Negus Negast: Ethiopian Triumph in the First

Italo-Ethiopian War

Matt Fitzsimmons
MH540
Dr. Kenneth Swope
13 August 2017
 The Ethiopian victory over the Italians on 1 March 1896 at Adwa shocked the

world, especially Italy’s fellow European powers. Many military historians consider the

Battle of Adwa one of the most significant battles in world history as the destruction of

the Italian army and the sight of thousands of Italian prisoners at the mercy of the

Ethiopians seemed to dispel deeply racist views held by many Europeans regarding the

intellect and strength of Africans and cemented Ethiopia’s place in history as one of the

only states during the Age of New Imperialism to resist the European conquest. This

composition will argue that the Ethiopians were successful at Adwa because they had

superior military and political leadership, a well-equipped army, and a proud,

nationalistic, and united state to back them up. All three factors, plus the ineptitude of the

Italians during the First Italo-Ethiopian War, proved instrumental in the Ethiopian victory

at Adwa.

The leadership of Tewodros II (reign, 1855-1868), Yohannis IV (r. (1868-1889),

and Menelik II (r. 1889-1916) were possibly the biggest factor in the creation of the

victory at Adwa. John Dunn makes an apt description of each emperor’s capabilities by

writing that, “With broad strokes, one might identify Tewodros as innovator, Yohannis as

master tactician, and Menelik as grand strategist.”1 Before the reign of Tewodros,

Ethiopia was engulfed in nearly a century of endemic warfare, anarchy, and misery

known as the Zamana Masafent, or the Age of the Princes where the royal family was

nothing more than figureheads while regional lords held the true power.2 Born Kassa

Hailuin in the borderlands region of Kwara in 1818 in western Ethiopia, Tewodros rose

from his position as a shifta (bandit) chief by marrying Tewabetch, granddaughter of the
                                                                                                               
1
John Dunn, “’For God, Emperor, and Country!’ The Evolution of Ethiopia’s Nineteenth-Century Army,”
in War in History 1, no. 3 (1994): 279.
2
Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkley: University of California Press, 2002), 47
empress, in 1846 and creating an army equipped with modern weapons.3 Although he

was supposedly under the command of the imperial family, by 1855, he defeated his

major rivals and courted the others into his retinue and army. On 11 February 1855,

Abuna Salama, leader of the Ethiopian Church, crowed Kassa Tewodros II.4 As emperor

and innovator, Tewodros sought to create a great Ethiopian empire and policies to

improve the lives of the people and to outfit his armies with modern weapons. For

example, he moved towards salaried troops trained as a modern army with the latest

weapons.5 Tewodros also began to reach out to foreign states in Europe where he

resolved to establish a relationship between them as equals and seek their technical help

in creating a modern Ethiopian state, something the leaders during the Age of the Princes

didn’t attempt.6 Tewordros’s reign was the start of the modernization of the army through

employing European technical advisors, craftsmen, and armaments experts.7

As a deeply religious man, Tewodros believed that he was chosen by God to

create a great Christian empire and even corresponded with Queen Victoria of the United

Kingdom to create a great alliance to rid Ethiopia of its Muslim neighbors and influences,

such as Egypt. The English consul, Walter Plowden, gushed over the potential of

Tewodros in bringing his country away from the night of backwardness into the

illuminating light of Christian civilization and encouraged the thought of a Christian

                                                                                                               
3
Ibid., 60-2.
4
Raymond Jones, The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press), 14.
5
R.A. Caulk, “Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia c. 1850-1935,” in The International
Journal of African Historical Studies 11, no. 3 (1978): 46,
http://www.jstor.org.library.norwich.edu/stable/217313
6
Donald Crummey, “Tewodros as Reformer and Modernizer,” in The Journal of African History 10, no. 3
(1969): 462, http://www.jstor.org/stable/179677
7
Marcus, A History, 69; Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence, 4th ed. (Hollywood, CA:
Tsehai Publishers, 2003), 179.
alliance between Great Britain and Ethiopia.8 This development is important not because

of the potential alliance with a European power, but because Tewodros saw his Ethiopia

as a nation equal to whatever Europe had, a new beacon of civilization against Islam.

However, despite his forward thinking policies, Tewodros never enjoyed the love

or affection of his people and especially his nobles who continually rose up against him.

