff Positions Rationale
An established
history of self- The University has self-reported a total of 91 Level
reporting Level III or III violations over the past five academic years for an
Agrees
secondary violations. average of approximately 18 Level III violations per
NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3- year.
(d)
Mitigating Factors
Asserted by
University Rationale
On or about March 1, 2018, and more than one month prior to the
superseding indictment which formed the basis for this case, NC State
contacted the NCAA enforcement staff and advised of its intended
inquiries related to a Yahoo Sports article that alleged Andy Miller’s
ASM Sports Agency with providing a loan to Dennis Smith, Jr. On
March 23, 2018, the University contacted the enforcement staff to
report its ongoing efforts and its response to a subpoena from the
SDNY. Following the April 10, 2018, release of the superseding
Affirmative steps to indictment naming NC State as a victim of fraud, on April 13, 2018, the
expedite final University again contacted the enforcement staff to discuss proposed
resolution of this next steps related to an investigation. Thereafter, and once the NCAA
matter. NCAA Bylaw enforcement staff was permitted to engage in its own fact gathering,
19.9.3-(c) the University worked cooperatively with the enforcement staff to
produce all documents submitted to the SDNY in response to the
subpoena issued to NC State, conduct interviews and complete the
NCAA investigation. On July 9, 2019, less than nine months after the
trial testimony relied upon by the staff in this case, the NCAA issued a
Notice of Allegations to the University. The processing of this case in
such an expedient manner could only have been accomplished
through the affirmative steps of the University to move this matter to
resolution.
41
A central figure in the SDNY trial and in the background of this case is
professional basketball agent Andy Miller. Miller himself is referenced
Other facts in the SDNY trial transcript more than 50 times and his sports agency,
warranting a lower ASM, is referenced over 60 times. In 2012, NC State identified Miller
penalty range. and his associates as bad actors in collegiate men’s basketball, and
NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3- NC State took the unprecedented step to disassociate Miller from
(i) having any contact with the University.21 This was one of the only
steps the University could take to protect its student-athletes from this
agent’s unethical actions.
Case Precedent Supports the University’s Positions on Aggravating and Mitigating

Factors
The NCAA enforcement staff has alleged four aggravating factors and one mitigating factor in this
case. The University disputes that three of the four aggravating factors should be cited.
Specifically, the University does not believe that Bylaw 19.9.3 - (b), (h) and (k) should apply to the
University, nor that case precedent supports such an application. Further, the University has
identified additional mitigating factors that are supported by the facts of this case and have
commonly been agreed upon by the NCAA enforcement staff and cited by a hearing panel of the
Committee on Infractions in other cases with similar fact patterns. Specifically, the University
asserts that mitigating factors -(c) and -(i) should be cited.
1. Aggravating Factors
With respect to aggravating factor (b) – a history of Level I, Level II or major violations by the
institution or involved individuals. Due to the length of time and the type of violations in the
University’s past cases, factor (b) should not apply in this case. See Utah (2018), p. 7. The last
major infractions case at the University was more than 30 years ago in 1989. NC State’s three-
21 Miller was never identified by the University as a representative of the institution’s athletics interests or booster, but
the disassociation was one related to Miller’s apparent willingness to act outside of the bounds of NCAA legislation and
utilize a former student-athlete as a runner for his agency.
42
decade record of NCAA rules compliance and institutional control should be weighed by the
hearing panel as a mitigating factor.
With respect to aggravating factor (h) – persons of authority condoned, participated in or
negligently disregarded the violation or related wrongful conduct. In the past five years, there
have been at least six cases where factor (h) was cited for an involved individual and not the
University.22 Similar to the case before the hearing panel, the violations in those infractions’ cases
involved the actions of a single coach or University employee who engaged in the activity outside
the scope of their employment. Here, with respect to Allegation 1-(c), it was solely the actions of
assistant men’s basketball coach Orlando Early that resulted in the agreed-upon unethical
conduct violation. Early’s actions should not be imputed to the University as an aggravating factor.
With respect to aggravating factor (k) – a pattern of noncompliance within the sports program
involved. In the past five years, there have been nine cases out of approximately 90 total Level I
or II cases where factor (k) was cited.23 The distinguishing factor in each of those cases was the
number of violations that occurred consistently over a period of multiple years. For example, the
recent Connecticut case involved violations related to impermissible preseason practice and
impermissible coaching activities, among other violations, in the men’s basketball program over
a four-year period. See Connecticut (2019), pp. 3-9. Here, however, the acknowledged
violations were limited in time and scope. All allegations relate to a single prospective and
enrolled student-athlete and occurred within one year. This is not indicative of a pattern in a
sports program that went undiscovered by the University which should result in additional
institutional culpability.
22 Missouri (2019), San Jose State (2016), Mississippi (2016), Georgia Southern (2016), Coastal Carolina (2015),
Georgia (2014).
23 Connecticut (2019), Oregon (2018), Sacramento (2018), Northern Colorado (2017), Mississippi (2017), Rutgers
(2017), Mississippi (2016), Hawaii (2015), Syracuse (2015).
43
2. Mitigating Factors
NC State and enforcement staff agrees that NC State’s established history of self-reporting Level
III violations is a mitigating factor for which it should receive credit.
With respect to mitigating factor (c) – affirmative steps to expedite final resolution of the matter,
factor (c) has been cited 41 times over the past five years and eight times alone in the past year.24
In only four situations in the past five years has the hearing panel rejected factor (c). In each of
those four scenarios, the hearing panel’s rationale was that the institution did not identify specific
steps that it took to assist the enforcement staff beyond the scope of the general cooperative
principle.25 Here, like the 41 previous cases where factor (c) was cited, the University contacted
the enforcement staff when it was made aware of a potential NCAA issue, consistently
communicated with the NCAA about the status of the SDNY case, promptly responded to NCAA
document requests, produced thoughts of emails, documents and records, and worked
collaboratively with the NCAA enforcement staff to conclude the investigation in a timely manner.
Indeed, the fact that this is the first infractions case stemming from the SDNY case is evidence of
the affirmative steps taken by the University in this case.
With respect to mitigating factor (i) – other factors warranting a lower penalty range, NC State’s
disassociation of professional basketball agent Andy Miller is a relevant additional factor that
should be credited in this case. Factor (i) has been cited in eight cases.26 In each of those cases,
the panel acknowledged the University’s efforts directly related to the underlying allegations.
Here, NC State prohibited Miller from access to private spaces including the men’s basketball
office and the practice facility. Miller was identified in the SDNY case over 50 times by name and
24 Mississippi State (2019), UNC Greensboro (2019), Connecticut (2019), Maryland (2019), California Poly (2019),
High Point (2019), Missouri (2019) and Arizona (2019).
25 South Carolina (2017), Morgan State (2017), Florida A&M (2015) and Sacramento (2015).
26 Oregon (2018), Sam Houston State (2017), Appalachian State (2016), San Jose State (2016), Campbell (2016),
Stanford (2016), Hawaii (2015) and Wichita State (2015).
44
his firm ASM was identified more than 60 times. NC State appears to be the only institution to
proactively limit access to its student-athletes and basketball program to someone associated
with potential NCAA violations discussed in the SDNY case.
University’s Overall Position on Level of Case
NCAA Bylaw 19.7.7.1 provides that if violations from multiple levels are identified in the notice of
allegations, the case shall be processed pursuant to the procedures applicable to the most serious
violation(s) alleged. However, case precedent indicates that 19.7.7.1 does not preclude the
hearing panel from processing the case as Level I for an involved individual and Level II for an
institution in circumstances that exist here – where it is the unethical conduct of an involved
individual that resulted in a potential Level I violation. Here, Allegation 1-(c) is the only potential
underlying Level I violation, and the violation is based on the alleged unethical conduct of former
assistant men’s basketball coach Early. Both the Committee on Infractions and the Infractions
Appeals Committee have found that there are circumstances so untethered from institutional
culpability that charging the institution at a Level I category for the actions of a former coach is
inconsistent with fundamental fairness and the intent of the legislation. As detailed in the
response to Allegation 1-(c), such circumstances are clearly present in this case.
In the Alabama (2017) case, despite a Level I unethical conduct finding involving a former
assistant football coach, the case was processed as a Level II – mitigated case for Alabama and
a Level I – aggravated case for the involved assistant coach. While the panel was silent on its
rationale for processing the institution and involved individual at different levels, it can be inferred
that the strict application of processing the case pursuant to the procedures applicable to the most
serious violation does not apply when the most serious violation is the result of a single rogue
coach’s unethical conduct.
45
Likewise, the Infractions Appeals Committee held in the Hawaii (2016) case that “when assigning
weight to a violation in order to hold an institution accountable for coaches’ unethical conduct,
there must be a nexus between the behavior of the coach and the institution.” See Hawaii
Infractions Appeal Decision (2016), p. 2. Here, as in Hawaii, there is no evidence that the
institution failed to monitor former assistant men’s basketball coach with respect to Allegation 1-
(c); that the institution did not educate the former assistant coach and all coaches about
impermissible involvement of third parties; or that the institution failed to warn coaches that such
behavior would not be tolerated.
Therefore, the University should not be held accountable for a Level I case based solely on the
actions of its former employee or that former employee’s unethical conduct. Similar to the
circumstances in Alabama and Hawaii, the hearing panel has the authority to categorize this case
at different levels for the involved former assistant men’s basketball coach and the University.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, one aggravating factor and three mitigating factors should be cited for
the University. In addition, case precedent permits the Panel to process this case at different
levels for the University and the involved individual, where the involved individual is the sole basis
for a Level I category. That is exactly the situation with NC State and former assistant men’s
basketball coach Early. Based on the evidence and the agreed upon violations in the case, the
case may be appropriately categorized as a Level I – mitigated, or Level II – standard case for
the University.
46
G. Requests for Supplemental Information
1. Provide mailing and email addresses for all necessary parties to receive communications
from the hearing panel of the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions related to this
matter.
Please direct all communications from the hearing panel to the University’s outside counsel for
this matter:
Mike Glazier
mglazier@bsk.com
Jason Montgomery
jmontgomery@bsk.com
Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC

7500 College Boulevard, Suite 910
Overland Park, Kansas 66210
__________________________________________________________
University Representatives
Dr. Randy Woodson

Chancellor
randy_woodson@ncsu.edu
Allison Newhart
Vice Chancellor and General Counsel
anewhar@ncsu.edu
Dr. Joel Pawlak

Faculty Athletics Representative
jjpawlak@ncsu.edu
Boo Corrigan
Athletics Director
wolfpackad@ncsu.edu
Carrie A. Doyle
Senior Associate Athletic Director – Compliance
cadoyle3@ncsu.edu
G-1
2. Indicate how the violations were discovered.
See Introduction to this Response.
G-2
3. Provide a detailed description of any corrective or punitive actions implemented by the
institution as a result of the violations acknowledged in this inquiry. In that regard, explain
the reasons the institution believes these actions to be appropriate and identify the
violations on which the actions were based. Additionally, indicate the date that any
corrective or punitive actions were implemented.
The University has imposed the following penalties and corrective actions based on the
acknowledged violations related to impermissible complimentary admissions:
• Financial Penalty: $5,000 fine.
• Scholarship reduction: Reduce the total number of athletics awards in the sport of men’s
basketball for the incoming class of the 2021-22 academic year by one (the first available
opportunity) from the permissible total of 13, or if a scholarship becomes available, at the
time of such availability if prior to the 2021-22 academic year.
• Recruiting restriction: Reduce the number of official visits by one during the 2019-20 and
2020-21 academic year and prohibit unofficial visits during a two-week period during the
2019-20 academic year.
• The University has implemented new complimentary admissions policies and procedures
that include but is not limited to a stricter adherence to individuals identified as business
contacts and on-site monitoring of all complimentary tickets by athletics compliance.
G-3
4. Provide a detailed description of all disciplinary actions taken against any current or former
athletics department staff members as a result of violations acknowledged in this inquiry.
In that regard, explain the reasons the institution believes these actions to be appropriate
and identify the violations on which the actions were based. Additionally, indicate the date
that any disciplinary actions were taken and submit copies of all correspondence from the
institution to each individual describing these disciplinary actions.
The athletics department staff members named in the allegations are no longer employed by the
University.
G-4
5. Provide a short summary of every past Level I, Level II or major infractions case involving
the institution or individuals named in this notice. In this summary, provide the date of the
infractions report(s), a description of the violations found by the Committee on
Infractions/hearing panel, the individuals involved, and the penalties and corrective
actions. Additionally, provide a copy of any major infractions’ reports involving the
institution or individuals named in this notice that were issued by the Committee on
Infractions/hearing panel within the last 10 years.
Date
December 12, 1989
Description
Findings of a lack of institutional control and a failure to monitor as a result of the improper use of
complimentary admissions and student-athletes receiving cash and other items of value in
exchange for complimentary admissions. Excessive pairs of shoes were provided to men’s
basketball student-athletes, which were sold or traded for other items of value. This case also
included secondary violations of boosters providing lodging, meals, and local transportation, as
well as an assistant men’s basketball coach transporting a prospective student-athlete off-campus
to meet with a former men’s basketball student-athlete.
Individuals Involved
Athletics director/Head men’s basketball coach
Sport Involved
Men’s basketball
Penalties and Corrective Actions
• Public reprimand and censure;

