PROOF WE ARE ILLEGALLY RULED BY CRMINALS USING FRAUD - Case Law

HISTORIC SUPREME COURT DECISIONS -
HTTPS://WWW.LAW.CORNELL.EDU/SUPCT/CASES/TOPIC.HTM
ENJOY THE PROFOUND TRUTH HEREIN - DISCLAIMER + DISCLAIMER ON THE LAST PAGE
Nothing herein is intended to be legal advice or to incite anyone to break the Law only to the contrary: Everything herein is for education.
Remember the following 'main objects' of this book, which are also "defenses" to help free Americans injuring no one:
1. Penal statutes of government never cite and apply to We the 'people'. Most Americans are wholly ignorant of the Law and conform.
2. The Constitutions still exist but the governments are outside the Constitution = overthrown = Void. In their stead a counterfeit System.
The Truth makes everything else a lie. If they rule in Truth we win. To rule over us our servants "pretend the People are not the People."
Praise God for our remedy: the Truth of the Law secures us total immunity from illegal government control: illegal jurisdiction is void.
Jurors shall know the Truth: We injured no one and live in the Land of the Free with 'sovereign immunity: our right to be let alone.'
The profound court cases herein are the Truth: "it's the Law!" that can free people from today's ruse: the servants pretend we are not
the 'People' and instead a 'person' vastly inferior to government, and not in Order to form a more perfect Union to secure our all.
USE THIS BOOK TO EMPOWER THE PEOPLE + PROVE WE ARE ILLEGALLY RULED BY CRMINALS USING FRAUD TO STEAL = FELONY CRIMES
The profound court cases in this study manual prove why mere statutes of government never cite and apply to the 'people'; and how
government servants pretend we are their slaves after they defraud us into signing misleading government 'Forms and Applications'
swearing we are a vastly inferior status (not the People) in a 'counterfeit System' of government acting outside the Constitution =
unlawful authority = illegal and void as no law; and contrary to the true intent of the People: the creators of government intended to
secure our all. You 'cannot get a fair trial': they do everything they can to 'refuse to ascertain the Truth' it's all illegal, while they play
their game: Mathew 3:28 'Even so you also outwardly appear righteous to men, but inside you are full of hypocrisy and lawlessness.'
INTRO TO THE 'WAR ON AMERICANS' - 'THE ART OF CONQUERING AT HOME' VIA ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT DECEPTION TO STEAL = CRIMES
We are faced with a fraud that is so monstrous those who are ignorant of the Law can't believe it exists. David Colton.
A conspiracy proved is hardly a theory and undeniable since 'government wrote it': laws and court cases. This book proves 'laws of
government' our 'artificial creature' never cite and apply to We the 'people', plus the 'just' powers of government are derived from the
'consent of even the governed.' So government pretends to bait and switch us from 'sovereigns to slaves' by using misleading 'Forms
and Applications' to pick our pockets, but that's illegal and void. You will see government is 'of' the people, the people are not 'of'
government a mere 'artificial creature' of our Law, so our servants have "no 'legal right' over" the people, the 'supreme power' and
Creators of government. To be 'subject' to its jurisdiction our servants simply 'pretend we are not the People' and 'inferior' to it, as its
'creature.' They know all 'men' have unalienable rights but "artificial creatures of government" don't. We are ' ruled in reverse' by
criminals? Cumulatively our servants are by far the biggest Law breakers: illegally stealing by false witness. Praise God, He has not
allowed today’s corrupt System to be lawful; and the Law still secures our sovereign 'right to be let alone' = Total immunity from
(corrupt) government control. I object to Americans being betrayed, needlessly abused and subjected by illegal government deception
= crime. Rev. 18:4 … Come out of her my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins… I filed papers withdrawing my consent. I’m out!
CRIME BY GOVERNMENT = CRIME BY MEN AT WAR WITH THE TRUTH - EVINCES A DESIGN TO SUBJECT US BY ILLEGAL DECEPTION
Ruled in revere scam-opposite-contrary: 'In Law' we are sovereigns 'in practice' government pretends we are its slaves. 'In Law' courts and government obey the Law 'in practice' they don't.
Judge Hand said, 'Next to death or fatal illness the thing I fear most is being a litigant in our (corrupt) courts.' Use this book to prove
why judges and prosecutors etc. 'refuse to ascertain the Truth,' namely prove lawful jurisdiction over us and confess their 'System' is
100% outside the Constitution (yet going through all the motions as if it is the lawful government) = 100% private authority = Illegal
and void as no law because its against the true intent of the People. We the people are profoundly sovereigns, "the supreme power,
'source' and Creators of the Constitution (the Supreme Law of the Land: Art. VI), the Creators of government, and in Law a Creator is
superior to its creature. To try to circumvent our profound supremacy, the servants use illegal deception to subject us because they
know all fraud; and jurisdiction outside the Constitution, depriving anyone of anything is illegal and void. Today’s super abusive Code
'System' of government is 100% Federal, outside the Constitution and outrageously ruling us through " private companies-for profit
corporations" deceptively called courts, police, troopers, IRS, etc. (search any government agency on Dunn & Bradstreet). "It's the
System NEO": composed of non-sovereigns = no sovereign right to govern = void. You will see the Law secures us 'sovereign immunity'
to statutes of our creature, therefore all jurisdiction = our right to be let alone = Liberty . The Truth of the Law is a perfect defense to
defeat our needless subjection. When jurors know the Truth, or the servants obey the Law we WIN! So, corrupt servants refuse to
'prove' they have lawful jurisdiction over us prescribed by Law and ascertain the Truth their counterfeit 'System of Federalism'
deceptively called "United States" is outside the Constitution = illegal-void. How can you ever trust deceivers? Liars have no credibility,
and you can never trust anything they say + actions speak louder than words + you know the tree by its fruit. After seeing the Truth
herein, you + jurors will know statutes of government never cite and apply to the People. Servants stop disobeying the Law. We object.
Under God, no one has any right to do any wrong to anyone. D. Colton. We injured no one, leave us alone. I withdraw my consent.
STUDY THIS BOOK UNTIL YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND IT! THE ONLY HOPE + OUR UNHINDERED RIGHT TO BE FREE
An enlightened citizenship is the only hope of a free government. No country that is steeped in ignorance can either
become or remain free. How can either retain their rights if they do not understand them? That requires continuous effort.
Otherwise the country will sink back to dictatorship and despotism and individual rights will be lost. Humans have sought
to restrict the rights of men. Wars have been fought and many men and women have lost their lives in the struggle upward
toward the plains of liberty. These wars have cost seas of blood, broken hearts, and billions of treasure. Our forefathers
wrung from the hands of a foreign tyranny the unhindered right to be free. But it is not enough to win liberty. It must be
maintained by 'eternal vigilance'; otherwise it will be lost. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS v. U.S., 180 F.Supp 379, 148
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(Court of Claims, 1960)(3). [Let there be Light! Keep the faith: In God We Trust! Not in man-government. ]
I rely on the Truth of the Law! We can't be ignorant of the Law if we and our children don't want to be slaves of men. Spread the Truth!
We have 2 peaceable choices: bend over and "submit or fight" their universe of lies with the invincible power of Truth. David Colton.
"…it does not require a majority to prevail, but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set brush fires in people's minds…" John Adams.
Witnesses with Videos: Demand televised grand jury investigations; indict the judges and prosecutors etc. who refuse to obey the
Constitution etc. Corrupt servants fear public debates because that will expose they are intentionally engaged in 'crime' against the people.
SUBJECT MATTER INDEX Page
Disclaimer. Illegal government scam converts us from sovereigns to slaves-taxpayers…………… 1
Index.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… .. 2
A taste of the truth of our profound sovereignty. Keys of Knowledge we should know .………….… 3-
Supreme Court interprets the true meaning of the Constitution and Laws… .………………………………… 5-
Government must obey the Law……………………………………………………………………………………………… .… 6
The Key: It's all about lawful jurisdiction……………………………………………………………………………………… .… 6-
Postulates are the keys-reasons that limit and control government's right of jurisdiction……… .… 8-
The Law applies to a "person" not to the sovereign "people"……………………………………………………… .… 11-
Government outside the Constitution with no sovereign right to govern.…………………………….… 13-
Sovereignty is the right to govern, tax, punish, and right of jurisdiction.
All jurisdiction implies superiority. The Order of things in Law………………………………………………….. 17-
Jurisdiction is derived "solely" from the Law of the Constitution of the People ..…………………………… 20-
Execution is the end of the Law...…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
Statutes must be "strictly" construed against government in favor of accused .…………………………… 24-
Government was intended to be perfect to secure our all in our more perfect Union………………. 31-
We the People are the 'source' of 'all' human government, power, law and jurisdiction ..…………..… 34-
The People are the Supreme power…………………………………………………………………………………………… .… 35-
A government of laws, creatures and servants of the People……………………………………………………… .… 37-
Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land. Our Supremacy is absolute..…………………………… . 39-
We the People are truly Sovereigns the supreme sovereign power….…………………………………………… . 43-
Creature cannot rule the Creator. An inferior cannot rule its Superior with its law..……………… 55-
Our Sovereign Immunity is guaranteed. Our Government creature is not sovereign…………………… 60-
Our servants have no lawful power to rob us of our Sovereign Birthright……………………………… .. 70-
Constitutional right to be let alone = Total immunity from (corrupt) government control…………… 81-
A citizen of the United States is not one of the supreme sovereign People……………………………… 84-
The United States vs. United States = the invisible prison outside the Constitution.
United States is a counterfeit government in D.C. acting outside the Constitution……………………… . 92-
'System of Federalism' = 100% Federal-U.S. outside the Constitution, administrative state… .. 119-
The Social Security number status scam. The pinnacle link to our stateless subjection……………… 124-
Federal Income Tax scam. A sovereign taxes its subject (Federal Social Sec. or employer #).
The word person scam. Federal legal terminology = other than human beings.
Substantive Regulations implement the statute if intended to affect the public…………………………… . 127-
Due Process of Law = Convicted of felony before deprived of life, liberty, property.
The Judiciary (Common Law judicial courts of record vs. executive branch COURTS of fact.……….. 176-
Unalienable right to fight. Servants violate the Law releases us from all obligation…………………… . 194-
Assistance of Counsel vs. Represented by an Attorney-member of the Bar Association………… .. 196-
Just powers of governed are derived from the consent of the governed…………………………………… 197-
Laws and government are void acting outside the Constitution since the Civil War………………… 199-
Right to bear arms. Our natural right of rebellion = right to fight………………………………………………… 205-
Declaration of Independence……………………………………………………………………………………………………… . 212-
Constitutions are to be interpreted by the very words and true intent of the People…………………… . 214-
Jury Nullification. Trial by Jury, the unjust GUESSING GAME……………………………………………… ..……… 219-
The Common Law of the Land is for subjects not sovereigns and based on the law of God………… . 225-
Commerce, Trade, Admiralty………………………………………………………………………………………………………….… . 239-
Out the reach of mere human if not injuring man + Right to be let alone………………………………… 247-
Government corruption is nothing new, age old conspiracies against the rights of men……………… . 253-
Oath to support and defend the Constitution. Servants take an Oath to their sovereign…………… 258-
SUPER GOOD: 1st Amendment right to expose government corruption and deception…………………. 260-
Ultimate goal of criminal Justice System is Truth; perfect Justice; Whole purpose of a trial is to
ascertain the Truth; In Law Fraud voids everything; application scam prescribed by law;
Overthrow of government is unlawful and void; Corrupt government is nothing new; etc.
I'm for the Law: We the People of the United States in Order to form a
more 'perfect' Union, establish Justice … (to) 'secure' the Blessings of Liberty… do ordain and establish this
Constitution for 'the United States of America.' (The Crown Jewel coveted by NWO. The Preamble is the true intent
of the supreme sovereign People. )
Justice by its very nature implies perfect justice via perfect Law pursuant to the Constitution free of fraud = the true intent of We the
people. Hence, the mandatory Oath of Office, and Oath to tell the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth, So help me God.
Imperfect law = imperfect government = imperfect justice = evil men using lawless usurpation to steal via Code = private law.
Make the world a better place with 0 tolerance for government fraud, disobeying the Law, and refusing to ascertain the Truth.
EXPOSE GOVERNMENT DECEPTION = OUR SERVANTS ARE ILLEGALLY SUBJECTING US AND OUTSIDE THE LAW TO STEAL
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Justice BLACKMUN (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Mr. Justice POWELL joins, concurring:
'The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the
Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free
and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a
free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant
lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.' Ibid. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING v. D.N.C. FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS, 412 U.S. 94 (1973)(2). [Expose their crimes by deception. Nazi's hung for crimes against man.]
To all whom these humble presents shall
come Greetings and God Bless you all:
THE INVINCIBLE POWER OF TRUTH
RELYING ON THE TRUTH OF THE LAW - A PERFECT DEFENSE
"The Absolute Defense of the Truth" Requiring our right to know the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth.
Citizen's arrest and Indictment charging our servants with fraud, obstruction of Justice, lawlessness, and illegally subjecting us.
I LOVE AMERICA - GOD BLESS AMERICA AND OUR HONEST SERVANTS - GOOD MUST CONQUER EVIL!
We the People in defiance of tyranny by criminals who dare call themselves government and abuse us outside the Constitution.
Degree of believability: The cases herein are authority that undeniably prove the servants are engaged in crime by government
deception via non full disclosure to our assent they are illegally subjecting us and outside the Law. I charge fraud, obstruction of
justice, and lawlessness = outside the Constitution = over throw of the government = illegal-void, against the true intent of the
People the profound source of the Law and Creators of government intending to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice…,
to secure the Blessings of Liberty. Anything contrary to perfection is 'lawless usurpation' in contempt of the Law and void.
IGNORANCE IS THE WEAPON - OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AIKENS, J. (Supreme Court of Vermont) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The doctrine that all powers are originally in the government, and that the people by their charters and their
constitutions have abridged and limited those powers, is fit only for those countries where the ignorance of the
people is the weapon by which lawless power maintains her throne. The axiom, that the sovereignty is in the
people, is a political truth, on which every free and rational government is founded. BATES v. KIMBALL, 2 D.Chip.
77 (1824)(1). [The whole world is governed by law. Are you suspicious why Americans are so ignorant of the Law? ]
HALLMARK OF TOTALITARIANISM IS SECRECY + FOUNDATION OF TYRANNY IS IGNORANCE - OF THE LAW
Our servants are engaged in crime so they have a lot to hide. We have the right to know the (whole) truth of the Law whatever it is.
FABE, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska) PER CURIAM:

The cornerstone of a democracy is the ability of its people to question, investigate and monitor the government. Free
access to public records is a central building block of our constitutional framework enabling citizen participation in
monitoring the machinations of the republic. Conversely, the hallmark of totalitarianism is secrecy and the
foundation of tyranny is ignorance. It has been written that "[i]f a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state
of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be." FULLER v. CITY OF HOMER, 75 P.3d 1059 (2003)(1).
[All jurisdiction is solely of the Constitution, so question "everything": who, what, where, when, why and how. ]
PROFOUNDLY THE PEOPLE ARE THE "SOURCE" OF ALL POWER = ALL LAWS AND JURISDICTION OF OUR CREATURE
Justice THOMAS (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with CHIEF JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and Justice SCALIA join,
dissenting:
Because the people of the several States are the only true source of power, however, the Federal Government
enjoys no authority beyond what the Constitution confers: The Federal Government's powers are limited and
enumerated. U.S. TERM LIMITS v. THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2).[Magical powers of government all of the People.]
OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT - LAWLESSNESS = VOID + UNAMERICAN ACTIVITY - SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
OPINION, FOX, Chief Judge (U.S. District Court of Michigan): “A mere statement of this fact may not seem very
significant; corporations, after all, are not supposed to exercise the governmental powers with which the Bill of
Rights was concerned. But this has been radically changed by the emergence of the public-private state. Today
private institutions do exercise governmental power; more, indeed, than 'government' itself ... . We have two
governments in America, then-one under the Constitution and a much greater one not under the Constitution. In
short, the inapplicability of our Bill of Rights is one of the crucial facts of American life today." MILOSZEWSKI v.
SEARS ROEBUCK, 346 F.Supp. 119 (1972)(2). [Outside = 100% private authority. 18 USC 2381-85 Treason - Sedition.]
TOTAL PERSONAL IMMUNITY FROM GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL - OUR RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
Our right' to be let alone = our sovereign immunity to laws of our creature to keep corrupt government (men) off our backs.
RABINOWITZ, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. [***] In reaching this
conclusion, we are cognizant of the fact that the term 'liberty' is an illusive concept, incapable of definitive,
comprehensive explication. Yet at the core of this concept is the notion of total personal immunity from
governmental control: the right 'to be let alone.' In 1891, the Supreme Court of the United States embraced Judge
Cooley's famous definition of 'liberty': See E. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.U.L.Rev. 216 (1960). No
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley, 'The right to one's person may be said to be a right
of complete immunity: to be let alone.' (emphasis in the original). BREESE v. SMITH, 501 P.2d 159 (1972)(1). [Same in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. Liberty includes everything. We injured no one, leave us alone! Stop stealing by false witness.]
THE RIGHT TO BE WHAT WE ARE ACCORDING TO THE LAW = TRUE STATUS - WITH OUR RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
Tired of being abused by unlawful government acting contrary to the rules of all just civilized nations, and against the true intent of the
People in Order to form a more perfect Union? Civil (dis)obedience = Obey the Truth only + zero tolerance for government corruption,
fraud, oppression etc. In our pursuit of Happiness invoke our sovereign right to be let alone. We injured no one, LEAVE US ALONE.
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS MAY NOT BE DISREGARDED + NO OTHER COURT MAY CORRECT IT!
Supreme Court interpretations are the Common Law, "it's the Law!" and Truth that may not be disregarded, or over ruled by any court.
THOMPSON District Judge: "Under our form of government and long established law and custom, the Supreme
Court is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of our Constitution and laws; its interpretations may not be
disregarded.... If the Supreme Court errs, no other court may correct it.") aff'd, 472 U.S. 38, (1985); also Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982). Glassroth v. Chief Justice Roy Moore, 229 F.Supp.2d 1290 (2002). [It's the Law!]
Hence, the importance of Supreme Court cases to prove the true 'interpretation' of the Law. You will see the Supreme Court
interprets the People are the 'supreme' power and sovereigns. And we have the 'right to be sovereign according to the Law.' This book
proves we are not the inferior class of 'person' statutes apply to (non-sovereigns) so our servants usurp over us by 'pretending' we are
not one of the sovereign people, and inferior to government therefore under its control. Taste the profound truth of the Law:
SOVEREIGNTY OR SUPREME POWER IS VESTED IN THE PEOPLE AND "ONLY" IN THE PEOPLE
Justice BREWER (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
There is a great deal of confusion in the use of the word 'sovereignty' by law writers. Sovereignty or supreme
power is in this country vested in the people, and only in the people. FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES, 149
U.S. 698 (1893)(2). [Only in the people. Not in an artificial creature of the people, U.S. citizens, or other person etc. ]
A SOVEREIGN ACKNOWLEDGES NO SUPERIOR BUT GOD ALONE - THE INFERIOR CANNOT RULE THE SUPERIOR
PINKNEY, Attorney General, in reply:
Sovereigns are equal. It is the duty of a sovereign, not to submit his rights to the decision of a co-sovereign. He is
the sole arbiter of his own rights. He acknowledges no superior, but God alone. To his equals, he shown respect,
but not submission. THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE v. McFADDON, 11 U.S. 116 (1812)(2). [Cited 1190 times as of
4/30/05. The leading case on sovereignty. This page says it all. We injure no one, Leave us alone. ]
THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE ARE NOT SUBJECT TO LAW - MERE HUMAN LAW - NOR LAWS OF ITS MERE CREATURE
This is why they pretend We the People are not the People. Emphasis added. This post-civil war Supreme Truth says it all:
Chief Justice Fuller (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with whom concurred Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham, dissenting:
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while
sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom
and for whom all government exists and acts. DOWNES v. BIDWELL, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)(2). ['The United States of
America' is the only country in the world where the People are 'sovereigns, the supreme power,' creator, and 'source' of all
lawful government, power, its law and jurisdiction. As creators we logically stand superior to our creature-servants. ]
OUR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS ENJOYED AS AN "ABSOLUTE RIGHT" FOR CENTURIES - TO SECURE OUR ALL
Justice KENNEDY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
We acknowledged that "[t]he immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been
enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute
character of that immunity," ibid., that "the notion that immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected
in our cases," id., at 415, and that "[t]his explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be
sued in its own courts without its consent," id., at 416. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Same in NEVADA
v. HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) etc. I injured no one so I invoke sovereign immunity from needless illegal abuse. ]
TRULY THE 'SOVEREIGNS'

Truly priceless. Truly profound. Truly the Supreme Truth. Truly says it all.
Justice SOUTER (Supreme Court of the United States) STEVENS, GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting:
Chief Justice Jay took a less vehement tone in his opinion, but he, too, denied the applicability of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to the States. He explained the doctrine as an incident of European feudalism, and said that by
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contrast, "[n]o such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly
the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless the African slaves among us may be
so called) and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint
tenants in the sovereignty." ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Truly sovereigns. The trick: a 'citizen of the
United States' is truly a non-sovereign stateless person that status is truly inferior to the supreme sovereign people. ]
WE THE PEOPLE ARE 'SOVEREIGNS' - NOT THOSE WHO SIT IN THE SEATS OF THE MIGHTY
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
First Amendment rights are indeed fundamental, for 'We the people' are the sovereigns, not those who sit in the
seats of the mighty. BROADRICK v. State of OKALAHOMA, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)(2). [Government is a 'dead thing' an
'artificial creature' prescribed by Law 'of' the Constitution 'of' the People filled with temporary servants who come and go.]
HOW TO WIN IN COURT + BECOME FREE + JURORS WILL KNOW OUR SERVANTS HAVE TOTAL UNLAWFUL JURSDICTION = VOID
Because so many Americans are 'victims of needless abuse' by these men acting outside the Constitution, we need a remedy. The only
way our servants can lawfully control anyone is by 'clear and unquestionable' authority of Law. So, I compiled the cases herein to show
we are being illegally subjected by deception 'against the true intent of the People' = void. If most Americans know that, it will be
difficult for our servants to get away with that fraud. It is a simple scam: Our servants 'pretend' they have jurisdiction over us by
'pretending' we are a business entity and not one of We the People = misapply the Law. They pretend you knowingly 'volunteered' to
be their slave (a licensed business entity) and identify you as such by your seemingly harmless, deceptively similar ALL CAPITAL LETTER
name, and Social Security number etc. Your phony 'less than human' status is deceptively called a 'person' in their statutes, inferior to
and under government control. The lawyers and judges helped invent the scam so government can pretend to have jurisdiction 'over'
us since laws are of (enacted by) our inferior 'artificial' creature. The problem is, their scam is illegal: against the true intent of the
people, and now we have the undeniable proof of their scam from the Supreme Court and its interpretations may not be disregarded,
demonstrating their jurisdiction is illegal and void. Since we injured no one and our servants are trying steal our all and destroy
America, it is prudent to become experts on 'illegal government deception' to defeat their jurisdiction. Keep it simple! I deny they
provide a fair trial: They are intentionally engaged in fraud and 'refuse to ascertain the Truth' they are illegally subjecting us using their
'Forms and Applications' (plus no lawful government of the Constitutions for us to join); their statutes apply to a non-sovereign 'person'
not We the 'people'; their code is of a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless Nation with no sovereign right to govern = void; they are
the ones breaking the Law and outside the Constitution by deception to steal = crime; we are sovereigns, injured no one with the 'right
to be what we are according to the Law' with our Constitutionally secured right to be let alone = sovereign immunity.
QUESTION EVERYTHING: BASED ON WHAT? IF YOU DO NOT KNOW HOW TO READ THE COURT CASES HEREIN
The court cases herein are 'public record' and can be verified as True via the Internet, public archives, law libraries, or
buy Westlaw services, etc. See the case below, my all cap HEADLINES are in bold above the court case to emphasize important
points. The court case starts with the name of the Justice(s) and the opinion of the Court, or dissent. Next is the actual text of
the case. [***] is my notice I deleted text to avoid this study manual being thousands of pages. After the case text ends, are
the names of the parties, case number, and year decided; see case below: "GLIDDEN CO. v. ZDANOK, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (2)."
GLIDDEN v. ZDANOK [is the names of the parties]; '370 U.S. 530' is the number of the (Supreme Court) case to find it, or prove it
exists; and '(1962)' is the year the case was decided; and '(2)' is one of the numbers to shepardize the status of the case at the
time, such as (1) = The case is good (not overturned) with zero negative treatment; (2) = may have a little negative treatment
but not overturned; (3) more negative treatment but not over turned; (4) means the case was over ruled, but does not mean
all of the points, or principles of Law were overturned with it. If they try to say a case was over ruled etc., demand they prove it
and why. Their "quotes" are for precision. Bold face type, underscore and italics are mine to add emphasis. I recommend
scanning my HEADLINES and read the first 50 pages or so several times before carefully studying this book to the Letter of the
Law. Plus using the index, a 'yellow' highlighter, and page flags help speed up finding things. Remember Supreme Court
interpretations may not be disregarded and no other court may correct it. It's the Law (part of the Common Law).
Per curiam (Supreme Court of Alaska): Criminal law is an area in which the precise use of language is particularly
important. Sivertsen v. State, 981 P.2d 564 (1999). [It's all about ascertaining the whole Truth about Lawful Power.]
LAWS ARE A DEAD LETTER WITHOUT COURTS TO 'EXPOUND' AND DEFINE THEIR "TRUE" MEANING
That is why I use (supreme) Court cases to explain and prove the 'Truth of the Law' which may not be disregarded.
Justice HARLAN (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion:
Cong.Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix, p. 2: 'It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice
against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals. [***]
For, as Hamilton observed, a chief defect of the Confederation had been ' *** the want of a judiciary power.
Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.' The Federalist, No.
22 (Wright ed. 1961), at 197. But because of the barrier of sovereign immunity, the laws controlling governmental
rights and obligations could not for years obtain a fully definitive exposition. The GLIDDEN CO. v. ZDANOK, 370
U.S. 530 (1962)(2). [Also 59 U.S. 3. Expound their 'true' meaning not false meaning. The Truth shall make you free. ]
EMPHATICALLY THE DUTY OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT TO SAY WHAT THE LAW IS = TRUTH ONLY
Supreme Court of Alaska: The Separation of Powers Doctrine Cannot Shield Unconstitutional Legislation. [***]
5
Under Alaska's constitutional structure of government, "the judicial branch ... has the constitutionally mandated duty
to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Alaska Constitution, including compliance by the legislature." [***];
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."). State v. Planned Parenthood, 28 P.3d 904 (2001)(2). [To declare the
Truth, "it's the Law!" Not to tell lies. See the same quote in City of Boerne v. Flores (U.S. Supreme Court, 1997). ]
ALL AMERICAN COURTS OWE OBEDIENCE TO THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
RABINOWITZ, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska) dissenting in part:
The basic principle operative here is that all American courts, state and federal, owe obedience to the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States on questions of federal law, and a judgment of the Supreme Court provides
the rule to be followed in all such courts until the Supreme Court sees fit to reexamine it. McCAIFFERT v. GREEN,
931 P.2d 407 (1997)(1). [The rule for all servants to obey, bound by Oath, So Help me God. Emphasis added. ]
EVERY COURT IS BOUND BY THE CONSTITUTION - OF WE THE PEOPLE
The Supreme Court is the 'final' arbiter of the Constitution - of the people the supreme sovereign power.
CONNOR, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):

Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, this court and every other court in the United States
are bound by each and every applicable provision of the United States Constitution. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). The United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter of that document. United States
Constitution Article III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 ( 1803). Hanby v. State, 479 P.2d 486 (1970).
[Every court + every servant is bound by oath. The old court cases if not over ruled are 'stare decisis'-set in stone. ]
THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT MEAN WHAT IT SAYS SO SAITH CORRUPT JUDGES AND SERVANTS
MORROW, J. (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas): It has been further held that any decision of the courts holding
contrary to the Constitution of this state can have no validity. It is the exercise of unauthorized and unwarranted
power on the part of the court. Chase v. Swayne, 88 Tex. 218. Exparte MYER, 84 Tex.Crim. 288 (1918)(1).
OUR CONSTITUTION 'ASSURES' THAT 'THE LAW' WILL ULTIMATELY PREVAIL = THE TRUTH WILL PREVAIL
Justice MARSHALL Circuit Justice (Supreme Court of the United States):
But the proper response to an arguably illegal action is not lawlessness by judges charged with interpreting and
enforcing the laws. Down that road lies tyranny and repression. We have a government of limited powers, and
those limits pertain to the Justices of this Court as well as to Congress and the Executive. Our Constitution assures
that the law will ultimately prevail, but it also requires that the law be applied in accordance with lawful procedures
(in lawfully established judicial Courts of Common Law. ). HOLTZMAN v. SCHLESINGER, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973)(1).
MERE ARTIFICIAL ENTITY = DEAD THING: LAW IS WRITTEN ON PAPER: LAW MUST BE FILLED WITH PEOPLE TO FUNCTION
MR. JUSTICE WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it. BUTZ v. ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)(2). [Also: 106 U.S. 196(1882)(2); 107 U.S. 711(1883)(2); 161 U.S. 10 (1896)
(2); 194 U.S. 601(1904)(1); Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 239-240. Creatures of the Law of the Constitution of the People. ]
THOSE WHO GOVERN 'MUST OBEY THE LAW' = OBEY THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 'OF THE PEOPLE'
Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the United States) with Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting: In a just society
those who govern, as well as those who are governed, must obey the law. U.S. v. LEON, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)(2).
Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting:
Failure of government to obey the law cannot ever constitute "legitimate law enforcement activity." OREGON v.
ELSTAD, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)(2). [More on our right to require government be according to the law: p. 293 etc. ]
FIRST DUTY TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION - AT ONCE TO APPLY AND FOLLOW THE LAW
Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring in the result: Generally state officials
know something of the individual's basic legal rights. If they do not, they should, for they assume that duty when
they assume their office. Ignorance of the law is no excuse for men in general. It is less an excuse for men whose
special duty is to apply it, and therefore to know and observe it. If their knowledge is not comprehensive, state
officials know or should know when they pass the limits of their authority, so far at any rate that their action
exceeds honest error of judgment and amounts to abuse of their office and its function. When they enter such a
domain in dealing with the citizen's rights, they should do so at their peril, whether that be created by state or
federal law. For their sworn oath and their first duty are to uphold the Constitution, then only the law of the state
which too is bound by the charter. Since the statute, as I think, condemns only something more than error of
judgment, made in honest effort at once to apply and to follow the law, cf. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389,
officials who violate it must act in intentional or reckless disregard of individual rights and cannot be ignorant that
6
they do great wrong. This being true, they must be taken to act at peril of incurring the penalty placed upon such
conduct by the federal law, as they do of that the state imposes. SCREWS v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945)(2). [No excuse.]
ALL MEN ARE ENTITLED TO BE 'TRIED ' AND SENTENCED 'ACCORDING TO LAW' - OF THE CONSTITUTION
Remember: Supreme Court interpretations may not be disregarded; the people are supreme sovereigns and not otherwise.
Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE DOUGLAS and Justice BRENNAN concur, dissenting:
Bad men, like good men, are entitled to be tried and sentenced in accordance with law, and when it is shown to us
that a person is serving an illegal sentence our obligation is to direct that proper steps be taken to correct the wrong
done, without regard to the character of a particular defendant or to the possible effect on others who might also
want to challenge the legality of their sentences as they have the right to do 'at any time' under Rule 35. If it has
any relevance at all, the fact that there may be other prisoners in this country's jails serving illegal sentences would
seem to me to make it all the more imperative that we grant appropriate relief in this case rather than search for
some obviously dubious excuse to deny this petitioner's claim. GREEN v. U.S., 365 U.S. 301 (1961)(2). [All illegal.]
KEEP IT SIMPLE: IT'S ALL ABOUT 'LAWFUL JURISDICTION' - WHATEVER GOVERNMENT DOES MUST BE LAWFUL-ELSE VOID
Simply put JURISDICTION = government control: 'power to declare the Law' over particular 'non-sovereign persons', and things.
ALL government control without 'lawful' jurisdiction: power prescribed by 'clear and unquestionable' authority of law is VOID!
So, our servant's scam is to refuse to 'prove' jurisdiction over the People prescribed by Law, because they are illegally subjecting us.
KEEP IT SIMPLE: 'jurisdiction' is limited to this: an 'inferior cannot rule its superior' with law (or law of our artificial creature).
3 kinds: personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction over status is super important + subject matter jurisdiction + territorial jurisdiction;
Plus execution is the end of the Law = lawful 'power of government' + court prescribed by Law to act = exercise or enforce jurisdiction.
A CRIMINAL CONVICTION WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS "VOID"

Our servants illegally subjects us and are 100% outside the Constitution yet argue 'Lawful' (personal) jurisdiction? Absurd fraud!
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas
corpus. JOHNSON v. ZERBST, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)(2). [Also 123 U.S. 443. No Personal jurisdiction over us by law.]
SINCE 1482 - TODAY: IF COURTS LACKS LAWFUL JURISDCTION = VOID! = CORAM NON JUDICE
If government (state or Feds) acquires jurisdiction over you by illegal deception, their jurisdiction (+ court's) is illegal = void.
Justice SCALIA (Supreme Court of the U.S.) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion:
The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void traces back to the English Year Books, see
Bowser v. Collins, Y.B.Mich. 22 Edw. IV, f. 30, pl. 11, 145 Eng.Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482), and was made settled law
by Lord Coke in Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke Rep. 68b, 77a, 77 Eng.Rep. 1027, 1041 (K.B. 1612).
Traditionally that proposition was embodied in the phrase coram non judice, "before a person not a judge"--
meaning, in effect, that the proceeding in question was not a judicial proceeding because lawful judicial authority
was not present, and could therefore not yield a judgment. American courts invalidated, or denied recognition to,
judgments that violated this common-law principle long before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. See, e.g.,
Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F.Cas. 609 (No. 11,134)(CC Mass. 1828); Dunn v.
Dunn, 4 Paige 425 (N.Y.Ch. 1834); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273 (1835); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447
(Pa.1844); Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336, 350 (1850). In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878), we
announced that the judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as well. BURNHAM v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)(2).
PRINCIPLE: A fundamental truth or doctrine, as of law; a comprehensive rule or doctrine which furnishes a basis
or origin for others; a settled rule of action, procedure, or legal determination. A truth or proposition so clear that it
cannot be proved or contradicted unless by a proposition which is still clearer. That which constitutes the essence
of a body or its constituent parts. 8 Term 107. 142 La. 133, 76 So. 585, 587. Black's Law Dict. 4th Ed. p. 1357.
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court, and, after stating the case, proceeded as follows:
A denial of jurisdiction forbids all inquiry into the nature of the case. OSBORN v. BANK OF THE U. S., 22 U.S. 738
(1824)(2). [Plus U. S. v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)(2); ROSENBERY v. U.S. SHIPPING, 295 F. 372 (1923)(1); 401 U.S. 82 (1970)].
Mr. Chief Justice TAFT (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
We ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to the principles upon which it was founded. MYERS v.
UNITED STATES, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)(2). [The principle that We the People are sovereigns etc. ]
EVERY COURT IN THE WORLD!
HOUSE, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Connecticut):
The rule of law is succinctly stated in O'Leary v. Waterbury Title Co., 117 Conn. 39: 'A court is without power to
render a judgment if it lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject-matter, one or both. In such cases, the
judgment is void, has no authority and may be impeached.' As it was stated in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 364, cited by this court in Clover v. Urban, 108 Conn. 13: 'It is an acknowledged principle of ... every
7
court in the world, that not only the decisions, but every thing done under the judicial process of courts, not having
jurisdiction, are, ipso facto, void.' 'When ... the court saw that it had no jurisdiction ..., then, without reference to its
other rulings, it was its duty to go no farther in the consideration of the case, and to dismiss it.' Wheeler v. New
York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 71 Conn. 270, cited with approval in Chzrislonk v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 101 Conn.
356. This is an accepted principle of established law. As stated in 20 Am.Jur.2d 457, Courts, s 97: 'The general rule
is that proceedings conducted or decisions made by a court are legally void where there is an absence of jurisdiction
over the subject matter' and 'a court devoid of jurisdiction over the case cannot make a decision in favor of either
party. It can only dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.' MARSHALL v. CLARK, 170 Conn. 199 (1976)(1).
IF NO JURISDICTION THERE IS NO AUTHORITY TO JUDGE ANYTHING = POWERLESS - 'ONLY DISMISS'
Justice SCALIA (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Questions of jurisdiction, of course, should be given priority--since if there is no jurisdiction there is no authority to
sit in judgment of anything else. See Steel Co., supra, at 93-102. "Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868). Even jurisdiction over the person (as opposed to subject-matter
jurisdiction) "is 'an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district ... court,' without which the court is 'powerless
to proceed to an adjudication.' Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (quoting 299 U.S. 374
(1937)). VERMONT AGENCY OF NAT. RESOURCES v. UNITED STATES, 529 U.S. 765 (2000)(2). [Government
never has lawful personal Jurisdiction over us = power to 'declare' the law (diction-juris) of the artificial creature. ]
THE LAW 'ALONE' DEFINES THE COURT'S 'POWER'

Does the statute cite the court shall have 'power' to (do something), or merely say the court 'may' … ?
Today, all officials are non-sovereign stateless persons exercising no lawful power from the Constitution = void as no law.
Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

The proposition that the law alone defines the limits of a court's power to enter a judgment can be traced to this
Court's early precedents. In Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339 (1870), the Court explained that a court "transcend[s] its
jurisdiction" when it orders the forfeiture of property beyond that authorized by statute. Id., at 351. In a similar vein,
Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), concluded that a judgment imposing punishment in excess of statutory
authorization is not merely voidable, but "void." Id., at 178. Precisely because extrastatutory punishments
implicate the very power of a court to act, the district court must, entirely apart from the specific procedure
mandated by Rule 11(f), satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for any judgment entered pursuant to a guilty plea
that threatens to exceed statutory bounds. Were a court to do otherwise, it would permit the parties to define the
limits of its power. Of course, the court's power to act is not similarly implicated when it imposes a sentence that is
arguably erroneous but nonetheless within the range authorized by statute. LIBRETTI v. U.S., 516 U.S. 29 (1995)(2).
[Jurisdiction = lawful power prescribed by strictly interpreted clear and unquestionable authority of Law alone. ]
A JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS VOID = AS NO LAW

A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and is thus vulnerable to attack pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(4) motion.
BALCHEN v. BALCHEN, 566 P.2d 1324. (1977)(1). [See the same in U.S. v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, etc. ]
BINDING NOWHERE
Mr. Justice BALDWIN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Judgments and decrees which are merely void are binding nowhere, and those which are only voidable are binding
everywhere until reversed by a superior authority. Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466 (1830)(1).
VOID JUDGMENT IS ENTITLED TO "NO RESPECT WHATEVER" = NOT PRESCIBED BY LAW TO MAKE IT VALID
BOOCHEVER, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):
We first consider the standards to be applied to a motion for relief under Civ.R. 60(b)(4), which is identical to the
similarly-numbered section of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A judgment is void and subject to attack under
F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or if it acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process of law. Although under other subsections of Rule 60(b) the movant must
show that denial of the motion below was an abuse of discretion in order to prevail on appeal, no question of the
lower court's discretion is presented by a Rule 60(b)(4) motion because the validity of a judgment is strictly a
question of law. Nor need the movant show that he could present a meritorious defense in a subsequent proceeding,
again because a void judgment is entitled to no respect whatever[!]. AGUCHAK v. MONTGOMERY WARD
CO., 520 P.2d 1352 (1974) (1). [See entitled to 'no respect' whatever in: Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 718; Worden v. Searls,
121 U.S. 14; Penn. v. Wheeling, 18 How. 421; U.S. v. U.S.M. 330 U.S. 258; Haines v. Haines, 35 Mich. 143; Brown v.
Moore, 61 Cal. 432; Bank v. Abbott, 20 Wis. 599; Strang v. Beach, 11 Ohio St. 283; 99 Ind. 4; 104 S.W.3d 825 (2003)
etc. ]
NO TIME LIMIT ON AN ATTACK ON A VOID JUDGMENT - NOT PRESCRIBD BY LAW TO MAKE IT VALID
8
DIMOND, Senior Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):
Rule 60(b)(4) provides as follows: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ....
(4) the judgment is void; ... As stated in Wright & Miller, "[A] motion under this part of the rule differs markedly
from motions under the other clauses of Rule 60(b).... [T]here is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void."
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure ß 2862, at 197 (1973). [***]
This court has previously stated what is meant by the term void: A judgment is void where the state in which the
judgment was rendered had no jurisdiction to subject the parties or the subject matter to its control, or where the
defendant was not given proper notice of the action and opportunity to be heard, or where the judgment was not
rendered by a duly constituted court with competency to render it, or where there was a failure to comply with
such requirements as are necessary for the valid exercise of power by the court. Holt v. Powell, 420 P.2d 468, 471
(Alaska 1966) (footnotes omitted). See also Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co., 520 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1974)
(judgment void if court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant or if court acted in a manner inconsistent with
due process of law). BURRELL v. BURRELL, 696 P.2d 157 (1984)(1). [Many cases on "no respect whatever." ]
REMEMBER: SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS (PART OF THE COMMON LAW) MAY 'NOT' BE DISREGARDED
Government may not disregard Supreme Court cases much less prove why they are wrong. The following cases prove why
statutes never cite-require the sovereign people to 'do' anything. Statutes intentionally say 'person' to deceive the 'people.'
POSTULATES = PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN LAW (REASONS) THAT LIMIT AND CONTROL JURISDICTION PRESCRIBED BY LAW
Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527
U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [See 'postulates limit and control' in: PENNHURST v. HALDERMAN, 465 U.S. 89 (1983); NEVADA v.
HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); and NATIONAL INS CO. v. TIDEWATER, 337 U.S. 582 (1949) etc. The postulates 'interplay.' ]
Behind the Constitution, therefore behind mere statutes are the same postulates which limit and control jurisdiction.
Postulates = principles (keys of knowledge) that limit and control an artificial creature's 'right' of jurisdiction over a status etc.
Behind the statutes are supreme Ct. interpretations-truth (at the Law Library) which limit and control, and may not be disregarded.
Postulates prove why mere statutes 'never' cite and apply to the people and why they pretend the people are not the people.
'Written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but the latter are prior in existence to the former.' 2
Webst.Works, 392; 1 Bl.Comm. 124; 2 Story, Life, 278, letter to Dr. Lieber; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 388, top;
Wilkerson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. In Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 132, middle, Miller J., mentions, as existing
outside of constitutions, those 'general principles supposed to limit all legislative power.' See, too, Merrill v.
Sherburne, 1 N.H. 213, near top, per Woodbury, J.; People v. Sup'rs, 4 Barb. 74-5; Benson v. Mayor, 10 Barb. 244-
5; Powers v. Bergen, 6 N.Y. 366-7; Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 225. Especially see People v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich.
107 et seq., cited supra. Also, read Lee v. State, 26 Ark. 265 et seq. U.S. v. CURTIS, 12 F. 824 (Cir.Ct.) (1882)(1).
THE MOST 'CRITICAL' POSTULATE: SOVEREIGNTY IS VESTED IN THE PEOPLE - IT'S THE LAW!
Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the U.S.) delivered the opinion of the Court: Second, we recognized the critical
postulate that sovereignty is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on the people the right to choose
freely their representatives to the National Government. TERM LIMITS INC. v. THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2).
Super postulate 1: SOVEREIGNTY IS OF COURSE NOT SUBJECT TO LAW Global principle of Law.
Not subject to law = Total immunity from governmental control = our sovereign right to be let alone. We injured no one.
Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Justice Harlan, Justice Brewer, and Justice Peckham, dissenting:
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while
sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom
and for whom all government exists and acts. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (Supreme Court of the U.S.) (1901)
(2). [We own the 'only country in the world' where the People are 'sovereigns,' and the supreme power, hence we are the
supreme sovereign 'creators' and 'source' of all lawful government, its law, and therefore its jurisdiction. ]
1999: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS ENJOYED AS AN "ABSOLUTE RIGHT" FOR CENTURIES

We acknowledged that "[t]he immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been
enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute
character of that immunity," ibid., that "the notion that immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected
in our cases," id., at 415, and that "[t]his explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be
sued in its own courts without its consent," id., at 416. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Consent. ]
Super Postulate 2: THE 'JUST' POWERS OF GOVERNMENT ARE DERIVED FROM 'CONSENT'
Justice STEWART (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:
9
We tend to overlook the basic political and legal reality that the people, not the bureaucracy, are the sovereign. Our
Federal Government was created for the security and happiness of the people. Executives, lawmakers, and members
of the Judiciary are inferior in the sense that they are in office only to carry out and execute the constitutional
regime. The Preamble of the Constitution states that 'We the people' ordained and established the Constitution. The
Declaration of Independence stated that to insure 'certain unalienable Rights,' 'Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed' and 'That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.' SCHLESINGER v.
RESERVISTS Committee, 418 U.S. 208(1974)(2). [The legal reality = It's the Law!: the People are sovereign masters.]
In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706
(1999)(2). [See p. 293 et seq: individual assent is necessary. Under God, mere human law is to be 'just' only. ]
Super Postulate 3: 'ALL' JURISDICTION IMPLIES 'SUPERIORITY' OF POWER Global principle of Law.
This super postulate essentially says it all once you understand the people are the ultimate 'supreme' sovereign power under God.
"And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-eminence... . Hence it is, that no suit or
action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all
jurisdiction implies superiority of power ...." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England pp 234-235
(1765). ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Hence, why our creature (government) has no 'legal right' of
jurisdiction over the sovereign people the 'supreme' power according to the established 'Order of things' in Law. ]
Super Postulate 4: 'ALL' HUMAN LAW MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY A SUPERIOR Global principle of Law.
Justice SOUTER, STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER (Supreme Court of the United States, 1999) join, dissenting:
"[***] The principle is, that all human law must be prescribed by a superior. [***] The sovereign, when traced to his
source, must be found in the man." Id., at 458. 1 Blackstone Commentaries. pp 241, 242. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527
U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Sovereignty is vested in the people and only in the people, not in government 'of' man. ]
THE "SUPREME" POWER RESIDES IN THE PEOPLE: OUR STATUS = KINGS AND QUEENS, CZARS, EMPERORS
'Higher' in legal authority than any other power, 'subject to no law.' - 1 Peter 2:13-25 The King is supreme.
Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER (Supreme Court of the United States) join dissenting:
Before the new federal scheme appeared, 18th-century political theorists had assumed that "there must reside
somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided, final power, higher in legal authority than any other power,
subject to no law, a law unto itself." B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 198 (1967);
see also Wood 345. The American development of divided sovereign powers, which "shatter[ed] ... the categories of
government that had dominated Western thinking for centuries," id., at 385, was made possible only by a
recognition that the ultimate sovereignty rests in the people themselves. See id., at 530 (noting that because "none
of these arguments about 'joint jurisdictions' and 'coequal sovereignties' convincingly refuted the Antifederalist
doctrine of a supreme and indivisible sovereignty," the Federalists could succeed only by emphasizing that the
supreme power" 'resides in the people, as the fountain of government' "(citing 1 Pennsylvania and the Federal
Constitution, 1787-1788, p. 302 (J. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888) (quoting James Wilson)). SEMINOLE TRIBE
OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)(2). [Undeniable: No status on earth is higher than 'supreme' or
sovereign = We the People = a 'law unto itself' as the 'source' and creators of the Constitution = the (1 st) 'supreme Law'
of the Land declared in Art. VI; under the perfect laws of God. 1 Peter 2:13 The King is supreme (the sovereign). ]
SUPREME POWER: The highest authority in a state, all other powers in it being inferior thereto. State ex rel.
Hartley v. Clausen, 146 Wash. 588. (Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed. p. 1610.) [Self evident. ]
Super Postulate 5: NO 'LEGAL RIGHT' AGAINST THE CREATOR OF THE LAW-CONSTITUTION Global.
Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Mr. Chief Justice Jay described sovereignty as the "right to govern"; (fn 9) that kind of right would necessarily
encompass the right to determine what suits may be brought in the sovereign's own courts. Thus, Mr. Justice Holmes
explained sovereign immunity as based "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." NEVADA v. HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)(2).
[See 'no legal right' over sovereigns, they make-create the Law-Constitution in: KAWANANAKOA v. POLYBLANK, 205 U.S.
349 (1907); WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES, 289 U.S. 553 (1933; SEMINOLE TRIBE v. FLORIDA, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); COLLEGE
BANK v. FLORIDA ED., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); STATE of Oklahoma v. McKNIGHT, 496 P.2d
775 (1972); etc. The Constitution is the Law 'of' the People; legislation is laws 'of' our mere artificial creature. ]
SUPER PROFOUND! "ALL" GOVERNMENTAL POWER STEM 'FROM' THE PEOPLE OF THE STATES
The People are the creators and supreme sovereign 'source' of all government power, its law and therefore its jurisdiction.
10
Justice KENNEDY (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:
The Constitution derives its authority instead from the consent of the people of the States. Given the fundamental
principle that all governmental powers stem from the people of the States, it would simply be incoherent to assert
that the people of the States could not reserve any powers that they had not previously controlled. U.S. TERM
LIMITS INC. v. THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2). [The established 'Order of things': Government is 'of' the People.]
HIGHEST POSITION = OFFICER 'OF' AN OFFICE - OF THE CONSTITUTION - OF THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN PEOPLE
All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it. BUTZ v. ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)(2). [Also: 106 U.S. 196(1882)(2); 107 U.S. 711(1883)(2); 161 U.S. 10 (1896)
(2); 194 U.S. 601(1904)(1); Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 239-240. Creatures 'of the Law of the Constitution of the People.' ]
THE CREATURE CANNOT RULE ITS CREATORS - LET ALONE UNJUSTLY OR OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION
JERTBERG, Circuit Judge: Or as simply stated by Justice Brewer, 'The creature cannot rule the creator'. State of
Kansas v. State of Colorado, 1906, 206 U.S. 46, 48, 83. GILBERTSON v. CITY OF FAIRBANKS, 262 F.2d 734,
U.S. Ct. App. 9th Cir.(1959)(1). [The inferior cannot rule its Superior let alone the superme sovereign people. ]
Super Postulate 6: ALL MEN HAVE UNALIENBLE RIGHTS ENDOWED BY THEIR CREATOR
CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court.
The rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man. 'To secure these rights,' says the Declaration of
Independence, 'governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.' The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union under the Constitution, was to
protect all persons within their boundaries in the enjoyment of these 'unalienable rights with which they were
endowed by their Creator.' Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests alone with the States. UNITED STATES v.
CRUIKSHANK, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)(2). [A business entity of the Federal System has no unalienable rights, nor the States
to secure them. See essentially the same in NORTHERN SECURITIES CO. v. UNITED STATES, 193 U.S. 197 (1903)(2). ]
Super Postulate 7: FRAUD DESTROYS EVERYTHING = VOIDS EVERYTHING

JUSTICE SWAYNE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court: Fraud destroys the
validity of everything into which it enters. It affects fatally even the most solemn judgments and decrees. NUDD v.
BURROWS, 91 U.S. 426 (1875)(1). [Truth or Justice never dwell with fraud and the System is all fraud. ]
GOVERNMENT TO "ALWAYS" PROTECT PEOPLE AGAINST FRAUD
Justice GINSBURG (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
See, e.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948) (the government's power "to protect people
against fraud" has "always been recognized in this country and is firmly established"); ILLINOIS ex rel MADIGAN
v. TELEMARKETING ASSOC. INC., 538 U.S. 600 (2003)(3). [Citing Ref. 131 times, 4/30/05. Always protect! ]
The postulates 'interplay' and are uniform with the global principle sovereignty is not subject to mere human law, and with
the principles in the Declaration of Independence: the just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed; and
all men have certain 'unalienable' rights endowed by their 'Creator,' among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness which
includes about everything. Mere artificial persons do not have unalienable rights, and that is why in their System of Federalism (the
'one' Nation under God indivisible… ) they pretend the 'people' act as business entities because a business entity-less than human does
not have unalienable 'private' rights retained by the people. A licensed public business entity is endowed by its creator (government)
with mere privileges it creates and therefore can take away. The concept is Biblical: the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. Our
servants are not but act as if they are our Lords. Abusive usurping mindsets end with: All they that hate me love death. Proverbs 8:36
Tired of being screwed by government and abused by liars who pretend to be lawful and righteous? Statutes never require
We the people to 'do' anything. Compulsory statutes say they apply to a 'person' to deceive the 'people'. Remember the postulates!
Because government is an inferior 'artificial creature' of the Constitution 'of the People' it is impossible for it to have 'legal right' of
jurisdiction over the 'supreme' sovereign people, its 'creator' and 'source' of all human: government, power, law, and jurisdiction. To
conceal that, We the 'people' are nowhere defined or cited in the statutes (nor cited on any government form or application ).
important. Sivertsen v. State, 981 P.2d 564 (1999). [To ascertain the Truth of the Law regarding Lawful jurisdiction.]
The next two cases are prime examples of statutes that substantially deprived the Life, Liberty, and property of a 'person.'
With a social security number you 'act' as a '100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person' status a.k.a. potential Taxpayer.
(FEDERAL) 'TAXPAYER' MEANS ANY "PERSON" SUBJECT TO ANY INTERNAL REVENUE TAX
Section 7701(a)(14), defining "taxpayer," informs us that "[w]hen used in [the Internal Revenue Code], where not
otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, ... [t]he term 'taxpayer' means any
person subject to any internal revenue tax." [***] The Treasury's regulation, 26 C.F.R. ß 301.7701-16 (1994), adds
11
nothing to the statute; in particular, the regulation does not ascribe any special or limiting meaning to the statute's
"subject to" terminology. U.S. v. WILLIAMS, 514 U.S. 527 (1995)(2). [Cites person to deceive the people. ]
ONLY A "PERSON" IS REQUIRED TO GET A DRIVER LICENSE - DOES NOT EVEN SAY CITIZEN MUCH LESS PEOPLE
Alaska Statute 28.15.011 (b) Every person exercising the person's privilege to drive, or exercising any degree of
physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway, vehicular way or area, or other public property in this state, is
required to have in the possession of the person a valid Alaska driver's license... . CAULKINA v. STATE, 743 P.2d
366 (Alaska, 1989). [That's really a U.S. driver license (see 42 USC 666). Since, our creature gets all of its authority
('everything') from us, it is impossible for it to give us anything that we do not already possess by sovereign right. ]
NECESSARY TO 'EXPLICITLY' CITE EVERY CLASS OF "PERSON" THEY INTEND TO INCLUDE

MANNHEIMER, Judge: [Apply this interpretation to: 'person means' in the above IRS case, etc. ]
Assuming that the legislature wanted the definition of "person" to include political entities, it would be necessary
for AS 11.81.900(b)(40) [the Criminal Code] to contain an explicit reference to political entities because this statute
uses the word "means", which indicates that what follows is "a complete meaning for the term defined".
MUSTAFOSKI v. STATE of Alaska, 867 P.2d 824 (1994)(3). [Must explicitly say people if our creature could. ]
THE NEXT CASE FULLY COMPLIES TO THE POSTULATES = SOVEREIGNTY IS OF COURSE NOT SUBJECT TO LAW
Keep it simple: It's all about the Truth and 'lawful jurisdiction' prescribed by our artificial creature. DODGE THIS SERVANTS:
LONGSTANDING INTERPRETIVE PRESUMPTION "PERSON" DOES NOT INCLUDE THE SOVEREIGN
Are you one of the supreme sovereign 'people', or a mere 'person' = non-sovereign. The just powers of government…
Questions of jurisdiction, of course, should be given priority--since if there is no jurisdiction there is no authority to
sit in judgment of anything else. See Steel Co., supra, at 93-102. "Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868). Even jurisdiction over the person (as opposed to subject-matter
jurisdiction) "is 'an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district ... court,' without which the court is 'powerless
to proceed to an adjudication.' Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (quoting Employers
Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374 (1937)). [***]
We must apply to this text our longstanding interpretive presumption that "person" does not include the
sovereign. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941); United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 275 (1947). [***] The presumption is, of course, not a "hard and fast rule of exclusion," Cooper Corp., supra, at
604-605, but it may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary. See
International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Ed. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 83 (1991). [If forced
into court I demand an affirmative showing of proof of the legislative intent of the true meaning of 'person' and charge
void for vagueness-deception, the statute does not say the people are included or excluded. Emphasis added. ] [***]
Justice BREYER, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court in full. I also join the opinion of Justice GINSBURG.
The Court's principal argument relies on "our longstanding interpretive presumption that 'person' does not
include the sovereign." [***] What's more, the doctrinal origins of that "presumption" meant only that the enacting
sovereign was not normally thought to be a statutory "person." See, e.g., United States v. California, 297 U.S., at
186 ("[T]he canon of construction that a sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound by its own statute
unless named in it ... has its historical basis in the English doctrine that the Crown [sovereign. ] is unaffected by acts
of Parliament not specifically directed against it. The presumption is an aid to consistent construction of statutes of
the enacting sovereign when their purpose is in doubt" (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Mine Workers,
330 U.S., at 275; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 73
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v. UNITED STATES EX
REL STEVENS, 529 U.S. 765 (2000)(2). [See longstanding interpretive presumption 'person' does not include the
sovereign in: U.S. v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876), U.S. v. UNITED MINE WORKERS, 330 U.S. 258 (1947)(2) WILL v. MICHIGAN
STATE POLICE, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); VERMONT RESOURCES v. UNITED STATES, 529 U.S. 765 (2000)(2), VERMONT AGENCY v.
U.S., 529 U.S. 765 (2003)(2); INYO CTY. CALIF. v. PAIUTE INDIANS, 538 U.S. 701 (2003)(2); etc. ]
That case interplays with the jurisdictional postulates of Law and with our sovereign right to be let alone. We injured no one.
It is impossible for our 'artificial creature' to have 'legal right of jurisdiction' over its supreme sovereign creators, let alone
without our consent, much less unjustly in a more perfect Union under God in this counterfeit system outside the Constitution.
IN LEGAL TERMINOLOGY "PERSON" = OTHER THAN HUMAN BEINGS = ARTIFICIAL PERSONS

Monstrous government criminal fraud: They intentionally conceal 'person' does not include the 'people' in the statute(s).
Before BARNES, WALLACE and TANG, Circuit Judges (C.A. 9th Cir. Calif., 1980) DISCUSSION:
The word "person" in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a
variety of entities other than human beings. See e. g. 1 U.S.C. s 1. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIF. v.
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, 612 F.2d 417 (2). [That person is not me! That 'person' is a 'non-sovereign person' a mere
'artificial' person (pretended to be us) under its control being inferior to government-an artificial person. ]
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Chief Justice REHNQUIST (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: While the
lawmaker is entirely free to ignore the ordinary meanings of words and make definitions of his own, Karnuth v.
United States, 279 U.S. 231, 242; Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502, that device may not be employed so as
to change the nature of the acts or things to which the words are applied. U.S. v. LOPEZ, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)(2).
'Legal terminology' is not always synonymous with common language. Statutes are of legislatures -mere 'artificial creatures' of
the Constitution of the People. The postulates 'interplay' and limit and control a legislature's 'right' of jurisdiction over persons subject
to its jurisdiction such as corporations and other 'artificial' entities created by legislation (i.e. government). I cited several postulates-
reasons that limit and control our servant's right of jurisdiction over the people to explain why statutes of the artificial creature apply
to a 'person' not the sovereign 'people.' We the 'People' is not defined in the statutes to take away a super key of knowledge.
FOR CENTURIES THE HIGH FUNCTION OF COURTS IS TO 'ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH'

Ascertain the Truth We the People are sovereigns, not injuring anyone, and not subject to the laws 'of' an artificial creature.
Justice CLARK (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Court proceedings are held for the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth which is the sine qua non
of a fair trial. Over the centuries Anglo-American courts have devised careful safeguards by rule and otherwise to
protect and facilitate the performance of this high function. ESTES v. STATE OF TEXAS, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)(2).
[Sine qua non: indispensable prerequisite. Court to ascertain the truth = Judge, prosecutor, defense, jurors, not just you.]
The previous cases may be foreign to your uneducated belief system, but they
UNDENIABLY PROVE THE PROFOUND TRUTH OF THE LAW, THAT MAY NOT BE DISREGARDED
The short story: There is nothing more 'intentionally' perverted and usurped than today’s laws and Justice in America. This excessive
System is engaged in monstrous deception formidable of anti-Christ only. The Law, 'mere human law' has never required the People of
the United States to 'do' anything. It is the nature and attribute of sovereignty, having no superior on Earth to be 'accountable to God'
alone. Nor must anyone obey their inferior. Since We the People are the supreme sovereign creators and 'source' of government (our
creature), its power, law, and jurisdiction is not superior over us, and cannot command us with its laws to do anything, because there
can be no legal 'right' over the supreme sovereign people, especially when injuring no one. Injuring no one we must obey our servants,
conspiring to subject us to steal our money and oppress us? Absurd! Ask a sovereign of any other country if they must obey their
servants, or if he would off their heads for engaging in needless oppression and unrighteousness by fraud?
It would be preposterous to pretend no one has a right to be what they are according to the Law in the Land of the Free. Since our
government servants have no power to deprive us of our supreme sovereign birthright status they simply sucker us to volunteer by
swearing we are an inferior status to steal our all. If one of the People (not injuring anyone) was dragged into court and objects, and
demands dismissal, and proof of the legislative intent of the true meaning of the word 'person' in the statute, the case should be
dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction because the statutes 'of our creature' do not and cannot apply to one of We the supreme
sovereign people. Injuring no one we obey the Law by not obeying their code because it does not apply to sovereigns.
Anything government requires anyone to do (or pay) must be prescribed by law. Therefore if these servants say you, or anyone
must get a drivers license, pay income tax, property tax, or do, or pay anything, or try to prosecute you in court there must be a
statute(s) [with substantive regulation(s)] citing the same, and statutes are 'strictly' interpreted and to be clear and unquestionable
authority to protect our freedom from government (men) oppression, especially when Americans injure no one and are just trying to
enjoy their pursuit of Happiness in the Land of the Free where prisons overflow. Statutes are to be written with 'exacting precision' and
'specify' all who are subject to its liability. That is to say, all jurisdiction is derived 'solely' from the Law, and penal statutes say they
apply to a 'person' (or legal equivalent) but they intentionally 'conceal what persons are included' (and excluded and 'why' according
to the law) which are always for other than one of We the sovereign 'people', but the truth would destroy their revenue scam.
'Victimless crimes' (no man injured) is a huge revenue scam and monstrous fraud: A charge for merely violating a statute that
requires a person (injuring no one) to 'do' or pay something. The biggest scam is IRS. If you do not pay income tax they might charge
you with a crime in their courts imposing fines, or imprisonment, or both, even though you never injured anyone. The judges and
lawyers know very well most Americans are ignorant of the Law (don't have a clue), gullible, credulous, and in fear of this government,
so they simply keep silent about their illegal subjection scam and their System is outside the Constitution, and let you believe you are
the class of 'person' their statute applies to, because you do not know (and cannot prove) their statutes do not apply to the people.
PERMANENTLY SECURE OUR ALL - ANYTHING ELSE IS AGAINST THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE
The true intent of the people after the revolution was to form a more perfect Union-government to 'secure' our all.
HAINER, J. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma Territory): Judge Story, in his work on the Constitution (volume 1 [5th Ed.]
ß 338) declares: "The true view to be taken of our state Constitutions is that they are forms of government ordained
and established by the people in their original sovereign capacity to promote their own happiness and permanently
to secure their rights, property, independence, and common welfare." FRANTZ v. AUTRY, 18 Okla. 561 (1907)(2).
[The only true intent of sane people is to create their government to secure their all as perfect as possible. ]
'ONE' NATION UNDER GOD. . . HENCE, UNDER THE LAW OF GOD (NOT ABOVE) SO HELP ME GOD
The scam: This 'one Nation under God' is 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status and outside the Constitution.
Strange nation indeed: Millions of sovereigns under God falsely swear they are 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless slaves.
Congress revisited the Pledge of Allegiance 12 years later when it amended the text to add the words "under God."
Act of June 14, 1954, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249. The House Report that accompanied the legislation observed that,
"[f]rom the time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the traditional concept that our
13
Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God." H.R.Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2 (1954). The
resulting text is the Pledge as we know it today: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America,
and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." 4 U.S.C.
§4. ELK GROVE v. NEWDOW, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)(3). [2 nations: 1 = We the People. 2 = citizens of the U.S. ]
PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE!

1 We the People, 1 Nation, 1 Constitution, 1 Government, 1 you; but by fraud government pretends there are 2.
Justice MILLER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The People of these United States constitute one nation. They have a government in which all of them are deeply
interested. CRANDALL v. STATE OF NEVADA, 73 U.S. 35 (1867)(2). [There can be only 1! Also 19 U.S. 264. ]
One Nation under God One Nation under God under Fraud
The System under the Constitution vs. Their 'System of Federalism' outside the Constitution and void.
The true intent of We the People vs. Against the true intent of the People: Counterfeit Satanic ruse.
Constitutional Convention = Lawful vs. Not created by the People in Convention: 100% Federal Fraud = void.
We the People = sovereign Nation vs. citizens of the U.S. = non-sovereign Nation-100% stateless Fed status.
'The United States' are of America vs. The pretended 'United States' is located in the District of Columbia.
Agent: 'the Government of the U.S.' vs. Agent: pretended 'U.S. government' = War and revenue machine.
Constitutional Republic vs. Democracy = mob rule via private corporations using code = Lawlessness
American Union or this Union vs. Federal Union = U.S. War powers Code System of corporate Federalism.
OPINION, FOX, Chief Judge (U.S. District Court of Michigan): A mere statement of this fact may not seem very
significant; corporations, after all, are not supposed to exercise the governmental powers with which the Bill of
Rights was concerned. But this has been radically changed by the emergence of the public-private state. Today
private institutions do exercise governmental power; more, indeed, than 'government' itself ... . We have two
governments in America, then-one under the Constitution and a much greater one not under the Constitution. In
short, the inapplicability of our Bill of Rights is one of the crucial facts of American life today." C. Reich, The
Greening of America, 127-28 (Bantam ed. 1971). MILOSZEWSKI v. SEARS ROEBUCK, 346 F.Supp. 119 (1972)(2).
[The city, state, national governments are overthrown and replaced with U.S. private companies using deceptively similar
names ruling over us as business entities in their System of Federalism outside the Constitution = void as no law. ]
ALLEN, J. (Supreme Court of North Carolina):

If they are not under the Constitution, by what authority do they exist? It cannot be that we are living as to a part of
our government under the Constitution, and as to another part outside the Constitution, without restrictions
or limitations. BICKETT, ATTY. GEN. v. KNIGHT, 169 N.C. 333 (1917). [Lawlessness. It cannot be! ]
ACTING OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND ALL ACTION IS NULL = VOID
COX, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Indiana): A "Constitution" is legislation direct from the people acting in their
sovereign capacity, while a "statute" is legislation from their representatives, subject to limitations prescribed by the
superior authority. People v. May, 3 Mich. 598. [***] The Legislature, acting outside of the Constitution, is without
jurisdiction and its action null." ELLINGHAM v. DYE et al, 178 Ind. 336 (1912) (2). [Unlawful and illegal. ]
STATE CAN HAVE NO EXISTENCE OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION - SOVEREIGNTY EXTENDS TO WHAT IT CREATES
DUNN, Chief Justice (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine): While a state can have no existence, politically, outside
the Constitution of the United States, and although co-operation between the state and the Union of the States is
highly desirable, nevertheless the states are not in any true and complete sense inferior to, or dependent upon, the
United States. [***] The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is
introduced by its permission. STATE v. MARTIN, 134 Me. 448 (1936)(1). [All private authority, illegal and void.]
WHOLLY ILLEGAL AND VOID IN EVERY PART + IN EXPRESS DISREGARD AND VIOLATION
Mr. Justice NELSON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court: We agree that all the
proceedings of these eleven states, either severally or in conjunction, by means of which the existing governments
were overthrown, and new governments erected in their stead, were wholly illegal and void, and that they remained
after the attempted separation and change of government, in judgment of law, as completely under all their
constitutional obligations as before. The Constitution of the United States, which is the fundamental law of each
and all of them, not only afforded no countenance or authority for these proceedings, but they were, in every part of
them, in express disregard and violation of it. MAURAN v. INSURANCE CO., 73 U.S. 1 (1867)(1).
BEYOND (OUTSIDE) THE CONSTITUTION EVERY ACT IS USURPATION = LAWLESSNESS = SATANIC?
Justice DANIEL (supreme Court of the United States):
Beyond the Constitution or the powers it invests, every act must be a violation of duty, an usurpation. MARSHALL
v. BALTIMORE R.R. CO., 57 U.S. 314 (1853)(2). [You will see all of their authority is of Constitution of the People and
not otherwise. Beyond = outside the Constitution = lawless usurpation to steal: 'against the true intent of We the People'.]
14
CITIZENS ARE SUBJECT, IF TO ANY AUTHORITY "ONLY" TO THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF THE STATE
Justice Harlan (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the following opinion:
It is said that whatever may be the power of a state over such subjects, Congress cannot forbid single individuals
from disposing of their stock in a state corporation, even if such corporation be engaged in interstate and
international commerce; that the holding or purchase by a state corporation, or the purchase by individuals, of the
stock of another corporation, for whatever purpose, are matters in respect of which Congress has no authority under
the Constitution; that, so far as the power of Congress is concerned, citizens, or state corporations, may dispose of
their property and invest their money in any way they choose; and that in regard to all such matters, citizens and
state corporations are subject, if to any authority, only to the lawful authority of the state in which such citizens
reside or under whose laws such corporations are organized. NORTHERN SECURITIES CO. v. UNITED STATES,
193 U.S. 197 (1903)(2). [Only to lawful authority! Not private code of 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless U.S. citizens.]
USURPATION IS TREASON TO THE CONSTITUTION = TREASON AGAINST THE PEOPLE + AMERICA
Chief Justice MARSHALL (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take
jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the
confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution. COHENS v. VIRGINIA, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)(2). [Same in 178 U.S. 548, and 209 U.S. 123
(1908)(2);. Usurpation = against the true intent of the People = outside the Constitution = lawlessness = void. ]
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS VOID "AS NO LAW" = OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION = LAWLESS USURPATION
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The validity of the judgments is assailed on the ground that the acts of Congress under which the indictments were
found are unconstitutional. If this position is well taken, it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. An
unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offence created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not
merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment. It is true, if no writ of error
lies, the judgment may be final, in the sense that there may be no means of reversing it. But personal liberty is of so
great moment in the eye of the law that the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not deemed so conclusive
but that, as we have seen, the question of the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on
habeas corpus by a superior court or judge having authority to award the writ. We are satisfied that the present is one
of the cases in which this court is authorized to take such jurisdiction. We think so, because, if the laws are
unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes. Its authority to indict and try the
petitioners arose solely upon these laws. EX PARTE SIEBOLD, 100 U.S. 371 (1879)(1). [See my section on all of that.]
Mr. Justice THOMPSON (the supreme Court of the United States):
And in the consideration of all such questions, it cannot be too often repeated, (although universally admitted,) or
too deeply impressed on the mind, that all the powers of the general government are derived solely from the
constitution; and that whatever power is not conferred by that charter, is reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people. OGDEN v. SAUNDERS, 25 U.S. 213 (1827)(2). ['Solely' from the Constitution of the People. ]
UNDENIABLE: A NON-SOVEREIGN NATION HAS NO RIGHT TO GOVERN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
One Nation? Or, undeniably 2 Nations! The scam is revealed by the status of today's 'one Nation under God' = 100% 'Federal non-
sovereign Nation' (see National Voter Registration Act 42 USC 1973gg) composed of 'citizens of the United States' = '100% Federal non-
sovereign stateless person status' with no sovereign right to govern under the Constitution therefore outside the Constitution using
private copyright 'Code' statutes corruptly claiming it's the Law. That nation is undeniably not the 'sovereign Nation' or the supreme
power status composed of 'We the People of the United States' of America. The court cases etc. herein prove the status of every
official of that counterfeit Nation is 100% Federal non-sovereign U.S. citizens via registered voters with Social Security numbers, driver
licenses, all Federal taxpayers etc. To enslave us these servants simply pretend we are not We the People and rule over us via "United
States" which by statute of every state is 'located in the District of Columbia' a city 'of a Nation' = one Nation under God… pretending
to have 'corporations' deceptively styled 'STATE' that were never created by We the People in Constitutional Convention. The 'non-
sovereigns' deceptively called U.S. citizens elect their stateless U.S. President, U.S. Congress, U.S. citizen Governor, etc., who are also
U.S. citizen registered voters, with social security numbers, drivers licenses etc. which proves by law they are not claiming to be We the
People composing the sovereign Nation, thereby proving the Federal subjection conspiracy as undeniable. 'Acting' as U.S. citizens we
live in the states, but swear on government forms we are a mere 'resident' meaning 'not a Citizen of the state.' That System is all
uniform: All Federal = all U.S. = '100% Federal, non-sovereign, stateless person status.' If you get a license, government pretends you
are 'acting' as a public 'business entity' a mere 'artificial' creature of, therefore inferior to and under its control and 'subject to the
jurisdiction' of their private copyright Code statutes in their counterfeit 'System of Federalism' (New Deal) acting 100% outside the
Constitution since it was never created by We the People in Constitutional Convention intending to steal our wealth-Liberty-success via
illegal government deception 'against the true intent of the People.' In their Code/System 'We the People and the several states'
(Constitutional system) totally disappear, therefore our Liberty, which 'evinces a design' to reduce us under absolute Despotism once
you know the truth about 'status' composing the government or Constitution: The System is all written on paper. The Code-statutes of
15
these artificial creatures are strictly interpreted and say they apply to a 'person' to deceive the supreme sovereign 'people' and
Citizens. They intentionally conceal in statutes the word 'person' excludes the sovereign people, and a Citizen. Their fraud is for unjust
enrichment but God has not allowed this God forsaken System to have sovereign right to govern. The coming of the lawless one…
SOVEREIGNTY "CANNOT" EXIST IN DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS OR NATIONS AT THE SAME TIME
And it doesn't! Supreme Court interpretations may not be disregarded. Sovereignty from its 'nature' is never subordinate.
Justice DANIEL (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The rights and powers of sovereignty, on the part of Spain, over the territory, ceased with her transfer of that
sovereignty to another government; it could not exist in different governments or nations at the same time. The
power to preserve the peace and order of the community may be admitted to have been in the officers previously
appointed by Spain, until the actual presence of the agents of the succeeding government; but this would not imply
sovereign power still remaining in Spain,--for if she [or We the People. ] continued to be sovereign after expressly
conceding her sovereignty to another government, she might still rightfully resist and control that government; for
sovereignty from its nature is never subordinate. THE UNITED STATES v. REYNES, 50 U.S. 127 (1850)(1). [Never
subordinate! Much less to an artificial creature of a non-sovereign nation outside the Constitution. ]
SOVEREIGNTY AS THE RIGHT TO GOVERN - It's Global

Today's non-sovereign U.S. citizen government servants are of the one non-sovereign Nation = No right to govern in Law.
Mr. Chief Justice Jay described sovereignty as the "right to govern"; that kind of right would necessarily encompass
the right to determine what suits may be brought in the sovereign's own courts. [***] Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. NEVADA v. HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)(2). [They
cannot prove that wrong because Supreme Court interpretations may not be disregarded by any court, judge etc. ]
SOVEREIGNTY MAKES A NATION - WITHOUT WHICH IT CAN HAVE NO EXISTENCE - NO RIGHT TO MAKE LAWS
WADE, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana):
Only the sovereign power of the State or government can demand forfeiture of an alien's property, and this
authority proceeds from the right of self-protection which inheres in every government, giving it the power of self-
preservation. But this is a great sovereign prerogative right, which belongs only to the supreme power in a State,
and cannot be exercised by any subordinate, secondary or limited depositary of power. [***]
What do we mean by the term "sovereignty?" It is the exercise of, or right to exercise, supreme power,
dominion, sway; and, as applied to a State, it is the right to exercise supreme power, dominion, authority. Says
Vattel in his Treatise on the Law of Nations: "Nations or States are bodies politic-- societies of men united together
for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their mutual strength. Such a
society has her affairs and interests. She deliberates and takes resolutions in common, thus becoming a moral person
who possesses an understanding and a will peculiar to herself. From the very design that induces a number of men
to form a society which has its common interests, and which is to act in concert, it is necessary that there should be
established a public authority to order and direct what is to be done by each in relation to the end of the association.
This political authority is the SOVEREIGNTY."
And this sovereignty, we may add, is the elemental prerogative of a nation, an essential attribute that gives
to it being, life and character, and without which it can have no existence. Sovereignty makes a nation; it forms a
State, and the lack of it makes a colony, a province, a dependence. Sovereignty implies the right to make laws
and to enforce them, and the laws it enacts cannot be modified, altered or abolished, except by the same supreme
power which enacts them. To this power belongs the authority to define the rights of persons, and it may regulate the
manner and circumstances under which property is held, and may direct the modes of administering justice. [***]
Sovereignty then signifies independence, absolute freedom and liberty, and a superiority to and exemption from
every foreign or extraneous influence. Every nation, like every individual, possesses the inherent right of self-
defense, and for this purpose it may use or destroy the property of its citizens, and to this power of a nation may be
referred its right to make laws of escheat, and forfeiture, providing when and under what circumstances property
shall become forfeited to the State. The authority to enact laws of forfeiture is a sovereign prerogative, and belongs
only to the supreme power of a nation. TERRITORY OF MONTANA v. LEE, 2 Mont. 124 (1874)(1).
Super postulate 8: SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF JURISDICTION
JOHNSON, J. (the supreme Court of the United States):
The right of jurisdiction is essentially connected to, or rather identified with, the national sovereignty [We the
People. ]. To part with it is to commit a species of political suicide. In fact, a power to produce its own annihilation is
an absurdity in terms. It is a power as utterly incommunicable to a political as to a natural person. FLETCHER v.
PECK, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)(2). [Citing References 2644 times, 4/30/05. Exodus 3:14 I am that I am. The Constitution
secures our sovereign birthright, but U.S. committed suicide: No sovereign right to govern, tax, etc. ]
JURISDICTION IMPLIES SOVEREIGNTY
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GIBSON, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania) opinion of the Court: "Every highway, toll or free, is
licensed, constructed, and regulated by the immediate or delegated action of the sovereign power, and in every
commonwealth the people in the aggregate constitute the sovereign. But it is the prerogative of a sovereign to be
exempt from coercion by action, for jurisdiction implies sovereignty, and a sovereign can have no superior."
O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 (1851)(1). [Same in 42 Pa.C.C. 579 (1914)(1). No superior but God alone. ]

The contempt power is understandable when seen through the perspectives of its age of inception, an age of
allegedly divinely ordained monarchies, ruled by a king totally invested with all sovereign legal powers and
accountable only to God. Under any circumstances resistance to the king was a sin which would bring damnation.
STATE of Alaska v. BROWDER, 486 P.2d 925 (1971)(2). [Sins (crimes) against the People injuring no one. ]
"ONLY" FULL TERRITORIAL "SOVEREIGNS" ENJOY THE 'POWER' TO "ENFORCE" LAWS

Chief Justice REHNQUIST (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Only full territorial sovereigns enjoy the "power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign's
territory, whether citizens or aliens," and Indian tribes "can no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense." Duro
v. Reina, supra, at 685. ATKINSON TRADING v. SHIRELY, 532 U.S. 645 (2001)(2). [Only! Same in 169 U.S. 649.]
THE ONLY REASON

Wilson, Justice (supreme Court of the United States):
The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same
principles, upon which he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, which are
formed and authorised by those laws. If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an
aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise? If the dignity of each singly is
undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be unimpaired. Chisholm v. The State of Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)
(4). [Sovereigns injuring no one bound to obey their corrupt servants? You can release yourself: see 517 U.S. 44.]
AN 'INFERIOR' CANNOT RULE OVER ITS 'SUPERIOR' - WITH ITS LAW
If you remember anything besides We the people are the Supreme Power and Sovereigns, remember that global principle.
Always remember We the People are the 'supreme' power, sovereigns, source of the Law and creators of government.
Globally, the 'inferior' cannot rule over the 'superior' with its law. The 'creature' cannot rule the 'creator' etc.
Globally, the sovereign or supreme power self governs and is not subject to its own rules, much less law of its creature.
Globally, the sovereign or supreme power governs its subjects (non-sovereign inferiors) who owe 'allegiance'.
The Law 'mere human law' and mere legislation of an 'artificial creature' is of the Constitution 'of' We the People.
Penal statutes of our mere 'artificial creature' say they apply to a 'person' to deceive the 'people' (injuring no one).
Universal: 'ALL' JURISDICTION IMPLIES SUPERIORITY OF POWER - Global principle of Law

Why government our artificial creature has no 'right of jurisdiction' over the sovereign people-the 'supreme' power.

But, in the case of the King, the sovereignty had a double operation. While it vested him with jurisdiction over
others, it excluded all others from jurisdiction over him. With regard to him, there was no superior power; and,
consequently, on feudal principles, no right of jurisdiction.' The law, says Sir William Blackstone, ascribes to the
King the attribute of sovereignty: he is sovereign and independent within his own dominions; and owes no kind of
objection to any other potentate upon earth. Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the King, even
in civil matters; because no Court can have jurisdiction over him: for all jurisdiction implies superiority of power.'
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)(4). [ALL! One of the most logical and important postulates about 'right.' ]
Universal: ALL JURISDICTION IMPLIES SUPERIORITY OF POWER
In 1999 still quoting the same ancient global principle based on 'right,' and reason. Anything contrary would be absurd!
"And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-eminence... . Hence it is, that no suit or
action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all
jurisdiction implies superiority of power ...." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 234-235 (1765).
ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [See the same: M'Carty v. Nixon, 1 U.S. 77 (1784) herein.]
Universal: ALL JURISDICTION IMPLIES SUPERIORITY OF POWER - The States
HODGES, Justice (Supreme Court of Oklahoma) dissenting:
In an old English legal commentary (I Blackstone Commentaries. 242) the basis for the doctrine was explained: ' ***
no suit or action can be brought against the King, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over
him. For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power. Authority to try would be vain and idle, without an authority
to redress; and the sentence of a court would be contemptible, unless that court had power to command the
17
execution of it; but who, says Finch, shall command the King.' NEWMAN v. The STATE of Oklahoma ex rel,
1971 OK 84 (1971)(1). [See all jurisdiction implies superiority: Muni v. Hart, 6 La.Ann. 570 (1851)(1); MAURAN v. SMITH, 8
R.I. 192 (1865)(1); STATE v. FLETCHER, 39 Mo. 388 (1867)(1); STATE v. TOWN COUNCIL, 18 R.I. 258 (1893)(1); STATE v. STONE, 120 Mo.
428 (1894)(2); ELLINGHAM Sec. of St v. DYE, 178 Ind. 336 (1912)(2); STATE v. HEDRICK, 294 Mo. 21 (1922)(2); DRIGGS v. UTAH
TEACHERS, 105 Utah 417 (1943)(2); NEITING v. BLONDELL, 306 Minn. 122 (1975)(1) etc. Anything contrary would be absurd! ]
THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE IS 'SUPERIOR TO BOTH' = LEGISLATURES + COURTS = ALL LAW + JURISDICTION
Chief Justice TANEY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
'It is the more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and
the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.'
(Federalist, No. 77, by Hamilton.) 'Nor does the conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both,' &c., &c. LUTHER v.
BORDEN, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (2). [The established "Order of things" = the "Supreme" sovereign People superior to all
government our creature. See the same in ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) herein + case below etc. ]
JURISDICTION is 'NECESSARY' to VALID LEGISLATIVE as to VALID JUDICIAL action = ALL LEGISLATURES & COURTS
Opinion of the Court (Supreme Court of the United States) by Mr. Justice JACKSON, announced by Mr. Justice REED:
Jurisdiction is as necessary to valid legislative as to valid judicial action.' St. Louis v. Wiggins, 11 Wall. 423, 430.
MILLER v. MARYLAND, 347 U.S. 340 (1954)(2). [Personal jurisdiction is derived 'solely' from the Law-Constitution.]
'SUPERIOR' to ALL LEGISLATURES and ALL COURTS = ALL LAWS therefore ALL JURISDICTION
The Supreme Power + the 'ultimate Sovereignty' of the whole country.
BRADLEY, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):

That decision was made in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, and created such a shock of surprise
throughout the country that, at the first meeting of congress thereafter, the eleventh amendment to the constitution
was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the states. This amendment,
expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country, superior to all legislatures and all courts,
actually reversed the decision of the supreme court. HANS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)(2).
'ALL' COURTS-JUDGES DERIVE ALL OF THEIR AUTHORITY FROM THE PEOPLE

Mr. Justice CLARK (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
'The power to fine and imprison for contempt, from the earliest history of jurisprudence, has been regarded as a
necessary incident and attribute of a court, without which it could no more exist than without a judge. It is a power
inherent in all courts of record, and coexisting with them by the wise provisions of the common law. A court
without the power effectually to protect itself against the assaults of the lawless, or to enforce its orders, judgments,
or decrees against the recusant parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a stigma upon the age
which invented it. In this country, all courts derive their authority from the people, and hold it in trust for their
security and benefit. In this State, all judges are elected by the people, and hold their authority, in a double sense,
directly from them; the power they exercise is but the authority of the people themselves, exercised through courts
as their agents. It is the authority and laws emanating from the people, which the judges sit to exercise and enforce.
Contempts against these courts, in the administration of their laws, are insults offered to the authority of the people
themselves, and not to the humble agents of the law, whom they employ in the conduct of their government. The
power to compel the lawless offender, against decency and propriety, to respect the laws of his country, and submit
to their authority (a duty to which the good citizen yields hearty obedience, without compulsion) must exist, or
courts and laws operate at last as a restraint upon the upright, who need no restraint, and a license to the offenders,
whom they are made to subdue.' At 341--342 of 36 Miss. UNITED STATES v. BARNETT, 376 U.S. 681 (1964)(2).
[Power and Jurisdiction are solely in the established judicial 'Courts' of the sovereign people, not in judges-servants. ]
THE ORDER OF THINGS (RANK IN LAW) FOR LAWFUL RIGHT OF JURISDICTION = INFERIOR CANNOT RULE SUPERIOR
The 'People' of the United States = Sovereigns, Supreme Power, source and creators of government our creature.
A 'citizen of the United States' in and 'resident' of a state = a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status.
Pretended 'United States citizen' in the state = 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status-SS#.
'person' = resident = not a Citizen of any state; and an artificial person-creature of law = stateless non-sovereign.
Driver License = 'acting' as a business entity, the ALL CAPITAL LETTER name = artificial person-taxpayer-slave.
The fraud is they pretend to convert the People into a statutory 'person' and fail to provide a 100% full definition.
Super Postulate 9: Laws are rules of action prescribed by a "SUPERIOR" which the "INFERIOR" is bound to obey.
That is a super key of knowledge and a universal principle. All Law, therefore all jurisdiction revolves around that great principle.
His Honor (Court of Appeals of South Carolina) on hearing the case, delivered the following judgment:
MR. (ATTORNEY GENERAL) SMITH'S ARGUMENT:
The truth is, the Constitution would be a mere power of Attorney, special or general, according to its terms, but
revokable and changeable according to the will of the sovereign; nor would the sovereignty of the country supposed
to be in the laws made by the Legislature or the people. "Laws are but the rules of action prescribed by a superior,
18
which the inferior is bound to obey." 1 Blackstone Commentaries 1. They [laws] are not the superior. They [laws]
are not the sovereign. They [laws] are merely the declaration of the will of the sovereign, through his Legislative
agents--authoritative and supreme over the citizen, so long as they are permitted to be of force, but changeable and
revokable at the will of the sovereign or his agents. There was a power above the Government, and the agents of the
Government, above the Constitution and Laws, by whose authority they all existed, and by whose authority they
could all be extinguished. That power was sovereignty, and that power was in the people. The State v. Meekin, 20
S.C.L. 1 (1834)(1). [We the People the supreme power, the supreme sovereign creators and source of all lawful:
government power, human law, and therefore jurisdiction. True Law is 100% righteous only. ]
Universal: ALL HUMAN LAW

In 1999 still citing and quoting the same ancient global principle based on right and logic.
We the People are the supreme power. The Law is enforced by right. Lawlessness is enforced by might.
Justice SOUTER, STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
"[***] The principle is, that all human law must be prescribed by a superior. This principle I mean not now to exa
Suffice it, at present to say, that another principle, very different in its nature and operations, forms, in my judgment,
the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of equality and justice must be
founded on the consent of those, whose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be
found in the man." Id., at 458. 1 Blackstone Commentaries. 241, 242. ALDEN et al v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(2). [Citing Reference 3210 times, 4/30/05. The sovereign is We the people, not our government. ]
The Supreme Court quoted Blackstone on the Common Law, reason and logic. The Common law (court cases, principles,
maxims etc.) not contrary to the Constitutions is the rule of decision in most states. Buy Blackstone Commentaries Vol. 1, Section 2
(the Nature of Laws in General); see the same global principle of law on pages 38, 39, 43, 44, 46, 49, 52, 53, 58, 88, etc. All jurisdiction
is based on the same principle 235, 237, 239, and must be prescribed by clear and unquestionable authority of law. The complete text
of Blackstone's Commentaries is available from the Yale Law School's 'Avalon Project'. See http://www.yale.edu.lawweb/avalon/
blackstone/blacks to.htm. Our creature has no lawful 'right' of jurisdiction prescribed by law over the supreme sovereign people. See
the same in M’Carty v. Nixon and the Schooner Exchange herein etc. By right all human law must be prescribed by a 'superior' and the
People are the 'supreme' power. The sovereign when traced to its 'source' must be found in man, not in a limited artificial creature 'of'
man. All lawful government is 'of' the Constitution 'of' the People and filled with temporary servants who come and go. It is impossible
for the People to be of their artificial creature. Sovereigns do not govern other sovereigns with human law. Sovereigns (by whatever
title) govern non-sovereigns (by whatever title-the governed) who owe allegiance and are governed by the sovereign's laws. The
Constitution does not say our servants were delegated power over the sovereign People, let alone when not injuring anyone. It is far
worse if our servants illegally subject the entire mass of good people and steal our Liberty and property than if a few bad people injure
and get away with refusing to do Justice. Servants quit breaking the Law and refusing to do Justice: We injured no one, Leave us alone.
'THE LAW' [MERE HUMAN LAW] IS THE DEFINITION AND "LIMITATION" OF POWER
Chief Justice Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, and Justice Peckham (Supreme Court of the U.S.) dissenting:
'The United States,' 'our great republic, which is composed of states and territories.' [***]
The government of the United States is the government ordained by the Constitution, and possesses the powers
conferred by the Constitution. 'This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different
departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by
those departments. The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are
defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?' Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 176. The opinion of the court,
by Chief Justice Marshall, in that case, was delivered at the February term, 1803, and at the October term, 1885, the
court, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, speaking through Mr. Justice Matthews, said: 'When we consider the
nature and theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review
the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play
and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is
the definition and limitation of power.' DOWNES v. BIDWELL, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)(2). [Same in COTTING v. GODARD,
183 U.S. 79 (1901)(2). No one, much less private authority has any "legal right" prescribed by Law over the People. ]
MUST BE CLEAR AND "UNQUESTIONABLE" AUTHORITY OF LAW

Before the turn of the century, this Court observed that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). CRUZAN v. DIRECTOR MO. DEPT. OF HEALTH, 497 U.S. 261 (1989)(2).
RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE = TOTAL PERSONAL IMMUNITY FROM GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL

19
(N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... . and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment which provides: No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law... . with the language of the Declaration of Independence: We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. [***] In reaching this conclusion, we are cognizant
of the fact that the term 'liberty' is an illusive concept, incapable of definitive, comprehensive explication. Yet at
the core of this concept is the notion of total personal immunity from governmental control: the right 'to be let
alone.' In 1891, the Supreme Court of the United States embraced Judge Cooley's famous definition of 'liberty': See
E. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.U.L.Rev. 216 (1960). No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As
well said by Judge Cooley, 'The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let
alone.' (emphasis in the original). Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). Justice Douglas
amplified this interpretation of 'liberty' in Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1144, (1972):
The word 'liberty' is not defined in the Constitution. But ... it includes at least the fundamental rights 'retained by
the people'... . One's hair style, like one's taste for food, or one's liking for certain kinds of music, art, reading,
recreation, is certainly fundamental in our constitutional scheme-a scheme designed to keep government off the
backs of people. BREESE v. SMITH, 501 P.2d 159 (972)(1). [The right to be true status according to the Law! ]
I Object to their jurisdiction not being clear and 'unquestionable' authority of Law. We injured no one and the supreme
sovereign people cannot lawfully be commanded by statutes 'of' this artificial creature. Hence, why government's illegal Forms and
Applications scam to pretend the sovereign 'people' are a non-sovereign stateless 'person' of and inferior to government which is all a
dead thing, an artificial person created by law. Plus we have unalienable rights endowed by our Creator that cannot be lawfully given
away, bartered, or taken by these mere temporary non-sovereign, stateless, servants-creatures bound by oath to secure our all. All
men have unalienable private rights endowed by their Creator. Artificial entities do not have unalienable rights from their creator.
JURISDICTION IS DERIVED "SOLELY" FROM THE LAW - OF THE CONSTITUTION - OF THE PEOPLE
Justice O'CONNOR (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
This Court said in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547-548 (1989): "It remains rudimentary law that '[a]s
regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction,
whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of
Congress must have supplied it... . To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.' " (quoting
Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252 (1867)). CITY OF CHICAGO v. INTERNAT’L COLLEGE, 522 U.S. 156
(1997)(2). [Jurisdiction is derived solely from the Law and of the Constitution of the sovereign people. Apply to IRS etc.]
ALL JURISDICTION COMES SOLELY FROM THE LAW

A Constitution is the Law 'of' the People, legislation is mere law of our artificial creature, of the Constitution of the People.
BRICKLEY, Justice (Supreme Court of Michigan) dissenting:

'This Court has never held that jurisdiction of the subject-matter can be conferred by consent or waiver....
"[J]urisdiction comes solely from the law, in no degree from consent of litigants. So that neither consent nor
anything else can authorize a court to act in a cause outside the sphere which the law has ordained for it." ' " Id. at
404-405 [175 N.W.2d 879] (citing Nichols v. Houghton Circuit Judge, 185 Mich. 654 [1915]). PEOPLE of the State
of Michigan v. SMITH, 438 Mich. 715 (1991)(3). [See the same in Jones v. Morris, 97 Va. 48; LONG v. LONG, 151 VA.
156 (1928). Without jurisdiction (power prescribed by Law of a sovereign) = Void. ]
RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska): See 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law s 379 (1965):
Jurisdiction of the subject matter is derived from the law. It can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the
accused. Objection that the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter may be made at any stage of the
proceedings, and the right to make such objection is never waived. But jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
may be acquired by consent of the accused or by waiver of objections. If he fails to make his objection in time, he
will be deemed to have waived it. Such an objection is also waived by pleading not guilty and going to trial. The
accused cannot raise the question for the first time in the appellate court. MORGAN v. STATE of Alaska, 635 P.2d
472 (1981)(3). [I Object and challenge how the State (free of all fraud) has lawful jurisdiction and power over me. ]
THE LAW ALONE SHALL GOVERN

MR. JUSTICE FIELD (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
We fully agree with the presiding justice of the Circuit Court in the doctrine that the military should always be kept
in subjection to the laws of the country to which it belongs, and that he is no friend to the Republic who advocates
the contrary. The established principle of every free people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it the military
must always yield. We do not controvert the doctrine of Mitchell v. Harmony, reported in the 13th of Howard; on
the contrary, we approve it. DOW v. JOHNSON, 100 U.S. 158 (1879)(1). [The Law alone. Must always yield. ]
20
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE COMMANDS: JURISDICTION OF COURTS 'SHALL' BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW
Find the same, or a synonymous provision in the Constitution of your state.
BURKE, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska): [Constitution, Article IV "The Judiciary" Section 1. ]
Judicial Power and Jurisdiction. The judicial power of the State is vested in a supreme court, a superior court, and
the courts established by the legislature. The jurisdiction of courts shall be prescribed by law. Alaska Const. art. IV,
ß 1. CITIZENS COALITION v. McALPINE, 810 P.2d 162 (1991)(1). [All judicial power and jurisdiction are vested
solely in the 'established' judicial 'courts' of 'The Judiciary,' not in mere judges who come and go, or private corporations.]
COURTS [AND JUDGES] ARE MERE INSTRUMENTS 'OF THE LAW' AND CAN WILL NOTHING
All lawful power and jurisdiction are derived solely from the Law of the Constitution 'of' the sovereign people.
Chief Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere
instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is
the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the
Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or in other words, to the will of the law.
OSBORN v. BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, 22 U.S. 738 (1824)(2). [Same 183 Okla. 286 (1938), 68 Conn. 186.
Mere jurisdiction without power prescribed by Law to render and execute judgment is a scam to usurp over people. ]
DISCRETION OF A JUDGE IS THE LAW OF TYRANTS
A judge is a mere temporary servant of the People. Today's corrupt so called judges could use a Constitutional enema.
HANEY, Circuit Judge (9th Circuit Court of Appeals):

'The discretion of a judge is said by Lord Camden to be the law of tyrants: it is always unknown, it is different in
different men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper and passion. In the best, it is oftentimes caprice;
in the worst, it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable *** '. 1 Bouv.Law Dict.,Rawles'
Third Revision, p. 885. DELNO v. MARKET, 124 F.2d 965 (1942)(2). [Same in 402 U.S. 183 and 3 Conn. 112. Today's
so called courts are 'private companies and for profit corporations;' no wonder why their justice bleeds us dry. ]
IF THE LAW CONFERS 'POWER' TO 'RENDER' JUDGMENT "THEN" THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION
Justice BALDWIN (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
However late this objection has been made, or may be made in any cause, in an inferior or appellate court of the
United States, it must be considered and decided, before any court can move one further step in the cause; as any
movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject
matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them; the question
is, whether on the case before a court, their action is judicial or extra-judicial; with or without the authority of law,
to render a judgment or decree upon the rights of the litigant parties. If the law confers the power to render a
judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction; what shall be adjudged or decreed between the parties, and with
which is the right of the case, is judicial action, by hearing and determining it. 6 Peters, 709; 4 Russell, 415; 3
Peters, 203-7. The State of R.I. v. The Common Wealth of Mass., 37 U.S. 657 (1838)(1). [Also 56 P. 1082 (1898)(1).]
COURT'S 'POWER TO ACT' IS ALTOGETHER DISTINCT FROM SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
OPINION OF THE COURT (Circuit Court, District of Michigan):
The subject matter, then, on which the court acts, is altogether distinct from its jurisdictional powers. The one is the
contract, the other the powers by which it is enforced. LORMAN et al v. CLARKE, 15 F.Cas. 915 (1841)(1). [The
power of the Court to enforce its order or judgment etc. prescribed by clear and unquestionable authority of Law by ( Writ
of) 'execution' which is the end of the Law and gives the successful party the fruits of his judgment of the court. ]
IF THE LAW SAYS THE COURT SHALL HAVE ‘POWER’ TO ACT = EXERCISE OR EXECUTE JURISDICTION
Mr. Justice THOMPSON (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Some criticisms have been made at the bar, between the use of the terms power and cognizance, as employed in
those sections. It is not perceived how such distinction, if any exists, can affect the construction of this law. That
there is a distinction, in some respects, cannot be doubted; and, generally speaking, the word power is used in
reference to the means employed in carrying jurisdiction into execution. But, it may well be doubted, whether any
marked distinction is observed and kept up in our laws, so as in any measure to affect the construction of those laws.
Power must include jurisdiction, which is generally used in reference to the exercise of that power in courts of
justice. But power, as used in the constitution, would seem to embrace both. [***]
This power must certainly embrace jurisdiction, so far as that term is applicable to the exercise of
legislative or executive power. And as relates to judicial power, the term jurisdiction is not used, until the
distribution of those powers among the several courts, is pointed out and defined. [***]
21
No court can, in the ordinary administration of justice, in common law proceedings, exercise jurisdiction
over a party unless he shall voluntarily appear, or is found within the jurisdiction of the court, so as to be served
with process. Such process cannot reach the party beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. And besides, this
is a personal privilege which may be waived by appearance; and if advantage is to be taken of it, it must be by plea
or some other mode at an early stage in the cause.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
Much has been said about the meaning of the words 'powers' and 'cognizance' as used in these acts of congress.
These words are no doubt generally used in reference to courts of justice, as meaning the same thing; and I have
frequently so used them in expressing my opinion in this case. But it is manifest that they are not so used in the acts
of congress establishing the judicial system of the United States; and that the word powers is employed to denote
the process, the means, the modes of proceedings, which the courts are authorized to use in exercising their
jurisdiction in the cases specially enumerated in the law as committed to their 'cognizance.' Thus in the act of 1789,
ch. 20, the 11th section specifically enumerates the cases, or subject matter of which the circuit courts shall have
'cognizance;' and subsequent sections under the name of 'powers' describe the process, the means which the courts
may employ in exercising their jurisdiction in the cases specified. For example, section 14 gives them the ' power' to
issue the writs 'necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions;' and names particularly some of the writs
which they shall have the 'power' to issue; section 15, gives them the 'power' to compel parties to produce their
books, &c.; section 17, gives them the 'power' to grant new trials, to administer oaths, to punish contempts, and to
establish rules of court. The same distinction between 'powers' and jurisdiction or 'cognizance' is preserved in the
act of February 13, 1801.
Justice BARBOUR: The principle is, as laid down in the number of the Federalist, just referred to-'That the judiciary
power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects
of litigation, between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most
distant part of the globe.' In conformity with this principle, it is said by this Court, 1 Wheaton, 340, speaking of the
state courts: 'From the very nature of their judicial duties, they would be called upon to pronounce the law
applicable to the case in judgment. They were not to decide merely according to the laws or constitution of the state,
but according to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, the supreme law of the land.' [***]
It is thus apparent, that congress used the terms jurisdiction, and powers, as being of different import. The sections
giving jurisdiction, describe the subject matter, and the parties of which the courts may take cognizance; the
sections giving powers, import authority to issue certain writs, and do certain acts incidentally becoming necessary
in, and being auxiliary to, the exercise of their jurisdiction. In regard to all the powers in the fifteenth and
seventeenth sections, this is apparent beyond all doubt, as every power given in both those sections, necessarily
presupposes that it is to be exercised in a suit actually before them, except the last in the seventeenth section, and
that is clearly an incidental one, it being a power 'to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly
conducting business in the said courts,' &c. And this bring me directly to the fourteenth section, under which it was
contended, in the case of M'Cluny v. Silliman, that the circuit courts could issue writs of mandamus. That section is
in these words:--'That all the beforementioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire
facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.' As the writ of
mandamus is not specially provided for by law, except in the case of the Supreme Court; it is obvious, that to enable
any circuit court to issue it, it must be shown to be necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. [***]
Upon the same principle, I believe that it may be affirmed, without exception, unless where a statutory
provision has been made, that in every state of the Union, where the common law prevails, this writ issues only
from the court possessing the highest original common law jurisdiction. KENDALL, POSTMASTER GENERAL v.
THE UNITED STATES, 37 U.S. 524 (1838)(2). [Today's System outside the Constitution has no lawful Power. ]
DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'RENDER' AND MERE 'ENTRY' OF JUDGMENT-DECREE-ORDER

LAYTON, Chief Justice (Superior Court of Delaware) delivering the opinion of the court:
The rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the Court in pronouncing the sentence of the law upon the facts in
controversy as ascertained by the pleadings, and verdict or findings, as distinguished from the entry of the judgment
which is the ministerial act of spreading it at large upon the record. HAZZARD v. ALEXANDER, 178 A. 873
(1935)(1). [A member of the Bar (so called Judge) enters an order upon motion submitted by = 'of' a party. ]
INFLEXIBLE AND WITHOUT EXCEPTION
Jurisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter
jurisdiction) and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that the court's decision will bind them. In
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), this Court adhered to the rule that a federal court
may not hypothesize subject-matter jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits. Steel Co. rejected a doctrine,
once approved by several Courts of Appeals, that allowed federal tribunals to pretermit jurisdictional objections
22
"where (1) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same
as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied." Id., at 93, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Recalling "a long and venerable line of
our cases," id., at 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, Steel Co. reiterated: "The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a
threshold matter ... is 'inflexible and without exception,' " id., at 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (quoting Mansfield, C. &
L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)); for "[j]urisdiction is power to declare the law," and " '[w]ithout
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause,' " 523 U.S., at 94, (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall.
506, 514 (1868)). RUHRGAS v. MARATHON OIL, 526 U.S. 574 (1999)(2). [Power prescribed by the sovereign.]
JURISDICTION SHOULD BE CLEARLY AND UNQUESTIONABLY PROVEN - IF NOT INTENDED TO DEFRAUD US
Chief Justice MARSHALL (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
If the jurisdiction does not appear upon the face of the proceedings, the presumption of law is, that the court had not
jurisdiction, and the cause was coram non judice; in which case no valid judgment could be rendered. Ex PARTE
TOBIAS WATKINS, 28 U.S. 193 (1830)(2). [If not intended to defraud, jurisdiction should be on the face, and the
judge should not refuse to ascertain the Truth about your true status-personal jurisdiction and power to enforce etc. ]
KEY: 'EXECUTION' IS THE END OF THE LAW - NOT A MERE ORDER, DECREE, OR JUDGMENT
Justice SHIRAS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
But it has been frequently determined by this court that the jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition of
the judgment, but continues until the judgment shall be satisfied. Thus it was said in Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall.
166, that 'process subsequent to judgment is as essential to jurisdiction as process antecedent, else the judicial
power would be incomplete, and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the constitution.'
And in Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136, it was said: 'The two sets of tribunals, state and national, are as
independent as they are separate. Neither can impede or arrest any action the other may take, within the limits of its
jurisdiction, for the satisfaction of its judgment and decrees.'
'An execution is the end of the law. It gives the successful party the fruits of his judgment.' U.S. v. Nourse,
9 Pet. 28. But it is scarcely necessary to quote authorities to show that to deprive a court of the power to execute its
decrees is to essentially impair its jurisdiction. 'Juris effectus in executione consistit.' Co. Litt. 289. CENTRAL
NAT. BANK OF BOSTON v. STEVENS, 169 U.S. 432 (1898)(2). [Execution power must be prescribed by Law.]
In Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945), the Supreme Court said a final decision generally was 'one
which ends the litigation *** and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' See also 9 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 110.08 (2d ed. 1970). STATE of Alaska v. BROWDER, 486 P.2d 925 (1971)(2).
'POWER' TO ENFORCE (ORDER-JUDGMENT-DECREE) MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW
INCH, District Judge (District Court, E.D. New York):
While jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, complete jurisdiction includes not only
the power to hear and determine but the power to enforce the determination. 15 Corpus Juris, ß 19, page 728, and
cases cited. In re POTELL, 53 F.2d 877 (1931)(2). [Writ of execution = power to enforce prescribed by law. ]
EXECUTION IS AN 'ESSENTIAL' PART OF EVERY JUDGMENT
Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion in which Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and Justice STEVENS joined:
Although the entry of an enforcement order is in some respects merely formal, it has long been recognized that
"'[t]he award of execution ... is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial
power. It is no judgment in the legal sense of the term, without it.' " ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 484, (1894),
quoting Chief Justice Taney's memorandum in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864). NORTHERN
PIPLELINE CONSTRUCTION v. UNITED STATES, 458 U.S. 50 (1982)(2). [See MEDIMMUNE, INC., PETITIONER v.
GENENTECH (2007). I will demand a judicial 'Court of record' with criminal 'Common Law jurisdiction.' None are open, only
(for profit corporations) courts with non-sovereign stateless Bar Association members deceptively called Judges. ]
ADD THIS NEXT PROFOUND CASE ABOUT JURISDICTION WITH THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SECTION HEREIN:
Defendant cannot be brought before 'any' municipal court, on account of their 'sovereign
character.' Courts must be confined to the particular cases, controversies, and parties 'over' which
the Constitution and laws have authorized it to act; any proceeding without the limits prescribed, is
coram non judice, and its action a 'nullity':
Justice BALDWIN (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
There are other classes of cases where the objection to the jurisdiction is of a different nature, as on a bill in
chancery; that the subject matter is cognizable only by the king in council, and not by any judicial power, 1 Ves. sen.
445; or that the parties, defendant, cannot be brought before any municipal court, on account of their sovereign
character, and the nature of the controversy; as 1 Ves. ir. 371, 387; 2 Ves. jr. 56, 60; or in the very common cases
23
which present the question, whether the cause properly belongs to a court of law or equity. To such cases, a plea in
abatement would not be applicable, because the plaintiff could not sue in an inferior court; the objection goes to a
denial of any jurisdiction of a municipal court in one class of cases; and to the jurisdiction of any court of equity or
of law in the other: on which last, the court decides according to their legal discretion. An objection to jurisdiction,
on the ground of exemption from the process of the court in which the suit is brought, or the manner in which a
defendant is brought into it, is waived by appearance and pleading to issue. 10 Peters, 473; Toland v. Sprague, 12
Peters, 300; but when the objections goes to the power of the court over the parties, or the subject matter, the
defendant need not, for he cannot give the plaintiff a better writ or bill. Where no inferior court can have jurisdiction
of a case in law or equity, the ground of the objection is not taken by plea in abatement, as an exception of the given
case, from the otherwise general jurisdiction of the court; appearance does not cure the defect of judicial power, and
it may be relied on by plea, answer, demurrer, or at the trial or hearing, unless it goes to the manner of bringing the
defendant into court, which is waived by submission to the process.
As a denial of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit between parties within the realm, over which
and whom the court has power to act, cannot be successful in an English court of general jurisdiction; a motion like
the present could not be sustained consistently with the principles of its constitution. But as this Court is one of
limited and special original jurisdiction, its action must be confined to the particular cases, controversies, and
parties over which the constitution and laws have authorized it to act; any proceeding without the limits prescribed,
is coram non judice, and its action a nullity. 10 Peters, 474; S. P. 4 Russ. 415. And whether the want or excess of
power is objected by a party, or is apparent to the Court, it must surcease its action, or proceed extra-judicially. THE
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. THE COMMON WEALTH OF MASSACHUTESS, 37 U.S. 657 (1838)(1).
[Sovereignty is of course not subject to law. War 'power' = military = force distinguished from the Law. Mine]
Before an executive branch for profit private company deceptively called COURT, I would say I waive nothing nor consent to
anything, expressly deny I am in "active" service or subject of any Land or naval forces, or militia, any government, or pretended
government, or political subdivision thereof; and like servant President Clinton demand a Court of Common Law (criminal) jurisdiction;
a Common Law trial by jury of my peers in the first instance in full conformity with the Bill of Rights, object, charge government
deception, deny I am the class of person subject to the statute, and demand an affirmative showing of its true meaning by the
legislative intent of the artificial creature, and stand on the right to assistance of counsel, and plead the 5 th Amendment: remain silent.
STATUTES ARE SUPPOSED TO BE "STRICTLY" INTERPRETED

AGAINST GOVERNMENT JURISDICTION AND CANNOT BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE WORDS USED.
Demand they 'prove' the 'person' in a statute applies to one of the sovereign 'people' according to the postulates-principles.
JURISDICTION OF OUR ARTIFICIAL CREATURE MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW AND IS SOLELY FOR NON-SOVEREIGNS
Types of jurisdiction: personal-status, territorial, subject matter, and execution or 'power' to enforce jurisdiction w/o consent.
You must understand the 'vice of vagueness' in statutes of the artificial creature is 'treachery' because they 'intentionally
conceal' the sovereign people are excluded in the meaning of the word 'person' plus fail to fully explain the reasons why according to
the postulates. If the Law actually applied to the People, it would be super easy to simply write 'people' in any statute. So, the vice of
(jurisdictional) vagueness in criminal statutes is the 'treachery' they intentionally conceal 'what persons' are included and excluded =
Mega fraud! Why? 1st, because no person can be lawfully deprived of life, liberty, or property unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of Law (of our artificial creature). 2 nd, in legal terminology-statutes 'person' means other than human beings (artificial
persons) and in common usuage we call people persons. So they conceal the word 'person' does not include the people. Intentional
Treachery? Fraud? Treason? Or Terrorism by government (men) engaged in theft by deception? To commit crime? Satanic? The
coming of the lawless one…
PRECISE LANGUAGE IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT - SUPER IMPORTANT

important. Sivertsen v. State, 981 P.2d 564 (1999). [It's all about ascertaining the whole Truth about Lawful Power.]
"VOID" FOR VAGUENESS - VAGUENESS = LEGISLATURE'S INTENTIONAL TRAP VIA DECEPTION
"A law is void for vagueness if persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application....' Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.8 quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court , 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67
(1960). The offense to due process lies in both the nature and consequences of vagueness. First, vague laws do not
give individuals fair notice of the conduct proscribed. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162.
Accord Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104, 108 & n. 3. Second, vague laws do not limit the exercise of
discretion by law enforcement officials; thus they engender the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville , 405
U.S. at 168-70. Third, vague laws defeat the intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional
regime. We remain 'a government of laws, and not of men,' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163, only
so long as our laws remain clear." 630 F.2d, at 1037 (citations abbreviated). CITY OF MESQUITE v. ALADDIN’S
CASTLE, 455 U.S. 283 (1982)(2). [How true. They $intentionally$ fail to cite the people are excluded and why. ]
24
TREACHERY = EVIL = CONCEAL "WHAT PERSONS ARE INCLUDED?" (AND EXCLUDED) = FRAUD = VOID
'The vice of vagueness in criminal statutes is the treachery they conceal either in determining what persons are
included or what acts are prohibited. Words which are vague and fluid *** may be as much of a trap for the
innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula.' United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952). Harris v. State, 457
P.2d 638, (Alaska, 1969). [Implies everyone is not included! The servants wish to commit crime on the sovereigns? ]
"VOID" FOR VAGUENESS = VOID FOR INTENTONAL FRAUD TO SUBJECT US

See generally Amsterdam, 'The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,' 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67 (1960).
[***] The third consideration is whether the statute is drawn so imprecisely that it creates a danger of arbitrary
enforcement. Stock v. State, supra at 8; State v. Martin, supra at 324 (concurring opinion); See, e. g., Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). [Woe unto the lawyers ye take away the 'keys' of jurisdictional knowledge. ]
[fn14.] The notice requirement embodies notions of fundamental fairness. Long ago, the United States Supreme
Court said that 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due
process of law.' Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391(1926). See, e. g., Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939); State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316, 323 (Alaska 1975) (Erwin, J. and Rabinowitz, J., concurring); Marks v.
City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1972). See generally Annot., 96 L.Ed. 374 (1952) and Annot., 16 L.Ed.2d
1231 (1967). We recognize our duty to construe a statute, where it is reasonable to do so, to avoid dangers of
unconstitutionality. LARSON v. STATE of Alaska, 564 P.2d 365. (1977)(1). [Making us guess = Intentional fraud?]
"NO ONE" MAY BE REQUIRED TO "SPECULATE" + "ALL" ARE ENTITLED TO BE INFORMED

Supreme duty of the Mlitary (OATH) is protection and security of the people + the lawful Government. Inform them, Troopers + Police.
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. s 890, provides:
'Any person subject to this chapter who--
'(1) strikes his superior commissioned officer or draws or lifts up any weapon or offers any violence against him
while he is in the execution of his office; or '(2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned
officer; 'shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-
martial may direct, and if the offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a
court-martial may direct.'
Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. s 933, provides:
'Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming of an officer and a
gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.' [***]
In United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893), the Court considered a court-martial conviction under what is now
Art. 133, rejecting Captain Fletcher's claim that the court-marital could not properly have held that his refusal to pay
a just debt was 'conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.' The Court of Claims decision which the Court
affirmed in Fletcher stressed the military's 'higher code termed honor, which holds its society to stricter
accountability' (fn 19) and with which those trained only in civilian law are unfamiliar. In Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. 553 (1897) [***] '(T)his is the very matter that falls within the province of courts-martial, and in respect to
which their conclusions cannot be controlled or reviewed by the civil courts. As was said in Smith v. Whitney, 116
U.S. 178, 'Of questions not depending upon the construction of the statutes, but upon unwritten military law or
usage, within the jurisdiction of courts-martial, military or naval officers, from their training and experience in the
service, are more competent judges than the courts of common law.'' 165 U.S., at 562. [***]
This Court has on more than one occasion invalidated statutes under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment because they contained no standard whatever by which criminality could be ascertained, and
the doctrine of these cases has subsequently acquired the shorthand description of 'void for vagueness.' Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). [***]
'Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not
reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). [***]
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965), the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing 'attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the
requisite narrow specificity' ... .'[I charge void for vagueness, I understand the statute does not apply to me. ][***]
The United States Court of Military Appeals has sensibly expounded the reason for this different
application of First Amendment doctrines in its opinion in United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A., at 570, 45
C.M.R., at 344: 'In the armed forces some restrictions exist for reasons that have no counterpart in the civilian
community. Disrespectful and contemptuous speech, even advocacy of violent change, is tolerable in the civilian
25
community, for it does not directly affect the capacity of the Government to discharge its responsibilities unless it
both is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. Brandenburg v. Ohio (395
U.S. 444 (1969)).
In Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct.Cl. 541 (1891), the Court of Claims reviewed a court-martial finding that
a Captain Fletcher was guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer in having, "with intent to defraud, failed,
neglected, and refused to pay (one W.) the amount due him, though repeatedly requested to do so." The court found
this charged offense to come within the article. The sentiments expressed by Judge Nott, writing for the court in that
case, are just as applicable to the case we decide today.
'It must be confessed that, in the affairs of civil life and under the rules and principles of municipal law,
what we ordinarily know as fraud relates to the obtaining of a man's money, and not to refusing to pay it back. It is
hard for the trained lawyer to conceive of an indictment or declaration which should allege that the defendant
defrauded A or B by refusing to return to him the money which he had borrowed from him. Our legal training, the
legal habit of mind, as it is termed, inclines us to dissociate punishment from acts which the law does not define as
offenses. As one of our greatest writers of fiction puts it, with metaphysical fitness and accurate sarcasm, as she
describes one of her legal characters, 'His moral horizon was limited by the civil code of Tennessee.' That it is a
fraud to obtain a man's money by dishonest representations, but not a fraud to keep it afterwards by any amount
of lying and deceit, is a distinction of statutory tracing. The gambler who throws away other people's money and
the spendthrift who uses it in luxurious living instead of paying it back, cheat and defraud their creditors as
effectually as the knaves and sharpers who drift within the meshes of the criminal law. We learnt as law students
in Blackstone that there are things which are malum in se and, in addition to them, things which are merely malum
prohibitum; but unhappilly in the affairs of real life we find that there are many things which are malum in se
without likewise being malum prohibitum. In military life there is a higher code termed honor, which holds its
society to stricter accountability; and it is not desirable that the standard of the Army shall come down to the
requirements of a criminal code.' Id., at 562-- 563. [***]
Relativistic notions of right and wrong, or situation ethics, as some call it, have achieved in recent times a
disturbingly high level of prominence in this country, both in the guise of law reform, and as a justification of
conduct that persons would normally eschew as immoral and even illegal. The truth is that the moral horizons of
the American people are not footloose, or limited solely by 'the civil code of Tennessee.' The law should, in
appropriate circumstances, be flexible enough to recognize the moral dimension of man and his instincts concerning
that which is honorable, decent, and right.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting:
'Membership by a school teacher in an organization advocating the violent disestablishment of the United States
Government has been regarded as conduct requiring dismissal. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485. It
seems to us that such membership is even more profoundly evil in the case of a person in the military
establishment. True, affiliation implies something less than membership (Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 143), but
the supreme duty of the military is the protection and security of the government and of the people. Hence, aside
from a specific intent on the part of the accused to overthrow the government by violence, the conduct alleged is
definitely discrediting to the armed forces.' 5 U.S.C.M.A., at 483--484, 18 C.M.R., at 107--108. [***]
Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join, dissenting:
As many decisions of this Court make clear, vague statutes suffer from at least two fatal constitutional defects.
First, by failing to provide fair notice of precisely what acts are forbidden, a vague statute 'violates the first
essential of due process of law.' Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391. As the Court put the
matter in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453: 'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids.' 'Words which are vague and fluid ... may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of
Caligula.' United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176. (fn 3) [***]
(fn 3) See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617: 'The constitutional requirement of definiteness is
violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for
conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' [COLTEN v. KENTUCKY, 407 U.S. 104 (1972)(2).]
Secondly, vague statutes offend due process by failing to provide explicit standards for those who enforce them
thus allowing discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-
171. 'A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on
an ad hoc and subjective basis ... .' Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108--109 (fn 4) The absence of
specificity in a criminal statute invites abuse on the part of prosecuting officials, who are left free to harass any
individuals or groups who may be the object of official displeasure. [How true. ] (fn 5)
(fn 4) See also Smith v. Goguen, 145 U.S. 566: 'Statutory language of such a standardless sweep allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities
for setting the standards of the criminal law.'
(fn 5) This Court has repeatedly recognized that the dangers inherent in vague statutes are magnified where laws
touch upon First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., id., at 573, 94 S.Ct., at 1247; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
26
U.S. 104, 109. In such areas, more precise statutory specificity is required, lest cautions citizens steer clear of
protected conduct in order to be certain of not violating the law. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67, 75--85. PARKER v. LEVY, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)(2).
Apply the following to void the intentionally vague use or the deceptive word "person" (status) in statutes of our artificial creature:
All sovereigns are persons but not all persons are sovereigns.
All people are persons but not all persons are the class of We the People.
All Citizens are persons but not all persons are Citizens.
All Americans are persons but not all persons are Americans.
All Negroes are persons but not all persons are Negroes.
The highest status in their System of Federalism via forms and applications is a "citizen of the United States."
The highest status in penal law is "person" or legal equivalent, and lawfully it cannot be a domestic "sovereign" person.
And "state", "State", "the United States", "United States", and "the United States of America": What are they and where?
GUILT IS PERSONAL
Congress cannot be deemed to have intended to punish "anyone"
who is not plainly and 'unmistakably' within the statute. (Super emphasis added.)
Regardless of the social "status" (apply that to the status of the supreme sovereign people.)
Normal meaning of 'person' is to distinguish between individual 'enterprises' and enterprises that are incorporated.
Justice MURPHY (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that guilt is personal and that it ought not lightly to be
imputed to a citizen who, like the respondent, has no evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing. It may be
proper to charge him with responsibility to the corporation and the stockholders for negligence and mismanagement.
But in the absence of clear statutory authorization it is inconsistent with established canons of criminal law to rest
liability on an act in which the accused did not participate and of which he had no personal knowledge. Before we
place the stigma of a criminal conviction upon any such citizen the legislative mandate must be clear and
unambiguous. Accordingly that which Chief Justice Marshall has called 'the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals' entitles each person, regardless of economic or social status, to an unequivocal warning from the
legislature as to whether he is within the class of persons subject to vicarious liability. Congress cannot be deemed
to have intended to punish anyone who is not 'plainly and unmistakably' within the confines of the statute. United
States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628; U.S. v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485; U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95.
Moreover, the fact that individual liability of corporate officers may be consistent with the policy and
purpose of a public health and welfare measure does not authorize this Court to impose such liability where
Congress has not clearly intended or actually done so. Congress alone has the power to define a crime and to specify
the offenders. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95. It is not our function to supply any deficiencies in these
respects, no matter how grave the consequences. Statutory policy and purpose are not constitutional substitutes for
the requirement that the legislature specify with reasonable certainty those individuals it desires to place under the
interdict of the Act. United States v. Harris, 177 U.S. 305; Sarlls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570.
Looking at the language actually used in this statute, we find a complete absence of any reference to
corporate officers. There is merely a provision in s 303(a) to the effect that 'any person' inadvertently violating s
301(a) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 201(e) further defines 'person' as including an 'individual,
partnership, corporation, and association.' The fact that a corporate officer is both a 'person' and an 'individual' is
not indicative of an intent to place vicarious liability on the officer. Such words must be read in light of their
statutory environment. [Equating to 'unmistakably' citing the 'specific' class of type of person. ]
Only if Congress has otherwise specified an intent to place corporate officers within the ambit of the Act
can they be said to be embraced within the meaning of the words 'person' or 'individual' as here used.
The normal and necessary meaning of such a definition of 'person' is to distinguish between individual
enterprises and those enterprises that are incorporated or operated as a partnership or association, in order to subject
them all to the Act. U. S. v. DOTTERWEICH, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)(2). [Each person regardless of status. ]
WAKE UP TO THEIR "TREACHERY" = CONCEAL = FRAUD - TO SUBJECT US TO STEAL USING CODE

To defraud us government 'intentionally' fails to fully defined and explain 'person' in the 'affirmative and negative.'
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The vice of vagueness in criminal statutes is the treachery they conceal either in determining what persons are
included or what acts are prohibited. Words which are vague and fluid, [person. ] cf. United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula. We cannot
sanction taking a man by the heels for refusing to grant the permission which this Act on its face apparently gave
him the right to withhold. That would be making an act criminal without fair and effective notice. Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242. U.S. v. CARDIFF, 344 U.S. 174 (1952)(2). [Monstrous criminal government deception. The
innocent sovereign people do not suspect the word 'person' in statutes does not include the sovereign 'people.' ]
27
TRAP: It imports an affirmative intent or design either malicious or mischievous, to cause injury. Gumbart v.
Waterbury, D.C.Conn., 27 F.Supp. 228-30.
TREACHERY: Deliberate and willful betrayal of trust and confidence. Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Ed.
Luke 11:52 WOE UNTO YOU YE LAWYERS YOU TAKE AWAY THE 'KEY' OF KNOWLEDGE
If a full 100% definition of We the People of the United States was provided in their Code statutes in the "affirmative and
negative" their subjection scam would be over and our freedom restored. The definitions should fully explain, who is and who is not
included and "why" according to the Law; and what they are not (subjects, non sovereigns, vassals, taxpayers, citizens of the United
States, United States citizens, and persons) and why according to the Law, supported by supreme Court cases.
"STRICTLY" CONSTRUED AGAINST GOVERNMENT AND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT

COATS, Judge (Court of Appeals of Alaska): It is well understood that criminal statutes must be strictly construed
against the state and in favor of the defendant. [***] Generally, if a statute is intended to impose a derivative
liability on some person other than the actor, there must be some legislative direction that it is to be applied to
persons who do not themselves commit the proscribed act. [***].
That certainly is the plain language of the statute and the statute could have been easily written to apply to
an accomplice. This interpretation is consistent with the principle of statutory construction which requires criminal
statutes to be strictly construed. 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.04, at 13 (4th ed. 1974). See
Lee v. State, 673 P.2d 892, 895 (Alaska App.1983). Dailey v. State, 675 P.2d 657 (Alaska, 1984). [It would be so
easy to add 'people' in the statute 'if' our mere artificial creature had lawful right of jurisdiction over the people. ]
VIOLATES THE FIRST ESSENTIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW = JUSTICE VIA THE WHOLE TRUTH + FAIRNESS
The third consideration is whether the statute is drawn so imprecisely that it creates a danger of arbitrary
enforcement. Stock v. State, supra at 8; State v. Martin, supra at 324 (concurring opinion); See, e. g., Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). The notice requirement embodies notions of fundamental fairness. Long ago,
the United States Supreme Court said that 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law.' Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See, e. g.,
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). LARSON
v. STATE of Alaska, 564 P.2d 365. (1977)(1). [They intentionally use 'person' to trap innocent people into taxes etc.]
TREACHERY? = INTENTIONALLY ILLEGALLY ENSLAVING AMERICANS TO STEAL = SUPER HIGH CRIME
Vice = evil = treachery. Vagueness = conceal = fraud, to steal from Americans injuring no one = Crime (Santanic?)

It is established that a criminal statute which is so vague and standardless as to not give fair warning of the acts
prohibited by it is a deprivation of due process of law under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
[***] See also Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
In striking down the statute the court said: 'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids.' 306 U.S. 451, 453. Among the underlying reasons for the void for vagueness doctrine is not merely the
notion of fair warning but a legitimate concern that a statute too broad in reach may be used as an instrument of
oppression by those entrusted with its enforcement. As pointed out in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399
(1966), it must not leave judges and juries free to decide in each case, without legally fixed standards, what
conduct shall be deemed prohibited. We cannot allow criminality to depend only upon the moral sentiment or
idiosyncrasies of the tribunal before which a defendant is tried. Vague terms in a criminal statute, if permitted to
stand, might be used to cover varieties of conduct not ordinarily regarded as criminal by vast portions of the public
affected by it. 'The vice of vagueness in criminal statutes is the treachery they conceal either in determining what
persons are included or what acts are prohibited. Words which are vague and fluid *** may be as much of a trap
for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula.' United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952). Harris v. State
457 P.2d 638 (1969). [Luke 11:52 Woe unto you Lawyers you have taken away the key of knowledge. ]
Super important to always remember: Absolutely no law or court case whatsoever cites a 'citizen of the United States' or a 'U.S.
citizen' is sovereign, nor the supreme power, nor synonymous with We the People, only to the contrary. Those so-called citizens of
government are vastly inferior 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status who owe allegiance to the sovereign people. All
relevant court cases hold, We the People of the U.S. are the sovereigns and the supreme power, and not otherwise.
FEAR OF WRONG GUESS LEADS PEOPLE TO FOREGO THE VERY RIGHTS THE PEOPLE SOUGHT TO PROTECT
Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concur, dissenting:
It goes without saying that a law to be valid must be clear enough to make its commands understandable. For
28
obvious reasons, the standard of certainty required in criminal statutes is more exacting than in noncriminal
statutes. (fn 2) This is simply because it would be unthinkable to convict a man for violating a law he could not
understand. [I do not understand any statutes apply to one of We the People. ] This Court has recognized that the
stricter standard is as much required in criminal contempt cases as in all other criminal cases, (fn 3) and has
emphasized that the 'vice of vagueness' is especially pernicious where legislative power over an area involving
speech, press, petition and assembly is involved. (fn 4) In this area the statement that a statute is void if it 'attempts
to cover so much that it effectively covers nothing,' see Musser v. State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97, takes on double
significance. For a statute broad enough to support infringement of speech, writings, thoughts and public
assemblies, against the unequivocal command of the First Amendment necessarily leaves all persons to guess just
what the law really means to cover, and fear of a wrong guess inevitably leads people to forego the very rights the
Constitution sought to protect above all others. [Constitution is intended to secure all pre-existing rights etc. ]
fn 2. E.g., Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451; Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507,
515; Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230—231.[Key: Our unalienable rights long pre-exist the Constitution. ]
fn 3. E.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 207--208; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147; S cull v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 79 S.Ct. 838.
fn 4. See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507; Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178; S cull v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 79 S.Ct. 838.
fn 5. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97--98. Cf. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242. BARENBLATT v.
UNITED STATES, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)(2). [The entire government is to secure our all, not deny or disparage anything.]
TO PROTECT OUR FREEDOM
Statutes are not to be extended beyond the plain meaning of its words, to 'protect our freedom' - from subjection.
JUSTICE HUNT (Supreme Court of the U. S.): I am compelled to dissent from the judgment of the court in this case:
In Sickles v. Sharp, 13 Johns. 49, it is said, 'The rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed admits of some
qualification. The plain and manifest intention of the legislature ought to be regarded.' In United States v. Hartwell,
6 Wall. 385, it is said, 'The object in construing penal as well as other statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent.
The words must not be narrowed to the exclusion of what the legislature intended to embrace, but that intention
must be gathered from the words. When the words are general, and embrace various classes of persons, there is no
authority in the court to restrict them to one class, when the purpose is alike applicable to all.' In Ogden v. Strong, 2
Paine, C.C. 584, it is said, 'Statutes must be so construed as to make all parts harmonize, and give a sensible effect to
each. It should not be presumed that the legislature meant that any part of the statute should be without meaning or
effect.' In United States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 474, the statute made it unlawful for a person 'voluntarily to serve on a
vessel employed and made use of in the transportation of slaves from one foreign country to another.' No slaves had
been actually received or transported on board the defendant's vessel; but the court held that the words of the statute
embraced the case of a vessel sailing with the intent to be so employed. The court say, 'A penal statute will not be
extended beyond the plain meaning of its words; ... yet the evident intention of the legislature ought not to be
defeated by a forced and over strict construction.' [***]
In Hodgman v. People, 4 Den. 235, 5 id. 116, an act subjecting an offender to 'the penalties' of a prior act
was held to subject him to an indictment, as well as to the pecuniary penalties in the prior statute provided for.
Especially should this liberal rule of construction prevail, where, though in form the statute is penal, it is in fact to
protect freedom. UNITED STATES v. REESE, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)(2). [To protect us from another long train of
abuse and usurpation by our artificial creature via men engaged in deception. Plus, person excludes the sovereign. ]
The void for vagueness doctrine 'bars enforcement' of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act [paying
taxes, obtaining a license etc.] in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. Most statutes do not a citizen of the United States or U.S. citizen, let alone the sovereign people.
THE VERY WORDS WOULD BE USED + NO ACT OF CONGRESS IS OF ANY VALIDITY

JUSTICE MILLER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
This Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and no act of Congress is of any validity which does not rest on
authority conferred by that instrument. It is, therefore, not to be supposed that Congress, when enacting a criminal
law for the punishment of officers of the United States, intended to punish any one not appointed in one of those
modes. If the punishment were designed for others than officers as defined by the Constitution, words to that effect
would be used, as servant, agent, person in the service or employment of the government; and this has been done
where it was so intended, as in the sixteenth section of the act of 1846, concerning embezzlement, by which any
officer or agent of the United States, and all persons participating in the act, are made liable. 9 Stat. 59. UNITED
STATES v. GERMAINE, 99 U.S. 508 (1878)(2). [Most jurors are ignorant of the law and don't have a clue that
statutes do not and cannot include the sovereign people, and their System of Federalism is outside the Constitution. ]
EACH STATUTE INCORPORATES 'CONSTITUTIONAL' LAW! = 'POSTULATES AND PRINCIPLES' ETC.

The principle all human law and jurisdiction must be prescribed by a superior. We the people are supreme to our creature.
Justice SOUTER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
29
Thus, in lieu of describing the specific conduct it forbids, each statute's general terms incorporate constitutional law
by reference, See U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988); U.S. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 797 (1966), and many of the
incorporated constitutional guarantees are, of course, themselves stated with some catholicity of phrasing. [***]
The right to due process enforced by ß 242 and said to have been violated by Lanier presents a case in
point, with the irony that a prosecution to enforce one application of its spacious protection of liberty can threaten
the accused with deprivation of another: what Justice HOLMES spoke of as "fair warning ... in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair,
so far as possible the line should be clear." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) . " 'The ... principle
is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed.' "Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
617 (1954)). The fair warning requirement also reflects the deference due to the legislature, which possesses the
power to define crimes and their punishment. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820);
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995). See generally H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction
79-96 (1968) (discussing "principle of legality," "that conduct may not be treated as criminal unless it has been so
defined by [a competent] authority ... before it has taken place," as implementing separation of powers, providing
notice, and preventing abuses of official discretion) (quotation at 80); Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L.Rev. 189 (1985). [Void for Vagueness doctrine. ]
There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement. First, the vagueness doctrine bars
enforcement of "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act [Paying Taxes, getting a license etc. ] in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." [With all of the authority herein the jurors would be guessing (wrong) the word 'person' includes the
sovereign People in criminal or penal statutes. ] Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ; accord,
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Second, as a
sort of "junior version of the vagueness doctrine," H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 95 (1968), the
canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in
a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
427 (1985); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-348 (1971). Third, although clarity at the requisite level may
be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, see, e.g., Bouie, supra, at 357-359; Kolender, supra,
at 355-356; Lanzetta, supra, at 455-457; Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
Va. L.Rev. 189, 207 (1985), due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to
conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope, see, e.g.,
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-192 (1977); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972) (per curiam);
Bouie, supra, at 353-354; cf. U.S. Const., Art. I, ß 9, cl. 3; id., ß 10, cl. 1; Bouie, supra, at 353-354 (Ex Post Facto
Clauses bar legislatures from making substantive criminal offenses retroactive). [***]
We applied this standard in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), which recognized that the
expansive language of due process that provides a basis for judicial review is, when incorporated by reference into ß
242, generally ill suited to the far different task of giving fair warning about the scope of criminal liability. The
Screws plurality identified the affront to the warning requirement posed by employing ß 242 to place "the
accused ... on trial for an offense, the nature of which the statute does not define and hence of which it gives no
warning." [3 Natures = in Law, equity, admiralty and maritime/trade-commerce. Code= private outside Constitution. ]
[***]
Fn6. This process of "making specific" does not, as the Sixth Circuit believed, qualify Screws as "the only Supreme
Court case in our legal history in which a majority of the Court seems [to have been] willing to create a common law
crime." 73 F.3d 1380, 1391 (1996). Federal crimes are defined by Congress, not the courts, Kozminski, 487 U.S., at
939; United States v. Wiltberger, supra, at 95, and Screws did not "create a common law crime"; it narrowly
construed a broadly worded Act of Congress, and the policies favoring strict construction of criminal statutes oblige
us to carry out congressional intent as far as the Constitution will admit, [The creature cannot rule the sovereign
creator. ] see Kozminski, supra, at 939; Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1974); United States v. Morris,
39 U.S. 464, 14 Pet. 464, 475 (1840). Nor is ß 242's pedigree as an Act of Congress tainted by its birth at the
hands of codifiers who arguably made substantive changes in the pre-existing law, see n. 1, supra, as the Sixth
Circuit concluded from the statutory history, 73 F.3d, at 1384-1387. The legislative intent of Congress is to be
derived from the language and structure of the statute itself, if possible, not from the assertions of codifiers directly
at odds with clear statutory language. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997). [***]
First, contrary to the Court of Appeals, see ibid., we think it unsound to read Screws as reasoning that only
this Court's decisions could provide the required warning. Although the Screws plurality gave two examples
involving decisions of the Court, their opinion referred in general terms to rights made specific by "decisions
interpreting" the Constitution, see 325 U.S., at 104 (plurality opinion), and no subsequent case has held that the
universe of relevant interpretive decisions is confined to our opinions. UNITED STATES v. LANIER, 520 U.S. 259
(1997)(2). [The Law should be so clear none of us can misunderstand it, prove it wrong, or unconstitutional. ]
INFORM THE JURORS THE CODIFIERS-REVISERS INTENTIONALLY PERVERT THE LAW IN THEIR PRIVATE CODE BOOKS
30
They change the Letter of the Law to pervert the System-Law? The codifiers-revisers pervert the Law in their private
copyright Code statutes of non-sovereigns: and uniformly at odds (not to the letter of the Law) with the original bill pass by the
Congress (or Legislature). Compare the statute with its source of law (to the Letter of the Law) and back track it to the beginning if
necessary and you will discover fraud. Plus, neither the law nor statute have been enacted with the legal enacting clause style.
Compare the Code with the Law on the courts. You will see 'State' is uniformly changed to 'state' etc. The national Codifiers have been
revising (perverting-changing) the Law of the Land since Feb. 27, 1871. They pervert the Law in the 'Code' to pretend this other so
called government acting outside the Constitution exists, although consisting of 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons.
GREAT DUTY OF GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN THEIR PURITY

The powers of the Union, on the great subjects of war, peace, and commerce, and on many others, are in themselves
limitations of the sovereignty of the States; but in addition to these, the sovereignty of the States is surrendered in
many instances where the surrender can only operate to the benefit of the people, and where, perhaps, no other
power is conferred on Congress than a conservative power to maintain the principles established in the constitution.
The maintenance of these principles in their purity, is certainly among the great duties of the government. COHENS
v. VIRGINIA, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)(2). [Purity of the principles: all mere human law and jurisdiction must be prescribed
by a superior; We the People are truly sovereigns with sovereign immunity in order to form a more perfect Union. ]
THE PEOPLE - MUST BE UNMISTAKABLY IN THE STATUTE.

Before a man can be punished 'his' case must be 'plainly and unmistakably' within the statute.
Justice BREWER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is axiomatic that statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment, and that no act,
however wrongful, can be punished under such a statute unless clearly within its terms. 'There can be no constructive
offenses, and, before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute.' U. S. v.
Lacher, 134 U. S. 624; End. Interp. St. (2d Ed.) ß 329; Pom. Sedg. St. Const. Law, 280. TODD v. UNITED STATES,
158 U.S. 278 (1895)(1). [Sovereignty is of course not subject to mere laws of its artificial creature. Just powers of… ]
HE 'MUST BE ACQUITTED' UNLESS "HE" IS 'PROVEN' TO BE GUILTY OF 'EVERY' ELEMENT

Innocence is a conclusion drawn by the Law in favor of the citizen.
Justice HARLAN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
In considering the distinction between the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, this court, in Coffin v. U.
S., 156 U. S. 432, upon full consideration, said: 'The presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in
favor of the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless
he is proven to be guilty. In other words, this presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of
one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof
which the law has created. [Emphasis added. ] This presumption on the one hand, supplemented by any other
evidence he may adduce, and the evidence against him on the other, constitute the elements from which the legal
conclusion of his guilt or innocence is to be drawn.' Reasonable doubt, it was also said, was 'the result of the proof,
not the proof itself; whereas the presumption of innocence is one of the instruments of proof, going to bring about
the proof, from which reasonable doubt arises. [Emphasis added. ] Thus one is a cause, the other an effect. To say
that the one is the equivalent of the other is, therefore, to say that legal evidence can be excluded from the jury, and
that such exclusion may be cured by instructing them correctly in regard to the method by which they are required to
reach their conclusion upon the proof actually before them.'
Strictly speaking, the burden of proof, as those words are understood in criminal law, is never upon the
accused to establish his innocence, or to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime for which he is indicted.
It is on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial, and applies to every element necessary to
constitute the crime. [Super emphasis added. ] [***]
The views we have expressed are supported by many adjudications that are entitled to high respect. If such
were not the fact, we might have felt obliged to accept the general doctrine announced in some of the above cases;
for it is desirable that there be uniformity of rule in the administration of the criminal law in governments whose
constitutions equally recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life and
liberty. [***] For, if he was without reason and understanding at the time, the act was not his, and he is no more
responsible for it than he would be for the act of another man.' Pages 67, 68. So in Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y.
159, 162, Chief Justice Church, speaking for the court, after observing that crimes can only be committed by human
beings [Fed definition of "person" is other than human beings. ] in a condition to be responsible for their acts, and that
the burden of overthrowing the presumption of sanity and of showing insanity is upon the person who alleges it,
says: 'If evidence is given tending to establish insanity, then the general question is presented to the court and jury
whether the crime, if committed, was committed by a person responsible for his acts; and upon this question the
presumption of sanity and the evidence are all to be considered, and the prosecutor holds the affirmative; and, if a
reasonable doubt exists as to whether the prisoner is sane or not, he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and to an
acquittal.' To the same effect are O'Connell v. People, 87 N. Y. 377, 380, Walker v. People, 88 N. Y. 81, 88. [***].
The same principle is recognized in New Hampshire. Bellows, J., speaking for the court, after observing
31
that a plea of not guilty in a criminal cause puts in issue all the allegations of the indictment, said: 'A system of rules,
therefore, by which the burthen is shifted upon the accused of showing any of the substantial allegations are untrue,
or, in other words, to prove a negative is purely artificial and formal, and utterly at war with the humane principle
which, in favorem vitae, requires the guilt of the prisoner to be established beyond reasonable doubt.' Again, in the
same case, after saying that, to justify a conviction, all the elements of the crime charged must be shown to exist, and
to a moral certainty, including the facts of a sound memory, an unlawful killing, and malice, he proceeded: [***]
Indeed, we regard these inferences of fact as not designed to interfere in any way with the obligation of the prosecutor
to remove all reasonable doubt of guilt; but are applied as the suggestions of experience, and with a view to the
convenience and expedition of trials, leaving the evidence, when adduced, to be weighed without regard to the fact
whether it comes from the one side or the other.' 'The criminal intent must be proved as much as the overt act, and
without a sound mind such intent could not exist; and the burthen of proof must always remain with the prosecutor to
prove both the act and criminal intent.' State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224, 231. DAVIS v. UNITED STATES, 160 U.S.
469 (1895)(2). [My only true intent is to be one of the sovereign People of the United States injuring no one. ]
We the People of the United States’ in Order to form a more perfect

Union', establish Justice… (all of that is) to secure the Blessings of Liberty... do… establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.
ANYTHING CONTRARY IS AGAINST THE TRUE INTENT OF WE THE PEOPLE = LAWLESS USURPATION = VOID AS NO LAW
AFTER A LONG TRAIN OF ABUSE AND USURPATION THE PEOPLE INTENDED TO FORM A MORE 'PERFECT' UNION
That decision reflects the Framers' understanding that Members of Congress are chosen by separate constituencies,
but that they become, when elected, servants of the People of the United States. They are not merely delegates
appointed by separate, sovereign States; they occupy offices that are integral and essential components of a single
National Government. In the absence of a properly passed constitutional amendment, allowing individual States to
craft their own qualifications for Congress would thus erode the structure envisioned by the Framers, a structure
that was designed, in the words of the Preamble to our Constitution, to form a "more perfect Union." U.S. TERM
LIMITS INC. v. THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2). [Perfect, not imperfect. The qualification status is only suppose
to be We the People, not citizens of the U.S. = 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons. ]
GOVERNMENT IF NOT PERFECT IS LAWLESS USURPATION = AGAINST THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE
Super important: Our servants are supposed to continually govern towards perfection, and that cannot be over emphasized.
The distinction between 'free self-government' based on the 'sovereignty' of the people from despotism.
MATTHEWS, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):

The state itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible, immutable. The government is an agent, and, within the
sphere of the agency, a perfect representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. [How true. ][***]
This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government. To deny it or blot it out obliterates
the line of demarcation that separates constitutional government from absolutism, free self-government based on the
sovereignty of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or the many, which enables the agent of the
state to declare and decree that he is the state; to say 'L'Etat, c'est moi.' POINDEXTER v. GREENHOW, 114 U.S.
270 (1855)(3). [See the same in STATE OF MISSOURI v. HOMESTEADERS, 16 F.Supp. 69 (1936)(1). The true intent of the
People is for our servants to 'continually' strive towards perfection in Order to form a more 'perfect' Union-government.
Romans 13:1-6 Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. God's rulers are not a terror to good works but to evil.
'Continually' attending to this very thing (good). Our agents-creatures are not higher than the supreme sovereign people.]
NO ONE HAS ANY LEGAL RIGHT TO DO ANY WRONG TO ANY ONE. David Colton
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE IS THE VOICE OF GOD - IN A MORE PERFECT UNION UNDER GOD + OATH: SO HELP ME GOD
BARTLEY, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Ohio) dissented:
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 2 Kentucky 537, (Judge Rowan delivered the opinion of the court, 1819):
But sovereignty has a fictitious perfection and purity, which must be taken as real, and which can not be
controverted. Of course the abuse of power can not be imputed to a sovereign, in restraint of its legitimate energies.
The maxim that the king can do no wrong is not an idle device of royalty formed to amuse or beguile the multitute;
nor is the correspondent maxim, that the voice of the people is the voice of God, the offspring of the demagogue's
brain. They are both just inferences drawn from the most profound views of civil policy, and illustrate the position
advanced in relation to the purity and perfection of sovereignty. It is not that the king in a monarchy, or the people
in a democracy, can do no wrong--for we know they are men, and of course partake of the frailties inseparable from
human nature; as men they err frequently and egregiously. But it is the sovereignty with which they are invested,
and in which they are merged, that is incapable of error. This incapacity in the sovereign to err, is matter of
necessity. There is no tribunal before which the sovereign can be arraigned, his conduct examined, his errors and
delinquencies detected, those errors corrected, and he punished. Sovereignty, therefore, whether displayed in the
monarch or the multitude, possesses necessarily this putative perfection; and is of course necessarily irresponsible.
32
Upon this purity and unerring character of sovereignty depends all the jurisdictions which are exercised in the
governments throughout the world. Government could not exist upon any other hypothesis.' THE PIQUA BRANCH
OF THE STATE BANK OF OHIO v. KNOUP, 6 Ohio St. 342 (1856)(1). [Same in 9 Ky. 75. Men drunk on usurpation.]
JUSTICE IS THE END OF GOVERNMENT - INJUSTICE IS THE END OF EVIL GOVERNMENT = EVIL MEN
GILLETT, J. (Supreme Court of Indiana): Hamilton declared that: "It is of great importance in a republic not only to
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the
other part. *** Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be
pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." 51 Federalist. McKINSTER v. SAGER, 163 Ind.
671 (1904)(1). [Justice report card for Bar Assoc. members (Judges, prosecutors) as a whole: F (for upholding Fraud).]
THE 'ULTIMATE GOAL' OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS 'TRUTH' AND JUSTICE
Duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional (unalienable and sovereign) rights of the citizen.
Justice POWELL (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Our goals are truth and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends... . "Truth and justice are ultimate
values, so understood by our people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of public respect and
loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted from these goals." Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility,
1975 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 591, 596.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs, dissenting: see Ante, at 3050 n. 31; this is
presumably because the "ultimate goal" of the criminal justice system is "truth and justice." E. g., ante, at 3050, and
n. 30. What possible justification then can there be for denying vindication of such rights on federal habeas when
state courts do deny those rights at trial? To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of
protecting society from law-breakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon
which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend. "Experience should teach us to be "most" on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding." [Our creature cannot lawfully rule over its supreme sovereign creator. ]
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandies, J., dissenting). See also Id., at 483, 485. [***] See also
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-394 (1914). The Court
asserts that "the hyperbole of the dissenting opinion is misdirected," Ante, at 3052, but I take seriously this Court's
continuing incursions on constitutionally guaranteed rights."(I)llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure... . It is
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon." [via government deception. ] Boyd v. U. S., supra, 116 U.S. at 635. STONE v. POWELL, 428 U.S. 465
(1976)(2). [We injured no one, leave us alone evil minded servants and stop ruling outside the Constitution. ]
THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE ARE PROFOUNDLY THE 'SOURCE' OF ALL GOVERNMENT POWER ETC.
Super important: We are the profound 'source' of all government power which limits and controls 'right' of jurisdiction.
This proves the reason the supreme sovereign people as the 'source' and creator are superior to their artificial 'creature.'
Chief Justice FULLER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Mr. Webster's argument in that case [Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, ] took a wider sweep, and contained a masterly
statement of the American system of government, as recognizing that the people are the source of all political
power, but that, as the exercise of governmental powers immediately by the people themselves is impracticable, they
must be exercised by representatives of the people; that the basis of representation is suffrage; that the right of
suffrage must be protected and its exercise prescribed by previous law, and the results ascertained by some certain
rule; that through its regulated exercise each man's power tells in the constitution of the government and in the
enactment of laws; that the people limit themselves in regard to the qualifications of electors and the qualifications
of the elected, and to certain forms of the conduct of elections; that our liberty is the liberty secured by the regular
action of popular power, taking place and ascertained in accordance with legal and authentic modes; and that the
constitution and laws do not proceed on the ground of revolution, or any right of revolution, but on the idea of
results achieved by orderly action under the authority of existing governments, proceedings outside of which are
not contemplated by our institutions. 6 Webster's Works, p. 217. DUNCAN v. MCCALL, 138 U.S. 448 (1891) (1).
[Qualifications: We "the people the great source of all power in this country." Kilbourne v. Thomas, 103 U.S. 168. ]
PROFOUNDLY - THE "ONLY TRUE SOURCE" OF POWER

Justice THOMAS (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with CHIEF JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and Justice SCALIA join, dissenting:
Because the people of the several States are the only true source of power, however, the Federal Government enjoys
no authority beyond what the Constitution confers: The Federal Government's powers are limited and enumerated.
In the words of Justice Black: "The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority
have no other source." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957)(plurality opinion). U.S. TERM LIMITS INC. v.
33
THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2). [Same in U.S. v. VERDUGO, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)(2). The U.S. is 'of' the Constitution,
'of' We the People profoundly the only true 'source' of all government power, therefore its law and jurisdiction. ]
The Truth is
THE PEOPLE ARE SUPERIOR TO OUR CONSTITUTIONS = SUPERIOR TO GOVERNMENT.
Of course, we are the 'supreme' sovereign creators and supreme sovereign source of the Constitution and government.
DAVIDSON, P.J. (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas) concurring:

The truth is that in our governments the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As
our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed, the
superiority in this last instance is much greater, for the people possess over constitutions control in act as well as
right. The consequence is that the people may change the constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a
right of which no positive institution can ever deprive them." In fact, the supreme power in our people may be
called the panacea in politics and in the science of free government. Exparte MYER, 207 S.W. 100 (1918)(1). [See
same: GLADON v. CLEVELAND, 662 N.E.2d 287(1996); COHEN v. LITTLE SIX, 543 N.W.2d 376 (1997) etc. The Constitution is
the Law of the People, and as the supreme 'Creators' we are vastly superior to our artificial creature. ]
THE PEOPLE ARE THE MASTERS OF ALL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

WANAMAKER, J. (Supreme Court of Ohio): That Preamble reads as follows: 'We the people of the United States,
in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.' [***] The people are the masters of their
Legislature and of every other branch of the government. [***] As the Constitution is above the Legislature, so the
people are above the Constitution, subject to it and all its parts while it is in force, but possessed of the undoubted
right to change, alter, or amend it at their own will in any of the regular ways provided by Constitution or laws.
HOCKETT v. STATE LIQUOR LIC. BOARD, 91 Ohio St. 176 (1915)(3). [Subject to the Const. not to the creatures.]
ALL POWER AND SOVEREIGNTY REPOSE IN THE PEOPLE
The people are the masters, officials the servants. The very point government fails to recognize the Truth Liberty is imperiled.
DUCKWORTH, Presiding Justice (Supreme Court of Georgia) after stating the foregoing facts:
In this State all power and sovereignty repose in the people. The departments of the State government have and can
exercise only such power as the people have conferred upon them by the Constitution. Art. 1, sec. 1, par. 1. [***] A
departure from that high principle might well endanger the stability of the entire governmental structure. It declares
a rule of law that denies any implied or inherent right or power in the legislative department to exercise any power
that has not by the sovereign people, through that Constitution, been reposed in the legislative department of
government. At the very point where any department of the State government fails to recognize the truth asserted in
the first paragraph of the Constitution, to the effect that in this State the people are the masters and the officials the
servants, liberty is imperiled. THOMPSON Lt. Gov. v. TALMADGE, 201 Ga. 867 (1947)(1). [Citing the same as
the above Supreme Court cases, all power and sovereignty etc. are of We the People, the sovereign source of the supreme
power. Sovereignty is not vested in citizens of the United States = 100% Federal, non-sovereign stateless persons. ]
'ALL' GOVERNMENTAL POWERS STEM FROM WE THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN PEOPLE

In Law the Order of Power under God. 1787 – today. It's the Law, the Supreme Law of the supreme sovereign people.