Tewodros II spent most of his reign moving from one area to another, pacifying

rebellions and looting the surrounding areas to pay for his army. Instead of using more

political tact or diplomacy, Tewodros solved most of his problems with force. Soon, the

destruction caused by his army made him extremely unpopular, especially in the northern

provinces where a famine caused by the devastation of the Zamana Masafent was made

worse by Tewodros’s destruction of crops and goods belonging to the rebellious

factions.9 The use of force alienated the people and nobles who would not support an

emperor whose paranoid and seemingly insane personality doomed any hope of pushing

modernizing policies.10 Even his own army was not immune to his madness. As one

Englishman describes it, “His immense army soon suffered severely from this mode of

warfare. Each year the provinces which the soldiers could plunder became fewer; severe

famines broke out…The soldiers, formerly papered, now in their turn half starved and

badly clad, lost confidence in their leader.”11

Tewodros II met his end in 1868 by his own hand when he infuriated the British

after jailing some of their minor diplomats in a bid to gain the attention of the Queen to

his increasingly frantic pleas for help in defeating Islam. The British dispatched a strike

                                                                                                               
8
Jones, 14.
9
Marcus, A History, 70
10
Crummey, 463.
11
Henry Blanc, A Narrative of Captivity in Abyssinia (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1868), 7. Retrieved
from https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hxg4x7;view=1up;seq=14.
force under General Sir Robert Napier whose well-disciplined and armed soldiers proved

too much for Tewodros’s demoralized army. On Easter Sunday, 1868, Tewodros

committed suicide once the British stormed his position.12 Tewodros II met an ignoble

end in 1868, but he laid the foundation for the modern Ethiopian state by ending the

widespread anarchy of the Age of the Princes, bringing all of Ethiopia under one rule,

albeit a very strained one, and beginning the modernization process of the Ethiopian army

that would prove to be a critical factor in their later victory at Adwa.

The emperor who followed Tewodros II, Yohannis IV, improved upon the

modernization process of Ethiopia by cashing in on foreign aid, improving the

capabilities of the Ethiopian state, and arming the Ethiopian army with increasingly

modern weapons. Yohannis IV rose to power thanks to his role in the defeat of Tewodros

II at the hands of the British. As the most powerful politician in Tigray, one of the

northern provinces of Ethiopia and the traditional seat of Ethiopian royalty, he submitted

to Tewodros’s rule, but secretly plotted to take the throne for himself. When the British

sent their punitive expedition in the 1868, Dejazmach (Count) Kassa, as Yohannis was

known before he took the throne, helped the British by creating a secure path from the

coast through his territory while also providing them with supplies and goods.13 After

Tewodros’s defeat, the British rewarded Kassa by giving him modern weapons and

ammunition.14 His modern weapons gave him an immediate advantage over his other

rivals for the throne and four years later, Kassa was crowned Yohannis IV.15

                                                                                                               
12
Jones, 15-17.
13
Marcus, A History, 71; Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844-1913
(Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, Inc., 1995), 30-1.
14
Dunn, 287; R.A. Caulk, Firearms and Princely Power in Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century,” in The
Journal of African History 13, no. 3 (1972): 614, http://www.jstor.org/stable/180757
15
Marcus, A History, 72.
 Yohannis’s hold on power was stronger than Tewodros thanks to the power of his

army and political relationships, but still relied on the promises of fealty from his nobles.

However, these words of promise didn’t hold with many lords, including Negus (King)

Menelik of Shoa. Yohannis’s rule was marked by wars against Egypt from 1875-1884.

The commanders of the European-trained Egyptian forces thought they could easily

defeat the Ethiopians like they did in 1848 against Tewodros II. However, that defeat was

the catalyst to improving the army begun by Tewodros and continued by Yohannis and

Menelik. Under Yohannis, the Ethiopians overwhelmed the Egyptians at Gundet and

Gura in 1875 and 1876, respectively.16 A respect for the power of firearms introduced

new tactics for the Ethiopians than simply rushing forward in a straight shock charge,

another product of the defeat in 1848. Ethiopian tactics focused on turning the flanks of

the enemy while keeping the middle in reserve. Once the enemy was in disarray, the

center struck and completed the victory.17 At Gundet in 1875, the Ethiopians attacked the

Egyptian vanguard, encircled them, and destroyed them in less than thirty minutes.

Moving on to the main Egyptian column, the Ethiopians used the same tactics and

defeated the Egyptian main force, albeit at the cost of 900 casualties.18 Augustus B.