• Two years of probation;
• One-year ban on official visits;
• One-year ban on off-campus recruiting;
• Grant-in-aid limitations in men’s basketball;
• One-year post-season ban for men’s basketball;
• One-year television ban for men’s basketball;
• Recertification requirement;
• Reorganization of the athletics department to create a position for a full-time compliance
officer;
• Reassignment of responsibilities of some existing personnel, and separation of the position
of athletics director and men’s head basketball coach;
• Revision of complimentary admissions procedures and procedures related to issuance of
basketball shoes;
• Increased rules education;
• Adoption of institutional requirements related to academic performance by student-athletes;
• Adoption of a drug-testing policy with mandatory testing and sanctions; and
• Reduction in the men’s basketball coaching staff size.
G-5
__________________________________________________
Date
March 21, 1983
Description
A booster provided impermissible transportation, lodging and meals to a football prospective

student-athlete. The football prospective student-athlete also received an excessive number of
official visits. Impermissible recruiting contacts in football by coaching staff members and a
booster occurred.
An assistant football coach

Two representatives of athletics interests
Sport Involved
Football
• Public reprimand;
• One-year probation; and
• Disassociation of involved boosters.
___________________________________________________________________________
Date
October 24, 1972
Description
Recruiting inducements were provided to prospective student-athletes in the form of cost-free

housing, transportation, and impermissible financial assistance to attend summer school. The
impermissible employment of prospective student-athletes and impermissible tryouts also
occurred.
Head men’s basketball coach

Assistant men’s basketball coach
Representatives of athletics interests
Sport Involved
Men’s basketball
G-6
• Public reprimand and censure;

• One-year probation; and
• One-year post-season ban in men’s basketball.
________________________________________________________________________
Date
January 11, 1957
Description
Representatives of the institution offered a prospective student-athlete annual cash gifts and an
impermissible five-year “unrestricted” scholarship, as well as a seven-year college medical
education for a friend of the prospective student-athlete. A staff member and a booster also
offered and subsequently provided $80 to the prospective student-athlete to pay for his
transportation costs to enroll at the institution.
Representatives of the institution and an institutional staff member
Sports Involved
Football
Men’s basketball
• Four-year probation;
• Four-year postseason ban;
• Four-year television ban for football
• Four-year committee ban and revocation of right to vote on Association matters; and
• Public reprimand and censure.
____________________________________________________________________________
G-7
6. Provide a chart depicting the institution’s reporting history of Level III and secondary
violations for the past five years. In this chart, please indicate for each academic year the
number of total Level III and secondary violations reported involving the institution or
individuals named in this notice. Also include the applicable bylaws for each violation, and
then indicate the number of Level III and secondary violations involving just the sports
team(s) named in this notice for the same five-year time period.
See Exhibit 17.
G-8
7. Provide the institution’s overall conference affiliation, as well as the total enrollment on
campus and the number of men’s and women’s sports sponsored.
North Carolina State University is a member of the Atlantic Coast Conference. North Carolina
State sponsors 11 men sport programs, 11 women sport programs, and one co-ed sport program.
North Carolina State’s total enrollment for the 2018-19 academic year was 35,479 (25,891
Undergraduate and 9,588 Graduate).
G-9
8. Provide a statement describing the general organization and structure of the institution’s
intercollegiate athletics department, including the identities of those individuals in the
athletics department who were responsible for the supervision of all sport programs during
the previous four years.
North Carolina State University’s organizational charts for the athletics department are attached
as Exhibit 18.
G-10
9. State when the institution has conducted systematic reviews of NCAA and institutional
regulations for its athletics department employees. Also, identify the agencies, individuals
or committees responsible for these reviews and describe their responsibilities and
functions.
2019 – Once-in-Four-Year Compliance Review – Conducted by The Compliance Group.
2016 – NC State Compliance Office requested a review from the Office of Internal Audit
related to Camps and Clinics (which was a recommendation from the 2015 compliance
review).
2015 – Once-in-Four-Year Compliance Review – Conducted by The Compliance Group.
2011 – Once-in-Four-Year Compliance Review – Conducted by the ACC Conference

compliance office.
G-11
10. Provide the following information concerning the sports program(s) identified in this
inquiry:
• The average number of initial and total grants-in-aid awarded during the past four
academic years.
Average Initial Men’s Basketball Grants-in-Aid:
Initial Counters: 5.25
Average Total Men’s Basketball Grants-in-Aid:
Average Total Counters: 12.75
• The number of initial and total grants-in-aid in effect for the current academic year
(or upcoming academic year if the regular academic year is not in session) and the
number anticipated for the following academic year.
North Carolina State’s Response
Initial Men’s Basketball Grants-in-Aid (2019-20): 5
Total Men’s Basketball Grants-in-Aid (2019-20): 13
• The average number of official paid visits provided by the institution to prospective
student-athletes during the past four years.
Average Official Paid Visits in the sport of men’s basketball:

2015-16: 14
2016-17: 16
2017-18: 11
2018-19: 11
Total 52
Average: 13
• Copies of the institution’s squad lists for the past four academic years.
See Exhibit 19.
• Copies of the institution’s media guides, either in hard copy or through electronic
links, for the past four academic years.
2018-19 Men’s Basketball Media Guide
G-12
2016-17 Men’s Basketball Roster
• A statement indicating whether the provisions of NCAA Bylaws 31.2.2.3 and

31.2.2.4 apply to the institution as a result of the involvement of student-athletes
in violations noted in this inquiry.
The provisions of NCAA Bylaws 31.2.2.3 and 31.2.2.4 are not applicable in this case.
• A statement indicating whether the provisions of Bylaw 19.9.7-(g) apply to the

institution as a result of the involvement of student-athletes in violations noted in
this inquiry.
The provisions of NCAA Bylaw 19.9.7-(g) may be applicable in this case.
G-13
11. Consistent with the Committee on Infractions IOP 4-16-2-1 (Total Budget for Sport
Program) and 4-16-2-2 (Submission of Total Budget for Sport Program), please submit
the three previous fiscal years’ total budgets for all involved sport programs. At a minimum,
a sport program’s total budget shall include: (a) all contractual compensation including
salaries, benefits and bonuses paid by the institution or related entities for coaching,
operations, administrative and support staff tied to the sport program; (b) all recruiting
expenses; (c) all team travel, entertainment and meals; (d) all expenses associated with
equipment, uniforms and supplies; (e) game expenses and (f) any guarantees paid
associated with the sport program.
Three years of actual expenditures in the sport of men’s basketball:
2016-17 $ 8,084,423
2017-18 $ 8,854,014
2018-19 $ 7,794,605
G-14
EXHIBITS LIST
Exhibit 1 Timeline 2012 to March 2018 produced to NCAA enforcement staff
Exhibit 2 USA Today Article re Dennis Smith, Jr. Torn ACL
Exhibit 3 ESPN Article re Dennis Smith, Jr. NBA Prospects
Exhibit 4 U.S. v. James Gatto, et. al. Unsealed Complaint
Exhibit 5 NC State Disassociation of Agent Andy Miller – 2012
Exhibit 6 Gatto Trial – Verdict Sheet
Exhibit 7 Gassnola Judgement
Exhibit 8 ESPN Article, May 22, 2019, Notices of allegations coming after hoops scandal
Exhibit 9 CBS Sports Article, June 12, 2019, At least six college basketball programs will
be notified of major NCAA violations by this summer
Exhibit 10 Gatto Trial – Jury Charge
Exhibit 11 Memorandum Opinion and Order on NCAA Motion to Intervene
Exhibit 12 ESPN Article, September 10, 2015, Dennis Smith, Jr. commits to attend NC
State
Exhibit 13 U.S. v. James Gatto, et. al Trial Transcript – October 3, 2018
Exhibit 14 Boston Globe Article, July 23, 2006, Ethical questions raised as amateur
basketball recruiters engage in high stakes battle for blue chip recruits
Exhibit 15 ESPN Articles, July 5, 2012, updated July 10, 2012, NCAA bans 4 summer
league teams
Exhibit 16 Complimentary Admissions Analysis 2015-16 and 2016-17
Exhibit 17 Level III Violations Chart
Exhibit 18 Organizational Charts
Exhibit 19 Squad Lists

December 19, 2019
VIA SECURE FILING SYSTEM
Mr. Mark Gottfried

c/o Mr. Scott Tompsett EXHIBIT
1236 West 61st Terrace 6
Kansas City, Missouri 64113
RE: North Carolina State University – Case No. 00935
Dear Mr. Gottfried:
I have reviewed the December 13, 2019, procedural letter submitted by Mr. Scott
Tompsett identifying his and his co-counsel potential scheduling problems with the
NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions' (COI's) intent to resolve this case in late
February. Individual COI members are currently holding dates in preparation for
serving on the panel to hear and resolve this case on these late February dates. The COI
stands ready to resolve this case for all parties. Counsel, however, does not appear ready
to resolve this matter consistent with the COI's timeline. Thus, prior to setting the
hearing date, I require more information demonstrating that it is not possible to hear this
case at the end of February 2020.
In your December 13, 2019, letter, you identify that the ongoing basketball season and
your counsels' potential obligations for outside matters prevent the COI from holding a
hearing in late February. While the COI is mindful of in-season obligations, the COI
regularly conducts infractions hearings during the season of the involved sport programs
to an infractions case. Not doing so would effectively limit the COI's ability to
efficiently resolve infractions cases to just a few weeks per year.
The COI also remains mindful of outside commitments for those involved in a case. Mr.
Tompsett identifies criminal matters that may require his attendance during the last week
of February and another commitment of Mr. Abrams that will occur roughly two weeks
after the COI intends to review this case. In light of courts often moving trial dates and
including extra time to ensure enough time for the trial, I request that you provide
additional information verifying why it would not be possible to conduct an infractions
hearing on Friday, February 28, 2020.
Finally, your letter also notes your intention to supplement the record. Consistent with
your acknowledgement that this case already involves a large and expansive record, I
previously cautioned all parties to be mindful of any supplemental submissions. Further,
and consistent with NCAA Bylaw 19.7.5 and COI Internal Operating Procedure 4-16,
the COI intends to adhere to the deadline to submit written material.
Mr. Mark Gottfried
North Carolina State University - Case No. 00935
December 19, 2019
Page No. 2
__________
Please submit the requested information via the secure filing system no later than Friday, January
3, 2020. If you have any issues with the secure filing system, please contact Evelyn Gross at
ocoiadmin@ncaa.org.
Sincerely,
Dr. Carol Cartwright, President emerita

Designee
CC:mm
cc: All parties via the secure filing system

Commissioner John Swofford
EXHIBIT
7
ENFORCEMENT WRITTEN REPLY
North Carolina State University – Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
KEY RECORD LIST
Following is a list of key factual information that the NCAA enforcement staff relied on in bringing forward
the allegations. This is not intended to be an all-encompassing list of factual information that supports the
case.
1. FI019_Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Gassnola's testimony

in Gatto, et al. court case where Gassnola admitted to providing Early with $40,000 in November 2015
to provide to Farmer to help secure the commitment of Smith.
2. FI018_Gatto17Cr686_OpeningStatements_100219_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Opening statements in