LIMITS v. THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2). [All power from We the people not citizens of the U.S. located in D.C.]
SUPER PROFOUND: "ALL LAWFUL POWER IS DERIVED FROM THE PEOPLE" THE SOURCE OF ALL
government power, therefore all of its law and therefore all of its jurisdiction, authority and right etc.
COMPTON, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska): Our dictum in Allred comports with traditional constitutional
analysis holding that the constitution serves as a check on the power of government: "That all lawful power derives
from the people and must be held in check to preserve their freedom is the oldest and most central tenet of
American constitutionalism." Luedtke v. Nabors Ak. Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (1989). [Therefore all jurisdiction.]
MATTHEWS, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska): Art. I, sec. 2 of the Alaska Constitution provides: " All
political power is inherent in the people. All government originates with the people [and] is founded upon their will
only." Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632 (1998). [Find the same in your Constitution. The People are the Supreme
Power, Creators, and source of all lawful government a mere 'artificial creature' of and 'under our will-Constitution only.']
PEOPLE MEANS THE SUPREME POWER

No status or word on Earth is higher than supreme.
34
Chief Justice FULLER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Mr. Justice Buller said: "People' means 'the supreme power'; 'the power of country,' whatever it may be. U.S. v. THE
THREE FRIENDS, 166 U.S. 1 (1897)(2). [Truly the sovereigns, the Supreme Power, and source of government.]
Mr. Justice Brown (Supreme Court of the U.S.) announced the judgment of the court: Notwithstanding its duty to
'guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government' (art. 4, ß 4), by which we understand,
according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the
people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them, [***]. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)(2).
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge (United States District Court, E.D. New York): Reliance on the jury
represents a reflection of our government's dependence on the ultimate and residual sovereignty of the people. That
foundation for all power--executive, legislative and judicial--is reflected in the preamble to the Constitution
beginning, "We the People ... do ordain and establish this Constitution." See also, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. IX
(reserved rights); Declaration of Independence ("Governments ... depriving their just Powers from the Consent of
the Governed."); James Madison, Essay on Sovereignty (1835) (equating "the supreme power" to "the sovereignty
of the people"). UNITED STATES of America v. KHAN, 325 F.Supp.2d 218 (2004)(3). [Universal in America. ]
THE SUPREME POWER RESIDES IN THE PEOPLE
The 'ultimate' sovereignty rests in the people themselves.
Higher in legal authority than any other power, subject to no law.
Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER (Supreme Court of the United States) join dissenting:
Before the new federal scheme appeared, 18th-century political theorists had assumed that "there must reside
somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided, final power, higher in legal authority than any other power,
subject to no law, [but God alone! ] a law unto itself." B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution 198 (1967); see also Wood 345. The American development of divided sovereign powers, which
"shatter[ed] ... the categories of government that had dominated Western thinking for centuries," id., at 385, was
made possible only by a recognition that the ultimate sovereignty rests in the people themselves. See id., at 530
(noting that because "none of these arguments about 'joint jurisdictions' and 'coequal sovereignties' convincingly
refuted the Antifederalist doctrine of a supreme and indivisible sovereignty," the Federalists could succeed only by
emphasizing that the supreme power" 'resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government' " (citing 1
Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, p. 302 (J. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888) (quoting James
Wilson)). SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA v. FLOR., 517 U.S. 44 (1996)(2). [We created the Law, obey it servants.]
Beyond the possibility of contradiction
THE PEOPLE THE SUPREME POWER EXERCISE THEIR SUPREME SOVEREIGN POWER
BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):
It is, of course, a mere platitude to say that the people are the supreme power in our system of government. The
history of our constitution and its adoption ... shows beyond the possibility of contradiction that the people
themselves deliberately and intentionally announced that, by its adoption, they meant to exercise their supreme
sovereign power directly to a far greater extent than had been done in the past ... . Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211,
125 P.2d 445, 450-51 (1942), Overruled on other grounds, Renck v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 320, 187 P.2d 656,
660-61 (1947). Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1 (1979). [We the People are the supreme sovereign power. ]
THE SUPREME POWER AND SOVEREIGN OWNERS
Justice MATTHEWS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The People of the United States, as sovereign owners of the national territories, have supreme power over them
and their inhabitants. MURPHY v. RAMSEY, 114 U.S. 15 (1885)(2). [Also, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). Free of fraud, the
sovereign People own everything; government = a dead thing and can own nothing, filled with mere temporary servants.]
WE THE PEOPLE ARE SOVEREIGNS NOT THOSE WHO SIT IN THE SEATS 'OF' THE MIGHTY
First Amendment rights are indeed fundamental, for 'We the People' are the sovereigns, not those who sit in the
seats of the mighty. BROADRICK v. State of OKLA., 413 U.S. 601 (1973)(2). ['Sovereigns.' How true it is. ]
NO SERVANT HAS ANY POWER NOT GIVEN BY THE CONSTITUTION - 'OF' THE PEOPLE
The CHIEF JUSTICE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the following opinion:
We agree in the proposition that no department of the government of the United States--neither President, nor
Congress, nor the Courts--possesses any power not given by the Constitution. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2
(1866)(2). [Outside the Constitution = no statute cites a specific Constitutional provision for its source of Power. ]
ARTIFICIAL CREATURE = OFFICER 'OF' AN OFFICE 'OF' A DEPARTMENT 'OF' THE CONSTITUTION 'OF' THE PEOPLE
35
All lawful government is locked in a box as a dead thing-an 'artificial creature' of the Law of the Constitution 'of' the People.
Highest position is an Officer of an Office, of one of the 3 great departments of the Constitution of We the sovereign People.
All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
BUTZ v. ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). [All are 'artificial' creatures of the Law of the Constitution 'of' the People.
See the same in UNITED STATES v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)(2); Justice HARLAN dissenting in STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JUMEL,
107 U.S. 711 (1883); BELKNAP v. SCHILD, 161 U.S. 10 (1896)(2); ROSENBERY BROS v. U.S. SHIPPING, 295 F. 372 (1923)(1);
etc. The temporaries act as our servants and bound by Oath to obey the Constitution 'of' the sovereign people. ]
THE CREATURE CANNOT RULE ITS SUPREME SOVEREIGN CREATORS

No position is higher than an Officer 'of' an Office = dead thing-artificial position created by law. Temporary servants sit in
the seats of the mighty as artificial persons' creating its statutes derived from our just authority in the written Constitution.
Kansas v. State of Colorado, 1906, 206 U.S. 46, 48, 83. GILBERTSON v. CITY OF FAIRBANKS , 262 F.2d 734, U. S.
Ct. of App. 9th Cir. (1959)(1). [The statutes 'of' our creature have never required We the people to do anything. ]
THE CREATOR CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO THE CREATURE - UPON WHAT POSTULATES-PRINCIPLES OF LAW?
HOWE, J. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin): First. That the reason why Victoria could not be arrested to-day upon
capias issued from the queen's bench, is not because her services are deemed so vitally necessary to the state, but it
is confessedly because she is the caput principium et finis of the body politic. As such she is above all authority,
because the courts have derived jurisdiction from the crown, and the crown has imposed no jurisdiction to which
she can be subjected. It is because as sovereign she cannot be amenable to her own judicature, because the creator
cannot be subject to the creature. STATE ex rel RESLEY v. FARWELL, 3 Pin. 393 (1852)(1).
THE PEOPLE ARE MASTERS AND ALL OFFICIALS ARE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE
Justice STEVENS, concurring in the judgment in No. 82-963, ante, p. 3424, and dissenting in No. 82-1771, ante, p.
3405: What THE CHIEF JUSTICE wrote, some two decades ago, remains true today: "It is the proud claim of a
democratic society that the people are masters and all officials of the state are servants of the people. UNITED
STATES v. LEON, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)(2). [Temporary servants that come and go are not our masters. ]
THE STATE IS NOT THE SOVEREIGN - THE PEOPLE WHO MAKE IT ARE SOVEREIGN - ALL OFFICERS ARE SERVANTS
DENT, P. (Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia): The word "state" is generally used to denote three different
things, and often without discrimination: First, the territory within its jurisdiction; second, the government or
governmental agencies appointed to carry out the will of the people; and, third, the people in their sovereign
capacity. The state is not the sovereign in this country. The people who make it are sovereign, and all its officers are
but their servants. RALSTON v. TOWN OF WESTON, 46 W.Va. 544 (1899)(2). [All servants of the Law of the...]
FISH, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Georgia): It must not be forgotten that the people are the sovereigns, and
that the mayor and councilmen are but their agents elected to represent them. The former are the masters; the latter,
the servants. [***] In Walsh v. City Council of Augusta, 67 Ga. 293, supra, Chief Justice Jackson, in dealing with
this very clause of the Constitution, said (page 297): "In order to arrive at the true construction of all statute law,
whether organic and fundamental, or legislative, the cardinal rule, if there be ambiguity in the words, is to consider
the old law, the mischief or evil, and the remedy." RENFROE et al v. CITY OF ATLANTA, 78 S.E. 449 (1913)(2).
SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE

But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Congress, nor
Congress upon the proper authority of the President. Both are servants of the people, whose will is expressed in the
fundamental law. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [Servants of the true will of the People. ]
SOVEREIGN POWER IS SUPREME POWER - NO SUPREME POWER IN ANY OF OUR SERVANTS
The separate opinion of Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS (Supreme Court of the United States):
If they could be, the people of the United States have all along totally misconceived the nature of their government,
and the character of the office of their supreme magistrate. Sovereign power is supreme power; and in no instance
whatever is there any supreme power vested in the President. [***]
'Inherent power! That is a new principle to enlarge the powers of the general government. *** The
partisans of the executive have discovered a third and more fruitful source of power. Inherent power! Whence is it
derived? [No where. ]. MYERS v. UNITED STATES, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)(2). [The executive war powers scam: our
servants say, "it's not prohibited" by law. All power is derived from the Constitution of the People and not otherwise. ]
36
THAT WHICH IS NOT SUPREME MUST YIELD TO THAT WHICH IS SUPREME
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
When this happens, that which is not supreme must yield to that which is supreme. This great and universal truth
is inseparable from the nature of things, and the constitution has applied it to the often interfering powers of the
general and State governments, as a vital principle of perpetual operation. BROWN v. The STATE OF
MARYLAND, 25 U.S. 419 (1827)(4). [See also: not supreme must yield to the supreme in Mondou v. N.Y., New
Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Glover v. State, D.O.T., 175 P.3d 1240 (Supreme Ct. of Ak. 2008). ]
THE SUPREME POWER CANNOT BE COMPELLED BY COURT PROCESS - OF ITS CREATURE

MILLER, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):
As we have no person in this government who exercises supreme executive power or performs the public duties of a
sovereign, it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests. It seems
most probable that it has been adopted in our courts as a part of the general doctrine of publicists, that the supreme
power in every state, wherever it may reside, shall not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to
defend itself from assaults in those courts. UNITED STATES v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)(2). [All of our creature's
lawful power therefore law and jurisdiction are derived solely from and limited by the Constitution 'of' the People. ]
THE KING = THE SOVEREIGN = THE SUPREME - A SOVEREIGN CANNOT COMMAND HIMSELF
Justice BALDWIN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
In England, right will be administered to a subject against the king, as a matter of grace; but not upon compulsion,
not by writ, but petition to the chancellor, 1 Bl. Com. 243; for no writ or process can issue against the king, for the
plain reason given in 4 Co. 55, a.; 7 Com. Dig., by Day, 83; Prerog. D. 78; 3 Bl. Com. 255; 'that the king cannot
command himself.' No execution goes out on a judgment or decree against him, on a monstrans de droit or petition
of right, or traverse of an inquisition which had been taken in his favour; for this reason, that as the law gives him a
prerogative for the benefit of his subjects, 1 Bl. Com. 255, he is presumed never to do a wrong, or refuse a right to a
subject; he is presumed to have done the thing decreed, by decreeing in his courts that it shall be done; such decree is
executed by the law as soon as it is rendered; and though process is made out to make the record complete, it is never
taken from the office. Co. Ent. 196; 9 Co. 98, a.; 7 D. C. D. 83. The State of Rhode Island v. The Common Wealth of
Mass. 37 U.S. 657 (1838)(1). [Who can lawfully command the supreme? Especially when injuring nothing. ]
STRICTLY: A GOVERNMENT 'OF' LAWS - NOT OF MEN

'United States' is outside the Constitution = counterfeit = must be a 'government of lies not of honest men' – criminals: Satanic?
Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) with Justice SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER join, dissenting:
"In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), for example, Chief Justice Marshall observed that our
Government 'has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.' This principle
originated in the English common law, and Blackstone described it as 'a general and indisputable rule, that where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.' 3 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries 23 (1783). GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA, 524 U.S. 274 (1998)(2). [Our Constitutionally
secured birthright to be natural born sovereigns (injuring no one). See also government of laws in: 5 U.S. 137; 107 U.S.
711; 114 U.S. 270; 183 U.S. 79; 272 U.S. 52; 384 U.S. 436; 487 U.S. 654; 527 U.S. 308; etc. ]
GOVERNMENT OF LAWS - NOT OF MEN

(Government of men = mob rule = democracy = public policy = opinion, passion, wishes, distinguished from the Law.)
"A law is void for vagueness if persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application....' Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572, quoting Connally, 269 U.S. 385, 391. See generally Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court , 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67 (1960). The offense to due process
lies in both the nature and consequences of vagueness. First, vague laws do not give individuals fair notice of the
conduct proscribed. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville , 405 U.S. 156, 162. Accord Grayned v. City of Rockford ,
408 U.S. 104, 108 & n. 3. Second, vague laws do not limit the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials;
thus they engender the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville , 405 U.S. at 168-70. Third, vague laws defeat the
intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional regime. We remain 'a government of laws, and
not of men,' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163] (1803) only so long as our laws remain clear." 630
F.2d, at 1037. CITY OF MESQUITE v. ALADDINS'S, 455 U.S. 283 (1983)(2). [Definition of 'person' is vague. ]
GOVERNMENT OF LAWS - NOT OF MEN
Government of men = private authority = mob rule via 'code' not 'the Law' of the Land of the Constitution of the People.
Justice SUTHERLAND (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
37
The action of the commission finds no support in right principle or in law. It is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary.
It violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional safeguards of personal liberty ultimately rest--that this
shall be a government of laws--because to the precise extent that the mere will of an official or an official body is
permitted to take the place of allowable official discretion or to supplant the standing law as a rule of human
conduct, the government ceases to be one of laws and becomes an autocracy. Against the threat of such a
contingency the courts have always been vigilant, and, if they are to perform their constitutional duties in the future,
must never cease to be vigilant, to detect and turn aside the danger at its beginning. The admonition of Mr. Justice
Bradley in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, should never be forgotten: 'It may be that it is the obnoxious
thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. *** It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Their motto should be obsta principiis.' [obsta principiis: means stop it in the first instance. ]
Arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution cannot both exist. They are antagonistic and incompatible
forces; and one or the other must of necessity perish whenever they are brought into conflict. To borrow the words
of Mr. Justice Day, 'there is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power.' Garfield v.
U.S. ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262. To escape assumptions of such power on the part of the three primary
departments of the government, is not enough. Our institutions must be kept free from the appropriation of
unauthorized power by lesser agencies as well. And if the various administrative bureaus and commissions,
necessarily called and being called into existence by the increasing complexities of our modern business and
political affairs, are permitted gradually to extend their powers by encroachments--even petty encroachments--
upon the fundamental rights, privileges and immunities of the people, we shall in the end, while avoiding the fatal
consequences of a supreme autocracy, become submerged by a multitude of minor invasions of personal rights, less
destructive but no less violative of constitutional guaranties. [***] The citizen, when interrogated about his private
affairs, has a right before answering to know why the inquiry is made; and if the purpose disclosed is not a
legitimate one, he may not be compelled to answer. [***] Judge Sawyer, in the course of his opinion (32 F. 241, at
page 263), after observing that a bill in equity seeking a discovery upon general, loose, and vague allegations is
styled 'a fishing bill,' and will, at once, be dismissed on that ground (Story, Eq.Pl. s 325), said: 'A general, roving,
offensive, inquisitorial, compulsory investigation, conducted by a commission without any allegations, upon no
fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, or of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice,
is unknown to our constitution and laws; and such an inquisition would be destructive of the rights of the citizen,
and intolerable tyranny. Let the power once be established, and there is no knowing where the practice under it
would end.' The fear that some malefactor may go unwhipped of justice weighs as nothing against this just and
strong condemnation of a practice so odious. And, indeed, the fear itself has little of substance upon which to rest.
The federal courts are open to the government; and the grand jury abides as the appropriate constitutional medium
for the preliminary investigation of crime and the presentment of the accused for trial. JONES v. SECURITIES, 298
U.S. 1 (1936)(2). [The right to remain silent in court under the 5 th Amendment. Obsta Principiis: Latin. Withstand
beginnings; resist the 1st approaches or encroachments. Right of privacy = right to be let alone in IRS audits etc. ]
A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS - AND OF PRINCIPLE(S)

Justice THOMAS, STEVENS and KENNEDY (Supreme Ct. of the U.S.) join, SCALIA except as to Part III, dissenting:
Our constitutional structure contemplates judicial review as a check on administrative action that is in disregard of
legislative mandates or constitutional rights. As Chief Justice Marshall explained: " 'It would excite some surprise
if, in a government of laws and of principle, furnished with a department whose appropriate duty it is to decide
questions of right, not only between individuals, but between the government and individuals; a ministerial officer
might, at his discretion, issue this powerful process ... leaving to [the claimant] no remedy, no appeal to the laws of
his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust. But this anomaly does not exist; this imputation cannot be cast
on the legislature of the United States.' " United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8, 28-29 (1835) (as quoted in Gutierrez de
Martinez, supra, at 424. SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL, 529 U.S. 1 (2000)(2). [Demand a 'judicial Court.' ]
CONSTITUTIONAL = LAWFUL v. UNCONSTITUTIONAL = LAWLESSNESS = VOID
The next cases prove the sovereign people, the 'supreme' power are profoundly the source of the 'supreme' law of the land.
The power, law and 'status' of the People are supreme and 'absolute' secured by the Constitution from 1787-today:
THE CONSTITUTION IS THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MIGHTY SOVEREIGN PEOPLE

"We the People of the United States in Order to form a more perfect Union… do ordain and establish this Constitution…"
Patterson, Justice (the supreme Court of the United States) : What is a Constitution? It is the form of government
(Ink on paper. ), delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws
are established. The Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the
supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the Legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the
authority that made it. [***] The Constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the
orbit within which it must move. In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the sun of the political system, around
38
which all Legislative, Executive and Judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet
in this there can be no doubt, that every act of the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, as absolutely void.
Vanhorne's v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795)(1). [An 'artificial' creature of Law = All ink on paper of/by the People. ]
IT IS ESSENTIAL TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE CONSTITUTION IS
COMBS, Justice (Supreme Court of Kentucky) concurring: It is essential to understand what the Constitution is,
and what it is not. It is the instrument by which the people created a government (Words on paper. ) and invested it
with certain powers, directed to a specific end. The Constitution does not create any rights of, or grant any rights to,
the people. It merely recognizes their primordial rights, and constructs a government as a means of protecting and
preserving them. (Securing our pre-existing unalienable rights etc. and all things lawfully acquired. )
WINTERSHEIMER, Justice, dissenting: The people have the right to decide what are constitutional rights and what
are not. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky v. WASSON, 842 S.W.2d 487 (1993)(2). [We are the sovereign masters.]
IT SHOULD ALWAYS BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PEOPLE ARE THE MASTERS - LEGISLATURE THEIR SERVANTS
MARSHALL, J. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin) concurring:
It should always be borne in mind that the people are the masters and that the members of the Legislature are their
servants, and that the agent should always give due consideration to the voice of the principal. In order to regard it
he must hear it. It is none the less true that the agent, by his oath of office, swears that he will defend the
Constitutions, state and federal, and perform the duties of his office to the best of his ability, and when vox populi
points in one direction, and our organic laws in the other, we must assume that the agent will courageously obey the
behest of his oath and his conscience. "The blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm
adherence to justice, moderation, frugality and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."
STATE EX REL v. FREAR, SECRETARY OF STATE, 142 Wis. 320 (1910)(1). [Corruption = Disobey their Oath.]
GANTT, J. (Supreme Court of Nebraska):
It is said that a constitution is the form of government delineated by the people in which fixed principles are
established; that it is the supreme law of the land, made by the people themselves in their original, sovereign and
unlimited capacity; that legislatures are creatures of the constitution, owe their existence to it, derive their power
from it, and therefore every legislative act clearly repugnant to it is void. Vanhorn v. Dorrence, 2 Dall., 308.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 176. Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 Comst., 547. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R. R.
Co., 18 Wend., 63. Sedg. on Const. Law, 468, 493. WILCOX v. SAUNDERS, 4 Neb. 569 (1878)(1).
GOVERNMENT IS OUR SUBJECT WE ARE NOT ITS SUBJECTS - WE ARE ITS CREATORS IT DID NOT CREATE US
DAVIDSON, P. J. (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas) dissenting: Our people created this government; the
government did not create them. The government is our subject; we are not its subjects. The citizenship of Texas
are the sovereigns, and "all power is inherent in the people," and they and they alone can make and unmake their
government and Constitution. If they do not like their Constitution, they can make another; but legislative bodies-
state or municipal-cannot make or change that instrument. Ex parte BRADSHAW, 70 Tex.Crim. 166 (1913)(1).
THE CONSTITUTION IS SUPERIOR TO ADMINISTRATION NOT ADMINISTRATION TO THE CONSTITUTION

PERKINS, J. (Supreme Court of Indiana):
This Constitution, then, is, in fact, the government, created by our fathers, and when it dies, that government expires.
And officers that carry on a government independent of a Constitution, constitute but a de facto government of
assumed and unlimited powers. The Constitution is superior to administration, not administration to the
Constitution. THAYER v. HEDGES, 22 Ind. 282 (1864)(1). [State-Constitution-government 'of' the people. ]
RULERS ARE SERVANTS - THE PEOPLE THEIR SUPERIORS AND SOVEREIGNS - WHO OWN THE UNITED STATES
CUFF, J. (Supreme Court, Kings County, New York):
'Dr. [Ben] Franklin. It seems to have been imagined by some that the returning to the mass of the people was
degrading the magistrate. This he thought was contrary to republican principles. In free Governments the rulers are
the servants, and the people their superiors and sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter was
not to degrade but to promote them. And it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them, to keep them
always in a State of servitude, and not allow them to become again one of the Masters.'
It is easy to understand why these patriotic citizens talked as they did at that convention. They were the
supporters of the government. They backed it. They knew the pitfalls. They were familiar with its history--its
mistakes, its successes. It was they who dared to sign the Declaration of Independence. Do we realize that failure of
the Rebellion would have translated the famous Declaration into a death warrant of those whose signatures were
affixed to it? It was they who fought and won the Rebellion. Did not George Washington preside over the
Convention? They were forming this great government alone, and to some extent without even ordinary support or
interest on the part of the general public. They were aware of and felt the indifference of the people in government
39
building. In view of all of those circumstances, many of the delegates considered that they had a proprietary interest
in the new republic; that they actually owned the United States. THOMAS v. COHEN, 262 N.Y.S. 320 (1933)(1).
THE CONSTITUTION BEGINS WITH THE "FIRST PRINCIPLE" THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS IN THE PEOPLE
Although the Constitution begins with the principle that sovereignty rests with the people, it does not follow that
the National Government becomes the ultimate, preferred mechanism for expressing the people's will. ALDEN v.
MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [We the People are the sovereign Creators of government our artificial creature. ]
"THIS CONSTITUTION 'SHALL' BE THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND"

This proves We the people are unalienably secured as the supreme sovereign people by the supreme Law of the Land of the People.
Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER (Supreme Court of the United States) join, concurring:
U.S. Const., Art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land"). VERIZON MARYLAND v. PUBLIC SERV. COM. 535 U.S. 635 (2002)(2). [See: Eagle v. State, 153 P.3d 976,
Supreme Court of Alaska (2007). The Constitution: the Supreme Law of the Land, our creature intended to secure our all.]
"Hold on, my friends, to the Constitution and the Republic for which it stands. Miracles do not cluster, and what has happened once in
6,000 years, may not happen again. Hold on to the Constitution, for if the American Constitution should fail, there will be anarchy
throughout the world." Daniel Webster. (Our standard of Liberty & Justice for all in varying degrees influences global Liberty & Justice.)
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE - TRULY A GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE

Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: As Chief Justice John
Marshall observed: "The government of the Union, then, ... is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people.
In form and in substance it emanates from them. [***] ("The Constitution of the United States was ordained by the
people, and, when duly ratified, it became the Constitution of the people of the United States"). Compare U.S.
Const., Preamble ("We the People"), with The Articles of Confederation, reprinted in 2 Bailyn 926 ("we the under
signed Delegates of the States"). U.S. TERM LIMITS INC. v. THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2).
THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION (OF THE PEOPLE) IS 'ABSOLUTE!'
Proving as self evident, our Supreme Sovereign 'status;' power, and authority are 'absolute' = the Supreme Law of the Land.
The framers of the Constitution, however, were not content to let the matter rest here, but provided explicitly--'This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; *** shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.' (Const. art. 6, cl. 2.) The supremacy of the Constitution as law is thus declared without
qualification. That supremacy is absolute; […]. CARTER v. CARTER COAL, 298 U.S. 238 (1936)(2). [Therefore
'our' supremacy-supreme sovereign status and unalienable rights are absolute. We injured no one, Leave us alone. ]
ALL MEN, ALL TIMES, ALL CIRCUMSTANCES! SUPER IMPORTANT

Justice GOLDBERG (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
'The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with
the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.' Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall,
2, 120--121. Robert F. KENNEDY v. MARTINEZ, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)(2). [All times! Especially martial law. It's the
Supreme Law of the Land, intended to be perfect. ]. Same quote in: TERRITORY OF HAWAII, v. MANKICHI, 190 U.S. 197 (1903)
(2); WILSON v. NEW, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) dissent (1); RUPPERT v. CAFFEY U.S Atty., 251 U.S. 264 (1920)(3); DUNCAN v. KAHANAMOKU,
Sheriff, 327 U.S. 304, concurring (1946)(3); U.S. v. BARNETT, 376 U.S. 681, dissent (1964)(2). Super important during martial
law and war conspiring by fraud against the Constitution to deprive us of Liberty before our day in court.]
NO OTHER SOURCE OF POWER THAN THE CONSTITUTION - OF WE THE PEOPLE

The Constitution is the source of Congress' authority to criminalize conduct, whether here or abroad, and of the
Executive's authority to investigate and prosecute such conduct. But the same Constitution also prescribes limits on
our Government's authority to investigate, prosecute, and punish criminal conduct, whether foreign or domestic. As
a plurality of the Court noted in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957): "The United States is entirely a creature of
the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution." See also ante, at 1067 (KENNEDY, J., concurring) ("[T]he Government may act only
as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic"). U.S. v. VERDUGO, 494
U.S. 259 (1990)(2). [Entirely a creature (dead entity) of the Constitution of We the People. ]
'ALL' AUTHRORITY IS DERIVED FROM THE CONSTITUTION AND 'NOT OTHERWISE'
It is by that law, [The Constitution. ] and not otherwise, that the legislative, executive, and judicial agencies which it
created exercise such political authority as they have been permitted to possess. The Constitution speaks for itself in
40
terms so plain that to misunderstand their import is not rationally possible. CARTER v. CARTER COAL CO. 298
U.S. 238 (1936)(1). [All lawful government authority is of the Constitution 'of' We the People and not otherswise intended
to secure our all and our supreme sovereign status and authority is 'absolute' and not otherwise. ]
"MENACE"
Congressional flexibility is desirable, of course--but only within the bounds of federal power established by the
Constitution. Beyond those bounds (the theory of our Constitution goes), it is a menace. COLLEGE SAVINGS
BANK v. FLORIDA, 527 U.S. 666 (1999)(2). [Beyond = outside the Constitution-Lawlessness-against the true intent.]
NO OTHER SOURCE - OUR ABSOLUTE SUPREME SOVEREIGN SOURCE ONLY
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the U.S.) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. REID v. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)(2).
[Entirely an inferior artificial creature (dead entity-dead thing) of the Constitution 'of' We the People. ]
CONSTITUTIONS ARE A RESTRAINING FORCE AGAINST ABUSE OF GOVERNMENT = ABUSE BY MEN

All 'persons' have corresponding obligations to 'the people' and to 'the State' = government of the people. + Right to be free.
COMPTON, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):

Our dictum in Allred comports with traditional constitutional analysis holding that the constitution serves as a check
on the power of government: "That all lawful power derives from the people and must be held in check to preserve
their freedom is the oldest and most central tenet of American constitutionalism." L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, § 1-2, at 2 (2d ed. 1988) . In the same vein, we have written in regard to Alaska's constitutional
right to privacy: "[T]he primary purpose of these constitutional provisions is the protection of 'personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusions by the State.' '' Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, 565 P.2d 138,
148 (1977) (quoting Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502, 506 (Alaska 1967) (referring to article I, section 14 guarantees
against unreasonable searches and seizures). In Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 499 (Alaska 1975), we quoted the
Supreme Court's statement that fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from
unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)). [***]
The court wrote: "[T]he American constitutional theory is that constitutions are a restraining force against the
abuse of governmental power...." 666 P.2d at 1013 (quoting Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska
1970)) (emphasis in original).
Alaska Const. art. 1, § 1 provides: Inherent Rights. This constitution is dedicated to the principles that all
persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their own
industry; that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law; and that
all persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the State. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768
P.2d 1123 (1989). [All lawful government power = all of its laws, therefore all of its lawful jurisdiction is from the People.]
THE CONSTITUTION FORMS A 'LIMITED' GOVERNMENT OF ENUMERATED POWERS
Justice ROBERTS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
As Story says: 'The Constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be the frame of a national government,
of special and enumerated powers, and not of general and unlimited powers.' U.S. v. BUTLER, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(2). [The sovereign People are the Creators and source of the Constitution, government, its laws and jurisdiction.]
NOT 'ANY' POWER NOT GIVEN BY THE CONSTITUTION - OF THE PEOPLE
We agree in the proposition that no department of the government of the United States--neither President, nor
Congress, nor the Courts--possesses any power not given by the Constitution. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2
(1866)(2). [It's the Law! Article VI: Our Supreme Law of the Land; anything contrary not-with-standing = void. ]
THE SYSTEM OF FEDERALISM SCAM: 'ONLY' SO FAR AS ITS PROVISIONS ARE 'APPLICABLE'
The SCAM: Barely applicable to a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless citizen of the U.S. ruled as an entity, by U.S. located in D.C. outside the Const.
Among them (pages 289, 292 of 182 U.S.,) are these: 'Every function of the government being thus derived from
the Constitution, it follows that instrument is everywhere and at all times potential in so far as its provisions are
applicable. *** In the case of the territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the Constitution is
invoked, the question which arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether
the provision relied on is applicable.' O'DONOGHUE v. UNITED STATES, 289 U.S. 516 (1933)(2).
DENYING ANY POWER OR FUNCTION NOT WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION - ALL WAYS ARE CLOSED
Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
41
This is a vital question; for nothing is more certain than that beneficent aims, however great or well directed, can
never serve in lieu of constitutional power.
The ruling and firmly established principle is that the powers which the general government may exercise
are only those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to
carry into effect the enumerated powers. Whether the end sought to be attained by an act of Congress is legitimate is
wholly a matter of constitutional power and not at all of legislative discretion. Legislative congressional discretion
begins with the choice of means and ends with the adoption of methods and details to carry the delegated powers
into effect. The distinction between these two things--power and discretion--is not only very plain but very
important. For while the powers are rigidly limited to the enumerations of the Constitution, the means which may
be employed to carry the powers into effect are not restricted, save that they must be appropriate, plainly adapted to
the end, and not prohibited by, but consistent with, the letter and spirit of the Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 421. Thus, it may be said that to a constitutional end many ways are open; but to an end not within the
terms of the Constitution, all ways are closed.
The proposition, often advanced and as often discredited, that the power of the federal government
inherently extends to purposes affecting the Nation as a whole with which the states severally cannot deal or cannot
adequately deal, and the related notion that Congress, entirely apart from those powers delegated by the
Constitution, may enact laws to promote the general welfare, have never been accepted but always definitely
rejected by this court. Mr. Justice Story, as early as 1816, laid down the cardinal rule, which has ever since been
followed--that the general government 'can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the
powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.' Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326. In the Framers Convention, the proposal to confer a general power akin to that just
discussed was included in Mr. Randolph's resolutions, the sixth of which, among other things, declared that the
National Legislature ought to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and 'moreover to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may
be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation.' The convention, however, declined to confer upon Congress
power in such general terms; instead of which it carefully limited the powers which it thought wise to intrust to
Congress by specifying them, thereby denying all others not granted expressly or by necessary implication. It made
no grant of authority to Congress to legislate substantively for the general welfare, United States v. Butler, supra,
297 U.S. 1, at page 64; and no such authority exists, save as the general welfare may be promoted by the exercise of
the powers which are granted. Compare Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22.
The general rule with regard to the respective powers of the national and the state governments under the
Constitution is not in doubt. The states were before the Constitution; and, consequently, their legislative powers
antedated the Constitution. Those who framed and those who adopted that instrument meant to carve from the
general mass of legislative powers, then possessed by the states, only such portions as it was thought wise to confer
upon the federal government; and in order that there should be no uncertainty in respect of what was taken and
what was left, the national powers of legislation were not aggregated but enumerated--with the result that what was
not embraced by the enumeration remained vested in the states without change or impairment. Thus, 'when it was
found necessary to establish a national government for national purposes,' this court said in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 124, 'a part of the powers of the States and of the people of the States was granted to the United States and the
people of the United States. This grant operated as a further limitation upon the powers of the States, so that now
the governments of the States possess all the powers of the Parliament of England, except such as have been
delegated to the United States or reserved by the people.' While the states are not sovereign in the true sense of that
term, but only quasi sovereign, yet in respect of all powers reserved to them they are supreme--'as independent of
the general government as that government within its sphere is independent of the States.' The Collector v. Day, 11
Wall. 113, 124. And since every addition to the national legislative power to some extent detracts from or invades
the power of the states, it is of vital moment that, in order to preserve the fixed balance intended by the Constitution,
the powers of the general government be not so extended as to embrace any not within the express terms of the
several grants or the implications necessarily to be drawn therefrom. It is no longer open to question that the general
government, unlike the states, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275, possesses no inherent power in respect of
the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation. The question in respect of the
inherent power of that government as to the external affairs of the Nation and in the field of international law is a
wholly different matter which it is not necessary now to consider. See, however, Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 212;
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705; Burnet v.
Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396. CARTER v. CARTER COAL CO. 298 U.S. 238 (1936)(2). [Hence, commerce scam. ]
THE PEOPLE ARE THE MASTERS AND GOVERNMENT THE SERVANT

YOUNG, J. (Supreme Court of Michigan) concurring:
See also, 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (4th ed., 1873), § 426, p. 315 (Justice
Story stated that the Constitution must "have a fixed, uniform, permanent, construction ... not dependent upon the
passions or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and forever"); Bork, The Tempting of
America (New York: The Free Press, 1990), ch. 7, pp. 143-160; Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, NJ:
42
Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 37-47. Further, the rights created under the Bill of Rights must be preserved
as they existed in 1791. McIntyre, supra at 371-372, 115 S.Ct. 1511 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.)
(stating that the traditional view held by the Court and society is that the Constitution's original meaning is
unchanging); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (a common-law action that becomes statutory is
nonetheless protected by the Seventh Amendment's right to trial by jury); Story, supra. This principle of
interpretation follows inexorably from the fact that the People provided an explicit method and means for amending
the Constitution. U.S. Const., art. V. [***] Such an outcome seems incompatible with the founders' understood view
that the People are the masters and the government the servant. J&J CONSTRUCTION CO. v.
BRICKLAYERS, 468 Mich. 722 (2003)(3). [Constitution has a Permanent intent. So the servants illegally usurp over
their masters. ]
OUR CONSTITUTION 'ASSURES' THE LAW WILL ULTIMATELY PREVAIL

Justice MARSHALL, Circuit Justice (Supreme Court of the United States) : But the proper response to an arguably
illegal action is not lawlessness by judges [denying us the whole Truth, and our sovereign right to be let alone. ]
charged with interpreting and enforcing the laws. Down that road lies tyranny and repression. We have a
government of limited powers, and those limits pertain to the Justices of this Court as well as to Congress and the
Executive. Our Constitution assures that the law will ultimately prevail, but it also requires that the law be applied
in accordance with lawful procedures (in the Courts of Common Law. ). HOLTZMAN et al v. SCHLESINGER, 414
U.S. 1304 (1973)(1). [All Officers of government are bound by Oath to obey the Constitution. Illegal action: Forms &
Applications scam and outside the Constitution. When not injuring nor intending to injure anyone or anything, we demand
the supremacy of the Constitution of the People to prevail 'immediately' and let us alone in the Land of the Free. ]
EVERYONE MUST BE TAUGHT THE CONSTITUTION

HOPKINS, District Judge: It was Abraham Lincoln who said, 'Let reverence for the law be breathed by every
American mother to the lisping babe that prattles on her lap. Let it be taught in the schools, in seminaries, in
colleges. Let it be written in primers, spelling books and almanacs. Let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed
in legislative halls, enforced in courts of justice, and, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation.' The
rights and privileges preserved by the Constitution may not continue unless every one of us shall recognize his
responsibilities and duties under the Constitution. UNITED STATES v. DEWEY, 37 F.Supp. 449 (1941)(1). [Those
ignorant of the Constitution are unwittingly advocates for us to be 'slaves of men' who call themselves government. ]
OUR SUPER WISE FOREFATHERS DID NOT TRUST ANY GOVERNMENT = SERVANTS = MEN
Why blindly trust any lawyer, judge, or servant? We must ascertain what the Truth of the Law is vs. What is government deception?
Illegal government 'deception' is why sovereigns injuring no one are not free in the Land of the Free and the prison industry overflows.
"The First Amendment is a value-free provision whose protection is not dependent on 'the truth, popularity, or social
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' NAACP v. Button, [371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) ]. 'The very purpose
of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind.... In this
field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to
separate the true from the false for us.' Thomas v. Collins, [323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) ] (Jackson, J., concurring)."
Id., at 1455. MEYER v. GRANT, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)(2). [A Fatal mistake to trust mere men acting as government.
See the same quote in W. Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. You will see, the whole purpose of a trial
is to ascertain the Truth. Jurors have power to ascertain the whole Truth of the Law for Justice. ]
THE PEOPLE ARE THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN POWER AND ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY
The right of the 'sovereign citizen' to speak out against his servants corruption (crime).
Before LANDRY, ELLIS and BLANCHE, JJ. BLANCHE, Judge (Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit):
We feel the trial court adequately disposed of this contention in Written Reasons for Judgment, from which we
quote approvingly as follows: 'Accepting, arguendo, that the State of Louisiana is a corporation and can, in certain
instances, be called a person, see 81 C.J.S., States, Sec. 213, 49 Am.Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, Sec.
80, and State of Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360) (1934), the Court cannot accord with plaintiff's conclusion that the
state is a person for purposes of the law of defamation and libel. It is the opinion of this Court that a state constitutes
a concept or idea, 'a sort of intangible sovereignty (sic) (which) legally speaking *** cannot be assaulted, slandered,
or injured as can an individual with respect to a personality which it does not possess. (') State Highway and Public
Works Comm. v. Cobb, 215 N.C. 556, 2 S.E.2d 565 (1939).
Under the American philosophy of government, the state is a creature of the people and does not exist
separate and apart from the people. The 'state' is simply the name given to a governmental system designed to
maintain an ordered freedom, and this system is not considered distinct from or superior to the people. To accept the
argument that the state is capable of being defamed would be to reject the basic American principle that the people
are the supreme sovereign and to replace it with the antithetical concept that the state is supreme and exists apart
from and independently of the people. As long as ultimate sovereignity (sic) resides in the people, the state cannot
be thought of as having a separate personality and, therefore, cannot be said to have been defamed.
43
'The limited jurisprudence in this area is clear to the effect that a government, such as the State of
Louisiana, may not maintain a civil action for libel. In the case of City of Chicago vs. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 139
N.E. 86 (1923), the City of Chicago brought a libel action against a newspaper publishing company claiming that
certain articles which appeared in the newspaper were false and defamatory. The court therein sustained the
defendant's demurrer saying, in part: 'The fundamental right of freedom of speech is involved in this litigation, and
not merely the right of liberty of the press. If this action can be maintained against a newspaper it can be maintained
against every private citizen who are (sic) ventures to criticize the ministers who (are) temporarily conducting the
affairs of his government. Where any person by speech or writing seeks to persuade others to violate existing law or
to overthrow by force (or other unlawful means) the existing government, he may be punished (citations omitted),
but all other utterances or publications against the government must be considered absolutely privileged.' 'Later in
its opinion, the court in City of Chicago stated: ' *** it (It) follows(,) therefore(,) that every citizen has a right to
criticize an inefficient or corrupt government without fear of civil as well as criminal prosecution.' 'The court
concluded by remarking: '(***) This action is out of tune with the American spirit, and has no place in American
jurisprudence.' 'In the case of City of Albany v. Meyer, 99 Cal.App. 651, 279 Pac. 213 (1929), the City of Albany
sued for libel claiming damages to its good name, reputation and credit. In sustaining defendant's demurrer, the
Court cited City of Chicago, Supra, with approval and made this relevant comment at p. 215: '*** the old common-
law right of the government to punish or sue for libel which prevailed in the days of the divine right of kings on the
theory that the king could do no wrong is fundamentally out of harmony with the whole American system of
government, which is based upon the theory that the people are sovereign, that its magistrates, as servants of the
people can do wrong, and that the people have the fundamental right to criticise (sic) them and expose their
inefficiency (sic) and corruption.' [***] "For good reason, 'no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or
even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of jurisprudence,'
City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 139 N.E. 86, 88 (1923)."
'Defendant admits, for the purposes of the exception of no cause of action, that its charges were false and
malicious. But, legally, falsity of the accusation, when its reference is to government, is not an abuse of free speech.
Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan and City of Albany v. Meyer, cited above. Freedom to criticize the local, state and
national governments is an American's birthright. As, James Madison said: 'Some degree of abuse is inseparable
from the proper use of everything, and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press. It has accordingly
been decided by the states that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth than by
pruning them away to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits.' 4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal
Constitution, 571.
'Thus, even though the charges made by defendant are, for the purposes of this exception, false and
malicious, the state cannot be heard to complain. The state, under our system, is simply a government composed of
temporary representatives of the sovereign people, and is not vested with a cause of action for defamation.'
(Written Reasons for Judgment, Record, pp. 70--A through 73) [***] We are satisfied that the result reached in the
City of Chicago case and the rationale thereof are sound and in harmony with the American republican form of
government embodied in and guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
The following excerpts from the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in City of Chicago are pertinent in
this regard: 'There were few prosecutions for libel on government in the American colonies, and no court of last
resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in
the American system of jurisprudence. The right of the government to prosecute its accusers was founded on the
theory that the king could do no wrong. He was an hereditary monarch and was not responsible to the people. When
the people became sovereign, as they did when our government was established under our Constitution and the
ministers became servants of the people, the right to discuss government followed as a natural sequence. When the
sovereign power is vested in an hereditary monarch there is no occasion for discussing the government and exposing
its inefficiency or corruption unless to advocate reformation by violence, because there can be no remedy except by
revolution. It appears, therefore, that there was reasonable foundation for prosecuting the government's critics in the
days of 'divine rights' of kings, but, since the people are sovereign, and since the magistrates are servants of the
people, the magistrates can do wrong, and the people have a fundamental right to criticize them and to expose their
inefficiency and corruption so that they may be displaced. It is one of the fundamental principles, therefore, of the
American system of government, that the people have the right to discuss their government without fear of being
called to account in the courts for their expressions of opinion. *** 'The fundamental right of freedom of speech is
involved in this litigation, and not merely the right of liberty of the press. If this action can be maintained against a
newspaper it can be maintained against every private citizen who ventures to criticize the ministers who are
temporarily conducting the affairs of his government. Where any person by speech or writing seeks to persuade
others to violate existing law or to overthrow by force or other unlawful means the existing government, he may be
punished (People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325), but all other utterances or
publications against the government must be considered absolutely privileged. 'While in the early history of the
struggle for freedom of speech the restrictions were enforced by criminal prosecutions, it is clear that a civil action is
as great, if not a greater, restriction than a criminal prosecution. If the right to criticize the government is a privilege
which, with the exceptions above enumerated, cannot be restricted, then all civil as well as criminal actions are
44
forbidden. *** '*** It follows, therefore, that every citizen has a right to criticize an inefficient or corrupt
government without fear of civil as well as criminal prosecution. This absolute privilege is founded on the principle
that it is advantageous for the public interest that the citizen should not be in any way fettered in his statements, and
where the public service or due administration of justice is involved he shall have the right to speak his mind freely.
'The government consists of associated persons representing the sovereign, who make, interpret, and
enforce the laws. The American system of government is founded upon the fundamental principle that the citizen is
the fountain of all authority. Under our system this sovereign citizen has conferred certain authority upon his
servants--officers of the law commissioned for a fixed time to discharge specific duties. In order to serve their needs
the citizens of Illinois, acting through the state government erected by them, have authorized the organization of
city governments. STATE of Louisiana v. TIME INC., 249 So.2d 328 (1971)(3). [Be absolutely fearless. ]
Beyond the possibility of contradiction
WE THE PEOPLE THE SUPREME POWER EXERCISE THEIR SUPREME SOVEREIGN POWER
BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):
It is, of course, a mere platitude to say that the people are the supreme power in our system of government. The
history of our constitution and its adoption... shows beyond the possibility of contradiction that the people
themselves deliberately and intentionally announced that, by its adoption, they meant to exercise their supreme
sovereign power directly to a far greater extent than had been done in the past... . Whitman v. Moore, 125 P.2d 445,
450-51 (Ariz. 1942), Overruled on other grounds, Renck v. Superior Court, 187 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Ariz. 1947). [***]
The basic principles for interpreting statutes apply to constitutions, [Statutes are strictly interpreted, and
against government and in favor of the accused to protect our freedom against abuse and usurpation. ] and thus, to
resolve this question, we shall turn to the language of section 7 construed in light of the purpose of the provision.
We are especially sensitive to the policy concerns embodied in constitutional provisions because a constitution is a
document "unchangeable by ordinary means," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), which "must
be considered as a living document adaptable to changing conditions and circumstances unanticipated at the time it
was written." Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 391 (Alaska 1976) (footnote omitted). [***] Art. I, s 1,
of the Alaska Constitution states: Inherent Rights. This constitution is dedicated to the principles that all persons
have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry;
that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law; and that all
persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the State. Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1 (1979).
On Friday, July 10th, 2009 Alaska Governor Sarah Palin signed House Joint Resolution 27 (HJR27), sponsored by State Representative
Mike Kelly. The resolution "claims sovereignty for the state under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States over
all powers not otherwise enumerated and granted to the federal government by the Constitution of the United States." [Sovereignty is
vested in the people and only in the people. Not in government an artificial creature filled with temporary servants who come and go.]
The House passed the resolution by a vote of 37-0 (3 not voting) and the Senate passed it by a vote of 40-0.
Many other states have moved for that resolution. [The significance? Our servants openly acknowledge (our) sovereignty.]
Gullible: If the many past and present judges have declared We the People are the supreme power and sovereigns, how could it
ever be possible all of the judges could suddenly be wrong? If judges can’t even agree on the Truth of the Law, why would anyone
believe or obey some 'new' interpretation that is not supported with perfect reasoning and clear and unquestionable authority of Law
from the people, or when judges or even Supreme Court Justices cannot interpret it true and correct in the first instance? Usurpation
by corrupt judges etc. is because the servants cannot amend the Constitution to accumulate unjust power = Insurrection by illegal
fraud?
THE UNDENIABLE PROOF BEYOND ALL CONTROVERSY
WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARE "SOVEREIGNS"
The right to be what we are pursuant to the Law! Remember the postulates and Supreme Court interpretations may not be disregarded.
THE PEOPLE HERE ARE AS SOVEREIGN AS THE CROWNED HEADS AT LAYBACH

Revelation 3:11 Behold, I come quickly: 'hold' that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy 'crown.'
JOSEPH STORY (supreme Court of the United States): [SEAL.] (***) Mr. Webster, on the same side:
The people here are as sovereign as the crowned heads at Laybach, but their will is not so easily discovered. [***]
Chief Justice TANEY (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
No one, we believe, has ever doubted the proposition, that, according to the institutions of this country, the
sovereignty in every State resides in the people of the State, and that they may alter and change their form of
government at their own pleasure. And if the people, in the distribution of powers under the constitution, should ever
think of making judges supreme arbiters in political controversies, when not selected by nor, frequently, amenable to
them, nor at liberty to follow such various considerations in their judgments as belong to mere political questions,
they will dethrone themselves and lose one of their own invaluable birthrights; building up in this way--slowly,
but surely--a new sovereign power in the republic, in most respects irresponsible and unchangeable for life, and one
more dangerous, in theory at least, than the worst elective oligarchy in the worst of times. Again, instead of
controlling the people in political affairs, the judiciary in our system was designed rather to control individuals, on
45
the one hand, when encroaching, or to defend them, on the other, under the Constitution and the laws, when they
are encroached upon. And if the judiciary at times seems to fill the important station of a check in the government, it
is rather a check on the legislature, who may attempt to pass laws contrary to the Constitution, or on the executive,
who may violate both the laws and Constitution, than on the people themselves in their primary capacity as makers
and amenders of constitutions. Hence the judiciary power is not regarded by elementary writers on politics and
jurisprudence as a power coördinate or commensurate with that of the people themselve s, but rather coördinate with
that of the legislature. Kendall v. U. States, 12 Peters, 526. Hence, too, the following view was urged, when the
adoption of the Constitution was under consideration:--'It is the more rational to suppose that the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.' (Federalist, No. 77, by Hamilton.) 'Nor does the conclusion by
any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the
people is superior to both,' &c., &c. LUTHER v. BORDEN, 48 U.S. 1 (1849)(2). [The supreme sovereign People
superior to all government are hardly non-sovereign stateless persons, nor inferior to their mere artificial creature. ]
PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN DEVOLVED ON THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE CONTROLLABLE BY NO AUTHORITY

Mr. Justice BALDWIN (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Those states, in their highest sovereign capacity, in the convention of the people thereof; on whom, by the
revolution, the prerogative of the crown, and the transcendant power of parliament devolved, in a plenitude
unimpaired by any act, and controllable by no authority, 6 Wheat. 651; 8 Wheat. 584, 88; adopted the
constitution, ... . The State of Rhode Island v. The Common Wealth of Massachutess, 37 U.S. 657 (1838)(1).
"The very meaning of 'sovereignty' is that the decree of the sovereign makes law." American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347.
A sovereign decides by his own will, which is the supreme law within his own boundary; 6 Peters, 714; 9 Peters,
748; a court, or judge, decides according to the law prescribed by the sovereign power, and that law is the rule for
judgment. The State of Rhode Island v. The Common Wealth of Massachutess, 37 U.S. 657 (1838)(1).
SOVEREIGNTY SURVIVES - SOVEREIGNTY IS 'NEVER' HELD IN SUSPENSE

Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political
society cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense. UNITED STATES
v. CURTISS, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)(2). [The supremacy of the Constitution of We the sovereign People survives. ]
'CROWNED'
'CLEARLY' APPEARS THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARE THE 'SAME'
14th Amendment did not change the relationship of government to the sovereign people (creators) who 'hold' the power.
14th Amendment created a legal status for Negroes as 'citizens of the United States.'
Before EVANS and PAGE, Circuit Judges, and FITZHENRY, District judge (Circuit Ct. of Appeals 7th Circuit):
From the time of the adoption of the Constitution it became necessary in many cases to determine whether an
individual in a given case was a citizen of the United States. In U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, there is a
very full examination of the authorities and discussion of the question as to what then constituted citizenship in the
United States. In the Dred Scott Case, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, the Supreme Court said: 'The words, 'people of the
United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body
who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the
government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen
is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.'
That was in 1856, before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1891, after the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 159, [the case before this one. ] the Supreme Court quoted
and adopted the above definition from the Dred Scott Case. Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations,
said: 'The people, in a legal sense, must be understood to be those who, by the existing Constitution, are crowned
with political rights, and who, while that instrument remains, will be the sole organs through which the will of the
body politic will be expressed.'
It clearly appears that the people of the United States are the same since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment as they were at the adoption of the Constitution; that is, they are 'the political body who, according to
our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through
their representatives.' [Clearly the same, the supreme sovereign creators. Super emphasis added. ] [***].
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted to give former slaves, negroes, a
legal status as citizens of the United States and of the several states in which they resided, and to protect them in
46
those rights. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 the Supreme Court said: 'The Fourteenth Amendment did not radically
change the whole theory of the relations of the state and federal governments to each other, and of both
governments to the people.' [Did not change the relations: Creator vs. creature. Emphasis added. ] PETER HAND CO.
v. UNITED STATES, 2 F.2d 449 (1924)(1). [Citing Ref. 13 times 4/30/05. It 'clearly' appears We the sovereign people
are the 'same.' We 'hold' the Power (the Supreme Power). + Authority to protect only. ]
"EVERY CITIZEN IS ONE" OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE WHO "HOLD THE POWER!"
Everyone of the sovereign People is also one of the Supreme Power. Our sovereignty survives because we 'hold' the power.
But in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404, Mr. Chief Justice TENEY, delivering the opinion of the court,
said: 'The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens,' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They
both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign
people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.' [***]
The fourteenth amendment reads: 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. [***]'
In The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, it was held by this court that the first clause of the fourteenth
article was primarily intended to confer citizenship on the negro race. [Emphasis added. ] BOYD v. STATE OF
NEBRASKA, 143 U.S. 135 (1892)(2). [How true it is. Citing Ref. 256 times 4/30/05. 'Citizen' distinguished from 'citizen
of the United States.' We the People of the U.S. already pre-exist. SEE THE SAME QUOTE "every citizen is one" (of the
sovereign people who hold the power, etc.) in , DRED SCOTT v. SANFORD, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)(4); Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135
(1892)(2); CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, U.S. v. STANLEY, 109 U.S. 3 (2); U.S. v. WONG KIM, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)(3); In re SILKMAN, 84 N.Y.S.
1025 (1903)(2); PETER HAND CO. v. U.S., 2 F.2d 449 (1924)(1) DUKE POWER CO. v. GREENWOOD CTY., 19 F.Supp. 932 (1937)(2). ]
There is no reason or proof the above is not the Law, and since the Supreme Court interprets it: 'it's the Law.' Remember, all mere
human law must be prescribed by a superior, and all jurisdiction implies superiority, and the sovereign people are the supreme power,
who hold the power, superior to all government, our mere artificial creature of Law filled with temporary servants who come and go.
TRULY THE 'SOVEREIGNS'

Truly priceless. Truly profound. Truly says it all.
Justice SOUTER (Supreme Court of the United States) STEVENS, GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting:
Chief Justice Jay took a less vehement tone in his opinion, but he, too, denied the applicability of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to the States. He explained the doctrine as an incident of European feudalism, and said that by
contrast, "[n]o such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly
the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless the African slaves among us may be
so called) and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint
tenants in the sovereignty." ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Truly sovereigns (plural). Can it truly be
any clearer than that? See all the court cases herein proving the sovereign people 'hold' the power and therefore did not
and can not change in Law by the Law of the Constitution. ]
NO SUPERIOR, BUT GOD ALONE - THE WHOLE CIVILIZED WORLD CONCURS

A sovereign in 'no' respect amenable to an equal. 'Absolute' independence of sovereigns.
HARPER, on the same side: You cannot draw to your jurisdiction those who owe you neither a local nor an absolute
allegiance; but you may enquire into the validity of every claim to a thing within your jurisdiction. This doctrine is
peculiarly applicable to sovereigns: [***]
PINKNEY, Attorney General, in reply: Sovereigns are equal. It is the duty of a sovereign, not to submit his rights to
the decision of a co-sovereign. He is the sole arbiter of his own rights. He acknowledges no superior, but God
alone. To his equals, he shown respect, but not submission. March 3d. All the Judges being present.
MARSHALL, Ch. J. Delivered the opinion of the Court as follows: [They are 'Judges' not mere 'Justices.' ]
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being
incapable of conferring extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their
sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to
mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which
every sovereign is understood to wave the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which
has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.
1st. One of these is admitted to be the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a
foreign territory. If he enters that territory with the knowledge and license of its sovereign, that license, although
containing no stipulation exempting his person from arrest, is universally understood to imply such stipulation.
47
Why has the whole civilized world concurred in this construction? The answer cannot be mistaken. A
foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity,
and the dignity of his nation, and it is to avoid this subjection that the license has been obtained. The character to
whom it is given, and the object for which it is granted, equally require that it should be construed to impart full
security to the person who has obtained it. This security, however, need not be expressed; it is implied from the
circumstances of the case. Should one sovereign enter the territory of another, without the consent of that other,
expressed or implied, it would present a question which does not appear to be perfectly settled, a decision of which,
is not necessary to any conclusion to which the Court may come in the cause under consideration. If he did not
thereby expose himself to the territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign, whose dominions he had entered, it would
seem to be because all sovereigns impliedly engage not to avail themselves of a power over their equal, which a
romantic confidence in their magnanimity has placed in their hands. THE SCHOONER v. McFADDON, 11 U.S. 116
(1812)(2). [Cited1190 times 4/30/05. The leading case on sovereignty. Same in NEVADA v. HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)(2).]
ONE SOVEREIGN BEING IN NO RESPECT AMENABLE TO ANOTHER - EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE
Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
In the opinion the Chief Justice attributed to every nation an exclusive and absolute jurisdiction within its own
territory, subject to no limitation not having its consent, observed that the consent might be either express or
implied, and then said (page 136): 'The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and
equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of
those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in
practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their
respective territories which sovereignty confers.
'This consent may, in some instances, be tested by common usage, and by common opinion, growing out of
that usage. 'A motion would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly
plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a manner not
consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world.
'This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being
incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their
sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign
rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or
in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.
'This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them
to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in
which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial
jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.'
After discussing the statute of a sovereign, his ministers and his troops when they or any of them enter the
territory of another sovereign, he proceeded (page 141): 'If there be no treaty applicable to the case, and the
sovereign, from motives deemed adequate by himself, permits his ports to remain open to the public ships of foreign
friendly powers, the conclusion seems irresistable, that they may enter by his assent. And if they enter by his assent
necessarily implied, no just reason is perceived by the court for distinguishing their case from that of vessels which
enter by express assent. [***]
'Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication. He may claim and
exercise jurisdiction either by employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals. But until
such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having imparted
to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of faith to exercise. Those general statutory
provisions therefore which are descriptive of the ordinary jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals, which give an
individual whose property has been wrested from him, a right to claim that property in the courts of the country, in
which it is found, ought not, in the opinion of this court, to be so construed as to give them jurisdiction in a case, in
which the sovereign power has impliedly consented to waive its jurisdiction.' [***]
'The principle to be deduced from all these cases is that, as a consequence of the absolute independence of
every sovereign authority, and of the international comity which induces every sovereign state to respect the
independence and dignity of every other sovereign state, each and every one declines to exercise by means of its
courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state, or over
the public property of any state which is destined to public use, or over the property of any ambassador, though such
sovereign, ambassador, or property be within its territory, and, therefore, but for the common agreement, subject to
its jurisdiction.' BERIZZI BROS. v. THE PESARO, 271 U.S. 562 (1926)(2). [See also 127 So.2d 687 (1961). ]
JUS SUMMI IMPERII - THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN PEOPLE -THE UNCONTROLLABLE SUPREME POWER
48
SMITH, Chief Justice (High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi), delivered the following dissenting opinion:
For, under the American theory of government, the jus summi imperii, the supreme, absolute, uncontrolled
authority, does not reside in any of the departments of the government, nor in all of them united. It is inherent in the
people, from whom all power is derived, and upon whose consent all government is founded. The Constitution
derives its existence from the immediate act and consent of the people. It is a law to the government "which derives
its just powers therefrom, as from the assent of the governed, for whose benefit that power is intrusted." As the
Constitution is the supreme law, all the acts of the government or the departments thereof, done in contravention of
its provisions, are inoperative and void. GREEN v. WELLER, 32 Miss. 650 (1856)(1). [Anything else is illegal fraud
and lawless usurpation against the people and the established Order of things in Law under the Constitution. ]
On earth there is no human 'status' higher than supreme (or sovereign). Anything contrary to the above is fraud and lawless
usurpation without 'right' invented by temporary usurping servants who come and go. Under God our Law = Justice, and our servants
are always suppose to strive towards perfection, and everything contrary to the law of God, the Constitution, Truth, or right is void.
SOVEREIGNS OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY

Jay, Chief Justice (supreme Court of the United States):
The Revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people already united for general purposes,
and at the same time providing for their more domestic concerns by State conventions, and other temporary
arrangements. From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it; and it
was then not an uncommon opinion, that the unappropriated lands, which belonged to that crown, passed not to the
people of the Colony or States within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people; on whatever
principles this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged
from the principles of the Revolution, combined with local convenience and considerations; the people nevertheless
continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they continued without
interruption to manage their national concerns accordingly; afterwards, in the hurry of the war, and in the warmth of
mutual confidence, they made a confederation of the States, the basis of a general Government. Experience
disappointed the expectations they had formed from it; and then the people, in their collective and national capacity,
established the present Constitution. It is remarkable that in establishing it, the people exercised their own rights,
and their own proper sovereignty, and conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming dignity, 'We the
people of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Here we see the people acting as sovereigns
of the whole country; and in the language of sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their will, that
the State Governments should be bound, and to which the State Constitutions should be made to conform. Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)(4). [We the People are truly the sovereign owners of the whole country = The U.S. of A.]
SOVEREIGNTY IS SUPREME - HAVING NO SUPERIOR PROFOUNDLY 'UNCONTROLLABLE'
Subject to no judge = Subject to no Law but God's alone - much less subject to a mere artificial creature
LOCKWOOD, Judge (Supreme Court of Arizona):

It may be remarked, with us, the body of the nation has kept in its own hands the empire, or the right to command,
and our government is therefore called a 'popular government.' Wheaton defines sovereignty, 'the supreme power
by which any citizen is governed.' Hurd says: 'The supreme power in the state must necessarily be absolute, in being
subject to no judge.' Jameson says: 'By the term 'sovereignty' is meant the person or body of persons in a state to
whom there is politically no superior.' Leiber has said: 'The necessary existence of the state, and that right and
power which necessarily follow, is sovereignty.' Story says: 'By sovereignty, in its largest sense, is meant supreme,
absolute, uncontrollable power; the jus sumni imperii; the absolute right to govern.' Yeaman, in his Study of
Government, (484), says: 'This sovereignty is the last and supreme will in the direction and control of the affairs of
society, and beyond or above which there is no political power, and no legal appeal. The word which by itself comes
nearest being the definition of sovereignty is will or volition, as applied to political affairs. Government is not
sovereignty. Government is the machinery or expedient for expressing the will of the sovereign power.'
Definitions of sovereignty might be almost indefinitely multiplied, but these which have been given I believe to be
sufficient to give an accurate idea of its nature. This sovereign power in our government belongs to the people, and
the government of the United States and the government of the several states are but the machinery for expounding
or expressing the will of the sovereign power.' CITY OF BISBEE v. COCHISE COUNTY, 52 Ariz. 1 (1938)(3).
THE PEOPLE ARE THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN MASTERS - OFFICIALS ARE SERVANTS
KENT, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of New York):
The people must be regarded as the sovereign or master, and the persons elected as their agents or servants. It is
essential, in an elective government, that the people should be at liberty, bona fide , to express their opinions of any
public officer, or candidate for office. It is said, that the people are the masters, and the governors or
representatives, are their servants; and the case of Weatherston v. Hawkins, has been cited on the ground of a
supposed analogy. The people, it is true, in their political capacity, constitute the supreme and sovereign power of
the state; and may, in that view, be justly considered as the sovereign or master. But when do the people appear and
49
act in this sovereign capacity? Only when they meet to elect their representatives. Who are the people? The great
body of electors. But any assemblage of citizens, whether electors or not, for the purpose of promoting the election
of a particular candidate, and of influencing the electors to vote for their favorite, is not the people, or sovereign in
this constitutional sense. It would be a most dangerous doctrine, and productive of the greatest licentiousness, if
such meetings were to be considered as the people, and possessing the attributes and immunities of sovereignty.
LEWIS v. FEW, 5 Johns. 1 (1809)(1). [How true it is. And lawfully the masters cannot be servants of servants. ]
SOVEREIGNTY FROM ITS NATURE IS 'NEVER' SUBORDINATE

Sovereignty could 'not' exist in different 'governments or nations' at the same time.
The rights and powers of sovereignty, on the part of Spain, over the territory, ceased with her transfer of that
sovereignty to another government; it could not exist in different governments or nations at the same time. The
power to preserve the peace and order of the community may be admitted to have been in the officers previously
appointed by Spain, until the actual presence of the agents of the succeeding government; but this would not imply
sovereign power still remaining in Spain,--for if she [We the People. ] continued to be sovereign after expressly
conceding her sovereignty to another government, she might still rightfully resist and control that government; for
sovereignty from its nature is never subordinate. THE UNITED STATES v. REYNES, 50 U.S. 127 (1850)(1).
[Never subordinate, much less to an artificial creature of a non-sovereign Nation of U.S. citizens. ]
THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN PEOPLE PUT 'NO' RESTRAINT UPON THEMSELVES

Supreme Court of Mississippi OPINION OF THE COURT: Even the power of the people, in their sovereign capacity,
is denied, to effect a general emancipation; to test this, we must first inquire into the source of sovereignty, as
understood in these United States, to reside in the people--In all governments whatsoever there must be of
necessity, and in the nature of things, a supreme irresistible absolute and uncontrolled authority, in which the "jura
summi imperii," or the rights of sovereignty reside, and when we speak of sovereignty in this sense, it is in
contradistinction of the powers given under a constitution, or the powers of a limited government, that a constitution
emanates from and is a part of that sovereignty in its most extensive sense, as residing in the people, is universally
acknowledged by all those best acquainted with the theory and principles of our government, that the same power
that creates, can change, alter or destroy, is a consequence too clear to require it to be supported by proof. The
people restrain the power under a delegated authority, but put no restraint upon themselves; [Emphasis added! ] the
acts of the supreme power, though contrary to natural rights, are nevertheless binding. [***]
Where does the power reside of restraining the people in their sovereign capacity? Is there any such power
recognised? Are we not told that the Parliament of England can pass any law, however it may violate first principles,
and the courts would be bound to enforce it. It is in vain to attempt to bind that which is in itself illimitable,
irresistible, and supreme. HARRY v. DECKER & HOPKINS. Walker PETITION FOR FREEDOM. 1 Miss. 36
(1818)(1). [Sovereignty is never subordinate. Hence, their illegal subjection scam. We injure no one leave us alone. ]
ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY THE SUPREME - SUPERIOR TO ALL GOVERNMENT
That decision was made in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, and created such a shock of surprise
throughout the country that, at the first meeting of congress thereafter, the eleventh amendment to the constitution
was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the states. This amendment,
actually reversed the decision of the supreme court. HANS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)(2). [See the
same in LUTHER v. BORDEN, and ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) infra. We can amend the Constitution our servants
usurp since they can't. Our subjection via illegal government usurpation can be nullified by us and jurors. ]
WE THE PEOPLE THE ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY SUPERIOR TO ALL LEGISLATURES AND ALL COURTS
Superior to all legislatures (= all laws) and all courts = all jurisdiction = all mere human law and jurisdiction.
The text and history of the Eleventh Amendment also suggest that Congress acted not to change but to restore the
original constitutional design. Although earlier drafts of the Amendment had been phrased as express limits on the
judicial power granted in Article III, see, e.g., 3 Annals of Congress 651-652 (1793) ("The Judicial Power of the
United States shall not extend to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States ..."), the adopted text addressed the proper interpretation of that provision of the original Constitution, see
U.S. Const., Amdt. 11 ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States ..."). By its terms, then, the Eleventh
Amendment did not redefine the federal judicial power but instead overruled the Court: "This amendment,
actually reversed the decision of the Supreme Court. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2).
50
A THOUSAND TIMES
Definitely settled, and a thousand times re-affirmed the people are the 'only rightful sovereigns.'
PRATT P. J. (Supreme Court of Michigan) dissenting:

Originally, and particularly in the old world, the masses of the people were not only taught to believe, but were, by
despotic power, compelled to submit to the degrading political heresy that all sovereign power, laws and rights
were inherent in their sovereign prince or potentate; and that the people, individually or otherwise, possessed no
rights or privileges, either social, political or religious, except such as were conferred upon them by the grace and
special favor of their sovereign. But this absurd and damnable doctrine was exploded and entirely discarded by
the Anglo-Americans before the revolution. Since that eventful and glorious period in the history of this country, the
true doctrine on that subject has been adopted. It has been definitely settled, affirmed, and a thousand times re-
affirmed, that the people are the only rightful sovereigns, and that all political power is inherent in them; and that
they do, individually, possess certain primitive rights, in virtue of the great laws of nature and the gift of Almighty
God, which are inherent and indefeasible. That social happiness, religious freedom, life, liberty, and the right of
property, honestly accumulated, belongs to this class of rights. And that the great and paramount object of instituting
civil government, is to secure those who enter into it in the enjoyment of these rights. And for the most indubitable
and conclusive evidence of the truth of this American theory, we have only to look into the various memorials and
resolutions of the American people, and the various speeches and addresses of the American statesmen, immediately
preceding 1776; the declaration of American independence; the articles of confederation; the constitution of the
United States, and the several state constitutions which have since been framed and adopted, in all of which this
theory is clearly defined, and these rights fully recognized as inherent and indefeasible in man, and which human
government can neither grant nor abolish, alter nor abridge.
If the legislature, by assumption, or, in other words, by the mere exercise of implied discretionary power,
can change or abrogate the well-defined and settled theory of our civil compact, [Constitution. ] and take away, or
otherwise destroy, the natural rights of citizens, then there are no rights which can be regarded as inherent; nor can
our system of government be justly deemed republican or free. Nor can those composing the minority be any longer
certain of protection by government, or have the least security for the enjoyment of any rights which they may
respectively possess; on the contrary, they must stand in no better attitude, irrespective of the fundamental principles
and maxims of free government, than that of the most abject slaves to the majority, and at all times entirely
dependent on the will, whim or caprice of the senators and representatives whom they may elect, for every right and
for every privilege, political, civil or religious, they may enjoy. If this is the true condition of those composing the
minority, and they have no other or greater security for the enjoyment of life, liberty and property than the will of
the legislature, then, beyond all controversy, our constitution is but a mythical representation, and our boasted
republican government is but a mere delusion--a fraud in its inception. But it is not so. The legislature is not
omnipotent. It does not possess the unrestricted sovereign powers claimed for it by Neal Dow and his deluded
followers. The people do individually possess certain rights, which are inherent in them, and which neither the
legislature nor any department of government can lawfully alter, abrogate or invade; and which should be the pride
and glory of every department to defend and preserve untouched. [Artificial entities have no such rights. ]
It is one of the cardinal principles of a republican system of government, that its legitimate authority shall
be respected and obeyed by the citizens, and that the legitimate rights and privileges of the citizens shall be
respected and defended by the government. This, beyond all doubt, is the true and settled theory of our system of
civil compact. Any other would be absurd and inconsistent with its spirit and genius. This theory, in a republican
system of government, is legally implied, and need never be expressly inserted in the fundamental law. In our state
constitution, however, it is substantially and sufficiently expressed. It stands out clearly and emphatically upon
every page of it. But whether it does or not, is entirely immaterial, for it is a settled theory, and, in legal
contemplation, constitutes one of the fundamental maxims of free government in this country; and as such, it legally
enters into, and becomes an integral portion of the entire system. And the legislature, and every other department,
are as much bound by it as the judicial tribunals of the state are bound by the settled and well-defined maxims of the
common law, which for ages have been deemed as fixed and fundamental rules that belong to the universal elements
of rational jurisprudence, and which no common law court of any ability and legal learning would, at this day,
assume for a moment to discard or reject as invalid. The very first rudiments of rational jurisprudence resulted from
general consent, or acquiescence and when legislation began to act upon it, it was to confirm and add to, and not to
supersede or destroy those primitive principles which had, by express or implied consent, been adopted and
engrafted into the system as component parts thereof.
And so it is, and so it ever has been in civil government. Neither the sovereign nor the legislature of any
government ever organized on the globe, gave origin to its entire system. The principles of natural justice, the
obligations of good faith, the protection of life, and the right of private property, must necessarily have been
understood, appreciated, and fully recognized by the people, before they could have even desired the organization of
any system of civil compact. This must be so; for men entered into the compact for the avowed and sole purpose of
confirming and defending, and not of abrogating or impairing those sacred rights and obligations, thus previously
recognized by them as just and valid. The great consideration of the organization is, to secure to themselves more
51
effectually the unmolested and continued enjoyment of these, among other rights and privileges. It is for this that
men live and toil. Without it, human life would scarcely be desirable. [How true. ]
The settled and known purposes for which men enter into civil government are to be necessarily taken into
consideration, in construing the articles of compact; [Constitution. ] in determining the terms and conditions upon
which it was entered into, and the nature and extent of the powers conferred. This is a fundamental rule, universally
adopted in construing the provisions of a constitution. [***] That justice and equal rights are among the great
purposes of republican government, will not be controverted. They constitute the "Magna Charta" of the system, and
are held and declared as cardinal principles, which ought always to govern and control the legislature and other
departments. Strict adherence to these great principles is essential and indispensably necessary to the perpetuation
of the government, and for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens. This is a self-evident proposition;
for justice cannot be administered, or equal rights conferred by government, where they are disregarded by those
intrusted with the powers of the several departments; nor where legislative acts are not within the scope of
legislative power, [as an artificial creature of our Law. ] but are partial, unjust, and oppressive, especially upon those
of the minority. The People v. Thomas Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 (1856)(1).
THE ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY RESTS IN THE PEOPLE 'THEMSELVES'

True sovereignty in the People themselves. The 'supreme power' resides in the people.
The sovereign was by definition, above the law (as the source and creator).
For he is free that can be free when he will.
The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil laws.
Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
As a matter of political theory, this federal arrangement of dual delegated sovereign powers truly was a more
revolutionary turn than the late war had been. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838
(1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring) ("Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of
sovereignty"). (fn 43) Before the new federal scheme appeared, 18th-century political theorists had assumed that
"there must reside somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided, final power, higher in legal authority than
any other power, subject to no law, a law unto itself." B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution 198 (1967); see also Wood 345. (fn 44). The American development of divided sovereign powers, which
"shatter[ed] ... the categories of government that had dominated Western thinking for centuries," id. , at 385, was
made possible only by a recognition that the ultimate sovereignty rests in the people themselves. See id., at 530
(noting that because "none of these arguments about 'joint jurisdictions' and 'coequal sovereignties' convincingly
refuted the Antifederalist doctrine of a supreme and indivisible sovereignty," the Federalists could succeed only by
emphasizing that the supreme power" 'resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government' " (citing 1
Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, p. 302 (J. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888) (quoting James
Wilson)). (fn 45) The People possessing this plenary bundle of specific powers were free to parcel them out to
different governments and different branches of the same government as they saw fit. See F. McDonald, Novus
Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origin of the Constitution 278 (1985). As James Wilson emphasized, the location
of ultimate sovereignty in the People meant that "[t]hey can distribute one portion of power to the more contracted
circle called State governments; they can also furnish another proportion to the government of the United States." 1
Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, supra, at 302. (fn 46).
(fn 43). Regardless of its other faults, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393
(1857), recognized as a structural matter that "[t]he new Government was not a mere change in a dynasty, or in a
form of government, leaving the nation or sovereignty the same, and clothed with all the rights, and bound by all the
obligations of the preceding one." Id., at 441. See also F. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual
Origins of the Constitution 276 (1985) ("The constitutional reallocation of powers created a new form of
government, unprecedented under the sun ..."); S. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American
Federalism 150-151 (1993) (American view of sovereignty was "radically different" from that of British tradition).
(fn 44). Cf., e.g., 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 49, 160-162 (Cooper ed. 1803). This modern notion of
sovereignty is traceable to the writings of Jean Bodin in the late 16th century. See J. Bodin, Six Books of the
Commonwealth, bk. 2, ch. I, pp. 52-53 (M. Tooley, abr. & transl. 1967) (1576); see also T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Part
II, ch. 29, pp.150-151N. Fuller ed. 1952 (1651).
(fn 45). See Wood 530 (noting that James Wilson "[m]ore boldly and fully than anyone else ... developed the
argument that would eventually become the basis of all Federalist thinking" about sovereignty); see also The
Federalist No. 22, at 146 (A. Hamilton) (acknowledging the People as "that pure original fountain of all legitimate
authority"); id., No. 49, at 339 (J. Madison) ("[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power").
(fn 46). See also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (the
Constitution "created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government,
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who
sustain it and are governed by [governed by not under it. ] it"). [***]
(fn 47). See Amar, 96 Yale L. J., at 1434-1435 ("The ultimate American answer [to the British notion that the
sovereign was by definition above the law], in part, lay in a radical redefinition of governmental 'sovereignty.'
52
Just as a corporation could be delegated limited sovereign privileges by the King-in-Parliament, so governments
could be delegated limited powers to govern. Within the limitations of their charters, governments could be
sovereign, but that sovereignty could be bounded by the terms of the delegation itself."
Given this metamorphosis of the idea of sovereignty in the years leading up to 1789, the question whether
the old immunity doctrine might have been received as something suitable for the new world of federal-question
jurisdiction is a crucial one. (fn 48) The answer is that sovereign immunity as it would have been known to the
Framers before ratification thereafter became inapplicable as a matter of logic in a federal suit raising a federal
question. The old doctrine, after all, barred the involuntary subjection of a sovereign to the system of justice and
law of which it was itself the font, since to do otherwise would have struck the common-law mind from the Middle
Ages onward as both impractical and absurd. See, e.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)
(Holmes, J.) ("A sovereign is exempt from suit ... on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends"). (fn 49) But the ratification demonstrated
that state governments were subject to a superior regime of law in a judicial system established, not by the State,
but by the people through a specific delegation of their sovereign power to a National Government that was
paramount within its delegated sphere. When individuals sued States to enforce federal rights, the Government that
corresponded to the "sovereign" in the traditional common-law sense was not the State but the National
Government, and any state immunity from the jurisdiction of the Nation's courts would have required a grant from
the true sovereign, the people, in their Constitution, or from the Congress that the Constitution had empowered. We
made a similar point in Nevada v. Hall, where we considered a suit against a State in another State's courts:
(fn48). See, e.g., Amar, supra, at 1436 ("By thus relocating true sovereignty in the People themselves ...
Americans domesticated government power and decisively repudiated British notions of 'sovereign' governmental
omnipotence") (footnote omitted). That this repudiation extended to traditional principles of sovereign immunity is
clear from Justice Wilson's opinion in Chisholm, in which he blasted "the haughty notions of state independence,
state sovereignty and state supremacy" as allowing "the state [to] assum[e] a supercilious pre-eminence above the
people who have formed it." 2 Dall., at 461.
(fn 49). See also Hobbes, supra, at 130 ("The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is not
subject to the civil laws.... For he is free that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be
bound to himself, because he that can bind can release; and therefore he that is bound to himself only is not
bound"); Bodin, supra, at 28-29 ("One may be subject to laws made by another, but it is impossible to bind oneself
in any matter which is the subject of one's own free exercise of will.... It follows of necessity that the king cannot
be subject to his own laws" [Much less of an inferior. The Constitution is the Law of the People for government. ]).
"This [traditional] explanation [of sovereign immunity] adequately supports the conclusion that no
sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in
another sovereign's courts. SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)(2). [They know
the Truth, it's the Law subordinate to God's. Our Law = the Constitution = our courts etc. ]
A SOVEREIGN CANNOT IN "ANY WAY" BE SUBJECT TO THE COMANDS OF ANOTHER

Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting:
His cited authorities stand in the line that today's Court purports to follow: Hobbes, Bodin, Sir John Eliot, and
Baldus de Ubaldis. Hobbes, in the cited work, said this: "The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or
one man, is not subject to the civil laws. For having power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he pleaseth,
free himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he
was free before. For he is free that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself,
because he that can bind can release; and therefore he that is bound to himself only is not bound." Leviathan, ch.
26, ß 2, p. 130. Jean Bodin produced a similar explanation nearly three-quarters of a century before Hobbes, see J.
Bodin, Les six livres de la république, Bk. 1, ch. 8 (1577); Six Books of the Commonwealth 28 (M. Tooley transl.
1967) ("[T]he sovereign ... cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes
law"). Eliot cited Baldus for the crux of the theory: majesty is "a fulness of power subject to noe necessitie, limitted
within no rules of publicke Law," 1 J. Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis: or Political Treatise of Government 15 (A. Grosart
ed. 1882), and Baldus himself made the point in observing that no one is bound by his own statute as of necessity,
see Commentary of Baldus on the statute Digna vox in Justinian's Code 1.14.4, Lectura super Codice folio 51b
(Chapter De Legibus et constitutionibus) (Venice ed. 1496) ("nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative"). ALDEN v.
MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [The point of sovereignty is to protect us from laws of evil minded servants etc. ]
LANGUAGE CONSTRUED MOST STRONGLY IN FAVOR OTHE PEOPLE THE SOVEREIGNS

CONNOR, J. (Supreme Court of North Carolina) dissenting:
Reade, J., in Nichols v. McKee, 68 N. C. 430, says: "The theory of our state government is that all political power is
vested in and derived from the people. The Constitution is their grant of powers, and it is the only grant which they
have made. [***] When an unusual or extraordinary power is asserted by the government, or unusual and
extraordinary methods, contrary to the procedure and course of the common law, are prescribed by which the
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right of the citizen, either in respect to his person or property, is invaded, every reasonable doubt must be construed
against the asserted power and mode of procedure, and in favor of the right of the citizen to demand that he be
tried by due course of law. As in England, all language in grants is to be construed most strongly in favor of the
King, so in North Carolina all such language must be construed most strongly in favor of the people--the
sovereigns. DANIELS v. HOMER, 139 N.C. 219 (1905)(2). [We injured no one leave us alone and secure our rights.]
THE PEOPLE ARE SOVEREIGN NOT THEIR GOVERNMENT- ORIGINATES IN THE CONSTITUTION
DOUGLAS and BATCHELDER, Justices (Supreme Court of New Hampshire) concurring specially: see also Magna
Carta c. 40: "Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus aut differimus rectum vel justitiam." (To no one shall we sell, to no
one shall we deny, or delay right or justice.) Our concern today is no less important than that of our thirteenth-or
eighteenth-century ancestors: to insist that justice be provided fairly to all. Part I, article 1 provides that our
government is derived from the people and is founded on their consent. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 1. Article 3 makes
it clear that the government originates in a social compact running between the State and the people, whose end is
the protection of man's natural rights. [***] In this State, it is the people who are sovereign, not their government.
[***]" [***] We would hold that to the extent that the doctrine of sovereign immunity denies an injured party a "just"
remedy, it is unconstitutional. The STATE of New Hampshire v. BROSSEAU, 124 N.H. 184 (1983)(1).
WE THE PEOPLE ARE SOVEREIGNS NOT THOSE WHO SIT IN THE SEATS OF THE MIGHTY
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting: First Amendment rights are indeed
fundamental, for 'We the People' are the sovereigns, not those who sit in the seats of the mighty. It is the voice of the
people who ultimately have the say; once we fence off a group, and bar them from public dialogue, the public
interest is the loser. Those who are tied into the federal regime either by direct employment or by state projects
federally financed now amount to about five and a half million. The number included, if all state employees are
added, is estimated at over 13 million. BROADRICK v. State of OKALAHOMA, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)(2).
WE THE PEOPLE BARGAINED AS SOVEREIGNS

WEINTRAUB, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of the New Jersey):
The argument the other way notes that actually the 13 States had already agreed 'that the Union shall be perpetual'
by the Articles of Confederation, Art. XIII, but nonetheless, if it be granted that the 13 States (perhaps more strictly
their inhabitants, i.e., 'WE THE PEOPLE of the United States') bargained as sovereigns in the formation of a new
constitution, still it does not follow that the 'compromise' they reached was an arbitrary invention which denied the
people of the United States something so fundamental as equal protection of the law. In United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), the Court said that '*** equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of
republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this
principle, if within its power.' JACKMAN v. BODINE, 43 N.J. 453 (1964)(1).
BARRED THE INVOLUNTARY SUBJECTION OF A SOVEREIGN TO JUSTICE AND LAW

Justice and Law = No jurisdiction prescribed by law.
No legal right as against the authority that makes the Law-Constitution.
Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER join, (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
The old doctrine, after all, barred the involuntary subjection of a sovereign to the system of justice and law of
which it was itself the font, [We the People! ] since to do otherwise would have struck the common-law mind from
the Middle Ages onward as both impractical and absurd. See, e.g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907)
(Holmes, J.) ("A sovereign is exempt from suit ... on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends"). SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA v.
FLORIDA, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)(2). [See the sovereign is the font in Alden v. Maine (1999). And We are the supreme
sovereign source, makers-creators-establishers of the Constitution. Legislation is law of our creature. ]
'THE LAWMAKERS ' BEING THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN PEOPLE THEMSELVES

All political power and sovereignty primarily reside in the people.
All government acts through the Constitution and not otherwise.
And the Constitution itself is in every real sense a law--the lawmakers being the people themselves, in whom
under our system all political power and sovereignty primarily resides, and through whom such power and
sovereignty primarily speaks. It is by that law, and not otherwise, that the legislative, executive, and judicial
agencies which it created exercise such political authority as they have been permitted to possess. The Constitution
speaks for itself in terms so plain that to misunderstand their import is not rationally possible. 'We the People of
the United States,' it says, 'do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Ordain and establish! These are definite words
of enactment, and without more would stamp what follows with the dignity and character of law. The framers of the
Constitution, however, were not content to let the matter rest here, but provided explicitly--'This Constitution, and
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the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; *** shall be the supreme Law of the Land.'
(Const. art. 6, cl. 2.) The supremacy of the Constitution as law is thus declared without qualification. That
supremacy is absolute; the supremacy of a statute enacted by Congress is not absolute but conditioned upon its
being made in pursuance of the Constitution. And a judicial tribunal, clothed by that instrument with complete
judicial power, and, therefore, by the very nature of the power, required to ascertain and apply the law to the facts in
every case or proceeding properly brought for adjudication, must apply the supreme law and reject the inferior
statute whenever the two conflict. CARTER v. CARTER, 298 U.S. 238 (1936)(1). [Therefore our supremacy is absolute.]
The sovereign People 'hold' the supreme Power and merely delegate [limited] just 'Power' (not sovereignty) in the Constitution to
government to avoid being judges in their own cause. They withheld the word 'sovereign' Power in the Constitution. The Supreme
Power creates the Supreme Law, and our artificial creature is solely of, under and bound by oath to obey the Constitution and not
otherwise. The mere creature cannot rule the creator with 'it's ' laws. The limitations of mere human law are coordinate with the right
of mere men (not gods) to make just laws over men (non-sovereigns) who owe allegiance.
ONE IS THE WORK OF THE "CREATOR" AND THE OTHER OF OUR "CREATURE"
The Constitution is the work 'of' the People in their original 'sovereign' capacity.
What are Legislatures? Creatures 'of the Constitution' = Creatures subordinate to the Constitution 'of' the People.
Patterson, Justice (the supreme Court of the United States) : What is a Constitution? It is the form of government,
delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established.
The Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the
land; it is paramount to the power of the Legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made
it. The life-giving principle and the death-doing stroke must proceed from the same hand. What are Legislatures?
Creatures of the Constitution; they owe their existence to the Constitution: they derive their powers from the
Constitution: It is their commission; and, therefore, all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void.
The Constitution is the work or will of the People themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity.
Law is the work or will of the Legislature in their derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the
Creator, and the other of the Creature. [Super Emphasis added. ] The Constitution fixes limits to the exercise of
legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it must move. In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the
sun of the political system, around which all Legislative, Executive and Judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may
be the case in other countries, yet in this there can be no doubt, that every act of the Legislature, repugnant to the
Constitution, as absolutely void. Vanhorne's v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795)(1). [Same: Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1
(1849); Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507 (1847); Bickett v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333 (1915); Hudson v. Livingston, 2 Denio
380 (Supreme Ct. of N.Y., 1845); Creature cannot rule its Creator let alone unjustly or outside the Law. ]
EVERY ACT OF THE CREATURE CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION IS VOID AND UNCORRECTED = OVERTHROW
BELL, J. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania):
But with us, the introduction of original written compacts, framed by the people themselves, has established a
marked distinction between the indefinite and unlimited power of the community, considered as a whole, and the
definite and limited power of the legislature. By these compacts, so much of the sovereign authority as is necessary
for the making of laws, is delegated to the selected agents of the mass; but it must be exercised in the mode and
manner pointed out by the compact itself. This observance is essential to the very existence of the constitution of a
state; for that is the instrument by which the administrative authority is created, its powers defined, and their extent
limited, the duties of the public functionaries prescribed, and the principles according to which the government is to
be administered, delineated: Paine's Rights of Man, part 1, p. 42; or, in the language of Judge Patterson, truthful as
eloquent, 2 Dall. 308, "It is the form of government delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain
first principles or fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent
will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the legislature, and can be
revoked or altered only by the authority that made it. The life-giving principle and the death-doing stroke must
proceed from the same hands." Until altered or destroyed by this authority, it is obligatory on the people
themselves; and legislatures, which are merely its creatures, must conform to it, or their acts will be void. Every
thing done in contravention of its principles is an act of usurpation, which, uncorrected, tends directly to its
overthrow. PARKER v. COMMONWEALTH, 6 Pa. 507 (1847)(2). [Hence, Code statutes of non-sovereigns. ]
CREATURES OF THE LAW - OF THE COUNSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE

MR. JUSTICE WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: All the officers of
the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. BUTZ v.
ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)(2). [Same in U.S. v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)(2); International Postal Sup. v. Bruce, 194
U.S. 601 (1904)(1); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 239-240. Creatures 'of the Law of the Constitution of the People.' ]
THE CREATURE CANNOT RULE ITS CREATOR

Sovereigns never delegate irrevocable power to their creature or servant to rule over them, let alone without immunity.
Justice Brewer (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
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The creature cannot rule the creator. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349. STATE OF KANSAS v. STATE
OF COLORADO, 206 U.S. 46 (1907)(2). ['It's the Law!' Hence, government's illegal forms and applications scam. ]
CONFIRMING OUR ARTIFICIAL CREATURE CANNOT RULE ITS SUPREME CREATOR
JERTBERG, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit):
Or as simply stated by Justice Brewer, 'The creature cannot rule the creator'. State of Kansas v. State of Colo.,
1906, 206 U.S. 46, 48, 83. GILBERTSON v. CITY OF FAIRBANKS, 262 F.2d 734 (1959)(1).
UNIVERSAL MAXIM - ESTABLISHED BY THE "BEST-SETTLED PRINCIPLES" OF PUBLIC LAW

Global principle: A sovereign cannot be amenable to 'its own creatures' or agents employed under its authority.
The question here propounded, without any necessity for recurrence to particular examples, would seem to meet its
solution in the regular and best-settled principles of public law. No maxim is thought to be better established, or
more universally assented to, than that which ordains that a sovereign, or a government representing the sovereign,
cannot ex delicto be amenable to its own creatures or agents employed under its own authority for the fulfilment
merely of its own legitimate ends. A departure from this maxim can be sustained only upon the ground of
permission on the part of the sovereign or the government expressly declared, and an attempt to overrule or to
impair it on a foundation independently of such permission must involve an inconsistency and confusion, both in
theory and practice, subversive of regulated order or power. HILL, PORTER v. THE UNITED STATES, 50 U.S.
386 (1850)(1). [Hence, government's Forms and Applications scam. Servants subjecting sovereigns? = Crime? ]
SELF EVIDENT INEVITABLE SUICIDE
Legislature, the mere 'creatures' and limited agents 'of' the sovereign people.
Justice DANIEL (the supreme Court of the United States):

I never can believe in that, to my mind suicidal doctrine, which confers upon one legislature, the creatures and
limited agents of the sovereign people, the power, by a breach of duty and by transcending the commission with
which they are clothed, to bind forever and irrevocably their creator, for whose benefit and by whose authority
alone they are delegated to act, to consequences however mischievous or destructive. THE OHIO LIFE
INSURANCE v. DEBOLT, 57 U.S. 416 (1853)(2). [Servants usurp by illegal deception-fraud to render evil-steal. ]
THE CREATURE IS NOT GREATOR THAN THE CREATOR - AND MAY NOT QUESTION ITS CREATOR
AMUNDSON, Justice (Supreme Court of South Dakota) concurring specially:
The creature is not greater than its creator, and may not question that power which brought it into existence and
set the bounds of its capacities." Edgemont Sch. Dist. v. S.D. Dept. of Revenue, et al., 1999 SD 48, ∂ 15, 593
N.W.2d 36, 40 (citation omitted). The power of the Legislature to control this issue is "unrestrained" because
counties "are not sovereign entities[,]" but are rather "[p]olitical subdivisions of states." See id. at ∂ 14. As a
creature existing only because the State created it, Pennington County has no authority to sue the sovereign/State.
No matter who is named in the caption of a case as a defendant, the UJS and its employees are just one part of the
sovereign/State. PENNINGTON v. STATE of So. D., 2002 SD 31 (2002)(1). [Our creature may not question us.]
ABSOLUTE DESPOTISM
Absolute despotism when the creature rules over its supreme sovereign creator by deception, especially unjustly.
(Mathew 10:24 The disciple is not above his master, nor the servant above his lord.)
Judge Underwood (Court of Appeals of Kentucky):

I shall notice one idea more in defence of the act, and only one. It is the appeal made in the preamble to the
sovereign power of the state. I do not admit that there is any sovereign power, in the literal meaning of the terms, to
be found any where in our systems of government. The people possess, as it regards their governments, a
revolutionary sovereign power; but so long as the governments remain which they have instituted, to establish
justice and "to secure the enjoyment of the right of life, liberty and property, and of pursuing happiness;" sovereign
power,?? or, which I take to be the same thing, power without limitation, is no where to be found in any branch or
department of the government, either state or national; nor indeed in all of them put together. The constitution of
the United States expressly forbids the passage of a bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or the granting of any title
of nobility, by the general or state governments. The same instrument likewise limits the powers of the general
government to those expressly granted, and places many other restrictions upon the power of the state
governments.-- The constitutions of the different states likewise contain many prohibitions and limitations of power.
The tenth article of our state constitution, consisting of twenty eight sections, is made up of restrictions and
prohibitions upon legislative and judicial power, and concludes with the emphatic declaration, "that every thing in
this article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws
56
contrary thereto, or contrary to this constitution, shall be void." These numerous limitations and restrictions prove,
that the idea of sovereignty in government, was not tolerated by the wise founders of our systems. "Sovereign
state" are cabalistic words, not understood by the disciple of liberty, who has been instructed in our constitutional
schools. It is an appropriate phrase when applied to an absolute despotism. I firmly believe, that the idea of
sovereign power in the government of a republic, is incompatible with the existence and permanent foundation of
civil liberty, and the rights of property. The history of man, in all ages, has shown the necessity of the strongest
checks upon power, whether it be exercised by one man, a few or many. Our revolution broke up the foundations of
sovereignty in government; and our written constitutions have carefully guarded against the baneful influence of
such an idea henceforth and forever. Gaines et al v. Buford, 31 Ky. 481 (1833)(1). [Washington and Jefferson etc.
were no fools. Sovereign 'immunity' was not surrendered, no corrupt temporary servants-strangers can legally enslave the
people. ]
THE CREATURE CANNOT LEGISLATE OR EXCLUDE ITS CREATOR!

'Evil' day for American Liberty if government 'outside ' of the supreme law of the land.
The scam: Their statutes exclude a definition of We the People so our status totally disappears in their Code-System.
Justice Harlan (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government outside of the supreme law of the land finds
lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to
prevent all violation of the principles of the Constitution.
Again, it is said that Congress has assumed, in its past history, that the Constitution goes into territories
acquired by purchase or conquest only when and as it shall so direct, and we are informed of the liberality of
Congress in legislating the Constitution into all our contiguous territories. This is a view of the Constitution that
may well cause surprise, if not alarm. Congress, as I have observed, has no existence except by virtue of the
Constitution. It is the creature of the Constitution. It has no powers which that instrument has not granted,
expressly or by necessary implication. I confess that I cannot grasp the thought that Congress, which lives and
moves and has its being in the Constitution, and is consequently the mere creature of that instrument, can, at its
pleasure, legislate or exclude its creator [We the People. ] from territories which were acquired only by authority of
the Constitution. DOWNS v. BIDWELL, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)(2). [Their System of 100% Federalism excludes the
legal existence of We the People and 'the several states' so everything is under U.S.-Federal control. ]
LET A STATE BE CONSIDERED AS SUBORDINATE TO THE PEOPLE

The state is a society. The State is an artificial creature of the Constitution of and subordinate to its sovereign creators.
Wilson, Justice (the supreme Court of the United States):

Man, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator: A State; useful and valuable as
the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its acquired
importance. When I speak of a State as an inferior contrivance, I mean that it is a contrivance inferior only to that,
which is divine: Of all human contrivances, it is certainly most transcendantly excellent. It is concerning this
contrivance that Gicero says so sublimely, 'Nothing, which is exhibited upon our globe, is more acceptable to that
divinity, which governs the whole universe, than those communities and assemblages of men, which, lawfully
associated, are denominated States'. Let a State be considered as subordinate to the People: But let every thing
else be subordinate to the State. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)(4). [Every government and servant is
subordinate to the supreme sovereign creators. See same in PHELPS v. ROONEY, 9 Wis. 70 (1859)(1). ]
EVERYTHING IS SUBORDINATE TO THE PEOPLE - THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN CREATORS

GILBERT, Chief Judge (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland):
We conclude by observing that the answer to this controversy was provided "in a nutshell" one hundred ninety-five
years ago by James Wilson, one of this country's Founding Fathers, who, as a Justice of the Supreme Court, penned
in Chisholm v. Georgia, (1793), "Let a State be considered as subordinate to the people: But let everything else be
subordinate to the State." HOWARD COUNTY v. ALLNUTT INC., 74 Md.App. 422 (1988)(1).
A SOVEREIGN CANNOT BE COERCED - ALL OTHERS ARE SUBJECT TO THE LAW

C. de Choiseul, for defendant, contended as follows: The sovereign in this country, is the people, represented by the
government they have created and constituted, as their agent, for that purpose. The whole government, and not any
separate department. Sovereignty is from its nature, undivided; it cannot be split and separated. There begins and
ends this difficulty. The sovereign cannot be coerced; all others are subject to the law, which is for that reason, by
a figure of speech, often termed sovereign. "It is obligatory on all the inhabitants of the State; the foreigner whilst
residing there, and his property within its limits, are subject to it." C. C. art. 9. "Corporations legally established are
substituted for persons." C. C. 424. The judgment of the court was pronounced by Eustis, Chief Justice.
Municipality Number Three v. Hart, 6 La.Ann. 570 (1851)(1). [Impossible for an inferior to have lawful 'right' over its
superior prescribed by its laws, much less over its supreme sovereign Creator. Inhabitant = resident = non citizen. ]
INDIVIDUALS ARE "NOT THE CREATURES 'OF' THE STATE" BUT CONSTITUTE IT
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The governments are 'of' the People, it is impossible for the People to be 'of' government an artificial creature.
Justice CAMPBELL (supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

Individuals are not the creatures of the State, but constitute it. They come into society with rights, which cannot be
invaded without injustice. But corporations derive their existence from the society, are the offspring of transitory
conditions of the State; and, with faculties for good in such conditions, combine durable dispositions for evil. They
display a love of power, a preference for corporate interests to moral or political principles or public duties, and an
antagonism to individual freedom, which have marked them as objects of jealousy in every epoch of their history.
Therefore, the power has been exercised, in all civilized States, to limit their privileges, or to suppress their
existence, under the exigencies either of public policy or political necessity. DODGE v. WOOLSEY, 59 U.S. 331
(1855)(2). [It is impossible for us to be a creature of our artificial creature, or servant of our servants etc. ]
Remember Law is prescribed by a 'superior' which the 'inferior' is bound to obey. Buy Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Common Law of England Volume I, Section the First, 'On the Study of the Law' and Section the Second, (page 38) 'Of the NATURE of
LAWS in general' you will see: The Law is a rule of action, which is prescribed by some 'superior' and which the 'inferior' is bound to
obey. Super emphasis added! And the Law is based on 'perfection of reason' else it's 'not law' and subordinate to the perfect Law of
God, especially in a more perfect Union under God pledging Liberty and Justice for all. The Supreme Court herein claims Blackstone was
one of the highest-excellent authorities on the Common Law of England. Super important see Vol. 1 p. 70: "the law is the perfection of
reason, that it always intends to conform thereto, and that what is not reason is not law." See also herein, 'When the reason of law
fails the law ceases to operate.' The complete text of the first edition of Blackstone's Commentaries is available online from the Yale
University Law School's 'Avalon Project.' See http://www.yale.edu.lawweb/avalon/blackstone/blacks to.htm.
ALL RULES OF LAW ARE PROTECTIVE? OR RUBBER? PERFECTION OF REASON? WOE UNTO YE LAWYERS
Justice STEVENS, with Justice BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and Justice BLACKMUN join, dissenting: It is important
to remember, however, that all rules of law are prophylactic. MICHIGAN v. HARVEY, 494 U.S. 344 (1990)(2).
ALL HUMAN LAW (Global)
Why our 'inferior' artificial creature cannot lawfully rule over its 'superior' supreme sovereign creator.

The principle is, that all human law must be prescribed by a superior. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 ( 1793)(4).
[Citing Ref 1796 times, 4/30/05. See COHENS v. VIRGINIA, 19 U.S. 264 (herein) government's high duty to maintain the
'principles' in their purity. Under God the lawful 'right' of man over man with 'just' human law only. ]
ALL HUMAN LAW

Still quoting the same sound universal principle and logic in 1999.
Under god the civilized principle of 'right', under Satan uncivilized 'might' and by deception.
Justice SOUTER (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with Justice STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER join, dissenting:
"[***] The principle is, that all human law must be prescribed by a superior. This principle I mean not now to exa
Suffice it, at present to say, that another principle, very different in its nature and operations, forms, in my judgment,
the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of equality and justice must be
founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must
be found in the man." Id., at 458. 1 Blackstone Com. 241. 242. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Citing
Ref. 3210 times, 4/30/05. The sovereigns are found in the People not our artificial creature. ]
A SOVEREIGN CAN HAVE NO SUPERIOR - A SOVEREIGN IS EXEMPT FROM COERCION

VAN SWEARINGEN, J. (Court of Quarter Sessions): "Every highway, toll or free, is licensed, constructed, and
regulated by the immediate or delegated action of the sovereign power, and in every commonwealth the people in
the aggregate constitute the sovereign. But it is the prerogative of a sovereign to be exempt from coercion by
action, for jurisdiction implies sovereignty, and a sovereign can have no superior." O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18
Pa. 187. Miller v. Menallen, 42 Pa.C.C. 579 (1914)(1). [No superior but God alone. The People are equals. Logically
impossible for the subordinate artificial creature to be superior to its supreme sovereign creators. Else evil prevails. ]
THE ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY + THE SUPREME POWER

ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY RESTS IN THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES
The supreme power resides in the people. Higher in legal authority than any other power, subject to no law.
As a matter of political theory, this federal arrangement of dual delegated sovereign powers truly was a more
revolutionary turn than the late war had been. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838
(1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring) ("Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of
sovereignty"). Before the new federal scheme appeared, 18th-century political theorists had assumed that "there
must reside somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided, final power, higher in legal authority than any
other power, subject to no law, a law unto itself." B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
198 (1967); see also Wood 345. The American development of divided sovereign powers, which "shatter[ed] ... the
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categories of government that had dominated Western thinking for centuries," id., at 385, was made possible only by
a recognition that the ultimate sovereignty rests in the people themselves. See id., at 530 (noting that because
"none of these arguments about 'joint jurisdictions' and 'coequal sovereignties' convincingly refuted the
Antifederalist doctrine of a supreme and indivisible sovereignty," the Federalists could succeed only by emphasizing
that the supreme power" 'resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government' " (citing 1 Pennsylvania and the
Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, p. 302 (J. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888) (quoting James Wilson)). SEMINOLE
TRIBE OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)(2). [They know the Truth: it's the Law! ]
SUBJECT TO NO ONE BUT GOD
ACCOUNTABLE TO NO POWER ON EARTH
ALL JURISDICTION IMPLIES SUPERIORITY OVER THE PARTY.
Exempt from jurisdiction, privileged from arrests, and not subject to its laws.
Hence, no jurisdiction over the sovereigns prescribed by law. Especially when the sons of God are injuring no one, or thing.
See Isaiah 33:22 For the Lord is our 'judge,' the Lord is our 'lawgiver,' the Lord is our 'king,' he will save us.
Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania:

He premised, that though the several states, which form [not formed. ] our federal republic, had, by the
confederation, ceded many of the prerogatives of sovereignty to the United States, yet these voluntary engagements
did not injure their independence on each other; but that each was a sovereign, 'with every power, jurisdiction, and
right, not expressly given up.' He then laid down two positions. First: that every kind of process, issued against a
sovereign, is a violation of the laws of nations; and is in itself null and void. Secondly: that a sheriff cannot be
compelled to serve or return a void writ.
1. The first point he endeavoured to prove, by considering, first the nature of sovereignty: and, secondly,
the rules of law, relative to process issued against ambassadors, the representatives of sovereigns.
He said, that all sovereigns are in a state of equality and independence, exempt from each other's jurisdiction, and
accountable to no power on earth, unless with their own consent.
That sovereigns, with regard to each other, were always considered as individuals in a state of nature,
where all enjoy the same prerogatives, where there could be no subordination to a supreme authority, nor any
judge to define their rights, or redress their wrongs.
That all jurisdiction implies superiority over the party, and authority in the judge to execute his decrees: but there
could be no superiority, where there was a perfect equality no authority, where there was an entire independence.
That the king of England, as sovereign of the nation, is said to be independent of all, and subject to no one
but God: and his crown is stiled imperial, on purpose to assert that he owes no kind of subjection to any potentate
on earth. No compulsory action can be brought against him, even in his own courts. That a sovereign, when in a
foreign country, is always considered by civilized nations, as exempt from its jurisdiction, privileged from arrests,
and not subject to its laws. Hence this inference was drawn, that the court having no jurisdiction over Virginia, all
its process against that state, must be coram non judice, and consequently void. 1 Vatt.P. 2. 133. 2. Vatt. 158. 1
Blackft. 141. 5 Bac. 450. It was then observed, that there being no instance in our law books, of any process against
a sovereign, it was proper to consider the rules of law relative to process against their representatives. [* * *]
That the true reason of the minister's exemption from process is the independence and sovereignty of the
person he represents. And although by engaging in trade, he may so far divest himself of his public character, as to
subject these goods to attachment, yet in every case where he represents his master, his property is sacred. But a
sovereign cannot subject himself by implication: he must do it expressly. M'Carty v. Nixon et al, 1 U.S. 77 (1784)
(1). [Universal with the established Order of things. The just powers of government are … ]
NO TRIBUNAL BEFORE WHICH THE SOVEREIGN CAN BE ARRAIGNED
BARTLEY, C. J. (Supreme Court of Ohio) dissented:
There is no tribunal before which the sovereign can be arraigned, his conduct examined, his errors and
delinquencies detected, those errors corrected, and he punished. PIQUA STATE BANK OF OHIO v. KNOUP, 6
Ohio St. 342 (1856)(1). [Same in 2 Kentucky 537. No one can prove legal right over a sovereign prescribed by law.]
SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF IS 'OF COURSE' NOT SUBJECT TO LAW

When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are
supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean
to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not
subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to
the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true that there must always
be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and in many cases of mere
administration, the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public
59
judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion, or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of
constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the
blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts
bill of rights, the government of the commonwealth 'may be a government of laws and not of men.' For the very
idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as
being the essence of slavery itself. YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)(2).
SOVEREIGNTY IS OF COURSE NOT SUBJECT TO LAW - MERE LAWS OF OUR ARTIFICIAL CREATURE - 'The United States'
Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Justice Harlan, Justice Brewer, and Justice Peckham, dissenting:
'The United States,' 'our great republic, which is composed of states and territories.' [***] The government of the
United States is the government ordained by the Constitution, and possesses the powers conferred by the
Constitution. 'This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their
respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained?' Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 176. The opinion of the court, by Chief
Justice Marshall, in that case, was delivered at the February term, 1803, and at the October term, 1885, the court, in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, speaking through Mr. Justice Matthews, said: 'When we consider the nature
and theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the
history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and
action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is
the definition and limitation of power.' Downes v, Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (Supreme Court of the U.S.) (1901)(2).
SOVEREIGNTY IS UTTERLY INCOMMUNICABLE

Our servants try to pretend we parted with our profound sovereignty to commit suicide under their enslavement.

People! ]. To part with it is to commit a species of political suicide. In fact, a power to produce its own annihilation
is an absurdity in terms. It is a power as utterly incommunicable to a political as to a natural person. FLETCHER
v. PECK, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)(2). [Citing References 2644 times, 4/30/05. Exodus 3:14 I am that I am. Sovereign
(under God) secured by the Constitution of the United States. Injuring no one. Leave us alone. ]
THE ULTIMATE BETRAYL IN THE LAND OF THE FREE

Converted from sovereigns accountable to God alone into stateless slaves by our servant's illegal deception to steal our all.
OUR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

'It's the Law!' - the Supreme Law of the Land. Our sovereign 'right' to be let alone.
Secured by the Constitution and interpreted as 'guaranteed' as an absolute right by the Supreme Court.
The ultimate point to secure our freedom from corrupt government (mere men) in conjunction with the 'just'
powers of government are derived 'from' the 'consent' of the governed; and their law is of course from mere human law.
John 8:32 And ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth 'shall' make you free.
According to the postulates, the creature cannot rule the creator, clearly demonstrating sovereigns are amenable to God alone
and uncontrollable by mere human law, especially when we injure no one. Hence, the statutes of our mere artificial creature do not
include [exclude] the supreme sovereign people. Even government invokes sovereign immunity as representatives of the people. Take
away their guns, their uniforms, their gowns, and their titles exuding our authority, then they are that they are, mere temporary
servants of the Law of the Constitution of the People. By the grace of God we are guaranteed our sovereign right to be let alone to
keep [corrupt] government servants off the backs of the sovereign people. Servants obey your masters and heed your Oaths to God, to
obey the Constitution of the People, or suffer eternal damnation and wrath for engaging in illegal deception and breaching your Oath.
Thou shalt do no unrighteousness in judgment, nor covet, bear false witness, steal, nor defraud, 'It's the Law!' Isaiah 33: 22 For the
Lord is 'our judge', the Lord is 'our lawgiver', the Lord is 'our king', he will save us. The sons of God are watching, ready, willing and able.
RIGHT TO CLAIM PROTECTION SECURED BY THE CONSTITUTION = SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AGAINST INJUSTICE OR DEPRIVATION
MR. JUSTICE WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States)delivered the opinion of the Court:
'The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury'. BUTZ v. ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)(2). [Many cases cite this from
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) to this case. We are injured-deprived from our illegal subjection. ]
60
"ONLY IN THE PEOPLE"
Sovereignty or supreme power is vested in the people, and 'only' in the people.
Justice BREWER (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

The government of the United States is one of limited and delegated powers. It takes nothing from the usages or the
former action of European governments, nor does it take any power by any supposed inherent sovereignty. There is
a great deal of confusion in the use of the word 'sovereignty' by law writers. Sovereignty or supreme power is in
this country vested in the people, and only in the people. [***] When, therefore, power is exercised by congress,
authority for it must be found in express terms in the constitution, or in the means necessary or proper for the
execution of the power expressed. If it cannot be thus found, it does not exist. FONG YUE TING v. UNITED
STATES, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)(2). [Only in the People. Not government, an 'artificial' creature of the Constitution 'of' the
People, the supreme sovereign 'source' of all government power etc. The just powers of government are … ]
By the Court (Supreme Court of Wisconsin) WHITON, Chief Justice:

We regard it as a fundamental principle, that sovereignty resides in the people. The truth of this proposition is so
obvious, that it will not probably be disputed by any one. [***] As has been before stated, the people are sovereign,
and it is proper to add that they alone are sovereign. In forming this government, they did not part with one jot or
tittle of sovereignty; it resides in them and in them alone. BASHFORD v. BARSTOW, 4 Wis. 567 (1855)(2).
"OUT OF THE QUESTION" - "OVER THE SOVEREIGN WE CAN HAVE NO POWER
GRAY, J. (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
Our citations will be confined to the time since Magna Charta declared that no man should be taken or imprisoned,
or be disseized of his freehold or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or in any way destroyed, or be
passed upon or condemned, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land--which is the origin
of the provision, embodied in the fifth amendment of the constitution of the United States, that no man shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The earliest authority to be referred to is Bracton,
who wrote in the reign of Henry III., and who, in the famous passage of his first book, affirms that the king ought
not to be subject to man, but to God and to the law, because the law makes the king; and therefore the king should
ascribe to the law what the law ascribes to him, namely, dominion and power, for there is no king where reigns will
and not law. Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem. Attribuat
igitur rex legi, quod lex attribuit ei, videlicet, dominium et potestatem, non est enim rex, ubi dominatur voluntas et
non lex. Bract. 5b. [***] In Queen v. Com'rs Treasury, L. R. 7 Q. B. 387, 394, in which the court refused to grant a
writ of mandamus to the lords commissioners of the treasury to pay over money in their hands as servants of the
crown, Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN said that it did not follow, because the prosecutor had no remedy except that
of applying by petition to the crown, or by petition to parliament, that the court could issue a writ of mandamus, and
added: 'I take it, with reference to that jurisdiction, we must start with this unquestionable principle, that when a
duty has to be performed (if I may use that expression) by the crown, this court cannot claim, even in appearance, to
have any power to command the crown; the thing is out of the question. Over the sovereign we can have no power.
UNITED STATES v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)(2). [A mere judge-servant or Court has no power over the sovereign
prescribed by law of the mere creature: It's out of the question. The People are superior to all legislatures and courts.]
UNALIENABLE & SOVEREIGN RIGHTS ARE SECURED BY THE CONSTITUTION-GOVERNMENT- A DEAD THING
Americans vehemently attacked the notion that rights were matters of " 'favor and grace,' "given to the people
from the Government. B. Bailyn, supra, at 187 (quoting John Dickinson). Thus, the Framers of the Bill of Rights did
not purport to "create" rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing
rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Amdt. 9 ("The enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"). U.S. v.
VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)(2). [The people delegated power to government to secure our all. ]
"GUARANTEED"
Sovereign immunity is an 'essential' constitutional component of federalism.
Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an
essential component of federalism" and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he States that ratified the Eleventh
Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants
in foreign jurisdictions"). PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL v. HALDERMAN, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)(2). [Washington,
Jefferson, Hamilton and Adams etc. were not fools: Sovereignty is vested in the people and 'only' in We the People. ]
"ABSOLUTE" RIGHT FOR CENTURIES

61
We noted that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is an amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable
to suits in the sovereign's own courts and the other to suits in the courts of another sovereign." 440 U.S., at 414. We
acknowledged that "[t]he immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as
a matter of absolute right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute character of
that immunity," ibid., that "the notion that immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected in our
cases," id., at 415, and that "[t]his explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in
its own courts without its consent," id., at 416. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Same in 440 U.S. 410]
THE PEOPLE "NOT THE BUREAUCRACY" ARE THE SOVEREIGN

Federal Government was created for the security and happiness of the people. Executives, lawmakers, and
members of the Judiciary are inferior in the sense that they are in office only to carry out and execute the
constitutional regime. The Preamble of the Constitution states that 'We the people' ordained and established the
Constitution. The Declaration of Independence stated that to insure 'certain unalienable Rights,' 'Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed' and 'That whenever any Form
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.'
SCHLESINGER v. RESERVISTS Committee, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)(2). [How true it is. It's the Law! ]
"THE ONLY WAY"
The people can 'reassert ' control, and limit a bloated, and inflated (corrupt) government servants lusting for more power.
SHULMAN, Judge (Court of Appeals of Georgia) concurring specially:

The most devastating all-persuasive point is that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is in all eventuality a
governmental inherent power, not a people's right; therefore, when the two collide the former must yield to the
latter. This doctrine was born of another era. (Constitution. ) The rights of individuals and the justice due to them are
as dear and precious as those of the states. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). To place the
enumerated power or inherent power of government (-servants. ) above the law is morally reprehensible and
dangerous as a usurpation of the people's immutable inherent rights. So called inherent powers (None. ) judicial,
executive and legislative should be deemphasized and guardedly used. Creator-endowed inherent rights of the
people should be magnified and reemphasized. The people are the master and the government the servant. The dog
must wag the tail and not vice versa. As Madison said, this is the only way the people can reassert control and limit
a bloated and inflated government lusting for more power. Ga. State B.J., supra. ECHOLS v. DeKALB CTY., 146
Ga.App. 560 (1978)(3). [Immunity reacquires a limited, just, non-oppressive, free government. ]
NO PERSON IN GOVERNMENT PERFORMS PUBLIC DUTIES AS A SOVEREIGN
MILLER, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):
As we have no person in this government who exercises supreme executive power or performs the public duties of a
sovereign, it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests. It
seems most probable that it has been adopted in our courts as a part of the general doctrine of publicists, that the
supreme power in every state, wherever it may reside, shall not be compelled, by process of courts of its own
creation, to defend itself from assaults in those courts. UNITED STATES v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)(2). [The
artificial creatures cannot rule its supreme sovereign creators. Much less unjustly. The just powers of government… ]
Kansas v. State of Colorado, 1906, 206 U.S. 46, 48, 83. GILBERTSON v. CITY OF FAIRBANKS, 262 F.2d 734,
Ct. of App. 9th Cir. (1959)(1). [Statutes 'of' our creature never cite and apply to We the people. We injured no one.]
NOR DO OUR SERVANTS PARTAKE IN THE SOVEREIGNTY - ALL CREATURES OF THE LAW
Jay, Chief Justice (supreme Court of the United States):
Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or State-sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In
Europe the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here it rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually
administers the Government; here, never in a single instance; our Governors are the agents of the people, and at
most stand in the same relation to their sovereign, in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns. Their
Princes have personal powers, dignities, and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but official; nor do they partake in
the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens. Chisholm v. The State of Georgia, 2
U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419 (1793)(4). [Mere officers of an office (or underlings) of the Constitution 'of' the People. ]
The established 'Order' of things in Law, in The United States of America, under God:
The sovereign People of the United States, the supreme power, creators and source of the Law.
The 'Constitution of the United States' = Written Law of the Land (ink on paper) of We the People.
The three 'departments', The Legislature, The Executive, The Judiciary, of the Constitution of the People.
62
Constitutional 'Offices', and 'Offices' created by the Legislature of the Constitution of the People.
'Officers' of an Office, an artificial creature. Fill with servants that come and go. Are sovereign? = Nonsense.
DOUGLAS, J. (Supreme Court of Ohio):

The king, as highest feudal lord, enjoyed this protection on the theory that no court was above him. Id. Further, the
king was considered the supreme power and was, thus, infallible. His person was considered sacred, and the law
ascribed to him the attribute of sovereignty. [***]
It is beyond doubt that the Executive in the United States is not historically the sovereign, and the
legislature, which is perhaps the depository of the widest powers, is restrained by constitutional limitations. The
federal government is one of delegated powers and the states are not sovereign, according to the Constitution, as
demonstrated forcibly by the Civil War and the resulting Amendments. That brings us to the only remaining
alternative, that sovereignty resides in the American electorate or the people." (Footnotes omitted.) Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. at 4-5. See, also, Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist. (1961), 55 Cal.2d 211,
214-216, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 90-92. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence is an expression of why this country
chose to sever ties with English rule. BUTLER v. JORDAN, 92 Ohio St.3d 354 (2001)(2). [Despotic rule. ]
ONLY IN THE PEOPLE

Sovereignty or supreme power is vested in the people, and 'only' in the people.
Justice FIELD (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

The government of the United States is one of limited and delegated powers. It takes nothing from the usages or the
former action of European governments, nor does it take any power by any supposed inherent sovereignty. There is
a great deal of confusion in the use of the word 'sovereignty' by law writers. Sovereignty or supreme power is in this
country vested in the people, and only in the people. By them certain sovereign powers have been delegated to the
government of the United States, and other sovereign powers reserved to the states or to themselves. This is not a
matter of inference and argument, but is the express declaration of the tenth amendment to the constitution, passed
to avoid any misinterpretation of the powers of the general government. That amendment declares that 'that powers
not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states,
respectively, or to the people.' FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)(2). [Why servants in
the artificial creature of the People usurp and pretend we are their creature without sovereign or unalienable rights. ]
SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF IS OF COURSE NOT SUBJECT TO LAW

When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are
supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean
to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not
subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists
and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)(2).
1882: ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE OF ALL CIVILIZED NATIONS

The sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in 'any' other, without its consent.
GRAY, J. (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

To repeat the words of Chief Justice TANEY, already quoted: 'It is an established principle of jurisprudence, in all
civilized nations, that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and
permission.' [Super emphasis added. The nature of just mere human law therefore human jurisdiction ] [***]
Under our system the people, who are there called subjects, are the sovereign. Their rights, whether
collective or individual, are not bound to give way to a sentiment of loyalty to the person of the monarch. The
citizen here knows no person, however near to those in power, or however powerful himself, to whom he need yield
the rights which the law secures to him when it is well administered. UNITED STATES v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196
(1882)(2). [See also a 'sovereign cannot be sued' without his consent in: BEERS v. ARKANSAS, 20 How. 527, 529; HANS v.
LOUISIANA, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)(2); 17 F. 171(1883) herein. The point of our sovereignty is to keep us secure from evil. ]
MEANING OF "ESTABLISHED"
Justice McKenna (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
' 'And if (to quote counsel) the lexicographer be consulted to define the word 'established' he will give its meaning
substantially, as does the Century Dictionary, to be 'to make stable; firm or sure; appoint; ordain; settle or fix
unalterably.'' To illustrate the immutability which one of its senses conveys, counsel quote with apologetic
reverence an illustration, which they say is often found in standard dictionaries: 'I will establish my covenant with
him for an everlasting covenant.' Gen. xvii: 19. OSBOURNE v. SAN DIEGO LAND CO., 178 U.S. 22 (1900)(3).
[We the People … do ordain and 'establish' this Constitution for the United States of America." See establish as the
'permanent ' will of the People in Vanhorne's v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795) herein. Hence, it is still superme Law. ]
63
SOVEREIGNTY UNDER GOD INHERES IN THE ORGANIC PEOPLE
HUGHES, J. (Circuit Court, W.D. Virginia) dissenting:
Observe that the clause just recited refers only to what occurs in cases of the compulsory collection of revenue under
the act of January 26th, and does not refer to what occurs in cases where the tax-payer comes voluntarily forward to
pay, as contemplated by the act of January 14th. The act goes on to make it misdemeanor, punishable criminally, for
the collecting officer to receive other funds than gold, etc. [***] Restraining collection of tax. See Second Nat. Bank.
v. Caldwell, 13 FED.REP. 429, and note, 434-439.-- (Ed. 1. IMMUNITY OF SOVEREIGN FROM SUIT.
Sovereignty, under God, inheres in the organic people, or the people as the republic; and every organic people
fixed to the soil, and politically independent of every other people, is a sovereign people, and, in the modern sense,
an independent sovereign nation. (fn1) The people themselves-- the entire mass of persons who compose the
political society-- are the true nation,-- the final, permanent depository of all power. (fn2) Such a political society
is a nation, and this nation possesses political sovereignty. (fn3) But the nation must exist as an historical fact, prior
to the existence of written constitutions and laws of any kind,-- and its existence must be established before they
can be recognized as having any legal force or validity. (fn4) The organized government, whatever be its form and
character, is but the creature and servant of this political unit, which alone possesses dominion in itself. (fn5) The
rule of the common law, that the sovereign cannot be held amenable to process in his own courts without his
consent, is applied in this country to the state, under which designation are included the people within its territorial
limits, in whom resides whatever sovereignty the state possesses. (fn6) That the supreme power in a state cannot be
compelled by process of courts of its own creation to defend itself from assaults in those courts, is a fundamental
principle that has been adopted in the courts of this country as a part of the general doctrine of publicists. (fn7) This
maxim is not limited to a monarchy, but is of equal force in a republic. In the one, as in the other, it is essential to
the common defense and general welfare that the sovereign should not, without its consent, be dispossessed of its
property. (fn8) [***] This principle of immunity from suit applies to every sovereign power, and but for the
protection which it affords the government would be unable to perform the various duties for which it was created.
(fn10) The principle that no sovereign can be sued without its consent, applies equally to foreign sovereigns, and to
sovereigns of the country where the suit is brought. The exemption of the sovereign is not less regarded by its own
courts than by the courts of other sovereigns. (fn11) In the words of Chief Justice TANEY, 'it is an established
principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be suited in its own courts, or in any
other, without its consent and permission. BALTIMORE & O.R. CO. v. ALLEN, 17 F. 171 (1883)(3).
1999: ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE OF "ALL" CIVILIZED NATIONS = Global

"Absolute right for centuries": The sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in 'any' other, without 'its' consent.
The people, 'not' the States, are sovereign.
We noted that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is an amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable
to suits in the sovereign's own courts and the other to suits in the courts of another sovereign." 440 U.S., at 414. We
acknowledged that "[t]he immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as
a matter of absolute right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute character of
that immunity," ibid., that "the notion that immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected in our
cases," id., at 415, and that "[t]his explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in
its own courts without its consent," id., at 416. [***]
See, e.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1857) ("It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all
civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and
permission"); Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337 (1879) ("The principle is elementary that a State cannot be
sued in its own courts without its consent. This is a privilege of sovereignty"); 746 Cunningham v. Macon &
Brunswick R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883). [***]
Justice SOUTER, Justice STEVENS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting.
Finally, Wilson laid out his view that sovereignty was in fact not located in the States at all: "Upon what principle
is it contended that the sovereign power resides in the state governments? The honorable gentleman has said truly,
that there can be no subordinate sovereignty. Now, if there cannot, my position is, that the sovereignty resides in
the people; they have not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions of the power as were conceived
necessary for the public welfare." Id., at 443. While this statement did not specifically address sovereign immunity,
it expressed the major premise of what would later become Justice Wilson's position in Chisholm: that because the
people, and not the States, are sovereign, sovereign immunity has no applicability to the States. ALDEN v.
MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Also The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. It is 'impossible' for
any mere artificial creature of law to be lawfully sovereign over its supreme sovereign creators: We the People. ]
IMMUNITY EXISTS TODAY BY "CONSTITUTIONAL" DESIGN = THE ESTABLISHED 'ORDER' OF THINGS IN LAW
64
These holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding, consistent with the views of the leading advocates of the
Constitution's ratification, that sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the
structure of the original Constitution itself. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-
268 (1997) (acknowledging "the broader concept of immunity, implicit in the Constitution, which we have regarded
the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and exemplifying"); Seminole Tribe, supra, at 55-56, 116 S.Ct. 1114;
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1984); Ex parte New York, supra, at 497,
112 S.Ct. 2408. The Eleventh Amendment confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a
constitutional principle; it follows that the scope of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of
the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design. As we explained in
Principality of Monaco: "Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of ß 2 of Article III,
or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting
States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. [***]
That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), has two
parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that ' "[i]t is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent," ' id., at 13, 10 S.Ct. 504
(emphasis deleted), quoting The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 ...." Seminole Tribe, supra, at 54. [***]
The text and the structure of the Constitution protect various rights and principles. [***] Although the
sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and history of
the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design. [The People are the class of
supreme sovereign source and creators of the Constitutions and governments. ] [***]
(" '[The King] can not be compelled to answer in his own court, but this is true of every petty lord of
every petty manor' "); accord, 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 465 (3d ed. 1927) ("[N]o feudal lord
could be sued in his own court"). It is doubtful whether the King was regarded, in any meaningful sense, as the font
of the traditions and customs which formed the substance of the common law, yet he could not be sued on a
common-law claim in his own courts. [***]
We acknowledged that "[t]he immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has
been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the
absolute character of that immunity," ibid., that "the notion that immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty
is reflected in our cases," id., at 415, 99 S.Ct. 1182, and that "[t]his explanation adequately supports the conclusion
that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent," id., at 416. [Attribute! ] [***]
The Federal Government, by contrast, "can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the
constitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary
implication." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516,
(1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). [***]
It [the founder's silence on sovereign immunity. ] suggests the sovereign's right to assert immunity from suit
in its own courts was a principle so well established that no one conceived it would be altered by the new
Constitution. [***]
See, e.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1857) ("It is an established principle of jurisprudence in
all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and
permission"); … . ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [Just powers are derived from our consent. ]

The sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in 'any' other, without its consent.
Justice WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is an "established principle of jurisprudence" that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts without its
consent. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858). WILL v. MICHIGAN DEPT. OF STATE POLICE,
491 U.S. 58 (1989)(2). [All of our servant's (lawful) authority is derived solely from the Constitution of the People. ]
The sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in 'any' other, without its consent. Declare its will and at once at an end.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the
sovereign's own courts and the other to suits in the courts of another sovereign. The immunity of a truly independent
sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries. Only the
sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute character of that immunity. [***] But the notion that immunity
from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected in our cases.
(fn 8). The Declaration of Independence proclaims: "[T]hat whenever any form of government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government . . .
and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the
present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the
establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states."
65
See generally B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 198-229 (1967).
Mr. Chief Justice Jay described sovereignty as the "right to govern"; (fn 9) that kind of right would necessarily
encompass the right to determine what suits may be brought in the sovereign's own courts. Thus, Mr. Justice Holmes
explained sovereign immunity as based "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law [the People make Constitutions. ] on which the right depends." (fn 10)
(fn 9). See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 472.
(fn 10). See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353.
This explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts
without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts. Such a claim
necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sovereign; its source must be found either in an
agreement, express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the
dignity of the first as a matter of comity.
This point was plainly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon , 7
Cranch 116, which held that an American court could not assert jurisdiction over a vessel in which Napoleon, the
reigning Emperor of France, claimed a sovereign right. In that case, the Chief Justice observed: "The jurisdiction of
courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power..
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
"All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to
the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source." Id., at 136.
After noting that the source of any immunity for the French vessel must be found in American law, the
Chief Justice interpreted that law as recognizing the common usage among nations in which every sovereign was
understood to have waived its exclusive territorial jurisdiction over visiting sovereigns, or their representatives, in
certain classes of cases. (fn 11)
(fn 11). The opinion describes the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention in a foreign
territory, the immunity allowed to foreign ministers, and the passage of troops through a country with its permission.
7 Cranch, at 137-140. [***]
Even apart from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Nevada argues that the Constitution implicitly establishes
a Union in which the States are not free to treat each other as unfriendly sovereigns, but must respect the sovereignty
of one another. While sovereign nations are free to levy discriminatory taxes on the goods of other nations or to bar
their entry altogether, the States of the Union are not. Nor are the States free to deny extradition of a fugitive when a
proper demand is made by the executive of another State. And the citizens in each State are entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States. [***]
Each of these provisions places a specific limitation on the sovereignty of the several States. Collectively
they demonstrate that ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns. But these provisions do not imply
that any one State's immunity from suit in the courts of another State is anything other than a matter of comity.
Indeed, in view of the Tenth Amendment's reminder that powers not delegated to the Federal Government nor
prohibited to the States are reserved to the States or to the people, (fn 28) the existence of express limitations on
state sovereignty may equally imply that caution should be exercised before concluding that unstated limitations on
state power were intended by the Framers. [See above: The Government is of the United States of America. ]
(fn 28). The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." [All of our sovereign and unalienable private rights are preserved to protect us from corrupt servants. ]
In the past, this Court has presumed that the States intended to adopt policies of broad comity toward one
another. But this presumption reflected an understanding of state policy, rather than a constitutional command. As
this Court stated in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 590,: "The intimate union of these states, as members of
the same great political family; the deep and vital interests which bind them so closely together; should lead us, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume a greater degree of comity, and friendship, and kindness towards
one another, than we should be authorized to presume between foreign nations. And when (as without doubt must
occasionally happen) the interest or policy of any state requires it to restrict the rule, it has but to declare its will,
and the legal presumption is at once at an end." [Apply that to the people the only true sovereigns. ] [***]
In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed. [***] It may be wise policy,
as a matter of harmonious interstate relations, for States to accord each other immunity or to respect any established
limits on liability. They are free to do so. But if a federal court were to hold, by inference from the structure of our
Constitution and nothing else, that California is not free in this case to enforce its policy of full compensation, that
holding would constitute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the States--and the power of the people--in our
Union. [***]
Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join, dissenting. [***]
That court theorized that Nevada was not "sovereign" for purposes of this case because sovereignty ended at the
66
California-Nevada line: [***] Indeed, the court said flatly that " 'state sovereignty ends at the state boundary,' " 74
Cal.App.3d, at 284, 141 Cal.Rptr., at 441, again quoting Hall, 8 Cal.3d, at 525, 503 P.2d, at 1365. [***]
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting. [***] Id., at 555-556 (John
Marshall): "It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. [***] ".
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.
This is the general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely
ideal." The Federalist No. 81, p. 508 (H. Lodge ed. 1908). (Emphasis in original).
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), this Court disagreed with the Madison-Marshall-Hamilton
triumvirate, and its judgment was in turn overruled by the Eleventh Amendment [by We the People. ]. [***]
In Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858), Mr. Chief Justice Taney observed in an opinion for the
Court that it "is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in
its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission." Some 25 years later Mr. Justice Miller, again
for the Court, was even more explicit: "It may be accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a State
nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent, except in the
limited class of cases in which a state may be made a party in the supreme court of the United States by virtue of the
original jurisdiction conferred on this court by the Constitution.
When the State's constitutional right to sovereign immunity has been described, it has been in expansive
terms. In Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944), the Court stated: "Efforts to force, through
suits against officials, performance of promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a sovereign must
be free from judicial compulsion in the carrying out of its policies within the limits of the Constitution. ... A state's
freedom from litigation was established as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment." (Emphasis
added.) [Amendment by the People, government cannot amend the Constitution so the servants usurp. ] [***]
Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. NEVADA v.
HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)(2). [Our inferior artificial creature cannot rule over its Supreme Sovereign Creators with its
legislation, much less unjustly, deriving its just powers from the Constitution of the People. ]
Sovereigns must consent to be sued, and only the People are sovereign(s), the source of the supreme power, and creators of
government. The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution of the People. Our inferior creature cannot rule its supreme
creators with its statute laws. The People merely delegated just powers over non-sovereigns owing allegiance. Hence, all of the
evasion by government (especially in court) and non-full disclosure to our assent of their deception and fraud scams herein.
"NO 'LEGAL' RIGHT" AS AGAINST THE AUTHORITY THAT MAKES = CREATES THE LAW
(Logically a sovereign is exempt-immune from suit. It's Global. Impossible to have legal right over the highest status.)
Justice Holmes (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own
permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.' Bodin,
Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur
necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61.
As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are sovereign in the
full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual administration, originate and change
at their will the law of contract and property, from which persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit
presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they are
so. KAWANANAKOA v. POLYBLANK, 205 U.S. 349 (1907)(2). [See Carter v. Carter Coal above: the People are the
Lawmakers themselves, the supreme lawmakers, the source of the supreme Law as the creators of the Constitution. ]
GENERAL PRACTICE OF MANKIND = GLOBAL - ESTABLISHED ORDER OF THINGS

'Inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amendable to suit without its consent. Just powers are derived from consent.
Not rational that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court (using authority of law of an artificial creature).
In Minnesota v. Hitchcock, supra, at pages 384, 386 of 185 U.S., it was said: [***] 'While the United States as a
government may not be sued without its consent, yet with its consent it may be sued, and the judicial power of the
United States extends to such a controversy.' [***]
He said [Hamilton. ] (page 13 of 134 U.S.,): 'It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amendable
to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the
Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
67
states, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. [***] The contracts between a nation and individuals are only
binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive force. They confer no right of
action independent of the sovereign will.'
The words of Madison and of Marshall in the Virginia Convention were quoted, the former to the effect
that the only operation which the provision of the judicial clause then under discussion could have was that, 'if a
state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen (of another state), it must be brought before the federal court'; and
those of Marshall: 'I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court. [* * *]
It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is to enable states
to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. [***] I see a difficulty in making a state defendant which
does not prevent its being plaintiff.' This court then declared (page 14 of 134 U.S.,), that 'looking at the subject as
Hamilton did, and as Mr. Justice Iredell did, in the light of history and experience and the established order of
things, the views of the latter were clearly right?; and that the views expressed by them applied as well to the then
pending case as to that of Chisholm v. Georgia. [***] The doctrine of sovereign immunity is fully discussed in Hans
v. Louisiana, and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell in Chisholm v. Georgia. We need not repeat that
discussion here. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353,
tersely said: 'A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception of obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority" that makes the law on which
the right depends.' WILLIAMS v. U. S., 289 U.S. 553 (1933)(2). [Established Order of things! See 'general practice of
mankind' in: HANS v. LOUISIANA, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)(2); NEVADA v. HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)(2); WELCH v. TEXAS, 483 U.S.
468 (1987)(2); ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2); FED MARITIME COM. v. SO. CARO, 535 U.S. 743 (2002)(2). ]
1996: BARRED THE INVOLUNTARY SUBJECTION OF A SOVEREIGN

To justice and law = courts and legislatures = all of our artificial creature's jurisdiction.
The old doctrine, after all, barred the involuntary subjection of a sovereign to the system of justice and law of
which it was itself the font, [We the font-Creators of the Constitution. ] since to do otherwise would have struck the
common-law mind from the Middle Ages onward as both impractical and absurd. See, e.g., Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)(Holmes, J.) ("A sovereign is exempt from suit ... on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends").
[See Carter v. Carter, above, the People are the Supreme Lawmakers. ] SEMINOLE TRIBE v. FLORIDA, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (2). [See 'no legal right' etc. in: KAWANANAKOA v. POLYBANK, 205 U.S. 349 (1907)(2); WILLIAMS v. U. S., 289 U.S.
553 (1933)(2); NEVADA v. HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)(2); ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2); etc. ].
THE SOVEREIGN IS "SOLE" ARBITER OF HIS OWN JUSTICE

Justice JOHNSON (supreme Court of the United States):
A case in which a sovereign undertakes to assert his right upon his sovereign responsibility; to right himself, and
not to appeal to any arbiter but the sword, for the justice of his cause. If the state of Maine were to extend its laws
over the province of New Brunswick, and send its magistrates to carry them into effect, it would be a parallel case.
In the Nabob of Arcot's case (4 Bro. Cha. Ca. and 1 and 2 Vesey, Jun.), a case of a political character not one half so
strongly marked as this; the courts of Great Britain refused to take jurisdiction, because it had its origin in treaties
entered into between sovereign states: a case in which the appeal is to the sword and to Almighty justice, and not to
courts of law or equity. In the exercise of sovereign right, the sovereign is sole arbiter of his own justice. The
penalty of wrong is war and subjugation. Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 5 Pet. 1 (1831)(2).
NO SUPERIOR BUT GOD ALONE

A sovereign is the 'sole' arbiter of his own rights.
PINKNEY, Attorney General, in reply:

Sovereigns are equal. It is the duty of a sovereign, not to submit his rights to the decision of a co-sovereign. He is
the sole arbiter of his own rights. He acknowledges no superior, but God alone. To his equals, he shown respect, but
not submission. THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE v. McFADDON & OTHERS, 11 U.S. 116 (1812)(2).
WE THE PEOPLE ARE THE SOVEREIGNS - NOT OUR INFERIOR ARTIFICIAL CREATURE OR TEMPORARY SERVANTS
He was, however, speaking to a representative of government, the police. And it is to government that one goes 'for
a redress of grievances,' to use an almost forgotten phrase of the First Amendment. But it is said that the purpose
was 'to cause inconvenience and annoyance.' Since when have we Americans been expected to bow submissively to
authority and speak with awe and reverence to those who represent us? The constitutional theory is that We the
people are the sovereigns, the state and federal officials only our agents. We who have the final word can speak
softly or angrily. We can seek to challenge and annoy, as we need not stay docile and quiet. COLTEN v.
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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 407 U.S. 104 (1972)(2). [Do it bold as a Lion in the light of God. We are the
supreme principles over the agents who must return to the Law and cease and desist in illegal government deception.]
REMEMBER: Our Constitution assures the Law will ultimately prevail. That supremacy (our supremacy) is absolute.
ALL OFFICERS ARE ARTIFICIAL CREATURES OF LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE
And bound to obey the Constitution and submit to that supremacy = the supreme power of the people.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court (Supreme Court of the United States):
No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system
of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound
to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
which it gives. BUTZ v. ECONOMOU, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)(2). [Same in: U.S. v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)(2); LOUISIANA v.
JUMEL, 107 U.S. 711 (1883)(2); BELKNAP v. SCHILD, 161 U.S. 10 (1896)(2). INTERNATIONAL POSTAL v. BRUCE, 194 U.S. 601
(1904)(1); ROSENBERY BROS v. U.S. SHIPPING, 295 F. 372 (1923)(1). Plus, add to that case, our Constitution assures the Law
will ultimately prevail, and the case below. The Constitution is the law of the people. Mere legislation is laws of our artificial
creature with authority over its creatures, and non-sovereign persons owing allegiance to the sovereign people. ]
OUR SERVANTS MUST OBEY THE LAW

We could, of course, facilitate the process of administering justice to those who violate the criminal laws by
ignoring the commands of the Fourth Amendment--indeed, by ignoring the entire Bill of Rights--but it is the very
purpose of a Bill of Rights to identify values that may not be sacrificed to expediency. In a just society those who
govern, as well as those who are governed, must obey the law. U.S. v. LEON, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)(2). [See p.6 &c]
UNWISE AND UNWARRANTED FOR SERVANTS TO VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER (Supreme Court of the United States): After consideration of the problem, a committee
of eminent lawyers reported this conclusion: 'The remedy for the ills which afflict the administration of criminal
justice, whatever that remedy may be, will not be found in measures which violate law. Such expedients, so far
from restoring health and vigor to the system, only aggravate and protract the disorder. Under our form of
government the machinery of criminal justice depends for its force and efficiency upon the enlightened moral sense
of the individuals to whom the public by their constitution and laws have temporarily entrusted its operation. And
it is as unwise as it is unwarranted for these servants of the public to violate the constitution and laws in the vain
hope of accomplishing useful or beneficial results.' Yearbook (1928) Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, 235, 255. MALINSKI v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF N.Y., 324 U.S. 401 (1945)(2). [Govern in Truth only.]
USURPATION OUGHT TO BE REPELLED
Our servants are bound by Oath to obey the Constitution. Therefore bound to repel usurpation especially against us.
Chief Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by
their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make or to unmake, resides only in the whole body of the
people; not in any sub-division of them. The attempt of any of the parts to exercise it is usurpation, and ought to be
repelled by those to whom the people have delegated their power of repelling it. [Every American ought to repel All
unrighteousness - usurpation= lawlessness = Godlessness. No better way than to deal in or govern by the Truth. ]
The acknowledged inability of the government, then, to sustain itself against the public will, and, by force
or otherwise [by fraud. ] to control the whole nation, is no sound argument in support of its constitutional inability
to preserve itself against a section of the nation acting in opposition to the general will. COHENS v. VIRGINIA, 19
U.S. 264 (1821)(2). [Non-sovereign stateless servants impose their private will by deception = minority.]
The 9th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States: 'The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the People.' Artificial persons do not have sovereign, or unalienable private
rights. We hold the Power (the supreme power) and retain our unalienable and sovereign rights. The People intended to secure their
rights etc. by locking government (ink on paper) in the Constitution as a dead thing-of our Law to secure our all (not the opposite nor to
deny or disparage are rights etc.); plus the just powers of government are derived from the consent of even the governed.
'I am that I am,' we are what we are secured by the Law: supreme sovereigns under God, and He will save us, if the People
'humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways…' especially ye servants engaged in sin.
I deny it matters if the People sign government's misleading forms or applications to keep from being harassed or
inconvenienced since there are no forms or applications for We the People to sign as a sovereign, and no law compelling the People to
sign any of their forms or applications, much less as subjects. Their deceptive forms and applications merely pretend to bind us as
slaves, and are only out of court mere pieces of paper that should be thrown into the trash because they’re fraud. And of course
because it is beyond all controversy that our servants have no power in the Constitution to strip people of their birthright. The People
have God given unalienable rights to do ALL things (right) that are not unlawful unto God, which are far more than mere government
privileges etc. granted to its creatures. All of our servant's 'limited' (just) power etc. comes from the supreme sovereign People, so, our
servants cannot give us anything it all comes from us already prepossessed by right. Anything our servants do that is not essentially
'perfect' is fraud and lawless usurpation and naturally should be repelled by our servants and prudent sovereigns. Sovereigns
69
conforming to their servant’s fraud in a more perfect Union? Absurd. Remember this: If the Judges or jurors were to corruptly decide
against us and hold we intended to surrendered our sovereign birthright, that is the same thing as claiming a power which the People
never specifically delegated to them in the Constitution therefore was 'expressly withheld,' hence forbidden. Ultimately we are
sovereigns who unalienably hold the Supreme Power, plus these servants are not even the Government established by We the People.
Once a fraud always a fraud. It is logic, and a maxim in Law that the law abhors fraud, and justice and truth never dwell with fraud. No
one would wish or claim to be tried, or convicted outside the Law is justice, especially when illegally subjected by government
deception, much less for a victimless so called crime. I deny it matters how real the counterfeit System appears to be in name or action.
We must keep the faith and the word of God and Jesus Christ, and hope the People of this other one Nation under God will
soon awake out of their immoral slumber and honor their pledge of Liberty and Justice for ALL, and brand ALL government corruption
and oppression with zero tolerance. Until then, I injured no one so I invoke sovereign immunity and charge governmental deception
and pray for an ounce of justice, by one freedom loving juror who loves the truth, and hope their Judges and prosecutors bound by
Oath will keep their promise to obey the Law knowing the Constitution is the Law for rulers and protection for all men, at all times, and
all circumstances especially during martial law, or war.
A 'Conspiracy Theory' clearly proved is hardly a theory. Always focus on and remember the pinnacle point of 'The Biggest
Scam in the History of America' coming with a $100 Trillion dollar governmental motive$, and why our servants for their paychecks are
willing to pretend to illegally convert the sovereign People to Taxpayers and subject us under their private artificial jurisdiction and
abuse us. From unhindered supreme sovereign Liberty to subjection by deception by the fascist U.S. Lords of Federalism (ruling elite)
acting outside the Constitution scheming to STEAL our crowns. Take heed, do not be deceived, most servants know what they do is
wrong and their use of "deception" (false witness) to steal proves; and they know about our illegal subjection, and their forced taxation
could not be accomplished via the plain rules of common honesty. The fact they use 'their' misleading Forms and Applications scam) in
and of itself proves 'they know' they have no lawful power under the Constitution to convert the People into their slaves. Hence, why
all of the profound knowledge herein is not wide open and notorious in court, instead of fraudulent silence about their illegal, un-
American, and anti-Liberty subjection scam to steal. We injure no one, let us alone!
The cases herein undeniable prove the People are supreme sovereigns and therefore 'why' government (lawyers) came up
with their forms and application scam to pretend to convert us into non-sovereign 'persons' inferior to our creature. In the established
'Order of things' We the People are the only true sovereigns who hold the supreme power with sovereign immunity and our 'right to
be let alone' because after the revolution and enduring a long train of abuse and usurpation the framers knew they never again wanted
anyone government to rule over the people unjustly. If our servants try to pretend only the whole body of the People is sovereign,
logic it out. Take three hundred million sovereigns, subtracting one by one down to two then one, is not the last man standing
sovereign? Plus, take one man out of the whole body of We the People and there is no other 'legal name' for one of We the People of
the United States. We are truly sovereigns of the country who hold the supreme power. We are not injuring any one, leave us alone.
USURPATION NEVER BECOMES LEGAL

SCOTT, J. (Supreme Court of Ohio):
If unauthorized it is a sufficient answer to this, that the usurpation of civil power in this country never becomes
constitutional or legal by prescription or frequent repetition. THE PIQUA BRANCH OF THE STATE BANK OF
OHIO v. KNOUP, 6 Ohio St. 342 (1856)(1). [How true. Upon what principle of Law could lies be Laws. ]
THE UNRIGHTEOUSNESS OF MEN, WHO HOLD THE TRUTH IN UNRIGHTEOUSNESS
Regarding pretended government (by men) not in accord with the perfect law of God. Romans 10:3 For they being ignorant
of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness
of God. 10:4 For Christ is the end of the Law for righteousness to every one that believeth. Romans 1:18 For the wrath of God is
revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness. 2:8 But unto them
that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath. 2:9 Tribulations and anguish, upon
every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile. 2:12 For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish
without law: and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law. 2:13. (for not the hearers of the law are just before God,
but the doers of the law shall be justified. 2:14 For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the
law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: 2:15 Which show the work, of the law written in their hearts, their
conscience also being witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another; 2:16 In the day when God
shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel. I John 5:17 All unrighteousness is sin: and there is a sin not unto
death. [Woe unto ye Lawyers, Judges, and prosecutors. ]
THE PROOF BEYOND ALL CONTROVERSY

OUR CREATURE HAS NO LAWFUL POWER TO DEPRIVE US OF OUR SOVEREIGN BIRTHRIGHT
First, it is necessary to demonstrate the self evident important significance of illegally depriving us of our profound sovereign
birthright to subject us to steal by comparing when government even let out confidential information pertaining to of our right of
privacy: See United States Census Form 2010 issued November 2009, Form D-3312(E) stating: " Keeping your answers confidential is
our solemn oath." And on the 2nd to the last paragraph is says, "All Census Bureau employees take an oath of nondisclosure and are
sworn for life to protect the confidentiality of the data. The penalty for unlawful disclosure is a fine of up to $250,000 or imprisonment
of up to five years, or both."
So how much more is the penalty if government employees illegally deprive us of our (as you will see after the next couple of
cases "priceless constitutional birthright" that provides us with total personal immunity from government control. The savings of being
immune to taxation over a life time is massive and the enjoyment of security in our pursuit of Happiness is immeasurable. In any event
their breach of confidential info is a (Felony) "High Crime" so defrauding us out of our sovereign birthright is right up their if not
70
precisely treason at Common Law carrying death penalty, and I am certain if the roles were reverse they would be quick to give us
death penalty or life imprisonment for enslaving our servants especially the Lords of Federalism.
You will see the Supreme Court hitting the nail on the head leaving it beyond all controversy (what should be self-evident)
that our servants bound by Oath to obey the Constitution, have of course absolutely no right or lawful power whatsoever under the
Constitution (meaning power from We the people) to take, rob, strip or deprive us of our true sovereign Citizenship (our Constitutional
'birthright') as one of We the 'natural born' sovereign People of the United States, the supreme power.
SOVEREIGNTY IS UTTERLY INCOMMUNICABLE!

(Our servants pretend we parted with our profound sovereignty to commit suicide = enslavement and worse.)