Wylde, a frequent visitor of Ethiopia, describes the aftermath: “The defeat of the

Egyptians was perfect; they left everything the brought with them behind – commissariat,

ordinance, treasure-chest, rifles and side arms of the soldiers.”19

Not only did tactics improve, but also Yohannis worked on improving the morale

and patriotism of his fellow Ethiopians. He presented the Egyptians as enemies of

                                                                                                               
16
Marcus, A History, 74-5.
17
Dunn, 284.
18
Ibid., 294.
19
Augustus B. Wylde, ’83 to ’87 in the Soudan (London: Remington & Co., 1888; New York: Negro
Universities Press, 1969), 330.
Ethiopia and Christendom, which encouraged more soldiers to fight. With the help of

Abuna Atenatewos, leader of the Ethiopian Church, Yohannis raised quickly raised a

large force to fight the Egyptians at Gundet. Under Yohannis, the patriotism and morale

of the Ethiopian soldier increased and laid the foundation for the emperor to come after

him, Menelik II. Sadly, although he did much to improve the state and the army while he

was emperor, Yohannis suffered from the same problems as Tewodros: unruly and

disloyal lords, the biggest of which was Menelik of Shoa. Despite solidifying his status as

emperor and acquiring vast stores of modern arms and munitions from the Egyptians,

Menelik still refused to acknowledge Yohannis as emperor. Menelik had even schemed

with the Egyptians to help bring him to power after Yohannis became emperor.20

However, the Egyptian defeats in 1875 and 1876 drew the ire of Yohannis onto

Menelik. With a large and well-armed army in front of him and domestic disarray in Shoa

itself, Menelik submitted to his emperor on 1878. Yohannis had reunited his empire and

proclaimed, “Only today am I…Emperor.”21 Yohannis, though, still could not keep his

nobles in check, not even Menelik who conspired with the French and Italians to obtain

more modern arms to fight Yohannis. In March 1889, while fighting against Muslim

invaders from the Sudan, Yohannis fell mortally wounded and died after naming his son

Dejzamach Mengesha as his heir. Yohannis IV continued the work of Tewodros II and

contributed to the modernization of the Ethiopian army. He not only kept the Ethiopian

Empire together after Tewodros’s death when it easily could have slipped back into civil

war again, but strengthened it by modernizing the army.

                                                                                                               
20
Marcus, Menelik, 38-9.
21
Ibid., 56
 Menelik II was the main force behind the victory of Adwa and Ethiopia’s greatest

emperor. As negus negast (emperor), Menelik enacted policies that improved the army,

the state, and Ethiopia’s world prestige. Menelik grew up under Tewodros who took him

hostage after Tewodros defeated and killed Menelik’s father and took the Kingdom of

Shoa in 1855. Despite being a hostage, Menelik enjoyed the full benefits of being a royal

son. He was part of Tewodros’s retinue, learned about war and horsemanship, was given

a court education, and was exposed to administration and politics at the highest level,

which would help him later on in his life.22 As a member of Tewodros’s court, Menelik

observed what Tewodros did and learned from his mistakes. One of the lessons he

learned was that of religious tolerance. Tewodros’s obsession with the external Muslim

threat prompted him to persecute the Muslims already within the Ethiopian Empire, such

as the Oromo people. Menelik saw the damage done by this intolerance and when he

returned to Shoa, he established religious tolerance for all Shoans.23 Menelik learned

much from his time under Tewodros whom he considered a father figure.

In 1865, Menelik escaped from the royal capital, took back his birthright, and

immediately set about strengthening Shoa militarily and economically. He built up his

forces and began an expansion program that saw the Kingdom of Shoa grow into an

empire. Even when he submitted to Yohannis in 1878, Menelik continued to expand his

empire. Thanks to the massive tribute Menelik had to pay to Yohannis after his

submission, Shoan expansion was tolerated and even encouraged by the emperor,

although he still kept a wary eye on the ambitious negus to the south. In late 1868, he

began a lengthy pacification of the province of Wollo directly north of Shoa, which

                                                                                                               
22
Ibid., 23.
23
Ibid., 27.
ended in 1876 with his installment of Imam Mahammed Ali (later Ras Mikael) as

governor.24 Ras Mikael proved to be one of Menelik’s staunchest supporters and his

public support showed once again the positive result of religious tolerance. To the south,

Menelik once again used his Muslim allies in the form of Dajazmatch (later Ras) Gobana

to help pacify the provinces there, and although they would remain a constant problem

until 1898, provided a much-needed boost in taxes and commercial goods to sell to the

Europeans.25. Menelik also supported the governorship of Ras Welo Betul of Yeju who

also became a staunch Menelik supporter and whose sister Taytu Betul became Menelik’s

wife.

Menelik’s need for modern arms to fight Yohannis also pushed him to establish

favorable economic relations with the Europeans. In 1883, he established a trading

contract with the Italians that allowed him access to the port at Assab where he received a

generous amount of weapons, ammunition, and other essential military equipment.26 At

the same time, the French port at Obok on the Gulf of Tajura became fully operational

and allowed Menelik to also receive arms and technicians.27 These two ports bypassed

Yohannis’s territory and the main port of Massawa in the north, which was controlled by

the Egyptians at the time and gave Menelik direct access to the arms and money

necessary to keep his army strong. By expanding his kingdom and opening up trade and

commerce with the European powers, Menelik was able to outfit a large part of his army

with modern weapons and artillery, which would prove decisive in the wars to come. The

                                                                                                               
24
Ibid., 35, 40.
25
Caulk, “Firearms,” 620; Marcus, Menelik, 64.
26
Ibid., 63.
27
Ibid., 45.
rearmament not only prepared Menelik for the future war against Italy, but also kept him

in the running for emperor once Yohannis IV died in 1889.