Gatto, et al. trial where Gatto's attorney acknowledged that NCAA rules were broken and that Gatto
and Adidas helped out financially a few families whose sons were among the most talented athletes in
America.
3. FI031_Gassnola18Cr252_SealedInformation_033018_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Sealed information

from Gassnola's criminal case detailing general charges brought against Gassnola. Specifically, that
Gassnola and others participated in a scheme to defraud certain universities by making, agreeing to
make and concealing payments to the families of high school student-athletes in connection with the
student-athletes' commitment to play basketball for those universities.
4. FI016_SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Timeline from 2014 through 2017 detailing

recruiting activity associated with Smith, phone calls between Gottfried and Early and pertinent
individuals to Smith's recruitment and impermissible complimentary admissions provided to Smith and
Farmer.
5. FI021_Gatto17Cr686_Transcript_101818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Closing statement from Gatto's

attorney where Gatto acknowledged that Gassnola and Gatto were trying to make sure that NC State
could compete with promises being made by others to Smith so he wouldn't go to a different institution.
6. FI112_Gassnola18Cr252_GovtSentencingMemo_082719_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Government's
sentencing letter regarding Gassnola's cooperation and criminal activity as it pertained to NC State.
7. FI056_AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlyPertinentInvdividuals_062319_NorthCarolin
aSt_00935 – Institutional Verizon telephone records of calls between Gottfried and Early from August
through November 2015 and all pertinent individuals tied to the alleged $40,000 payment to the Smith
family.
8. FI013_MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Gottfried's detail of Smith's recruitment

and his oversight of his director or indirect reports.
9. FI009_AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Coleman's detail of his role with Adidas and

confirmation of details from Gassnola's testimony and exhibits related to meeting with the Smith
family, members of the NC State men's basketball staff and Farmer's involvement with Smith's
recruitment.
10. FI015_CDoyle_TR_062119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 – Doyle's detail of monitoring efforts on the

complimentary admissions lists and acknowledgement that Ford was the best source for first-hand
knowledge on what was being monitored. Additionally, Doyle's acknowledgement that compliance did
not run the men's basketball office pass list through its additional screening protocol.
i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Following is a list of key authorities that the NCAA enforcement staff relied on in bringing forward the
allegations. This is not intended to be an all-encompassing list of pertinent authorities.
Official/Staff Interpretations.
October 19, 1999 – Corporate Entities as Representatives or an Institution's Athletics Interests.
October 10, 2013 – Student-Athlete Complimentary Admissions to Coaches or Others Involved with
Prospective Student-Athletes.
December 9, 1992 – Institution's coach traveling with friends to view prospect's competition.
Case-Specific Interpretations
None.
Educational Columns.
None
Committee on Infractions Decisions.
March 6, 2015 – Syracuse University.
Infractions Appeals Committee Decisions.
None
Other Reference Materials.
October 18, 1999 – Report of the Division I Management Council October 18-19, 1999 Meeting.
Division I Proposal – 2018-15 – Infractions Program – Notice of Allegations and Opportunity to Respond
– Committee Hearings – Basis of Decision – Importation.
Division I Proposal – 2018-16 – Athletics Personnel and Infractions Program – Contractual Agreements
and Expectations and Shared Responsibility – Responsibility to Cooperate.
Division I Enforcement Charging Guidelines.
ii
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
This case includes four alleged violations in the institution's men's basketball program that occurred
between September 2014 and March 2017, and one allegation issued in a post-separation notice of
allegations (NOA) to which the institution is not a party. The NCAA enforcement staff identified two
allegations as Level I and two allegations as Level II. The post-separation allegation is identified as Level
I. The facts uncovered during a fair and thorough investigation substantiated the violations.
The allegations include the arrangement and likely provision of a substantial recruiting inducement,
including a $40,000 cash payment arranged through third parties and boosters and additional violations
related to the recruitment of former men's basketball student-athlete Dennis Smith Jr. (Smith), who was a
top point guard prospect in the 2016 recruiting class. Additionally, the allegations include substantial extra
benefits in the form of 150 impermissible complimentary admissions for Smith when he became a student-
athlete and his then trainer Shawn Farmer (Farmer), an individual associated with a prospect (IAWP).
Further, the allegations include 14 additional impermissible complimentary admissions for two other
IAWPs, who were former AAU coaches of then student-athletes. Many of the facts surrounding the
underlying violations are uncontroverted. The scope and nature of violations also demonstrate that Mark
Gottfried (Gottfried), then head men's basketball coach, failed to satisfy the responsibilities of a head coach
in monitoring his direct reports in specific instances, and the institution failed to adequately monitor its
men's basketball program's complimentary admissions practices.
The investigation originated from the release of an April 2018 superseding indictment in the federal
criminal investigation and subsequent Southern District of New York (SDNY) prosecution in United States
v. James Gatto, et al. (Gatto case) 1 and the corresponding unsealing of a March 30, 2018, information and
1
FI017, Gatto17Cr686_SupersedingIndictment_050718_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 2
guilty plea in the SDNY prosecution in United States v. Thomas Gassnola (Gassnola case). 2 The
superseding indictment set forth allegations related to North Carolina State University (NC State)
referencing a coach at NC State, now known to be Orlando Early (Early), former assistant men's basketball
coach, and a co-conspirator now known to be Thomas "TJ" Gassnola (Gassnola), 3 former outside consultant
for Adidas. The superseding indictment alleged that in or about October 2015, Gassnola delivered $40,000
to Early, who represented that the money would be delivered to Smith's parent. 4 Similar to the Gassnola
case, the charge in the Gatto case related to NC State was conspiracy to commit wire fraud. 5 These
allegations, which form the basis for Allegation No. 1-(c), gave rise to the collaborative investigation
between the institution and enforcement staff. That investigation later uncovered the other allegations set
forth in the NOA.
II. ALLEGATION NO. 1 – From September 2014 through March 2017, Early violated the
principles of ethical conduct when he and members of the men's basketball staff
committed multiple recruiting violations and provided extra benefits during the
recruitment and subsequent enrollment of then men's basketball prospective student-
athlete, Smith. As a result of the impermissible benefits, Smith competed in contests and
received actual and necessary expenses while ineligible. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaws
11.5.1, 11.7.5, 13.1.2.4, 13.2.1 and 13.7.2.1.6 (2014-15); 10.1-(c) and 13.2.1 (2015-16); 10.01.1
and 10.1 (2015-16 and 2016-17); 10.1-(b), 12.11.1, 13.8.1, 16.2.1.1, 16.8.1 and 16.11.2.1
(2016-17)]
A. Overview.
The institution agrees with the underlying facts in Allegation Nos. 1-(a), (b), (d) and (e). The institution
disputes the facts in Allegation No. 1-(b) constitute an NCAA violation. The institution further argues the
facts in Allegation Nos. 1-(a) and (b) are time barred by the NCAA statute of limitations. The institution
2
FI031, Gassnola18Cr252_SealedInformation_033018_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (Gassnola pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit wire fraud).
3
FI017, Gatto17Cr686_SupersedingIndictment_050718_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 14.
4
FI017, Gatto17Cr686_SupersedingIndictment_050718_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 14.
5
FI017, Gatto17Cr686_SupersedingIndictment_050718_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 29 through 32; and
FI031, Gassnola18Cr252_SealedInformatin_033018_NorthCarolinaSt_00935. No information shows why the
government charged conspiracy to commit wire fraud related to NC State and no additional substantive count.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 3
agrees that the facts of Allegation Nos. 1-(d) and (e) constitute violations, but does not agree they support
an unethical conduct charge. Lastly, the institution agrees Early received money in violation of NCAA
Bylaws 10.01.1 and 10.1 in Allegation No. 1-(c); however, it disputes the remainder of the allegation. Early
did not submit a response.
B. Enforcement staff's position as to why the violations should be considered Level I

[NCAA Bylaw 19.1.1] and if the institution and involved individual are in agreement.
The enforcement staff believes a hearing panel of the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions could
conclude Allegation No. 1 is a severe breach of conduct (Level I) because the violations (1) provided or
were intended to provide a substantial or extensive recruiting advantage; (2) provided or were intended to
provide a substantial or extensive impermissible benefit; (3) involved third-parties in recruiting violations
about which institutional officials knew or should have known; (4) involved cash payments intended to
secure, and which resulted in, the enrollment of a prospect; (5) were intentional or showed reckless
indifference to the NCAA constitution and bylaws; and (6) involved unethical or dishonest conduct, which
seriously undermined or threatened the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model. The institution asserts that
the only Level I violation in Allegation No. 1, if found, is Allegation 1-(c). It further asserts that Allegation
Nos. 1-(a) and (b), if found, should be Level III, and that the agreed to portion of Allegation No. 1-(c) and
Allegation Nos. 1-(d) and (e) are Level II. Early did not respond.
C. Enforcement staff's review of facts related to the allegation.
During 2014 and 2015, Smith was a high-profile prospect rated as one of the best point guards in the
country for the 2016 recruiting class. 6 Smith was the highest rated recruit the institution had in many
decades, 7 and was so obviously talented that the men's basketball staff began recruiting him by his
6
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 18; and
FI002, BLutz_TR_010919_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 24.
7
FI015, CDoyle_TR_062119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 9; and
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 4
sophomore year in high school. 8 Smith's recruitment was highly contested between Duke University; NC
State; University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (North Carolina); and University of Kansas. 9 Throughout
Smith's recruitment he participated on Team Loaded, an Adidas-sponsored AAU basketball team, 10 which
was coached by Dennis Smith Sr. (Smith Sr.), 11 Smith's father. Additionally, during his recruitment, Smith
was trained by Farmer, who was also described as "the go-between for anybody who was trying to speak
with Smith – universities, AAU coaches, shoe brands – and the Smith family." 12 Smith's recruitment took
an unexpected turn in early August 2015, before Smith's senior year in high school, when he tore his ACL
while participating in an Adidas-sponsored AAU event. 13 The injury expedited Smith's recruitment, forcing
him to consider early enrollment in order to have better rehabilitation services on campus. 14 Smith verbally
committed to NC State September 10, 2015. 15 While Smith made multiple unofficial visits to NC State
leading up to his verbal commitment, he did not take an official visit until October 30 through November
FI006, CBoyer_TR_011019_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 18.

8
FI002, BLutz_TR_010919_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 24 and
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (general timeline detailing Smith's recruitment).
9
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 20 and 21 and
FI002, BLutz_TR_010919_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 26. Other institutions recruited Smith; however, these
three institutions were regarded as the programs NC State was competing with to sign Smith.
10
Adidas is a multi-national corporation that designs and manufactures shoes, clothing and accessories for multiple
sports. It sponsors numerous AAU, high school, college, and professional basketball programs. At all relevant times
it was the apparel sponsor for NC State with the exclusive right to publicly represent, market and otherwise promote
that it is the exclusive supplier to NC State of designated products based on its endorsement/sponsorship agreement
with NC State.
11
FI009, AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 16;
FI002, BLutz_TR_010919_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 26; and
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 19 and 20.
12
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 86 and 87; and
FI009, AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 33.
13
FI009, AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 23 and 24.
14
FI009, AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 23 and 24;
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 20.
15
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 3.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 5
1, 2015. 16 His father and grandmother accompanied him on the visit, as did Farmer. 17 On November 11,
2015, Smith officially committed to the institution by signing his National Letter of Intent (NLI). 18 The
next day, Smith announced he would graduate early from high school and enroll at NC State for the 2016
spring semester. 19 Smith enrolled and rehabbed during the spring of 2016, and competed during the 2016-
17 basketball season. At the end of the season, he declared for the NBA draft and was selected ninth overall
by the Dallas Mavericks.
1. Allegation Nos. 1-(a), (b) and (c) – Impermissible recruiting activities related to Smith.
The enforcement staff references the institution's review of the allegations for an overview of the facts.
a. Allegation No. 1-(a) – Impermissible VIP parking for Smith on an unofficial visit.
The enforcement staff directs the hearing panel to its discussion later in this section for the enforcement
staff's position on the statute of limitations of this allegation.
b. Allegation No. 1-(b) – Gottfried took Jim Harrick (Harrick), former college
basketball coach, with him to view Smith's competition.
The enforcement staff directs the hearing panel to its discussion later in this section for the enforcement
staff's position on the statute of limitations related to this allegation.
The enforcement staff notes Harrick was previously the head men's basketball coach at Pepperdine
University; University of California, Los Angeles; University of Rhode Island; and University of Georgia.
In the fall of 2014, Harrick did motivational speaking at basketball clinics and camps. He also spent time
around the men's basketball program a couple of times each year in October for the start of practice and
16
FI097, OfficialVisitFormARMS_Dsmith_111715_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
17
FI002, BLutz_TR_010919_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 27 (Farmer attended the football game versus
Clemson University that weekend and had dinner at Ruth's Chris Steakhouse, where his girlfriend also attended the
dinner). FI097, OfficialVisitFormARMS_Dsmith_111715_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 and
FI098, OfficialVisitPassListClemsonFB_103115_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
18
FI083, DSmithNLI_111115_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
19
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 6
during the season to watch a game. 20 Gottfried wanted to hire Harrick as an assistant coach; however, the
institution did not believe it was a good idea based upon Harrick's previous involvement in infractions
matters. 21
The facts of this subparagraph constitute a violation because Harrick is a representative of the
institution's athletics interests. The enforcement staff based that determination on a December 9, 1992,
NCAA staff interpretation, which states the following:
Institution's Coach Traveling with Friends to View Prospect's Competition: A friend of an