People. ]. To part with it is to commit a species of political suicide. In fact, a power to produce its own annihilation
is an absurdity in terms. It is a power as utterly incommunicable to a political as to a natural person. FLETCHER v.
PECK, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)(2). [Citing References 2644 times, 4/30/05. Secured by the Constitution as a supreme sovereign
under God. Exodus 3:14 I am that I am. Mere paper cannot change what you are in Law. ]
WORLD SERIES GRAND SLAMS

CONSTITUTION OF COURSE GRANTS CONGRESS NO POWER TO STRIP PEOPLE OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP
The people are sovereign and Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by 'taking'
away their citizenship. (Praise Jesus. Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free. )
No act of congress can affect citizenship acquired as a 'birthright' by virtue of the constitution itself.
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Petitioner, born in Poland in 1893, immigrated to this country in 1912 and became a naturalized American citizen in
1926. He went to Israel in 1950, and in 1951 he voluntarily voted in an election for the Israeli Knesset, the
legislative body of Israel. In 1960, when he applied for renewal of his United States passport, the Department of
State refused to grant it on the sole ground that he had lost his American citizenship by virtue of s 401(e) of the
Nationality Act of 1940 which provides that a United States citizen shall 'lose' his citizenship if he votes 'in a
political election in a foreign state.' (fn 1) Petitioner then brought this declaratory judgment action in federal district
court alleging that s 401(e) violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and s 1, cl. 1, of the
Fourteenth Amendment (fn 2) which grants American citizenship to persons like petitioner. Because neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to take
away that citizenship once it has been acquired, petitioner contended that the only way he could lose his citizenship
was by his own voluntary renunciation of it. Since the Government took the position that s 401(e) empowers it to
terminate citizenship without the citizen's voluntary renunciation, petitioner argued that this section is prohibited by
the Constitution. The District Court and the Court of Appeals, rejecting this argument, held that Congress has
constitutional authority forcibly to take away citizenship for voting in a foreign country based on its implied power
to regulate foreign affairs. Consequently, petitioner was held to have lost his American citizenship regardless of his
intention not to give it up. This is precisely what this Court held in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44.
(fn1). 54 Stat. 1168, as amended, 58 Stat. 746, 8 U.S.C. ss 801 (1946 ed.): '(A) person who is a national of the
United States, [distinguished from a Citizen. ] whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: '(e)
Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory.' This provision was re-enacted as s 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. s 1481(a)(5).
(fn2). 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States ***.' [***]
The fundamental issue before this Court here, as it was in Perez, is whether Congress can consistently with
the Fourteenth Amendment enact a law stripping an American of his citizenship which he has never voluntarily
renounced or given up. The majority in Perez held that Congress could do this because withdrawal of citizenship is
'reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the power of Congress to achieve'. 356 U.S., at 60. That
conclusion was reached by this chain of reasoning [Opposed to the express words contained in the Constitution. ] :
Congress has an implied power to deal with foreign affairs as an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; this implied
power, plus the Necessary and Proper Clause, empowers Congress to regulate voting by American citizens in
foreign elections; involuntary expatriation is within the 'ample scope' of 'appropriate modes' Congress can adopt to
effectuate its general regulatory power. 257 Id., 356 U.S., at 57--60 at 575--577. [***]
First we reject the idea expressed in Perez that, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has any
general power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen's citizenship without his assent. This power
cannot, as Perez indicated, be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations. Other
nations are governed by their own constitutions, if any, and we can draw no support from theirs. In our country the
people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their
citizenship. [Super emphasis added. ] Our Constitution governs us and we must never forget that our Constitution
limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or those that are necessary and proper to carry out the
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specifically granted ones. The Constitution of course, grants Congress no express power to strip people of their
citizenship, [They know they are illegally scheming to strip us! We did not knowingly, willingly, and intelligently consent to
any deprivation much less without day in court. ] whether in the exercise of the implied power to regulate foreign
affairs or in the exercise of any specifically granted power. [Super emphasis added. ] And even before the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, views were expressed in Congress and by this Court that under the Constitution the
Government was granted no power, even under its express power to pass a uniform rule of naturalization, to
determine what conduct should and should not result in the loss of citizenship. On three occasions, in 1794, 1797,
and 1818, Congress considered and rejected proposals to enact laws which would describe certain conduct as
resulting in expatriation. On each occasion Congress was considering bills that were concerned with recognizing the
right of voluntary expatriation and with providing some means of exercising that right. In 1795 and 1797, many
members of Congress still adhered to the English doctrine of perpetual allegiance and doubted whether a citizen
could even voluntarily renounce his citizenship. (fn 9) By 1818, however, almost no one doubted the existence of
the right of voluntary expatriation, but several judicial decisions had indicated that the right could not be exercised
by the citizen without the consent of the Federal Government in the form of enabling legislation. (fn 10) Therefore, a
bill was introduced to provide that a person could voluntarily relinquish his citizenship by declaring such
relinquishment in writing before a district court and then departing from the country. (fn 11) The opponents of the
bill argued that Congress had no constitutional authority, either express or implied, under either the Naturalization
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, to provide that a certain act would constitute expatriation. (fn 12) They
pointed to a proposed Thirteenth Amendment, subsequently not ratified, which would have provided that a person
would lose his citizenship by accepting an office or emolument from a foreign government. (fn 13) Congressman
Anderson of Kentucky argued:
[***] (fn 9). 4 Annals of Cong. 1005, 1027--1030 (1794); 7 A. of Cong. 349 et seq. (1797).
(fn10). See, e.g.,Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133. [Herein. ]
(fn11). 31 Annals of Cong. 495 (1817).
(fn12). Id., at 1036--1037, 1058 (1818). Although some of the opponents, believing that citizenship was derived
from the States, argued that any power to prescribe the mode for its relinquishment rested in the States, they were
careful to point out that 'the absence of all power from the State Legislatures would not vest it in us.' Id., at 1039.
(fn13). The amendment had been proposed by the 11th Cong., 2d Sess. See The Constitution of the United States of
America, [True name: the 'Constitution of the United States. ] S.Doc.No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 77-78 (1964).
'The introduction of this article declares the opinion *** that Congress could not declare the acts which should
amount to a renunciation of citizenship; otherwise there would have been no necessity for this last resort. When it
was settled that Congress could not declare that the acceptance of a pension or an office from a foreign Emperor
amounted to a disfranchisement of the citizen, it must surely be conceded that they could not declare that any other
act did. The cases to which their powers before this amendment confessedly did not extend, are very strong, and
induce a belief that Congress could not in any case declare the acts which should cause 'a person to cease to be a
citizen.' The want of power in a case like this, where the individual has given the strongest evidence of attachment
to a foreign potentate and an entire renunciation of the feelings and principles of an American citizen, certainly
establishes the absence of all power to pass a bill like the present one. Although the intention with which it was
introduced and the title of the bill declare that it is to insure and foster the right of the citizen, the direct and
inevitable effect of the bill, is an assumption of power by Congress to declare that certain acts when committed shall
amount to a renunciation of citizenship.' 31 Annals of Cong.1038-1039 (1818).
Congressman Pindall of Virginia rejected the notion, later accepted by the majority in Perez, that the nature
of sovereignty gives Congress a right to expatriate citizens: '(A)llegiance imports an obligation on the citizen or
subject, the correlative right to which resides in the sovereign power: allegiance in this country is not due to
Congress, but to the people, with whom the sovereign power is found; [Super emphasis added. ] it is, therefore by
the people only that any alteration can be made of the existing institutions with respect to allegiance.' Id., at 1045.
[Super emphasis added. ]
Although he recognized that the bill merely sought to provide a means of voluntary expatriation,
Congressman Lowndes of South Carolina argued: 'But, if the Constitution had intended to give to Congress so
delicate a power, it would have been expressly granted. That it was a delicate power, and ought not to be loosely
inferred, *** appeared in a strong light, when it was said, and could not be denied, that to determine the manner in
which a citizen may relinquish his right of citizenship, is equivalent to determining how he shall be divested of that
right. The effect of assuming the exercise of these powers will be, that by acts of Congress a man may not only be
released from all the liabilities, but from all the privileges of a citizen. If you pass this bill, *** you have only one
step further to go, and say that such and such acts shall be considered as presumption of the intention of the citizen
to expatriate, and thus take from him the privileges of a citizen. *** (Q)uestions affecting the right of the citizen
were questions to be regulated, not by the laws of the General or State Governments, but by Constitutional
provisions. If there was anything essential to our notion of a Constitution, *** it was this: that while the
employment of the physical force of the country is in the hands of the Legislature, those rules which determine what
constitutes the rights of the citizen, shall be a matter of Constitutional provision.' Id., at 1050-1051.
The bill was finally defeated. (fn 14) It is in this setting that six years later, in Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 9
72
Wheat. 738, 827, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, declared in what appears to be a mature and
well-considered dictum that Congress, once a person becomes a citizen, cannot deprive him of that status:
(fn14). Id., at 1071. It is interesting to note that the proponents of the bill, such as Congressman Cobb of Georgia,
considered it to be 'the simple declaration of the manner in which a voluntary act, in the exercise of a natural right,
may be performed' and denied that it created or could lead to the creation of 'a presumption of relinquishment of
the right of citizenship.' Id., at 1068. '(The naturalized citizen) becomes a member of the society, possessing all the
rights of a native citizen, and standing, in view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does
not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national Legislature, is to
prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the
individual.'
Although these legislative and judicial statements may be regarded as inconclusive and must be considered
in the historical context in which they were made, (fn 15) any doubt as to whether prior to the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment Congress had the power to deprive a person against his will of citizenship once obtained
should have been removed by the unequivocal terms of the Amendment itself. It provides its own constitutional
rule in language calculated completely to control the status of citizenship: 'All persons born or naturalized in the
United States *** are citizens of the United States ***.' There is no indication in these words of a fleeting citizenship,
good at the moment it is acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any time. Rather the Amendment
can most reasonably be read as defining a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.
Once acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of
the Federal Government, the States, or any other governmental unit. [Emphasis added. ]
(fn15). The dissenting opinion here points to the fact that a Civil War Congress passed two Acts designed to deprive
military deserters to the Southern side of the rights of citizenship. Measures of this kind passed in those days of
emotional stress and hostility are by no means the most reliable criteria for determining what the Constitution
means. It is true that the chief interest of the people in giving permanence and security to citizenship in the
Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to protect Negroes. [Emphasis added. ] The Dred Scott decision, Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, had shortly before greatly disturbed many people about the status of Negro citizenship.
But the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, had already attempted to confer citizenship on all persons born or
naturalized in the United States. Nevertheless, when the Fourteenth Amendment passed the House without
containing any definition of citizenship, the sponsors of the Amendment in the Senate insisted on inserting a
constitutional definition and grant of citizenship. They expressed fears that the citizenship so recently conferred on
Negroes by the Civil Rights Act could be just as easily take away from them by subsequent Congresses, and it was
to provide an insuperable obstacle against every governmental effort to strip Negroes of their newly acquired
citizenship that the first clause was added to the Fourteenth Amendment. (fn 16) Senator Howard, who sponsored
the Amendment in the Senate, thus explained the purpose of the clause: [Our artificial creature cannot even take away
14th Amendment subject citizenship, its purpose was expressly written to 'protect' them. ]
(fn16). Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768--2769, 2869, 2890 et seq. (1866). See generally, Flack, Adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment 88--94 (1908).
'It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens
of the United States. *** We desired to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens *** under the civil
rights bill beyond the legislative power ***.' Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2890, 2896 (1866).
This undeniable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to make citizenship of Negroes permanent and
secure would be frustrated by holding that the Government can rob a citizen of his citizenship without his consent
by simply proceeding to act under an implied general power to regulate foreign affairs or some other power
generally granted. Though the framers of the Amendment were not particularly concerned with the problem of
expatriation, it seems undeniable from the language they used that they wanted to put citizenship beyond the power
of any governmental unit to destroy. In 1868, two years after the Fourteenth Amendment had been proposed,
Congress specifically considered the subject of expatriation. Several bills were introduced to impose involuntary
expatriation on citizens who committed certain acts. (fn 17) With little discussion, these proposals were defeated.
Other bills, like the one proposed but defeated in 1818, provided merely a means by which the citizen could himself
voluntarily renounce his citizenship. (fn 18) Representative Van Trump of Ohio, who proposed such a bill,
vehemently denied in supporting it that his measure would make the Government 'a party to the act dissolving the
tie between the citizen and his country *** where the statute simply prescribes the manner in which the citizen shall
proceed to perpetuate the evidence of his intention, or election, to renounce his citizenship by expatriation.' Cong.
Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1804 (1868). He insisted that 'inasmuch as the act of expatriation depends almost
entirely upon a question of intention on the part of the citizen,' id., at 1801, 'the true question is, that not only the
right of expatriation, but the whole power of its exercise, rests solely and exclusively in the will of the individual,'
id., at 1804. (fn 19) In strongest of terms, not contradicted by any during the debates, he concluded:
(fn17). Representative Jenckes of Rhode Island introduced an amendment that would expatriate those citizens who
became naturalized by a foreign government, performed public duties for a foreign government, or took up domicile
in a foreign country without intent to return. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 968, 1129, 2311 (1868). Although
he characterized his proposal as covering 'cases where citizens may voluntarily renounce their allegiance to this
73
country,' id., at 1159, it was opposed by Representative Chanler of New York who said, 'So long as a citizen does
not expressly dissolve his allegiance and does not swear allegiance to another country his citizenship remains in
statu quo, unaltered and unimpaired.' Id., at 1016.
(fn18). Proposals of Representatives Pruyn of New York (id., at 1130) and Van Trump of Ohio (id., at 1801, 2311).
(fn19). While Van Trump disagreed with the 1818 opponents as to whether Congress had power to prescribe a
means of voluntary renunciation of citizenship, he wholeheartedly agreed with their premise that the right of
expatriation belongs to the citizen, not to the Government, and that the Constitution forbids the Government from
being party to the act of expatriation. [Our Constitution contains no express provision over the Supreme Sovereigns
therefore it is withheld = Forbidden. Emphasis added. ] Van Trump simply thought that the opponents of the 1818
proposal failed to recognize that their mutual premise would not be violated by an Act which merely prescribed 'how
*** (the rights of citizenship) might be relinquished at the option of the person in whom they were vested.'
Cong.Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1804 (1868).
'To enforce expatriation or exile against a citizen without his consent is not a power anywhere belonging
to this Government. No conservative minded statesman, no intelligent legislator, no sound lawyer has ever
maintained any such power in any branch of the Government. The lawless precedents created in the delirium of war
*** of sending men by force into exile, as a punishment for political opinion, were violations of this great law *** of
the Constitution. *** The men who debated the question in 1818 failed to see the true distinction. *** They failed to
comprehend that it is not the Government, but that it is the individual, who has the right and the only power of
expatriation. *** (I)t belongs and appertains to the citizen and not to the Government; and it is the evidence of his
election to exercise his right, and not the power to control either the election or the right itself, which is the
legitimate subject matter of legislation. There has been, and there can be, no legislation under our Constitution to
control in any manner the right itself.' Ibid. [All power is derived from the Constitution and not otherwise. ]
But even Van Trump's proposal, which went no further than to provide a means of evidencing a citizen's intent
to renounce his citizenship, was defeated. (fn 20) The Act, as finally passed, merely recognized the 'right of
expatriation' as an inherent right of all people. (fn 21)
(fn20). Id., at 2317. Representative Banks of Massachusetts, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs which drafted the bill eventually enacted into law, explained why Congress refrained from providing a
means of expatriation: 'It is a subject which, in our opinion, ought not to be legislated upon. *** (T)his comes within
the scope and character of natural rights which no Government has the right to control and which no Government
can confer. And wherever this subject is alluded to in the Constitution-- *** it is in the declaration that Congress
shall have no power whatever to legislate upon these matters.' Id., at 2316. [Super emphasis added. When the People
intended to grant power, or 'except' something they expressly declared the words in the Constitution. ]
(fn 21). 15 Stat. 223, R.S. s 1999.
The entire legislative history of the 1868 Act makes it abundantly clear that there was a strong feeling in
the Congress that the only way the citizenship it conferred could be lost was by the voluntary renunciation or
abandonment by the citizen himself. And this was the unequivocal statement of the Court in the case of United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649. The issues in that case were whether a person born in the United States to
Chinese aliens was a citizen of the United States and whether, nevertheless, he could be excluded under the Chinese
Exclusion Act, 22 Stat. 58. The Court first held that within the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, Wong Kim
Ark was a citizen of the United States, and then pointed out that though he might 'renounce this citizenship, and
become a citizen of *** any other country,' he had never done so. Id., at 704--705. The Court then held (fn 22) that
Congress could not do anything to abridge or affect his citizenship conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Quoting Chief Justice Marshall's well-considered and oft-repeated dictum in Osborn to the effect that Congress
under the power of naturalization has 'a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away,' [Super emphasis
added. ] the Court said:
(fn22). Some have referred to this part of the decision as a holding, see, e.g., Hurst, supra, 29 Rocky Mt.L.Rev., at
78--79; Comment, 56 Mich.L.Rev., at 1153--1154; while others have referred to it as obiter dictum, see, e.g., Roche,
supra, 99 U.Pa.L.Rev., at 26--27. Whichever it was, the statement was evidently the result of serious consideration
and is entitled to great weight. 'Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the constitution upon
those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of congress, a fortiori no act *** of congress *** can
affect citizenship acquired as a birthright by virtue of the constitution itself ***. [Super emphasis added. ] The
fourteenth amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in congress, to regulate naturalization, has
conferred no authority upon congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the constitution to constitute a
sufficient and complete right to citizenship.' Id., at 703. [Emphasis added. ]
To uphold Congress' power to take away a man's citizenship because he voted in a foreign election in
violation of s 401(e) would be equivalent to holding that Congress has the power to 'abridge,' 'affect,' 'restrict the
effect of,' and 'take *** away' citizenship. Because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from doing any of
these things, we agree with the Chief Justice's dissent in the Perez case that the Government is without power to rob
a citizen of his citizenship under s 401(e). (fn 23) [They know that is robbery. ]
(fn23). Of course, as The Chief Justice said in his dissent, 356 U.S., at 66; naturalization unlawfully procured can
be set side. See e.g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665;
74
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118.
Because the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the expatriation proposals which
preceded and followed it, like most other legislative history, contains many statements from which conflicting
inferences can be drawn, our holding might be unwarranted if it rested entirely or principally upon that legislative
history. But it does not. Our holding we think is the only one that can stand in view of the language and the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and our construction of that Amendment, we believe, comports more nearly
than Perez with the principles of liberty and equal justice to all that the entire Fourteenth Amendment was adopted
to guarantee. Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under the name
of one of its general or implied grants of power. In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left
without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world--as a man without a country. Citizenship in this
Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry.
The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under
which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation
against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding
does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free
country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship. Perez v. Brownell is overruled. The judgment is reversed.
AFROYIM v. RUSK, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)(2). [Remember: Supreme Court interpretations may not be disregarded and
no other court may correct them; our Constitution assures that the Law will ultimately prevail; the Constitution is the
Supreme Law of the Land, and it's (our) supremacy is absolute. Sovereignty by its nature is utterly incommunicable.
FLETCHER v. PECK, herein. The People never even considered the absurdity of delegating power to subject us. ]
How true it is. Dodge this:

"GOVERNMENTAL DECEPTION"
"WHEN GOVERNMENT ACTS IN MISLEADING WAYS, IT MAY NOT ENFORCE THE LAW!"
This next profound case relates to government's misleading Forms and Applications scam = illegal fraud. Our servants
pretend to convert We the people, the supreme sovereigns, into vastly inferior 100% Federal non-sovereign, stateless persons =
citizens of the 'United States located in the District of Columbia' so we are (Taxpayers) by illegal 'governmental deception.' Praise God:
Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall ... . We are suppose to be free in the Land of the Free, so they know to boil the frogs slowly.
In fact, at least two of our cases seem to rest on the premise that when the Government acts in misleading ways, it
may not enforce the law if to do so would harm a private party as a result of governmental deception. [Super
emphasis added. ] See United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973) (criminal
defendant may assert as a defense that the Government led him to believe that its conduct was legal) [government's
conduct is illegal, and intended to commit crime by status deprivation. Our servants of course have no power under the
Constitution to strip us of our sovereign birthright, much less by government deception. ] ; Moser v. U.S., 341 U.S. 41
(1951) (applicant cannot be deemed to waive right to citizenship on the basis of a form he signed when he was
misled as to the effect signing would have on his rights). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
178-180 (1979); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Branson v. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32, 42 (1873). [***]
See generally St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Our
Government should not by picayunish haggling over the scope of its promise, permit one of its arms to do that
which, by any fair construction, the Government has given its word that no arm will do. It is no less good morals
and good law that the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people than that the people should
turn square corners in dealing with their government"); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S., at 387-
388 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("It is very well to say that those who deal with the Government should turn square
corners. But there is no reason why the square corners should constitute a one-way street"); Brandt v. Hickel, 427
F.2d 53, 57 (CA9 1970)("To say to these appellants, 'The joke is on you. You shouldn't have trusted us,' is hardly
worthy of our great government"); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859) ("Men naturally trust in their
government, and ought to do so, and they ought not to suffer for it"). See also Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
To analyze the nature of a private party's detrimental change in position, we must identify the manner in
which reliance on the Government's misconduct has caused the private citizen to change his position for the worse.
In this case the consequences of the Government's misconduct were not entirely adverse. Respondent did receive an
immediate benefit as a result of the double reimbursement. Its detriment is the inability to retain money that it
should never have received in the first place. Thus, this is not a case in which the respondent has lost any legal
right, either vested or contingent, or suffered any adverse change in its status. (fn 14) When a private party is
deprived of something to which it was entitled of right, it has surely suffered a detrimental change in its position.
[From sovereign birthright to slave by illegal government deception. ] Here respondent lost no rights but merely was
induced to do something which could be corrected at a later time.] This case is, therefore, plainly distinguishable
from Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951), in which the petitioner "was led to believe that he would not
thereby lose his rights to citizenship." Id., at 46. HECKLER v COMMUNITY HEALTH SERV. 467 U.S. 51
(1984)(2). [Proverbs 12:20 'Deceit' is in the heart of them that imagine 'evil.' Illegally subjecting people (injuring no one)
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to steal is evil, and unrighteous is sin. Satanic? In the end the joke is on the unrighteous. ]
FRAUD FATALLY DESTROYS EVERYTHING = VOIDS EVERYTHING

MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Fraud destroys the validity of every thing into which it enters. It affects fatally even the most solemn judgments
and decrees. Bankrupt Act, sect. 35; 1 Story's Eq., sect. 252; Freeman on Judgments, sect. 486. Whenever fraud is
perpetrated by one party to the injury of another, the offender is liable. Paisley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51; Benton v.
Pratt, 2 Wend. 385. NUDD v. BURROWS, 91 U.S. 426 (1875)(1). [Misleading us = Government deception = fraud. ]
GOVERNMENT TO "ALWAYS" PROTECT PEOPLE AGAINST FRAUD
See, e.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948) (the government's power "to protect people
against fraud" has" always been recognized in this country and is firmly established"); ILLINOIS ex rel
MADIGAN v. TELEMARKETING ASSOC. INC., 538 U.S. 600 (2003)(3). [Subjecting us by deception = fraud. ]
Justice White (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The Constitution of the United States does not secure to any one the privilege of defrauding the public.'
CROSSMAN v. LURMAN, 192 U.S. 189 (1903)(2). [See the same in PATAPSCO GUANCO v. BOARD AGRICULTURE
NO.CAR. 171 U.S. 345 (1898)(2); SAVAGE v. JONES, 225 U.S. 501 (1912)(2). All forms of fraud by servants is void. ]
Our servants have no right to defraud us out of our profound sovereign birthright and into slaves by illegal governmental
deception via the Constitution and prescribed by Law. Liberty and 'Justice' for all? The depth of the ruling elite’s evil corruption and
affinity to steal by deception is a pervasive long train. We injure no one yet they pretend to defraud us out of our profound sovereign
birthright by illegal governmental deception to steal our all even though they swear oaths to obey the Constitution and pledge Liberty
and Justice for all in a more perfect Union under God. That is hardly securing our rights, Liberty and Justice for all.
The joke's on government if judges uphold their oaths and obey the Law and support and defend the Constitution and do
not allow government to enforce their fraud since they are without lawful power to rob us of our sovereign birthright, or engage in
government deception, or if jurors just say no (not guilty) to all victimless crimes etc. In any event the Truth is now revealed to the
public (and jurors) exposing government (men) as anti-American fraud artists engaged in illegal deception refusing to do Justice for all,
and scheming to steal our profound birthright, Liberty, and money. In Heckler (supra = above) the Court did not say we could not
invoke sovereign immunity, and no mere out of court piece of paper (pulp fiction) can change 'what' we truly are in Law. Only,
imprudence, ignorance, gullibility, or timid submission to our servants engaged in fraud and lawlessness can 'force' us into subjection.
Besides having no power under the Constitution to convert us, much less into slaves, their deceptive forms and applications fail to
provide us with fair warnings to our assent of the detrimental change in status, nor definitions of the converting words and terms that
are deceptively similar, plus there are no forms for We the people to sign as the sovereign people. It is all carefully calculated as a
stealthy ruse because they know they have no lawful "right" or power to defraud anyone let alone the sovereign people in a more
perfect Union under God. Check out the uniform status on all of their relevant forms and applications. (I made a booklet.) They defraud
the people from sovereigns accountable to God alone into slaves-taxpayers and 'subject' to the jurisdiction they steal trillions of dollars
via taxes of every kind and description, using tax forms, licenses, social security, mandatory insurance, permits, fees, fines, and
imprisonment if we do not pay to play the game of subjection outside the Constitution. Simply put, our servants are private companies
and they trick us into agreeing to pay for their 'services' to create trillions of dollars of revenue, none of which, would we otherwise be
'required' to do or pay as sovereigns, and all of that extortion cannot be done according to the plain rules of common honesty, hence
government deception against the Constitution = against the true intent of We the people. We are ruled in reverse! by fraud.
Our consent is via fraud. Where are the forms for the people to sign as the people? None. We would not sign their forms as
a subject if there were forms to sign as a sovereign. Sovereigns have more 'rights' etc. than subjects. And our servants get all of their
lawful authority etc. from the people so they cannot give us anything we do not already have a right to. Emphasis added.
ONLY INCOMPETENTS WILLINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE RIGHTS AND TO BE FINED OR IMPRISONED ETC.
Justice STEWART (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
In D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, the Court recently outlined the considerations relevant to
determination of a contractual waiver of due process rights. Applying the standards governing waiver of
constitutional rights in a criminal proceeding (fn 31) --although not holding that such standards must necessarily
apply-- the Court held that, on the particular facts of that case, the contractual waiver of due process rights was
'voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly' made. Id., at 187. [***] (fn 31). See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742;
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464. In the civil area, the Court has said that '(w)e do not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights,' Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292. Indeed, in the civil no
less than the criminal area, 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.' Eetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy,
301 U.S. 389. FUENTES v. SHEVIN, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)(2). [1st thing to say in court: I do not waive anything. ]
MENACE
The classic description of an effective waiver of a constitutional right is the "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). "[C]ourts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel.
76
Bogash, 301 U.S. 389 (1937). See also Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292
(1937) (we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights"). State sovereign immunity, no less
than the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally protected. Great Northern, supra, at 51; Pennhurst,
465 U.S., at 98. And in the context of federal sovereign immunity--obviously the closest analogy to the present
case--it is well established that waivers are not implied. See, e.g., United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969)
(describing the "settled propositio[n]" that the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but
must be unequivocally expressed"). We see no reason why the rule should be different with respect to state
sovereign immunity. [Much less the People's sovereign immunity. ] [***].
Congressional flexibility is desirable, of course--but only within the bounds of federal power established by
the Constitution. Beyond those bounds (the theory of our Constitution goes), it is a menace. COLLEGE SAVINGS
BANK v. FLORIDA, 527 U.S. 666 (1999)(2). [Anything contrary is fraud to reign tyranny. ]
Since there are no forms to sign as a sovereign, I only sign government forms and applications out of necessity to keep from
getting harassed in my pursuit of Happiness. I deny that I am insane and intended to WILLINGLY commit political suicide and waive my
profound sovereign birthright. Since there are no forms to sign as a sovereign, forcing me to get a license as a subject is only
accomplished by fraud, covert threat and coercion of fine and imprisonment, or possibly getting beat up, or shot by law enforcement
for not having one, nor will they always let you preserve your rights etc. on their license etc.
NO MUTUAL ASSENT = NO MEETING OF THE MINDS [TO BE ANYTHING OTHER THAN A SOVEREIGN]
"The formation of an express contract requires an offer encompassing its essential terms, an unequivocal
acceptance of the terms by the offeree, consideration and an intent to be bound." Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge,
779 P.2d 310, 314 (Alaska 1989); Hall v. Add-Ventures, Ltd., 695 P.2d 1081, 1087 n. 9 (Alaska 1985) (citing 1 W.
Jaeger, Williston on Contracts ß 64 at 211, ß 72 at 235, ß 73 at 128 (3d ed.1957)). "Mutual assent is an elementary
requirement for a binding contract." Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1281 (Alaska 1985)
(citing State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, 621 P.2d 1329, 1331 n. 3 (Alaska 1981) ). YOUNG v.
HOBBS, 916 P.2d 485 (Alaska 1996)(2). [Mutual assent = Meeting of the minds - with intent to be bound. ]
ANY AGREEMENT REQUIRES ASSENT OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE PARTIES
DIXON, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Wisconsin): "To make any agreement valid," says Judge Willard (Eq.
Jur., 170), "requires the assent of the understanding of the several parties thereto. This implies freedom of action,
as well as the exercise of reason, accompanied with deliberation; the mind weighing as in a balance the good and
evil on either side. KUELKAMP v. HIDDING, 31 Wis. 503 (1872)(1).
STATE MAY NOT REQUIRE THE RELINQUISHMENT OF CONSTITUIONAL RIGHTS

But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose
conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable
that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.
FROST v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA, 271 U.S. 583 (1926)(2). [Refuse to enforce rights. ]
ANY LEGISLATION THAT DEPRIVES US OF A RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID

Mr. Justice Harlan, after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court:
Dealing with that point, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Gray, said: 'But that statute, requiring the corporation, as
a condition precedent to obtaining a permit to do business within the state, to surrender a right and privilege
secured to it by the Constitution and laws of the United States, was unconstitutional and void, and could give no
validity or effect to any agreement or action of the corporation in obedience to its provisions,'--citing Home Ins. Co.
v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186; Texas Land & Mortg. Co. v. Worsham, 76 Tex. 556.
See also to the same effect, Martin v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (Gerling v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.) 151 U. S. 673, 684;
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 356; Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 110, 111. WESTERN UNION TELE
CO. v. The State of Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910)(2). [Constitution secures even a corporation let alone the people. ]
18 USC 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law [Crime to deprive us of our rights. ]
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any
State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the
punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily
injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
77
ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or
an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be
sentenced to death. [Sovereigns knowingly arrested-kidnapped as pretended subjects= Unconstitutional practice. ]
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, provided in pertinent part: [A]ny person who, under color of
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law... . [Now 42 US 1983. ]
The purpose of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act was not to abolish the immunities available at common law, see
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), but to insure that federal courts would have jurisdiction of constitutional
claims against state officials. [***]
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), we recognized that state judges sued on constitutional claims
pursuant to § 1983 could claim a similar absolute immunity. The Court reasoned: It is a judge's duty to decide all
cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense
feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied
litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would
contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking, but to intimidation. Id. at 554. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478 (1977). [Immunity = unaccountable: fearless corrupt decisions against us. Bound by Oath = true intent of the People.]
CITIZENS THEMSELVES OUR SOVEREIGN - GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE CANNOT TAKE AWAY THAT
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The Government must be able not only to deal affirmatively with foreign nations, as it does through the maintenance
of diplomatic relations with them and the protection of American citizens sojourning within their territories. It must
also be able to reduce to a minimum the frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns sensitive in matters
touching their dignity and interests. [***]
Mr. Chief Justice WARREN, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS join, dissenting:
What is this government, whose power is here being asserted? And what is the source of that power? The answers
are the foundation of our Republic. To secure the inalienable rights of the individual, 'Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.' I do not believe the passage of time has
lessened the truth of this proposition. It is basic to our form of government. This Government was born of its
citizens, it maintains itself in a continuing relationship with them, and, in my judgment, it is without power to sever
the relationship that gives rise to its existence. I cannot believe that a government conceived in the spirit of ours
was established with power to take from the people their most basic right. [***]
The people who created this government endowed it with broad powers. They created a sovereign state
with power to function as a sovereignty. But the citizens themselves are sovereign, and their citizenship is not
subject to the general powers of their government. Whatever may be the scope of its powers to regulate the conduct
and affairs of all persons within its jurisdiction, a government of the people cannot take away their citizenship
simply because one branch of that government can be said to have a conceivably rational basis for wanting to do so.
[***] My conclusions are as follows. The Government is without power to take citizenship away from a native-
born or lawfully naturalized American. The Fourteenth Amendment recognizes that this priceless right is immune
from the exercise of governmental powers. [***] But every exercise of governmental power must find its source in
the Constitution. The power to denationalize is not within the letter or the spirit of the powers with which our
Government was endowed. [***] But the Court also has its duties, none of which demands more diligent
performance than that of protecting the fundamental rights of individuals. That duty is imperative when the
citizenship of an American is at stake--that status, which alone, assures him the full enjoyment of the precious
rights conferred by our Constitution.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting:
The hated Alien and Sedition Laws grew out of that field. [fn1] More recently the rise of fascism and communism
has had profound repercussions here. (fn 1) Miller, Crisis in Freedom (1951), 167--168, states the Federalist case
for those laws: 'As in the case of the Alien Act, the Federal lists justified the Sedition Law by citing the power of
Congress to provide for the common defense and general welfare, and the inherent right of every government to act
in self- preservation. It was passed at a time of national emergency when, as a member of Congress said, 'some
gentlemen say we are at war, and when all believe we must have war.' 'Threatened by faction, and actually at
hostility with a foreign and perfidious foe abroad,' the Sedition Act was held to be 'necessary for the safety, perhaps
the existence of the Government.' Congress could not permit subversive newspapers to 'paralyze the public arm, and
weaken the efforts of Government for the defense of the country.' The wiles of France and its adherents were as
dangerous as its armies: 'Do not the Jacobin fiends of France use falsehood and all the arms of hell,' asked William
Cobbett, 'and do they not run like half famished wolves to accomplish the destruction of this country?' If Congress
78
had failed to take every precautionary measure against such danger, the blood of the Republic would have been
upon its hands.' PEREZ v. BROWNELL, 356 U.S. 44 (1958)(4).
A NATURAL BORN SOVEREIGN PRICELESS CONSTITUTIONAL "BIRTHRIGHT"
What the Constitution confers neither Congress, nor the Executive, nor the Judiciary,
'nor' all three in concert may strip away = It's the Law! The Supreme Law of the Land.
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS joins:
While I concur in the opinion of the Court I add the following to state what I conceive to be the controlling
constitutional principles in this and other expatriation cases.
The Fourteenth Amendment declares that 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.' Nishikawa was
born in this country while subject to its jurisdiction; therefore American citizenship is his constitutional birthright.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649. What the Constitution has conferred neither the Congress, nor
the Executive, nor the Judiciary, nor all three in concert, may strip away. [Super emphasis added. ] Although
Congress can enact laws punishing those who shirk their duties as citizens or those who jeopardize our relations
with foreign countries it cannot involuntarily expatriate any citizen. As the CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice
DOUGLAS explain in their dissenting opinions in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 62, this results not only from the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment but from the manner in which the Government of the United States was
formed, the fundamental political principles which underlie its existence, and its continuing relationship to the
citizenry who erected and maintain it. [Emphasis added. ] Cf. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738.
In my view the notion that citizenship can be snatched away whenever such deprivation bears some 'rational nexus'
to the implementation of a power granted Congress by the Constitution is a dangerous and frightening proposition.
By this standard a citizen could be transformed into a stateless outcast for evading his taxes, for fraud upon the
Government, for counterfeiting its currency, for violating its voting laws and on and on ad infinitum. Of course a
citizen has the right to abandon or renounce his citizenship and Congress can enact measures to regulate and affirm
such abjuration. But whether citizenship has been voluntarily relinquished is a question to be determined on the
facts of each case after a judicial trial in full conformity with the Bill of Rights. NISHIKAWA v. DULLES, 356
U.S. 129 (1958)(2). [It would literally be insanity-incompetence for a supreme sovereign to knowingly, willingly, and
intelligently, volunteer to be a lesser being, much less a non-sovereign stateless slave. ]
POWERS NOT GRANTED ARE PROHIBITED = "FORBIDDEN" - SUPER EMPHASIS ADDED

From the accepted doctrine that the United States is a government of delegated powers, it follows that those not
expressly granted, or reasonably to be implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to the states or to the
people. To forestall any suggestion to the contrary, the Tenth Amendment was adopted. (fn 18) The same
proposition, otherwise stated, is that powers not granted are prohibited. None to regulate agricultural production is
given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden.
The Tenth Amendment declares: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' U.S. v. BUTLER, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)(2).
Only a fool would commit political suicide and knowingly and intelligently volunteer to surrender their profound 'sovereign
birthright'. Whatever pretended benefit is offset by extreme disadvantage. Always remember, there are no forms or applications to
sign as sovereigns, and no law requiring the people to sign any form or application, much less one that subjects us. Yet, our servants
will harass us if we do not sign their forms that subject us. If they say they will not harass us, then there is no need to sign their forms.
If there is no need to sign, then there should be zero penalties, especially since there are no forms for the people to sign as sovereigns.
Because our servants do not have the lawful power to take away our unalienable sovereignty, they cannot lawfully decide we willingly
surrendered it. To decide against us would be in effect the same thing as saying they have the lawful power to rob us of our
sovereignty. Since such power is not expressed in the Constitution it was expressly intended to be withheld. We have the lawful right
to do everything right that is not unlawful to God which is greater than the rights and privileges of a mere subject. Remember all of
that logic if you try to defend yourself from the corrupt or overzealous prosecution and judges who swore Oaths to uphold the
Constitution yet are engaged in fraud, refuse to obey the Law and prove lawful jurisdiction over us.
NATURAL BORN CITIZENSHIP IS A "BIRTHRIGHT" THAT IS "TRULY INALIENABLE"

INALIENABLE = UTTERLY INCOMMUNICABLE = CANNOT LEGALLY OR JUSTLY BE TRANSFERRED.
Precious right of citizenship. Highest hope of civilized men.
Nowhere in the world today is the right of citizenship of greater worth.
Justice STEVENS, MARSHALL and BLACKMUN (Supreme Court of the United States) join, concurring in judgment:
American citizenship is "a right no less precious than life or liberty." Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-
617 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring in result). For the native-born citizen it is a right that is truly inalienable.
[Super emphasis added. ] For the naturalized citizen, however, Congress has authorized a special procedure that may
result in the revocation of citizenship. That statute provides that a certificate of naturalization may be canceled and
an order granting citizenship revoked if the Government proves that "such order and certificate of naturalization
79
were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." 8
U.S.C. ß 1451(a). [Are they hypocrites? ] [***]
In his concurrence opinion explaining why special procedural safeguards are appropriate in
denaturalization proceedings, Justice Rutledge advanced an argument that further demonstrates the importance of
the requirement that the Government prove the existence of a disqualifying fact. He wrote: "To take away a man's
citizenship deprives him of a right no less precious than life or liberty, indeed of one which today comprehends
those rights and almost all others. To lay upon the citizen the punishment of exile for committing murder, or even
treason, is a penalty thus far unknown to our law and at most but doubtfully within Congress' power. U.S. Const.,
Amend. VIII. Yet by the device or label or a civil suit, carried forward with none of the safeguards of criminal
procedure provided by the Bill of Rights, this most comprehensive and basic right of all, so it has been held, can be
taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty of banishment.
"No such procedures could strip a natural-born citizen of his birthright or lay him open to such a
penalty." Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-617 (1949). The wisdom of experience is further reflected
in our prior cases imposing a special burden on the Government when it seeks to denaturalize an American citizen.
Thus, in explaining why the Government's burden of proof in this kind of civil proceeding is equivalent to that
enforced in criminal cases, and why default judgments in denaturalization proceedings are intolerable, the Court has
written: "Denaturalization consequences may be more grave than consequences that flow from conviction for
crimes.... This Court has long recognized the plain fact that to deprive a person of his American citizenship is an
extraordinarily severe penalty. The consequences of such a deprivation may even rest heavily upon his children. 8
U.S.C. ß 719. As a result of the denaturalization here, petitioner has been ordered deported. 'To deport one who so
claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty.... It may result also in loss of both property and life; or of
all that makes life worth living.' [Our sovereign Liberty. ] Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). [***]
We have recognized that this burden is substantially identical to the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt burden of
proof borne by the Government in criminal cases. Ibid. Indeed, the factors that support the imposition of so heavy a
burden are largely the same in both contexts--particularly critical are the immense importance of the interests at
stake, ibid.; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the possibility of loss of liberty, Klapprott, 335 U.S., at 612; In re
Winship, 397 U.S., at 363, the resultant stigmatization, Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122-23
(1943); In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 363, and the societal interest in the reliability of the outcome, id., at 363-3642.
The use of burden-shifting presumptions to reduce the Government's burden of proof in criminal cases has been
consistently rejected by this Court without regard to whether the presumptions were rebuttable. See Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985), and cases cited therein. Such presumptions are equally objectionable in the
denaturalization context.
In Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), a case in which the Government sought "to turn the
clock back twelve years after full citizenship was conferred upon petitioner by a judicial decree, and to deprive him
of the priceless benefits that derive from [citizenship] status," we discussed the grave consequences of
denaturalization and the special burden borne by the Government in denaturalization proceedings: "In its
consequences it is more serious than a taking of one's property, or the imposition of a fine or other penalty. For it is
safe to assert that nowhere in the world today is the right of citizenship of greater worth to an individual than it is
in this country. It would be difficult to exaggerate its value and importance. By many it [Sovereignty. ] is
regarded as the highest hope of civilized men. [Super emphasis added. ] This does not mean that once granted to an
alien, citizenship cannot be revoked or cancelled on legal grounds under appropriate proof. But such a right once
conferred should not be taken away without the clearest sort of justification and proof. So, ... in an action
instituted ... for the purpose of depriving one of the precious right of citizenship previously conferred we believe
the facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably possible in favor of the citizen. Especially is this so
when the attack is made long after the time when the certificate of citizenship was granted and the citizen has
meanwhile met his obligations and has committed no act of lawlessness. It is not denied that the burden of proof is
on the Government in this case. KUNGY’S v. U.S., 485 U.S. 759 (1988)(2). [I did not knowingly, willingly, and
intelligently commit suicide and waive my sovereign birthright. Our servants are not empowered to subject their masters.]
STATE CANNOT ARROGATE ANY POWER OVER EVEN A FOREIGNER WHO HAS NOT BECOME HER SUBJECT
BARTLEY, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Ohio):
It is an established principle, that the personal status of a party, as fixed by the law of the place of his domicile, is
regarded as accompanying him in other countries, so long as his domicile remains unchanged. See Story's Conflict
of Laws, secs. 51, 52, 60, 64-66; 2 Kent's Com.; Pattee v. Brown, 5 East, 131; 1 Huberus, Lib. 1, tit. 3, sec. 12.
A standard author, of the highest character, on the laws of nations, says: 'The citizen or subject of a state
who absents himself for a time, without any intention to abandon the society of which he is a member, does not lose
his privilege by his absence; he preserves his rights, and remains bound by the same obligations. Being received in
a foreign country, in virtue of the natural society, the communication, and commerce which nations are obliged to
cultivate with each other, he ought to be considered there as a member of his own nation, and treated as such.
'The state which ought to respect the rights of other nations, and, in general, those of all mankind, can not
arrogate to herself any power over the person of a foreigner, who, though he has entered her territory, has not
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become her subject.' Vattel's Law of Nations, 174. ANDERSON V. POINDEXTER, 6 Ohio St. 622 (1856)(1).
CITIZENS CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF PRECIOUS RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT JUDICIAL TRIAL BY JURY
Similar concerns drove the conclusion in Kennedy v. Mendoza- Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), holding that free
citizens must receive procedural protections prior to revocation of citizenship for draft evasion. Without discussing
"liberty interests," the Court recognized that deprivation of the "most precious right" of citizenship necessitated
process by way of jury trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id., at 159, 83 S.Ct., at 562-563. As in Bell, the
Court feared the Government would enforce the criminal law punishing draft evasion through the back door of
denaturalization without prosecution for said crimes. 372 U.S., at 186. SANDIN v. CONNER, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)(2).
THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE "HOLD" THE POWER - THE SUPREME POWER

"Hold the power" proves our sovereignty is unalienable and the people did not empower our creature to steal it by Law.
The Power Holders. The Supreme Power Holders.
This is the 1st Supreme Court case that proves the sovereign people did not and cannot change under the Constitution.
Hence, government's Forms and Applications scam to pretend the people are instead non-sovereign persons.
"EVERY CITIZEN IS ONE" OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE

AND "A" MEMBER OF THE SOVEREIGNTY
But in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404, Mr. Chief Justice TENEY, delivering the opinion of the court,
said: 'The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens,' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They
both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign
people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.' [***]
article was primarily intended to confer citizenship on the negro race, [Super emphasis added. ] BOYD v. STATE
OF NEBRASKA, 143 U.S. 135 (1892)(2). [Citing Ref. 256 times 4/30/05. Says 'citizen' not 'citizen of the United
States.' The People of the U. S. already pre-exist. ]
SEE the same quote: 'every citizen is one' of the sovereign people who hold the power, etc. in, DRED SCOTT v.
SANFORD, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)(4); Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892)(2). THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, U.S. v. STANLEY, 109 U.S.
3(2); U.S. v. WONG KIM ARK, 169 U.S. 6g49 (1898)(3); DUKE POWER CO. v. GREENWOOD CTY., 19 F.Supp. 932 (1937)(2); In re
SILKMAN, 84 N.Y.S. 1025, 88 A.D. 102 (1903)(2); PETER HAND CO. et al v. U.S., 2 F.2d 449 (1924)(1). ["It's the Law!" ]
This next circuit court case clearly shows the distinction between We the sovereign white 'People of the United States' and
the stateless, non-sovereign, Federal 'citizens of the United States.' And shows the pre-existing sovereign people hold the power and
are clearly the same, have not changed, and cannot change in Law because no power in the Constitution for our servants to switch us
from sovereigns to non-sovereigns. Our servants only pretend to change us by illegal government deception.
"CROWNED"
IT 'CLEARLY' APPEARS THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARE "THE SAME"
14th Amendment did not change the relationship of government to the sovereign people = the Creators hold the Power.
14th Amendment gave the former slaves 'negroes' a legal status as 'citizens of the United States.'
Before EVANS and PAGE, Circuit Judges (Circuit Court of Appeals 7th Circuit) and FITZHENRY, District judge:
From the time of the adoption of the Constitution it became necessary in many cases to determine whether an
individual in a given case was a citizen of the United States. In U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, there is a
very full examination of the authorities and discussion of the question as to what then constituted citizenship in the
United States. In the Dred Scott Case, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, the Supreme Court said: 'The words, 'people of the
United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body
who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the
government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen
is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.'
That was in 1856, before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1891, after the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 159, the Supreme Court quoted and adopted the above
definition from the Dred Scott Case. Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, said: 'The people, in
a legal sense, must be understood to be those who, by the existing Constitution, are crowned with political rights,
and who, while that instrument remains, will be the sole organs through which the will of the body politic will be
expressed.' [Sovereignty is the right to govern. ]
It clearly appears that the people of the United States are the same since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment as they were at the adoption of the Constitution; that is, they are 'the political body who, according to
our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through
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their representatives.' [Super emphasis added. Also we conduct the servants not vis versa. ] [***]
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted to give former slaves, negroes, a
legal status as citizens of the United States and of the several states in which they resided, and to protect them in
those rights. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 the Supreme Court said: 'The Fourteenth Amendment did not radically
change the whole theory of the relations of the state and federal governments to each other, and of both
governments to the people.' [Super emphasis added. ] PETER HAND CO. et al v. UNITED STATES, 2 F.2d 449
(1924)(1). [Citing Ref. 13 times 4/30/05. It clearly appears the sovereign People of the United States are the same. We
the People pre-exist, and hold the Power as the supreme power, source, and creators of government. ]
The Supreme Court cases may not be disregarded and undeniably prove by much authority that the sovereign people are the
same and did not and cannot change in Law. Much less by government deception. Our supremacy is absolute. Hence, their System of
Federalism is calculated to exclude the People of the United States as sovereigns by pretending to illegally convert the people into
vastly inferior non-sovereign stateless persons via government's illegal Forms and Applications scam.
OUR SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE

Glory, glory hallelujah 'It's the Law!'
In the name of God and Jesus Christ we command you servants to let us alone, or suffer eternal damnation and wrath.
GOD'S WARNING: Proverbs 21:7 The violence of the wicked 'will' destroy them, because they refuse to do justice.
CONCERN OF OUR SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT OF 'EACH' INDIVIDUAL TO BE LET ALONE
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with
promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. [***] In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618. the Court
indicated that those cases that had been given retroactive effect went to 'the fairness of the trial--the very integrity of
the fact-finding process. [***] The Fourth Amendment 'is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth.' The
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment stand 'as a protection of quite different constitutional values--values reflecting
the concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone. To recognize this is no more than to
accord those values undiluted respect.' Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416. SCHNECKLOTH
v. BUSTAMONTE, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)(2). [Do you want our innocent children to be let alone? Or enslaved? ]
TOTAL PERSONAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL.
The right of 'complete' immunity. Free from all restraint or interference.
To 'keep' government (corrupt men) off the backs of the supreme sovereign people.

(N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... . and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment which provides: No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... with the language of the Declaration of Independence: We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. ... [***] In reaching this conclusion, we are
cognizant of the fact that the term 'liberty' is an illusive concept, incapable of definitive, comprehensive explication.
Yet at the core of this concept is the notion of total personal immunity from governmental control: the right 'to be
let alone.' In 1891, the Supreme Court of the United States embraced Judge Cooley's famous definition of 'liberty':
See E. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.U.L.Rev. 216 (1960). No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As
well said by Judge Cooley, 'The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let
alone.' (emphasis in the original). Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). Justice Douglas
amplified this interpretation of 'liberty' in Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1144, (1972):
The word 'liberty' is not defined in the Constitution. But ... it includes at least the fundamental rights 'retained by
the people' ... One's hair style, like one's taste for food, or one's liking for certain kinds of music, art, reading,
recreation, is certainly fundamental in our constitutional scheme-a scheme designed to keep government off the
backs of people. BREESE v. SMITH, 501 P.2d 159 (1972)(1). [Hence, statutes never cite the sovereign people. ]
Do you know what total, and complete mean, or clear and 'unquestionable' authority of Law? The supreme sovereign people
cannot be lawfully compelled by mere human law or law of our creature. Hence, government's illegal Forms and Application scam used
to pretend to convert the sovereign people into stateless 'persons'? The people have unalienable rights endowed by God and by Law
(distinguished from force or fraud) cannot be taken, bartered, or given away by our servants = men.
THE RIGHT OF COMPLETE IMMUNITY

Free from 'all' restraint or interference unless by clear and unquestionable authority of Law.
Our right to be let alone from corrupt government servants engaged in treachery to steal.
Justice GRAY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
We concur with the circuit court in holding that it had no legal right or power to make and enforce such an order.
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to
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the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley: 'The right to one's person may be said to be a right
of complete immunity; to be let alone.' Cooley, Torts 29. UNION PAC. RY. v. BOTSFORD, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)
(2). [See our 'right to be let alone' in: Kentucky v. WASSON, 842 S.W.2d 487 (1993)(2); GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)(2); CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASS. v. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21, (1974)(2) herein; also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928); WASHINGTON v. HARPER, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)(2); etc. ]
STRUGGLE AGAINST GOVERNMENT = CORRUPT MEN CONSPIRING TO USURP JUST POWERS

Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring in the judgment:
The struggle for liberty has been a struggle against Government (corrupt men. ). The essential scheme of our
Constitution and Bill of Rights was to take Government off the backs of people. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING
COM. v. 412 U.S. 94 (1973)(2). [To keep government (corrupt men) off the backs of the People. ]
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) with Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs, dissenting:
The Constitution was designed to keep government off the backs of the people. [***] The Bill of Rights was added to
keep the precincts of belief and expression, of the press, of political and social activities free from surveillance. The
Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents of government and official eavesdroppers away from assemblies of
people. The aim was to allow men to be free and independent and to assert their rights against government.
There can be no influence more paralyzing of that objective than Army surveillance. When an intelligence officer
looks over every noncomformist's shoulder in the library, or walks invisibly by his side in a picket line, or
infiltrates his club, the America once extolled as the voice of liberty heard around the world no longer is cast in the
image which Jefferson and Madison designed, but more in the Russian image, depicted in Appendix III to this
opinion. LAIRD v. TATUM, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)(2). [To 'keep' government (corrupt men) off the backs of the supreme
sovereign people, especially when not injuring nor intending to injure anyone in our pursuit of Happiness. ]
THE GOOD NEWS

Psalm 142:9 Keep me from the snares which they have laid for me, and the gin of the workers of iniquity. 142:10 Let the wicked fall
into their own nets, whilst that I withal escape. - Government has fallen into its own net, caught as the maker of their illegal Forms
and Applications scam. Escape via our right to be let alone by invoking sovereign immunity. We injured no one, leave us alone.
Romans 13:1-14 + I John 3:4-10. Our servants are not obeying We the People the supreme sovereign masters.
THEIR ILLEGAL SUBJECTION SCAM IS UNDENIABLE AND THEIR ULTIMATE DEMISE EXPOSING THEM AS CRIMINALS
The super good news is, government's illegal 'Forms and Application scam' is 'their ultimate demise.' The bonus is these
deceivers are 'self-incriminated.' They are professionals and learned in the Law and therefore knowingly, willingly and intelligently
engaged in massive theft by deception = criminals. Their conduct is unbecoming of American officers and gentlemen. They needlessly
enslave good Americans in the Land of the Free to steal by false witness. Our servants are caught red handed in 'criminal' activity
conspiring to steal our money and freedom by illegal government deception while they swear Oaths to obey the Constitution. And it's
totally undeniable. Why? Because they are the 'maker' of their deceptive forms and applications scam calculated by them to illegally
subject Americans in the Land of the Free to steal using 'government' deception. And that is unnecessary, unjust, dishonest, illegal
lawlessness, and just plain un-American and wrong that equates to 'crime.' This one Nation pledges Liberty and Justice for all (not just
some) yet it has corrupt servants who steal our rights, liberty, property, and happiness by illegal government deception in a more
perfect Union 'under God.' Because they are in concert and engaged in an illegal conspiracy that is so immense, and such monstrous
hypocrisy via government 'deception' instead of the whole Truth according to the plain rules of common honesty, their traitorous
conduct is magnum treason, rebellion, and sedition = crime formidable of anti-Christ only? God Bless our honest servants!
A NATION CANNOT BE PIRATES - VIA FRAUD AND LAWLESSNESS IN A MORE PERFECT UNION UNDER GOD
In private contracts, in subjects of municipal regulation, in matters of meum et tuum, the rule is clear, that fraud
vitiates everything, and the fraud may be collected from circumstances. But is fraud to be presumed in a conflict of
national rights? It is said, that a nation cannot be considered in the light of pirates; 1 Wood. so a nation cannot
commit frauds. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795)(3). [Tax pirates of a government of one Nation under God. ]
NO ONE IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW TO DEFRAUD ANYONE OUT OF ANYTHING = NO LEGAL RIGHT TO DEFRAUD
Justice White (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The Constitution of the United States does not secure to any one the privilege of defrauding the public.'
CROSSMAN v. LURMAN, 192 U.S. 189 (1903)(2). [See the same in: PATAPSCO GUANCO v. BOARD AGRICULTURE
NO.CAR. 171 U.S. 345 (1898)(2). SAVAGE v. JONES, 225 U.S. 501 (1912)(2). Fraud voids everything, and the whole System is
counterfeit = 100% fraud. Counterfeit: money, law, government, and names, are all deceptively similar. Psalms 43:1
Judge me, O God, and plead my cause against an ungodly nation: O deliver me from the deceitful and unjust man. ]
GOVERNMENT TO 'ALWAYS' PROTECT PEOPLE AGAINST FRAUD

See, e.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) (the government's power "to protect people
against fraud" has "always been recognized in this country and is firmly established"); ILLINOIS ex rel
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MADIGAN v. TELEMARKETING ASSOC. INC., 538 U.S. 600 (2003)(3). [Citing Ref. 131 times, 4/30/05.
Defrauding us out of our profound sovereignty by illegal deception is hardly Justice, let alone protecting us by 'securing'
our rights etc. Especially when not injuring anyone. Plus, fraud voids everything into which it enters. ]
THE LAW IS FOR OTHER THAN THE CREATIVE POWER

The supreme sovereign people are the source and creators of government our artificial creature.
Harrington, Justice (Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware): I have said that law is a rule of conduct, prescribed
by legislative power, commanding what is right, or prohibiting what is wrong. This is the exact definition given by
the highest authorities. It is a rule-a certain, positive and known principle of action; a rule prescribed-fixed upon,
defined, ordered and made known; a rule prescribed by legislative power-by that depository of sovereignty, or
branch of government, whose province it is to make law. No other can prescribe a rule of conduct for the citizen, or
announce a will that the citizen is bound to obey. Law is never, in this sense, contingent; it is never subject to the
discretion of those whose conduct it is designed to govern. It is a command; not counsel merely, or advice; it
prohibits, and does not persuade. It extends its iron sway over the unwilling as well as the willing, and never asks
the consent or ratification of any other than the creative power. [***] But when these representatives, by an
imperfect legislative act, assume to subject their constituents to the judgment and will of any other body, however
numerous; expressed in any other form, however imposing; the delegation of such power is unauthorized and
invalid, and the execution of it is not an act of legislation but of usurpation, which the citizen is not obliged, and
the other departments of government are not at liberty, to obey. [***] In the case of the borough of West
Philadelphia, (5 Watts & Serg. 283,) Chief Justice Gibson, delivering the opinion of all the court, said-"Under a
well-balanced constitution, the legislature can no more delegate its proper function, than can the judiciary. It is on
the preservation of the lines which separate the cardinal branches of the government, that the liberties of the citizen
depend; for a consolidated sovereignty, in whatever form, is a despotism, in so far as it subjects the governed, not
to prescribed rules of action, to which he may safely square his conduct before-hand, but to the unsettled will of the
ruling power, which cannot be foreseen; and a government becomes consolidated in proportion as its legislative
branch abandons its own functions, or usurps those which have been vested elsewhere. In the very constitution of
things, the whole people of a State cannot assemble together to exercise their sovereign power in person; and it is
not to be regretted that they cannot, for their rule being untrammelled by any thing but their own will, would be as
arbitrary and fitful in its exercise as any other uncontrolled domination. When they delegate it to an undivided
agency, they slip their hold on it, and in turn become its slaves. RICE v. FOSTER, 4 Delaware 479 (1847)(1). [Other
than We the supreme sovereign creators. ]
DOWLING, Justice (Supreme Court, Onondaga County, New York):

'American citizenship is a status of privilege, power, and honor of inestimable value.' In re CAPOZI, 289 N.Y.S.
869 (1936)(1). [See same In re CARONI 13 F.2d 954 (1926)(1). + All men have unalienable rights. ]
You have seen many court cases ('authority' with reasons = truth) proving why this counterfeit non-sovereign, artificial
creature cannot lawfully rule over its supreme sovereign creators and source of power, superior to all government. I Timothy 1:8 But
we know that the law is good, if a man use it lawfully: 1:9 Knowing this, that the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the
lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners, for unholy and profane, for murders of fathers and murders of mothers, for
manslayers. Isaiah 33: 22 For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king, he will save us.
THE PROOF BEYOND ALL CONTROVERSY

That in Law a 'citizen of the United States' and a never created 'United States citizen'
are 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status, and not one of We the supreme sovereign people.
FED scam: Infiltrate a 100% Federal status in the states. I Cor. 7:23 Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the servants of men.
The sovereign People of the United States vs. The non-sovereign citizens of the United States.
Citizen of The United States of America vs. citizen of the 'United States located in the District of Columbia.'
Citizens in the several states vs. stateless citizen of the United States owe allegiance to the sovereigns.
The People of the states vs. resident of a state = stateless person from D.C., or territories.
Natural born or naturalized white People vs. Negroes & certain persons of color, not a citizen of any 'state'.
Truly 'Sovereigns' of The U.S. of America vs. truly 'Subjects' of the United States (Federal government).
Sovereign Tax Immunity vs. Taxpayers? = stateless non-sovereigns, non-supreme power.
Government of the People vs. citizens of government-a mere 'artificial' person.
None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free. Goethe
INJURYING NO ONE AMERICANS SHOULD BE AS FREE AS POSSIBLE IN THE LAND OF THE FREE IN A MORE PERFECT UNION
KEY: Unlock their confusion between the 'sovereign and subject' (subject = a non-sovereign who owes allegiance to the sovereign).
The following cases prove the supreme sovereign 'People of the United States' are not 'citizens of the United States' a vastly
inferior subject status: a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person who are not a 'citizen of any state' = 'residents' of the state,
United States territories, a.k.a. citizens of a Federal government a.k.a. 'United States located in the District of Columbia,', in practice on
equal footing with mere resident aliens ruled by today's 'System of Federalism'. 14 th Amendment: All persons born or naturalized in
'the United States' 'and subject' to the jurisdiction are citizens of the United States... (those so called citizens of a government (located
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in D. C.) entirely an artificial creature of code invented by government. Free of fraud one of we the supreme sovereign people of the
United States could hardly be a 'stateless' subject in 'The United States of America.' Sovereignty is the right to govern; a 'State' entirely
composed of 100% Federal 'stateless' persons = absurd and unconstitutional. A citizen of a government of the people. Ruled in reverse.
A citizen 'of' the United States = a so called citizen 'of' the Federal 'government' only and stateless
To whose jurisdiction he is 'subject' (not sovereign to the jurisdiction. A citizen of the Government of the sovereign People.)
RIDGE, District Judge (United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division):
A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the Federal Government and at the same time a citizen of the State in
which he resides. Determination of what is qualified residence within a State is not here necessary. Suffice it to say
that one possessing such double citizenship owes allegiance and is entitled to protection from each sovereign to
whose jurisdiction he is subject. KITCHENS v. STEELE, 112 F.Supp. 383 (1953)(1). [So called citizen 'of the
Federal government' only = zero political connection of the state = citizen of D.C., territories, possessions = stateless.]
A profound Supreme Court interpretation of the Truth that may not be disregarded.
ALLEGIANCE IN THIS COUNTRY IS NOT DUE TO CONGRESS, BUT TO THE PEOPLE!
(A)llegiance imports an obligation on the citizen or subject, the correlative right to which resides in the sovereign
power: allegiance in this country is not due to Congress, but to the people, with whom the sovereign power is
found; [Super emphasis added. ] it is, therefore by the people only that any alteration can be made of the existing
institutions with respect to allegiance.' Id., at 1045. AFROYIM v. RUSK Secretary of State, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)(2).
[Allegiance to the sovereign not to an artificial creature of the people. I love the flag. Allegiance to cloth? ]
14TH AMENDMENT PRIMARILY INTENDED TO CONFER CITIZENSHIP ON THE NEGRO RACE

article was primarily intended to confer citizenship on the negro race. [Super emphasis added. ] BOYD v. STATE
OF NEBRASKA, 143 U.S. 135 (1892)(2). [Citing References 256 times 4/30/05. The supreme sovereign people who
'hold' the power pre-exist as the source and creators; and they are not citizens of the United States. ]
SUBJECT TO: "Liable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed or affected by; provided that;
provided; answerable for." American Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 251 Mass. 329; Hannibal Trust Co. v. Elzea, 315
Mo. 485; Allen v. Simmons, 9 W.Va. 318; Middleton v. Findla, 25 Cal. 76; Manning v. Sams, 143 Ga. 205,
Homan v. Employers Reinsurance, 345 Mo. 650 (Black's Law 4th Ed. p.1594.) [Hardly the supreme sovereigns.]
COLORED persons are citizens of the United States

Justice DAY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The statute of 1866, originally passed under sanction of the Thirteenth Amendment, 14 Stat. 27, and practically re-
enacted after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 Stat. 144, expressly provided that all citizens of the
United States in any state shall have the same right to purchase property as is enjoyed by white citizens. Colored
persons are citizens of the United States and have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use the same
without laws discriminating against them solely on account of color. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 508. BUCHNAN
v. WARLEY, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)(2). [Pre 14th Amendment "the Government of the U.S." had no Citizens of its own.
The 14th Amendment only authorized jurisdiction to protect the newly created citizens of the federal Government! ]
EVERY 'citizen of the United States' owes "ALLEGIANCE" to two SOVEREIGNS

'Allegiance' and 'subject' are the key words that apply to non-sovereigns or non supreme power persons.
Hence, the 14th Amendment's carefully articulated words 'and subject to' the jurisdiction... To deceive the ignorant.
Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The Court rejected this argument, saying: 'Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory.
He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws
of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both. ABATE v. UNITED STATES of
America 359 U.S. 187 (1959)(2). [They are supposed to be free. Sovereignty is vested 'only' in We the People. ]
See every 'citizen of the United States' owes 'allegiance' in: MOORE v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS , 55
U.S. 13 (1852)(2); COLEMAN v. TENNESSEE, 97 U.S. 509 (1878)(1); EX PARTE SIEBOLD, 100 U.S. 371 (1879)(1);
GRAFTON v. U.S., 206 U.S. 333 (1907)(2); BARTKUS v. PEOPLE OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS , 359 U.S. 121 (1959)
(2); HEATH v. ALABAMA, (1985) below. They owe allegiance to We the People of the United States.
It is clear the supreme sovereign 'People of the United States' hold the Power and are not 'citizens of the United States' who owe
'allegiance' to the People (the supreme power) and subject to the jurisdiction of the sovereign's laws and government. Subject to the
jurisdiction of Code of an artificial creature composed of non-sovereign stateless persons? No sovereign right to govern.
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Allegiance is due to We the People not government an artificial creature of the People.
EVERY CITIZEN OF THE U.S. OWES ALLEGIANCE TO 2 'DEPARTMENTS' = GOVERNMENTS
The satanic price we pay after being illegally deceived into subjection in their System of Federalism outside the Constitution.
Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting:
Past cases have recognized that the special ordeal suffered by a defendant prosecuted by both federal and state
authorities is the price of living in a federal system, the cost of dual citizenship. Every citizen, the Court has noted,
"owes allegiance to the two departments, so to speak, and within their respective spheres must pay the penalties
which each exacts for disobedience to its laws. In return, he can demand protection from each within its own
jurisdiction." United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 551, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1876) . See Moore v. Illinois, supra, at
20 ("Every citizen … may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an
infraction of the laws of either"). HEATH v. ALABAMA, 474 U.S. 82 (1985)(3). [Notice the deception: They
inserted: "…" intending to leave out, "of the United States" after citizen. They know what they do Lord. ]
Besides the names being undeniably different, you can prove the difference between a 'sovereign' and a ' subject' by proving
which one owes 'allegiance' to who. The inferior subject owes allegiance to the sovereign as the (superior) supreme power. Sovereigns
are never subjects, subjects are never sovereigns. The following cases plus the ones above prove a 'citizen of the United States' is a
100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person, mere residents of the state; and are of the District of Columbia, territories, and
possessions and 'subject to the jurisdiction,' who are not one of We the supreme sovereign 'people.' See the stealthy wording in the
14th Amendment, a person must be 'and subject' to the jurisdiction. A sovereign is sovereign to the jurisdiction, not subject the
jurisdiction, much less to 'its' artificial creature and its laws, deriving all of its (limited just) power from the its supreme creators.
'Sovereign' vs. 'subject' = the supreme power vs. the governed. We the 'People" vs. 'citizens of the United States.' Remember the key: a
subject (non-sovereign) owes allegiance (obedience) to its sovereign = the supreme power.
2002: A SUBJECT' OWES ALLEGIANCE TO A SOVEREIGN

SOUTER, J. (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court:
Although the word ''citizen'' may imply (and in 1789 and 1875 may have implied) the enjoyment of certain basic
rights and privileges, see Black's Law Dict. 237 (7 th ed.1999) (defining ''citizen'' as ''entitled to enjoy all its civil
rights and protections'' of a community), a "subject" is merely "[o]ne who owes allegiance to a sovereign and is
governed by that sovereign's laws," id., at 1438. JPMORGAN BANK v. TRAFFIC STREAM, 536 U.S. 88 (2002)(3).
A SUBJECT MUST HAVE A MASTER AND THAT MASTER MUST BE A TYRANT

The term 'subject' was also disgraceful. A subject must have a master; that master must be a
tyrant and 'of course' the appellation was only fit for 'slaves.' [If you are a subject you are not free.]
Present, Cushing, Paterson, Washington, and Johnson, Justices. Chief Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Ct. of the U.S.):
It is true that Blackstone speaks of that allegiance which is coeval with birth; distinguishing it from local allegiance,
arising from temporary residence. [***]
February 18. Stockton on the same side. [***] No; the patriots of that day had a more sublime object. Their
great object was independence. By these acts they meant to legitimate the revolution by the supreme power of the
people. They proclaim their new and republican government. They declare whom they consider as the members
composing this new community. [***]
The terms allegiance and subject were thought to contain sounds discordant to the ears of a freeman:
Obedience and citizenship were to be substituted. Allegiance was feudal-- it denoted only the submission of a slave
to his master. It was monarchical-- unworthy a republican, who ought not to owe allegiance even to the people
themselves-- In short, it could not exist in a free country. The term subject was also disgraceful: A subject must
have a master; that master must be a tyrant, and of course the appellation was only fit for slaves. M'ILVAINE v.
COXE'S LESSEE, 6 U.S. 280 (1805)(1). [A citizen of the U.S. is suppose to be free with unalienable rights not a slave of
corrupt government = men. Usurpation is always by deception. Servants return to the Constitution and leave us alone.]
ALLEGIANCE IS A REPULSIVE BADGE OF INFERIORITY - ALLEGIANCE IS SERVITUDE

The point has been since argued and decided, in the case of Wilcart et al v. Dauchy, post. ***
Yet, it is to be remembered, that whether in its real origin, or in its artificial state, allegiance, as well as
fealty, rests upon lands, and it is due to persons. Not so, with respect to Citizenship, which has arisen from the
dissolution of the feudal system; and is a substitute for allegiance, corresponding with the new order of things.
Allegiance and citizenship, differ, indeed, in almost every characteristic. Citizenship is the effect of compact;
allegiance is the offspring of power and necessity. Citizenship is a political tie; allegiance is a territorial tenure.
Citizenship is the charter of equality; allegiance is a badge of inferiority. Citizenship is constitutional; allegiance is
personal. Citizenship is freedom; allegiance is servitude. Citizenship is communicable; allegiance is repulsive.
Citizenship may be relinquished; allegiance is perpetual. With such essential differences, the doctrine of allegiance
is inapplicable to a system of citizenship; which it can neither serve to controul, nor to elucidate. And yet, even
among the nations, in which the law of allegiance is the most firmly established, the most pertinaciously enforced,
there are striking deviations that demonstrate the invincible power of truth, and the homage, which, under every
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modification of government, must be paid to the inherent rights of man. [***] The doctrine is, that allegiance
cannot be due to two sovereigns; [Bible: a servant cannot have two masters. ] and taking an oath of allegiance to a
new, is the strongest evidence of withdrawing allegiance from a previous, sovereign. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133
(1795)(3). [Pre civil war no citizen of federal government. A sovereign owes allegiance to God alone. ]
"UNIMAGINABLE TERROR"
OLIPHANT, J. (Supreme Court of New Jersey ) dissenting:
Allegiance in its application to the subject of a sovereign goes back to early English history. Lord Coke says (1
Coke on Littleton, 129 a): 'Allegiance or ligeance is that lawful obedience which a subject is bound to render to his
sovereign.' Blackstone [***]. Allegiance involves the obligation to obey and the duty to protect. It is a duty to obey
the command of a sovereign and involves the duty to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. In this form,
the duty is most suitable for a republic. Indeed it is actually more comprehensive than the other oaths of allegiance
of which I have spoken. A breach of it may constitute treason; but in many ways the oath may be violated by acts
inferior to treason. The oath usually required in this country, then, embraces all the oath of allegiance can embrace
and much more.
Our duty is obedience to the government of the people, and if I believed there was any other duty, it would
carry with it unimaginable terror, for the reason we could not know our duty or who has the right to command it.
The great Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero has admirably described the great fear that seizes a government which
knows itself to be contested and illegitimate. 'Power is condemned to live in terror,' wrote Ferrero, 'because in
order to govern, it uses violence and terror. Its subjects fear the arbitrary power which they must obey, while that
power itself fears the subjects whom it commands. Cain fears Abel; that is why he ends by slaying him. Here is the
explanation of the Holy Fear of dictatorship; it is merely the fear inherent in power, fear of the revolt of its
subjects, a fear which from the very outset seizes upon all powers that are founded on force.' [***]
A government, once founded, is the people, as organized for the attainment of the ends of government.
Neither a part of the people, in their individual capacity, nor acting as a dissociated, non-organized mass, are
legally competent to change their political structure. If that is to be done at all, consistently with the integrity of the
government, or with the safety or happiness of the citizens, it must be done through the people themselves, as
organized for the purposes of government. In a word, it is a right of the governed to know where to look for lawful
successors to the institutions and magistrates under which they now live--a thing impossible except when the
succession takes place according to law [amendment according to the Constitution distinguished from fraud. ].
Revolution, as I understand the term, is a political act or acts done in violation of law, or without law. The
act is a political one and is not to be confused with the ordinary misdemeanors or felonies. Such an act, to be
revolutionary, accordingly, must be done either, first, in violation of law; that is, of the Constitution, or of the
customary or statute law, including in the term law, the letter, together with its necessary implications; or, secondly,
without law; by which is meant, that the act must rest, for its warrant, on abstract considerations, such as physical
power, necessity, or natural equity, and not upon the authority of the existing social order, to which it is extrinsic or
hostile. It is the hostility to the established law both constitutional and statutory that marks an act or purpose
revolutionary. If it results successfully, it lays the foundation for a new order of things or government. If it fails,
he who did it is subject to the penalties under the established system. From time to time we read of an overthrow
overnight or in a few minutes of a government by mere physical seizure, a superiority of might applied at a crucial
time and place. That is an illustration of a change in government by unconstitutional methods.
I have spoken of revolution in rather abstract terms, but a revolution today is unlike a revolution in the
sense of which I have spoken. It is much easier in our day to start a revolution than to end one. It is much easier
to succumb by surprise to a dictatorship than to get rid of it. When a revolutionary or dictatorial regime, which
can be assumed to be familiar with the technique of a Coup d'etat, makes every effort to maintain itself in power
and to defend itself by all the modern arms of which the State today disposes, it would be astounding if a revolt or a
counter-revolution were ever to break out. In this way, the revolution escapes from the people, and is no longer
subject to the influence of the masses, of the nation. It becomes identified with authority, by which it is absorbed.
Authority then becomes an end in itself. To remain in power against all and everything, to make of power the
supreme, exclusive and permanent attribute of the party and its leaders, to sacrifice for this object all ideas and all
men who become troublesome or superfluous, is the end to which a totalitarian regime naturally and inevitably
tends today. The struggle against a subject or a citizen in such a regime loses its revolutionary character; it soon
ceases to be a question of doing violence to an individual with the object of correcting and improving him. The
problem becomes one of keeping him in subjection just because he is a man, because his natural human reactions,
unless they are crushed beforehand, might lead him to contest the legitimacy of the dictatorial power as seized. It
is this total rupture of the rights of a subject or citizen as a man or person that seems to be the distinctive trait of a
revolution by force or violence where it is experienced today. [Deprivation of rights, Liberty, and property. ]
Therefore, I am of the firm opinion that true allegiance to our established system of government negates
the right of any citizen or person to attempt to alter or abolish the form of our government by the use of force or
violence or other unconstitutional or unlawful means; and I understand the word 'unlawful' to mean any violation
of constitutional limitations and as synonymous with 'unconstitutional.'
87
Our allegiance is to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State, and it is a duty
which by those instruments is demanded and is commanded to be discharged, and obedience must follow on each
and every day from every one who lives under the government thus set up. [Allegiance to Constitution of the people.]
I regard an oath of allegiance as an oath that the affiant will bear true faith and allegiance to the
constitution established under the authority of the people, that he will defend against all enemies, foreign and
domestic, that he does not believe in the use of force and violence by himself or others for the overthrow of the
established government, that he is not a party, either directly or through others, to such a destructive effort, and that
he owes no allegiance to a foreign sovereignty or an enemy of our own sovereignty.
I do not understand how a democratic government may endure if its citizens [all government officials. Mine]
are not in such position of mind and circumstance as to be able truthfully to subscribe to such an oath if required,
and I do not understand why a good citizen should, if required, hesitate to subscribe to such an oath.
The views expressed above defining the sovereignty to which the allegiance of a citizen of this State is
due is in accord with the decisions in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 Dall. 54;
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 87; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316;
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113; see also Kersting
v. Hardgrove, 24 N.J.Misc. 243 (Circuit Court 1946). IMBRIE v. MARSH, 3 N.J. 578 (1950)(2). [How true: Are the
officials of this counterfeit government unimaginable terrorists? Primary allegiance is owed to We the People. ]
ALLEGIANCE IS 'NOTHING MORE' THAN OBEDIENCE OF A "SUBJECT" TO THE SOVEREIGN

Mr. Justice Story stated the reasons upon this point more at large, referring to Calvin’s Case, Blackstone’s
Commentaries, and Doe v. Jones, above cited, and saying: ‘Allegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of
obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is; and allegiance by birth is that which arises
from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign. Two things usually concur
to create citizenship: First, birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign; and, secondly, birth within the
protection and obedience, or, in other words, within the ligeance, of the sovereign. That is, the party must be born
within a place where the sovereign is at the time in full possession and exercise of his power, and the party must
also at his birth derive protection from, and consequently owe obedience or allegiance to, the sovereign, as such, de
facto. UNITED STATES v. WONG KIM ARK, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)(3) . [Hence: "and subject to the jurisdiction." ]
We the supreme sovereign People of the United States do not owe allegiance to our artificial creature or servants. A citizen
of the United States owes allegiance to the sovereign people, not to government the artificial creature, nor owes allegiance to the 'flag
of the United States of America' (de facto) . The name of the true flag is the 'flag of the United States.' See 1 Statute 415. The 14 th
Amendment was to protect Negroes not enslave them. The Law is always supposed to be to 'the Letter of the Law.'
'citizens
of the United States' = gypsies, the entire race designated as blacks, persons of color, NEGROES,
mulattoes, and persons of African blood (non-sovereign 'colored' citizens and subject to the jurisdiction).
HARLAN, J. (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
The entire debate shows, with singular clearness, indeed, with absolute certainty, that no senator who participated in
it, whether in favor of or in opposition to the measure, doubted that the bill as passed admitted, and was intended to
admit, to national citizenship Indians who abandoned their tribal relations and became residents of one of the states
or territories, within the full jurisdiction of the United States. It was so interpreted by President Johnson, who, in his
veto message, said: 'By the first section of the bill all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States. This provision
comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific states, Indians subject to taxation, the people called gypsies, as well as the
entire race designated as blacks, persons of color, negroes, mulattoes, and persons of African blood. Every
individual of those races, born in the United States, is, by the bill, made a citizen of the United States.' ELK v.
WILKINS, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)(2). [Cited 353 times as of 6/8/2004. Congress conspiring to usurp to create citizens of
the federal Government when it is only empowed by Law to make a uniform rule of 'naturalization' for the states. ]
14TH AMENDMENT 'CREATES' AND DEFINES CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES

Fraud: No 100% complete definition in the affirmative and negative by clear and unquestionable authority of law.
HUNT, CIRCUIT JUSTICE (Circuit Court, N.D. New York):

The fourteenth amendment creates and defines citizenship of the United States. It had long been contended, and
had been held by many learned authorities, and had never been judicially decided to the contrary, that there was no
such thing as a citizen of the United States, except as that condition arose from citizenship of some state. No mode
existed, it was said, of obtaining a citizenship of the United States, except by first becoming a citizen of some state.
This question is now at rest. The fourteenth amendment defines and declares who shall be citizens of the United
States, to wit, 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The latter
qualification was intended to exclude the children of foreign representatives and the like. With this qualification,
every person born in the United States or naturalized is declared to be a citizen of the United States and of the state
88
wherein he resides.
After creating and defining citizenship of the United States, the fourteenth amendment provides, that 'no state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.'
This clause is intended to be a protection, not to all our rights, but to our rights as citizens of the United States only;
that is, to rights existing or belonging to that condition or capacity. The expression, citizen of a state, used in the
previous paragraph, is carefully omitted here. In article 4, ß 2, subd. 1, of the constitution of the United States, it
had been already provided, that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
[C]itizens in the several states.' The rights of citizens of the states and of citizens of the United States are each
guarded by these different provisions. That these rights are separate and distinct, was held in the Slaughterhouse
Cases, 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 36, [See that case below! ] recently decided by the supreme court. The rights of citizens of
the state, as such, are not under consideration in the fourteenth amendment. They stand as they did before the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and are fully guaranteed by other provisions. The rights of citizens of the
states have been the subject of judicial decision on more than one occasion. Corfield v. Coryell [Case No. 3,230];
Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. [79 U. S.] 418, 430; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. [75 U. S.] 168. UNITED STATES v.
SUSAN B. ANTHONY, 24 F.Cas. 829 (1873)(1). [Pre-14th Amendment, no such thing as a citizen of the Federal
government. Pre civil war a 'citizen of the United States' was slang for a Citizen of 'one' of the States. ]
14th Amendment CREATES citizens of the United States + To protect them

The supreme sovereign People of the United States, are the creators who hold the power and already pre-exist.

The first clause of the fourteenth amendment changes this whole subject, and removes it from the region of
discussion and doubt. It recognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United States, and it makes
their citizenship dependent upon the place of their birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution
or laws of any State or the condition of their ancestry. A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States
residing in that State. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a
free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any
State. The exercise of these rights and privileges, and the degree of enjoyment received from such exercise, are
always more or less affected by the condition and the local institutions of the State, or city, or town where he
resides. They are thus affected in a State by the wisdom of its laws, the ability of its officers, the officiency of its
magistrates, the education and morals of its people, and by many other considerations. This is a result which follows
from the constitution of society, and can never be avoided, but in no other way can they be affected by the action of
the State, or by the residence of the citizen therein. They do not derive their existence from its legislation, and
cannot be destroyed by its power. [***]
The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United States always controlled any State legislation
of that character. But if the amendment refers to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the
inhibition has a profound significance and consequence. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)(2).
UNDENIABLE PURPOSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO MAKE CITIZENSHIP OF NEGROES

It is true that the chief interest of the people in giving permanence and security to citizenship in the Fourteenth
Amendment was the desire to protect Negroes. [Emphasis added. ] The Dred Scott decision, Dred Scott v. Sandford,
19 How. 393, had shortly before greatly disturbed many people about the status of Negro citizenship. But the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, had already attempted to confer citizenship on all persons born or naturalized in the
United States. Nevertheless, when the Fourteenth Amendment passed the House without containing any definition
of citizenship, the sponsors of the Amendment in the Senate insisted on inserting a constitutional definition and
grant of citizenship. They expressed fears that the citizenship so recently conferred on Negroes by the Civil Rights
Act could be just as easily take away from them by subsequent Congresses, and it was to provide an insuperable
obstacle against every governmental effort to strip Negroes of their newly acquired citizenship that the first clause
was added to the Fourteenth Amendment. (fn 16) Senator Howard, who sponsored the Amendment in the Senate,
thus explained the purpose of the clause:
(fn16). Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768--2769, 2869, 2890 et seq. (1866). See generally, Flack, Adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment 88--94 (1908).
'It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens
of the United States. *** We desired to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens *** under the civil
rights bill beyond the legislative power ***.' Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2890, 2896 (1866). [Our creature
was not empowered by the people to take away even a subject's 14th Amendment citizenship. ]
This undeniable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to make citizenship of Negroes permanent and
secure would be frustrated by holding that the Government can rob a citizen of his citizenship without his consent by
simply proceeding to act under an implied general power to regulate foreign affairs or some other power generally
granted. Though the framers of the Amendment were not particularly concerned with the problem of expatriation, it
89
seems undeniable from the language they used that they wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any
governmental unit to destroy. AFROYIM v. RUSK Secretary of State, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)(2). [The temporary
servants have no power under the Constitution to steal, take, rob, deceive even a citizen of the United States out of their
birthright (status), much less our supreme sovereign 'birthright' (status) let alone without due Process of Law. ]
CONGRESS CHANGES: CONSTITUTIONS + VOTER QUALIFICATIONS + MILITARY GOVERNMENT ETC.

1. The powers and duties of the military commanders in the districts constituted by the act of March 2, 1867, 'to
provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,' considered and determined.
2. The jurisdiction of military commissions under that act defined. [***]
The 5th section declares the qualification of voters in all elections, as well to frame the new constitution for each
State, as in the elections to be held under the provisional government, until the new State constitution is ratified by
Congress, and also fixes the qualifications of the delegates to frame the new constitution. [***]
Congress was not satisfied with the organic law or constitution under which this civil government was
established. That constitution was to be changed in only one particular to make it acceptable to Congress, and that
was in the matter of the elective franchise. The purpose, the sole object of this act, is to effect that change, and to
effect it by the agency of the people of the State, or such of them as are made voters by means of elections provided
for in the act, and in the meantime to preserve order and to punish offenders, if found necessary, by military
commissions. [Subjection scam: Voter registration qualifications: non-sovereign citizens of the United States. ] [***]
Here is a general clause, making it the duty of the military commander to give protection to all persons in
their rights of person and property. [***]
It is a power to preserve, not to abrogate; to sustain the existing frame of social order and civil rule, and
not a power to introduce military rule in its place; in effect, it is police power; and the protection here intended is
protection of persons and property against violence, unlawful force, and criminal infraction. [***]
A strange spectacle, where the judge and the criminal may very well 'change places;' for if the criminal
has unlawfully taken life, so too does the judge. This is the inevitable result, for the only tribunal, the only judges, if
they can be called judges, which a military commander can constitute and appoint under this act, to inflict the death
penalty, is a military court composed of a board, and called in the act a 'military commission.' [***]
One can plainly see what will be the inevitable confusion and disorder which such disturbances of the
whole civil policy of the State must produce. If these military edicts are allowed to remain, even during the brief
time in which this provisional military government may be in power, the seeds will be sown for such a future
harvest of litigation as has never been inflicted upon any other people. [***]
In giving construction to this power, we must not forget the recent and authoritative exposition given by
the Supreme Court of the United States as to the power of Congress to provide for military tribunals for the trial of
citizens in time of peace, and to the emphatic declaration, as to which there was no dissent or difference of
opinion among the judges, that such a power is not warranted by the constitution. [***]
Who are entitled to registration? [An illegal scheme to pretend the People are not the sovereign people. ]
3. As to citizenship and residence. The applicant for registration must be a citizen of the State and of the United
States, and must be a resident of a county included in the election district. HENRY STANBERY. 12 U.S. Opinion
Attorney General 182 (1867). [Conspiracy to infiltrate the 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status. ]
Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice BLACK concurred: As has been said, prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there had been no constitutional definition of citizenship of the United
States, or of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured thereby or springing therefrom. The phrase 'privileges
and immunities' was used in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, U.S.C.A., which decrees that 'The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.' HAGUE v.
COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRIAL ORG. 307 U.S. 496 (1939)(2). [Sovereign Citizens in the several states. ]
'NEW STRUCTURE OF LAW' THAT EMERGED IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR ERA

Basic 'alteration' in our federal system in the Reconstruction era.
THE 14TH AMENDMENT'S (DECEPTIVE WORDS) WAS ITS CENTERPIECE
Section 1983 was originally s 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 17 Stat. 13. It was 'modeled' on s 2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, and was enacted for the express purpose of 'enforc(ing) the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 17 Stat. 13. The predecessor of s 1983 was thus an important part of the basic alteration
in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and constitutional amendment.
As a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era--and especially of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was its centerpiece-the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights
against state power was clearly established. MITCHUM v. FOSTER, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)(2). [New structure of law
= the artificial creature legislates over those 'natural' persons to 'protect' their rights, privileges (Liberty) etc. ]
UNIVERSAL FREEDOM FOR ALL
90
Mr. Justice Hughes (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The language of the 13th Amendment was not new. It reproduced the historic words of the ordinance of 1787 for the
government of the Northwest territory, and gave them unrestricted application within the United States and all
places subject to their jurisdiction. While the immediate concern was with African slavery, the Amendment was not
limited to that. It was a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color, or estate, under
the flag. The words involuntary servitude have a 'larger meaning than slavery.' [***] As was said in the Civil Rights
Cases: 'By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom. [***] What the
state may not do directly it may not do indirectly. BAILEY v. ALABAMA, 219 U.S. 219 (1911)(2).
New Structure of law: 13th Amend: …the United States, or any place subject to 'their' jurisdiction. 14 th Amend: .., the United
States and subject to 'the' jurisdiction. Plus the 14th Amendment and post Amendments authorize, 'The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of those articles.' Which allows the 'artificial' creature to legislate the provisions of
those amendments over 'natural' persons-citizens of the United States to protect them. They knew the deceptive name citizen of the
United States would eventually sucker the ignorant sovereign the People of the United States into believing that status is the same
thing and they are subject to the jurisdiction of their creature as Federal taxpayers. Inspect the Statute books at the Law Library: Pre
Civil War: There are the 'Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America' 'under the authority of Congress', containing 'the
Laws of the United States. ' Post Civil War they change to the 'Revised' Statutes of THE UNITED STATES, and are not and do not say they
are under the authority of the Congress, and today 'UNITED STATES CODE' by a non-sovereign stateless U.S. Congress. Domestic private
corporations (other than governments) were not contemplated by the Constitution yet today they are fraudulently cited by statute as a
never created United States citizen of the never created or pretended 'United States' located in D.C.
CONFINES NATURALIZATION TO 'FREE WHITE PERSONS'

Chancellor Kent settles this question beyond cavil: "The act of Congress confines the description of aliens capable
of naturalization to 'free white persons.' I presume that this excludes the inhabitants of Africa and their descendants;
and it may become a question, to what extent persons of mixed blood, as mulattoes, are excluded, and what shades
or degrees of mixture of colour disqualify an alien from application for the benefits of the act of naturalization.
Perhaps there might be difficulties as to the copper-coloured natives of America, or the yellow or tawny race of
Asiatics, though I should doubt whether any of those were 'white persons,' within the purview of the law." 2 Kent's
Com. 72. 2nd ed. Crandall v. The State of Connecticut, 10 Conn. 339 (Supreme Court or Errors)(1834) (1). [Find
those naturalization acts by back tracking today's Code to its 'source' of the Law. ]
FREE WHITE PERSONS ONLY

Mr. Justice GRAY (Supreme Court of the U.S.) delivered the opinion of the court.
For many years after the establishment of the original constitution, and until two years after the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, congress never authorized the naturalization of any one but 'free white persons.' Acts March
26, 1790, c. 3, and Jan. 29, 1795, c. 20 (1 Stat. 103, 414); April 14, 1802, c. 28, and March 26, 1804, c. 47 (2 Stat.
153, 292); March 22, 1816, c. 32 (3 Stat. 258); May 26, 1824, c. 186, and May 24, 1828, c. 116 (4 Stat. 69, 310).
UNITED STATES v. WONG KIM ARK, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)(3). [Emphasis added. ]
The Government observes that statutes enacted by the first Congresses required state courts to record applications
for citizenship, Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, to transmit abstracts of citizenship applications and
other naturalization records to the Secretary of State, Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 567, and to register
aliens seeking naturalization and issue certificates of registry, Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 154-155. It
may well be, however, that these requirements applied only in States that authorized their courts to conduct
naturalization proceedings. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103; Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S.
509, 516-517 (1910) (explaining that the Act of March 26, 1790, "conferred authority upon state courts to admit
aliens to citizenship" and refraining from addressing the question "whether the States can be required to enforce
such naturalization laws against their consent"); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519-520 (1883) (stating that
these obligations were imposed "with the consent of the States" and "could not be enforced against the consent of
the States"). UNITED STATES v. MACK, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)(2).
14TH AMENDMENT GAVE FORMER SLAVES, NEGROES A STATUS AS CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES
Before EVANS and PAGE, Circuit Judges PAGE, Circuit Judge (Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit):
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted to give former slaves, negroes, a legal status
as citizens of the United States and of the several states in which they resided, and to protect them in those rights. In
re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448, the Supreme Court said: 'The Fourteenth Amendment did not radically change the
whole theory of the relations of the state and federal governments to each other, and of both governments to the
people.' PETER HAND CO. et al v. UNITED STATES, 2 F.2d 449 (1924)(1). [Citing Reference 13 times 4/30/05.]
THE KEY DISTINCTION IS FOUND BETWEEN WHO IS 'SOVEREIGN' AND WHO IS 'SUBJECT'
'subject of the king' is now 'a citizen of the State' (State = the sovereign people composing an artificial body).
91
Justice GRAY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court: The sovereignty has been
transferred from one man to the collective body of the people - and he who before was a "subject of the king" is now
"a citizen of the State." U.S. v. WONG KIM, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)(3). [Same in U.S. v. RHODES, 27 F.Cas. 785 (1). ]
Not a citizen of any state = stateless = so called citizens of D.C. and territories under the control of Congress
LEARNED HAND, District Judge (District Court, S.D. New York):
One may be a citizen of the United States, and yet not be a citizen of any state. The Slaughter House Cases, 16
Wall. 36, 74 [83 U.S. 36 (1872)]. HOUGH v. SOCIETE ELECTIQUE, 231 F. 341 (1916)(1).
PRIMARY AND HIGHEST 'ALLEGIANCE' TO THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT NOT TO HIS STATE
VAN VALKENBURGH, District Judge (District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division):
It is apparent that state citizenship, under our system and as used in the Constitution and Judiciary Act, is essentially
different from national citizenship. The latter is defined to be the relation of allegiance and protection between
individuals and their country. It is the antithesis of alienage, and involves a national right or condition. As was said
in Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf.Ch.(N.Y.) 583: … 'It pertains to the confederated sovereignty-- the United States-- and
not to the individual states.'
A citizen of the United States owes his primary and highest allegiance to the general government, and not
to his particular state. On the other hand, state citizenship is the practical equivalent of domicile.
'That place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, not for a mere
special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home.' 14 Cyc. 833.
HAMMERSTEIN v. LYNE, 200 F. 165 (1912)(1). [Subjects owe 'allegiance' to the sovereign (people). Today, the status
'citizen of the United States status' has infiltrated all state Constitutions and Federalized the one Nation under fraud. ]
NOT A CITIZEN OF 'ANY' PARTICULAR STATE

NELSON, Circuit Justice (Circuit Court, N.D. New York):
A person may be a citizen of the United States, and not a citizen of any particular state. This is the condition of
citizens residing in the District of Columbia, and in the territories of the United States, or who have taken up a
residence abroad, and others that might be mentioned. A fixed and permanent residence or domicil in a state is
essential to the character of citizenship [of a State. ] that will bring the case within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, as will appear from the cases already referred to. PRENTISS v. BRENNAN, 19 F.Cas. 1278 (1851)(1). [Not
a citizen of any state = stateless = U.S. citizen and mere resident of wherever: District of Columbia, a territory, or
possession = 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status. A citizen of a territory = foreigner. ]
'stateless'
COLE, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit):
After reviewing the evidence presented by both parties, the district court found that "Smith, although a United
States citizen, is not domiciled in any state. He is 'stateless' for purposes of [28 U.S.C.] ß 1332(a)(1)." NATIONAL
ENTERPRISES v. SMITH, 114 F.3d 561 (1997)(3). [System of Federalism = stateless subjection scam.]
NOT A CITIZEN OF ANY STATE = STATELESS PERSON STATUS
BLATCHFORD, District Judge (Circuit Court, S.D. New York, 25 Int. Rev. Rec. 138):
In Picquet v. Swan [Id. 11,134], in 1828, Judge Story says: 'A citizen of one of our territories is a citizen of the
United States, but he is not by law entitled to sue or be sued in the circuit courts of the United States.' In Prentiss v.
Brennan, ut supra, Mr. Justice Nelson says: 'A person may be a citizen of the United States and not a citizen of any
particular state. This is the condition of citizens residing in the District of Columbia, and in the territories of the
United States, or who have taken up a residence abroad, that might be mentioned. A fixed and permanent residence
or domicil in a state is essential to the character of citizenship that will bring the case within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.' This view was again asserted by the supreme court in 1867, in Barney v. Baltimore City, 6 Wall.
[73 U. S.] 280, 287, in reference to a citizen of the District of Columbia. CISSEL v. McDONALD, 5 F.Cas. 717
(1879)(1). [A 100% Federal non-sovereign 'stateless' citizen of D.C., territories, and possessions under congress. ]
THE SUPER EVIL DRASTIC CONSEQUENCES OF STATELESSNESS
With special reference to the United States – (Where officials play god by illegal fraud.)
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. A. BASIC PRINCIPLES.
An expatriate who, like Cort, had no other nationality becomes a stateless person—a person who not only has no
rights as an American citizen, but no membership in any national entity whatsoever. ‘Such individuals as do not
possess any nationality enjoy, in general, no protection whatever, and if they are aggrieved by a State they have no
means of redress, since there is no State which is competent to take up their case. As far as the Law of Nations is
concerned, there is, apart from restraints of morality or obligations expressly laid down by treaty *** no restriction
whatever to cause a State to abstain from maltreating to any extent such stateless individuals.’ 1 Oppenheim,
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International Law (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955), s 291, at 640. The calamity is ‘(n)ot the loss of specific rights, then,
but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever ***.’ Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism (1951), 294. The stateless person may end up shunted from nation to nation, there being no one
obligated or willing to receive him, (fn 15) or, as in Cort’s case, may receive the dubious sanctuary of a Communist
regime lacking the essential liberties precious to American citizenship. [***]
(fn15). See Seckler-Hudson, Statelessness: With Special Reference to the United States (1934), 244-253; Preuss,
International Law and Deprivation of Nationality, 23 Geo.L.J. 250 (1934); [***] See also Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 [United States is located in D. C., a city of a Nation not of any state. ]
The drastic consequences of statelessness have led to reaffirmation in the United Nations [NWO. ] Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15, of the right of every individual to retain a nationality [opposed to a
state. ]. The evils of statelessness were recognized in the Report of the President’s Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization (1953), 241, and the treatise writers have unanimously disapproved of statutes which denationalize
individuals without regard to whether they have dual nationality. Robert F. KENNEDY v. MARTINEZ, 372 U.S.
144 (1963)(2). [The super evil consequences (subjection and statelessness) with 'special' reference to United States-
government located in D.C. Millions of people and officials (falsely) swear they are subjected stateless U.S. citizens
(Federal taxpayer slaves) Socialist Security # and Voter registration status. Satanic? U.N. = United NWO. ]
SUPER PROFITABLE TO CREATE CONFUSION, CONVOLUTE, PERVERT, BURY AND CONCEAL THE WHOLE TRUTH
Super Important: Never forget all of the relevant court cases cite We the People of the United States are sovereigns, and reciprocally
all of the relevant court cases cite or imply a 'citizen of the United States' or 'United States citizen' are subjects owing allegiance, and
none of the relevant court cases cite they are sovereigns or the supreme Power which of course would be to government's demise.
That essentially proves the Truth and sets in stone the vast difference between We the People of the U.S., and citizens of the U.S.
Hence, the established 'Order of things' is why our servants connive to deceive the sovereign People of the United States into non-
sovereign citizens of the United States, or U.S. citizens via government's Forms and Applications scam.
If the People being sovereigns is not a super important jurisdictional issue, our servants would not need to scheme by illegal
government deception to rob our sovereign birthright, or need to get us to 'swear' we are their slaves without sovereign immunity, and
confess the (whole) truth. Plus there would be Forms and Applications for the People to sign as the sovereign People of the United
States. A state composed of 100% Federal non-sovereign 'stateless' persons? What a queer notion of a state that is.
SIC SEMPER TYRANNUS - THE SATANIC REALM - COUP D’ETA RUSE - THIEFDOM - AND HOSTILE PREDATOR GOVERNMENT DECEPTIVELY CALLED
'UNITED STATES' AN INVISIBLE FEDERAL PRISON, A COUNTERFEIT SUPPOSEDLY LOCATED IN D.C.
In their counterfeit System all voters are citizens of the United States = 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status.
Their System of Federalism deceptively called 'United States' a God forsaken pretended government in D.C. outside the Constitution
Thess. 2:9 The coming of the lawless one is according to the workings of Satan with all power and lying wonders.
The sovereign people (falsely) swear on government forms they are a "citizen of the United States" (or U.S. citizen). So what
is 'United States' and where was it created and located in Law? Or is it pretended and in name only. I expressly deny this other so called
government: "United States" was ever established in Law by the People in Constitutional Convention. Emphasis added. I deny I
intended to be a U.S. Federal taxpayer slave 'of' an artificial creature supposedly located in D.C.? Nor ever been there.
"Location of United States. The United States is located in the District of Columbia." Section 1 Chapter
113 Session Laws of Alaska year 2000. [Codified at Alaska Statute Title 45.29.307(h). The counterfeit fraud. ]
Query "Location of United States. The United States is located in the District of Columbia." You will see many states have a statute that
cites the same. Free of fraud it should read, "the Government of the United States is located in the District of Columbia." The agent of
'The United States' composed of the States (the government of each state united in Congress) which 'are' located severally in 'The
United States of America' consisting of "the several states" of this American Union and country.
Since that United States is located in the District of Columbia, it obviously is not our country 'The United States of America.'
'We the People of the United States in order to form a more perfect Union . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for 'the United
States of America.' Did you intend to swear on government forms and applications you are a taxpayer (debtor-slave) of a counterfeit
System of government located in a government named the District of Columbia, 'a city of a Nation,' the 'one Nation under God
indivisible' falsely pledging Liberty and Justice for all,' entirely composed of 100% Federal non-sovereign U.S. citizen stateless persons.
Woe unto you Lawyers ye take away the key of knowledge. 'The United States' are of America, not D.C.
UNDENIABLY prescribed by law-statute: "government" means the United States …
Also, "government" means any state ... within the United States (no of America);
Codified at Alaska Statute 11.81.900. "government" means the United States, any state or any municipality or other
political subdivision within the United States or its territories; any department, agency, or subdivision of any of the
foregoing; an agency carrying out the functions of government; or any corporation or agency formed under interstate
compact or international treaty;… . Section 10 Chapter 199 Session Law of Alaska 1978: [Query that definition on
the internet and see pursuant to the Uniform Commericial Code many states have a statute citing the same. ]
5 U.S.C.A. § 5701 (5) "Government" means the Government of the United States and the government of the
District of Columbia; … [See the Constitution of the United States, Article 1. Section 8, clause 17. … the "Seat of the
Government of the United States," … . "In practice" the Government of the United States, is overthrown by fraud. ]
In quotes 'The United States' (de jure)

93
In the United States, and in the several States, which compose the Union, we go not so far: but still we go one step
farther than we ought to go in this unnatural and inverted order of things. The states, rather than the People, for
whose sakes the States exist, are frequently the objects which attract and arrest our principal attention. This, I
believe, has produced much of the confusion and perplexity, which have appeared in several proceedings and
several publications on state-politics, and on the politics, too, of the United States. Sentiments and expressions of
this inaccurate kind prevail in our common, even in our convivial, language. Is a toast asked? ' The United States,'
instead of the 'People of the United States,' is the toast given. This is not politically correct. The toast is meant to
present to view the first great object in the Union: It presents only the second: It presents only the artificial person,
instead of the natural persons, who spoke it into existence. A State I cheerfully fully admit, is the noblest work of
Man: But, Man himself, free and honest, is, I speak as to this world, the noblest work of God.
Concerning the prerogative of Kings, and concerning the sovereignty of States, much has been said and
written; but little has been said and written concerning a subject much more dignified and important, the majesty of
the people. [Super emphasis added. ] Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)(4).
In quotes 'The United States' (de jure) 'our great republic'
Justice White, Shiras and Mr. Justice McKenna, uniting in the judgment of affirmance:
'The United States,' 'our great republic, which is composed of states and territories.' [***] Aliens in the territories
are made citizens of the United States, and bankrupts residing in the territories are discharged from debts owing
citizens of the states, pursuant to uniform rules and laws enacted by Congress in the exercise of this power.
The 14th Amendment provides that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside;' and this court naturally
held, in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, that the United States included the District and the territories. Mr.
Justice Miller observed: 'It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States, except
as he was a citizen of one of the states composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been born and resided
always in the District of Columbia or in the territories, though within the United States, were not citizens. Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)(2). ['Citizen' is distinguished from 'citizen of the United States' and person. ]
"The United States of America" - The Crown Jewel and God’s Country coveted by NWO
PERKINS, J. (Supreme Court of Indiana): "The style of this confederacy shall be, 'The United States of America."'
The third was as follows: "The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for
their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to
assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion,
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever." [***] Indeed, it may not improperly be said that the Federal
Constitution is the Government of the United States, though in common parlance we apply that term to
administration. It was the Constitution that the convention formed, and the people ordained for their government.
That Constitution provided for installing temporary administrations to administer, to execute the provisions of the
Constitution, but it constituted no body of men as the government. It provided for placing men temporarily in
office to execute the powers specified in the Constitution, and nothing more. The very preamble of the instrument
declares this. "We, the people of the United States [***]". THAYER v. HEDGES, 22 Ind. 282 (1864)(1).
SOVEREIGNTY SURVIVES - SOVEREIGNTY IS NEVER HELD IN SUSPENSE
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty
passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as
the United States of America. Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, acting
through a common agency-- namely, the Continental Congress, composed of delegates from the thirteen colonies.
That agency exercised the powers of war and peace, raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted the
Declaration of Independence. Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but
sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never
held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it
immediately passed to the Union. See Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54, 80, 81, Fed.Cas. No. 10925. That fact was
given practical application almost at once. The treaty of peace, made on September 3, 1783, was concluded between
his Brittanic Majesty and the 'United States of America.' 8 Stat., European Treaties, 80.
The Union existed before the Constitution, which was ordained and established among other things to form
'a more perfect Union.' Prior to that event, it is clear that the Union, declared by the Articles of Confederation to be
'perpetual,' was the sole possessor of external sovereignty, and in the Union it remained without change save in
so far as the Constitution in express terms qualified its exercise. The Framers' Convention was called and exerted its
powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states were several their people in respect of foreign affairs
were one. UNITED STATES v. CURTISS, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)(2). [Sovereignty is vested 'only' in the People. ]
94
THE UNITED STATES IS "ENTIRELY A CREATURE" OF THE CONSTITUTION
Its power and authority have 'no' other 'source' = the Constitution of the supreme sovereign People.
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the
Bill of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other
source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. REID v. COVERT, 354
U.S. 1 (1957)(2). [Entirely an artificial creature of We the People and cannot rule its sovereign creators, let alone unjustly.]
THE UNITED STATES, IN ITS CORPORATE CAPACITY AS AN "ARTIFICIAL" PERSON
Our inferior artificial creature exposed as what it truly is.
The Texas decision was expressly followed by this court in Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 517, where it was
held that the word 'person' used in the statute there under consideration would include the United States 'as a body
politic and corporate.' Blackstone, writing on the rights of persons (1 Bl. 123) says: 'Persons also are divided by the
law into either natural persons, or artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are
such as are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government, which are called
corporations or bodies politic.'
While it cannot be said that the United States, in its corporate capacity as an artificial person, has a bodily
presence in any place, it is not unreasonable to hold that in the eye of the law it has a residence, and especially so
when a contrary holding would defeat the evident purpose of a statute. HELVERING (Com.Int.Rev.) v.
STOCKHOLMS ENSIKILDA BANK, 293 U.S. 84 (1934)(2). [Demand government 'prove' where U.S. is created in Law
and where 'it' is located in the District of Columbia and where its boundaries are prescribed in Law, and free of fraud
exactly how you lawfully became a slave 'of' this 'artificial' creature = lawfully and physically impossible. ]
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 'THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE'

Justice GRAY (Supreme Court of the United States) after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court:
It was also said, repeating the language of Mr. Justice Bradley in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457, 555: 'The United
States is not only a government, but it is a national government, and the only government in this country that has
the character of nationality. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and
negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all of which are forbidden to the state governments.' 130 U. S. 605.
And it was added: 'For local interests, the several states of the Union exist; but for international purposes, embracing
our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.' 130 U. S. 606. FONG YUE TING
v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893)(2). [In quotes:'The United States' established by We the sovereign People of the United
States in Constitutional Convention. Today’s counterfeit 'United States' is entirely composed of 100% Federal non-
sovereign stateless persons. All are 100% Federal status only, no sovereign or supreme power status, nor status of, or
legally connected to any of the several states. It’s a trick, a paper scheme lurking behind the scene in name only. ]
POWERS NOT GRANTED ARE PROHIBITED = "FORBIDDEN" - SUPER EMPHASIS ADDED

From the accepted doctrine that the United States is a government of delegated powers, it follows that those not
expressly granted, or reasonably to be implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to the states or to the
people. To forestall any suggestion to the contrary, the Tenth Amendment was adopted. (fn 18) The same
proposition, otherwise stated, is that powers not granted are prohibited. None to regulate agricultural production is
given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden.
The Tenth Amendment declares: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' U.S. v. BUTLER, 297 U.S. 1
(1936)(2). [When government pretends it's 'not prohibited' = Fraud and usurpation = all powers by lying wonders. ]
District of Columbia is not one of "the states"
Mr. Justice Brown (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the conclusion and judgment of the court: 'But,'
said the Chief Justice, 'as the act of Congress obviously used the word 'state' in reference to that term as used in the
Constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state in the sense of that instrument. The result
of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated
in the Constitution, ... and excludes from the term the signification attached to it by writers on the law of nations.'
This case was followed in Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280, and quite recently in Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U.S. 395.
The same rule was applied to citizens of territories in New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, 4 L. ed. 44, in which an
attempt was made to distinguish a territory from the District of Columbia. But it was said that ' neither of them is a
state in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution.' Downes v, Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)(2).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IS A CITY OF 'A' NATION
95
The 'one' Nation under God, 'indivisible' entirely composed of 100% Federal stateless U.S. citizen taxpayer slaves.
The city, not of a state, not of a district[?], but of 'a nation.'
Justice WHITE, with CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and POWELL (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
As the majority recognizes, see ante, at 282, this Court has recently ruled in other contexts that D.C.Code provisions
are "statutes of the United States," United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, (1971) (criminal appeal statute), and "Acts
of Congress," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (three-judge court appeals). [***] Nor do I agree that we
should view federal legislation relating to the District of Columbia as not sufficiently national in significance to
merit mandatory review. We are not free to disregard ß 1257(1). Moreover, the clause giving the Congress power
to legislate for the District of Columbia stands beside the other enumerated powers of Congress in Art. I, ß 8, of
the United States Constitution." 'The object of the grant of exclusive legislation [limited powers. ] over the district
was. . . national in the highest sense, and the city organized under the grant became the city, not of a state, not of a
district, but of a nation.' " O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 539-540 (1933), quoting Grether v. Wright,
75 F. 742, 756-757 C.A. 6 1896) (Taft, J.). KEY v. DOYLE, 434 U.S. 59 (1977)(2). [System of Federalism = 100%
Federal non-sovereign stateless person status of U.S. located in D.C. a city of a nation under fraud. ]
The District vs. District of Columbia

THE DISTRICT IS THE SEAT OF THE "GOVERNMENT" 'OF' THE UNITED STATES
District, as the seat of the national 'government'.
Article 1, s 8, cl. 17: 'The Congress shall have Power *** To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,
over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of
Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.' [court houses, IRS buildings. etc. ] [***]
How different are the status and characteristics of the District of Columbia! The pertinent clause of the
Constitution (article 1, s 8, cl. 17) confers the power on Congress to 'exercise exclusive Legislation *** over such
District *** as may *** become the Seat of the Government of the United States.' These are words of permanent
governmental power. The District, as the seat of the national government, is as lasting as the states from which it
was carved or the union whose permanent capital it became. It could not have been intended otherwise; and it was
thus recognized by the act of acceptance in 1790 (section 1, c. 28, 1 Stat. 130): ' *** The same (district) is hereby
accepted for the permanent seat of the government of the United States.' O'DONOGHUE v. UNITED STATES,
289 U.S. 516 (1933)(2). ["the Government of the United "States" is the agent of "The United States" of the Constitution
of We the People, the principals. "The United States of America" is composed of "the several states." ]
CREATED INTO A GOVERNMENT BY THE NAME OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Chief Justice Fuller (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The 1st section of the act 'to provide a government for the District of Columbia,' approved February 21, 1871 (16
Stat. at L. 419, chap. 62), provided: 'That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits
of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the District of
Columbia by which name it is hereby constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes, and may contract and
be contracted with, sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, have a seal, and exercise all other powers of a
municipal corporation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the provisions of
this act.' DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. CAMDEN IRON WORDS, 181 U.S. 453 (1901)(3). [A stateless slave of
the never created in Law (U.S.) located in a government/city of a nation composed of stateless non-sovereign U.S.
citizens. ]
'ONE' SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITY - ONE NATION

The District shall remain and continue a municipal 'corporation'

That language is that the District shall 'remain and continue a municipal corporation' with all rights of action and
suits for and against it. If it were a department of the government, how could it be sued? Can the treasury
department be sued? or any other department? We are of opinion that the corporate capacity and corporate liabilities
of the District of Columbia remain as before, and that its character as a mere municipal corporation has not been
changed. [***] All municipal governments are but agencies of the superior power of the state or government by
which they are constituted, and are invested with only such subordinate powers of local legislation and control as
the superior legislature sees fit to confer upon them. [***] No more than this was meant by Chief Justice TANEY,
when, in Bank of Alexandria v. Dyer, 14 Pet. 141, 146, he spoke of the District of Columbia as being formed, by
the acts of congress, into one separate political community, and of the two counties composing it (Washington and
Alexandria) as resembling different counties in the same state, by reason whereof it was held that parties residing in
one county could not be said to be 'beyond the seas,' or in a different jurisdiction, in reference to the other county,
though the two counties were subject to different laws. [***]
It cannot apply to the sovereign power, of course. No restrictive laws apply to the sovereign unless so
96
expressed. [The sovereign People did not express power in the Constitution over themselves. ] And especially no laws
affecting a right on the ground of neglect or laches, because neglect and laches cannot be imputed to him. And it
matters not whether the sovereign be an individual monarch, or a republic or state. The principle applies to all
sovereigns. METROPOLITAN R. CO v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 132 U.S. 1 (1889)(2). [Constitution: Article I,
Section 8, clause 17, The 'District' not exceeding ten miles square is the Seat of 'Government' of 'the United States'.
'United States' is the name of a never created in Law (pretended) government located in D.C. a city of a Nation. ]
THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT vs. A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT = THE DISTRICT vs. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The Government of the United States vs. a government located in a government named the District of Columbia.
The names 'Washington' for the 'federal city' and 'Columbia' for the 'federal district.'
Congress' power over the District of Columbia encompasses the 'full' authority of government,
the 'Executive and Judicial powers as well as the Legislative.'
GARLAND, Circuit Judge, and OBERDORFER and KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judges (U.S. District Ct. D. C.):
MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM
In Carter, the Court held that the District of Columbia is not a "State or Territory" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, but rather "is truly sui generis in our governmental structure." Carter, 409 U.S. at 432: accord Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) ("The District of Columbia is constitutionally distinct from the States ....")
(citing Hepburn & Dundas, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 445, (1805)). [***]
And we also again have the problem that it is Congress that is the ultimate executive authority for the
District. See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982)("Congress' power over the
District of Columbia encompasses the full authority of government, and thus, necessarily, the Executive and
Judicial powers as well as the Legislative."). The possibility that the Framers intended Congress to fill its own
vacancies seems far too much of a stretch, even if the constitutional fabric were more flexible than it appears to be.
[***] Since, as noted above, Congress is ultimately both the Legislature and Executive for the District,
plaintiffs' theory would mean that Congress would fill vacancies in the District's Senate seats--except when
Congress is in recess, in which event Congress would also fill the vacancies. [***]
Members of Congress opposed to the Organic Act made the same argument. See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 992
(1801) (remarks of Rep. Smilie) (arguing that upon assumption of congressional jurisdiction, "the people of the
District would be reduced to the state of subjects, and deprived of their political rights"). [***]
See generally 3 STORY, supra note 25, § 1218 (1833) (noting that inhabitants of the District "are not indeed
citizens of any state, entitled to the privileges of such, but are citizens of the United States" and that "[t]hey have
no immediate representatives in congress").
In 1820, Marshall reviewed a claim that, because District residents were unrepresented in Congress, the
national legislature lacked the power to impose a direct tax upon the District. See Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 317 (1820). If there were a Justice who would have been particularly sensitive to this reprise of the
Revolutionary War battle cry of "no taxation without representation," surely it would have been Marshall-- who
served as a company commander at Valley Forge. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A
NATION 62-65 (1996). Nonetheless, speaking for a unanimous Court, Marshall held that Congress had the power to
tax residents of the District of Columbia despite their lack of representation. See Loughborough, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
at 317. The District, he said, "relinquished the right of representation, and has adopted the whole body of Congress
for its legitimate government." Id. at 324, 5 Wheat. 317. [***]
Congress accepted the cessions by the Act of July 16, 1790, and established the first Monday of December
1800 as the date for the removal of the government to the District. (fn 40) In 1791, Maryland ratified the cession,
stating that "all that part of the said territory called Columbia which lies within the limits of this State shall be ...
forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, and full and absolute right
and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil as of persons residing or to reside thereon." (fn 41)
(fn 38). See An Act to Cede to Congress a District of Ten Miles Square in This State for the Seat of Government
of the United States, 2 Kilty Laws of Md., ch. 46 (1788); see also An Act for the Cession of Ten Miles Square, or
Any Lesser Quantity of Territory Within This State, to the United States, in Congress Assembled, for the Permanent
Seat of the General Government, 13 Va. Stat. at Large, ch. 32, at 43 (Hening 1823) (enacted 1789). [***]
(fn 56). See O'Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 541, (holding that judges of District of Columbia are Article III judges whose
salaries cannot be decreased). But see id. at 539-40 ("The object of the grant of exclusive legislation over the
district was, therefore, national in the highest sense, and the city organized under the grant became the city, not of a
state, not of a district, but of a nation.") (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). [***] See District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1973) ("[I]n light of the transitory nature of the territorial condition,
Congress could reasonably treat the Territories as inchoate States, quite similar in many respects to the States
themselves, to whose status they would inevitably ascend. The District of Columbia, on the other hand, is an
exceptional community ... established under the Constitution as the seat of the National Government.") (internal
quotation omitted).
OBERDORFER, District Judge, dissenting in part, and concurring in part:
The boundaries of the permanent seat of government were fixed by Presidential proclamation of March 30, 1791.
97
See Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 200 (1899). Later that year, commissioners appointed by President
Washington chose the names "Washington" for the federal city and "Columbia" for the federal district. There was
no District of Columbia political entity created at that time, although the municipal corporations of Alexandria and
Georgetown continued to exist. ADAMS v. William Jefferson CLINTON, 90 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.C. 2000)(3). [Slick
Willy and Hillary etc. know the secret Truth of the Law and are in on the System of Federalism subjection scam. ]
The United States is 'a government.'

'The 'States are governments' consequently 'body' politics = a political body = artificial person.
A so called State composed of 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons instead of We the people.
The united States = the government of each of the states of America united. True name: 'The United States.'
THE UNITED STATES AS A GOVERNMENT - CONSEQUENTLY A BODY POLITIC AND CORPORATE

Justice BRENNAN, with Mr. Justice MARSHALL joins as to Parts I, II, and III, concurring in the judgment:
Even the Court's opinion today does not dispute the fact that in 1871 the phrase "bodies politic and corporate" would
certainly have referred to the States. (fn 12) See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 188 (1915); McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892); 357 Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885); Cotton v. United States, 11 How.
229, 231 (1851); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (Iredell, J.), 468 (Cushing, J.) (1793); Utah State Building
Comm'n v. Great American Indemnity Co. , 105 Utah 11, 16, 140 P.2d 763, 766 (1943) ; Board of Comm'rs of
Hamilton County v. Noyes, 3 Am.L.Rec. 745, 748 (Super.Ct.Cincinnati 1874); 1 J. Wilson, Works 305 (1804); cf.
Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1877); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50, 76-77
(1868); Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 416-417 (1851); Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators , 3 Dall. 54,
92-93 (1795) (Iredell, J.); Mass. Const., Preamble. Indeed, during the very debates surrounding the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act, States were referred to as bodies politic and corporate. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., 661-662 (1871) (hereinafter Globe) (Sen. Vickers) ("What is a State? Is it not a body politic and corporate?");
cf. id., at 696 (Sen. Edmunds). Thus the expressed intent of Congress, manifested virtually simultaneously with the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was that the States themselves, as bodies corporate and politic, should be
embraced by the term "person" in ß 1 of that Act. [Many old cases. ] [***]
(fn 12). The phrase would also have referred to the United States. As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated: "The
United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate ... " United States v. Maurice, 26
Fed.Cas. No. 15747, 2 Brock. 96, 109 (CC Va.1823). See Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 154 (1886);
Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172, 178, (1818) (argument of Attorney General William Wirt).
In construing the meaning of the term "person" in a Texas law creating a statute of limitations for suits to
recover real estate "as against any person in peaceable and adverse possession thereof," this Court stated: "Of
course, the United States were not bound by the laws of the State, yet the word 'person' in the statute would include
them [plural. ] as a body politic and corporate. Sayles, Art. 3140; Martin v. State, 24 Texas, 61, 68." Stanley v.
Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893). See United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 257, (1959); Ohio v. Helvering, 292
U.S. 360, 370 (1934); cf. Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1978) . QUERN v. JORDAN, 440 U.S. 332
(1978)(2). [Undeniably an 'artificial' body or creature of the Constitution of the People. It should read the United States
'are', not 'is'. Their agent is 'the Government of the United States'. No proof of intent of the People in Convention for
government (men) to overthrow, abandon, or circumvent the de jure government of and under the Constitution. ]
EVERY STATE IS A BODY POLITIC, OR "ARTIFICIAL" PERSON

The United States is a government, a body politic and corporate.
The following case refers to the Dictionary Act, but skips over the most important part, the 'enacting
clause' of 'all' acts of Congress hereafter 'shall' be in the following form, yet aren't. Their law books no longer say
they are under the authority of Congress, or 'The United States'. Thereafter their acts are not in the 'quoted' form
in the dictionary act, demonstrating 'The United States' switched to 'United States' and outside the Constitution.
Justice BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
For this case is not decided on the basis of our ordinary method of statutory construction; instead, the Court
disposes of it by means of various rules of statutory interpretation that it summons to its aid each time the question
looks close. Specifically, the Court invokes the following interpretative principles: the word "persons" is ordinarily
construed to exclude the sovereign; congressional intent to affect the federal-state balance must be "clear and
manifest"; and intent to abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity must appear in the language of the statute
itself. [***] The Court invokes, first, the "often-expressed understanding" that " 'in common usage, the term " person"
does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.' " Ante,
at 2308, quoting Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979). This rule is used both to refute the argument
that the language of ß 1983 demonstrates an intent that States be included as defendants, ante, at 2308, and to
overcome the argument based on the Dictionary Act's definition of "person" to include bodies politic and corporate,
ante, at 2310-2310. It is ironic, to say the least, that the Court chooses this interpretive rule in explaining why the
Dictionary Act is not decisive, since the rule is relevant only when the word "persons" has no statutory definition.
When one considers the origins and content of this interpretive guideline, moreover, one realizes that it is
inapplicable here and, even if applied, would defeat rather than support the Court's approach and result.
98
The idea that the word "persons" ordinarily excludes the sovereign can be traced to the "familiar principle
that the King [sovereign. ] is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be named therein by special and
particular words." Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1874) [+ STANLEY v.
SCHWALBY, 147 U.S. 508 (1893)(3) ] As this passage suggests, however, this interpretive principle applies only to
"the enacting sovereign." United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). See also Jefferson County
Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 161 (1983). Furthermore, as explained in United
States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 251, 255 (1874), even the principle as applied to the enacting sovereign is not
without limitations: "Where an act of Parliament is made for the public good, as for the advancement of religion and
justice or to prevent injury and wrong, the king is bound by such act, though not particularly named therein; but
where a statute is general, and thereby any prerogative, right, title, or interest is divested or taken from the king, in
such case the king is not bound, unless the statute is made to extend to him by express words." [No (express) words
in any statute or the Constitution. ] It would be difficult to imagine a statute more clearly designed "for the public
good," and "to prevent injury and wrong," than ß 1983.
Even if this interpretative principle were relevant to this case, the Court's invocation of it to the exclusion
of careful statutory analysis is in error. As we have made clear, this principle is merely "an aid to consistent
construction of statutes of the enacting sovereign when their purpose is in doubt, but it does not require that the aim
of a statute fairly to be inferred be disregarded because not explicitly stated." United States v. California, supra, 297
U.S., at 186. Indeed, immediately following the passage quoted by the Court today, ante, at 2308, to the effect that
statutes using the word "person" are "ordinarily construed to exclude" the sovereign, we stated: "But there is no
hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the
executive interpretation of the statute [regulations. ] are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use
of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. [***]
"Decision is not to be reached by a strict construction of the words of the Act, nor by the application of
artificial canons of construction. On the contrary, we are to read the statutory language in its ordinary and natural
sense, and if doubts remain, resolve them in the light, not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment,
but, as well, by all other available aids to construction." United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604- 605
(1941). [Woe unto the lawyers, massive fraud to confuse. ] [***]
The only principle of statutory construction employed by the Court that would justify a perfunctory and
inconclusive analysis of a statute's language and history is one that is irrelevant to this case. This is the notion "that
if Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must
make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' " Ante, at 2308, quoting Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). [***]
In short, the only principle of statutory interpretation that permits the Court to avoid a careful and thorough
analysis of ß 1983's language and history is the clear-statement principle that this Court has come to apply in
Eleventh Amendment cases--a principle that is irrelevant to this state-court action. In my view, a careful and
detailed analysis of ß 1983 leads to the conclusion that States are "persons" within the meaning of that statute.
II
Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
Although ß 1983 itself does not define the term "person," we are not without a statutory definition of this
word. "Any analysis of the meaning of the word 'person' in ß 1983 ... must begin ... with the Dictionary Act."
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Passed just
two months before ß 1983, and designed to "suppl[y] rules of construction for all legislation," ibid., the Dictionary
Act provided: "That in all acts hereafter passed ... [the 3 periods means they corruptly left out the 'form' of the true
enacting clause, which demonstrates in part none of the Laws of the United States have been lawfully enacted under the
lawful authority of the Congress of the United States of America de jure. ] the word 'person' may extend and be applied
to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were intended to be used in a more
limited sense...." [See Dictionary] Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ß 2, 16 Stat. 431.
In Monell, we held this definition to be not merely allowable but mandatory, requiring that the word
"person" be construed to include "bodies politic and corporate" unless the statute under consideration "by its terms
called for a deviation from this practice." 436 U.S., at 689-690. Thus, we concluded, where nothing in the "context"
of a particular statute "call[s] for a restricted interpretation of the word 'person,' the language of that [statute] should
prima facie be construed to include 'bodies politic' among the entities that could be sued." Ibid.
Both before and after the time when the Dictionary Act and ß 1983 were passed, the phrase "bodies politic
and corporate" was understood to include the States. See, e.g., J. Bouvier, 1 A Law Dictionary Adapted to the
Constitution and Laws of the United States of America 185 (11th ed. 1866); W. Shumaker & G. Longsdorf,
Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law 104 (1901); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (Iredell, J.); id., at 468
(Cushing, J.); Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1851)
99
("Every sovereign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person"); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 270, 288 (1885); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). See
also United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 109, 26 F.Cas. 1211 (CC Va.1823) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The United
States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate"); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S.
151, 154 (1886) (same). Indeed, the very legislators who passed ß 1 referred to States in these terms. See, e.g.,
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 661-662 (1871).
(Sen. Vickers) ("What is a State? Is it not a body politic and corporate?"); id., at 696 (Sen. Edmunds) ("A
State is a corporation"). [Generically a corporation, an artificial creature of the Constitution 'of' the People. ]
The reason why States are "bodies politic and corporate" is simple: just as a corporation is an entity that
can act only through its agents, "[t]he State is a political corporate body, can act only through agents, and can
command only by laws." [Jurisdiction is derived solely from the Law. Yet corruptly use private copyright Code
Statutes. ] Poindexter v. Greenhow, supra, 114 U.S., at 288, See also Black's Law Dictionary 159 (5th ed. 1979)
[Black’s Dict. its self is not official, or judicial authority. ] ("[B]ody politic or corporate": "A social compact by which
the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by
certain laws for the common good"). As a "body politic and corporate," a State falls squarely within the Dictionary
Act's definition of a "person."
While it is certainly true that the phrase "bodies politic and corporate" referred to private and public
corporations, see ante, at 2311, and n. 9, this fact does not draw into question the conclusion that this phrase also
applied to the States. Phrases may, of course, have multiple referents. Indeed, each and every dictionary cited by
the Court accords a broader realm-- one that comfortably, and in most cases explicitly, includes the sovereign--to
this phrase than the Court gives it today. See 1B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or
English Jurisprudence 155 (1879) ("[T]he term body politic is often used in a general way, as meaning the state or
the sovereign power, or the city government, without implying any distinct express incorporation"); W.
Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 127 (1893) ("[B]ody politic": "The governmental, sovereign power: a city or a
State"); Black's Law Dict 143 (1891).
("[B]ody politic": "It is often used, in a rather loose way, to designate the state or nation or sovereign power, or
the government of a county or municipality, without distinctly connoting any express and individual corporate
charter"); 1A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 212 (2d ed. 1871) ("[B]ody politic": "A body to take in
succession, framed by policy"; [Distinguished from a Constitution of the People. ] "[p]articularly applied, in the old
books, to a Corporation sole"); id., at 383 ("Corporation sole" includes the sovereign in England).
Because I recognize that both uses of this phrase were deemed valid when ß 1983 and the Dictionary Act
were passed, the Court accuses me of "confus [ing] [the] precise definition of [this] phrase with its use 'in a rather
loose way,' " "to refer to the state (as opposed to a State)." [Super emphasis added. ] Ante, at 2311, quoting
Black, supra, at 143. It had never occurred to me, however, that only "precise" definitions counted as valid ones.
Where the question we face is what meaning Congress attached to a particular word or phrase, we usually--and
properly--are loath to conclude that Congress meant to use the word or phrase in a hypertechnical sense unless it
said so. Nor does the Court's distinction between "the state" and "a State" have any force. The suggestion, I take
it, is that the phrase "bodies politic and corporate" refers only to nations rather than to the states within a nation;
[Super emphasis added. ] but then the Court must explain why so many of the sources I have quoted refer to states
in addition to nations. In an opinion so utterly devoted to the rights of the States as sovereigns, moreover, it is
surprising indeed to find the Court distinguishing between our sovereign States and our sovereign Nation.
In deciding what the phrase "bodies politic and corporate" means, furthermore, I do not see the relevance of
the meaning of the term "public corporation." See ante, at 2310-2311. That is not the phrase chosen by Congress in
the Dictionary Act, and the Court's suggestion that this phrase is coterminous with the phrase "bodies politic and
corporate" begs the question whether the latter one includes the States. Nor do I grasp the significance of this
Court's decision in United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1877), in which the question was whether the State of New
York, by including "persons" and "corporations" within the class of those to whom land could be devised, had
intended to authorize devises to the United States. Ante, at 2311. Noting that "[t]he question is to be determined by
the laws of [New York]," the Court held that it would require "an express definition" to hold that the word "persons"
included the Federal Government, and that under state law the term "corporations" applied only to corporations
created under the laws of New York. 94 U.S., at 320- 321. The pertinence of these state-law questions to the issue
before us today escapes me. Not only do we confront an entirely different, federal statute, but we also have an
express statement, in the Dictionary Act, that the word "person" in ß 1 includes "bodies politic and corporate." See
also Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S., at 315 [Even Supreme Court Justices can't agree on what things mean using hyper
complex legal terminology. Yet, many judges want the 'gullible' to believe the Letter of the Law does not matter. ]
The relevance of the fact that ß 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27,--the model for ß 1 of the
1871 Act--was passed before the Dictionary Act, see ante, at 2310, similarly eludes me. Congress chose to use the
word "person" in the 1871 Act even after it had passed the Dictionary Act, presumptively including "bodies politic
and corporate" within the category of "persons." Its decision to do so--and its failure to indicate in the 1871 Act that
the Dictionary Act's presumption was not to apply-- demonstrate that Congress did indeed intend "persons" to
100
include bodies politic and corporate. In addition, the Dictionary Act's definition of "person" by no means dropped
from the sky. Many of the authorities cited above predate both the Dictionary Act and the 1866 Act, indicating that
the word "persons" in 1866 ordinarily would have been thought to include "bodies politic and corporate," with or
without the Dictionary Act.
This last point helps to explain why it is a matter of small importance that the Dictionary Act's definition of
"person" as including bodies politic and corporate was retroactively withdrawn when the federal statutes were
revised in 1874. See T. Durant, Report to Joint Committee on Revision of Laws 2 (1873). Only two months after
presumptively designating bodies politic and corporate as "persons," Congress chose the word "person" for ß 1 of
the Civil Rights Act. For the purpose of determining Congress' intent in using this term, it cannot be decisive that,
three years later, it withdrew this presumption. In fact, both the majority and dissent in Monell emphasized the 1871
version of the Dictionary Act, but neither saw fit even to mention the 1874 revision of this statute. 436 U.S., at 688-
689 (opinion for the Court); id., at 719 ( REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Even in cases, moreover, where no statutory
definition of the word "persons" is available, we have not hesitated to include bodies politic and corporate within
that category. See Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 517 (1893) ("[T]he word 'person' in the statute would include
[the States] as a body politic and corporate"); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934); United States v. Shirey, 359
U.S. 255, 257 (1959).
Thus, the question before us is whether the presumption that the word "person" in ß 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 included bodies politic and corporate--and hence the States--is overcome by anything in the statute's
language and history. Certainly nothing in the statutory language overrides this presumption. The statute is
explicitly directed at action taken "under color of" state law, and thus supports rather than refutes the idea that the
"persons" mentioned in the statute include the States. Indeed, for almost a century--until Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961)--it was unclear whether the statute applied at all to action not authorized by the State, and the enduring
significance of the first cases construing the 14th Amend., pursuant to which ß 1 was passed, lies in their conclusion
that the prohibitions of this Amendment do not reach private action. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In
such a setting, one cannot reasonably deny the significance of ß 1983's explicit focus on state action.
Unimpressed by such arguments, the Court simply asserts that reading "States" where the statute mentions
"person" would be "decidedly awkward." Ante, at 2308. The Court does not describe the awkwardness that it
perceives, but I take it that its objection is that the under-color-of-law requirement would be redundant if States were
included in the statute because States necessarily act under color of state law. But ß 1983 extends as well to natural
persons, who do not necessarily so act; in order to ensure that they would be liable only when they did so, the
statute needed the under-color-of-law requirement. The only way to remove the redundancy that the Court sees
would have been to eliminate the catchall phrase "person" altogether, and separately describe each category of
possible defendants and the circumstances under which they might be liable. I cannot think of a situation not
involving the Eleventh Amendment, however, in which we have imposed such an unforgiving drafting requirement
on Congress. Taking the example closest to this case, we might have observed in Monell that ß 1983 was clumsily
written if it included municipalities, since these, too, may act only under color of state authority. Nevertheless, we
held there that the statute does apply to municipalities. 436 U.S., at 690. Similarly, we have construed the statutory
term "white persons" to include " 'corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals,' " see Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U.S., at 666, quoting 1 U.S.C. ß 1,
despite the evident awkwardness in doing so. Indeed, virtually every time we construe the word "person" to include
corporate or other artificial entities that are not individual, flesh-and-blood persons, some awkwardness results.
But given cases like Monell and Wilson, it is difficult to understand why mere linguistic awkwardness should
control where there is good reason to accept the "awkward" reading of a statute.
The legislative history and background of the statute confirm that the presumption created by the
Dictionary Act was not overridden in ß 1 of the 1871 Act, and that, even without such a presumption, it is plain that
"person" in the 1871 Act must include the States. I discussed in detail the legislative history of this statute in my
opinion concurring in the judgment in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S., at 357-365, and I shall not cover that ground again
here. Suffice it to say that, in my view, the legislative history of this provision, though spare, demonstrates that
Congress recognized and accepted the fact that the statute was directed at the States themselves. One need not
believe that the statute satisfies this Court's heightened clear-statement principle, reserved for Eleventh Amendment
cases, in order to conclude that the language and legislative history of ß 1983 show that the word "person" must
include the States. As to the more general historical background of ß 1, we too easily forget, I think, the
circumstances existing in this country when the early civil rights statutes were passed. "[V]iewed against the events
and passions of the time," United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803 (1966), I have little doubt that ß 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 included States as "persons." The following brief description of the Reconstruction period is
illuminating: "The Civil War had ended in April 1865. Relations between Negroes and whites were increasingly
turbulent. Congress had taken control of the entire governmental process in former Confederate States. It had
declared the governments in 10 'unreconstructed' States to be illegal and had set up federal military
administrations in their place. Congress refused to seat representatives from these States until they had adopted
constitutions guaranteeing Negro suffrage, and had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. [Coercion under point of
bayonet is not the Law of the Constitution of the People. ] Constitutional conventions were called in 1868. Six of the
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10 States fulfilled Congress' requirements in 1868, the other four by 1870. [***]
This was a Congress in the midst of altering the "'balance between the States and the Federal
Government.'" Ante, at 2308, quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S., at 242. It was fighting to
save the Union, and in doing so, it transformed our federal system. [How true it is. ] It is difficult, therefore, to
believe that this same Congress did not intend to include States among those who might be liable under ß 1983 for
the very deprivations that were threatening this Nation at that time. [***] The Court appears to be driven to this
peculiar result in part by its view that "in enacting ß 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established
immunities or defenses under the common law." Ante, at 2309. But the question whether States are "persons" under
ß 1983 is separate and distinct from the question whether they may assert a defense of common-law sovereign
immunity. In our prior decisions involving common-law immunities, we have not held that the existence of an
immunity defense excluded the relevant state actor from the category of "persons" liable under ß 1983, see, e.g.,
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), and it is a mistake to do so today. Such an approach entrenches the effect
of common-law immunity even where the immunity itself has been waived.
For my part, I would reverse the judgment below and remand for resolution of the question whether
Michigan would assert common-law sovereign immunity in defense to this suit and, if so, whether that assertion of
immunity would preclude the suit.
Given the suggestion in the court below that Michigan enjoys no common-law immunity for violations of
its own Constitution, Smith v. Department of Public Health, 428 Mich. 540, 641-642, 410 N.W.2d 749, 793-794
(1987) (Boyle, J., concurring), there is certainly a possibility that that court would hold that the State also lacks
immunity against ß 1983 suits for violations of the Federal Constitution. [***]
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
Legal doctrines often flourish long after their raison d'être has perished. (fn 1) The doctrine of sovereign
immunity rests on the fictional premise that the "King can do no wrong." [It's also based on 'right' of jurisdiction
prescribed by mere law of the creature. ] (fn 2) Even though the plot to assassinate James I in 1605, the execution of
Charles I in 1649, and the Colonists' reaction to George III's stamp tax made rather clear the fictional character of
the doctrine's underpinnings, British subjects found a gracious means of compelling the King to obey the law rather
than simply repudiating the doctrine itself. They held his advisers and his agents responsible. (fn 3)
(fn 1). "A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of history, is this. The customs, beliefs,
or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity
disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten and ingenious minds set
themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it
and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been
found for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies
itself to fit the meaning which it has received." O. Holmes, The Common Law 8 (M. Howe ed. 1963). (fn 2). See 1
W. Blackstone, Commentaries ("The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking
wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing"). [But our servants do much more than mere improper things
even to their sovereign even though in a more perfect Union under God. Would most kings execute death penalty? ]
(fn 3). In the first chapter of his classic History of England, published in 1849, Thomas Macaulay wrote: "Of these
kindred constitutions the English was, from an early period, justly reputed the best. The prerogatives of the
sovereign were undoubtedly extensive. ***
"But his power, though ample, was limited by three great constitutional principles, so ancient that none can
say when they began to exist, so potent that their natural development, continued through many generations, has
produced the order of things under which we now live.
"First, the King could not legislate without the consent of his Parliament. Secondly, he could impose no tax without
the consent of his Parliament. Thirdly, he was bound to conduct the executive administration according to the
laws of the land, and, if he broke those laws, his advisers and his agents were responsible." 1 T. Macaulay, Hist. of
Eng. 28-29.[The Federal System by stateless non-sovereigns outside the Constitution is not the Law of the Land. ]
In the United States as well, at the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, actions against
agents of the sovereign were the means by which the State, despite its own immunity, was required to obey the
law. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 297 (1885) ("The fancied inconvenience of an interference
with the collection of its taxes by the government of Virginia, by suits against its tax collectors, vanishes at once
upon the suggestion that such interference is not possible, except when that government seeks to enforce the
collection of its taxes contrary to the law and contract of the State, and in violation of the Constitution of the
United States"); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 203, 220 (1873) ("Where the State is concerned, the State should be made a
party, if it could be done. That it cannot be done is a sufficient reason for the omission to do it, and the court may
proceed to decree against the officers of the State in all respects as if the State were a party to the record"). [***]
An official-capacity suit is the typical way in which we have held States responsible for their duties under
federal law. Such a suit, we have explained, " 'generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent.' " Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)); see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). WILL v. MICHIGAN DEPT OF STATE POLICE, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)(2).
102
THE UNITED STATES AS 'A GOVERNMENT' AND PARTY 'PLAINTIFF'
In Minnesota v. Hitchcock, supra, at pages 384, 386 of 185 U.S., it was said: 'This is a controversy to which the
United States may be regarded as a party. It is one therefore to which the judicial power of the United States
extends. It is, of course, under that clause, a matter of indifference whether the United States is a party plaintiff or
defendant. It could not fairly be adjudged that the judicial power of the United States extends to those cases in which
the United States is a party plaintiff, and does not extend to those cases in which it is a party defendant. [***] 'While
the United States as a government may not be sued without its consent, yet with its consent it may be sued, and the
judicial power of the United States extends to such a controversy.' WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES, 289 U.S. 553
(1933)(2). [The Government of the United States is the agent of 'The United States' (of America) of the People. ]
WADING THROUGH SEAS OF BLOOD TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT

HANNA, J. (Supreme Court of Indiana):
It is in point of fact and of law but the same government to-day that it was before the war--so far as States where no
war exists are interested, for the people, who are by the theory of the government the source of all power, have not
changed that form of government. Whether those who are, for the time being, administering the government, have
been guilty of the exercise of powers not granted by the constitution, is quite another question. The government, as
we have seen, was inaugurated to secure to each citizen certain unalienable rights--rights which have not been
alienated, or transfered, to Congress, nor to the President, nor to the military commanders; for they could not be so
conveyed and the people remain free, and when wrested from them by force they will become mere serfs. If those
sacred rights, among which are the liberty of speech, the liberty of the press, and the freedom of elections, which
are the three great bulwarks of free institutions, are to be stricken down, permanently destroyed by armed force; or,
if that force is not to be used to restore the just authority of our once glorious government, but merely to establish,
by wading through seas of blood, a single consolidated government, having for its corner stone certain chimerical
ideas of philanthropy, fraternity and equality, social and political, of all races of men, without respect to color, then
it might not be so readily conceded that imperative necessity would require that the force should be kept up solely
for such purpose. [***] The very first line of the guarantees is that "Congress shall make no law," &c., &c. See 1
Amend. Const. U. S. Then follows, as I understand that instrument, the enumeration of various subjects upon which
the Congress shall make no law infringing the rights of the people. Among those rights are life, liberty, and the
right to possess and enjoy property, of which the citizen can not be deprived without due process of law; 5
amendment; and also to be secure from arrests, &c. 4 amendment. GRIFFIN v. WILCOX, 21 Ind. 370 (1863)(1).
LAWFULLY THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE
Take heed of (the God forsaken) "United States" = 100% fake acting outside the Constitution.
The entire 'UNITED STATES CODE' only has definitions of "United States" (de facto) and no definition for "The United States" (de jure)
The definition does not say, "the United States", nor "United States" means "the Government."
"United States" = 100% Counterfeit = Void = NO SUCH THING ESTABLISHED BY THE PEOPLE
A citizen 'of' the 'United States': subject to the jurisdiction of the following 'artificial' entities?
United States is defined as "(A) a federal corporation; (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other
entity of the United States; or (C) an instrumentality of the United States." 28 U.S.C. Section 3002(15)(A), (B), (C).
Accordingly, the question presented to this Court is whether the FDCP's definition of "United States" includes
Agribank. Agribank, FCB v. Bergman, 847 F.Supp. 118 (S.D.Ill.,1994)(1).
The above Title 28 USC definition is under Federal debt collection. "United States" is not 'The United States' nor defined as 'the
Government.' Agri-bank is hardly one of the 'States' of The United States' (no of America). See below, 18 USC is the Criminal Code!
TERRITORIAL sense = stateless = does not includes 'the several states,' nor 'the States'
''. . . See 18 U.S.C. § 5; The term ''United States'', as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places
and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone. U. S. v.
Christian, 505 F.2d 94 (5th Cir., Florida, 1974)(2). [No states. places = Forts… needful 'buildings' = courts etc. ]
Territorial sense = No states = stateless. Have the prosecution 'prove' precisely where their on 'Land' Federal Common Law criminal
jurisdiction' is and over what status (according to the very words in the Constitution and the true intent of the People in Convention.
There is a territorial sense, geographical sense, and continental sense. See 18 USC § 7. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
GEOGRAPHICAL sense = all so called 'governments' of 'U.S.'

Before NIES, Chief Judge, ARCHER and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
26 I.R.C. ß 7701 sets forth general definitions for the Internal Revenue Code. Section 7701(a)(9) provides the
following: (a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the
intent thereof-- .... [Below "United States" in quotes. No such thing in Law! Undeniable government deception. ]
(9) United States. The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the
103
District of Columbia. [Only governments. Counterfeit governments. No definition of "The United States." ]
The regulations for section 953 provide, in pertinent part: "For purposes of section 953(a), the term
'United States' is used in a geographical sense and includes only the States and the District of Columbia...."
Treas. Reg. ß 1.953-2 (1964). OCEAN DRILLING & EXPLORATION v. The UNITED STATES, 988 F.2d 1135
(1993)(2). [The System includes 'only' States/governments, + the fraud of the District of Columbia-government matching
the Levy statute for governmental income tax coming from governmental employers. Not our right of privacy pay. ]
LAWFULLY THERE CAN BE ONLY 1 UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

Only 1: 1 We the People of the U.S., created 1 Constitution of the U. S. to form 1 Government of the U.S., 1 you, and 1 God.
Luke 11:17 Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and a house divided against a house falleth.
'INDE'STRUCTIBLE' UNION COMPOSED OF 'INDESTRUCTIBLE' STATES - 'SYSTEM' OF FEDERALISM = ALL FRAUD

This case says it all-almost. By deception there are 2 Unions, American Union & Federal union = Two governments.
'The United States' v. 'United States' de facto. The States of the Constitutions v. 100% Federal non-sovereign status STATES.
Separate opinion of Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS (Supreme Court of the United States):
In Texas v. White (1869) 7 Wall. 700, 725, a cause of momentous importance, this Court, through Chief Justice
Chase, declared-- 'But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no means implies the loss of distinct and
individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of Confederation each State
retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly
delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution, though the powers of the States were much restricted, still,
all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people. And we have already had occasion to remark at this term, that 'the people of each State compose a
State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent
existence,' and that 'without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States.' (Lane
County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71). Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to
the States, through their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of
the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as
the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National Government. The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.' STEWARD MACH CO. v.
DAVIS, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)(2). [In Order to form 'a more perfect Union' (not Unions). Their insurgent-hostile-rebellious-
abusive counterfeit System of Federalism in D.C. make the sovereign People and The States totally disappear, without
sovereigns to compose 'The States', The States disappear and therefore 'The United States' disappears. Hence, their scam
deceptively named 'United States' outside the Constitution undeniably composed of 100% Federal non-sovereign
stateless persons with no sovereign right to govern = void Code. See: People compose the State 92 U.S. 214. ]
CRITICAL POSTULATE SOVEREIGNTY IS IN THE PEOPLE - ALL SERVANTS OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE PEOPLE
A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being
elected, as the number authorised to elect' "); 395 U.S., at 534-535 (citing statements of Williamson and Madison
emphasizing the potential for legislative abuse). [Elected vs. appointed-selected + subject status of electors. ] [***]
Second, we recognized the critical postulate that sovereignty is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers
on the people the right to choose freely their representatives to the National Government. For example, we noted
that "Robert Livingston ... endorsed this same fundamental principle: 'The people are the best judges who ought to
represent them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural
rights.' " 395 U.S., at 541 quoting 2 Elliot's Debates 292-293. Similarly, we observed that "[b]efore the New York
convention ..., Hamilton emphasized: 'The true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they
please to govern them. [scam: servants not elected: serving at the pleasure of a superior oath breaker. ] [***]
See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("The Constitution ... permitt[ed] direct contact between the National Government and the
individual citizen"). In that National Government, representatives owe primary allegiance not to the people of a
State, but to the people of the Nation. [The sovereign Nation that established the Constitution of the U.S. ][***]
George Washington made a similar argument: "The power under the Constitution will always be in the People. It is
entrusted for certain defined purposes, and for a certain limited period, to representatives of their own chusing; and
whenever it is executed contrary to their Interest, or not agreeable to their wishes, their Servants can, and
undoubtedly will be, recalled." 1 Bailyn 305, 306-307. [***] The Constitution thus creates a uniform national body
representing the interests of a single people. [The sovereign people nation. ] [***]
That decision reflects the Framers' understanding that Members of Congress are chosen by separate
constituencies, but that they become, when elected, servants of the people of the United States.
Justice KENNEDY, concurring: The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of
mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. [by it not under it. ] [***] A
distinctive character of the National Government, the mark of its legitimacy, is that it owes its existence to the act of
104
the whole people who created it. [***] "The people of these United States constitute one nation" and "have a
government in which all of them are deeply interested." But in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court set forth its
authoritative rejection of this idea: "The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by the State
legislatures. But the instrument ... was submitted to the people.... It is true, they assembled in their several States--
and where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking
down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass. Of
consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to
be the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments." 4 Wheat., at 403. U.S.
TERM LIMITS INC. v. THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2). [Today, servants of the People are wild dreamers. ]
If no We the People (the sovereigns) to compose the Constitutional states there can be no "The United States"
As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the
Federal Government. This Court also has recognized this fundamental principle. In Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,
458 (1990), "[w]e beg[a]n with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent
with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause." Over 120
years ago, the Court described the constitutional scheme of dual sovereigns: " '[T]he people of each State compose
a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent
existence,'... '[W]ithout the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States.' GREGORY
v. ASHCROFT, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)(2). [Fraud: U.S. citizens compose "United States". See the people compose a
State: 7 Wall. 71, 74 U.S. 700, 92 U.S. 214, 157 U.S. 429, 193 U.S. 197, 301 U.S. 548, etc. They know what they do Lord. ]
Mr. Justice Harlan announced the affirmance of the decree of the circuit court, and delivered the following opinion:
In Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725, the court remarked 'that 'the people of each state compose a state, having its
own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence,' and that
'without the states in union, there could be no such political body as the United States.' Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 76. Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the states, through their
union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the states, and the
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation
of the Union and the maintenance of the national government.' These doctrines are at the basis of our constitutional
government, and cannot be disregarded with safety. NORTHERN SECURITIES CO. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1903)(2).
Under the Constitution there can be only one.
TRULY 'A' GOVERNMENT 'OF' THE PEOPLE
The Government is of the People, the People are not of government. Impossible to be of an artificial creature.
Notice all of the 'singular' adjectives (the, a, it etc.); distinguished from 'plural' adjectives (their, them, are, etc.).
As Chief Justice John Marshall observed: "The government of the Union, then, ... is, emphatically, and truly, a
government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and
are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 404-405. Fn31
Ours is a "government of the people, by the people, for the people." A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (1863). Fn31.
Cf. Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221, 226 (1920) ("The Constitution of the United States was ordained by the
people, and, when duly ratified, it became the Constitution of the people of the United States"). Compare U.S.
Const., Preamble ("We the People"), with The Articles of Confederation, reprinted in 2 Bailyn 926 ("we the under
signed Delegates of the States"). U.S. TERM LIMITS INC. et al v. THORNTON et al, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2).
Many cases cite the same ever since M’CULLOUGH v. The State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)(2). Truly a government of the
Constitution of We the sovereign People. Not a pretended government of government. They know how to "quote the exact words"
from a previous case when they want to, so nothing is changed, perverted, or pretended out of thin air, by fraud to usurp.
EMPHATICALLY 'A' GOVERNMENT OF LAWS - 'NOT OF MEN' = MOB RULE = DEMOCRACY

Justice STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
“In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), for example, Chief Justice Marshall observed that our
Government "has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." GEBSER v. LAGO
VISTA, 524 U.S. 274 (1998)(2). [A government 'of' laws, and not of men, of men = mob rule = democracy = anarchy =
lawlessness = Godlessness. A government 'of' laws = officer 'of' an office of one of the three great departments of the
Constitution 'of' the People. The Government vs. a government. U.S. = a government of lies not of honest men? ]
"EXISTENCE" OF 'THE' GOVERNMENT WILL BE IMPERILED

The 'existence' of the Government failing to observe the Law 'scrupulously' is anarchy outside the Constitution.
Justice BRENNAN, DOUGLAS and MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
105
Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes added their enormous influence to these precepts in their notable
dissents in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Mr. Justice Brandeis said: 'In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy.' Id., at 485, 48 S.Ct., at 575. UNITED STATES v. CALANDRA, 414 U.S.
338 (1974)(2). ['U.S.' = Democracy = mob rule = anarchy. In contempt of the Law and won't always obey their 'Code'.]
CONNOR, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska) dissenting:

As Mr. Justice Brandeis observed in his classic dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928): ‘In a
a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man (the servants. ) to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.’
In that same case Mr. Justice Holmes said: ‘(W)e must consider the two objects of desire both of which we
cannot have and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that
end that all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and
pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained... . We have to choose, and
for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part... . If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit
the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed.' Unless the exclusionary rule is applied against all forms of official
lawlessness we engage in governmental hypocrisy of the most serious kind. For we are not dealing merely with
ordinary legalities but with fundamental constitutional values of first magnitude. Freedom from unlawful searches
and seizures goes to the very core of our constitutional heritage, encompassing as it does our right to privacy and
to protection from arbitrary governmental intrusion into our lives.
Unless some meaningful consequence follows from the violation of constitutional rights, those rights
become merely a form of words without substantive content. To the extent that we condone official lawlessness
we become parties to the subversion of constitutional rights, and we fail to support and defend the constitution,
which we are sworn to do. [Violating their sworn Oath to obey the Constitution-Law-Truth So Help me God. ] (fn 9)
fn 9. See the opinions of Brennan, J., (dissenting) in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974); People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 (1955) (majority opinion of Traynor, J.), and the dissenting opinion of Peters, J., in In Re
Martinez, 1 Cal.3d 641 (1970). [***]
The principle of judicial refusal to be a party to wrongdoing remains the same. (fn 10)
fn 10. It is notable that some courts exclude illegally obtained evidence even in administrative proceedings, not
criminal in nature. See, e. g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Knoll Associates,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968); Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 268
N.Y.S.2d 433, reversed on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 418 (1967). [***]
As I urged in Dimmick v. State, supra, (dissenting), we must close the courthouse door to evidence
obtained in violation of fundamental constitutional rights. Our failure to do so validates the role of government as
lawbreaker, it betrays our obligation to support and defend the constitutions of the United States and Alaska, and it
renders ineffective one of the most important guarantees necessary to the maintenance of a free society. State v.
Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (1976). [Super betrayed by our servants unbecoming of American officers and gentlemen. ]
LAWLESSNESS BREEDS LAWLESSNESS
As Justice Brandeis warned in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928): "If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ...
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, Id., at 485, (dissenting opinion). [Also 504 U.S. 655, 384 U.S. 436. ]
This principle is no different when the United States applies its rules of conduct to foreign nationals. If we
seek respect for law and order, we must observe these principles ourselves. Lawlessness breeds lawlessness. U.S. v.
VERDUGO, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)(2). [How true. Outside the Constitution = Lawlessness = Anarchy breeds Crime. ]
A SERVANT CAN BE A BEAST AS FEROCIOUS AS A CONCENTRATION CAMP GUARD - ALL LOVERS OF LIBERTY MUST FIGHT
NOONAN, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit) concurring:
A bland American civil servant can be as much of a beast as a ferocious concentration camp guard if he does not
think about what his actions are doing. Single-minded Inspector Javert is a monster, even though he focused only
on his duty. Half the cruelties of human history have been inflicted by conscientious servants of the state. The
mildest of bureaucrats can be a brute if he does not raise his eyes from his task and consider the human beings on
whom he is having an impact.
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TROTT, Circuit Judge, with whom WIGGINS and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges, join, and with whom WALLACE,
Chief Judge, joins in part, dissenting: Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who
have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily shown
a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses
of self-restraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a respect for law
or an appreciation of the rights of others. (Corrupt servants outside the Constitution. ) [***]
Now for judicial philosophy. I borrow some thoughts directly from Professor Philip Kurland: [T]he issue of
discretion versus restraint goes to the very heart of constitutionalism. For it is of the essence of constitutionalism
that all government-not excepting the courts--is to be contained by established principles. The Justices in
espousing the notion that they are the creatures of the higher law and not the creators of it are not indulging myth
so much as they are confronting the paradox implicit in constitutional democracy. The paradox has been described,
if not so labeled, by Charles McIlwain: We live under a written constitution which classifies some things under
jurisdiction, as legal fundamentals, and thus puts them under the protection of the courts, while it leaves other
matters to the free discretion of the organs of positive government it has created. The distribution of these matters
between jurisdiction and gubernaculum, made so many years ago, is of course in constant need of revision by
interpretation or by amendment; and it may also be that the mode of amendment is somewhat too slow and
cumbersome for the best interests of all... . The long and fascinating story of the balancing of jurisdiction and
gubernaculum ... should be, if we could study it with an open mind, of some help in adjusting and maintaining today
the delicate balance of will and law, the central practical problem of politics now as it has been in all past ages. The
two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the
legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed. Philip B.
Kurland, Politics, the Constitution and the Warren Court 8-9 (1970) (quoting Charles McIlwain, Constitutionalism:
Ancient and Modern 145-46 (rev. ed. 1947)). JORDAN v. GARDNER, 986 F.2d 1521 (1992)(2). [Complete! ]
When others impose or force 'their' law-code on us by fraud that is anarchy, especially when each instance is not 'absolutely'
necessary. Even if their code were 'the Law,' if our servants 'in practice' refuse to obey it scrupulously that is anarchy. Democracy =
mob rule = anarchy = lawlessness = Godlessness, no matter how stealthy it is. And when the Law is not strictly upheld based on right,
reason, and the whole Truth pursuant to the Constitution that is anarchy converted into a stealthy weapon 'by men' to enslave the
ignorant masses to steal-crime, who refuse to do justice and then arrogantly claim "it's the Law." We injured no one let us alone.
NOTHING WORSE THAN TO 'DISREGARD THE CHARTER' OF ITS EXISTENCE = CONSTITUTION

MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) joins, dissenting:
I adhere as well to the view that the judiciary must 'avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal
government conduct.' United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). '(I)t is
monstrous that courts should aid or abet the law-breaking police officer. It is abiding truth that '(n)othing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter
of its own existence.'' Harris, supra, 401 U.S., at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting). State of OREGON, v. HASS, 420 U.S.
714 (1975)(2). [Same in 367 U.S. 643. Outside the Constitution = disregard of the charter. They know what they do Lord.]
ALL OFFICERS DERIVED THEIR AUTHORITY FROM THE PEOPLE

RILEY, J. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma) concurring specially:
John C. Calhoun stated that executive patronage "is but a necessary evil; that its tendency where it is not effectually
checked and regulated is to debase and corrupt the community," and that, unless checked, "it is a certain indication
of the near approach of irresponsible and despotic power."
In Federal and State Constitutions, by Stimson, p.7, the passage of sovereignty from the king to Parliament,
and the existence in America of sovereignty in the people themselves, is reviewed. The author points out that the
great principle of separate powers was suggested by the practical working of things in England, but that it had never
been formally embodied in the Constitution of any country except our own, and that it is based upon the principle
that those who make the laws may not administer them, and he who administers them may not judge them, "to
the end that it be a government of laws and not of men." He then says: "Lastly, with us the people are sovereign;
not as in England, the Parliament; nor as in continental countries, the King, and this led logically to the invention
and the functions of our Supreme Court. *** But in England we had the history of the judgments by the courts, of the
King's own acts, and those of his officers under his orders. 'What power the king hath, he hath but by law.' This
English heritage, joined with the logic of our Constitution, led to the creation of our great tribunal. When a people
has granted to its government only certain powers, it may not trust to the wisdom of that government to judge of
its own oversteps. When it has parcelled out those powers between Congress and executive, between federal
government and state, neither branch, neither forum, may safely be entrusted to determine its own power or limit
its own realm." [So absolutely true and prophetic. ] This rule is applicable to the Governor of Oklahoma.
If this were permitted, the frailties of human nature would render it certain that the branch of government
permitted so to do would enlarge its own powers and extend its own realm until all powers were centered on that
branch, and the other branch of government would be entirely stripped of all its legitimate powers. The people of
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this state have by their Constitution said: "All political power is inherent in the people; and government is instituted
for their protection, security, and benefit, and to promote their general welfare; and they have the right to alter or
reform the same whenever the public good may require it: Provided, such change be not repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States." Section 1, art. 2, Constitution.
ANDREWS, J. (specially concurring):
But upon the principle of our government, that the sovereign power of the State resides in the people, and that only
such powers as they have delegated to their functionaries can be exercised, where a claim of power is advanced by
the executive, the question is, not whether the power in question has been granted to the people, but whether it has
been granted to the executive; and if the grant cannot be shown, he has no title to the exercise of the power. [***]
In despotic governments, where the will of the ruler is the law of the land, there is no delay between its
promulgation and execution. The quickening influence of fear, the principle upon which such governments are
founded, reaches every department, and keeps the head of every functionary, from that of the Bashaw to the Cadi,
always in danger. [***]
According to the theory of our government, the people are the sovereign power. All offices are created and
administered for their benefit and convenience, and not for the benefit or convenience of the chief magistrate. All
the officers of government derive their authority directly or indirectly from the people; and an officer, who is to
execute or administer the laws, is not less an officer of the people, nor more an officer of the executive, or the
legislature, because the people have declared, by the Constitution, that he shall receive his appointment through
their instrumentality. In making the appointment, they act as the agents of the people, but when that act is performed,
their agency and authority ceases. WENTZ v. THOMAS, 159 Okla. 124 (1932)(1).
PRETENDED GOVERNMENT: THE OLD SCHEME OF EVIL MEN IMPOSING FRAUD BY GOVERNMENT TO STEAL
I'll bet you never heard about this old scheme of fraud and lawlessness to steal by pretended government = pretended law.
'That hereafter every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United
States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service, excepting the President of the United
States, shall, before entering upon the duties of such office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation:
"I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States
since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to
persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted, not attempted to exercise the
functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I
have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution with the
United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and
ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that
I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter,
so help me God;' &c. EX PARTE GARLAND, 71 U.S. 333 (1866)(2). [Counterfeit = pretended = never created by
the People in Constitutional 'Convention' using deceptively similar names: 'U.S.' - 'U.S. citizen' - 'U.S. Constitution'. ]
PRETENDED GOVERNMENT AN OLD SCHEME OF EVIL FRAUD AND USURPATION - LAWLESSNESS TO STEAL
De facto government without 'right', a government by 'usurpation' founded in "crime", and in violation of "every"
principle of international or municipal "law, right and justice." (How super true it is.)
1 Stat. at Large, 114. 'If any citizen shall commit any piracy or robbery aforesaid, or any act of hostility against the
United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the high seas, under color of any commission from any foreign prince or
state, or any pretence of authority from any person, such offender shall, notwithstanding the pretence of any such
authority, be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be a pirate, felon, and robber; and on being thereof convicted, shall
suffer death.' In United States v. Wiltberger, the court, obiter, says that the sole object of this statute was to reach a
citizen of the United States who depredates on commerce of the United States under color of a foreign commission.
The word 'foreign' here includes, of course, any government other than the United States and especially a
pretended government; and most especially a pretended government in rebellion against our own. 5 Wheat, 76.
Mr. Justice NELSON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
A capture, as defined by some of the most eminent writers on insurance within the policy, is a taking by the enemy
of vessel or cargo as prize, in time of open war, or, by way of reprisal, with intent to deprive the owner of it. This
was probably the primary or original idea attached to the term in these instruments. Losses of ships and cargo
engaged in commerce by the public enemy were the most to be apprehended and provided against. But usage, and
the course of decisions by the courts, have very much widened this meaning, and it now may embrace the taking of a
neutral ship and cargo by a belligerent jure belli; also, the taking forcibly by a friendly power, in time of peace, and
even by the government itself to which the assured belongs. [***]
Another illustration will be found in a capture by a de facto government, which government is defined to
be one in possession of the supreme or sovereign power, but without right--a government by usurpation, founded
perhaps in crime, and in the violation of every principle of international or municipal law, and of right and justice;
yet, while it is thus organized, and in the exercise and control of the sovereign authority, there can be no question
108
between the insurer and the insured as to the lawfulness of the government under whose commission the capture has
been made. If any presumption could properly be indulged as to the perils against which the insured would most
desire to protect himself, it might well be captures by these violent and irregularly constructed nationalities. The
court in the case of Nesbitt v. Lushington, fitly described the character of the government contemplated in the
clause respecting the restraints, &c., of kings, princes, or people, namely: 'the ruling power of the country,' 'the
supreme power,' 'the power of the country, whatever it might be,'-- not necessarily a lawful power or government,
or one that had been adopted into the family of nations. MAURAN v. INSURANCE CO., 73 U.S. 1, 6 Wall. 1
(1867)(1). [How true. Death? For sure eternal damnation to usurpers engaged in crime, fraud, robbery, lawlessness, and
injustice? We must save our servants. First they deceive, next vilify, and at last oppress their masters and makers. ]
FIELD, J. (Supreme Court of the U.S.) [Pretended government outside the Constitution to steal is nothing new. ]
The court said: 'Although they assumed the functions of judges and clerk, and attempted to act as such their acts in
that character are totally null and void, unless they had been regularly appointed under and according to the
constitution. [***] There is no government in action except the government de facto, because all the attributes of
sovereignty have, by usurpation, been transferred from those who had been legally invested with them to others
who, sustained by a power above the forms of law, claim to act, and do act, in their stead. But when the constitution
or form of government remains unaltered and supreme, there can be no de facto department or de facto office.
NORTON v. SHELBY 118 U.S. 425 (1886)(2). [The Constitution of the United States remains supreme. ]
OUR GOVERNMENT HAS IN A 'LARGE' PART BEEN TAKEN AWAY FROM THE PEOPLE - BY ILLEGAL FRAUD
MILLARD, Justice (Supreme Court of Washington) dissenting:
Our government has, as stated by United States Representative Eugene E. Cox, of Georgia, a veteran of twenty-five
years' service in the House, in large part, been taken away from the people of this country and delivered into the
keeping of those not in sympathy with our form of government. Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia said;
'We must bring these administrative rules and orders back within the bounds of due process,' in outlining his
program for a special committee to investigate bureaucratic excesses. He further said: 'Of course, we are at war, and
we must win it. I do not want this country to awaken after we have won the war and find that we have lost the form
of government that was founded here 150 years ago. We should be very careful in this congress to take every step
that is necessary to see that our form of government is preserved during the emergency.'
We must it is the duty of all, especially those who have taken the oath to support the constitution—
actively resist each and every effort to change our form of government. [Amen. Resist the illegal fraud? ]
By enactments of legislative bodies of our country there have been created during the past few years
bureaus and departments to regulate each and every act of each and every human being from the cradle to the
grave. Those enactments purportedly delegate not only legislative power to, but also vest judicial power in, such
bureaus and departments. Judicial power cannot constitutionally be delegated to bureaus, O. P. A., W. L. B., or other
alphabetical bureaus and commissions. SOUTHWEST WASH. PRO. V. FENDER, 21 Wash.2d 349, 150 P.2d 983
(1944)(1). [After 65 years their subjection scam is 100% outside the Constitution. Against the intent of the People. ]
THOU OUTWARDLY IT APPEARS TO BE THE REAL DEAL BUT INSIDE TOTALLY OVERTHROWN
The opinion of the Court was delivered by ROGERS, J. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania):
If the people have thought it right to set limits to legislative power, of what can they complain? They are but
servants of the people, as well as other branches of government, and there is certainly at least as much necessity to
keep them within the legitimate sphere, as the other branches. [***]
As the people, who are the fountain of all power, have in their wisdom distributed the functions of
government into their co-ordinate branches--the legislative power, the executive power, and the judicial power--it is
necessary that each should respect the just rights of the others, and abstain, as far as practicable, from the exercise of
all doubtful authority. In this way, and in this way only, can the harmony of our system be preserved. In this mode,
in the language of the Constitution of the United States, we shall best promote the general welfare and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.
And here let me further remark, (without pretending to any great merit for the prediction), that whenever
the liberty of this people is overthrown, all the forms of the government will be anxiously and carefully preserved.
While the spirit of liberty has fled, its semblance will still remain. Of this truth the fall of the Roman Republic is a
memorable and a useful example. Although the most infamous despotism was established which the world has ever
seen, yet, to all outward appearances, the government continued the same. But the limits of a judicial opinion will
not allow me to pursue this theme by the citation of numerous other examples full of instructive and salutary
warning. And let me also, (without intending the slightest disrespect), recall the attention of the intelligent people of
the Commonwealth to the frightful despotism which raged without control in a neighbouring country, and at a
recent period, under the name and with the apparent sanction of the legislative body. The page of history teems with
examples which incontestably prove that no more convenient or effectual instrument can be devised for the success
of unhallowed ambition than a corrupt legislature and a subservient judiciary. To prevent the evils which would
inevitably result from the overthrow of the government, the equilibrium established by the Constitution must be
109
preserved, and this can only be done by meeting on the threshold the first attempt at encroachment, whether arising
from design, inattention or mistake, come from what branch of the government it may. Commonwealth ex rel
Hepburn v. Mann, 5 Watts. & Serg. 403 (1843)(1). [To succeed they must try to 'appear' to be the lawful government.]
FELONY CRIME - ESPECIALLY TO ENSLAVE TO STEAL AND ABUSE

WIEST, J. (Supreme Court of Michigan):
Act No. 255, Public Acts 1919 (1922 Supp. C. L. ß 15585 [2] et seq.), defines the crime of criminal syndicalism,
specifies acts constituting the offense, and fixes the penalty: [***]
The act under consideration makes the advocacy of the overthrow of the government a felony, and
provides for the punishment of the advocate, and so it is not necessary that there be a real or actual effort to carry
out the program that he advocates.' See, also, People v. Gitlow, 187 N. Y. S. 783, affirmed 234 N. Y. 132; Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U. S. 326. PEOPLE v. RUTHENBERG, 229 Mich. 315 (1924)(1).
THE TALE OF TWO GOVERNMENTS – TODAY THE ONE IS IN NAME ONLY ILLEGALLY ACTING OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION = OVERTHROW
2 GOVERNMENTS: ONE 'OUTSIDE' THE CONSTITUTION = 100% COUNTERFEIT = UNLAWFUL
Thess. 2:9 The coming of the 'lawless' one is according to the workings of Satan with all power and 'lying' wonders.
Math. 22:36-40 (2 great commands): All the law hangs on love. Regarding their System: You know the tree by its fruit.
The true intent of the People is to create 1 Constitution, to form 1 government, and 1 government only.
U.S. System of Federalism= 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person-private mob rule outside the Constitution = Overthrow.
OPINION, FOX, Chief Judge (United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division):
A mere statement of this fact may not seem very significant; corporations, after all, are not supposed to exercise the
governmental powers with which the Bill of Rights was concerned. But this has been radically changed by the
emergence of the public-private state. Today private institutions do exercise governmental power; more, indeed,
than 'government' itself ..... We have two governments in America, then-one under the Constitution and a much
greater one not under the Constitution. MILOSZEWSKI v. SEARS ROEBUCK, 346 F.Supp. 119 (1972)(2). [Welcome
to 'United States' located in D.C., the ruling elite's private System of Federalism = democracy = mob rule composed of
100% Federal non-sovereign 'stateless' U.S. citizens in a pretended private police STATE of TAXES via illegal government
deception acting outside the Constitution imposing private-law = 'Code' statutes and regulations for trade and commerce;
which is not 'the states' composing 'The United States' of the Constitution of the People established in Convention. ]
IF NOT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION BY WHAT AUTHORITY DO THEY EXIST? - IT CANNOT BE!
ALLEN, J. (Supreme Court of North Carolina):
In Mechem on Public Officers, § 1, it is said that an "office" is "a public position to which a portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches for the time being, and which is
exercised for the benefit of the public," and this definition was adopted and approved in a unanimous opinion of this
court in State ex rel. Wooten v. Smith, 145 N. C. 476, and again at this term in the case of Groves v. Barden, [Also In
re RICKER, 29 A. 559 (1890)(1) etc. ] and in the latter case it was also said that the performance of an executive,
legislative, or judicial act is the test of a public office. " [***] The Constitution is the origin and measure of legislative
authority. It says to legislators, Thus far ye shall go, and no farther. [***]" The language of the court in Worthy v.
Barrett, supra, in reference to the Constitution of the United States, is applicable to our own Constitution, as the two
are in this respect practically identical. The court says: "The government of the United States is divided into three
branches-- legislative, judicial, and executive. These three parts make one whole. There is no other part or parcel. It
follows that there can be no office in the government that is not in one of these departments. There can be no officer
unless he be the incumbent of an office. Therefore there can be no officer except he be in some office in one of these
three departments."
If they are not under the Constitution, by what authority do they exist? It cannot be that we are living as to
a part of our government under the Constitution, and as to another part outside the Constitution, without
restrictions or limitations. BICKETT, ATTY. GEN. v. KNIGHT, 169 N.C. 333 (1917). [It cannot be! = Void. ]
Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court: State laws, by combining large masses of men under a
corporate name, cannot repeal the Constitution. MARSHALL v. BALTIMORE R.R. CO., 57 U.S. 314 (1853)(2).
NEITHER THE OFFICERS NOR THE WHOLE PEOPLE CAN OPPOSE THE CONSTITUTION
COX, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Indiana):
In that remote and despotic period when the sovereign king chartered rights and liberties to his subjects, the people,
all governmental powers were assumed to be his by divine right. In him were combined the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of government; he was lawgiver, interpreter, and enforcer; when the powers were executed by
agents, the agents were his and responsible to him alone. On this continent we came to the time when the people, by
revolution, took to themselves sovereignty, and, in exercising supreme political power, chartered governments by
written Constitutions. These organic instruments declared and guaranteed the rights and liberties of the individual,
which had come to the people through centuries of struggle against absolutism in government. The majority was to
110
rule, but under restraints and limitations which preserved to the minority its rights. "By the Constitution which they
establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the
officers of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law." Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) p.56. The government so instituted was
representative of the creator of it, the people. ELLINGHAM Sec. of State v. DYE et al, 178 Ind. 336 (1912)(2).
NOT ENOUGH TO BE AN ORGANIZED BODY - THEY MERELY APPEAR TO BE A STATE = ACTING IN NAME ONLY
It is furnished in 12 Pet., 724, where the court say, speaking of Vermont,--'The people assumed by their own power
the position of a State, and settled the controversy by taking to themselves the disputed territory as the rightful
sovereigns thereof.' 12 Pet., 724. [***]
Mr. Justice WOODBURY (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Hence, two things must unite, in order to justify it. There must be an act of solemnity and importance, such as a
statute, and that statute must be by a State, a member of the Union and a public body, owing obedience and
conformity to its constitution and laws. This seems to have been settled by this court as to the meaning of the word
'State,' where empowering one to bring an action. It must be a member of the Union. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5
Pet., 18. And it is not enough for it to be an organized political body within the limits of the Union.
In conformity with this, where it is required that a party should be a citizen of a different 'State' in order to
give a Circuit Court jurisdiction, it has been held it is not sufficient to be a citizen of the District of Columbia
(Hartshorn v. Wright et al., Pet. C. C., 64; Hepburn et al. v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445), or citizen of a Territory (New
Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat., 90), but the party must belong to a State in the Union, one of the members of the
confederacy. Chief Justice Marshall, in Hepburn et al. v. Ellzey. SCOTT v JONES, 46 U.S. 343 (1847)(2).
HOW TRUE IT IS: OUR SERVANTS REFUSE - TO OBEY THE LAW-CONSTITUTION AND SECURE OUR RIGHTS
The answer which has been given to this argument, does not deny its truth, but insists that confidence is reposed, and
may be safely reposed, in the State institutions; and that, if they shall ever become so insane or so wicked as to seek
the destruction of the government, they may accomplish their object by refusing to perform the functions assigned
to them. COHENS v. VIRGINIA, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)(2). [They 'refuse' to enforce your status and rights etc. ]
PEOPLE PETITIONING TO RESTORE THEIR GOVERNMENT - A STATE CREATED GOVERNMENT= NOT BY CONVENTION
HUGHES, District Judge (United States District Court, S. District Texas, Houston Division):
The school districts have urged that the national government has breached its duty to the state through the districts
because the Constitution says the "United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government...." U.S. CONST. art. IV, ß 4. Ordinarily, a guaranty would be protection from the acts of some third-
party and not from the guarantor itself. The text could be understood to mean that the national government
guarantees that it will not destroy the states' republican governments by its own excesses, but the constitutional role
of the states is balance through federalism, which does not require republican states. A monarchical Nebraska
could counter national power.
If a state's government did not observe the limits on its power that republicanism requires, its imposition
on its people would require a response by the national government. The constitutional guaranty says that the
national government will assist the people of a state in maintaining their right to a state administration whose power
is derived "from the consent of the governed." Rather than a people petitioning Washington to restore the state's
republican institutions, we have a state-created government objecting to a reduction of taxes on its people.
The companies argue, with much legal "authority" on their side, that the guaranty required by the
Constitution of the United States for the benefit of the people of the states cannot be enforced in court. The
occasion to decide whether to enforce the Constitution's limits on the character of state governments does not now
arise, but an unenforceable limit is no limit, and the text of the Constitution is mostly keel and little sail.
The school districts seek shelter from the national omnipresence in the reservation of the power to the
states and people that the people did not actually allocate to the national government in the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. amend. X. Even if the reservation in the Tenth Amendment restates the implication of the restricted grants
that precede it, our experience has shown that the categories of grant have become infinitely expandable; the
founders denied a possible inference that there was a quantum of power floating free for acquisition by the national
government. Since this statute fits squarely within one of the express grants of power, the reservation's express
vesting of residual authority in the people is not implicated.
The form of government may seem like a lawyer's hyper-technicality, but our Constitution restricts power
by allocating it to specific parts of the apparatus and by sheer prohibitions. Other than the implicit policy of
preserving individual liberty through limited government, the Constitution is about methods and process rather
than policies and ends. The structure of the machinery is the Constitution; what it constitutes is a structure. DEER
PARK v. HARRIS CTY APPR DISTRICT, 963 F.Supp. 605 (1997)(3). [They so know about the overthrow. ]
111
GOVERNMENT BY "FRAUD" IS THE BASEST (LOWEST) OF SOCIAL EXISTENCE
O'REAR, J. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky):
Throughout all these efforts to perfect the law this main idea has been kept prominent: to insure an absolutely fair,
untrammeled expression of the choice of the legal voters. It is realized that unless this fountain of all power and
government under the American system is preserved from the control of fraud, the state is imperiled, and
government by the people will be impossible. For government by fraud is the basest of social existence, and is
utterly inconsistent with the idea of government by popular will. The machinery necessary for conducting elections
has been found more or less cumbersome, because of the intricacy required to prevent all manner of frauds--to make
them, as far as practicable, impossible in the first instance. For it is realized that if fraud can triumph at first, so as
to get hold of the functions of government, it would be more difficult to right it, to the extent that its agents or
recipients were to execute the laws to punish it. Therefore the prevention, in preference to the punishment, of frauds,
has been sought with a diligence indicated by the extreme care exacted of all officers in holding elections.
COMMONWEALTH v. COMBS, 120 Ky. 368, 86 S.W. 697 (1905)(1). [How true. It's all fraud-counterfeit. ]
NOT AUTHORIZED TO ABANDON ITS ONLY LEGITIMATE CAPACITY NOR TO ENGAGE IN BUSINESS
ROBINSON, Justice (Supreme Court of Washington):
'When the government abandons its sovereign capacity and seeks to avail itself of its legal rights as a body politic
or artificial person, as fixed by local laws, its rights and remedies are the same as those of the individual.'' [***] A
more careful examination of the opinion of the United States Circuit Court, particularly the following observation
respecting the argument which the majority opinion in the case at bar criticises counsel for invoking as an 'authority,'
would have obviated the criticism: 'A different situation as to the applicability of statutes of limitation is presented
when the government is merely a nominal party, bringing action for the benefit of a third party, United States v.
Fletcher, 8 Cir., 242 F. 818, [155 C.C.A. 406]; Curtner v. United States, 149 U.S. 662; United States v. New Orleans
P. R. Co., 248 U.S. 507; or when the United States steps down from its plane of sovereignty and enters the domain
of business and commerce, such as operating merchant vessels by a Shipping Board, or running railroads, or going
into the insurance business. When this is done, it may well be claimed that it has abandoned its sovereignty and
submitted itself to the same laws that govern individuals engaged in that business. Gould Coupler Co. v. United
States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., D.C., 261 F. 716; The No. 34, D.C., 11 F.2d 287; The Falcon, D.C., 19
F.2d 1009; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U.S. 76.' U.S. v. Miller, supra. *** I took without any mental
reservation an oath to support the constitution of the United States. I cannot, in good conscience, subscribe to the
view that I should unreservedly support that constitution as it is interpreted by others. If I follow an interpretation
which I am convinced erroneously contributes to the movement to change our form of government into other than
a representative republic, I am not supporting the constitution and preserving the safeguards of liberty against all
enemies, domestic and foreign. Yes, I have a vow registered in heaven to preserve the constitution, while those who
urge revolutionary change in our form of government have no such vow registered. Did I not resist each and every
encroachment, the ultimate objective of which is the destruction of liberty under law controlled and carried on
through the institutions of representative government, I would be recreant to God and America; unmindful of the
sacrifices of the founding fathers, and inappreciative of the sufferings of those now undergoing the horrors of the
second world war in order to preserve constitutional safeguards, which some, on the score of expediency or
necessity and in utter disregard of basic legal principles, seek to sweep away. [***] In Federal Land Bank v.
Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, it is said: 'The federal government is one of delegated powers, and from that it
necessarily follows that any constitutional exercise of its delegated powers is governmental. [Everything else is
unconstitutional. ] Graves v. [People of State of] New York ex rel. O'keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477. SOUTHWEST
WASH. v. FENDER, 21 Wash.2d 349 (1944)(1). [The change to private 'services' to profit outside the Constitution.]
INCAPABLE OF LAWFUL TRANSFER TO ANYONE
The powers of government are delegated in trust to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other
parties. They cannot be abandoned or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be hampered, when needed for the public
good, by any considerations of private interest. The exercise of these public trusts is not the subject of barter or
contract. FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)(2). [They delegate functions not power. ]
A CENTURY OF ILLEGALLY DELEGATING AUTHORITY TO "PRIVATE" INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS
The 'administrative' state = 100% mob rule outside the Constitution by (licensed) private individuals providing "services."
4th branch = administrative-executive branch code mob rule by stateless non-sovereign U.S. citizens 'outside' the Constitution.
AUTHORITY ROUTINELY DELEGATED TO 'PRIVATE' INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

Outrageous corruption. The people conferred no power in the Constitution to delegate, much less to 'private individuals.'
Justice WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

The Court heeded this counsel in approving the modern administrative state. The Court's holding today that all
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legislative-type action must be enacted through the lawmaking process ignores that legislative authority is routinely
delegated to the Executive branch, to the independent regulatory agencies, and to private individuals and groups.
"The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century....
They have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal
theories ...". Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J. dissenting). I.N.S. v.
CHADA, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)(2). [The people did not delegate power to delegate, much less to 'independent' agencies,
'private' individuals, and groups = private companies and for profit corporations = administrative STATE outside the Law.]
FANSLER, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Indiana):

'A ministerial act is defined to be 'one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the
propriety of the act being done.'' Page 578 of 72 Ind. The above case was cited with approval in French v. State ex
rel. Harley, 1895, 141 Ind. 618, which we will later discuss, and in Ellingham, et al. v. Dye, 1912, 178 Ind. 336.
The word 'administrative' is sometimes loosely used as synonymous with 'executive,' but it is clear that it
was not so used in the Constitution, for to conclude that it was is to conclude that two executive departments were
established or two administrative departments, as the case may be. More strictly and correctly, the word
'administrative' is synonymous with 'ministerial.' They stem from the word 'minor,' meaning 'inferior in bulk,
degree, importance, etc.; less, smaller; as, minor divisions; of minor importance.' See Webster's New International
Dictionary. 'Minister' is the next form of the word, and we note in the quotation from State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble,
supra, page 357 of 118 Ind., page 247, that Lord Bacon is referred to as using the expression 'ministers and
assistants' to describe those who assisted in performing sovereign functions. 'Ministerial' pertains to minister, and
'administrative' pertains to the same word. It is noted that administrative state officers were treated and considered
as ministerial officers in Gray, Governor, et al. v. State ex rel. Coghlen, supra. They were the officers referred to in
the statement that (page 578 of 72 Ind.): 'Any power or authority vested by legislation in the Governor, together with
other officers or persons, in which they are to have an equal voice with him, can not be executive, as he alone is
vested with the executive power of the State.'
In our Constitution the powers of the government are divided into three; (1) the legislative power is
vested in the General Assembly; (2) the judicial power is vested in the courts; but (3) the executive power is vested
in the Governor alone. These are all the powers of the government. The administrative officers were vested with
no powers. It is provided that: 'They shall perform such duties as may be enjoined by law ***.' TUCKER v. STATE,
218 Ind. 614 (1941)(2). [Administrative state-private companies exercise no sovereign power, only duty-authority. ]
INDEED, MOST OF THEM INTERPRETED "DEMOCRACY AS MOB RULE"

U.S. Democracy = private non-sovereign authority = mob rule (global) = Anarchy = Lawlessnes = Godlessness = Satanic?
Justice HARLAN (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

'The assemblage at the Philadelphia Convention was by no means committed to popular government, and few of the
delegates had sympathy for the habits or institutions of democracy. Indeed, most of them interpreted democracy as
mob rule and assumed that equality of representation would permit the spokesmen for the common man to outvote
the beleaguered deputies of the uncommon man.' WESBERRY v. SANDERS, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)(2). [Constitutional
republic v. democracy = ruled outside the Constitution = stealthy mob rule by ruling elite = public policy = code. ]
CANNOT ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY - EVIL TENDENCIES OF DEMONCRACY - BLOODSHED AND HORROR BY DEMOCRACY
Booth, Chief Justice (Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware):
The powers of government in the United States are derived from the people, who are the origin and source of
sovereign authority. The framers of the Constitution of the United States, and of the first constitution of this State,
were men of wisdom, experience, disinterested patriotism, and versed in the science of government. They had been
taught by the lessons of history, that equal and indeed greater dangers resulted from a pure democracy, than from
an absolute monarchy. Each leads to despotism. Wherever the power of making laws, which is the supreme power
in a State, has been exercised directly by the people under any system of polity, and not by representation, civil
liberty has been overthrown. Popular rights and universal suffrage, the favorite theme of every demagogue, afford,
without constitutional control or a restraining power, no security to the rights of individuals, or to the permanent
peace and safety of society. In every government founded on popular will, the people, although intending to do
right, are the subject of impulse and passion; and have been betrayed into acts of folly, rashness and enormity, by
the flattery, deception, and influence of demagogues. A triumphant majority oppresses the minority; each
contending faction, when it obtains the supremacy, tramples on the rights of the weaker: the great aim and objects of
civil government are prostrated amidst tumult, violence and anarchy; and those pretended patriots, abounding in all
ages, who commence their political career as the disinterested friends of the people, terminate it by becoming their
tyrants and oppressors. History attests the fact, that excesses of deeper atrocity have been committed by a
vindictive dominant party, acting in the name of the people, than by any single despot. In modern times, the scenes
of bloodshed and horror enacted by the democracy of revolutionary France, in the days of her short-lived,
misnamed republic, shocked the friends of rational liberty throughout the civilized world. There, in the midst of the
113
most refined and polished nation of Europe, the guillotine dispensed with the forms of law as unmeaning pageants;
and under the capricious mandates of popular frenzy, running wild in pursuit of the phantom of a false, licentious
liberty, "suspicion filled their prisons, and massacre was their gaol delivery." [***] Mr. Edmund Randolph, of
Virginia, observed, "that the object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States labored; that in
tracing these evils to their origin, every man found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy; that some check,
therefore, was to be sought for, against this tendency of our governments; and that a good Senate seemed most
likely to answer the purpose." In the debates on the federal constitution in the Virginia convention, Mr. Madison,
always the advocate of popular rights, subject to the wholesome restraints of law, remarked, "that turbulence,
violence, and abuse of power, by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and
commotions; and that these in republics, more frequently than any other cause, have produced despotism." "If," he
observes, "we go over the whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their destruction to have
generally resulted from those causes. If we consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and go to the sources
of that diversity of sentiment which pervades its inhabitants, we shall find great danger to fear that the same causes
may terminate here, in the same fatal effects which they produced in those republics." To guard against these
dangers and the evil tendencies of a democracy, our republican government was instituted by the consent of the
people. The characteristic which distinguishes it from the miscalled republics of ancient and modern times, is, that
none of the powers of sovereignty are exercised by the people; but all of them by separate, co- ordinate branches of
government in whom those powers are vested by the constitution. These co-ordinate branches are intended to
operate as balances, checks and restraints, not only upon each other, but upon the people themselves; to guard them
against their own rashness, precipitancy, and misguided zeal; and to protect the minority against the injustice of
the majority. [***] Having thus transferred the sovereign power, the people cannot resume or exercise any portion
of it. To do so, would be an infraction of the constitution, and a dissolution of the government. Nor can they
interfere with the exercise of any part of the sovereign power, except by petition, remonstrance, or address. They
have the power to change or alter the constitution; but this can be done only in the mode prescribed by the
instrument itself. The attempt to do so in any other mode is revolutionary. And although the people have the
power, in conformity with its provisions, to alter the constitution; under no circumstances can they, so long as the
Constitution of the United States remains the paramount law of the land, establish a democracy, or any other than
a republican form of government. It is equally clear, that neither the legislative, executive, nor judicial departments,
separately, nor all combined, can devolve on the people, the exercise of any part of the sovereign power with which
each is invested. The assumption of a power to do so, would be usurpation. The department arrogating it, would
elevate itself above the constitution; overturn the foundation on which its own authority rests; demolish the whole
frame and texture of our republican form of government, and prostrate every thing to the worst species of tyranny
and despotism, the ever varying will of an irresponsible multitude. RICE v FOSTER, 4 Del. 479 (1847)(1).
DEMOCRACY: ABUSE OF POWER BY MAJORITY TRAMPLING ON RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY RESULTS IN DESTRUCTION
BELL, J. ( Supreme Court of Pennsylvania): Athens once possessed a government in a measure representative; but
the decrees of its senate were subject to the supervision of the popular assemblies of the citizens, who, by
progressive innovations, entirely changed the nature of the constitution, and introduced corruption, anarchy, and
final destruction. [***] The American Revolution introduced a new feature into the science of government, before
speculated upon by theorists, but then, for the first time, formally and solemnly announced as constituting an
important element in the political constitution of a nation. It is, in the language of our own bill of rights, in this
respect, but an echo of prior declarations, that "all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness." But though it was thus proclaimed,
that the sovereign power resided in the body of the people, and that the only legitimate end of government is the
promotion of their welfare, the utter impracticability of a personal and immediate exercise of this power by them, in
the administration of the affairs of government, forbade the idea of a pure democracy. [***] In the course of the
debates on the federal constitution, in the Virginia convention, he remarked, "that turbulence, violence, and abuse of
power by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and commotions, and these,
in republics, more frequently than any other cause, have produced despotism." And, again, he observed, "if we go
into the whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their destruction to have generally resulted
from these causes. PARKER v. COMMONWEALTH, 6 Pa. 507 (1847)(2). [Democracy: Illegal mob rule via the elite.]
'NEW' FORM OF (SO CALLED) GOVERNMENT

Which might best be labeled an 'administocracy'= rule by U.S. 'licensed administrative agencies' = private companies.
The never created in Convention (de facto) private STATE = mob rule = against the Constitution and 'true' intent of the People.
MIANO, J. (Superior Court of Connecticut):

In Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976), our Supreme Court explained:
"Individual rights and remedies must at times and of necessity give way to the interests and needs of society. If the
law is to continue on the path of homogeneity to be the means of order in the complex social scheme of our growing
populace, the legislature must be allowed to create alternate remedies for ills where the machinery of justice [The
114
Judiciary. ]is so burdened that justice is denied to many. We are in an age of the nascence of a new form of
government, which might best be labeled an 'administocracy'--rule by administrative agencies. Even the legislature
branch of government, both state and federal, must so delegate many of its tasks or fail to provide the people all that
their government should." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 308, 363 A.2d 1. *** The dictionary definition of "department"
is "a major administrative division [executive. ] of a government" as defined in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary (10th Ed.1993). HARTFORD CTY. SHERIFF DEPT. v. BLUMENTHAL, 47 Conn.Supp. 447 (2001)(2).
[Covertly saying the overthrow of the Government by private persons = private companies-for profit corporations = mob
rule. 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless private officials: Just doin my job: 18 USC ch. 115 Sedition & Rebellion? ]
PRIVATE ZONE - TWILITE ZONE - FEDERAL ZONE - CORRUPTION ZONE - OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION ZONE
Alaska Statute 45.77.020(3) "public corporation" means the State of Alaska...; Title 45 = Trade and Commerce, Chapter 77
= Foreign Trade Zone. D-U-N-S US company number 07-819-8783 its Federal Employer Identication number (EIN) 92-6001185;
see IRS.gov "EIN" used to identify a business, Form SS-4. The never created by the People in Convention 'STATE OF …' Inc.
Violating of the principles of the Declaration of Independence: Creating jurisidictions foreign to our Constitutions: overthrow.
Justice GRIER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
In courts of law, an act of incorporation and a corporate name are necessary to enable the representatives of a
numerous association to sue and be sued. 'And this corporation can have no legal existence out of the bounds of the
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law and by force of the law; and where that
law ceases to operate the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation.' Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 512. MARSHALL v. BALTIMORE R.R., 57 U.S. 314 (1853)(2). [Apply that to their
System of Federalism deceptively styled 'United States' in the D.C., and its so called STATES-corporations. ]
A 'FOREIGN' TRADE ZONE IS IN BUT TREATED AS IF 'OUTSIDE' THE UNITED STATES

HUGHES, District Judge (United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division):
A foreign trade zone is an area that is physically within the United States, but it is treated as if it were outside of the
United States territory for import duty purposes. Since 1934, federal law has permitted importation of goods into
zones without payment of customs duties until they are transferred from the zone into the general domestic
economy. If the products are shipped to another country, then no American duty is charged. See The Foreign Trade
Zones Act of 1934, 19 U.S.C. ß ß 81a-81u (1996). DEER PARK v. HARRIS COUNTY, 963 F.Supp. 605 (1997)(3).
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IS 'BY THE CONSTITUTION' NOT BY FORCE OR "FRAUD!"