Menelik showed a gift for political, diplomatic, and military strategy that the

previous two emperors didn’t posses. For example, Menelik knew when to be harsh in

punishment and when to be merciful. After Menelik secured the throne in 1889, he

pardoned and forgave Ras Mengesha and his general, Ras Alula in 1894 after a period of

rebellion.28 These two became generals in Menelik’s army during the war against Italy. In

1895, he led a campaign against the Welayta, a Muslim people whom he defeated handily

and looted their possessions and wealth, but also showed mercy to their negus, Tona and

let him continue to rule his lands and pay Menelik through annual tribute.29 These acts of

mercy showed both wisdom and compassion, increasing his popularity with his people at

home and abroad.

He showed off his political genius by marrying Taytu Betul of Yeju in 1883.

Taytu was a politically savvy, powerful landowner from the northern province of Tigray,

and the sister of Ras Welo Betul, another powerful noble from the province of Yeju who

became one of Menelik’s staunchest allies.30 By marrying her, Menelik solidified his

position as emperor in the northern provinces and gained a valuable ally. Menelik’s core

group of supporters like Taytu, Ras Welo, Ras Mikael, and others gave Menelik the solid

political backing he needed to keep the empire together. Menelik’s program of religious

tolerance for Muslims in Ethiopia also showed off his diplomatic and strategic thinking.

By pushing into the southern regions, Menelik began to integrate the Muslim Oromo

                                                                                                               
28
Haggai Erlich, Ras Alula and the Scramble for Africa (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1996), 183,
186.
29
Jones, 50-1.
30
Jones, 21.
people and other typical outsiders often ignored by the rulers to the north.31 He also

placed Muslim rulers like Ras Gobana as governors so not to antagonize the people and

ease them into the increasing powerful Shoan Kingdom. Menelik not only showed his

benevolence and tolerance for the traditional enemy of Christian Ethiopia, but also began

to ferment nationalistic feelings and behavior in the people by assimilating them to

Ethiopian culture and language.32

In the realm of diplomacy, Menelik also made larger strides than his processors.

He established a strong relationship with France, Italy, and Russia who wanted to protect

the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia. Menelik used the rivalries between the different foreign

powers to his benefit. For example, aware that the Berlin Conference in 1885 forbade the

export of weapons to Africa, Menelik circumvented this through signing the Brussels

Anti-Slavery Act in 1890, which exempted its members from this ban.33 The main import

was firearms and Menelik did everything he could to acquire them. Menelik made sure

that Ethiopia was always seen in a positive light and made efforts to hide any signs of

“barbarity,” which included slavery. Thanks to his numerous meetings with the

Europeans, Menelik’s diplomatic and strategic grasp of the international situation

allowed him to keep Ethiopia strong and independent.

Menelik was not perfect, however, and made several mistakes throughout his

career as a leader that could have doomed him. For example, he often overplayed his

hand against Yohannis as Negus of Shoa and was only saved from complete destruction

in 1878 thanks to the reluctance of Yohannis to fight on Shoan territory and the

involvement of the Church. Despite Menelik’s efforts to improve the image of Ethiopia
                                                                                                               
31
Marcus, A History, 79.
32
Ibid.
33
Dunn, 297.
on the world stage, Ethiopian military campaigns were often brutal and created the image

of the brutal and savage Ethiopian. In his campaign against the Welayta, the description

of the fighting by Jean Gaston Vanderheym hurt Menelik’s global reputation, a

potentially fatal move on the eve of the war with Italy.34 The treatment of both the Italian

prisoners and their African auxiliaries after the Battle of Adwa hurt the Ethiopian image

and contributed to Italy’s desire to avenge their loss later in 1935.35

The leaders under Menelik II were a major component to the victory over the

Italians. The Ras and Dajazmatch leaders helped raise armies, advised the emperor, and

carried out the tactical battle plan as the emperor conducted strategy. The two most

important leaders in Menelik’s army were Ras Makonnen and Ras Alula. Ras Makonnen,