institution's coach may provide transportation (e.g., ride in car) to the coach in conjunction
with the coach's recruiting trip to observe a prospect's contest, provided the institution has
authorized such activity. The staff confirmed that such an individual would be considered
an athletics representative and, therefore, may not attend the contest. (emphasis added) 22
Further, the applicable portion of Bylaw 13.1.2.4 states in part that, "[a]n athletics representative may view
a prospective student-athlete's athletics contest on his or her own initiative, …." Here, Harrick did not travel
and view Smith's showcase on his own initiative; rather, Gottfried, who was conducting recruiting activities
at that time, took Harrick with him in violation of Bylaw 13.1.2.4. Further, recruiting activities, specifically
recruiting off-campus, may only be conducted by countable coaches. Harrick was not certified to recruit
off-campus; therefore, his evaluation of Smith also violated Bylaw 11.
c. Allegation No. 1-(c) – $40,000 impermissible recruiting inducement.
20
FI011, JHarrick_TR_050219_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 4.
21
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 9. See also August 5, 2004 – University of
Georgia infractions case involving violations including recruiting inducements, extra benefits, student-athlete
competition while ineligible, academic fraud and two additional instances of unethical conduct committed by a former
assistant men's basketball coach while Harrick was the head coach. See also April 30, 1998 – University of California,
Los Angeles infractions case involving improper entertainment and material benefits to a club coach, extra benefits
and unethical conduct by Harrick. Harrick is currently employed as an assistant coach for Gottfried at California State
University, Northridge.
22
FI079, Interp_CoachFriendsViewingPSACompetition_120992_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 [citing Bylaw 13.1.2.5-
(b)].
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 7
Gassnola acknowledged he was involved in making payments to families of five student-athletes,
including Smith, because those students were either (1) involved in or Adidas wanted them on its grassroots
circuit, or (2) attending or in the process of enrolling at Adidas-sponsored universities. 23 Gassnola was an
outside consultant for Adidas and he reported to Jim Gatto (Gatto), then Adidas' director of global sports
marketing for basketball. 24 Gatto's attorney, in opening trial statements admitted that, "NCAA rules were
broken. [Gatto] and Adidas helped out financially a few families …. We are not going to waste your time
pretending that these families did not get funds." 25 Gassnola made the payments while he was employed by
Adidas and obtained the funds from Adidas, either through Gatto or as reimbursement. 26 According to
Anthony Coleman (Coleman), then sports marketing director for Adidas, Gassnola was hired because he
knew college coaches and helped build relationships with them. 27
Gassnola testified that in October 2015, Early reached out to him indicating that there were issues
concerning Smith and "the people around him." Early also told him that certain things were promised to the
Smith family and Early was having issues "keeping that situation together." 28 Phone records show that in
the week preceding October 30, Early called Gassnola at least six times.29 During that conversation,
23
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 5 and 35;
FI032, Gassnola18Cr252_SealedAffirmation_033018_NorthCarolinaSt_00935; and
FI031, Gassnola18Cr252_SealedInformation_033018_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 2 (Gassnola participated in
a scheme to defraud universities by agreeing to make payments to the families of high school student-athletes in
connection with the student-athletes' commitment to play basketball for those universities).
FI112, Gassnola18Cr252_GovtSentencingMemo_082719_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (the government's sentencing
memorandum indicating the criminal conspiracy as it related to Gassnola and Gatto) and
FI113, Gassnola18Cr252_Defendant'sSentencingMemo_090319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 2 (Gassnola
affirming that the government's sentencing letter is accurate as to Gassnola's conduct).
24
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 10, 29 and 30.
25
FI018, Gatto17Cr686_OpeningStatements_100218_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 21.
26
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 97.
27
FI009, AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 9 and 10 and
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 144 (Gassnola testifying that
part of his job at Adidas was to help Adidas colleges recruit top high school basketball players).
28
29
FI056, AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlyPertinentInvdividuals_062319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935
(illustrating phone calls made/received by Early and Gottfried).
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 8
Gassnola offered to bring Early $40,000 to "make it easier to keep people happy." 30 Gassnola further
testified that Early accepted the $40,000 in cash when Gassnola flew to Raleigh, North Carolina, and handed
it to him in an envelope at Early's house November 2. 31 At that time Early told Gassnola that he would
provide the money to Farmer. 32
Evidence presented at trial established that October 30, 2015, Gassnola withdrew $40,000 from his
bank account; November 1, he purchased a November 2 flight to and from Raleigh; and November 2, he
rented and returned a car in Raleigh. 33 Additionally, October 30 – the day Gassnola withdrew the $40,000
– Early and Gassnola exchanged two phone calls and one text and Early had two phone calls with Farmer. 34
On November 1 – the day Gassnola booked his flight to Raleigh – he and Early spoke once by phone and
had one text message conversation, and Early spoke with Farmer at least three times. 35 Additionally,
November 2 – the day that Gassnola delivered the $40,000 to Early – they communicated via text nine
times, and Gassnola had a six minute telephone conversation with Gottfried. 36 Bobby Lutz (Lutz), then
associate head basketball coach, confirmed Gassnola being at the NC State practice facility speaking with
Early and Gottfried immediately before the NLI signing period in late October/early November 2015.37
Over the next week, after receiving the $40,000 from Gassnola that he stated he intended to provide to
30
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 88 and 89.
31
32
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 90, 309 and 310.
33
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 95 through 97;
FI026, Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit306D1_112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (Gassnola's bank account records);
FI023, Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit309A_112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, (airline and rental car purchases).
34
FI056, AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlyPertinentInvdividuals_062319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935;
FI037, October2015TextMessages_MGottfriedOEarly_TGassnolaDSmithJrMFox_062019_NorthCarolinaSt_00935;
and FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 3.
35
and FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 3.
36
and FI038,
November2015TextMessages_MGottfriedOEarly_TGassnolaDSmithJrDSmithSr_062019_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
37
FI002, BLutz_TR_010919_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 33, 34 and 38.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 9
Farmer, and leading up to the November 11 signing day, Early exchanged 44 calls with Farmer and two
calls with Gatto. 38
Gassnola reported making the payment because he was nervous Smith was "going to leave NC State." 39
Gatto's attorney confirmed that Gatto and Gassnola were "trying to make sure that NC State can compete
with the promises that are being made by others to the Smith family so that [Smith] wouldn't go to a different
college" (emphasis added). 40 Additionally, the payment was made to Early, Smith's primary recruiter at NC
State, just prior to NLI signing day. Smith signed an NLI November 11, and he announced his intent to
enroll early at NC State the next day.41
Early did not respond to the NOA and, consistent with Bylaw 19.7.2, Early's failure to submit a response
may be viewed by the hearing panel as an admission that the alleged violations occurred. Additionally,
Early did not cooperate with the investigation and, consistent with Bylaws 19.2.3.2.2 and 19.7.8.3.3, Early's
failure to participate in an interview may be viewed by the hearing panel as an admission that the alleged
violation occurred. Early's non-cooperation may be used as further corroboration of Gassnola's and Gatto's
statements confirming the violations. 42
The consistent and credible evidence, together with factual information uncovered in this investigation,
confirms that Early made arrangements for financial aid or other benefits to Smith or his family members
or friends in violation of Bylaw 13.2.1. This evidence includes, among other things, Gassnola's testimony
and guilty plea that he paid Early so Smith would not leave NC State; Gatto's statements at trial that he paid
38
(as reference for the entire month of October, Early exchanged 53 calls with Farmer and only had one other call with
Gatto in 2015).
39
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 92; and
FI112, Gassnola18Cr252_GovtSentencingMemo_082719_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 3.
40
FI021, Gatto17Cr686_Transcript_101818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 46.
41
FI083, DSmithNLI_111115_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 and FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935,
Page No. 3.
42
FI102, SMcDonald_Letter_Oearly_FinalContactForInterview2UPS_040319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 and
FI103, UPSShippingConfirmation_Oearly_040419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 10
the Smith family so NC State could compete and Smith would not go to a different college; the jury's guilty
verdict of conspiracy to commit wire fraud as it related to NC State and the government's positions in the
Gatto case; the government's and Gassnola's positions in their respective sentencing memoranda that
Gassnola made payments on behalf of Adidas and Gatto to ensure Smith would attend and play at NC State
in the Gassnola case; and phone records.
Early's arrangement of the $40,000 impermissible inducement violated Bylaw 13.2.1 even if the money
was never provided to Farmer or the Smith family; however, in addition to Early's arrangement of an
impermissible inducement, the enforcement staff believes a hearing panel could conclude that Early
provided the $40,000 to Smith's family or Farmer. Bylaw 19.7.8.3 permits the hearing panel to base its
decision on information that circumstantially supports the alleged violation. The direct record shows that
Early arranged for Gassnola to provide him $40,000 and that he intended to provide that money to Farmer.
There is no evidence that Early kept the money or provided it to someone not associated with Smith. The
record also shows that the objective of the arrangement – Smith's commitment and early enrollment –
happened shortly after Early received the money, and during that same time Early communicated
extensively with Farmer, Gassnola, Gatto and the Smith family. On November 3, 2015, the day after
Gassnola gave Early the $40,000, the following communication occurred:
• 1:13 p.m. – Early had a four-minute call with Smith Sr.

• 1:18 p.m. – Early called and sent a text message to Gassnola.
• 1:19 p.m. – Gassnola returned Early's call and the two spoke for three minutes.
• 1:32 p.m. – Early called Farmer and had an eight-minute call.
• 1:47 p.m. – Early received a call from and spoke to Gatto for two minutes.
• 2:05 p.m. – Early received a call from and spoke to Gassnola and sent him a text message. 43
43
FI056, AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlyPertinentindividuals_062319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935
and FI038,
November2015TextMessages_MGottfriedOEarly_TGassnolaDSmithJrDSmithSr_062019_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 11
It should be noted that November 1 and 17, 2015, Gassnola submitted reimbursement invoices to Gatto
totaling approximately $40,000. 44 Additionally, in January 2016 at the time of Smith's enrollment, he and
his father lived in government subsidized housing. 45 However, by April 2016, Smith's family moved to a
home valued at more than $200,000. 46 Lastly, Smith did not receive an athletics scholarship for the 2016
spring semester and had to pay the remaining balance of his fees after his Federal Pell and institutional
grants were calculated. 47 Based on this information, it is unremarkable to conclude that Early followed
through with his original intent and provided the $40,000 to Farmer to ensure that Smith enrolled at NC
State.
2. Allegation Nos 1-(d) and (e) – Early's provision of impermissible complimentary

admissions to Farmer and Smith.
The enforcement staff references the institution's review of the allegations for an overview of the facts.
Early did not submit a response to the NOA and did not cooperate with the investigation and, consistent
with Bylaws 19.7.2, 19.2.3.2.2 and 19.7.8.3.3, Early's failure to submit timely responses or participate in
an interview may be viewed by the hearing panel as an admission that the alleged violations occurred..
a. Allegation No. 1-(d) – Impermissible complimentary admissions to Farmer as an