OLIPHANT, J. (Supreme Court of New Jersey ) dissenting:
A person cannot truly swear and affirm an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and this State and
believe in its overthrow by force or violence, without doing so with a mental reservation or a purpose of evasion. It
is a principle of our constitutions that a change in the organization of our government is to be effected by the orderly
procedures ordained by the constitutions and not by force or fraud. Dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Stone,
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 181. Nothing in the majority opinion or the subject matter of that case
is contrary to or inconsistent with what I have said here. IMBRIE et al v. MARSH et al, 3 N.J. 578 (1950)(2). [How
true it is. By Constitutional amendment, not by usurpation via 'fraud' against the true intent of the People = Overthrow.]
THE 'VERY' POINT WHERE THE LAW ENDS TYRANNY BEGINS - OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION = TYRANNY
Magistrates are 'subjects' and 'only' delegated with authority as the 'servants' of God or of the People.
RILEY, J. [Apply this case to the cases we are ruled by executive branch private stateless non-sovereigns. ]
When executive act preceded the law, or determination of what the law is (when determination is involved in court
as in these causes), we are afforded an example of tyranny. William Pitt expressed it in another dimension when he
said: "Where the law ends Tyranny begins." It will be remembered that when free governments superseded the
hereditary sovereignties of Greece, all who obtained absolute power in a state were called tyrants, for the term
regards the irregular way in which the power was gained, whether by force or fraud, as well as the manner of the
exercise of the power. Webster's Int. Dict.
Should we recognize this power to rule by executive orders in one case, we should in all. The acts and
deeds of this court are declaratory of the permanent rule of law. It must be so, for, as Edmund Burke pointed out:
"The vice of ancient democracies, and one of the causes of their ruin: that they ruled by occasional decrees, which
broke in upon the tenor and consistency of their laws."
Consequently, should this court recognize the superseding of a pending determination of law by an
executive order proclaiming the law, there is no telling the consequences. In its inception it is an executive
despotism, and the result is beyond our conception of government. Opposition to despotic government is so
ingrafted in the Anglo-Saxon mind that it cannot be countenanced as a rule over such people.
Authority leads to love of power. The recorded struggle to hold within limits of law the power granted is
the history of the English people. That struggle began within 50 years after the conquest. What is probably the oldest
constitutional document in English history-a writ in the reign of John (1204) establishes that then there was a higher
authority than that of even the King, and it was his council of advisors (Report on the Dignity of a Peer of the
115
Realm, vol. 1, p. 54). In a Medieval Year Book an authority over even a king was recognized: "The law is the
highest inheritance which the King has, for if there were no law, there would be no King, and no inheritance."
Burke recognized limitations upon the power of King George III, when, in speaking upon the Excise Bill to
levy tax upon the American Colonies, he said: "The poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of
the Crown; it may be frail, its roof may shake, the storm and rain may enter, but the King of England may not
enter." It may have been that King George had before him the example of his cousin, Frederick the Great, in his
object of making all of his ministers dependent on him (Enc. Brit. 4-827), rather than constituting them members of
a party acting together in pursuance of a common policy. Howbeit, as Viscount Morley remarks: Not every one can
draw the bow of Ulysses. Moreover, the English people cannot long endure a government possessed of the spirit of
the bayonet. The people of Oklahoma have indicated on at least two occasions their ineptitude for the Spirit of
Martial Law. [***] [Today: ruled by a executive War powers and emergency rule government outside the Law. ]
The Governor is bound by the law, as enacted by the people and as interpreted by their courts. "Whether
God or the people be regarded as ruler (source of power) their authority must be exercised by some intermediate
persons, either priests or magistrates. These latter belong personally to the class of subjects, and they exercise only
delegated authority as the servants of God or of the people. They cannot therefore be regarded as real rulers, who
are unable to act in person. They are constantly forced to refer to a superior power (the law) [of the Constitution of
the People. ] which itself rules them, and which confers upon them an authority that they do not possess in
themselves." The Theory of the State, p. 340, Oxford 1892. In re INITIATIVE PETITION NO. 112 STATE
QUESTION, 154 Okla. 257 (1932)(1). [Hence, no Law of a sovereign, no lawful government. Hence, CODE. ]
ADVENT (SAVIOR) AND TRIUMPH (VICTORY) OF THE "ADMINISTRATIVE STATE"

Their confession that "all" recognized classifications (of the Constitution) have broken down = Overthrow.
'United States,' or more properly the 'Executive' Departments (Private Companies) = Overthrow.
Justice WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

The Court, acting in the name of separation of powers, takes upon itself to strike down the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act, one of the most novel and far-reaching legislative responses to a national crisis since the New Deal.
[***] In an earlier day, in which simpler notions of the role of government in society prevailed, it was perhaps
plausible to insist that all "executive" officers be subject to an unqualified Presidential removal power, see Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); but with the advent and triumph of the administrative state and the
accompanying multiplication of the tasks undertaken by the Federal Government, the Court has been virtually
compelled to recognize that Congress may reasonably deem it "necessary and proper" to vest some among the broad
new array of governmental functions in officers who are free from the partisanship that may be expected of agents
wholly dependent upon the President.
(fn2). The Solicitor General appeared on behalf of the "United States," or, more properly, the Executive
Departments, which intervened to attack the constitutionality of the statute that the Chief Executive had earlier
endorsed and signed into law. [***] [No such thing as "United States" established by the People in Convention. ]
Thus, although the Court in Humphrey's Executor found the use of the labels "quasi- legislative" and
"quasi-judicial" helpful in "distinguishing" its then- recent decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, (1926),
these terms are hardly of any use in limiting the holding of the case; as Justice Jackson pointed out, "[t]he mere
retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down,
and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a
disordered bed. [unlawful government. ]" FTC v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 487-488, (1952) (dissenting). BOWSHER
v. SYNAR, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)(2). ['The U.S.' is broken down by men engaged in confusion by 'U.S.' ]
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Administrative law is a separate and distinct branch = private copyright 'Code' statutes.
It is not common law, equity, or admiralty law = private Code outside the Constitution = Lawlessness.
BLAKE, Justice (Supreme Court of Washington):
Colonel O. R. McGuire, a member of the [anti-] American Bar Association's special committee on administrative
law, in an article published in 26 Georgetown Law Journal, 574, 589, says: ' *** administrative law is a separate and
distinct branch of the law. It is not common law, equity, or admiralty law ***. The court has recognized the principle
with respect to the industrial insurance act that controversies arising under it are controlled by "special statutory
proceedings exercised in derogation of, or not according to, the course of the common law." Nafus v. Department
of Labor and Industries, 142 Wash. 48, 52. BOWEN v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 148 (1942)(1). [Same in
STATE v. LINSTROM, 191 P.2d 1009 (1948). Meaning not under the Constitution (= Not in Law, Equity, or Admiralty and
Maritime jurisdiction = In private copyright 'Code' statutes = Overthrow. Ruled in their private System of Federalism.]
EVERYWHERE - THE EXECUTIVE "ADMINISTRATIVE STATE" - VITAL CONCERN TO THE PEOPLE

Justice KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is a principal concern of the court system in any State to define and maintain a proper balance between the State's
courts on one hand, and its officials and administrative agencies on the other. This is of vital concern to States.
As the Idaho State Attorney General has explained: "Everywhere a citizen turns--to apply for a life-sustaining
116
public benefit, to obtain a license, to respond to a complaint--it is [administrative law] that governs the way in
which their contact with state government will be carried out." EchoHawk, Introduction to Administrative Procedure
Act Issue, 30 Idaho L.Rev. 261 (1994). IDAHO v. COEUR d’ALENE TRIBE, 521 U.S. 261 (1999)(2).
CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES NO 'THIRD' CLASS, 'PART' CIVIL AND 'PART MILITARY'
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion:
Although Winthrop, in his treatise, states that the Constitution 'clearly distinguishes the military from the civil class
as separate communities' and 'recognizes no third class which is part civil and part military--military for a
particular purpose or in a particular situation, and civil for all other purposes and in all other situations *** ,'
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1896), 145, [***] The Constitution is an organic scheme of
government to be dealt with as an entirety. A particular provision cannot be dissevered from the rest of the
Constitution. REID v. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)(2). [They are talking about a third class because a U.S. military
war powers government with a capacity over private sector is not suppose to exist, but does by illegal deception. ]
2 GOVERNMENTS - ONE OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION

Follow the "status": The 1 and only "We the People" created the 1 and only Constitution of the United States forms the 1 and only
Government of 'the United States' and 1 You. There can be only 1! Anything else is "pretend" by government deception.
The 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person "voter status" elects 1 President, 1 governor of the STATE, etc. who are Federal
Taxpayers proving they are all in their System of Federalism outside the Constitution. Hence, the System's deceptively similar names
and phrases (true but not correct) to appear (by false impression) they are "the" Government of the Constitution of the People of God.
"The United States of America" = the name of the Country

The formal proper name of 'the several states' composing 'The United States of America.' There can be only 1!
The free Government under the Constitution vs. Their contrary pretended System of government outside the Constitution
Established by the People in Convention Never established by the People in Convention nor created in Law.
'The United States' of America 'United States' (located in) of the District of Columbia = Overthrow.
'the Government of the United States' United States Government a.k.a. U.S. Government.
Constitutional Republic to secure our all Democracy-mob rule. A pretended government to steal our all using code.
this (American) Union = Freedom Federal Union a.k.a. United States located in D.C. = Bondage
'the States' compose The U.S. 'STATES' of United States composed of 100% Federal stateless persons.
2 NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS - OVER A CENTURY OF GOVERNMENT DECEPTION

Thess. 2:9 The coming of the lawless one is according to the working of Satan with all power, signs, and lying wonders.
The idea prevails with some--indeed, it found expression in arguments at the bar--that we have in this country
substantially or practically two national governments; one to be maintained under the Constitution, with all its
restrictions; the other ["United States" ] to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument,
by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to exercise. DOWNS v. BIDWELL, 182
U.S. 244 (1901)(2). [How true it is. Outside the Constitution ruling over us as business entities. ]
THE MERE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE MUST SHOW THEIR AUTHORITY - UPON WHAT POSTULATES?
The opinion of the court (Supreme Court of Pennslyvania) was delivered by AGNEW, Chief Justice:
There is no subject more momentous or deeply interesting to the people of this state than an assumption of absolute
power by their servants. [***] Struck by the danger, and prompted by self-interest, they will at once distinguish
between their own rights and the powers they commit to others. These rights it is, the judiciary is called in to
maintain. [***] The people having challenged their power to set a government over them at will, the agents must
show their authority to do this. [***] Limits must be set to power. Liberty demands absolute security. No people
can be safe in the presence of a divine right to rule or of self-imputed sovereignty in their servants to bind them
without ratification. [***] Who will predict what effects may be produced by combinations foreign to the purpose
which actuated the call? The fundamental rights of the people, the true principles of civil liberty, the nature of
delegated power, and the liability of the people to temporary commotion, all rise up in earnest protest against such
a doctrine of imputed sovereignty in the mere servants of the people. Wood’s Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874)(4).
TWO GOVERNMENTS OVER THE PEOPLES 'SUBJECT' TO THE JURISDICTION
Ambition to become the dominant political power in 'all the earth.' (N.W.0.?) – Justice Harlan is prophetic?

Three members of the court, constituting the majority, who concurred in the judgment in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.
S. 244, 288, 289, 291, 292, distinctly held that 'the government of the United States was born of the Constitution,'
and that all the powers enjoyed by it, or which it may exercise, must be derived, either expressly or by implication,
from that instrument; that that instrument, in respect of every function of the government, 'is everywhere and at all
times potential, in so far as its provisions are applicable;' that wherever a power is given by the Constitution, and a
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limitation imposed upon its exercise, 'such restriction operates upon and confines every action on the subject within
its constitutional limits;' that, 'as Congress, in governing the territories, is subject to the Constitution, it results that
all the limitations of the Constitution which are applicable to Congress in exercising this authority necessarily limit
its power on this subject;' that 'every provision of the Constitution which is applicable to the territories is also
controlling therein;' and that 'in the case of the territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the
Constitution is invoked, the question which arises is not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-
evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable.' [Super emphasis added. Their System of Federalism is
essentially inapplicable to a stateless non-sovereign U.S. citizen acting as business entity of D.C. ] [***]
Can it be that the Constitution is the supreme law in the states of the Union, in the organized territories of
the United States, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and in the District of Columbia, and yet was not, prior to
the act of 1900, the supreme law in territories and among peoples situated as were the territory and people of
Hawaii, and over which the United States had acquired all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind? A negative
answer to this question, and a recognition of the principle that such an answer involves, would place Congress
above the Constitution. It would mean that the benefit of the constitutional provisions designed for the protection
of life and liberty may be claimed by some of the people subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the United
States, but cannot be claimed by others equally subject to its authority and jurisdiction. It would mean that the will
of Congress, not the Constitution, is the supreme law of the land for certain peoples and territories under our
jurisdiction. It would mean that the United States may acquire territory be cession, conquest, or treaty, and that
Congress may exercise sovereign dominion over it, outside of and in violation of the Constitution, and under
regulations that could not be applied to the organized territories of the United States and their inhabitants. It would
mean that, under the influence and guidance of commercialism and the supposed necessities of trade, this country
had left the old ways of the fathers, as defined by a written constitution, and entered upon a new way, in following
which the American people will lose sight of, or become indifferent to, principles which had been supposed to be
essential to real liberty. It would mean that, if the principles now announced should become firmly established, the
time may not be far distant when, under the exactions of trade and commerce, and to gratify an ambition to become
the dominant political power in all the earth, the United States will acquire territories in every direction, which are
inhabited by human beings, over which territories, to be called 'dependencies' or 'outlying possessions,' we will
exercise absolute dominion, and whose inhabitants will be regarded as 'subjects' or 'dependent peoples,' to be
controlled as Congress may see fit, not as the Constitution requires nor as the people governed may wish. Thus will
be engrafted upon our republican institutions, controlled by the supreme law of a written Constitution, a colonial
system entirely foreign to the genius of our government and abhorrent to the principles that underlie and pervade
the Constitution. It will then come about that we will have two governments over the peoples subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States,--one, existing under a written Constitution, creating a government with authority
to exercise only powers expressly granted and such as are necessary and appropriate to carry into effect those so
granted; the other, existing outside of the written Constitution, in virtue of an unwritten law, to be declared from
time to time by Congress, which is itself only a creature of that instrument. [***] '[***] Those great and good men
foresaw that troublous times would arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by
sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional
liberty would be in peril unless established by irrepealable law. The history of the world had taught them that what
was done in the past might be attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times,
and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.' HAWAII v.
MANKICHI, 190 U.S. 197 (1903)(2). [Covert War: illegitimate excuses to break the Law to screw the people? ]
Undeniable: In quotes: "the United States", and "United States" = 100% Counterfeit
'the United States' limited to ' the states' of 'the Union'
'United States' limited to 'States' of the 'Federal Union' a.k.a. 'STATEs of United States' distinguished from the States-
under the Constitution of the People. Deceptively similar names = fraud. Woe unto you Lawyers.
TANG, Senior Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit):
In the Insular Cases the Supreme Court decided that the territorial scope of the phrase "the United States" as used in
the Constitution is limited to the states of the Union. [***]
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court compared the language of the revenue clause ("all duties ... shall be
uniform throughout the United States") with that of the Thirteenth Amendment (prohibiting slavery "within the
United States, or in any place subject to their jurisdiction" [plural. ]) and the Fourteenth Amendment (extending
citizenship to those born "in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" [singular. ]). Id. At 251
(emphasis added). The Court emphasized that the language of the Thirteenth Amendment demonstrates that "there
may be places within the jurisdiction of the United States that are no part of the Union." Id. [Emphasis added. ] In
comparison, the Fourteenth Amendment has "a limitation to persons born or naturalized in the United States which
is not extended to persons born in any place 'subject to their jurisdiction.' " Id. (emphasis added). Like the revenue
clauses, the Citizenship Clause has an express territorial limitation which prevents its extension to every place
over which the government exercises its sovereignty. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 291
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(1990) (Brennan, dissenting) (distinguishing Downes holding regarding the revenue clauses, because the Fourth
Amendment [judicial Court 'Warrant.' ] "contains no express territorial limitations").
The Downes Court further stated: "[I]n dealing with foreign sovereignties, the term 'United States' has a
broader meaning than when used in the Constitution, and includes all territories subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal government, wherever located." Downes, 182 U.S. at 263. In other words, as used in the Constitution, the
term "United States" does not include all territories subject to the jurisdiction of the United States government. See
also Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 588 (1976), citing
H.R.Rep. No. 249, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1900) ("upon reason and authority the term 'United States' as used in
the Constitution, has reference only to the States that constitute the Federal Union and does not include the
Territories.") [The Federal Union = 'United States' located in D.C. = System of Federalism = counterfeit-fraud. ]
It is thus incorrect to extend citizenship to persons living in United States territories simply because the
territories are "subject to the jurisdiction" or "within the dominion" of the United States, because those persons are
not born "in the United States" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. [***]
We hasten to add that if the plaintiffs were entitled to citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, this
would not conflict with Congress' constitutional power to regulate naturalization, as urged by the government. The
power to confer citizenship through naturalization does not confer the power to take citizenship away. See Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 703 (Congress has no authority to restrict the effect of citizenship by birth); Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (same) [***]
Focusing upon the phrases "within the territory" and "within the dominions," the dissent concludes that
persons born in territories of the United States are born "in the United States." As previously discussed, the Supreme
Court has already interpreted the territorial scope of the phrase "the United States" as used in the Constitution as
limited to the states of the Union. ['the states' plural, lower case 's' in 'states.' Emphasis added. ]. RABANG v. I.N.S.,
35 F.3d 1449 (1992)(3). [Undeniably citing 2 different governments in 'quotes.' Obviously the names must be
'deceptively similar' to deceive those ignorant of the Law and the principle there can be only 1 lawfully. ]
'the several states' only

The members of the American Confederacy 'only' are 'the states' contemplated in the Constitution: The several
states = Maine, Virginia, Minnesota, Georgia etc. (the Lands-countries) composing 'The United States of America.'
Chief Justice MARSHALL (the supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
This is true. But as the act of congress obviously uses the word 'state' in reference to the term as used in the
constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state in the sense of that instrument. The result
of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated
in the constitution. HEPBURN v. ELLZEY, 6 U.S. 445 (1805)(2). [Pre civil war 'the state', post civil war 'State'. ]
11th Amendment: 'one' of the United States

In the Constitution itself (+ political status of the nation) proves the deception. 'The United States' are plural not singular.
Justice KENNEDY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: The text and history of
the Eleventh Amendment also suggest that Congress acted not to change but to restore the original constitutional
design. Although earlier drafts of the Amendment had been phrased as express limits on the judicial power granted
in Article III, see, e.g., 3 Annals of Congress 651-652 (1793) ("The Judicial Power of the United States shall not
extend to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States ..."), the adopted text
addressed the proper interpretation of that provision of the original Constitution, see U.S. Const., Amdt. 11 ("The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States ..."). By its terms, then, the Eleventh Amendment did not redefine the
federal judicial power but instead overruled the Court: "This amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate
sovereignty of the whole country, superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the decision of the
Supreme Court. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [We the People the supreme power, are waking up! ]
"the United States" CONSISTENTLY PLURAL IN THE CONSTITUTION
Justice THOMAS, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice O'CONNOR, Justice SCALIA (Supreme Court of the U.S.) join dissenting:
The ringing initial words of the Constitution--"We the People of the United States"--convey something of the same
idea. (In the Constitution, after all, "the United States" is consistently a plural noun. See Art. I, ß 9, cl. 8; Art. II, ß
1, cl. 7; Art. III, ß 2, cl. 1; Art. III, ß 3, cl. 1; [***]. The Preamble that the Philadelphia Convention approved
before sending the Constitution to the Committee of Style is even clearer. It began: "We the people of the States
of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia...." [the states. ] TERM
LIMITS INC. v. THORNTON l, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2). [How true: "the United States" in quotes. ]
According to the rules of proper English grammar the first letter of a proper name is always capitalized. Examples of the names
of the true governments: 'The State of Minnesota,' or 'The Commonwealth of Virginia,' or 'The Republic of Texas' etc. The various
names of the country or land, i.e. Virginia, Texas etc. have defined surveyed 'boundaries prescribed by Law' to ascertain the right to
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exercise territorial jurisdiction over the land. The "status" of the Nation reveals the distinction between the de jure and de facto.
13th Amend. = SUBJECT TO THEIR JURISDICTION vs. 14th Amend. = SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION
The designation thus given to the United States as 'herself' in a pleading drawn by one of their attorneys is open to
criticism, the Civil War, the United States have always been designated in the plural; thus, article 3, ß 3, declares
that 'treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort;' and article 13, adopted since the Civil War, declares that 'neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist in the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.' STANLEY v. SCHWALBY, 147 U.S. 508
(1893)(3). [Whereas the 14th Amendment reads: "and subject to the jurisdiction" (singular instead of plural). ]
ULTIMATELY DESTROYING "the United States."
Avowed Soviet purpose of substituting here a totalitarian dictatorship.
The United States vs. "United States"
Our "Constitutional Republic" vs. Their "Democracy" (mob rule) outside the Constitution.
Justice WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The drafters of the 1951 Subversive Activities Act stated to the Washington Legislature that '(t)he (Communist
Party) dovetailed, nation-wide program is designed to *** create unrest and civil strife, and impede the normal
processes of state and national government, all to the end of weakening and ultimately destroying the United States
as a constitutional republic and thereby facilitating the avowed Soviet purpose of substituting here a totalitarian
dictatorship.' First Report of the Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities in
Washington State, 1948, p. IV. BAGGETT v. BULLITT, 377 U.S. 360 (1964)(2). [Take heed the un-American anti-
Christ do not deceive you. They're hereeeeeee. And have been here for quite awhile, working hard to destroy us. ]
How true it is: STATE within a state. COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP WITHIN A REPUBLIC
Justice JACKSON (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:
In more recent times these problems have been complicated by the intervention between the state and the citizen of
permanently organized, well-financed, semisecret and highly disciplined political organizations. Totalitarian
groups here and abroad perfected the technique of creating private paramilitary organizations to coerce both the
public government and its citizens. These organizations assert as against our Government all of the constitutional
rights and immunities of individuals and at the same time exercise over their followers much of the authority which
they deny to the Government. The Communist Party realistically is a state within a state, an authoritarian
dictatorship within a republic. [How true. A STATE within a State. ][***]
No decision by this Court can forestall revolution whenever the existing government fails to command the
respect and loyalty of the people and sufficient distress and discontent is allowed to grow up among the masses.
Many failures by fallen governments attest that no government can long prevent revolution by outlawry,
corruption, ineptitude, inflation, oppressive taxation, militarization, injustice, and loss of leadership capable of
intellectual initiative in domestic or foreign affairs are allies on which the Communists count to bring opportunity
knocking to their door. Sometimes I think they may be mistaken. But the Communists are not building just for
today--the rest of us might profit by their example. DENNIS v. UNITED STATES, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)(2). [One of
many must read cases on Communism and techniques to overthrow our governments etc. Did evil succeed? ]
NAMES OF 205 'COMMUNISTS' IN 'THE STATE DEPARTMENT'

Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring in the judgment:
The same cry of protest has gone up against the newspapers and magazines. When Senator Joseph McCarthy was at
his prime, holding in his hand papers containing the names of 205 'Communists' in the State Department (R.
Feuerlicht, Joe McCarthy and McCarthyism 54 (1972)), there were scarcely a dozen papers in this Nation that stood
firm for the citizen's right to due process and to First Amendment protection. That, however, was no reason to put
the saddle of the federal bureaucracy on the backs of publishers. Under our Bill of Rights people are entitled to have
extreme ideas, silly ideas, partisan ideas. [And our right to be let alone. ]
The same is true, I believe, of TV and radio. At times they have a nauseating mediocrity. COLUMBIA
BROADCASTING COM. v. 412 U.S. 94 (1973)(2). [How many Communists after a forty years later? ]
700,000
During the depression when millions were unemployed and our economic system was paralyzed many turned to the
Communist Party out of desperation or hope. It proposed a radical solution to the grave economic crisis. Later the
rise of fascism as a menace to democracy spurred others who feared this form of tyranny to align with the
Communist Party. (fn 17) After 1935, that Party advocated a 'Popular Front' of 'all democratic parties against
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fascism.' Its platform and slogans stressed full employment, racial equality and various other political and
economic changes. (fn 18)
According to figures of the Communist Party it had 14,000 members in 1932, 26,000 in 1934, 41,000 in
1936. W. Z. Foster, From Bryan to Stalin (1937), 303. It has been estimated that more than 700,000 persons in this
country have been members of the Communist Party at one time or another between 1919 and 1951. Ernst and
Loth, Report on The American Communist (1952), 14. [58 years later how many Communists today? ]
(fn 17). For the numerous and varied reasons why individuals have joined the Communist Party, see Taylor,
Grand Inquest (1955), 155--159; Ernst and Loth, Report on The American Communist (1954); Almond, The
Appeals of Communism (1952); Crossman, The God That Failed (1949); Department of Defense, Know Your
Communist Enemy: Who Are Communists and Why? DOD PAM 4--6, Dec. 8, 1955. Many of these reasons are
not indicative of bad moral character. [They will not admit they are Communists, or conspiring to destroy us. ]
(fn18). See Moore, The Communist Party of the U.S.A.; An Analysis of a Social Movement, 39 Am.Pol.Sci.Rev.
31, 32--33. SCHWARE v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, 353 U.S. 232 (1957)(2).
IN THIS COUNTRY COMMUNISTS INTOLERANCE FOR FREEDOM WHERE THEY ARE IN POWER
Justice JACKSON (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring and dissenting each in part:
The idea that a Constitution should protect individual nonconformity is essentially American and is the last thing
in the world that Communists will tolerate. Nothing exceeds the bitterness of their demands for freedom for
themselves in this country except the bitterness of their intolerance of freedom for others where they are in
power. An exaction of some profession of belief or nonbelief is precisely what the Communists would enact--each
individual must adopt the ideas that are common to the ruling group. Their whole philosophy is to minimize man as
an individual and to increase the power of man acting in the mass. If any single characteristic distinguishes our
democracy from Communism it is our recognition of the individual as a personality rather than as a soulless part in
the jigsaw puzzle that is the collectivist state. [Collectivist = Communist. ] AMERICAN COM. ASS'N v. DOUDS,
339 U.S. 382 (1950) (2). [Take heed of the anti-Christ, they have not vanished. Obviously the ruling elite etc. will try
their best to conceal and deny what they are, and their game is to turn it around and claim you are a Red. ]
Revelations 20:4 And I saw THRONES, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them: and I saw the souls of them that
were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither
had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hand; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. [Who but un-
American anti-Christ would render that evil? What kind mind abuses and deprives Americans injuring no one? ]
The following proves the Federal conspiracy to illegally subject the people via government's Forms and Application SCAM.
SYSTEM OF FEDERALISM = ALL U.S. STATELESS PERSON STATUS = IT'S ALL FEDERAL
Deceptively named 'United States' in D.C. outside the Constitution engaged in trade and commerce providing services.
Federalism? Hideous Feudalism (war powers subjection by military force = private Code vs. the Law of the Constitution.
Their contrary Feudal War powers 'System of Federalism' a.k.a. democracy = stealthy mob rule = Elite anarchy.
Lords of Federalism outside the Constitution rule over us as U.S. taxpayers in a pretended Federal STATE of Taxes.
COMPLETELY CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT

Lopez emphasized, however, that even under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
Congress' regulatory authority is not without effective bounds. Id., at 557, 115 S.Ct. 1624. "[E]ven [our] modern-
era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is
subject to outer limits. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the interstate commerce power
'must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.' " Id., at 556-557, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel, supra, at 37, 57 S.Ct.
615). UNITED STATES v. MORRISON, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)(2). [The lords know exactly what they do Lord. ]
THE FEDERAL TWILIGHT ZONE - INCOME TAX ZONE + ANTI-CHRIST ZONE?
The dark lord's 'System of Federalism' playing god over their vassals in their invisible prison outside the Constitution = Bondage.
System of Federalism a.k.a. 'United States' located in D.C. a.k.a. the Federal Union.
The stateless U.S. citizen 'vassal' subjected under the evil Lords of Federalism: Fuedal Decepticons.
Justice BREYER (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with whom Justice STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG join, dissenting:
In Alden the Court said that feudal law had created an 18th-century legal norm to the effect that " 'no lord could be
sued by a vassal in his own court, but each petty lord was subject to suit in the courts of a higher lord.' " 527 U.S., at
741. It added that the Framers' silence about the matter had woven that feudal "norm" into the "constitutional
design," i.e., had made it part of our "system of federalism" unchanged by the "'plan of the convention.' " Id., at
714-717, 730, 740-743. And that norm, said the Alden Court, by analogy forbids a citizen ("vassal") [U.S. citizen-
taxpayer-slave. ] to sue a State ("lord") in the "lord's" own courts. Here that same norm argues against immunity, for
the forum at issue is federal--belonging by analogy to the "higher lord." FED. MARITIME COM. v. SO.
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CAROLINA, 535 U.S. 743 (2002)(2). [It seems so harmless until you know the awful Truth: 'United States' is 100%
fraud-outside the Constitution engaged in commerce to subject us from sovereigns to vassals reigning tyranny to steal.]
SUPREME SOVEREIGNS vs. NON-SOVEREIGN STATELESS VASSALS SUBJECT TO THE LORDS OF FEDERALISM
The feudal Constitutions, stiled the inferior relation, that of a vassal, the superior that of a subject. But in our
country, vassalage has never been known, and the relation of subject ceasd with the Declaration of Independence.
"At the revolution," says Chief Justice Jay. 2 Dall. p. 71, "the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly
the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects." The State v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. 1 (1834)(1).
HOW TRUE IT IS – U.S. FEDERALISM = FUEDALISM
FEUDALISM IS AN OLD SCHEME OF MEN CONVERTING MEN INTO SLAVES
It is the law of nature, and of nature's God, pointing to 'the wide world before us, where to chose our place of rest,
and Providence our guide.' 2 Bynk. 125. Wickefort. b.1.c.2. p. 116. Grot. b.2.5.s.24. par. 2. 3. Dig. de cap. et post.
Law. 12.s. 9.Wick b.1.s. 11. p. 244. Puff. b. 8.1.c.11.s.3. p. 862. 1 Fred. Code. 34. 5. 2 vol. 10. 1Gill. Hist. Greece.
With this law, however, human institutions have often been at variance; and no institutions more than the feudal
system, which made the tyranny of arms, [military force. ] the basis of society; chained men to the soil on which
they were born; and converted the bulk of mankind into the villeins, or slaves of a lord, or superior. From the
feudal system, sprung the law of allegiance; which pursuing the nature of its origin, rests on lands; for, when lands
were all held of the Crown, then the oath of allegiance became appropriate: It was the tenure of the tenant, or vassal.
Blac. Com. 366. [***] Yet, it is to be remembered, that whether in its real origin, or in its artificial state, allegiance,
as well as fealty, rests upon lands, and it is due to persons. [not government. ] Not so, with respect to Citizenship,
which has arisen from the dissolution of the feudal system; and is a substitute for allegiance, corresponding with the
new order of things. Allegiance and citizenship, differ, indeed, in almost every characteristic. Citizenship is the
effect of compact; [Constitution. ] allegiance is the offspring of power and necessity. Citizenship is a political tie;
allegiance is a territorial tenure. Citizenship is the charter of equality; allegiance is a badge of inferiority.
Citizenship is constitutional; allegiance is personal. Citizenship is freedom; allegiance is servitude. Citizenship is
communicable; allegiance is repulsive. Citizenship may be relinquished; allegiance is perpetual. With such
essential differences, the doctrine of allegiance is inapplicable to a system of citizenship; which it can neither serve
to controul, nor to elucidate. And yet, even among the nations, in which the law of allegiance is the most firmly
established, the most pertinaciously enforced, there are striking deviations that demonstrate the invincible power of
truth, and the homage, which, under every modification of government, must be paid to the inherent rights of
man. [all men have unalienable rights. ] [***] The doctrine is, that allegiance cannot be due to two sovereigns; and
taking an oath of allegiance to a new, is the strongest evidence of withdrawing allegiance from a previous,
sovereign. [***] The American Confederation is a complex machine, and sui generis. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133
(1795)(3). [sui generis means 1 of a kind. The only country on earth. ]
Allegiance is the repulsive badge of inferiority and servitude that U.S. citizen-taxpayers (vassals) are marked with by their
Social Security number and license. Today 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons compose a mob rule STATE of lawlessness
outside the Constitution. Men calling themselves government are undeniably acting as stateless U.S. citizens and intentionally
scheming by illegal governmental deception to steal from the sovereign people acting as Taxpayers, a.k.a. 100% Federal non-sovereign
'stateless' persons acting as licensed business entities, and subject to the jurisdiction of the Code of the dark Lords of Federalism acting
outside the Constitution under the guise of Democracy a.k.a. stealthy code mob rule a.k.a. anarchy a.k.a. lawlessness a.k.a.
Godlessness, instead of pursuant to the Constitution subordinate to the perfect Law of God.
THE IDEA OF FEDERALISM vs. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

Their undeniable written confession they absolutely know, and in on, their illegal Federal System of Slavery in the Land of the Free.
Federalism aligns exactly with government's Forms and Applications scam = 'one' 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless Nation.
Federalism = Feudalism = war powerism-statelessism-taxpayerism-subjectionism-lawlessism–anti Americanism-Anti Christism?

The Constitution was ratified by Conventions in the several States, not by the States themselves, U.S. Const., Art.
VII, a historical fact and a constitutional imperative which underscore the proposition that the Constitution was
ordained and established by the people of the United States. U.S. Const., preamble.
The idea of federalism is that a National Legislature enacts laws which bind the people as individuals, not
as citizens of a State; and, it follows, freedom is most secure if the people themselves, not the States as
intermediaries, hold their federal legislators to account for the conduct of their office. COOK v. GRALIKE, 531
U.S. 510 (2001)(2). [A National Legislature distinguished from 'the Congress of the United States of America' (de jure)
enacts laws for the Forms and Applications, Voter Registration, Social Security etc. The so called STATES composed of
100% Federal non-sovereign 'stateless' persons. Outrageous! No sovereign right to govern under the Constitution. ]
Supreme Court (in on the scam) undeniably confirming their System of Federalism = 'statelessness' = not as citizens of a State. A
state government and cities composed of 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons? Lawlessness. Our forefathers never in their
wildest dreams imagined they or their posterity would be so ignorant of the Law, and anti-Liberty in The United States of America that
Americans would swear they are stateless slaves. Satanic? Undeniable proof of the scam of the enemies of freedom scheming to
illegally subject and oppress the sovereign people. A 'citizen of the United States,' or 'United States citizen' swear they are a "resident"
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of the state on government's forms and applications which undeniably equates to 'not citizens of a State" = 'stateless.' Satanic?
Not domiciled in any state = not a citizen of any State = 100% 'stateless' status: citizen is less letters than resident.
You swear on government Forms and Applications you are a 'resident' distinguished from 'Citizen.'
RESIDENT = 'not ' a citizen of the State = stateless vs. DOMICILE = citizen of the State = free citizen.
RESIDENT = a intent of 'indefinite' legal home-transient vs. DOMICILE = intent of 'permanent' legal home.
Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
In order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen
of the United States and be domiciled within the State. See Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 648-649 (1878);
Brown v. Keene, 8 Pet. 112, 115 (1834). The problem in this case is that Bettison, although a United States citizen,
has no domicile in any State. He is therefore "stateless" for purposes of ß 1332(a)(3). Subsection 1332(a)(2), which
confers jurisdiction in the District Court when a citizen of a State sues aliens only, also could not be satisfied
because Bettison is a "United States citizen." NEWMAN-GREEN, INC. v. LARRAIN, 490 U.S. 826 (1989)(2).
[See the same in GRUPO DATAFLUX v. ATLAS, 124 S.Ct. 1920 (2004). Supreme Court using 'citizen of the United States,' and
'United States citizen' in quotes. Both are 100% Federal non-sovereign 'stateless' persons. Both of those and a citizen of a
State are non-sovereigns. They understand Federalism = U.S. statelessness. ]
'RESIDENT' OF THE STATE = STATELESS

The scam used in Federal and IRS indictments is to claim the 'person' is a: 'resident of the District.'
The 'seal' of the court: 'UNITED STATES' DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISRTRICT OF (THE LAND)
We speak of 'residents' of Alaska not of its 'citizens' who are 'citizens of the United States'
PERHAPS 'THAT IS ALL.'
DIMOND, District Judge (District Court, Territory of Alaska, Third Division):

The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2, refers to 'citizens' only. It must be assumed that the
word 'citizens' as so used is identical in meaning with the word 'citizens' used in the Fourteenth Amendment and
defined therein, even though the Fourteenth Amendment came into the Constitution more than three quarters of a
century after the Constitution was adopted and went into operation. Nothing in the pleading in either of the cases
now under consideration indicates that the defendants are citizens of the United States, or of any State or of the
Territory of Alaska.
Can a person be considered a 'citizen' of Alaska in the same constitutional sense as that of a 'citizen' of a
State? The distinction between a State and a Territory is obvious, because a State in some of its aspects and within
constitutional limits is sovereign. No such claim has ever been made for any Territory except for the apparently
casual observation to be found in Moore v. People of State of Illinois, 14 How. 13, 55 U.S. 13, at page 20. So we
usually speak of residents of Alaska, not of its citizens. The residents of Alaska may be, and most of them are,
citizens of the United States. Perhaps that is all. Alaska does not yet enjoy the political status which would bring its
residents within the constitutional meaning and definition of 'citizens' as applied to citizens of the United States
who are domiciled in the States and therefore citizens of the States.
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment offer any protection to the defendants in these cases because the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to apply to the States and does not extend to the
Territories or the District of Columbia. Neild v. District of Columbia, 71 App.D.C. 306, 110 F.2d 246; Wight v.
Davidson, 181 U.S 371; Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. 397, 41 N.W. 746, 3 L.R.A. 355.
The application of the Fifth Amendment to the cases before us cannot be doubted. It is obvious that
whatever in the Constitution limits or restrains the governmental powers of the United States must equally limit and
restrain the authority of a territorial government created by a legislative act of the United States Government [of
therefore under Congress. ]. Attempted service of summons under Section 55-4-6, subdivision 6, A.C.L.A., for the
reasons stated, runs counter to the due process clause of that Amendment. In that Amendment the word 'persons' is
used, not 'citizens'. See Barry v. Hall, 68 App D.C. 350, 98 F.2d 222. ANDERSON v. SCHOLES et al, 83 F.Supp.
681, 12 Alaska 295, (1949)(1). [Alaska became a 'State'? Alaska is still in USC Title 48 'Territories and Insular
Possessions' jurisdiction. Persons in Alaska are 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons trapped in the prison. ]
STATELESS PERSON = THE PROVERBIAL MAN WITHOUT A COUNTRY

Absent a 'state' there is 'no' sovereign' to offend. (Hence, private Code statutes instead of 'the Law' of the sovereign.)
Judge CALABRESI (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit) dissents in a separate opinion. SOTOMAYOR,
Circuit Judge, with whom Judge LEVAL concurs, dissenting from the denial of rehearing in banc:
The people of Bermuda would undoubtedly be surprised to learn that they are "stateless." [***] And a
stateless person-the proverbial man without a country- cannot sue a United States citizen under alienage
jurisdiction."). [***] Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82 (internal quotation omitted). These panels implicitly reason that absent
a "state," there is no sovereign to offend and therefore no cause to provide federal alienage jurisdiction.
KOEHLER v. The BANK OF BERMUDA, 229 F.3d 187 (2003)(3). [Would we be merely 'surprised,' or 'shocked' we
are pretended to be stateless in The United 'States' of America? Satanic? No laws of a sovereign. Emphasis added. ]
SOTOMAYOR, 2nd Circuit Judge, with Judge LEVAL concurs, dissenting from the denial of rehearing in banc:
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As an historical matter, the drafters of the Constitution chose the words "citizens" or "subjects" to refer to the broad
category of those under the authority of a foreign power. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (recognizing that the Constitution "established national tribunals for the
decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen [of the United States]"), overruled in part on other grounds by
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). The Judiciary Act of 1789 used
the word "alien" apparently as an equivalent term to "citizens" or "subjects" in the first rendering of the statutory
grant of authority to exercise federal alienage jurisdiction. Compare U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1 (extending
jurisdiction to controversies "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects") with
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, ß 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (extending jurisdiction to suits in which "an alien is a party").
KOEHLER v. The BANK OF BERMUDA, 229 F.3d 187 (2003)(3).
Connect the dots, they reveal their System of Federalism = statelessism = taxpayerism = codeism = deceptionism.
Marked with a Federal Social Security number = U.S citizen = potential Taxpayer - U.S. 'Individual' 1040 Tax form.
A 'citizen of the United States' and resident of the state = 'not' a citizen of any state = stateless = the proverbial
man without a country. Confirmed by court cases: U.S. citizen = taxpayer = Individual = person, easily identified
by their Social Security number required on all U.S. Individual 1040 Tax forms etc.
Social Security # = U.S. citizen = Taxpayer = stateless person = resident of the District (on Fed. indictments)
persecuted in: 'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT' OF (THE LAND) [the name on the seal of court].
Undeniable proof confirming their System of Federalism is uniform = 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status:
All jury pools consist of non-sovereign 'citizen of the United States' and 'resident of the state' prescribed by statute.
All jurors swear in court they are a "citizen of the United States" = 100% Federal stateless subjects
Nearly every State requires that its jurors be citizens of the United States, (fn 27) residents of the locality, See,
e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. s 21--201 (1956); Wis.Stat.Ann. s 255.01(1) (Supp. 1969). See, e.g., Cal.Civ.Proc.Code s
198 (1954); Wash.Rev.Code s 2.36.070(2) (1956). CARTER v. JURY COMMISSION OF GREENE CTY., 396
U.S. 320 (1970)(2). [Undeniable: jurors swear in court they are a 'citizen of the United States' and have a Social Security
#, Voter registration card, driver license etc. proving their status is 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons. ]
Nearly? Every State and Federal court require the same jury status in their uniform System of Federalism via the National
voter registration act, Social Security #, tax forms, and licensing etc., all uniform 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless status.
Essentially their U.S. System of Federalism is 100% uniform status. In their System of Federalism they totally exclude the
sovereign people of the United States in their statutes. If you claim you are one of the People of the United States they will not let you
sit as a juror, or vote. I would object, since they are outside the Constitution scheming to provide a Codified or Statutory U.S. 'trial
before a jury' which does not proceed according to the due judicial course and sealed judicial Court Process of 'the Common Law' of
the Land (unwritten law, lex non scripta) with a Constitutional Common Law 'Trial by Jury' of your impartial peers of the state. Their
private company COURT is not a judicial Court of record of The Judiciary. So, if you are not in 'active' service of the land, or naval forces
or militia (any government or political subdivision thereof) under separation of powers their executive branch military commissions are
without (criminal) 'Common Law jurisdiction' nor ' exercising ' the judicial Power of the United States, or of the State and engaged in a
'preliminary examination' a.k.a. 'executive investigation' (tribunals of fact, a.k.a. members of the Bar Association deceptively called
COURTS and Judges) who 'appear' to do justice. See the judicial courts of The judiciary 'seal and process' laws. Emphasis added. You
know the judicial Courts of The Judiciary by their 'seal of court prescribed by Law,' distinguished from the seals of other COURTS are
prescribed by Supreme Court Order (SCO); and by law all judicial process shall be sealed with the seal of the judicial court which is
prescribed in the process law. The clerk of court is the keeper of the judicial seals and may reluctantly provide you with the seal
prescribed by law so you can prove it exists. The executive branch COURTS have no Common Law jurisdiction and cannot
Constitutionally 'exercise' the Judicial Power, or jurisdiction to pronounce the sentence of the Law to fine, or imprison you without
your consent, which without your consent denies you Constitutional 'due Process of Law' in an established judicial Court of record of
'The Judiciary' having competent Common Law jurisdiction (unwritten law jurisdiction. Statutes are inapplicable to people).
The above cases clearly prove the Federal stateless scam: People swear on jury pool questionnaires, and personally swear in
court they are a stateless 'citizen of the United States' and a mere 'resident' of the state. Most jurors are voters and have a Social
Security number, and swear on all relevant government Forms and Applications they are 'citizens of the United States' or 'United States
citizens' and a mere resident of the state status, with an ALL CAPITAL LETTER name, a.k.a. assumed business name, JOHN IGNORANT
DOE a.k.a JOHN TAXPAYER DOE. That all capital letter name is on all tax bills, your driver license, and court defendant etc. President
Clinton is a Lawyer and demanded a judicial Court with 'Common Law jurisdiction' because he knew they could not provide him in the
Monica Lewinski affair because 1. They are outside the Constitution. 2. Under executive War powers deception none of the judicial
Courts of Record of The Judiciary with 'Common Law criminal jurisdiction' at the seat of government are open. 3. The jurors are not
domiciled citizens of a state therefore 'stateless" residents, merely citizens of a Federal government located in D.C. 4. The jurors are
not acting as your peers (even free of fraud some are not your peers). 5. There is no guarantee the jurors are impartial, and a high
probability most (if not all) are credulous, gullible, and conformists who under delusion believe government deception is the truth,
therefore will follow the directions of the corrupt government and its judges, prosecutors and witnesses. And for irrational reasons
unknown will probably believe government over you, and contrary to the truth.
Would you (injuring no one) want any juror to try you that does not fully understand the Law (or this book)?
Examine jurors with the knowledge herein 'what government writes.' Supreme Court cases may not be disregarded.
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Silver bullet for appeal? 100% Federal non-sovereign 'stateless' jurors are a Constitutional jury 'of' the state?
INTENTIONALLY EXCLUDING THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE STATUS IN THEIR CODE SYSTEM OF FEDERALISM
I deny there are any Forms or Applications for We the People to sign as We the (sovereign) People = Fraud to subject us.
Exclusionary method of jury selection held invalid. Any method of jury selection which is in reality a subterfuge to
exclude from juries systematically and intentionally some cognizable group or class of citizens in the community
must be held invalid. Hampton v. State, 569 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1056 (1978). [How true
it is. In legal contemplation (statutes = System) the sovereign people are illegally totally excluded = invalid. ]
I will object to jurors pretending to be '100% Federal non-sovereign stateless residents, distinguished from the
Constitutionally guaranteed impartial jurors 'of' the state.' I am sure the jurors would like to know all about how our non-sovereign
stateless government servants are pretending to convert the sovereign people into non-sovereign stateless vassals by illegal
governmental deception in their System of Federalism outside the Constitution. The jury pool is defined by state statute, aligning with
the national voter registration act, which excludes We the sovereign People of the United States in the code of the System.
THE EVIL LIES IN THE ADMITTED (BY STATUTE) 'EXCLUSION' OF AN ELIGIBLE CLASS
Admitted and proven by their jury pool and voter registration statutes only for resident citizens of the United States.
Justice MARSHALL, with Justice BRENNAN and STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
Ballard v. U.S., 329 U.S. 187 (1946): "[E]xclusion of women from jury panels may at times be highly prejudicial to
the defendants. But reversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an individual case. The evil lies in
the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of
jury selection." Id., at 195. [Also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493. The jury statute admits people are excluded. ]
There is good reason why public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary is diminished whenever
invidious prejudice seeps into its processes. This diminution of confidence largely stems from a recognition that the
institutions of criminal justice serve purposes independent of accurate fact finding. These institutions also serve to
exemplify, by the manner in which they operate, our fundamental notions of fairness and our central faith in
democratic norms. (fn 2) They reflect what we demand of ourselves as a Nation committed to fairness and equality
in the enforcement of the law. That is why discrimination "is especially pernicious in the administration of justice,"
why its effects constitute an injury "to the law as an institution," why its presence must be eradicated root and
branch by the most effective means available.
(fn 2). "In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the laws
scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). HOBBY v.
UNITED STATES, 468 U.S. 339 (1984)(2). [You know the tree by its fruit. Legislature intentionally engaged in fraud.]
A natural borne Citizen and a naturalized Citizen must have the same legal status and status name
Analyzing their confusion: Under Article II of the Constitution if one is a 'natural born 'Citizen' (of the United States of
America) they can run for President of the United States of America, so that has not changed. If a white person is naturalized, the
name of the naturalized Citizen must be the same as a natural born Citizen which has not changed since the beginning; except in the
Code the 'c' in citizen is not capitalized as it is in the Constitution of the United States. Plus, 'the United States' is not the same thing as
'The United States of America' the true name of the country i.e. the name of the several states of America united i.e. Georgia,
Minnesota, California, etc., distinguished from the counterfeit 'United States' in the Code located in the District of Columbia.
THE TRUE NAMES OF THE SUPREME SOVEREIGNS:

In the Constitution: We 'the People of the United States,' a.k.a. natural born 'Citizen' Article 2:4; free 'Citizens in the several
states' 4th Article of Confederation, Const. Art 4:2: a.k.a. a natural born (sovereign white) 'Citizen of the United States of America.'
I say: I deny I am not one of 'We the People of the United States' (one of the natural borne sovereign white People in the Preamble).
The naturalized 'Citizen of the United States of America'.

SEE June 27, 1952, c. 477, Title III, ch. 2, ß 338, 66 Stat. 259; 104 Stat. 5041, 5045; Dec. 12, 1991, Pub.L. 102-
232, Title III, ß 305(j), 105 Stat. 1750; Oct. 25, 1994, Pub.L. 103-416, Title I, ß 104(a), Title II, ß 219(z)(3), 108
Stat. 4308, 4318.) [Codified at 8 U.S.C. Section 1449.] [Back track that statute to the source of the Law to 1776. ]
'Citizen of the United States of America' = Sovereigns of the whole Country
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court, which is joined in full by Chief Judge HUG, Judge
BROWNING, Judge SCHROEDER, Judge O'SCANNLAIN, Judge GRABER, and Judge WARDLAW:
Before the amendment, district judges used to sign an order that said, "It is hereby ordered that each of the
beneficiaries so listed ... is admitted to become a citizen of the United States of America." Now, if the oath is
administered in court, a clerk of the court signs a certification that each applicant listed "appeared in open court at an
oath administration ceremony ... and having taken the oath of allegiance ... was issued the Certificate of
Naturalization...." The certificate of naturalization is issued by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization. It says that, "the Attorney General having found that" the person is entitled to citizenship and has
met the requirements and taken the oath of allegiance, "such person is admitted as a citizen of the United States of
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America." [See] Immigration and Naturalization Service, Certificate of Naturalization, N-550 rev. 6-91.
GORBACH v. RENO, 219 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1999)(3). [In the Constitution 'Citizen' has a capital 'C', not small 'c'. ]
SUPER IMPORTANT
Remember a 'U.S. citizen' was never created because Congress is not empowered to create a new class of Citizen. Yet
'United States citizen' is cited by government in many court cases, and even in quotes "United States citizen" in the statutes, and
regulations, making it undeniable government intended 'specific' government deception. If it were mere error it would have been
noticed by one of the million Bar Association Attorneys and Judges and promptly corrected, if not intended to defraud the people.
To reiterate a super important point: There are absolutely no laws, or court cases whatsoever claiming a 'United States
citizen,' or 'citizen of the United States' are sovereign, or the supreme power, only to the contrary. Both are vastly inferior stateless
non-sovereigns owing allegiance and 'subject' to the jurisdiction of the so called Federal government. Plus, all of the relevant court
cases cite We the People are sovereigns and of course none claim they are citizens of the United States, nor subjects.
THE SUPER EVIL SOCIALIST INSECURITY NUMBER = STATELESSS U.S. TAXPAYER SYSTEM
The pinnacle key linking everything together in their System of Federalism on their forms and applications: uniform status.
Only a United States citizen, or alien can obtain a social security number. Super emphasis added.
Social Security# is required on government Forms and Applications to identify the subjected stateless person prisoner.
There is 'no vested right' to receive Social Security yet it is deemed a benefit. The number of the beast is a tool to subject.
AFTER FALSELY SWEARING YOU RECEIVE THE MARK AND NUMBER OF HIS NAME: PRISONER I.D.
With the mark you act as a stateless slave in the dark lord's System of Federalism outside the Constitution.
Justice CARDOZO (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Even sovereigns may contract without derogating from their sovereignty. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330; 1
Oppenheim, International Law (4th Ed.) ss 493, 494; Hall, International Law (8th Ed.) s 107; 2 Hyde, International
Law, s 489. STEWARD MACH. CO. v. DAVIS, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)(2). [Cannot lawfully change your true status.]
The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no
pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. ALDEN v.
MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [See the same in 134 U.S. 1, 370 U.S. 530, 289 U.S. 553, 483 U.S. 468, 292 U.S. 571,
337 U.S. 582, 483 U.S. 468, etc. Sovereignty is vested in the People and only in the People. ]
SEE 20 C.F.R. 422.104

The Social Security Act and application are 'only' for a 'United States citizen' (and aliens) matching their non-substantive regulation (see
20 C.F.R. 422.104) calculated to exclude and subject the sovereign people in their System. The Social Security# is the key identifying link
required on income tax returns and other relevant forms and applications: Identified as a government employee or alien?
SHAME: SELECTIVE SERVICE REQUIRES SS.# - BRAVE AMERICANS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM AND DIE AS SLAVES
Chief Justice BURGER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. ß 453, empowers the
President to require every male citizen and male resident alien between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the
draft. Section 12 of that Act imposes criminal penalties for failure to register. On July 2, 1980, President Carter
issued a Proclamation requiring young men to register within 30 days of their 18th birthday. Presidential
Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 82 (1981). [***]
See Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 84 (1981) ("Persons who are required to be registered
shall comply with the registration procedures and other rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of Selective
Service"). [***] Pointing to the fact that the willful failure to register within the time fixed by Proclamation No.
4771 is a criminal offense punishable under ß ß 12(a) and (b), they contend that ß 12(f) requires them-- since in
fact they have not registered--to confess to a criminal act and that this is "compulsion" in violation of their Fifth
Amendment rights.
Justice BRENNAN, dissenting:
After a class action successfully challenged agency practice as a violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, ß2, note
following 5 U.S.C. ß 552a (statutory authorization required to collect Social Security numbers), Congress amended
the Military Selective Service Act to require registrants to provide Social Security numbers. Department of
Defense Authorization Act of 1982, Pub.L. 97-86, ß 916, 95 Stat. 1129, 50 U.S.C.App. ß 453. See Wolman v.
United States, 542 F.Supp. 84 (DC 1982). Pub.L. 97-86 also authorized the President to require the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to furnish the Director of Selective Service, for enforcement purposes, the name, date
of birth, social security number, and address of any person required to register for the draft. 50 U.S.C.App. ß
462(e). The Fifth Amendment privilege against coerced self-incrimination extends to every means of government
information gathering. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)
(WHITE, J., concurring); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM v.
MINNESOTA PUBLIC INTEREST GROUP RESEARCH 468 U.S. 841 (1984)(2). [Shame on the President etc. to
require Americans to bravely fight for freedom yet live and die as slaves by illegal government deception. ]
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666?
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER = FED INVISIBLE PRISON NUMBER REQUIRED ON 'ALL' FORMS AND APPLICATIONS
System of Federalism: The two sided Socialist number for a 100% Federal U.S. Taxpayer slave stateless 'person' (citizen or alien).
Cops and Troopers, "I need to see your Driver License" to identify you as a slave to our so called judge-lawyer.
MANNHEIMER, Judge (Court of Appeals of Alaska):

The amendment to Alaska Statute 28.15.061(b), requiring all applicants for driver's licenses to supply their social
security number. [Super emphasis added. The License is really a U.S. Federal Drivers License issued in the state. ]
In August 1996, the federal government enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (Public Law 104-193). One of the aims of this legislation was to reduce welfare payments by
improving the collection of child support. In order to make it easier to track down parents who were delinquent in
their child support obligations, Section 317 of the Act required each state to amend its laws so that applicants for
any "professional license, commercial driver's license, occupational license, or marriage license" had to furnish
their social security number. One year later, in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress amended this provision
by deleting the word "commercial"--thus expanding the social security number requirement to include all
applications for driver's licenses. [Their System of Federalism is uniform. Federal business entity slave status. ]
As enacted by Section 317 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, and
as amended by Section 5536 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33), 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(13)
provides: Recording of social security numbers in certain family matters. Procedures requiring that the social
security number of--
(A) any applicant for a professional license, driver's license, occupational license, recreational license, or marriage
license be recorded on the application;
(B) any individual who is subject to a divorce decree, [Revocation of Federal marriage license deceptively called no
fault divorce. Satanically a pretended divorce by mere servants. ] support order, or paternity determination or
acknowledgment be placed in the records relating to the matter; and
(C) any individual who has died be placed in the records relating to the death and be recorded on the death certificate.
For purposes of subparagraph (A), if a State allows the use of a number other than the social security
number to be used on the face of the document while the social security number is kept on file at the agency, the
State shall so advise any applicants. (The federal government has no authority to directly order the states to change
their licensing laws, so Congress used an economic incentive: states lose a substantial portion of their federal
funding for various welfare programs if they do not require all license applicants to supply their social security
number.) In 1998, the Alaska Legislature responded to the federal mandate by enacting SLA 1998, chapter 132, a
session law that amended several statutes to make them conform to the guidelines contained in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Section 51 of this session law amended AS 28.15.061(b)
to require all applicants for driver's licenses to supply their social security number. The legislature openly
acknowledged that they were responding to economic pressure exerted by the federal government. In section 1 of
the session law, the legislature stated: Purpose; Findings. The primary purpose of this Act is to amend the Alaska
Statutes to comply with the mandates of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 and other federal law to ensure continued federal financial participation [in] Alaska's child support
enforcement, public assistance, and unemployment programs. The legislature finds that the federal requirements are
unreasonable and constitutionally questionable, and the statutory changes that must be made to meet the federal
requirements may do little to improve [the] collection of child support. These statutory changes are being made only
under duress from the federal government. In perhaps a further sign of the legislature's unease, the legislature also
declared that the social security number requirement would expire in three years. (fn 2) But in the 2001 legislative
session (i.e., at the end of the appointed three years), the legislature re-enacted the requirement. (fn3) It is now a
permanent part of the statute. See AS 28.15.061(b)(4). (fn 2). See SLA 1998, ch. 132, § 54.
(fn 3). See SLA 2001, ch. 40, § 1. Tenison v. State, 38 P.3d 535 (2001)(2). [All constitutionally questionable. ]
BANKSTERS [TRACK INCOME FOR IRS] REQUIRE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Justice REHNQUIST (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Title I of the Act, and the implementing regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Treasury,
require financial institutions to maintain records of the identities of their customers, to make microfilm copies of
certain checks drawn on them, and to keep records of certain other items. Title II of the Act and its implementing
regulations require reports of certain domestic and foreign currency transactions. [***] Section 241 of the Act, 31
U.S.C. s 1121, authorizes the Secretary to prescribe regulations requiring residents and citizens of the United
States, as well as nonresidents in the United States and doing business therein, to maintain records and file reports
with respect to their transactions and relationships with foreign financial agencies. Pursuant to this authority, the
regulations require each person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to make a report on yearly tax
returns of any 'financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank, securities or other financial account
in a foreign country.' 31 CFR s 103.24. Violations of the reporting requirement of s 241 as implemented by the
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regulations are also subject to civil and criminal penalties under s 207, 209, and 210 of the Act, 31 U.S.C. ss 1056,
1058, and 1059.
C. TITLE II--DOMESTIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
In addition to the foreign transaction reporting requirements discussed above, Title II of the Act provides
for certain reports of domestic transactions where such reports have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings. Prior to the enactment of the Act, financial institutions had been providing
reports of their customers' large currency transactions pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Treasury (fn11) which had required reports of all currency transactions that, in the judgment of the institution,
exceeded those 'commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry or profession of the person or
organization concerned.' (fn 12) [***]
In issuing these regulations, the Secretary relied upon the authority of two statutory provisions: (1) the
Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, as amended by s 2, Act of Mar. 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1, and by s 301, First
War Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 839, see 12 U.S.C. s 95a (1940 ed., Supp. V); and (2) s 251 of the Revised
Statutes, 31 U.S.C. s 427.
(fn12). The previous regulations promulgated by the Secretary, see 31 CFR s 102.1 (1949), 10 Fed.Reg. 6556,
originally mentioned transactions involving $1,000 or more in denominations of $50 or more, or $10,000 or more in
any denominations. In 1952, the former amount was raised to $2,500 in denominations of $100 or more. See 17
Fed.Reg. 1822, 2306. When these regulations were revised in 1959 to simplify the reporting form, the Secretary
noted the great value of the reports to law enforcement. See Treasury Release No. A--590, Aug. 3, 1959, included
in the Jurisdictional Statement for the United States in No. 72--1073, App. E, pp. 127--130. [***]
The form prescribed by the Secretary, see 31 CFR s 103.25(a), for the reporting of the domestic currency
transactions is Treasury Form 4789 (Currency Transaction Report). See Jurisdictional Statement for the United
States in No. 72--1073, App. D, p. 121. Form 4789 requires information similar to that required by the previous
Treasury reporting form, see n. 12, supra, including (1) the name, address, business or profession and social
security number of the person conducting the transaction; (2) similar information as to the person or organization
for whom it was conducted; (3) a summary description of the nature of the transaction, the type, amount, and
denomination of the currency involved and a description of any check involved in the transaction; C(4) the type of
identification presented; and (5) the identity of the reporting financial institution. The regulations also provide that
the names of all customers whose currency transactions in excess of $10,000 are not reported on Form 4789 must be
reported to the Secretary on demand. 31 CFR s 103.22. CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASS. v. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21
(1974)(2). [Social Security# status identifies you as a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless slave: potential taxpayer.]
ARREST REPORTS - LAW ENFORCEMENT ON THEIR RADIOS TO DISPATCH SAY: IN PURSUIT OF 'SUBJECT'
TERRY, Associate Judge (District of Columbia Court of Appeals):
A. The Government's Evidence [***] Cianciotti then told Villars that they should move on to the second phase of the
processing: completion of the arrest report, Form PD-163, also known as a booking form. As Cianciotti read
aloud the questions from the PD-163, asking Antonio his name, address, date of birth, social security number,
employment history, and names and addresses of relatives and friends, Villars translated each question into Spanish.
Villars also translated Antonio's answers into English for Cianciotti, who typed them on the form. MARTINEZ v.
UNITED STATES, 566 A.2d 1049 (1989)(2). [That stateless subject status is uniform. ]
Jurors ask our servants if they have a social security number, voter registration, driver license etc.
The Constitutions and laws prove today every public official is a 100% stateless non-sovereign citizen of the Fed government.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM: CHARGING INTENTIONAL COMPLEX FRAUD TO STEAL

File and pay all lawful taxes, but nobody owes any unlawful or inapplicable tax. I charge void for vagueness.
All officials are U.S. citizen Federal taxpayers (entities) with 'no sovereign right to govern, tax, or punish.'
Scam: No forms, or applications for We the People to sign as We the People of the United States (sovereigns) = Not required to pay taxes.
Isn't this whole System a 'self evident' TRAP? I object: We understand we do not have to pay taxes and in 'the interests of Justice' our
servants do not prove lawful jurisdiction by clear and unquestionable authority before conviction, and refuse to prove the Truth?
The paying of taxes is no virtue. There is no such thing as a Taxpayer in the Constitution. Taxpayer: a person under delusion who
believes he is free and finances his destruction. Tax Collector: a felon with a complex code. No such thing as a volunteer Tax Collector.
Would Pym and John Hampden of the Boston Tea Party, and Patrick Henry and the Virginians say this is a self evident fraud scam?
Charging unconstitutional practices: The System is intentionally too massive, complex, complicated, convoluted yet still incomplete.
SELF EVIDENT Void for vagueness: No "full" definitions "explaining" what and where etc. are "We the People of the United States",
"United States", "person", "individual", "citizen of the United States", "United States citizen", "The United States of America", "The
United States", "income", "income tax", "gain", "wages", the "District", "the State", "District of Columbia" "the several states" etc.
The "solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth ... is the sine qua non of a fair trial," Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). DARDEN v. WAINRIGHT, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)(2). [The truth shall make you free. ]
CLEAR AND UNQUESTIONABLE AUTHORTY OF LAW
128
SUPPRESSION OF WHAT YOUR TRUE STATUS IS AND WHAT CLASS OF PERSON THE STATUTE APPLIES TO
Prove what the plaintiff "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is: outrageously-deceptively a private company? See Dunn & Bradstreet
Decision of this case requires us to again consider "what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally
guaranteed access to evidence." United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) . In Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), we held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id., at 87. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976). ARIZONA v. YOUNGBLOOD, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)(2). [Same in U.S. v. BAGLEY, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)(2).]
COMPTON, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska): "That all lawful power derives from the people and must be held in
check to preserve their freedom is the oldest and most central tenet of American constitutionalism." Luedtke v.
Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123 (1989). [Preserve our freedom from non consensual taxation at payment. ]
KNOWLES, J. (Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana):

The term "cases in law," as used in article 3, section 2, of the United States constitution, has been defined to be a
suit or action at law. Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; Story on Const., ß 1646. CHUMASERO v. POTTS, 2
Mont. 242 (1875)(3). [At law = Civil. In Law, or outlaw-outside the Constitution. Else, not due Process of Law. ]
UNDENIABLY GOVERNMENT TAXES INCOME ON 100% FEDERAL NONSOVEREIGN STATELESS PERSONS
Their undeniable confession of the status of a U.S. Federal Taxpayer person, who files a 'U.S.' Individual 1040 Tax Form etc.
The never created 'United States citizen' a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless 'resident of the District': slave of our servants.
Since 1913: TAXPAYER = UNITED STATES CITIZENS

Social Sec. # required on U.S. 1040 tax forms prove Federal income tax laws applied to 'such' Federal citizens-subjects-persons.
Before FERGUSON, NORRIS and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges (United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit):
For over 75 years, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have both implicitly and explicitly recognized
the Sixteenth Amendment's authorization of a non-apportioned direct income tax on United States citizens residing
in the United States [no 'of America.' ] and thus the validity of the federal income tax laws as applied to such citizens.
See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1916); Ward, 833 F.2d at 1539; Lovell v. U.S.,
755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir.1984); Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.1984); U.S. v. Romero, 640
F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.1981). In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547 (Nev.) (1989)(1). [The statute says 'person' but
fraudulently extended to U.S. citizen. (U.S) Social Security # + (U.S.) Driver License = 100% Federal-U.S. taxpayer-person. ]
TAXPAYER = UNITED STATES CITIZEN = SOCIAL SECURITY # STATUS

UNDENIABLE: U.S. Individual 1040 tax forms require social security number.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit):

For seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has recognized that the sixteenth amendment authorizes a direct
nonapportioned tax upon United States citizens throughout the nation not just in federal enclaves, see Brushaber v.
Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1916) ; efforts to argue otherwise have been sanctioned as frivolous, see, e.g.,
Becraft, 885 F.2d at 549 (Fed.R.App.P. 38 sanctions for raising frivolous sixteenth amendment argument in petition
for rehearing); Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519-20 (7th Cir.1984) (Fed.R.App.P. 38 sanctions imposed on
pro se litigants raising frivolous sixteenth amendment contentions). Dickstein's contention that defendant was not an
"individual" under the Internal Revenue Code also is frivolous. See Dawes, 874 F.2d at 750-51; U.S. v. Studley,
783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir.te1986); U.S. v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) . 'UNITED STATES' of
America v. COLLINS, 920 F.2d 619 (1990)(1). [Illegal Federal scam subjects this one nation under God into taxpayers.]
CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES DEFENDENTS TO PRESENT A "COMPLETE" DEFENSE
Eighth amendment requires jury to consider and give effect to all relevant evidence: Use this book.
The cases following Cupp in the Winship line establish that States must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with
respect to every element of the offense charged, but that they may place on defendants the burden of proving
affirmative defenses. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
Since "[t]he Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant
mitigating evidence," id., at 494 U.S. 377- 378, this evidence was plainly constitutionally relevant. [***]
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We have previously stated that "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.' " Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). [I will use everything relevant in this book as part of my complete defense. Mine] [***]
The first exception applies to those rules that "plac[e] certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S., at 307
(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). [***] Teague's second exception permits the retroactive
application of " 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding." 494 U.S., at 495 (quoting Teague, supra, 489 U.S., at 311). [***]
Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Justice WHITE joins, concurring in the judgment:
Due process, of course, requires that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). GILMORE v. TAYLOR, 508 U.S. 333 (1993)(2).
OMIT NOTHING WHICH IN ANY DEGREE ELICIDATE THE QUESTIONS - DEMANDS UTMOST DELIBERATION
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Whenever this court is required to pass upon the validity of an act of congress, as tested by the fundamental law
enacted by the people, the duty imposed demands, in its discharge, the utmost deliberation and care, and invokes
the deepest sense of responsibility. And this is especially so when the question involves the exercise of a great
governmental power, and brings into consideration, as vitally affected by the decision, that complex system of
government, so sagaciously framed to secure and perpetuate 'an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
states.' We have, therefore, with an anxious desire to omit nothing which might in any degree tend to elucidate the
questions submitted, and aided by further able arguments embodying the fruits of elaborate research, carefully re-
examined these cases, with the result that, while our former conclusions remain unchanged, their scope must be
enlarged by the acceptance of their logical consequences. POLLOCK v. FARMERS’ 158 U.S. 601 (1895)(2).
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, dissenting:
The Constitution, in its sixth amendment, strikes with nullity all such vague accusations as are embraced in this
indictment. It declares, repeating in this respect the doctrine of the common law, that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall 'be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation' against him; and this means that all the
essential ingredients of the offence charged must be stated, embracing, with reasonable certainty, the particulars of
time, place, and person or property. EX PARTE VIRGINIA 100 U.S. 339 (1879)(2). [What is the true nature etc.]
REQUIREMENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS BE AFFORDED TO PRESENT A "COMPLETE DEFENSE"

Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting:
The Constitution requires that criminal defendants be provided with a fair trial, not merely a "good faith" try at a
fair trial. [***] Trombetta 's initial discussion focused on the due process requirement "that criminal defendants be
afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense," 467 U.S., at 485, and then noted that the delivery
of exculpatory evidence to the defendant "protect[s] the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensur[es] the
integrity of our criminal justice system." ARIZONA v. YOUNGBLOOD, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)(2). [No fair trials. ]
There is no art which one government sooner learns of another, than that of draining money from the pockets of the people. Adam
Smith, British economist (1776). [This System of so called government is certainly not based on the "Golden Rule": Do on to others… . ]
How true: Entered into the District Court of Massachusetts by Lysander Spooner 1852: 'If the government can take a man’s money
without his consent, there is no limit to the additional tyranny it may practice upon him ; for, with his money, it can hire soldiers [law
enforcement] to stand over him, keep him in subjection, plunder him at discretion, and kill him if he resists.' (Consent by deception.)
Continental Congress Journals 1:pp105-113: 'If money is wanted by Rulers who have in any manner oppressed the People, they may
retain it until their grievances are redressed, and this peaceably procures relief, without trusting to despised petitions or disturbing the
public tranquility.'
History is a war between good and evil men over the right to steal using law. I am not against lawful taxation with a minimalist
approach. I object to unconstitutional taxation, unlawful taxation, taxation without right, taxation by fraud, misapplication of the laws,
and oppressive, excessive, and wasteful taxation under the ruse of necessary in the Land of the Free pledging Liberty and Justice for all.
David Colton [Never forget, for many, many years there was properly no general income tax in the Land of the Free.]
See Louisiana Attorney Tom Cryer 's webcite: liefreezone. He won his IRS case.
The short story: It's all fraud! Intentional fraud! Fraud, fraud, fraud and more fraud to steal our success and conquer America.
If I am dragged into court, I will charge fraud: The System is intentionally too immense, complex, convoluted, and
complicated so the mass of easily confused and ignorant of the Law taxpayers cannot unmistakably understand it. The tax System is
certainly not simply by 'clear and unquestionable' authority of law. I deny there is a Federal Income tax form for one of the People of
the United States to sign as one of the (sovereign) People of the United States. I deny there is a current U.S. Code statute requiring We
the People to file or pay Federal income tax on their labor. Undeniably U.S. Individual 1040 income tax forms (etc.) require a Social
Security number which is only for U.S. citizens (or resident aliens). Commissioner can make returns 26 USC 3614(a): Regulation?
Proverbs 16:8 Better is a little with righteousness than great revenues without 'right.' 16:12 It is an abomination to kings [rulers]
to commit wickedness: for the throne is established by righteousness. You will see beyond doubt We the People are taxed (and
excessively) by illegal government deception. All domestic business licensing is Federal for U.S. citizens or aliens (S.S.# status). Dissolve
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your corporation, it is a taxable creature of government and must appear by an attorney who will likely bleed you dry. The Declaration
of Independence shows taxing Englishmen (the subjects of England) without their consent was a ground for war (theft). The Code
Regulation 'imposes' a tax on citizens and residents of the United States, but statutes, or regulations cannot be extended beyond the
words used, and I expressly deny there is a lawful current U.S. Code statute much less one of "the Laws of the United States"
demanding even all of them to file and pay income tax on their private labor, much less We the People, nor expressly says private labor
is "taxable income". Plus (free of fraud) how could mere Federal Reserve Notes backed by nothing (In Law maybe worth the paper
they are printed on) could in Truth and Law be considered gain-income. The IRS Code is intentionally not simple or clear by
unquestionable authority of Law, so Americans keep guessing (wrong) = fraud. The following is the essence of what you will learn in
this section from Supreme Court cases that may not be disregard and used as defenses against willful evasion and good faith
understanding:
1. Federal Income taxes if compulsory are imposed on citizens and residents of the United States, and the never created U.S. citizen
(social security # status is required on U.S. Individual 1040 tax forms) which are not We the sovereign People of the United States.
Deny your 'labor' of the strictly 'private sector' (non-government) is taxable income prescribed by Law.
2. Legal duties on imports (importers) are compulsory payment everything else is voluntary, and the 16 th Amendment did not extend
the 'power' of the sovereign (much less non-sovereigns) to tax new subjects. Re-venue is all commerce (salt H20).
3. Government must 'prove every' element of the crime. Guilt is personal and willfulness is a necessary element to convict a person
for a victimless Federal income tax crime. A person's 'misunderstanding (of their duty to pay income taxes) need not have a
reasonable basis to provide a defense. I will use all of the proof contained herein as my good faith reasonable defense, and
charge governmental deception, and government may not enforce the law
4. ! If they try to say any of the points of the cases herein were overturned make them prove it and why. Even Judges are confused?
5. Demand jurors rule as our defense the tax System is unfair fraud and excessive: the labyrinth is too immense, complex,
convoluted, complicated, etc. and intentionally not plain and simple and by 'clear and unquestionable authority of law' therefore
void for vagueness. Americans supposedly keep guessing wrong for reasons unknown so the Code is self evident too complex,
convoluted, and complicated. And although immense it is still incomplete, intentionally missing many and total definitions (ye
take away the keys of knowledge) definitions in the affirmative and negative "truth but not the whole truth" of the status "We the
People of the United States" and "what" they are: the supreme power, sovereigns, source of the Law, creators of government;
plus what they are not: subjects, citizens of the U.S., U.S. citizens, citizen of a State, or class of person the statute applies to, and
why according to the Law; who is included and excluded and why according to the Law: Based on what principles!
See Internal Revenue Manual 4.10.7.2.9.8. IMPORTANCE OF COURT DECISIONS (Approved 5-14-99).
(1) Decisions made at various levels of the court system are considered to be interpretations of tax laws and may be used by either
examiners or taxpayers to support a position.
(2) Certain court cases lend more weight to a position than others. A case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court becomes the law of the
land and takes precedence over decisions of lower courts. The Internal Revenue Service must follow Supreme Court decisions. For
examiners, Supreme Court decisions have the same weight as the Code. ["It's the Law" no other court may correct it. ]
Mr. Justice BALDWIN (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: A sovereign decides
by his own will, which is the supreme law within his own boundary; 6 Pet., 714; 9 Pet., 748; a court, or judge,
decides according to the law prescribed by the sovereign power, and that law is the rule for judgment. Rhode Island
v. Massachutess, 37 U.S. 657 (1838)(1). [The perfect laws of God and the Constitution are my supreme Law. ]
COYLE, District Judge (United States District Court, E.D. California):
26 U.S.C. ß 7433 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general.--If, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or
employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence disregards any
provision of this title, or any regulation promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for
damages against the United States in a district court of the United States. Except as provided in section 7432,
such civil action shall be the exclusive remedy for recovering damages from such actions.
(b) Damages.--In any action brought under subsection (a) ..., upon a finding of liability on the part of the defendant,
the defendant shall be liable to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the lesser of $1,000,000 ($100,000, in the case of
negligence) or the sum of -
(1) actual, direct economic damages sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the reckless or intentional or
negligent actions of the officer or employee, and
(2) the costs of the action.
. . . . .
(d) Limitations. -
(1) Requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.--A judgment for damages shall not be awarded under
subsection (b) unless the court determines that the plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies available to
such plaintiff within the Internal Revenue Service.
(2) Mitigation of damages.--The amount of damages awarded under subsection (b)(1) shall be reduced by the
amount of such damages which could have reasonably been mitigated by plaintiff.
(3) Period for bringing action.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action to enforce liability created
under this section may be brought without regard to the amount in controversy and may be brought only within 2
years after the date the right of action accrues.
The United States argues that, because the Petition does not allege that petitioner has exhausted
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administrative remedies available to petitioner for the filing of an action under Section 7433, which administrative
remedies are set forth in Treas. Reg. ß 301.7433-1, petitioner has not stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted. THE PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA v. DISTRICT DIRECTOR. 170 F.Supp.2d 1040 (2001)(1).
TITLE 18 PART I CHAPTER 47 § 1001 [Apply to government fraud and our true status etc. ]
§ 1001. Statements or entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully-
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense
involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.
If the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591, then the term of
imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements,
representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that
proceeding. [Outrageous: party includes government and its counsel-prosecution. Advocates their fraud in court? ]
THE 'POWER' OF 'TAXATION AND PUNISHMENT' APPERTAINS TO 'SOVEREIGNTY' - OVER ITS CREATURES
MARSHALL, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
All admit, that the government may, legitimately, punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among the
enumerated powers of congress. The right to enforce the observance of law, by punishing its infraction, might be
denied, with the more plausibility, because it is expressly given in some cases.
Congress is empowered 'to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of
the United States,' and 'to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against
the law of nations.' The several powers of congress may exist, in a very imperfect state, to be sure, but they may
exist and be carried into execution, although no punishment should be inflicted, in cases where the right to punish
is not expressly given. [Super emphasis added. That is part of the fraud going on at sentencing. ] [***]
Take, for example, the power 'to establish post-offices and post-roads.' This power is executed, by the
single act of making the establishment. But, from this has been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail
along the post-road, from one post-office to another. And from this implied power, has again been inferred the right
to punish those who steal letters from the post-office, or rob the mail. It may be said, with some plausibility, that the
right to carry the mail, and to punish those who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the establishment of a post-
office and post-road. This right is indeed essential to the beneficial exercise of the power, but not indispensably
necessary to its existence. So, of the punishment of the crimes of stealing or falsifying a record or process of a court
of the United States, or of perjury in such court. To punish these offences, is certainly conducive to the due
administration of justice. But courts may exist, and may decide the causes brought before them, though such crimes
escape punishment.
The good sense of the public has pronounced, without hesitation, that the power of punishment appertains
to sovereignty, and may be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his constitutional
powers. It is a means for carrying into execution all sovereign powers, and may be used, although not indispensably
necessary. It is a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise. [***]
Those means are not given by the people of a particular state, not given by the constituents of the
legislature, which claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the states. They are given by all, for the
benefit of all--and upon theory, should be subjected to that government only which belongs to all.
It may be objected to this definition, that the power of taxation is not confined to the people and property of
a state. It may be exercised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction. This is true. But to what source do we
trace this right? It is obvious, that it is an incident of sovereignty, and is co-extensive with that to which it is an
incident. All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends, are objects of taxation; but those over
which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be
pronounced self-evident. The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is
introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means which are employed by congress to carry into
execution powers conferred on that body by the People of the United States? We think it demonstrable, that it does
not. Those powers are not given by the people of a single state. They are given by the People of the United States, to
a government whose laws, made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be supreme. Consequently, the
people of a single state cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over them. M'CULLOUGH v. The State of
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)(2). [The officials of this one non-sovereign Nation under God are outside the Constitution
with no sovereign right to govern, punish, or tax; much less by illegal fraud, fear, or force, over its subjects. ]
BY THE LAW RIGHTS ARE SECURED - IMMUNITY FROM PUNISHHMENT- WE INJURED NO ONE WICKED SERVANTS
132
Justice DAVIS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the whole
people; for it is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished
according to law. The power of punishment is, alone through the means which the laws have provided for that
purpose, and if they are ineffectual, there is an immunity from punishment, no matter how great an offender the
individual may be, or how much his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the country, or endangered its
safety. By the protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy
of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [Wicked Code rule.]
FRESCHI, City Magistrate (City Magistrates' Court of the City of New York):
A crime is essentially local and can be prosecuted and punished only in the sovereignty offended. People v. Martin,
77 App. Div. 396, 79 N. Y. Supp. 340, affirmed 175 N. Y. 315. PEOPLE v. DOWNS, 136 N.Y.S. 440 (1911)(1).
Judge CALABRESI (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit):
These panels implicitly reason that absent a "state," there is no sovereign to offend and therefore no cause to
provide federal alienage jurisdiction. KOEHLER v. The BANK OF BERMUDA, 229 F.3d 187 (2003)(3).
POWER TO TAX IS AN INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY - NOT OF NON SOVEREIGNS
Sovereignty of a state extends to every thing which 'exists by its authority.' Super emphasis added!
In reasoning on the argument that the power of taxation was not confined to the people and property of a state, but
might be exercised on every object brought within its jurisdiction, this court admitted the truth of the proposition;
and added, that 'the power was an incident of sovereignty, and was co-extensive with that to which it was an
incident. All powers, the court said, over which the sovereign power of a state extends, are subjects of taxation. The
sovereignty of a state extends to every thing which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission;
but does it extend to those means which are employed by congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that
body by the people of the United States? We think not. PROVIDENCE BANK v. PITTMAN, 29 U.S. 514 (1830)
(1). [Extends to its creatures and non-sovereign foreigners-aliens owing allegiance to the sovereign people. ]
POWER OF TAXATION "ALWAYS" REGARDED AS AN INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY

The established Order of things: The sovereign's 'right' to tax and collect from its 'subjects' = non-sovereigns
Undeniably why these non-sovereign officials scheme to convert the sovereign people into their subjects.
There are no tax forms etc. for We the People of the United States to sign as We the sovereign People of the U.S.
Justice SHIRAS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The facts of this case, as appearing by the record, are undisputed, and are as follows: Charles A. Snyder was, during
the year 1878, engaged in the business of the manufacture of tobacco in the city of New Orleans, and while so
engaged became indebted to the United States for internal revenue taxes in the sum of several thousand dollars; and
these taxes were duly assessed and certified to the collector of internal revenue, who made demand for payment.
[***] The power of taxation has always been regarded as a necessary and indispensable incident of sovereignty. A
government that cannot, by self-administered methods, collect from its subjects the means necessary to support and
maintain itself in the execution of its functions, is a government merely in name. UNITED STATES v. SYNDER,
149 U.S. 210 (1893)(1). [See Justice White delivered the opinion of the court, quoting the same in STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA v. HANSON, Sheriff, 215 U.S. 515 (1910)(2). Today's officials are all Federally's = Federal taxpayers. ]
POWER TO TAX IS AN INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY

As stated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 429, the power to tax 'is an incident of
sovereignty, and is co-extensive with that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which the sovereign power of
a state extends, are objects of taxation ***.' STATE TAX COMM. v. ALDRICH, 316 U.S. 174 (1942)(3).
NO GOVERNMENT WAS EVER CREATED TO TAKE OR TAX "PRIVATE" PROPERTY OF CITIZENS
After the revolution We the people intended to create a government that could force them to pay taxes without their consent?
Mr. Justice CATRON (Supreme Court of the United States):

The next question, decided by the State court is of most grave importance; I give it in the language of the State
court: 'Had the general assembly power, under the constitution then in force, permanently to surrender, by contract,
within the meaning and under the protection of the Constitution of the United States, the right of taxation over any
portion of the property of individuals, otherwise subject to it?' On which proposition the court proceeds to remark:
'Our observations and conclusions upon this question, must be taken with reference to the unquestionable facts, that
the act of 1851 was a bona fide attempt to raise revenue by an equal and uniform tax upon property, and contained
no covert attack upon the franchises of these institutions. That the surrender did not relate to property granted by the
State, so as to make it a part of the grant for which a consideration was paid; the State having granted nothing but
the franchise, and the tax being upon nothing but the money of individuals invested in the stock; and that no bonus
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or gross sum was paid in hand for the surrender, so as to leave it open to controversy, that reasonable taxes, to
accrue in future, were paid in advance of their becoming due. What effect a different state of facts might have, we
do not stop to inquire. Indeed, if the attempt has here been made, it is a naked release of sovereign power without
any consideration or attendant circumstance to give it strength or color; and, so far as we are advised, is the first
instance where the rights and interests of the public have been entirely overlooked.'
'Under these circumstances, we feel no hesitation in saying the general assembly was incompetent to such
a task. This conclusion is drawn from a consideration of the limited authority of that body, and the nature of the
power claimed to be abridged. 'That political sovereignty, in its true sense, exists only with the people, and that
government is 'founded on their sole authority,' and subject to be altered, reformed, or abolished only by them, is a
political axiom upon which all the American governments have been based, and is expressly asserted in the bill of
rights. Such of the sovereign powers with which they were invested, as they deem necessary for protecting their
rights and liberties, and securing their independence, they have delegated to governments created by themselves, to
be exercised in such manner and for such purposes as were contemplated in the delegation. That these powers can
neither be enlarged or diminished by these repositories of delegated authority, would seem to result, inevitably,
from the fundamental maxim referred to, and to be too plain to need argument or illustration.
'If they could be enlarged, government might become absolute; if they could be diminished or abridged, it
might be stripped of the attributes indispensable to enable it to accomplish the great purposes for which it was
instituted. And, in either event, the constitution would be made, either more or less, than it was when it came from
the hands of its authors; being changed and subverted without their action or consent. In the one event its power
for evil might be indefinitely enlarged; while in the other its capacity for good might be entirely destroyed; and thus
become either an engine of oppression, or an instrument of weakness and pusillanimity.
'The government created by the constitution of this State, (Ohio,) although not of enumerated, is yet one of
limited powers. It is true, the grant to the general assembly of 'legislative authority' is general; but its exercise within
that limit is necessarily restrained by the previous grant of certain powers to the federal government, and by the
express limitations to be found in other parts of the instrument. Outside of that boundary, it needed no express
limitations, for nothing was granted. Hence this court held, in Cincinnati, Wilmington, &c. R. R. v. Clinton Co. 1
Ohio State Rep. 77, that any act passed by the general assembly not falling fairly within the scope of 'legislative
authority,' was as clearly void as though expressly prohibited. So careful was the convention to enforce this
principle, and to prevent the enlargement of the granted powers by construction or otherwise, that they expressly
declared in art. 8, ß 28--'To guard against the transgression of the high powers we have delegated, we declare that all
powers, not hereby delegated, remain with the people.' When, therefore, the exercise of any power by that body is
questioned, its validity must be determined from the nature of the power, connected with the manner and purpose
of its exercise. What, then, is the taxing power? And to what extent, and for what purposes has it been conferred
upon the legislature? That it is a power incident to sovereignty--'a power of vital importance to the very existence of
every government'--has been as often declared as it has been spoken of. Its importance is not too strongly
represented by Alexander Hamilton, in the 30th number of the Federalist, when he says: 'Money is with propriety
considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to
perform its most important functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of
revenue, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in
every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be
subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the
government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and in a short course of time perish.' [Exaggerated to extremism. ]
'This power is not to be distinguished, in any particular material to the present inquiry, from the power of
eminent domain. Both rest upon the same foundation--both involve the taking of private property--and both, to a
limited extent, interfere with the natural right guaranteed by the constitution, of acquiring and enjoying it. But,
as this court has already said, in the case referred to, 'neither can be classed amongst the independent powers of
government, or included in its objects and ends.' No government was ever created for the purpose of taking, taxing,
or otherwise interfering with the private property of its citizens. 'But charged with the accomplishment of great
objects necessary to the safety and prosperity of the people, these rights attach as incidents to those objects, and
become indispensable means to the attainment of those ends.' They can only be called into being to attend the
independent powers, and can never be exercised without an existing necessity.
'To sustain this power in the general assembly, would be to violate all the great principles to which I have
alluded. It would affirm its right to deal in, and barter away the sovereign right of the State, and thereby, in effect,
to change the constitution. When the general assembly of 1845 convened, it found the State in the unquestionable
possession of the sovereign right of taxation, for the accomplishment of its lawful objects, extending to 'all the
persons and property belonging to the body politic.'' [Why government pretends it owns and creates everything. ]
When its successor convened, in 1846, under the same constitution, and to legislate for the same people, if
this defence is available, it found the State shorn of this power over fifteen or twenty millions of property, still
within its jurisdiction and protected by its laws. This and each succeeding legislature had the same power to
surrender the right, as to any and all other property; until at length the government, deprived of every thing upon
which it could operate, to raise the means to attain its necessary ends, by the exercise of its granted powers, would
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have worked its own inevitable distruction, beyond all power of remedy, either by the legislature or the people. It
is no answer to this to say that confidence must be reposed in the legislative body, that it will not thus abuse the
power. 'But, in the language of the court, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 'is this a case of confidence?''
'For every surrender of the right to tax particular property not only tends to paralyze the government, but
involves a direct invasion of the rights of property, of the balance of the community; since the deficiency thus
created must be made up by larger contributions from them, to meet the public demand.'
The foregoing are some of the reasonings of the State court on the consideration here involved. With these
views I concur, and will add some of my own. The first is, 'That acts of parliament derogatory from the power of
subsequent legislatures, are not binding. Because, (as Blackstone says,) the legislature [in England not America. ]
being in truth the sovereign power, is always equal, always absolute; and it acknowledges no superior on earth,
which the prior legislature must have been if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament [***].' PIQUA
BRANCH BANK OF OHIO v. KNOOP, 57 U.S. 369 (1853)(2). [The main object of government is to secure our all.]
POWER TO TAX IS NOT THE POWER TO DESTROY - LET ALONE TO DESTROY THE SUMPREME POWER
Justice FRANKFURTER (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:
The web of unreality spun from Marshall's famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke of Mr. Justice Holmes's
pen: 'The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits'. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S.
218 (dissent). GRAVES v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF N.Y., 306 U.S. 466 (1939)(2). [If can tax at all could tax all.]
MULTI-MILLIONS OF NON-FILERS IN 2006 - SEE 2006 CENSUS.GOV. + IRS.US.GOV
In 1986 there was a purported 35 million non-filers. In 1996 there was 116 million filers, but 63 million non-filers. The July 1,
2006 Census reports 299,398,484 people; subtracting 116 million filers from 299 million people there are 180 million non-filers, minors
included. Subtract government employees, and with knowledge the non-filers are the overwhelming silent majority, limiting
government to feed off itself, resident aliens, and foreign corporations. It was said the IRS only successfully prosecutes about 250
(ignorant U.S. persons) a year. I met an (ex-IRS agent) who was found 'not' guilty by a jury for willful failure to file. I understood
government failed to prove the current U.S. Code requires any Citizens, or the People of the United States to file and pay Federal
income taxes (in the Land of the Free). Plus our private 'labor' is merely an 'exchange,' not 'income' = gain. Paid with Federal Reserve
debtor Notes back by nothing is gain? (U.S) Social Security # + (U.S.) Driver License = U.S. Federal Individual Taxpayer.
"NOBODY" OWES 'ANY' DUTY TO PAY MORE THAN 'THE LAW' DEMANDS - ESPECIALLY THE PEOPLE
Justice SOUTER (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court:
Failure to pay the tax on such a kit thus would amount to evasion, not avoidance. In our system, avoidance of a tax
by remaining outside the ambit of the law that imposes it is every person's right. "Over and over again courts have
said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does
so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant."
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-851 (CA2) (L. Hand, J., dissenting) (1947). U.S. v. THOMPSON/CTR.
ARMS, 504 U.S. 505 (1992)(2). [It's fraud to have to guess what the Law is; should be "clear and unquestionable." ]
16 AMENDMENT DID NOT EXTEND THE TAXING POWER TO NEW SUBJECTS

It merely removed apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income.
Justice PITNEY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
As repeatedly held, this [16th Amendment] did not extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the
necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income. Brushaber v.
Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 17-19; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103, 112 et seq.; Peck & Co. v.
Lowe, 247 U. S. 165. EISNER v. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)(2).
IN RECOGNITION OF THE LIMITATION

Justice PITNEY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: Afterwards, and evidently
in recognition of the limitation upon the taxing power of Congress thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment was
adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished: 'The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.' EISNER v. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)(2).
16TH AMENDMENT IS A GRANT FROM THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the following [dissenting] opinion:
That such a result was intended by the people of the United States when adopting the Sixteenth Amendment is
inconceivable. Our sole duty is to ascertain their intent as therein expressed. In terse, comprehensive language
befitting the Constitution, they empowered Congress 'to lay and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source
derived.' [***] Compare Rugg, C. J., Tax Commissioner v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 524: 'It is a grant from the
sovereign people and not the exercise of a delegated power. It is a statement of general principles and not a
135
specification of details. Amendments to such a charter of government ought to be construed in the same spirit and
according to the same rules as the original. It is to be interpreted as the Constitution of a state and not as a statute or
an ordinary piece of legislation. Its words must be given a construction adapted to carry into effect its purpose.'
'It is our duty, when required in the regular course of judicial proceedings, to declare an act of Congress void if not
within the legislative power of the United States; but this declaration should never be made except in a clear case.
EISNER v. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)(2). [The direct tax "clauses" are not prescribed with "Power". ]
16th Amendment must be construed with Article 1, § 2, cl. 3, and section 9, cl. 4
The Sixteenth Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution
and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158
U. S. 601, under the Act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat. 509, 553, c. 349, § 27) it was held that taxes upon rents and
profits of real estate and upon returns from investments of personal property were in effect direct taxes upon the
property from which such income arose, imposed by reason of ownership; and that Congress could not impose such
taxes without apportioning them among the states according to population, as required by article 1, §2, cl. 3, and
section 9, cl. 4, of the original Constitution. EISNER v. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)(2).
THE LIMITATION STILL HAS AN APPROPRIATE AND IMPORTANT FUNCTION NOT TO BE OVERRIDDEN
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also that this [16 th] amendment shall not
be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the
Constitution [Article 1, § 2, cl. 3, and § 9, cl. 4. ] that require an apportionment according to population for direct
taxes upon property, real and personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is not to
be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts. EISNER v. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)(2).
ART 1 SEC 8 IS EXHAUSTIVE AND EMBRACES EVERY CONCEIVABLE POWER OF TAXATION

Mr. Chief Justice White (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
That the authority conferred upon Congress by § 8 of article 1 'to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises'
is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation has never been questioned, or, if it has, has been so
often authoritatively declared as to render it necessary only to state the doctrine. BRUSHABER v UNION PACIFIC
R.R. CO., 240 U.S. 1 (1916)(2). [Art. 1 § 8 is a "Power"; Art 1, § 2, cl. 3, and § 9, cl. 4 are clauses not "Powers". ]
2 GREAT CLASSES OF TAXES: DIRECT AND INDIRECT

Mr. Chief Justice White (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. supra, at page 557: 'In the matter of
taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes … BRUSHABER v UNION
PACIFIC R.R. CO., 240 U.S. 1 (1916)(2).
2 GREAT CLASSES OF FEDERAL TAXATION: DIRECT AND INDIRECT = DUTIES IMPOSTS EXCISES
As heretofore stated, the constitution divided federal taxation into two great classes,--the class of direct taxes, and
the class of duties, imposts, and excises,--and prescribed two rules which qualified the grant of power as to each
class. POLLOCK v. FARMERS’ LOAN, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)(2).
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the opinion of the court:
In the constitution, the words 'duties, imposts, and excises' are put in antithesis to direct taxes. POLLOCK v.
FARMERS’ LOAN, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)(2).
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL TAXES

EXTERNAL: duties on imported articles
INTERNAL: all remaining powers (taxes, imposts, and excises)
DIRECT: article 1, § 2, cl. 3, and § 9, cl. 4, of the original Constitution (are clauses but not Powers).
INDIRECT: duties and excises on articles of consumption.
Thus we find Mr. Hamilton, while writing to induce the adoption of the constitution, first dividing the power of
taxation into 'external' and 'internal,' putting into the former the power of imposing duties on imported articles and
into the latter all remaining powers; and, second, dividing the latter into 'direct' and 'indirect,' putting into the latter
duties and excises on articles of consumption. POLLOCK v. FARMERS’ LOAN, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)(2).
DIRECT TAXES: lands, buildings, assessments of whole property of individuals, or whole real or personal estate.
136
INDIRECT TAXES: Duties, imposts, and excises appear to be contradistinguished from 'taxes.
It seems to us to inevitably follow that in Mr. Hamilton's judgment at that time all internal taxes, except duties and
excises on articles of consumption, fell into the category of direct taxes. [***]
It was not reported by Dallas, but was published in 1851 by his son, in the edition of all Hamilton's writings
except the Federalist. After saying that we shall seek in vain for any legal meaning of the respective terms 'direct
and indirect taxes,' and after forcibly stating the impossibility of collecting the tax if it is to be considered as a
direct tax, he says, doubtingly: 'The following are presumed to be the only direct taxes: Capitation or poll taxes;
taxes on lands and buildings; general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals, or on their whole
real or personal estate. All else must, of necessity, be considered as indirect taxes.' "Duties,' 'imposts,' and 'excises'
appear to be contradistinguished from 'taxes." POLLOCK v. FARMERS’ LOAN, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)(2).
DIRECT TAX: One which demanded from the very persons who, it is intended or desired, should pay it.
Historical evidence shows that personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, have never been treated as the
subjects of direct tax the phrase is understood to be limited to taxes on land and its appurtenances, and on poles.
Veasie Bank v. Fenno, Wall. 533; Railroad Co. V. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406; People v. Knight, 174 N.Y. 475. (Black’s
Law Dictionary 4th Ed. p. 1629.) [Usurpation is complex and full of confusion and contradiction by deception. ]
INCOME TAX: An income tax is not levied upon property, funds, or profits, but upon the right of an individual or
corporation to receive income or profits. Paine v. City of Oshkosh, 190 Wis. 69. (Black’s Law Dict. 6 th Ed. p. 906.)
[An individual cannot be one of the sovereign creators pre-possessing all possible rights that government is to secure.]
INCOME TAX IS A DIRECT TAX IMPOSED ON A THING CALLED INCOME - AS DIRECT AS TAX ON LAND!
DICKINSON, District Judge (United States District Court, E. District of Pennsylvania):
There is, of course, a fundamental difference between an income tax and an excise tax, both with respect to
what is taxed and the source of the power to tax.
We are concerned wholly with an excise tax. Whether it is a scientifically accurate concept of it or not,
the concept of it as a charge for the privilege of following an occupation or trade, or carrying on a business, gives us
a fairly good working idea of what it is. It is, in consequence, an indirect tax, and has no reference to earnings or
income, except that the sum of such earnings or income may (as anything else may) be made the measure of the tax.
An income tax, on the contrary, is a direct tax imposed upon the thing called income, and is as directly imposed as
is a tax on land. [Emphasis added. ] UNITED STATES v. PHILADELPHIA B. & W. CO., 262 F. 188 (1920)(1).
Income = gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding 'from' the property, 'severed' from
the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived'--that is, received or drawn by
the (taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal--that is income derived from property, [capital]
being likened to the tree or the land, the latter [income] to the fruit or the crop. Nothing else! is income:
INCOME IS GAIN DERIVED FROM PROPERTY SERVERED FROM THE CAPITAL AND RECEIVED SEPERATELY
In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the Constitution may have proper force and
effect, save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential
to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as
cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may
adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power
to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
The fundamental relation of 'capital' to 'income' has been much discussed by economists, the former
[capital] being likened to the tree or the land, the latter [income] to the fruit or the crop; the former [capital]
depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs, the latter [income] as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow
during a period of time. For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term 'income,' as used in
common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the amendment, and, having formed also a correct judgment as
to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue.
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L.D.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.;
Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax
Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179,
185, 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the
Doyle Case, 247 U. S. 183, 185.
Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income essential for a correct
solution of the present controversy. The government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted,
placed chief emphasis upon the word 'gain,' which was extended to include a variety of meanings; while the
137
significance of the next three words was either overlooked or misconceived. 'Derived--from--capital'; 'the gain--
derived--from--capital,' etc. Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or
increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the
property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived'--that is, received
or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal--that is income derived from
property. Nothing else answers the description. EISNER v. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)(2). [Nothing else!]
LANGENBACH, Judge pro tem (Supreme Court of Washington): The Buck Act in [4 USC] ß 110 defined permitted
taxes as follows: … '(c) The term 'income tax' means any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by, net income,
gross income, or gross receipts.' STATE OF ALASKA v. BAKER, (1964)(3). [4 USC: Flag, Seal, Seat of Government.]
GAIN DERIVED: FROM CAPITAL, FROM LABOR, OR FROM BOTH COMBINED

Mr. Justice CLARKE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: The act under which
the assessment was made provides that the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income
derived from *** sales or dealings in property, whether real or personal *** or gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever. 39 Stat. 757; 40 Stat. 300, 307. [***] And the definition of 'income' approved by this
Court is: "The gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include
profits gained through sale or conversion of capital assets.' Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207. GOODRICH v.
EDWARDS, 255 U.S. 527 (1921)(2). ["Writ of Error" from the "District Court of the United States". ]
GAINS AND PROFITS OF ALL COMPANIES OTHER THAN THE COMPANIES SPECIFIED
Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court: 1916 (39 Stat. 756 c. 463 [Comp. St. § 6336a et seq.]
Title I.--Income Tax. Part I.--On Individuals. [Fraud: "What" is it? Artificial persons? Does not say the people. ]
Sec. 2. (a) That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed, the net income of a
taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived, * * * [? ] also from interest, rent, dividends,
securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever: [***]
The government relies upon Collector v. Hubbard (1870) 12 Wall. 1, which arose under section 117 of the
Act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 223, 282, c. 173), providing that--- 'The gains and profits of all companies, whether
incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in that section, shall be included in estimating the
annual gains, profits, or income of any person, entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.'
Manifestly this argument must be rejected, since the amendment applies to Income only, and what is called the
stockholder's share in the accumulated profits of the company is capital, not income.
Mr. Justice HOLMES, dissenting: I think that the word 'incomes' in the Sixteenth Amendment should be read in 'a
sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption.' Bishop v. State, 149 Ind. 223, 230;
State v. Butler, 70 Fla. 102, 133. [***] Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the following [dissenting] opinion:
So far as concerns Towne v. Eisner we have only to bear in mind what was there said 245 U. S. 425: 'But it is not
necessarily true that income means the same thing in the Constitution and the [an] act.' [Fraud! ] EISNER I.R.C. v.
MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)(2). [Statutes of legislature, and "regulations" of executive; but to have "force and
effect of law" to effect the public it must be a "substantive regulation" which has statute cited at the end of it.) The
regulation implements statute otherwise regulation for government. It never applies to the sovereign people! ]
NO GENERAL POWER TO LEVY - LEVY MAY BE MADE ON CERTAIN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC ENTITIES
Internal Revenue: Fed. government entities. Not for non-government paid Citizen-People: Right of privacy = right to be let alone.
26 USC 6331 (Subtitle F, Chapter 64, Subchapter D, Part II Levy) Section 6331 Levy and Distraint:
(a) --If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and
demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover
the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under
section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such
tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official, of the
United States, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District of
Columbia, by serving a notice of levy on the employer (as defined in section 3401(d)) of such officer, employee, or
elected official. If the Secretary makes a finding that the collection of such tax is in jeopardy, notice and demand
for immediate payment of such tax may be made by the Secretary and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax,
collection thereof by levy shall be lawful without regard to the 10-day period provided in this section.
(b) Seizure and sale of property.--The term "levy" as used in this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by
any means. [Unconstitutional if 'seizure' of our private property without 4th Amend judicial 'court warrant.' ] Except as
otherwise provided in subsection (e), a levy shall extend only to property possessed and obligations existing at the
time thereof. In any case in which the Secretary may levy upon property or rights to property, he may [but no
'power'. ] seize and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or intangible).
138
U.S. INDIVIDUAL 1040 INCOME TAX FORM - WHERE IS IRS (26 USC) DEFINITION OF INDIVIDUAL? = PERSON
5 United States Code § 552a
Title 5. Government Organization and Employees
Part I. The Agencies Generally Chapter 5. Administrative Procedure
Subchapter II. Administrative Procedure
§ 552a. Records maintained on individuals
(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term "agency" means agency as defined in section 552(e) of this title;
(2) the term "individual" means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence; [Notice: The Government of the U.S. had no citizens of its own to tax prior to the 14th Amendment. ]
(3) the term "maintain" includes, collect, use, or disseminate; *** Current through P.L.109-34, approved 07-12-05.
BASED ON WHAT? MAGIC? EVEN CITIZENS OF THE U.S. ARE SUPPOSE TO BE FREE IN THE LAND OF THE FREE
The 14th Amendment only empowered the Government of the United States to protect citizens of the United States.
Congress has authority to require filing of returns reporting taxable income under its general power to levy taxes.
U.S. v. Acker, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1969, 415 F.2d 328. [See Levy: on income from government or subdivision thereof. ]
26 CFR (Treas. Reg.) §1.1-1 Income tax on individuals.

(a) General rule. (1) Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a
citizen or resident of the United States and, to the extent provided by section 871(b) or 877(b), on the income of a
nonresident alien individual. [Does not say: imposes an income tax on every citizen or resident of the United States. ]
(b) Citizens or residents of the United States liable to tax. In general, all citizens of the United States, wherever
resident, and all resident alien individuals are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code whether the income is
received from sources within or without the United States. [On equal with aliens. Not the sovereign people. ]
(c) Who is a citizen. Every person born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction is a citizen.
[T.D. 6500, 25 FR 11402, Nov. 26, 1960, as amended by T.D. 7117, 36 FR 9396, May 25, 1971; T.D. 7332, 39 FR
44216, Dec. 23, 1974] June 16, 2004; 69 FR 33774. [They know how to cite citizen!; but fraudulently left out "of the
United States". This is not a substantive regulation. + No substantive regulation for punishment of IRS crimes? ]
SUBJECT TO: "Liable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed or affected by; provided that;
provided; answerable for." American Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 251 Mass. 329; Hannibal Trust Co. v. Elzea, 315
Mo. 485; Allen v. Simmons, 9 W.Va. 318; Middleton v. Findla, 25 Cal. 76; Manning v. Sams, 143 Ga. 205,
Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 345 Mo. 650 (Black’s Law 4th Ed. p 1594.) [subject citizen of Government.]
SUBJECT: Constitutional Law. One that owes allegiance to a sovereign and is governed by his laws. The natives of
Great Britian are subjects of the British government. Men in free governments are subjects as well as citizens; as
citizens they enjoy rights and franchises; as subjects they are bound to obey the laws. Webster. The term is little
used, in this sense in countries enjoying a republican form of government. The Pizzaro, 2 Wheaton 245; Swiss Nat.
Ins. Co. v. Miller, 267 U.S. 42. [In our Constitutional republic, government is of We the People not the opposite. ]
26 CFR 301.6012-1 Persons required to make returns of income. For provisions with respect to person required to
make returns of income, see § § 1.6012-1 to 1.6012-4, inclusive, of this chapter (Income Tax Regulations). [32 FR
15241, Nov. 3, 1967](Not a substantive regulation. Cites no statute at the end of it to have force and effect of law. )
OVER TEN MILLION DOLLARS RETURNED
See: losthorizons.com And Pete's book Cracking the Code, for filing a claim for an income tax refund etc. What a simple concept:
There is no power to Levy -'seize' (take) property from anyone other than any officer, employee, or elected official of said Federal
governments, or agency or instrumentality thereof, hence, for us voluntary assessment and payment like the Supreme Court says since
no compulsory levy power in the statute to enforce it by seizure other than all said Federal public employment filing tax forms.
DECLARATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 1040 INCOME TAX REFUND - SEE FORM 4852
To whom it may concern in the Internal Revenue Service et al;
Free of all fraud I the affiant (your Christian and surname here) am one of We the natural borne sovereign
white People of the United States in my 'private' capacity of the private sector not 'public' sector, hereby declares:
I am a natural borne on one of the several states (the state = the land) of The United States of America.
I deny I have ever truly been and intended to be any of the 'entities' (as defined in IRC section 6331(A), 26 C.F.R. 301.6331, 26
U.S.C. 6331)). [Levy applies to income from Federal governments to the Federal artificial entities-persons cited. ]
I deny I have ever truly been and intended to be a citizen or resident of 'United States', Federal Government, or the federal
District of Columbia or of any Federal State, STATE, district, District, territory, Territory, possession, or enclave.
I deny I have ever truly been and intended to be an 'employee' (defined in 26 U.S.C. 3401(c) who earned 'wages' (defined in 26
U.S.C. 3401(a) that were paid to me by an 'employer' (defined in 26 U.S.C. 3401(d).
139
I deny I am and intended to be in a 'trade or business' as defined in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26) "includes functions of a public office").
I deny that I have ever truly been and intended to be in the 'employment' (as defined in 26 U.S.C. 3121(b)) of an 'American
employer' (as defined in 26 U.S.C. 3121(h)), who earned 'wages' (as defined in 26 U.S.C. 3121(a)).
I deny I have ever truly been and intended to be an officer or employee of an 'United States Corporation' (as defined in section
207 of the Public Salary Tax Act). I deny I am and intended to be in any Federal public employment.
I deny I received income salary, or wages for services from any government or political subdivision thereof.
If I am in error please contact me before anything becomes any kind of a problem. Thank you. (Signature)
See Internal Rev. stat 26 USC § 6109 (d). Identifying number is Social Security number, as required on the tax form.
If you have attempted to deal with an IRS problem unsuccessfully contact the Taxpayer Advocate online at
www.irs.gov/advocate or by calling a toll free number, 1-877-777-4778.
For Tax Forms and Publications SE: W:CAR:MP:T:T I.R.S. 1111 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20224
MISUNDERSTANDING TO PAY TAXES NEED 'NOT' HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS!
I deny I am and intended to be the class of taxable and liable (non-sovereign) 'person' or individual in the statute.
SEYMOUR, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges (U.S. Ct. of Appeals,10th Cir.) BALDOCK, Circuit Judge:
A good faith misunderstanding of the duty to pay income taxes can negate the willfulness element of tax evasion
charge, "and '[t]he misunderstanding need not have a reasonable basis to provide a defense.' " United States v.
Harting, 879 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Hairston, 819 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir.1987) );
but see United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1270 (7th Cir.1989) (rejecting subjective reasonableness standard
followed by other circuits in favor of objective reasonableness standard), vacated 498 U.S. 192 (1991). However,
"although not itself the standard by which to evaluate good faith, the reasonableness of a good-faith defense is a
factor which the jury may properly consider in determining whether a defendant's asserted beliefs are genuinely
held." United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 537 n. 3 (10th Cir.1989) . In the instant case, the district court explained
to the jury that, although defendant's subjective belief that he was not obligated to pay taxes did not have to be
reasonable to effectuate a valid good faith defense, the objective reasonableness of defendant's belief could be
considered, along with other evidence, in determining whether his subjective belief was genuine. We find the
court's instruction unambiguous and fully consistent with our holdings in Mann and Harting. U.S. of America v.
COLLINS, 920 F.2d 619 (1990)(1). [See 26 USC Sec. 6201 Assessment authority (d) Required reasonable verification of
information returns. 'Shifts' burden. The court cases herein are my good faith defense of the truth yet. The System is too
immense, complex, and convoluted to understand and rely on as ample security, vague applicability = fraud =void. ]
For purposes of offense of failure to file income tax return, a defendant's conduct is not "willful" if he acted through
negligence, inadvertence or mistake, or due to his good-faith misunderstanding of requirements of the law. U.S.
v. Rosenfield, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1972, 469 F.2d 598. [I deny I am in active service or paid by any government or subdivision]
Only true income can be considered in determining whether a person was obliged to file an individual tax return
for year. Clawson v. U.S., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1952, 198 F.2d 792. [I deny I am anything other than 1 of We the People.]
"Willful" requirement of this section making it misdemeanor to willfully fail to file federal income tax return means
act both intentional and reprehensible, attended by knowledge of legal obligation and purpose to prevent
government from getting that which it lawfully requires. U.S. v. Vitiello, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1966, 363 F.2d 240.
Defendant charged with willfully failing to file income tax returns was entitled to admit into evidence legal
materials, including court opinions and portions of the Congressional Record, which he claimed supported his
belief that he was not required to file income tax, which evidence was relevant to issue of willfulness. U.S. v.
Gaumer, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1992, 972 F.2d 723, rehearing denied. [Use the court opinions in this Book. ]
An inefficient and negligent accountant does not constitute a justification for failure to file federal income tax
returns, warranting acquittal of a taxpayer on charge of willfully failing to file; only a good-faith misunderstanding
or inadvertence constitutes justification for failure to file. U. S. v. Wilson, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1977, 550 F.2d 259.
Both failure to file and false filing offenses under Internal Revenue Code require that accused have acted willfully,
that is, intentionally in violation of known legal duty. U.S. v. Burton, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1984, 737 F.2d 439.
Where defendant or his tax advisors may have subjectively, but wrongly, seen ambiguity in tax law, defendant in
prosecution for willful failure to file tax returns or willful tax evasion may present evidence to jury showing basis
for his alleged good-faith belief in his construction of tax law, which may include expert testimony about case law
to the extent actual reliance on case law is claimed. U.S. v. Harris, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1991, 942 F.2d 1125.
Only inadvertent failure to file tax returns or bona fide misunderstanding as to defendant's duty to make return
constitute justifiable excuses in prosecution for willful failure to file income tax returns. U.S. v. McCorkle, C.A.7
(Ill.) 1975, 511 F.2d 482.
Willfulness element in statute prohibiting willful failure to file income tax return requires proof of intentional
violation of known legal duty, and thus describes specific intent crime. U.S. v. Birkenstock, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1987, 823
140
F.2d 1026.
To show that a taxpayer's failure to file a federal tax return was willful, the Government need not prove anything
beyond establishing that taxpayer's action was deliberate, intentional, and without justifiable excuse or, as
otherwise stated, a voluntary, intentional violation of a known duty. U.S. v. Pohlman, C.A.8 (N.D.) 1975, 522 F.2d
974. See, also, U.S. v. Londe, D.C.Mo.1978, 449 F.Supp. 590, affirmed 587 F.2D 18; U.S. v. Greenlee,
D.C.Pa.1974, 380 F.Supp. 652, affirmed 517 F.2D 899.
"Willfulness," under this section requires proof only of a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty, and
good faith disagreement with the law does not negate willfulness, and circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove
willfulness. U.S. v. Gleason, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1984, 726 F.2d 385.
A careless or reckless disregard does not elevate a defendant's conduct to "willful" as that term is employed in this
section. U. S. v. Bengimina, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1974, 499 F.2d 117.
Willfulness under this section requires only proof of intentional violation of known legal duty. U.S. v. Francisco,
C.A.8 (Iowa) 1980, 614 F.2d 617. See, also, U.S. v. Rifen, C.A.Mo.1978, 577 F.2d 1111; U.S. v. Bourque,
C.A.R.I.1976, 541 F.2d 290; U.S. v. Marks, W.D.Mo.1982, 534 F.Supp. 663.
Failure to file income tax return does not violate this section which prohibits willful failure to file if failure resulted
from good-faith misunderstanding of the law. U.S. v. Buras, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1980, 633 F.2d 1356.
In prosecution for willful failure to file income tax returns, jury could acquit if it found that defendants believed in
good faith that statute removed obligation to file tax return, but not because the jury itself so interpreted the statute.
U.S. v. Powell, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1991, 955 F.2d 1206, appeal after new trial 46 F.3d 1148.
"Willful" within this sec. making it a misdemeanor to wilfully fail to make an income tax return means with a bad
purpose or without grounds for believing that one's act is lawful or without reasonable cause or capriciously or
with a careless disregard of whether one has the right to so act. Martin v. U.S., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 1963, 317 F.2d 753.
Holding that tax protester who claimed too many exemptions could not claim protection of U.S.C.A.Const. Amend.
5 on his federal tax return did not moot finding that taxpayer did not assert his claim in good faith in prosecution for
wilfully failing a file a return, as assertion of even an invalid self- incrimination claim in "good faith" would defeat
requirement of his section that the failure be "willful" and someone who thinks he is complying with the law
cannot be said to be "willfully" violating it. U.S. v. Carlson, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1980, 617 F.2d 518.
Federal income tax regulations governing filing of income tax returns do not require Office of Management and
Budget control numbers because requirement to file tax return is mandated by statute, not by regulation. U.S. v.
Bartrug, E.D.Va.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1290, affirmed.
Section 7201 of this title requires affirmative act of evasion while this section is an omission of a duty to make
return. U.S. v. Ming, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1972, 466 F.2d 1000. Also U.S. v. Coppola, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1969, 425 F.2d 660.
Difference between misdemeanor offense of willful failure to pay taxes when due and felony offense of willful
attempt to evade or defeat taxes is that the felony offense involves some commission in addition to willful
omission. Sansone v. U.S., U.S. 380 U.S. 343 (Mo.) 1965. Also, U.S. v. Vitiello, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1966, 363 F.2d 240.
Omissions denounced in this section consist of wilful failure to perform number of specified acts at time required,
and commission of felony within ß 7201 of this title cannot be made out by allegations limited to these omissions,
but omissions within this section coupled with wilful, affirmative acts of commission designed to evade or defeat
tax will constitute a felony. U.S. v. Donovan, W.D.Tex.1966, 250 F.Supp. 463.
Congressional intent, in enacting ß 145(a) [I.R.C.1939] providing that any person required to pay any income tax
who willfully fails to pay such tax at the time required by law or regulation shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor, was to make failure to make timely payment of income tax a
misdemeanor, regardless of the civil remedies available to insure prompt collection and the other penalties
applicable in cases of late payment. U.S. v. Palermo, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1958, 259 F.2d 872.
Good-faith misunderstanding of the law may negate willfulness, but good-faith disagreement with the law does not.
U.S. v. Kraeger, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 711 F.2d 6. See, also, U.S. v. Romero, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1981, 640 F.2d 1014; U.S.
v. Moore, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1980, 627 F.2d 830. [The scam: In Law vs. In practice-the parties are not the true ones.]
Taxpayer's W-2 forms were relevant to establish duty to file tax return and to show willfulness of failure to file tax
return and were admissible despite taxpayer's willingness to stipulate to amount of income. U .S. v. Bergman, C.A.9
(Nev.) 1987, 813 F.2d 1027. [Based on what? Where does the W-2 form disclose the duty? ]
Even though defendant was not entitled to protection under U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5 for allegedly willfully failing
to file income tax return, he could not be properly convicted for an erroneous claim of privilege asserted in good
141
faith. U.S. v. Smith, C.A.9 (Or.) 1984, 735 F.2d 1196 See, also, U.S. v. Pilcher, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1982, 672 F.2d 875.
Statute providing for criminal sanctions for failure to file federal income tax returns [26 U.S.C.A. ß 7203] was not
void for vagueness due to failure to define "person required" to file tax returns; definition of "person required" to
pay income tax is set forth in 26 U.S.C.A. ß 1 which imposes tax on all individuals in accordance with detailed
tables set forth in that section, and definition is again repeated explicitly in 26 U.S.C.A. ß 6012 which governs
persons required to make returns of income. U.S. v. Pederson, C.A.9 (Mont.) 1986, 784 F.2d 1462.[Of gov.? ]
Decision in Lumetta v. United States, 362 F.2d 644, holding that government seeking to prove offense of willful
failure to file income tax returns at required time must prove that failure to file return was prompted by a bad
purpose and without grounds for believing that failure to file was lawful, as opposed to a careless, thoughtless or
inadvertent oversight is overruled to extent that it indicates that "a careless disregard" may establish willfulness. U.
S. v. Bengimina, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1974, 499 F.2d 117.
"Willfulness" in context of criminal tax cases is defined as voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty,
and neither bad purpose nor evil motive is an independent element of willful failure to file tax returns; thus, the
Government may prove willful conduct by establishing either that defendant acted with bad purpose or evil motive,
or that defendant voluntarily, intentionally violated a known legal duty. U.S. v. Powell, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1991, 955
F.2d 1206, appeal after new trial 46 F.3d 1148.
Husband and wife were "persons" under Internal Revenue Code, and thus, required to file income tax return despite
their contention that they were not taxpayers because they were "free born, white, preamble, sovereign, natural
individual common-law 'de jure' citizens of Kansas." U.S. v. Dawes, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1989, 874 F.2d 746, rehearing
denied, certiorari denied 493 U.S. 920, error coram nobis granted 895 F.2d 1581, on remand.(government income?)
Income must be reported by, and is taxable to, taxpayer who earns it. Mallette Bros. Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S., C.A.5
(Miss.) 1983, 695 F.2d 145. [I invoke sovereign immunity. No forms for the sovereign people to sign as them. ]
Failure to file federal income tax return is offense malum prohibitum. State v. Jones, Utah 1965, 17 Utah 2d 190.
In order to sustain conviction for failure to file timely income tax returns, government need only show that
defendant was required to file return, that he knew he was so required, and that he willfully or purposefully, as
distinguished from inadvertently, negligently, or mistakenly, failed to file such return, and defendant's reasons for
failing to so file are irrelevant. U.S. v. Matosky, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1970, 421 F.2d 410.
Government, in prosecution for failure to file federal income tax returns, was required to show that defendant was
required to file a return, that he did not do so, and that his failure to file was willful and was not required to prove
that defendant owed government any tax. U.S. v. Gorman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1968, 393 F.2d 209.
In order to establish a failure to file a federal income tax return, it must be shown that taxpayer was required to file
tax return for year in question, that defendant failed to make such a return, and that defendant's failure was willful.
U.S. v. Grabinski, D.C.Minn.1983, 558 F.Supp. 1324, affirmed 727 F.2d 681.
The government charging wilful failure to make personal income tax returns had burden of proving (1) that
defendant was required to make returns for taxable years in question, (2) that defendant failed to make timely
returns, and (3) that defendant's failure to make timely returns was a "knowing" and "wilful" failure. U.S. v.
Thompson, D.C.Conn.1964, 230 F.Supp. 530, affirmed 338 F.2d 997.
Unrealized increases in net worth resulting from higher market value are not probative of gross income for
purposes of prosecution for failure to file income tax return. U. S. v. Walker, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1973, 479 F.2d 407.
The element of "wilfulness" as used in this section making it a misdemeanor wilfully to fail to file income tax
returns involves a specific wrongful intent, namely: actual knowledge of existence of a legal obligation and intent
to evade that obligation. U.S. v. Thompson, D.C.Conn.1964, 230 F.Supp. 530, affirmed 338 F.2d 997.
CUMMINGS, District Judge: Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit [159 F.3d at 294 dissenting] aptly explains
the dilemma between the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" and the inherent unreasonableness of
criminal prosecutions involving obscure violations of law: We want people to familiarize themselves with the laws
bearing on their activities. But a reasonable opportunity doesn't mean being able to go to a local law library and
read Title 18. [What does? ] UNITED STATES of America v. EMERSON, 46 F.Supp.2d 598 (1999)(4).
(SUPER) EASILY CONFUSED MASS - OF IGNORANT OF THE LAW - U.S. FEDERAL TAXPAYERS
In our 'complex' tax system uncertainty 'often' arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law.
(Tax system is void for fraud? = too vast complex, complicated, convoluted with missing and incomplete definitions etc.)
'willfully' is not met, therefore, if a taxpayer 'has relied in good faith on a prior decision of this Court.'
Justice BLACKMUN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
142
This longstanding interpretation of the purpose of the recurring word 'willfully' promotes coherence in the group of
tax crimes. In our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow
the law. The Court has said, 'It is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent
errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care.' Spies, 317 U.S., at 496. Degrees of negligence give rise in the
tax system to civil penalties. The requirement of an offense committed 'willfully' is not met, therefore, if a taxpayer
has relied in good faith on a prior decision of this Court. James v. United States, 366 U.S., at 221--222. Cf. Lambert
v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). The Court's consistent interpretation of the word 'willfully' to require an element
of mens rea implements the pervasive intent of Congress to construct penalties that separate the purposeful tax
violator from the well-meaning, but easily confused, mass of taxpayers. [and jurors, convicting Americans. ]
Until Congress speaks otherwise, we therefore shall continue to require, in both tax felonies and tax
misdemeanors that must be done 'willfully,' the bad purpose or evil motive described in Murdock, supra. We hold,
consequently, that the word 'willfully' has the same meaning in s 7207 that it has in s 7206(1). UNITED STATES v.
BISHOP, 412 U.S. 346 (1973)(2). [In part I rely on this book! I deny I am that class of taxpayer 'person.' I demand our
servants immediately produce the specific tax form for We the People to sign as one of We the (sovereign) People. ]
THEIR CONFESSION: "AS COMPLEX AS THE TAX SYSTEM"

O'CONNOR, J. (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court:
As we observed in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983): "In an area as complex as the tax
system, the agency Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its authority to meet
changing conditions and new problems.... SKINNER v. MID-AMERICA PIPELINE CO., 490 U.S. 212 (1989)(1).
BLATCHFORD, J. (Supreme Court of the United States): Although by section 29 of the act of June 10, 1890, c.
407, entitled 'An act to simplify the laws in relation to the collection of the revenues.' AUFFMORDT et al v.
HEDDEN Collector, 137 U.S. 310 (1890)(3). [Simplify the laws again, and super simplify them as unquestionable.]
COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THE LAW REQUIRES LONG PREPRATORY TRAINING AND PROFOUND LIFE TIME STUDY
SHAW, Chief Justice (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts):
The founders of our constitution understood, what every reflecting person must understand, from the nature of the
law, in its fundamental principles, and in its comprehensive details, that it is a science, requiring a long course
of preparatory training, of profound study and active practice, to be expected of no one who has not dedicated
his life to its pursuit; they well understood that no safe system of jurisprudence could be established, that no
judiciary department of government could be constituted, without bringing into its service jurists thus trained and
qualified. Commonwealth of Mass. v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185 (1855)(1). [System is more Complex than tax code ]
INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY OF 'EVERY' ELEMENT
The Constitution requires a criminal conviction to rest upon a 'jury' determination that 'the
defendant' is guilty of 'every' element of the crime.
Guilt is personal. Super emphasis added. If the statute does not apply to the sovereign People the
court lacks jurisdiction to proceed at all, and can only announce the fact and dismiss the cause.
Justice SOUTER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Cf. Green, "The Whole Truth?": How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 Loyola (LA) L.Rev. 699,
703 (1992) ("[E]videntiary rules ... predicated in large measure on the law's distrust of juries [can] have the
unintended, and perhaps ironic, result of encouraging the jury's distrust of lawyers. The rules do so by fostering the
perception that lawyers are deliberately withholding evidence" [Refusing to prove lawful jurisdiction over us. ]
(footnote omitted)). The fact that juries have expectations as to what evidence ought to be presented by a party, and
may well hold the absence of that evidence against the party, is also recognized in the case law of the Fifth
Amendment, which explicitly supposes that, despite the venerable history of the privilege against self-incrimination,
jurors may not recall that someone accused of crime need not explain the evidence or avow innocence beyond
making his plea. See, e.g., Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340, and (1978) . The assumption that jurors may have
contrary expectations and be moved to draw adverse inferences against the party who disappoints them undergirds
the rule that a defendant can demand an instruction forbidding the jury to draw such an inference. [***]
Justice O'CONNOR, with THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice SCALIA, and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting:
It may well be that the prosecution needs "evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story" in order to prove its
case in a way a jury will accept. Ante, at 654. But that is by no means the only or the most important reason that a
defendant may not oblige the Government to accept his concession to an element of the charged offense. The
Constitution requires a criminal conviction to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every
element of the crime of which he is charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510
(1995) (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993)); see also Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,
156 (1979) ("[I]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a given case remains
constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the
State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt"). "A simple plea of not guilty, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11,
143
puts the prosecution to its proof as to all elements of the crime charged...." Mathews v. U.S., 485 U.S. 58, 64-65
(1988). Further, a defendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the crime does not remove the
prosecution's burden to prove that element. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991). At trial, a defendant may
thus choose to contest the Government's proof on every element; or he may concede some elements and contest
others; or he may do nothing at all. Whatever his choice, the Government still carries the burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt on each element.
It follows from these principles that a defendant's stipulation to an element of an offense does not remove
that element from the jury's consideration. The usual instruction regarding stipulations in a criminal case reflects as
much: "When the attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree as to the existence of a fact, you may accept the
stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved. You are not required to do so, however, since you are the sole
judge of the facts." 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff, & K. O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions ß
12.03, p. 333 (4th ed.1992). Obviously, we are not dealing with a stipulation here. A stipulation is an agreement,
and no agreement was reached between petitioner and the Government in this case. Does the Court think a different
rule applies when the defendant attempts to stipulate, over the Government's objection, to an element of the charged
offense? If so, that runs counter to the Constitution: The Government must prove every element of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970), and the defendant's strategic decision
to "agree" that the Government need not prove an element cannot relieve the Government of its burden, see Estelle,
supra, at 69-70. Because the Government bears the burden of proof on every element of a charged offense, it must
be accorded substantial leeway to submit evidence of its choosing to prove its case. OLD CHIEF v. UNITED
STATES, 519 U.S. 172 (1997)(2). [Proof of the truth of the Law and fact regarding every relevant element. ]
We do not have to prove anything, yet our servants refuse to prove lawful jurisdiction over us. If jurors demanded our servants
prove everything (not by lip service) 'what' your true status is; what class of 'person' their statute applies to; if the plaintiff is the
Government; and where the District boundaries are prescribed in Law: case dismissed. They refuse to ascertain the Truth = Justice?
ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF GUILT

Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must
convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.' [***] The standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence--that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' Coffin v. United States, supra, 156 U.S., at 453. [***]
Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. [***] Due process commands that no man
shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of *** convincing the factfinder of his guilt.' In the
Matter of WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)(2).
ENCOURAGE AND ACHIEVE THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE 'VOLUNTARY' COMPLIANCE

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are charged with the responsibility of
administering and enforcing the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. ß ß 7801 and 7802. Congress, by ß 7601(a),
has required the Secretary to canvass revenue districts to "inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may
be liable to pay any internal revenue tax." With regard to suspected fraud, these duties encompass enforcement of
both civil and criminal statutes. [***] Pursuant to 26 CFR ß 601.107 (1977), each revenue district has an Intelligence
Division, "whose mission is to encourage and achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary compliance with the
internal revenue laws." [***]
A referral to the Justice Department permits criminal litigation to proceed. The IRS cannot try its own
prosecutions. Such authority is reserved to the Department of Justice [of executive. ] and, more particularly, to the
United States Attorneys, 28 U.S.C. ß 547(1). U.S. v. LaSALLE NAT. BANK, 437 U.S. 298 (1978) (2). [Tried by
members of the Bar. On a 1040 Tax return it is merely my opinion of what is true, correct, and complete, without their
admission my answers are true, I dare not 'swear' everything is true. Every answer is merely my guess __?__ ]
Revised Statutes of the United States 1900, June 6; Chapter 786, Title II §§ 707-713 (p. 1319)
Sec. 707. A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice. …
Sec. 708. Whenever it appears that the judge of the district court presiding in the division where the action is
pending is disqualified under the provisions of the section last preceding the action shall be transferred to another
division of said court unless a judge of another division will appear and preside during the disposition thereof:
Provided, however, That the parties may by written stipulation agree upon a member of the bar of said court to try
the same. [Merely authorized to try the action, under separation of powers not authorized to execute judgement. ]
Sec. 710. A judge may exercise, out of court, all the powers expressly conferred upon a judge contradistinguished
from a court and not other wise.
Sec. 711. Every judicial officer has power- [All judicial power and jurisdiction is in the courts of The Judiciary. ]
144
First. To preserve and enforce order in his immediate presence, and in the proceeding before him, [contempt of
"court" not contempt of judge or member of the Bar. Established judicial Court vs. Member of the Bar out of Court. ]
PRECLUDES ANY EMPLOYEE OF THE ALASKA COURT SYSTEM FROM PRACTICING LAW IN ANY THE COURTS
CONNOR, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska): Before dealing with the specific contentions on review, we think it
will be helpful to set forth the general structure of the Alaska Bar Association. The Association is a creation and
instrumentality of the state, AS 08.08.010.) [***] AS, 08.08.020 provides that every person licensed to practice law
in the state (except a judge of a court of record) is eligible for active membership in the Alaska Bar, (fn 5) while
AS 08.08.210 provides that no person may engage in the private practice of law unless he is an active member of the
Alaska Bar. (fn 6) Rule 2(d) of the court administrative rules precludes any employee of the Alaska court system
from engaging directly or indirectly in the practice of law in any of the courts in the state, (fn 7) while Rule 4 of the
Appellate Rules specifically forbids the private practice of law by a law clerk to a justice of the Supreme Court. (fn
8) Former Alaska Bar Rule II, s 7, states that successful applicants to the Association will be sworn in by the
Supreme Court, after which the applicant is to pay the membership fee, if any, required of new members and shall
be thereupon enrolled as an active member. ["The Judiciary" vs. Court System-private company-all employees. ]
Rule 2. Appointment and Compensation of Employees-Practice of "Law" by Personnel Prohibited.
'(d) During his term of office or employment, neither the administrative director nor any other employee of the
Alaska court system shall engage directly or indirectly in the practice of law in any of the courts of this state.'
(Amended by Supreme Court Order 148 dated November 26, 1971). Petition by W. Micheal MOODY, 524 P.2d
1261. (1974)(1). [Bench vs. Bar. Judicial judge of a judicial court of record vs. administrative Bar lawyer of-for the state.]
NO ORIGINAL EVIDENCE OF ANYTHING NOR THE TAX STATUTE ORIGINATED IN HOUSE AS A BILL
Congress delegates to the Executive authority to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Code."
O'CONNOR, J., (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court:
Article I, ß 8 of the Constitution enumerates the powers of Congress. First in place among these enumerated powers
is the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises...." We discern nothing in this placement of the
Taxing Clause that would distinguish Congress' power to tax from its other enumerated powers--such as its
commerce powers, its power to "raise and support Armies," its power to borrow money, or its power to "make
Rules for the Government"--in terms of the scope and degree of discretionary authority that Congress may
delegate to the Executive in order that the President may "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II,
ß 3. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding broad delegation of authority to the President
under the Taxing Clause and the Commerce Clause to impose duties on foreign imports). It is, of course, true that
"[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue [must] originate in the House of Representatives...." Art. I, ß 7. But the Origination
Clause, while embodying the Framers' concern that persons elected directly by the people have initial responsibility
over taxation (until the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, Senators were chosen by state
legislatures, see Art. I, ß 3), implies nothing about the scope of Congress' power to delegate discretionary authority
under its taxing power once a tax bill has been properly enacted. Mid-America does not contend that ß 7005 failed
to originate in the House. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce drafted the provision, which was
included in H.R. 3500, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. See H.R.Rep. No. 99-300, p. 492 (1985). [Demand original Bill. ][***]
Even when Congress legislates with remarkable specificity, as it has done in the Internal Revenue Code, it
has delegated to the Executive the authority to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of
[the Code], including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to
internal revenue" and the authority to determine "the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the
internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect." 26 U.S.C. ß ß 7805(a), (b). Such rules and
regulations, which undoubtedly affect individual taxpayer liability, are equally without doubt the result of entirely
appropriate delegations of discretionary authority by Congress. As we observed in Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983): "In an area as complex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with
administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and new
problems.... "Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rulings it considers improper; and courts
exercise review over IRS actions. In the first instance [by (substantive) regulation. ], however, the responsibility for
construing the [Internal Revenue] Code falls to the IRS. Since Congress cannot be expected to anticipate every
conceivable problem that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight, it relies on the administrators and on the
courts to implement the legislative will." Id., at 596-597, 103 S.Ct., at 2031.
See also National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488 (1979) ("The choice
among reasonable interpretations [of the Internal Revenue Code] is for the Commissioner, not the courts").
SKINNER v. MID-AMERICA PIPELINE CO., 490 U.S. 212 (1989)(1). [Not the judicial courts? No stroke! ]
NO POSSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL OR CIVIL SANCTIONS - SUPER EMPHASIS ADDED!
145
Since, as we have observed earlier in this opinion, the statute is not self-executing, and were the Secretary to take
no action whatever under his authority there would be no possibility of criminal or civil sanctions being imposed
on anyone, the District Court was wrong in framing the question in this manner. [***]
Although the 'right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men,' Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, is not confined literally to
searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70, neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations
can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. Hale v. Henkel, supra; U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694.
'While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public
investigation, cf. Federal Trade Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, corporations can claim no
equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. Cf. United States v. White, supra. They are
endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of
acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSOC. v. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)(2). [If no substantive regulation, no possibility
of enforcing tax or levy on private people in the association- STATE and fraudulently converted to public status = License.]
THERE MUST BE A LAWFUL VOLUNTARY ASSESSMENT - RIGHT OF PRIVACY = RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge (9th Circuit Court of Appeals):
"Tax liability is a condition precedent to the demand. Merely demanding payment, even repeatedly, does not
cause liability. For the condition precedent of liability to be met, there must be a lawful assessment, either a
voluntary one by the taxpayer or one procedurally proper by the IRS. Because this country's income tax system is
based on voluntary self-assessment, rather than distraint, Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960) the
Service may assess the tax only in certain circumstances and in conformity with proper procedures." Bothke v.
Terry, 713 F.2d 1405, 1414 (1983). [Did you volunteer? IRS not authorized by law to make the 1st assessment on us.]
OUR SYSTEM OF TAXATION IS BASED ON 'VOLUNTARY' ASSESSMENT AND PAYMENT - RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Chief Justice WARREN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Of course, the Government can collect the tax from a District Court suitor by exercising its power of distraint--if he
does not split his cause of action--but we cannot believe that compelling resort to this extraordinary procedure is
either wise or in accord with congressional intent. Our system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and
payment, not upon distraint. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399; {See}Treas. Regs. on Procedural Rules
(1954 Code) s 601.103(a). FLORA v. UNITED STATES of America, 362 U.S. 145 (1960)(2). [No demands. That aligns
with their levy statute for government + no substantive regulation. Object to liens w/o judgment of a judicial court. ]
CANNOT BE GULLIBLE: THEIR COMPLEXITY &C. IS TO DEFRAUD AGAINST THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE
If the Supreme Court interprets assessment and payment are voluntary it's the Law and may not be disregarded by any
court. IRS says that means they will not come to your home and force you to file or pay, yet they try to force you (as a business entity)
to pay using their immense complex system of rules in their courts. Voluntary yet not voluntary? Their confusion is fraud. On such a
super important issue they should honorably provide a clear and simple section and form listing all of what the 'the Law' demands
applied to your true status. If not I would demand they show me clear and unquestionable authority of the Law that specifically shows
what status is liable for what source of income, where, and why, by an affirmative showing of the legislative intent of what class of
person is required to keep and produce private records, file, assess, and pay Federal income tax on their private labor, much less
before notice of deficiency and demand for payment is made by the bona fide authorized Officer. Plus, show from the beginning what
'source' of income is labor, and from 'where' (the location with boundaries) prescribed by Law. Our labor is an exchange, not income =
wealth, gain, profit. Demand to know where the corresponding Statute: 26 USC 601.103(a) plus substantive regulation requiring even a
'person' to pay, much less a Citizen let alone the sovereign people? The above Treasury Reg. 26 601.103(a) is not a 'substantive'
regulation because it fails to cite a statute for its 'source of law-legislative authority' to have 'force and effect of law.'
A GOVERNMENT WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE PRIVATE RIGHTS IS A DESPOTISM

Mr. Justice MILLER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
We have referred to this history of the contest over aid to railroads by taxation, to show that the strongest advocates
for the validity of these laws never placed it on the ground of the unlimited power in the State legislature to tax the
people, but conceded that where the purpose for which the tax was to be issued could no longer be justly claimed to
have this public character, but was purely in aid of private or personal objects, the law authorizing it was beyond
the legislative power, and was an unauthorized invasion of private right. Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wallace, 689;
People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94; Dillon on Municipal Corps., ß 587; 2 Redfield's
Laws of Railways, 398, rule 2. [Public taxes pay for private U.S. citizens welfare yet the People are not eligible. ]
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the State. A
government which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens
subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of
power, is after all but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of the majority, if you choose to call it
so, but it is none the less a despotism. It may well be doubted if a man is to hold all that he is accustomed to call his
146
own, all in which he has placed his happiness, and the security of which is essential to that happiness, under the
unlimited dominion of others, whether it is not wiser that this power should be exercised by one man than by many.
[***] To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow
it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery
because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under
legislative forms. Nor is it taxation. A 'tax,' says Webster's Dictionary, 'is a rate or sum of money assessed on the
person or property of a citizen by government for the use of the nation or state.' 'Taxes are burdens or charges
imposed by the legislature upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes.' Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 479. LOAN ASSOC. v. TOPEKA, 87 U.S. 655 (1874)(2). [Not public = the People are excluded. ]
NONE OTHER THAN LEGAL 'DUTIES' ARE PAYABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT
Justice McLEAN (Supreme Court of the United States):
From the proceedings of this court we know that collectors of the customs after their removal from office or the
expiration of their term, and sometimes while in office, under the pretext of indemnifying themselves against suits
for the exaction of illegal duties, were in the practice of withholding from the Treasury large sums of money. [***]
It is said that the law cannot raise a promise to pay by an officer, where it requires him to pay the same
money into the Treasury. The action is founded on the illegality of the transaction. None other than legal duties are
payable to the government; and where an officer by his own volition, or acting under the instructions of his superior,
demands a higher duty than the law authorizes, he is guilty of a wrong which his instructions cannot justify. [***]
The notice should induce the collector to reconsider his act, and if found to have been against law to
correct it. But it is said, he may have acted under the orders of the Secretary of the Treasury. Suppose he did, would
that justify or excuse an illegal act? I will answer this in the language of this court in the case last cited: 'Any
instructions from the Treasury Department could not change the law or affect the rights of the plaintiff. He, the
collector, was not bound to take and adopt that instruction. He was at liberty to judge for himself, and act
accordingly.' And in Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet., 99, this court say, 'that the personal inconvenience of the collector
is not to be considered.' When acting under instructions the government is bound to indemnify him. CARY v.
CURTIS, 44 U.S. 236 (1845)(1). [Executive regs cannot change the Law. Illegally withholding from the people. ]
EVERYTHING ELSE IS VOLUNTARY
From the mouth of the Attorney General of the United States. Duties on imports is compulsory everything else is voluntary.
Mr. Evarts, Attorney-General, and Mr. Talbot, contra:

The common law implies no contract on the part of the government to repay money erroneously collected into the
public treasury for public dues. This point sustained, the appeal fails. But further:
1. No new liability on the part of the government, in this respect, has been created by the statutes establishing or
relating to the Court of Claims. This appears by the statutes themselves.
2. What the revenue statutes define to be a compulsory payment in a case like this, and that alone, is such.
Everything else is voluntary. NICHOLS v. U.S., 74 U.S. 122 (1868)(2). [Code is vague-tax not defined as compulsory.]
That case is about duties on imports are compulsory. See I Statute (123 ?) creating judicial districts = commerce and trade
districts-ports in the 13 original states. See Federal Register Oct. 5, 1972 Vol. 37 No. 194: Intent of Constitution is taxation on ' shipping
and importation' since the Government of the U.S. had no citizens of its own to tax prior to the 14 th Amend. Emphasis added. Like the
Bible says, tax strangers (importers) coming in to our Land. To inspect and prevent unsafe imported foreign merchan(t)dise etc.
COLLECTION OF THE REVENUE - TO LEVY AND COLLECT "DUTIES "

Justice STORY (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Congress have, in a great variety of cases, acted upon this interpretation of the constitution, from the earliest period
after the constitution; as will be abundantly seen by the punishment of certain offences on land, connected with
piracies and felonies on the high seas, in the act of 1790, ch. 36, sec. 10 and sec. 11; and in the acts for regulation of
commerce and navigation, and for the collection of the revenue, passed from time to time: in which many of the
penalties, forfeitures and offences provided for, are such as are, or may be done on land; and yet which arise from
the power to regulate commerce and navigation, and to levy and collect duties. The ship registry act of 1792, ch. 45;
the act of 1798, ch. 52, for the enrolment and licensing of vessels in the coasting trade and fisheries; the act of
1790, ch. 102, for the regulation and government of seamen in the merchants' service; and the revenue collection
act, from the act of 1789, ch. 5, to that of 1799, ch. 128, afford many pointed illustrations. THE UNITED STATES
v. COOMBS, 37 U.S. 72 (1838). [Revenue is connected with commerce = water world-place. ]
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER ARTICLE 1 SEC. 8 CL. 1
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States... ."[apply noscitur a sociis to Taxes, Duties, Imposts, Excises: H20 world?]
USURPATION - UNJUST POWERS AND TAXING WITHOUT TRUE CONSENT - PRODUCED A WAR
147
Those illustrious statesmen and patriots had been, many of them, deeply engaged in the discussions which preceded
the war of our revolution, and all of them were well read in those discussions. The right to regulate commerce, even
by the imposition of duties, was not controverted; but the right to impose a duty for the purpose of revenue,
produced a war as important, perhaps, in its consequences to the human race, as any the world has ever witnessed.
GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)(2). [See same in MAYOR v. MILN, 36 U.S. 102 (1837). ]
The following are to prove why they conceal 1040 individual income tax is really gain from Commerce (Water World) for
artificial persons, and aliens engaged in such public business and not for private business by human Citizens of the states in The United
States of America. Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s ? But that's We the People the ultimate supreme sovereign power.
31 CFR Ch. 1. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY B. FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS 31 CFR ß 103.122:

(7) Taxpayer identification number is defined by section 6109 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.
6109) and the Internal Revenue Service regulations implementing that section (e.g., social security number or
employer identification number).[68 FR 25129, May 9, 2003](Taxpayer = resident of the District = U.S. person + alien)
CRIMES AGAINST THE REVENUE LAWS ARE COMMERCE CRIMES
They fraudulently fail to fully inform the accused of the "nature and cause" of the accusation (Const. Article VI):
27 CFR ß 72.11 Commercial crimes. Any of the following types of crimes (Federal or State): Offenses against
the revenue laws [&c] ... and attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or compounding any of the foregoing
crimes. [Art. 1 "commerce" clause: what other of the 18 "Power" clauses could create Federal "revenue crimes"? ]
38 Stat. 731 at Title 15 USC - COMMERCE AND TRADE - Sec. 17 "The labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce." [Hence, they pretend people (hu-mans) are artificial-public business entities-persons. ]
18 USC PART I CHAPTER 95 RACKETEERING Sec. 1951. Interference with commerce by threats or violence (b) As
used in this section - (3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory
or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District
of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place
outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 793; Pub. L. 103-322. title XXXIII, Sec. 330016(1)(L), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.) (This section is
popularly known as the "Hobbs Act") [All governments! (with foreign nations and among the several "States"?) ]
"The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... ."
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8. U.S. STEEL CORP et al v. MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)(3).
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court: Commerce among the States must, of necessity,
be commerce with the States. GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)(2). [Uniform regulation of commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States = Laws of the United States = body politics-governments-artificial persons. ]
REGULATIONS APPLY TO INHABITANTS = RESIDENT OF THE DISTRICT - "NOT TO THE PEOPLE"

Usurpation = Men using the artificial creature with its laws to prosecute its supreme sovereign Creators injuring no one?
MR. JUSTICE HUNT: I am compelled to dissent from the judgment of the court in this case [on voting. ]: The power
of Congress to 'regulate commerce among the several States' (sec. 8, subd. 3) refers to the commerce between the
inhabitants of the different States, and not to transactions between the political organizations called 'States.' The
people of a State are here intended by the word 'State.' U.S. v. REESE, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)(2). [Same below. ]
NO DECEPTION: EVERY MAN SHOULD KNOW WITH CERTAINTY WHEN HE IS COMMITTING A CRIME
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
If the legislature undertakes to define by statute a new offence, and provide for its punishment, it should express its
will in language that need not deceive the common mind. Every man should be able to know with certainty when
he is committing a crime. UNITED STATES v. REESE, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)(2). [He: his status. ]
INTERSTATE COMMERCE IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT ENTITLED TO EVERY CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Justice Harlan (Supreme Court of the U.S.) after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court:
To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every
citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and the
accession of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the
effect of depriving them of such right, unless Congress should see fit to interpose some contrary regulation on the
subject. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. STATE OF KANSAS, 216 U.S. 1 (1910)(1).
TO "FACILITATE" COMMERCE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE - NOT FOR MATTERS OF "INTERNAL" REGULATION
148
MR. JUSTICE FIELD (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, dissenting:
The government created by the Constitution was not designed for the regulation of matters of purely local concern.
The States required no aid from any external authority to manage their domestic affairs. They were fully competent
to provide for the due administration of justice between their own citizens in their own courts; and they needed no
directions in that matter from any other government, any more than they needed directions as to their highways and
schools, their hospitals and charitable institutions, their public libraries, or the magistrates they should appoint for
their towns and counties. It was only for matters which concerned all the States, and which could not be managed
by them in their independent capacity, or managed only with great difficulty and embarrassment, that a general and
common government was desired. Whilst they retained control of local matters, it was felt necessary that matters of
general and common interest, which they could not wisely and efficiently manage, should be intrusted to a central
authority. And so to the common government which grew out of this prevailing necessity was granted exclusive
jurisdiction over external affairs, including the great powers of declaring war, making peace, and concluding
treaties; but only such powers of internal regulation were conferred as were essential to the successful and efficient
working of the government established,--to facilitate intercourse and commerce between the people of the different
States, and secure to them equality of protection in the several States.
That the central government was created chiefly for matters of a general character, which concerned all
the States and their people, and not for matters of interior regulation, is shown as much by the history of its
formation as by the express language of the Constitution. The Union preceded the Constitution. As happily
expressed by the late Chief Justice, 'It began among the colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual
sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by
the necessities of war, and received definite form and character and sanction from the Articles of Confederation.'
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 725. Those articles were prepared by the Continental Congress, which was called to provide
measures for the common defence of the colonies against the encroachments of the British crown, and which,
failing to secure redress, declared their independence. Its members foresaw that, when the independence of the
colonies was established and acknowledged, their condition as separate and independent States would be beset with
dangers threatening their peace and safety; that disputes arising from conflicting interests and rivalries, always
incident to neighboring nations, would lead to armed collisions, and expose them to reconquest by the mother
country. To provide against the possibility of evils of this kind, the Articles of Confederation were prepared and
submitted to the legislatures of the several States, and finally, in 1781, were adopted. They declared that the States
entered into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defence, the security of their liberties and
their mutual and general welfare; and they bound themselves to assist each other against attacks on account of
religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence. They clothed the new government created by them with powers
supposed to be ample to secure these ends, and declared that there should be freedom of intercourse and commerce
between the inhabitants of the several States. They provided for a general congress, and, among other things,
invested it with the exclusive power of determining on peace and war, except in case of invasion of a State by
enemies, or imminent danger of such invasion by Indians; of sending and receiving ambassadors, entering into
treaties and alliances; of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by the authority of the States or of the United
States; of fixing the standard of weights and measures; of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians; and of establishing and regulating post-offices from one State to another; and they placed numerous
restraints upon the States. But by none of the articles was any interference authorized with the purely internal
affairs of the States, or with any of the instrumentalities by which the States administered their governments and
dispensed justice among their people; and they declared in terms that each State retained its sovereignty, freedom,
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which was not by the articles expressly delegated to
the United States in Congress assembled.
When the government of the confederation failed, chiefly through the want of all coercive authority, to
carry into effect its measures,--its power being only that of recommendation to the States,--and the present
Constitution was adopted, the same general ends were sought to be attained; namely, the creation of a central
government, which would take exclusive charge of all our foreign relations, representing the people of all the States
in that respect as one nation, and would at the same time secure at home freedom of intercourse between the
States, equality of protection to citizens of each State in the several States, uniformity of commercial regulations, a
common currency, a standard of weights and measures, one postal system, and such other matters as concerned all
the States and their people. [The sovereigns, and all institutions are under their control. ]
Accordingly, the new government was invested with powers adequate to the accomplishment of these
purposes, with which it could act directly upon the people, and not by recommendation to the States, and enforce its
measures through tribunals and officers of its own creation. There were also restraints placed upon the action of the
States to prevent interference with the authority of the new government, and to secure to all persons protection
against punishment by legislative decree, and insure the fulfilment of contract obligations. But the control of
matters of purely local concern, not coming within the scope of the powers granted or the restraints mentioned, was
left, where it had always existed, with the States. The new government being one of granted powers, its authority
was limited by them and such as were necessarily implied for their execution. But lest, from a misconception of
their extent, these powers might be abused, the Tenth Amendment was at an early day adopted, declaring that 'the
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powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.' EX PARTE VIRGINIA, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)(2). [I deny I am a citizen of the U.S.]
Foreign commerce is between subject citizens of the United States and foreign individuals.
citizens of the United States and those tribes.
Mr. Justice MILLER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
'Commerce,' says Chief Justice Marshall, in the opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, to which we so often turn with profit
when this clause of the Constitution is under consideration, 'commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something
more; it is intercourse.' [***] It relates to buying and selling and exchanging commodities, which is the essence of
all commerce, and it regulates the intercourse between the citizens of the United States and those tribes, which is
another branch of commerce, and a very important one. [***] Commerce with foreign nations, without doubt, means
commerce between citizens of the United States and citizens or subjects of foreign governments, as individuals.
U.S. v HOLLIDAY, 70 U.S. 407 (1865)(1). [Does not say commerce between the (sovereign) people. ]
MERCHANDISE: All commodities which merchants usually buy and sell, whether wholesale or retail; wares are
commodities such as are ordinarily the objects of trade and commerce. But the term is never understood as including
real estate, and is rarely applied to provisions such as are purchased day by day, or to such other articles as are
required for immediate consumption. Passaic Mfg. Co. v. Hoffman, 3 N.Y. 512; Hein v. O’Oconner, Tex.App., 15
S.W. 414; Elliot Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137; Smith v. Boyer, 119 S.C. 176. (Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed. p. 1138.)
Admiralty for commerce-business of citizens of United States on any navigable waters
Mr. Justice CAMPBELL (supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
The definition under this decree, if carried to its logical extent, will run thus: 'That the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States extends to all cases of contracts, torts, and injuries, which arise in or
concern the navigation, commerce, or business of citizens of the United States, or persons commorant therein, on
any of the navigable waters of the world.' JACKSON v. MAGNOLIA, 61 U.S. 296 (1857)(1).
Mr. Justice McLEAN (supreme Court of the United States): By the Constitution, 'Congress have power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.' The provision, 'among the
several States,' limits the power of Congress in the regulation of commerce to two or more States; consequently, a
State has power to regulate a commerce exclusively within its own limits; but beyond such limits the regulation
belongs to Congress. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is essentially a commercial power, and it is
necessarily limited to the exercise of that power by Congress. JACKSON v. MAGNOLIA, 61 U.S. 296 (1857)(1).
FEDERAL COURTS ARE NOT JUDICIAL "COURTS OF RECORD" EXERCISING COMMON LAW CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Not exercising Article III "judicial Power." No Power prescribed by Law of Article I to exercise jurisdiction and imprison people w/o consent.
WOODBURY, Circuit Justice (Circuit Court, D. Massachusetts):
It is doubtful whether many of the framers of the constitution thought of any criminal jurisdiction in extending
judicial powers to cases in admiralty. It was 'civil cases.' It was those that belonged to commerce. UNITED
STATES v. NEW BEDFORD BRIDGE, 27 F.Cas. 91 (1847)(1). [Usurpation: 'victimless' commercial crimes. ]
MERE 25% "CIVIL" PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO FILE IF REQUIRED TO FILE - TODAY CRUEL FINE AND IMPRISONMENT
70th Congress Sess. I. Ch. 852 (1928):
Sec. 11. NORMAL TAX ON INDIVIDUALS. There shall be [1st] levied, [2nd] collected, and [3rd] paid for each taxable
year on the net income of every individual a normal tax equal to the sum of the following: …
Sec. 13 TAX ON CORPORATIONS. [***]
Sec. 291. FAILURE TO FILE RETURN. In case of any failure to make and file a return required by this title, within
the time prescribed by law or prescribed by the Commissioner in pursuance of law, 25 per centum of the tax shall
be added to the tax, except that when a return is filed after such time and it is shown that the failure to file it was due
to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect no such addition shall be made to the tax. …
[Fraud: No definition of individual: Artificial entity or gov. stateless person-alien? Void for vagueness. Levy is a key. ]
The intent to evade taxation is twice the amount evaded. 200% increase: but still not cruel and unusual imprisonment.
NOT REQUIRED TO PERFORM THE ACTS IN THE ABSENCE OF NOTICE BY THE COMMISSIONER
MEMORANDUM ORDER PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, District Judge:
In 1873, Congress with its new Revised Statutes placed s 3173, the predecessor of the current Code's s 7602(2), in
the "Assessments and Collections" part of the Internal Revenue Laws and integrated the return requirement and the
summons provisions. The Revised Statutes did not include a provision requiring taxpayers to keep records. R.S.
3173 was reenacted without substantial change on numerous occasions prior to the first codification of the internal
revenue laws in 1939. [Right of Privacy. Must have 4th Amendment judicial court Warrant for search, or seizure. ]
The first record-keeping requirement appeared in the Revenue Act of 1914. It provided as follows: That all
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administrative, special or stamp provisions of law, including the law related to assessment of taxes, so far as
applicable, are hereby extended to and made part of this Act, and every person, firm, company, corporation or
association liable to any tax imposed by this Act, or for the collection thereof, shall keep such records and render,
under oath, such statements and returns, and shall comply with such regulations as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of Treasury, may from time to time prescribe and (every person who
attempts to evade taxation shall be liable for a penalty of twice the amount the person attempted to evade). ch. 331,
s 23, 38 Stat. 764. [A mere fine of double amount evaded. No cruel and unusual punishment of imprisonment. ] [***]
The first codification of the Internal Revenue laws appeared in 1939. It included a number of record and return
provisions which were directed at those with specific types of tax liability (e.g., Income Tax, s 54; Estate Tax, s
821(d); Admissions and Dues Taxes, s 1720; Documents and Instruments Tax s 1835). It also included, as part of
its General Administrative Provisions, record and return, examination and summons provisions which, with one
exception, were identical to those found in the 1924 Act. The exception was that the record and return provision
required taxpayers to make returns and statements and keep records where the Commissioner served notice on
them, but it did not require them to perform these acts in the absence of notice by the Commissioner. UNITED
STATES of America v. MOBIL CORP., 543 F.Supp. 507 (1981)(1). [Now mega fine and prison. Was a notice 'served'
on you by the Commissioner to file or pay based on facts and Law? Did they use the word 'Demand' for payment. Mine]
FRANK, Circuit Judge Dissenting as to the petitions for rehearing as to all the defendants: See Miller, Origins of the
American Revolution (1943) 325, 340. The Tea Act of 1773-- of which the smugglers were the first victims-- led to
the Boston Tea Party which was hailed as a 'glorious illegality' based on 'the great law of nature and reason' which
gives every society 'a right to defend itself from ruin.' Ibid. 338, 349. See also, ibid. 84: 'A New Englander, it was
said (in 1775), derived his right of cheating the revenue, and of perjuring himself, from the example of his fathers
and the rights of nature.' UNITED STATES of America v. GRUNEWALD, 233 F.2d 556 (1956)(4). [1/4 of 1%.
Today cruel and usual punishment by abusive servants. We need protection from government not by government. ]
KEY: to collect taxes for the general welfare of "the United States" = plural in Union (as a government)
vs. to regulate commerce, and among "the several States" = singulars (regulate governments)
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court: Commerce among the States must, of necessity,
be commerce with the States. GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)(2). [Uniform regulation of commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States; "the Laws of the United States" for aliens and non-Citizen merchants. ]
SET UP A DESPOTISM
PERKINS, J. (Supreme Court of Indiana):
Congress, as we have seen, takes no power under the general welfare clause, as that is not a grant of any power,
but a mere expression of one of the ends to be accomplished by the exercise of the powers granted. And should
Congress assume, upon its own ideas of general welfare, to exercise other powers than those granted, to carry them
out, it would simply, to that extent, set up a despotism. THAYER v. HEDGES, 22 Ind. 282 (1864)(1). [Like today.]
WHERE ARE THE 'BOUNDARIES' OF THE DISTRICT PRESCRIBED BY LAW?