Menelik’s cousin, a sophisticated Ethiopian noble and Ras Alula, a fierce Ethiopian

patriot from the northern province of Tigray, gave Menelik strong leadership in critical

areas. Makonnen was in charge of the important trading town of Harrar in the east as well

as a trusted advisor in foreign affairs36 while Ras Alula helped unite the northern

provinces behind Menelik. Although Ras Alula was the right hand of Yohannis IV,

Menelik forgave him in 1894 and Alulua pledge his loyalty to him alone.37 Ras Alula

proved to be a great general for Menelik during the First Italo-Ethiopian War due to his

knowledge of the land and his presence as a fierce anti-Italian patriot, which raised the

morale of the soldiers fighting at Adwa.38 Ras Makonnen led the vanguard and was victor

of Amba Algae, the first Ethiopian victory of the war. Both leaders became loyal and

steadfast figures for Menelik and just a small example of the leaders gathered under

                                                                                                               
34
Jones, 51.
35
Ibid., 236-7.
36
Ibid., 74, 82.
37
Erlich, 187.
38
Ibid., 192.
Menelik. These leaders became just as important as the emperor because they were able

to bring Ethiopia together under one rule.

The creation of a unified Ethiopia was not easy, but essential to the victory over

the Italians at Adwa. The Age of the Princes stopped any chance of forming a nation-state

due to the incessant warfare. The development of a state and patriotic feelings is

important because simply putting the latest gun in a soldier’s hand does not guarantee

victory. One must feel like they want to fight for their country and preserve it. While

Tewodros II and Yohannis IV laid down the foundation for the development of the state,

Menelik II was the one to utilize it when the Italians came. The development of Ethiopia

as a unified nation-state was a key development in the victory of Ethiopia over the

Italians.

Each emperor improved upon the modernization of the state. Tewodros began by

the aforementioned improvement of the army and ending the Zamana Masafent by

seeking to introduce a salaried and national army, limiting the power of Church, and

introducing a national language.39 His predatory and aggressive use of force, however,

stopped any hope of creating a unified state. After him, Yohannis established his power

over the nobles through the strength of his army, which was stronger than Tewodros’s,

but as seen in the rebellious attitude of Menelik, it wasn’t a successful style of

governance. Given time, Yohannis’ downfall probably would have come from Menelik

or another lord. Yohannis moved to make the Ethiopian state a more viable international

player. He continued to recruit foreign soldiers to help the train Ethiopian soldiers and he

managed to open up Ethiopian embassies in Aden and London. Although these did not

                                                                                                               
39
Rubenson, 172.
produce any significant diplomatic victories like he hoped, Yohannis continued to present

Ethiopia as a nation on par with other European nations.40

Under Menelik, the key issues of the Ethiopian divisions were put to rest or at

least contained for a time. The friendship and respect between Menelik and his

subordinate leaders like Ras Mikael of Wollo and Ras Gobana promoted the idea of

religious tolerance and helped improve relationships between the Muslim and Christian

population. During the war against Italy, Oromo cavalry played a significant role in

demoralizing the Italians and securing victory at Adwa. A key component to the

development of the state was the expansion of Shoa during Menelik’s rule. The

expansion campaigns created refugees in the southern parts of the Shoan Kingdom who

resettled in other parts of Ethiopia, leading to accelerated assimilation and the creation of

Ethiopian nation-state.41 Menelik helped destroy traditional barriers between the

Ethiopian people and united them under one banner, an essential step towards victory at

Adwa.

The army was the key component to the establishment of Ethiopian independence

and for winning at Adwa. The modernization of the Ethiopian army began with Tewodros

II and culminated into the army of 150,000 Menelik raised during the First Italian-

Ethiopian War.42 An important note to make is that the Ethiopian army did not fight in

the European fashion. The organization was still feudal with commanders of the

vanguard (fitwarai) and reserves (dejazmatch) although they had junior officer grades

going from commander of a ten-man unit (asiralke’a) to a thousand-man unit

                                                                                                               
40
Ibid., 277, 284.
41
Marcus, Menelik, 65.
42
Dunn, 280.
(shalek’a).43 Nor did they wear a uniform, most of the soldiers came wearing the same

clothing used in their normal lives. The men also supplied their own food, typically sun-

dried beef and grain, due to a lack of a competent supplu system.44

However, just because they didn’t wear uniforms or were not organized in

battalions and regiments didn’t mean that they were not trained. The Ethiopian warrior

caste was proud, bellicose, and experienced combat veterans thanks to the incessant

warfare either against each other or foreign invaders like the Egyptians. As a British

observer of the Egyptian army during their war with Ethiopia, Wylde lamented that

although the Egyptian soldier can be well drilled and trained, he did not have the requisite

will to fight and could not stomach battle; however, the Ethiopian soldier “loves fighting,

he loves…his rifle, his band.”45 Also, the increased deadliness and effectiveness of

firearms changed the tactics of the Ethiopians, who were used to crushing enemies

through shock charges, such as rushing in groups of warriors and laying down fire against

the enemy. Augustus Wylde describes one tactic used by Ethiopians to get in close with

soldiers: “They generally go in threes, fives, or sevens, with respectively either one, two,

or three of the rifles always loaded, so as to cover the men who are loading.”46 Those

armed with swords, shields, and other traditional weapons were placed in the center and

used as the shock troop of the army while cavalry mopping up resistance afterwards.