individual associated with a prospect and Smith's trainer.
44
FI027, Gatto17CR686_GovtExhibit1116_112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935;
FI028, Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit1118_112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935; and
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 95 and 96.
45
FI086, rsmith1263_Email_KDomnick_PublicHousingandSNAPProgram_010516_NorthCarolinaSt_00935
(January 5, 2016, email indicating that the Smiths live in public housing) and FI084,
DSmithFinancialAidFile_013118_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 9 (Showing Smith Sr. claimed no income for
the 2014 tax year).
46
FI087, PetersenUnderwriterInvoice_042616_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (showing Smith's address of 526 Hilliard
Drive) and FI088, CumberlandCountyTaxRecords2016_526Hilliard_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (property tax
information).
47
FI084, DSmithFinancialAidFile_013118_NoarthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 23.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 12
In addition to the institution's discussion, the enforcement staff notes that Farmer ran a basketball
training business and was an AAU basketball coach. 48 According to members of the men's basketball staff,
Farmer was Smith's trainer. 49 While Smith could have provided Farmer with complimentary admissions
out of his student-athlete allotment, he did not. 50 Instead, Early provided almost all of Farmer's
complimentary admissions through the men's basketball office pass list. 51 Over 26 contests, Early provided
Farmer with 44 complimentary admissions in excess of the number he could permissibly receive as an
IAWP while Smith was a student-athlete. 52 Some admissions were provided to home contests in excess of
the two permissible admissions; however, on 10 occasions the admissions were for away or postseason
contests, in violation of NCAA legislation. 53
The enforcement staff asserts Early acted unethically in this matter because he knew that IAWPs could
receive only two complimentary admissions. 54 In some instances he specifically attempted to deceive any
monitoring by listing Farmer as a "business contact" or "friend". 55 The value of the benefits provided to
Farmer as an IAWP ($2,119) was substantial, and Early's actions were repetitive and showed a reckless
indifference for NCAA rules.
b. Allegation No. 1-(e) – Impermissible complimentary admissions to Smith.
48
FI091, SFarmerARMSProfile_071518_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (Farmer's profile in the institution's ARMS
database indicating he was a club team coach for NC Zoom) and FI092,
Screenshot_ShawnFarmerBasketballWebsite_ARoadLessTraveled_080813_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (details of
Farmer's basketball training business in which these activities trigger IAWP status).
49
50
FI078, Interp_ComplimentaryAdmissionsIAWP_100913_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (confirming that a student-
athlete may provide complimentary admissions to any IAWP as long as the admissions are not provided to the IAWP
at the direction of an institutional staff member and this precluded Early from directing Farmer and Smith to coordinate
Farmer's admissions).
51
FI062, 2015-2016 CompTicketLists and FI063, 2016-2017 CompTicketLists (copies of each contest's
complimentary admissions lists including student-athlete list, men's basketball office list and prospective student-
athlete list).
52
FI065, SFarmerCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
53
FI065, SFarmerCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
54
FI015, CDoyle_TR_062119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 5.
55
FI063, 2016-2017 CompTicketLists, MBB@GeorgiaTechPassLists_022217_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (example of
Early designating Farmer as a "business contact").
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 13
In addition to the institution's discussion, the enforcement staff notes that Smith could have provided
his family and friends with complimentary admissions out of his student-athlete allotment or by having
teammates transfer tickets to him, but he did not. 56 Early provided all of the impermissible complimentary
admissions to Smith's family and friends through the men's basketball office pass list. 57
In doing so, Early regularly listed as the primary recipients Smith's family members who had different
last names than Smith and identified each individual as a "potential donor". 58 Throughout the 2016-17
season, Early provided 106 total impermissible complimentary admissions to Smith's family and friends
for 13 of the team's 18 home contests. 59
The enforcement staff considers Early's conduct to be unethical because he specifically attempted to
deceive any monitoring efforts when he categorized Smith's family members or friends as potential
donors. 60 Additionally, the value of the benefits provided to Smith's family and friends ($4,562) was
substantial, and Early's actions were repetitive and showed a reckless indifference for NCAA rules. 61
3. Background related to importation and other procedural matters.
The September 2017 announcement of the SDNY investigation into fraud in college basketball
recruiting led the NCAA Board of Governors, Division I Board of Directors and NCAA President to
establish the Commission on College Basketball (Commission) to examine critical aspects of Division I
56
FI063, 2016-2017 CompTicketLists (individual contest complimentary student-athlete admissions lists, which
include examples of student-athlete transfers of complimentary admissions to teammates and in each instance
regarding Smith, these transfers were not done) and
FI066, SmithFamilyCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
57
FI063, 2016-2017 CompTicketLists and FI066, SmithFamilyCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
58
FI063, 2016-2017 CompTicketLists, MBBvStFrancisPassLists_111316_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (an example,
where Early provided tickets to Darrell and Tara Caldwell, Smith's aunt and uncle, listing them as "potential donors"
and the guests under their respective tickets are Rhonda Smith, Smith's aunt, and Onelia Smith, Smith's cousin).
59
FI066, SmithFamilyCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
60
FI063, 2016-2017 CompTicketLists; MBBvBostonPassLists_120316_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (an example of
Early listing Tara Caldwell, Smith's aunt, as a "potential donor" and Smith family members signing as her guests).
61
FI064, TicketValuesperYear_062119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 14
men's basketball, including modifications to improve the integrity of NCAA processes and evaluate whether
the appropriate degree of authority is vested in the current infractions processes. 62 In August 2018, based
upon the Commission's April 2018 recommendations, the membership adopted multiple reforms to solidify
a more efficient system for investigating and adjudicating potential violations. 63 At that time, Bylaw
19.7.8.3.1, permitting importation of facts, evidence and positions from outside proceedings and reviews
into the infractions process, was adopted. The bylaw confirms that parties to an NCAA investigation and
the hearing panel may consider information from other formal proceedings.
The institution and Gottfried present differing positions on the hearing panel's authority to import
information from the Gatto case. 64 The enforcement staff agrees with the institution that evidence and
testimony from the Gatto case may be considered by the hearing panel pursuant to Bylaw 19.7.8.3.1. 65 This
is consistent with the rationale provided in the adoption of NCAA Proposal No. 2018-15, which was to
increase efficiency in the infractions process by saving time and resources. 66 Additionally, the importation
legislation, like much of NCAA Article 19, was adopted to help the committee make fully-informed
decisions by giving hearing panel members access to all available and relevant information. Confirming
the hearing panel's permissive authority to take judicial notice of evidence admitted in federal court
proceedings is wholly unremarkable.
Gottfried's contrary position is incorrect. His novel argument is not supported by the bylaw language,
the clear purposes of Article 19 or any authority. The enforcement staff does not purport to import a jury
verdict under appeal. Instead, the enforcement staff simply imports facts and evidence admitted into the
62
See Commission On College Basketball Charter.
63
See More Efficient Enforcement System.
64
The institution asserts that the hearing panel may consider evidence submitted and positions taken in the Gatto case,
but that evidence and testimony must be evaluated for veracity and credibility. Gottfried asserts that because the Gatto
case is still under appeal, the enforcement staff cannot rely on any trial evidence or testimony to bring an allegation
and the hearing panel may not consider evidence submitted and positions taken in the matter.
65
The enforcement staff asserts the same applies to any positions taken in the Gassnola case.
66
See NCAA Proposal No. 2018-15.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 15
proceeding. Those facts and that evidence speak for themselves and remain probative regardless of whether
a verdict is ultimately affirmed or reversed on appeal. Contrary to Gottfried's suggestion, the bylaw does
not require exhaustion of all appellate remedies before underlying facts may be considered in the infractions
process. Furthermore, his position would undermine the purposes of Article 19 and deprive the hearing
panel of pertinent information and delay the processing of an infractions case. The hearing panel may opt
to assign little or no weight to imported information, but hearing panel members should at least be permitted
to consider facts admitted in federal court proceedings on a related matter. The facts and evidence are
properly included in the record for consideration by this panel.
4. Statute of limitations as it relates to Allegation Nos. 1-(a) and (b).
The enforcement staff asserts the statute of limitations tolled in April 2018, when the institution alerted
the enforcement staff of the superseding indictment and its inquiries into alleged improprieties in Smith's
recruitment. 67 As a result, only violations occurring before April 2014 (none are present in this case) fall
outside the window identified in Bylaw 19.5.11. 68
Additionally, after the institution notified the enforcement staff of the possible violations in April 2018,
the enforcement staff asked the institution to provide certain documents for review. The institution
submitted the records in mid-July, which uncovered the facts of Allegation Nos. 1-(a) and (b). Further, July
31, 2018, leaders from the institution traveled to the NCAA national office to discuss this matter with the
investigative team and enforcement department leaders. On August 20, and as a professional courtesy to
the institution, the enforcement staff requested the institution's preference for receiving a notice of inquiry
(NOI) in writing or verbally. 69 More than a month later, September 27, the institution asked for a verbal
NOI call and scheduled it for October 5. The institution's delay in responding to the August 20 courtesy
67
See Institution's Response, Page No. 3.
68
The institution has indicated October 1, 2018, as the date of the verbal notice of inquiry; however, the enforcement
staff's records indicate the verbal notice was provided October 5, 2018.
69
See Exhibit NCAA-1. SMcDonald_Email_MGlazier_RecordsSubmissions_082418_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 16
and its further delay in scheduling the verbal NOI call pushed Allegation Nos. 1-(a) and (b) outside of the
four-year period by one week. An institution on actual notice of potential violations should not be permitted
to delay its formal NOI and then argue that those same violations are time barred. Even if the hearing panel
believes the violations are outside of the statute of limitations, the exception in Bylaw 19.5.11-(b) applies
because all five subparagraphs in Allegation No. 1 show a pattern of willful violations by the men's
basketball staff in its the recruitment of Smith.
D. Remaining issues.
1. Are Allegation Nos. 1-(a) and (b) time barred by the NCAA statute of limitations? If
not, is Allegation No. 1-(b) a violation? Additionally, what is the appropriate level of
the alleged facts in the two subparagraphs?
2. Is Allegation No. 1-(c) substantiated by the facts presented?
3. Is unethical conduct substantiated by the facts presented in Allegation Nos. 1-(d) and
(e)? What is the appropriate level of Allegation Nos. 1-(d) and (e)?
4. If the hearing panel concludes all Allegation No. 1 is a violation, what is the appropriate
level? If the hearing panel concludes Allegation No 1-(c) is not a violation, what is the
appropriate Level of Allegation No. 1?
E. Rebuttal information.
In its written response, the institution argues that Gassnola is not credible and his statements are not
corroborated. The enforcement staff disagrees and notes that as it pertains to NC State, the Gatto case was
based almost solely on Gassnola's testimony. That jury found Gatto guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud as to NC State. 70 Additionally, Gatto admitted through his attorneys that
70
FI112, Gassnola18Cr252_GovtSentencingMemo_082719_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (government's position in the
Gassnola case that Gassnola was a co-conspirator of Gatto as it related to the NC State).
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 17
he paid the students' families, which included Smith, in his opening and closing statements and his
sentencing submission. 71 The enforcement staff believes the totality of the evidence presented and positions
taken in the Gatto case and Gassnola case, together with the facts uncovered in this investigation, confirm
Gassnola's credibility. Further, not only did Gassnola testify under oath in a criminal proceeding with
penalty of perjury and extensive prison time at risk in the Gatto case, he also pled guilty to the same criminal
activity. The enforcement staff believes that these factors far outweigh the fact that Gassnola has a criminal
record.
In its written response, the institution argues there is no evidence the $40,000 was provided to Farmer
or the Smith family. The enforcement staff directs the hearing panel to its discussion above related to
additional circumstantial evidence.
In its written response, the institution argues that Adidas and Gassnola are not representatives of the
institution's athletics interests, Adidas was not the source of the $40,000 and the payment was not to ensure
Smith's commitment to NC State.
Because Early was an institutional staff member involved in arranging the impermissible inducement,
a violation of Bylaw 13.2.1 occurred. Whether Adidas or Gassnola are considered boosters or where the
money came from is irrelevant for determining that the conduct was a recruiting inducement. Nonetheless,
both Adidas and Gassnola meet the definition of a representative of athletics interests.
Gassnola was requested by Early to assist and/or assisted Early in recruiting when he provided the
$40,000 intended inducement to Early. As a result, he triggers booster status per Bylaws 6.4.2-(c) and
13.02.15-(c).
71
FI029, Gatto17Cr686_GattoSentencingSubmission_021219_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 7 and 22 and
FI021, Gatto17Cr686_Transcript_101818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 46.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 18
Adidas is an apparel or equipment manufacturer that members of the athletics department staff knew
to be promoting the institution's athletics program, which triggers booster status per Bylaw 6.4.1. At all
relevant times, Adidas was the apparel sponsor for NC State with the right to publicly represent, market
and otherwise promote NC State. The particulars of this specific relationship may render Adidas a booster
and there are also additional actions triggering the definition of a booster in this instance. Specifically,
Adidas promoted the athletics program and provided financial resources to the athletics department. Adidas
provided the athletics department $425,000 in financial contributions and $1.3 million worth of Adidas
merchandise annually during the 2014-15 and 2015-16 academic years. Additionally, Adidas assisted the
men's basketball program by providing resources to update the office recruiting display cases and providing
Gottfried with an allotment of shirts to promote basketball camps.72 Further, Adidas was involved in high-
level marketing and promotion strategy meetings with NC State athletics senior staff and provided
substantial resources for redesigning public displays throughout NC State's Reynolds Coliseum. 73 As a
result of these actions and many more, Adidas would trigger booster status per Bylaws 6.4.1, 6.4.2-(a),
6.4.2-(b), 6.4.2-(e), 13.02.15-(a), 13.02.15-(b) and 13.02.15-(e).
Additionally, Gassnola, as an individual who is a member of such an agency as an outside consultant
for Adidas, would also satisfy the requirements of Bylaws 6.4.2-(a) and 13.02.15-(a), again triggering
booster status.
In October 1999, the NCAA Division I Management Council (Council) unanimously clarified that
corporate entities could be considered athletics representatives. The Council confirmed that the provisions
of NCAA Constitution 6.4.1 are applicable to "corporate entities and other organizations (e.g., apparel and
equipment companies)" and directed the Academics/Eligibility/Compliance Cabinet to incorporate that
72
FI012, JDunlap_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 39.
73
See Exhibit NCAA-2.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 19
interpretation into Constitutions 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 and Bylaw 13.02.12. 74 The clarification arose due to
concerns raised by various membership organizations regarding possible interference of outside
organizations, specifically referencing apparel companies, in providing increased athletics opportunities to
prospects that may lead to recruiting activities. Those concerns were realized here. The specific facts of this
case demonstrate that Adidas was not only an apparel sponsor of NC State, but also involved in promoting
its athletics interests and therefore is a booster.
The institution's assertion in its written response that Gassnola made the payment to Early on behalf of
an agent for the purpose of securing the agent's future representation is only speculation and is not supported
by the facts. Furthermore, Gassnola and Gatto both confirmed that the payment was from Adidas.
III. ALLEGATION NO. 2 – From January through March 2016, men's basketball staff
members violated NCAA recruiting legislation when they provided impermissible
complimentary admissions to individuals responsible for teaching or directing an activity
in which a prospective student-athlete is involved. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaw 13.8.1
(2015-16)]
A. Overview.
The institution agrees with the underlying facts of Allegation No. 2 and that those facts constitute
NCAA violations.
B. Enforcement staff's position as to why the violations should be considered Level II