I object, I did not understand I was in the district (port). I understand I was in the state but not in the district.
The states are instead 100% Federal revenue districts? Where does the Constitution authorize that fraud?
STORY, Circuit Justice (Circuit Court of the United States of the District of Maine):
Indeed, in our revenue laws 'port' and 'district' are often used, as of the same import, in cases where the limits of
the port and district are the same. The act of 1799, c. 128, seems to have used the words 'port' and 'district' of
Passamaquoddy in this sense. I am not aware, that there is any town or place known and incorporated by the name
of Passamaquoddy. Ayer v. Thatcher, 2 F.Cas. 269, 3 Mason 153, No. 684 (1823)(1). [Where are the 'boundaries' of
the district prescribed by law for lawful territorial jurisdiction? See TOLAND v. SPRAGUE, 37 U.S. 300 (1838)(2). ]
PORTS
Mr. Justice McLEAN (supreme Court of the United States):
The Constitution requires that all 'duties and imposts shall be uniform,' and declares that 'no preference shall be
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another.' [***]
As early as May 27th, 1796, Congress enacted, that 'the President be authorized to direct the revenue-officers
commanding forts and revenue-cutters to aid in the execution of quarantine, and also in the execution of the health
laws of the States respectively.' SMITH v. TURNER, 48 U.S. 283 (Passenger cases)(1849). [Military and salt water.]
NO STATE SHALL LAY IMPOST OR DUTIES … THE "ONLY" COMMERICAL RESTRICTION
Mr. Justice McLEAN (Supreme Court of the United States):
Before the adoption of the Constitution, the States, respectively, exercised sovereign power, under no other
limitations than those contained in the Articles of Confederation. By the third section of the sixth article of that
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instrument, it was declared that 'no State shall lay any imposts or duties which may interfere with any stipulations
in treaties entered into by the United States in Congress assembled'; and this was the only commercial restriction
on State power. As might have been expected, this independent legislation, being influenced by local interests and
policy, became conflicting and hostile, insomuch that a change of the system was necessary to preserve the fruits of
the Revolution. This led to the adoption of the Federal Constitution. SMITH v. TURNER, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
COMMERCIAL PRIVILEGES OF WE THE PEOPLE

Mr. Justice JOHNSON (Supreme Court of the United States): But, it is almost labouring to prove a self-evident
proposition, since the sense of mankind, the practice of the world, the contemporaneous assumption, and continued
exercise of the power, and universal acquiescence, have so clearly established the right of Congress over
navigation, and the transportation of men and their goods, as not only incidental to, but actually of the essence of,
the power to regulate commerce. As to the transportation of passengers, and passengers in a steam boat, I consider
it as having been solemnly recognised by the State of New-York, as a subject both of commercial regulation and of
revenue. [***] It is impossible, with the views which I entertain of the principle on which the commercial privileges
of the people of United States, among themselves, rests, to concur in the view which this Court takes of the effect of
the coasting license in this cause. GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)(2). [Copy DVD movies = "Piracy". ]
"UNRESTRICTED" AND FREE COMMERCIAL AND SOCIAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN WE THE PEOPLE
BARTLEY, C. J. (Supreme Court of Ohio):
This rule of law, founded upon comity prevailing among the distinct and independent nations of the earth, rests
upon still higher obligations among the people of the several states of the American Union. Having entered into a
league of friendship and solemn compact with each other, as the basis of a confederated government, designed to
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the several states, to secure to each its liberty, and to
establish justice, and insure domestic tranquility; they established intimate relations, and laid the foundation for
unrestricted and free commercial and social intercourse between the people of the several states; and that, too,
when the relation of master and slave actually existed, to some extent, in every state of the confederacy. Having
guaranteed to the people of each state inviolability in their rights of private property, and security in their
domestic tranquility; having declared that the powers enumerated in the constitution should not be construed to
deny or disparage the rights retained by the people; and having guaranteed the sovereignty and independence of
each state, subject only to the powers delegated to the confederacy, they recognized the relation of master and
servant, secured the return of fugitives from servitude, and provided, expressly, that 'full faith and credit shall be
given, in each state, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state;' and that 'the citizens
of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.'
United upon such intimate relations, for such purposes, and upon such terms, under the same confederated
government, the people of each state are bound, if not by the express obligations, certainly by the spirit and true
intent of the compact, to regard with the strictest fidelity, and in the most amicable spirit of reciprocity, all the
peculiar rights of the people of each other state, which separate and independent nations, in their intercourse with
each other, recognize in regard to the ordinary rights of persons and property, upon the ground of comity. Without
this, the harmony required to insure 'domestic tranquility' and the free commercial and social intercourse between
the people of the several states, essential to the great purposes of the confederacy, can not be secured. The citizens
of each state can not expect long to enjoy 'all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states,' unless
each state maintains a scrupulous regard for comity and reciprocity in this respect. ANDERSON V.
POINDEXTER, 6 Ohio St. 622 (1856)(1). [Unconstitutional means against the true intent of the People. ]
SECURE AND PERPETUATE INTERCOURSE AMONG THE PEOPLE OF THE DIFFERENT STATES
PAGE, Circuit Judge (Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit):
[Chief Justice Marshall] McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, quoting from page 402 [***] From these
conventions the Constitution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the people, is
'ordained and established' in the name of the people. [***]
While it is true that the Constitution did not define 'what body of citizens should constitute the people who
were to be in this union,' it is by no means true that the nation's citizenship was undefined or unknown. Under the
Articles of Confederation, which preceded the Constitution, there was a confederation of the several states. Article 4
of the Confederation provided, as to citizenship: 'The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different states in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these states
(paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several states.' [***] 'The words, 'people of the United States' and 'Citizens' are synonymous terms,
and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form
the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what
we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this
sovereignty.' PETER HAND CO. v. UNITED STATES, 2 F.2d 449 (1924)(1). [Free means Free, not sort of Free.]
152
REVENUE, WIDELY REMOTE FROM INVOLUNTARY SUBJECTION OF THE SOVEREIGN
Want of a special provision in the Constitution for an 'execution.' Emphasis added.

Revenue; and all of them are widely remote from an involuntary subjection, of the sovereign to the cognizance of
his own Courts. [***] [Plus the just powers of government are derived from the consent of even the governed. ]
3rd. Nor will these sentiments be weakened by the want of a special provision in the Constitution for an
execution; since it is so provided in no case, not even where States are in litigation. Chisholm v. The State of
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)(4). [After judgment ('writ' of) execution is the end of the Law. ]
FEDERAL SERVANTS HAVE NO CENSOR MORUM OVER THE STATES AND THEIR PEOPLE
Mr. Justice DANIEL (supreme Court of the United States) dissents:
The Federal tribunals can have no power to control the duties or the habits of the different members of private
families in their domestic intercourse. This power belongs exclusively to the particular communities of which those
families form parts, and is essential to the order and to the very existence of such communities. [***]
That authority can exist nowhere but with the power and the right to control the private and domestic
relations of life. The Federal Government has no such power; it has no commission of censor morum over the
several States and their people. BARBER v. BARBER, 62 U.S. 582 (1858)(2). [No power over the sovereigns. Hence:
Forms and applications scam + License pretends to convert us from private sovereigns to Federal business entity status.]
SOOOOOOOO STARTLING
The Constitution is a compact between 'sovereigns.' (No power prescribed by Law.)
Sovereigns pay their servants for the "privilege" of exercising powers of sovereignty guaranteed by the Constitution?
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) with Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting:
The immunity of the States from federal taxation is no less clear because it is implied. The States on entering the
Union surrendered some of their sovereignty. It was further curtailed as various Amendments were adopted. But the
Tenth Amendment provides that 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' The Constitution is a compact between
sovereigns. The power of one sovereign to tax another is an innovation so startling as to require explicit authority
if it is to be allowed. If the power of the federal government to tax the States is conceded, the reserved power of the
States guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment does not give them the independence which they have always been
assumed to have. They are relegated to a more servile status. They become subject to interference and control both
in the functions which they exercise and the methods which they employ. They must pay the federal government for
the privilege of exercising the powers of sovereignty guaranteed them by the Constitution, whether, as here, they
are disposing of their natural resources, or tomorrow they issue securities or perform any other acts within the scope
of their police power.
That fact distinguishes those cases where a citizen seeks tax immunity because his income was derived
from a State or the federal government. Recognition of such a claim would create a 'privileged class of taxpayers'
(Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra, 304 U.S. at page 416) and extend the tax immunity of the States or the federal
government to private citizens [employed by government. ]. NEW YORK v. U.S., 326 U.S. 572 (1946)(3).
We the People = "'Sovereignty,' in its largest and most comprehensive sense, means,
supreme, absolute, uncontrollable powers-the absolute right to govern"
State Courts (and the people) do not exist by the authority of the Government of the United States, they
do not come within its jurisdiction, and are not objects over which its sovereign power extends, except, perhaps,
for purposes of protection. Therefore, it does not possess over them, even the incidental power of taxation.
HAWKINS, J. (Supreme Court of Tennessee) delivered the opinion of the Court:

What are taxes, duties, imposts and excises? The word "taxes," in its most extended sense, includes all
contributions imposed by the Government upon individuals, for the services of the Government, by whatever
name they are called or known. But in the sense of the Constitution, taxes are divided into two classes--direct and
indirect. Under the former, are, taxes on real property, and under the latter, are, taxes on articles of consumption: 5
Wheat., 317. [***] The Government of the United States is one of limited powers, and possesses only such powers as
are either expressly, or by clear implication, delegated to it by the Constitution of the United States, and such as are
incidental to the sovereignty conferred upon it. The Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the United
States made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme law of the land; and in the exercise of the foregoing powers, the
Government is sovereign, and possesses ample powers to enforce obedience to its Constitution, and the laws made
in pursuance thereof, "anything in the constitutions or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding."
The word "State," is used in various senses. In its most enlarged sense, it means the people composing a
particular nation or community; and in this sense, "the State," means the whole people united into one body politic,
and "the State," and "the people of the State," are equivalent expressions.
153
But there is a more limited sense in which the word is used, expressive merely of the position or actual
organization of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers. The sovereignty of a nation or State, may, in all
respects, be absolute and unconditional, except the limitations which it chooses to impose upon itself; but the
sovereignty of the Government organized within the State, may be of a very limited nature, extending to few or
many objects--unlimited as to some, but restrained as to others. The people composing a State, may divide its
sovereign powers among various functionaries, and each, in the limited sense, would be sovereign in respect to the
powers confided to each.
" 'Sovereignty,' in its largest and most comprehensive sense, means, supreme, absolute, uncontrollable
powers--the absolute right to govern:" Story on Constitution, sec. 208: "It is the union and exercise of all human
power possessed in a State--abstractly, it resides in the body of the nation, and belongs to the people; but the powers
are generally exercised by delegation.
In our republican form of government, the absolute sovereignty of the nation, is in the people of the
nation, and the residuary sovereignty of each State, not granted to any of the public functionaries, is in the people of
the State:" Story on Con., sec. 208.
Prior to our Declaration of Independence, the Colonies were not, nor did they pretend to be, sovereign
States; but, by the Declaration of Independence, adopted on the 4th of July, 1776, it was solemnly declared, that,
"These United Colonies are, and, of right, ought to be, free and independent States. They have full power to levy
war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things, which independent
States may of right do."
It follows, then, that the people of the States, respectively, possess all the powers of their original
unlimited sovereignty, except such as have been delegated by them to the Government of the United States, or are
prohibited to the States by the Constitution.
By the Constitution of the United States, the sovereign power of the nation, to-wit, the people, granted a
portion of its sovereignty to the Government of the United States, and imposed upon itself restrictions, established
courts of record of inferior jurisdiction; and has provided the means, or rather declared the manner, by which
every man may enforce the constitutional remedy, for injuries done him in his goods, person, or reputation.
The judicial power of the United States, is limited to sec. 2 of art. 3 of the Constitution; and without the aid
of State Courts, parties, generally, would be without remedy for injuries done them. It is not pretended that Congress
can confer upon Federal Courts, jurisdiction adequate to the ordinary and reasonable wants of society; Congress can
not establish, regulate, or abolish State Courts; they exist alone by and under the authority of the reserved sovereign
power and authority of the people of the State. Both the National and State Governments are now, and have been,
ever since the adoption of the Constitution, in the exercise of all the several powers belonging alone to sovereignty,
to-wit, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. Now, while it is clear, this limited sovereignty exists in the State or the
people thereof, it is equally clear that it must be exercised in subordination to the sovereignty of the United States.
Inasmuch, then, as the State Courts do not exist by the authority of the Government of the United States, or by its
permission, they do not come within its jurisdiction, and are not objects over which its sovereign power extends,
except, perhaps, for purposes of protection. Therefore, it does not possess over them, even the incidental power of
taxation. The Union Bank v. C.A. Hill, 43 Tenn. 325 (1866)(1). [Not its creature = no jurisdiction to tax. ]
SOVEREIGN TAX IMMUNITY IS WELL-ESTABLISHED

ENGLAND, Justice (Supreme Court of Florida):
In resolving these diametrically opposed theories of intergovernmental finance, we have concluded that the State
must prevail. Precedent and logic both dictate that the sovereign's general freedom from taxation derives from an
'immunity', not from an 'exemption'. [***]
The doctrine of sovereign tax immunity is also well-established in the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions
having a similar constitutional scheme of government. E.g., Kern-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954);
Newton v. Atlanta, 189 Ga. 441 (1939); Tempe v. Arizona Board of Regents, 11 Ariz.App. 24 (1970); Hellerstein,
State and Local Taxation 649--94 (3d Ed.1969). DICKINSON, Jr. etc. et al v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, 325
So.2d 1 (1975)(1). [Sovereignty is vested in the people and 'only' in the People. ]
See sovereign tax immunity in, UNITED STATES of America v. CITY OF LEAVENWORTH, 443 F.Supp. 274. (1977)
(2); CANAVERAL PORT v. DEPT. OF REVENUE, 690 So.2d 1226 (1996)(2). NATIONAL R.R. CORP. v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, 695
F.Supp. 1570 (1988)(3). Sovereignty is vested only in the People, the supreme sovereign source of power.
SMALL
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court: Taxation is the simple operation of taking small
portions from a perpetually accumulating mass, susceptible of almost infinite division; and a power in one to take
what is necessary for certain purposes, is not, in its nature, incompatible with a power in another to take what is
necessary for other purposes. GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)(2). [Boston Tea Party was ¼ of 1%? ]
EX-STATUTE CITES CITIZEN OF THE U.S. AND PERSON - SUPER EASY TO CITE ALL THE LAW DEMANDS
Act of Congress (October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 166, c. 16). Properly held unConstitutional?
154
Mere 1% tax on net income of a 'citizen of the U.S.' or 'person' not a citizen = resident stateless subjects.
Justice McREYNOLDS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
'Section II, A. Subdivision 1. That there shall be [1st] levied, [then] assessed, collected and paid annually upon the
entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding calendar year to every citizen of the United
States, whether residing at home or abroad, and to every person residing in the United States, though not a citizen
thereof, a tax of 1 per centum per annum upon such income, except as hereinafter provided. *** ' GOULD v.
GOULD, 245 U.S. 151 (1917)(2). [See same in U.S. v. MERRIAM, 263 U.S. 179 (1923)(2). [Today the IRS Code cites
only a 'person' is liable. Emphasis added. No clear and unquestionable authority of Law over the People. ]
There it is! It is so easy for them to simply cite a 'citizen of the United States' in the statute if they can. And just as easy to
cite the 'People of the United States' if they could, but they have no legal right over their supreme sovereign creators. That was a
'revised' statute (= perverted), but no such current U.S.'Code' [6012(A)] demanding 1st levy, then assessment, collection and payment
from even a subject citizen of the United States; only an individual (non-sovereign Federal stateless person). Even if the Constitution
authorized it, the Congress must still enact the thunderbolt of a Law commanding all of what the Law demands from who, by clear and
unquestionable authority of Law. Nobody owes more than the Law demands. Statutes are strictly interpreted against government and
in favor of the accused and cannot be extended beyond the language used in the statute. This System of bloated non-sovereign
stateless government is an expensive curse. There are many ways to support just government other than despotic forced taxation by
governmental deception. They start with a mere 1% tax; but power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
EVEN THE 'SUBJECT' IS FREE

If the subject is not within the letter of the law, the subject is free.
If even the mere subject is free, the Supreme Sovereign People must certainly be free with immunity.
Doubt must be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.
But in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most important for such statutes are not to
be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must
be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151. The rule is stated
by Lord Cairns in Partington v. Attorney General, L. R. 4 H. L. 100, 122: 'I am not at all sure that in a case of this
kind--a fiscal case--form is not amply sufficient; because, as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is
this: If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the
hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot
bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law
the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible in any statute what is called an
equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply
adhere to the words of the statute.' And see Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 583. UNITED STATES v.
MERRIAM, 263 U.S. 179 (1923)(2). [The Order of things is uniform. The sovereign rules over subjects. ]
UNEQUIVOCAL
'well-settled' rule: 'citizen' is exempt from taxation unless 'unequivocal' language is used.
Justice Harlan (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Judge Gray, dissenting, said: 'Keeping in mind the well-settled rule that the citizen is exempt from taxation unless
the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of a tax law is doubtful,
the doubt is to be resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid, I cannot assent to the
affirmance of the judgment of the court below in this respect. I do not think that the income derived from such
investment of funds is in any proper sense receipts in the business of sugar refining. The very term 'gross receipts'
in 'the business,' would seem to exclude all such receipts as the interest upon investments here referred to.'
SPRECKLES SUGAR REF. CO. v. McCLAIN, 192 U.S. 397 (1904)(2). [Today's income tax statute cites a person,
not a citizen, let alone the sovereign people. Self evident intended to steal by false witness-deception. ]
The IRS Code liability statute fails to cite citizen of the United States, much less the sovereign people, or 'Citizen' because
they can't. See Breese v. Smith supra 'clear and unquestionable' authority of Law, 'right to be let alone' to 'keep' corrupt government
off the backs of the 'people' to deflate this bloated abusive government-men lusting for more power and money.
NONTAXPAYERS
Of course there is such a thing as a nontaxpayer = the sovereigns of the country and free Citizens etc.
BOURQUIN, District Judge (District Court, District of Montana):

The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and
not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no
attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress does not
assume to deal, and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws. The instant suit is not to
restrain assessment or collection of taxes of Wise, but is to enjoin trespass upon property of plaintiff, and against
whom no assessment has been made, and of whom no collection is sought. Note, too, the taxes are not assessed
against the property. This presents a widely different case than that wherein the person assessed, or whose property
155
is assessed, seeks to restrain assessment or collection on the theory that he or it is exempt from taxation, or that for
any reason the tax is illegal.
The distinction between persons and things within the scope of the revenue laws and those without them is
vital. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 176, 179, To the former only does section 3224 apply (see cases cited in
Violette v. Walsh (D.C.) 272 Fed. 1016), and the well-understood exigencies of government and its revenues and
their collection do not serve to extend it to the latter. It is a shield for official action, not a sword for private
aggression. There is dictum to the contrary in Sheridan v. Allen, 153 Fed. 569, 82 C.C.A. 522, but it is neither
supported by the case it cites nor by any other brought to attention.
Markle v. Kirkendall (D.C.) 267 Fed. 500, tends to the conclusion herein. It is not improbable that section
934, R.S. (Comp. St. Sec. 1560), wherein it provides that property taken by an officer 'under authority of any
revenue law' is 'irrepleviable,' is in 'custody of law,' and 'subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the
United States having jurisdiction thereof,' contemplates the instant case. The collector assumed in good faith to
distrain property he believes to be the taxpayer's. If he peaceably secures possession of it (for, if not the taxpayer's,
the owner may lawfully forcibly prevent), he is not bound to deliver it to any chance claimant, nor is he subject to
be deprived of it by replevin before trial. [5th Amend right to due Process of Law = your day in (judicial) Court. ]
The nontaxpayer owner, however, is free to bring any other proper action, the court to determine title,
ownership, and possession, the collector having no power to do so, and the property 'subject only to the orders and
decrees of the court,' to be by the court disposed of as justice requires. See In re Fassett, 142 U.S. 486; De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 180. And this is the course in respect to any property in custodia legis, aside from statute.
LONG v. RASMUSSEN Collector of Internal Revenue, 281 F. 236 (1922)(1).
The courts have 'always' acted upon the conviction that the trial courts have 'no power' to receive an
indictment, try a case or pronounce sentence 'outside' the district 'where' the crime was 'committed.'
JAMES ALGER FEE, District Judge (District Court, District of Oregon):

28 U.S.C.A. ß 41(2). This statute originally confined the district judges to crimes committed in the state and
district. Circuit courts were given jurisdiction over 'all crimes' against the United States concurrent with the district
courts. When the act was amended in 1911 and the circuit courts abolished, the phrase was transferred to the district
courts. But the circuit courts had jurisdiction concurrently with several districts at first over crimes committed within
their respective boundaries and thus the phrase meant that such courts had power over all crimes committed against
the United States and triable in any district over which the circuit court had jurisdiction. Likewise this phrase was to
give the circuit courts jurisdiction over crimes not committed in any district. It has never been construed to give
either a circuit or district court power to try a criminal cause outside a district where the crime was committed and
the indictment returned. The courts have always acted upon the conviction that the trial courts have no power to
receive an indictment, try a case or pronounce sentence outside the district where the crime was committed.
UNITED STATES v. BINK, 74 F.Supp. 603 (1947)(1). [Demand they prove where the boundaries of the district are
previously ascertained by Law? How did we get trapped in their mysterious district? There are no warning signs. Super
good case on crimes being tried in the 'district previously ascertained by Law' where-in the crime was committed pursuant
to Article V of the Constitution. Massive fraud: the states magically become revenue districts to steal our wealth. Their
district territorial jurisdiction outside D.C. is namely forts, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings? ]
11 POINTS OF LIGHT
Cite the clear and unquestionable Law that requires the People to file a return? Produce the specific form?
Cite the clear and unquestionable Law that requires the People to self assess from his private records.
Cite the clear and unquestionable Law that requires the People or a Citizen to pay.
Cite the clear and unquestionable Law that describes the particular 'source' of taxable income we are liable to pay.
Cite the clear and unquestionable law describing our labor is income and why according to the Law.
Cite the clear and unquestionable Law that says the commissioner can file a return for you, and then assess it.
If you cannot prove the above, why are you filing swearing everything is true and correct and paying?
If the commissioner cannot show the Law for any of the same how can he do any of the same?
Besides the fraud of doing any of the same as a subjected Federal business entity and not as a sovereign.
Where is any tax form for the sovereign People of the U.S. to file as the sovereign People of the U.S.?
The U.S. Individual 1040 tax form requires a social security number for a non-sovereign stateless U.S. citizen, or alien.
PRESIDENT MAY ESTABLISH CONVENIENT COLLECTION DISTRICTS

Commander in Chief thief subdividing 'governments only' fails to fully disclose that truth in his STATE of the State address.
NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit):

In pursuance of Congressional authority, codified as USCA, title 26, Sec. 12, the President was empowered to
establish 'convenient collection districts.' That act provides as follows: 'For the purpose of assessing, levying, and
collecting the taxes provided by the internal revenue laws, the President may establish convenient collection
districts, and for that purpose he may subdivide any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or may unite two
or more States or Territories into one district, and may from time to time alter said districts. The whole number of
collection districts for the collection of internal revenue shall not exceed sixty-five.' BOWLES v. UNITED
156
STATES, 73 F.2d 772 (1934)(3). [Matches the levy statute for certain income from government. ]
REQUIRING PRIOR NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY AND 'DEMAND' FOR PAYMENT

It is voluntary self-assessment, but still where is the assessment form for the sovereign people?
FAHY, Senior Cir. Judge, LEVENTHAL and ROBINSON, Cir. Judges (U.S. Ct. of App., D.C. Circuit. PER CURIAM:
A. Statutory and Judicial Background.
Ordinarily, the Commissioner cannot attempt to collect an asserted tax deficiency until he has mailed a notice of
deficiency to the taxpayer and the period during which the taxpayer may file suit in the Tax Court has expired. (fn
8) And if the taxpayer files suit, the collection is further enjoined until the final decision of the Tax Court. (fn 9) The
single exception to this procedure comes when the Commissioner 'believes that the assessment or collection of a
deficiency . . . will be jeopardized by delay . . .;' in that event 'he shall . . . immediately assess such deficiency . . .,
and notice and demand shall be made by the (Commissioner) for the payment thereof.' (fn 10) This is the jeopardy
assessment procedure that the Commissioner used against Shapiro. Once the Commissioner has made a jeopardy
assessment, he must notify the taxpayer and demand payment of the asserted deficiency. If the taxpayer neglects or
refuses to pay within ten days after notice and demand, the Commissioner may collect the tax by seizing property
of the taxpayer. (fn 11) Moreover, 'if the Secretary (of the Treasury) or his delegate makes a finding that the
collection of such tax is in jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment of such tax may be made by the
Secretary or his delegate and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection thereof by levy shall be lawful
without regard to the 10-day period provided in this section.' (fn 12). [26 USC 6331: Levy for Fed. income. ]
(fn 8). When the Commissioner determines that a taxpayer has failed to pay the correct tax in a previous year, he
may issue a notice describing the alleged deficiency. Int.Rev.Code § 6212(a).
(fn 9). Int.Rev.Code § 6213(a).
(fn10). Int.Rev.Code § 6861(a). Once the Commissioner makes the jeopardy assessment, he has sixty days in
which to mail a deficiency
(fn11). Int.Rev.Code § 6331(a). By levy is meant 'the power of distraint and seizure by any means.' Int.Rev.Code
6331(b). [Federal entities deriving income from Federal System. ]
(fn 12). Int.Rev.Code § 6331(a). It should be noted that section 6331 (a) requires that the Commissioner provide a
taxpayer prior notice of the demand for payment. The power to levy is inoperative until the subsequent 'failure or
refusal' of the taxpayer to pay the required amount. In the present case there are allegations that the Commissioner
failed to provide the taxpayer the required notice prior to serving 'Notices of Levy' on the taxpayer's New York
banks. If so, then the Commissioner may well have violated Shapiro's right to due process. See, e.g., Mrizek v.
Long, 187 F.Supp. 830, 835 (N.D.Ill.1959): ... if plaintiffs are being thus deprived of their property by
administrative action purporting to conform, but failing to conform, to the requirements of Section 6331, the
plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. [***] When an asserted deficiency is an exaction rather than a tax, there can be no valid collection
purpose which is stymied by the court's intervention. (fn 18) Accordingly, the Commissioner can assert no interest
that outweighs the taxpayer's interest in avoiding irreparable harm. (fn 19) [No mention of lien. ]
(fn 18). Id. at 509-510. See also Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108 (1870).
(fn 19). Miller, supra, 284 U.S. at 510. SHAPIRO v. SECRETARY OF STATE, 499 F.2d 527 (App. D.C.1974)(2).
[See also UNITED STATES v. SYNDER previously herein. ].
See 26 Code of Federal Regulations. Section 1.1-1 (a) General Rule. [a regulation is not the same thing as a statute much less
the Common Law of the Land] and merely 'imposes' an income tax on every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States
(emphasis added) but, there is no current Code statute with a 'substantive regulation' requiring even a non-governmental citizen much
less one of We the People to 'file and pay' Federal Income Tax from a specific source of income much less on their private labor.
Question everything, presume nothing. What does 'impose' truly mean? Regardless, where is the 'clear and unquestionable' authority
of Law commanding-demanding We the people pay income tax on what source of income, located where by boundaries prescribed by
law? Simplify: Demand proof of the law from the proper IRS agent of what 'person' means and is, who is liable to pay income tax.
THE TAXPAYER IS THE PERSON 'ULTIMATELY' LIABLE FOR THE TAX ITSELF
The ALL CAPITAL LETTER business entity name and Social Security status is ultimately not me, a sovereign.
A lien is for a 'person' liable to pay any tax that neglects or refuses to pay 'after' demand is made.
This case presents the question whether respondent Lori Williams, who paid a tax under protest to remove a lien on
her property, has standing to bring a refund action under 28 U.S.C. ß 1346(a)(1), even though the tax she paid was
assessed against a third party. We hold that respondent has standing to sue for a refund. Respondent's suit falls
within the broad language of ß 1346(a)(1), which gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear "[a]ny civil action against
the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected," and only a strained reading of other relevant provisions would bar her suit. [***] See 26 U.S.C. ß 6321
("If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien
157
in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person."). The Government has not alleged that Williams is personally liable for these or any subsequent
assessments. [***]".
After the Government denied Williams' claim for an administrative refund, she filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, claiming she had taken the property free of the
Government's lien under 26 U.S.C. ß 6323(a) (absent proper notice, tax lien not valid against purchaser). To
enforce her rights, she invoked 28 U.S.C. ß 1346(a)(1), which waives the Government's sovereign immunity from
suit by authorizing federal courts to adjudicate "[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected." [***]
To fathom the congressional instruction, we turn first to the language of ß 1346(a). This provision does
not say that only the person assessed may sue. Instead, the statute uses broad language: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of: "(1) Any civil action
against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws." 28 U.S.C. ß 1346(a) (1988
Ed. and Supp. V) (emphasis added).
Williams' plea to recover a tax "erroneously ... collected" falls squarely within this language.
The broad language of ß 1346(a)(1) mirrors the broad common-law remedy the statute displaced: actions of
assumpsit for money had and received, once brought against the tax collector personally rather than against the
United States. See Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controversies, 48 Iowa L.Rev. 312, 327 (1963).
Assumpsit afforded a remedy to those who, like Williams, had paid money they did not owe--typically as a result of
fraud, duress, or mistake. See H. Ballantine, Shipman on Common-Law Pleading 163-164 (3d ed. 1923).
Assumpsit refund actions were unavailable to volunteers, a limit that would not have barred Williams because she
paid under protest. See Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 Wall. 720, 731-732 (1867) ("Where the party voluntarily pays
the money, he is without remedy; but if he pays it by compulsion of law, or under protest, or with notice that he
intends to bring suit to test the validity of the claim, he may recover it back...."). [***]
III
From the statute's use of the term "taxpayer," rather than "person who paid the tax," the Government concludes
that only a "taxpayer" may file for administrative relief under ß 7422, and thereafter pursue a refund action under 28
U.S.C. ß 1346(a)(1). Then, to show that Williams is not a "taxpayer," the Government relies on 26 U.S.C. ß
7701(a)(14), which defines "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." According to the
Government, a party who pays a tax is not "subject to" it unless she is the one assessed. [***]
The Government's argument fails at both statutory junctures. First, the word "taxpayer" in ß 6511(a)--the
provision governing administrative claims--cannot bear the weight the Government puts on it. This provision's plain
terms provide only a deadline for filing for administrative relief, (fn7) not a limit on who may file. To read the term
"taxpayer" as implicitly limiting administrative relief to the party assessed is inconsistent with other provisions of
the refund scheme, which expressly contemplate refunds to parties other than the one assessed. Thus, in authorizing
the Secretary to award a credit or refund "[i]n the case of any overpayment," 26 U.S.C. ß 6402(a) describes the
recipient not as the "taxpayer," but as "the person who made the overpayment." Similarly, in providing for credits
and refunds for sales taxes and taxes on tobacco and alcohol, 26 U.S.C. ß 6416(a) and 26 U.S.C. ß 6419(a) describe
the recipient as "the person who paid the tax."
As a statute of limitations, ß 6511(a) does narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity in ß 1346(a)(1) by
barring the tardy. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 602 (1990) ("Read together, the import of these
sections [ß ß 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), 6511(a) ] is clear: unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the
time limits imposed by ß 6511(a), a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been
'erroneously,' 'illegally,' or 'wrongfully collected,' ß ß 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), may not be maintained in any court.").
Further, even if, as the Government contends, only "taxpayers" could seek administrative relief under ß
6511, the Government's claim that Williams is not at this point a "taxpayer" is unpersuasive. Section 7701(a)(14),
defining "taxpayer," informs us that "[w]hen used in [the Internal Revenue Code], where not otherwise distinctly
expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, ... [t]he term 'taxpayer' means any person subject to
any internal revenue tax." (fn 8) That definition does not exclude Williams. The Government reads the definition as
if it said "any person who is assessed any internal revenue tax," but these are not Congress' words. The general
phrase "subject to" is broader than the specific phrase "assessed" and, in the tax collection context before us, we
think it is broad enough to include Williams. In placing a lien on her home and then accepting her tax payment
under protest, the Government surely subjected Williams to a tax, even though she was not the assessed party.
(fn 8). The Treasury's regulation, 26 C.F.R. ß 301.7701-16 (1994), adds nothing to the statute; in particular, the
regulation does not ascribe any special or limiting meaning to the statute's "subject to" terminology.
In support of its reading of "taxpayer," the Government cites our observation in Colorado Nat. Bank of
Denver v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 52 (1940), that "[t]he taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for the tax itself."
The Government takes this language out of context. We were not interpreting the term "taxpayer" in the Internal
Revenue Code, but deciding whether a state tax scheme was consistent with federal law. In particular, we were
158
determining whether Colorado had imposed its service tax on a bank's customers (which was consistent with federal
law) or on the bank itself (which was not). Though the bank collected and paid the tax, its incidence fell on the
customers. Favoring substance over form, we said: "The person liable for the tax [the bank], primarily, cannot
always be said to be the real taxpayer. The taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for the tax itself." Ibid. As a
result, we determined that the tax had been imposed on the customers rather than the bank. If Colorado Nat. Bank is
relevant at all, it shows our preference for commonsense inquiries over formalism--a preference that works against
the Government's technical argument in this case. As we have just developed, 28 U.S.C. ß 1346(a)(1) clearly
allows one from whom taxes are erroneously or illegally collected to sue for a refund of those taxes. And 26 U.S.C.
ß 6402(a), with similar clarity, authorizes the Secretary to pay out a refund to "the person who made the
overpayment." [***] If the Government has not levied on property--as it has not levied on Williams' home--the
owner cannot challenge such a levy under 26 U.S.C. ß 7426. Nor would an action under 28 U.S.C. ß 2410(a)(1) to
quiet title afford meaningful relief to someone in Williams' position. [***]
We do not agree with the Government that, if ß 1346(a)(1) authorizes some third-party suits, the levy, quiet
title, and separate-fund remedies become superfluous. Section 1346(a)(1) is a postdeprivation remedy, available
only if the taxpayer has paid the Government in full. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). The other
remedies offer predeprivation relief. The levy provision in 26 U.S.C. ß 7426(a)(1) is available "without regard to
whether such property has been surrendered to or sold by the Secretary." Likewise, 28 U.S.C. ß 2410 allows a
property owner to have a lien discharged without ever paying the tax. Under 26 U.S.C. ß 6325(b)(3), the lien on the
property is removed in exchange for a new lien, rather than a cash payment. [***]
The legal question at hand is whether the Government has waived its sovereign immunity in 28 U.S.C. ß
1346(a)(1) to authorize respondent, who conceded that she "is not the taxpayer," App. 16, to file a refund suit. In
answering that question, it must be remembered that ß 1346(a)(1) is "a jurisdictional provision which is a keystone
in a carefully articulated and quite complicated structure of tax laws." Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 157
(1960). UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS, 514 U.S. 527 (1995)(2). [Carefully complicated to the Letter of the Law.]
It is clear the Commissioner or IRS director must first have a specific return (and assessment) and if deficient provide you
with 'notice' of deficiency and 'demand payment' from ultimately the true you within 10 days of (voluntary) self-assessment. The levy
statute applies to government. So, how could a particular IRS agent be empowered to notice the people of deficiency and demand
payment if no statute requires us to file and pay? Demand they provide you the specific form to file for one of We the People of the
United States, and the legislative intent of 'what' class of person (sovereign, or non-sovereign) is required to pay and why according to
the Law demands. We obviously have a 'right' to avoid paying all unlawful or inapplicable taxes, and if 'the Law' does not demand the
People to file a specific tax return, assess, or pay income tax from a Constitutional source of income we all do right by not filing false
statements etc. The Fed income tax: the engine that pulled the Constitution inside out. How the haves get it from the have nots.
$$100 TRILLION DOLLAR GOVERNMENT SERVANTS MOTIVE$$

Tax system is void for fraud: too massive complex, convoluted and complicated with missing and incomplete definitions?
The 100 trillion dollar government motive to pretend to convert the sovereign people into taxpayers, to steal by deception
via convoluting, and failing to fully demonstrate lawful jurisdiction over us by clear and unquestionable authority of Law (especially in
court). Their intentional 'complex' tax system is too immense and complicated. The IRS statute cites 'taxpayer' means … a 'person'
subject … . By construction a 'United States citizen' is magically included as a 'person' even though it that is other than human beings
which includes 'officer' etc. of government = artificial person. By government deception We the sovereign People magically end up
subjected as a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless U.S. citizen taxpayer 'person.' If we committed such mega fraud and theft by
deception (crime) they would give us life imprisonment and throw away the key, or the death penalty.
CORPORATION TAX ACT AUGUST 5, 1909, SS 38, 36 STAT. 112

Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here,
something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax;
conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities. As was said in Stratton's
Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415: 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor,
or from both combined.' DOYLE v. MITCHELL BROS. CO. 247 U.S. 179 (1918)(2). [Our artificial creature taxes
non-sovereign Federal artificial persons/creatures inferior to and subject to its jurisdiction = other than human beings.
Hence, their System of Federalism the 'creator' of (driver) licenses (42 U.S.C. 666) the taxpayer is its creature. ]
LABOR AND SERVICES ARE EXCHANGED FOR MONEY

Justice Holmes (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the right of personal liberty and right of private property-
partaking of the nature of each-is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. Chief among such
contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms
of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in
the long-established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to
the rich, for the vast majority of person have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working for
money. [***] Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445. In that case, the right to exclude was held not to include the
159
right to impose any condition under which the corporation might do business in the state. In that connection this
court said: ‘A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights. In a criminal case, he
cannot, as was held in Cancemi’s Case 18 N.Y. 128 be tried, in any other manner than by a jury of tweleve men,
although he consent in open court to be tried by a jury of eleven men. COPPAGE v. STATE OF KANSAS, 236 U.S.
1 (1913). [Cannot barter away our sovereign, or unalienable rights. Our private labor exchanged for Federal Reserve
debtor Notes backed by nothing (zero guaranteed value prescribed by law) is gain-profit-income-wealth? ]
$100 TRILLION DOLLAR GOVERNMENT SERVANTS MOTIVE$

The intentional government treachery is the concealment (= fraud) by failing to provide a 100% complete unmistakable
definition of 'person' in the statutes to trap the sovereign people into paying taxes, fines, and imprisonment to load up their private
prison $industry$ with Americans who injured no one. Satanic? Void for having to guess for eternity in the vastness of vagueness.
GENERAL DEFINITION OF 'TAXPAYER' IN 'UNITED STATES' CODE

Remember lower courts explicitly held the tax applies to U.S. citizens = Social Security number.
U.S. Individual 1040 Tax form requires the social security number of 'United States citizens' or aliens.
The treachery is they also conceal 'what' persons are included in the statute: Non-sovereigns.
RIGHT FROM THE MOUTH OF OUR CREATURE-CONGRESS AND IRS

Taxpayer = 'person' means an individual, a trust or estate, a partnership, or a corporation (with social security #).
Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234, 43 Stat. 253: Sec. 2(a) When used in this Act (title)--
(1) The term 'person' means an individual, a trust or estate, a partnership, or a corporation. [Artificial entities. ]
(9) The term 'taxpayer' means any person subject to a tax imposed by this Act (title). 26 USCA s 1262(a)(1, 9)
[Taxpayer = person; person = individual, trust, estate, partnership etc. = all artificial persons = creatures of law. ]
Sec. 214(a) In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(1) All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. *** 26 USCA s 955(a)(1). VAN WART v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 U.S. 112 (1935)(3).
[Undeniably taxpayer = social security number status. 'U.S. Individual' 1040 form requiring S.S. number etc. Definition of
what a 'person' is, is hardly 'clear and unquestionable' authority of law to commit theft by deception = crime. ]
'MEANS' IS USED TO PROVIDE A 'COMPLETE' MEANING FOR THE TERM

MANNHEIMER, Judge (Court of Appeals of Alaska Court System):
Under standard rules of statutory drafting and interpretation, the term "includes" is used preceding a partial
listing or illustrative list in a definition, while the term "means" is used to provide a complete meaning for the term
defined. Bilal MUSTAFOSKI v. STATE of Alaska, 867 P.2d 824 (1994)(3). [Apply that to definition (9) and then
(1) in the Supreme Court case above and below this one. ]
1873-today: 'TAXPAYER' MEANS ANY 'PERSON' SUBJECT TO ANY I.R.S. TAX

Section 7701(a)(14), defining "taxpayer," informs us that "[w]hen used in [the Internal Revenue Code], where not
otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, ... [t]he term 'taxpayer' means
any person subject to any internal revenue tax." [***] The Treasury's regulation, 26 C.F.R. ß 301.7701-16 (1994),
adds nothing to the statute; in particular, the regulation does not ascribe any special or limiting meaning to the
statute's "subject to" terminology. U.S. v. WILLIAMS, 514 U.S. 527 (1995)(2). [A natural person is an "entity state"
occurring naturally. 23 Va. Cir. 352 (1991). Hardly "clear and unquestionable" authority of law. ]
MONSTEROUS LEGISLATIVE DECEPTION: INTENTIONALLY FAILING TO "FULLY" DEFINE THE WORD 'PERSON'
Person is not 100% defined in the affirmative and negative by clear and unquestionable authority = Intentional Fraud.
IN LEGAL TERMINOLOGY 'PERSON' = OTHER THAN HUMANS = ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES = NOT ME
Before BARNES, WALLACE and TANG, Circuit Judges (C.A. 9th Cir.): DISCUSSION:
The word "person" in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a
variety of entities other than human beings. See e. g. 1 U.S.C. s 1. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIF. v.
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, 612 F.2d 417 (Calif. 1980)(2). ['Legal' terminology vs. 'common' terminology. The artificial
creature cannot rule over the superior supreme sovereign creators: No legal right. Notice hu modifies man: Fuedal. ]
1 USC Ch. 1 § 1. In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise--
the words "person" and "whoever" include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies, as well as individuals; ... (Apply: Noscitur a sociis to that definition + the Order of things. )
'Noscitur a sociis'
Applying the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis--that a word is known by the company it keeps…
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GREGORY v. ASHCROFT, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)(2). [See also Stouteunbgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889). ]
ENTITIES
Word "indicates," appearing in Dictionary Act definition of word "person" to include specifically designated
entities unless context "indicates" otherwise, has broad meaning bespeaking something more than an express
contrary definition in statute in question. Rowland v. Calif. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, remand 990 F.2d 519.
FROM 'LEGAL' CONTEMPLATION THE (SOVEREIGN) PEOPLE TOTALLY DISAPPEAR IN THE CODE
The art of subjection by deception, an old scam of tyrants pretending people act as artificial entities without unalienable rights.

What, then, or where, are the People? Nothing! No where! They are not so much as even the 'baseless fabric of a
vision!' From legal contemplation they totally disappear! Am I not warranted in saying, that, if this is a just
description; a Government, so and justly so described, is a despotic Government? Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419
(1793) (4). [How true it is. Woe unto the Lawyers ye take away the 'key' of knowledge. Where is the 100% complete
definition of We the (sovereign) People of the U.S. in the statutes, or regs? Just like today, the People, 'the several states'
and Courts of Common Law despotically totally disappear in the statutes and regs of the System: Fed-STATES. ]
The Supreme Court calls the legislature's (intentional) concealment of the class of persons included 'treachery.' I say crime.
We call each other persons. We did not know in 'legal' terminology person excludes the sovereign people in the statutes, because
the artificial creature has no legal right to rule over its supreme sovereign creators (especially when injuring nothing).
U.S. INDIVIDUAL 1040 TAX FORM = SOC. SEC# = TAXPAYER = PERSON-INDIVIDUAL = ENTITY
BARNES, FARRIS and CANBY, Circuit Judges. CANBY, Circuit Judge (C.A. 9th Cir.):
III. TAXPAYER STATUS [Emphasis added. ]
Studley contends that she is not a "taxpayer" because she is an absolute, freeborn and natural individual. This
argument is frivolous. An individual is a "person" under the Internal Revenue Code and thus subject to 26 U.S.C. ß
7203. United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.1981). UNITED STATES of America v. STUDLEY,
783 F.2d 934 (1985)(2). [Individual = person = other than human beings = a public entity, or licensed artificial entity?]
Remember Cook v. Graylike? A national legislature binds the People as 'individuals' not as 'citizens of a State' (by
government deception). The IRS Code statute cites person means an individual for deceptive $reasons$, but fails the rule of strict
statutory construction by failing to cite citizen of the United States, let alone the sovereign people. Skip ahead two 2 pages to interpret
the term 'person' using 'ejusdem generis, 'Noscitur a sociis,' and 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius'. Take any one of the words of the
definition of taxpayer and they interchange as far as they all are 'artificial entities' = other than human beings = artificial persons.
Hence, the taxpayer's ALL CAPITAL LETTER assumed business name JOHN TAXPAYER DOE. Their definitions are all fraud because they
are not complete in the affirmative and negative, therefore not by clear and unquestionable authority of Law.
THE WORD 'PERSON' EXCLUDES THE SOVEREIGN

SUPER FRAUD: They 'intentionally' fail to disclose in the statute 'person' excludes the sovereign people.
Since, in common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are
ordinarily construed to exclude it. [Thank God for the Truth. ] (fn 5) But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion.
The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are
aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of
the law. (fn 6) [Non-sovereign nation. The artificial creature cannot rule its sovereign creators. ]
(fn 5) In re Fox, 52 N.Y. 530, 11 Am.Rep. 751; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315.
(fn 6) See Levy v. M'Cartee, 6 Pet. 102; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 565; Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S.
360, 370; Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379.
The Government admits that often the word 'person' is used in such a sense as not to include the sovereign
but urges that where, as in the present instance, its wider application is consistent with, and tends to effectuate, the
public policy evidenced by the statute, the term should be held to embrace the Government. UNITED STATES v.
COOPER CORPORATION et al, 312 U.S. 600 (1941)(2). [Sovereignty is vested only in the People. ]
NOT IN THE LEAST
Affect not 'him the sovereign' in the least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish 'any' of his rights or interests.
Chief Justice VINSON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
There is an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will
not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect. (fn 20) [***]
(fn 20) Lewis, Trustee v. United States, 92 U.S. 618 (1875),; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 263 (1873); see
Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152, 155 (1912). ( fn 21) United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175, 186 (1936); Green v. United States, 9 Wall. 655, 658 (1869).
(fn 22) United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. 190, 197 (1909); United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 159
161
U.S. 548, 553—555 (1895); Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 238, 230, 239 (1873).
(fn23) 'The most general words that can be devised (for example, any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate)
affect not him (the sovereign) in the least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish any of his rights or interests.'
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 239 (1873). 'If such prohibition is intended to reach the
government in the use of known rights and remedies, the language must be clear and specific to that effect.' United
States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. 190, 197 (1909). UNITED STATES v. UNITED MINE WORKERS, 330 U.S. 258
(1947)(2). [Only the People are sovereign, and the Constitution of the People cannot rule over the People. Hence, their
deception. They simply 'intentionally' fail to fully disclose the 'whole' Truth in the statute for control = revenue. ]
NOT 'SUBJECT TO' IT UNLESS SHE IS 'THE' ONE ASSESSED

'What' is she: sovereign, or non-sovereign? Acting as a business entity? Employed by government?
From the statute's use of the term "taxpayer," rather than "person who paid the tax," the Government concludes that
only a "taxpayer" may file for administrative relief under ß 7422, and thereafter pursue a refund action under 28
U.S.C. ß 1346(a)(1). Then, to show that Williams is not a "taxpayer," the Government relies on 26 6 U.S.C. ß
7701(a)(14), which defines "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." According to the
Government, a party who pays a tax is not "subject to" it unless she is the one assessed. UNITED STATES v.
WILLIAMS, 514 U.S. 527 (1995)(2). [That (artificial entity) 'person' is ultimately not me (or us) the sovereign. ]
I.R.C. SS 7701 SETS FORTH GENERAL DEFINITIONS FOR THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Interpreted correctly: "United States" in a geographical sense includes 'only' governments (counterfeits).
Before NIES, Chief Judge, ARCHER, CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
26 I.R.C. ß 7701 sets forth general definitions for the Internal Revenue Code. Section 7701(a)(9) provides the
following:
(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent
thereof-- [***]
(9) United States. The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the
District of Columbia. [Only 'governments' and essentially parallels IRS levy statute for government personnel. ]
The regulations for section 953 provide, in pertinent part: "For purposes of section 953(a), the term 'United
States' is used in a geographical sense and includes only the States and the District of Columbia...." Treas.Reg. ß
1.953-2 (1964). ["United States" specifically in quotes-twice. Specific fraud. ] [***]
Courts "must defer to Treasury Regulations that 'implement the congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner.' " Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 450 U.S. 156, 169, (1981) (quoting United
States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)); Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 773 F.2d 300, 303 (Fed.Cir.1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986) (quoting Portland ). Where there is a doubt as to the meaning of the statutory
language "an examination of the legislative history, for whatever illumination it may shed, is necessary." Ellis First
Nat'l Bank of Bradenton v. United States, 550 F.2d 9, 15 (1977) . "In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is
the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or
to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed
most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen." Estate of Renick v. U.S, 687 F.2d 371, 376
(1982) (quoting Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917) (citations omitted)). [***]
Finally, if there is a doubt as to the meaning of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the doubt
"must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer." Citizens Nat'l Bank of Waco v. United States, F.2d 832, 843 (1977)
(citing Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 442 (1933), and United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 188 (1923)).
OCEAN DRILLING & EXPLORATION v. The UNITED STATES, 988 F.2d 1135 (United States Court of
Appeals, Federal Circuit) (1993)(2). [Most strongly against the government. ]
From the above case, 'taxpayer' means any 'person' subject. That is fraud and treachery to the nth degree because it is a
super important multi-trillion dollar revenue generating statute so they intentionally fail to 'specifically' cite 'what' class of persons are
included (and exclude), or even 'what' they are, so that it won’t be 'clear and unquestionable' authority of Law to conceal it excludes
the People. If not fraud, where is the tax form for the sovereign People to sign as sovereigns? Super emphasis added.
The next 2 cases contain maxims to interpret the meaning of 'person' = all non-sovereign artificial entities-persons.
'Noscitur a sociis'
Applying the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis--that a word is known by the company it keeps…
GREGORY v. ASHCROFT, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)(2). [See also Stouteunbgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889). ]
'Noscitur a sociis,' a word is known from its associates.
The meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words. Louis Pizitiz Dry Goods Co. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 223 Ala. 385, 136 So. 800, 801. Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321. [Apply that
162
to the word 'person' in the above case, all are non-sovereign 'artificial' entities-persons. ]
'expressio unius est exclusio alterius'

Apply to the above statute etc. The sovereign is not included so it is excluded. Void for Vagueness!
The ancient maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (mention of one impliedly excludes others) cautions
against engrafting additional exception to what is already complex tax code. Greene v. U.S., 79 F.3d 1348
(C.A.2.N.Y.) (1996)(3).
In relation to construing statute, maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" is premised on the assumption that
the legislature considered and rejected all factors not listed. Tri-State Terminals, Inc. v. Jesse, 596 F.2d 752
(C.A.7)(1979)(1).
The Attorney General also made the following points, viz:

On the principle involved in the maxim, 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' each of these restrictions adds
strength to the conclusion that there are no other restrictions unexpressed. 'As exception strengthens the force of a
law in cases not excepted, so, according to Lord Bacon, enumeration weakens it in cases not enumerated.' [***]
In the construction of a statute, we must endeavor to give a definite meaning to every word and expression
found therein. The fair and natural import of the terms employed is to govern in construing the law, and where a
clear intelligible meaning can be gathered from those terms, we are not to look beyond them to fancy some
unexpressed intent. [***]
What we have been contending for is, that in the construction of this statute the court should confine itself
to the language of the law. The principle which has been sanctioned by this court justifies us in insisting upon such a
rule. In the case of the Paulina's Cargo v. the United States, 7 Cranch, 60, Chief Justice Marshall says: 'In
construing these laws, it has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention of the Legislature. But
this intention is to be searched for in the words which the Legislature has employed to convey it.' And again, in the
United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 390: 'Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown,
where the general principle of the law is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible
clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects. [***] Mr. Justice CATRON delivered
the opinion of the court. THE DUBUQUE & PACIFIC R.R. CO. v. LITCHFIELD, 64 U.S. 66 (1859)(1). [The
'principle' all human law must be written by a superior etc., and congress is our artificial creature. ]
DRIVER LICENSE SUBJECTION SCAM = GROSS ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT DECEPTION

Our servants pretend a license converts the People from their sovereign 'private' business capacity into acting as a Federal
business entity (less than human) regulated in 'public' business, to pretend to circumvent our sovereign unalienable rights.
The undeniable scam is status and identity theft. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (a)(7) 15 years imprisonment and fine.
LICENSE = BUSINESS = TAXPAYER = INFERIOR CREATURE OF THE ARTIFICIAL CREATOR-GOVERNMENT
See your seemingly harmless ALL CAPITAL LETTER Federal driver License and Taxpayer name used on tax bills etc.
Driver License Statute requires a person to have a Social Sec. # = U.S. citizen or resident alien before license is issued.

Speaking of them in the License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471, Chief Justice CHASE said: 'The granting of a license,
therefore, must be regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax,' etc., and that 'this construction is
warranted by the practice of the government from its organization. *** They were regarded merely as a convenient
mode of imposing taxes on several descriptions of business, and of ascertaining the parties from whom such taxes
were to be collected. *** But, as we have already said, these licenses give no authority. They are mere receipts for
taxes.' ROYALL v. STATE OF VIRGINIA, 116 U.S. 572 (1886)(2). [A license is merely issued in the state it's really a
Federal license. The Federal N.A.I.C.S. numbers are for the type of business. See 'Public Administration' # 91,000 et seq.;
all of the so-called state officials are really 'U.S.' industry, occupations, professions: businesses providing services. ]
A License is a privilege for a "person" - What a fraud!: I deny my private vehicle is for public "use."
A License subjects and deprives you out of your private Liberty to do private business injuring no one.
It is really about deceivers subjecting us and depriving us out of our private business into $regulated$ public business.
PEOPLE DO NOT HAVE LAWFUL POWER TO CONTROL PRIVATE RIGHTS OF A CITIZEN WHO INJURED NO ONE
'A body politic,' as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by which
the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by
certain laws for the common good.' This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are
purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment
of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure
another. This is the very essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License
Cases, 5 How. 583, 'are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, ... that
163
is to say, ... the power to govern men and things.' Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its
citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation
becomes necessary for the public good. [Between citizens. Not between government and citizens. ] [***]
For us the question is one of power, not of expediency. If no state of circumstances could exist to justify
such a statute, then we may declare this one void, because is excess of the legislative power of the State. [***] And it
must also be conceded that it is a business in which the whole public has a direct and positive interest. It presents,
therefore, a case for the application of a long-known and well-established principle in social science, and this statute
simply extends the law so as to meet this new development of commercial progress. [***] Undoubtedly, in mere
private contracts, relating to matters in which the public has no interest, what is reasonable must be ascertained
judicially. But this is because the legislature has no control over such a contract. [***] The controlling fact is the
power to regulate at all. [No power at all to regulate over private matters of the people, especially injuring no one. ]
MR. JUSTICE FIELD and MR. JUSTICE STRONG dissented:
The doctrine declared is that property 'becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large;' and from such clothing the right of the
legislature is deduced to control the use of the property, and to determine the compensation which the owner may
receive for it. When Sir Matthew Hale, and the sages of the law in his day, spoke of property as affected by a public
interest, and ceasing from that cause to be juris privati solely, that is, ceasing to be held merely in private right, they
referred to property dedicated by the owner to public announced, the legislature may which was granted by the
government, or in connection with which special privileges were conferred. Unless the property was thus dedicated,
or some right bestowed by the government was held with the property, either by specific grant or by prescription of
so long a time as to imply a grant originally, the property was not affected by any public interest so as to be taken
out of the category of property held in private right. But it is not in any such sense that the terms 'clothing property
with a public interest' are used in this case. From the nature of the business under consideration--the storage of
grain--which, in any sense in which the words can be used, is a private business, in which the public are interested
only as they are interested in the storage of other products of the soil, or in articles of manufacture, it is clear that the
court intended to declare that, whenever one devotes his property to a business which is useful to the
public,--'affects the community at large,'--the legislature can regulate the compensation which the owner may
receive for its use, and for his own services in connection with it. 'When, therefore,' says the court, 'one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and
must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He
may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the
control.' [***] If this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in the principles upon which our republican
government is founded, or in the prohibitions of the Constitution against such invasion of private rights, all
property and all business in the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature. The doctrine of the State
court, that no one is deprived of his property, within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition, so long as he
retains its title and possession, and the doctrine of this court, that, whenever one's property is used in such a manner
as to affect the community at large, it becomes by that fact clothed with a public interest, and ceases to be juris
privati only, appear to me to destroy, for all useful purposes, the efficacy of the constitutional guaranty. All that is
beneficial in property arises from its use, and the fruits of that use; and whatever deprives a person of them deprives
him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title and possession. If the constitutional guaranty extends no further
than to prevent a deprivation of title and possession, and allows a deprivation of use, and the fruits of that use, it
does not merit the encomiums it has received. Unless I have misread the history of the provision now incorporated
into all our State constitutions, and by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments into our Federal Constitution, and have
misunderstood the interpretation it has received, it is not thus limited in its scope, and thus impotent for good. It has
a much more extended operation that either court, State, or Federal has given to it. The provision, it is to be
observed, places property under the same protection as life and liberty. Except by due process of law, no State can
deprive any person of either. The provision has been supposed to secure to every individual the essential conditions
for the pursuit of happiness; and for that reason has not been heretofore, and should never be, construed in any
narrow or restricted sense.
No State 'shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' says the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. By the term 'life,' as here used, something more is meant than mere
animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is
enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the
putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with
the outer world. The deprivation not only of life, but of whatever God has given to every one with life, for its
growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision, if its efficacy be not frittered away by judicial decision.
By the term 'liberty,' as used in the provision, something more is meant than mere freedom from physical
restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in such manner, not
inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness; that is,
to pursue such callings and avocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their
highest enjoyment. The same liberal construction which is required for the protection of life and liberty, in all
164
particulars in which life and liberty are of any value, should be applied to the protection of private property. If the
legislature of a State, under pretence of providing for the public good, or for any other reason, can determine,
against the consent of the owner, the uses to which private property shall be devoted, or the prices which the owner
shall receive for its uses, it can deprive him of the property as completely as by a special act for its confiscation or
destruction. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller (Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 177) said:
'It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if, in construing a provision of constitutional law, always
understood to have been adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual as against the
government, and which has received the commendation of jurists, statesmen, and commentators, as placing the
just principles of the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary legislation to change or control
them, it shall be held that, if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the
public, it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect,
subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is
not taken for the public use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional provision into a restriction on the
rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law, instead of the government, and make it an authority
for invasion of private right under the pretext of the public good, which had no warrant in the laws or practices of
our ancestors.' The views expressed in these citations, applied to this case, would render the constitutional provision
invoked by the defendants effectual to protect them in the uses, income, and revenues of their property, as well as in
its title and possession. The construction actually given by the State court and by this court makes the provision, in
the language of Taney, a protection to 'a mere barren and abstract right, without any practical operation upon the
business of life,' and renders it 'illusive and nugatory, mere words of form, affording no protection and producing
no practical result.' The power of the State over the property of the citizen under the constitutional guaranty is well
defined. The State may take his property for public uses, upon just compensation being made therefor. It may take
a portion of his property by way of taxation for the support of the government. It may control the use and possession
of his property, so far as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of others, and to secure to them the equal
use and enjoyment of their property. The doctrine that each one must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor--
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas--is the rule by which every member or society must possess and enjoy his
property; and all legislation essential to secure this common and equal enjoyment is a legitimate exercise of State
authority. Except in cases where property may be destroyed to arrest a conflagration or the ravages of pestilence, or
be taken under the pressure of an immediate and overwhelming necessity to prevent a public calamity, the power of
the State over the property of the citizen does not extend beyond such limits. [***] One may go, in like manner,
through the whole round of regulations authorized by legislation, State or municipal, under what is termed the police
power, and in no instance will he find that the compensation of the owner for the use of his property has any
influence in establishing them. It is only where some right or privilege is conferred by the government or
municipality upon the owner, which he can use in connection with his property, or by means of which the use of his
property is rendered more valuable to him, or he thereby enjoys an advantage over others, that the compensation to
be received by him becomes a legitimate matter of regulation. Submission to the regulation of compensation in such
cases is an implied condition of the grant, and the State, in exercising its power of prescribing the compensation,
only determines the conditions upon which its concession shall be enjoyed. When the privilege ends, the power of
regulation ceases. [Today a license is used to enrich the servants for their "services" even though we injure no one. ]
Jurists and writers on public law find authority for the exercise of this police power of the State and the
numerous regulations which it prescribes in the doctrine already stated, that every one must use and enjoy his
property consistently with the rights of others, and the equal use and enjoyment by them of their property. 'The
police power of the State,' says the Supreme Court of Vermont, 'extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property in the State. According to the maxim, sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, which, being of universal application, it must, of course, be within the range of
legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others.'
Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co. , 27 Vt. 149. 'We think it a settled principle growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil society,' says the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 'that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights
of the community.' Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84. In his Commentaries, after speaking of the protection
afforded by the Constitution to private property, Chancellor Kent says:--- 'But though property be thus protected, it
is still to be understood that the law-giver has the right to prescribe the mode and manner of using it, so far as may
be necessary to prevent the abuse of the right, to the injury or annoyance of others, or of the public. [***]
The will of the legislature is made the condition upon which the owner shall receive the fruits of his
property and the just reward of his labor, industry, and enterprise. 'That government,' says Story, 'can scarcely be
deemed to be free where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body without
any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and
private property should be held sacred.' Wilkeson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. The decision of the court in this case gives
unrestrained license to legislative will. [***] The State in such cases exercises no greater right than an individual may
exercise over the use of his own property when leased or loaned to others. The conditions upon which the privilege
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shall be enjoyed being stated or implied in the legislation authorizing its grant, no right is, of course, impaired by
their enforcement. The recipient of the privilege, in effect, stipulates to comply with the conditions. It matters not
how limited the privilege conferred, its acceptance implies an assent to the regulation of its use and the
compensation for it. The privilege which the hackman and drayman have to the use of stands on the public streets,
not allowed to the ordinary coachman or laborer with teams, constitutes a sufficient warrant for the regulation of
their fares. In the case of the warehousemen of Chicago, no right or privilege is conferred by the government upon
them; and hence no assent of theirs can be alleged to justify any interference with their charges for the use of their
property. There is nothing in the character of the business of the defendants as warehousemen which called for the
interference complained of in this case. Their buildings are not nuisances; their occupation of receiving and storing
grain infringes upon no rights of others, disturbs no neighborhood, infects not the air, and in no respect prevents
others from using and enjoying their property as to them may seem best. The legislation in question is nothing less
than a bold assertion of absolute power by the State to control at its discretion the property and business of the
citizen, and fix the compensation he shall receive. The will of the legislature is made the condition upon which the
owner shall receive the fruits of his property and the just reward of his labor, industry, and enterprise. 'That
government,' says Story, 'can scarcely be deemed to be free where the rights of property are left solely dependent
upon the will of a legislative body without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to
require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.' Wilkeson v. Leland, 2 Pet.
657. The decision of the court in this case gives unrestrained license to legislative will.
The several instances mentioned by counsel in the argument, and by the court in its opinion, in which
legislation has fixed the compensation which parties may receive for the use of their property and services, do not
militate against the views I have expressed of the power of the State over the property of the citizen. They were
mostly cases of public ferries, bridges, and turnpikes, of wharfingers, hackmen, and draymen, and of interest on
money. In all these cases, except that of interest on money, which I shall presently notice, there was some special
privilege granted by the State or municipality; and no one, I suppose, has ever contended that the State had not a
right to prescribe the conditions upon which such privilege should be enjoyed. The State in such cases exercises no
greater right than an individual may exercise over the use of his own property when leased or loaned to others. The
conditions upon which the privilege shall be enjoyed being stated or implied in the legislation authorizing its grant,
no right is, of course, impaired by their enforcement. The recipient of the privilege, in effect, stipulates to comply
with the conditions. It matters not how limited the privilege conferred, its acceptance implies an assent to the
regulation of its use and the compensation for it. [***] The quotations from the writings of Sir Matthew Hale, so far
from supporting the positions of the court, do not recognize the interference of the government, even to the extent
which I have admitted to be legitimate. They state merely that the franchise of a public ferry belongs to the king,
and cannot be used by the subject except by license from him, or prescription time out of mind; and that when the
subject has a public wharf by license from the king, or from having dedicated his private wharf to the public, as in
the case of a street opened by him through his own land, he must allow the use of the wharf for reasonable and
moderate charges. Thus, in the first quotation which is taken from his treatise De Jure Maris, Hale says that the king
has 'a right of franchise or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry for all passengers without a
prescription time out of mind or a charter from the king. He may make a ferry for his own use or the use of his
family, but not for the common use of all the king's subjects passing that way; because it doth in consequent tend to
a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest and use, and every man for his passage pays a toll,
which is a common charge, and every ferry ought to be under a public regulation, viz., that it give attendance at due
times, keep a boat in due order, and take but reasonable toll; for if he fail in these he is finable.' Of course, one who
obtains a license from the king to establish a public ferry, at which 'every man for his passage pays a toll,' must
take it on condition that he charge only reasonable toll, and, indeed, subject to such regulations as the king may
prescribe. [All lawful power of government therefore its laws and jurisdiction are derived from the sovereign people. ]
In the second quotation, which is taken from his treatise De Portibus Maris, Hale says:---- 'A man, for his
own private advantage, may, in a port or town, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his
customers can agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to
do, viz., makes the most of his own. If the king or subject have a public wharf, unto which all persons that come to
that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharves only licensed by
the king, or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected, in that case
there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive dutes for cranage, wharfage, pesage, &c.; neither can they be enhanced
to an immoderate rate, but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the king's license or
charter. For now the wharf and crane and other conveniences are affected with a public interest, and they cease to
be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in new building on his own land, it is now no longer bare private
interest, but is affected by the public interest.' The purport of which is, that if one have a public wharf, by license
from the government or his own dedication, he must exact only reasonable compensation for its use. By its
dedication to public use, a wharf is as much brought under the common-law rule of subjection to reasonable
charges as it would be if originally established or licensed by the crown. All property dedicated to public use by an
individual owner, as in the case of land for a park or street, falls at once, by force of the dedication, under the law
governing property appropriated by the government for similar purposes. I do not doubt the justice of the
166
encomiums passed upon Sir Matthew Hale as a learned jurist of his day; but I am unable to perceive the pertinency
of his observations upon public ferries and public wharves, found in his treatises on 'The Rights of the Sea' and on
'The Ports of the Sea,' to the questions presented by the warehousing law of Illinois, undertaking to regulate the
compensation received by the owners of private property, when that property is used for private purposes.
The principal authority cited in support of the ruling of the court is that of Alnutt v. Inglis, decided by the
King's Bench, and reported in 12 East. But that case, so far from sustaining the ruling, establishes, in my judgment,
the doctrine that every one has a right to charge for his property, or for its use, whatever he pleases, unless he
enjoys in connection with it some right or privilege from the government not accorded to others; and even then it
only decides what is above stated in the quotations from Sir Matthew Hale, that he must submit, so long as he
retains the right or privilege, to reasonable rates. In that case, the London Dock Company, under certain acts of
Parliament, possessed the exclusive right of receiving imported goods into their warehouses before the duties were
paid; and the question was whether the company was bound to receive them for a reasonable reward, or whether it
court arbitrarily fix its compensation. In deciding the case, the Chief Justice, Lord Ellenborough, said:---- 'There is
no doubt that the general principle is favored, both in law and justice, that every man may fix what price he
pleases upon his own property, or the use of it; but if, for a particular purpose, the public have right to resort to his
premises and make use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the benefit of that
monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, perform the duty attacted to it on reasonable terms.'
And, coming to the conclusion that the company's warehouses were invested with 'the monopoly of a
public privilege,' he held that by law the company must confine itself to take reasonable rates; and added, that if the
crown should thereafter think it advisable to extend the privilege more generally to other persons and places, so that
the public would not be restrained from exercising a choice of warehouses for the purpose, the company might be
enfranchised from the restriction which attached to a monopoly; but, so long as its warehouses were the only places
which could be resorted to for that purpose, the company was bound to let the trade have the use of them for a
reasonable hire and reward. The other judges of the court placed their concurrence in the decision upon the ground
that the company possessed a legal monopoly of the business, having the only warehouses where goods imported
could be lawfully received without previous payment of the duties. From this case it appears that it is only where
some privilege in the bestowal of the government is enjoyed in connection with the property, that it is affected with
a public interest in any proper sense of the terms. It is the public privilege conferred with the use of the property
which creates the public interest in it.
In the case decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama, where a power granted to the city of Mobile to
license bakers, and to regulate the weight and price of bread, was sustained so far as regulating the weight of the
bread was concerned, no question was made as to the right to regulate the price. 3 Ala. 137. There is no doubt of the
competency of the State to prescribe the weight of a loaf of bread, as it may declare what weight shall constitute a
pound or a ton. But I deny the power of any legislature under our government to fix the price which one shall
receive for his property of any kind. If the power can be exercised as to one article, it may as to all articles, and the
prices of every thing, from a calico gown to a city mansion, may be the subject of legislative direction. [***]
The practice of regulating by legislation the interest receivable for the use of money, when considered with
reference to its origin, is only the assertion of a right of the government to control the extent to which a privilege
granted by it may be exercised and enjoyed. By the ancient common law it was unlawful to take any money for the
use of money: all who did so were called usurers, a term of great reproach, and were exposed to the censure of the
church; and if, after the death of a person, it was discovered that he had been a usurer whilst living, his chattels were
forfeited to the king, and his lands escheated to the lord of the fee. No action could be maintained on any promise
to pay for the use of money, because of the unlawfulness of the contract. Whilst the common law thus condemned
all usury, Parliament interfered, and made it lawful to take a limited amount of interest. It was not upon the theory
that the legislature could arbitrarily fix the compensation which one could receive for the use of property, which, by
the general law, was the subject of hire for compensation, that Parliament acted, but in order to confer a privilege
which the common law denied. The reasons which led to this legislation originally have long since ceased to exist;
and if the legislation is still persisted in, it is because a long acquiescence in the exercise of a power, especially
when it was rightfully assumed in the first instance, is generally received as sufficient evidence of its continued
lawfulness. 10 Bac. Abr. 264. (fn) [Remember the license statute is cites and applies to a person not people. ]
(fn) The statute of 13 Eliz. c. 8, which allows ten per cent interest, recites 'that all usury, being forbidden by the
law of God, is sin, and detestable;' and the statute of 21 James the First, reducing the rate to eight per cent,
provided that nothing in the law should be 'construed to allow the practice of usury in point of religion or
conscience,'--a clause introduced, it is said, to satisfy the bishops, who would not vote for the bill without it.
There were also recognized in England, by the ancient common law, certain privileges as belonging to the
lord of the manor, which grew out of the state of the country, the condition of the people, and the relation existing
between him and his tenants under the feudal system. Among these was the right of the lord to compel all the
tenants within his manor to grind their corn at his mill. No one, therefore, could set up a mill except by his license,
or by the license of the crown, unless he claimed the right by prescription, which presupposed a grant from the lord
or crown, and, of course, with such license went the right to regulate the tolls to be received. Woolrych on the Law
of Waters, c. 6, of Mills. Hence originated the doctrine which at one time obtained generally in this country, that
167
there could be no mill to grind corn for the public, without a grant or license from the public authorities. MUNN v.
ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)(2). [When you register your motor vehicle it is dedicated to the feudal STATE? ]
Typically our servants refuse to use our true name in proper English grammar and true status, or let you preserve your rights, or
write under threat, duress, and coercion on the license and refuse to confirm collaterally (by affidavit etc.) the ALL CAPITAL LETTER
name has no effect on your true status. They will harass you (jail etc.) if they find out you do not have a license. The Drivers License
statutes (in Alaska) reads a 'person' must have a Social Security number before the license can be issued, and another statute requires
you must use your 'true' name. But do you have 'any' government ID or tax bill that does not have the ALL CAPITAL LETTER name on it?
Taxpayer means 'governmental person' 'acting' as a 'business entity' in 'more' than one state =
Other than human beings engage in interstate commerce = Congress = Federal = U.S. located in D.C.
DEFINING [INCOME] TAXPAYER IN THE 'MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT'

[Codified at Alaska Statute 43.19.010 (regarding [Federal] state income tax:]
"Taxpayer" means any corporation, partnership, firm, association, governmental unit or agency or
person 'acting' as a 'business entity' in more than one state. (Section 1 ch 124 Session Laws of
Alaska 1970.) [No comma after governmental = all governmental, as is the IRS levy statute. ]
BURKE, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):
First, ERCA argues that it does not come within the definition of "taxpayer" contained in AS 43.19.010(II)(3). The
statute defines a taxpayer as "any corporation ... acting as a business entity in more than one state." ERCA asserts
that because it operates in only one state, it falls outside the Department's jurisdiction. This, however, begs the
central question of the appeal. If a taxpayer doing business only in Alaska is found to be part of a larger business
unity [U.S.? ] which also does business outside the state, the definition of AS 43.19.010(II)(3) is met and AS
43.20.065 mandates apportionment. [***] "As a general principle, a state may not tax value earned outside its
borders." Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, --- U.S. ----, ----, 102 S.Ct. 3103, 3109 (1982). EARTH
RESOURCES CO. v. STATE of Alaska, 665 P.2d 960 (1983)(2). [Alaska has no boundaries prescribed by 'law.' ]
ALL CAPITAL LETTER ASSUMMED BUSINESS NAME = ACTING AS A BUSINESS ENTITY

Driver license name - Taxpayer name = created by, therefore of government. Social Security # name - Defendant's name.
BRYNER, Justice, Pro Tem (Supreme Court of Alaska):

FDIC's argument in favor of a mandatory registration requirement finds little support as a matter of common law,
which "generally recognizes that persons may transact business under an assumed or fictitious name as long as
fraud ... [is] not involved." Platt v. Locke, 11 Utah 2d 273, 358 P.2d 95, 98 (1961). The proposition appears to be
well settled that "[i]n the absence of a statutory prohibition, a person, without abandoning his real name, may
adopt or assume a name, and he may use such assumed name to identify himself in the transaction of his business,
the execution of contracts and the carrying on of his affairs." Kreuter v. United States, 201 F.2d 33, 35 (10th
Cir.1953). (fn 6) This rule is settled in practice as well as in law: "There is, of course, nothing illegal whatsoever
about transacting business under a fictitious name if the purpose is not to defraud. It is a common business
practice, particularly on the part of sole proprietorships and partnerships...." United States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d 348,
354 n. 12 (9th Cir.1977). (fn 6). See generally Annotation, Doing Business Under an Assumed Name, 42 A.L.R.2d
516, ß 1 (1951) ROECKL v. F.D.I.C., 885 P.2d 1067 (1994)(1). [I deny that "person" or false status is me. ]
ALL CAPITAL LETTER DRIVER LICENSE NAME = ACTING AS A BUSINESS ENTITY = TAXPAYER
Unwittingly acting as a licensed business entity identified by your ALL CAPITAL LETTER business name = Taxpayer.
LIGHTNER, District Judge (Supreme Court of Nebraska): A trade-name is "the name or style under which a
concern or firm does business." Webster's New International Dictionary. "Trade-names are names which are used
in trade to designate a particular business of certain individuals considered somewhat as an entity." St. Louis
Independent Packing Co. v. Houston, 8 Cir., 215 F. 553, 560. See Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 55
Ind.App. 455, 104 N.E. 34. "It is a matter of common observation that persons do business frequently under what
is known as 'trade-name,' adopted for the purpose of giving them an apparent standing in the business community."
Willey v. Crocker-Woolworth Nat. Bank, 141 Cal. 508, 75 P. 106, 108. "A business name, also sometimes called a
trade name or a commercial name, is that name under which a business is carried on, whatever it may be, whether
a personal name, as is commonly the case, or not." Shoemaker v. Ulmer, 34 Pa.Co.Ct.R. 469. PLUM v.
SEIKMANN, 135 Neb. 101 (1938)(1). [See: 215 F. 553, 15 U.S.C.A 1127 and Black’s Law 4th on Trade Name. ]
RICHARD L. BOHANON, Bankruptcy Judge:
The distinction between a nominal party and a real party in interest was first raised in Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). [***] For a nominal party, under this definition, is one who substitutes for
the real party in interest. In re BARRETT REFINING CORP, 221 B.R. 795, 32 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 937 (1998)(2).
Syllabus of the Hon. D. C. Glenn's opinion, prepared by himself (High Court of Errors and Appeals of Miss.):
168
Courts of justice are not governed by names and designations. "The law looks beyond mere names and firms, and
sees who are the real parties, and treats them as the persons who are to enforce their contracts." Gage v. Rollins, 10
Met. 354. BUCKNER and STANTON v. CALCOTE, 28 Miss. 432 (1855)(3). [Beyond the ALL CAPITAL LETTER
assumed business entity taxpayer name is a real sovereign not a creature of government. ]
Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with MARSHALL joins Parts I, II, and III, concurring in the judgment:
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of United States , 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), which held: "It may, we think,
be laid down as a rule which admits of no exception, that, in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is
the party named in the record. [***]
"In deciding who are parties to the suit the court will not look beyond the record. [***]" Id., at 220. QUERN v.
JORDAN, 440 U.S. 332 (1978)(2). [I deny the false status, object, and charge government deception and say why. ]
IDENTITY THEFT + STATUS THEFT
'JOHN TAXPAYER DOE' Soc. Sec.# 666-66-666 = non-sovereign U.S. stateless person-Taxpayer-slave.
Outrageous fraud extending: citizen of the United States = United States citizen = person = individual = taxpayer = subject = vassal-slave
and creature, acting as a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless entity (other than a human being) easily identified by your ALL CAPITAL
LETTER assumed business name, with Social Security number, acting as a taxpayer 'and subject to the jurisdiction' of the dark Lords of
Federalism in THE STATE OF TAXES a.k.a. the UNITED POLICE STATES of America. Seem harmless in the Land of the Free?
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES = MISAPPLY THE LAW OVER THE PEOPLE - THEN REFUSE TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH
Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Ct. of the U.S.) with STEWART joins except to Part I concurring and dissenting in part:
Mr. Justice Bradley's admonition almost a century ago has even greater cogency in today's world of ever more
intrusive governmental invasions of privacy: "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule
that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)(2).
EXACTING PRECISION
The $100 Trillion Dollar$ government 'motive' to not fully define 'Taxpayer' with 'unmistakable exacting precision'
and 'clear and unquestionable' authority of law, free of all fraud.
Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting:
This is the paradigm case in which "the exact words of the statute provide the surest guide to determining
Congress' intent." (fn 11) I would not enlarge the coverage of the statute beyond its plain meaning. Although this
case involves an office, the invasion of a home would raise precisely the same statutory issue.
(fn11). "Congress drafted [Title III] with exacting precision. As its principal sponsor, Senator McClellan, put it: "
'[A] bill as controversial as this ... requires close attention to the dotting of every "i" and the crossing of every
"t". ...' [114 Cong.Rec. 14751 (1968).] "Under these circumstances, the exact words of the statute provide the surest
guide to determining Congress' intent, and we would do well to confine ourselves to that area." United States v.
Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 441 (BURGER, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). DALIA v. UNITED
STATES, 441 U.S. 238 (1979)(2). [They know how to be exact, clear and unquestionable when they want to profit.]
The above IRS Code statute intentionally treacherously cites taxpayer means 'person' and not 'the People of the United
States,' or sovereign 'Citizen of The United States of America', nor even cites 'citizen of the United States,' or 'United States citizen.' I
see no reason why the People cannot out of necessity pretend to do business as a subject (since there are no government forms or
applications to sign as a sovereign) and then pay taxes (or not) ultimately as a sovereign. I expressly deny the sovereign People are or
could be lawfully included in the definition of income taxpayer, much less lawfully forced to pay income taxes in the Land of the Free,
especially when taxing the subjects without their true consent was a ground for WAR in the Declaration of Independence. Think of all
the money taxpayers could save if they let all of the illegally subjected so called tax evaders out of prison ($30+ thousand a year?)
saved per each sovereign pretended to be a criminal convicted of a victimless crime by governmental deception. If it be pretended the
sovereign people intended to delegate power to their servants over themselves without preserving sovereign immunity after declaring
the grievance of taxing them without their (true) consent, where is government's clear and unquestionable proof of their contradictory
intent? 1st Where is the tax form for the People to sign as the sovereign People? 2nd The sovereign people would not be sovereigns if
bound by mere human law. 3rd There is no competent evidence of proof of that intent of the people. 4th Point of logic: No owner of a
business ever gives his employees power over himself, much less irrevocable power to destroy the owner that he must forever obey.
Much less after his employees try to abuse him by taking however much of his money they want. 5th Where is the law requiring a
sovereign, or even a subject Citizen to file or pay Federal income tax? 6th Taxing without true consent (theft) was a ground for war. 7th
What sovereign in the history of the world ever volunteered to surrender their sovereignty? None! Much less after just suffering a long
train of abuse and usurpation causing a bloody Revolution. That would be like forever giving up being King of the world in the Land of
the Free in a more perfect Union for the opportunity to be excessively abused and subjected again. Insanity, Satanity, or both?
Remember the court case citing title 26 'taxpayer' means any 'person' subject? The following cases demonstrate penal statutes must
169
be strictly interpreted by the words used and cannot be extended, proving the word 'person' cannot be applied to the sovereign
People in the Land of the Free. The creature cannot rule its sovereign creator. We injure no one, Let us alone.
In the Constitution: Indians not taxed. Even General Acts of Congress did not apply to Indians
Indian Tribes have sovereign immunity. The sovereign People would be clearly included, if they could be.
GRAY, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):

Indians and their property, exempt from taxation by treaty or statute of the United States, could not be taxed by any
state. General acts of congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to
include them. Const. art. 1, ß ß 2, 8; art. 2, ß 2; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet.
515; U. S. v. Rogers, 4 How. 567; U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407; Case of the Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737; Case of
the New York Indians, Id. 761; Case of the Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616; U. S. v. Whisky, 93 U. S. 188;
Pennock v. Commissioners, 103 U. S. 44; Crow Dog's Case, 109 U. S. 556; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693;
Hastings v. Farmer, 4 N. Y. 293. ELK v. WILKINS, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)(2). [Cited 353 times 6/8/04. ]
THE ESTABLISHED RULE NOT TO EXTEND BEYOND THE LANGUAGE USED
Most 'strongly' against the government, and in favor of the citizen. Most strongly in favor of the people. Emphasis added.
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication,
beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically
pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.
United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141
U. S. 468, 474; Benziger v. United States, 192 U. S. 38, 55. GOULD v. GOULD, 245 U.S. 151 (1917)(2).
TAXING ACTS ARE NOT TO BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE LANGUAGE USED
Doubt is resolved "against" government and "in favor" of the taxpayer-accused-defendant.
Second. Is the United States a resident within the meaning of the words 'residents, corporate or otherwise?' We think
it is. It many times has been held that the United States or a state is a 'person' within the meaning of statutory
provisions applying only to persons. See Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370, and cases cited. In Martin v. State,
24 Tex. 61, 68, this was held in respect of a criminal statute, notwithstanding the general rule that such statutes are
to be construed strictly. The statute (Laws Tex. 1848, c. 152, s 33) there penalized the false making or fraudulent
alteration of a public record when done 'with intent that any person be defrauded.' The state Supreme Court held
that the state was to be taken as a 'person' within the meaning of the statute, and one who made the entry with intent
to defraud the state violated the statute. The Texas decision was expressly followed by this court in Stanley v.
Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 517, where it was held that the word 'person' used in the statute there under consideration
would include the United States 'as a body politic and corporate.' Blackstone, writing on the rights of persons (1
Blackstone 123) says: 'Persons also are divided by the law into either natural persons, or artificial. Natural persons
are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for the
purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.' While it cannot be said that the
United States, in its corporate capacity as an artificial person, [Super emphasis added. ] has a bodily presence in any
place, it is not unreasonable to hold that in the eye of the law it has a residence, [Demand to know where it is located:
Washington "D.C.", and where its boundaries are prescribed in Law? ] and especially so when a contrary holding would
defeat the evident purpose of a statute. This may be in the nature of a legal fiction; but legal fictions have an
appropriate place in the administration of the law when they are required by the demands of convenience [Fraud. ]
and justice. Thus, intangible personal property has been held to have a situs at the domicile of the owner, although
intangibles ordinarily have no actual situs and the paper evidence of their existence may be elsewhere. [The paper
evidence of our immovable property (land and home) is fraudulently pretended to be in their outside the Constitution
venue. ] First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 328. If to carry out the purposes of a statute it be admissible
to construe the word 'person' as including the United States, it is hard to see why, in like circumstances, it is
inadmissible to construe the word 'resident' as likewise including the United States. [***]
As, for example, it did in the Act of March 3, 1919, s 4, c. 100, 40 Stat. 1309, 1311 (31 USCA s 750).
In the foregoing discussion, we have not been unmindful of the rule, frequently stated by this court, that taxing
acts 'are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used,' and that doubts are to be
resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. The rule is a salutary one, but it does not apply here.
The intention of the lawmaker controls in the construction of taxing acts as it does in the construction of other
statutes, and that intention is to be ascertained, not by taking the word or clause in question from its setting and
viewing it apart, but by considering it in connection with the context, the general purposes of the statute in which it
is found, the occasion and circumstances of its use, and other appropriate tests for the ascertainment of the
legislative will. Compare Rein v. Lane, L.R. 2 Q.B. Cases 144, 151. The intention being thus disclosed, it is enough
that the word or clause is reasonably susceptible of a meaning consonant therewith, whatever might be its meaning
in another and different connection. We are not at liberty to reject the meaning so established and adopt another
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lying outside the intention of the Legislature [our artificial creature ] simply because the latter would release the
taxpayer or bear less heavily against him. To do so would be not to resolve a doubt in his favor, but to say that the
statute does not mean what it means. [Mean no more than what the mere artificial creature intends to say. ]
'The rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words of a statute to have their full
meaning, or the more extended of two meanings. The words are not to be bent one way or the other, but to be taken
in the sense which will best manifest the legislative intent... United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 396; United
States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242.' Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 329. HELVERING
(Com.Int.Rev.) v. STOCKHOLMS ENSIKILDA BANK, 293 U.S. 84 (1934)(2). [There are many easy ways to
pervert written law to usurp, especially if you do not understand the Order of things for lawful right of jurisdiction. ]
THEY MAY COMMIT 'ANY OF THE CRIMES' SPECIFIED - WITH 'IMPUNITY'

Justice SWAYNE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
If the subordinates are not within the act, there is no provision in the laws of the United States for their
punishment in such cases. So far as those laws are concerned they may commit any of the crimes specified with
impunity. We think it clear that it was not the intention of Congress to leave an omission so wide and important in
the act, and our minds have been brought satisfactorily to the conclusion that they have not done so.
We are not unmindful that penal laws are to be construed strictly. It is said that this rule is almost as old as
construction itself. But whenever invoked it comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important. It
is by the light which each contributes that the judgment of the court is to be made up. The object in construing penal,
as well as other statutes, is to ascertain the legislative intent. That constitutes the law. If the language be clear it is
conclusive. There can be no construction where there is nothing to construe. The words must not be narrowed to the
exclusion of what the legislature intended to embrace; but that intention must be gathered from the words, and they
must be such as to leave no room for a reasonable doubt upon the subject. It must not be defeated by a forced and
over-strict construction. The rule does not exclude the application of common sense to the terms made use of in the
act in order to avoid an absurdity, which the legislature ought not to be presumed to have intended. When the words
are general and include various classes of persons, there is no authority which would justify a court in restricting
them to one class and excluding others, where the purpose of the statute is alike applicable to all. The proper course
in all cases is to adopt that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context, and promotes in the fullest
manner the policy and objects of the legislature. The rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the
words of the statute to have their full meaning, or the more extended of two meanings, as the wider popular instead
of the more narrow technical one; but the words should be taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the other,
as will best manifest the legislative intent. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheaton, 96; Same v. Morris, 14 Peters,
475; Same v. Winn, 3 Sumner, 211; 1 Bishop's Criminal Law, ß 123; Bacon's Abridgment, tit. Statute I. U.S. v.
HARTWELL73 U.S. 385 (1867)(1). [The word "person" what a scam, intended to defraud the whole nation. ]
THE LEGISLATURE KNEW AND UNDERSTOOD THE RULES OF GRAMMAR + LOOK TO THE COMMON LAW
OPINION CARPENETI Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):
We may presume that the legislature was aware of the effect of drafting in the passive voice. See Employment Sec.
Comm'n v. Wilson, 461 P.2d 425, 428 (Alaska 1969) ("[W]e may assume that the legislature knew and understood
the rules of grammar."). The common law supports an expansive reading of the statute. Especially when statutory
language and legislative history are ambiguous, we look to the common law (fn 48) as a useful tool to discern
legislative intent and to interpret statutes. "The common law ... furnishes one of the most reliable backgrounds
upon which analysis of the objects and purposes of a statute can be determined." (fn 49) By statute dating back to
territorial days, Alaska has adopted the common law (where not inconsistent with federal or state constitutions or
with state statutes) as "the rule of decision in this state." (fn 50) We presume that the legislature is aware of the
common law when enacting statutes. (fn 51) Moreover, the common law is an especially important tool when "a
statute attempts to restate the common law." (fn 52) We have stated that "[s]tatutes which establish rights that are in
derogation of common law are to be construed in a manner that effects the least change possible in common law."
[By statute the Common Law not contrary to the Constitutions is the rule of decision in this state. ] (fn 53)
(fn 48) Here we use the term "common law" in the very general sense of the decisions and principles that form the
basis of our legal system, encompassing both the traditional realms of law and equity.
(fn 49) 2B SINGER, supra n. 23, § 50:01,
(fn 50) AS 01.10.010. at 139.
(fn 51) See 2B SINGER, supra n. 23, § 50:01, at 139-140, 3A SINGER, § 70:4, at 499-500. See Sears v. State, 713
P.2d 1218, 1219 (Alaska App.1986) (legislature presumed to be aware of common-law terms of art). Accord
Ultrawall, Inc. v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FSB, 135 Idaho 832, 25 P.3d 855, 859 (2001) (legislature presumed aware of
judicial decisions when amending mechanics' lien statute); In re Proceedings of King County for Foreclosure of
Liens for Delinquent Real Prop. Taxes for the Years 1985 Through 1988, 117 Wash.2d 77, 811 P.2d 945, 950
(1991) (legislature enacting tax foreclosure statute presumed aware of case law on sufficiency of description of
property); Mack Motor Truck Corp. v. Wolfe, 303 S.W.2d 697, 700-01 (Mo.App.1957) (legislature presumed aware
171
of common law of lien priority); State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 269 P.2d 491, 496 (1954)
(legislature presumed to be aware of common-law right preserved by Sixth Amendment).
(fn 52) 2B SINGER, supra, § 50:02, at 146.
(fn 53) Univ. of Alaska v. Shanti, 835 P.2d 1225, 1228 n. 5 (Alaska 1992). See also Roeckl v. Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., 885 P.2d 1067, 1074 (Alaska 1994). Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936 (2006).
SPECIFICITY NECESSARY
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
following opinion, in which the CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice REED, concur:
Accordingly, it is argued that such a body of legal principles lacks the basic specificity necessary for criminal
statutes under our system of government. Congress did not define what it desired to punish but referred the citizen to
a comprehensive law library in order to ascertain what acts were prohibited. To enforce such a statute would be like
sanctioning the practice of Caligula who 'published the law, but it was written in a very small hand, and posted up in
a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it.' Suetonius, Lives of the Twelve Caesars, p. 278. SCREWS et al
UNITED STATES, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)(2). [No specificity = Intentional fraud for control and revenue. ]
'Beyond a reasonable doubt' is a scam invented by the judges to convict Americans without proof distinguished from
'innocent until proven guilty.' Besides what does 'beyond a reasonable doubt' even mean? It is a kind of doubt, therefore doubt. Take
out the word reasonable modifying doubt, and it reads 'beyond a doubt' take out 'a' and it reads 'beyond doubt.' Hence, to me it
means one is 'innocent' until 'proven' guilty beyond reasons for doubt, with facts that prove every necessary element of the crime.
Otherwise the verdict is a mere despotic guess without all the necessary facts proven true. And that is why many innocent Americans
have been released from wrongful convictions by government deception and error.
IGNORANT OF THE LAW JURORS + SUBJECTION BY ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT DECEPTION = FAIR TRIAL?
A "reasonable doubt," at a minimum, is one based upon "reason." Yet a properly instructed jury may occasionally
convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
same may be said of a trial judge sitting as a jury. In a federal trial, such an occurrence has traditionally been
deemed to require reversal of the conviction. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80; Bronston v. United States,
409 U.S. 352. See also, e. g., Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-233. Under Winship, which established
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as an essential of Fourteenth Amendment due process, it follows that when such a
conviction occurs in a state trial, it cannot constitutionally stand. JACKSON v. VIRGINIA, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)(2).
[Reason = facts, that are supposed to be found and proven true by competent evidence. ]
THE GOVERNMENT MUST 'PROVE EVERY' ELEMENT OF THE CRIME

Demand the prosecution prove every element of the crime, free of fraud and according the Law interpreted by the supreme
Court. Not by lip service! 1. Guilt is personal, demand they prove what you truly are in Law arising under the Constitution: one of the
natural born (sovereign) white People. 2. Prove what a taxpayer is and where their lawful power is to convert you into a taxpayer. 3.
Prove how you became and intended to be a 'resident of the District' and prove 'where' the crime was committed within the
boundaries previously ascertained by law pursuant to the 6th Amendment. 4. How the true you (sovereign) are 'ultimately' the one
required to file a specific tax form, liable and required by law to pay taxes as a sovereign from a specific 'source' of income from where.
5. That a bona fide Officer of a lawful government with lawful authority timely noticed you with a Notice of Deficiency, and then a
Demand for Payment after assessment of a return you filed etc.
The Burden of Proof Remains on the Government.
Nor does this rule shift the burden of proof. The Government must still prove every element of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt though not to a mathematical certainty. The settled standards of the criminal law are applicable to
net worth cases just as to prosecutions for other crimes. Once the Government has established its case, the defendant
remains quiet at his peril. Cf. Yee Hem v. U.S., 268 U.S. 178, 185. The practical disadvantages to the taxpayer are
lessened by the pressures on the Government to check and negate relevant leads.
Willfulness Must be Present.
A final element necessary for conviction is willfulness. The petitioners contend that willfulness 'involves a
specific intent which must be proven by independent evidence and which cannot be inferred from the mere
understatement of income.' This is a fair statement of the rule. HOLLAND v. UNITED STATES of America, 348
U.S. 121 (1955)(2). [Add this to the other must 'prove every element' cases. Old Chief etc. ]
Many Americans would die (and have) for our country and freedom. Most Americans would pay taxes if they were truly
necessary, lawful, just, and right; and government was not corrupt, wasting our money, giving themselves raises, giving it away, and
losing it. We understand government (mere men) is engaged in deception outside the Constitution to steal our money to keep us
subjected. Only a fool would finance their own destruction and that of their children. Demand to pay all your 'lawful' taxes in a timely
manner, and object to all of their fraud and confusion imposed by 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless servants.
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THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT PARTLY PUBLIC OR PARTLY "PRIVATE "
It's either the Government, or not = 100% private Federal non-sovereign stateless citizens of the U.S. government.
Who is demanding you pay taxes? The Government, or is it a pretended government acting outside the Constitution?
'The United States' vs. 'United States' de facto 'The State of …' vs. private 'STATE OF …' de facto (non-sovereign status)
These servants are acting as 100% Federal non-sovereign U.S. citizen-stateless persons acting outside the
Constitution. They are not bona fide duly appointed and lawfully commissioned Officers of 'The United States'
exercising lawful Constitutional 'Power.' Non-sovereign status + outside the Constitution = Lawlessness = void.
Justice FRANKFURTER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just another private litigant, for purposes of charging it with
liability, whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enterprise or engages in competition
with private ventures. Government is not partly public or partly private, depending upon the governmental pedigree
of the type of a particular activity or the manner in which the Government conducts it. The Government may carry
on its operations through conventional executive agencies or through corporate forms especially created for
defined ends. See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 390. Whatever the form in which
the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having
accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority
[outside the Constitution. ]. The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by
delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as here, the
agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v.
U.S., 243 U.S. 389, 409; United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70, and see, generally, In re Floyd Acceptances, 7
Wall. 666. FEDERAL CROP INS. CORP. v. MERRILL, 332 U.S. 380 (1947)(2). [They always pretend they have it.]
YOU TAKE THE RISK

What possible lawful power or authority could non-sovereign stateless persons have outside the Constitution?
"Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government
takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the
bounds of his authority. [Judges, IRS etc. ] The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be
limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as
here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority." Federal Crop Insurance
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S., at 384. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1947); United States v.
Stewart, 311 U.S., at 70; United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31- 32; Wilber National Bank v. United
States, 294 U.S. 120, 123-124 (1935); Utah v. United States, 284 U.S. 534, 545-546 (1932); Jeems Bayou Fishing &
Hunting Club v. United States, 260 U.S. 561, 564 (1923); Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S., at 579 (1921); Utah
Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917); Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S.,
at 291; Hart v. United States, 95 U.S., at 318-319; Gibbons v. U.S., 8 Wall. 269, 274 (1869); Lee v. Munroe, 7
Cranch 366 (1813). HECKLER v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SERV. 467 U.S. 51 (1984)(2). [Apply to all officials.]
NO POSSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL OR CIVIL SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON ANYONE!

Since, as we have observed earlier in this opinion, the statute is not self-executing, and were the Secretary to take
no action whatever under his authority there would be no possibility of criminal or civil sanctions being imposed
on anyone, the District Court was wrong in framing the question in this manner. CALIFORNIA BANKERS
ASSOCIATION. v. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)(2). [Must be a 'substantive' regulation to apply to the public. ]
EXECUTIVE CANNOT CHANGE THE LAW OR AFFECT THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES

Mr. Justice THOMPSON (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting: Although instructions from the treasury
department may afford an apology for the collector, and exonerate him from any intentional violation of duty, yet it
can never be admitted, that they can shield him from all responsibility, when not warranted by the rules and
principles of law. If any authority is necessary to support this position, it will be found in the case of Elliot vs.
Swartwout, 10 Peters, 153, where it is expressly laid down, that instructions from the treasury department cannot
change the law or affect the rights of the parties: that the collector is not bound to take and adopt such instructions,
but is at liberty to judge for himself, and act accordingly. BEND v. HOYT, 38 U.S. 263 (1839)(2).
SUBSTANTIVE REGULATIONS 'IMPLEMENT' THE STATUTE(S)

U.S. licensed private agencies vs. Commissioned public Officers of the Government of The United States.
DEMAND PROOF OF THE SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION MADE BY THE SECRETARY FOR ALL AGENCY ACTION
Mere agents of the executive branch cannot act on the public much less the people without a substantive reg.
173
Show me 'the Law' that specifically says who can specifically do what to who and where?
(a) The Act addresses formal agency action as well as acts of individual Government employees, and there is
nothing in its legislative history to show that Congress intended the phrase "authorized by law" to have a special,
limited meaning different from the traditional understanding that properly promulgated, substantive agency
regulations have the "force and effect of law." In order for a regulation to have the "force and effect of law," it
must be a "substantive" or "legislative-type" rule affecting individual rights and obligations (as do the regulations in
the case at bar), and it must be the product of a congressional grant of legislative authority, promulgated in
conformity with any procedural requirements imposed by Congress. Pp. 1714- 1718.
In order for a regulation to have the "force and effect of law," it must have certain substantive
characteristics and be the product of certain procedural requisites [notice and day in court. ] . The central distinction
among agency regulations found in the APA is that between "substantive rules" [rules for the government? ] on the
one hand and "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice" on the other. (fn 30) A "substantive rule" is not defined in the APA, and other authoritative sources
essentially offer definitions by negative inference. (fn 31) But in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), we noted a
characteristic inherent in the concept of a "substantive rule." We described a substantive rule--or a "legislative-
type rule," id.,at 236, --as one "affecting individual rights and obligations." Id., at 232. This characteristic is an
important touchstone for distinguishing those rules that may be "binding" or have the "force of law." Id.,at 235,.
(fn 30). 5 U.S.C. ß ß 553(b), (d).
(fn 31). Neither the House nor Senate Report attempted to expound on the distinction. In prior cases, we have given
some weight to the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947), since the Justice
Department was heavily involved in the legislative process that resulted in the Act's enactment in 1946. See
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978);
Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396 (1961); United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 96 (1956).
The Manual refers to substantive rules as rules that "implement" the statute. "Such rules have the force and effect
of law." Manual, supra, at 30 n. 3. In contrast it suggests that "interpretive rules" and "general statements of policy"
do not have the force and effect of law. Interpretive rules are "issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers." Ibid. General statements of policy are
"statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to
exercise a discretionary power." Ibid. See also Final Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure 27 (1941). [I deny the sovereign people are included within the class of 'public' = non-sovereigns. ]
That an agency regulation is "substantive," however, does not by itself give it the "force and effect of law."
The legislative power of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority
by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to
limitations which that body imposes. As this Court noted in Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977):
"Legislative, or substantive, regulations are 'issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and ...
implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission. ...
Such rules have the force and effect of law.' " (fn 32)
(fn 32). Quoting Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act supra, at 30 n. 3.
Likewise the promulgation of these regulations must conform with any procedural requirements imposed
by Congress. Morton v. Ruiz, supra, 415 U.S. at 232. For agency discretion is limited not only by substantive,
statutory grants of authority, but also by the procedural requirements which "assure fairness and mature
consideration of rules of general application." NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969). The
pertinent procedural limitations in this case are those found in the APA. [***]
It is enough that such regulations are not properly promulgated as substantive rules, and therefore not the
product of procedures which Congress prescribed as necessary prerequisites to giving a regulation the binding
effect of law. [Administrative 'procedural' due process (not of Law) = Notice and opportunity to be heard. ]
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, concurring. [***] Administrative Procedure Act requires agency action to be "in
accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. ß 706(2)(A), a reviewing court can prevent any disclosure that would violate ß
1905. CHRYSLER CORP. v. BROWN, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)(2). [There must be a substantive regulation to
'implement' a statute if it effects the public i.e. non-sovereign persons (distinguished from the sovereign people) and the
Law is supposed to be clear and unquestionable citing what particular servant can do what, to who, and where etc. ]
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

1 CFR 21.40 General requirements: Authority citations. Each section in a document subject to codification must
include, or be covered by, a complete citation of the authority under which the section is issued, including
(a) General or specific authority delegated by statute; and
(b) Executive delegations, if any, necessary to link the statutory authority to the issuing agency.
1 CFR 22.2 Authority citation.
The authority under which an agency issues a notice shall be cited in narrative form within text or in parentheses on a
separate line following the text.
1 CFR 21.41 Agency responsibility.
(a) Each issuing agency is responsible for the accuracy and integrity of the citations of authority in the documents it issues.
174
(b) Each issuing agency shall formally amend the citations of authority in its codified material to reflect any changes therein.
Supreme Court of the United States: But we are of the opinion that there was no necessity for a formal introduction
in evidence of such rules and regulations. [***] [T]he rules and regulations prescribed in pursuance of such
authority become a mass of that body of public records of which the courts take judicial notice. CAHA v. U.S., 152
U.S. 211, 221, 222 (1894). [According to the regulations compulsory statutes are only for government persons. ]
Substantive Regulations are issued by the 'Head' of the Department of Executive Branch: See previous Chrysler v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281 (1979) etc., only 'substantive' regulations have the 'force and effect of law' not interpretive regulations, and must cite a
specific grant of authority from the Congress if intended to effect the rights and obligations of the public [specifically designated non-
sovereign persons cited. I understand only a substantive regulation 'implements' a statute affecting the (said) public.
[IRS 26 USC 3401-Wages] [IRS 26 USC 1441-nonresidents] [IRS 26 USC 770- definitions]
Only 'substantive' regulations implement the statute and apply to the public (distinguished from the People):
26 USC 1441(c)(4) & 3401(a)(6) Implementing Reg. 26 CFR 1.1441-2 (Nonresident Aliens & Foreign Corp.)
26 USC 1441(c)(4) & 3401(a)(6) & 7701(1). Imp. Reg. 26 CFR 1.1441-3 (Nonresident Aliens & Foreign Corp.)
26 USC 1441(c)(4) & 3401(a)(6) & 7701(b)(11). I Reg. 26 CFR 1.1441-5 (Nonresident Aliens & Foreign Corp.)
26 USC 1441(c)(4) & 3401(a)(6) & Implementing Reg. 26 CFR 1.1461-1 (Nonresident Aliens & Foreign Corp.)
[Important: Collection of Income at the 'source' for (Nonresident Aliens), see:
26 USC 1441(c)(4) & 3401(a)(6) & 7701(1). Imp. Reg. 26 CFR 31.3401(a)(6) (Nonresident Aliens Individuals)
[Discovery of Liability & Enforcement of Title Examination and Inspection (Nonresident Aliens & Foreign Corp.) see:
26 USC 1441(c)(4) & 3401(a)(6) & 7701(1). Imp. Reg. 26 CFR 301.7605 (Nonresident Aliens & Foreign Corp.)
26 USC 1441(c)(4) & 3401(a)(6) & 7701(1). Imp. Reg. 26 CFR 301.7701-16 [Definition of withholding Agent]
REGULATIONS CONSTITENT WITH LAW ARE FOR THE GOVERNEMENT OF HIS DEPARTMENT
"And to protect individuals from (government and private authority) fraud or loss."
NEWMAN, District Judge (District Court, N.D. Georgia):

Section 3167, Rev. St. U.S. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2058), is as follows:
'That it shall be unlawful for any collector, deputy collector, agent, clerk, or other officer or employe of the United
States, to divulge or to make known in any manner whatever not provided by law to any person the operations, style
of work or apparatus of any manufacturer or producer visited by him in this discharge of his official duties, or the
amount or source of income, profits, losses, expenditures, or any particulars thereof, set forth or disclosed in any
income return by any person or corporation, or to permit any income return or copy thereof or any book containing
any abstract or particulars thereof, to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; and it shall be
unlawful for any person to print or to publish in any manner whatever not provided by law, any income return or
any part thereof of the amount or source of income, profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income return;
and any offense against the foregoing provision shall be a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine not exceeding
$1,000.00 or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court; and if the offender be
an officer or employee of the United States, he shall be dismissed from office and be incapable thereafter of holding
any office under the government.'
In addition to this statute, certain rules and regulations have been promulgated by the Treasury Department.
These rules and regulations have been made pursuant to the statutes. The following statutes of the United States
are pertinent to this question, as follows: Rev. St. U.S. Sec. 161 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 80): 'The head of each
department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his
department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody,
use, and preservation of the records, papers and property appertaining to it.' *** Rev. St. U.S. Sec. 251 (U.S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 138): 'The Secretary of the Treasury shall make and issue from time to time, such instructions and
regulations to the several collectors, receivers, depositaries, officers, and others who may receive treasury notes,
United States notes or other securities of the United States, or who may be in any way engaged or employed in the
preparation and issue of the same, as he shall deem best calculated to promote the public convenience and security,
and to protect the United States, as well as individuals, from fraud or loss; he shall prescribe forms of entries,
oaths, bonds, and other papers, and rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, to be used under and in the
execution and enforcement of the various provisions of law relating to raising revenue from imports, or to duties
on imports, or to warehousing; he shall give such directions to collectors and prescribe such rules and forms to be
observed by them as may be necessary for the proper execution of the law; he shall also prescribe the forms of the
annual statements to be submitted to Congress by him showing the actual state of commerce and navigation
between the state and foreign countries; or otherwise between the collection districts of the United States, in each
year.' *** It is fully settled in many cases that the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury with reference
to the question of internal revenue, and for the government of the officers of the Revenue Department, have the
175
force and effect of law, and are as binding as if incorporated in the statute law of the United States. United States v.
Barrows, 1 Abb.(U.S.) 351, 24 Fed.Cas.No. 14,529; United States v. Hutton, 10 Ben.(U.S.) 268, 26 Fed.Cas.No.
15,433; In re Huttman (D.C.) 70 Fed. 699; In re Weeks (D.C.) 82 Fed. 729; United States ex rel. Flynn v. Fuellhart
(C.C.) 106 Fed. 911; In re Lamberton (D.C.) 124 Fed. 446; Boske v. Comingore, supra; Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13;
Gratiot v. United States, 4 How. 804. *** These regulations are not to be questioned by this court, but must be
upheld and enforced, and they must be regarded by all as having the same force as an act of Congress. As before
stated, the commissioner of internal revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, by statute is
given the power to make such regulations as he deems necessary in the matter of the assessment and collection of
internal revenue. It has been frequently decided that such regulations have the force of statutes.' (Citing United
States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291; Gratiot v. U.S., 4 How. 80; Alvord v. United States, 95 U.S. 356; Ex parte Reed, 100
U.S. 13.) 'And the acts of the commissioner in matters relating to the revenue are presumed to be the acts of the
Secretary. Parish v. U.S., 100 U.S. 500. STEGALL v. THURMAN, 175 F. 813 (1910)(2). [Must have approval. ]
THE VERY DEFINITION OF TYRANNY

Justice POWELL (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring in the judgment:
The Framers perceived that "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Theirs was not a
baseless fear. Under British rule, the colonies suffered the abuses of unchecked executive power that were
attributed, at least popularly, to an hereditary monarchy. See Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76
Colum.L.Rev. 369, 374 (1976); The Federalist No. 48. During the Confederation, the States reacted by removing
power from the executive and placing it in the hands of elected legislators. But many legislators proved to be little
better than the Crown. "The supremacy of legislatures came to be recognized as the supremacy of faction and the
tyranny of shifting majorities. The legislatures confiscated property, erected paper money schemes, [and]
suspended the ordinary means of collecting debts." Levi, 76 Colum.L.Rev., at 374-375. [Nothing new. ][***]
Unlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules.
Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal,
that are present when a court or an agency adjudicates individual rights. The only effective constraint on Congress'
power is political, but Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability.
When it decides rights of specific persons, those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a shifting majority." [***]
Justice WHITE, dissenting: The wisdom and the constitutionality of these broad delegations are matters that still
have not been put to rest. But for present purposes, these cases establish that by virtue of congressional delegation,
legislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments without the passage of new
legislation. For some time, the sheer amount of law--the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct
the operation of government-- made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress
through the traditional process. There is no question but that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or
realistic sense of the term. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) provides that a "rule" is an
agency statement "designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." When agencies are authorized to
prescribe law through substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation is not only due deference, but is
accorded "legislative effect." See, e.g. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416 (1977). (fn 19) These regulations bind courts and officers of the federal government, may pre-empt
state law, see, e.g., Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982), and grant rights
to and impose obligations on the public. In sum, they have the force of law.
Fn 19 "Legislative, or substantive, regulations are 'issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and ...
implement the statute, as for example, the proxy rules issue by the Securities and Exchange Commission ... Such
rules have the force and effect of law.' U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedures Act 30 n. 3 (1947)." Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n. 9 (1977).
Substantive agency regulations are clearly exercises of lawmaking authority; agency interpretations of their
statutes are only arguably so. But as Henry Monaghan has observed, "Judicial deference to agency 'interpretation' of
law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency." H. Monaghan, Marbury
and the Administrative State, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 26 (1983). See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111
(1944); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and executive agencies, it is most difficult to
understand Article I as forbidding Congress from also reserving a check on legislative power for itself. Absent the
veto, the agencies receiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power may issue regulations having the
force of law without bicameral approval and without the President's signature. It is thus not apparent why the
reservation of a veto over the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more exacting test. In both
cases, it is enough that the initial statutory authorizations comply with the Article I requirements.
Nor are there strict limits on the agents that may receive such delegations of legislative authority so that it
might be said that the legislature can delegate authority to others but not to itself. While most authority to issue rules
176
and regulations is given to the executive branch and the independent regulatory agencies, statutory delegations to
private persons have also passed this Court's scrutiny. I.N.S. v. CHADHA, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)(2). [All private. ]
The private Administrative State-executive branch.
5 CFR ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL B- CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS ß 581. 102 Definitions.
In this part:
(a) The executive branch of the Government of the United States means all "governmental entities" as defined in
this section, including therein the territories and possessions of the United States, the United States Postal Service,
the Postal Rate Commission, any wholly owned Federal corporation created by an Act of Congress, and the
government of the District of Columbia.
(b) Governmental entity means each department, both civilian and military, agency, independent establishment, or
instrumentality of the executive branch, including the United States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission, any
wholly owned Federal corporation created by an Act of Congress, any office, commission, bureau, or other
administrative subdivision or creature of the executive branch, and the governments of the District of Columbia
and of the territories and possessions of the United States. [(a) and (b) = all executive-administrative. ]
(c) Private person means a person who does not have sovereign or other special immunity or privilege which
causes that person not be be subject to legal process. (3-05-2004; 69 FR 10589) [All private Fed executive entities.]
Title 18 § 6. Department and agency defined

As used in this title: The term "department" means one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of
Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial
branches of the government.
5 UCS § 301 Departmental regulations.
The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations for the government of his
department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, [Emphasis added. ] and
the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. This section does not authorize withholding
information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public.
5 UCS § 552
(f) For purposes of this section, the term-
(1) "agency" as defined in section 551 (1) of this title includes any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of
the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency;
The term "agency" includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority,
board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless
the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense.
Title 5 § 101. The Executive departments are: The Department of State. The Department of the Treasury. The
Department of Defense. The Department of Justice. The Department of the Interior. The Department of
Agriculture. The Department of Commerce. The Department of Labor. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development. The Department of Transportation. The Department of Energy. The Department of Education. V.A.
Title 5 § 105. Executive agency
For the purpose of this title, "Executive agency" means an Executive department, a Government corporation, and
an independent establishment.
Title 5 § 2104. Officer
(a) For the purpose of this title, "officer", except as otherwise provided by this section or when specifically
modified, means a justice or judge of the United States and an individual who is-
(1) required by law to be appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in an official capacity-
(A) the President;
(B) a court of the United States;
(C) the head of an Executive agency; or
(D) the Secretary of a military department;
(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an Executive act; and
(3) subject to the supervision of an authority named by paragraph (1) of this section, or the Judicial Conference of
the United States, while engaged in the performance of the duties of his office.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW = DUE JUDICIAL COURT PROCESS OF THE COMMON LAW
The Courts of Common Law jurisdiction proceeding according to the course of the common Law over non-sovereigns.
Like President Clinton, DEMAND a judicial Court of "Common Law criminal jurisdiction" (Court of Record of the Constitution).
5th Amendment: Even a non-sovereign man cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property unless convicted of a felony.
177
Cannot lawfully be deprived of life, liberty, or property without (= before) your day in court = judicial court
DUE PROCESS OF LAW = INDICTMENT OR PRESENTMENT = FELONY + DEPRIVED AFTER 'CONVICTION'
Only the established judicial 'Courts of Common Law' jurisdiction of 'The Judiciary' of the Constitutions of the people.

It having been stated,' he continued, 'by Lord COKE, that by the 'law of the land' was intended a due course of
proceeding according to the established rules and practice of the courts of common law, it may, perhaps, be
suggested that this might include other modes of proceeding, sanctioned by the common law, the most familiar of
which are, by informations of various kinds, by the officers of the crown, in the name of the king. But, in reply to
this, it may be said that Lord COKE himself explains his own meaning by saying by 'the law of the land' as expressed
in Magna Charta, was intended due process of law; that is, by indictment or presentment [Felony. Not
misdemeanors, nor Civil matter. ] of good and lawful men. And further, it is stated. On the authority of Blackstone,
that informations of every kind are confined by the constitutional law to misdemeanors only. 4 Bl. Comm. 310.'
HURTADO v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIF. 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (2). [The protection of the 4th, 5th and 6th
Amendments all 'interplay' as if one Amendment. If you do not 'consent' to anything in a civil action, how can they force
you to pay short of imprisonment: crime? Especially if you are innocent, defrauded, and illegally subjected. Civil is all mere
'procedure.' See DALE COUNTY v. GUNTER , 46 Ala. 118 (1871)(1); Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161 (not by statute of our
creature) (1865)(1); People v. Sponsler, 46 N.W. 459 (1876)(1); Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. 481 (1833)(1) etc. ]
Even subjects/non-sovereigns cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property unless

CONVICTION OF SOME PUBLIC OFFENSE = CONVICTION FOR CRIME
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.' [All our private, unalienable, and sovereign rights. ]
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection
against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' We recently referred in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, to the Fourth Amendment as creating a 'right to privacy, no less important than
any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people.' See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy,
1962 Sup.Ct.Rev. 212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.U.L.Rev. 216 (1960).
The Court said in full about this right of privacy: 'The principles laid down in this opinion (by Lord Camden
in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029) affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They
reach further than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply
to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where
that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,--it is the invasion of this sacred right
which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. GRISWOLD v. STATE OF
CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(2). [See same in BOYD v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886)(2); OSBOURN, James Hoffa v.
U.S., 385 U.S. 323 (1966)(1). Indictment, Warrant, and Conviction in a judicial Common Law Court of record. ]
SUPER PROFOUND
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS UNDERSTOOD AT THE FOUNDING AND SINCE
Due Process of Law = Indictment (felony only) in the judicial Courts with Common Law jurisdiction of The Judiciary.
Due process 'requires' day in court with a neutral and detached judge (and jury) in the 'first' instance before deprived.
By state statute the Common Law not contrary to the Constitutions and constitutional legislation is the rule of decision.
Justice O'CONNOR (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice BREYER join:
See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An essential principle of due process is that a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case' ")(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); Concrete
Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993)
("due process requires a 'neutral and detached judge in the first instance' ") (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972)). "For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:
'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must first be notified.' It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (quoting Baldwin
v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (citations omitted)). These
essential constitutional promises may not be eroded. [***] [Must have your 'day in court' before deprived. ]
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice STEVENS joins, dissenting. [***]
178
The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from
indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive. Blackstone stated this principle clearly: "Of great importance
to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest,
magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper ... there would soon be an end of all
other rights and immunities. ... To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation
or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny
throughout the whole kingdom. But confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his
sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of
arbitrary government. ... "To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be, by process from the courts of
judicature, or by warrant from some legal officer, having authority to commit to prison; which warrant must be in
writing, under the hand and seal of the magistrate, and express the causes of the commitment, in order to be
examined into (if necessary) upon a habeas corpus. If there be no cause expressed, the gaoler is not bound to detain
the prisoner. For the law judges in this respect, ... that it is unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not to signify withal
the crimes alleged against him." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 132-133 (1765)
(hereinafter Blackstone). These words were well known to the Founders. Hamilton quoted from this very passage in
The Federalist No. 84, p. 444 (G. Carey & J. McClellan eds.2001). The two ideas central to Blackstone's
understanding--due process as the right secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which due process could be
insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned-found expression in the Constitution's Due Process and Suspension
Clauses. See Amdt. 5; Art.I, § 9, cl. 2.
The gist of the Due Process Clause, as understood at the founding and since, was to force the Government
to follow those common-law procedures traditionally deemed necessary before depriving a person of life, liberty,
or property. When a citizen was deprived of liberty because of alleged criminal conduct, those procedures typically
required committal by a magistrate followed by indictment and trial. See, e.g., 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555); 3 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1783, p. 661 (1833) (hereinafter Story) (equating
"due process of law" with "due presentment or indictment [= Felony only. ], and being brought in to answer thereto
by due process of the common law"). The Due Process Clause "in effect affirms the right of trial according to the
process and proceedings of the common law." Ibid. See also T. Cooley, General Principles of Constitutional Law
224 (1880) ("When life and liberty are in question, there must in every instance be judicial proceedings; and that
requirement implies an accusation, a hearing before an impartial tribunal, with proper jurisdiction, and a
conviction and judgment before the punishment can be inflicted" (internal quotation marks omitted)). HAMDI v.
RUMSFELD, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)(2). [Day in judicial court 'before' you are deprived. ]
WE WILL SELL TO NO MAN, DENY TO NO MAN, DELAY TO NO MAN, EITHER JUSTICE OR RIGHT
Today they bleed us dry in their private Co. & for profit courts. No 'law' authorizies a fee for commencing an action, or appeal.
WAGNER, Judge (Supreme Court of Missouri) delivered the opinion of the court:
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Cummings case proceeds on the idea, that the right to
pursue a calling or profession is a natural and inalienable right, and that a law precluding a person from practicing
his calling or profession on account of past conduct is inflicting a penalty, and therefore void. There are certain
rights which inhere in and attach to the person, and of which he cannot be deprived except by forfeiture for crimes,
whereof he must be first tried and convicted according to due process of law. These are termed natural or absolute
rights. Blackstone says: "By the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are so in their primary and
strictest sense; which would belong to their periods merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to
enjoy whether out of society or in it." These rights may be arranged under the following heads: 1. the right of
personal security; 2. The right of personal liberty; and 3. The right to acquire and enjoy property. [***]
When the sturdy barons wrested from a despotic king magna charta they put into that great instrument,
"No freeman shall be taken (arrested) or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or
be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will deny to no man, we will delay to no
man, either justice or right." The words "by the law of the land," as used in the great charter, are understood to mean
due process of law--that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men. And Story remarks that the
better and larger definition of "due process" is, that it means law, in its regular course of administration, through
courts of justice. Lord Coke, in commenting upon the above passage in magna charta, says that it enunciated no
new principle, but was declaratory of the common law. The illustrious author of the Declaration of Independence
embodies the same estimable axioms, when he declares that "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Essentially the same principles are
inserted in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and in the bills of rights of the respective
States. The right, then, to life, liberty, and private property, is natural, absolute, and vested, and belongs as well to
the individual in a state unconnected with society, as in the most carefully guarded and well arranged system of
government. He cannot be deprived of life but by due process of law; he can be restrained of his liberty only by the
same means; and his right to acquire and enjoy property, reap the fruits and earnings of his own industry, should be
fully guaranteed and protected. A man may be said to have a special property in his profession or calling, by which
179
means he makes his support, and that he can be deprived of it only in the usual manner, according to the common
forms of law. In a state of nature, if he had never entered into society, he would undoubtedly have the right to select
his avocation, whereon to depend for maintenance, and he cannot be said to have surrendered it by coming into the
social compact, only so far as may be necessary for the general good, in manner to be regulated by law." BLAIR v.
RIDGLEY, 41 Mo. 63 (1867)(1). [Cannot be deprived except for crime. "No freeman …" 62 N.H. 193 (1882) S.Ct of New
Hampshire. The Constitution secures way more rights for Americans than the mere subjects of despotic England. ]
UNALIENABLE RIGHTS CANNOT BE BARTERED, GIVEN, OR TAKEN AWAY

Our servants are to 'secure' our sovereign and pre-existing unalienable natural rights endowed by our Creator.
OUR LABOR, OUR MONEY, OUR UNALEINABLE RIGHTS, DEPRIVED BY ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT DECEPTION = LAWLESSNESS.
Even a subject citizen of the U.S. has unalienable rights. Mere creatures of government or business entities don't.
FIELD, J. (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:

As in our intercourse with our fellow-men certain principles of morality are assumed to exist, without which society
would be impossible, so certain inherent rights lie at the foundation of all action, and upon a recognition of them
alone can free institutions be maintained. These inherent rights have never been more happily expressed than in the
Declaration of Independence, that new evangel of liberty to the people: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident'--
that is, so plain that their truth is recognized upon their mere statement--'that all men are endowed'--not by edicts of
emperors, or decrees of parliament, or acts of congress, but 'by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.'--that is,
rights which cannot be bartered away, or given away, or taken away, except in punishment of crime--'and that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and to secure these'--not grant them, but secure
them--'governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.' Among
these inalienable rights, as proclaimed in that great document, is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which
is meant the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of
others, which may increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment.
The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and
have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore be free in this country to all alike
upon the same conditions. The right to pursue them, without let or hinderance, except that which is applied to all
persons of the same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an
essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright. It has been well said that 'the property which
every man has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and
inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his
employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and
of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it
hinders the others from employing whom they think proper.' SLAUGHTER-HOUSE v. CRESENT City, 111 U.S.
746 (1884)(3). [Cannot be deprived except for judgment of your peers for crime. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S.
578. Right to be let alone our unalienable sovereign birthright, see KUNGY'S v. U.S. 485 U.S. 759 (herein). ]
PERPETUAL REMINDER OUR SERVANTS ARE WITHOUT POWER TO DEPRIVE PEOPLE OF RIGHTS
BURKE, Judge (Court of Appeals of New York) dissenting:
The unconstitutionality stems from its inherent conflict with the Declaration of Independence, the basic instrument
which gave birth to our democracy. The Declaration has the force of law and the constitutions of the United States
and of the various States must harmonize with its tenets. The Declaration when it proclaimed 'We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness' restated the natural law. It was intended to
serve as a perpetual reminder that rulers, legislators and Judges were without power to deprive human beings of
their rights. [I Object to depriving us of our unalienable private rights as business entities: Less than human. ] [***]
Unless there had been a Thomas Jefferson who was educated by a philosophy professor to know the
primacy of the natural law--there would be no United States of America. For, if the Declaration had been written
by a pragmatist for expedient reasons we never could have enlisted the sympathies and agreement of such a large
part of the then world, including members of the British Parliament in our righteous cause. They would know the
pragmatic reasoning would be nothing more than petti-foggery, and had no basis in law.
We began our legal life as a Nation and a State with the guarantee that these were inalienable rights that
come not from the State but from an external source of authority superior to the State which authority regulated our
inalienable liberties and with which our laws and Constitutions must now conform. That authority alone establishes
the norms which test the validity of State legislation. BYRN v. N.Y.C. H., 31 N.Y.2d 194 (1972)(3).
TEMPORARY SERVANTS GIVE THEIR SOVEREIGNS RIGHTS? - ALL LAWFUL POWER IS DERIVED FROM THE PEOPLE
Americans vehemently attacked the notion that rights were matters of " 'favor and grace,' "given to the people
180
from the Government. B. Bailyn, supra, at 187 (quoting John Dickinson). Thus, the Framers of the Bill of Rights
did not purport to "create" rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from
infringing rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Amdt. 9 ("The enumeration in
the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"). U.S.
v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)(2). [Truly sovereigns with secured unalienable sovereign rights. ]
MAN MAY NOT BARTER AWAY HIS FREEDOM, SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS - OR SOVEREIGNTY
Justice Holmes (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445. In that case, the right to exclude was held not include the right to impose any
condition under which the corporation might do business in the state. In that connection this court said: ‘A man
may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights. In a criminal case, he cannot, as was held in
Cancemi’s Case, 18 N.Y. 128 be tried, in any other manner than by a jury of twelve men, although he consent in
open court to be tried by a jury of eleven men. COPPAGE v. KANSAS, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
SOLE OBJECT AND ONLY LEGITIMATE END OF GOVERNMENT IS TO SECURE OUR ALL
Mr. Justice Pitney, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court: (Citing the Constitution
of Alabama): 'That the sole object and only legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment
of life, liberty, and property, and when the government assumes other functions it is usurpation and oppression.'
SINGER SEWING MACH. CO. v. BRICKELL, 233 U.S. 304 (1914)(2). [Super emphasis added. Ruled in reverse.]
CARDINAL OBJECT OF OUR CONSTITUTION AND THE END OF ALL GOOD GOVERNMENT TO SECURE OUR ALL
Mr. JUSTICE LAWRENCE (Supreme Court of Illinois) delivered the opinion of the Court: The right of the citizen
to his personal liberty, except when restrained of it upon a charge of crime, and for the purpose of judicial
investigation, or under the command of the law pronounced through a judicial tribunal, is one of those elementary
facts which lie at the foundation of our political structure. The cardinal object of our Constitution, as it is the end
of all good government, is to secure the people in their right to life, liberty and property. The more certainly to
attain this end, the framers of our Constitution not only proclaimed certain great principles in the bill of rights, but
they distributed governmental power into three distinct departments, each of which, while acting in its proper
sphere, was designed to be independent of the others. To the legislative department it belongs to declare the causes
for which the liberty of a citizen may be taken from him, to the judicial department to determine the existence of
such causes in any given case, and to the executive to enforce the sentence of the court. If a citizen can be arrested,
except upon a charge of violated law, and for the purpose of taking him before some judicial tribunal for
investigation, then it is plain that the executive department has usurped the functions of the other two, and the
whole theory of our government, so far as it relates to the protection of private rights, is overthrown.
But on this question we are not left merely to arguments drawn from the general spirit and object of our
Constitution. Our forefathers had fresh in their memory the struggles which it had cost in England to secure those
two great charters of freedom, the magna charta of King John's time, and the bill of rights of 1688, and they
incorporated into our fundamental law whatever was most valuable in those instruments for the security of life,
liberty and property. JOHNSON v. JONES, 44 Ill. 142 (1867)(1). [We are illegally subjected and ruled in reverse. ]
OUR SERVANTS ARE TO SECURE OUR BIRTHRIGHTS - SECURE OUR ALL IS THE ONLY LEGITIMATE OBJECT
BARNES, J. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin):
It should always be borne in mind that the people are the masters and that the members of the Legislature are their
servants, and that the agent should always give due consideration to the voice of the principal. In order to regard it
he must hear it. It is none the less true that the agent, by his oath of office, swears that he will defend the
Constitutions, state and federal, and perform the duties of his office to the best of his ability, and when vox populi
points in one direction, and our organic laws in the other, we must assume that the agent will courageously obey the
behest of his oath and his conscience.
MARSHALL, J. concurring: It seems that over-leaping desire for change, at times colors mental views, so that men
are wont to survey our system from the viewpoint of ancient conceptions of man's status; that one's liberty and
property and freedom to enjoy and acquire the latter are mere privileges afforded by grace of a sovereign, instead of
ours, which displaced it, that all those mere privileges of the ancient system are inherent rights, not rights conferred
by any human power, nor subject to be taken away by such power; but birthrights; that they may be regulated; but
that regulation to be legitimate must be within the spirit of the Constitution, i. e. to preserve, to secure their
integrity and competency to conserve human enjoyment; that at the dividing line between regulation which
conserves and that which impairs, is the one between the legitimate and the illegitimate, in legislation. Danger of
encroaching upon this line, which is sometimes seen in legislative acts passed or proposed, was foreseen, as well as
importance of vigilance to guard against it. So the fathers closed the fundamental guarantees by this admonishment:
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"The blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, frugality
and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." [***]
The government of this country, as said by Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137,
is a government of laws and not of men. That fundamental idea must not be forgotten. Any departure from it
endangers the very purpose of government to conserve our birthrights. The Constitution is the paramount law.
Legislatures and judges are sworn to support it as they find it, regardless of their notions of expediency from a
original standpoint. STATE EX REL v. FREAR, SEC. OF STATE, 142 Wis. 320 (1910)(1). [Sovereign birthright.]
SOLE END AND AIM OF ALL OUR INSTITUTION IS THE SAFETY AND HAPPINESS OF THE CITIZEN
Mr. Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court: It is true, that such a power, if it exists, must be derived
from implication, and the genius and spirit of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of implied powers. [***]
Where all power is derived from the people, and public functionaries, at short intervals, deposite it at the feet of the
people, to be resumed again only at their will, individual fears may be alarmed by the monsters of imagination, but
individual liberty can be in little danger. No one is so visionary as to dispute the assertion, that the sole end and aim
of all our institutions is the safety and happiness of the citizen. ANDERSON v. DUNN, 19 U.S. 204 (1821)(2).
OUR SERVANTS HAVE NO PURELY PERSONAL POWER - READ CONSTITUTION IN LIGHT OF DECLARATION
Mr. Justice BREWER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
No language is more worthy of frequent and thoughtful consideration than these words of Mr. Justice Matthews,
speaking for this court, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369, 1071: 'When we consider the nature and the
theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the
history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and
action of purely personal and arbitrary power.' The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of
government in these words: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.' While such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of
judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of
the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the spirit,
and it is always safe to read the letter of the constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty
rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure
that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government. GULF v. ELLIS, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)(2). [See
same in COTTING v. GODARD, 183 U.S. 79 (1901)(2). [Sovereigns conforming to unjust laws of their servants? ]
UNALIENABLE RIGHTS ENDOWED BY OUR CREATOR NOT BY OUR SERVANTS OF OUR LAW
IN A GOVERNMENT WHERE 'NONE' OF THEM WERE INTENDED TO BE INFRINGED
Chief Justice BURGER (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment and opinion of the Court:
When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it was contended that there was no need separately to
assert the right of assembly because it was subsumed in freedom of speech. Mr. Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued
the inclusion of "assembly" among the enumerated rights would tend to make the Congress "appear trifling in the
eyes of their constituents. ... If people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-
evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be called in
question. ..." 1 Annals of Cong. 731 (1789). Since the right existed independent of any written guarantee,
Sedgwick went on to argue that if it were the drafting committee's purpose to protect all inherent rights of the people
by listing them, "they might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights," but this was unnecessary, he said,
"in a Government where none of them were intended to be infringed." Id., at 732. RICHMOND NEWS v.
VIRGINIA, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)(2). [Creatures of government = artificial entities without God given unalienable rights
of men. ]
SOLE OBJECT AND ONLY LEGITIMATE END OF GOVERNMENT IS TO SECURE OUR ALL
In a more prefect union under God anything else is fraud and lawless usurpation to reign tyranny.
MAYFIELD, J. (Supreme Court of Alabama) dissenting:

The following quotations are from Hawker's Case, 170 U.S. 203: In Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 321, the
court said: "The theory upon which our political institutions rest is that all men have certain inalienable rights, that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all
honors all positions, are alike open to every one, and that in the protection of these rights all are equal before the
law. Any deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punishment, and can be in no otherwise
defined." [***] Our Bill of Rights provides, among other things: "That all men are equally free and independent; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness." "No person shall be punished but by virtue of a law established and promulgated prior to the offense and
legally applied." "That the sole object and only legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the
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enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and when the government assumes other functions it is usurpation and
oppression." STATE v. TEASLEY, 194 Ala. 574 (1915)(1). [Also 233 U.S. 304. The only true intent of sane people!]
TRUE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE - THE VERY END OF GOVERNMENT - TO SECURE OUR ALL - NO OTHER END
No other end but preservation and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave the subject except for crime.
Nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and nobody has arbitrary power over any other.
MURRAY, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of California):

Among the advocates of the former system are Paley and Burke, and of the latter, Vattel and Locke. Locke contends
"that the great end of man's entering into society being the enjoyment of property in peace and safety, and the great
instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society, the first and fundamental positive law is the
establishing of the legislative power; the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern the Legislature itself,
is the preservation of the society, and so far as consistent with public good, every person in it. While on the one
hand, he concedes the doctrine that the legislative power is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but
sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have placed it, the edict of any, in what form soever
conceived, or by what power soever backed, cannot have the force and obligation of a law without the sanction of
the Legislature, which the public has chosen and appointed and in whom the legislative power is invested by the
consent of those for whom they are to legislate; on the other hand, he contends that though the legislative be the
supreme power, it cannot possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For, it being but
the joint power of every member of society, given up to that person or assembly which is the legislative, it can be
no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up their natural rights
to the community; for nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and nobody has an
absolute, arbitrary power over himself or over any other, to destroy his own life, or to take away the life or
property of another. A man cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another, and having in the state of
nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law gave him for
the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all that he doth or can give to the commonwealth, and
by it to the legislative power; so that the Legislature can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds
of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and
therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subject. Thus, the law of
nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, binding upon legislatures as well as others. The fundamental law of
nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be valid or good against it. That the legislative
or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by temporary arbitrary decrees; but is bound to
dispense justice, and to decide the rights of the subject, by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized
judges. To avoid the inconveniences which disorder men's property in a state of nature, they unite in societies. The
object of this union is, that they may have the united strength of the whole to secure and defend their property, and
may have standing rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. It is to this end men give up their
natural powers to society, which puts the legislative powers into such hands as they think fit with this trust; that they
shall be governed by declared laws. Absolute arbitrary powers, or governing without settled standing laws, can
neither of them, consist with the ends of society and government; and men would not quit the freedom of a state of
nature, and tie themselves up under a government, were it not to preserve their lives, liberty, and fortunes, by
stated rules of right and property. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they the power to do so, to
give any one or more an absolute, arbitrary power over their persons and estates. For this were to put themselves in a
worse condition than a state of nature, wherein they had the liberty to defend their rights against the injuries of
others, and were upon equal terms; whereas, by supposing that they have given up themselves to the absolute,
arbitrary power of the legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him to make a prey of them when he
pleases. The supreme power cannot take from any man his property without his own consent, for the preservation
of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and
requires that the people should have property and be protected in it, without which they must be supposed to lose
by entering into society, the very thing which was the end and design of the social compact to secure, and for the
attainment of which they entered into it. If this position be true, it was fallacious to think that the supreme or
legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, irrespective of the principles of natural justice, or
dispose of the estates of the subjects arbitrarily, or divest vested rights at pleasure." [***]
In the case of Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill. 140, Judge Bronson, one of the ablest judges that has ever adorned
the bench of this or any other country, after admitting the right to take private property for public use, held "that
there was no provision in the Constitution that just compensation should be made to the owner, when his property is
taken for private purposes. If the power exists to take the property of one man, and transfer it to another, it may be
exercised without any reference to compensation. The power of making bargains for individuals has not been
delegated to any branch of the government, and if the title of A can be, without his fault, transferred to B, it may as
well be done without, as with consideration. This view of the question was sufficient to put them on inquiring where
can the power be found to pass such a law as that under which the defendant attempted to justify? It is not to be
presumed that such a power exists, and those who set it up should tell us where it may be found. Under our form of
government, the Legislature is not supreme. It is only one of the organs of that absolute sovereignty which resides
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in the whole body of the people; like other departments of government, it can only exercise such powers as have
been delegated to it, and when it steps beyond that boundary, its acts, like those of the most humble magistrate in
the State, who transcends his jurisdiction, are utterly void." [***]
The security of life, liberty, and property lies at the very foundation of the social compact; and to say that
this grant of "legislative power" includes the right to attack private property, is equivalent to saying that the people
have delegated to their servants the power of defeating one of the great ends for which governments were
established. If there was not one word of qualification in the whole instrument, he should feel great difficulty in
bringing his mind to the conclusion that the clause under consideration had clothed the Legislature with despotic
power; such is the extent of their authority, if they can take the property of A, either with or without compensation,
and give it to B. "The legislative power of the State does not reach to such an unwarrantable extent. Neither life,
liberty, nor property, except when forfeited by crime, or when the latter is taken for public use, falls within the
scope of this power." In the case of Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657, Judge STORY says, "that government can
scarcely be deemed free where the rights of property are left solely dependent on the legislative body, without any
restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and
private property should be held sacred."
TERRY, J.: In reference to these doctrines, Sir WILLIAM BLACKSTONE says: "It must be owned, that Mr.
Locke, and other theoretical writers, have held, that there remains still inherent in the people a supreme power to
remove or alter the legislative, when they find the Legislature act contrary to the trust reposed in them; for, when
such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, and devolves to those who gave it. But, however just this conclusion
may be in theory, we cannot practically adopt it, nor take any legal steps for carrying it into execution under any
dispensation of government at present actually existing. For this devolution of power to the people at large,
includes in it the dissolution of the whole form of government established by that people-- reduces all the
members to their original state of equality, and by annihilating the sovereign power, repeals all positive laws
whatsoever before enacted. No human laws will, therefore, suppose a case which at once must destroy all law, and
compel men to build afresh upon a new foundation; nor will they make provision for so desperate an event, as must
render all legal provisions ineffectual. So long, therefore, as the English Constitution lasts, we may venture to
affirm that the power of Parliament is absolute and without control." (1 Com. 162.) [***]
Chancelor KENT, who, in point of legal knowledge and learning, stands second to no American jurist, says:
"The principle in the English government that the Parliament is omnipotent, does not prevail in the United States;
though if there be no constitutional objection to a statute, it is with us as absolute and uncontrollable as laws flowing
from the sovereign power under any other form of government. But in this and all other countries where there is a
written Constitution designating the powers and duties of the legislative as well as other departments of the
government, an Act of the Legislature may be void, as being against the Constitution. The law with us must
conform in the first place, to the Constitution of the United States, and then to the subordinate Constitution of its
particular State, and if it infringes the provisions of either it is so far void." (1 Com. 449.) [***]
The remedy for unwise and oppressive legislation within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the
justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people; if these fail, the people in their sovereign capacity can
correct the evil. BILLINGS v. HALL, 7 Cal. 1 (1857)(1). [Authority forfeited and devolves to the People. ]
The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummage for among old parchments, or musty records. They
are written, as with a sun beam in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of the divinity itself; and can
never be erased or obscured by mortal power. Alexander Hamilton (1775).
Constitutional + Due sealed judicial court 'PROCESS OF LAW' of the Common Law of the Land
Day in court 'before' you are deprived of life, liberty, property, much less sovereignty.
Traffic stops and ex parte domestic violence restraining orders etc. are not before your day in judicial court = unConstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS IS A REQUIREMENT OF JUDICIAL PROCESS

Mr. Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins dissenting:
"[W]hen fundamental rights are in question, this Court has repeatedly emphasized 'the difference in security of
judicial over administrative action.' " Crowell v. Benson, supra, 285 U.S., at 61, quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White,
supra, at 285, 42 S.Ct., at 495. In this respect, the Court found that its earlier discussion of the historical use of
masters and commissioners was irrelevant, for even as to factual issues "their reports are essentially advisory, a
distinction of controlling importance when questions of a fundamental character are in issue." Crowell v. Benson,
supra 285 U.S., at 61. [Jurors are the fact finders in a judicial Court of Record of The Judiciary of the People. ]
In his celebrated dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis rejected the view that the particular factual issues in
Crowell were ones that must constitutionally be resolved de novo in an Art. III court. He did agree, however, that
there are some issues of fact which must be found independently in an Art. III court. "[U]nder certain
circumstances," he stated, "the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process."
285 U.S., at 87. As he explained in a subsequent opinion: "A citizen who claims that his liberty is being infringed
is entitled, upon habeas corpus, to the opportunity of a judicial determination of the facts. And, so highly is this
liberty prized, that the opportunity must be accorded to any resident of the United States who claims to be a
184
citizen." St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 77 (1936) (concurring opinion)(emphasis added).
UNITED STATES v. RADDATZ, 447 U.S. 667 (1980)(2). [See requirement of judicial process: Justice WHITE in
NORTHEREN PIPLELINE CONSTRUCTION CO. v. U.S., MARATHON PIPELINE CO. 458 U.S. 50 (1982)(2). If not, the people do not
have a Constitutionally secured lawful form of tripartite government. I object and do not consent. ]
ESTABLISHED JUDICIAL COURTS OF COMMON LAW + COURTS OF EQUITY + COURTS OF ADMIRALTY

Mr. Justice THOMPSON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
And such manner of proceeding is pointed out by the process act of 1792, 2 Laws U. S. 299, which declares that the
modes of proceeding in suits of common law, shall be the same as are now used in the said courts respectively, in
pursuance of the act entitled, 'an act to regulate process in the courts of the United States;' viz., the same as are now
used and allowed in the supreme courts of the respective states, 2 Laws U. S. 72; and in suits of equity, and those of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of
equity, and courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistinguished from courts of common law; subject to such
alteration by the courts as may be thought expedient, &c. From this view of the acts of congress, it will be seen that
prior to the act of 1824, which will be noticed hereafter, Louisiana when she came into the union had organized
therein a district court of the United States, having the same jurisdiction, except as to appeals and writs of error,
as the circuit courts of the United States, in the other states. And that in the modes of proceeding, that court was
required to proceed according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity, as
contradistinguished from courts of common law. [***] The descriptive terms here used, civil actions, are broad
enough to embrace cases at law and in equity; and may very fairly be construed, as used in contradistinction to
criminal causes. LIVINGSTON v. STORY, 34 U.S. 632 (1835)(2).[at law = civil. Today: private co. administrative courts.]
NOT DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY BEFORE DAY IN COURT - COMPETENT JUDICIAL COURT
OPINION BURKE, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):
We further noted that the due process clause of the federal constitution requires that every person 'shall have the
protection of [a] day in court, and the benefit of the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds not arbitrarily or capriciously, but upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after a trial....' More
specifically, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a property
interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. Johnson, 544 P.2d at 70 (quoting Truax v. Carrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
332 (1921)). CARVALHO v. CARVALHO, 838 P.2d 259 (1992)(2).
JUDGE OF HELL FIRST HE PUNISHES THEN HE HEARS
I cannot forbear to quote one passage from p. 55 of the 2d Institute of Coke: "The philosophical poet doth notably
describe the damnable and damned proceedings of the Judge of Hell," 'Gnosius hic Radamanthus habet durissima
regna; Castigatque, auditque dolos, subigitque fateri."'
And in another place: 'Leges fixit pretio, atque refixit.' First, he punisheth; then he heareth; and lastly
compelleth to confess; and makes and mars laws at his pleasure; like as the Centurion in the holy history did to St.
Paul. For the text saith: Centurio apprehendi Paulum jussit, et se catenis ligari; et tunc interrogabat quis fuisset et
quid fecisset.' [The Centurion ordered Paul to be seized and loaded with chains, and then he inquired of him who he
was and what he had done.] But good judges and justices abhor these courses." BLAIR v. RIDGLEY, 41 Mo. 63,
97 Am.Dec. 248 (1867)(1). [How true it is. And the apathetic conforming public cares not enough to do much if anything
if injustice happens to 'you' but if it happens to one of 'them' oh how they wine about their injustice. ]
CONNOR, J. (Supreme Court of North Carolina) dissenting: "I oft have heard of Lydford law, How in the morn they
hang and draw And sit in judgment after." DANIELS v. HOMER, 139 N.C. 219 (1905)(2).
A RULE AS OLD AS THE LAW
Justice WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
In Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, the court said (page 368): 'It is a rule as old as the law, and never more to be
respected than now, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court, by which is meant until
he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation
and opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination. It is judicial usurpation and oppression, and
can never be upheld where justice is justly administered.' HOVEY v ELLIOTT et al, 167 U.S. 409 (1897)(2). [Must
have all 3 departments of government-tripartate government for due Process of 'Law.' The Legislature makes the law; then
The Judiciary, judges the Law and facts; The Executive executes the process. Separation of powers. Checks and balances.]
IMMUTABLE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE

It never has been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we know, that notice and hearing are preliminary
steps essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and that they, together with a legally competent tribunal
having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due process of law.
The words of Webster, so often quoted, that by 'the law of the land' is intended 'a law which hears before it
185
condemns,' have been repeated in varying forms of expression in a multitude of decisions. In Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366, 389, the necessity of due notice and an opportunity of being heard is described as among the 'immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard.' And Mr. Justice Field, in an earlier case, Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 368, 369, said that the rule that no
one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court was as old as the law, and it meant that he must be
cited to appear and afforded an opportunity to be heard. 'Judgment without such citation and opportunity wants all
the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and never can be upheld where
justice is justly administered.' Citations to the same effect might be indefinitely multiplied, but there is no occasion
for doing so. POWELL v. STATE OF ALABAMA, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)(2). [No one, and as old as the law. ]
"BE HEARD" BEFORE ANYONE IS DEPRIVED
Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with whom Justice MARSHALL joins as to Part I, dissenting:
See also Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900) ("That a man is entitled to some notice before he can be
deprived of his liberty or property, is an axiom of law to which no citation of authority would give additional
weight"); Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864) ("Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be
heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified"). ATKINS COMM v. PARKER et al,
472 U.S. 115 (1985)(2). [I Charge unconstitutional practices and or legislation against the intent of the people. ]
FULL AND FAIR HEARING
In contrast to due process, which principally serves to protect the personal rights of litigants to a full and fair
hearing, separation of powers principles are primarily addressed to the structural concerns of protecting the role of
the independent Judiciary within the constitutional design. MILLER et al v. FRENCH et al, 530 U.S. 327 (2000)(2).
[Due Process of Law = a judicial Court with Common Law jurisdiction, a full and fair trial with free speech that ascertains
the whole Truth free of government deception vs. Due process (of code) = by a private company and Bar members. ]
FAIR TRIAL IN A FAIR TRIBUNAL - Where's our judicial courts of the sovereign people?
Due Process Clause clearly requires a "fair trial in a fair tribunal," Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975),
before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case. See, e.g.,
Aetna, supra, at 821-822; Tumey, supra, at 523. BRACY v. GRAMLEY, 520 U.S. 899 (1997)(2).
WOE UNTO YOU LAWYERS
David Dudley Field, a famous law reformer and eminent advocate, who died in 1894 in his ninetieth year in
addressing himself to the subject of a lawyer's duty said, which is as applicable to the Bench as to the Bar: 'Those
who were sycophants and cowards before kings in past days would have been sycophants and cowards before the
people in ours. They who feared to defend one whom the crown hated would be afraid now to defend one whom the
multitude pursued. It is only the object of the flattery or the fear that has changed. Then it was the power above
them; now it is the power around them,--but power in both cases all the same.' [***] It behooves us of the legal
profession to discontinue boasting of our past contributions to preserve the constitution, and awaken from our
lethargy realizing that only by eternal vigilance and further effort to save our constitutional form of government
may the safeguards of liberty be preserved for ourselves and those who follow us. S.W. WASHINGTON PRO. v.
FENDER, 21 Wash.2d 349 (1944)(1). [Most lawyers conceal all of the illegal government deception going on. ]
WOE UNTO YOU, YE LAWYERS