Tactical leadership by the leaders of the Ethiopian army, namely the Rases and

Dajazmatches, was usually superior when compared to the leadership of their foes. For

example, the poorly led Egyptians at Gundet and Gura were better armed and, at Gura,

                                                                                                               
43
Ibid., 282.
44
Ibid., 290.
45
Wylde, 111.
46
Ibid., 109.
usually held fortified positions, but Ethiopian leaders showed their mastery of different

tactics, exploited the terrain, and were often at the forefront or close to it leading their

men and providing leadership on hand.47 A testament of how powerful they were came

from Augustus Wylde who said in 1883, “I cannot say I should like to campaign in

Abyssinia with a united country for an enemy. I can see my way into the country, but not

out again.”48 Against a united army in 1896, the Italian army and their allies would find

truth in Wylde’s statement.

The improvement of the firearms capabilities of the Ethiopian army was a

significant step towards victory. Although nearly half the army that fought in the First

Italo-Ethiopian War was armed with traditional weapons such as swords, shields, and

spears, the other half possessed modern firearms and the training to use them. The

armament of the Ethiopian Army began with Tewodros. The Ethiopians were introduced

to guns in the 1540s, but it wasn’t until the middle nineteenth century when firearms

began to take on a whole new meaning.49 However, Ethiopia never developed the means

to manufacture modern weapons by themselves and had to rely on foreign imports and

technicians to help them modernize. Tewodros II even used Protestant missionaries to

start his manufacturing industry!50 Although previous kings and lords of Ethiopia brought

in Europeans to help them, Tewodros was the first to attempt a national industry and

bring in Europeans to teach Ethiopian technicians.

However, Tewodros’s destructive reign and toxic personality destroyed any hope

of creating an arms industry and Yohannis and Menelik solely relied on imports or

                                                                                                               
47
Ibid., 294
48
Wylde, 97.
49
Caulk, “Firearms,” 609
50
Richard Parkhurst, “Guns in Ethiopia,” in Transition 20 (1965): 28, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2934388
captured weapons from then on. For example, Yohannis’s victory in the Egyptian wars of

1875-84 resulted in the capture of over 20,000 Remington breech loading rifles, 25 to 30

artillery pieces, huge amount of ammunition, and other military supplies.51 Menelik’s

trade deals with the French and Italians allowed him to acquire a vast amount of modern

weapons; one Italian observer estimated that Menelik obtained, in one way or another,

over 25,000 breech-loading rifles between 1878 and 1886.52 By the time of the First Italo-

Ethiopian War, Menelik’s trade deals with the French and Italians as well as the previous

acquisitions through conquest and trade furnished the nearly half the Ethiopian with

modern Remingtons. The artillery arm of the Ethiopian army made leaps and bounds

thanks to Yohannis and Menelik. As mentioned above, Yohannis obtained modern

artillery pieces thanks to the Egyptians and used captured Egyptian gunners as well as

European trainers to teach a corps of Ethiopian artillerists.53 By the time of the war with

Italy, Menelik’s commanders and soldiers were well informed about the capabilities of

artillery, how to use it, and how to counter it. The Ethiopian army at the time of the Battle

of Adwa was equipped with the best modern weapons in the and could handle any army

that invaded Ethiopia.

However well trained and armed the Ethiopian army was, there were still flaws

the emperors struggled to overcome. The biggest flaw was the logistical support system,

or the lack therefore of. Typically, an Ethiopian army on campaign lived off the land of

the people, which was terrible during the Zamana Masafent, but increasingly problematic

afterwards when one was trying to unite the empire under one rule. As John Dunn writes,

“Except for its modern armament, an Ethiopian army on the march was but slightly
                                                                                                               
51
Ibid., 29.
52
Ibid., 30.
53
Dunn, 288.
removed from that of ancient Aksum…it probably made less than 10 miles per day when

going over rough terrain.”54 This slow moving, ravenous army of men and their camp

followers often devastated the food supplies and agriculture of whatever region they

traveled through. The emperors tried to stymie the incessant pillaging and foraging, but

their efforts were never very successful. Yohannis began a system of supply depots and

four mills in Tigray, which Menelik used to assuage some of the burden upon the

peasants during the Italo-Ethiopian War.55 Also, the emperor had the power to award land

for the soldiers who could either tend it themselves or use tenants. Known as gult

(inheritable land) or maderiya (temporary land), peasants provided for the soldiers

assigned to the land, making pillaging unnecessary.56 Still, the majority of the burden lay

with the peasants in the army’s path, whether they liked it or not. A part of the problem

was that there was no salaried position among the majority of the soldiers, so the soldiers

had to loot and pillage in order to get paid while the emperor and his leaders also receive

a tribute from the loot the soldier collect. The peasants resented the abuse of the

Ethiopian soldiers and wished that the army would leave as soon as they came. The

taking of supplies and the devastation of the crops caused resentment among the peasants

for Menelik and the Ethiopian army. The Ethiopian army, however flawed their logistical

system, was a well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped army capable of taking on any

European or foreign army.