[NCAA Bylaw 19.1.2] and if the institution is in agreement.
The enforcement staff believes a hearing panel could conclude that Allegation No. 2 is a significant
breach of conduct (Level II) because the violations (1) were not isolated or limited in nature, (2) provided
or were intended to provide more than a minimal recruiting or other advantage, (3) included more than
minimal impermissible benefits and (4) compromised the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model. The
institution agrees the violations are Level II.
74
FI076, Division1ManagementCouncilReport_101899_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 9 and
FI077, Interp_CorporateEntitiesasRIAs_101999_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 20
The enforcement staff references the institution's review of the allegation for an overview of the facts.
Additionally, the enforcement staff directs the hearing panel to its discussion of Allegation No. 1-(d) above
regarding impermissible complimentary admissions to IAWPs. While then men's basketball student-
athletes Anthony Barber (Barber), BeeJay Anya (Anya) and Lennard Freeman (Freeman) could have
provided Stanley Bland (Bland), an IAWP and AAU coach, and Keith Stevens (Stevens), an IAWP and
AAU coach for Team Takeover, with complimentary admissions out of their student-athlete allotment,
they did not. 75 Instead, the men's basketball staff provided almost all of Bland's and Stevens' complimentary
admissions through its pass list. 76
D. Remaining issue(s).
None.
IV. ALLEGATION NO. 3 – From 2015-16 through 2016-17, Gottfried did not demonstrate
that he monitored his direct reports for compliance within the men's basketball program.
[NCAA Division I Manual Bylaw 11.1.1.1 (2015-16 and 2016-17)]
A. Overview.
The institution agrees with the violation as alleged in Allegation No. 3. Gottfried disputes the allegation.

[NCAA Bylaw 19.1.1] and if the institution and involved individual are in agreement.
The enforcement staff believes a hearing panel could conclude that Allegation No. 3 is a severe breach
of conduct (Level I) because it is a head coach responsibility violation resulting from underlying Level I
75
FI078, Interp_ComplimentaryAdmissionsIAWP_100913_NorthCarolinaSt_00935 (confirming that a student-
athlete may provide complimentary admissions to any IAWP as long as the admissions are not provided to the IAWP
at the direction of an institutional staff member).
76
FI062, 2015-2016 CompTicketLists (copies of each contest's complimentary admissions lists including student-
athlete list, men's basketball office list and prospective student-athlete lists, Barber did have one available ticket that
he could have provided to Bland through the student-athlete pass list for three of the seven contests and Anya and
Freeman had an available ticket for one of the two games that Stevens attended through the men's basketball office
pass list) and FI067, SBlandCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 21
and II violations and seriously undermined or threatened the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model. The
institution believes the violation should be classified as Level II. Gottfried disputes a violation occurred.
1. Gottfried's failure to demonstrate that he monitored Early's involvement of Gassnola

and Farmer in the recruitment of Smith.
The enforcement staff incorporates its factual summary of Allegation No. 1-(c) for the basis of this
allegation. Along with Early, Farmer and Gassnola were the main individuals involved in the alleged
$40,000 inducement to Smith's family. Early was Smith's primary recruiter. 77 Adidas staff members
described Farmer as the liaison between recruiters and the Smith family." 78 Jeff Dunlap (Dunlap), former
director of basketball operations, stated that Early dealt closely with Farmer in the recruitment of Smith, 79
and Lutz confirmed that during Smith's recruitment, Farmer was his trainer and "a guy that had [Smith's]
ear for sure." 80 Farmer was not involved with any other prospect recruited by NC State.
Gassnola introduced Farmer to the NC State men's basketball staff between February 10 and 12, 2015.81
Gottfried confirmed Gassnola was around the basketball staff during that time and that he had conversations
with Gassnola about Smith. 82 On February 12, Early placed the men's basketball staff's first phone call to
Farmer. 83 In the five months prior to February 2015, Early had no phone calls with Farmer; however, after
Gassnola introduced Farmer to the staff, Early and Farmer called each other 409 times between then and
77
78
FI019, Gatto17Cr686_TGassnolaTestimony_101519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 86 and 87 and
FI009, AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 33.
79
FI012, JDunlap_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 24.
80
FI002, BLutz_TR_010919_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 28 and 29 (Lutz also recalled Early asking him to
speak with Farmer in the spring of 2015 to let Farmer know that NC State was interested in Smith and Early would
be his main recruiter).
81
FI022, Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit1096_112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 3.
82
83
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 2 and
FI035, MBBPhoneRecordstoDSmithJrDSmithSrSFarmer_FY14-15_&_FY15-16_062019_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 22
November 2015. 84 Similarly, Early had one call with Gassnola prior to January 2015; however, from
January to November 2015, he and Gassnola called each other 171 times. 85
Gottfried stated that it was obvious that Gatto and the shoe companies wanted to eventually sign
Smith, 86 and that he knew that Gassnola was close with Gatto and affiliated with Adidas.87 Gottfried also
stated that he likely discussed Smith with Gassnola, but he did not recall specifics. 88 Men's basketball staff
members reported that Gassnola attended practices, games and met with the coaches during Smith's
recruitment. 89 Gassnola, Gatto and Coleman attended the team's shootaround for and game against North
Carolina February 24, 2015. 90 Farmer joined them for the game. They received tickets from the men's
basketball office under Gassnola's name and sat directly behind the NC State bench. 91
The frequency and timing of communication the men's basketball staff, primarily Early and to a lesser
extent Gottfried, had with Farmer and Gassnola indicates a close connection among Farmer, Gassnola and
Smith. 92 Telephone records show that prior to February 2015 when Gassnola introduced Farmer to the staff,
Gottfried had not spoken with Gassnola or Farmer, and Early had five calls with Gassnola and no calls with
Farmer. However, between August and November 2015 when Smith's recruitment became expedited,
Gottfried exchanged 17 calls with Gassnola and four calls with Farmer, and Early exchanged 103 calls with
84
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 1 and 2 (for monthly breakdowns of
communications between Early and Gottried to Farmer, Gassnola and Smith).
85
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 1 and 2.
86
87
88
89
FI002, BLutz_TR_010919_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 33 and 34 and
FI001, TJohnson_TR_111918_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 28 and 29.
90
FI022, Gatto17Cr686_GovtExhibit1096_112818_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 3 and
FI009, AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 39 through 41 and 65 through 68 (Coleman's
account of going to the NC State/North Carolina game through Gassnola on NC State pass list and Coleman sitting
right next to Farmer).
91
FI009, AColeman_TR_011419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 65 through 68.
92
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 1 and 2 (monthly breakdowns of
communications between Early and Gottried to Farmer, Gassnola and Smith).
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 23
Gassnola and 297 calls with Farmer. 93 Gottfried could not recall the details of his conversations or whether
he discussed with Early his communications with Farmer or Gassnola. 94
The timing of many basketball staff communications with Farmer and Gassnola coincide with major
recruiting developments specific to Smith.95 For example, on August 3, 2015, shortly after Smith tore his
ACL, Gottfried spoke with Early, then immediately called Farmer. 96 As another example, the chart below
shows the events and communications in the week surrounding Smith's verbal commitment: 97
Date Events and Communications

September 4, 2015 Gassnola withdrew $40,000 from his bank account.
Gottfried exchanged seven texts with Gassnola.
September 7, 2015 Early exchanged two phone calls and 18 texts with Gassnola and had four calls
with Farmer.
Gassnola rented a car in Raleigh.
Early had two calls and four text messages with Gassnola and 25 calls with
September 8, 2015 Farmer.
Gottfried spoke with Farmer at 10:39 p.m., immediately after one of Early and
Farmer's calls.
Gottfried and Early took a helicopter to visit Smith.
September 9, 2015
Early exchanged 12 calls with Farmer and one call with Gassnola.
Smith verbally committed to NC State.
September 10, 2015 Gottfried had three text messages with Gassnola.
Early had two calls with Farmer and one call with Gatto.
Gottfried had one call and six text messages with Gassnola and one call with
September 11 through Gatto.
14, 2015 Early had two calls and five text messages with Gassnola and six calls with
Farmer.
93
94
95
96
FI057, AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlySFarmer_062319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
97
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 3;
FI057, AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlySFarmer_062319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935;
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 36 (Gottfried's failure to recall any information
about the conversation with Farmer).
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 24
The events surrounding Smith's signed commitment show a similar pattern. 98
Date Events and Communications

Gassnola withdrew $40,000 from his bank account.
October 30, 2015 Early had two phone calls with Gassnola and exchanged two calls with Farmer
immediately followed by a call to Gottfried.
October 30 through Smith made his official visit. He was accompanied by his father and
November 1, 2015 grandmother and Farmer.
Gassnola flew to Raleigh and delivered $40,000 to Early.
November 2, 2015 Gottfried had one phone call and two text messages with Gassnola.
Early had nine text messages with Gassnola and three calls with Farmer.
Early had numerous communications with Smith Sr., Gassnola, Farmer and
November 3, 2015
Gatto as detailed on Page No. 11 above.
Early had eight phone calls and seven text messages with Gassnola, 44 phone
November 3-10, 2015 calls with Farmer and two calls with Gatto. Gottfried had four calls and four
text messages with Gassnola.
November 11, 2015 Smith signed his NLI.
November 12, 2015 Smith announced his intent to enroll early at NC State.
On 31 occasions during that same time, Early communicated with Farmer then immediately contacted
Gottfried or vice versa. 99 Additionally, on 15 occasions during that same time, Early communicated with
Gassnola then immediately contacted Gottfried or vice versa. 100
Gottfried could not recall details about conversations or interactions he had with either Farmer or
Gassnola. 101 Gottfried never asked Early about Gassnola's involvement with Smith, and his only question
about Farmer was what he did for a living. 102 Gottfried knew that Early regularly spoke with Farmer and
that Farmer was a person close to the Smith family, but "[a]t the same time, I don't think we talked very
98
FI056, AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlyPertinentIndividuals_062319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935;
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 3; and
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 46 and 47 (Gottfried's failure to recall any
information about the conversation).
99
FI057, AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlySFarmer_062319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
100
FI058, AugtoNov2015PhoneRecords_MGottfriedOEarlyTGassnola_062319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
101
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 35, 36 and 43 through 45.
102
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 26, 37 and 38.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 25
much about specifics." 103 Gottfried stated he rarely spoke to Farmer and did not believe Farmer was heavily
involved with Smith's recruitment. 104 The enforcement staff notes that Farmer and his girlfriend
accompanied Smith on his official visit and had dinner with Gottfried during that visit.105 Additionally,
Gottfried stated that Smith Sr. and Smith's grandmother were the most important individuals involved in
Smith's recruitment. 106 However, Gottfried called Smith's grandmother twice in the 15 months leading up
to Smith's NLI signing. 107
Red flags surrounding Smith's recruitment were abundant and not hidden. These included, among
others, the following: Gassnola introduced Farmer to the staff, Farmer's subsequent involvement in Smith's
recruitment, Farmer accompanied Smith on his official visit, Gottfried knew that Adidas wanted to sign
Smith, Gassnola was in Raleigh and communicated with Early and Gottfried immediately before Smith's
verbal and signed commitments and the numerous communications between Early, Farmer and Gassnola.
Gottfried was also obviously aware of his own communications in connection with Smith. Dunlap even
stated that Early indicated to him how many agents, NBA people and shoe companies wanted a piece of
Smith. 108 Despite these red flags, Gottfried did virtually nothing to ascertain the nature of Farmer's and
Gassnola's roles in Smith's recruitment. Either Gottfried knew or should have known that Farmer and
Gassnola were involved in Smith's recruitment and did not seek information regarding their involvement,
or he did not monitor Early's recruitment of Smith as it pertained to Farmer's and Gassnola's roles. Head
coach responsibility legislation does not require Gottfried to detect all violations; however, it requires that
103
104
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 22 (this contradicts the interviews of Lutz,
Coleman and Gassnola's testimony all of which said that Farmer was involved in Smith's recruitment).
105
106
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 21, 24, 25 and 47.
107
FI016, SmithTimeline_070119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 1 and 2 (Gottfried also only exchanged 11 calls
with Smith Sr. during the same time period).
108
FI012, JDunlap_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 46 and 47.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 26
he take action, ask questions and seek out potential questionable behavior. Those obligations are heightened
when, as here, circumstances arose that should raise concern. 109 He did none of these things and cannot
rebut the presumption of responsibility. The burden is on Gottfried to demonstrate that he monitored his
staff, but he was unable to carry that burden.
2. Gottfried's failure to monitor his staff's provision of complimentary admissions on the