ROBINSON, Chief. Justice (Supreme Court of North Dakota) concurring specially:
It is high time for the courts to cease following bad precedents, piling error upon error and lading men with burdens
that are grievous to be borne. It was for that evil practice the Master said: "Woe unto you, ye lawyers." WILHELM
v. BANG, 48 N.D. 240 (1921)(1). [How true. All members of the Bar, waxing worse and worse after 88 years. ]
THEIR ART OF DECEPTION IS TO APPEAR TO DO JUSTICE WHILE UPHOLDING THEIR FRAUD FOR PROFIT
You know the judicial Courts by their 'seal' of court prescribed by Law.
You know the executive branch private COURTS by their seal by SCO = Supreme Court Order + executive gold fringe flag.
You know their corrupt so called Judges by their fruit: they 'refuse' to ascertain the whole Truth + members of the Bar Assoc.
The Judiciary ARTICLE III vs. FEDERAL COURTS - U.S. - EXECUTIVE BRANCH
'District Court of the United States' vs. 'UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT'
Judicial Courts of Justice vs. COURTS that 'appear' to do justice.
'Established' Art. III judicial Courts vs. Legislatively 'created' executive COURTS.
Tenured for life Judge vs. 4 years + removal by President. A Member of the Bar = Lawyer
Constitution empowers Congress to 'create' Art. I tribunals; but ordain and 'establish' Art. III judicial Courts.
With all of the deception going on it should be self evident today's seats of Satan are not our judicial Courts of Justice.
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ALL WARFARE IS BASED ON THE ART OF DECEPTION SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR
War on terrorism, War on Iraq, War on drugs. War on Americans?
Our judicial Courts of Justice vs. their member of the Bar, private, executive branch War COURTS engaged in deception.
(1973) Senate Report 93-549 introduction: "A majority of the people of the United States have lived all their lives
under emergency rule." *** "For 40 years, freedoms and governmental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution
have, in varying degrees, been abridged by laws brought into force by states of national emergency." *** "And, in
the United States, actions taken by the government in times of great crisis have from, at least, the Civil War, in
important ways shaped the present phenomenon of a permanent state of national emergency."
Senate Report 93-549 (1973): "Since March the 9th, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national
emergency." In 1933, Congressman Beck, speaking from the Congressional Record, states: "I think of all the
damnable heresies that have ever been suggested in connection with the Constitution, the doctrine of emergency is
the worst, it means that when Congress declares an emergency, there is no Constitution. This means its death. It is
the very doctrine that the German chancellor is invoking today in the dying hours of the parliamentary body of the
German republic, namely, that because of an emergency, it should grant to the German chancellor absolute power to
pass any law, even though the law contradicts the Constitution of the German republic. Chancellor Hitler is at
least frank about it. We pay the Constitution lip service, but the result is the same." [Just like today. Why?  ]
National Emergency: A state of national crisis; a situation demanding immediate and extraordinary national or
federal action. Congress has made little or no distinction between a "state of national emergency" and a "state of
war." Brown v. Bernstein, D.C.Pa., 49 F.Supp. 728, 732.
THE TYRANT’S PLEA - BAD MEN USURP THE SUPREME LAW TO ENSLAVE + STEAL BY LAW = CONQUER
Separate opinion by Mr. JUSTICE BREESE (Supreme Court of Illinois): I cordially concur in the sentiment, that the
Constitution of the United States was designed by its framers, and has been hitherto so understood by the people, to
be the same protecting instrument in war as in peace; that a state of war does not enlarge the powers of any one
department of the government established by it, nor has any one of these defendants any right to urge "necessity," or
"extraordinary emergencies," as a plea for the usurpation of powers not granted. The first is the tyrant's plea, and
the other places the dearest rights of the citizen at the mercy of a dominant party, who have only to declare "the
emergency," which they can readily create, pretexts for which, bad men are keen to find and eager to act upon.
There can be, and there should be, no higher law for the conduct of the government in its relations to the citizen,
than the Constitution of the United States. JOHNSON v. JONES, 44 Ill. 142 (1867)(1).
ANY SATANIC SIMULARITIES?
VAN ANTWERPEN, District Judge (U.S. District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania):
On February 29, 1933, following the rise to power of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in Germany, a state of
emergency was declared in Germany and all constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and civil rights were
suspended. Pursuant to decree [Presidential Proclamation. ] the SS (Schutzstaffel or protection squads) was
authorized to arrest, without warrant and without judicial recourse, persons who were suspected of being enemies
of Hitler and the Nazi Party and hold them in "protective custody." This decree was in effect until May 7, 1945.
(Sydnor, March 16, 1993, pp. 53-55, 57-58, 89, 90, 102; P-71.) The SS implemented the aims and objectives of
Nazi Germany. All police power was centralized into the hands of the SS. [FEDS. ] The SS was responsible for the
administration of the concentration camps. [all over America. ] (Sydnor, March 16, 1993, pp. 61, 63-64, 100, 111.)
Enemies of Hitler and the Nazi Party included political opponents, such as members of dissenting political parties or
moderate parties who criticized the regime; (Sydnor, March 16, 1993, pp. 92, 95, 97, 116-117; P-70; P-95.)
Between 1933 and 1945 the policy of protective custody was broadened and enabled the SS and police to arrest
anyone for any reason and put that person in a concentration camp indefinitely. (Sydnor, March 16, 1993, pp. 92,
93.) The Waffen -SS ("Armed SS"), formed in 1939, was an elite guard within the SS. (Sydnor, March 16, 1993, pp.
136, 151; P-137.) Estimates for the total number of persons killed in Nazi concentration camps range between
seven and nine million persons. (Sydnor, March 19, 1993, pp. 69-70.) Guards administered the looting and
confiscating of effects of the people who were murdered in the camps. (Sydnor, March 16, 1993, p. 111-112.)
Concentration camp guards received continuous ideological training including the history of the SS, the purpose of
concentration camps, the reasons that people were imprisoned in camps, and the claim that the camps housed the
most dangerous enemies of the state. (Sydnor, March 16, 1993, pp. 103-104, 140, 141, 145, 156; P-97; P-82.)
Guards were not punished for committing acts of brutality against prisoners. (Sydnor, March 16, 1993, pp. 170-
171.) Because of the atrocities that had occurred in the concentration camps, a new category, " crimes against
humanity," was added to international law. (Ziemke, pp. 17- 18.) In 1946 the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremburg declared crimes against humanity to be a war crime. The Nuremburg Tribunal adjudged the SS and the
Waffen -SS to be criminal organizations. Anyone who was a member of these organizations was automatically a
war crimes suspect and subject to automatic arrest. (Ziemke, pp. 19-20.) Persons who had served in concentration
camps were aggressively sought as suspects because status as a concentration camp guard automatically gave rise to
the possibility of a charge of murder, or mass murder. (Ziemke, pp. 33-34.) UNITED STATES of America v.
187
SCHIFFER, 831 F.Supp. 1166 (1993)(3). [The scam: Commit crimes via pretended necessity and "protection." ]
Article III ordained and established judicial "District Court of the United States" of The Judiciary
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from the decree of the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas. [***] For as
the sovereignty resides in the people, every citizen is a portion of it, and is himself personally bound by the laws
which the representatives of the sovereignty may pass, or the treaties into which they may enter, within the scope of
their delegated authority. KENNETT v. CHAMBERS, 55 U.S. 38 (1852)(1).
UNDER SEAL OF THIS COURT
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the district court of the United States, for the
eastern district of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court,
that the said district court could not entertain jurisdiction of this cause, and that, consequently, this court has not
jurisdiction in this cause, but for the purpose of reversing the judgment of the said district court entertaining said
jurisdiction: Whereupon, it is ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said district court be, and
the same is hereby reversed, and that this writ of error be, and the same is hereby dismissed, for the want of
jurisdiction. All of which is hereby ordered to be certified to the said district court, under the seal of this court.
BROWN v. KEENE, 33 U.S. 112 (1834)(2). [Judicial courts have seals prescribed by law, administrative courts by SCO.]
JUDICIAL COURTS OF RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTION HAVE SEALS PRESCRIBED BY LAW - NOT BY SCO
Ch 50 Laws of Alaska 1959, Article I. Supreme Court (of the State of Alaska)
Sec. 2 Court of Record. Composition General Powers. The supreme court is a court of record, consists of three
justices including the chief justice, and is vested with all power and authority necessary to carry into complete
execution all its judgments, decrees and determinations, according the Constitution, the laws of the State, and the
common law.
Sec. 5. Process. Process of the supreme court shall be in the name of the “State of Alaska”, be signed by the clerk
of the court or his deputy, be dated when issued, sealed with the seal of the court, and made returnable according to
rule prescribed by the court.
Sec. 6. Seal of Court. The seal of the supreme court shall be a vignette of the official flag of Alaska with the words
“Seal of the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska”, surrounding the vignette.
Sec. 7. Qualifications of Justices. A justice of the supreme court shall be a citizen of the United States and of the
State, a resident of Alaska for three years immediately preceding his appointment, have been engaged for not less
than eight years immediately preceding his appointment in the active practice of law, and at the time of appointment
be licensed to practice law in Alaska. The active practice of law shall include
(1) Sitting as a judge in a state or territorial court. [They are all active members of the Bar Association. ]
(2) Actually being engaged in advising and representing clients in matters of law.
(3) Rendering legal services to any agency, branch, or department of a civil government within the United
States or any state or territory thereof, in an elective, appointive or employed capacity. (4)…
Article II. Superior Court Sec. 18 Courts of Record: Sec. 20 Seal of Court. Sec. 21 Process. Sec 22 Qualifications.
Ch 50 Laws of Alaska 1959. [Superior Court has essentially the same wording as Supreme Court. Those courts of record
are "established in the Constitution" of the People, courts of the People-supreme sovereign power (Kings courts). ]
BURKE, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska): [Constitution of the State of Alaska, Article IV "The Judiciary". ]
"Judicial Power and Jurisdiction. The judicial power of the State is vested in a supreme court, a superior court, and
the courts established by the legislature. The jurisdiction of courts shall be prescribed by law. Alaska Const. art. IV,
ß 1. CITIZENS COALITION v. McALPINE, 810 P.2d 162 (1991)(1). [All judicial power and jurisdiction are vested
solely in the 'established' judicial 'courts' of 'The Judiciary,' not in mere judges who come and go, or private corporations.]
3 Blackstone Commentaries p. 24, 25: "All courts of record are the king’s courts, in right of his crown and royal
dignity. And therefore no other court hath authority to fine or imprison; so that the very erection of a new
jurisdiction with power of fine or imprisonment makes it instantly a court of record. A court not of record is the
court of a private man, whom the law will not intrust with any discretionary power over the fortune or liberty of
his fellow-subjects." [King = sovereign = us. Our "established" judicial "Courts of record" (Common Law criminal
jurisdiction) of "The Judiciary" of the Constitution of the sovereign People are not open? Woe unto ye Lawyers. ]
COURT OF RECORD OF THE JUDICIARY OF THE CONSTITUTION v. THE COURT SYSTEM = PRIVATE COURTS
CONNOR, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska): The Association is a creation and instrumentality of the state, AS
08.08.010. (fn 3) [***] AS, 08.08.020 provides that every person licensed to practice law in the state (except a judge
of a court of record) is eligible for active membership in the Alaska Bar, (fn 5) Rule 2(d) of the court
administrative rules precludes any employee of the Alaska court system from engaging directly or indirectly in the
practice of law in any of the courts in the state. (fn 7) [Its Judges are all employees + members of the Bar. ]
188
(fn 5) AS 08.08.020. 'Active members. Every person licensed to practice law in the state except a judge of a court
of record is eligible for active membership in the Alaska Bar.' (s 4 ch 196 SLA 1955).
(fn 6) AS 08.08.210. 'Who may practive law. No person may engage in the private practice of law in the state unless
he is an active member of the Alaska Bar. ...'
(fn 7) Rule 2. Appointment and Compensation of Employees-Practice of Law by Personnel Prohibited. '(d) During
his term of office or employment, neither the administrative director nor any other employee of the Alaska court
system shall engage directly or indirectly in the practice of law in any of the courts of this state.' (Amended by
Supreme Court Order 148 dated November 26, 1971). Petition by W. Micheal MOODY, 524 P.2d 1261 (1974)(1).
PARTIES MAY BY WRITTEN STIPULATION AGREE UPON A MEMBER OF THE BAR TO TRY AN ISSUE OUT OF COURT
WICKERSHAM, District Judge (District Court, District of Alaska, Third Division):
There is but one tribunal in Alaska under our Code which has power or authority to try an issue out of a court of
record, and that is a referee under the provisions of chapter 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that:
"Sec. 211. Trial of Issue may be Referred.--All or any of the issues in the action, whether of fact or law, or both,
may be referred to a referee or referees upon the written consent of the parties" [***]
"Sec. 707. Judicial Officer, Definition of. When Disqualified to Act.--A judicial officer is a person authorized to act
as a judge in a court of justice. [***]
"Sec. 708. When Judge Disqualified.--Whenever it appears that the judge of the district court presiding in the
division where the action is pending is disqualified under the provisions of the section last preceding the action
shall be transferred to another division of said court unless a judge of another division will appear and preside
during the disposition thereof: Provided, however, that the parties may by written stipulation agree upon a member
of the bar of said court to try the same." UNITED STATES v. PRATT, 3 Alaska 400 (1907)(1). [Old scam. ]
EXECUTION IS A WRIT OF LAW OF A JUDICIAL COURT OF RECORD - COMMON LAW JURISDICTION

Judicial Courts of Common Law jurisdiction proceed according to the course of the Common Law = unwritten Law and by Jury.
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court, and, after stating the case, proceeded as follows:
The 13th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. describes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and grants the
power to issue writs of prohibition and mandamus, in certain specified cases. [***]
The words of the 14th are understood by the Court to comprehend executions. An execution is a writ,
which is certainly 'agreeable to the principles and usages of law.' The 14th section enacts, 'that all the before
mentioned Courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other
writs not specially provided by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.' The 17th section authorizes the Courts 'to make all necessary rules
for the orderly conducting business in the said Courts;' and the 18th, empowers a Court to suspend execution, in
order to give time for granting a new trial.
There is no reason for supposing that the general term 'writs,' is restrained by the words, 'which may be
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions,' to original process, or to process anterior to judgments.
The jurisdiction of a Court is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until that judgment
shall be satisfied. Many questions arise on the process subsequent to the judgment, in which jurisdiction is to be
exercised. It is, therefore, no unreasonable extension of the words of the act, to suppose an execution necessary for
the exercise of jurisdiction. Were it even true, that jurisdiction could technically be said to terminate with the
judgment, an execution would be a writ necessary for the perfection of that which was previously done; and would,
consequently, be necessary to the beneficial exercise of jurisdiction. If any doubt could exist on this subject, the
18th section, which treats of the authority of the Court over its executions as actually existing, certainly implies, that
the power to issue them had been granted in the 14th section. The same implication is afforded by the 24th *24 and
25th sections, both of which proceed on the idea that the power to issue writs of execution was in possession of the
Courts. So, too, the Process Act, which was depending at the same time with the Judiciary Act, prescribes the forms
of executions, but does not give a power to issue them.
On the clearest principles of just construction, then, the 14th section of the Judiciary Act must be
understood, as giving to the Courts of the Union, respectively, a power to issue executions on their judgments.
But this section provides singly for issuing the writ, and prescribes no rule for the conduct of the officer
while obeying its mandate. It has been contended, that the 34th section of the act supplies this deficiency.
That section enacts, 'that the laws of the several States, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes,
of the United States, shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law, in the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.'
This section has never, so far as is recollected, received a construction in this Court; but it has, we believe,
been generally considered by gentlemen of the profession, as furnishing a rule to guide the Court in the formation of
its judgment; not one for carrying that judgment into execution. It is 'a rule of decision,' and the proceedings after
judgment are merely ministerial. It is, too, 'a rule of decision in trials at common law;' a phrase which presents
clearly to the mind the idea of litigation in Court, and could never occur to a person intending to describe an
execution, or proceedings after judgment, or the effect of those proceedings. It is true, that if, after the service of an
189
execution, a question respecting the legality of the proceeding should be brought before the Court by a regular suit,
there would be a trial at common law; and it may be said, that the case provided for by the section would then
occur, and that the law of the State would furnish the rule for its decision. [***]
The act to 'regulate processes in the Courts of the United States,' passed in 1789, has also been referred to. It
enacts, 'that until farther provision shall be made, and except where by this act, or other statutes of the United States,
is otherwise provided, the forms of writs and executions, except their style, and modes of process, in the Circuit
and District Courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each State respectively, as are now used in the
Supreme Courts of the same.
This act, so far as spects the writ, is plainly confined to form. But form, in this particular, it has been
argued, has much of substance in it, because it consists of the language of the writ, which specifies precisely what
the officer is to do. His duty is prescribed in the writ, and he has only to obey its mandate. [***]
To 'the forms of writs and executions,' the law adds the words, 'and modes of process.' These words must
have been intended to comprehend something more than 'the forms of writs and executions.' We have not a right to
consider them as mere tautology. They have a meaning, and ought to be allowed an operation more extensive than
the preceding words. The term is applicable to writs and executions, but it is also applicable to every step taken in a
cause. It indicates the progressive course of the business from its commencement to its termination; and 'modes of
process' may be considered as equivalent to modes or manner of proceeding. If, by the word process, Congress had
intended nothing more than a general phrase, which might comprehend every other paper issuing out of a Court, the
language would most probably have resembled that of the first section, where the word 'processes,' not 'process,' is
used in that sence. But the introduction of the word 'modes,' and the change of the word 'processes' for 'process,'
seem to indicate that the word was used in its more extensive sence, as denoting progressive action; a sense
belonging to the noun in the singular number, rather than in the sense in which it was used in the first section,
which is appropriate to the same noun in its plural number.
This construction is supported by the succeeding sentence, which is in these words: 'and the forms and
modes of proceedings, in causes of equity, and of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to the
course of the civil law.'
The preceding sentence had adopted the forms of writs and executions, and the modes of process, then
existing in the Courts of the several States, as a rule for the Federal Courts, 'in suits at common law.' And this
sentence adopts 'the forms and modes of proceedings' of the civil law, 'in causes of equity, and of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.' It has not, we believe, been doubted, that this sentence was intended to regulate the whole
course of proceeding, 'in causes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' It would be difficult to assign
a reason for the solicitude of Congress to regulate all the proceedings of the Court, sitting as a Court of equity, or of
admiralty, which would not equally require that its proceedings should be regulated when sitting as a Court of
common law. [***]
'The forms of writs and executions, and modes of process in suits at common law,' and 'the forms and
modes of proceedings, in causes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' embrace the same subject,
and both relate to the progress of a suit from its commencement to its close.
It has been suggested, that the words 'in suits at common law,' restrain the preceding words to proceedings
between the original writ and judgment. But these words belong to 'writs and execution,' as well as to 'modes of
process,' and no more limit the one than the other. As executions can issue only after a judgment the words, 'in
suits at common law,' must apply to proceedings which take place after judgment.
But the legal sense of the word suit adheres to the case after the rendition of the judgment, and it has been
so decided. (fn g) (fn g) Co. Litt. 291. 8 Co. 53. b.
This construction is fortified by the proviso, which is in these words: 'Provided, that on judgments, in any
of the cases aforesaid, where different kinds of executions are issueable in succession, a capias ad satisfaciendum
being one, the plaintiff shall have his election to take out a capias ad satisfaciendum in the first instance, and be at
liberty to pursue the same, until a tender of the debt and costs in gold or silver shall be made.' [***]
It enacts, 'that the forms of writs, executions, and other process, except their style, and the forms and
modes of proceeding in suits in those of common law, shall be the same as are now used in the said Courts
respectively, in pursuance of the act entitled, 'an act to regulate processes in the Courts of the United States,' except
so far as may have been provided for by the act to establish the judicial Courts of the United States; subject,
however, to such alterations and additions as the said Courts respectively shall, in their discretion, deem expedient,
or to such regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule, to
prescribe to any Circuit or District Court concerning the same.
This act is drawn with more deliberation than the original act; and removes, so for as respects the question
now under consideration, some doubt which might be entertained in relation to the correctness with which the act of
1789 has been construed. It distinguishes very clearly between the forms of writs, and all other process of the same
character, and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits, and provides for both. It is impossible to confound 'the
forms of writs, executions, and other process,' which are to be attested by a Judge, and to be under the seal of the
Court from which they issue, with 'the forms and modes of proceeding in suits.' They are distinct subjects. The first
describes the paper which issues from the Court, and is an authority to the officer to do that which it commands; the
190
last embraces the whole progress of the suit, and every transaction in it, from its commencement to its
termination, which has been already shown not to take place until the judgment shall be satisfied. It may, then,
and ought to be understood, as prescribing the conduct of the officer in the execution of process, that being a part of
'the proceedings' in the suit. This is to conform to the law of the State, as it existed in September, 1789. The act
adopts the State law as it then stood, not as it might afterwards be made. [***]
The subject was resumed in 1793, in the act, entitled, 'An act in addition to the act entitled an act to
establish the judicial Courts of the United States.' [***]
The jails in which prisoners were to be confined did not belong to the government of the Union,
and the privilege of using them was ceded by the several States, under a compact with the United States. [***]
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes,
and the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other
departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court
will not enter unnecessarily. [***]
In adopting the temporary mode of proceeding with executions then prevailing in the several States, it was
proper to provide for that return to ancient usage, and just, as well as wise principles, which might be expected from
those who had yielded to a supposed necessity in departing from them. Congress, probably, conceived, that this
object would be best effected by placing in the Courts of the Union the power of altering the 'modes of proceeding
in suits at common law,' which includes the modes of proceeding in the execution of their judgments, in the
confidence, that in the exercise of this power, the ancient, permanent, and approved system, would be adopted by
the Courts, at least as soon as it should be restored in the several States by their respective legislatures. WAYMAN v.
SOUTHARD, 23 U.S. 1 (1825)(2). [Due sealed judicial Court writ of execution Process of Law after judgment. ]
28 USC 1691: All writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk
thereof. 28 USC 454: Any justice or judge appointed under the authority of the United States who engages in the practice of law is
guilty of a high misdemeanor. (Courts of the executive branch of 'The Executive' are not our 'established' judicial Courts of Law of 'The
Judiciary' with judicial Power and seal of court prescribed by law that shall be affixed on all judicial Process of Law. Military
commissions [members of the Bar] have the same gold fringe flag on the shoulder patches of soldiers etc. of the executive branch.
"District Court of the United States" for the protection of the People
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court.
In the case before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, a right was claimed under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and the decision was against the right claimed; and it refuses obedience to the writ of error, and
regards its own judgment as final. It has not only reversed and annulled the judgment of the District Court of the
United States, but it has reversed and annulled the provisions of the Constitution itself, and the act of Congress of
1789, and made the superior and appellate tribunal the inferior and subordinate one. [***] The Constitution of the
United States, with all the powers conferred by it on the General Government, and surrendered by the States, was
the voluntary act of the people of the several States, deliberately done, for their own protection and safety against
injustice from one another. And their anxiety to preserve it in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against
resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State, is proved by the clause which requires that the
members of the State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, (as well as those of
the General Government,) shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution. This is the last and
closing clause of the Constitution, and inserted when the whole frame of Government, with the powers hereinbefore
specified, had been adopted by the Convention; and it was in that form, and with these powers, that the Constitution
was submitted to the people of the several States, for their consideration and decision. ABLEMAN v. BOOTH, 62
U.S. 506 (1858)(2). [Demand they open the judicial Courts of The Judiciary of the Constitution of the People. ]
MILITARY COMMISSION IS OUR COMMON-LAW WAR COURT = EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECEPTION

It has 'no statutory existence' though it is recognized by 'statute' law. (Their integrated disease by deception.)
Justice BURTON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
While explaining a proposed reference to military commissions in Article of War 15, Judge Advocate General
Crowder, in 1916, said, 'A military commission is our common-law war court. It has no statutory existence, though
it is recognized by statute law.' S.Rep.No.130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 40. ***. Such as Military Commission,
Council of War, Military Tribunal, Military Government Court, Provisional Court, Provost Court, Court of
Conciliation, Arbitrator, Superior Court, and Appellate Court. See Winthrop, op.cit. 803--804.
In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears that, as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction
and procedure of military commissions, and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied by
Armed Forces of the United States. His authority to do this sometimes survives cessation of hostilities. MADSEN
v. KINSELLA, 343 U.S. 341 (1952)(2). [How true, and their 'deceptively similar' names are not just semantics. ]
THRUSTING ASIDE THE REGULAR COURTS (judicial courts of The Judiciary)
Bar Association is of executive branch? Under separation of powers a judge cannot be at the same time executive and 'judicial'.
191
MILLARD, Justice dissenting: [See D&B, today's so called COURTS are 'private companies-for profit corporations'. ]
Within the last five years we have seen, for the first time, self-constituted tribunals not only assuming power which
the law did not give them, but thrusting aside the regular courts to which the power was exclusively given. What is
the consequence? This terrible authority is wholly undefined, and its exercise is without any legal control.
Undelegated power is always unlimited. The field that lies outside of the constitution and laws has no boundary.
Thierry, the French historian of England, says that, when the crown and scepter were offered to Cromwell, he
hesitated for several days, and answered: 'Do not make me a king, for then my hands will be tied up by the laws
which define the duties of that office; but make me protector of the commonwealth, and I can do what I please,--no
statute restraining and limiting the royal prerogative will apply to me.' So these commissions, [Military
commissions. ] have no legal origin and no legal name by which they are known among the children of men; no law
applies to them [Code. ]; and they exercise all power for the paradoxical reason that none belongs to them rightfully.
[Deceptively similar named. ] '*** You assert the right of the executive government, [military. ] without the
intervention of the judiciary, to capture, imprison, and kill any person to whom that government or its paid
dependents may choose to impute an offense. This, in its very essence, is despotic and lawless. It is never claimed
or tolerated except by those governments which deny the restraints of all law. It has been exercised by the great and
small oppressors of mankind ever since the days of Nimrod. It operates in different ways; the tools it uses are not
always the same; it hides its hideous features under many disguises; it assumes every variety of form; "It can
change shapes with Proteus for advantages, ... " S.W. WASHINGTON PRO. v. FENDER , 21 Wash.2d 349 (1944)(1).
[The favorite word of a member of the Bar Judge in their Kangaroo courts is: DENIED! w/o proving anything. ]
ADMINISTRATIVE = EXECUTIVE COURTS - JUDGES - LAW - PROCEDURE - STATE: SEPARATION OF POWERS

Without life tenure and permanent salary: "incapable of exercising any portion of the judicial power." Emphasis added.
Justice SCALIA, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
Today, the Federal Government has a corps of administrative law judges numbering more than 1,000, whose
principal statutory function is the conduct of adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), see 5
U.S.C. § § 554, 3105. They are all executive officers. "Adjudication," in other words, is no more an "inherently"
judicial function than the promulgation of rules governing primary conduct is an "inherently" legislative one. See
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 ("Rule making"). [***]
In short, given the performance of adjudicatory functions by a federal officer, it is the identity of the
officer--not something intrinsic about the mode of decisionmaking or type of decision--that tells us whether the
judicial power is being exercised. "[O]ur cases demonstrate [that] a particular function, like a chameleon, will often
take on the aspect of the office to which it is assigned." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 749 (1986) (STEVENS, J.,
concurring in judgment). Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953, n. 16 (1983). Where adjudicative decision makers
do not possess life tenure and a permanent salary, they are "incapable of exercising any portion of the judicial
power." Ex parte Randolph, 20 F.Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C.J.). FREYTAG v. C.I.R.
501 U.S. 868 (1991)(2). [Executive branch courts incapable or rendering judgment and execution w/o our consent. ]
ALL OR ALMOST ALL SO CALLED JUDGES ARE ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE BAR (LAWYERS) ASSOCIATION
BEEZER, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit): In recommending disbarment, the bar
association is not a private organization disciplining its members, but an "administrative arm" of the state Supreme
Court designed to assist its decisionmaking. See Chaney v. State Bar of Cal., 386 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir.1967).
ROSENTHAL v. JUSTICES OF CALIF, 910 F.2d 561 (1990)(3). [A monopoly is always an expensive Tyranny. ]
(Congress may not control execution of laws except through Art. I procedures); Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982) (Congress may not confer Art. III power on Art. I judge).
MISTRETTA v. UNITED STATES, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)(2). [Art. I Tribunal has procedure not Power = by consent.]
ALL EXECUTIVE = ALL MEMBERS OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION: PROSECUTOR + COURT = ADMINISTRATIVE
Their: so called COURTS, prosecutors, Judges, rules, to uphold their Code System outside the Constitution by their fraud.

A tyrannical government calls everybody a traitor who shows the least unwillingness to be a slave. In the absence
of a constitutional provision it was justly feared that statutes might be passed which would put the lives of the most
patriotic citizens at the mercy of minions that skulk about under the pay of an executive. Therefore a definition of
treason was given in the fundamental law, and the legislative authority could not enlarge it to serve the purpose of
partisan malice. [***] Alfred, the greatest of revolutionary heroes, and the wisest monarch that ever sat on a throne,
made the first use of his power, after the Saxons restored it, to re-establish their ancient laws. He had promised
them that he would, and he was true to them, because they had been true to him. But it was not easily done. The
courts were opposed to it, for it limited their power; a kind of power that everybody covets,--the power to punish
without regard to law. He was obliged to hang forty-four judges in one year for refusing to give his subjects a
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trial by jury. When the historian says that he hung them, it is not meant that he put them to death without a trial. He
had them impeached before the grand council of the nation, the Wittenagemote, the parliament of that time. During
the subsequent period of Saxon domination, no man on English soil was powerful enough to refuse a legal trial to
the meanest peasant. If any minister or any king, in war or in peace, had dared to punish a freeman by a tribunal of
his own appointment, he would have roused the wrath of the whole population; all orders of society would have
resisted it; lord and vassal, knight and squire, priest and penitent, bocman and socman, master and thrall,
copyholder and villein, would have risen in one mass and burnt the offender to death in his castle, or followed him
in his flight and torn him to atoms. S.W. WASHINGTON PRO. v. FENDER et al, 21 Wash.2d 349 (1944)(1).
[Same in EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). Declaration of Independence: "refusing his assent to laws for
establishing judiciary powers." If forced into court I will demand a judicial Court of Record of The Judiciary having criminal
Common Law jurisdiction. Few are open. Mainly executive branch: private companies and for profit corporations. ]
WHETHER CITIZENS OR NOT - DISCHARGED BECAUSE RESTRAINED WITHOUT LAWFUL AUTHORITY
GRAY, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):
Each of the other two cases was a writ of habeas corpus; and any person, whether a citizen or not, unlawfully
restrained of his liberty, is entitled to that writ. Case of the Hottentot Venus, 13 East, 195; Case of Dos Santos, 2
Brock. 493; In re Kaine, 14 How. 103. In Kenyon's Case, judge PARKER held that the court in which the prisoner
had been convicted had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, because the place of the commission of the act was
beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, and, as was truly said, 'this alone would be conclusive of this case.'
5 Dill. 390. In U. S. v. Crook, the Ponca Indians were discharged by Judge DUNDY because the military officers
who held them were taking them to the Indian Territory by force and without any lawful authority, (5 Dill. 468;) and
in the case at bar, as the record before us shows, that learned judge concurred in the judgment below for the
defendant. ELK v. WILKINS, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)(2). ['Captured' by military without a Warrant of an established Judicial
Court. Unlawful territorial jurisdiction without boundaries prescribed by law under military occupation. ]
CONSTITUTION PROTECTS ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES

By the protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers.
The controlling question in the case is this: Upon the facts stated in Milligan's petition, and the exhibits filed, had the
military commission mentioned in it jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence him? Milligan, not a resident of one
of the rebellious states, or a prisoner of war, but a citizen of Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the military
or naval service, is, while at his home, arrested by the military power of the United States, imprisoned, and, on
certain criminal charges preferred against him, tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged by a military
commission, organized under the direction of the military commander of the military district of Indiana. Had this
tribunal the legal power and authority to try and punish this man?
No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the
whole people; for it is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished
of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people. If there was law to justify this military trial, it is not our
province to interfere; if there was not, it is our duty to declare the nullity of the whole proceedings. The decision of
this question does not depend on argument or judicial precedents, numerous and highly illustrative as they are.
These precedents inform us of the extent of the struggle to preserve liberty and to relieve those in civil life from
military trials. The founders of our government were familiar with the history of that struggle; and secured in a
written constitution every right which the people had wrested from power during a contest of ages. By that
Constitution and the laws authorized by it this question must be determined. The provisions of that instrument on
the administration of criminal justice are too plain and direct, to leave room for misconstruction or doubt of their
true meaning. Those applicable to this case are found in that clause of the original Constitution which says, 'That
the trial of all crimes, except in case of impeachment, shall be by jury;' and in the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of
the amendments. The fourth proclaims the right to be secure in person and effects against unreasonable search and
seizure; and directs that a judicial warrant shall not issue 'without proof of probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation.' The fifth declares 'that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
unless on presentment by a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in
actual service in time of war or public danger, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.' And the sixth guarantees the right of trial by jury, in such manner and with such regulations that with upright
judges, impartial juries, and an able bar, the innocent will be saved and the guilty punished. It is in these words: 'In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
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counsel for his defence.' These securities for personal liberty thus embodied, were such as wisdom and experience
had demonstrated to be necessary for the protection of those accused of crime. And so strong was the sense of the
country of their importance, and so jealous were the people that these rights, highly prized, might be denied them by
implication, that when the original Constitution was proposed for adoption it encountered severe opposition; and,
but for the belief that it would be so amended as to embrace them, it would never have been ratified.
Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors; for even these provisions, expressed in such plain
English words, that it would seem the ingenuity of man could not evade them, are now, after the lapse of more than
seventy years, sought to be avoided. [How true it is. ] Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would
arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to
accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless
established by irrepealable law. The history of the world had taught them that what was done in the past might be
attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to
anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the
Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily
proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority. [The Civil War. ]
Have any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution been violated in the case of Milligan? and if so, what
are they? Every trial involves the exercise of judicial power; and from what source did the military commission
that tried him derive their authority? Certainly no part of judicial power of the country was conferred on them;
because the Constitution expressly vests it 'in one supreme court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish,' and it is not pretended that the commission was a court ordained and established
by Congress. They cannot justify on the mandate of the President; because he is controlled by law, and has his
appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws; and there is 'no unwritten criminal code to
which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction.' EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [Jurisdiction of a
judicial Court of Common Law vs. today’s executive branch-member of the Bar Association-lawyer called judge of a private
company deceptively called a court and judge. Nor can any officer be 'executive and judicial' at the 'same' time. ]
INVIOLABLE LAW OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE - AMEND BY THE SOVEREIGNS NOT BY USURPATION
JUDGE ROBERTSON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT (Court of Appeals of Kentucky):
At the threshold of this mere frame-work of an argument, which we intend to be as brief and condensed as the
subject will allow, we premise that the Constitution of the United States, in its declared and necessary supremacy,
is the same fundamental, paramount, and inviolable law of the sovereign people, at all times and under all
circumstances--that it is supreme over all--the citizens, the States, and the national government in all its departments
and operations, military as well as civil--and that it is as supreme in war as in peace.
These we consider axiomatic truths; and we believe that none of them, except, perhaps, the last, will be
denied by any statesman or jurist. But there seem to be a few of that denomination who assume that, in war, the
Constitution is either totally or essentially suspended or paralyzed; and these alone practically deny its coequal
supremacy in peace and in war. But this assumed exception from its vital operation at all times appears to us a self-
evident heresy, as indefensible in principle as it would be despotic in practice.
The people, in adopting the Constitution, made no such nullifying exception, and they were too wise to
contemplate its suspension in war further than they then provided for it. And, therefore, to silence all doubt as to
either its rightful supremacy or the universal and incessant prevalence of it until changed in the mode they therein
prescribed, they labeled its bosom with the precautionary and unqualified stereotype--"THIS CONSTITUTION
SHALL BE THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND." Supreme law, when? Always. Where? Everywhere in the
Union. It neither imports nor allows any exception. As the Constitution was made to secure liberty and property
against arbitrary and ambitious power, its guarantees are most needful when there is most danger of the
assumption of any such power; and when, therefore, the safety of the people needs their only protection most. Can
this be denied or doubted? Surely not. Then the Constitution was made even more for the turbulence of war than
the calm of peace. And, prudently contemplating seasons of war, it gave to the general government all the powers
deemed necessary or safe for upholding its own supremacy, preventing usurpation, and maintaining the Union in
war as well as in peace. But as belligerent exigencies are, to some extent, peculiar, the Constitution, as far as deemed
proper or safe, made some express exceptions providing for them and corresponding with them. And if, as thus
moulded and finished, its powers are insufficient for the ordeal of war in any of its forms, it is an abortion, and
should be remoulded and made, if possible, more adaptable to all emergencies and times . This, however, is the
work, not of the government nor of its armies, in whose hands it would be a revolutionary job of usurpation, but it
is the rightful task of their sovereigns, the constituent and peaceful people. And we can not doubt that, even in war,
the faithful observance of the Constitution, in all its normal vitality, would be much more auspicious to success than
a reckless breach of it by the official sentinels sworn to guard it. Corbin v. Marsh, 63 Ky. 193 (1865)(1).
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CONDEMNED BY ALL AND SUBVERSIVE OF THE LIBERTY OF THE 'SUBJECT'
From the first year of the reign of Edward the Third, when the Parliament of England reversed the attainder of the
Earl of Lancaster, because he could have been tried by the courts of the realm, and declared, 'that in time of peace no
man ought to be adjudged to death for treason or any other offence without being arraigned and held to answer; and
that regularly when the king's courts are open it is a time of peace in judgment of law,' down to the present day,
martial law, as claimed in this case, has been condemned by all respectable English jurists as contrary to the
fundamental laws of the land, and subversive of the liberty of the subject. ExParte MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2).
WHEN THE LAWS CAN ACT, EVERY OTHER 'MODE' OF PUNISHING 'SUPPOSED' CRIMES IS AN "ENORMOUS CRIME"
Those eminent statesmen, Lord Brougham and Sir James Mackintosh, participated in that debate; and denounced the
trial as illegal; because it did not appear that the courts of law in Demerara could not try offences, and that 'when
the laws can act, every other mode of punishing supposed crimes is itself an enormous crime.' So sensitive were
our Revolutionary fathers on this subject, although Boston was almost in a state of siege, when General Gage issued
his proclamation of martial law, they spoke of it as an 'attempt to supersede the course of the common law, and
instead thereof to publish and order the use of martial law.' The Virginia Assembly, also, denounced a similar
measure on the part of Governor Dunmore 'as an assumed power, which the king himself cannot exercise; because
it annuls the law of the land and introduces the most execrable of all systems, martial law.'
In some parts of the country, during the war of 1812, our officers made arbitrary arrests and, by military
tribunals, tried citizens who were not in the military service. These arrests and trials, when brought to the notice of
the courts, were uniformly condemned as illegal. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [How true. Super
crime against the people. Peace = Liberty via the Law of the Land upheld by truth vs. Code of War (deception & force).]
BOTH ARE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE

Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail.
CHIEF JUSTICE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the following opinion:
But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Congress, nor
Congress upon the proper authority of the President. Both are servants of the people, whose will is expressed in the
fundamental law [Constitution. ]. Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or any
commander under him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences,
either of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a controlling necessity, which justifies what it compels, or at least
insures acts of indemnity from the justice of the legislature. [All servants of the people. ]
We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war where no war has been
declared or exists. Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. What we do maintain is, that when the nation
is involved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is within the
power of Congress to determine in what states or district such great and imminent public danger exists as justifies
the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or security of the
army or against the public safety. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [Why are our Courts of Common Law
jurisdiction not open and ascertaining the Truth? The Communist goal is to make us and our children their slaves. ]
THEIR COURTS = THEIR JUDGES-MEMBERS OF THE BAR THEIR MOST EFFICIENT ALLIES - WEAPONS
In times of rebellion and civil war it may often happen, indeed, that judges and marshals will be in active sympathy
with the rebels and courts their most efficient allies. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [Rebels-men
daring to call themselves government acting outside the Constitution. Ban the anti-American Bar Association now. ]
THERE IS NO LAW NOT DERIVED FROM THE CONSTITUTION - OF WE THE PEOPLE

We have thus far said little of martial law, nor do we propose to say much. What we have already said sufficiently
indicates our opinion that there is no law for the government of the citizens, the armies or the navy of the United
States, within American jurisdiction, which is not contained in or derived from the Constitution. And wherever our
army or navy may go beyond our territorial limits, neither can go beyond the authority of the President or the
legislation of Congress. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [The President is to execute the Law. ]
CIVILIANS ON MILITARY RESERVATIONS ARE TRIED BY CIVILIAN COMMISSIONERS
Distinguished from appointed and commissioned judicial judges of an established judicial Court of The Judiciary.
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join:
It is urged that the expansion of military jurisdiction over civilians claimed here is only slight, and that
195
the practical necessity for it is very great. (fn 73) The attitude appears to be that a slight encroachment on the Bill of
Rights and other safeguards in the Constitution need cause little concern. But to hold that these wives could be tried
by the military would be a tempting precedent. Slight encroachments create new boundaries from which legions
of power can seek new territory to capture. 'It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule
that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives then of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.' (fn 74) Moreover we cannot consider this encroachment a
slight one. Throughout history many transgressions by the military have been called 'slight' and have been justified
as 'reasonable' in light of the 'uniqueness' of the times. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that today the peoples of
many nations are ruled by the military. [Often by such stealthy deception the people do not even know it. ]
(fn 73). According to the Government's figures almost 95% of the civilians tried abroad by army courts-martial
during the six-year period from 1949--1955 were tried for minor offenses. In this country 'petty offenses' by
civilians on military reservations are tried by civilian commissioners unless the alleged offender chooses trial in the
Federal District Court. 18 U.S.C. s 3401, 18 U.S.C.A. s 3401. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635. REID v.
COVERT, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)(2). [No judicial judges. Alaska is w/o boundaries prescribed by law and deemed over seas-
abroad and mostly a military reservation see Alaska statehood act. There are many military withdrawals in the U.S.A.]
ALL OFFICIAL AUTHORITY IS DERIVED FROM THE PEOPLE - AND NOT OTHERWISE
There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction: one to be exercised both in peace and war;
another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion
and civil war within states or districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in time
of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States, or during rebellion within the limits of states
maintaining adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires its exercise. The first of these
may be called jurisdiction under MILITARY LAW, and is found in acts of Congress prescribing rules and articles of
war, or otherwise providing for the government of the national forces; the second may be distinguished as
MILITARY GOVERNMENT, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the
military commander under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress; while
the third may be denominated MARTIAL LAW PROPER, and is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when
the action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of
insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where ordinary law no longer
adequately secures public safety and private rights. We think that the power of Congress, in such times and in such
localities, to authorize trials for crimes against the security and safety of the national forces, may be derived from its
constitutional authority to raise and support armies and to declare war, if not from its constitutional authority to
provide for governing the national forces. We have no apprehension that this power, under our American system
of government, in which all official authority is derived from the people, and exercised under direct responsibility
to the people, is more likely to be abused than the power to regulate commerce, or the power to borrow money. EX
PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [U.S. trading with the enemy via War powers and emergency rule. ]
Exodus 18:21 Moreover, thou shalt provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating
covetousness ... . Deuteronomy 16:18 Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the Lord thy God
giveth thee, throughout thy tribes: and they shall judge the people with just judgment. 16:20 That which is altogether just
shalt thou follow, that thou mayest live, and inherit the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. 1 Cor. 6:1 Dare any of
you, having a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints?
Today most-all so called Judges (members of the Bar) fail to carry the Holy Bible- word of God into their private pagan courts.
INDICT ALL OATH BREAKERS - JUDGES ARE MERE TEMPORARY SERVANTS OF THE LAW WHO COME AND GO
I injured no one so I invoke sovereign immunity besides government refuses to ascertain the Truth and 'guarantee' to do Justice.
His Honor (Justice Bay, Court of Appeals of South Carolina) on hearing the case, delivered the following judgment:
The natural right of rebellion against oppressive laws--the unalienable "right to fight," would still be retained by
the citizen, as a safeguard against tyranny--or another convention might be called to annul the acts of that which
had abused its powers; but it appeared to him clear, that this court had no authority whatever, to apply a remedy for
the arbitrary ordinances of a convention. Again--the right claimed for this court to judge whether the ordinance of
1833 be valid, presupposes that there is a higher law, to which the convention is subject, and with which its
enactments may be compared. Now what law is this, which is to controul the powers and the acts of a convention of
the people? Will it be said that the act of the legislature, calling the convention, is this law--what! the subject
paramount to the sovereign--the creature controlling the action of the creator--an act of the Legislature higher than
the authority of the people! It appeared to him that this was a solecism of the grossest nature--that it was almost
absurd to think of this court's annulling an ordinance of the convention, because it contravened an act of the
legislature. Again--It is supposed that our state constitution is this standard law, to regulate the authority of the
196
convention. This notion arises from a mistake of the true object and effect of constitutions. A constitution is a law
ordained by the sovereign for the regulation of the Government. [***] It must be admitted that some support for the
opinion he was combatting is to be found in the provision of the 2d Sec. of the 6th Art. of the federal constitution,
viz: "that the constitution and laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the
supreme law of the land--and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." [***] And first, what is sovereignty? It is the supreme and
ultimate authority in a state. It is of the very essence of sovereignty, to be highest legal power in the state, and to be
subject to no legal restraint but its own will. It is admitted that the sovereign, as all human agents are, is subject to
moral obligations, but only to such. It is the essential characteristic of a sovereign state, to be responsible only to
the laws of God, and thus when it breaks through those restraints, and violates its plighted faith, there is no other
appeal but to the God of battles. "This sovereignty," to use the language of a distinguished patriot, "wherever it
exists, is omnipotent--it is the same in one independent community as another, and is unsusceptible of division,
increase or diminution.Constitutions and governments are emanations from it, as light from the sun, which parts
with it constantly, without itself being impaired or wasted or weakened. Hence it is, that it makes and unmakes at
pleasure, and knows no superior but Divinity, and no law but the universal law ordained by that Divinity, which is
the law of right and justice." This sovereignty ought also to be distinguished from the exercise of certain visible
attributes of sovereignty--such attributes may be vested by the sovereign in an agent--in an ambassador--but this
would not constitute the ambassador the sovereign-- nothing, therefore, could be more illogical and unsound, than
to conclude that a government was a sovereignty, because it was entrusted with the power of making war and
peace--of regulating foreign relations and the like. It was no less evident that it was absolutely essential to
sovereignty to be one and indivisible. The contrary opinion led to the absurdity, that there may be two different
powers in the same state, each supreme, each the highest, which was a contradiction in terms, or in the language of
Burlamaqui, (2d vol. 2d. part. 1st chap. 18th sect.) "is morally impossible." In considering what would amount to a
surrender of sovereignty, (supposing it inalienable,) it was obvious that several sovereigns may unite together under
a compact, for certain purposes--may agree to exercise certain powers, jointly, and to forbear from their exercise
separately, and still retain the character of perfect sovereigns. [***] Nothing is more clear than that between the
sovereign and the subject, there cannot be a matter of legal right. As between them, the only standard of law, the
only tenure of right, is the will of the sovereign. [***] It has been shown to be of the very essence of sovereignty--to
be illimitable by any legal restrictions--to be paramount to all laws, but the law of God. This sovereignty, under
despotic systems of government, was vested in the Autocrat-- under our popular system, it resided in the people.
How then stands the case-- we have before us an Ordinance passed by "a Convention of the people of South
Carolina"--an act of the sovereignty of the State--and this tribunal is gravely called upon to pronounce this act
invalid. Can this court assume such authority, is the question? What! a sovereign subject to the supervisory
jurisdiction of a court of law--of a court created by itself? Assuredly a heresy so extravagant needs no formal
refutation. The State v. Hunt v. M. Meekin 20 S.C.L. 1, 2 Hill (SC) 1 (1834)(1). [How true. But those brain dead to
the Law have no clue. ]
DISSOLVES THE GOVERNMENT AND REMITS THE PEOPLE TO THEIR PRIMITIVE RIGHTS
Most U.S. citizens are ignorant of the law and conform and question and object to nothing they are easily deceived into subjection.
Cushing, Paterson, Washington, and Johnson, Justices. Chief Justice MARSHALL (the supreme Court of the U.S.):
In revolutions, every man has a right to take his part. He is excusable, if not bound in duty to take that part which in
his conscience he approves. [***]
February 18. Stockton on the same side. [***] No; the patriots of that day had a more sublime object. Their
great object was independence. By these acts they meant to legitimate the revolution by the supreme power of the
people. They proclaim their new and republican government. They declare whom they consider as the members
composing this new community. [***]
It was further stated that the preamble of the constitution asserts fundamental principles which are
inconsistent with this common law notion of allegiance: Such as that all power is derived from the people--that
protection and allegiance are reciprocal--that when a prince violates the fundamental laws he abdicates and
dissolves the government, and remits the people to their primitive rights.--This is all very true; but it is equally true
in England by the common law as here: it leaves the doctrine of allegiance where it was; but on great occasions
transfers the duty of that allegiance from one man to another--or from one form of government to another. These
principles were all recognized and acted upon in England in the revolution of 1688. But did that revolution change
the doctrine of perpetual allegiance? No! it transferred it from James to William, but the law remained the same.
M'ILVAINE v. COXE'S LESSEE, 6 U.S. 280 (1805)(1). [Our illegal subjection + government outside the Constitution
= illegal and violates the fundamental law = Constitution; and in part why 'the' Government is dissolved. ]
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS RELEASED SUBJECTS TO MAKE WAR UPON THE KING - BREACH OF CONTRACT-LAW
BROWN, Justice (Supreme Court of Florida) dissenting:
After this marvelous statute, rights, which before had rested largely on custom, rested on law, with a guaranty
against violation by the amazing covenant of King John that, if he refused redress for an 'excess committed,' his
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subjects should be released from their allegiance, and at liberty to make war upon him, 'saving harmless our person
and the persons of our Queen and children and when it hath been redressed they shall obey us as they have done
before.' Cap. 61. STATE ex rel GIBBS Atty. Gen. v. COUCH, 139 Fla. 353 (1939)(1). [Their Oath to Constitution. ]
RELEASES HIS SUBJECTS' FROM 'ALL' THEIR OBLIGATIONS
Mr. Black, on the same side: In a despotism the autocrat is unrestricted in the means he may use for the defence of
his authority against the opposition of his own subjects or others; and that is what makes him a despot. But in a
limited monarchy the prince must confine himself to a legal defence of his government. If he goes beyond that, and
commits aggressions on the rights of the people, he breaks the social compact [Constitution. ], releases his subjects
from all their obligations to him, renders himself liable to be dragged to the block or driven into exile. A violation
of law on pretence of saving such a government as ours is not self-preservation, but suicide. [Also 150 P.2d 983. ]
Salus populi suprema lex. This is true; but it is the safety of the people, not the safety of the ruler, which is the
supreme law. The maxim is revolutionary and express simply the right to resist tyranny without regard to
prescribed forms. It can never be used to stretch the powers of government against the people. EX PARTE
MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [See also Blackstone Comm. on the Laws of England, Vol. 1 Ch. 7 p 238 et seq. ]
WHEN TRUST IS ABUSED IT IS FORFEITED AND DEVOLVES TO THOSE WHO GAVE IT

MURRAY, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of California):
The supreme power cannot take from any man his property without his own consent, for the preservation of
property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and
requires that the people should have property and be protected in it, without which they must be supposed to lose
by entering into society, the very thing which was the end and design of the social compact to secure, and for the
attainment of which they entered into it. If this position be true, it was fallacious to think that the supreme or
legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, irrespective of the principles of natural justice, or
dispose of the estates of the subjects arbitrarily, or divest vested rights at pleasure." [***] In reference to these
doctrines, Sir WILLIAM BLACKSTONE says: "It must be owned, that Mr. Locke, and other theoretical writers, have
held, that there remains still inherent in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they
find the Legislature act contrary to the trust reposed in them; for, when such trust is abused, it is thereby
forfeited, and devolves to those who gave it. BILLINGS v. HALL, 7 Cal. 1 (1857)(1). [See all others herein. ]
SILVER BULLETS - UNCONSTITUTIONAL POINTS FOR REVERSAL ON APPEAL

st
1 Denial of Constitutional right to (effective-competent) 'Assistance' of Counsel.
2nd No Common Law criminal jurisdiction and Trial 'by Jury' (by your sovereign Christian peers) 'of the state.'
3rd No boundaries of the District previously ascertained by Law where in the crime was committed.
4th No trial conducted by a lawfully appointed and commissioned judicial judge of an established judicial
Court with criminal Common Law jurisdiction rendering due judicial court Process of Law of the Land.
5th Indictment is fatally defective for insufficient facts to sustain the alleged conclusions of acts of a 'person'.
6th The 4th Amendment warrant and 5th, and 6th Amendments interplay.
7th Government must prove every element of the crime. Fraud voids everything. It's all fraud-counterfeit.
8th Statutes are construed strictly against the government, and that class of person is not you. Void for Vagueness.
9th All officials (legislative, executive, judicial) are acting as 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons.
10th Want of power and jurisdiction over the people prescribed by clear and unquestionable Law.
11th Want of (court, judge and government official) power to execute fine or imprison the people prescribed by Law.
12th Want of boundaries prescribed by clear and unquestionable authority of Law for territorial jurisdiction.
OUR 6TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 'ASSISTANCE' OF COUNSEL

I demand effective 'Assistance' of counsel and object to being 'represented' by a member of the Bar in on the fraud, incompetent or both.
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, [not by rule of court. ] and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.' JOHNSON v.
ZERBST, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)(2). [Competent 'Assistance' of Counsel could answer all of your jurisdictional questions.
Hire a liar to battle the other liars concealing the whole System is unlawful etc.? = Crime 2 ? ]
'REQUIRES' THE GUIDING HAND OF COUNSEL AT 'EVERY' STEP = IN THE 1ST INSTANCE TO THE END
The '*** right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge,
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and convicted upon incompetent evidence [What a queer notion of Justice that is. ], or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he
have a perfect one [Sovereign immunity, I injured no one. ]. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him.' (fn 10) The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the
assistance of counsel. (fn 10) Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 69. Cf., Barron v. The Mayor, 7 Pet. 243, 247;
Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 557. JOHNSON v. ZERBST, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)(2). [See same: 372 U.S. 335;
407 U.S. 25 et al; In the 1st instance: arraignment to allocution, appeal, and execution, or automatic reversal. ]
Mr. Justice STEWART (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or
federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and
punished by imprisonment. This clear constitutional rule has emerged from a series of cases decided here over the
last 50 years. FARETTA v. CALIFORNIA, 422 U.S. 806 (1974)(2). [All fail to prove their statutes apply to us. ]
'ASSISTANCE' vs. 'REPRESENTED'
For purpose of appeal etc.: I in the first instance demand and never waive effective 'Assistance' of counsel.
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel,
compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority
to deprive an accused of his life or liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer
a necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not
represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.
A court's jurisdiction at the hearing of trial may be lost 'in the course of the proceedings' due to failure to complete
the court--as the Sixth Amendment requires--by providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel,
who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. (fn 22) If this
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may
obtain release by habeas corpus. (fn 23) A judge of the United States--to whom a petition for habeas corpus is
addressed--should be alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the trial absolutely
void.' (fn 24)[I would never waive effective 'Assistance' of counsel of my choice and right to to defend myself also. ]
(fn 22) Cf. Frank v. Mangum, supra, page 327. (fn 23) Ex parte Hans Neilsen, Petitioner, supra.
(fn 24) Cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92; Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 313. JOHNSON v.
ZERBST, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)(2). [The members of the Bar Association are educated professionals, so 99.9% of them
either sold their souls and are in on the scam (corruption-crime) to bleed us dry, or else incompetent, ineffective, or both.
Shakespeare’s Dick Butcher said, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers,"… . They know what they do Lord. ]
CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

Lies are Laws? Ruled by fraud, or force is hardly 'just' power much less derived from the true consent of the governed.
There are only 2 kinds of government: government of laws; or by force = government of lies-despotic.
(Government by) 'Force always attracts men of low morality.' Albert Einstein. When the laws become lies I'm out.
When the laws become lies to needlessly subject us to steal and abuse, instead of to 'secure' our all, I 'm out. In a just Nation
under God by what principle of Law, truth, Justice and 'right' am I lawfully bound by a pretended 'government of laws' not of men
deriving their 'just' powers from the consent of the governed, especially when I injure no one and my consent is not knowing, willing,
intelligent, and free of all fraud and coercion? I deny we ever intended to be needlessly converted from sovereigns to slaves (a vastly
inferior 100% Federal non-sovereign U.S. stateless taxpayer vassal) outside the Constitution in their System of Federalism. In truth our
consent is acquired by illegal deception, fear, forced covert mental coercion under threat of future fine and incarceration, instead of
our true knowing, willing, and intelligent consent (free will) free of all fraud and mental coercion, to which had we known would
otherwise still consent to the same. 1. No specific number is prescribed by law that constitutes the Nation. 2. No number of persons
who consent is prescribed by law to bind others. And taken t the extreme one person who consents cannot bind all others not consenting;
nor could an arbitrary number of corrupt servants consent and bind all of the rest? Under God no one has any legal right to do any
wrong any one, especially those swearing Oaths, So Help me God. It is impossible to delegate anything we do not lawfully possess to
some dipsticks calling themselves a government; so corrupt servants pretend they are the masters with "all powers by lying wonders."
THE ONLY REASON

'He' binds himself to the laws, and the Courts are formed and authorised by those laws.
Our creature has no legal right over its undiminished sovereigns without our consent especially when we injure no one.

The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same
principles, upon which he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, which are
formed and authorised by those laws. If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an
aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise? If the dignity of each singly is
undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be unimpaired. Chisholm v. The State of Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)
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(2). ['No' Forms or applications for the people sign to bind us as sovereigns. Demand they produce them. ]
INDIVIDUAL ASSENT IS NECESSARY

'Individual' assent is 'necessary,' or it deserves the name of 'usurpation and tyranny.' = W/o consent equates to force.
Cushing, Paterson, Washington, and Johnson, Justices, Chief Justice MARSHALL (the supreme Court of the U.S.):
When government is regularly established, a majority with propriety governs the minority; to institute it legally,
individual assent is necessary, or it deserves the name of usurpation, and ought to be execrated as tyranny.
M'ILVAINE v. COXE'S LESSEE, 6 U.S. 280 (1805)(1). [Assent = meeting of the minds with intent to be bound.]
LAWS MUST BE FOUNDED ON THE CONSENT OF THOSE, WHOSE OBEDIENCE THEY REQUIRE
Individual consent is necessary: no number constitutes the nation by law, and it could diminish to any number even one.
Justice SOUTER (Supreme Court of the U.States) with Justice STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER join, dissenting:
The principle is, that all human law must be prescribed by a superior. This principle I mean not now to exa Suffice
it, at present to say, that another principle, very different in its nature and operations, forms, in my judgment, the
basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of equality and justice must be founded
on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found
in the man." Id., at 458 [in man, not the inferior artificial creature of the man.]. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706
(1999)(2). [Citing References 3210 times, 4/30/05. Sovereigns may consent to (just) mere human law. Most of our
financial problems, grief, stress, and misery come from man-corrupt government. ]
COURTS (AND EVERYTHING ELSE) WITHIN GOVERNMENTS DERIVED JUST POWERS FROM CONSENT
GRIFFEN, Judge (Court of Appeals of Arkansas) dissenting: In a constitutional democracy the judicial power--like
every other governmental power--must come from somewhere. Judicial power is not self-existent. Courts are
neither eternal nor omnipotent. Rather, it is a fundamental tenet of American government dating to the Declaration
of Independence that governments and the courts within them derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed. ELLIOTT v. BOONE CTY, 56 Ark.App. 113 (1997)(1). [I formally withdraw all of my consent. ]
HOW TRUE IT IS, EVIL SERVANTS OVERLOOK THE 'LEGAL' REALITY = EVEN THOUGH IT'S THE LAW!
Federal Government was created for the security and happiness of the people. Executives, lawmakers, and members
of the Judiciary are inferior in the sense that they are in 'office' only to carry out and execute the constitutional
regime. The Preamble of the Constitution states that 'We the people' ordained and established the Constitution. The
Declaration of Independence stated that to insure 'certain unalienable Rights,' 'Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed' and 'That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.' SCHLESINGER v.
RESERVISTS Committee, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)(2). [The servants illegally overlook: the legal reality = It's the Law!]
BILL OF RIGHTS DENIES THOSE IN POWER ANY LEGAL OPPORTUNITY TO COERCE CONSENT
Justice JACKSON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by
avoiding these beginnings. There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature or origin of
its authority. [We the People. ] We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies
those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
v. BARNETTE, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)(2). [Key: No forms or applications for We the People to sign as We the People of
the United States. In practice law enforcement will not let us alone and will use force to see our false slave ID. ]
FORCE IS ELIMINATED
Mr. Justice Brewer (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court: Force, under our system
of government, is eliminated. KANSAS v. STATE OF COLORADO, 206 U.S. 46 (1907)(2).
NO SANE PERSON WOULD KNOWINGLY RELINQUISH A RIGHT TO BE FREE OF COMPULSION - HENCE DECEPTION
Mr. Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
Because of the nature of the right to be free of compulsion, it would be pointless to ask whether a defendant knew
of it before he made a statement; no sane person would knowingly relinquish a right to be free of compulsion. [***]
In contrast, this case deals not with 'coercion,' but with 'consent,' a subtly different concept to which different
standards have been applied in the past. Freedom from coercion is a substantive right, guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Consent, however, is a mechanism by which substantive requirements, otherwise
applicable, are avoided. [Emphasis added. ] SCHNECKLOTH v. BUSTAMONTE, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)(2).
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AMERICAN VALUES: FREEDOM OF CHOICE - INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY - PERSONAL AUTONOMY
BROWN, J. (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin):
In assessing the reasonableness of the coercive nature of the implied consent statute, we first acknowledge that
coercion and duress need not be based on some act by the government which is physical or brutal in nature to
vitiate consent. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). Psychological compulsion may, in appropriate
cases, operate to overcome American values of freedom of choice, individual liberty and personal autonomy.
STATE of Wisconsin v. WINTLEND, 258 Wis.2d 875 (2003)(3). [Free choice to be our true status, free of fraud. ]
CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED PROVIDES A FUNDAMENTAL 'BASIS' FOR POWER

See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S., at 56, and n. 7 (noting that Bill of Rights is inapplicable to
tribes, and holding that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not give rise to a federal cause of action against the
tribe for violations of its provisions). This is all the more reason to reject an extension of tribal authority over those
who have not given the consent of the governed that provides a fundamental basis for power within our
constitutional system. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 172-173 (1982) (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting). DURO v. REINA, Chief of Police, Dept. of Pub. Safety, 495 U.S. 676 (1989)(2). [In a government of
laws under God, lawful jurisdiction is a matter of 'right' not 'might' and free of fraud and government deception. ]
ONLY BY CONSENT
Justice KENNEDY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: In this Nation each
sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed. ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2). [We govern.]
ONE OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE

Super important: 'All' power stems 'from' the consent of the people.
Justice THOMAS (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with CHIEF JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and Justice SCALIA join, dissenting:
Our system of government rests on one overriding principle: All power stems from the consent of the people. U.S.
TERM LIMITS INC. et al v. THORNTON et al, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2). [Sovereigns consent to 'just' powers only.]
PRINCIPLE ALL GOVERNMENTAL POWERS STEM FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE STATES
LIMITS v. THORNTON, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(2). [Not from U.S. citizens. See 10th Amendment reservation. ]
THE 'PRINCIPLE' GOVERNMENT RESTS UPON THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED
"The constitutional protection does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered.' " New York Times, supra, at 271, (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)). I
appreciate this Court's concern with redressing injuries to an individual's reputation. But as long as it is clear to the
reader that he is being offered conjecture and not solid information, the danger to reputation is one we have chosen
to tolerate in pursuit of " 'individual liberty [and] the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a
whole.'" Falwell, supra 485 U.S., at 50-51 (quoting Bose Corp., 466 U.S., at 503- 504). Readers are as capable of
independently evaluating the merits of such speculative conclusions as they are of evaluating the merits of pure
opprobrium. Punishing such conjecture protects reputation only at the cost of expunging a genuinely useful
mechanism for public debate. "In a society which takes seriously the principle that government rests upon the
consent of the governed, freedom of the press must be the most cherished tenet." MILKOVICH V. LORAIN
JOURNAL CO. 497 U.S. 1 (1990)(2). [We take that principle seriously and therefore our right to be let alone. ]
Are you uniting and setting up a group of family and friends withdrawing consent (like many others are doing) and so you have
witnesses in court if needed that IRS and government refuses to ascertain the Truth and answer our questions? The unjust powers of
government are derived from the consent of the governed. They cannot lawfully coerce your consent. I deny I knowingly, willingly, and
intelligently intended to be a member subjected to this abusive System of government of lies acting outside the Constitution.
14TH AMENDMENT AND THIS ACT SHOWS THEREAFTER THE LAW IS NOT LAWFULLY ENACTED = OVERTHROW
1 USC 101 The enacting clause of all Acts of Congress shall be in the following form: "Be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled." [But all acts are not! ]
Besides their claim of two (2) governments, their contrary counterfeit System ruling us in reverse is the one outside the
Constitution, and I understand since the 'Enacting clause Act' (a.k.a. the Dictionary Act) Feb. 27 1861 all of "the Laws of the United
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States" pursuant to Art VI are not under their authority: 'the United States' therefore cannot and are not lawfully enacted by 'the
Congress of the United States of America' (de jure), because they overthrew the Government of the United States and supplanted it
with 'United States' without lawful Constitutional authority, therefore 'non-constitutional,' hence, unconstitutional, and void.
Upon close inspection you will find there is an enacting clause in 'quotes' which is required by Law which is according to the
rules of proper English grammar. That enacting clause (the signature of the Lawful Legislature) is not the one they are using because
their System is outside the Constitution. Their treachery is the other enacting clause is 'deceptively similar' to the one required by Law
to deceive the gullible People. It is always in all capital letters, or any other form other than the true and correct form. In Alaska see
Article II Section 13. *** The enacting clause shall be: 'Be in enacted by the Legislature of the State of Alaska.' Yet the non-sovereign
stateless legislature does not follow the supreme Law and instead stealthily uses this seemingly harmless deceptively similar enacting
clause: 'BE IN ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA.' in violation of the commands of the Constitution. The Federal
non-sovereign stateless officials are not stupid. Do you believe they are so ignorant, or incompetent they cannot make the Law to the
Letter of the Law, and the Letter is not important and therefore neither is the Law?
The difference between fraud and mere error is self-evident: If 'the Law' is in error they would prudently correct it. If it is
fraud, they pretend the Letter of the 'the Law' does not need to be correct so they can apply it against you anyway using some pathetic
excuse like that’s just 'semantics'. It is logically prudent to object to any law that is not to the Letter of the Law.
For the original bona fide enacting clause of "the Laws of the United States" see the Forty First Congress Sess. III Ch. LXXI (71)
p. 431. Feb. 27, 1871. You will see it says, Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That the enacting clause of all acts of Congress hereafter enacted shall be in the following form: "Be it enacted by
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled." But after that none of them are!
None of their following acts have that specified form. All of the acts of Congress from the beginning (1776) until Feb. 27,
1871 were the same 'form' (Italics) to wit: 'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled', but after Feb. 27, 1871 the law mandates 'all acts hereafter shall be in the following form' (i.e. standard upright
letters as quoted to wit: 'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled' but all of the acts of Congress thereafter are not in the standard English grammar upright form as 'quoted' because they
were not lawful acts under the authority of 'the Congress of the United States of America' (de jure) because they conspired to go
outside the Constitution in a pretended government engaged in War deceptively styled, 'United States.' Hence, the Congress of the
United States, or 'U.S. Congress' is 100% and the status of the Nation is composed of citizens of the Federal government in D.C..
That is further demonstrated by going to the Law Library and inspecting the statute books for yourself, a must see. The
undeniable fact is that pre-Civil War, the volumes were styled the 'Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America' under the
authority of Congress,' but post-Civil War they were changed to the 'Revised' Laws of THE UNITED STATES with 'no' claim of being
under the authority of the de jure Congress. Today, they charge, indict, incarcerate Americans with mere private copyright 'United
States Code' a.k.a. the STATUTE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. Their "private" copyright Code (Statutes) of non-sovereigns needlessly
enslaving men, women and children in the Land of the Free for the ruling elite’s profit and convenience. Where the Law ends tyranny
begins. Apply the above foregoing knowledge to the cases below.
Outside or 'beyond the Constitution' or the powers it invests
'EVERY' ACT MUST BE A VIOLATION OF DUTY, AN 'USURPATION'
It can "never" be appealed to for the destruction of the 'supreme' authority = We the People
Justice DANIEL (the supreme Court of the United States):

The principle stare decisis, adopted by the courts in order to give stability to private rights, and to prevent the
mischiefs incident to mutations for light and insufficient causes, is doubtless a wholesome rule of decision when
derived from legitimate and competent authority, and when limited to the necessity which shall have demanded its
application; but, like every other rule, must be fruitful of ill when it shall be wrested to the suppression of reason or
duty, or to the arbitrary maintenance of injustice, of palpable error, or of absurdity. Such an application of this rule
must be necessarily to rivet upon justice, upon social improvement and happiness, the fetters of ignorance, of
wrong, and usurpation. It is a rule which, whenever applied, should be derived from a sound discretion, a
discretion having its origin in the regular and legitimate powers of those who assert it. It can never be appealed to
in derogation or for the destruction of the supreme authority, of that authority which created and which holds in
subordination the agents whose functions it has defined, and bounded by clear and plainly-marked limits.
Wherever the Constitution commands, discretion terminates. Considerations of policy or convenience, if ever
appealed to, I had almost said if ever imagined in derogation of its mandate, become an offence. Beyond the
Constitution or the powers it invests, every act must be a violation of duty, an usurpation. MARSHALL v. THE
BALTIMORE & OHIO R.R. CO., 57 U.S. 314 (1853)(2). [Praise God for saving our sovereign immunity = our
absolute right to be let alone, to keep corrupt government (men) subordinate and in check to secure our Liberty. ]
MENACE - TO COMMIT MONSTROUS CRIME

Congressional flexibility is desirable, of course--but only within the bounds of federal power established by the
Constitution. Beyond those bounds (the theory of our Constitution goes), it is a menace. COLLEGE SAVINGS
BANK v. FLORIDA, 527 U.S. 666 (1999)(2). [Apply to outside the Constitution = Void = Lawlessness = Satanic?]
NO ONE IS BOUND TO OBEY UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONFERS NO POWER ON ANY ONE - IS NO LAW
CHRISTIANSON, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of North Dakota) concurring specially:
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"The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law,
but is wholly void, and in legal contemplation is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. Since an
unconstitutional law is void, it imposes no duties and confers no power or authority on any one; it affords
protection to no one, and no one is bound to obey it, and no courts are bound to enforce it." 6 R. C. L. p. 117.
DALY v. BEERY Cty. Auditor, 45 N.D. 287 (1920)(1). [See "no one is bound to obey" in BRUCE v. C.I.R. 19 B.T.A. 777
(1930)(1); FLOURNOY v. FIRST NAT. BANK, 197 La. 1067 (1941)(1); ANDERSON v. LEHMKUHL, 119 Neb. 451 (1930)(1). ]
WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY THERE CAN BE NO STATE! - NOR BINDING LAW - BINDS NO ONE - IS NOT LAW
ALLEN, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of New Hampshire):
The state's life is continuous and the state maintains itself irrespective of changes in the government, which is but
a means of exercising the state's sovereignty. The independence of the people forming the state was not an
independence of the Assembly to destroy, suppress or curtail their independence. The continued existence of the
state requires the continued existence of the essentials of statehood. [Constitution. ] Without sovereignty there can
be no state, if it is to be independent. The Assembly had no power to qualify or modify the sovereignty of the state
or the independence of the people. It could not deprive the people of their right to govern themselves or to be
governed as they saw fit. The powers of sovereignty may be delegated, but not sovereignty itself. [***]
In principle, when a law is void, the state has not acted. "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it binds no
one, and protects no one." Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97. "*** if the Legislature has not acted under authority,
no action has been taken by the state ***." Conway v. Board, 89 N.H. 346, 348. Conduct of executive agents of the
state in treating a void statute as valid would seem to be equally in action on the part of the state. Its agents may no
more bind it in assuming the statute to be valid and acting upon the assumption than may the agents who have
assumed authority to enact it. If the legislature has acted ultra vires in the enactment of the statute, so do executive
agents of the state in enforcing it. If the state has not acted, it can hardly be charged as though it had acted. And not
having acted, it cannot be estopped as though it had acted. TRUSTEES OF PHILLIPS EX ACADEMY v. EXETER, 11
A.2d 569 (1940)(2). [Without sovereignty no Law of the sovereign: Code. Change of government = Outside Constitution.]
INFRINGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION IS VOID - THERE CAN BE NO MISSTEP

Justice THOMAS (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:
Our invalidation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act therefore falls comfortably within our proper role in reviewing
federal legislation to determine if it exceeds congressional authority as defined by the Constitution itself. As John
Marshall put it: "If [Congress] were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be
considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard.... They would declare it
void." 3 Debates 553 (before the Virginia ratifying convention); see also The Federalist No. 44, at 305 (J. Madison)
(asserting that if Congress exercises powers "not warranted by [the Constitution's] true meaning" the judiciary will
defend the Constitution); id., No. 78, at 526 (A. Hamilton) (asserting that the "courts of justice are to be considered
as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments"). Where, as here, there is a case or
controversy, there can be no "misstep," post, at 1657, in enforcing the Constitution. UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,
514 U.S. 549 (1995)(2). [Non-sovereigns have no sovereign right to govern under the Constitution. ]
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS NULL AND VOID - CONSTITUTION IS ABOVE CONGRESS AND THE STATES
HARLAN, J. (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
An unconstitutional law will be treated by the courts as null and void. Osborn v. Bank of U. S. 9 Wheat. 859;
Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 226.' [***] [I]n Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 625, that the constitution of the United States 'is
above and beyond the power of congress and the states, and is alike obligatory upon both; a state can no more
impair an existing contract by a constitutional provision than by a legislative act; both are within the prohibition of
the national constitution.' STATE OF LOUISIANA ex rel et al v. JUMEL, 107 U.S. 711 (1883)(2).
ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION IS VOID

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion,
shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The
exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The
principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is
supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their
respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. [***]
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the
legislature repugnant to the constitution is void. MARBURY v. MADISION, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)(2).
203
LAW REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION IS VOID - ALL DEPARTMENTS BOUND BY THE CONSTITUTION
Mr. Justice Brewer (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The constitutionality of an act of Congress is a matter always requiring the most careful consideration. [***] And
yet, when clear, if written constitutions are to be regarded as of value, the duty of the court is plain to uphold the
Constitution, although in so doing the legislative enactment falls. The reasoning in support of this was, in the early
history of this court, forcibly declared by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 177, and
nothing can be said to add to the strength of his reasoning. His language is worthy of quotation: 'The Constitution is
either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts,
and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
'If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if
the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its
own nature illimitable.
'Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the
legislature repugnant to the constitution is void. [Void being against the true intent of the People. ]
'This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered, by this court, as
one of the fundamental principles of our society. ...
'It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other,
the courts must decide on the operation of each.
'So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular
case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or
conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
'If, then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of
the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. [***]
'The particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that
courts as well as other departments are bound by that instrument.' [***]
The true spirit of constitutional interpretation in both directions is to give full, liberal construction to the
language, aiming ever to show fidelity to the spirit and purpose. [***]
Constitutional mandates are imperative. The question is never one of amount, but one of power. The
applicable maxim is, 'Obsta principiis,' not, 'De minimis non curat lex.' [***] 'In Philadelphia & S. Mail S. S. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, and Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, it was held that a tax on income received
from interstate commerce was a tax upon the interstate commerce itself, and therefore unauthorized. FAIRBANKS
v. U.S., 181 U.S. 283 (1901)(2). [Their Trick is: misapply the law over us = unconstitutional practices ]
AN ACT WHICH IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID OR INOPERATIVE DOES NOT REPEAL VALID ACTS
CORNELL, J. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut):
"Ordinarily where one statute specifically repeals another and attempts unconstitutionally to provide a substitute,
the provision of repeal will fall with the act of which it is a part. The question in every case is whether the legislature
intended that the repeal should take effect in any event; that is whether the repeal provision is severable." 102
A.L.R. Annotation, p. 803. "Unless it employs language showing an intent to repeal in any event and irrespective of
its unconstitutional provisions, an act which is invalid, or unconstitutional and void or inoperative does not repeal
another valid act... . OSBORN v. ZONING BOARD, 11 Conn.Supp. 489 (1943)(1). [Former laws v. Revised laws.]
IN REALITY NO LAW
WOODS, J. (Supreme Court of South Carolina):
But the distinction is that the courts are bound to treat unconstitutional enactments as void in whatever proceedings
they may be encountered. An unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law,
and the courts must liberate one suffering imprisonment under it just as if there had never been the form of trial,
conviction, and sentence. Ex parte HOLLMAN, 79 S.C. 9 (1908)(2).
A CASE THAT CANNOT BE TESTED BY PRINCIPLE IS NOT LAW - A THOUSAND TIMES DECLARED
JOHNSON, J. (supreme Court of the United States): If I need precedent to support me in this doctrine, I will cite the
example of this court, which, in the case of the United States v. Moore, February, 1805, acknowledged that in the
case of the United States v. Sims, February, 1803, it had exercised a jurisdiction it did not possess. Strange indeed
would be the doctrine, that an inadvertency once committed by a court shall ever after impose on it the necessity of
204
persisting in its error. A case that cannot be tested by principle is not law, and in a thousand instances have such
cases been declared so by courts of justice. EX PARTE BOLLMAN & SWARTWOUT, 8 U.S. 75 (1807)(2).
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS VOID AS NO LAW AND ILLEGAL AND VOID

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Without attempting to decide how far this case may be regarded as law for the guidance of this court, we are clearly
of opinion that the question raised in the cases before us is proper for consideration on habeas corpus. The validity
of the judgments is assailed on the ground that the acts of Congress under which the indictments were found are
unconstitutional. If this position is well taken, it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. An
unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offence created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not
merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment. It is true, if no writ of error
lies, the judgment may be final, in the sense that there may be no means of reversing it. But personal liberty is of so
great moment in the eye of the law that the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not deemed so conclusive
but that, as we have seen, the question of the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on
habeas corpus by a superior court or judge having authority to award the writ. We are satisfied that the present is one
of the cases in which this court is authorized to take such jurisdiction. We think so, because, if the laws are
unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired no jurisdiction of the causes. Its authority to indict and try the
petitioners arose solely upon these laws. EX PARTE SIEBOLD, 100 U.S. 371 (1879)(1). [The whole proceeding. ]
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACT IS NOT LAW - INOPERATIVE AS THOUGH IT HAD NEVER BEEN PASSED
FIELD, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. NORTON v. SHELBY CO.
STATE OF TENN. 118 U.S. 425 (1886)(2). [BRUCE v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 19 B.T.A. 777 (1930)(1).]
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS ILLEGAL AND VOID - CANNOT SUPERSEDE EXISTING VALID LAW
Their Code is of 100% non-sovereigns and outside the Constitution = non-constitutional = unconstitutional = not the Law = void.
Mr. Justice Lurton (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
'Concluding, as we do, that the statute, whilst it embraces subjects within the authority of Congress to regulate
commerce, also includes subjects not within its constitutional power, and that the two are so interblended in the
statute that they are incapable of separation, we are of the opinion that the courts below rightly held the statute to be
repugnant to the Constitution, and nonenforceable.'. Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.)
207 U. S. 463, 504.
That act was therefore as inoperative as if it had never been passed, for an unconstitutional act is not a
law, and can neither confer a right or immunity nor operate to supersede any existing valid law. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U. S. 425, 442; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S 371, 376. CHICAGO, IND. & LOIUS. RAIL CO. v.
HACKETT, 228 U.S. 559 (1913)(2). [Un-Constitutional really means contrary to the true intent of the People. ]
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law!
BESTOWS NO POWER - UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW CANNOT OPERATE TO SUPERSEDE EXISTING VALID LAW
HIGGINS, Justice (Supreme Court of Louisiana):
In the case of Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that an
unconstitutional statute is no law; that it is always unconstitutional; and that the judgment of the court declaring it so
is simply judicial recognition that the Legislature had transcended the provisions of the Constitution. We quote
from the language of the Court: '*** An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed.' In the case of Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, the same Court,
having declared a statute unconstitutional, said: '***That act was therefore as inoperative as if it had never been
passed, for an unconstituional act is not a law, and can neither confer a right or immunity nor operate to supersede
any existing valid law.'
The general rule is well stated in Volume XI, American Jurisprudence, verbo 'Constitutional Law,' Sec.
148, page 827, as follows: 'The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having form and name of
law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and in legal contemplation is as inoperative as if it had never been
passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been
enacted. Moreover, a construction of a statute which brings it in conflict with the Constitution will nullify it as
effectually as if it had, in express terms, been enacted in conflict therewith.
'Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no
rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no acts
performed under it. No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it because
only the valid legislative intent becomes the law to be enforced by the courts. ***
205
'A contract which rests on an unconstitutional statute is void and creates no obligation to be impaired by
subsequent legislation.'
Under the heading of Constitutional Law, 16 C.J.S., ß 101, page 290, we find the following statement:
'Acts Done under Unconstitutional Statutes. *** As a general rule, all acts done under an unconstitutional law are
void and of no effect, but acts that are merely incidental to an unconstitutional legislative enactment, it seems, may
be valid. The legislature may direct payment of expenses incurred under an unconstitutional statute ***.
'Official acts. *** Although the rule that an unconstitutional law is a nullity cannot be applied to work
hardship and impose liability on a public officer who, in performance of his duty, has acted in good faith in
reliance on the validity of a statute before any court has declared it invalid, in the absence of such circumstances, an
unconstitutional law affords no protection to officers who act under it, and officers cannot be punished for refusing
to obey such a statute. ***
'[Judgments.] Judgments and decrees rendered in the course of judicial proceedings under
unconstitutional statutes are, according to some authority, void and should be reversed. By other authority, a
judgment in a civil action under an unconstitutional statute is not void but merely voidable, and if such judgment
becomes final before the statute is declared unconstitutional, it is valid and binding and cannot be disturbed, [The
Constitution of the United States in article VI: anything contrary not with standing. ] unless it is void or voidable
for some other reason, at least, where the court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter and had
power to render the particular judgment. Where, however, all the proceedings have not been completed before the
statute purporting to give jurisdiction is held unconstitutional, and all the parties are before the court, relief from
such proceedings under the statute should be granted.'
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Constitutional Law, Vol. 16, ß 101, at page 290, we find the following
statement: 'As a general rule, all acts done under an unconstitutional law are void and of no effect. ***'
Due to the fact that situations may arise resulting from transactions and acts performed under an
unconstitutional statute, whereby the parties involved are placed in positions where it would be most unequitable to
follow the general rule that an unconstitutional statute was void ab initio and without any legal effect whatsoever, or
where it was impossible for the court to undo what had transpired under an unconstitutional statute and to restore the
parties to some reasonable position, the courts have recognized exceptions to the rule as a matter of public policy or
necessity in such instances.
In the case of Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank et al., 308 U.S. 371, the United States
Supreme Court said: 'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425; Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination,
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects,--with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations, deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination . These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. ***' FLOURNOY v. FIRST NAT. BANK, 197 La.
1067, 3 So.2d 244 (1941)(1). [See No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law! DALY v. BEERY Cty. Auditor,
(Supreme Court of North Dakota) 178 N.W. 104 (1920)(1); COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS OF the WEST VIRGINIA STATE BAR
v. George R. TRIPLETT, 180 W.Va. 533 (1988)(4); etc. (…consent of the governed. ]
JUDGES WILL NOT UPHOLD THEM - NOR WILL THE PEOPLE OBEY THEM!
Congress' power, said John Steele at the North Carolina convention, was not to be used to allow Congress to create
rotten boroughs; in answer to another delegate's suggestion that Congress might use its power to favor people living
near the seacoast, Steele said that Congress 'most probably' would 'lay the state off into districts,' and if it made laws
'inconsistent with the Constitution, independent judges will not uphold them, nor will the people obey them.'
[Emphasis added. ] 4 Id., at 71. WESBERRY v. SANDERS, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)(2). [Consent of the governed. ]
CANNOT BE A LEGAL CAUSE OF IMPRISONMENT

YOUNG, District Judge (United States District Court, for the District of Massachusetts):
As the Supreme Court has stated: The validity of the judgment is assailed on the ground that the act of Congress
under which the indictments were found are unconstitutional. If this position is well taken, it affects the foundation
of the whole proceedings. An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offense created by it is not a
crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of
imprisonment. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. at 376-77 (1). FIREMAN v. UNITED STATES of America, 20
206
F.Supp.2d 229 (1998)(3). [See the same in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995). Code of non-
sovereign stateless officials outside the constitution is hardly the true intent of the people = unconstitutional-void. ]
WHATEVER THE GOVERNMENT DOES "MUST BE LAWFUL!" - OR ILLEGAL AND VOID

MATTHEWS, J. (Supreme Court of the United States): The state itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible,
immutable. The government is an agent, and, within the sphere of the agency, a perfect representative; but outside
of that, it is a lawless usurpation. The constitution of the state is the limit of the authority of its government, and
both government and state are subject to the supremacy of the constitution of the United States, and of the laws
made in pursuance thereof. So that, while it is true in respect to the government of a state, as was said in Langford v.
U. S. 101 U. S. 341, that the maxim, that the king can do no wrong, has no place in our system of government; yet it
is also true, in respect to the state itself, that whatever wrong is attempted in its name is imputable to its
government, and not to the state, for, as it can speak and act only by law, whatever it does say and do must be
lawful. That which, therefore, is unlawful because made so by the supreme law, the constitution of the United
States, is not the word or deed of the state, but is the mere wrong and trespass of those individual persons who
falsely speak and act in its name. [***] [Important distinction between the state and the government of the state. ]
The defendant in error is not her officer, her agent, or her representative, in the matter complained of; for
he has acted not only without her authority, but contrary to her express commands. POINDEXTER v.
GREENHOW, 114 U.S. 270 (1885)(3). [Must be lawful: State of Mo. v. Homesteaders, 16 F.Supp. 69 (1936)(1). ]
WHATEVER THE STATE DID MUST BE LAWFUL! - OR ILLEGAL AND VOID = ABSENCE OF VALID AUTHORITY
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN, Justice MARSHALL, and Justice BLACKMUN join, dissenting:
When an official acts pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the Court reasoned, the absence of valid authority
leaves the official ultra vires his authority, and thus a private actor stripped of his status as a representative of the
sovereign.) (fn 25) In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court was merely restating a settled principle
when it wrote: "The Act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the
State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and
one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part
of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void
because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person
to the consequences of his individual conduct." Id., 159-160.(fn 26) [***][Outside Constitution all private actors. ]
fn 25. "That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but it is not a law of the State of
Virginia. The State has passed no such law, for it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of
law, has not done. The Constitution of the United States, and its own contract, both irrepealable by any act on its
part, are the law of Virginia; and that law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter taken, to be without warrant of law, and
therefore a wrong. He stands, then, stripped of his official character; and, confessing a personal violation of the
plaintiff's rights for which he must personally answer, he is without defence." Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S., at
288. [***] Since the ideal State could only act by law, whatever the State did must be lawful. On this ground a
distinction was drawn between the State and its officers, and since the State could not commit an illegal act, any
such act was imputed to government officers. PENNHURST v. HALDERMAN, 465 U.S. 89 (1983)(2). [16F.Supp.69.]
I object to their Code since it is not lawfully enacted as the Law of the Land under the authority of 'The United States' by the Congress
of the United States of America composed of We the sovereign People, instead these officials act as 100% non-sovereign stateless U.S.
citizens, via voter registration, social security number, driver license etc. Their Code of non-sovereigns is merely passed into their
private copyright code 'positive law' (custom- private commerce statutes-war time policy = lawlessness) and misapplied over us.
NO COURT RULE MAKING OR LEGISLATION CAN ABROGATE THE CONSTITUTION

Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional dimension have evolved decade by decade. As courts have been
presented with the need to enforce constitutional rights, they have found means of doing so. That was our
responsibility when Escobedo was before us and it is our responsibility today. Where rights secured by the
Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them. MIRANDA v.
STATE OF ARIZONA v. STATE OF NEW YORK, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)(2). [Praise God, nothing has or can lawfully
change our sovereign birth-right and He has not allow this corrupt so called government to be sovereign or lawful. ]
OUR SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS - OUR SAVING GRACE "FOR THE SECURITY OF A FREE STATE"
When the Truth becomes fruitless for defense = 2nd Amendment. Gun statutes are for a "person" engaged in commerce.
Armed Americans make polite servants (mere men). Pre-existing right to Keep & Bear implies use, without permission?
Sovereigns need no permission from their servants. Control or take arms is so the elite can reign tyranny over the defenseless.
207
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc:
Judges know very well how to read the Constitution broadly when they are sympathetic to the right being asserted.
We have held, without much ado, that "speech, or ... the press" also means the Internet, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997), and that "persons, houses, papers, and effects" also means public telephone booths, see Katz v. U.S.,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). When a particular right comports especially well with our notions of good social policy, we
build magnificent legal edifices on elliptical constitutional phrases--or even the white spaces between lines of
constitutional text. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.1996 en banc) rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). But, as the panel amply demonstrates, when we're none too
keen on a particular constitutional guarantee, we can be equally ingenious in burying language that is
incontrovertibly there. [Bill of Rights are not a delegation of Power, they are express prohibitions = forbidden. Mine]
It is wrong to use some constitutional provisions as springboards for major social change while treating
others like senile relatives to be cooped up in a nursing home until they quit annoying us. As guardians of the
Constitution, we must be consistent in interpreting its provisions. If we adopt a jurisprudence sympathetic to
individual rights, we must give broad compass to all constitutional provisions that protect individuals from tyranny.
If we take a more statist approach, we must give all such provisions narrow scope. Expanding some to gargantuan
proportions while discarding others like a crumpled gum wrapper is not faithfully applying the Constitution; it's
using our power as federal judges to constitutionalize our personal preferences.
The able judges of the panel majority are usually very sympathetic to individual rights, but they have
succumbed to the temptation to pick and choose. Had they brought the same generous approach to the Second
Amendment that they routinely bring to the First, Fourth and selected portions of the Fifth, they would have had no
trouble finding an individual right to bear arms. Indeed, to conclude otherwise, they had to ignore binding
precedent. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), did not hold that the defendants lacked standing to raise a
Second Amendment defense, even though the government argued the collective rights theory in its brief. See
Kleinfeld Dissent at 586-587; see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller's Tale: A Reply to
David Yassky, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 113, 117-18 (2002) . The majority falls prey to the delusion--popular in
some circles--that ordinary people are too careless and stupid to own guns, and we would be far better off leaving all
weapons in the hands of professionals on the government payroll. But the simple truth--born of experience--is
that tyranny thrives best where government need not fear the wrath of an armed people. Our own sorry history
bears this out: Disarmament was the tool of choice for subjugating both slaves and free blacks in the South. In
Florida, patrols searched blacks' homes for weapons, confiscated those found and punished their owners without
judicial process. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L.J. 309, 338 (1991). In the North, by contrast, blacks exercised their right to
bear arms to defend against racial mob violence. Id. at 341-42. As Chief Justice Taney well appreciated, the
institution of slavery required a class of people who lacked the means to resist. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857) (finding black citizenship unthinkable because it would give blacks the right to
"keep and carry arms wherever they went"). A revolt by Nat Turner and a few dozen other armed blacks could be
put down without much difficulty; one by four million armed blacks would have meant big trouble.
All too many of the other great tragedies of history--Stalin's atrocities, the killing fields of Cambodia, the
Holocaust, to name but a few-- were perpetrated by armed troops against unarmed populations. Many could well
have been avoided or mitigated, had the perpetrators known their intended victims were equipped with a rifle and
twenty bullets apiece, as the Militia Act required here. See Kleinfeld Dissent at 578-579. If a few hundred Jewish
fighters in the Warsaw Ghetto could hold off the Wehrmacht for almost a month with only a handful of weapons, six
million Jews armed with rifles could not so easily have been herded into cattle cars. My excellent colleagues have
forgotten these bitter lessons of history. The prospect of tyranny may not grab the headlines the way vivid stories
of gun crime routinely do. But few saw the Third Reich coming until it was too late. The Second Amendment is a
doomsday provision, one designed for those exceptionally rare circumstances where all other rights have failed--
where the government refuses to stand for reelection and silences those who protest; where courts have lost the
courage to oppose, or can find no one to enforce their decrees. However improbable these contingencies may seem
today, facing them unprepared is a mistake a free people get to make only once. [Super Emphasis added. ]
Fortunately, the Framers were wise enough to entrench the right of the people to keep and bear arms within
our constitutional structure. The purpose and importance of that right was still fresh in their minds, and they spelled
it out clearly so it would not be forgotten. Despite the panel's mighty struggle to erase these words, they remain,
and the people themselves can read what they say plainly enough: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. ['Not a grant of power' a
limitation and prohibition to secure the right of sovereigns to 'bear' arms to protect themselves against injury. ]
The sheer ponderousness of the panel's opinion--the mountain of verbiage it must deploy to explain away
these fourteen short words of constitutional text-- refutes its thesis far more convincingly than anything I might say.
The panel's labored effort to smother the Second Amendment by sheer body weight has all the grace of a sumo
wrestler trying to kill a rattlesnake by sitting on it--and is just as likely to succeed. SILVEIRA v. LOCKYER, 328
F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003)(3). [The Bill of Rights are prohibitions not clauses of Power. No provision of power to legislate
over our right to bear arms. They avoid arguing our pre-existing 'sovereign right to fight' with arms in self-defense against
208
tyrannical government (evil men). Luke 22:36 "… he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one." ]
Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God. Thomas Jefferson

Watch the News, even the poor peasants and children of many enslaved countries carry and use automatic weapons
etc. to defend themselves against the N.W.O. ruling elite = evil men. Their overthrow is to enslave not for freedom.
OUR SELF DEFENSE FOR A FREE STATE AND TO RESIST USURPATION BY IMMORAL SERVANTS COMMITING CRIMES
JUSTICE ALITO (Sup. Ct. of the U.S.) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court:
We have previously held that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply with full force to both the
Federal Government and the States. Applying the standard that is well established in our case law, we hold that the
Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States. [***] The Court held that other fundamental rights-rights
that predated the creation of the Federal Government and that “the State governments were created to establish and
secure”- were not protected by the Clause. Id., 16 Wall. 36, 76. [***]
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” (Emphasis added.) [***]
The Court wrote that the right of bearing arms for a lawful purpose “is not a right granted by the
Constitution” and is not “in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.” Id., 92 U. S., at 553. [***]
A Our decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer. Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal
systems from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is “the central
component” of the Second Amendment right. 554. [***] Citing Jewish, Greek, and Roman law, Blackstone wrote
that if a person killed an attacker, “the slayer is in no kind of fault whatsoever, not even in the minutest degree; and
is therefore to be totally acquitted and discharged, with commendation rather than blame.” 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 182 (reprint 1992). [Are we not being illegally attacked via fraud? ][***]
St. George Tucker, for example, described the right to keep and bear arms as “the true palladium of liberty”
and explained that prohibitions on the right would place liberty “on the brink of destruction.” 1 Blackstone’s
Commentaries, Editor’s App. 300 (S. Tuckered. 1803); see also W. Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United
States of America, 125–126 (2d ed. 1829) (reprint 2009); 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States §1890, p. 746 (1833) (“The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the
palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary
power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and
triumph over them”). [***] The Apologies for the Crime: The True Remedy, Speech of Hon. Charles Sumner in the
Senate of the United States 64–65 (1856). Indeed, the 1856 Republican Party Platform protested that in Kansas the
constitutional rights of the people had been “fraudulently and violently taken from them” and the “right of the
people to keep and bear arms” had been “infringed.” National Party Platforms 1840–1972, p. 27 (5th ed. 1973). [***]
Cramer, “This Right is Not Allowed by Governments That Are Afraid of The People”. MCDONALD v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, 561 U. S. __ (2010). [Corrupt servants fear and fail to secure our pre-existing rights. ]
STATE ITSELF ABETS ORGANIZED TERRORISM = OUR ILLEGAL SUBJECTION BY THEM TO STEAL
Our corrupt servants arrogant indifference to their crimes against the people in contempt of the Law, justice and right?
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, with Circuit Judges KOZINSKI, O'SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON join, dissenting:
When the state itself abets organized terrorism, the right of the people to keep and bear arms against a tyrant
becomes inseparable from the right to self-defense. SILVEIRA v. LOCKYER, 328 F.3d 567 (2003)(3). [How true!]
NO CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION COULD BY ANY RULE GIVE CONGRESS POWER TO DISARM THE PEOPLE
GOULD, Circuit Judge, with whom O'SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, TALLMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
Those who debated and framed the Bill of Rights were educated in practical political concepts and doubtless
recognized that an opening gambit for tyrants is to disarm the public. [***]
The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia must be taken, shall
have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no permission or regulation of law for the purpose. [***].
In A View of the Constitution of the United States of America, Rawle wrote of the Second Amendment that
"[t]he prohibition is general. No clause of the Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give
congress a power to disarm the people." William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of
America, 125-26 (2d ed. 1829). Similarly, Justice Story emphasized that "[t]he right of the citizens to keep, and
bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral
check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the
first instance, enable the people to resist, and triumph over them." 3 Joseph Story, Com. on the Constitution § 1890
(1833). NORDYKE v. KING, 364 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2004)(3). [Statutes apply to a person to deceive the people.]
MADMEN: CONGRESS MUST BE MAD TO FORM ANY PROJECT OF TYRANNY OVER THE PEOPLE
+ IT MUST BE YOUR OWN FAULT IF YOU BECOME ENSLAVED!
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Appendix: Brutus, Alexandria VIRGINIA JOURNAL, December 6, 1787 (excerpt reprinted in Young, at 144) ("The
powers which the people delegate to their rulers are completely defined, and if they should assume more than is
there warranted they would soon find that there is a power in the United States of America
paramount to their own, which would bring upon them the just resentment of an injured people."; Cassius XI,
Boston Massachusetts Gazette, December 25, 1787 (excerpt reprinted in Young, at 179) ("[O]f what use would be a
bill of rights, in the present case? ... It can only be to resort to when it is supposed that Congress have infringed the
unalienble rights of the people: but would it not be much easier to resort to the federal constitution, to
see if therein power is given to Congress to make the law in question? If such power is not given, the law is in fact
a nullity, and the people will not be bound thereby.; [***]
4. Federalists argue bill of rights not needed as Americans, used to freedom, would not allow infringement of rights.
Letter from William Pierce to St. George Tucker (September 28, 1787) (reprinted in Young, at 29) ("I set this down
as a truth founded in nature, that a nation habituated to freedom will never remain quiet under an invasion of its
liberties."); A CITIZEN OF PHILADELPHIA [Pelatiah Webster], THE WEAKNESS OF BRUTUS EXPOSED, November
8, 1787 (reprinted in Young, at 85) ("[S]hould they [Congress] assume tyrannical powers, and make incroachments
on liberty without the consent of the people, they would soon attone for their temerity, with shame and disgrace,
and probably with their heads."); The State Soldier, Richmond VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE, January 16,
1788 (excerpt reprinted in Young, at 209) ("[T]here is nothing in this constitution itself that particularly bargains for
a surrender of your liberties, it must be your own faults if you become enslaved. Men in power may usurp
authorities under any constitution--and those they govern may oppose their tyranny."); [***]
A CITIZEN OF AMERICA [Federalist Noah Webster], AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING
PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (October 10, 1787) (reprinted in Young, at 40) ("Before a standing
army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in almost every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power
in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and
constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretense, raised in the United States." );
[***] Number VI, Philadelphia FEDERAL GAZETTE, November 7, 1788 (excerpt reprinted in Young, at 556) ("We
proceed to consider the amendments that regard the military power of the federal government.... While the people
have property, arms in their hands, and only a spark of a noble spirit, the most corrupt congress must be mad to
form any project of tyranny." UNITED STATES of America v. EMERSON, 270 F.3d 203 (2001)(2). [Is mad. ]
THE 'NATURAL RIGHT' OF RESISTANCE
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges KOZINSKI, O'SCANNLAIN, and T.G. NELSON join, dissenting:
And a core value protected by the Second Amendment for "the people" was "the Right of the people to
alter or abolish" tyrannical government, as they had done a decade before. The concept had been established by law
in England as well, after its revolution from 1640 to 1660. In 1765, Blackstone explained the right of every
Englishman "of having arms for their defence" arose from "the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,
when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression." [***]
As Blackstone describes the "natural right" of an Englishman to keep and bear arms, the arms are for
personal defense as well as resistance to tyranny. [***] [Keep and bear logically implies use. ] When the state itself
abets organized terrorism, the right of the people to keep and bear arms against a tyrant becomes inseparable from
the right to self-defense. SILVEIRA v. LOCKYER, 328 F.3d 567 (9 th Cir. 2003)(3). [Oppression = Crime?: A
tyrannical state = men acting as government outside the Constitution illegally subjecting us to steal by deception. ]
HEAVEN KNOWS OUR GOVERNMENT ORIGINATED UPON REVOLUTION = OVERTHROW FOR FREEDOM
Ye know the tree by its fruit: It is doubtful criminals will concede nor repent for their crimes against the people.
Chief Justice VINSON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
That experience is written into our Constitution in the following provision of Article VI' 'The Senators and
Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States.' [Bound by Oath to support the Constitution of the people means bound to support the people. ] [***]
Mr. Justice JACKSON, concurring and dissenting, each in part. [***]
1. The goal of the Communist Party is to seize powers of government by and for a minority rather than to
acquire power through the vote of a free electorate. It seeks not merely a change of administration, or of Congress,
or reform legislation within the constitutional framework. Its program is not merely to socialize property more
rapidly and extensively than the other parties are doing. While the difference between other parties in these matters
is largely as to pace, the Communist Party's difference is one of direction.
The Communist program only begins with seizure of government, which then becomes a means to impose
upon society an organization on principles fundamentally opposed to those presupposed by our Constitution. It
purposes forcibly to recast our whole social and politial structure after the Muscovite model of police-state
dictatorship. It rejects the entire religious and cultural heritage of Western civilization, as well as the American
economic and political systems. This Communist movement is a belated counter-revolution to the American
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Revolution, designed to undo the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and our Bill of Rights, and
overturn our system of free, representative self-government.
Goals so extreme and offensive to American tradition and aspiration obviously could not be attained or
approached through order or with tranquility. If, by their better organization and discipline, they were successful,
more candid Communists admit that it would be to an accompaniment of violence, but at the same time they
disclaim responsibility by blaming the violence upon those who engage in resistance or reprisal. It matters little by
whom the first blow would be struck; no one can doubt that an era of violence and oppression, confiscations and
liquidations would be concurrent with a regime of Communism. [***]
Indeed all ideological struggles, religious or political, are primarily battles for dominance over the minds
of people. It is not to be supposed that the age-old readiness to try to convert minds by pressure or suppression,
instead of reason and persuasion, is extinct. Our protection against all kinds of fanatics and extremists, none of
whom can be trusted with unlimited power over others, lies not in their forbearance but in the limitations of our
Constitution.
It happens that the belief in overthrow of representative government by force and violence which Congress
conditionally proscribes is one that I agree is erroneous. But 'if there is any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought--not free thought for those who
agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.' Holmes, J., dissenting in United States v. Schwimmer, 279
U.S. 644, 654--655. Moreover, in judging the power to deny a privilege to think otherwise, we cannot ignore the fact
that our own Government originated in revolution and is legitimate only if overthrow by force may sometimes be
justified. That circumstances sometimes justify it is not Communist doctrine but an old American belief. (fn 11).
(fn 11). Nothing is more pernicious than the idea that every radical measure is 'Communistic' or every liberal-
minded person a 'Communist.' One of the tragedies of our time is the confusion between reform and Communism--
a confusion to which both the friends and enemies of reform have contributed, the one by failing to take a clear
stand against Communists and Communism and the other by characterizing even the most moderate suggestion of
reform as 'Communistic' and its advocates as 'Communists.' Unquestioning idolatry of the status quo has never
been an American characteristic.
The men who led the struggle forcibly to overthrow lawfully constituted British authority found moral
support by asserting a natural law under which their revolution was justified, and they broadly proclaimed these
beliefs in the document basic to our freedom. Such sentiments have also been given ardent and rather extravagant
expression by Americans of undoubted patriotism. (fn 12) Most of these utterances were directed against a tyranny
which left no way to change by suffrage. [Like today, It's the 'System' Neo. ] It seems to me a perversion of their
meaning to quote them, as the Communists often do, to sanction violent attacks upon a representative government
which does afford such means. But while I think Congress may make it a crime to take one overt step to use or to
incite violence or force against our Government, I do not see how in the light of our history, a mere belief that one
has a natural right under some circumstances to do so can subject an American citizen to prejudice any more than
possession of any other erroneous belief. Can we say that men of our time must not even think about the
propositions on which our own Revolution was justified? Or may they think, provided they reach only one
conclusion--and that the opposite of Mr. Jefferson's?
(fn 12). A surprising catalogue of statements could be compiled. The following are selected from Mencken, A New
Dictionary of Quotations, under the rubric 'Revolution': 'Whenever any government becomes destructive of these
ends (life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness) it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new
government, laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their safety and happiness.' Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776.
'The community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish government, in
such manner as shall be by that community judged most conducive to the public weal.' The Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights, 1776. 'It is an observation of one of the profoundest inquirers into human affairs that a
revolution of government is the strongest proof that can be given by a people of their virtue and good sense.' John
Adams, Diary, 1786. 'What country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that
their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms.' Thomas Jefferson, Letter to W. S. Smith, Nov.
13, 1787. 'An oppressed people are authorized whenever they can to rise and break their fetters.' Henry Clay,
Speech in the House of Representatives, March 4, 1818. 'Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the
power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government and form a new one that suits them better.'
Abraham Lincoln, Speech in the House of Representatives, 1848. 'All men recognize the right of revolution: that is,
the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and
unendurable.' H. D. Thoreau, An Essay on Civil Disobedience, 1849. 'This country, with its institutions, belongs to
the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government they can exercise their
constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.' Abraham Lincoln,
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861. 'Whenever the ends of Government are perverted, [Truth of the Law, for Justice. ]
and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the People may, and of a
right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government; the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power
and oppression is absurd, slavish and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.' Declaration of Rights of
211
Maryland, 1867. 'The right of revolution is an inherent one. When people are oppressed by their government, it is
a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal
from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable.' U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, I,
1885. Quotations of similar statements could be multiplied indefinitely. Of course, these quotations are out of their
context and out of their times. And despite their abstract theories about revolt, it should also be noted that Adams,
Jefferson, Lincoln and Grant were uncompromising in putting down any show of rebellion toward the Government
they headed. [Withdrawl from government outside the Constitution is certainly justified in America? ]
The revolutionary origin of our own Government has inclined Americans to value revolution as a means
to liberty and loosely to think that all revolutionists are liberals. The fact is, however, that violent revolutions are
rare which do more in the long run than to overthrow one tyranny to make way for another. The cycle from revolt to
reaction has taken less than a score of bloody years in the great revolutions. The Puritan Commonwealth under
Cromwell led but to the Restoration; the French by revolution escaped from the reign of Louis XVI to the
dictatorship of Napoleon; the Russians overthrew the Czar and won the dictatorship of Lenin and Stalin; the
Germans deposed the Kaiser and fell victims of a dictatorship by Hitler. I am convinced that force and violence do
not serve the cause of liberty as well as nonviolence. See Fischer, Gandi and Stalin, passim. But the sentiments I
have quoted have strong appeal to the impetuous and are deeply imbedded in American tradition.
While the Governments, State and Federal, have expansive powers to curtail action, and some small
powers to curtail speech or writing, I think neither has any power, on any pretext, directly or indirectly to attempt
foreclosure of any line of thought. Our forefathers found the evils of free thinking more to be endured than the evils
of inquest or suppression. They gave the status of almost absolute individual rights to the outward means of
expressing belief. I cannot believe that they left open a way for legislation to embarrass or impede the mere
intellectual processes by which those expressions of belief are examined and formulated. This is not only because
individual thinking presents no danger to society, but because thoughtful, bold and independent minds are essential
to wise and considered self-government. Progress generally begins in skepticism about accepted truths. Intellectual
freedom means the right to re-examine much that has been long taken for granted. A free man must be a reasoning
man, and he must dare to doubt what a legislative or electoral majority may most passionately assert. The danger
that citizens will think wrongly is serious, but less dangerous than atrophy from not thinking at all. Our Constitution
relies on our electorate's complete ideological freedom to nourish independent and responsible intelligence and
preserve our democracy from that submissiveness, timidity and herd-mindedness of the masses which would
foster a tyranny of mediocrity. The priceless heritage of our society is the unrestricted constitutional right of each
member to think as he will. Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we have no claim to it. It is not the
function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the
Government from falling into error. We could justify any censorship only when the censors are better shielded
against error than the censored.
The idea that a Constitution should protect individual nonconformity is essentially American and is the
last thing in the world that Communists will tolerate. Nothing exceeds the bitterness of their demands for freedom
for themselves in this country except the bitterness of their intolerance of freedom for others where they are in
power. (fn 13) An exaction of some profession of belief or nonbelief is precisely what the Communists would
enact--each individual must adopt the ideas that are common to the ruling group. Their whole philosophy is to
minimize man as an individual and to increase the power of man acting in the mass. [Mob rule = Democracy. ] If any
single characteristic distinguishes our democracy from Communism it is our recognition of the individual as a
personality rather than as a soulless part in the jigsaw puzzle that is the collectivist state. [Communist STATE. ]
Fn13. Prime Minister Atlee recently stated: 'I constantly get hypocritical resolutions protesting against alleged
infringements of freedom in this country. I get protests because we keep out from places where secret work is
carried on people who cannot be trusted. This from Communists who know that their fellows in Communist
countries carry on a constant purge and ruthlessly remove from office anyone who shows the slightest sign of
deviating from what their rulers consider to be orthodoxy. It is sickening hypocrisy.' London Times, Weekly
Edition, July 6, 1949.
I adhere to views I have heretofore expressed, whether the Court agreed, West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, or disagreed, see dissenting opinion in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
92, that our Constitution excludes both general and local governments from the realm of opinions and ideas, beliefs
and doubts, heresy and orthodoxy, political, religious or scientific. The right to speak out, or to publish, also is
protected when it does not clearly and presently threaten some injury to society [not government? ] which the
Government has a right to protect. Separate opinion, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516. But I have protested the
degradation of these constitutional liberties to immunize and approve mob movements, whether those mobs be
religious or political, radical or conservative, liberal or illiberal, Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157;
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13, or to authorize pressure groups to use amplifying devices to drown out the
natural voice and destroy the peace of other individuals. Saia v. People of New York, 334 U.S. 558; Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77. And I have pointed out that men cannot enjoy their right to personal freedom if fanatical
masses, whatever their mission, can strangle individual thoughts and invade personal privacy. Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, dissent at page 166. A catalogue of rights was placed in our Constitution, in my view, to protect the
212
individual in his individuality, and neither statutes which put those rights at the mercy of officials nor judicial
decisions which put them at the mercy of the mob are consistent with its text or its spirit.
I think that under our system, it is time enough for the law to lay hold of the citizen when he acts illegally,
or in some rare circumstances when his thoughts are given illegal utterance. I think we must let his mind alone. (fn
14). (fn 14): The Court appears to recognize and compound the constitutional weakness of this statute and, to save
this part of the oath from unconstitutionality, declines to read the text 'very literally.' It renders the Act to call for
disclaimer of belief in forcible overthrow only as an objective but not as a prophecy. And furthermore, one is
allowed to believe in forcible overthrow, even as an objective, so long as the belief does not relate to the
Government 'as it now exists.' I think we do not make an Act constitutional by making it vague but only compound
its invalidity. Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507.
The task of this Court to maintain a balance between liberty and authority is never done, because new
conditions today upset the equilibriums of yesterday. The seesaw between freedom and power makes up most of the
history of governments, which, as Bryce points out, on a long view consists of repeating a painful cycle from
anarchy to tyranny and back again. The Court's day-to-day task is to reject as false, claims in the name of civil
liberty which, if granted, would paralyze or impair authority to defend existence of our society, and to reject as false,
claims in the name of security which would undermine our freedoms and open the way to oppression. These are
the competing considerations involved in judging any measures which government may take to suppress or
disadvantage its opponents and critics. AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS v. DOUDS, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)(2).
SUBMISSIVENESS IS NOT OUR HERITAGE - REVOLUTION AND REBELLION - OVERTHROW FOR FREEDOM IS
Do you gullibly believe the high ranking military intel is not aware of and in on the overthrow to enslave the People by fraud?
The 'disease' that afflicts us. Is not by accident.
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs, dissenting:
The Army uses undercover agents to infiltrate these civilian groups and to reach into confidential files of students
and other groups. The Army moves as a secret group among civilian audiences, using cameras and electronic ears
for surveillance. The data it collects are distributed to civilian officials in state, federal, and local governments and to
each military intelligence unit and troop command under the Army's jurisdiction (both here and abroad); and these
data are stored in one or more data banks. [***]
This case involves a cancer in our body politic. [Government. ] It is a measure of the disease which afflicts
us. Army surveillance, like Army regimentation, is at war with the principles of the First Amendment. Those who
already walk submissively will say there is no cause for alarm. But submissiveness is not our heritage. The First
Amendment was designed to allow rebellion to remain as our heritage.
The Constitution was designed to keep government off the backs of the people. The Bill of Rights was
added to keep the precincts of belief and expression, of the press, of political and social activities free from
surveillance. LAIRD v. TATUM, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)(2). [Constitutional right to be let alone = Liberty-Freedom. ]
Mr. Justice JACKSON (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:

Communism, the antithesis of anarchism, (fn 5) appears today as a closed system of thought representing Stalin's
version of Lenin's version of Marxism. As an ideology, it is not one of spontaneous protest arising from American
working-class experience. It is a complicated system of assumptions, based on European history and conditions,
shrouded in an obscure and ambiguous vocabulary, which allures our ultra sophisticated intelligentsia more than
our hard-headed working people. From time to time it champions all manner of causes and grievances and makes
alliances that may add to its foothold in government or embarrass the authorities.
fn 5. Prof. Beard demonstrates this antithesis by quoting the Russian anarchist leader Bakunin, as follows: "Marx
is an authoritarian and centralizing communist. He wishes what we wish: the complete triumph of economic and
social equality, however, within the state and through the power of the state, through the dictatorship of a very
strong and, so to speak, despotic provisional government, that is, by the negation of liberty. His economic ideal is
the state as the sole owner of land and capital, tilling the soil by means of agricultural associations, under the
management of its engineers, and directing through the agency of capital all industrial and commercial associations.
"We demand the same triumph of economic and social equality through the abolition of the state and everything
called juridical right, which is according to our view the permanent negation of human right. We wish the
reconstruction of society and the establishment of the unity of mankind not from above downward through
authority, through socialistic officials, engineers and public technicians, but from below upward through the
voluntary federation of labor associations of all kinds emancipated entirely from the yoke of the state." Beard,
Individualism and Capitalism, 1 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 145, 158. [***]
The Communist Party advocates force only when prudent and profitable. Their strategy of stealth
precludes premature or uncoordinated outbursts of violence, except, of course, when the blame will be placed on
shoulders other than their own. They resort to violence as to truth, not as a principle but as an expedient. Force or
violence, as they would resort to it, may never be necessary, because infiltration and deception may be enough.
Force would be utilized by the Communist Party not to destroy government but for its capture. DENNIS et al v.
UNITED STATES, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)(2). [To many evil similarities. We appear to have been captured for now. ]
213
AMERICA ONCE EXTOLLED AS THE VOICE OF LIBERTY - IS MORE IN THE RUSSIAN IMAGE
Bill of rights was to allow men to assert their rights against government = against their servants.
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs, dissenting:
The Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents of government and official eavesdroppers away from assemblies of
people. The aim was to allow men to be free and independent and to assert their rights against government. There
can be no influence more paralyzing of that objective than Army surveillance. When an intelligence officer looks
over every noncomformist's shoulder in the library, or walks invisibly by his side in a picket line, or infiltrates his
club, the America once extolled as the voice of liberty heard around the world no longer is cast in the image which
Jefferson and Madison designed, but more in the Russian image, depicted in Appendix III to this opinion. LAIRD v.
TATUM, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)(2). [Democrats are Communists and Republicans are wantobees? ]
Were you aware of the disease afflicting us? Tell all of your 'military and law enforcement' friends and relatives about all of
the illegal government servant corruption going on so they are aware of it and can get ready to help return America to the Law of
Freedom, Truth and Justice for all. Remember no one is required to obey any unlawful order against the People peaceably fighting for
our freedom, Truth, Justice and right, in defiance of tyranny combined against us, our country, children, family, and friends.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE = OVERTHROW FOR FREEDOM NOT SLAVERY

106th Cong. 2nd Sess. H.Doc. 106-215: The Declaration of Independence was the promise; the Constitution was the fulfillment.
Sovereignty means the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power.
DOUGLAS, Justice (Supreme Court of Ohio) dissenting:

First, it should be noted that the concept of sovereign immunity is applicable in this country (if at all) to the federal
and state governments--not to the political subdivisions of the state. See, generally, Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts
(5 Ed.1984) 1033, 1043, 1051, Section 131. Corporate political subdivisions of the state are not sovereign powers.
By definition, a "sovereign" is "[a] person, body, or state in which independent and supreme authority is vested."
Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 1395. "Sovereignty" means "[t]he supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power
by which any independent state is governed." Id. at 1396. In this regard, a political subdivision of a state government
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered a sovereign power. Nevertheless, I will discuss the topic of
sovereign immunity before proceeding to the question whether there existed a common-law right to sue a political
subdivision of a state government for negligence.
The history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in this country is associated with the English common-
law concept that "the king can do no wrong." See Haas v. Hayslip (1977) 51 Ohio St.2d 135 (William B. Brown, J.,
dissenting). (fn 4) That concept evolved from the personal prerogatives of the King of England, who was considered
the fountain of justice and equity in the English common law. In the English feudal system, the lord of the manor
was not subject to suit in his own courts. See 1 Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law (2 Ed.1968) 518.
The king, as highest feudal lord, enjoyed this protection on the theory that no court was above him. Id. Further, the
king was considered the supreme power and was, thus, infallible. His person was considered sacred and the law
ascribed to him the attribute of sovereignty. Therefore, it was his personal royal prerogative not to be subjected to
suit in his own courts. See, generally, Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924), 34 Yale L.J. 1, 4.
Accordingly, the king could do no wrong. (fn 4) Haas v. Hayslip (1997) 51 Ohio St.2d 135 was overruled by
Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc. (1982) 2 Ohio St.3d 26.
Although the notion of sovereign immunity is best suited to a government of royal power, American courts
nonetheless accepted the doctrine in the early days of the republic. See Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 1033. However,
courts and commentators have remained mystified why the doctrine was ever accepted in this country. [Logically to
secure the right of the sovereign people against consent to another long train of abuse and usurpation. ] In Borchard's
writings on this subject (Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, supra, 34 Yale L.J. at 4-5) it is stated that:
"Nothing seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the King's courts was purely
personal. How it came to be applied in the United States of America, where the [royal] prerogative is unknown, is
one of the mysteries of legal evolution. [It is self-evident there is no legal 'right' of mere men over a sovereign man not
injuring man. ] Admitting its application to the sovereign and its illogical ascription as an attribute of sovereignty
generally, it is not easy to appreciate its application to the United States, where the location of sovereignty--
undivided sovereignty, as orthodox theory demands--is a difficult undertaking. It is beyond doubt that the
Executive in the United States is not historically the sovereign, and the legislature, which is perhaps the depository
of the widest powers, is restrained by constitutional limitations. The federal government is one of delegated powers
and the states are not sovereign, according to the Constitution, as demonstrated forcibly by the Civil War and the
resulting Amendments. That brings us to the only remaining alternative, that sovereignty resides in the American
electorate or the people." (Footnotes omitted.) See, also, Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist. (1961), 55 Cal.2d 211,
214-216. [***]
On July 4, 1776, our founding fathers declared independence from the British Crown. One of the specific
causes that impelled them to do so was the act of King George III in attempting to deprive the people of the United
States of the benefits to trial by jury. Although the Declaration of Independence is over two hundred years old, the
document continues to speak with great clarity and wisdom. It continues to define our very existence as a free and
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independent nation. We must remain mindful of that historic document, (fn5] which provides:
Fn5. The Declaration of Independence is reproduced in Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated, Appendix (1994)
405-406, and in Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code Annotated, 1 Constitutions (1995) 21-24.
"When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which
have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires
that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. "We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,--That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute
new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that
mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to
which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.--Such has been the patient sufferance of these
Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The
history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid
world. "He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. "He has
forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till
his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.
"He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would
relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.
"He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their
public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.
"He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions of the rights
of the people.
"He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative
powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the
mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within.
"He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for
Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions
of new Appropriations of Lands.
"He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary
powers. [Today Bar Association Lawyers in executive-Administrative private company for profit so called courts. ]
"He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of
their salaries. "He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people,
and eat out their substance. [Today officers are merchants charging for their services-said grievance herein. ]
"He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislature.
"He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.
"He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by
our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: [government outside the Constitution. ]
"For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
"For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the
Inhabitants of these States:
"For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:
"For imposing taxes on us without our Consent:
"For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury:
"For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences: [Victimless statutory crimes etc. ]
"For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary
government, and enlarging its Boundaries [U.S. is located in D.C. is the System over the entire country. ] so as to
render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies:
"For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our
Government: "For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for
us in all cases whatsoever. [government outside the Constitution: Code democracy vs. Constituional republic. ]
"He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. "He has
plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. " ***
"In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated
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Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which
may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
"Nor have We been wanting in attention to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of
attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the
circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and
we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably
interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity.
We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest
of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.
"We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to
the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good
People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be
Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political
connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved ***. And for the
support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each
other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor." (Emphasis added.) [They relied on God, and won. ]
We should also remain mindful of those brave souls who placed their signatures on the Declaration of
Independence, including John Hancock, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Button Gwinnett.
These great men and the document that they signed should forever remind us that there is nothing to be gained, and
there is everything to lose, by infringing upon the sacred and fundamental right to trial by jury. GLADON v.
GREATER CLEVELAND RTA, 75 Ohio St.3d 312 (1996)(2). [Those horrific grievances were grounds for war and
essentially the same "crimes" by todays System-UNITED police STATES. The Declaration was the promise, the Constitution
was the fulfillment. The 2nd Amendment is to secure our freedom after evil servants deny the 1st Amendment? ]
WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION?
HAINER, J. (Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma):
In a territory, the source of all power is Congress. But in the formation of a Constitution and state government the
power emanates from the people. The delegates to the convention were not the agents or representatives of
Congress, but they were the immediate agents and representatives of the people of the two territories. They derived
their power and authority from the people in their sovereign capacity. And this is in harmony with the principles of
the Declaration of Independence, which declares that "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed," and is in keeping with the doctrine announced by Lincoln when he
uttered the immortal words, that this is "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people." In Benner
v. Porter, 9 How. (U. S.) 242, the Supreme Court of the United States, in speaking of the source of power, with
reference to the admission of the territory of Florida, said: "The convention being the fountain of all political power,
from which flowed that which was embodied in the organic law, was, of course, competent to prescribe the laws and
appoint the officers under the Constitution, by means whereof the government could be put into immediate
operation." The convention, therefore, was created by the direct action of the people, and in the discharge of its
powers, duties, and obligations it performs one of the highest and most important acts of popular sovereignty. [***]
Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, on page 68, in discussing the attributes and objects of a
Constitution, says: "In considering state Constitutions, we must not commit the mistake of supposing that, because
individual rights are guarded and protected by them, they must also be considered as owing their origin to them.
These instruments measure the powers of the rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed. What is a
Constitution, and what are its objects? It is easier to tell what it is not than what it is. It is not the beginning of a
community, nor the origin of private rights. It is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government. It is
not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom. It grants no rights to the people, but is the
creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience." [***]
Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 549, states the true doctrine as follows: "The
government of the United States is one of delegated powers alone. Its authority is defined and limited by the
Constitution. All powers that are not granted to it by that instrument are reserved to the states or to the people. No
rights can be acquired under the Constitution or laws of the United States, except such as the government of the
United States has the authority to grant or secure. All that cannot be so granted or secured are left under the
protection of the states." Chief Justice Marshall, in the celebrated case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.)
409, 4 L. Ed. 579, in speaking of the division of sovereignty appertaining to the United States and to the states,
declared: "Does it belong to one more than to another? In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between
the government of the Union, and those of the states. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed
to it; and neither is sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to the other."
What, then, is a state Constitution, and what are its attributes? Judge Story, in his work on the Constitution
(volume 1, ß 339), says: "A Constitution is in fact a fundamental law or basis of government, and falls strictly
within the definition of law as given by Mr. Justice Blackstone. It is a rule of action prescribed by the supreme
power in a state, regulating the rights and duties of the whole community. It is a rule, as contradistinguished from a
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temporary or sudden order, permanent, uniform and universal." The late Justice Miller, of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in his valuable work on the Constitution (page 70), says: "A Constitution, in the American sense of
the word, is the written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited, and
defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise
for the benefit of the body politic." In Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 308, Fed. Cas. No. 16,857, 1 L. Ed. 391,
the court defines a constitution as follows: "What is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the
mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The Constitution is
certain and fixed, it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land. It is paramount to
the power of the Legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it." In Phoebe v. Jay 1
Ill. (Breese) 268, 271, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared that: "The term 'Constitution,' as applied to
government, is the form or government instituted by the people in their sovereign capacity, in which, first, the
principal and fundamental laws are established. A Constitution is the supreme, permanent, and fixed will of the
people in their original, unlimited, and sovereign capacity, and in it are determined to conditions, rights, and duties
of every individual of the community." The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the case of In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59
N. E. 359, (fn1) said: "In our system of government, a written Constitution is the highest expression of law. None
other emanates directly from the sovereign people themselves. It is the deliberate and affirmative utterance of the
sovereign majority." In Taylor v. Governor, 1 Ark. 27, it is said: "What is a Constitution? The Constitution of an
American state is the supreme, organized, and written will of the people acting in convention and assigning to the
different departments of the government their respective powers. It may limit and control the action of these
departments, or it may confer upon them any extent of power not incompatible with the federal compact. By an
inspection and examination of all the Constitutions of our own country, they will be found to be nothing more than
so many restrictions and limitations upon the departments of the government and the people." In 8 Cyc. 717, the
doctrine is clearly stated as follows: "A state Constitution consists of a number of fundamental laws passed by, and
alterable and repealable alone by, the people. It is superior to the will of the Legislature, the validity of whose acts is
determined by its provisions"-citing with approval Taylor v. Governor, 1 Ark. 21, 27; Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.)
121, 165; and Bates v. Kimball, 2 D. Chipm. (Vt.) 77, 84, where it is said: "When the people associate, and enter
into compact for the purpose of establishing government, that compact, whatever may be its provisions, or in
whatever language it may be written, is the Constitution of the state, revocable only by the people, or in the manner
they prescribe." FRANTZ v. AUTRY, 18 Okla. 561 (1907)(2).
OUR CONSTITUTION IS TO BE INTERPRETTED ACCORDING TO THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE
Limited by the very words of a written Constitution, postulates and principles of mere human law and intent of the people.
Zero intent of the people for our servants to invent pretended loop holes to enslave the people, or to do wrong to anyone.
The Constitution (form of government) was delineated by the mighty hand of the sovereign people in the nature of a
contract (compact) to limit the just powers of government by the written supreme Law of the Land. The Constitution is suppose to
be interpreted according to the very words of the Constitution according to the true intent of the People in Constitutional
Convention to 'secure' the pre-existing rights and Liberty etc. of the People and most strongly against government power. The
Preamble is their intent, and their first intent was to form a more 'perfect' Union intending every part of government (Law and
Justice) to continually strive towards perfect. How? The very next thing 'establish Justice,' and all to 'secure the Blessings of Liberty'
(our all), anything contrary is lawless usurpation via fraud. A written Constitution, like a contract is to 'limit' government power. Or
else why have one? To usurp the true intent of the People the lawyers invent bogus loophole scams. One scam is to pretend
government is authorized to do things because it's 'not prohibited' in the Constitution. If that were true, the joke's on us. Why have
a written Constitution (like a contract for building a home) if our servants (builder) can do whatever they want except what you
happen to remember to prohibit? Who knows, you may end up with a shanty instead of a castle, or Federalism instead of a (more)
perfect Union. We demand our servants continually strive towards perfection. Hence, zero tolerance for governmental imperfection.
When power is 'delegated to' government its direction shows where the power came from, in order to form a more perfect Union.
LITTLE TOUCH ON THE 'PRIVATE' LIFE OF AN INDIVIDUAL - LET ALONE THE SOVEREIGNS
Why our servants deceive us into acting as subjected stateless 'public' business entities.
Justice BREWER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Even the constitution of the United States, which is supposed to have little touch upon the private life of the
individual, contains in the first amendment a declaration common to the constitutions of all the states, as follows:
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' etc.,--
and also provides in article 1, ß 7, (a provision common to many constitutions,) that the executive shall have 10
days (Sundays excepted) within which to determine whether he will approve or veto a bill. HOLY TRINITY
CHURCH v. UNITED STATES, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)(2). [Pretend to convert our private business to public business.]
INTERPRETTED BY THE TRUE INTENT OF WE THE PEOPLE IN CONVENTION
After suffering a long train of abuse and usurpation causing the bloody American Revolution.
The great object of the convention was (as expressed in the preamble to the constitution,) 'to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general
welfare, [to] secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.' THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND V.
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THE COMMON WEALTH OF MASSACHUTESS. 37 U.S. 657 (1838)(2). [The Law intended to secure our all. ]
Logically the only true intent of the People was for 'their servants' to perfectly secure our all, all of our rights, privileges,
immunities, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness. To steal, or diminish any of them, or to do any 'imperfection' much less crime
or anything by illegal government deception is contrary to the intent of the people in Order to form a more perfect Union.
INTENTION OF THE CONVENTION

The words of the constitution are to be taken in their obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction. In
Gibbons v. Ogden, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, with his usual felicity, said: 'As men whose intentions require no
concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the
enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.' 9 Wheat. 188. And in Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, where the question was whether a controversy between two states over the boundary
between them was within the grant of judicial power, Mr. Justice Baldwin, speaking for the court, observed: 'The
solution of this question must necessarily depend on the words of the constitution, the meaning and intention of the
convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions of the people of and in
the several states, together with a reference to such sources of judicial information as are resorted to by all courts in
construing statutes, and to which this court has always resorted in construing the constitution.' 12 Pet. 721.
POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN, 158 U.S. 601 (1895)(2). [Contrary to the Constitution or true intent of the People?]
THE INTENTION OF THE CONVENTION OF 'EVERY WORD'
Every 'word' was weighed with the 'utmost' deliberation, and its force and effect to have been 'fully' understood.
The use of the word 'all' in some cases, and its omission in others, cannot be regarded as accidental, under the rule
stated in an early case, Holmes v. Jennison et al., 14 Pet. 540, 570--571, 614, and ever since fully accepted, that: 'In
expounding the constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for
it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added. The many
discussions which have taken place upon the construction of the constitution, have proved the correctness of this
proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every
word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully
understood.' See, also, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151. WILLIAMS v. U.S., 289 U.S. 553 (1933)(2).
[Constitutions are of course supposed to be strictly interpreted against government deriving their 'just' power from the
'consent' of the governed, and in favor of the people to protect our freedom from corrupt government-men. ]
EXPOUND THE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT 'ANY' REFERENCE TO OTHER SOURCES

Justice JOHNSON (the supreme Court of the United States) dessenting opinion:
We can thus expound the constitution without a reference to the definitions of a state or nation by any foreign
writer, hypothetical reasoning, or the dissertations of the Federalist. This would be to substitute individual authority
in place of the declared will of the sovereign power of the union, in a written fundamental law. Whether it is the
emanation from the people or the states, is a moot question, having no bearing on the supremacy of that supreme law
which from a proper source has rightfully been imposed on us by sovereign power. Where its terms are plain, I
should, as a dissenting judge, deem it judicial sacrilege to put my hands on any of its provisions, and arrange or
construe them according to any fancied use, object, purpose, or motive, which, by an ingenious train of reasoning,
I might bring my mind to believe was the reason for its adoption by the sovereign power, from whose hands it
comes to me as the rule and guide to my faith, my reason, and judicial oath. In taking out, putting in, or varying the
plain meaning of a word or expression, to meet the results of my poor judgment, as to the meaning and intention of
the great charter, which alone imparts to me my power to act as a judge of its supreme injunctions, I should feel
myself acting upon it by judicial amendments, and not as one of its executors. I will not add unto these things; I
will not take away from the words of this book of prophecy; I will not impair the force or obligation of its
enactments, plain and unqualified in its terms, by resorting to the authority of names; the decisions of foreign
courts; or a reference to books or writers. The plain ordinances are a safe guide to my judgment. When they admit
of doubt, I will connect the words with the practice, usages, and settled principles of this government, as
administered by its fathers before the adoption of the constitution: and refer to the received opinion and fixed
understanding of the high parties who adopted it; the usage and practice of the new government acting under its
authority; and the solemn decisions of this court, acting under its high powers and responsibility: nothing fearing
that in so doing, I can discover some sound and safe maxims of American policy and jurisprudence, which will
always afford me light enough to decide on the constitutional powers of the federal and state governments, and all
tribunals acting under their authority. They will at least enable me to judge of the true meaning and spirit of plain
words, put into the forms of constitutional provisions, which this court in the great case of Sturges and
Crowninshield say, 'is to be collected chiefly from its words. It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from
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extrinsic circumstances that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from
its operation. Where words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of an instrument bear upon each
other, and would be inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be varied, construction becomes
necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning of words is justifiable.' But the absurdity and injustice of
applying the provision to the case must be so monstrous, that all mankind would without hesitation unite in rejecting
the application. 4 Wheat. 202, 3. CHEROKEE NATION v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)(2).
LET THE DAMNED SOULS BE EXTINGUISHED
OF ALL WHO VIOLATE THIS CHARTER OR UNRIGHTEOUSLY INTERPRET IT
Justice CAMPBELL (the supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
A portion of that judicial system was esteemed of such vital importance to the liberty of the citizen, that it was
incorporated into the Constitution of the United States, and placed above the reach of the authority of any
department of the Federal Government. The sections of the Constitution, 'that no person shall be held to answer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of the grand jury; that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right of trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed,' and 'be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation;' 'that in suits at common law,
when the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved;' 'that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;' and others of a like kind, identify
the men of the Revolution as the descendants of ancestors who had maintained for many centuries a persevering and
magnanimous struggle for a constitutional Government, in which the people should directly participate, and which
would secure to their posterity the blessing of liberty. The supremacy of those courts of justice that acknowledged
the right of the people to share in their administration, and directed their administration according to the course of
the common law, in all the material subjects of litigation--of that common law which sprung from the people
themselves, and is legitimate by that highest of all sanctions, the consent of those who are submitted to it--of that
common law, which resulted from the habitual thoughts, usages, conduct, and legislation, of a practical, brave, and
self-relying race--was established in England and in the United States only by their persevering and heroic exertions
and sacrifices. Magna Charta, from which a portion of this Constitution was extracted, was, according to Lord
Brougham, 'a declaration of existing and violated rights.' It was renewed thirty times. To preserve its authority, it
was read in churches, published four times a year in the county courts, sustained by force of arms, and when
violated, the commons vindicated it by the infliction of exemplary punishment upon the guilty authors. A delinquent
King at one time was required to imprecate the wrath of Heaven on those who transgressed it. The archbishop and
bishops, apparelled in their official robes, with candles burning, 'did excommunicate, accurse, and from the
threshold of the church cut off all those who, by any art or device, shall violate, break, lessen, or change, secretly
or openly, by deed, word, or counsel, against it, in any article whatsoever, and all those that against it shall make
statutes, or observe them being made, or shall bring in customs, or keep them when they be brought in, and the
writers of such statutes, and also the counsellors and executioners of them, and all those that shall presume to
judge according to them.'
The old historian, who describes this solemn ceremony, says, 'that when this imprecation was uttered, and
when the candles extinguished had been hurled upon the ground, and the fumes and stench rose offensive to the
nostrils and eyes of those who observed it, the archbishop cried, 'Even so let the damned souls be extinguished,
smoke, and stink, of all who violate this charter or unrighteously interpret it.' JACKSON v. MAGNOLIA, 61
U.S. 296 (1857)(1). [Now you know how they usurp the true intent of the people to enslave and injure us. ]
We the People are the rightful masters of both Congress and the Courts-not to overthrow the Constitution, but to
overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution. Abraham Lincoln(We are superior to all legislatures and all courts.]
McALISTER, J. (Supreme Court of Tennesee):

The rule of stare decisis is peculiarly applicable in the construction of written constitutions. Says Mr. Cooley, viz.:
"A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that
their practical construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and
another at some subsequent time, when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule
in the case seem desirable. A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions would be lost, if the
rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion." Const. Lim.
(2d Ed.) p. 52. The Judges' Cases; McCully v. State, 102 Tenn. 509 (1899)(1). [Typically a change is to usurp. ]
ULTIMATE TOUCHSTONE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IS THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF
Justice FRANKFURTER (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:
But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.
Neither Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, and its offspring, nor Collector v. Day, supra, and
its, can stand appeal to the Constitution and its historic purposes. Since both are the starting points of an
interdependent doctrine, both should be, as I assume them to be, overruled this day. GRAVES v. PEOPLE OF STATE
OF NEW YORK, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)(2). [Same in FELDMAN v. UNITED STATES, 322 U.S. 487 (1943)(4). ]
219
BLACKSTONE - CONSTITUTION MUST BE INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMON LAW AND PRINCIPLES
The People are sovereigns with sovereign immunity in accordance with the postulates that 'limit and control.'
But that in the body of the Constitution does not include a petty offense like the present. It must be read in the light
of the common law. 'That,' said Mr. Justice Bradley, in Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270, 274, referring to the
common law, 'is the system from which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived. The language of the
Constitution and of many acts of Congress could not be understood without reference to the common law.' Again,
in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478, is this declaration by Mr. Justice Matthews: 'The interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language
of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.' In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.
S. 649, 654, Mr. Justice Gray used this language: 'In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of
the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution.
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 422; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624;
Smith v. Alabama.' See also Kepner v. United States, 194 U. S. ----, ante, 797; 1 Kent Com. 336.
Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of
England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, it had been published about twenty years, and it has
been said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England; so that undoubtedly, the
framers of the Constitution were familiar with it. In this treatise, vol. 4, p. 5. is given a definition of the word
'crimes:' SCHICK v. UNITED STATES, 195 U.S. 65 (1904)(1). [The Common Law is the unwritten Law. ]
TO MISUNDERSTAND THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT RATIONALLY POSSIBLE
The supremacy of the Constitution is absolute. Therefore our supremacy is absolute in the established Order of things.
And the Constitution itself is in every real sense a law--the lawmakers being the people themselves, in whom
under our system all political power and sovereignty primarily resides, and through whom such power and
sovereignty primarily speaks. It is by that law, and not otherwise, that the legislative, executive, and judicial
agencies which it created exercise such political authority as they have been permitted to possess. The Constitution
speaks for itself in terms so plain that to misunderstand their import is not rationally possible. 'We the People of
the United States,' it says, 'do ordain and establish this Constitution.' Ordain and establish! These are definite
words of enactment, and without more would stamp what follows with the dignity and character of law. The
framers of the Constitution, however, were not content to let the matter rest here, but provided explicitly--'This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; *** shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.' (Const. art. 6, cl. 2.) The supremacy of the Constitution as law is thus declared without
qualification. That supremacy is absolute; the supremacy of a statute enacted by Congress is not absolute but
conditioned upon its being made in pursuance of the Constitution. And a judicial tribunal, clothed by that
instrument with complete judicial power, and, therefore, by the very nature of the power, required to ascertain and
apply the law to the facts in every case or proceeding properly brought for adjudication, must apply the supreme
law and reject the inferior statute whenever the two conflict. CARTER v. CARTER CO., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)(2).
[The Secret: the Constitution is the 'Law of the People; legislation is mere laws of an 'artificial' creature of our Law. ]
Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution. "The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
constitution is written." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803). U.S. v. MORRISON, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)(2).
TOO MANY (B.S.) 'STORIES' COLLAPSE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION-LAW
Justice HARLAN, Justice STEWART and Justice WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) join dissenting:
In conclusion: Nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-
handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously taken by the Court in the name of fulfulling its constitutional
responsibilities. The foray which the Court makes today brings to mind the wise and farsighted words of Mr. Justice
Jackson in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, [***] (separate opinion): 'This Court is forever adding new
stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is
added.' MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)(2). [Zillions of stories to usurp to where they are today. ]
FOLLOW WHAT OUR CONSTITUTION SAYS - NOT WHAT JUDGES THINK IT SHOULD SAY
Judge made law = usurpation by corrupt men at war with the Truth of the Law to reign tyranny over us to steal.
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

I do not believe the wise men who sought to draw a written constitution to protect the people from governmental
harassment and oppression, who feared alike the king and the king's judges, would have used any such words or
phrases. Such unbounded authority in any group of politically appointed or elected judges would unquestionably be
220
sufficient to classify our Nation as a government of men, not the government of laws of which we boast. With a
'shock the conscience' test of Constitutionality, citizens must guess what is the law, guess what a majority of nine
judges will believe fair and reasonable. Such a test wilfully throws away the certainty and security that lies in a
written constitution, one that does not alter with a judge's health, belief, or his politics. I believe the only way to
steer this country towards its great destiny is to follow what our Constitution says, not what judges think it should
have said. BODIE v. CONNECTICUT, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)(2). [They make us guess instead of providing 'clear and
unquestionable authority' of law = intentional fraud = government of lies-criminals? Shock’s the Conscience? ]
THE ONLY SOUND PRINCIPLE IS TO OBEY - NOT USURP AND ESTABLISH A NEW GOVERNMENT
The separate opinion of Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS (Supreme Court of the United States):
'Nor should it ever be lost sight of that the government of the United States is one of limited and enumerated
powers, and that a departure from the true import and sense of its powers is pro tanto the establishment of a new
Constitution. It is doing for the people what they have not chosen to do for themselves. It is usurping the
functions of a legislator, and deserting those of an expounder of the law. Arguments drawn from impolicy or
inconvenience ought here to be of no weight. The only sound principle is to declare, 'ita lex scripta est,' to follow,
and to obey. Nor, if a principle so just and conclusive could be overlooked, could there well be found a more unsafe
guide in practice than mere policy and convenience.' Story on the Constitution, s.426. MYERS v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52
(1926)(2).
Do not be deceived. Judges know very well how to interpret the Constitution correctly by its very words according to the
true intent of the People in Convention and the Order of things, principles, and postulates. To make every word in the Constitution as
perfect as possible there was a 'Committee of Style and Detail' in the Convention. The true intent of the People is in the Preamble 'in
Order' to form a more 'perfect' Union, establish Justice, … (all) to 'secure' the blessings of Liberty, and interpreted against government
power and in favor of the People, plus limited to 'just' powers only. When any Judge 'interprets the Law' by giving his opinion without
quoting the very words of 'the Law' laid against the specific words of a provision of the Constitution for its source of authority, and
base their opinion on anything else especially if not in our favor to secure our all is always expressly intended to be lawless
"usurpation" by a corrupt servant "because they cannot amend the Constitution" to their wishes. (The Common Law = unwritten Law).
TRIAL BY JURY - IN NAME ONLY - THE UNJUST GUESSING GAME

Judge Hand said, 'Next to death or fatal illness the thing I fear most is being a litigant in our courts.' (A Trial by Jury: in name only.)
The fear of being prosecuted by criminals and tried before those ignorant of the Law who do not ascertain the Truth of the Law and facts?
The scam: Judges and prosecutors refuse to confess they are outside the Constitution, and their statutes do not apply to the people.
The so called Judges etc. never tell the jurors the people are sovereigns and the just powers of government are derived from consent.
The joke's on us. Jurors hardly care about their own freedom much less ours, and question little of anything much less everything.
Jurors conform to lies over the truth. They never demand government prove lawful jurisdiction over us, or ask based on what? Magic?
Jurors previously pledge Liberty and Justice for all yet do not demand government prove lawful power and jurisdiction over us.
Most jurors are conformists, and unaccountable they ignorantly say, We 'find' the defendant guilty, but fail to show the facts found.
Americans are provided no guarantee jurors must ascertain the truth of the Law nor even find all the facts in their verdict to do Justice.
If jurors were fined and or imprisoned for a wrong conviction they would prudently ascertain the Truth of the Law and the facts.
I died and went to Hell: Americans against freedom or in favor of tyranny? U.S. citizen jurors are advocates of crime against the people:
Judging illegally subjected Americans outside the Law. Rev. 18:4 … Come out of her my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins…
MOST PEOPLE DON'T HAVE A CLUE ABOUT THE IMPERCEPTABLE PRACTICES OF JUDGES + PROSECUTORS
'Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it;
grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices... . (A)ll the apparatus and machinery of civil government,
all the processes of justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared detection. Among the
most dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal to justice.' Id., at App. 78. MITCHUM v. FOSTER, 407
U.S. 225 (1972)(2). [Their Justice is Crime + Jurors lie: We "find" the defendant guilty upon no showing of facts. ]
The "solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth ... is the sine qua non of a fair trial," Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). DARDEN v. WAINRIGHT, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)(2). [The truth shall make you free. ]
CLEAR AND UNQUESTIONABLE AUTHORTY OF LAW

REQUIRING A LONG COURSE OF TRAINING - PROFOUND STUDY - ACTIVE PRACTICE - LIFE DEDICATION
SHAW, Chief Justice (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts):
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The founders of our constitution understood, what every reflecting person must understand, from the nature of the
law, in its fundamental principles, and in its comprehensive details, that it is a science, requiring a long course
of preparatory training, of profound study and active practice, to be expected of no one who has not dedicated
his life to its pursuit; they well understood that no safe system of jurisprudence could be established, that no
judiciary department of government could be constituted, without bringing into its service jurists thus trained and
qualified. Commnwealth of Mass. v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185 (1855)(1).
PROVERBS 19:15 YE SHALL DO 'NO' UNRIGHTEOUSNESS IN JUDGMENT

James 4:12 There is one lawgiver, who is able to save and destroy: who art thou that judgest another? I Cor. 6:1 Dare any of you,
having a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints? 6:5 I speak to your shame. It is so, that there
is not a wise man among you? no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? 3:18 Let no man deceive himself. If any
man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise. 3:19 For the wisdom of this world is
foolishness with God. Is. 33: 22 For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king, he will save us.
James 2:12 So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty. 2:13 For he shall have judgment without mercy,
that hath shown no mercy; and mercy rejoiceth against judgment. Leviticus 19:15 Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou
shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor.
American Jurors can save us from this System of despotic written law of our artificial creature. The wise Common Law = unwritten Law.
Today's Trial by Lawyers in a private Co. and for profit Corp. (court) is merely trial 'before' a jury to uphold the tyrannical System.
Common Law Trial 'by jury' = the people are judges of the Law and the facts. Jury trial = jurors try facts and judges direct verdict.
Unconstitutional for appellate judges to decide facts against the defendant. The 'jury must find' all the relevant facts to convict.
Common Law Trial by Jury proceeds according to the unwritten Common Law vs. Jury trial is by written rules to manipulate the outcome.
U.S. jurors are ignorant of the Law and of our subjection by illegal government deception = Fair trial? We live the Milgram Experiment.
JURY NULLIFICATION
The power of one sovereign to "just say no" to secure our Liberty and Justice for all in the Land of the Free sovereigns.
Grand Jurors can indict judges and prosecutors. + Citizen's arrest for obstruction of justice, fraud and lawless usurpation.
FAR WORSE TO CONVICT THE INNOCENT THAN TO LET THE GUILTY GO FREE
It still remains "a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (concurring opinion). ARIZONA v.
YOUNGBLOOD, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)(2). [We injured no one, Let us alone. Take heed of professional jurors a.k.a.
government 'ringers' incognito to stealthily sway the jurors verdict, because an acquittal never resurrects. ]
AVIDITY TO PUNISH IS 'ALWAYS' DANGEROUS TO LIBERTY

Justice STEVENS, Justice BLACKMUN, Justice O'CONNOR join (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
As Thomas Paine warned, an "avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty" because it leads a nation "to stretch,
to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws." [***]. As Judge Mansfield presciently observed in a case
not unlike the one before us today: "Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods
that lead to decreased respect for the law." United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (CA2 1974). 2 The
Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945). "He that would make his own liberty secure must
guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to
himself." Ibid. UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, 504 U.S. 655 (1992)(2). [How true + Misapply! ]
The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by Blackstone as 'the glory of the English law' and 'the
most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy' [***] .' DIMICK v. SCHIEDT, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)(2).
AN ACT OF USURPATION IS NOT OBLIGATORY - IT IS NOT LAW
Mr. Justice GRAY (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom concurred Mr. Justice SHIRAS, dissenting:
Theophilus Parsons [chief justice] in the Massachusetts convention of 1788, answering the objection that the
constitution of the United States, as submitted to the people for adoption, contained no bill of rights, said: 'The
people themselves have it in their power effectually to resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal to arms.
An act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any man may be justified in his resistance. Let him be
considered as a criminal by the general government; yet only his fellow-citizens can convict him. They are his jury,
and, if they pronounce him innocent, not all the powers of congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will
pronounce him if the supposed law he resisted was an act of usurpation.' 2 Elliot, Deb. 94; 2 Bancroft, Hist. Const.
267. SPARF v. UNITED STATES, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)(2). [Outside the Constitution + illegally enslaving sovereigns.]
TODAY: TRIAL BY EXECUTIVE - BAR MEMBER JUDGES + PROSECUTORS WORK TO MAINTAIN THE EVIL SYSTEM
Mr. Justice GRAY (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom concurred Mr. Justice SHIRAS, dissenting:
222
John Milton, in his Defence of the People of England, after speaking of the king's power in his courts and through
his judges, adds: 'Nay, all the ordinary power is rather the people's, who determine all controversies themselves by
juries of twelve men. And hence it is that when a malefactor is asked at his arraignment, 'How will you be tried?' he
answers always, according to law and custom, 'By God and my country'; not by God and the king, or the king's
deputy.' 8 Milton, Works (Pickering's Ed.) 198, 199, The idea is as old as Bracton. Bract. 119. SPARF v. UNITED
STATES, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)(2). [Ordinary = the Law. Trial by country = Trial Per Pais, by Jury not government. ]
FREEDOM FROM SHAM TRIALS = REFUSING TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH AND EXPOSE GOVERNMENT FRAUD
Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring in the result:
Separately, and often together in application, Sections 19 and 20 have been woven into our fundamental and
statutory law. They have place among our more permanent legal achievements. They have safeguarded many
rights and privileges apart from political ones. Among those buttressed, either by direct application or through the
general conspiracy statute, Section 37, 18 U.S.C. s 88, 18 U.S.C.A. s 88, are the rights to a fair trial, including
freedom from sham trials; to be free from arrest and detention by methods constitutionally forbidden and from
extortion of property by such methods; from extortion of confessions; from mob action incited or shared by state
officers; from failure to furnish police protection on proper occasion and demand; from interference with the free
exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of speech and assembly; and the necessary import of the
decisions is that the right to be free from deprivation of life itself, without due process of law, that is, through
abuse of state power by state officials, is as fully protected as other rights so secured. SCREWS v. UNITED
STATES, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)(2). [Refusing to ascertain the Truth the sovereign people are not statutory persons. The
scam is pretending the People are not the People. Pretending we are less than human. We injured no one, Let us alone.]
INJURY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF EVEN THE SUBJECTS (INJURING NO ONE) IS NOT LAW
MANNHEIMER, Judge (Court of Appeals of Alaska):
The due process guarantee protects citizens from the arbitrary or fundamentally unfair use of government power
… [The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] have their historical origins in the notion that
conditions of personal freedom can be preserved only when there is some institutional check on arbitrary
government action. The Supreme Court has analogized due process to the Magna Carta's "guaranties against the
oppressions and usurpations" of the royal prerogative. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd ed.
1988) §10-7, p. 664, quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531(1884). Hurtado continues: Law is something
more than mere will exerted as an act of power. ... Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons
and property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifested as the decree of a personal monarch or of an impersonal
multitude. ... [T]he limitations imposed by our constitutional law upon the action of the governments, both state
and national, are essential to the preservation of public and private rights, notwithstanding the representative
character of our political institutions. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE v. RAY, 854 P.2d 740 (1993). [Not Law.]
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE = STATUTES DO NOT APPLY TO US AND WE INJURED NO ONE - SERVANTS OUTSIDE THE LAW
Justice BLACKMUN (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Justice STEVENS joins, dissenting:
The omission of an adequate affirmative-defense instruction constitutes a profound violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights. It creates an ex post facto law, misinforms the jury as to the governing legal principles, and
denies a defendant his right to a fair trial. [***] The right to an affirmative-defense instruction that jurors can
understand when there is evidence to support an affirmative defense is as significant to the fairness and accuracy
of a criminal proceeding as is the right to counsel. GILMORE v. TAYLOR, 508 U.S. 333 (1993)(2). [We are sovereigns.]
JUSTICE IN THE BROADEST SENCE + RIGHT TO A JURY AND JUDGE NOT IGNORANT OF THE LAW IN 1ST INSTANCE
Justice STEWART (Supreme Court of the United States) with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL joins dissenting:
A trial judge is "charged with the duty of insuring that justice, in the broadest sense of that term, is achieved in
every criminal trial." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 839 (Burger, C. J. dissenting). See Geders v. United States,
425 U.S. 80, 86. [I demand a judicial judge of an established judicial Court of Common Law jurisdiction. ][***]
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, the Court made clear that "the State's trial court procedure
(cannot) be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial
adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance." Id., at 61-62. See also
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (right to trial by jury is right to a jury in first instance). [Super emphasis. ]
But surely there can be no meaningful constitutional difference between a trial that is fundamentally unfair
because of the judge's possible bias, and one that is fundamentally unfair because of the judge's ignorance of the
law. NORTH v. RUSSELL et al, 427 U.S. 328 (1976)(2). [Demand prosecution prove 'what' we are in Law. ]
NO FREEMAN (SUBJECT) SHALL IN ANY MANNER BE DESTROYED EXCEPT BY JUDGMENT OF HIS PEERS
OPINION MANNHEIMER, Judge (Court of Appeals of Alaska):
223
The development of the common law in England was marked by a tension between the jury, as an expression of the
popular will, and the judiciary, as the representative of established authority. Parliament engaged in the practice of
barring the right to jury trial when it defined new, statutory offenses such as the Stamp Act and other statutes
regulating trade within the British Empire. This practice was condemned by Blackstone, and it occasioned the
protest in the American Declaration of Independence against the deprivation of the right to jury trial. Malloy, 1 P.3d
at 1283-84. The United States Supreme Court addressed this same issue in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227
(1999), when the Court noted that the Americans who drafted our federal constitution understood that the right to
jury trial "could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion". Id., 526 U.S. at 247-48. One contributor to the
ratification debates ..., commenting on the jury trial guarantee in Art. III, § 2, echoed Blackstone in warning of the
need "to guard with the most jealous circumspection against the introduction of new, and arbitrary methods of trial,
which, under a variety of plausible pretenses, may in time, imperceptibly undermine this best preservative of
liberty." Jones, 526 U.S. at 248, quoting The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins
(Neil H. Cogan, editor, 1997), p. 477. [A corrupt method is to deny jurors decide the whole Truth of the Law etc. ]
Thus, the guarantee of trial by jury is not based solely or even primarily on the idea that "twelve heads are
better than one" when it comes to discerning the truth. [***] The Supreme Court elaborated on this concept in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968): Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience
that it was necessary to protect [citizens] against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies [as
well as to protect them] against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the
constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary, but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary
[governmental] action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If
the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic
reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. Or, as Justice Black explained in his dissent
in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958): Trial by an impartial jury of independent laymen raises another
imposing barrier to oppression by government officers. As one of the more perceptive students of our experiment in
freedom keenly observed, "The institution of the jury ... places the real direction of society in the hands of the
governed, or of a portion of the governed, and not in that of the government." [Quoting De Tocqueville, Democracy
in America (Reeve translation, 1948 edition), Vol. 1, p. 282.] The jury injects a democratic element into the law.
This element is vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not only in safeguarding the rights of the
accused, but in encouraging popular acceptance of the laws and the necessary general acquiescence in their
application. Green, 356 U.S. at 215-16 (Black, J., dissenting). [***]
One of the Alaska Supreme Court's most detailed discussions of this important role of the jury is found in
Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970): [T]he right to jury trial holds a central position in the framework of
American justice. Trial by jury is one of the oldest discernible and distinguishing institutions of our Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence. Its heritage can be traced in an unbroken line at least from the 14th century
forward. The Magna Carta declared that "no freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or exiled, or in any other
manner destroyed, except by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." [As quoted in Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Cooley, 4th ed. 1899), Vol. 4, p. 343] Baker, 471 P.2d at 396. The supreme
court then quoted Blackstone's description of the central importance of trial by jury as a check on the power of the
government: Our law has ... wisely placed this strong ... barrier [of] trial by jury ... between the liberties of the
people and the prerogative of the crown. It was necessary ... to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince:
and yet this power might be dangerous and destructive ... if exerted [by judges appointed by the crown] without
check or control, ... who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or exile any man that was
obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration that such is their will and pleasure. But the founders of the
English law have, with excellent fore [sight], contrived that ... the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in
the shape of indictment [or] information ... should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of
[the defendant's] equals and neighbors, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion. Baker, 471 P.2d at 396-97
(quoting Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (Cooley, 4th ed. 1899), Vol. 4, pp. 349-350). In short,
the Baker Court declared, the guarantee of trial by jury is "a valuable safeguard to liberty"--if not "the very
palladium of free government". 471 P.2d at 397, quoting Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 83. [***]
The Alaska Supreme Court returned to this theme in Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971). In
Alvarado, our supreme court emphasized that even though the jury is "charged with the task of finding the truth of
the facts asserted [in criminal litigation]", this is but one aspect of the jury's role in our system of government:
The jury is an essential institution in our democracy, and [it] serves multifaceted purposes.... [B]eyond its utility as a
finder of fact, the jury fulfills other equally vital political and psychological purposes.... [The jury serves] as a
safeguard against the possibility of governmental tyranny and oppression, as a protection or barrier against the
exercise of arbitrary power[.] Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 903. The supreme court then explained: (Quoting Green v.
State, 462 P.2d 994, 997 (Alaska 1969) quotation marks omitted). As an institution, the jury offers our citizens the
opportunity to participate in the workings of our government, and serves to legitimize our system of justice in the
eyes of both the public and the accused. The jury, like the right to vote, is fundamentally preservative of ideals
which are essential to our democratic system. When [this guarantee] is neglected, "[t]he injury is not limited to the
224
defendant--there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the
democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts." Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 903-04 (quoting Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)). Because the importance of trial by jury far transcends the jury's role as a finder of
fact, it could be argued that the United States Supreme Court, when deciding Schriro v. Summerlin, should not have
focused solely on the comparative accuracy of the findings made by juries versus the findings made by judges. [***]
Both federal law and Alaska law acknowledge the importance of trial by jury as a guarantee of the citizenry's
liberties and as a check on the power of the government (including the power of judges). In addition, in Baker v.
Fairbanks, our supreme court suggested that the framers of our state constitution intended to adopt a right of jury
trial broader than the right recognized at that time under federal law. Id., 471 P.2d at 398-401. Smart v. State, 146
P.3d 15 (2006). [All judicial power and jurisdiction are vested 'solely' in the judicial courts, none in judges or Bar. ]
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF "EVERY" FACT NECESSARY
STEVENS J. (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
At stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of any deprivation of
liberty without "due process of law," Amdt. 14, and the guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury," Amdt. 6. [fn 3] Taken together, these rights
indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to "a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime
with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); see also
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); Winship, 397 U.S., at 364 ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged"). [How about proof of who the statute really applies to and not. ] [***]
As we have, unanimously, explained, Gaudin, 515 U.S., at 510-511, the historical foundation for our
recognition of these principles extends down centuries into the common law. "[T]o guard against a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers," and "as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties," 2 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 540-541 (4th ed. 1873), trial by jury has been
understood to require that "the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information,
or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals and
neighbours...." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343 (1769) (hereinafter Blackstone)
(emphasis added). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-154 (1968). APPPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY, 530
U.S. 466 (2000)(2). [Sovereigns are equal, and amenable to God alone not to servants who refuse to ascertain the Truth.]
JURY NULLIFICATION: THE RIGHT TO SAY NO - TO THE FRAUD AND LAWLESSNESS OF THE SERVANTS
Obedience to a higher law, the Constitution of the People under God and his law.
A Juror's verdict cannot be controlled – a simple just say no acquits. Just say no to unrighteousness = imperfection.
CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit):