The First Italo-Ethiopian War showcased these qualities that made Ethiopia great

and highlighted Italy’s deficiencies in these areas. Ethiopia’s problem with Italy began in

1884-5 when the Italians took over Egyptian Eritrea and, more importantly, the port of
                                                                                                               
54
Ibid., 290.
55
Dunn, 291.
56
Caulk, “Armies as Predators,” 467.
Massawa.57 The hand-over of the port was supposed to go to Ethiopia, but thanks to the

machinations of Great Britain, who wanted a European power in charge of the ports on

the Red Sea, Italy gained control of the port and fell into conflict with the Ethiopian

Empire and Yohannis IV. The Italians were newcomers to the imperial game, as they

only became a unified country in 1870, but her missionaries, trade dealers, and other

dignitaries had spent almost forty years in Ethiopia creating relationships amongst the

lords like Menelik.58 The Scramble for Africa created a thirst for a new Roman Empire

where the Italians could bring civilization to the “barbarians” of Africa; they saw their

fortune in Ethiopia, the only unclaimed territory in Africa. The man to lead this effort

was the Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi longed for his country, that he always

called “my Italy,” to become a great colonial empire and sought to undermine Yohannis’s

authority from within. 59

Ironically, Italy’s relationship with Menelik encouraged their operations in

Ethiopia because they thought they had a willing puppet in Menelik once Yohannis died

or was disposed. As such, they helped supply Menelik with modern weapons, and

engaged in trade deals with him in hopes that he would be on their side when the

confrontation with Yohannis began.60 After Yohannis died in 1889, Menelik ascended the

throne and worked out a treaty with the Italians to stop their advancements into Ethiopia.

The Treaty of Wichale, signed on 2 May 1889, was one of the main catalysts for the First

                                                                                                               
57
Dunn, 295.
58
Robert L. Hess, “Italian Imperialism in Its Ethiopian Context,” in The International Journal of African
Historical Studies 6, no. 1 (1973): 95, http://www.jstor.org/stable/216975
59
Theodore M. Vestal, “Reflections on the Battle of Adwa and Its Significance for Today,” in The Battle of
Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia’s Historic Victory Against European Colonialism, ed. Paulos Milkias &
Getachew Metaferia (New York: Algora Publishing), 24.
60
Jones, 70.
Italo-Ethiopian War thanks to Article XVII.61 Written in both Amharic and Italian,

Article XVII seemed to state two different things: in Amharic, it guaranteed Ethiopian

independence and said that the Italians should be consulted first before taking any serious

foreign measures. In the Italian version, however, it stated that the Ethiopians must

confirm with the Italian before making any diplomatic or military moves, essentially

making Ethiopia the protectorate of Italy.62 Once the discrepancy became apparent to

Menelik, he protested vehemently, but the Italians refused to budge and began to

reinforce their army in Eritrea.63 Menelik saw that conflict with Italy was inevitable and

mobilized his forces. He showed off his diplomatic skills by playing the European powers

off one another, such as using France to supply him with weapons when the Italians

stopped their trade deals with him.64 He also sent out his European agents like the Swede

Alfred Ilg to help rally support for the Ethiopian state and acquire more modern firearms

and other supplies for them.65

When the Italians invaded Ethiopian territory in Tigray in 1895, Menelik issued

his mobilization order to protect sacred Ethiopian ground from the foreign invaders. His

mobilization order on 17 September 1895 showed how successful the efforts of the

emperors to create a modern, patriotic state had been as over 100,000 answered the first

call to arms and eventually more than 150,000 soldiers would serve in Menelik’s army.66

Menelik’s web of political and military support at home confirmed his mastery of the

political situation. Menelik’s relationships were not all the same as he relied on love, fear,
                                                                                                               
61
Ibid., 73.
62
Marcus, A History, 89;
63
F. Ernest Work, “Italo-Ethiopian Relations,” in The Journal of Negro History 20, no. 4 (1935): 440,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2714261
64
Robert Gale Woolbert, “Italy in Abyssinia,” in Foreign Affairs 13, no. 3 (1935): 499,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20030687
65
Jones, 13.
66
Marcus, A History, 96; Dunn, 280,
blood, and wealth to keep his empire together, but when the call came, rivals and friends

answered the call. The threat of the European invasion also rallied support for his cause,

uniting his people from every corner of Ethiopia.67 Menelik’s efforts in rallying his

people and creating a modern, unified state pay dividends when threatened by Italian

invasion.