men's basketball office pass list.
The enforcement staff incorporates its factual summary of Allegation Nos. 1-(d), (e) and 2 for the basis
of this allegation. Over a 14 month span, the men's basketball staff provided 164 impermissible
complimentary admissions to IAWPs, Farmer and Smith's family and friends on the men's basketball office
pass list. 110 These complimentary admissions were primarily arranged by Early, and on a few occasions by
Dunlap. 111 In all instances, the impermissible complimentary admissions were provided by men's basketball
staff members who reported directly to Gottfried.
Administrative and compliance staff had ongoing discussions with the men's basketball staff regarding
the provision of complimentary admissions to AAU and high school coaches because the basketball staff
did not always place those coaches on the proper pass list and included them on men's basketball office
pass lists instead. 112 Additionally, there were multiple emails, reminders and discussions with the basketball
staff regarding the proper use of the men's basketball office pass list. 113 Gottfried stated that his staff was
well versed in complimentary admissions practices. 114
109
March 6, 2015 – Syracuse University [which cites University of Miami (2013)].
110
FI065, SFarmerCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935;
FI066, SmithFamilyCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935; and
FI067, SBlandCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
111
FI012, JDunlap_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 26 (Dunlap became the "default" name as he and
Maggie Burge, men's basketball administrative assistant, were responsible for adding names to the men's basketball
office pass list).
112
FI014, MFord_TR_061319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 6 and 7.
113
FI015, CDoyle_TR_062119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 4 through 6, 66 and 67.
114
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 27
Gottfried denied any responsibilities related to overseeing his staff's complimentary admissions list and
said he never spot-checked a complimentary ticket list after it was finalized or following a contest. 115
Instead, Gottfried relied on the compliance staff to monitor complimentary admissions, and he took no
action to check the activities of his direct reports regarding their use of the men's basketball office pass list.
Head coach responsibility legislation places a specific and independent monitoring obligation on head
coaches. 116 Two examples of a commitment to monitoring are the establishment of a program of prompt
and consistent review of documentation related to monitoring within the program and frequent spot checks
to uncover potential compliance problems. 117 As the head coach of the program, Gottfried was well-
positioned to uncover any potential violations because he knew the identities of most of the listed IAWPs,118
and some of Smith's family members, particularly his aunts, father and grandmother, who all appeared on
the men's basketball office pass list. 119 Instead, he opted to delegate these responsibilities entirely to others.
Having done so, he cannot satisfy his burden of demonstrating that he monitored complimentary admissions
at even the most basic level. Accordingly, he is unable to rebut the presumption of responsibility for
behaviors of his direct reports.
1. Did Gottfried clearly demonstrate he monitored Early's involvement of Farmer and
Gassnola during Smith's recruitment?
2. Did Gottfried clearly demonstrate he monitored his staff's provision of complimentary
admissions on the men's basketball office pass list?
115
116
March 6, 2015 – Syracuse University, Page No. 51 citing November 25, 2008 - University of Indiana, Bloomington
at Pg. 20.
117
NCAA Enforcement Charging Guidelines
118
FI013, MGottfried_TR_050819_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 40 (Gottfried acknowledged that Farmer would
come to practice from time-to-time and would likely be at the games).
119
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 28
E. Rebuttal information.
None.
F. Additional matters that relate to Allegation No. 3.
On December 12, 2019, ESPN published a story containing case-related disclosures attributed to Scott
Tompsett (Tompsett), Gottfried's counsel. In his remarks to the reporter, Tompsett stated that "[t]he NCAA
broke their own rule when they considered evidence from a court case on appeal and then relied on that
evidence to charge [Gottfried] with a Level I violation. They should withdraw the allegation and let the
court case run its course." 120
Tompsett's representations were untrue, inflammatory and designed to pressure the enforcement staff
to amend its allegations. Falsely and publicly accusing the enforcement staff of breaking NCAA rules
during the pendency of a case cannot be tolerated. Similarly, publicly pressuring the enforcement staff to
amend its allegations is unwelcomed and ineffective. As an experienced practitioner in infractions matters,
Tompsett knows this is not an appropriate use of the media and that public statements about a pending case
violate NCAA confidentiality rules. The enforcement staff notes Tompsett's violation of Bylaw 19.01.3 for
the hearing panel's consideration.
V. ALLEGATION NO. 4 – From 2015-16 and 2016-17, the institution failed to monitor its
men's basketball complimentary admissions. [NCAA Division I Manual Constitution 2.8.1
(2015-16 and 2016-17)]
A. Overview.
The institution agrees with the underlying facts of Allegation No. 4 and that those facts constitute
NCAA violations.
B. Enforcement staff's position as to why the violations should be considered Level II

[NCAA Bylaw 19.1.2] and if the institution is in agreement.
120
See Exhibit NCAA-3.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 29
The enforcement staff believes a hearing panel could conclude that Allegation No. 4 is a significant
breach of conduct (Level II) because the violation (1) is a failure to monitor, which is presumed Level II;
(2) resulted from the subparts of underlying violations that could be considered Level II violations; and (3)
compromised the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model. The institution agrees the violations are Level
II.
The enforcement staff references the institution's review of the allegation for an overview of the facts.
Additionally, the enforcement staff directs the hearing panel to its discussion of Allegation Nos. 1-(d), 1-
(e) and 2 above regarding impermissible complimentary admissions to IAWPs and Smith's family and
friends.
On 48 occasions over 14 months, the men's basketball staff provided a total 164 impermissible
complimentary admissions on its office pass list.121 Some of the impermissible complimentary admissions
could have been provided permissibly through student-athletes transferring their unused tickets to Smith,
but this did not happen. Once, Smith's family members were moved to permissible slots in Smith's student-
athlete complimentary admissions; however, on 39 other occasions that was not done with respect to Smith's
family or Farmer's tickets. 122 Christopher Boyer, then deputy director of athletics for external operations
and men's basketball sport supervisor, stated that most staff members knew Farmer because he was "high
maintenance" regarding where he wanted to sit at games. 123 Meeghan Ford, then assistant director of
athletics for compliance, stated that she spot checked the men's basketball office pass list occasionally, for
individuals disassociated from the institution, but she did not review the list for AAU coaches, Farmer or
121
FI065, SFarmerCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935;
FI066, SmithFamilyCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935; and
FI067, SBlandCompTicketChart_062519_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
122
FI015, CDoyle_TR_062119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 30, 31 and 80.
123
FI006, CBoyer_TR_011019_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 21.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 30
Smith's family members unless there were irregularities. 124 The institution created a system to cross check
a list of known agents or disassociated individuals, but it did not apply the system to the men's basketball
office pass list. 125 While the institution had written policies and procedures, educated its staff and generally
monitored its complimentary admissions processes, it did not adequately monitor the men's basketball
office pass list.
None.
VI. ALLEGATION NO. 1 [post-separation NOA] – Early refused to furnish information

relevant to an investigation and to cooperate fully with the institution and enforcement
staff. [NCAA Division I Manual Bylaws 10.1, 10.1-(a) and 19.2.3 (2018-19)]
A. Overview.
Early did not respond to the NOA

[NCAA Bylaw 19.1.1] and if the involved individual is in agreement.
The enforcement staff believes a hearing panel could conclude that Allegation No. 1 is a severe breach
of conduct (Level I) because the failure to cooperate, which is presumed Level I, involved unethical or
dishonest conduct and seriously undermined or threatened the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model.
Furthermore, it adversely impacted the NCAA's ability to investigate alleged violations, which the
membership identified as critical to the common interests of the Association and the preservation of its
enduring values. Early did not respond.
Throughout the investigation into potential violations at NC State, the institution and enforcement staff
requested interviews and cooperation from Early. The enforcement staff initially requested an interview
124
FI014, MFord_TR_061319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page Nos. 5 and 6.
125
FI015, CDoyle_TR_062119_NorthCarolinaSt_00935, Page No. 15.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 31
through telephone calls and voicemails January 15, 16 and 23, 2019. On January 25 and February 13, the
institution and enforcement staff requested Early's participation in an interview via email. Further, February
13 and 25, the enforcement staff sent letters via UPS requesting Early's participation in an interview. Lastly,
April 3, 2019, the enforcement staff sent its final letter via UPS requesting Early's participation. 126 On April
4, 2019, Early received and signed for the UPS letter. 127
Early did not submit a response to the NOA and, consistent with Bylaw 19.7.2, Early's failure to submit
timely responses may be viewed by the hearing panel as an admission that the alleged violations occurred.
None.
VII. ADDITIONAL MATTERS RELATED TO THE CASE
A. Legislative Guidance.
The enforcement staff relied on official/staff interpretations and/or educational columns outlined in the
key record list index of authorities and included all case-specific formal interpretations as factual
information.
VIII. POTENTIAL AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
The enforcement staff directs the hearing panel to the statement of the case for a summary of
aggravating and mitigating factors identified and the party's positions on each identified factor.
A. Position of enforcement staff regarding institution's response.
The institution agrees with the mitigating factors identified by the enforcement staff and also asserts
that mitigating factors in Bylaws 19.9.4-(c) and (i) should apply. The institution does not believe that the
aggravating factors in Bylaws 19.9.3-(b), (h) and (k) should apply to the institution.
126
FI102, SMcDonald_Letter_OEarly_FinalContactForInterview2UPS_040319_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
127
FI103, UPSShippingConfirmation_Oearly_040419_NorthCarolinaSt_00935.
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 32
1. Bylaw 19.9.4-(c) – Affirmative steps to expedite final resolution of the matter.
The enforcement staff disagrees that this mitigating factor should be applied. While the institution
worked collaboratively with the enforcement staff in this investigation, it took no actions in addition to the
normal course of an investigation that would lead to this mitigating factor.
2. Bylaw 19.9.4-(i) – Other factors warranting a lower penalty range.
The enforcement staff disagrees with this proposed mitigating factor. Records provided indicate that
Andy Miller (Miller), former certified NBA agent, was disassociated from the institution; however, phone
records also indicate that members of the institution's men's basketball staff were in communication with
Miller during the time period of the violations.
3. Bylaw 19.9.3-(b) – A history of Level I, Level II or major violations by the institution.
The enforcement staff cited this aggravating factor because the institution has a history of five major
infractions cases. The staff defers to the hearing panel regarding the weight this aggravating factor should
be given.
4. Bylaw 19.9.3-(h) – Persons of authority condoned, participated in or negligently

disregarded the violation or related conduct.
The enforcement staff believes this aggravating factor should be applied to the institution. At the time
of the violations, Early was the head assistant men's basketball coach and lead recruiter for the program;
therefore, he was a person of authority. Additionally, Early's actions were impermissible under NCAA
legislation, and he engaged in activities well within his scope of employment in recruiting. Application of
this factor to the institution is consistent with prior cases decided by the committee. 128
5. Bylaw 19.9.3-(k) – A pattern of noncompliance within the sport program involved.
July 23, 2019 – DePaul University (applying Bylaw 19.9.3-(h) to both the institution and involved individual and
128
emphasizing that institutions are responsible for their employees, particularly coaches).
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 33
The enforcement staff cited this aggravating factor because as outlined in the allegations, the men's
basketball program failed to comply with recruiting, benefits and complimentary admissions legislation.
Additionally, the pattern of noncompliance involved multiple violations related to Smith, and multiple
impermissible complimentary admissions to IAWPs.
B. Position of enforcement staff regarding response of involved individual [Early].
Early did not respond to this NOA. The enforcement staff directs the hearing panel to the aggravating
and mitigating factors identified in the notice.
C. Position of enforcement staff regarding response of involved individual [Gottfried].
Gottfried agrees with the mitigating factor identified by the enforcement staff. Further Gottfried
disagrees with Allegation No. 3 and disagrees that the aggravating factor in Bylaw 19.9.3-(k) should apply.
The enforcement staff cited this aggravating factor because as outlined in the allegations, the men's
basketball program failed to comply with recruiting, benefits and complimentary admissions legislation.
Additionally, the pattern of noncompliance involved multiple violations related to Smith, and multiple
impermissible complimentary admissions to IAWPs.
IX. INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE MENTIONED DURING THE HEARING
Bland, Stanley – IAWP for Barber and an AAU coach.
Boyer, Christopher – Deputy director of athletics for external operations (January 2013 through
September 2019).
Coleman, Anthony – Former sports marketing coordinator for Adidas USA (2013 through 2017).
Doyle, Carrie – Senior associate director of athletics for compliance (November 2010 through present).
Dunlap, Jeff – Former director of basketball operations (March 2011 through March 2017).
Early, Orlando – Former assistant men's basketball coach (March 2011 through March 2017).
Farmer, Shawn – Individual associated with prospective student-athlete Smith and Smith's trainer.
Ford, Meeghan – Former assistant director of athletics for compliance (August 2012 through December
2018).
Case No. 00935
February 7, 2020
Page No. 34
Fox, Martin – Associate of Miller.
Gassnola, TJ – Former outside consultant for Adidas (2013 through September 2017).
Gatto, Jim – Former Adidas executive, director of global marketing basketball.
Gottfried, Mark – Former head men's basketball coach (March 2011 through March 2017).
Harrick, Jim – Former college basketball coach and colleague of Gottfried.
Lutz, Bobby – Former associate head men's basketball coach (2011 through April 2016) and assistant to
the deputy athletic director (April 2016 through November 2016).
Miller, Andy – Former certified NBA agent, principle of ASM Sports.
Smith, Jr., Dennis – Former men's basketball prospective student-athlete (2014 through December 2015)
and former men's basketball student-athlete (January 2016 through April 2017).
Smith, Sr., Dennis – Father of Smith.
Smith, Gloria – Grandmother of Smith.
Stevens, Keith – IAWP for Anya and Freeman and AAU coach of Team Takeover
National Collegiate Athletic Association

February 7, 2020 SJM:kde
NCAA - 1
Page No. 1
From: McDonald, Scott

To: Glazier, Mike
Cc: Duff, Taylore
Subject: RE: NC State - submissions; NOI, contact info.
Date: Friday, August 24, 2018 9:40:31 AM
Mike,

Thank you for the update on each of the matters we discussed on August 20. I understand the issue
with the attachments, and will await that submission once the institution is able to resolve the
problem.