As Mr. Justice Holmes wrote in Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920): 'The jury has the power
to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts. But the judge always has the right and duty to tell them what
the law is upon this or that state of facts that may be found ... .'
In our system of jury justice, the judge must state the law, though the jury is free to indulge in vagary and
compromise once the case is sent to the jury room. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943); Dunn v.
United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932). Although the jury stands as a bulwark against laws which it deems unjust
or excessively harsh, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1955); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 155, 157 (1965), (fn 3) it is not the judge's place to advise the jury of the possible collateral effects of their
decision, information that has nothing to do with the legal standards which they have sworn to apply.
(fn 3). The present law of 'jury nullification' (the jury's power to acquit a defendant out of refusal to apply the law
to facts clearly evidencing a criminal violation) seems not to require or permit a judge to tell the jury that it has the
right to ignore the law as charged but to allow a defense attorney some leeway in persuading the jury to acquit out
of considerations of mercy or obedience to a higher law. [The Constitution of the People under God's Supreme Law.
Super emphasis added. ] See Scheflin, 'Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No,' 45 So.Cal.L.Rev. 168 (1972); W.
Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 217-20 (2d ed. 1875); Kunstler, 'Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases,' 10
Va.J.Int'l L. 71 (1949); Note, 'Toward Principles of Jury Equity,' 83 Yale L. J. 1023 (1974). UNITED STATES v.
BURKHART, 501 F.2d 993 (1974)(3). [Proverbs 19:15 Ye shall do 'no' un-right-eousness in judgment. ]
'He that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from oppression, for if he violates
this duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself' (his children, family, and friends). Thomas Paine
THE JURY IS AN AGENT OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE - HAS A RIGHT TO ACQUIT = RIGHT TO JUST SAY NO
Jury nullification = conscience of the community to protect us from our servants’ oppression and fraud = by man.
Juries power to 'disregard the law' in order to serve justice. (Challenge everything.)
'Not a mere power of the jury, but their proper right.' (Sovereign right to say no, to let us alone = Freedom.)
WISEMAN, District Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit):

The drafters of the Constitution "clearly intended [the right of trial by jury] to protect the accused from oppression
225
by the Government." Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (citations omitted); see Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 152-57 (1968) ("The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government."). Part of this protection is embodied in the
concept of jury nullification: "In criminal cases, a jury is entitled to acquit the defendant because it has no
sympathy for the government's position." United States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d 439, 443 (6th Cir.1980) . "The Founding
Fathers knew that, absent jury nullification, judicial tyranny not only was a possibility, but was a reality in the
colonial experience." (fn 5) Although we may view ourselves as living in more civilized times, there is obviously no
reason to believe the need for this protection has been eliminated. Judicial and prosecutorial excesses still occur, (fn
6) and Congress is not yet an infallible body incapable of making tyrannical laws. [How true. ]
(fn 5). Steven I. Friedland, "On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility," 40 Case W.Res.L.Rev.
165, 173 (1990); see also Colleen P. Murphy, "Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal
Juries," 61 Geo.L.J. 723, 750 (1993) ("[The right to jury trial] stems from the Founders' belief that jury trial
constitutes a valuable buffer against governmental oppression in both the civil and criminal contexts." [***]
The power of a jury to nullify extends back to seventeenth century England. In Bushell's Case, Vaughn. 135, 124
Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), William Penn was acquitted of unlawful assembly notwithstanding damning facts, and
Justice Vaughan, rather than impose fines or terms of imprisonment on the jurors as had been the custom, held that
acquittal was a judicial act punishable only by attaint, an obsolete penalty by 1670. The roots of jury nullification
in this country reach back to 1735 and the prosecution of Peter Zenger for seditious libel. There the defendant
admitted the facts charged but pleaded non-culpability, and the jury acquitted. See J. Alexander, A Brief Narration
of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger (1963); see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130
(D.C.Cir.1972). "In the century following the Zenger case, it was generally recognized in American jurisprudence
that the jury, agent of the sovereign people, had a right to acquit those whom it felt it unjust to call criminal."
Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 986 (D.C.Cir.1964) (Wright, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court has consistently endorsed the traditional power of the jury to nullify a law or a specific
conviction. (fn 7) In Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), the Court ruled that, although a jury does not have
the right to decide the law and facts of a case, [the big supreme Court lie. ] neither does the judge have the right to
instruct a jury that it must convict even if evidence against a defendant is great. See id. at 102, 105-07. After Sparf,
in effect "[t]he right [to nullify] was gone, but the power remained." (fn 8) In Horning v. District of Columbia, 254
U.S. 135 (1920), Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, explicitly acknowledged this power: "the jury has the
power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts." Id. at 138. The continued prohibition on directed
verdicts of guilt, on the set aside of not guilty verdicts, and on the use of special interrogatories in criminal cases, as
well as the allowance of inconsistent verdicts, can only be understood as arising from respect for the jury's power to
disregard the law and facts of a case in order to serve justice. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564 (1977) ("[A] trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come
forward with such a verdict ... regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction."); [* * *]
[I would put servants under Citizen's arrest if they tell me what to do for obstruction of justice. ]
(fn 8). L. Moore, The Jury 151 (1973) (quoted in Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, "Rethinking Harmless Constitutional
Harmless Error," 88 Colum.L.Rev. 79, 139 n. 226 (1988)). Justice Gray, dissenting in Sparf, reiterated the power of
the jury to ignore law [ignore our servants oppressive Code enslaving sovereigns = prevent crime. Mine] and acquit:
It is universally conceded that a verdict of acquittal, although rendered against the instructions of the
judge, is final, and cannot be set aside; and consequently that the jury have the legal power to decide for themselves
the law involved in the general issue of guilty or not guilty. [Sovereign legal power to ascertain the Truth, etc. ]
Sparf, 156 U.S. at 172 (Gray, J., dissenting). But Justice Gray went farther and argued that this was indeed a right
and duty, and not just a power, of the jury. See id. at 110-83; see also Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 986
(D.C.Cir.1964) (Wright, J., dissenting) ("[Justice Gray's dissent] went further and reaffirmed the American common
law tradition that this was no mere power of the jury, but their proper right."). [Sovereign right. ]
This respect for nullification flows from the role of the jury as the "conscience of the community" in our
criminal justice system. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). [***] This interposition serves the essential
purpose of the jury trial, which is "to prevent oppression by the Government." UNITED STATES of America v.
DATCHER, 830 F.Supp. 411 (1993)(4). [How true. Constitutional trial 'by Jury' is not by servants-judges. ]
JURY NULLIFICATION IS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST TYRANNY IN THE LAW - MERE LAWS OF OUR CREATURE
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit):
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."); Adams v. United
States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) ("The public conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates
the administration of justice."). [Fairness is refusing to ascertain the Truth? Personal jurisdiction. ]
III. The Issue of Jury Nullification [***]
Reflective opinions upholding the necessity for the jury as a protection against arbitrary action, such as
prosecutorial abuse of power, stress fundamental features like the jury "common sense judgment" and assurance of
"community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence." (fn 34) Human fraility being what it is, a
226
prosecutor disposed by unworthy motives could likely establish some basis in fact for bringing charges against
anyone he wants to book, but the jury system operates in fact, (see note 33) so that the jury will not convict when
they empathize with the defendant, as when the offense is one they see themselves as likely to commit, or consider
generally acceptable or condonable under the mores of the community.
(fn 34). See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968): Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. [***]
See Judge Learned Hand in United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F. 2d 774, 775-776 (2d Cir.
1942): The institution of trial by jury-especially in criminal cases-has its hold upon public favor chiefly for two
reasons. The individual can forfeit his liberty-to say nothing of his life-only at the hands of those who, unlike any
official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and melt
anonymously in the community from which they came. Moreover, since if they acquit their verdict is final, no one
is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally disapprove; and this introduces a slack into the enforcement
of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions.
The existence of an unreviewable and unreversible power in the jury, to acquit in disregard of the
instructions on the law given by the trial judge, has for many years co-existed with legal practice and precedent
upholding instructions to the jury that they are required to follow the instructions of the court on all matters of law.
There were different soundings in colonial days and the early days of our Republic. We are aware of the number
and variety of expressions at that time from respected sources-John Adams; Alexander Hamilton; prominent judges-
that jurors had a duty to find a verdict according to their own conscience, though in opposition to the direction of
the court; that their power signified a right; that they were judges both of law and of fact in a criminal case, and not
bound by the opinion of the court. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv.L.Rev. 582 (1939). [***]
Fear of arbitrary judicial action ... was especially strong in the United States because in seventeenth-
century England (the time of colonizing America) the criminal law, in the hands of appointees of the crown subject
to arbitrary removal, had been found an effective agent of political and religious persecution. . . . Colonial justice
was long executive or legislative. There had been but little experience of true judicial justice with the checks upon
judicial action which the common law tradition and pressure of professional opinion provided. [***]
But by the end of the century, even the most prominent state landmarks had been toppled; (fn 39) and the
Supreme Court settled the matter for the Federal courts in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895) after
exhaustive review in both majority and dissenting opinions.The jury's role was respected as significant and
wholesome, but it was not to be given instructions that articulated a right to do whatever it willed. The old rule
survives today only as a singular relic. (fn 40)
(fn 39). See e. g., State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 34-35, (1892), overruling State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849). In State v.
Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 480, 531-532 (1829), the court had laid down that although the principle that the jury is to
determine the law in criminal cases represents a departure from "logical symmetry," it is a safeguard against
tyranny in the law, and one of the law's "great landmarks" for all who view "liberty and law as almost
synonymous." [***]
In Maryland the juries must be told the judge's instructions on the law are only "advisory". In Indiana, a
similar constitutional provision was attenuated by a decision that a trial court in a criminal case "is not required to
neutralize the effect of its instructions by telling the jury that they are at liberty to disregard them, and to decide the
law for themselves." Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 560, 566, 55 N.E. 737, 739 (1889).
The breadth of the continuing prerogative of the jury, however, perseveres, as appears from the rulings
permitting inconsistent verdicts. These reflect, in the words of Justice Holmes, an acknowledgment that "the jury has
the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts," (fn41] or as Judge Learned Hand said: "We
interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which
they were disposed through lenity." (fn 42)
(fn 41). Horning v. DIST.COL., 254 U.S. 135, 138(1920)(jury power to render illogical and inconsistent verdicts).
(fn 42). Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1920).
Since the jury's prerogative of lenity, again in Learned Hand's words (supra, note 34) introduces a "slack
into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions," it is
only just, say appellants, that the jurors be so told. It is unjust to withhold information on the jury power of
"nullification," since conscientious jurors may come, ironically, to abide by their oath as jurors to render verdicts
offensive to their individual conscience, to defer to an assumption of necessity that is contrary to reality. This so-
called right of jury nullification is put forward in the name of liberty and democracy, but its explicit avowal risks
the ultimate logic of anarchy. [by this System. ] U.S. of America v. DOUGHERTY, 473 F.2d 1113 (1972)(2).
PRATT P. J. (Supreme Court of Michigan) dissenting: Penal laws for the punishment of criminals are necessary, but
they have never yet reformed the world, in a moral or religious point of view; nor will men ever be reformed, or
made better, by the use of such means. The People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 (1856)(1). [Plus the super high cost.]
GROSS INJUSTICE AND TYRANNY OUTSIDE THE CONSTITUTION - WE LIVE THE MILGRAM EXPERIMENT
227
Instead of a Constitutional Common Law 'Trial by Jury' by the sovereign People who are the 'judges' of both 'the Law' and
the facts and the accused is innocent until 'proven' guilty, the lawyers invented a horror called 'jury trial' = a trial 'before' a jury, to
avoid wise jurors from deciding against bad law and government, fraud etc. We're surrounded by Bar Lawyers. A jury trial is conducted
by a member of the Bar (Lawyer) deceptively called Judge of a private company and for profit corporation deceptively called COURT
who of course wants jurors to swear to take the law as he gives it. The prosecutor and defense counsel are also members of the Bar =
executive branch. Then at the end of litigation the jury's verdict is 'directed' so the lawyers can try to direct it to guilty. The System's
appellate company Judges 'decide for the people' what 'the Code' is to keep the despotic status quo in place. Shamefully jurors do not
actually find or state the facts (much less even in their minds judge the Code and just say no. Jurors only check a box on a form.
THE COMMON 'LAW' OF THE LAND = THE UNWRITTEN LAW - NOT OF THE LEGISLATURE
The Common Law 'mere human' law is always for subjects never for sovereigns else one is not sovereign.
The Common Law not contrary to the Constitution or legislation made in pursuance thereof is the rule of decision in your state.
Circuit Court, D. Pennsylvania (1793): Charge of Judge WILSON (of the supreme Court of the United States) as
president of a special court of the United States, for the Middle circuit and Pennsylvania district, holden at the
court house, in the city of Philadelphia, on the 22d day of July, 1793, to the grand jury of said court: If the qualities
of the parent may be expected in the offspring, the common law, one of the noblest births of time, may be
pronounced the wisest of laws. This expression, says a great lawyer (Finch, Law, 74, 75), is not new and strange, or
barbarous and peculiar to England. It is the proper term for other laws also. Euripides mentions the common laws of
Greece; and Plato defines common law to be that, which being taken up by the common consent of a country, is
called law. In another place the same illustrious philosopher names it the golden and sacred rule of reason which we
call 'Common Law.' To the common law of England, however, the phrase is often peculiarly appropriated. [***] In
matters of a civil nature the common law works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice. In matters of
a political nature it works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of freedom. It was this spirit which dictated
the frequent and formidable demands on the Norman princes, for the complete restoration of the Saxon
jurisprudence. It was this spirit which, in Magna Charta, manifested a strict regard to the rights of the Commons as
well as those of the Peers. It was this spirit which extracted sweetness from all the bitter contentions between the
rival houses of York and Lancaster. It was this spirit which preserved England from the haughtiness of the Tudors
and from the tyranny of the Stuarts. It was this spirit which rescued the states of America from the oppressive
claims and from all the mighty efforts made to enforce the oppressive claims of a British parliament. [***] The law
of nations as well as the law of nature is of 'origin divine.' [***] But the municipal laws of a state are not more
distinct from the law of nature than those consentual laws of nations are in their source and power distinct from the
law of nations properly so called. Indeed those consentual laws of nations are not less controlled by the law of
nations properly so called, than municipal laws are controlled by the law of nature. The law of nations is the law of
states and sovereigns. On states and sovereigns it is obligatory in the same manner and for the same reasons, as the
law of nature is obligatory upon individuals. Universal and unchangeable is the obligation of both. How great, how
important, how interesting are these truths! They announce to a free people how solemn their duties are! If a
practical knowledge and a just sense of those duties were diffused universally among the citizens, how beneficial
and lasting would the fruits be! HENFIELDS CASE, 11 F.Cas. 1099 (1793)(1). [Divine Origin - Perfect Truth ]
THE LAW OF NATURE IS AN ETERNAL RULE TO ALL MEN - LEGISLATURES MUST CONFORM TO THE WILL OF GOD
COLLIER, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alabama):
It is further argued, that the act of eighteen hundred and twenty-six, is against common right, and therefore void. A
statute, it is true, cannot change the law of nature, for jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum--
Day v. Savage, (Hob. Rep. 87.) "The law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men," says Locke, "legislators as
well as others; and the rules that they make for other men's actions, must, as well as their own and other men's
actions, be conformable to the will of God, of which that is a declaration." Lord Chief Justice Hobart was of
opinion, that a law which makes a man a judge in his own case, is opposed to natural equity, and void. Lord Coke,
(Bonham's case, 8 Rep. 116,) with the boldness which marked his public career, declared that the common law
would control and adjudge void, an act of parliament against common right, or reason, or repugnant, or impossible
to be performed. And Lord Holt, (City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. R. 687,) influenced by the same high sense of
justice,--with a mind relying upon its own vigor, and often setting at defiance the restraints of precedent, declared
that the observation of Lord Coke was not extravagant, but was a very reasonable and true saying. [***]
Mr. Justice Iredell, (whose great self-possession and accuracy of judgment, entitle his opinions to all respect,) in
Calder v. Bull, (3 Dal. R. 386,) after expressing the opinion, that a statute violative of constitutional provision is
void, proceeds: " [***] There are, then, but two lights in which the subject can be viewed. 1. If the legislature pursue
the authority delegated to them, their acts are valid. 2. If they transgress the boundaries of that authority, their acts
are invalid. In the former case, they exercise the discretion vested in them by the people, to whom alone they are
responsible for the faithful discharge of their trust: but in the latter case, they violate a fundamental law, which must
be our guide, whenever we are called upon as judges to determine the validity of a legislative act." IN THE
MATTER OF J. L. DORSEY, 7 Port. 293 (1838)(1). [Eternal immutable rule to all men, not to business entities. ]
228
NONAPPLICABILITY OF MERE CODE STATUTES OF OUR CREATURE TO SOVEREIGNS AMENABLE TO GOD ALONE
In the Land of the Free pursuant to due Process of (the Common) Law in pursuance of the Constitution of the People.
It was so self evident that it was beyond all controversy
THE COMMON 'LAW' OPERATES ON SUBJECTS ONLY, NOT SOVEREIGNS
Mr. Austin (attorney general of the state of Massachusetts) in support of the motion:
It is not necessary to settle it in this case; because, if the common law and chancery law of England are in operation
here, in their utmost latitude and force, they do not reach the respondent. The common law of England takes no
jurisdiction over the actions of sovereign states; nor is there any power in chancery to hold jurisdiction over a
sovereign, without his consent. The present law is what we term by eminence, and for distinction, the common
law; and it is beyond all controversy, that the common law operates on subjects only, and not sovereigns; and upon
property, and not sovereign rights. [Under the Law there is no "right" to do wrong to a man injuring nothing. ]
If the constitution authorizes the government of the United States to subject a state to judicial process and
judgment, the government of the United States may pass the laws necessary for the purpose. But to declare what
may be done, is not to declare what is done. If congress, for any reason, has stopped short, the judicial department is
at the same point brought to a stand. If it has adopted the common law, and nothing more, the Court can do no more
than the common law warrants. If the common law does not extend its jurisdiction over a sovereignty, neither can
the Court. THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. THE COMMON WEALTH OF MASSACHUTESS. 37 U.S. 657, 12
Pet. 657 (1838)(1). [Citing Ref. 529 times, 4/30/05. The Common Law = unwritten Law, distinguished from written
statutes of a mere artificial creature. The Common Law trial was to prevent application of unjust written laws. ]
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND MEANT ALL OF THOSE UNIVERSAL RULES, "NOT" THE ENACTMENT OF
PARLIAMENT [LEGISLATURE] WHICH GOVERN THE ENGLISH PEOPLE = SUBJECTS = NON-SOVEREIGNS
BROWN, District Judge (District Court, District of Alaska, First Division):
"Common law" is sometimes defined as follows: "It includes, those principles, usages, and rules of action
applicable to the government and security of person and property which do not rest for their authority upon any
express positive declaration of the will of the Legislature." 1 Kent, Com. 533. Again: "A system of elementary
principles and of general judicial truths which are continually expanding with the progress of society, and adapting
themselves to the gradual changes of trade and commerce, and the mechanical arts and the exigencies and usages
of the country." Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R. I. 227, 14 Am. Rep. 667. Ordinarily we mean
by the "common law" the unwritten law, or the English common law, as sometimes stated, comprising the
immemorial custom declared by the courts and particular local customs, the law merchant, or that part not defined
by statute, and the canon and ecclesiastical law.[***][written law = lex scripta v. unwritten law = lex non scripta. ]
In Patterson v. Winn, 5 Pet. 241, it is said, "The term 'common law' means both the common law of
England, as opposed to written or statute law, and the statutes passed before the immigration of the first settlers to
America." This latter definition, furnished by the court of last resort for Alaska, would seem to be the one that
should control this court in its application of the common law to the case at bar. The common law, as before stated,
is said to be an unwritten law. It is classed by Blackstone as the lex non scripta. Another definition is, "The
common law of England meant all of those universal rules, not the enactment of Parliament, which govern the
English people." In Andrews' American Law, ß 200, the author says: "'Common law' is a term which has with us a
double significance in the United States, when we speak of the common law, the mind of the lawyer naturally
reverts to the system of English jurisprudence, an indefinite and undescribed portion of which was said to be the
birthright of the colonies, and has been adopted in most of our states as a portion of our jurisprudence."
VALENTINE v. ROBERTS, 1 Alaska 536 (1902)(1). [Parliament = Legislature. It's beyond all controversy the English
people are subjects, not sovereigns. The Common Law protected the subjects from the law of the artificial creature. ]
THE COMMON LAW DOTH CONTROL ACTS OF LEGISLATURE - NOT SO SAITH CORRUPT SERVANTS
HARRIS, J. (High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi) delivered the opinion of the court:
Independent of written constitutions, as early as the seventeenth century it was said by Lord Coke, when Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, in Dr. Bonham's case, "that the common law doth control acts of Parliament, and
adjudges them void when against common right and reason." Lord Chief Justice Hobart, a few years after, in Day
v. Savage, declared that an act of Parliament made against natural equity (as to make a man judge in his own case)
was void; and Lord Chief Justice Holt is reported to have said, in relation to the declaration of Lord Coke, cited
above, that it "was not extravagant, but was a very reasonable and true saying." City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod.
687, and 10 Mod. 118. GRIFFIN v. MIXON, 38 Miss. 424 (1860)(1). [Despots obrogate the unwritten Common Law.]
TO ABBROGATE COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES A STATUTE MUST SPEAK DIRECTLY
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit): As to the general applicability of
common-law principles to federal statutes, the Supreme Court has held that "in order to abrogate a common-law
principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law." United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (citation omitted). ARRIAGA v. FLORIDA PAC. FARMS, 305 F.3d 1228 (2002)(1).
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COMMON LAW = PRINCIPLES, MAXIMS, FOUNDED ON REASON, NATURAL JUSTICE SANCTIONED BY THE COURTS
NETERER, District Judge (District Court, W.D. Washington, Northern Division):
Section 858 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that: 'The laws of the state in which the court is
held shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States in trials at
common law, and in equity and admiralty.'
The common law consists of those principles, maxims, usages, and rules founded on reason, natural
justice, and an enlightened public policy, deduced from universal and immemorial usage, and receiving
progressively the sanction of the courts. Common law is generally used in contradistinction to statute law. Levy
v. McCartee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 102. There are no common-law crimes in the United States as a unit, as recently held
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In re Greene (C.C.) 52 Fed. 104. In the various states the common law as
recognized is by no means universal. Patterson v. Winn, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233. The term 'common law' is used in our
statute to distinguish it from criminal actions. It was held in Kirby v. C. & N.W.R. Co. (C.C.) 106 Fed. 551, that
within the meaning of the Act of March 31, 1887, c. 373, Sec. 1, 24 Stat. 552, providing that courts of the United
States shall have original cognizance of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, the expression
'common law' is used to distinguish it from a criminal action. The Supreme Court in Logan v. U.S., 144 U.S. at
page 300, clearly limits the application of the expression 'at common law,' used in section 858, supra, when it says:
'By the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, Sec. 34, it was enacted 'that the laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.' 1
Stat. 92. Although that section stood between two sections clearly applicable to criminal cases, it was adjudged by
this court at December term, 1851, upon a certificate of division of opinion of the Circuit Court, directly presenting
the question, that the section did not include criminal trials, or leave to the states the power to prescribe and change
from time to time the rules of evidence in trials in the courts of the United States for offences against the United
States.' This case has not been overruled or modified. The Circuit Court of Appeals for this Circuit, in Cohen v.
U.S., 214 Fed.at page 28, 130 C.C.A. 422, say: 'The competency of witnesses in criminal trials in the courts of the
United States is not governed by the statute of the state, but by the common law, except where Congress has made
specific provisions on the subject.' UNITED STATES v. MILLER et al, 236 F. 798 (1916)(1).
STRIPPED OF THE COMMON LAW THERE WOULD BE NEITHER CONSTITUTION OR GOVERNMENT

THE ASSISTANT VICE-CHANCELLOR (Chancery Court of New York):
In the convention of the people of Pennsylvania, which was held in November, 1787, to take into consideration the
adoption of the Federal Constitution, it was objected because the word "appeals" was used in that instrument, that
the trial by jury was intended to be given up, and the civil law introduced in its stead. (See Wilson's Works and 4
Hall's Amer. Law Journal, 321, 423, 426.) [***] And in the debates on the judiciary in 1802, to which I have before
alluded, Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, in an able speech in the House of Representatives, said on this subject, (what was
not disputed, so far as facts were concerned,) that "the judges of the United States have held generally that the
Constitution of the United States was predicated upon an existing common law. Of the soundness of that opinion I
never had a doubt. I should scarcely go too far were I to say, that, stripped of the common law, there would be
neither Constitution nor government. The Constitution is unintelligible without reference to the common law.
And were we to go into our courts of justice with the mere statutes of the United States, not a step could be taken,
not even a contempt could be punished. There would be no form of pleading, no principles of evidence, no rule of
property. Without this law, the Constitution becomes a dead letter. For ten years it has been the doctrine of our
courts, that the common law was in force." (Debates on the Judiciary, 1802, p. 372. And see 1 Story's Com. on the
Const. 140, 141, ß 157, 158, and note 2; 262 to 267, ß794 to 797; Rawle on the Const. 258.) LYNCH v. CLARKE,
7 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 443 (1844)(1). [Our Constitutionally established judicial Courts of record of Common Law jurisdiction.]
THE COMMON LAW OF THE COURTS OF THE SOVEREIGN - CANNOT COMPEL THE SOVEREIGN ONLY PERSUADE
Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting:
As I explain, infra, at 2272-2273, this common law conception of sovereign immunity differed from the natural
law version, which understood immunity as derived from the fact that the sovereign was the font of the law, which
could not bind him. I do not dispute, indeed I insist, that in England it was the common law version that existed,
and so it is beside the point for the Court to protest that the King could not be sued under French law in his own
courts, see ante, at 2257; naturally not, since the common law conception was not couched in terms of who was the
font of the law. This said, I note that it is surprising for the Court to say that "[i]t is doubtful whether the King was
regarded ... as the font of the traditions and customs which formed the substance of the common law," ibid.
Although Bracton said that "law makes the king," 2 Bracton, at 33, he also said that the unwritten law of England
could properly be called law only to the extent that "the authority of the king or prince [has] first been added
thereto," id., at 19, and he spoke of "these English laws and customs, by the authority of kings," id., at 21. The
judges who announced the common law sat "in the place of the king," id., at 20, and so in practice the common law
certainly derived from him. Thus, at least for the most part, "[t]he custom of the king's court is the custom of
230
England, and becomes the common law." 1 Pollock & Maitland supra n. 3, at 184. [Judgments of the courts of record
of people are the Common Law. ] But for this, Blackstone would probably not have remarked that the natural law
theory produced a result "consonant" with the common law, 1 Blackstone 243; see infra this page, and 2273.
It is worth pausing here to note that after Blackstone had explained sovereign immunity at common law, he
went on to say that the common law tradition was compatible with sovereign immunity as discussed by writers on
"natural law": "And this is entirely consonant to what is laid down by the writers on natural law. 'A subject,' says
Puffendorf, 'so long as he continues a subject, hath no way to oblige his prince to give him his due, when he refuses
it; though no wise prince will ever refuse to stand to a lawful contract. And, if the prince gives the subject leave to
enter an action against him, upon such contract, in his own courts, the action itself proceeds rather upon natural
equity, than upon the municipal laws.' For the end of such action is not to compel the prince to observe the contract,
but to persuade him." Ibid. (footnote omitted). ALDEN v. MAINE, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)(2).
PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW ARE OPERATIVE ON ALL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE
Mr. Justice Brewer (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
This general truth is not inconsistent with the decisions that no suit or action can be maintained against the nation in
any of its courts without its consent, for they only recognize the obvious truth that a nation is not, without its
consent, subject to the controlling action of any of its instrumentalities or agencies. The creature cannot rule the
creator. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349 [***].
As heretofore stated, the constant declaration of this court from the beginning is that this government is
one of enumerated powers. 'The government, then, of the United States, can claim no powers which are not granted
to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given or given by necessary
implication.' Story, J., in Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 326. 'The government of the United States is one of
delegated, limited, and enumerated powers.' United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 292.
Appreciating the force of this, counsel for the government relies upon 'the doctrine of sovereign and
inherent power;' adding, 'I am aware that in advancing this doctrine I seem to challenge great decisions of the
court, and I speak with deference.' His argument runs substantially along this line: All legislative power must be
vested in either the state or the national government; no legislative powers belong to a state government other than
those which affect solely the internal affairs of that state; consequently all powers which are national in their scope
must be found vested in the Congress of the United States. But the proposition that there are legislative powers
affecting the nation as a whole which belong to, although not expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict
with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers. That this is such a government clearly appears
from the Constitution, independently of the Amendments, for otherwise there would be an instrument granting
certain specified things made operative to grant other and distinct things. This natural construction of the original
body of the Constitution is made absolutely certain by the 10th Amendment. This Amendment, which was
seemingly adopted with prescience of just such contention as the present, disclosed the widespread fear that the
national government might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise powers which
had not been granted. With equal determination the framers intended that no such assumption should ever find
justification in the organic act, and that if, in the future, further powers seemed necessary, they should be granted by
the people in the manner they had provided for amending that act. It reads: 'The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.'
The argument of counsel ignores the principal factor in this article, to wit, 'the people.' Its principal purpose was
not the distribution of power between the United States and the states, but a reservation to the people of all powers
not granted. The preamble of the Constitution declares who framed it,--'we, the people of the United States,' not the
people of one state, but the people of all the states; and article 10 reserves to the people of all the states the powers
not delegated to the United States. The powers affecting the internal affairs of the states not granted to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, and all powers of
a national character which are not delegated to the national government by the Constitution are reserved to the
people of the United States. The people who adopted the Constitution knew that in the nature of things they could
not foresee all the questions which might arise in the future, all the circumstances which might call for the exercise
of further national powers than those granted to the United States, and, after making provision for an amendment to
the Constitution by which any needed additional powers would be granted, they reserved to themselves all powers
not so delegated. This article 10 is not to be shorn of its meaning by any narrow or technical construction, but is to
be considered fairly and liberally so as to give effect to its scope and meaning. As we said, construing an express
limitation on the powers of Congress, in Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 288: 'We are not here confronted
with a question of the extent of the powers of Congress, but one of the limitations imposed by the Constitution on
its action, and it seems to us clear that the same rule and spirit of construction must also be recognized. If powers
granted are to be taken as broadly granted and as carrying with them authority to pass those acts which may be
reasonably necessary to carry them into full execution; in other words, if the Constitution in its grant of powers is to
be so construed that Congress shall be able to carry into full effect the powers granted, it is equally imperative that,
where prohibition or limitation is placed upon the power of Congress, that prohibition or limitation should be
enforced in its spirit and to its entirety. It would be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is
231
to be liberally construed, and that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed. Especially
is this true when, in respect to grants of powers, there is, as heretofore noticed, the help found in the last clause of
the 8th section, and no such helping clause in respect to prohibitions and limitations. The true spirit of constitutional
interpretation in both directions is to give full, liberal construction to the language, aiming ever to show fidelity to
the spirit and purpose.' [***]
Congress cannot enforce either rule upon any state. It is undoubtedly true that the early settlers brought to
this country the common law of England, and that that common law throws light on the meaning and scope of the
Constitution of the United States, and is also in many states expressly recognized as of controlling force in the
absence of express statute. As said by Mr. Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 654:
'In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and
history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex
parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 42; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, 625; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465.
The language of the Constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood without reference to the common
law. 1 Kent, Com. 336; Bradley, J., in Moore v. U.S., 91 U. S. 270, 274. [unwritten Order of things. ][***]
Can it be that the great multitude of interstate commercial transactions are freed from the burdens created
by the common law, as so defined, and are subject to no rule except that to be found in the statutes of Congress?
We are clearly of opinion that this cannot be so, and that the principles of the common law are operative upon all
interstate commercial transactions, except so far as they care modified by congressional enactment.'
What is the common law? Kent says (vol. 1, p. 471): 'The common law includes those principles, usages, and rules
of action applicable to the government and security of persons and property, which do not rest for their authority
upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature.'
As it does not rest on any statute or other written declaration of the sovereign, there must, as to each
principle thereof, be a first statement. Those statements are found in the decisions of courts, and the first statement
presents the principle as certainly as the last. Multiplication of declarations merely adds certainty. For after all, the
common law is but the accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain what is
right and just between individuals in respect to private disputes. As Congress cannot make compacts between the
states, as it cannot, in respect to certain matters, by legislation compel their separate action, disputes between them
must be settled either by force or else by appeal to tribunals empowered to determine the right and wrong thereof.
Force, under our system of government, is eliminated. STATE OF KANSAS v. STATE OF COLORADO, 206 U.S.
46 (1907)(2). [The people are sovereign, fraud voids everything, government was delegated just powers only. ]
PUBLIC GOOD IS NOTHING MORE THAN PROTECTION OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL 'S PRIVATE RIGHTS
OPINION, FOX, Chief Judge (District Court of Michigan):
As Blackstone had put it, "the public good is in nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of every
individual's private rights." (Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, pg. 53.) Nothing shows the soundness of the
Founding Fathers more clearly than in their use of the phrase "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." [***]
The value of a single human being with an eternal destiny is incomparable in comparison to that of an
artificial being with a finite destiny. [***] Nor were Americans indulging in rhetoric when they declared, "We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." They meant exactly what
they said. They were a generous, sincere, freedom-loving and God-fearing people. They saw these truths so clearly
and felt so deeply about them that they were willing to stake their lives upon them. MILOSZEWSKI v. SEARS
ROEBUCK, 346 F.Supp. 119 (1972)(2). [Hence, they pretend we are public business entities with no private rights. ]
Always remember Blackstone Commentaries are on the Laws of England (the Land) where the 'sovereign' is the king, and the
people are mere 'subjects.' Whereas, in The United States of America, the People here are as sovereign as the crown heads of Layback
and truly sovereigns of the whole country, and the just powers of governed are derived from the consent of the governed. Compulsory
law is always for subjects never for sovereigns else one is not sovereign. It is beyond all controversy the Common Law (unwritten Law
and statutes) are for 'subjects' (non-sovereigns) only, not for sovereigns. Statutes of our creature cannot command the sovereigns
against their will especially when injuring no one. The object in a more perfect Union is to secure our all, any Thing contrary is not-with-
standing; therefore nothing opposite, much less to create servitude, imperfection, or wrong to steal etc.
The sovereign people through their agent(s) govern residents = non-sovereigns: diverse races of unnaturalized foreigners
and inhabitants, i.e. colored persons, Negroes, Chinese, Africans, gypsies etc., English subjects, Irish, Scottish, German, native tribe s
(Indians) etc. who owe allegiance. The judicial interpretations herein are the Common Law of America (in part).
COURTS OF COMMON 'LAW' DISTINGUISHED FROM COURTS OF EQUITY, ADMIRALTY , MILITARY

McPHERSON, District Judge (Circuit Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division):
The phrases 'law' and 'common law' under this statute are one and the same, and were defined by Judge Story in
Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, as being used in contradistinction to 'equity' and 'admiralty,' and 'maritime'
jurisdiction. And Judge Bradley, in the case of Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 23, defined the terms in the same way,
and added: 'That they must be construed to embrace all litigations between party and party which in the English
system of jurisprudence, under the light of which the judiciary act, as well as the constitution, were framed, were
232
embraced in all the various forms of procedure carried on in the ordinary courts of law and equity as distinguished
from the ecclesiastical, admiralty, and military courts of the realm.' KIRBY v. CHICAGO & N.W.R. CO. 106 F. 551
(1900)(1). [Only 3 natures: In Law (of the Land); equity, admiralty = water world. Code = private. ]
COURTS OF COMMON LAW MUST BE REGULATED BY THE COMMON LAW = UNWRITTEN LAW
WOODBURY, Circuit Justice: Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 22 U. S. 738; American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U. S. 511.
The decisions, above referred to, proceed upon the ground, that the general government itself is one of limited
powers, and hence possesses no authority to punish conduct, beyond what is expressly granted to it, or is necessary
and proper to carry into effect what is expressly granted. That it hence follows, no conduct can be declared a crime
by congress, which does not come within such power. That the constitution, being an organic instrument and form
of government for general purposes, does not usually establish courts, and limit their jurisdiction, and parcel out
among them and define various offences, but leaves that duty to congress. The definition of treason in article 3, ß 2,
is almost the only exception. [***] And again, that acts of congress, as well as the constitution, must generally unite
to give jurisdiction to a particular court. 1 Kent, Comm. 294; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U. S. 8; Clarke v.
Bazadone, 5 U. S. 212; McIntire V. Wood, 11 U. S. 504. [***] So, generally, it is not enough to constitute an act a
crime, that it is opposed to some law or the constitution, unless they declare it to be criminal or punishable. It often
is but a civil injury or wrong. Evans v. Foster, 1 N. H. 374. [***] In Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. 75, 93, the true guide
in answering this question is given: 'Courts, which originate in the common law, possess a jurisdiction, which must
be regulated by the common law, until some statute may change their established principles; but courts which are
created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction'
(Marshall, C. J., and page 102, Johnson, J.). [***] But unless they went further and in the constitution or treaty, or
elsewhere, designated the court or magistrate to try or examine the offence, that must still be done by legislation,
or the jurisdiction in any particular court could not be sustained. [***] To enable this court to act, a case must not
only fall within the judicial power of the United States, as conferred by the constitution, but jurisdiction over it
must have been conferred on the circuit court by some act of congress. Conk. Prac. 69, 88. Such cases alone are
those described in the judiciary act, as 'cognizable under the authority of the United States.' U. S. v. Ravara [Case
No. 16,122]. [***] So as to crimes. U. S. v. Hudson, 11 U. S. 32; U. S. v. Bevans, 16 U. S. 336; U. S. v. Wiltberger,
18 U. S. 76; U. S. v. Smith, Id. 153, 157; U. S. v. Grush [Case 15,268]; U. S. v. Coombs, 37 U. S. 73; Turner v.
Bank of North America, 4 U. S. 10; 3 Kent, Comm. 363. U.S. v. NEW BEDFORD BRIDGE, 27 F.Cas. 91 (1847)(1).
Federal courts must follow Supreme Court decisions – No other court may correct them.
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to
develop and apply their own rules of decision. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (1812). MILWAUKEE v. States of ILLINOIS & MICH., 451 U.S. 304 (1981)(2).
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS NO COMMON LAW AUTHORITY OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT
Chase, Justice (Circuit Court, D. Pennsylvania):
Upon the whole, it may be a defect in our political institutions, it may be an inconvenience in the administration of
justice, that the common law authority, relating to crimes and punishments, has not been conferred upon the
government of the United States, which is a government in other respects also of a limited jurisdiction: but Judges
cannot remedy political imperfections, nor supply any Legislative omission. I will not say whether the offence is at
this time cognizable in a State Court. But, certainly, Congress might have provided, by law, for the present case, as
they have provided for other cases, of a similar nature; and yet if Congress had ever declared and defined the
offence, without prescribing a punishment, I should still have thought it improper to exercise a discretion upon
that part of the subject. The United States v. Worrall (yeoman of the Navy), 28 F.Cas. 774 (1798)(1).
If the Code is not "rules for the government…" (Article I, s 8, cl. 14) where are those rules? There are no other 'natures' in the
Constitution of the United States, other than the three (3) cited therein, 1. 'The Law ' of the Land for subjects only; 2. Equity, a body of
principles to decree more perfect Justice, which is not the same thing as in Law, nor does a court of equity have power prescribed by
Law to decide matters at all; 3. Admiralty and Maritime the 'Law of Nations' for commerce between foreign nations (of foreign
countries) and among the several states, and Indian tribes. 'Regulations' of commerce (are for shipping and navigation) within the ebb
and flow of tide - 'water world' out of the county of the realm. The parties are 'stipulators' (agreements). Licenses are issued by
Congress under the Commerce clause.
5th Amendment of the Constitution commands, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
Law. Meaning the Constitutional Law of the Land (not water). The lex non scripta or unwritten Common Law (of the Land for subjects
only, not sovereigns) distinguished from written private copyright Code Statutes (lex scripta) of a legislature being a creature of the
Law; today deriving no lawful power from 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons. A 'regulation' of commerce is not the Law 'of
the Land.' Domestic commercial land, or business is a jurisdictional fraud (scam) for control to tax us.
Notice: a Congressionally "created" executive branch (private company) "United States District Court" is not the same thing
as an "established" judicial "District Court of the United States" of The Judiciary "exercising judicial Power" under Article III with
appointed and commissioned Article III judicial judge(s) thereof "tenured for life" which cannot removed by anyone except for
233
"impeachment." The 6th Amendment right to be informed of the "nature and cause" of the accusation is super important regarding
every element of the plaintiff, court, Bar member Judge and prosecutor, alleged crime(s), and District.
Americans are not charged with a breach of "the Laws of the United States" distinguished from "United States Code". In any
event all of the penal law jurisdiction of their (private) code "System of Federalism" acting outside the Constitution is coming out of
"United States" located in the District of Columbia engaged in commerce between public "business entities" (artificial persons) whether
plaintiff or defendant. This System outside the Constitution regulating commerce and trade is not and cannot be lawfully exercising any
Constitutional "Power" whatsoever "in Law". The de facto government has "deceptively similar names" to those of the de jure
government. And it is super easy to pervert and usurp the Law especially regarding personal jurisdiction.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit):

As to the general applicability of common-law principles to federal statutes, the Supreme Court has held that "in
order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the
common law." United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (citation omitted). ARRIAGA v. FLORIDA
PACIFIC FARMS, 305 F.3d 1228 (2002)(1). [Apply to our sovereignty and principles of jurisdiction etc. ]
GREATEST ENGLISH JURISTS - SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES

The United States is entirely a 'creature' of the Constitution – of the People.
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the
Bill of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. (fn 3) Its power and authority have no
other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. (fn 4) When the
Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another land. This is not a novel concept. To the contrary, it is as old as government. It was recognized long before
Paul successfully invoked his right as a Roman citizen to be tried in strict accordance with Roman law. And many
centuries later an English historian wrote:
(fn 3). Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 119, 136--137, Graves v. People
of State of New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25.
(fn 4). Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176--180; Territory of Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 236--239
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 'In a Settled Colony the inhabitants have all the rights of Englishmen. They take with them,
in the first place, that which no Englishman can by expatriation put off, namely, allegiance to the Crown, the duty of
obedience to the lawful commands of the Sovereign, and obedience to the Laws which Parliament may think proper
to make with reference to such a Colony. But, on the other hand, they take with them all the rights and liberties of
British Subjects; all the rights and liberties as against the Prerogative of the Crown, which they would enjoy in this
country.' It was against this general background that two of the greatest English jurists, Lord Chief Justice Hale and
Sir William Blackstone--men who exerted considerable influence on the Founders--expressed sharp hostility to any
expansion of the jurisdiction of military courts. REID v. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)(2).
BLACKSTONE ACCEPTED AS THE MOST SATISFACTORY EXPOSITION OF THE COMMON LAW
Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England. At the
time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that
more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England; so that undoubtedly, the framers of the
Constitution were familiar with it. In this treatise, vol. 4, p. 5. is given a definition of the word 'crimes:' SCHICK v.
UNITED STATES, 195 U.S. 65 (1904)(1). [Most satisfactory (demonstrating the principles of mere human Law). ]
THE COMMON LAW [OF MAN] WAS GROUNDED ON THE LAW OF GOD - THE MOST HIGH
MOORE, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alabama) concurring specially:
American law derives its principles from the common law of England, clearly explained in Commentaries on the
Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone. In 1799, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, James
Iredell, charged the grand jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania as follows: "[F]or near 30 years
[The Commentaries on the Laws of England] has been the manual of almost every student of law in the United
States, and its uncommon excellence has also introduced it into the libraries, and often to the favourite reading of
private gentlemen; so that [Sir William Blackstone's] views of the subject could scarcely be unknown to those who
framed the Amendment to the Constitution, ...."
Claypoole's American Daily Advertiser, April 11, 1799, Philadelphia, 3 The Documentary History of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800, at 347 (Maeva Marcus, ed., Columbia University Press 1990)
(emphasis added). Because Blackstone's Commentaries was the manual for law students in the United States
during and after the revolutionary period and the drafting of the United States Constitution, we should consider his
interpretations of common law not only as influential but also as authoritative for applying the common law today.
Blackstone's explanation of the common law is important because of the influence it has had upon the
234
American legal system. In 1993, Justice Antonin Scalia stated: "The conception of the judicial role that [Chief
Justice John Marshall] possessed, and that was shared by succeeding generations of American judges until very
recent times, took it to be 'the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,' Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added)--not what the law shall be. That original and enduring
American perception of the judicial role sprang not from the philosophy of Nietzsche but from the jurisprudence of
Blackstone, which viewed retroactivity as an inherent characteristic of the judicial power, a power 'not delegated to
pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.' 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (1765)."
Harper v. Virginia Dep't. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). [The opposite: Usurp by
fraudulent interpretation. ] Natural law forms the basis of the common law. (fn 7) Natural law is the law of nature
and of nature's God as understood by men through reason, but aided by direct revelation found in the Holy
Scriptures: [Super emphasis added. Or else the heretics exalt themselves above God. Mine]
Fn7. There can be no debate as to the connection between the common law and the natural law. Alabama uses a
phrase that harkens back to the natural law--"crime against nature"--to refer to homosexuality. See ß 30-1-19,
Ala.Code 1975. Chief Justice Sir Christopher Wray and the entire Court at King's Bench resolved a point of law as
follows: "That in this point, as almost in all others, the common law was grounded on the law of God...."[Super
emphasis added. ] Ratcliff's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 713, 726 (K.B.1592).
"The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the Holy
Scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of
nature, as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity." Blackstone indicated that one law was more reliable
than the other: "If we could be as certain of the [natural law] as we are of the [revealed law], both would have an
equal authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together." 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries 42.
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 42. Blackstone's Commentaries explain that because our reason is
full of error, the most certain way to ascertain the law of nature is through direct revelation. The ultimate
importance of this law and its influence upon our law cannot be understated. [Super emphasis. ] "Upon these two
foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws
should be suffered to contradict these. [Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not bear false witness. Servant's obey your
masters. Keep God's commandments etc. Emphasis added. ] There is, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in
which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the
benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and
efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in
subordination to, the former." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 42. [Super emphasis added. ]
There are impeccable American sources for the above proposition. James Wilson, Associate Justice on the
first United States Supreme Court and signer of both the Declaration of Independence and the United States
Constitution, said: "Human law must rest its authority ultimately upon the authority of that law which is divine....
Far from being rivals or enemies, religion and law are twin sisters, friends, and mutual assistants. Indeed, these two
sciences run into each other." James Wilson, "Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation," in 1 The Works of
the Honourable James Wilson, 104-06 (Bird Wilson ed., Bronson and Chauncey 1804). John Jay, first Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court and coauthor of the Federalist Papers, declared: "[N]o sovereign ought to permit
those who are under his Command to violate the precepts of the Law of Nature, which forbids all Injuries...."
[Super emphasis added. ] "John Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia, May
22, 1793, Richmond, Virginia." 2 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800,
at 386 (Maeva Marcus, ed., Columbia University Press 1988).
Our own Declaration of Independence refers to "the laws of nature and of nature's God": "When, in the
course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected
them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of
nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should
declare the causes which impel them to the separation." (Emphasis added.) It would be an odd logic to assert that the
American colonies could use the law of God "to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with
another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and
of nature's God entitle them," but not to decide the fundamental basis of their laws. Alabama has adopted the
common law, as evidenced by ß 1-3-1, Ala.Code 1975. That section states: "The common law of England, so far as
it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions
and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or
repealed by the Legislature."
Our cases have held consistently and frequently that Alabama is a common-law state. See, e.g., Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Cook, 168 Ala. 592, 53 So. 190 (1910); Hollis v. Crittenden, 251 Ala. 320, 37 So.2d 193 (1948); State v.
Taylor, 415 So.2d 1043, 1047 (Ala.1982) . Our jurisprudence explains that old English statutes are a part of the
common law. The statutes passed in England before the emigration of our ancestors, which amend the law and are
applicable to our situation, constitute a part of our common law. See, e.g., Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala. 301 (1877);
Clark v. Goddard, 39 Ala. 164 (1863); Carter v. Balfour's Adm'r, 19 Ala. 814 (1851).
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Homosexuality is strongly condemned in the common law because it violates both natural and revealed
law. The author of Genesis writes: "God created man in His own image, in the image of God He created him; male
and female He created them.... For this reason a man shall leave his father and his mother, and be joined to his wife;
and they shall become one flesh." Genesis 1:27, 2:24 (King James). The law of the Old Testament enforced this
distinction between the genders by stating that "[i]f a man lies with a male as he lies with a woman, both of them
have committed an abomination." Leviticus 20:13 (King James).
From the passage in Leviticus 20:13, the early western legal tradition garnered its laws on homosexuality.
The Corpus Juris Civilis is the sixth-century encyclopedic collection of Roman laws made under the sponsorship of
Emperor Justinian. "It is Justinian's collection which served as the basis of canon law (the law of the Christian
Church) and civil law (both European and English)." The following is a statement in Law French from Corpus Juris:
Vern L. Bullough, Homosexuality: A History 32 (New American Library 1979).
"Another important academician who had a significant impact upon the continued influence of Roman law
in England was Vacarius, a gifted scholar who had taught Roman law at Bologna. Vacarius founded the law school
at Oxford and it is generally recognized that his influence 'began a new era in the history of English law and of its
connection with the legal system of Rome.' [Quoting Burdick, The Principles of Roman Law, 67 (1938).] Vacarius
was the first professor of law in England and one of his most popular texts, a summary of law for poor students, was
essentially a condensed version of Justinian's Code and Digest.
"The most ancient work on the common law, a Latin text written between 1187 and 1189 called A Treatise
of the Laws and Customs of England, was written by Ranulf deGlanvill who was a student of Vacarius. [Citing
Stubbs, 'The History of the Canon Law in England,' in 1 Select Essays in AngloAmerican Legal History, 248, 259
(1907).] Glanvill enjoyed the complete confidence of Henry II and became his Chief Justice in 1190. Glanvill's
treatise, which clearly pays tribute and reference to Roman law and Justinian's Code and Digest, was the standard
text book on the laws of England and established the method of legal writing for centuries to come." Ex parte H.H.
In re D.H., 830 So.2d 21 (2002)(3).
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS JUDGE
All human law is "declaratory of" and subordinate to the Law of God or no validity. - Thou shalt not steal by false witness.
MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge (United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division):
On November 7, 2000, Judge Moore was elected Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court. During his
campaign for Chief Justice, Judge Moore capitalized on the name recognition that he had obtained during the 1995
lawsuits. Judge Moore's campaign referred to him as the "Ten Commandments Judge," and virtually everything put
out by the campaign referenced the Ten Commandments. Shortly after his election, now-Chief Justice Moore began
designing a monument depicting, in his words, "the moral foundation of law" and reflecting "the sovereignty of God
over the affairs of men." By God, the Chief Justice specifically meant the Judeo-Christian God of the Holy Bible
and not the God of any other religion. [***]
Engraved on the left tablet is: "I am the Lord thy God"; "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me"; "Thou
shalt not make unto thee any graven image"; "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and
"Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy." Engraved on the right tablet is: "Honour thy father and thy mother";
"Thou shalt not kill"; "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; "Thou shalt not steal"; "Thou shalt not bear false witness";
and "Thou shalt not covet." In addition, the four sides of the monument are engraved with fourteen quotations from
various secular sources; these sources are identified on the monument to the extent that each quotation is
accompanied by the name of a document or an individual. On each side of the monument, one of the quotations is
larger than the others and is set apart in relief. The smaller quotations on each side are intended to relate to that
larger quotation. The north (front) side of the monument has a large quotation from the Declaration of
Independence, "Laws of nature and of nature's God," and smaller quotations from George Mason, James Madison,
and William Blackstone that speak of the relationship between nature's laws and God's laws. The large quotation on
the west (right) side of the monument is the National Motto, "In God We Trust"; the smaller quotations on that side
were excerpted from the Preamble to the Alabama Constitution and the fourth verse of the National Anthem. The
south (back) side of the monument bears a large quotation from the Judiciary Act of 1789, "So help me God," and
smaller quotations from George Washington and John Jay speaking of oaths and justice. The east (left) side of the
monument has a large quotation from the Pledge of Allegiance 1954, "One nation under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all," and smaller quotations from the legislative history of the Pledge, James Wilson, and
Thomas Jefferson suggesting that both liberty and morality are based on God's authority. The full quotations from
all four sides of the monument are attached as Appendix B to this opinion. [***]
At the monument's unveiling ceremony, Chief Justice Moore made a speech noting 1296 that the
monument depicted the "moral foundation of law." But consistent with the impression the court had when it viewed
the monument and consistent with his intent to design the monument to emphasize the preeminence of God's Word,
the Chief Justice made clear the monument was ultimately a monument to the giver of this moral foundation, the
Judeo-Christian God, and, in particular, to his sovereignty over all the affairs of men. [***] He said that these
officials have "turned away from those absolute standards that serve as the moral foundation of law." In the Chief
Justice's opinion, to restore this moral foundation of law, "we must first recognize the source from which all
236
morality springs ... [by] recogniz [ing] the sovereignty of God." Finally, the Chief Justice said that he hoped that
"this day marks the beginning of the restoration of the moral foundation of law to our people and a return to the
knowledge of God in our land." Because of its importance to this litigation, a transcript of the Chief Justice's entire
speech is attached as Appendix C to this opinion. [***]
That Chief Justice Moore's purpose in displaying the monument was non-secular is self-evident. First, it is
self-evident from his own words. At the monument's unveiling ceremony, the Chief Justice explained that the
monument "serves to remind ... that in order to establish justice we must invoke 'the favor and guidance of almighty
God.'" He made clear that, in order to restore this moral foundation of law, "we must first recognize the source from
which all morality springs ... [by] recogniz[ing] the sovereignty of God." Thus, he made clear that, while the
monument depicted the "moral foundation of law," it was ultimately a monument to the giver of this foundation, the
Judeo-Christian God. He saw the placement of the monument in the Judicial Building rotunda as not only "the
beginning of the restoration of the moral foundation of law to our people," but, more fundamentally, as "a return to
the knowledge of God in our land."
In his trial testimony before this court, the Chief Justice gave more structure to his understanding of the
relationship of God and the state, and the role the monument was intended to play in conveying that message. He
explained that the Judeo-Christian God reigned over both the church and the state in this country, and that both
owed allegiance to that God. In other words, the Chief Justice described essentially a vertical or standing triangle,
with God at the top as the sovereign head, and with the state and the church, side-by-side, forming the base under
God. [The Order of Things. 1st God, then the sovereign people then everything else is subordinate to the People.] [***]
The Ten Commandments monument, as the Chief Justice made clear both at the unveiling ceremony and at
trial, is a granite reminder to Alabama judges and justices and all other state citizens of the ultimate sovereignty of
the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church, and of how all men and women should, therefore, look
to God as the ultimate source of the moral foundation of all the laws of this country; for, it was God, and not man or
the state, that gave us the Ten Commandments.
Chief Justice Moore's non-secular purpose is also evident from the monument itself. To be sure, "The Ten
Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam). But,
as the evidence in this case more than adequately reflected, the Ten Commandments have a secular aspect as well.
Experts on both sides testified that the Ten Commandments were a foundation of American law, that America's
founders looked to and relied on the Ten Commandments as a source of absolute moral standards. The second tablet,
of course, is entirely secular--from "Thou shalt not kill" to "Thou shalt not covet"--but the first tablet also has
secular aspects. As the Chief Justice pointed out in his speech unveiling the monument, Samuel Adams gave a
speech, the day before the signing of the Declaration of Independence, referring to the King as a false idol, alluding
to the Commandment that "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me." [***]
As discussed above, the monument's primary feature is the Ten Commandments, an "undeniably ... sacred
text," Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980), carved as tablets into the top of the monument. See Indiana
Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 772 (7th Cir.2001) (recognizing additional religious
significance when the Commandments are presented as tablet-shaped blocks), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1162
(2002). The monument's sloping top and the religious air of the tablets unequivocally call to mind an open Bible
resting on a lectern. While the quotations on the monument's sides are non-Biblical, the fact that they have been
edited so as to emphasize the importance of religion and the sovereignty of God in our society fails to diminish, and
even amplifies, the ineffable but still overwhelming holy aura of the monument. As the Chief Justice himself stated
at the monument's unveiling ceremony, these quotations were not included to serve as "history, [or] historical
documents. All history supports the acknowledgment of God. You'll find no documents surrounding the Ten
Commandments because they stand alone as an acknowledgment of that God that's contained in our pledge,
contained in our motto, and contained in our oath." [***] Specifically, the Court focused on the fact that "[t]he
opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history
and tradition of this country. From colonial times through the founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice
of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom." [***]
The Chief Justice contends that, under Marsh, the monument is constitutional because, as he has written
in his briefs to the court, "judges throughout our nation's history have acknowledged the moral foundation of law
and, indeed, have depended upon it in reaching their decisions." He points to an uninterrupted history, from as early
as 1819 to today, in which courts "interacted with, relied upon, or otherwise discussed the moral foundation of the
law [in their decisions]." As such, the Chief Justice contends, his reference to "God and to God's law on the
monument do not render it unconstitutional." The Chief Justice also argues that the acknowledgment of God made
by this monument is no different from the acknowledgments of God appearing on United States currency, in the
United States motto, and at the opening of court sessions. Basically, the Chief Justice argues that the monument's
acknowledgment of God, like the legislative prayer upheld in Marsh, is part of our nation's history.
Additionally, the Chief Justice has presented evidence of numerous displays of the Ten Commandments in
judicial buildings and other government buildings in Washington, D.C. The Chief Justice argues that the existence
of these Ten Commandments displays demonstrates a history of such displays which validates the constitutionality
of his own display under Marsh. The most significant of these displays, discussed previously, are: (1) Moses,
237
among other historical lawgivers, holding two tablets on the East Portico of the United States Supreme Court
Building; (2) a carving of two tablets with the numbers I through X on the entrance door to the United States
Supreme Court's courtroom; (3) a pylon in front of the E. Barrett Prettyman Building in Washington D.C. with
(among other things) two tablets carved with Hebrew writing; (4) two blank tablets at the feet of the Spirit of Justice
statue in the United States Justice Department Building; and (5) a mural in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
courtroom with Moses carving the Ten Commandments and a full version of the text of the Ten Commandments.
[***] Thus, the Bible dictates the Chief Justice's understanding of the relationship between God and the state
because, "While both the priest and the king were under the law of God, the role of civil government was separated
from the worship of God." Id. Jesus, too, according to the Chief Justice, explicitly recognized this separation when
he said "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." Id.
(citing Matthew 22:21 (King James)). [How True, but ere the People are sovereigns. ]
The Chief Justice also believes that his specific understanding of the relationship between God and the state
is embodied by the First Amendment. The Chief Justice quotes Thomas Jefferson's "Bill For Establishing Religious
Freedom," "that Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it
shall remain," (emphasis added by the Chief Justice), for the proposition that "even Thomas Jefferson recognized
that a separation between church and state existed because 'Almighty God' was sovereign over both institutions." Id.
The Chief Justice also quotes James Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance": "It is the duty of every man to
render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent
both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as
a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe ..." Id. at 2(quoting
II The Writings of James Madison 184-85) (Gaillard Hunt, ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1901). This language
leads to the Chief Justice's conclusion that "Madison explicitly recognized that maintaining a 'separation' in no way
meant to separate from civil government a belief in the sovereignty of God. Indeed, the very concept of separation
mandates a recognition of a sovereign God." Id. at 21. The Chief Justice uses these examples from Jefferson and
Madison, as well as earlier examples in English history, to support his belief "that the recognition of the sovereignty
of God is the very source of the principle of the separation of church and state." Id. at 22. [***]
In fact, this country's founding documents support the idea that it is from the people, and not God, that the
state draws its powers. As every American schoolchild knows, the Declaration of Independence states that
"governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," and the
Constitution begins with that immortal phrase, "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." [***]
See, e.g., Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir.1983) ("Under our form of government and
long established law and custom, the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of our
Constitution and laws; its interpretations may not be disregarded.... If the Supreme Court errs, no other court may
correct it."), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) ("But unless we
wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower
federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be." [***].
(2) Interviews he has given on TV and radio: For example, on a segment entitled "One True God," aired by
Coral Ridge Ministries as part of a television program in October 2001, the Chief Justice discussed the "long,
continuous battle that I have fought over acknowledging God.... I have put the monument depicting the sovereignty
of God and his standards in the Judicial building. And I have no intention of removing them. We will defend it,
because it is truth, and you can't deny truth." [Super emphasis added. ] [***]
(4) Speeches he has given at different rallies: For example, after he was elected Chief Justice, the Chief Justice
appeared at a rally in Tennessee on December 2, 2001, in which he gave a speech stating, in part, that "God gave us
our rights; government is to secure it. If it doesn't--if it denies God, it should be abolished." [***]
APPENDIX A The Ten Commandments Monument
APPENDIX B Quotations inscribed on the monument's four sides
Front (North) side
"Laws of nature and of nature's God"--Declaration of Independence
"The laws of nature are the laws of God, whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth"--
George Mason [Taken from arguments submitted by George Mason in Robin v. Hardaway, 2 Va. Reports (Jeff.)
109, 114 (Va.1772) ]
"The transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the
objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed"--James
Madison [Taken from The Federalist No. 43, at 295]
"This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation
to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any
validity if contrary to this; ... upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all
human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these"--William Blackstone
[Taken from Volume I of The Commentaries of the Law of England, "Of the Rights of Persons," at 41
(1765) ]
238
Right (West) side
"In God We Trust"--National Motto
"We, the people of the state of Alabama, in order to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, invoking the favor and guidance of almighty God, do ordain and
establish the following constitution and form of government for the state of Alabama"--Constitution of Alabama
"O thus be it ever when freemen shall stand between their lov'd home and the war's desolation! Blest with vict'ry
and peace may the heav'n rescued land praise the power that hath made and preserv'd us a nation! Then conquer we
must, when our cause it is just, and this be our motto--'in god is our trust,' and the star-spangled banner in triumph
shall wave o'er the land of the free and the home of the brave"--National Anthem
Back (South) side
"So help me God"--Judiciary Act of 1789 [through today. See 5 U.S.C. 3331. ]
"Let it simply be asked, where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation
desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in the courts of justice?"--George Washington [Taken
from Washington's Farewell Address of 1796]
"The greater part of evidence will always consist of the testimony of witnesses--this testimony is given under those
solemn obligations which an appeal to the God of truth impose; and if oaths should cease to be held sacred, our
dearest and most valuable rights would become insecure"--John Jay [Taken from John Jay's charge to the grand jury
of the circuit court for the district of Vermont on June 25, 1772, at 284]
Left (East) side
"One nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all"--Pledge of Allegiance 1954
"The inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our
government upon the moral directions of the creator"--Legislative History [Taken from the House Report of
legislation adopting the Pledge of Allegiance, at 2340]
"Human law must rest its authority ultimately upon the authority of that law which is divine"--James Wilson
[Taken from Volume I of The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, at 104-05 (Bird Wilson ed. 1804) ]
"And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the
minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of god? That they are not to be violated but with his wrath?"--
Thomas Jefferson [Taken from Notes on the State of Virginia, at 169]
APPENDIX C
Speech by Justice Moore at monument's unveiling ceremony [***]
When I ran for the office of Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, I made a pledge to restore the
moral foundation of law. It is axiomatic that to restore morality, we must first recognize the source of that morality.
From our earliest history in 1776, when we were first pleased to be called the Untied States of America, our
forefathers recognized the sovereignty of God. As late as 1954, the United States Congress placed in our Pledge of
Allegiance the word "under God," and said the inclusion of God in our pledge, therefore, would further
acknowledge the dependence of our people and our government upon the moral directions of the Creator. Judges,
legislators, and executive officers around our country have, since our nation's birth, consistently pledged under oath,
"so help me God," to uphold the Constitution. [***].
And what an appropriate date this is. For it was on August 1st of 1776, exactly 225 years ago today, that
Samuel Adams, the father of the American Revolution, stood before a rather large crowd at the Philadelphia State
House. And on its steps, he delivered a speech prior to the formal signing of the Declaration of Independence on
August 2nd of 1776. He began by stating, "We have explored the temple of royalty and found that the idol that we
have bowed down to has eyes which see not, ears that hear not our prayers, and a heart like the nether millstone."
Today a cry has gone out across our land for the acknowledgment of that God upon whom this nation and
our laws were founded and for those simple truths which our forefathers found to be self-evident; but once again,
we find that those cries have fallen upon eyes that have seen not, ears that hear not our prayers, and hearts much like
that nether millstone. Samuel Adams concluded his remarks by saying, "We have this day restored the Sovereign, to
whom alone all men ought to be obedient. He reigns in Heaven and with a propitious eye beholds his subjects
assuming that freedom of thought and dignity of self-direction which he bestowed upon them. From the rising to the
setting sun, may His kingdom come." And may this day mark the restoration of the moral foundation of law to our
people and the return to the knowledge of God in our land. [The Truth of God and Jesus Christ. ]
This monument, ladies and gentlemen, tells a story. If you look to the front, you'll see on the inset, "The
Laws of Nature and of Nature's God." It was on those laws, the will of the Maker, upon which the Declaration of
Independence was premised and upon which the Constitution was predicated.
James Madison, for example, the chief architect of the Constitution, said we were entitled to have a
constitution because of the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and
happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim and to which all such institutions must be
sacrificed. They knew the law. The law was clearly written by Sir William Blackstone, which was the law of this
country for many, many decades. He said, "This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God
himself, is, of course, superior in obligations to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries and at all
times, and no humans laws are of any validity if contrary to this." This law of nature and the law of revelation
pin all human laws on these two foundations. [Thou shalt not covet or steal anything much less by false witness. ]
239
On each side of this monument, you'll see quotes from various presidents. For example, George
Washington, on the back, said, "Let it simply be asked, where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if
the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in our courts of justice."
The first Chief Justice, John Jay, also with President Washington, said, "If testimony of witnesses, if the
oaths ever cease to be held sacred, our dearest and most precious rights will become insecure."
On the right side as you face it, you'll see the Constitution and the Preamble of Alabama, which says that
we must invoke the favor and guidance of Almighty God; but you'll also sing--see that National Anthem. Oh, you
won't see the first stanza, "Oh, say can you see"--you know it very well--"by the dawn's early light." You'll see the
verse we neglect today: "Thus be it ever when freemen shall stand between their loved home and the war's
desolation, blest with vict'ry and peace. May the heaven rescued land praise the power that has made and preserved
this nation. And conquer we must when our cause it is just. And this be our motto-- in God is our trust. And the star-
spangled banner in triumph shall wave over the land of the free and the home of the brave."
Indeed, in 1956, the United states Congress, by act of Congress, by law today, made "In God We Trust" our
national anthem--our national motto. "So help me God," by which we pledge to uphold the constitution, has been
around since 1789, when the Judiciary Act established that as the basis of our oath.
You'll see quotes from that famous third President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson. He said, "Can
the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of
the people that these liberties are the gift of God, that they're not to be violated but with his wrath?" Indeed, I
tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just and that His justice cannot sleep forever. [It's coming. ]
Surrounding this monument, you see every ounce of support for the acknowledgment of the sovereignty of
that God and those absolute standards upon which our laws are based. Oh, this isn't surrounding the plaque with
history, historical documents. All history supports the acknowledgment of God. You'll find no documents
surrounding the Ten Commandments because they stand alone as an acknowledgment of that God that's contained in
our pledge, contained in our motto, and contained in our oath.
I thank you very much for your attendance today. And I'll allow any questions to be answered by my public
information officer and my attorney. Thank you.
APPENDIX D Quotations inscribed on the Moral Foundation of Law plaque
"A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is
out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is
not rooted in eternal law and natural law."--Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, April 16, 1963.
"The first work of slavery is to mar and deface those characteristics of its victims which distinguish men
from things, and persons from property. Its first aim is to destroy all sense of high moral and religious responsibility.
It reduces man to a mere machine. It cuts him off from his Maker, it hides him from the laws of God."--Frederick
Douglass, December 1, 1850. Glassroth v. Chief Justice Roy Moore, 229 F.Supp.2d 1290 (2002). [Ask the anti-
Christ precisely which God is it that they swear their Oaths to So help me God; which God is it this one Nation is under and
IN GOD WE TRUST. Woe unto ye Lawyers and anti-Christ refusing to Justice by ascertaining the Truth.]
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS IS WHOLLY DERIVED FROM ACTS OF CONGRESS

RIDGE, District Judge (United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division):
Ever since the case of United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, 2 U.S. 384 ( 1798), it has been universally recognized
that Federal Courts have no common law jurisdiction in criminal cases. The jurisdiction of such Courts is wholly
derived from Acts of the Congress. Although the Constitution contains no grant, general or specific, to Congress of
power to provide for the punishment of crimes, except piracies and felonies on the high seas, offenses against the
law of nations, treason, and counterfeiting the securities and coin of the United States, no one doubts the power of
Congress to 'create, define, and punish, crimes and offenses, whenever they shall deem it necessary and proper by
law to do so, for effectuating the objects of the Government.' United States v. Worrall, supra; Cf. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316; U.S. v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 346. KITCHENS v. STEELE, 112 F.Supp. 383 (1953)(1). [1787-
1870 "person" means bodies artificial. Common Law criminal jurisdiction over We the people? Based on what? Magic?]
FEDERAL COURTS HAVE NO "POWER" TO INCARSERATE (SOVEREIGN) CONTEMPTERS PRESCRIBED BY LAW

Justice SCALIA (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring in the judgment:
Our first reference to the special status of the federal courts' contempt powers appeared in United States v. Hudson,
7 Cranch 32 (1812), where the question presented was whether circuit courts had the power to decide common-law
criminal cases. Congress had not conferred such power, but the prosecution argued that it was part of the National
Government's inherent power to preserve its own existence. Id., at 33-34. The Court ruled that such an argument
could establish, at most, that Congress had inherent power to pass criminal laws, not that the federal courts had
inherent power without legislation to adjudge common-law crimes. [***]
I would therefore hold that the federal courts have no power to prosecute contemners for disobedience of
court judgments, and no derivative power to appoint an attorney to conduct contempt prosecutions. That is not to
say, of course, that the federal courts may not impose criminal sentences for such contempts. But they derive that
power from the same source they derive the power to pass on other crimes which it has never been contended they
may prosecute: a statute enacted by Congress criminalizing the conduct which has been on the books in one form or
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another since the Judiciary Act of 1789, supra, at 2131. See 18 U.S.C. ß 401. [***] That provision states: "A court
of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its
authority, and none other, as ... (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command." YOUNG v. U.S., 481 U.S. 787 (1987)(2). [Power prescribed by Law = Jurisdiction over a 'person'. ]
JURISDICTION MUST BE SHOWN ON JUDGMENT
There is no presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction. 2 Wils. 382, 383.
MARSHALL, Chief Justice (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court as follows:
All courts from which an appeal lies are inferior courts in relation to the appellate court before which their judgment
may be carried; but they are not therefore inferior courts in the technical sense of those words. They apply to courts
of a special and limited jurisdiction, which are erected on such principles that their judgments, taken alone, are
entirely disregarded, and the proceedings must show their jurisdiction. The courts of the United States are all of
limited jurisdiction, and their proceedings are erroneous, if the jurisdiction be not shown upon them. Judgments
rendered in such cases may certainly be reversed, but this court is not prepared to say that they are absolute
nullities, which may be totally disregarded. KEMPE'S LESSEE, v. KENNEDY, 9 U.S. 173 (1809)(3).
COMMERCE AND ADMIRALTY ARE REALLY THE 'SAME' THING = WATER WORLD
The power to regulate commerce, we answer. The admiralty power is really the same thing, as McLean J. says in
his opinion in the Magnolia Case, 20 How., and, as before said, by the law of nations. The People v. Tyler, 7 Mich.
161 (1859)(1). [Admiral is Navy-military. Congress cannot regulate between foreign nations only. Hence, notice the
proper grammar: regulates 'Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States', and Indian tribes. ]
GLOBAL COMMERCE FOUNDED ON NATURAL REASON AND JUSTICE - THEREFORE TRUTH
Says Nelson, J.: (The Patriot, 1 A. M. L., p. 77) 'The admiralty is a maritime court, instituted for the purpose of
administering the law of the sea.' [***]
Mr. Justice BRADLEY (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
No one doubts that every nation may adopt its own maritime code. France may adopt one; England another; the
United States a third; still, the convenience of the commercial world, bound together, as it is, by mutual relations of
trade and intercourse, demands that, in all essential things wherein those relations bring them in contact, there
should be a uniform law founded on natural reason and justice. Hence the adoption by all commercial nations (our
own included) of the general maritime law as the basis and groundwork of all their maritime regulations. [***]
Congress undoubtedly has authority under the commercial power, if no other, to introduce such changes as
are likely to be needed. The scope of the maritime law, and that of commercial regulation are not coterminous, it is
true, but the latter embraces much the largest portion of ground covered by the former. THE LOTTAWANNA, 88
U.S. 558 (1874)(1). [Commerce and admiralty we say is really the same thing. ]
THE LAW OF NATIONS IS BINDING ON EVERY PEOPLE AND EVERY GOVERNMENT AT ALL TIMES
Nations are prohibited from doing evil and commanded to do good - includes this one nation under God.
Circuit Court, D. Pennsylvania: Judge WILSON, IREDELL and PETERS (of the Supreme Court of the United States)
charged the jury as follows: The law of nations, being the common law of the civilized world, may be said, indeed,
to be a part of the law of every civilized nation; but it stands on other and higher grounds than municipal customs,
statutes, edicts, or ordinances. It is binding on every people and on every government. It is to be carried into effect
at all times under the penalty of being thrown out of the pale of civilization, or involving the country into a war. To
love and to deserve an honest fame is another duty of a state as well as of a man. To a state as well as to a man,
reputation is a valuable and an agreeable possession. It represses hostility and secures esteem. In transactions with
other nations, the dignity of a state should never be permitted to suffer the smallest diminution. Need it be
mentioned here, that happiness is the centre to which states as well as men are universally attracted! To consult its
own happiness, therefore, is the duty of a nation. When men have formed themselves into a political society, they
may reciprocally enter into particular engagements and contract new obligations in favour of the community or of its
members. But they cannot, by this union, discharge themselves from any duties which they previously owed to those
who form a part of the political association. Under all the obligations due to the universal society of the human race,
the citizens of a state still continue. To this universal society it is a duty that each nation should contribute to the
welfare, the perfection and the happiness of the others. If so, the first degree of this duty is to do no injury.
Among states as well as among men, justice is a sacred law. This sacred law prohibits one state from exciting
disturbances in another, from depriving it of its natural advantages, from calumniating its reputation, from seducing
its citizens, from debauching the attachment of its allies, from fomenting or encouraging the hatred of its enemies.
Vatt. Law Nat. 127. But nations are not only prohibited from doing evil, they are also commanded to do good to
one another. On states as well as individuals the duties of humanity are strictly incumbent; what each is obliged to
perform for others, from others it is entitled to receive. Hence the advantage as well as the duty of humanity. It may
be uncommon, but it is unquestionably just to say, that nations ought to love one another. From the pure source of
benevolence the offices of humanity ought to flow. By a nation these enlarged and elevated virtues should be
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cultivated with peculiar assiduity and ardour; of an individual, however generous his disposition may be, the sphere
of exertion is frequently narrow; but of a nation this sphere is comparatively boundless. By exhibiting a glorious
example in her constitution, in her laws, and in the administration of her constitution and laws, she may diffuse
instruction, she may diffuse reformation, she may diffuse happiness over the whole terrestrial globe. These
maxims of national law, though the sacred precepts of nature, and of nature's God, have been too often unknown
and unacknowledged by nations. Even where they have been known and acknowledged, their calm still voice has
been drowned by the clamours of ambition and by the thunder of war. HENFIELDS CASE, 11 F.Cas. 1099 (1793)(1).
[Suppose to be doing perfect Justice in more perfect Union, So help me God, in this one Nation under God. ]
CONGRESS IS CONFINED TO EXTERNAL COMMERCE

The power of parliament was, on the American principle of the revolution, confined to the regulation of 'external
commerce;' though by the English principle, it extended to all cases whatever. The State of Rhode Island v. The
Common Wealth of Massachutess, 37 U.S. 657 (1838)(1).
ADMIRALTY FOR COMMERCE-BUSINESS OF CITIZENS OF UNITED STATES ON ANY NAVIGABLE WATERS

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
The definition under this decree, if carried to its logical extent, will run thus: 'That the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States extends to all cases of contracts, torts, and injuries, which arise in or
concern the navigation, commerce, or business of citizens of the United States, or persons commorant therein, on
any of the navigable waters of the world.' JACKSON v. MAGNOLIA, 61 U.S. 296 (1857)(1).
COMMERCE BETWEEN THE INHABITANTS [PERSONS] NOT BETWEEN THE PEOPLE
MR. JUSTICE HUNT: I am compelled to dissent from the judgment of the court in this case:
The power of Congress to 'regulate commerce among the several States' (sect. 8, subd. 3) refers to the commerce
between the inhabitants of the different States, and not to transactions between the political organizations called
'States.' The people of a State are here intended by the word 'State.' U.S. v. REESE, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)(2).
ADMIRALTY DOES 'NOT' ARISE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution declares, that 'the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all
cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.' The Constitution certainly contemplates these as three distinct classes of cases; and if they are distinct,
the grant of jurisdiction over one of them, does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other two. The
discrimination made between them, in the Constitution, is, we think, conclusive against their identity. If it were not
so, if this were a point open to inquiry, it would be difficult to maintain the proposition that they are the same. A
case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old
as navigation itself; and the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the
cases as they arise. THE AMERICAN INSUR. CO. v. CANTER, 26 U.S. 511 (1828)(3). [Same in The People v. Tyler, 7
Mich. 161 (1859)(1). See 42 USC 666 for Licenses = Art. 1. commerce clause. Admiralty is not in Law. No person can be
deprived of Life, Liberty, or property without due judicial Court "Process of Law" = Writs. Admiralty not a court of record.]
COMMERCE: BUYING FROM ONE NATION AND SELLING TO ANOTHER OR TRANSPORTING

Not because the person is in the territory but because they are "under" the sovereignty - else no right.
Mr. Justice WAYNE (supreme Court of the United States):

Commerce between nations or among states has several branches. Martens, in his Summary of the Laws of Nations
says,--'It consists in selling the superfluity; in purchasing articles of necessity, as well productions as manufactures;
in buying from one nation and selling to another, or in transporting the merchandise from the seller to the buyer
to gain the freight.' [***]
A State's right to tax may only be limited to the extent mentioned; but that does not give the State the right
to tax a foreigner or person for coming into one of the States of the United States. That would be a tax or revenue
act, in the nature of a regulation of commerce, acting upon navigation. It is not a disputable point, that, under the
power given to Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, it may, in the exercise of its power to
regulate commerce, tax persons as well as things, as the condition of their admission into the United States. To lay
and collect taxes, duties, and imposts gives to Congress a plenary power over all persons and things for taxation,
except exports. Such is the received meaning of the word taxes in its most extended sense, and always so when it
is not used in contradistinction to terms of taxation, having a limited meaning as to the objects to which, by usage,
the terms apply. It is in the Constitution used in both senses. In its extended sense, when it is said that Congress may
lay and collect taxes; and in a more confined sense, in contradistinction to duties, imposts, and excises.
242
The power, then, to tax, and the power to regulate commerce, give to Congress the right to tax persons
who may come into the United States, as a regulation of commerce and navigation. I have already mentioned,
among the restraints which nations may impose upon the liberty or freedom of commerce, those which may be put
upon foreigners coming into or residing within their territories. This right exists to its fullest extent, as a portion of
the commercial rights of nations, when not limited by treaties. [***]
The right in a nation or state occurs--not in all cases, for there are international exceptions--upon all
persons and things when they come or are brought within the territory of a state. Not, however, because the person
or thing is within the territory, but because they are under the sovereignty or political jurisdiction of the state. If
not within the latter, the right to tax does not arise until that event occurs. States may have territorial jurisdiction
for most of the purposes of sovereignty, without political jurisdiction for some of them.
The distinction is not It has been long since made by jurists and writers upon national law, because the
history of nations, from an early antiquity until now, shows such relations between them. The framers of the
Constitution acted upon it throughout, in all the sovereign powers which they proposed that the States should yield
to the United States. Martens properly says, that, to have a just idea of the states of which Europe is composed, we
must distinguish those which are absolutely sovereign from those which are but demi-sovereign. The states of the
German empire, for instance, and the Italian princes who acknowledge their submission to the empire,--and the
German states, in their present Diet for great national purposes, with a vicar at its head, overtopping in might and
majesty, but with regulated power, all before who have been emperors of Germany. I do not mean to say that the
States of this Union are demi-sovereign to the general government in the sense in which some of the nations in
Europe are to other nations; but that such connection between those nations furnishes the proof of the distinction
between territorial sovereignty and political sovereignty. The sovereignty of these States and that of the United
States, in all constitutional particulars, have a different origin. But I do mean to say, that the distinction between
territorial and political jurisdiction arises, whether the association be voluntary between states, or otherwise.
Whenever one power has an exterritorial right over the territory or sovereignty of another power, it is called by
writers 'a partial right of sovereignty.' Is not that exactly the case between the United States, as a nation, and the
States? SMITH v. TURNER, 48 U.S. 283 (Passenger cases)(1849). [Today's System: No sovereign Political Power.]
QUARRELS TERMINATED IN THE HANGING OF SOME OF THE JUDGES

WOODBURY, Circuit Justice (Circuit Court of the United States, District of Massachusetts):
In the mutiny act of 22 Geo. II., a special proviso is introduced, that the powers of naval courts martial shall not
extend to any matters still left to admiralty jurisdiction. 1 McArthur, 'Courts Martial,' 174; U. S. v. Bevans, 16 U. S.
360, note. And an additional reason, corroborating all this, is, that the admiralty court had not for two centuries in
England as an admiralty court, but only through a commission, including other judges and a trial by jury, had any
jurisdiction over felonies; and it was doubted whether it had any over misdemeanors at all. Indeed, another strong
illustration of the strength of public sentiment in England against trials in the admiralty for any offences whatever,
is, that though 28 Hen. VIII. is in terms relating, not to misdemeanors, but only felonies (on the high seas. ), yet
since its passage, no crimes whatever, whether misdemeanors or felonies, are tried in the court of admiralty by the
judge of admiralty alone; but they are all tried by a jury, and all prosecuted in the courts of common law or under
a commission, or under special statutes. 2 Browne, Civ. & Adm. Law, No. 3 App. 519; 2 Chit. Bl.; Corfield v.
Coryell, Case No. 3,230. [Admiralty is not a court of record: cannot fine or imprison, no common Law side.] [* * *]
But beyond this, to render it very improbable that many matters, before treated as crimes in admiralty,
continued to be so treated, many will doubtless remember the long struggle between the court of admiralty and
courts of common law in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, for jurisdiction over offences as well as civil
cases, on navigable waters within the body of a county, and which led to the restraining statutes of Rich. II., and
was one with many other quarrels, which terminated in the hanging of some of the judges on both sides. The Chief
Justice Tresilian seems to have headed one party, and Arundel, the lord high admiral, the other. 1 Henry, Hist. Eng.
258, 263; 1 Harg. St. Tr. 1. [***] Shutting the admiralty court, then out of all criminal jurisdiction since 13 and 15
Rich. II., and certainly since Hen. VIII., in England, as to matters happening within a county, how could the framers
of the constitution or the authors of the act of 1789 mean to use language broad enough to make the present case
'cognizable' in admiralty, a case happening several miles within a county? UNITED STATES v. NEW BEDFORD
BRIDGE, 27 F.Cas. 91 (1847)(1). [The nature of usurpation: Pretend or just say they have jurisdiction without proof.]
PRIVATE BUSINESS NOT OPEN TO THE WHOLE PUBLIC = AT LARGE - GENERAL PUBLIC
WOODBURY, Circuit Justice (Circuit Court, District of Massachusetts): But the jus privatum in the state must be so
exercised as not to impair or obstruct the higher jus publicum in the United States and the people at large. Corfield
v. Coryell [supra]; Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 230; 1 Story, Const. 432; Peirce v. New Hampshire, 6 U. S. 504; 15
Wend. 113. And it was laid down generally, in U. S. v. Bevans, 16 U. S. 337, 389, that admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, ceded to the general government, did not pass the waters where that jurisdiction exists, or any
territory, and hence, no general jurisdiction over them, but only over that specific matter of admiralty jurisdiction,
the rest remaining in the state contiguous. A bay or haven, however, must be out of the jurisdiction of a state, to
make an offence punishable there under many of the acts of congress, as congress has not, if it can, extended
243
powers over waters, in a state always concurrent with the state, and made offences there punishable. If congress can
punish them under any ceded power, it has not yet. I think it may punish obstructions or nuisances, if necessary to
regulate foreign commerce, preserve buoys and break-waters, or collect revenue, but perhaps only what is
necessary to enforce that grant and others as to maintaining a navy, &c. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 230. UNITED
STATES v. NEW BEDFORD BRIDGE, 27 F.Cas. 91 (1847)(1).
3 KINDS OF COMMERCE OR 2? CONGRESS CAN REGULATE THOSE OVER NAVIGATABLE WATERS
WOODBURY, Circuit Justice: The powers not granted by the states remained as before; that it, they were reserved
to the states or the people, as either may have exercised them before. Thus in Miln v. New York, 11 Pet. [36 U. S.]
102, 139, it is held, that the powers reserved to the states are usually unaffected by the federal constitution. Again,
the states may continue to legislate for internal commerce, for police, for roads, ferries, canals, &c., and regulate
all, and 'the use of them, where such regulations do not interfere with the free navigation of the waters of the state
for purposes of commercial intercourse, nor with the trade within the state, which the laws of the United States
permit to be carried on.' Corfield v. Coryell [Case No. 3,230]. Three kinds of commerce are confided to the general
government,--foreign, between the states, and with the Indians. Hence, congress possesses the power to regulate
them, over those navigable waters, and to punish offences in public vessels sailing upon those waters. Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U. S. 230; U. S. v. Bevans, 16 U. S. 387. U.S. v. NEW BEDFORD BRIDGE, 27 F.Cas. 91 (1847)(1).
WATERS ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES = WE THE PEOPLE ARE THE OWNERS
WOODBURY, Circuit Justice: In Corfield v. Coryell, Case No. 3,230, in speaking of the power to regulate
commerce invested in the general government, the judge says it 'comprehends the use of a passage over the
navigable waters of the several states,' and further, it 'renders these waters the public property of the United States
for all the purposes of navigation and commercial intercourse, subject only to congressional regulation.' Hence, I
cannot doubt that the power to regulate commerce abroad and between the states, conferred on congress,
authorizes it to keep open and free all navigable streams, from the ocean to the highest ports of delivery or entry, if
no higher, and protect the intercourse between two or more states, on all our tide waters. De Lovio v. Boit [Id.
3,776]; Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 230; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1; New York v. Miln, 36 U. S. 102, 135; Ang.
Tide Waters, 50. Congress may remove unauthorized obstructions, or punish them by acts of congress, and it may
punish injuries on land, if they tend to interfere with foreign commerce and navigation, or those between different
states, though mere admiralty powers may not go above the sea. U. S. v. Coombs, 37 U. S. 72. See in detail, Miln
v. New York, 36 U. S. 102, 155, by Justice Story. U.S. v. NEW BEDFORD BRIDGE, 27 F.Cas. 91 (1847)(1).
HOPED ADMIRALTY WILL NEVER BE EXTENDED TO CRIMES

WOODBURY, Circuit Justice (Circuit Court, District of Massachusetts): In the recent case of Waring v. Clarke, 46
U. S. 441, it has been settled, that jurisdiction in Admiralty exists over torts, by collision of vessels, committed
above the sea or tide water, however far it flows into the body of a county. But this is not the English law; and it is
to be hoped will never be extended in this country to crimes, the subject we are now considering. The powers of
congress, however, embrace much wider matters than those of mere admiralty on account of its authority over our
foreign relations, and the regulation of our commerce, not only with foreign nations, but between the states. And, as
one evidence, that the framers of the constitution meant that the latter should cover matters on land often, as well as
at sea, power was given to congress, not only 'to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas,' but
'offences against the law of nations.' These last happen as often on land as water; as do offences against the
revenue, and the purity of our coin and the security of the mails, and of all public property. Mere admiralty
authority is much more restricted. UNITED STATES v. NEW BEDFORD BRIDGE, 27 F.Cas. 91 (1847)(1).
EXECUTIVE INVESTIGATIONS - ADMINISTRATIVE FACT FINDING - EXECUTIVE vs. JUDICIAL COURT
Justice SCALIA (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: While the Constitution of
the United States divides all power conferred upon the Federal Government into "legislative Powers," Art. I, ß 1,
"[t]he executive Power," Art. II, ß 1, and "[t]he judicial Power," Art. III, ß 1, it does not attempt to define those
terms. To be sure, it limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies," but an executive
inquiry can bear the name "case" (the Hoffa case) and a legislative dispute can bear the name "controversy" (the
Smoot- Hawley controversy). LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 504 U.S. 555 (1991)(2). [In the executive War
Powers-Administrative private State, The Judiciary in the Constituition is not open to try their IRS or other case. ]
COMMERCE IS A UNIT AND ENTIRELY DISTINCT FROM THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse. [***] The 9th section of the 1st article declares, that 'no preference shall be given, by
any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another.' [***]
244
To what commerce does this power extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce 'with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.'
It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that these words comprehend every species of commercial
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country
and any other, to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said, that commerce, as the word is used in the
constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term.
If this be the admitted meaning of the word, in its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same
meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there be some plain intelligible cause which alters it.
The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce 'among the several States.' The word
'among' means intermingled with. [***] The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the
States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States,
and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.
[***] We must first determine whether the act of laying 'duties or imposts on imports or exports,' is considered in
the constitution as a branch of the taxing power, or of the power to regulate commerce. We think it very clear, that it
is considered as a branch of the taxing power. It is so treated in the first clause of the 8th section: 'Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises;' and, before commerce is mentioned, the rule by
which the exercise of this power must be governed, is declared. It is, that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be
uniform. In a separate clause of the enumeration, the power to regulate commerce is given, as being entirely
distinct from the right to levy taxes and imposts, and as being a new power, not before conferred. The constitution,
then, considers these powers as substantive, and distinct from each other; and so places them in the enumeration it
contains. The power of imposing duties on imports is classed with the power to levy taxes, and that seems to be its
natural place. GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)(2). [A trade license was for an alien-person. ]
ARTIFICIAL PERSON-PUBLIC BUSINESS PRIVILEGE vs. PRIVATE BUSINESS
Mr. Justice White, with whom concur Chief Justice Fuller, Justice Peckham, and Justice Holmes, dissenting:
In Paul v. Virginia 8 Wall. 168, the question was as to the power of the state of Virginia to license a foreign
insurance company, and one of the contentions considered was whether the contract of insurance, since it was
related to commerce, was within the regulating power of Congress, and not of the state of Virginia. The proposition
was disposed of in the following language (p. 183, L. ed. p. 361): 'Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction
of commerce. The policies are simply contracts of indemnity against loss by fire, entered into between the
corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by the latter. These contracts are not articles of commerce in
any proper meaning of the word. They are not subjects of trade and barter offered in the market as something
having an existence and value independent of the parties to them. They are not commodities to be shipped or
forwarded from one state to another, and then put up for sale. They are like other personal contracts between
parties, which are completed by their signature and the transfer of the consideration. Such contracts are not
interstate transactions, though the parties may be domiciled in different states. The policies do not take effect--are
not executed contracts--until delivered by the agent in Virginia. They are, then, local transactions, and are governed
by the local law. They do not constitute a part of the commerce between the states any more than a contract for the
purchase and sale of goods in Virginia by a citizen of New York, whilst in Virginia, would constitute a portion of
such commerce.' [***] The subject was considered at circuit in Re Greene, 52 Fed. 105. The case was this: A person
was indicted in one state for creating a monopoly in violation of the antitrust act of Congress, and was held in
another state for extradition. The writ of habeas corpus was invoked, upon the contention that the face of the
indictment did not state an offense against the United States, since the matters charged did not involve interstate
commerce. The case is referred to, although it arose at circuit and was determined before the decisions of this court
in the Pearsall and Louisville & Nashville Cases, because it was decided by Mr. Justice Jackson, then a circuit judge,
who subsequently, became a member of this court. The opinion manifests that the case was considered by Judge
Jackson with that care which was his conceded characteristic, and was stated by him with that lucidity which was his
wont. In discharging the accused on the grounds stated in the application for the writ, Judge Jackson said (p. 112):
'Congress may place restriction and limitations upon the right of corporations created and organized under its
authority to acquire, use, and dispose of property. It may also impose such restrictions and limitations upon the
citizen in respect to the exercise of a public privilege or franchise conferred by the United States. But Congress
certainly has not the power or authority under the commerce clause or any other provision of the Constitution, to
limit and restrict the right of corporations created by the states, or the citizens of the states, in the acquisition,
control, and disposition of property. Neither can Congress regulate or prescribe the price or prices at which such
property or the products thereof, shall be sold by the owner or owners, whether corporations or individuals. It is
equally clear that Congress has no jurisdiction over, and cannot make criminal, the aims, purposes, and intentions
of persons in the acquisition and control of property which the states of their residence or creation sanction and
permit. It is not material that such property, or the products thereof, may become the subject of trade or commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations. Commerce among the states, within the exclusive regulating
245
power of Congress, 'consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation of
persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.' Mobile County v. Kimball, 102
U. S. 691-702; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 203, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826.
In the application of this comprehensive definition, it is settled by the decision of the Supreme Court that such
commerce includes not only the actual transportation of commodities and persons between the states, but also the
instrumentalities and processes of such transportation. NORTHERN SECURITIES CO. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1903)(2).
3 Blackstone Commentaries p. 24, 25: "All courts of record are the king’s courts, in right of his crown and royal
dignity. And therefore no other court hath authority to fine or imprison; so that the very erection of a new
jurisdiction with power of fine or imprisonment makes it instantly a court of record. A court not of record is the
court of a private man, whom the law will not intrust with any discretionary power over the fortune or liberty of
his fellow-subjects." [King = the sovereign. Where are our "established" judicial Courts of Common Law jurisdiction of
"The Judiciary" and the Government of the People: The Legislature, The Executive, The Judiciary? In the Constitution. ]
COURT OF ADMIRALTY IS NOT A COURT OF RECORD - I WOULD NOT CONSENT

M'Kean, C. J. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is):
Even the court of Admiralty (which is not a court of record) possesses a power to punish them (contempt. ); and
the reason arises from the necessity that every jurisdiction should be competent to protect itself from immediate
violence and interruption. But contempts which are alledged to have been committed out of doors, are not within
this reason; they come properly within the class of criminal offences; and, as such, by the 9th sect. of the bill of
rights, they can only be tried by a jury. Respublic v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319 (1788)(2).
COMMERCE LITERALLY MEANS WITH MERCHANDISE
Justice THOMAS (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring: At the time the original Constitution was
ratified, "commerce" consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes. See 1 S.
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 361 (4th ed. 1773) (defining commerce as "Intercour[s]e;
exchange of one thing for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick"); N. Bailey, An Universal
Etymological English Dictionary (26th ed. 1789) ("trade or traffic"); T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the
English Language (6th ed. 1796) ("Exchange of one thing for another; trade, traffick"). This understanding finds
support in the etymology of the word, which literally means "with merchandise." See 3 Oxford English Dictionary
552 (2d ed. 1989) (com--"with"; merci--"merchandise"). UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)(2).
COMMERCE IS NOT BETWEEN MAN AND MAN IN A STATE
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court:
The Constitution delegates to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Art. I, ß 8, cl. 3. The Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, first defined
the nature of Congress' commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-190, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) :
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse." [***]
The Gibbons Court, however, acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the
very language of the Commerce Clause. "It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce,
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of
the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is
certainly unnecessary. "Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one... . The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated;
and that something, if we regard the language, or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal
commerce of a State." Id., at 194-195. UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)(2). [See same: 36 U.S.
102; 193 U.S. 197; 298 U.S. 238 et al. Hence, in their Federal System "the states" and people totally disappear. ]
'ACQUITTED' BECAUSE, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT, HE WAS "NOT A SUBJECT"

If, therefore, Camp is to be considered in the honorable light of an open enemy, the argument for the Defendant is
unfounded: but, when it is recollected, that he did not avow his sentiments on the declaration of Independence; and
that, nevertheless, he remained in the enjoyment of his property under the laws of Connecticut for some time
afterwards, it is impossible to regard him in any other light than that of a subject, and subjects are the objects of the
municipal law, not of the law of nations. In the case of Respublica v. Chapman on an indictment for treason (See
ant. 53.) The Defendant was acquitted, because, in the opinion of the Court, he was not a subject: [***]. Camp v.
Lockwood, 1 U.S. 393 (1788)(1).
ADMIRALTY IS A MARITIME COMMERCE TRIBUNAL
SAMPSON, J. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky):
246
"Maritime," says Bouvier, "pertains to navigation or commercial intercourse upon the seas, Great Lakes, and
rivers. A maritime cause is one arising from a maritime contract, whether made at sea or on land."
Admiralty is a tribunal exercising jurisdiction over all maritime contracts, torts, injuries or offenses, and
extends to navigable rivers, whether tidal or not, in the United States. The court of original admiralty jurisdiction in
the United States is the United States District Court. From this court causes could formerly be removed, in certain
cases, to the circuit and ultimately to the Supreme Court.
In 7 R. C. L. p. 1039, it is said: "It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot by consent give, as such,
jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question is, not whether a
competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether the court itself is competent under
any circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And, where there is want of jurisdiction of the
subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality which a
valid judgment derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its
agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people."
The same principle is stated in 15 Corpus Juris 802, in these words: "It is not within the power of litigants
to invest a court with any jurisdiction or power not conferred on it by law, and accordingly it is well established as
a general rule that, where the court has no jurisdiction of the cause of action or subject-matter involved in a
particular case, such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, agreement, or waiver." LEE v. LICKING
VALLEY COAL DIGGER CO., 209 Ky. 780 (1925)(1). [Art. I Tribunal v. Art. III Court exercising judicial Power. ]
SUPREME COURT OF THE CONSTITUTION HAS NO APPELLATE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, according to repeated decisions which have
never been questioned. U.S. v. More, 3 Cranch, 172; U.S. v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall., 297; U.S. v. Hudson , 7 Cranch,
32. IN THE MATTER OF METZGER, 46 U.S. 176 (1847)(2). [Since U.S. District courts are inferior to the supreme
Court I deny they are empowered with the Law of the Land crime jurisdiction. + Appeals from state courts go up to it!]
Mr. Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Article III provides, in relevant part: "Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. ...
"Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... ." State of NEVADA
v. HALL, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)(2). ["United States" courts cannot lawfully have or exercise criminal judicial "Power ."]
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IS CONSOLIDATED: APPEALS FROM STATE COURTS GO UP TO THE U.S. CIRCUIT COURT
JUSTICE FIELD and JUSTICE CLIFFORD, dissenting: Nothing, in my judgment, could have a greater tendency to
destroy the independence and autonomy of the States; reduce them to a humiliating and degrading dependence
upon the central government; engender constant irritation; and destroy that domestic tranquility which it was one
of the objects of the Constitution to insure,--than the doctrine asserted in this case, that Congress can exercise
coercive authority over judicial officers of the States in the discharge of their duties under State laws. It will be only
another step in the same direction towards consolidation, when it assumes to exercise similar coercive authority
over governors and legislators of the States. EX PARTE VIRGINIA, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)(2). [It's the System Neo.]
ADMIRALTY STIPULATOR = AGREEMENT - VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION
JOHNSON, Justice (the supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
By making the note negotiable at the Bank of Columbia, the debtor chose his own jurisdiction; in consideration of
the credit given him, he voluntarily relinquished his claims to the ordinary administration of justice, and placed
himself only in the situation of an hypothecater of goods, with power to sell on default, or a stipulator in the
admiralty, whose voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of that court subjects him to personal coercion. BANK
OF COLUMBIA v. OKELY, 17 U.S. 235 (1819)(1). [Admiralty is not a 'court of record' with the power to fine or
imprison. Art. I: To constitute 'Tribunals' inferior to the supreme Court, is not an 'established' Court of record of The
Judiciary with Common Law jurisdiction, sealed judicial Court Process of Law of the Land, and judges tenured for life. Mine]
WAR POWERS PRESIDENT= COMMANDER IN CHIEF = LORD HIGH ADMIRAL

The sections of this act commented on in the argument, are as follows:
SEC. I. That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States of America, shall levy war against
them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States, or elsewhere, and
shall be thereof convicted, on confession in open Court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act
of the treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason
against the United States, and shall suffer death. [***]
But it appears that the colonial Vice Admiralty Courts have uniformly exercised a jurisdiction over
revenue cases upon their original inherent powers by virtue of their commissions, independent of any statute. (See
247
a case cited in the Fabius, 6 Rob. 245.)
The learned reader will observe, that this position is not disturbed by the decision of this Court in the case
in the text, (The U. S. v. Wiltberger,) or by that of the United States v. Bevans; (Ante, vol. III. p. 336.)
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is
founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to
define a crime, and ordain its punishment.
It is said, that notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the law maker must govern in the construction of
penal, as well as other statutes. This is true. [***]
Treason is a breach of allegiance, and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance either
perpetual or temporary. The words, therefore, 'owing allegiance to the United States,' [***]
The word admiral or ammiral, is doubtless derived from the Arabic word emir or amira, signifying a
general officer or commander in chief, dominum vel praefectum. (Du Cange. Glossary. Verbo Admiralius. In the
time of the crusades, by means of which so many oriental usages were brought into the west of Europe, it was
introduced into France as the title of a commander in chief, either of land or sea forces. Accordingly, we find that
the office, with that title, was unknown until the third race of French kings, under Charles IV., about the end of the
thirteenth century, and it appeared in England about the same period in the reign of Edward I. After the term thus
came to be exclusively applied to the commander in chief of naval forces in France, the station was filled with
several illustrious characters, and in the scale of civil and military dignities ranked immediately after the office of
constable. The person who filled this high station had jurisdiction by himself or his deputies, of all crimes and
offences committed on the sea, its ports, harbours, and shores. (Valin. Com. sur l'Ordon. l. 1. tit. 2. art. 10. De la
Competence.) In England, the office subsisted with the same title of high admiral, until the reign of Charles II.,
when it was filled by his brother, the Duke of York, (afterwards James II.) who being excluded from office as a
Catholic by the test act in 1673, it was executed by commissioners, with the same power and authority as belonged
to the Lord High Admiral: and since the accession of the house of Hanover, the office has also been vested in
commissioners, who are styled the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. But the king is said still to hold, for
certain purposes, the office of Lord High Admiral, though in a capacity distinguishable from his regal character; a
distinction of practical importance in the law of prize, but immaterial to the present purpose. The judge of the High
Court of Admiralty in England formerly held his place by patent from the Lord High Admiral, but since that office
has only existed in contemplation of law, he holds it by direct commission from the crown. The ancient criminal
jurisdiction of the Court was modified by the statute of the 28th of Henry VIII. c. 15. which enacted, that offences
upon the seas, and in havens, rivers, &c. should be tried by the admiral or his deputy, and three or four more, among
whom two common law judges are usually appointed, the judge of the High Court of Admiralty presiding. (2 Bro.
Civ. and Adm. Law, 458.) The United States v. WILTBERGER, 18 U.S. 76 (1820)(3).
FUEDAL LORDS OF FEDERALISM RULE OVER THE STATELESS VASSALS BY ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT DECEPTION
Justice BREYER (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with whom Justice STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG join, dissenting:
In Alden the Court said that feudal law had created an 18th-century legal norm to the effect that " 'no lord could be
sued by a vassal in his own court, but each petty lord was subject to suit in the courts of a higher lord.' " 527 U.S.,
at 741. It added that the Framers' silence about the matter had woven that feudal "norm" into the "constitutional
design," i.e., had made it part of our "system of federalism" unchanged by the "'plan of the convention.' " Id., at
714-717, 730, 740-743. And that norm, said the Alden Court, by analogy forbids a citizen ("vassal") [U.S. citizen-
business entity-taxpayer-slave. ] to sue a State ("lord") in the "lord's" own courts. Here that same norm argues
against immunity, for the forum at issue is federal--belonging by analogy to the "higher lord." FEDERAL.
MARITIME COMMISSION v. SO. CAROLINA, 535 U.S. 743 (2002)(2). [In the System of Federalism all governments
state and Federal and subdivisions and employees thereof are 100% Federally stateless Federal income taxpayers. ]
Title 19. Customs Duties ß 2601. Definitions (11) The term "United States citizen" means--
(A) any individual who is a citizen or national of the United States;
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity organized or existing under the laws of the
United States or any State; or
(C) any department, agency, or entity of the Federal Government or of any government of any State. (Pub.L. 97-
446, Title III, ß 302, Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2351.) [U.S. System of Federalism = %100 Federally STATES, etc. ]
COMMERCE, UNDOUBTEDLY, IS TRAFFIC - WITH FOREIGN NATIONS AND AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES
In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189, 190, Chief Justice Marshall said: 'Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it
is something more--it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations,
in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.' [***]
'It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation
248
between them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed, for, while the one
furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the states as
required by our dual form of government; and acknowledged evils, however grave and urgent they may appear to
be, had better be borne, than the risk be run, in the effort to suppress them, of more serious consequences by resort
to expedients of even doubtful constitutionality. ***
'The regulation of commerce applies to the subjects of commerce, and not to matters of internal police.
Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the several states, the transportation and its
instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold, or exchanged for the purposes of such transit among the states, or put in
the way of transit, may be regulated; but this is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce. CARTER
v. CARTER COAL. 298 U.S. 238 (1936)(2). ['Commerce' is intercourse (by water (ship-ping between domestic and
foreign ports-districts; also air-ports) but between a nation of a foreign country 'and' among the several States, and
Indians tribes. 'Wholly domestic internal' Federal commerce is fraud. 'Trade' is from one state port (district) to another.]
Our unalienable right of privacy, and sovereign right to be let alone secured by the Constitution.
LIBERTY THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE OF RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT MOST VALUED BY CIVILIZED MEN
Our sovereign right to be let alone + even a subject not injuring anything is 'out of the reach of mere human laws.'
LEIBSON, Justice (Supreme Court of Kentucky):

The first mention of a federal guarantee of the right of privacy is in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Louis
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), in which he defined it as "the right to be let
alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Actual recognition by the
majority as a working premise came much later in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
The list of individual rights guaranteed by the Federal Bill of Rights is patently incomplete; ergo the Ninth
Amendment stating: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." [Our sovereign and all unalienable private rights. ]
Federal constitutional analysis has proceeded from so-called "emanations" and "penumbras" of the First,
Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the Bill of Rights. These amendments elaborate some of the "blessings of
liberty" referred to in the Preamble to the United States Constitution, but by no means all of them. It is because the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the list is not exclusive, not even for purposes of federal
constitutional protection, that it has undertaken, using the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, to create a so-called zone of privacy constitutionally beyond the reach of governmental intrusion.
[private vs. public. Their license scam circumvents our private unalienable rights, into acting as a public regulated
business. Super emphasis added. ] But the United States Supreme Court is extremely reticent in extending the reach
of the Due Process Clauses in substantive matters, albeit this is the jurisprudence of this century and not before,
following President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court packing efforts in the 1930's. [***]
"ß 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be
reckoned:
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties. ....
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness. ....
ß 2. Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not
even in the largest majority." [***]
The Commonwealth has stressed that there was no discussion of the right of privacy at the 1890 Kentucky
Constitutional Convention, but that is only partly true. The meaning of Sections One and Two as they apply to
personal liberty is found in the remarks of J. Proctor Knott of Marion County (see Official Report of the Proceedings
and Debates in the 1890 Convention, E. Polk Johnson, Vol. 1, p. 718): "[T]hose who exercise that power in
organized society with any claim of justice, derive it from the people themselves. That with the whole of such
power residing in the people, the people as a body rest under the highest of all moral obligations to protect each
individual in the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, provided that he shall in no wise injure his
neighbor in so doing." [Emphasis added.] See also Comments of Delegate J.A. Brents from Clinton County.
Debates, Vol. 1, p. 614-18, concluding "majorities cannot and ought not exercise arbitrary power over the minority."
The leading case on this subject is Commonwealth v. Campbell, supra. At issue was an ordinance that
criminalized possession of intoxicating liquor, even for "private use." Our Court held that the Bill of Rights in the
1891 Constitution prohibited state action thus intruding upon the "inalienable rights possessed by the citizens" of
Kentucky. Id. 117 S.W. at 385.
Our Court interpreted the Kentucky Bill of Rights as defining a right of privacy, even though the
constitution did not say so in that terminology: "Man in his natural state has the right to do whatever he chooses and
has the power to do. When he becomes a member of organized society, under governmental regulation, he
surrenders, of necessity, all of his natural right the exercise of which is, or may be, injurious to his fellow citizens.
This is the price that he pays for governmental protection, but it is not within the competency of a free government
to invade the sanctity of the absolute rights of the citizen any further than the direct protection of society
requires.... It is not within the competency of government to invade the privacy of a citizen's life and to regulate his
conduct in matters in which he alone is concerned, or to prohibit him any liberty the exercise of which will not
249
directly injure society. Id. [Emphasis added.] .... ... let a man therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or
vicious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public
decency, he is out of the reach of human laws." Id. at 386. [From Blackstone Commentaries Volume I. ]
The Court concludes, at p. 387: "The theory of our government is to allow the largest liberty to the
individual commensurate with the public safety, or, as it has been otherwise expressed, that government is best
which governs least. Under our institutions there is no room for that inquisitorial and protective spirit which seeks
to regulate the conduct of men in matters in themselves indifferent, and to make them conform to a standard, not of
their own choosing, but the choosing of the lawgiver...." COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky v. WASSON, 842
S.W.2d 487 (1993)(2). [Deceived into getting a 'license' (distinguished from a 'certificate') on the costly pretense of
public safety 'prevention,' sic: we might be possible we injure someone in some future event. The vast majority do not
injure then refuse to do justice. Also see our 'right to be let alone' in GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(2);
CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASS. v. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)(2); Breese v. Smith herein; etc. ]
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
One partial solution to the problem of minor offenses may well be to remove them from the court system. The
American Bar Association Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control recently recommended, inter alia,
that: 'Regulation of various types of conduct which harm no one other than those involved (e.g., public
drunkenness, narcotics addiction, vagrancy, and deviant sexual behavior) should be taken out of the courts.
ARERSINGER v. HAMLIN, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)(2). [Victimless crimes = pretended crimes created by pretended
legislation to create massive business = massive revenue which would not fly in The Judiciary de jure. ]
OUT OF THE REACH OF MERE HUMAN LAWS

He owes 'nothing' to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights = 'injures' without lawful justification.
Justice Hughes (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in
his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his
business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the
state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His [unalienable. ] rights
are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken
from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to
incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant
of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights. WILSON v. UNITED
STATES, 221 U.S. 361 (1911)(2). [When not ruled by tyrants, all men are out of the reach of mere human law if they
injure no one. The Constitution secures pre-existing unalienable rights to Life, Liberty, and pursuit of Happiness =
everything. Our creature derives all of its authority from the people so it is impossible for it to give us anything we do not
already have a right to. We have our 'right to be let alone' to keep corrupt government (men) off our backs. ]
INDIVIDUAL SELF GOVERNMENT

HENSHAW, J. (Supreme Court of California):
Says Mr. Justice Field in Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 518: 'Labor is a necessity, imposed by the condition of our race,
and to protect labor is the highest office of our laws.' [***]
We are a self-governing people, and our just pride is that our laws are made by us as well as for us.
Every individual citizen is to be allowed so much liberty as may exist without impairment of the equal rights of his
fellows. Our institutions are founded upon the conviction that we are not only capable of self-government as a
community, but, what is the logical necessity that we are capable, to a great extent, of individual self-government.
If this conviction shall prove ill founded, we have built our house upon sand. [***] We do not even punish a man for
his vices, unless they be practiced openly, so as to lead to the spread of corruption, or to breaches of the peace, or to
public scandal. In brief, we give to the individual the utmost possible amount of personal liberty, and, with that
guarantied him, he is treated as a person of responsible judgment, not as a child in his nonage, and is left free to
work out his destiny as impulse, education, training, heredity, and environment direct him. So, while the police
power is one whose proper use makes most potently for good, in its undefined scope and mordinate exercise lurks
no small danger to the republic; for the difficulty which is experienced in defining its just limits and bounds
affords a temptation to the legislature to encroach upon the rights of citizens with experimental laws none the less
dangerous because well meant. [***]
A man's constitutional liberty means more than his personal freedom. It means, with many other rights,
his right freely to labor, and to own the fruits of his toil. It is a curious law for the protection of labor which
punishes the laborer for working. Yet that is precisely what this law does. Ex parte JENTZSCH, 112 Cal. 468 (1896)
(1). [Common Law (unwritten) and its jurisdiction was to protect us from $oppressive$ written laws of the creature.]
PEOPLE COME INTO SOCIETY WITH - UNALIENABLE - RIGHTS

Which 'cannot' be invaded without injustice.
Justice CAMPBELL (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

250
Individuals are not the creatures of the State, but constitute it. They come into society with rights, which cannot be
invaded without injustice. DODGE v. WOOLSEY, 59 U.S. 331 (1855)(2). [See the same below. People are endowed
with pre-existing unalienable rights before they create government deriving just powers (only) from us. ]
REMEMBER OUR RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE

Our unalienable and sovereign rights shall not be construed to be denied or disparaged.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.'
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as
protection against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.'(fn) We
recently referred in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, to the Fourth Amendment as creating a 'right to privacy, no
less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people.' See Beaney, The Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup.Ct.Rev. 212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.U.L.Rev. 216 (1960).
The Court said in full about this right of privacy: 'The principles laid down in this opinion (by Lord
Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029) affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security.
They reach further than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances;
they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,--it is the invasion of
this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. GRISWOLD v. STATE
OF CONN., 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(2). [4th = Warrant+ 5th Amendment is important: No person shall be 'held' to answer
for a … crime 'unless' upon presentment or indictment (= felony) 'of a Grand Jury', 'except' when in 'active' service… . I
object to misdemeanors and bail as an unconstitutional deprivation of Liberty of a 'person' unless upon presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury: I deny I am in 'active' service of any government or subdivision. See our 'right to be let alone'
in CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASS. v. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)(2). The 'right to be let alone' the 'most comprehensive' of rights
and the right 'most valued' by civilized men,' Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, at
page 478, Breese v. Smith, UNION PAC. RY. CO. v. BOTSFORD, and SLAUGHTER-HOUSE v. CRESENT city, 111 U.S. 746 (1884)
etc. herein. They pretend we are a public entity and not our 'private' status with sovereign and unalienable rights. ]
PUBLIC SAFETY 'PREVENTION' LAWS = EXCESSIVE CONTROL - SUPER EXPENSIVE REVENUE SCAM
Pretending to convert the sovereigns into licensed entities and from our private business into business with public at large.
Public safety 'prevention' laws, a high price to pay even though you never injure anyone, without any guarantee of protection.
Proverbs 30:21 For three things the earth is disquieted, and for four which it cannot bear.
Proverbs 30:22 For a 'servant when he reigneth.' (Especially when outside the Law: Constitution. )
PUBLIC SAFETY 'PREVENTION' - PROVIDING 'SERVICES' IS NOT GOVERNING MUCH LESS SECURING OUR RIGHTS
Prevention scam: Federal Committee of 'ways and means' to steal revenue even though some of us never injure anything.
Since, I injured no one, should I condemn our servants for the thousands of dollars they have stolen from me under the guise
of public safety prevention services via taxes, licenses, bonds, insurance, permits, and fees, after I was illegally deceived into acting as
their creature? Compared to the trillions we pay in taxes, it is a crime how little we reap back to enjoy after our servants take their pay,
retirements, benefits, perks, wastes it, unnecessarily gives it away, and loses it etc.
Public safety 'prevention' is a tyrant’s plea of pretended 'necessity' and far more a ruse for revenue calculated to "enslave
the masses than to maybe protect a few" from injury, and the immense cost comes with no guarantee of anyone’s safety. A license is
distinguished from a certificate. A license pretends to convert the people from their 'sovereign private capacity' (totally free to engage
in all lawful business activity) into a regulated (controlled) 'public business' entity = taxpayer. Our servants know shit happens and will
always happen regardless of how many laws they pass. They invented 'victimless' crimes, whereby man is not injured, merely the
violation of a statute, or regulation requiring a person to do, or 'pay' something. Federal Income Tax crimes are a prime example of
victimless crimes which are used as the main way and means to defund the people and fund this bloated System of so called
government outside the Constitution. Taxing the people without their (knowing, willing, intelligent) consent was a 'ground for war,' a
self-evident crime when men dare call themselves government and endow themselves with the magical 'right' to steal and claim 'it's
the Law' even though in violation of the supreme commands, thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not bear false witness (to steal); thou
shalt not covet our property and steal it, nor defraud us to steal our status, property, rights, or Liberty etc. Victimless crimes are also
used to fine and $jail$ Americans for exercising their 'Liberty' a.k.a. our 'right of locomotion' today dubbed 'right to travel' in our own
private vehicles. Many Americans object to government's Driver's License scam knowing they have the private (sovereign) 'right to
travel' which by government deception is converted into a mere government "privilege to drive" (employed as a driver for hire
engaged in 'public' business, or used by the 'public' for hire. A license is a privilege to do business with the public.) The insidious
driver's license is picture I.D. you are a subjected person engaged in a public business, branding you with a seemingly harmless
deceptively similar ALL CAPITAL LETTER assumed business name and status. Your state statute (via the Federal Statute 42 USC 666)
requires a 'person' to have a Social Security number (only for a U.S. citizen or alien) before they can even get a license in this System of
Federalism. An illegal but convenient way to pretend to protect people is not necessary the best way, much less the only way to do
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things right, lawful, and free of fraud. Hence, a (driver) license is really a ruse with long reaching tentacles sucking on revenue.
Another example of extorting money and our liberty is the domestic violence scam, sounding on the equity (agreement) side
of the court, requiring a previous 'action' (complaint) to be commenced so personal jurisdiction is already obtained. To create business-
profit, the System corruptly-unjustly allows a 'petitioner' to deprive their partner of liberty and property without any proof and upon a
mere (false) 'allegation' that a supposed 'crime' involving domestic violence was committed. In the interests of 'Justice' the often
innocent respondent is surprised by a court order depriving them of their liberty before their 'day in court' and without any proof they
committed a 'crime' involving domestic violence. The unscrupulous Judges of the Bar Association issue restraining orders like toilet
paper know a very profitable battle will most likely ensue to unjustly enrich their private company and for profit corporation if the
petitioner is granted an order unjustly positioning themselves over the respondent, especially in divorce and custody disputes. The
SCAM is: a respondent is served a restraining order 'before' their day in court to defend against the fraud, and without a criminal trial
by an impartial Jury before deprived of their liberty, and or property, who typically rush to $retain$ an Attorney to try and remedy the
gross injustice/fraud. The System's domestic violence $industry$ corruptly allows ex parte restraining orders upon the mere lip service
of any unscrupulous party willing to swear they are a victim of a 'crime' involving domestic violence, who are rarely if ever prosecuted
for perjury. It doesn't take too long before everybody believes they too can probably get a restraining order if they can act and deceive.
The so called Judge (silently) pretends 'it's the Law' and 'the only way' to keep the accuser (deceiver) safe; as if every one is totally blind
to the fact that an order (mere paper) comes with no guarantee the respondent can't get angry and injure or kill the (false) accuser
who could be restrained in 'any' safe place, or even jailed etc. if they 'truly' needed to be protected until indictment and the accused is
justly afforded the opportunity to be heard by a jury for a supposed 'crime' involving domestic violence. But then the System 's revenue
scam would not be very lucrative. No day in court to defend before being restrained is a monstrous injustice and revenue scam . When
someone is unjustly deprived of their liberty and property by false accusations and without trial by jury it is too much to endure by
some people so they go off the deep end and shoot people because the Judges allowed and refused to remedy and cure the injustice.
That monstrous revenue scam may seem harmless and a 'subtle encroachment' to those who are not the one being deprived of their
liberty and property because it appears to be a 'necessity' to protect people, but not to the accused who is defrauded and suppose to
be innocent until proven guilty. Attorneys (and Judges) know the game of injustice is very profitable.
FEDERAL MARRIAGE LICENSE REVOCATION DECEPTIVELY CALLED NO FAULT DIVORCE = SATANIC?
Isn't this special? The members of the Bar conceal (by non-full disclosure to the parties assent) that divorce, property
settlement, child custody, and child support require the consent (just agreement) of both parties. Divorce is not in Law, but rather
sounds on the 'equity' side of a court with no power to decide matters at all. Divorce is a purely "private" and "special proceeding" one
of "domestic relations" and a "private realm of family life" which the state cannot enter (= cannot deprive you without your agreement
with full understanding with intent to be bound). The state has essentially no power over the divorcing parties other than to refuse to
'grant' (contract) a divorce, but how often does that happen? Never? Being on the equity side of a court there is 'no power of the court
to 'decide' matters at all' prescribed by Law, it's all procedure. Therefore the court lacks jurisdiction and execution power prescribed by
law to involuntarily divest either party of 'their' property, child (custody), and the 'Liberty' thereto, and if they issue an order, or
'decree' it is void for want of 'power' for 'execution' prescribed by Law. The Constitutions command: nor shall any person be deprived
of Life, Liberty, or property without due 'Process of Law' not process of equity i.e. decree or interlocutory order made upon a motion
(i.e. request since there is no 'legal right'. In Law, a party with standing 'demands' their 'legal right' be enforced, and a judgment, or
verdict is rendered. This System is destroying, traumatizing and abusing children and families for $profit$ by concealing our consent
with full understanding is required. Satanic? Especially when a divorce is not absolutely necessary, or when one party is immorally
scamming the other spouse using the advocates (Judges) as a weapon. A license revocation deceptively called divorce by servants is
less than pretending to divorce ourselves. Woe unto ye Lawyers! If you want my treatise 'THE NO-FAULT DIVORCE SCAM' on traumatizing
and abusing our children and parents for profit; property settlement; child custody; and child support to help save American families
and our 'children' from the Lawyers and Judges, feel free contact me. Let no servant put asunder with their rules of mere procedure.
THE SCAM: PRETENDED STATE 'NECESSITY' THE TYRANT'S PLEA TO REIGN TYRANNY - 'EXCUSES' 'EXCUSES'
Nothing that the worst men ever propounded has produced so much oppression, misgovernment, and suffering as
this pretense of state necessity. A great authority calls it 'the tyrant's devilish plea,' and the common honesty of all
mankind has branded it with everlasting infamy. SOUTHWEST WASH. PRO. v. FENDER, 150 P.2d 983 (1944) (1).
[Same in EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). The propaganda of government on TV to impose their $wishes$. ]
'God send me never to live under the Law of Conveniency or Discretion. Shall the Souldier and Justice Sit on one
Bench, the Trumpet will not let the Cryer speak in Westminster-Hall.' REID v. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (2).
SCOTT, J. (Supreme Court of Ohio): The necessity and utility of the power has ever been the tyrant's plea for the
usurpation of power. THE PIQUA BRANCH OF THE STATE BANK OF OHIO v. KNOUP, 6 Ohio St. 342 (1856)(1).
WE LIVE THE MILGRAM EXPERIMENT
The Stanley 'Milgram Experiment' (Yale University experiment 1961-62) shamefully demonstrates most people are 'immoral
conformists' and man has not changed. When a little psychological pressure is applied by even low level 'authority' (the teacher), paid
persons (students) conform to torture innocent people upon the teacher's slightest plea of 'necessity.' And even though the paid
students 'knew they were free to quit at anytime' and the person being shocked was emphatically shouting to stop. The immoral
conformists continued to shock the test subject to the max (450 volts) upon the teacher's mild plea: we 'need' to finish the experiment.
The lesson? Many immoral people will 'obey for pay' then say, just doing my job. That will be no defense, demonstrated to the
Mengalah maniacs at the Nuremberg Trials. Prov. 8:36 All they that hate me love death…
The Milgram Experiment shock's the conscience revealing the mystery of why history's evil tyrants were able to reign terror:
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'IMMORAL MINIONS' who sold their souls. Take morality (God) out of society and it gradually degrades to a satanic personality like
war-mongering pagan Rome with its bloody coliseum sports distracting the mob. The global ruling elite (teachers-government) know
history very well and profit from its many lessons. The ruling elite have been covertly conquering America (the New World) for well
over a century. The art of deception has produced an extremely profitable 'System' of so called government acting outside the
Constitution to steal from the People, then refuse to do Justice and claim, 'it's the Law!' It is self evident that without paid minions it
would be 'impossible' for the evil ruling elite to succeed, let alone by deception especially in a 'government of laws in a more perfect
Union under God.' The proof we live the Milgram Experiment is virtually omnipresent. Their judges pack their private prisons which are
many and overflowing even though we live in the Land of the Free pledging Liberty and Justice for all. Who cares? I care. You, your
friends, family, or children might be next. Simply put, the U.S. Gulag is overflowing because of GODLESSNESS-immorality: Immoral
people commit crimes against innocent people. Immoral jurors convict innocent Americans without actually finding the facts as true
that supports their alleged verdict, and instead play a 'guessing game' because it's not their life, liberty, or property; and so ignorant
and conforming they fail (even in their minds) to judge the validity of the Law, challenge unjust power, search for government fraud,
unconstitutionality, and unjust law, even for 'victimless' so called crimes, because it's 'not them' being tried, and sentenced. Our
immoral servants act outside the Constitution and by fraud convict sovereign Americans as non-sovereigns for fun and profit, then
claim, 'It's the Law!' Where is the Love? Where is the Mercy? Where is the Truth? Where is the Liberty and Justice for all in the Land of
the Free? And where is their full 'accountability' in a more perfect Union for those who swear Oaths to obey the Constitutions of the
People, So Help me God, yet traitorously don't? God bless our honest servants as much as possible.
And to keep the satanic ball rolling trillions of tax dollars, millions of laws and lawyers, judges, law enforcement, military and
civil personnel sucking the life out of and bleeding us dry to keep us in bondage. Plus, the government controlled main stream media,
and other propaganda machines help keep the status quo in place and promote the System as politically correct, almost delightful. 1.
By millions of conforming government controlled servants packing guns and prisons fighting to keep the despotic status quo in place to
keep their jobs, retirements, benefits, and perks, claiming 'it's the Law' to the ignorant, unquestioning taxpayers. 2. By government
controlled public school system molding the computer brains of our children to conform to the norm as the next generation of
unquestioning ignorant taxpayer slaves. 3. By the churches of God converted to 501 C3 corporations 'of government' molding the
minds of Christians to not question authority and conform to unrighteousness, as good taxpayers. 4. By government controlled
mainstream media corporations glorifying officials and policy, always spinning the Truth to produce slanted, or false propaganda, and
instill fear into the minds of taxpayers. Hence, how false doctrine gains notoriety over the perfect Law of God, all working together to
dominate the minds of the people to conform to the unrighteous status quo (until injured enough by the System). Together those
insidious machines are persuasive weapons that must be in on the scam, or else so out of touch they are not worth their salt oblivious
to the concept of Liberty and pursuit of Happiness. If nothing else than inaction, they promote this counterfeit System that outwardly
appears righteous to men, but inside is full of lawlessness and hypocrisy, essentially engaged in perpetual war, fraud, theft, murder,
and overall destruction in defiance of the perfect law of God, the Constitution, morals, and honesty. If the propaganda machines
believe we should support such a vulgar System, it is one that behind the mask is so foul it is fast becoming, if not already become thee
most hated government on earth. According to the News it appears other nations wish War til we reap what we sow. And we will pay
the price for allowing the sins of corrupt government (men).
The hypocrisy is, we are suppose to be the most free people on earth but we are not (thanks for that C.B.!); and even if we
are it's hardly to brag about. History demonstrates the awful truth that immoral servants will follow the down hill path of unrighteous,
waxing worse and worse until eventually they will try to kill us when we resist just to keep their jobs, retirements, benefits, and perks.
Like many people they are too in love with the root of all evil to just say no to government corruption. For their paychecks, they will
fight if they must though their cause is unjust, betraying us, their country, truth, justice, and right, and all that is God then pretend 'it's
the Law.' In the end all of that will be seen for what it has always been, 'foolishness.' Only fools fight against their own freedom and
that of their children. Yea the righteous stand for truth, justice, and right and all that is God, and in the face of their adversaries 'do
what is right' for God and Country instead of what appears to be 'good for them' at the time.
THE CONSTITUTION IS PROTECTION FOR ALL MEN, ALL TIMES, ALL CIRCUMSTANCES
Justice Day (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
In this country written constitutions were deemed essential to protect the rights and liberties of the people against
the encroachment of power delegated to their governments, and the provisions of Magna Charta were
incorporated into Bills of Rights. They were limitations upon all the powers of government, legislative as well as
executive and judicial... . Applied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and tyranny, here they
have become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation.' See Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co.
18 How. 272; [***] and the illuminating discussion of the subject by Mr. Justice Moody in Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78, [***].
If I am right in the conclusion that this legislation amounted to a deprivation of property without due
process of law, no emergency and no consequence, whatever their character, could justify the violation of
constitutional rights. The argument of justification by emergency was made and answered in this court in Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281, decided more than fifty years ago, in which it was held that not even the perils of
war could impair the right of a resident of a loyal state, not connected with the military service, and where the
courts were open, and in the proper exercise of their jurisdiction, to be tried, convicted, or sentenced only by the
ordinary courts of law, with trial by jury and with the safeguards intended to secure a fair trial in the courts of law.
Speaking of the purposes which controlled in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, and animated those who
framed that instrument, this court said, page 120: 'Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would
arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to
accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless
established by irrepealable law. The history of the world had taught them that what was done in the past might be
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attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law [the Supreme Law of the Land. ] for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man
than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine
leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government,
within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been
happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority.' WILSON v. NEW, 243 U.S. 332
(1917)(1). [Super important: The Bill of Rights are 'not' a grant of power, they are prohibitions. ]
DESERVE NEITHER
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, with PREGERSON, KOZINSKI, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting:
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN, HISTORICAL REVIEW of PENNSYLVANIA (1759). UNITED STATES of America v. KINCADE, 379
F.3d 813 (2004). [And in the end they will have neither, nor their children, nor their children's children. ]
GIVE ME LIBERTY OR GIVE ME DEATH
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to
define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty. Id. at 619. That, in the final analysis, liberty is at stake
brings forward Patrick Henry's admonition, known to all, at the Virginia Convention in Richmond, against taking
the easier course and not asserting one's rights in exchange for ease and comfort; it is as true today as it was in
1775: Is life so dear or peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty
God! I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death! Speech of Patrick
Henry (Mar. 23, 1775) in THE REVOLUTIONARY YEARS 123, 125 (Mortimer J. Adler, ed. 1976). LOUISIANA
DEBATING v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 42 F.3d 1483 (1995)(3). [By now you must know why he said that.]
HOLY BIBLE
All the law hangs on love. The servants of God continually strive for perfection, not imperfection.
Mathew 22:36 Master, which is the 'great commandment in the Law' 22:37 Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
all thy heart, and with all they should, and with all thy mind. 22:38 This is the first and great commandment. 22:39 And the second is
like unto it. Thou shallot love thy neighbor as thyself. 22:40 On these two commandments 'hang all the law'... .
Teach the simple Truth of all good people under God: No one has any right to do any wrong to any one. David Colton
Anything imposed on anyone that is not absolutely necessary is a degree of tyranny. D Colton.
Mathew 5:44 Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use
you, and persecute you. (But you can hate what they do.) We must pray for our servants else they receive eternal damnation if not
first the wrath of an armed people in defiance of tyranny and defending their children, family and friends.
Read Romans 1:18-25, 2:8-16, 6:13-23, 7:1, 10:3-4, 13et seq., and Proverbs16:12.
The law of the Lord is perfect. Imperfection is unrighteousness.
See Psalms of David 19:7-13, Deuteronomy 32:4, II Samuel 22:31
Our servants must be pretending their System of code statutes are more perfect than the perfect Laws of God, and for pay
are willing to enforce 'their' code statutes not declaratory of the perfect Law of God so the ruling elite can subject us in bondage to
steal our money?
Mathew 4:4 But he answered and said, It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone, but 'by every word' that proceedeth out of the
mouth of God.
GOD IS THE CREATOR OF ALL THINGS
Read Genesis 1:1,9, 26,27. Colossians 1:15-18. We are the sons and daughters of God, 'our father' who art in heaven ...
END TIMES? EVIL NWO TIMES AND CHAOS FOR SURE
Hardly the Preamble's more perfect 'domestic Tranquility', much less Liberty and Justice for all.
Rev. 12:9 So the great dragon was cast out, that serpent of old, called the Devil and Satan, who deceives the whole world; he was cast
to the earth, and his angels were cast out with him. Joel 3:14 Multitudes, multitudes in the valley of decision: for the day of the Lord
is near in the valley of decision. [Drawing the line in the sand, which side of the Law and God, or Satan and the Code are you on?]
See II Thessalonians. 2:1-17, Math. 13:37-50; 24:4-51 and John 2:16.
I AM SO ASHAMED I HAVE NOT DONE MORE TO HELP FREE THE PEOPLE - WOE FOR BEING INDIFFERENT
The world should know Americans are ashamed of not stopping our war mongering government (men-ruling elite) engaged in
fraud and lawless usurpation outside the Constitution, killing, stealing, abusing, and refusing to do justice for all, and their minions who
say "just doing my job" for pay, without which the corrupt ruling elite could never succeed with their N.W.O. bondage called freedom.
WOULD OUR FOREFATHERS SENTANCE THEM WITH LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY?
Now you have learned about pretended government by government deception, the super profitable game of stealing from
people by deception while pretending to be 'the' Government, pretending code is the Law, pretending to do Justice, pretending to
covert you from sovereigns to slaves, pretending you have an all capital letter name, pretending Federal Reserve Notes (debtor notes)
are lawful money, even though they are backed by nothing (lawful substance). It is an evil game of evil mere men pretending while
intending to steal all of our rights, Liberty, property, and pursuit of Happiness and that of our children, family and friends, then refusing
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to Justice and claiming it's the Law. Anything that you do, or not do that aids and abets this System, aids your own destruction and that
of our children, family and friends. Evil government (men) corruption is ancient and on going. To conquer evil requires 'eternal
vigilance.' Are Americans waiting for formal notice they must get in the box cars headed for the internment camps?
Justice O'CONNOR (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring in the judgment:
Particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). George WALLACE v. JAFFREE, 472 U.S. 38 (1984)(2). [History
teaches lessons from experience demonstrating the Constitution was intended to prevent subjection and injustice. ]
NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: UNJUST AND CORRUPT GOVERNMENT = UNJUST AND CORRUPT MEN
Justice BLACK, with CHIEF JUSTICE DOUGLAS and BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the United States) concur, dissenting:
But the men who founded this country and wrote our Bill of Rights were strangers neither to a belief in the 'right of
revolution' nor to the urgency of the need to be free from the control of government with regard to political beliefs
and associations. Thomas Jefferson was not disclaiming a belief in the 'right of revolution' when he wrote the
Declaration of Independence. And Patrick Henry was certainly not disclaiming such a belief when he declared in
impassioned words that have come on down through the years: 'Give me liberty or give me death.' This country's
freedom was won by men who, whether they believed in it or not, certainly practiced revolution in the
Revolutionary War.
Since the beginning of history there have been governments [men. ] that have engaged in practices against
the people so bad, so cruel, so unjust and so destructive of the individual dignity of men and women that the ' right
of revolution' was all the people had left to free themselves. As simple illustrations, one government almost 2,000
years ago burned Christians upon fiery crosses and another government, during this very century, burned Jews in
crematories. I venture the suggestion that there are countless multitudes in this country, and all over the world, who
would join Anastaplo's belief in the right of the people to resist by force tyrranical governments like those. In re
George ANASTAPLO, 366 U.S. 82 (1961)(3). [Most Americans have no clue of the depth of accumulative abuse.]
CARTER, Justice (Supreme Court of California) I dissent: History is replete with accounts of the many stratagems
created by tyrants to violate the individual's liberty. But it is also replete with accounts of man's constant warfare
against these devices and victories won by courageous judges, legislators, administrators, lawyers, and citizens.
FIRST U. CHURCH OF L.A. v. CTY. OF L.A., 48 Cal.2d 419 (1957)(4). [Victory by eternal vigilance. Every bit helps.]
DICTATORIAL PROCEDURE = TODAY’S MANIPULATED TRIALS = STEALTY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES

Mr. Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Tyrannical governments had immemorially utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment to make scape
goats of the weak, or of helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed, who would not
conform and who resisted tyranny. [***] And a liberty loving people won the principle that criminal punishments
could not be inflicted save for that which proper legislative action had already by 'the law of the land' forbidden
when done. But even more was needed. From the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture
and extortion of confessions of violations of the 'law of the land' evolved the fundamental idea that no man's life,
liberty or property be forfeited as criminal punishment for violation of that law until there had been a charge fairly
made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement and tyrannical power. Thus, as
assurance against ancient evils, our country, in order to preserve 'the blessings of liberty', wrote into its basic law
the requirement, among others, that the forfeiture of the lives, liberties or property of people accused of crime can
only follow if procedural safeguards of due process have been obeyed. [***]
The determination to preserve an accused's right to procedural due process sprang in large part from
knowledge of the historical truth that the rights and liberties of people accused of crime could not be safely
entrusted to secret inquisitorial processes. The testimony of centuries, in governments of varying kinds over
populations of different races and beliefs, stood as proof that physical and mental torture and coercion had brought
about the tragically unjust sacrifices of some who were the noblest and most useful of their generations. The rack,
the thumbscrew, the wheel, solitary confinement, protracted questioning and cross questioning, and other
ingenious forms of entrapment of the helpless or unpopular had left their wake of mutilated bodies and shattered
minds along the way to the cross, the guillotine, the stake and the hangman's noose. And they who have suffered
most from secret and dictatorial proceedings have almost always been the poor, the ignorant, the numerically
weak, the friendless, and the powerless. CHAMBERS v. STATE OF FLORIDA, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)(2). [How true.]
CONQUERED BY THE DETESTABLE AID OF DELUDED CITIZENS - SURROUNDED BY ENEMIES OF FREEDOM

A charge delivered by the Honourable JOHN JAY, Esquire, Chief Justice of the United States, to the grand jury
impannelled for the court of the United States, holden for the Middle circuit in the district of Virginia, at the capitol
in the city of Richmond, on the 22d day of May, 1793. [***]
By their constitution and laws, the people of the United States have expressed their will, and their will so
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expressed, must sway and rule supreme in our republic. It is in obedience to their will, and in pursuance of their
authority, that this court is now to dispense their justice in this district; and they have made it your duty, gentlemen,
to inquire whether any and what infractions of their laws have been committed in this district, or on the seas, by
persons in or belonging to it. [***]
There is not a history of any nation which does not record the mischiefs they experienced from such
parties, and they rarely present us with an instance of a nation being conquered and subjugated, without the
detestable aid of its own degenerate or deluded citizens. [Super emphasis added. ] Nothing is more certain than,
that if such parties should arise among the people, they will find their way into every department of government,
and carry distrust and discord with them-- dark and dreary would then be the prospect before us, and we should in
vain look for the speedy return of those happy days, when the government was peacefully, wisely and
prosperously administered, under the care and auspices of a patriot, in whom the United States have by repeated
unanimity in their suffrages, manifested a degree of confidence, no less reputable to their own wisdom and virtue to
his. HENFIELDS CASE, 11 F.Cas. 1099 (1793)(1). [All power is of the people: Good must conquer evil! Resist + Reject.]
AGE OLD CONSPIRACIES BY MEN AGAINST THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE
The State, meaning the government of the State.
Justice BRENNAN, with MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) joins as to Parts I, II, and III, concurring:
"The powers of the States have been limited and the powers of Congress extended by the last three amendments of
the Constitution. These last amendments--thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen--do, in my judgment, vest in Congress a
power to protect the rights of citizens against States, and individuals in States, never before granted. [***] "Why not
in advance provide against the denial of rights by States, whether the denial be acts of omission or commission, as
well as against the unlawful acts of combinations and conspiracies against the rights of the people?
"The States never had the right, though they had the power [Force. ], to inflict wrongs upon free citizens by
a denial of the full protection of the laws; because all State officials are by the Constitution required to be bound by
oath or affirmation to support the Constitution. As I have already said, the States did deny to citizens the equal
protection of the laws, they did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the extent of the
express limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the citizen had no remedy. ... They took property without
compensation, and he had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of the press, and he had no remedy. They
restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no remedy. They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no
remedy. They bought and sold men who had no remedy. Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended,
that the nation cannot by law provide against all such abuses and denials of right as these in States and by States,
or combination of persons?" Globe App. 83, 85 (emphasis added). Section 1 of H.R. 320 was modeled after ß 2 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, which imposed criminal penalties on "any person" who, "under color of
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom," deprived "any inhabitant of any State or Territory" of "any right
secured ... by this act." As Representative Shellabarger stated: "That section [ß 2] provides a criminal proceeding
in identically the same case as this one [ß 1] provides a civil remedy ... ." Globe App. 68. Representative Bingham
noted the limited application of the remedy provided by ß 2: "It is clear that if Congress do so provide by penal laws
for the protection of these rights [guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment], those violating them must answer for
the crime, and not the States. The United States punishes men, not States, for a violation of its law." Globe 85-86.
Representative Bingham was thus able to distinguish, as apparently the Court is not, ante, at 1145 n. 11,
between the reach of the word "person" in ß 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and its reach in ß 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. H.R. 320 was necessary, as Senator Edmunds stated, to protect citizens "in the rights that the
Constitution gave them ... against any assault by any State or under any State or through the neglect of any
State ...," Globe 697, and by a "State," Edmunds meant "a corporation ... an organized thing ... manifested,
represented entirely, and fully in respect to every one of its functions, by that department of its government on which
the execution of those functions is respectively devolved." Id., at 696. See id., at 607-608 (Sen. Pool).
It was common ground, therefore, that, as Representative Wilson argued, the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment were directed against the State, meaning "the government of the State ... the legislative, the judicial,
and the executive"; that the fifth section of the Amendment had given Congress the power to enforce it by
"appropriate legislation," meaning "legislation adequate to meet the difficulties to be encountered to suppress the
wrongs existing, to furnish remedies and inflict penalties adequate to the suppression of all infractions of the rights
of the citizens"; and that H.R. 320 was such legislation. Globe 481-483. Those who opposed the bill were fully
aware of the major implications of such a statute. Representative Blair, for example, rested his opposition on the
fact that the bill, including ß 1, was aimed at the States in their "corporate and legislative capacity": "The inhibitions
in the [Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth] amendments against the United States and the States are against them
in their corporate and legislative capacities, for the thing or acts prohibited can alone be performed by them in their
corporate or legislative capacities. ***
"As the States have the [unlawful] power to violate them and not individuals, we must presume that the
legislation provided for is against the States in their corporate and legislative capacity or character and those acting
under their laws, and not against the individuals, as such, of the States. I am sustained in this view of the case by the
tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States. In it are a number of inhibitions against the
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States, which it is evident are against them in their corporate and legislative capacity; and to which I respectfully call
the attention of the gentlemen who favor this bill." GlobeApp.208. Representative Blair reached this conclusion
after reasoning that if the bill were interpreted as applicable only to individuals, it would not be able to fulfill the
purposes of the Reconstruction Amendments.
See id., at 209. This conclusion produced an anguished outcry from those committed to unrevised notions of state
sovereignty. Representative Arthur, for example, complained that ß 1. "reaches out and draws within the despotic
circle of central power all the domestic, internal, and local institutions and offices of the States, and then asserts
over them an arbitrary and paramount control as of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected, in a
peculiar sense, by the United States in the citizens thereof. Having done this, having swallowed up the States and
their institutions, tribunals, and functions, it leaves them the shadow of what they once were." Globe 365.
The answer to such arguments was, of course, that the Civil War had irrevocably and profoundly altered the
balance of power between Federal and State Governments: "If any one thinks it is going too far to give the United
States this national supervisory power to protect the fundamental rights of citizens of the United States, I do not
agree with him. It is not wise to permit our devotion to the reserved rights of the States to be carried so far as to
deprive the citizen of his privileges and immunities.
"We must remember that it was State rights, perverted I admit from their true significance, that arrayed
themselves against the nation and threatened its existence. We must remember that it was for the very purpose of
placing in the General Government a check upon this arrogance of some of the States that the fourteenth
amendment was adopted by the people. We must remember that, if the legislation we propose does trench upon
what have been, before the fourteenth amendment, considered the rights of the States, it is in behalf and for the
protection of immunities and privileges clearly given by the Constitution; and that Federal laws and Federal rights
must be protected whether domestic laws or their administration are interfered with or not, because the
Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land. We are not making a
constitution, we are enacting a law, and its virtue can be tested without peril by the experiment." Id., at 502 (Sen.
Frelinghuysen). In the reconstructed union, national rights would be guaranteed federal protection even from the
States themselves. QUERN v. JORDAN, 440 U.S. 332 (1978)(2).
Congress enacted ß 1983 and its predecessor, ß 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, to provide an
independent avenue for protection of federal constitutional rights. The remedy was considered necessary because
"state courts [Judges etc. ] were being used to harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts were
powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected
rights." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972). PULLIAM v. ALLEN, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)(2).
STATUTES OF MURDER AGAINST MEN BECAUSE OF THEIR LOYALTY TO THE CONSTITUTION
Corruption by government = by men, is nothing new under the sun.
Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) joins in this opinion:
'As slaves were not protected by the Constitution, there might be some color of excuse for the slave States in their
disregard for the requirement of the bill of rights as to slaves in refusing them protection in life or property. ***
'But, sir, there never was even colorable excuse, much less apology, for any man North or South claiming that any
State Legislature or State court, or State Executive, has any right to deny protection to any free citizen of the United
States within their limits in the rights of life, liberty, and property. Gentlemen who oppose this amendment oppose
the grant of power to enforce the bill of rights. Gentlemen who oppose this amendment simply declare to these rebel
States, 'Go on with your confiscation statutes, your statutes of banishment, your statutes of unjust imprisonment,
your statutes of murder and death against men because of their loyalty to the Constitution and Government of the
United States.'' Id. at 1089--1091. ADAMSON v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)(4). [They refuse to do
justice and hate to apologize for their murder, robbery, rape, and needless abuse of Americans injurying no one. ]
INSIDIOUS ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTION CANNOT SUCCEED UNLESS THROUGH CORRUPTION OF THE PEOPLE
The opinion of the Court was delivered by ROGERS, J. (Supreme Court of Pennslyvania):
The history of the human race has taught mankind by melancholy experience, that it is necessary in all
governments, whether monarchial or republican, to strictly guard the rights of the subject from the injustice of
the crown (sovereign. ) and the citizen from the injustice and gradual encroachments of those to whom they are
compelled to intrust the management of their affairs, whether a legislative body, or whatever mode they may choose
to adopt. Experience has also taught us the useful lesson, that there is no more effectual way of destroying the
liberties of the people, than by gradual encroachments under colour of law, and that no better instrument could be
employed for that purpose, than a venal, time serving, timid and subservient judiciary. This melancholy truth was
completely exemplified in the tyrannical and corrupt reigns of Charles II. and James II., not to mention other
notorious examples, which will readily occur to any person even slightly versed in the history of the people from
whom we have taken our laws and the principles of our government. [Most Americans ignorant of true history.][ ***]
Thoroughly acquainted with the human heart, deeply versed in history, and taking warning from the
numerous examples it affords of the insidious approaches of tyranny, they have surrounded this branch with every
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protection which might, as they supposed and intended, secure them from the encroachments of the other branches
of government. The Constitution itself supposes that our representatives may abuse their trusts, and provides against
such a contingency as well as human wisdom can provide. It is a consolation to every lover of his country's welfare,
that insidious or open attacks upon the Constitution cannot ultimately succeed, unless through the corruption of
the people themselves. And when the time occurs when assaults on the Constitution are regarded with indifference,
it will be an easy step to take refuge in the arms of tyranny. They will deserve to be slaves, because they are
unworthy of the blessings of liberty. [How prophetic and true it is. Arrogant indifference to their crime. ][***]
We are fully sensible of the delicate situation in which the Judges of this court are placed, but it is not of
our seeking, and we should be recreant to our duty, if, when it is demanded by a citizen whose rights have been
invaded, we should shrink from its performance. We should in all probability receive, most certainly we should
richly merit, the contempt of the Legislature itself. We wish it to be distinctly understood that no claim is put in for
judicial irresponsibility; we acknowledge in its fullest extent the constitutional responsibility of Judges for an abuse
of their high functions, among which the greatest that could be committed would be a base betrayal of trust in
refusing to interpose to prevent injustice whether arising from a wilful, deliberate and wicked invasion of the
Constitution, or from what we believe to have been a mistaken construction of legislative authority. As the people,
who are the fountain of all power, have in their wisdom distributed the functions of government into their co-
ordinate branches--the legislative power, the executive power, and the judicial power--it is necessary that each
should respect the just rights of the others, and abstain, as far as practicable, from the exercise of all doubtful
authority. In this way, and in this way only, can the harmony of our system be preserved. In this mode, in the
language of the Constitution of the United States, we shall best promote the general welfare and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.
And here let me further remark, (without pretending to any great merit for the prediction), that whenever
the liberty of this people is overthrown, all the forms of the government will be anxiously and carefully preserved.
While the spirit of liberty has fled, its semblance will still remain. Of this truth the fall of the Roman Republic is a
memorable and a useful example. Although the most infamous despotism was established which the world has ever
seen, yet, to all outward appearances, the government continued the same. But the limits of a judicial opinion will
not allow me to pursue this theme by the citation of numerous other examples full of instructive and salutary
warning. And let me also, (without intending the slightest disrespect), recall the attention of the intelligent people of
the Commonwealth to the frightful despotism which raged without control in a neighbouring country, and at a recent
period, under the name and with the apparent sanction of the legislative body. The page of history teems with
examples which incontestably prove that no more convenient or effectual instrument can be devised for the success
of unhallowed ambition than a corrupt legislature and a subservient judiciary. To prevent the evils which would
inevitably result from the overthrow of the government, the equilibrium established by the Constitution must be
preserved, and this can only be done by meeting on the threshold the first attempt at encroachment, whether arising
from design, inattention or mistake, come from what branch of the government it may. Commonwealth ex rel
Hepburn v. Mann, 5 Watts. & Serg. 403 (1843)(1). [How true. No Judiciary and Surrounded by Enemies of Freedom.]
The Law, the most complicated 'game' in the world.
ILLEGAL "METHODS CALCULATED TO PRODUCE A WRONGFUL CONVICTION"
But, oh, the attorneys can twist the questions.
'Mrs. Goldie Goldstein takes the stand. She says she knows Jones, and you can bet your bottom dollar she knew
Berger. She stood right where I am now and looked at him and was afraid to go over there, and when I waved my
arm everybody started to holler, 'Don't point at him.' You know the rules of law. Well, it is the most complicated
game in the world. I was examining a woman that I knew knew Berger and could identify him, she was standing
right here looking at him, and I couldn't say, 'Isn't that the man?' Now, imagine that! But that is the rules of the
game, and I have to play within those rules.' The jury was thus invited to conclude that the witness Goldstein knew
Berger well but pretended otherwise; and that this was within the personal knowledge of the prosecuting attorney.
Again, at another point in his argument, after suggesting that defendants' counsel had the advantage of
being able to charge the district attorney with being unfair 'of trying to twist a witness,' he said: 'But, oh, they can
twist the questions, *** they can sit up in their offices and devise ways to pass counterfeit money; 'but don't let the
Government touch me, that is unfair; please leave my client alone.''
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a one. BERGER
v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78 (1935)(2). [How true. Improperly convicting sovereigns injuring no one as non-sovereigns. ]
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The presumption is all men know the Law should have no exceptions yet
THE ABLEST OF THE BAR AND THE BENCH KNOW BUT A SMALL PART OF THE LAW
Credulous U.S. citizens are essentially totally ignorant of the Law and the Code = clueless.
BRADLEY, J. (Springfield Court of Appeals) dissenting: Credulity is defined as "readiness of belief; a disposition
to believe on slight evidence." The expression "blind confidence" as a single term does not appear in the dictionary,
but its meaning is so apparent that one could not be mistaken. imbecility, credulity, blind confidence--Mrs. Kellems
was afflicted with neither. [***] I believe that the presumption that all men know the law should have no exceptions
except in extreme cases, and I do not believe that the cause at bar is so extreme as to justify the invoking of an
exception. No one will attempt to justify or excuse the lawyer who knowingly misrepresents the law. The ablest of
the bar and the bench know but a small part of the law, when what they know is compared with the great body of
the law. SECURITY SAV. BANK v. KELLEMS, 274 S.W. 112 (1925)(3). [Bar Associations, but no 'Bench'
Association.]
WHEN SUPREME COURT JUSTICES ARE DECEIVERS, WHO DARE TRUST A JUDGE OF AN INFERIOR COURT?
How true it is. The deceptive non full whole Truth opinions of Supreme Court Justices.
Remember the case: Woe unto the Lawyers, it's high time for the judges to stop (intentionally) following error?

In the Seattle Daily Times, June 30, 1944, is the following item: 'The Supreme Court of the United States has
'rendered it impossible for the practicing lawyer to advise his client as to what the law is today, or even to offer a
guess as to what it will be tomorrow,' a resolution adopted by the State Bar of Texas declares: 'The court 'repeatedly
has overruled decisions, precedents and landmarks of the law of long standing without assigning any valid reason
therefor,' read the resolution adopted yesterday, 'dismissing the question with a wave of the hand, and contenting
itself with the assertion that these precedents have been eroded by the processes of the years; or basing its decision
on casuistry and sophistry rather than by logic.'
'The resolution added that 'by this conduct and controversies within its own personnel, it (the court) has
subjected itself to the suspicion, widely held, that it speaks, or undertakes to speak, in the voice of the appointing
power, rather than the voice of the law.'
'Presented by J. W. Hassell of Dallas, the resolution asserted that 'the Supreme Court of the United States is
losing, if it has not already lost, the high esteem in which it has been held by the people.'' S.W. WASHINGTON
PRO. v. FENDER et al, 21 Wash.2d 349 (1944)(1). [How they uphold this corrupt System of Federalism. ]
Beat these servants at their own game by uniting the supreme power with the invincible power of Truth. I never give them
any excuse to use against me, I never touch them, I boldly speak the invincible Truth in the light of God, being righteous inside and
outside. You will see (Proverbs 27:28) The wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are bold as a lion.
Mathew 5:44 Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which
despitefully use you, and persecute you. 5:48 Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect. [Help try to
re-perfect our more perfect Union. ]
Highly praise all of our honest public servants and those who put their lives on the line trying to do good in this corrupt
God forsaken System. It is wonderful when you come across a servant who is on the side of Truth and Justice, and those who are
not revenue hunters trying to bleed you dry. Just like the Lord I love my servants (but hate what they do). Live by example and love
your enemies even if you hate what they do, because: War begets war, evil begets evil, anger begets anger, wrong begets wrong ;
but love begets love, compassion begets compassion, and mercy begets mercy. Yet defend yourself, family, friends and neighbors to
the max at all times. David Colton.
Take heed If you are a juror, or government servant etc. who hereafter goes against the Truth, or the Supreme Law of the
Land in pursuance of the perfect Supreme Law of God, your pre-ordained destiny shall be fulfilled if it works unrighteousness against
the innocent (not injuring man) especially our children of God.
Zechariah 8:16 These are the things that ye shall do; Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbor; execute the judgment of truth
and peace in your gates; 8:17. And let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his neighbor; and love no false oath; for all
these things that I hate, saith the Lord. Romans 1:18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and
unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; ... . Proverbs 8:36 All they that hate me love death...
REVELATIONS OF ANTI-CHRIST?
Get Aaron Russo's 2006 movie, America from Freedom to Fascism. It shows defecting IRS agents exposing alleged IRS
fraud, emphatically demanding government honesty to 'Show me the Law' (specific statute) that requires one of the People to file,
or pay Federal Income Tax. Russo also interviewed former IRS Commissioners (the top dogs) failed to step up to the plate and show
the Law, or statute. Also, President Bush Sr. is shown standing behind the U.N. symbol arrogantly letting us know their will be New
World Order, the anti-Christ One World Government composed of the ruling elite pretending to protect the people yet at war
enslaving the nations of the world via the ruse of democracy. Further, it reveals the War Powers 'Commander in Chief,' Bush Jr. in
2005 arrogantly said, 'The Constitution is just a G. Damn piece of paper,' who is responsible for the death of thousands of U.S.
soldiers in Iraq (a.k.a. Babylon). Shocking revelations from the head who is suppose to take care to execute the Laws faithfully, and
article VI expresses the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land, plus taking God 's name in vain is anti-Supreme Law
(Revelations 20:4, Leviticus 19:12). Glenn Beck radio show 6-11-10: In 1982 a FBI agent said he infiltrated the Whethermen Group
including Bill Aires and it was said, When they takeover the Governement they will send Americans to re-education camps and kill
about 25 million who cannot be re-educated. Go on U-tube and search for the U.S. prision-concentration camps.
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Mathew 24:4. Take heed that no man deceives you. Thess. 2:9 The coming of the lawless one is according to the working of Satan,
with all power, signs, and 'lying' wonders. Mathew II Peter 2:19. While they promise them Liberty, they themselves are the servants
of corruption: for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage. Proverbs 16:12 It is an abomination to kings to
commit wickedness: for the throne is established by righteousness. [Not unrighteousness. ] Proverbs 21:7 The violence of the wicked
will destroy them, Because they refuse to do justice. Proverbs 16:6 By mercy and 'truth' iniquity is purged: and by the fear of the
Lord men depart from evil. [Bound by Oath to obey the Constitution, So Help me God. ]
PROVERBS 19:15 YE SHALL DO 'NO' UNRIGHTEOUSNESS IN JUDGMENT "SO HELP ME GOD"

Simply stated, we are in bondage under the lying wonders of the ruling elite acting outside the Constitution, by the old Sinful
ruse called 'pretended' government, whereby evil 'men enslave men' using fraud and force for profit then 'refuse to do Justice' and
arrogantly claim 'it's the Law' against the true intent of the people and righteousness. The Constitution requires all Officers to be bound
by Oath: See (5 USC 3331). Their oath is to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic without ' any'
mental reservation or purpose of 'evasion.' 'So Help me God.' Super emphasis added. I deny our state officials are bound by any
lawful Oath of allegiance with imprecation: 'So help me God.' I understand there are no lawfully appointed and commissioned
Constitutional public "Officers" (of the state, or Federal) because they are all 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless U.S. citizens acting
outside the Constitution providing 'services' as private licensed agents under the N.A.I.C.S. Public Administration.
Proverbs 8:16 By me princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth. 8:20 I lead in the way of righteousness, in the midst of
the paths of judgment. 8:13 The fear of the Lord is to hate evil: pride, and arrogancy, and the evil way, and the froward mouth, do I
hate. Leviticus 19:1 And the Lord spake… 19:11 Ye shall not steal, neither deal falsely, neither lie one to another. 19:12 And ye shall
not swear by my name falsely, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God: I am the Lord. 19:13 Thou shalt not defraud thy
neighbor, neither rob him… . 19:14 Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling block before the blind, but shalt fear thy God: I
am the Lord. 19:15 Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person
of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor. 19:16 Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy
people: neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor: I am the Lord. 19:17 Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart:
thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him. 19:18 Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against thy
children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy self: I am the Lord. 19:19 Ye shall keep my statutes.
NO KING OR OFFICER SWEARS AN OATH TO AN INFERIOR, ALWAYS TO THEIR SUPERIOR-SOVEREIGN

From 1787 – today: The 'Constitution of the U.S.' of the people requires all officers to take the oath of allegiance (1 stat 23).
CARTER, Justice (Supreme Court of California) I dissent:

It must be remembered that while our government was 'conceived in liberty,' it was born in revolution. The
Declaration of Independence was the antithesis of a pledge of allegiance or loyalty to the British government of
which the then American colonists were a part. This memorable document epitomized the concept of its framers of
the objects and purposes of government and the right of the people to change it by force if necessary. It declared:
'We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that
Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience
hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing
invariably the same Object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their
duty, to throw off such Government and to provide new Guards for their future security. Such has been the patient
sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of
Government.' The events which followed the adoption of the Declaration of Independence by the Continental
Congress on July 4, 1776, are well known to every student of American history. These events culminated in the
Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 where the Constitution of the United States
was drafted. Many of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention had been members of the Continental Congress
which had adopted the Declaration of Independence. They were revolutionists in the truest and most dignified sense.
It should be remembered that the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States were
prepared by a group of men who had endured tyranny under a monarchial form of government for over three
generations. They were the leaders in the struggle which overthrew that government and they sought to establish a
government of the people, by the people, and for the people, which would derive its just powers from the consent of
the governed. They sought to establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, promote the general welfare, provide
for the common defense and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity a government which
would govern without tyranny and without oppression and which would guarantee to the governed all of the
liberty that a free people in a homogeneous society could enjoy.
The great liberality accorded to the guarantees of freedom of speech and press by those at the head of our
government during its formative period is exemplified by the following statement in the First Inaugural Address of
President Thomas Jefferson. He there declared: 'If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or
change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may
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be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.' This same concept was again expressed by Mr. Jefferson in his
letter to Benjamin Rush in these words: 'I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of
tyranny over the mind of man.' This concept was more recently depicted by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v.
People of State of California, 274 U.S. 357, in words that will forever be a part of our American heritage. 'Those
who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless
reasoning applied through the process of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.'
Over a century and a half has elapsed since the above quoted utterances of Thomas Jefferson. Our
government has withstood one major revolution and several minor armed rebellions but the fundamental basic
concept of civil liberties embraced within the Bill of Rights has remained unimpaired.
It is worthy of note that the framers of the Constitution of the United States saw fit to exact of the person
who assumed the office of President a very simple oath which reads as follows: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.' U.S.C.onst. art. II, s 1. This is the only oath mentioned in
the Constitution. Notwithstanding the great trust reposed in and power conferred upon the President of the United
States by the Constitution and laws enacted by Congress, no other oath or pledge of loyalty may be exacted of him.
Nevertheless no President has ever been suspected of disloyalty. It may be said with confidence that history has
demonstrated the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in drafting an oath so simple and yet so effective that it
has endured the tests of time and trial. The past at least is secure. But such an oath was not deemed sufficient to
insure the loyalty and fealty of the Vice President, members of Congress and other officials of our national
government. Although no other official of our government possesses the power or authority of the President, they
are required to take an oath much more exacting as it amounts to a pledge of allegiance. This oath is contained in an
act of Congress and is as follows: 'I *** do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.' 5
U.S.C.A. s 16. [5 USC § 3331. Oath of office. ] I find no fault with this oath and recognize the propriety of exacting
such an oath from one who assumes an official position with our government. FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF
L.A. v. COUNTY OF L.A., 48 Cal.2d 419 (1957)(4). [w/o So help me God intent to be Oath breakers.]
Notice the outrageous fraud of the period after 'enter.' and in front of So Help me God instead of a comma to disconnect 'So help
me God' from their Oath. They are outside the Constitution and none of their Code statutes cite a provision of the Constitution as its
source of Law. For many centuries government rulers all over the world have sworn Oaths to God the most high.
OUR SERVANTS SWEAR OATHS TO OBEY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE AND OWE ALLEGIANCE TO US
'And a third generation was already far on its way to the grave before this monstrous doctrine was conceived or
thought of,--that public officers all over the country might disregard their oaths whenever a war or a rebellion was
commenced. S.W. WASHINGTON PRO. v. FENDER et al, 21 Wash.2d 349 (1944)(1). [Today: Oath breakers?]
See requirement to take the Oath in the 'Constitution of the United States' Article VI, (last paragraph) 'The Senators and
Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to an Office or public Trust under the United States.' See Vol. 1 Statutes at Large 23.
The oath clearly aligns the established Order of things. No one takes an oath to an inferior! Our servant's oath of allegiance
is to the Constitution of the sovereign People under God.
See government's employee 'Personnel Affidavit' document (GPO 1992 60-648 (m)) for their Oath of Allegiance to the
Constitution of the United States citing Title 5 U.S.C. § 3331, Every person appointed to any office of' honor or profit shall, before
entering upon the duties of such office, and before being entitled to any part of the salary thereof, take and subscribe to the following
oath: 'I, ………., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So
help me God.' [Super emphasis added. ] 1 Blackstone Commentaries 228: "After this the king or queen, laying his or her hand upon
the holy gospels, shall say, The things which I have here before promised I will perform and keep: so help me God. And then shall kiss
the book."
Since the servants from the highest to the lowest are in private companies and for profit corporations and outside the
Constitution, there are no Constitutional 'Officers' only mere 'employees'.
Peter 2:18 Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentile, but also to the froward.
Titus 2:9 Exhort servants to be obedient unto their own masters, and to please them well in all things: no answering again.
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Ephesians 6:5 Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters, according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in
singleness of your heart, as unto Christ.
Proverbs 12:17 He that speaketh truth showeth forth righteousness: but a false witness deceit. 12:20 Deceit is in the heart of them that
imagine evil: [government. ] but to the counsellors of peace joy. 12:21 There shall no evil happen to the just: but the wicked shall be
filled with mischief. 12:22 Lying lips are abomination to the Lord: but they that deal truly are his delight. 14:5 A faithful witness will not
lie: but a false witness will utter lies. 16:6 By mercy and truth iniquity is purged: and by the fear of the Lord men depart from evil. 16:8
Better is a little with righteousness than great revenues without 'right.' 16:12 It is an abomination to kings to commit wickedness: for
the throne is established by righteousness.
John 14:6 Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me. Mark 10:19
Thou knowest my commandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, do not bear false witness, Defraud not, . . .
Essentially we all know right from wrong. Even crooks do not like to be cheated or robbed. It was said by the most
'wonderful and wise' G.S.N.B. at age 14, "It's not that our servants don't do any right, it's they do too much wrong."
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO "FULLY" PERFORM THEIR SWORN DUTY - SOVEREIGN POWER TO PUNISH
At the other end of the spectrum of constitutional errors lie "structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards." Id., at 309, 111 S.Ct., at 1265. The existence of
such defects--deprivation of the right to counsel, (fn 4) for example--requires automatic reversal of the
conviction because they infect the entire trial process. See id., at 309-310, 111 S.Ct., at 1265. [***]
We have also spoken of comity and federalism. "The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing
the criminal law. In criminal trials they also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights.
Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their
good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Engle v. Isaac, supra, 456 U.S., at 128. See also Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991); McCleskey, supra, 499 U.S., at 491.[The States totally disappeared. ][***]
Petitioner argues that application of the Chapman harmless-error standard on collateral review is necessary
to deter state courts from relaxing their own guard in reviewing constitutional error and to discourage prosecutors
from committing error in the first place. Absent affirmative evidence that state-court judges are ignoring their
oath, we discount petitioner's argument that courts will respond to our ruling by violating their Article VI duty to
uphold the Constitution. See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884). Federalism, comity, and the
constitutional obligation of state and federal courts all counsel against any presumption that a decision of this Court
will "deter" lower federal or state courts from fully performing their sworn duty. See Engle, supra, 456 U.S., at 128,
102 S.Ct., at 1572; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-265 (1973)(Powell, J., concurring). BRECHT v.
ABRAHAMSON, 507 U.S. 619 (1992)(2). [Oath breakers are indifferent to crime and abuse against Americans. ]
THE GREATEST MENACE TO FREEDOM IS AN INERT PEOPLE
SO SPREAD THE INVINCIBLE POWER OF TRUTH
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

Thomas Jefferson wrote, 'I deplore *** the putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and the malignity,
the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write them. *** It is however an evil for which there is no remedy,
our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost.' Jefferson,
Democracy, selected and arranged by S. Padover 150--151 (1939).
Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375--376, said: 'Those who won
our independence *** believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that
the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.' Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971)(2).
SILENCE MAKES COWARDS OF MEN

Justice BLACK (Supreme Ct. of the U.S.) with THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice DOUGLAS concur, dissenting:
[N]o nation can continue to exist on such a foundation unless its citizens are wholly free to speak out fearlessly for
or against their officials and their laws. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961)(2).
Gullible: Anyone that's easily cheated or deceived (by their servants). After reading this study manual about government
deception how could any one ever trust this government-men again? Why would anyone blindly trust anyone much less your
adversaries scheming to steal your money and enslave you? Why do jurors? How can you ever trust a liar? When can you ever trust a
deceiver? Beware, those who engage in fraud for profit will fight for it. Mathew 24:4 Take heed no one deceives you.
AWAKENING THE PUBLIC AND EXPOSING CORRUPTION.