The campaign of Menelik II during the First Italo-Ethiopian War showed off his

military skill, as well as how weak the Italians grasp of the situation was. The first battles

of the war were defeats for the Ethiopians under Ras Mengesha in January 189568, but

these battles actually hurt the Italians in the end. Although Menelik forgave him after he

submitted in 1894, Mengesha still harbored dreams of taking the throne from Menelik.

By defeating him, the Italians forced Mengesha into Menelik’s corner and deprived the

Italians of a potential ally with a serious claim to the throne and the potential to divide the

Ethiopians.69 The Italians also became overconfident and overextended their forces,

leading to their defeat at Alba Algae on 7 December 1895, as Ras Makonnen and his

40,000 men overwhelmed them.70 The number of Ethiopian soldiers shocked the Italians,

who thought that Menelik could muster only a force of maybe 40,000 men total. The

victory at Alba Algae was the first inkling that the Ethiopians were a much more

dangerous and numerous opponent than previously thought. At the next battle at the

fortress of Mekele, the Ethiopians suffered a tactical defeat due to their inability to take

the fortress, but won a strategic victory when the Italian forces surrendered due to lack of

provisions and ammunition. Instead of massacring the Italian prisoners or mistreating

                                                                                                               
67
Vestal, 25.
68
Jones, 103.
69
Ibid., 104
70
Ibid., 130.
them, Menelik promised to “escort “ them to the Italian front line at Sauria.71 Menelik

used the Italians as a screen to pass the fortified town of Agridat and moved closer to

Italy’s base of power, Eretria. Menelik also appeared as the wise and noble statesman for

taking care of the Italian prisoners and scored points with the international community.

While Menelik was winning victories at Alba Algae, the Italian colonial army and

government continued to make strategic mistakes. Even though the Italian press tried to

pass Alba Algae off as a heroic last stand, it highlighted the deficiencies within the Italian

army and government, namely the underestimation of Menelik and Ethiopia. The

commanding general of the Italian army, Oreste Baratieri, once confronted with the size

and scale of Menelik’s army, kept a strong defensive position at Sauria and conspired to

keep his position there. However, Menelik’s victory at Alba Algae and his stroke of

strategic genius at Mekele put immense pressure on Baratieri to win a decisive victory to

avenge Italy’s honor.72 For Menelik, he could wish for nothing more as his larger army

could only be stopped by fortifications like at Mekele. When Menelik’s army moved

south to Adwa, Baratieri strived to catch them unawares with a night march to give battle

the next day. However, during the march, Baratieri’s plan fell apart as the brigades

became separated from one another. When daylight broke on 1 March 1896, the

miscommunication created several gaps between the Italian brigades. The Ethiopians

exploited the gap between the brigades in the center, surrounded each of the brigades, and

defeated them. Thoroughly devastated and with mounting international pressure to stop

the war, Italy retreated to Eretria and renounced their claim of “protectorate” over

Ethiopia, paying an indemnity of five million dollars in gold. Although allowed to stay in

                                                                                                               
71
Ibid., 146-7.
72
Vestal, 27.
Eretria, the Italians defeat was total and embarrassing.73 Ethiopia’s advantages in

leadership, state, and army led to the stunning victory over the Italians at Adwa and

guaranteed Ethiopian independence in the age of empires.

The leadership of the Ethiopian emperors, the creation of a united Ethiopian state,

and the creation of a modern army capable of defeating the Italians at Adwa were key to

the victory in the First Italo-Ethiopian War. Ethiopia overcame many differences and

obstacles both within and without the empire to emerge into the twentieth century as the

only free and independent African nation-state in the world. However, the thirst for

vengeance created by the humiliation of Adwa, among other factors, saw the rise of

Fascist Italy and Benito Mussolini. In 1935, he came back to Ethiopia with an army

armed with tanks, airplanes, poison gas, and other modern military technology. Sadly, the

Ethiopian army had not kept up with the modern trends of warfare and still fought like

they did in 1896. The Italians easily defeated the Ethiopians and extended their colony of

Eretria to include all of Ethiopia. However, the defeat of the Ethiopians in 1935 does not

erase the magnificence of their victory in 1896, for the Ethiopians proved that an African

nation-state can defeat those from Europe if properly led, trained, and motivated to

defend their freedom.

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