Just as an FYI. Since we have held off on providing the institution an original NOI, this would be the
original NOI call. I am not travelling the next three weeks, so I should be able to make most availability
work based upon the open windows you receive.

Thanks,
Scott

From: Glazier, Mike <GlazieM@bsk.com>
Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2018 4:18 PM
To: McDonald, Scott <smcdonald@ncaa.org>
Subject: NC State - submissions; NOI, contact info.

Scott:

Back on Aug. 20, you asked if we had submitted all materials in NC State’s possession that are
responsive to your June 4 records request. Rob Hoon and I have gone thru our records and I can report
that with the exception of request #4, we have submitted everything the University has that is
responsive. With regard to #4, the University gathered the emails responsive to that request some
time ago and sent them to counsel for the criminal matter (Cadwalader) to Bates stamp so we could
and forward to you . Cadwaleder has run into difficulty with the folders - the attachments (in the
thousands) were uncoupled from the sending emails when extracted from their native format –
Cadwalader’s tech support is working on resolving that issue. As soon as the problem is resolved, we
will get the emails, with attachments to you, and that will complete the University’s submissions.

With regard to the 6-month NOI update, Rob will get a couple of open windows on the Chancellor’s
calendar and we will schedule a time for a call so you can deliver the update verbally.

Finally, Carrie Doyle is going to reach out to HR to see if they have contact information for the 4 former
staff members you hope to interview. We do know that Jeff Dunlap has joined coach Gottfried at
CSUN.

Mike Glazier
Chair
Collegiate Sports Practice Group
D 913.234.4413
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Page No. 2
F 913.234.4401
C 913.484.4644
mglazier@bsk.com

Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC
7500 College Boulevard, Suite 910, Overland Park, KS, 66210
www.bsk.com

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1/14/2020 ESPN.com - Former NC State coach Mark Gottfried's attorneys question NCAA trying to import evidence Page No. 1
ESPN.com: Men's College Basketball [Print without images]
Wednesday, December 11, 2019
Former NC State coach Mark Gottfried's attorneys question NCAA

trying to import evidence
By Mark Schlabach
Former NC State coach Mark Gottfried's attorneys are questioning whether the NCAA's enforcement staff can
import evidence and testimony from recent federal criminal trials involving bribes and other corruption in
college basketball because the defendants' convictions are under appeal.
In a 41-page response to the NCAA notice of allegations that NC State received in July, Gottfried's attorneys
argued that new NCAA bylaws exclude evidence and testimony from court cases that are under appeal.
Much of the information included in the notices of allegations sent to NC State and Kansas derived from an
October 2018 federal criminal case in the Southern District of New York. A jury convicted former Adidas
executive James Gatto, Adidas consultant Merl Code and aspiring business manager Christian Dawkins on
conspiracy and fraud charges for their roles in a pay-for-play scheme to steer top recruits to Adidas-sponsored
schools, including Kansas, Louisville and NC State.
Each of the three defendants appealed his conviction.
The NCAA has alleged two Level I violations (the most serious) against the Wolfpack, including a failure to
monitor charge against Gottfried, who has since been hired at Cal State Northridge.
Former NC State assistant Orlando Early is accused of helping facilitate $40,000 from Adidas consultant T.J.
Gassnola to former Wolfpack star Dennis Smith Jr.'s father to ensure he enrolled at the school. Gassnola testified
during the criminal trial that he gave the money to Early, who said he was forwarding the money to Shawn
Farmer, Smith's former trainer, who was then supposed to give the money to Dennis Smith Sr.
In its response to the NCAA, NC State questioned whether Adidas was the source of the money, and if Early
delivered the cash to Farmer or Smith's father.
In August 2018, the NCAA adopted new bylaws that allowed its enforcement staff, committee on infractions and
independent resolution panels to rely on decisions and positions made by outside entities -- such as courts and
accrediting bodies -- and import the evidence used by those groups into the NCAA infractions process.
NCAA bylaw 19.7.8.3.1 reads: "Facts established by a decision or judgment of a court, agency, accrediting body,
or other administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction, which is not under appeal, or by a commission, or
similar review of comparable independence, authorized by a member institution or the institution's university
system's board of trustees and regardless of whether the facts are accepted by the institution or the institution's
university system's board of trustees, may be accepted as true in the infractions process in concluding whether an
institution or individual participating in the previous matter violated NCAA legislation. Evidence submitted and
positions taken in such a matter may be considered in the infractions process."
Because United States vs. Gatto, et al., is still under appeal, Gottfried's attorneys, Scott Tompsett of Kansas City,
Missouri, and Elliott Abrams of Raleigh, North Carolina, argued in their response to the NCAA that the
enforcement staff improperly imported evidence from the federal criminal trial.
"Because United States v. Gatto et al. is under appeal and has been under appeal since March 2019, it is not a
matter from which facts found may be accepted as true or evidence submitted may be considered 'in the
https://www.espn.com/espn/print?id=28275770&type=HeadlineNews&imagesPrint=off 1/3
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infractions process,'" the attorneys wrote. "Thus, not only is the Committee on Infractions prohibited from
considering any of the facts found or evidence submitted in the Gatto et al. matter, the enforcement staff [is] also
prohibited from considering any of the facts found or evidence submitted in Gatto et al. in determining whether
to issue a Notice of Allegations.
"Therefore, the Committee cannot import facts from or consider evidence submitted (or positions taken) in, the
matter of Gatto et al. Moreover, the allegations involving the alleged payment from Gassnola and Gottfried's
alleged failure to monitor Early's recruitment of Smith must be withdrawn because they are based on evidence
submitted in Gatto et al., and the enforcement staff was prohibited from relying on that evidence in determining
whether to bring allegations."
"The NCAA broke their own rule when they considered evidence from a court case on appeal and then relied on
that evidence to charge Mr. Gottfried with a Level I violation," Tompsett told ESPN. "They should withdraw the
allegation and let the court case run its course."
Gottfried's attorneys also criticized two NCAA executives for publicly commenting about the ongoing
investigations at NC State and other Division I programs.
In May 2019, Kevin Lennon, NCAA vice president of Division I governance, said, "Now that the court cases are
done, now we're in a position where you're likely to see notices of allegations going to institutions that have
violated NCAA rules, etc."
About a month later, Stan Wilcox, NCAA vice president for regulatory affairs, told CBS Sports that the NCAA
would charge head coaches in future notices of allegations for allegedly breaking NCAA rules.
"Those top coaches that were mentioned in the trials where the information shows what was being said was a
violation of NCAA rules, yes. They will be a part of these notices of allegations," Wilcox told CBS Sports.
"These public statements of prejudgment by the NCAA executive administration prior to a notice of allegations
being issued are virtually unprecedented in an NCAA infractions case," Gottfried's attorneys wrote. "They are
unprecedented because it is improper for the NCAA executive administration to state publicly that a notice of
allegations is coming in a case in which information is still being gathered, reviewed and analyzed. It is
impossible now for Gottfried to get a fair hearing after the NCAA executive administration has prejudged and
told the public that rules have been violated, that there will be consequences, and that 'top coaches' are a part of
the violations."
Gottfried's attorneys argued that the NCAA was using its "awesome and untethered power to call him a cheater."
"In short, through the actions and public statements of its top officials, the NCAA has made clear that a decision
has already been made," the attorneys wrote. "Such a decision was made well before any facts have been found
at an infractions hearing, and well before Gottfried had an opportunity to challenge those facts or any related
allegations. Indeed, the NCAA's prejudicial public statements were made not only before Gottfried received the
notice of allegations, but before the NCAA's investigation had concluded."
The NCAA did not immediately respond for comment.
In May, a jury convicted Code and Dawkins in a separate federal criminal case for their roles in bribing assistant
coaches to influence their players to sign with Dawkins' new sports management company and certain financial
advisers once they turned pro.
Code and Dawkins have appealed those convictions as well.
Three former assistant coaches -- USC's Tony Bland, Oklahoma State's Lamont Evans and Arizona's Emanuel
"Book" Richardson -- each pleaded guilty to one felony count of conspiracy to commit bribery.
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Oklahoma State announced in November that it had received an NCAA notice of allegations, which included a
Level I unethical conduct charge against Evans.
Arizona and USC officials have indicated in court records that there are ongoing NCAA investigations into their
men's basketball programs.

NCSU Response

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RESPONSE OF NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY

DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS’

PETITION TO REFER CASE NO. 00935

TO THE INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY RESOLUTION STRUCTURE

Mike Glazier Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC

Response to Referral Petition, Case No. 00935

Case History and Background ......................................................................................... 1

A. Remaining before the COI would likely prejudice NC State ................................. 2

Commitment to Cooperation ........................................................................................... 6

CASE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

THE REFERRAL PETITION AND THE INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY RESOLUTION

A. Remaining before the COI would likely prejudice NC State.

-2- 39817.1 4/8/2020

(a) The COI’s incorrect application of the importation bylaw

-3- 39817.1 4/8/2020

(b) The COI’s improper interpretive ruling.

In addition to making a ruling on a procedural argument in the Referral Petition related to

2. There remains one single subpart of an NCAA allegation at issue – an alleged

-4- 39817.1 4/8/2020

1. An appellate body is a necessary check particularly when any entity is attempting to

-5- 39817.1 4/8/2020

2. Fundamental fairness includes both fairness of procedures and timely resolution.

-6- 39817.1 4/8/2020

-7- 39817.1 4/8/2020

Response to Referral Petition, Case No. 00935

Exhibit 1 Rice Commission Report, April 2018

Exhibit 2 NCAA Notice of Allegations

Exhibit 3 Committee on Infractions Stay of All SDNY Cases

Exhibit 4 Committee on Infractions Lift of Stay

Exhibit 5 NC State Response to Notice of Allegations

Exhibit 6 Committee on Infractions Proposed Hearing Date

Exhibit 7 Enforcement Written Reply

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 1

The Independent Commission on College Basketball was established on October

In brief, it is the overwhelming assessment of the Commission that the state of

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 1

The Commission believes that the answer to many of college basketball’s

College basketball, like college sports generally, is to be played by student-

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 2

To this end, the Commission makes a number of recommendations set forth

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Separate The Collegiate Track From The Professional Track By Ending

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 3

The Commission is concerned about one unintended consequence of ending

B. Allow Student-Athletes To Test Their Professional Prospects And

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 4

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 5

We understand that the NCAA’s Transfer Working Group is currently considering

In sum, student-athletes should have more information about their professional

C. Permit Students To Receive Meaningful Assessment of Professional

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 6

As described below, in its specific recommendations about non-scholastic

D. Provide Resources To Make The Promise of A College Education

The Commission recommends that the NCAA immediately establish a substantial

Many NCAA member institutions already provide Degree Completion Programs.

The NCAA is frequently criticized for not permitting payment to student-athletes,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 7

If a college or university is using a student-athlete’s NIL for commercial purposes,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 8

Establish Professional Neutral Investigation and Adjudication of Serious

A. Implement Independent Investigation and Adjudication of Complex

The Commission recommends that the NCAA create independent investigative

The NCAA’s investigative and enforcement processes require a complete overhaul.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL 9