Justice STEWART (Supreme Court of the U.S.) with Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting:
Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised, and a free
press is thus indispensable to a free society. Not only does the press enhance personal self-fulfillment by providing
the people with the widest possible range of fact and opinion, but it also is an incontestable precondition of self-
government. The press 'has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing
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corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and
occurrences ... .' Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214; Grosjean, supra, 297 U.S. at 250.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)(2). [It's high time to Wake up! the American republic. ]
EFFECTIVELY EXPOSE DECEPTION IN GOVERNMENT
Paramount duty of the free press to prevent any part of the government from 'deceiving the people.'
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Mr. Justice POWELL (Supreme Court of the United States) joins, concurring:
In recent years the admonition of Mr. Justice Black that the First Amendment gave the press freedom so that it might
'serve the governed, not the governors' (id., at 717) has been disregarded. [By mainstream media. ]
'The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and
sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.' Ibid. COLUMBIA
BROADCASTING COM. v. 412 U.S. 94 (1973)(2). [Start exposing all of the deception contained in this book. ]
ULTIMATELY PRODUCE A MORE CAPABLE CITIZENRY AND MORE PERFECT UNION
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no State shall "abridg[e] the freedom of speech." See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1952) . Freedom of speech is "indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth," Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ... ." Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The First and Fourteenth Amendments remove
"governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity ... ." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). [***]
This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment "embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully all matters of public concern ... ." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940); see Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). CONSOL. EDISON CO. v. PUBLIC SERV. COM., 447 U.S. 530 (1980)(2).
ONLY WE THE PEOPLE CAN PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
We the People and our children hereby formally object to being illegally deceived into subjection outside the Constitution.
Shame on this one nation under God hypocritically falsely pledging Liberty and Justice for all (not just some).
Shame on all those who are in defiance of the Truth, Law, Liberty and Justice = the American way under God.
Shame on our servants (Judges) engaged in government deception stealing our freedom and property for pay.
Shame on all of the immoral, apathetic, conformists pretending to be Americans, doing little or nothing to help save America.
Break the Law to enforce their code? Utter hypocrisy and lawlessness.
ARE YOU TRULY FREE IN THE LAND OF THE FREE?

Justice SOUTER, with Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
For he is free that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself, because he that
can bind can release; and therefore he that is bound to himself only is not bound". SEMINOLE TRIBE OF
FLORIDA v. FLORIDA, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)(2). [You cannot unwillingly bind yourself to your rules-law. ]
ALL LAWS CONTRARY TO NATURAL REASON OR JUSTICE ARE VOID
C.J. Ingersoll, for the plaintiffs:
There is an implied contract between every state and every individual citizen of it, that all laws contrary to natural
reason or justice, are void. The English cases on this subject are collected in 1 Kent's Com. 420. LIVINGSTON v.
MOORE, 32 U.S. 469 (1833)(3). [Blackstone Commentaries: the law is 'perfect reasoning' or else it's not law. ]
WHERE THE REASON OF THE LAW FAILS, THE LAW CEASES TO OPERATE
HAMERSLEY, J. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut):
This consequent effect upon incidental rights plainly comes within the rule that, where the reason of the law fails,
the law ceases to operate. Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1; Hart v. Knapp, 76 Conn. 135. By our first legislation it was
enacted that justice should be administered according to the laws of this jurisdiction, "and for want thereof according
to the rule of the Word of God." 1 Col. Rec. pp. 21, 509; Revision 1672, Preface; Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day, 163,
190, 193, 194. MATHEWSON v. MATHEWSON, 79 Conn. 23 (1906)(1).
PERFECT JUSTICE: LAW = PERFECTION OF REASONING - IN A MORE PERFECT UNION UNDER THE PERFECT LAW OF GOD
ORLOFSKY, District Judge (United States District Court, D. New Jersey):
("The ideal of a judicial system is perfect justice. However, in a case where, as here, absolute precision in fixing
damages may not be attainable, we should not hesitate to seek essential justice. It would be a travesty to deny a
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plaintiff essential justice because the absence of means for precision precludes perfect justice."); Sandler v. Lawn-
A-Mat Chemical & Equip. Corp., 141 N.J.Super. 437, 454, 358 A.2d 805 (App.Div.1976). LITHUANIAN
COMMERCE CORP. LTD. v. SARA LEE HOSE. 219 F.Supp.2d 600 (2002)(3). [Perfection is their duty. ]
How they play the game of deception: The best way for government to lie is to mix in a little truth; the best way to do
injustice is to mix in a little justice; and the best way for government to be unaccountable is to mix in a little accountability etc.
DAVIDSON, J. (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas) dissenting: Truth is changeless and immortal-"The eternal
years of God's are hers." Ex parte FRANCIS, 72 Tex.Crim. 304 (1914)(4). [You cannot deny the Truth. ]
ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS TRUTH AND JUSTICE
In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed: "I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our
preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures are not the ultimate goals of our legal
system. Our goals are truth and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends... . "Truth and justice are
ultimate values, so understood by our people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of public
respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted from these goals." Ethics, Morality and Professional
Responsibility, 1975 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 591, 596.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs, dissenting. [***] see Ante, at 3050 n.
31; this is presumably because the "ultimate goal" of the criminal justice system is "truth and justice." E. g., ante, at
3050, and n. 30. STONE v. POWELL, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)(2). [Stop refusing to ascertain the whole Truth of the Law.]
I Thes. 5:15 See that none render evil for evil unto any man; but ever follow that which is good, both among yourselves, and
to ALL men. [Super Emphasis added! Especially in a more perfect Union.] Romans 1:18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven
against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; . . .
THEY KNOW HOW TO DO PERFECT JUSTICE AND COULD START AGAIN YESTERDAY
LOCKWOOD, Chief Justice (dissenting):
That the ideal of every system of law is the attainment of perfect justice in every concrete case which may arise is a
truism. MITCHELL v. VULTURE MIN. & MILL CO. 47 Ariz. 249 (1936)(1).
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO PREVENT INJUSTICE
Mr. Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the U.S.) delivered the opinion of the Court: Of the contention that the law
provides no effective remedy for such a deprivation of rights affecting life and liberty it may well be said--as in
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113--that it 'falls with the premise.' To deprive a citizen of his only effective
remedy would not only be contrary to the 'rudimentary demands of justice' but destructive of a constitutional
guaranty specifically designed to prevent injustice. JOHNSON v. ZERBST, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)(2).
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: Impeding or obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who have
duties or power of administering justice therein. People v. Ormsby, 310 Mich. 291. The act by which one or more
persons attempt to prevent, or do prevent, the execution of lawful process. The term applies also to obstructing the
administration of justice in any way-as by hindering witnesses from appearing. Melton v. Commonwealth 160 Ky.
642; People v. Hebbard, 162 N.Y.S. 80, 89. Any act, conduct, or directing agency pertaining to the pending
proceedings, intended to play on human frailty and to deflect and deter court from performance of its duty and
drive it into compromise with its own unfettered judgment by placing it, through medium of knowingly false
assertion, in wrong position before public, constitutes an obstruction to administration of justice. State v. Shumaker,
200 Ind. 623; Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S., 247 U.S. 402. (Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed. p. 1228.)
GREATEST SCOURGE AN ANGRY HEAVEN EVER INFLICTED ON A SINNING PEOPLE
WAS AN IGNORANT, A 'CORRUPT' OR A DEPENDENT JUDICIARY
The anxiety of the framers of the Constitution to preserve the independence especially of the judicial department is
manifested by the provision now under review, forbidding the diminution of the compensation of the judges of
courts exercising the judicial power of the United States. This requirement was foreshadowed, and its vital character
attested, by the Declaration of Independence, which, among the injuries and usurpations recited against the King
of Great Britain, declared that he had 'made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and
the amount and payment of their salaries.'
In framing the Constitution, therefore, the power to diminish the compensation of the federal judges was
explicitly denied, in order, inter alia, that their judgment or action might never be swayed in the slightest degree by
the temptation to cultivate the favor or avoid the displeasure of that department which, as master of the purse, would
otherwise hold the power to reduce their means of support. The high importance of the provision, as the
contemporary history shows, was definitely pointed out by the leading statesmen of the time. Thus, in the Federalist,
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No. 78, Hamilton said: 'The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution.' And in No. 79: 'Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support. *** In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will.' (The italics are in the original.)
Chief Justice Marshall, in the course of the debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829--1830 (pp.
616, 619), used the following strong and frequently quoted language: 'The Judicial Department comes home in its
effects to every man's fireside; it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not, to the last degree
important, that he should be rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or control
him but God and his conscience? *** I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest
scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a
dependent Judiciary.' [***]
'The propriety and necessity of the independence of the judges is evident in reason and the nature of their
office [Truth and Justice. ]; since they are to decide between government and the people, as well as between
contending citizens; and, if they be dependent on either, corrupt influence may be apprehended, sacrificing the
innocent to popular prejudice; and subjecting the poor to oppression and persecution by the rich. And this applies
more forcibly, to exclude a dependence on the legislature; a branch, of whom, in cases of impeachment, is itself a
party. *** For vain would be the precautions of the founders of our government to secure liberty, if the legislature,
though restrained from changing the tenure of judicial offices, are at liberty to compel a resignation by reducing
salaries to a copper. ***' O'DONOGHUE v. UNITED STATES, 289 U.S. 516 (1933)(2).
JUSTICE IS THE END OF GOVERNMENT - PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitution forms government, the preamble is the intent: to form a perfect Union, 'establish Justice' to secure Liberty.
GILLETT, J. (Supreme Court of Indiana): The law of the land or due process of law cannot be taken to be the very
act of legislation which wantonly deprives a person of his rights. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378. In Loan
Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 662, Mr. Justice Miller declared that there are rights in every free government
which are beyond the control of the state, and, in continuing, the learned judge said: "A government which
recognized no such rights-- which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the
absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power--is, after all, but a
despotism. It is true, it is a despotism of the many, of the majority, if you choose to call it so, but it is none the less a
despotism. It may well be doubted, if a man is to hold that he is accustomed to call his own, all in which he has
placed his happiness, and the security of which is essential to that happiness, under the unlimited dominion of
others, whether it is not wiser that this power should be exercised by one man than by many." [***]
The doctrine has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States that "every partial or private
law which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording remedies
leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and void." Cotting v. Kansas City, etc., Co., 183 U. S. 79, 22
Sup. Ct. 30. See, also, Cooley, Const. Lim. 559. [***] It was said by Marshall, C. J., in United States v. Nourse, 9
Pet. 8, 27: "An execution is the end of the law. It gives the successful party the fruits of his judgment." [***]
There is, and always will be, in every representative government, a struggle going on between the various
interests of society with reference to legislation. This but evinces the necessity for the existence of a co-ordinate
department of government, also acting under the responsibility of an oath, to determine, when called on to enforce
legislation, whether it operates unequally. Hamilton declared that: “It is of great importance in a republic not only
to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of
the other part. [***] Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be
pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.” 51 Federalist. McKINSTER v. SAGER, 163 Ind.
671 (1904)(1). [Amen. Justice is the very first object in the preamble in order to form a more perfect union. ]
ANTITHESIS TO PERFECT JUSTICE IS DESPOTISM BY DECEPTION
Justice BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
Unfortunately there are some who think that the way to save freedom in this country is to adopt the techniques of
tyranny. One technique which is always used to maintain absolute power in totalitarian governments is the use of
anonymous information by government against those who are obnoxious to the rulers. [***]
Recently Nikita Khrushchev is reported to have told the 20th Communist Party Congress that Stalin
violated: '*** all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws. 'Abritrary behavior by one person encouraged and
permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial
and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation. ' *** honest
Communists were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and revolutionary legality was gravely
undermined.' Department of State Press Release, June 4, 1956, pp. 8-9, 14; Washington Post & Times Herald, June
6, 1956, p. 11, cols. 1, 6. But the core of our constitutional system is that individual liberty must never be taken
away by shortcuts, that fair trials in independent courts must never be dispensed with. That system is in grave
danger. [***] The destruction of judicial protections for fair and open determinations of guilt is an essential to
maintenance of dictatorships. After the murderous purge of hundreds of German citizens Hitler said: 'If anyone
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reproaches me and asks why I did not resort to the regular courts of justice for conviction of the offenders, then all
that I can say to him is this: in this hour I was responsible for the fate of the German people, and thereby I became
the supreme Justiciar of the German people! '*** If people bring against me the objection that only a judicial
procedure could precisely weigh the measure of the guilt and of its expiation, then against this view I lodge my most
solemn protest. He who rises against Germany is a traitor to his country: and the traitor to his country is not to be
punished according to the range and the extent of his act, but according to the purpose which that act has revealed.'
Speech delivered by Hitler in the Reichstag on 13 July 1934, 1 Hitler's Speeches (Baynes ed. 1942), 321--323.
The Russian purges of the 1930's are reported to have been governed by a directive initiated by Stalin, which stated:
'I. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of acts
of terror. JAY v. BOYD, 351 U.S. 345 (1956)(2). [How true. That global disease is here and pandemic. ]
A COUNTERFEIT SYSTEM = IT'S ALL FRAUD

Liberty and Justice for all? Or abuse? Government deception is a perfect defense since it's all fraud = counterfeit.
Government fraud is to avoid ascertaining the whole Truth of the Law, and the antithesis to form a more perfect Union.
GOVERNMENT IS TO "ALWAYS" PROTECT PEOPLE AGAINST FRAUD

Justice GINSBURG (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: See, e.g., Donaldson
v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) (the government's power "to protect people against fraud" has
"always been recognized in this country and is firmly established"); ILLINOIS v. TELEMARKETING ASSOC.
INC., 538 U.S. 600 (2003)(3). [Citing Ref. 131 times 4/30/05. Defrauding us out of our profound sovereignty. ]
Mr. Justice WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
I submit that great principles of government rest upon solid foundations of truth and justice, and are not to be set at
naught and evaded by the mere confusion of words. SANFORD v. POE, 165 U.S. 194 (1897)(2).
ALL ACTS OF FRAUD ARE NULLITIES + ALL DESTROYING POWER + LEAVES DEATH ONLY
Deception is Satan's key weapon to circumvent the (whole) Truth.
Syllabus of the Hon. D. Glenn's opinion, prepared by himself: J. Winchester, on the same side.
Is it not a universal principle, that fraud vitiates every thing into which it enters? In Niles v. Anderson, 3 How.
(Miss.) R., Chief Justice Sharkey says, p. 386, "Any act, however solemn, even though it be a judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction, may be set aside if procured by fraud," and the cases cited by Clayton Counsel, p. 376,
abundantly make good the remark. Contracts, solemn assurances, judgments of courts, and even the statutes of the
land, have been impeached for fraud. [***]
Fraud vitiates every thing into which it enters. It is like the deadly and noxious simoom of arid and desert
climes. It prostrates all before its contaminating touch, and leaves death only and destruction in its train. No act,
however solemn, no agreement, however sacred, can resist its all-destroying power.
And, as we have shown above, all acts into which fraud enters are nullities. [***]
Fraud vitiates all contracts into which it enters, whether verbal, written, under seal, or of record; as well as
the records and judgments of courts. 3 Fost. N. H. R. 535.
"I know of no case," says Judge Story, "where fraud, if established by competent proofs, is not sufficient to
overthrow any judgment or decree, however solemn may be its form and promulgation." Bradstreet, &c., v. Neptune
Ins. Co. 3 Sum. R. 604. [***] That it is essential to the jurisdiction of this court to detect fraud, and prevent its
having its intended effect; and even formal judgments at law cannot resist its all-searching power, and when the
frauds on which they have been obtained are exposed, such judgments are decreed to be nullities." "If the discharge
was obtained by fraud or concealment, it was a mere nullity, like every other judgment or sentence of a court
obtained by fraud or surreptitiously." BUCKNER v. CALCOTE, 28 Miss. 432 (1855)(3).
I Thessalonians. 4:6 That no man go beyond and defraud his brother in any matter: because that the Lord is the avenger
of all such, as we also have forewarned you and testified. [The sons of God are all brothers. ]
FRAUD DESTROYS - NULLIFIES AND VOIDS - EVERYTHING

JUSTICE SWAYNE (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Fraud destroys the validity of every thing into which it enters. It affects fatally even the most solemn judgments
and decrees. Bankrupt Act, sect. 35; 1 Story's Eq., sect. 252; Freeman on Judgments, sect. 486. Whenever fraud is
perpetrated by one party to the injury of another, the offender is liable. Paisley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51; Benton v.
Pratt, 2 Wend. 385. NUDD ET AL v. BURROWS, 91 U.S. 426 (1875)(1). [Truth never dwells with fraud. ]
FRAUD VITIATES = DESTROYS = NULLIFIES AND VOIDS EVERYTHING
JUSTICE MILLER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
Mr. Wells, in his very useful work on Res Adjudicata, says, sect. 499: 'Fraud vitiates every thing, and a judgment
equally with a contract; that is, a judgment obtained directly by fraud, and not merely a judgment founded on a
fraudulent instrument; for, in general, the court will not go again into the merits of an action for the purpose of
266
detecting and annulling the fraud.' UNITED STATES v. THROCKMORTON, 98 U.S. 61 (1878)(2). [Jurors take
heed; fraud vitiates everything this counterfeit System of government (men) does to our injury. ]
FRAUD VITIATES ALL

Justice McLEAN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court.
Fraud vitiates all transactions. It makes void a judgment, which is a much more solemn act than the issuing of a
patent. STODDARD v. CHAMBERS, 43 U.S. 284 (1844)(2).
THE LAW ABHORS FRAUD
CALLAWAY, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Montana):
In the language of Lord Chief Baron Pollock in Rogers v. Hadley:
"Fraud cuts down everything. The law sets itself against fraud to the extent of breaking through almost every rule,
sacrificing every maxim, getting rid of every ground of opposition. The law so abhors fraud that it will not allow
technical difficulties of any kind to interfere to prevent the success of justice, right and truth." Variously reported
in 9 Law Times Reports, 292, 9 Jurist, 898, 32 L. J. Exch. 248. STATE v. DISTRICT COURT, 66 Mont. 496 (1923)
(1). [The American way in Order to from a more perfect Union under God. ]
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit):
"The law abhors fraud and perjury. It also abhors interminable litigation." Cole v. Chellis, 122 Me. 262, 119 A.
623, 624 (1923). LUNDBORG v. PHOENIX, 91 F.3d 265 (1996)(1).
Chief Justice BURGER (Supreme Court of the U.S.) delivered the opinion of the Court: [Apply to our status. ]
As long ago as Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), this Court made clear that deliberate deception of a
court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of
justice.' This was reaffirmed in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), we
said, '(t)he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected
when it appears.' Id., at 269, 79 S.Ct., at 1177. Thereafter Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 87, held that suppression
of material evidence justifies a new trial 'irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' [***] A new
trial is required if 'the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury
. . .' Napue, supra, at 271, 79 S.Ct., at 1178. GIGLIO v. UNITED STATES, 405 U.S. 150 (1971)(2).
FRAUD VITIATES WHATEVER IT TOUCHES
ELLIOTT, Presiding Judge (Court of Appeals of Kansas):
In Stegman v. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 744, 751, 252 P.2d 1074 (1953), the Supreme
Court held that parol evidence is permitted where a contract is procured or induced by fraud, explaining that "[f]raud
vitiates whatever it touches including final judgments and final orders as well as contracts." MILES
EXCAVATING INC v. RUTLEDGE, 23 Kan.App.2d 82 (1997)(2). [Government cannot subject us without fraud.]
FRAUD = ANYTHING MANKIND CAN DEVISE TO CHEAT ANOTHER
KELLOGG, J. (Court of Appeals of New York) dissenting:
Certainly the word 'fraud' or 'fraudulent' has not 'a technical or other special meaning.' Conduct may be fraudulent or
otherwise accordingly as we apply the standards of law or morality, of civil or criminal law, of the common law or
of equity. Thus, fraud is said to be 'any cunning, deception or artifice, used to circumvent, cheat or defraud another'
(Story, Eq. Juris. [14th Ed.] § 267); 'all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and other unfair way that is used to
cheat any one' (Willard, Eq. Juris. p. 147); 'a device by means of which one party has taken an unconscientious
advantage of the other ' (Jeremy, Eq. Juris. vol. 3, pp. 2, 358). It has been said that, 'It is impossible to separte deceit
or artifice from fraud; it is of the very essence of the fraud.' People v. Taylor, 4 Parker Cr. R. 158, 161. On the other
hand, it has been remarked: 'Fraud and dishonesty are synonymous terms;' 'an unjust man is a fraudulent one' (Ex
parte Clark, 20 N. J. Law, 648, 650, 45 Am. Dec. 394); 'bad faith and fraud are synonymous' terms (Stark v. Starr,
22 Fed. Cas. page 1084, No. 13,307); 'Fraud is not a fact,' but a 'legal epithet applied to such facts' (Tibbits v. Miller,
9 Okl. 677, 681, 60 P. 95, 96); 'Whatever is dishonest is fraudulent in foro conscientioe and is so treated in a court
of equity' (Ex parte Clark, supra). PEOPLE v. MANCUSO et al, 255 N.Y. 463 (1931)(3). [Depriving us of our
sovereign birthright by illegal government deception (false witness) to steal our Life, Liberty, and property-money. ]
FRAUD = ANYTHING CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN RULES OF COMMON HONESTY

O'SULLIVAN, Judge (Supreme Court of Connecticut):
"Cheat and defraud' include every kind of trick, device, artifice, deception, false representation and intimidation to
suppression and concealment of fact or information, used for the purpose of depriving another of his property or
other known right contrary to the plain rules of common honesty.' State v. Parker, supra, 114 Conn. 362, 158 A.
800. [***] Conspiracy can seldom be proved by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the activities of the
accused persons. State v. Faillace, 134 Conn. 181, 185, 56 A.2d 167. From the very nature of the crime, the corrupt
267
and usually secret agreement or understanding can only in rare instances be established otherwise than through the
use of circumstantial evidence. State v. Thompson, 69 Conn. 720, 726; State v. Spalding, 19 Conn. 233, 237.
STATE v. GERICH et al, 138 Conn. 292 (1951)(1). [Government forms and applications conspiracy. ]
FRAUD IS TO CONFIRM OR DENY ANYTHING IF YOU DO NOT KNOW WHETHER IT IS TRUE OR NOT
DUCKWORTH, Justice (Supreme Court of Georgia) (after stating the foregoing facts):
In the course of a carefully prepared opinion in an early case, Smith v. Mitchell, 6 Ga. 458, Judge Nisbet, speaking
for the court, said, 'If the fact is neither known to be true or false, the affirmation of its truth is, in morals a
falsehood, and in law a fraud. [***] One of the definitions of 'deceive' by Webster is, 'To lead into error; to cause to
believe what is false or disbelieve what is true; to impose upon.' BEAVERS v. WILLIAMS, 199 Ga. 113 (1945)(2).
[Apply to our servants, and people ignorantly swearing-signing government's forms and applications (scam). ]
MISLEADING: Delusive; calculated to lead astray or to lead into error. Diamond Drill Contracting Co. v. International
Diamond Drill Contracting Co. 106 Wash. 72, 179 P. 120, 122. (Black’s Law Dictionary 4 th Ed. 1151)
WHEN OUR SERVANTS SILENCE OR SUPPRESS THE WHOLE TRUTH TO OUR ASSENT = FRAUD
LOWE, Judge (Georgia Court of Appeals):
Silence is a species of conduct and constitutes an implied representation of the existence of the state of facts in
question, and the estoppel is accordingly a species of estoppel by misrepresentation. 16 Cyc. 681, note 10. [***]
16 Cyc. 681, note 10. When the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a
fraud upon the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other
to believe and act upon it, it will operate as an estoppel. GANLEY v. G., 44 Md.App. 568 (1980)(1).
ANY DEVIATION FROM PROBITY

Supreme Court of Ohio PER CURIAM (per curiam means: full court, en banc. ):
Webster defines 'dishonesty' as follows: 'Want of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; want of fairness and
straightforwardness; a disposition to defraud, deceive or betray; faithlessness, fraud; any deviation from probity.'
STATE ex rel FOXALL v. COSSAIRY, 146 Ohio St. 328 (1946)(3).
INTENT TO ILLEGALLY DECEIVE US INTO SUBJECTION
'Fraud.' said Mr. Justice CATRON, in Lord v. Goddard, 54 U.S. 198 (2), 'means an intention to deceive.' 'Where
one,' said SHIPLEY, C. J., in Hammatt v. Emerson, 27 Me. 308-326, 'has made a false representation, knowing it to
be false, the law infers that he did so with an intention to deceive.' 'If a person tells a falsehood, the natural and
obvious consequence of which, if acted on, is injury to another, that is fraud in law.' CLAFLIN v.
COMMONWEALTH CO. OF BOSTON, 110 U.S. 81 (1884)(2) . [Pretending to be the Government; illegally subjecting us
using deceptively similar names, words, and phrases without fair warnings or legal definitions on their forms etc. ]
Fraud connotes perjury, falsification, concealment, misrepresentation. KNAUER v. U.S., 328 U.S. 654, (1946)(2).
FRAUD = CONCEALMENT OR 'SUPPRESSION' OF THE 'WHOLE' TRUTH - OF THE LAW
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge (United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit):
See, e.g., Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888). The Supreme Court in Stewart
carefully explained why concealment is "equivalent to a false representation" and so appropriately forms the basis
for a common law fraud action: "the concealment or suppression is in effect a representation that what is disclosed
is the whole truth. The gist of the action is fraudulently producing a false impression upon the mind of the other
party; and if this result is accomplished, it is unimportant whether the means of accomplishing it are words or acts
of the defendant, or his concealment or suppression of material facts not equally within the knowledge or reach of
the plaintiff." 128 U.S. at 388; [***]. UNITED STATES of America v. COLTON, 231 F.3d 890 (2000)(2).
WHATEVER IS DISHONEST IS FRAUDULENT

JOHN C. HARRISON, Justice (Supreme Court of Montana):
Most certainly these acts could come within the legal definition of wilfulness and fraud as has been set down by
this court in the case of Waite c. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 132 Mont. 220, 315 P.2d 989, where the court said
quoting from Ex parte Clark, 20 N.J.L. 648, 45 Am.Dec. 394, 396, "Whatever is dishonest is fraudulent in foro
conscientiae and is so treated in a court of equity. Fraud and dishonesty are synonymous terms. *** "*** if he acts
unjustly and unlawfully, he acts fraudulently; an unjust man is a fraudulent one." CHRISTENSON v. HUNT, 147
Mont. 484 (1966)(1). [Essentially the whole System is dishonest failing to admit it's counterfeit. ]
DEFRAUD = ANYTHING CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN RULES OF COMMON HONESTY
268
HINMAN, J. (Supreme Court or Errors of Connecticut.):
State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 A. 559, 59 Am. Rep. 710; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. (45 Mass.) 111, 121, 123,
38 Am. Dec. 346; 12 Corpus Juris, pp. 557, 558. "Cheat and defraud' include every kind of trick, device, artifice, or
deception from false representation and intimidation to suppression and concealment of fact or information, used
for the purpose of depriving another of his property or other known right contrary to the plain rules of common
honesty.' State v. Parker, 43 N. H. 83, 85; 2 Words and Phrases, First Series, page 1107: 11 Corpus Juris, 747. "It
has become established that a conspiracy to defraud an individual is indictable by reason of the combination of
numbers [Members of government, Bar Association, IRS, Bankers etc.? ] to do the unlawful thing though the same
wrong actually accomplished by one of the conspirators alone would only be a civil injury, not a crime." "It is the
law of conspiracy that its purpose shall be to accomplish something either criminally or civilly unlawful, which
unlawful thing may be either the means or the end. And no lawyer ever denied that to cheat a man is at least a civil
wrong." 2 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th Ed.) ß ß 198, 202. "A conspiracy to cheat by force of combination, even in
a way which is not indictable, when designed and effected by an individual singly, adds to the cheating a quality
(that of reciprocity of support among the conspirators) which may make it indictable at common law, just in the way
that using false weights or tokens make a cheat indictable at common law, when, without such false weights or
tokens, it would not be so indictable. The playing of several persons into each other's hands may be, if not a false
token, in some measure a false pretense." 2 Wharton Cr. Law (11th Ed.) p. 1757. STATE v. PARKER, 114 Conn.
354, 158 A. 797 (1932)(2). [Pretending to be the government under false pretenses by a combination of 100% Federal
non-sovereign stateless persons. Honesty is the best policy? Honesty is the only policy! David Colton.]
GOVERNMENT AGENTS ARE BOUND TO DEAL IN GOOD FAITH WITH US - WE ARE ITS PRINCIPLES
Chief Justice FULLER (Supreme Court of the U.S.) after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court:
In his celebrated judgment in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 155, Lord HARDWICKE arranged all
the forms of fraud, recognized by equity, in four classes, the first two of which he gives in these words: '(1) Then
fraud, which is dolus malus, may be actual, arising from facts and circumstances of imposition, which is the plainest
case. (2) It may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself; such as no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other;
which are unequitable and unconscientious bargains; and of such even the common law has taken notice; for which,
if it would not look a little ludicrous, might be cited James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111.' [***]
In order to guard the public against losses and injuries arising from the fraud or mistake or rashness or
indiscretion of their agents, the rule requires of all persons dealing with public officers the duty of inquiry as to
their power and authority to bind the government; and persons so dealing must necessarily be held to a recognition
of the fact that government agents are bound to fairness and good faith as between themselves and their principal.
Whiteside v. U. S., 93 U. S., 247, 257; U. S. v. Barlow, 132 U. S. ----, ante, 77. HUME v. UNITED STATES, 132
U.S. 406 (1889)(2). [Illegally conspiring to deprive their principle of our sovereign birthright to steal is honest? ]
A fair trial for justice is only by ascertaining the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, by the Judge, Jury,
prosecutor, and defense counsel, thereby excludes all fraud, concealment, dishonesty, and of course, free of all governmental
deception regarding what you truly are (sovereign) and who the statute applies to (non-sovereigns) and they are outside the Law.
THE UNSHAKABLE FOUNDATION THAT TRUTH IS THE OBJECT = RELEVANT WHOLE TRUTH
Truth will ultimately prevail, where there are pains taken to bring it to light. George Washington.
DAVIS, Justice (Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia):

In fact, in Shaffer I the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the general duty of candor lawyers owe to courts. The
opinion held: Our adversary system for the resolution of disputes rests on the unshakable foundation that truth is
the object of the system's process which is designed for the purpose of dispensing justice. However, because no one
has an exclusive insight into truth, the process depends on the adversarial presentation of evidence, precedent and
custom, and argument to reasoned conclusions--all directed with unwavering effort to what, in good faith, is
believed to be true on matters material to the disposition. Even the slightest accommodation of deceit or a lack of
candor in any material respect quickly erodes the validity of the process. As soon as the process falters in that
respect, the people are then justified in abandoning support for the system in favor of one where honesty is
preeminent. GUM v. DUDLEY, 202 W.Va. 477 (1997)(1). [This case cites much more by many court cases. The
'whole' Truth free of all fraud and deceit for Justice. See the same quote in: UNITED STATES of America v. SHAFFER, 11
F.3d 450 (1993)(3); EAGAN v. JACKSON, 855 F.Supp. 765 (1994)(1); AUSHERMAN v. BANK OF AMERICA, 212 F.Supp.2d 435
(2002)(3); LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BOARD v. SCOTT, 213 W.Va. 209, 579 S.E.2d 550 (2003)(2). ]
THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF A TRIAL IS TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH - THE WHOLE TRUTH NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH
RITCHIE, District Judge (District Court, Territory of Alaska, Third Division):
The whole purpose of a law trial, criminal or civil, is to ascertain the truth. UNITED STATES v. RICH, 6 Alaska
670 (1922)(1). [Citing References 10 times, 4/30/05. Ascertain means to make certain. ]
TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH IS THE 'SINE QUA NON' OF A FAIR TRIAL
269
Justice BLACKMUN, BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
The "solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth ... is the sine qua non of a fair trial," Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 540 (1965). DARDEN v. WAINRIGHT, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)(2). [Citing Refs 3612 times, 4/30/05.]
Sine Qua Non is defined as an indispensable prerequisite, without which the thing cannot be done. So, ascertain the Truth
we are sovereigns (injuring no one) and the statutes of our non-sovereign artificial creature do not apply to We the People, or Citizens.
Ascertain the Truth about all government deception such as illegally converting the People from sovereigns to slaves; and our servants
are 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless U.S. citizens acting outside the Constitution intending to steal using code.
[Apply to Federal officials, IRS agents etc. ]: 18 USC 1621 Whoever -

(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United
States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any
written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such
oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section
1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to
be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is
made within or without the United States. [Apply this to false allegations etc. of charges attempted against you. ]
SUPPRESSIO VERI: Lat. Suppression or concealment of the truth. It is a rule of equity, as well as of law, that a
supressio veri is equivalent to a suggestion falsi; and where either the suppression of the truth or the suggestion of
what is false can be proved, in a fact material to the contract, the party injured may have relief against the contract.
Fleming v. Slocum, 18 Johns, N.Y., 405, 9 Am.Dec. 224; Turne v. Avery, 92 N.J.Eq. 473, 113 A. 710.
SUPPRESSIO VERI EXPRESSION FALSI: Supression of the truth is [equivalent to] the expression of what is false.
Addington v. Allen, 11 Wend., N.Y. 374, 417. (Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed. p. 1609)
SUPPRESSIO VERI SUGGESTIO FALSI: Supression of the truth is [equivalent to] the suggestion of what is false.
Paul v. Hadley, 23 Barb. N.Y. 521, 525. (Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed. p. 1609)
FOR CENTURIES THE HIGH FUNCTION TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH
Court proceedings are held for the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth which is the sine qua non of
a fair trial. Over the centuries Anglo-American courts have devised careful safeguards by rule and otherwise to
protect and facilitate the performance of this high function. ESTES v. STATE OF TEXAS, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (2).
[Luke 11:52 Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge. The truth makes everything else a lie.]
JUDGES OF BOTH THE LAW AND THE FACTS - SOLE INTEREST TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH
MOORE, Judge (Court of Special Appeals):
But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of
your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
'You are not partisans. You are judges-judges of the facts. (In criminal cases substitute the following: Since this is a
criminal case, you are judges-judges of both the law and the facts.) Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from
the evidence in the case.' (Emphasis added.) PINDER v. STATE of Maryland, 31 Md.App. 126 (1976)(2). [When
Trial 'by Jury' is not judging the Law and ascertaining the Truth = Despotism. ]
NO FRAUD IS MORE ODIOUS THAN AN ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT JUSTICE

No servant, judge, or lawyer is more odious than those who subvert justice pursuant to the Constitution.
Justice ROBERTS: No fraud is more odious than an attempt to subvert the administration of justice. HAZEL ATLAS
GLASS CO. v. HARTFORD EMPIRE CO, 322 U.S. 238 (1944)(4). [How true. Subverting justice by governmental
deception, and refusing to ascertain the whole truth we are sovereigns injuring no one is the epitome of hypocrisy. ]
JUDGMENTS (ARE SUPPOSED TO) IMPORT "ABSOLUTE" VERITY - [AND NO FRAUD]

Mr. Justice GRAY (Supreme Court of the United States) after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court:
In Bradstreet v. Insurance Co. (1839), in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, Mr.
Justice Story said: 'If a civilized nation seeks to have the sentences of its own courts held of any validity elsewhere,
they ought to have a just regard to the rights and usages of other civilized nations, and the principles of public and
national law in the administration of justice.' 3 Sumn. 600, 608, 609, Fed. Cas. No. 1,793. [***]
Judge Ware, in overruling the demurrer, said: 'Whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the binding force
of foreign judgments, all agree that they are not entitled to the same authority as the judgments of domestic courts of
general jurisdiction. They are but evidence of what they purport to decide, and liable to be controlled by counter
evidence, and do not, like domestic judgments, import absolute verity, and remain incontrovertible and conclusive
until reversed.' 2 Ware, 236, 239, 241, Fed. Cas. No. 2,178. HILTON v. GUYOT, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)(2).
270
Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: In the words of one 19th
century court, in damages suits against witnesses, "the claims of the individual must yield to the dictates of public
policy, which requires that the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and
unobstructed as possible." Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860). BRISCOE v. LaHUE, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
THE END OF LITIGATION IS JUSTICE - KNOWLEDGE IS ESSENTIAL TO JUSTICE
BREWER, J. (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
The end of litigation is justice. Knowledge of the truth is essential thereto. We believe that truth and justice are
more sacred than any personal consideration; and if in other cases, in the interests of justice, or from considerations
of mercy, the courts may, as they often do, require such personal examination, why should they not exercise the
same power in cases like this, to prevent wrong and injustice? UNION PAC. RY CO. v. BOTSFORD, 141 U.S. 250
(1891)(2). [Knowledge of the whole relevant truth of the Law is essential to ascertain the scams. ]
PURE JUSTICE
HARGRAVE, Vice Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Oklahoma): The Court quoting from an early encyclopedia said:
"The policy of the courts, is on the one hand to suppress fraud, and, on the other, not to encourage negligence and
inattention to one's own interests. The rule of law is one of policy. Is it better to encourage negligence in the foolish,
or fraud in the deceitful? Either course has obvious dangers. But judicial experience exemplifies that the former is
the less objectionable, and hampers less the administration of pure justice. The law is not designed to protect the
vigilant, or tolerably vigilant, alone, although it rather favors them, but is intended as a protection to even the
foolishly credulous, as against the machinations of the designedly wicked...." [our servant's engaged in our illegal
subjection by government deception? ] UPTEGRAFT v. DOME PETRO, 1988 OK 129 (1988)(1). [Leave us alone.]
Proverbs 8:36 All they that hate me love death. John 3:20 For every one that doeth evil hateth the light ; neither cometh to the light,
lest his deeds should be reproved. 3:21 But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they
are wrought in God. 3:34 For he whom God hath sent speatheth the words of God:
J. R. SWAN, J. (Supreme Court of Ohio) concurring: Once free, always free, except for the violation of law, is the
rule there and here. Rankin v. Lydia, 2 A. K. Marsh. 472. [***] If the parties will have judgment, 'fiat justitia, ruat
coelum;' let justice be done whatever be the consequence. ANDERSON V. POINDEXTER, 6 Ohio St. 622 (1856)(1).
Justice SCALIA, (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting: Fiat justitia, ruat coelum. Let justice be done,
though the heavens may fall. MORRISON v. OLSON, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)(2).
THOUGH THE HEAVENS FALL
The power, the right, the duty, to do justice, though the heavens fall, are constitutional attributes of the Federal
Courts that cannot constitutionally be whittled away in cases before them by denying to such courts the power to
find the truth. In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, text 60 the Court said: 'In cases brought to enforce constitutional
rights, the judicial power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent determination of all questions,
both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme function.' [***] Courts which were established for
the purpose of preventing injustice not only cannot prevent it, but must lend their offices to the commission of
injustices, as in the present case in reference to the discharged employee, Burleson Johnson, who, to approximately a
dozen employee witnesses, was an irresponsible, incorrigible worry-wart, but who, to the Examiner and the Board,
was a member of the Union and privileged to be all that these employees considered him to be, yet immune from
discharge. A finding by an examiner, [members of the Bar Association called Judges. ] whether arrived at carefully and
skillfully, or through incredible credulity, or simple stultification, should be deemed prima facie correct but should
never be substituted in place of the power which the people in their Constitution solemnly and surely committed to
their courts. C.A.5 1947. N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 161 F.2d 798 (C.A.5 1947)(3). [Bench = judicial
Judges of the established judicial Courts. Bar = Attorneys and Counselors at law ]
PARAMOUNT DUTY IS NOT TO WIN - BUT TO ENSURE THAT JUSTICE IS DONE. PERIOD!
Injustice = evading the whole truth of the Law then fine and imprison you for a victimless crime.
Before ELY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges U.S. Ct. of App., 9th Cir., and SOLOMON, District Judge. PER CURIAM:
Even if the United States Attorney's office were totally ignorant of the agents' activities and deceptions, the
Government still remained responsible for any and all of their actions. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, (1972).
The agents were nothing less than "an arm of the prosecutor." U. S. v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555(2d Cir. 1975). [***]
The Government, and particularly the United States Attorney's office, is charged not only with the duty to
prosecute the accused, but also with the paramount duty to ensure that justice is done. United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934). "(T)he interest of the prosecution is not that
it shall win the case, but that it shall bring forth the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime so that
justice shall be done ... ." Surely, conduct such as that indulged in here by the Government cannot in any imaginable
way promote the just administration of the laws in the United States, and, in fact, affirmatively obstructs the pursuit
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of justice, the very lofty mission with which the Government is charged. UNITED STATES of America v.
BUTLER, 567 F.2d 885. (1978)(2). [How true. Same quote in: 422 U.S. 806; 481 U.S. 787; ]
GOVERNMENT - GUILT SHALL NOT ESCAPE OR - SOVEREIGN INNOCENCE SUFFER
Government attorney is a 'servant of the law' – of the Constitution of the People.
In upholding the validity of Rule 23(a), we reiterate the sentiment expressed in Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88, that
the government attorney in a criminal prosecution is not an ordinary party to a controversy, but a 'servant of the law'
with a 'twofold aim *** that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.' SINGER v. U.S, 380 U.S. 24 (1965)(2).
DISMISS THE CASE AND LET US ALONE IF WE INJURED NO ONE

Justice CLARK (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:
Of course where enforcement of a non-disclosure policy deprives an accused of a fair trial it must either be
relaxed or the prosecution must be foregone. The Government is fully aware of this dilemma and solves it every
day by foregoing prosecutions in many cases where evidence essential to the defense would require disclosure.
ROVIARO, v. UNITED STATES of America, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)(2). [Our servants corruptly fail to disclose to the
jurors they are illegally subjecting us and their System-Code is 100% outside the Constitution and void. ]
Apply the following case to the prosecution not fully disclosing to the jury we are sovereigns, and their code statutes do not
apply to the people, and our 100% Federal non-sovereigns stateless servants are not the Government of the Constitution(s).
Justice BLACKMUN (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion of the Court except as to Part III:
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), this Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment." [***] The court noted: "In Davis v. Alaska, ... the Supreme Court held that the denial of the 'right of
effective cross-examination' was ' "constitutional error of the first magnitude" 'requiring automatic reversal." 719
F.2d, at 1464 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)) (emphasis added by Court of Appeals).
The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is not to displace the adversary
system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not
occur. [***] The Court has recognized, however, that the prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary: he "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88,
(1935). See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 87-88.
(fn 7). See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972). See also
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). [***]
"... But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless
his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." 427 U.S., at
108. [***] Impeachment evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. See Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Such evidence is "evidence favorable to an accused," Brady, 373 U.S.,
at 87 so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. [***]
This Court reversed the defendant's conviction, ruling that the direct restriction on the scope of cross-examination
denied the defendant "the right of effective cross-examination which ' "would be constitutional error of the first
magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it." Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3" ' " 415
U.S., at 318 quoting 678 Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968). Also U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting: I begin from the fundamental premise, which
hardly bears repeating, that "[t]he purpose of a trial is as much the acquittal of an innocent person as it is the
conviction of a guilty one." Application of Kapatos, 208 F.Supp. 883, 888 (SDNY 1962) ; see Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66, 98, (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in judgment) ("The State's obligation is not to convict, but to see that,
so far as possible, truth emerges"). When evidence favorable to the defendant is known to exist, disclosure only
enhances the quest for truth; it takes no direct toll on that inquiry. Moreover, the existence of any small piece of
evidence favorable to the defense may, in a particular case, create just the doubt that prevents the jury from
returning a verdict of guilty. The private whys and wherefores of jury deliberations pose an impenetrable barrier to
our ability to know just which piece of information might make, or might have made, a difference. [***]
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), of course, established this requirement of disclosure as a
fundamental element of a fair trial by holding that a defendant was denied due process if he was not given access to
favorable evidence that is material either to guilt or punishment. Since Brady was decided, this Court has struggled,
in a series of decisions, to define how best to effectuate the right recognized. To my mind, the Brady decision, the
reasoning that underlay it, and the fundamental interest in a fair trial, combine to give the criminal defendant the
right to receive from the prosecutor, and the prosecutor the affirmative duty to turn over to the defendant, all
information known to the government that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case.
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Formulation of this right, and imposition of this duty, are "the essence of due process of law. It is the State that tries
a man, and it is the State that must insure that the trial is fair." Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 809-810 (1972)
(MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [***] In a case of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct,
automatic reversal might well be proper. Certain kinds of constitutional error so infect the system of justice as to
require reversal in all cases, such as discrimination in jury selection. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
A deliberate effort of the prosecutor to undermine the search for truth clearly is in the category of offenses
antithetical to our most basic vision of the role of the state in the criminal process. [***] In both situations, the
prosecution's deliberate nondisclosure constitutes constitutional error--the conviction must be set aside if the
suppressed or perjured evidence was "material" and there was "any reasonable likelihood" that it "could have
affected" the outcome of the trial. 427 U.S., at 103. See Brady, supra, 373 U.S., at 88 ("would tend to exculpate");
accord, U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 874 (1982) ("reasonable likelihood"); Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S.
150, 154(1972)( "reasonable likelihood"); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272, (1959)("may have had an effect on
the outcome"). The combination of willful prosecutorial suppression of evidence and, "more importantly," the
potential "corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process" requires that result. 427 U.S.104, 106 [***]
Justice STEVENS, dissenting: This is not faithful to our statement in Agurs that "[w]hen the prosecutor receives a
specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable." 427 U.S., at 106. Such
suppression is far more serious than mere nondisclosure of evidence in which the defense has expressed no
particular interest. A reviewing court should attach great significance to silence in the face of a specific request,
when responsive evidence is later shown to have been in the Government's possession. Such silence actively
misleads in the same way as would an affirmative representation that exculpatory evidence does not exist when, in
fact, it does (i.e., perjury)--indeed, the two situations are aptly described as "sides of a single coin." Babcock, Fair
Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan.L.Rev. 1133, 1151 (1982) .
U.S. v. BAGLEY, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)(2). [How true. The whole truth is super important. ]
OUR SOCIETY ATTACHES SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO VIOLATING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Thus, as the Court has previously recognized, "over the long term, [the] demonstration [provided by the
exclusionary rule] that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to
encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate
Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 492. UNITED STATES v. LEON,
468 U.S. 897 (1984)(2). [4th Amendment Warrant. Get serious about violating our Constitutional birth-right. ]
HOW THE GAME IS PLAYED - THE STORY OF USURPATION - AND BOIL THE FROGS SLOWLY
MORRIS, J. (Supreme Court of Indiana) dissenting:
The history of the decline and fall of republics from the Grecian democracies to the time of the adoption of our
American Constitutions is a story of usurpation of power, growing from slight encroachments, increasing
gradually, sometimes by imperceptible advances; but each infringement furnishing an excuse for another
trespass, until the governmental structure either fell or became the citadel of arbitrary power. ELLINGHAM v.
DYE, 178 Ind. 336 (1912)(2). [They boil the sovereigns slowly and usurp because they cannot amend the Constitution.]
THE TEMPORARY SERVANTS EVENTUALLY DESTROY THE LAW AND GOVERN AS THEY PLEASE
NEIL, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Tennessee) concurring:
The last expression of the court on the subject is found in State v. Burrow, 119 Tenn. 376. [***] "Constitutions are
expressions of the sovereign will of the people, the fountain of all power and authority. The several departments
of the government are created and vested with their authority by them, and they must exercise it within the limits
and in the manner which they direct. The provisions of these solemn instruments are not advisory, or mere
suggestions of what would be fit and proper, but commands which must be obeyed. Presumably they are all
mandatory. Certainly no provision will be construed otherwise, unless the intention that it shall be unmistakably
and conclusively appears upon its face. The supremacy and permanency of republics depend upon the
maintenance of the fundamental law, in its integrity, as written in Constitutions adopted by the people; and it is the
solemn duty of all those temporarily vested with power, in all departments of the state, to do this. The necessities
of a particular case will not justify a departure from the organic law. It is by such insidious process and gradual
encroachment that constitutional limitations and government by the people are weakened and eventually
destroyed. It has been well said: "'One step taken by the Legislature or judiciary in enlarging the powers of
government opens the door for another, which will be sure to follow, and so the process goes on until all respect
for the fundamental law is lost, and the powers of government are just what those in authority please to make or
call them."' WEBB v. CARTER, 129 Tenn. 182 (1914)(1). [Same quote in 3 N.Y.547,567; 62 N.J. Super (1960). ]
EVIL MINDED RULERS - HOW TRUE IT IS
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment.
ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS 'TRUTH' AND JUSTICE
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In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed: "I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our
preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures are not the ultimate goals of our legal
system. Our goals are truth and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends... . "Truth and justice are
ultimate values, so understood by our people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of public
respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted from these goals." Ethics, Morality and Professional
Responsibility, 1975 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 591, 596.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs, dissenting: see Ante, at 3050 n. 31; this is
presumably because the "ultimate goal" of the criminal justice system is "truth and justice." E.g., ante, at 3050, and
n. 30. What possible justification then can there be for denying vindication of such rights on federal habeas when
state courts do deny those rights at trial? To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of
protecting society from law-breakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon
which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend.
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandies, J., dissenting). See also Id., at 483,
485. [***] See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-394
(1914). The Court asserts that "the hyperbole of the dissenting opinion is misdirected," Ante, at 3052 n. 37, but I
take seriously this Court's continuing incursions on constitutionally guaranteed rights. "(I)llegitimate and
unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations
from legal modes of procedure... . It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v. U. S., supra, 116 U.S. at 635. STONE v. POWELL, 428
U.S. 465 (1976)(2). [Stealthy gradual unconstitutional practices and encroachments. Every trick in the book. ]
GRADUAL DEPRECIATION OF OUR RIGHTS BY IMPERCEPTIBLE PRACTICE OF COURTS
Do not be deceived, their so called judges are the weapons of their System who most assuredly know how to play the game.
Officers are 'under' the law and the police-state where they are the law.
Justice JACKSON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law which he
personifies must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. Any other rule would undermine 'the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,' (fn8] and would obliterate one of the most
fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state
where they are the law. [At least for the moment the imposters are the law = mob rule = democracy–police state. ]
In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 302, 303, this Court said: 'It would not be possible to add to the
emphasis with which the framers of our Constitution and this court (in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, and in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385) have
declared the importance to political liberty and to the welfare of our country of the due observance of the rights
guaranteed under the Constitution by these two (Fourth and Fifth) Amendments. The effect of the decisions cited is:
That such rights are declared to be indispensable to the 'full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property'; that they are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty of
them is as important and as imperative as are the guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual
citizen--the right to trial by jury, to the writ of habeas corpus, and to due process of law. It has been repeatedly
decided that these amendments should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon
or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned,
but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.' JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES, 333 U.S. 10 (1947)(2).
The above are a few examples of their governmental deception they admitted to. A test to show who is dishonest is: cite the
law and see if they fail to give you an "appropriate response." They admitted 7 of their many ways used "in practice" to circumvent the
truth "in Law" to subject us by "deception":
1. Stealthy encroachment. (It's all stealthy deception)

2. Gradual depreciation. (Boil the sovereigns slowly)
3. Slight deviations. (deceptively similar names, words and phrases to that of the Law).
4. Silent approaches. (refuse to prove the whole truth of a matter, or deny the truth without reason).
5. Imperceptible practice of courts. (sustained or over ruled with no proof of the truth based on legal reasons).
6. Mistakenly overzealous, executive officers. (prosecutors etc.).
7. Governmental deception: From "sovereigns to slaves" under pretended government jurisdiction outside the Constitution.
Fraud = Any trick mankind can devise. Everything on the counterfeit or de facto side of government is a deceptively similar name to the
in Law side (de jure). To "appear" to do justice they pretend the ultimate goal is 'Truth' and Justice. Some of the imperceptible
practices of courts (judges and prosecutors) are: suppressing presumptions, such as you are acting as a business entity; a corrupt and
rude 'DENIED' is their response against your show of court case authority against their jurisdiction etc.; or they 'just say' your filings are
'frivolous' while failing to prove why you are supposedly wrong according to the Truth in Law; sustaining the prosecution's etc., or over
274
rule your objection etc. in front of the jury while failing to prove why; alleged 'ringers' (professional jurors) help fix the outcome of the
trial to sway the gullible, ignorant of the law and conforming jurors in favor of government; refusing to guarantee to do Justice by
ascertaining the whole Truth of the Law and the facts; the jurors do not actually find you guilty by a statement of the facts and law
found true, they merely say so and check a box(es) on a form. See if they deny you a full and fair trial by refusing to ascertain the whole
truth of the Law based on this treatise, thereby refusing to prove lawful jurisdiction, sic: Obstruction of Justice.
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are not injuring anyone, Let us alone!
MOST PEOPLE DON'T HAVE A CLUE ABOUT THE IMPERCEPTABLE PRACTICES OF JUDGES - PROSECUTORS
'Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it;
grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices... . (A)ll the apparatus and machinery of civil government,
all the processes of justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared detection. Among the
most dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal to justice.' Id., at App. 78. MITCHUM v. FOSTER, 407
U.S. 225 (1972)(2). [It is sickening when jurors say, We find the defendant guilty: with no facts for proof the Truth. ]
1997: WELL GROOMED IN THE 'ART' OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION

Many corrupt judges etc. are in concert disobeying the Law, engaged in fraud, perverting the truth to uphold the System.
Many dishonest judges exposed and convicted. Demand the judges etc. be indicted for obstruction of justice and fraud.
Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through "Operation Greylord," a labyrinthine
federal investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago. See United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (C.A.7 1995),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996); see generally J. Tuohy & R. Warden, Greylord: Justice, Chicago Style (1989).
Maloney served as a judge from 1977 until he retired in 1990, and it appears he has the dubious distinction of being
the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case. (fn 2) Before he was appointed to the bench, Maloney
was a criminal defense attorney with close ties to organized crime who often paid off judges in criminal cases.
App. 54-56; 81 F.3d 684, 696 (C.A.7 1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting) ("[B]y the time Maloney ascended to the bench
in 1977, he was well groomed in the art of judicial corruption"). Once a judge, Maloney exploited many of the
relationships and cconnections he had developed while bribing judges to solicit bribes for himself. For example,
Lucius Robinson, a bailiff through whom Maloney had bribed judges while in practice, and Robert McGee, one of
Maloney's former associates, both served as "bag men," or intermediaries, between Maloney and lawyers looking for
a fix. Two such lawyers, Robert J. Cooley and William A. Swano, were key witnesses against Maloney at his trial.
Maloney, supra, at 650-652.
(fn 2). Although apparently the first in Illinois, Maloney is not, unfortunately, the first American judge to be
convicted of taking bribes in murder cases. See, e.g., Ohio v. McGettrick, 40 Ohio App.3d 25 (1988); In re Brennan,
65 N.Y.2d 564 (1985). BRACY v. GRAMLEY, 520 U.S. 899 (1997)(2). [A few down and many Bar members to go.]
JUDGES CAN BE AS CORRUPT AND AS WICKED AS LEGISLATORS - TYRANTS

The opinion of BLACK, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Pennslyvania) was as follows:
There is nothing more easy than to imagine a thousand tyrannical things which the legislature may do, if its
members forget all their duties; disregard utterly the obligations they owe to their constituents, and recklessly
determine to trample upon right and justice. But to take away the power from the legislature because they may
abuse it, and give to the judges the right of controlling it, would not be advancing a single step, since the judges can
be imagined to be as corrupt and as wicked as legislators. Sharpless and Others v. The Mayor &c., of Philadelphia,
21 Pa. 147 (1853)(1). [We have been Surrounded by Enemies of Freedom for a long time. ]
SLIGHTEST APPEARANCE OF SANCTIONING ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT CONDUCT OPENLY INVITES
The conviction that 'all government is staffed by hypocrites.'
Justice BRENNAN, DOUGLAS and Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) join, dissenting:
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the
constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.' [***]
This Mapp summation crystallizes the series of decisions that developed the rule and with which today's
holding is plainly at war. For the first time, the Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital function of
the rule to insure that the judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct.
This rejection of 'the imperative of judicial integrity,' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960), openly
invites '(t)he conviction that all government is staffed by ... hypocrites, [engaged in governmental deception. ] (a
conviction) easy to instill and difficult to erase.' [***] When judges appear to become 'accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold,' Elkins v. United States, supra, 364 U.S., at 223, we
imperil the very foundation of our people's trust in their Government on which our democracy rests. [Distinguished
from our Constitutional Republic. ] [***] The judges who developed the exclusionary rule were well aware that it
embodied a judgment that it is better for some guilty persons to go free than for the police to behave in forbidden
275
fashion. U.S. v. CALANDRA, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)(2). [Judges and prosecutors are monsterous hypocrites? ]
ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT CONDUCT' IS HARDLY SANCTIONED
The dissent also voices concern that today's decision will betray "the imperative of judicial integrity," sanction
'illegal government conduct,' and even 'imperil the very foundation of our people's trust in their Government.' Post,
at 626. There is no basis for this alarm. 'Illegal conduct' is hardly sanctioned, nor are the foundations of the
Republic imperilled, by declining to make an unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule to grand jury
proceedings where the rule's objectives would not be effectively served and where other important and historic
values would be unduly prejudiced. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965); and cases cited supra, at 619--620. UNITED STATES v. CALANDRA, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)(2).
"THE PROMISE"
Doing justice without respect to government.
The promise which every free government makes to every free citizen.
THE GREAT AND GLORIOUS PRINCIPLE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE SOVEREIGN
WAITE, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of the United States):
And Chief Justice JAY, (p. 479:) 'The extension of the judiciary power of the United States to such controversies
appears to me to be wise, because it is honest, and because it is useful. It is honest, because it provides for doing
justice without respect to persons, and, by securing individual citizens as well as states in their respective rights,
performs the promise which every free government makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and protection. It is
useful, because it is honest; because it leaves not even the most obscure and friendless citizen without means of
obtaining justice from a neighboring state; because it obviates occasions of quarrels between states on account of the
claims of their respective citizens; because it recognizes and strongly rests on this great moral truth, that justice is
the same whether due from one man or a million, or from a million to one man; because it teaches and greatly
appreciates the value of our free republican national government, which places all our citizens on an equal footing,
and enables each and every of them to obtain justice without any danger of being overborne with the might and
number of their opponents; and because it brings into action and enforces the great and glorious principle that the
people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that fellow-citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be
degraded by appearing with each other in their own courts to have their controversies determined.' STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, 108 U.S. 76 (1883)(2). [The Supreme Law is the supreme promise via the
Government of the supreme sovereign people to secure our Liberty and Justice pursuant to the Constitution and Truth.]
NOR WILL THE PEOPLE OBEY THEM!
Congress' power, said John Steele at the North Carolina convention, was not to be used to allow Congress to create
rotten boroughs; in answer to another delegate's suggestion that Congress might use its power to favor people living
near the seacoast, Steele said that Congress 'most probably' would 'lay the state off into districts,' and if it made laws
'inconsistent with the Constitution, independent judges will not uphold them, nor will the people obey them.'
[Emphasis added. ] 4 Id., at 71. WESBERRY v. SANDERS, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)(2). [Implying the self governing
sovereigns decide for themselves if they will consent to just powers-laws (only) of their (corrupt) artificial creature or not.]
What to do?
PRAY, PRAY, PRAY, THEN PRAY SOME MORE AND INVOKE OUR RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
Imagine if the vast 'global' majority wake up to the invincible power of Truth and unite, and starting doing everything they
possibly can to conquer evil, enforcing the simple truth, No one has any legal right to do any wrong to any one on the planet (David
Colton). Therefore zero tolerance for government (men) corruption, deception, or oppression. Is it our labor, our money, our liberty,
our country, our freedom, and our right to be let alone, not the evil ruling elite's. Pray for God to destroy evil! For starters:
1. Pray to God for his perfect law of peace, truth, justice, mercy, and right to prevail: Resist and Reject: Let God destroy.
2. Pray to God for our servants to repent for all of their massive crimes, and that good will conquer evil.
3. Unite with others and our right to be let alone revolution and be totally prepared to 'defend' to the max.
4. Unite your friends and family and get peaceably active. There are many more Americans than the ruling elite.
5. Stay out of trouble and under their radar. Do not injure anyone, their rights, or property.
6. Invoke sovereign immunity and our right to be let alone. Do not consent, object, resist and reject and let God destroy.
7. Charge governmental deception and humbly prove everything and why.
8. Jury nullification. Saved by 'American' jurors, they are freedom loving heroes not U.S. zeros.
9. Obedience to the Truth only. Plus defund the beast or fund your prisons.
10. Zero tolerance for government corruption, imperfection, oppression, fraud, and lawlessness etc. Resist and Reject.
FIAT JUSTITIA
FICTIO CEDU VERITATI. FICTIO JURIS NON EST UBI VERITAS. FICTIO LEGIS INIQUE OPERATUR ALICUI DAMNUM VEL INJURIAM.
THINK GLOBAL FREEDOM FROM DESPOTIC NEW WORLD ORDER = BONDAGE BY EVIL TYRANNICAL MEN
Mark 8:36 For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?
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DRAWING THE LINE IN THE SAND WHICH SIDE OF THE TRUTH, CONSTITUTION, AND THE LAW ARE YOU ON?
Eccles. 12:13 Let us hear the conclusion of the whole: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man. 12:14
For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil. Ephesians 6:11 Put on
the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. 6:12 For we wrestle not against flesh and blood,
but against principalities, against powers, against rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places. 6:13
Wherefore take unto you the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to withstand in the evil day; and having done all, to stand. 6:14
Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness; 6:15 And your feet shod with
the preparation of the gospel of peace: 6:16 Above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery
darts of the wicked. 6:17 And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God. 6:18 Praying always
with all prayer and supplication in the Spirit, and watching thereunto with all perseverance and supplication for all saints; ... .
CORRUPT GOVERNMENT = CORRUPT MEN AT WAR WITH THE TRUTH AND ORDER OF THINGS IN OUR MORE PERFECT REPUBLIC
The established 'Order of things' is super important. Simply put the supreme sovereign people of the United States are the
profound 'Creators' of government a subordinate 'artificial creature of Law' of our written Constitutions. The exercise of sovereign
power and 'right of jurisdiction' are controlled by the 'Order of things.' Hence, our inferior creature cannot rule over its superior
supreme sovereign creator, and that is why our 'servants' illegally conspire to 1 st deceive their supreme sovereign masters and creators
into vastly inferior non-sovereigns, via government's illegal forms and applications scam to oppress us without legal right, or just cause.
ALWAYS A STRONG CURRENT AGAINST THE "ORDER OF THINGS"

Let a State (government-our artificial creature) be subordinate to the People (the supreme sovereign power).

Man, fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator: A State; useful and valuable as
the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its acquired
importance. When I speak of a State as an inferior contrivance, I mean that it is a contrivance inferior only to that,
which is divine: Of all human contrivances, it is certainly most transcendantly excellent. It is concerning this
contrivance that Gicero says so sublimely, 'Nothing, which is exhibited upon our globe, is more acceptable to that
divinity, which governs the whole universe, than those communities and assemblages of men, which, lawfully
associated, are denominated States'. Som, Sup. c. 3.
Let a State be considered as subordinate to the People: But let every thing else be subordinate to the State.
The latter part of this position is equally necessary with the former. For in the practice, and even at length, in the
science of politics there has very frequently been a strong current against the natural order of things, and an
inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to the means. As the State has claimed precedence of
the people; so, in the same inverted course of things, the Government [Officers. ] has often claimed precedence of
the State; and to this perversion in the second degree, many of the volumes of confusion concerning sovereignty
owe their existence. The ministers, dignified very properly by the appellation of the magistrates, have wished, and
have succeeded in their wish, to be considered as the sovereigns of the State. This second degree of perversion is
confined to the old world, and begins to diminish, even there: but the first degree is still too prevalent, even in the
several States, of which our union is composed. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)(4). [How true it is, our
inferior servants (men) have become our masters by illegal government deception to oppress us. ]
INVERTED MANNER OF TEACHING AND THINKING, FORMS KINGS TO BE TYRANTS = TYRANICAL MEN
I have already remarked, that in the practice, and even in the science of politics, there has been frequently a strong
current against the natural order of things; and an inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to
the means. This remark deserves a more particular illustration. Even in almost every nation, which has been
denominated free, the state has assumed a supercilious preeminence above the people, who have formed it: Hence
the haughty notions of state independence, state sovereignty and state supremacy.
In despotic Governments, the Government has usurped, in a similar manner, both upon the state and the
people: Hence all arbitrary doctrines and pretensions concerning the Supreme, absolute, and incontrolable, power
of Government. In each, man is degraded from the prime rank, which he ought to hold in human affairs: In the
latter, the state as well as the man is degraded. Of both degradations, striking instances occur in history, in politics,
and in common life. One of them is drawn from an anecdote, which is recorded concerning Louis XIV. who has
been stiled the grand Monarch of France. This Prince, who dissused around him so much dazzling splendour, and
so little vivifying heat, was vitiated by that inverted manner of teaching and of thinking, which forms Kings to be
tyrants, without knowing or even suspecting that they are so. The oppression, under which he held his subjects
during the whole course of his long reign, proceeded chiefly from the principles and habits of his erroneous
education. By these, he had been accustomed to consider his Kingdom as his patrimony, and his power over his
subjects as his rightful and undelegated inheritance. Chisholm vote State of Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)(4). [It is
always evil men (tyrants) reigning needless oppression on the people by perverting the law by deception to steal. ]
THE TRUTH OF THE LAW = LIBERTY AND JUSTICE - YOU ARE EITHER FOR IT, OR AGAINST IT
Unite the clans in defiance of tyranny and peacefully CONQUER EVIL with the invincible power of Truth.
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Ecclesiastes 1:17 And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly; I perceived that this also is vexation of spirit.
1:18 For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.
UNHOLY - GODLESSNESS - DECEIVERS
Are you angry that evil men have illegally enslaved us by government deception to steal our property and freedom in the Land of
the Free in a more perfect union under God? Love your enemies hate what they do. Read II Timothy 3:1-17
INVOKE OUR SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE TO KEEP FROM BEING THE SLAVES OF MEN
'*** A tyrannical government calls everybody a traitor who shows the least unwillingness to be a slave. The party
in power never fails, when it can, to stretch the law on that subject by construction, so as to cover its honest and
conscientious opponents. [***] Those men who think we can be subjected and abjected to the condition of mere
slaves are wholly mistaken. The great race to which we belong has not degenerated so fatally. S.W.
WASHINGTON v. FENDER, 21 Wash.2d 349 (1944)(1). [Were back, and locked and loaded with the Truth. ]
IGNORANCE IS THE WEAPON - OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AIKENS, J. (Supreme Court of Vermont ) delivered the opinion of the Court:
The doctrine that all powers are originally in the government, and that the people by their charters and their
constitutions have abridged and limited those powers, is fit only for those countries where the ignorance of the
people is the weapon by which lawless power maintains her throne. The axiom, that the sovereignty is in the
people, is a political truth, on which every free and rational government is founded. BATES v. KIMBALL, 2
D.Chip. 77 (1824)(1). [The whole world is governed by Law, are you suspicious why the People are ignorant of the Law? ]
The ruling elite's weapon of mass destruction is stealthy 'deception' ruling the imprudent through 'fear and ignorance'
without hardly firing a shot. If it was not for the writ of truth in the holy scripture, the reality is so satanic it could drive you mad. Try to
comprehend how a 'whole country of supreme sovereigns' in the Land of the Free accountable to God alone could shamefully reject
knowledge and swear they are stateless slaves of their servants acting outside the Law in a more 'perfect' Union under God.
IS AMERICA BEING PUNISHED FOR REJECTING GOD = GODLESSNESS?

Proverbs 18:15 The heart of the prudent getteth knowledge; and the ear of the wise seeketh knowledge. II Chron. 7:14 If my people,
which are called by my name, shall humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways; then I will hear
from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land. Hosea 4:6 My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge: because
thou has rejected knowledge, I will also reject thee, (***) : seeing thou hast forgotten the law of thy God. I will also forget thy children.
4:7 As they were increased, so they sinned against me: therefore will I change their glory into shame.
I CHANGE THEIR GLORY INTO SHAME
In the Land of the Free can there be more 'glory' than being a supreme sovereign in a more perfect Union under God with
sovereign immunity and the right to be let alone? And can there be more 'shame' than you destroying yourself by foolishly rejecting
knowledge, then falsely 'swear' you are a never created in law, 'United States citizen' a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless-taxpayer-
slave' under your servant's' despotic control outside the Constitution? If that is not prophecy fulfilled, what is? Revelations 18:4 And I
heard another voice from heaven, saying, Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of
her plagues. We all know things are wrong, get active and help free the people from NWO bondage. The more you know the truth of
the Law, the more your mind will open your eyes to see the deception cloaking their lies. Learn the Law and fight for Truth, Liberty and
Justice for all. It's the mother of all games. United, injustice can be conquered by the mighty hand of the people, who shall know the
truth according to the perfect word of God. We are surrounded by ENEMIES OF FREEDOM, become a sword of Truth, because good
must conquer evil with eternal vigilance. Be a part of the solution not the problem.
"If ye love Wealth better than Liberty, the Tranquility of servitude better than the animating contest of FREEDOM,
go home from us in peace. We ask not your counsel or your arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed
you. May your chains set lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." Samuel Adams
Do you believe We the People (injuring no one) in their pursuit of Happiness intended to not be as free as possible in the Land of
the Free in a more perfect Union under God? And instead intended our servants (mere men) could make us do whatever they want
and 'it's the Law'? And our servants do not have to secure the people in Order to form a more perfect Union after suffering a long train
of abuse and usurpation causing the bloody Revolution? The apathetic, and those who do not want you (injuring no one) to be Free in
the Land of the Free, do not love the Truth. Hence, II Thes. 2:11 God sends you strong delusion so you believe a lie.
We must obey the Law but our servants don't? That is the very definition of absurd hypocrisy. Thank God for the knowledge
herein so we can spread the invincible power of Truth for Liberty and Justice for all, not just some or those who work for it.
HEAVEN ON EARTH
Envision our future as a monumental time, a time when we are uniting to create an insurmountable
momentum for the good of humanity. For, what is a man who maketh not the world a better place? David Colton.
SERVANTS STOP STEALING AND NEEDLESSLY ABUSING AMERICANS BY ILEGAL GOVERNMENT DECEPTION
If our servants bound by Oath to obey the Law will stop defrauding us they will stop stealing. With less revenue government
will naturally decrease and mellow out providing much more liberty and prosperity in the Land of the Free.
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CRIMEN LESOE MAJESTATIS
TREASON, THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF DESTROYING THE SOVEREIGN
At the time the Constitution was adopted, treason, or the crimen lesoe majestatis the crime of destroying the
sovereign, had a definite technical meaning. THE STATE v. HUNT, 20 S.C.L. 1 (1834)(1).
LAESA MAJESTAS: Lat. Leze-majesty, or injured majesty; high treason. It is a phrase taken from the civil law, and
acnciently meant any offense against the king’s (sovereign) person or dignity. (Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed.)
Circuit Court D. Pennslyvania: Judge WILSON, Judge IREDELL, Judge PETERS (all of the supreme Court of the
U.S.) charged the jury as follows: Nothing is more inconsistent with the duty of a citizen than treason; but it is
because he still continues a citizen that he is liable to punishment. HENFIELDS CASE, 11 F.Cas. 1099 (1793)(1).
Judge Chase: The court are of the opinion, that if a body of people conspire and mediate an insurrection to resist or
oppose the execution of any statute of the United States by force, that they are only guilty of a high misdemeanor;
but if they proceed to carry such intention into execution by force, that they are guilty of treason of levying war,
and the quantum of the force employed neither lessens nor increases the crime-whether by one hundred or one
thousand persons is wholly immaterial [see Vigol v. Mitchell (1795) ]. Fries, 9 F.Cas. 924, 930, 931 (1800). [They use
armed law enforcement against the sovereigns injuring no one with the right to bear arms in self defense. ]
MARSHALL, Chief Judge (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
To prevent the possibility of those calamities which result from the extension of treason to offences of minor
importance, that great fundamental law which defines and limits the various departments of our government has
given a rule on the subject both to the legislature and the courts of America, which neither can be permitted to
transcend. 'Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort.' [***] It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty
of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his county. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a
body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who
perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in
the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men for the
treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war. Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the
subversion by violence of those laws and those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace
and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment because they have not ripened into treason. [***] To complete
the crime of levying war against the United States, there must be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of
executing a treasonable design. In the case now before the court, a design to overturn the government of the United
States in New-Orleans by force, would have been unquestionably a design which, if carried into execution, would
have been treason, and the assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of carrying it into execution would amount
to levying of war against the United States; but no conspiracy for this object, no enlisting of men to effect it, would
be an actual levying of war. [***] Judge Chase, in the trial of Fries, was more explicit. He stated the opinion of the
court to be, 'that if a body of people conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of any
statute of the United States by force, they are only guilty of a high misdemeanor; but if they proceed to carry such
intention into execution by force, that they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force
employed, neither lessens nor increases the crime: whether by one hundred, or one thousand persons, is wholly
immaterial.' 'The court are of opinion,' continued Judge Chase, on that occasion, 'that a combination or conspiracy to
levy war against the United States is not treason, unless combined with an attempt to carry such combination or
conspiracy into execution; some actual force or violence must be used in pursuance of such design to levy war; but
it is altogether immaterial whether the force used is sufficient to effectuate the object; any force connected with
the intention will constitute the crime of levying war.' EX PARTE BOLLMAN, 8 U.S. 75 (1807)(2).
GOVERNMENT'S FORMS AND APPLICATIONS SCAM THEIR UNDENIABLE WRITTEN CONFESSION PRESCRIBED BY LAW
Making their subjection scam and counterfeit System composed of 100% Federal stateless non-sovereigns undeniable.
Their Forms and Applications are made in pursuance of their code statutes, therefore they undeniably self incriminate them!
Felony Fraud = There are no forms or application for We the People to sign as We the sovereign people. Forcing us to be liars!
Universal System of Federalism status = 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status.
All Federal status: "citizen of the United States" = All 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless officials outside the Constitution.
Find their forms and applications and corresponding code statutes of your state. Forcing us to be liars and slaves.
Alaska Statute 11.81.900 (30) "identification document" means a paper, instrument, or other article used to establish the identity
of a person; "identification document" includes a social security card, driver's license, non-driver's identification, birth
certificate, passport, employee identification, or hunting or fishing license; [Find the same in your Fed state code statutes.]
1. Social Security number: Only for a stateless United States citizen (or alien) See 42 USC 405 et seq (Social Security Act of
Congress Which Article 1 power of Congress? (Rules for Government, or Commerce?)); 42 CFR 422. CFR Sec. 422.107 Evidence
requirements (a) General. An applicant for an original social security number card must submit documentary evidence that the
Commissioner of Social Security regards as convincing evidence of age, U.S. citizenship or alien status, and true idenity. These are
not substantive regulations therefore for (government) employees said in the title. Fed prisoner-slave number. Mark of the Beast?
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2. Voter's Registration: Only for a 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless 'citizen of the United States' as a mere 'resident' of the
state. See 42 USC 1973gg National Voter's Registration act for the non-sovereign Nation under God. See your constitution and
statutes: Art. V, sect. 1 of Alaska Constitution; Voter qualifications AS 15.05.010, 6 AAC 25.510. Cissna v. Stout, 931 P.2d 363
(Supreme Court of Alaska, 1996). (What Art. 1 power of Congress?) The non-sovereign stateless voter-slaves elect their slave status
non-sovereign stateless officers. No dejure Congress, Executive, or Judiciary, of the Federal System, hence, in Code opposed to
the Law of the Land pursuant to the Constitution of the sovereign people.
3. Birth Certificate:. Pub. L. 108-458, title VII, Sec. 7211(a)-(d), Decc. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3825-3827, only for a stateless 'citizen or
national of the United States.' See 5 USC 22 et seq. sec. 301 et seq. and A.S. 18.50.165 et seq.] (Pursuant to which Article 1
power?). Alaska Statute 18.50.162 requires Social Security number of parents. Birthed into bondage.
4. Jury Pool: (2). AS 09.20.010. Only for a stateless 'citizen of the United States' as a mere 'resident' of the state (resident = a
transient, not a citizen of the state). Confirmed by CARTER et al v. JURY COMMISSION OF GREENE CTY., 396 U.S. 320 (1970). Trial by a
jury of your subjected 100% non-sovereign stateless Federal peers, residents no legal status tie of the state.
5. Permanent Fund Dividend: For a 'United States citizen' as a mere 'resident' of the state. See AS 43.23.005(a),15 AAC 23.213.
See State Dept. of Revenue v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58 (Supreme Court of Alaska 2001).
6. Licenses: For 'United States citizens.' All licensing is under act of Congress - Art. 1 commerce clause, acting as a business entity
pretending to be engaged in U.S. commerce and trade; STATE OF ALASKA acting as a Federal (U.S.) corporation in a foreign trade
zone, see AS 45.77.020(3)); see U.S. 'driver license' for your STATE: 42 USC 666 [See herein Tenison v. State, 38 P.3d 535 Alaska
Court of Appeals 2001 herein]; 7 AAC 05.600; Requirement of Marriage License; 2 AAC 90.420. Application for driver's License,
and all other Licenses. All licenses require social security number which is 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless person status.
7. U.S. Passport: Only for a stateless 'United States citizen.' See 22 USC 212 et seq.
8. Criminal Arrest Tracking Number of subject: See 13 Alaska Administrative Code 68.905
9. Proof of identification to run for Office: Office of the President, Congress, etc.; Office of the Governor, state legislature, Judges
etc., require Social Security number, and or driver license. See STATE handbook for running for public office. All are 100% Federal
non-sovereign stateless persons who have a Social Security number, Driver License, and registered Voters etc., and for sure all are
elected by 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless persons, all mere citizens of U.S. located in D.C. the one Nation under fraud
indivisible without Liberty and Justice for all; (stateless = not a citizen of any state).
10. Federal Income Taxpayer: The Social Security number is required on all tax forms, bank accounts, credit cards, ad nausea and
is only for a stateless citizen of the United States, and alien/foreigner, although the IRS liability statute deceptively cites 'person'.)
11. Bar Association: AS O8.08.137 Fingerprints; Social Security Number. The Board of Governors shall require an applicant for
admission to be fingerprinted and to provide the applicant's social security number.
12. Basic booking information: Social security number, and driver’s license number. Smith v. State 992 P.2d Alaska App. 1999.
13. Militia of the United States: 10 U.S.C. §311 Organized + unorganized National Guard and Naval Militia = citizen of the U.S.
18 USC § 1028. Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features,
and information (a) Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (c) of this section -
(1) knowingly and without lawful authority produces an identification document, authentication feature, or a
false identification document; [***]
(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) of this section is-
(1) except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 15
years, or both, if the offense is-
(A) the production or transfer of an identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document
that is or appears to be -
(i) an identification document or authentication feature issued by or under the authority of the United States; or
(ii) a birth certificate, or a driver’s license or personal identification card; ***
(d)(6) the term “issuing authority”- [They disregard ensuring the elementary Truth about our true status. ]
(A) means any governmental entity or agency that is authorized to issue identification documents, means of
identification, or authentication features; and
(B) includes the United States Government, a State, a political subdivision of a State, a foreign government, a
political subdivision of a foreign government, or an international government or quasi-governmental organization;
(d)(7) the term “means of identification” means any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with
any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any-
(A) name, social security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification
number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number; ***
(d)(8) the term “personal identification card” means an identification document issued by a State or local
government solely for the purpose of identification;
(f) Attempt and Conspiracy. - Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this section shall
be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the
attempt or conspiracy.
APPLY THIS TO ALL OFFICIALS, WELFARE RECIPIENTS, "JURORS" AND JUDGES ETC. WHO FALSELY SWEAR FOR PAY
18 USC 911. Citizen of the United States:
Whoever falsely and willfully represents himself to be a citizen of the United States shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both. [Felony Crime. ]
18 USC § 1015. Naturalization, citizenship or alien registry
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(f) Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or claim that he is a citizen of the United States in order to
register to vote or to vote in any Federal, State, or local election (including an initiative, recall, or referendum) -
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. [Felony Crime. ]
Most of this one Nation's officials (president, governor, judges, lawyers etc.) falsely swear they are citizens of the United States for
election and pay. They have a Soc. Sec. #, driver license, voter registration etc. If the People sign a government form or application that
has a different status on it than what they are that makes them liars, plus slaves. (No forms for the People to sign as the People!)
GOVERNMENT IF NOT A PERFECT AGENT OF THE PEOPLE IS LAWLESS USURPATION

Super true and important. Continually trying to govern towards perfection and truth cannot be over emphasized.
Our servants are to continually strive towards perfection only; anything contrary is against the true intent of the people.
The distinction between free self-government based on the sovereignty of the people from despotism!

The state itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible, immutable. The government is an agent, and, within the
sphere of the agency, a perfect representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation.
This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government. To deny it or blot it out obliterates
the line of demarcation that separates constitutional government from absolutism, free self-government based on
the sovereignty of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or the many, which enables the agent of the
state to declare and decree that he is the state; to say 'L'Etat, c'est moi.' Of what avail are written constitutions,
whose bills of right, for the security of individual liberty, have been written too often with the blood of martyrs shed
upon the battle-field and the scaffold, if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed with
impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce them; and that, too, with the
sacred authority of law, not only compelling obedience, but entitled to respect? And how else can these principles
of individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties
upon individual offenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenever they interpose the shield of the state? The
doctrine is not to be tolerated. The whole frame and scheme of the political institutions of this country, state and
federal, protest against it. Their continued existence is not compatible with it. It is the doctrine of absolutism, pure,
simple, and naked, and of communism which is its twin, the double progeny of the same evil birth. POINDEXTER
v. GREENHOW, 114 U.S. 270 (1855)(3). [Continually strive towards perfection based on the (whole) Truth. ]
Google: Governor Sarah Palin (Parnell-Lt. Gov.) promised 'corruption free government' and pledged to 'crush corruption,' and swore
into office with her hand on the Holy Bible to support and defend the Constitution (amplifying) 'So Help me God!'
Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. Voltarire
Remember Supreme Court interpretations may not be disregarded. Demand, if they can, to prove the Supreme Court case
authority herein are incorrect, else they stand as the Truth uncontested and it's the Law that shall make you free. Remember, our non-
sovereign stateless government servants have no (sovereign) right to govern (that says it all) in their 'System of Federalism' acting
outside the Constitution, and scheming by illegal government deception to subject innocent Americans (injuring no one) into acting as
a subjected 100% Federal non-sovereign stateless business entity, without power under the Constitution and lawful authority from the
people to deprive us of our sovereign birthright. Their statutes fail to define We the People (much less fully) by clear and
unquestionable authority of Law. Woe unto ye Lawyers! you take away the key of knowledge. The People never intended to enslave
any Citizen or free man in Order to form a more perfect Union to secure the Blessings of Liberty.
Today’s outlaw code system uses a 'motion' of a party for an order. A motion is a mere 'request', so I 'object' to any motion I
do not like and demand my adversary prove they have a 'legal right' (prescribed by law) for whatever they are requesting. In Law you
'demand your legal rights' to be enforced and move the court with a Writ, distinguished from a mere motion-request.
One of the biggest frauds is, we are accused by mere 'conclusory opinions' (w/o 'facts') much less proof the facts are true. A
fact has physical elements something you did or did not do, (act or omission to act) with circumstances describing particular things you
did, or did not do, with the date, time, place etc. Example: You are a liar! (How I handle that opinion): Denied! Based on what? You
stated no facts much less proof of the Truth of your opinion, so I charge you with fraud and obstruction of justice.
People should not fear their government, crooked government (men-elite) should fear the wrath of a needlessly abused
armed people under God. Unite with the invincible power of Truth, we are surrounded by enemies of freedom and good must conquer
evil. The next time you hear this so called government (composed of non-sovereign stateless officials) arrogantly claim "it's the Law!"
maybe you will stop and think about the true intent of We the People the source of all (lawful) government, power, law, and
jurisdiction was to form a more perfect Union and anything else is lawless usurpation. Code is used to over throw the Law.
Servants refusing to do justice via illegal government deception.
Proverbs 21:7 The violence of the wicked will destroy them, because they refuse to do justice.
Love our servants, but hate what they do. Hating the unrighteous things they do is a natural and proper emotion.
LAW HAS REACHED ITS FINEST MOMENTS WHEN IT HAS FREED MAN - FROM UNRIGHTEOUS MEN
Justice MARSHALL (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring in the judgment: "Law has reached its finest
moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler, some civil or military official, some
bureaucrat." United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951). HECKLER v. CHANEY, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
[Imperfect human law, the biggest revenue scam in the history of the world. The law is not for the righteous. ]
BRINKERHOFF, J., (Supreme Court of Ohio) concurring:

281
From the declaration of independence until very recently, it was never questioned that, in the United States, a person
once legally free is always free. The doctrine has been regarded as a part of American common law. Courts have
differed as to facts which constitute a title to freedom, but have, almost with one mind, concurred in the doctrine
that no man once free can be again enslaved except for crime. ANDERSON v. POINDEXTER, 6 Ohio St. 622
(1856)(1). [The People (injuring no one) are needlessly enslaved by illegal government deception. ]
PROFOUND RIGHT OF ALLOCUTION

Judgment of the Court and opinion of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, joined by Mr. Justice CLARK, Mr. Justice
HARLAN and Mr. Justice WHITTAKER, announced by Mr. Justice HARLAN (Supreme Court of the United States):
Rule 32(a) in pertinent part provides: 'Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity
to make a statement in his own behalf and to present [***] information in mitigation of punishment.' [***]
[1] The design of Rule 32(a) did not begin with its promulgation; its legal provenance was the common-law right of
allocution. As early as 1689, it was recognized that the court's failure to ask the defendant if he had anything to say
before sentence was imposed required reversal. See Anonymous, 3 Mod. 265, 266, 87 Eng.Rep. 175 (K.B.). Taken
in the context of its history, there can be little doubt that the drafters of Rule 32(a) intended that the defendant be
personally afforded the opportunity to speak before imposition of sentence. We are not unmindful of the relevant
major changes that have evolved in criminal procedure since the seventeenth century-- the sharp decrease in the
number of crimes which were punishable by death, the right of the defendant to testify on his own behalf, and the
right to counsel. But we see no reason why a procedural rule should be limited to the circumstances under which it
arose if reasons for the right it protects remain. None of these modern innovations lessens the need for the defendant,
personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may
not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. We are
buttressed in this conclusion by the fact that the Rule explicitly affords the defendant two rights: 'to make a
statement in his own behalf,' and 'to present any information in mitigation of punishment.' We therefore reject the
Government's contention that merely affording defendant's counsel the opportunity to speak fulfills the dual role of
Rule 32(a). See Taylor v. United States, 9 Cir., 1960, 285 F.2d 703. [***]
Trial judges before sentencing should, as a matter of good judicial administration, unambiguously address
themselves to the defendant. Hereafter trial judges should leave no room for doubt that the defendant has been
issued a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing. ***
Judges are warned that hereafter their records must leave no doubt that a 'defendant has been issued a
personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing.' This, I think, is the correct meaning of the Rule as it was adopted,
and this defendant just like all others should be accorded his right under it. He should not be denied that right either
because of his criminal record or because of fears conjured up about the number of prisoners who might raise the
same question in the event of a decision in this defendant's favor. Bad men, like good men, are entitled to be tried
and sentenced in accordance with law, and when it is shown to us that a person is serving an illegal sentence our
obligation is to direct that proper steps be taken to correct the wrong done, without regard to the character of a
particular defendant or to the possible effect on others who might also want to challenge the legality of their
sentences as they have the right to do 'at any time' under Rule 35. If it has any relevance at all, the fact that there
may be other prisoners in this country's jails serving illegal sentences would seem to me to make it all the more
imperative that we grant appropriate relief in this case rather than search for some obviously dubious excuse to
deny this petitioner's claim. GREEN v. U.S., 365 U.S. 301, (1961)(2).
NEVER GIVE UP!
OUR CONSTITUTION 'ASSURES' THE LAW WILL ULTIMATELY PREVAIL
Justice MARSHALL, Circuit Justice (Supreme Court of the United States):
But the proper response to an arguably illegal action [Forms and Application scam ] is not lawlessness by judges
[denying us the whole Truth, and our sovereign right to be let alone. ] charged with interpreting and enforcing the laws.
Down that road lies tyranny and repression. We have a government of limited powers, and those limits pertain to
the Justices of this Court as well as to Congress and the Executive. Our Constitution assures that the law will
ultimately prevail, but it also requires that the law be applied in accordance with lawful procedures (in the Courts
of Common Law. ). HOLTZMAN v. SCHLESINGER, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973)(1). [Our Servants are bound by Oath to
obey the Constitution, So help me God yet engage in Lawlessness? When we are not injuring anyone, our Constitution
needs to prevail immediately so our servants let us alone. ]
Intentional government fraud and lawlessness is of course not the answer. I compiled the knowledge herein knowing we
could be way more free in a matter of days. I do not want this needless tyranny to fall on the backs of our children, family and friends,
especially when our servants could easily make things way, way better almost over night. No better way than the Law = The Truth.
SERVANTS OBEY THE LAW, STOP DEFRAUDING US, AND LET US ALONE
'No one has any legal right to do any wrong to anyone.' David Colton
LET'S MAKE A DIFFERENCE - GOOD MUST CONQUER EVIL
When people fear their government, there is Tyranny; when government fears the People there is Liberty. Jefferson
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In forming the governments in this country the People do not intend to destroy or enslave themselves.
Spread the invincible power of Truth to help Free the People and our children from Tyranny by men via fraud.
Make the world a better place with obedience to the truth only, and zero tolerance for imperfect human law.
We injured no one, tell our servants to let us alone and our children.
Enjoy the Truth of the Law for anyone's perfect defense.
Jurors should read this study manual in favor of Liberty and Justice for all (not just some).
John 8:32 YOU SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE. AND NOW YOU DO KNOW THE TRUTH.
The just powers of government are derived from the consent of even the governed. I'm out. Are you?
GOOD MUST CONQUER EVIL - WITH ETERNAL VIGILANCE

The People … are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our Liberty. Thomas Jefferson.
"God who gave us life gave us liberty. And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis,
a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are a gift from God? That they are not to be violated but with His wrath?
Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just, and that His justice cannot sleep forever." Jefferson's Notes on the
State of Virginia, XVIII, 1781. Excerpts are inscribed on the walls of the Jefferson Memorial in the nation's capital.
WE MUST FORM GROUPS (WITNESSES) OR BE PLOWED UNDER - BY SERVANTS AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND THE LAW
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:
We have a Constitution designed to keep government out of private domains. But the fences have often been
broken down; and Frothingham denied effective machinery to restore them. The Constitution even with the judicial
gloss it has acquired plainly is not adequate to protect the individual against the growing bureaucracy in the
Legislative and Executive Branches. He faces a formidable opponent in government, even when he is endowed
with funds and with courage. The individual is almost certain to be plowed under, unless he has a well-organized
active political group to speak for him. FLAST v. COHEN, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)(2). [United We Stand! ]
It's not what you know it's what you can prove. They refuse to prove lawful power and right of jurisdiction over the people because
they are acting illegally. We injured no one. Let us alone! I'm out! It is super important to inform all of your military and police oath
keeper friends about the illegal subjection scam to commit crime against Americans who injure no one in the Land of the Free.
I would use the court cases herein for my ultimate perfect defense, and to debate against government fraud
and injustice in a more perfect Union under God. All government crimes are sins against the clear and unquestionable
commands of the supreme Law of the most High, therefore against the true intent of the people to form a perfect union.
THOU SHALT NOT STEAL

Thou shalt not covet our property. Thou shalt not bear false witness (nor defraud) to steal.
And the simple Truth: No one has any legal 'right' to do any wrong to anyone. David Colton
Our subjection by illegal government deception to steal is the biggest scam in the history of America.
DENT, J. (Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia) concurring:

I am aware that there are some people who at least profess to believe that elections, being human institutions, are
governed solely by human inclinations, and are not subject to the supervision or control of that moral code of ethics
promulgated by God through the greatest of all human law-givers from Sinai's hoary summit. This, however, is a
great and grievous error, for the eighth commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," forbids not only larceny as defined in
the Criminal Code, but also the unjust deprivation of every person's civil, religious, political, and personal rights
of life, liberty, reputation, and property--even though done under the sanction of legal procedure. While the tenth
commandment, "Thou shalt not covet," rebukes even the desire to do such things. The selfish disregard of these
plain inhibitions of both revealed and natural law, supported by the dictates of a pure conscience, brings on political
corruption, poisons the very fountain head of civil authority--the ballot box--and ends in disrespect to all law,
followed by lawlessness, fraud, rapine, murder, and lynching by rope, fire, and torture. [Like today. ] A broken
moral law, by whoever done, however done, and wherever done, is certain to bring its retribution, which may fall
on the head of the innocent and pure, but for which the aggressor must some day, somewhere and somehow, make
full restitution. This is a lesson which men are slow to learn and unwilling to receive, although the history of the
past is but a record of one half of its profound truth, while the other half awaits the revelations of eternity. With my
unshaken and fixed belief in the moral law, the supreme rule of Almighty God, the final triumph of perfect
righteousness, and the sure punishment of all iniquity, I could not do otherwise than concur in sustaining the
expressed will of the people, bound as I am by the oath of office under which I hold my commission. A cross and a
crown of thorns are far more to be preferred than success achieved through the broken laws of God. DOLE v.
BENDER, 55 W.Va. 404 (1904)(4). [Amen. Proverbs 21:7 The violence of the wicked will destroy them, because they
refuse to do justice. Ascertain the truth for Justice pursuant to the Constitution of the People. ]
SHALL BE INFORMED OF IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

MARSHALL joins, dissenting: (Apply this to our Constitutional sovereign birth right and immunity to statutes):
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees every individual that, if taken into official
custody, he shall be informed of important constitutional rights and be given the opportunity knowingly and
283
voluntarily to waive those rights before being interrogated about suspected wrongdoing. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). (fn1). This guarantee embodies our society's conviction that "no system of criminal justice can, or
should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through
unawareness of their constitutional rights." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964). OREGON v.
ELSTAD, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)(2). [Our Constitutional sovereign birthright. We injured no one. Leave us alone. ]
Mr. Justice HAGNER (Supreme Court, of the District of Columbia) delivered the opinion of the court:
"Under our system, the people who are there called subjects, are the sovereigns. Their rights, whether collective or
individual, are not bound to give way to a sentiment of loyalty to the person of a monarch. The citizen here knows
no person, however near to those in power, or however powerful himself, to whom he need yield the rights which
the law secures to him when it is well administered." IN THE MATTER OF MORRIS MILLER, 16 D.C. 507
(1887)(3). [The same in: U.S. v. LEE, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)(2); and Rosenbury v. U.S. Shipping 295 F. 372 (1923)(1). ]
The Federal conspiracy is proved by knowing what the political "status" of the Nation is (voters and officials).
Demand they show the jury a full definition of We the People and a citizen of the United States in their statutes:
Justice POWELL announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
Justice WHITE, and Justice O'CONNOR join: As we have stated, supra, at ----, the doctrine of stare decisis is of
fundamental importance to the rule of law. For this reason, "any departure from the doctrine ... demands special
justification." WELCH v. TEXAS D.O.T., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)(2). [The rule of Law is the people are sovereigns. ]
CACULATED TO INDUCE PEOPLE WITHOUT INQUIRY TO SUBMIT

FIELD, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):
The case of State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, decided by the supreme court of Connecticut, upon which special
reliance is placed by counsel, and which is mentioned with strong commendation as a land-mark of the law, in no
way militates against the doctrine we have declared, but is in harmony with it. That case was this: The constitution
of Connecticut provided that all judges should be elected by its general assembly. An act of the legislature
authorized the clerk of a city court, in case of the sickness or absence of its judge, to appoint a justice of the peace to
hold the court during his temporary sickness or absence. A justice of the peace having thus been called in, and
having acted, a question arose whether the judgments rendered by him were valid. The court held that whether the
law was constitutional or not, he was an officer de facto, and, as such, his acts were valid. The opinion of Chief
Justice BUTLER is an elaborate and admirable statement of the law, with a review of the English and American
cases, on the validity of the acts of de facto officers, however illegal the mode of their appointment. It criticises the
language of some cases, that the officer must act under color of authority conferred by a person having power, or
prima facie power, to appoint or elect in the particular case; and it thus defines an officer de facto: 'An officer de
facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold
valid, so far as they involve the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office are
exercised--First, without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or
acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing
him to be the officer he assumed to be; second, under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where
the officer had failed to conform to some precedent, requirement, or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or
the like; third, under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or
because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in
its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public; fourth, under color of an
election or an appointment by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such. '
Of the great number of cases cited by the chief justice, none recognizes such a thing as a de facto office, or speaks
of a person as a de facto officer, except when he is the incumbent of a de jure office. NORTON v. SHELBY, 118
U.S. 425 (1886)(2). [How true it is. And most Americans are ignorant of the Law and therefore, don't have a clue. ]
CORNELL, J. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut): There can be no such thing as a de facto court. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425. OSBORN v. ZONING BOARD, 11 Conn.Supp. 489 (1943)(1).
DE FACTO: This phrase [de facto] is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs
which must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate. Thus, an office, position or status
existing under a claim or color of right such as de facto corporation. In this sense it is the contrary to de jure, which
means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. Thus an officer, king, or government de facto is one who is in
actual possession of the office or supreme power, but by usurpation, or without lawful title; while an officer, king,
or government de jure is one who has just claim and rightful title to the office or power, but has never had plenary
possession of it, or is not in actual possession. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416. [Unacceptable. ]
Free of fraud: We the People own everything, including our artificial creatures which cannot own anything, nor via our servants.
OVERTHROW: "ALL ITS ACTS AND THE ACTS OF ALL ITS COURTS ARE UTTERLY VOID!" EMPHASIS ADDED!
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PETERS, J. (Supreme Court of Alabama):
In the first place, the judgment is that of an illegal court. The clerk who issued the writ, the sheriff who served it,
and the judge who gave the judgment, so far as this court can know, were all mere usurpers, who did not hold their
offices by color of any rightful authority. The court was not that of a State of the Union, and the government of
which it formed a part, was not that of a State of the Union. The judge who presided in it was not a judicial officer,
recognized in this court, or by the rightful government.-- Chisholm v. Coleman, January term, 1869. The
government and the court in which this judgment is presumed to have been rendered was a foreign affair.--Scott v.
Jones, 5 How. 343, 377. No such foreign court could be rightfully set up in this State. There was no law or treaty to
authorize it. No citizen of this State was bound, in law, to answer to its summons or plead to its process. For the
reasons above shown, it was wholly destitute of any authority as a legal court.--Glass v. Schooner Betsey, 3 Dall. 6;
10 Bac. Abr. p. 374, verb void; 3 Blackstone's Com. 24, 25. The whole proceeding was utterly void, as though it
had never taken place, unless validity is given to it as a decree of a court of a government illegally and
unconstitutionally erected in a State of the Union. To give legality without legislative assistance to such a tribunal,
is to give legality to the insurrection itself--to give legality to treason against the government of the United States.
Shortridge & Co. v. Macon, Pasch. Annotated Constitution, p. 212. To recognize the sentence of this court as legal
is to recognize the court as legal, and the government of which the court formed a part as legal; for they all cling
together as a whole. But this can not be. The entire current of decisions from Scott v. Jones to Texas v. White,
denounce such a government as utterly void in all its departments, without legislative affirmance and ratification.--
Texas v. White, 7 Wall, 700; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343; Glass v. The Betsey, 3 Dall.
5; Shortridge & Co. v. Macon, Paschall's Ann. Const., p. 212. [***]
PETERS, J. (Supreme Court of Alabama):
I therefore think that to enable any government, erected in a State of this Union, to enact valid laws, or its
courts to render valid judgments, it must be a legal State government, and must be acknowledged by the congress of
the United States as such; otherwise, all its acts, and the acts of all its courts are utterly void, and they can only
become valid by the affirmance and ratification of the rightful legal government in its restoration to power, or by
the rightful government of the nation, as the question may be one of domestic or national import. In this State
necessity may be pleaded to excuse an individual act, otherwise unlawful, but it can not be pleaded to validify a law
or a judgment of an incompetent authority.
That which is illegal remains illegal until the law removes its illegality, and laws can only be passed by
the agency which is clothed by the fundamental law of the State, or of the Union, with that great right. This is a
principle which forms the very basis of all our State governments. And as a great jurist and statesman has said,
upon another occasion, "doubtless the continuance of regulated liberty depends on maintaining this principle."--
(Daniel Webster.) To depart from this is to turn over to the courts a portion of the legislative power of this State--the
power to say what laws and what judicial acts of an illegal government shall have effect, and what shall not have
effect. Such power the courts are expressly forbidden to exercise. Con. Ala. art. 3, ß ß 1, 2; art. 6; art. 5.
This judgment, then, was coram non judice, and does not bind the defendants, even as the judgment of a
foreign court, because it was not a court of a government acknowledged by the rightful political authority. [***]
These powers rest upon the same basis that the separate and original powers of any other department do,
upon a grant by the people--the sovereigns--to the court, by constitutional provision. Under these powers, in the
performance of the duties arising out of them, the court proceeds according to its own discretion. But this discretion
is not to be a reckless and unreasonable discretion, but such as shall lead most certainly to the accomplishment of
the highest justice, and the enforcement of the laws. EX PARTE BIBB, 44 Ala. 140 (1870)(1). [Whatever
government does must be legal and lawful: And of the sovereign people through Constitutional Convention. ]
GOVERNMENT HAD NO LEGAL EXISTENCE = TRESPASSERS AND "CRIMINALS" = THEIR TRUE INTENT
Mr. Justice BRENNAN (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court reasoned as follows: (1) If a court were to hold the defendants' acts
unjustified because the charter government had no legal existence during the period in question, it would follow
that all of that government's actions--laws enacted, taxes collected, salaries paid, accounts settled, sentences
passed--were of no effect; and that 'the officers who carried their decisions into operation (were) answerable as
trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals.' There was, of course, no room for application of any doctrine of de
facto status to uphold prior acts of an officer not authorized de jure, for such would have defeated the plaintiff's
very action. A decision for the plaintiff would inevitably have produced some significant measure of chaos, a
consequence to be avoided if it could be done without abnegation of the judicial duty to uphold the Constitution.
BAKER v. CARR, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)(2). [Same quote in PACIFIC STATES TELE CO. v. STATE OF OREGON, 223 U.S. 118
(1912)(2). ]
NO SERVANTS ARE EVER LAWFULLY AUTHORIZED TO DISPENSE WITH THE LAWS-CONSTITUTION

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:
Today we would ask with him: '*** who could hold for a moment, when the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
suspended by the legislature itself, either in the general government or most of the States, without an express
285
constitutional permission, that all other writs and laws could be suspended, and martial law substituted for them
over the whole State or country, without any express constitutional license to that effect, in any emergency?'
Justice Woodbury went on to say: 'It would be alarming enough to sanction here an unlimited power, exercised
either by legislatures, or the executive, or courts, when all our governments are themselves governments of
limitations and checks, and of fixed and known laws, and the people a race above all others jealous of
encroachments by those in power. And it is far better that those persons should be without the protection of the
ordinary laws of the land who disregard them in an emergency, and should look to a grateful country for indemnity
and pardon, than to allow, beforehand, the whole frame of jurisprudence to be overturned, and every thing placed
at the mercy of the bayonet.
'No tribunal or department in our system of governments ever can be lawfully authorized to dispense with
the laws, like some of the tyrannical Stuarts, or to repeal, or abolish, or suspend the whole body of them; or, in
other words, appoint an unrestrained military dictator [Code Commander in Chief. ] at the head of armed men.
'Whatever stretches of such power may be ventured on in great crises, they cannot be upheld by the laws, as they
prostrate the laws and ride triumphant over and beyond them, however the Assembly of Rhode Island, under the
exigency, may have hastily supposed that such a measure in this instance was constitutional. It is but a branch of the
omnipotence claimed by Parliament to pass bills of attainder, belonging to the same dangerous and arbitrary
family with martial law.' BAKER v. CARR, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)(2).
SETTLED PRINCIPLE IN THIS COUNTRY THE PEOPLE ARE SOVEREIGNS = SERVANT CANNOT CONTROL THE MASTER
CHURCH, J. (Supreme Court of the Territory of Dakota): We think it might be regarded as a settled principle of
constitutional interpretation in this country, that the people are the sovereigns, and that in the people resides
ultimate sovereignty. If we consider the several state organizations, it is evident that the legislature is not the state,
nor is the judiciary, nor the executive, nor are all combined, the state. The people organized into a political society
are the state, and the various departments mentioned are but the machinery through which the popular will finds
expression, interpretation, and execution. To these several departments the people have committed--or, in other
words, delegated--the exercise of the various powers and duties appropriate to each, and as limitations thereupon
have formulated and adopted those organic instruments which we call constitutions; and the power that these
created, conferred, and limited, may, within certain limitations, alter, amend, and even abrogate. And it is to be
observed that these limitations last referred to are either self-imposed, or such as inhere in the very nature and
constitution of human society; they are never imposed upon the people by any of the departments of the state
government, nor can they be. The servant cannot control the master. [Super emphasis added! ] [***]
Passing now to the federal government, we find here a like commission or delegation of power from the
sovereign, to-wit, the people; only here it is the people of the United States who are the sovereign. The language
of the preamble to the constitution is, "We, the people of the United States." There, too, we have the three
departments of government framed for the expression, interpretation, and execution of the sovereign will, to each of
which has been committed or delegated its appropriate powers. And here, also, we find an organic act or
instrument, called a constitution, containing within itself an expression of the conditions and methods, self-
imposed by the sovereign, under and in accordance with which it may be altered or amended. This is sometimes
spoken of as a surrender of power by the people to the general government; but can it be so regarded ? The only true
view of our system of government, both state and national, is that which regards the people as still sovereign, and
every lawful act of every department of any of these governments, state or national, as but the will of the sovereign,
expressed by and through their chosen instruments. [***]
The preamble to the constitution recites the sovereign purpose. [***] The general power of congress for
this purpose is found in section 8 of article 1 of the constitution, where the right of exclusive legislation is given
"over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of
congress, become the seat of government of the United States." By chapter 28, 1 St. at Large, 130, it was enacted
"that a district of territory not exceeding ten miles square, to be located as hereinafter directed, on the river Potomac,
at some place between the mouths of the eastern branch and Conecocheague, be, and the same is hereby, accepted
for the permanent seat of government of the United States." Territory ex rel Smith v. Scott, 20 N.W. 401 (1884)(1).
SERVANTS OBEY YOUR MASTERS - CEASE IN AIDING IN ANARCHY AND ORGANIZED INSURRECTION
BARTLEY, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Ohio) dissenting:
It is not necessary here to inquire whether the repeated teachings of the New Testament, of obedience of servants to
their masters (Titus, ch. ii., v. 9; 1 Ep. of Peter, ch. ii., v. 18; 1 Timothy, ch. vi.; Collosians, ch. iii., v. 22;
Ephesians, ch. 6, v. 5); [***] there is no higher law to us than the constitution which we have sworn to support. [***]
I may add, that if the time shall come when our judicial tribunals shall yield to the clamor of popular excitement,
and announce a higher law than the constitution and statutes framed under it, they will proclaim anarchy and
organize insurrection. ANDERSON v. POINDEXTER, 6 Ohio St. 622 (1856)(1). [They disobey their masters. ]
TREASON MIGHT CHANGE A STATE GOVERNMENT FROM REPUBLICAN TO A DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT

286
Mr. Justice HARLAN, dissenting: He [House Thaddeus Stevens] immediately continued:
'The second section excludes the conclusion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law; save,
indeed, with this exception, that as the right in the people of each State to a republican government and to choose
their Representatives in Congress is of the guarantees of the Constitution, by this amendment a remedy might be
given directly for a case supposed by Madison, where treason might change a State government from a republican
to a despotic government, and thereby deny suffrage to the people.' (Emphasis added.). REYNOLDS v. SIMS,
377 U.S. 533 (1964)(2). [They know! The sovereign people vote as subject citizens of the United States. ]
ARTICLE 4 § 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES A REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT

SWAYNE, Circuit Justice (Circuit Court, District of Kentucky):
Mr. Justice Story, adopting the language of the Federalist, says: 'That but for this power [art. 4, § 4.] a successful
faction might erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could be constitutionally afforded by
the Union to the friends and supporters of the government.' ... 'But a right implies a remedy, and where else could
the remedy be deposited than where it is deposited by the constitution?' 2 Story, Const. 559, 560. UNITED STATES
v. RHODES, 27 F.Cas. 785 (1866)(1). [I charge: In practice we do not have a functioning republican form of
government-they are outside the Constitution; refuse to recognize our sovereign status; no sealed judicial Process of Law.]
WHY THEIR STATELESS SYTEM OF FEDERALISM EMANATES FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mr. Justice Brown (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the conclusion and judgment of the court:
Notwithstanding its duty to 'guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government' (art. 4, ß 4),
by which we understand, according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the supreme power resides
in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them,' [… .] The court was of opinion
that if these terms, 'states of the Union,' were held to exclude the District of Columbia and the territories, [… .]
DOWNS v. BIDWELL, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)(2). [Hence, their state-less System of Federalism in D.C. ]
THE PROTECTION OF UNALIENABLE PRIVATE RIGHTS OF MEN WAS LEFT WHOLLY TO THE STATES
The rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man. 'To secure these rights,' says the Declaration of
Independence, 'governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.' The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union under the Constitution, was to
protect all persons within their boundaries in the enjoyment of these 'unalienable rights with which they were
endowed by their Creator.' Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests alone with the States. UNITED STATES v.
CRUIKSHANK, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)(2). [Mere business enmities = artificial persons = do not have such rights. ]
LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ET AL UPHOLD THE OVERTHROW BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE?
Mr. Chief Justice VINSON (Supreme Court of the United States) announced the judgment of the Court and an
opinion in which Mr. Justice REED, Mr. Justice BURTON and Mr. Justice MINTON join.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) ss 10, 11 (see present 18 U.S.C. s 2385),
provide as follows: 'Sec. 2. '(a) It shall be unlawful for any person--
'(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any
officer of any such government;
'(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States, to print, publish, edit,
issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by
force or violence;
'(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage
the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence; or to be or become a
member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.
'(b) For the purposes of this section, the term 'government in the United States' means the Government of the
United States, the government of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, the government of the
District of Columbia, or the government of any political subdivision of any of them.
'Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts
prohibited by the provisions of *** this title.' DENNIS v. UNITED STATES, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)(2).
WIEST, J. (Supreme Court of Michigan):
In law, the term 'violence' means the unlawful exercise of physical force, or intimidation by its exhibition and
threat of employment. The meaning of the term is not uncertain. See People v. Lloyd, supra. PEOPLE v.
RUTHENBERG, 229 Mich. 315 (1924)(1). [Law enforcement may kill you for a victimless crime if you resist. ]
287
ANTHING DONE BY OUR SERVANTS UNATHORIZED BY THE CONSTITUTION IS UNLAWFUL
Mr. Justice WAYNE (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The departments of the government are legislative, executive, and judicial. They are coördinate in degree to the
extent of the powers delegated to each of them. Each, in the exercise of its powers, is independent of the other, but
all, rightfully done by either, is binding upon the others. The constitution is supreme over all of them, because the
people who ratified it have made it so; consequently, any thing which may be done unauthorized by it is
unlawful. DODGE v. WOOLSEY, 59 U.S. 331 (1855)(2). [It is not illegal to steal your all with your consent. ]
HOW THE TRAITORS PLAY THE GAME OF OVERTHROW

(Supreme Court of Missouri) T. T. Gantt, for plaintiff in error:
Where peace had reigned, war reared its bloody crest; where friendship had bound together, distrust and hatred
separated; where law had regulated, anarchy bred confusion; where love of country had burned bright, the love of
slavery, inciting rebellion, quenched it in blood; where the Nation's flag had been blessed and honored, it was
cursed, spit upon, and trodden underfoot. Treason stalked abroad with defiant front, and in secret set its devilish
enginery in motion. Falsehood, treachery, and perjury pervaded the whole social fabric. Few of the loyal could
say with certainty who of their neighbors, or even their friends, was not infected with the virus of treason. Only
traitors knew each other, always and everywhere: they enrolled themselves by thousands under the rebel flag,
and turned their arms against their country and their former friends;--other thousands banded themselves together
in secret organizations, to give aid, comfort, countenance, and support to the armies of traitors that were battering
at the ramparts of the Constitution, and hacking at the golden bands of the Union;--other thousands dispersed
themselves through every ramification of official and social life, to become the pimps and spies of the rebellion;--
other thousands took to the brush, to waylay and shoot down unsuspecting patriots--to murder them in their
habitations in presence of their wives and children--to set the firebrand to their dwellings, and make night lurid
with flames which left them houseless, homeless, and beggared;--other thousands still, became the harborers,
informers, guides, and purveyors of the bloody and merciless bushwhacker;--other thousands still, who claiming
to be American citizens, had for years exercised at the ballot-box the highest privilege of citizenship, when the
struggling Nation was compelled to resort to a draft to recruit its wasted armies, flocked to the office of the British
Consul to obtain a certificate of their being subjects of the British Queen, that they might not be compelled to fight
for a flag under which they had voluntarily sought a home, and had lived in peace and prospered;--others, not so
numerous, but still large in numbers fled the State, to avoid being drafted into the army, for whose defeat and
destruction they nightly prayed, and in secret labored;--other thousands, to escape service in the militia of the
State, for the protection of our own soil and people, shamelessly enrolled themselves as "disloyal" or as "Southern
sympathizers," and so, in faith of final triumph of the rebellion, put themselves on record as traitors in heart. In
short, there was hardly any form in which treason to country, treachery to friends, faithless to obligations, and
disregard of all laws, divine and human, could be manifested, that was not exhibited daily, for years, in this
unhappy State. Could there be written a full account of all the crimes of the rebels of Missouri, and the wrongs and
outrages inflicted by them upon her loyal inhabitants, during the four years of the rebellion the world would shrink
aghast from a picture which has no parrallel in the previous history of any portion of the Anglo-Saxon race. [***]
Now, may it please the court, as has already been shown, one of the fundamental declarations in the
Constitution of this State has always been, the right of the people to alter their Constitution "whenever it may be
necessary to their safety and happiness"; and the motto of the State proclaims, " Salus populi suprema lex esto." In
obedience to this supreme law, and for their own safety and happiness, the people of this State began, through their
delegates in Convention, in a little more than a year after the outbreak of the rebellion, to devise measures to protect
themselves from the future domination of traitors. That the rebellion would finally be overthrown was inevitable;
and that, when overthrown, its whole gang of Missouri officers, soldiers, guerrillas, bush-whackers, spies, pimps,
aiders and abettors, would rally everywhere in solid force at the ballot-box, to secure there the power they had
failed to obtain by war, was equally inevitable to the mind of any man whose knowledge of men was equal to that of
a twelve-year old boy. It required but the smallest modicum of sagacity to foresee this; and, foreseen, the very
instinct of self preservation would prompt the adoption of measures to guard against a humiliation so deep, an evil
so incalculable in its extent and disastrous in its effects. [***]
"I. A. B., do solemnly swear that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have
been a citizen thereof that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement, to persons
engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise the functions of
any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not
yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution, within the United
States, hostile or inimical thereto." BLAIR v. RIDGLEY, 41 Mo. 63 (1867)(1).
AN ASSOCIATION TO PERVERT THE LAW IS A CRIME VERY HIGH IN NATURE - BAR ASSOCIATION
288
Mr. Justice HARLAN, (Supreme Court of the United States) after stating the facts in the foregoing language,
delivered the opinion of the court: 'The general rule of the common law,' the supreme judicial court of
Massachusetts said in Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111, 121, 'is that it is a criminal and indictable offense for two or
more to confederate and combine together, by concerted means, to do that which is unlawful or criminal, to the
injury of the public, or portions or classes of the community, or even to the rights of an individual.' In State v.
Burnham, 15 N. H. 401, it was held that 'combinations against law or against individuals are always dangerous to
the public peace and to public security. To guard against the union of individuals to effect an unlawful design is
not easy, and to detect and punish them is often extremely difficult.' Hawkins, in discussing the nature of
conspiracies as offenses against public justice, and referring especially to the statute of 21 Edw. I. relating to
confederacies to procure the indictment of an innocent person, says that, 'notwithstanding the injury intended to the
party against whom such a confederacy is formed may perhaps be inconsiderable, yet the association to pervert the
law, in order to procure it, seems to be a crime of a very high nature, and justly to deserve the resentment of the
law.' 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 27, ß 3. So in Reg. v. Parnell, 14 Cox, Crim. Cas. 508, 514, it was observed that an
'agreement to effect an injury or wrong to another by two or more persons is constituted an offense, because the
wrong to be effected by a combination assumes a formidable character. When done by one alone it is but a civil
injury; but it assumes a formidable or aggravated character when it is to be effected by the powers of the
combination.' CALLAN v. WILSON, 127 U.S. 540 (1888)(2). [Officials pervert the Law + illegally subject us for profit.]
ADVOCATES CRIMES AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND UNLAWFUL OVERTHROW

WIEST, J. (Supreme Court of Michigan): Act No. 255, Public Acts 1919 (1922 Supp. C. L. ß 15585 [2] et seq.),
defines the crime of criminal syndicalism, specifies acts constituting the offense, and fixes the penalty: 'Section 1.
Criminal syndicalism is hereby defined as the doctrine which advocates crime, sabotage, violence or other
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. The advocacy of such
doctrine, whether by word of mouth or writing, is a felony punishable as in this act, otherwise provided. [***] The
overthrow of the national government would be a direct blow at the representative form of government now secured
to each of the several states, and the overthrow of the government of any one of the several states would be an
indirect assault upon the government of each of the other 47 states. PEOPLE v. RUTHENBERG, 229 Mich. 315
(1924)(1). [Overthrow anywhere is a threat to Liberty everywhere. ]
18 USC § 2331. Definitions

(5) the term "domestic terrorism" means activities that-
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TAKING OVER THE POWER OF THE STATES

The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.' Every
journey to a FORBIDDEN END begins with the first step; and the danger of such a step by the federal government
in the direction of TAKING OVER the powers of the states is that the end of the journey may find the states so
despoiled of their powers, or--what may amount to the same thing--so relieved of the responsibilities which
possession of the powers necessarily enjoins, as to reduce them to little more than geographical subdivisions of the
national domain. It is safe to say that if, when the Constitution was under consideration, it had been thought that any
such danger lurked behind its plain words, it would never have been ratified. CARTER v. CARTER COAL, 298
U.S. 238 (1936)(2). [The forbidden take over of the states, despoiled as pretended subdivisions of this Federal System.]
WHOLLY ILLEGAL AND VOID

Mr. Justice NELSON (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court: We agree that all the
proceedings of these eleven states, either severally or in conjunction, by means of which the existing governments
were overthrown, and new governments erected in their stead, were wholly illegal and void, and that they remained
after the attempted separation and change of government, in judgment of law, as completely under all their
constitutional obligations as before. The Constitution of the United States, which is the fundamental law of each
and all of them, not only afforded no countenance or authority for these proceedings, but they were, in every part of
them, in express disregard and violation of it. MAURAN v. INSURANCE CO., 73 U.S. 1 (1867)(1).
289
WALKER, J. (Supreme Court of Texas):
But in this country the people make and ordain their own constitutions, and grant no power to their representatives
to alter or break them. EX PARTE RODRIGUEZ, 39 Tex. 705 (1873)(4).
THE PEOPLE DID NOT DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO OVERIDE OR ABROGATE THE CONSTITUTION - NOR TO ENSLAVE US
MORROW, J. (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas):
Military necessity, so far as we are advised, does not become the authority for the passage of law. Its functions arise,
as we understand, when in the time of war extraordinary and unforeseen emergencies occur, in which the protection
of the public interests requires for the moment the disregard of private rights, but to justify its exercise "the public
danger must be immediate, imminent, and impending, and the emergency in the public service must be extreme and
imperative, and such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any other source of supply." United States v. Russell,
13 Wall. 623. [***] The people of the United States are at war, maintained through the agencies authorized by their
federal Constitution. They are proceeding according to the organic law of the nation. On the subject we quote from a
recent address by a jurist of national reputation: "While we are at war, we are not in revolution. We are making war
as a nation, organized under a Constitution from which the established national authorities derive all their powers,
either in war or in peace. The Constitution is as effective to-day as it ever was, and the oath to support it is just as
binding." American Bar Association 1917, vol. 42, p. 232. Speech of Chas. E. Hughes. [***] The Congress, having
power to prosecute war, and not in the Constitution limited as to methods, has broad discretion in the enactment of
extraordinary regulations during war. These, however, to be valid, must find sanction in the express or implied
powers granted to Congress. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. [***] In both peace and war the Legislature, in
the passage of laws, must observe the express and implied limitations of the state Constitution, and the Congress
must find sanction in the federal Constitution for its enactments. Neither can exercise unbridled power on the
assumption that a necessity exists therefor. [***] In the American system of government by the people through
agencies, with powers defined and limited by written Constitution, the courts have no power to legislate. Their
utmost is to refuse to aid in the enforcement of an act of the Legislature which transcends the authority vested in
that department by the Constitution. The limitations imposed by the Constitution are essential (Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 576), and there is no menace to constitutional government in requiring their observance, though there is danger
thereto in suffering a disregard of them. [***]
There can be found no case, so far as the writer has been able to ascertain, which lays down the proposition
that the police power is superior to the constitutional provisions, or can suspend the Constitution when the question
arises on a conflict of superior authority. The police power is always subordinate to constitutional authority. The
police power, in a general way, pertains to the legislative department, and is derived from the Constitution, and
delegated to the legislative branch of the government by the provisions of the Constitution. The Legislature could
not exist except by the provisions of the Constitution. Police power inheres in the Legislature by reason of this
granted power. The people framing their Constitution did not delegate authority to the Legislature, or any
department of government, to override or abrogate any provision of the Constitution. The power of the courts, of
the executive department, and the Legislature finds authority only in the provisions of the Constitution. They are not
outside of, nor superior to, those provisions, and cannot be. They exist by reason of the will of the people as
expressed in the Constitution. Article 1, § 2, of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, provides that: "All political
power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their
benefit. [***] It cannot be contended in the face of this language that the Legislature, by reason of the police power,
can suspend any clause of the Constitution, for the Legislature only acts under delegated authority, its grant of
power being found in the Constitution.
In a general way constitutional provisions are considered as limitations upon legislative power as applied
to state governments. This proposition is to be considered from the standpoint of conferred authority, delegation
of power. Such limitations cannot be used to destroy constitutional provisions, but can only be correctly used for
the purpose of carrying into effect those provisions. Legislative power was not given to destroy, but to uphold,
ordained governments. The Constitution was made for and by our citizenship for their use and benefit. Citizenship
is not made for the Constitution, but the Constitution is made for the citizenship. Nor were the people and the
Constitution made for the Legislature, but the Legislature was created to carry into effect the Constitution. The
police power is not a limitation upon the Constitution, but the Constitution is a limitation upon police power. The
police power is a result of the Constitution, to be operated by the Legislature to carry it into execution. These
provisions cannot be used for suspending, changing, or altering the Constitution. The faith of the people of Texas
stands pledged to the preservation of a republic form of government, and, subject to this limitation only, they have
at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think
expedient." [***] Article 1, § 2, inhibits the exercise of power which would abolish, alter, or reform the government,
and expressly provides this only can be done by the people.
It is directly asserted in said section that this is an "inalienable right" of the people, and all powers of
government are specially interdicted from usurping or exercising these powers. It specially excepts from the power
of the people themselves, and provides that a republican form of government shall not be destroyed, but that it shall
290
remain unrepealable by any power, state or federal. This the states pledge each other by binding obligations in the
federal government, and bound that government to maintain and guarantee such republican form of government.
The contention of the Attorney General, therefore, from this viewpoint cannot be sustained, for if sustained it would
confer upon the Legislature power to destroy even this form of government. This the people cannot do themselves.
Legislative bodies, under American institutions, do not and cannot act by original or inherent power. Such
authority has not been conferred. Such authority as that body may exercise is but one of delegation by the people
through the Constitution. Assumption of original or inherent power by the Legislature would result in the higher
and controlling authority over the people through their Constitution, and would be destructive of every principle of
self-governing democracy. It was Edmund Burke, the great English orator, who said that: "This change from an
immediate state of procuration and delegation to a course of acting as from original power is the way in which all
the popular magistracies have been perverted from their purposes." To avoid this result, and to effect the purposes
of our people as set out in Article 1, § 2, of the Bill of Rights, article 17 was placed in the Constitution as the only
means by which that instrument may be changed, altered, or reformed, and limits that authority to the action of the
people directly. This excludes the idea of alteration or changing the Constitution, or the suspension of its provisions
in any other mode or manner. The Legislature may suspend laws, but such power is especially limited for that
purpose. This is to be found in article 1, § 28, of the Bill of Rights. The power to suspend laws does not convey the
idea of suspension of the Constitution, or its alteration or abrogation. This is the "inalienable" right of the people. It
will be noticed that our government, as before stated, is republican in form and in its nature. It is a representative
democracy. It is based upon the theory that autocracy, militarism, and social democracy shall find no lodgment
with us. They are excluded as forms of government, and we limit our government to republican form, as it was
instituted and guaranteed by state ancd federal Constitutions. A complete refutation to the position of the
Attorney General that the Legislature can suspend the Constitution, or any of its provisions, is found and
emphasized, in addition to section 2, art. 1, and article 17, already cited, in the provisions of section 29 of article 1,
which ordains that: "To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that
everything in this 'Bill of Rights' is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain
inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall be void."
This absolutely prohibits any action on the part of the Legislature, or other departments of the government,
to do any act or pass any law which may conflict with either the "Bill of Rights or the following provisions" of the
Constitution. It emphatically declares that all such action or laws shall be void. This section reiterates and
emphasizes that the power to the different departments of the government is only one of delegation. It precludes the
idea of original power in any department of the government. It denounces complete invalidity to all acts which may
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. All provisions of the Constitution are by the terms of this section
excepted out of the general powers of the government, and clothed with inviolable sanctity, and shall remain
inviolate, not to be infringed by any department of government. They are more than mandatory and comprehensive
in declaring inhibitions. The rule of legislative or official omnipotence finds no standing in American government or
institutions. It may be that the British Parliament was clothed with authority to make and unmake British
constitutions, but this idea does not obtain in America, or under American form of government. In the creation and
erection of American constitutional government, state and federal, the doctrine of omnipotence, as applied to British
Parliament, was excluded, and in its place was substituted the omnipotent or inherent power of the people to
make, alter, or change their government. It was said by one of the great statesmen of Pennsylvania in the convention
ratifying the federal Constitution: "To control the power and conduct of the legislatures by an overruling
Constitution was an improvement in the science and practice of government reserved to the American states.
Perhaps some politician who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our political systems would answer that in
our governments the supreme power was vested in the constitutions. This opinion approached the subject nearer to
the truth, but does not reach it. The truth is that in our governments the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
power remains in the people. As our Constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to
our constitutions. Indeed, the superiority in this last instance is much greater, for the people possess over
constitutions control in act as well as right. The consequence is that the people may change the constitutions
whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no positive institution can ever deprive them."
In fact, the supreme power in our people may be called the panacea in politics and in the science of free
government. While it is true that some politicians may have contended that the sovereignty of the government is in
the Constitution and not in the people, yet until very recently it has not been contended that these politicians may go
to the extent of contending that legislative authority can overturn the sovereign will of the people.
These questions have come for review in courts of Texas on various occasions. By numerous decisions the
courts of last resort in this state have declared that the Legislature has no authority to make any rule or enact any
legislation in contravention of the plain provisions of the Bill of Rights. Pratt v. State, 53 Tex.Cr.R. 281; Gold v.
Campbell, 54 Tex.Civ.App. 269; Ex parte Farnsworth, 61 Tex.Cr.R. 353; Kemper v. State, 63 Tex.Cr.R. 1. This
proposition was asserted and laid down in Snyder v. Baird, etc., 102 Tex. 4. The language of that decision is
emphatic to the effect that the Legislature has no authority to annul any clause of the Constitution. In State v. Moore,
57 Tex. 307, it was held that the Legislature cannot withdraw any power from the hands of those in whom the
Constitution has placed it unless the Constitution expressly so authorizes. It has also been held that the Constitution
291
is the superior and supreme law, and laws or acts of the legislative body in conflict with it or its provisions are void.
Williams v. Taylor, 83 Tex. 667; Higgins v. Rinker, 47 Tex. 385; Galveston Ry. Co. v. Gross, 47 Tex. 428;
Huntsman v. State, 12 Tex.App. 619. It is also the declared doctrine in Texas, and has been so held by the courts,
that the Constitution may be expanded to give effect to its provisions, but this cannot be done to infringe or defeat its
purpose or provisions. Hunt v. State, 7 Tex.App. 212. All provisions of the Constitution are mandatory, and
necessarily so. They are not directory. For a collation of a great number of cases so holding see Harris' Ann. Const.
at page 219, note 54. It is also held in State v. Durst, 7 Tex. 74, that the provisions of the Constitution are
mandatory upon the courts. It has been further held that any decision of the courts holding contrary to the
Constitution of this state can have no validity. It is the exercise of unauthorized and unwarranted power on the
part of the court. Chase v. Swayne, 88 Tex. 218.
Nor is there any force in the contention that because article 16, § 20, is not self executing, therefore the
Legislature may disregard, set it aside, or overrule it. The proposition has been announced and sustained by the
decisions and jurisprudence of Texas that any and all provisions of the Constitution are self-executing to the extent
that anything done in conflict with such provisions, or in violation of such provisions, is null and void. Hemphill v.
Watson, 60 Tex. 679. See, also, Const. art. 1, § 29.
One of the most far-reaching and dangerous propositions asserted by the Attorney General is that the
Legislature may suspend the Constitution, or any of its provisions, on account of military necessities. This might
find defensive grounds in the military autocracy of Germany, but not in democratic America. The Texas
Legislature has no authority to declare war or make treaties. Such power is delegated alone to the federal
government by the states of the Union. If Texas has not the authority to declare war, it would seem to necessarily
follow that she could not invoke the police power of the state to enact war measures in conflict with the
Constitution. That instrument declares, in section 24 of the Bill of Rights, that military shall always be subordinate
to the civil authority. To sustain the contention of the Attorney General would mean the abolition of the republican
form of government and the substitution in its place of a military government. This is beyond comprehension or
contemplation in Texas. It is directly foreign to every principle of our government and the very mention of it ought
to be sufficient to show the falsity of the contention. One of the leading features of Texas independence may be
quoted thus: "In this expectation they have been cruelly disappointed, inasmuch as the Mexican nation has
acquiesced to the late changes made in the government by General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, who, having
overturned the Constitution of his country, now offers, as the cruel alternative, either to abandon our homes,
acquired by so many privations, or submit to the most intolerable of all tyranny, the combined despotism of the
sword and the priesthood." Exparte MYER, 84 Tex.Crim. 288 (1918)(1). [How true. ]
THOMPSON, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Illinois): The second President of this nation could have been
prosecuted criminally under this law for seditious libel when he stated: 'The right of a nation to kill a tyrant in cases
of necessity can no more be doubted than that to hang a robber or kill a flea.' 6 Works of John Adams, edited by C.
F. Adams, p. 130. PEOPLE v. LLOYD, 304 Ill. 23 (1922)(1).
FELONY - HIGH CRIME- ENORMOUS CRIME - SEDITION - TREASON - SATANIC?
THOMPSON, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Illinois):
The act under consideration makes the advocacy of the overthrow of the government a felony, and provides for the
punishment of the advocate, and so it is not necessary that there be a real or actual effort to carry out the program
that he advocates. The act is certain in its terms, has no double meaning, and will not in any way deceive the
common mind. PEOPLE v. LLOYD, 304 Ill. 23 (1922)(1).
ALWAYS UNLAWFUL
THOMPSON, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Illinois): Since it has always been unlawful to advocate the
overthrow by force of established government, the common-law counts in this indictment are good. People v.
Blumenberg, supra; Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17. PEOPLE v. LLOYD, 304 Ill. 23 (1922)(1). [Via law enforcement.]
THE UNLAWFUL AND TREASONABLE PURPOSE OF OVERTHROWING BY FORCE THE CONSTITUTION
PEYTON, J. (High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi) delivered the opinion of the court:
Oaths have a solemn obligation upon the minds of all reflecting men, and especially upon those who feel a deep
sense of accountability to a Supreme Being. [***]
Mr. Madison, in his report on the Virginia resolutions, says: "That the term States is sometimes used in a vague
sense, and sometimes in different senses, according to the subject to which it is applied. Thus, it sometimes means
the separate sections of territory occupied by the political societies within each; sometimes the political governments
established by those societies; and lastly, it means the people composing those political societies in their highest
sovereign capacity."
The government of the United States has uniformly, from early in 1861 to the spring of 1865, characterized
the controlling authorities of those seceded States not as governments, but as unlawful combinations of rebellious
persons, usurping the functions of government, and forcibly controlling the people. That government has invariably
292
regarded them as parts of a machinery for waging unlawful war, and making treasonable resistance to the rightful
authority of the United States, having their central power in the government of the Confederate States, and co-
operating in one combination for the unlawful and treasonable purpose of overthrowing by force of arms the
Constitution of the United States. [***]
The terms de facto, as descriptive of a government, have no well-fixed and definite sense. It is, perhaps,
most correctly used as signifying a government completely, though only temporarily, established in the place of the
lawful or regular government, occupying its capital and exercising its power, and which is ultimately overthrown
and the authority of the government de jure re- established. [We need to re-established the de jure a.s.a.p. ][***]
But the terms de facto, when employed as descriptive of government, are often used, and perhaps more
frequently in a sense less precise than that above indicated, as signifying any organized government, established for
the time over a considerable territory, in exclusion of the regular government. A de facto government of this sort is
not distinguishable in principle from other unlawful combinations. It is distinguishable in fact mainly by power,
and in territorial control, and by the policy usually adopted in relation to it by the national government. With respect
to such a government, it is clear that none of its acts in hostility to the regular government can be recognized as
lawful, yet it is equally clear that transactions between individuals, which would be legal and binding under ordinary
circumstances, cannot be pronounced illegal and of no obligation, because done in conformity with laws enacted or
directions given by the usurping power. THOMAS v. TAYLOR, 42 Miss. 651 (1869)(3).
'EVERY' PERSON IS DEEMED A PARTY TO 'ALL' ACTS DONE BY 'ANY' OF THE PARTIES BEFORE OR AFTER
THOMPSON, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Illinois):
Though the common design is the essence of the charge of conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove that the co-
conspirators came together and actually agreed in terms to have that design and to pursue it by common means. If it
is proven that the co-conspirators pursued, by their acts, the same object, often by the same means, one performing
one part and another part of the same, so as to complete it with a view of the attainment of the same object, the
natural deduction from this proof is that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. It is not necessary to
prove that the conspiracy originated with any part or all of the co-conspirators, or that they met during the process of
its concoction, because every person entering into a conspiracy or common design already formed is deemed, in
law, a party to all acts done by any of the parties before or afterwards, in furtherance of the common design. Ochs
v. People, supra; Cooke v. People, 231 Ill. 9; People v. Strauch, 240 Ill. 60; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, ß 92; 2
Wharton on Crim. Evid. (10th Ed.) 1434; Roscoe on Criminal Evid., 88. PEOPLE v. LLOYD, 304 Ill. 23 (1922)(1).
GAME OF COUP D’ETAT VIA DECEPTION - COERCION - PRETENSES + REDIRECT SUSPICION + NEVER CONFESS
Mr. Justice JACKSON (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring and dissenting, each in part:
Our Constitution explicitly precludes punishment of the malignant mental state alone as treason, most serious of all
political crimes, of which the mental state of adherence to the enemy is an essential part. It requires a duly
witnessed overt act of aid and comfort to the enemy. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1. [Most serious crime. ]
The international police state has crept over Eastern Europe by deception, coercion, coup d'etat,
terrorism and assassination. Not only has it overpowered its critics and opponents; it has usually liquidated them.
The American Communist Party has copied the organizational structure and its leaders have been schooled in the
same technique and from the same tutors. [***][Treason the most serious of all crimes and super cumulative. ]
Mr. Justice BLACK dissenting:
Under the Stuart monarchs in England it was standard practice to give an informer one-third of the fines
collected from his victim. E.g., 3 Jac. I c. 5. And a few were sufficiently daring and unscrupulous to obtain the more
satisfying reward of fame. A notorious example took place in England during the reign of Charles II: 'The political
atmosphere was electric. *** Thus it is not strange that when Titus Oates, an Anglican clergyman who had been
reconciled the year before to Rome, came forward in August, 1678, to denounce a vast Jesuit conspiracy against the
King's life and the Protestant religion, his tale of wild lies met with a degree of credence that later ages would
perhaps have refused to it. *** The Pope, he declared, had commanded, and the Jesuits undertaken, a conquest of the
kingdom; *** In all the arrangements he had been, he said, a trusted emissary ***. Over a hundred conspirators,
mostly Jesuits, were mentioned by name ***. Oates was examined at the Council Board. The King caught him lying,
but the extent and gravity of his charges demanded investigation; *** In one important point Oates' story was
confirmed. *** There was no 'plot' in Oates' sense; but there was quite enough of plotting to cost men their heads
under the English law of treason ***.' 5 Cambridge Modern History, 220-221 [***]
35 Eliz. c. 2, for example, was aimed at 'sundry wicked and seditious Persons, who terming themselves
Catholicks, and being indeed Spies and Intelligencers, *** and hiding their most destable and devilish Purposes
under a false Pretext of Religion and Conscience, do secretly wander and shift from Place to Place within this
Realm, to corrupt and seduce her Majesty's Subjects, and to stir them to Sedition and Rebellion.' [***]
Castigating Jefferson and his followers as 'jacobins,' a 'French faction' guilty of 'subversion,' Fisher Ames
warned: '(T)he jacobins have at last made their own discipline perfect: they are trained, officered, regimented and
formed to subordination, in a manner that our militia have never yet equalled. *** (A)nd it is as certain as any
293
future event can be, that they will take arms against the laws as soon as they dare. ***' Ames, Laocoon, printed in
Works of Fisher Ames 94, 101, 106 (Boston, 1809). AMERICAN COM. v. DOUDS, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)(2).
MILITARY MUST ALWAYS YIELD TO THE LAW - OF THE CONSTITUTION - OF THE PEOPLE
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court: We fully agree with the presiding justice of the Circuit
Court in the doctrine that the military should always be kept in subjection to the laws of the country to which it
belongs, and that he is no friend to the Republic who advocates the contrary. The established principle of every free
people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it the military must always yield.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD: A soldier cannot justify on the ground that he was obeying the orders of his superior
officer, if such orders were illegal and not justified by the rules and usages of war, and such that a person of
ordinary intelligence would know that obedience would be illegal and criminal. Riggs v. State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 87;
Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch, 331, 337; Commonwealth v. Palmer, 2 Bush (N.Y.) 570.
It follows that the military commander, after the capture of New Orleans, had no right to seize private property
as booty, or to confiscate it, for the reason that hostilities had ceased and the courts were open. Planters' Bank v.
Union Bank, 16 Wall. 483; 7 Waite, Actions and Defences, 315. DOW v. JOHNSON, 100 U.S. 158 (1879)(1).
UTMOST TO PREVENT ANYONE WITH INTENT TO CAUSE THE DESTRUTION OF LAWFUL CIVIL AUTHORITY
MR. JUSTICE BLACK (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: Arts. 77-134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 133-143, 50 U.S.C. §§ 671-728. [Currently 10 USC Sub Title A Part II
Ch. 47 Sub Ch. X Sec. 894. Art 94 of the UCMJ. et seq. ] A particularly sweeping offense, punishable by death and
not subject to any statute of limitations, is found in Article 94, which provides in part that anyone
"(2) who with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any
other person or persons, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against such authority is guilty of sedition;
(3) who fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress an offense of mutiny or sedition being committed in his
presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior or commanding officer of an offense of mutiny
or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a
mutiny or sedition." (Emphasis supplied.) United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
YOU CANNOT PROVE THE TRUTH HEREIN IS WRONG MUCH LESS WITH SUPERIOR COURT CASE AUTHORITY
Our servants cannot have enslaved us without using illegal fraud. Hence, their universe of deception (the key tool of Satan
Rev. 12:9). Because they use deception it clearly implies they know what they do is wrong and unlawful . They know not what they do
Lord. You must get through your delusion and fear factor. Their private System is 100% counterfeit = all deception and in name only.
They must appear to do justice, appear to be the government, and appear it's the Law, because they are not, then refuse to ascertain
the whole Truth. That's satanic. Deliver us from evil. "In Law" essentially everything is intended to form a more perfect Union via the
Truth, right, and free of fraud to secure our all; "in practice" essentially everything is in reverse, contrary, and backwards via fraud to
unsecure our all by men who outwardly pretend to love America and Americans but inside they hate us. You know the tree by its fruit.
Find out just what the people will submit to and you have found out the exact amount of injustice and wrong which will be
imposed upon them; and these will continue until they are resisted with either words or blows, or with both. The limits of tyrants are
prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress. Frederick Douglass, civil rights activist, 1857.
What is not the Truth herein? We the People expressly intended to form a more perfect Union, only. The Constitution
contains no words intending any imperfection only the contrary. The perception of its imperfection is from intentionally perverted laws
and justice = government; and in all its forms, whether severe or slight are not from the Constitution or the People but from corrupt
temporary servants who come and go conspiring against the Order of things and misinterpreting the Constitution and misapplying the
Law of We the People over the People, who (as a Nation) under God well know, (in Law) no one has any legal right to do any wrong to
anyone: Leviticus 19:15 Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the
person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor. So help me God.
This book serves formal public notice to our servants et al to cease and desist all unrighteousness from your sovereign LAW
ABIDING CITIZENS. We need protection from government not by government. Demand they repeal of all revised code statutes passed
over the last 150 years without lawful authority, save a revolution, that seems the only solution from oppression and despotism. There
is no better way to govern than according to the Truth = the Law = Justice. In America the just powers of government are derived from
the consent of even the governed, and no one has any legal right to do any wrong to any one (much less to a Citizen, let alone the
sovereign People) and especially by government servants who come and go bound by Oath to obey the Constitution, So Help me God.
The true intent of people creating government (like creating a business) is for our temporary servants (employees) who
come and go to secure our all lawfully acquired pursuant to the Constitution, anything contrary is nothing but fraud and usurpation.
JUDGES AND STATE OFFICIALS ARE SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

It makes clear that judges and other "state officials integral to the judicial process" are subject to criminal liability
for violating the constitutional rights of individuals. [***] See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-514 (1978)
(administrative law judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity even though they are in the Executive Branch); Imbler
v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S., at 430-431 (reserving the question whether a prosecutor, who is absolutely immune
for decisions to initiate a prosecution or put witnesses on the stand, has similar immunity for administrative or
294
investigative tasks); cf. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (CA7 1973) (prosecutor's immunity ceases
when he acts in a capacity other than his quasi-judicial role). Like prosecutors and judges, official witnesses may be
punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. §242. [See §241!] BRISCOE v.
LaHUE, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). [Immunity? so saith corrupt, usurping, servants = Fraud: unaccountable to their Oath.]
THE VERY PURPOSE OF 42 USC 1983 SUIT IS AGAINST OFFICIALS DEPRIVING US OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
The interpretation in Ex parte Virginia of Congress' intent in enacting the Civil Rights Acts has not lost its force
with the passage of time. In Mitchum v. Foster, supra, the Court found ß 1983 to be an explicit exception to the
anti-injunction statute, citing Ex parte Virginia for the proposition that the "very purpose of ß 1983 was to interpose
the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights--to protect the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.' " 407 U.S., at 242. PULLIAM v. ALLEN, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)(2).
A SOVEREIGN TAKES BENEFIT OF ANY ACT THOUGH NOT NAMED

But, as observed by Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the opinion of the court in Savings Bank v. U. S., 19 Wall. 227,
239, while the king is not bound by any act of parliament unless he be named therein by special and particular
words, he may take the benefit of any particular act though not named; and he adds that the rule thus settled as to
the British crown is equally applicable to this government, and that so much of the royal prerogative as belonged to
the king in his capacity of parens patriae, or universal trustee, enters as much into our political state as it does into
the principles of the British constitution. The general rule is stated in Chitty on the Law of the Prerogatives of the
Crown, 382, clearly to be 'that, though the king may avail himself of the provisions of any acts of parliament, he is
not bound by such as do not particularly and expressly mention him; for it is agreed in all our books that the king
shall take benefit of any act, although he be not named.' Case of a Fine, 7 Coke, 32a; Magdalen College Case, 11
Coke, 68b; Queen & Buckberd's Case, 1 Leon. 150; 1 Bl. Comm. 262. STANLEY v. SCHWALBY, 147 U.S. 508
(1893)(3). [Use for 42 USC 1983 civil actions etc. and 18 USC 242 Criminal actions as a private attorney general. ]
WE ARE RULED IN REVERSE - INVERTED - BACKWARDS - UPSIDE DOWN - CONTRARY - UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Buy: The Law by Frederic Bastiat: The law perverted! And the police powers of the state perverted along with it! The law, I
say, not only turned from its proper purpose but made to follow an entirely contrary purpose! The law become the weapon of every
kind of greed! Instead of checking crime, the law itself guilty of the evils it is supposed to punish!
"What, then, is law? It is the collective organization of the individual right to lawful defense.
Each of us has a natural right - from God - to defend his person, his liberty, and his property. These are the three basic requirements of
life, and the preservation of any one of them is completely dependent upon the preservation of the other two. For what are our
faculties but the extension of our individuality? And what is property but an extension of our faculties? If every person has the right to
defend even by force - his person, his liberty, and his property, then it follows that a group of men have the right to organize and
support a common force to protect these rights constantly. Thus the principle of collective right - its reason for existing, its lawfulness -
is based on individual right. And the common force that protects this collective right cannot logically have any other purpose or any
other mission than that for which it acts as a substitute. Thus, since an individual cannot lawfully use force against the person, liberty,
or property of another individual, then the common force - for the same reason - cannot lawfully be used to destroy the person,
liberty, or property of individuals or groups." - Never forget all of the courts cases are of our mere temporary "servants" who come
and go whose only place to look for all of their lawful authority is the Constitution of the People which are strictly of an artificial
creature. All of our rights etc. are pre-existing and government was created to secure them, any thing else is lawless usurpation.
ALWAYS REMEMBER THE - ESTABLISHED ORDER OF THINGS UNDER GOD - PROVES RIGHT OF JURISDICTION
BRADLEY, J. (Supreme Court of the United States): Adhering to the mere letter, it might be so, and so, in fact, the
supreme court held in Chisholm v. Georgia; but looking at the subject as Hamilton did, and as Mr. Justice IREDELL
did, in the light of history and experience and the established order of things, the views of the latter were clearly
right, as the people of the United States in their sovereign capacity subsequently decided. [***] Chief Justice
TANEY, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized
nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission; but
it may, if it thinks proper, waive this privilege, and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit by individuals, or
by another state. HANS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)(2).
MAGISTRATES-SERVANTS HAVE WISHED AND SUCCEEDED IN THEIR WISH TO BE THE SOVEREIGNS

PARTRIDGE, District Judge (District Court, N.D. California):
And while, as Mr. Justice Miller said, no reasons for the principle had ever been given, a most persuasive argument
had been made against it by Mr. Justice Wilson in the Chisholm Case. His language is as follows: 'For in the
practice, and even, at length, in the science of politics, there has very frequently been a strong current against the
natural order of things, and an inconsiderate or an interested disposition to sacrifice the end to the means. As the
295
state has claimed precedence of the people, so, in the same inverted course of things, the government has often
claimed precedence of the state; and to this perversion in the second degree many of the volumes of confusion
concerning sovereignty owe their existence. The ministers, dignified very properly by the appellation of the
magistrates, have wished, and have succeeded in their wish, to be considered as the sovereigns of the state. This
second degree of perversion is confined to the old world, and begins to diminish even there. But the first degree is
still too prevalent, even in the several states of which our Union is composed. By a state I mean a complete body
of free persons united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to
others. It is an artificial person. ROSENBERG BROS. v. U.S. SHIPPING BOARD, 295 F. 372 (1923)(1).
WARNING
SCHWELLENBACH, District Judge (District Court, E.D. Washington, Southern Division):
The sovereign has the power and the duty to make use of the property of the individual when such use is necessary
for its protection. Those who exercise that power should not be insensitive to the fact that those from whom they
take property are members of the political community which is the sovereign. Therefore, even in war time, those
charged with the responsibility of government must recognize the need for them to maintain public confidence in
the fairness of the sovereign. Failing in that, they might endanger the entire structure upon which sovereignty rests.
It might be well were they to heed the early warning of the Supreme Court (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 455)
of the 'perversion' resulting when the 'ministers' of the people 'have wished, and have succeeded in their wish, to
be considered as the sovereigns of the state.' UNITED STATES v. EDDINGS, 50 F.Supp. 926 (1943)(1).
THE WAY ALL SERVANTS CHANGE AND PERVERT GOVERNMENT AND USURP THE ORDER OF THINGS
DAVIDSON, P.J. (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ) concurring:
It was Edmund Burke, the great English orator, who said that: "This change from an immediate state of procuration
and delegation to a course of acting as from original power is the way in which all the popular magistracies have
been perverted from their purposes." Ex parte MYER, 84 Tex.Crim. 288 (1918)(1). [Also 72 Tex.Crim. 304. ]
How true it is and nothing new under the sun.
FIRST DECEIVE, NEXT VILIFY AND AT LAST OPPRESS THEIR MASTER AND MAKER
Having thus avowed my disapprobation of the purposes, for which the terms, State and sovereign, are frequently
used, and of the object, to which the application of the last of them is almost universally made; it is now proper that I
should disclose the meaning, which I assign to both, and the application, which I make of the latter. In doing this, I
shall have occasion incidently to evince, how true it is, that States and Governments were made for man; and, at the
same time, how true it is, that his creatures and servants have first deceived, next vilified, and, at last, oppressed
their master and maker. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)(4). [Just like today. And kill you if you resist? ]
In the beginning of a change a patriot is a scarce man, brave, hated and scorned, but when his cause succeeds, the timid join
him, for then it costs nothing to be a patriot. Mark Twain. If I tell you the Truth herein, why would you not believe me?
GOOD MUST CONQUER EVIL

Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God. Thomas Jefferson. Demand the right of the people to freely submit in person any
evidence to the grand jury of any government illegal activity, deception etc. Impose life imprisonment on anyone who pretends to be
of the government or acts outside the Constitution of the United States; or schemes or attempts to subject the people (injuring or
attempting to injure no one) or in any manner whatsoever deprives or diminishes our true sovereign status, and sovereign immunity =
our right to be let alone, our right to life, liberty, and pursuit of Happiness using any kind of law, statutes, code, or rules whatever. And
demand the unhindered right to video all the participants, actors, witnesses, and parties in all prosecutions, cases, actions, or
proceedings, in any court, or tribunal to protect us from government corruption and reveal the same to the public. "Extremism in
pursuit of Liberty is no vice" Barry AuH 20. Beware of the old scheme of tyrants accumulating power by creating emergencies to enslave
via pretended necessity: "Nazi Prophecies", Gestapo, Valkyrei, Star Wars, The Legacy Revealed etc. @ HISTORY.COM.
Now you can prove we are ruled by criminals via illegal government deception to steal? A counterfeit intented to appear to be the real deal.
RIGHT OF EVERY CITIZEN TO REQUIRE GOVERNMENT BE ADMINISTERED ACCORDING TO LAW!
Mr. Chief Justice BURGER (Supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the Court:
'the right possessed by every citizen' 'to require that the government be administered according to law ***'.'
SCHLESINGER v. RESERVISTS Committee, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)(2). [See same: LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,
504 U.S. 555 (1991)(2); UNITED STATES v. RICHARDSON, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)(2); BAKER v. CARR, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)(2);
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-130 (1922). In court our servants have no lawful "standing" = We injured no one.]
FARRINGTON, District Judge (District Court, D. Nevada):
296
Public agents must be liable to the law, unless they are to be put above the law. NEVADA-CALIF POWER v.
HAMILTION Cty. Treas., 235 F. 317 (1916)(1).
THE PEOPLE DEMAND OBEDIENCE TO THE LAWS

WOODBURY, J. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin):
The constitution makes it the duty of the governor "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Whatever right,
therefore, the laws of the state give to any of its citizens, the governor must "take care" to enforce, and to that end
may employ the whole or so much of the executive power of the state as shall be needful. Ordinarily, indeed, the
governor is not required to act in person. Where the people frame the laws, the people demand obedience to the
laws. Submission to the laws is therefore in all republics the first duty of the citizen. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ex rel BASHFORD v. BARSTOW, 4 Wis. 567 (1855)(2). [The People demand citizen officials to obey the Law. ]
Mr. Justice DANIEL (supreme Court of the United States) delivered the opinion of the court:
The supremacy of the Constitution over all officers and authorities, both of the federal and state governments, and
the sanctity of the rights guarantied by it, none will question. CARY v. CURTIS, 44 U.S. 236 (1845)(1).
Mr. Justice WHITE (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court announced generally that officers of the executive branch of
the government should be immune from liability where their action is reasonable "in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good-faith belief." Id., at 247-248. The Court went on to say: "Public officials, whether governors,
mayors or police, legislators or judges, who fail to make decisions when they are needed or who do not act to
implement decisions when they are made do not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices. STONE v.
POWELL, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)(2). [Act in Good Faith upon notice we are the sovereigns injuring no one. ]
PRESIDENTS MOST IMPORTANT DUTY - ALL CHARGED WITH PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, and an opinion with
respect to Part III-B, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and Justice THOMAS join:
For example, in Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-130 (1922) , we dismissed a suit challenging the propriety of
the process by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court: "[This is] not a
case within the meaning of ... Article III.... Plaintiff has [asserted] only the right, possessed by every citizen, to
require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted.
Obviously this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit...." Ibid. The
question presented here is whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies'
observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by a statute
that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no
distinctive concrete harm) to sue. If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance we
have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress
to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, ß 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, "to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department," Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S., at 489, and to become " 'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action.' " Allen, supra, 468 U.S., at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). We have always rejected
that vision of our role: "When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on
governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted. This permits the
courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies only to the extent necessary to protect
justiciable individual rights against administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers.... This is very far from
assuming that the courts are charged more than administrators or legislators with the protection of the rights of the
people. Congress and the Executive supervise the acts of administrative agents.... But under Article III, Congress
established courts to adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights whether
by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power." Stark v. Wickard,
321 U.S. 288, 309-310 (1944) (footnote omitted). "Individual rights," within the meaning of this passage, do not
mean public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the
public. See also Sierra Club, 405 U.S., at 740-741. LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 504 U.S. 555 (1991)(2).
PRECEDENT
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge: PRECEDENT:
Under our form of government and long established law and custom, the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority
on the interpretation of our Constitution and laws; its interpretations may not be disregarded.
297
Although the district court recognized the importance of precedent, it chose to disregard Supreme Court
precedent. The district court attempted to justify its actions by discussing the limited exceptions to the doctrine of
stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis pertains to the deference a court may give to its own prior decisions. See
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910). The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a
lower court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 183 (1965).
Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court.
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, 333 F.2d 55, 61
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); Booster Lodge No. 405, Int. Ass'n of M. & A.W. v. NLRB, 459 F.2d
1143, 1150 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of precedent when he observed that
"unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed
by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be." Davis, 454 U.S.
at 375. See Also, Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1343 (1983) (the
Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, recently stated: "Needless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its
precedents."). The old Fifth Circuit articulated these positions when it stated that "no inferior federal court may
refrain from acting as required by [a Supreme Court's] decision even if such a court should conclude that the
Supreme Court erred as to its facts or to the law." Stell, 333 F.2d at 61. Judicial precedence serves as the
foundation of our federal judicial system. Adherence to it results in stability and predictability. If the Supreme
Court errs, no other court may correct it. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1536 11th Cir. (1983).
POWER OF PUNISHMENT IS 'ALONE' THROUGH THE LAWS - HUMAN LAWS DO NOT APPLY TO SOVEREIGNS
No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the whole
people; for it is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished
of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people. EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)(2). [The Law vs. Code.]
CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS TO PRESENT A 'COMPLETE' DEFENSE

The flaw found in Falconer was not that the instructions somehow lessened the State's burden of proof below that
constitutionally required by cases such as In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, but rather that the instructions prevented
the jury from considering evidence of an affirmative defense. Cases following Cupp in the Winship line establish
that States must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element of the offense charged, but
may place on defendants the burden of proving affirmative defenses, see Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228; Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, and, thus, make clear that Cupp is an unlikely progenitor of the Falconer rule.
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court: See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 373 (1993).
Nevertheless, Boyde was a capital case, with respect to which we have held that the Eighth Amendment requires a
greater degree of accuracy and fact finding than would be true in a noncapital case. See Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 399 (1993); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). [***] Since "[t]he Eighth Amendment requires that
the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence," id., at 377- 378, 110 S.Ct., at 1196,
this evidence was plainly constitutionally relevant. [***] Sandstrom is a lineal descendant of Winship; it simply held
that an instruction which creates a presumption of fact violates due process if it relieves the State of its burden of
proving all of the elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. [***]
We have previously stated that "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.' " Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). [***] Compare Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (constitutional
error occurs when there is a "substantial probability" the instructions precluded consideration of constitutionally
relevant evidence), with Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (constitutional error occurs when jurors
"could reasonably have concluded" that the instructions created a presumption of guilt on an element of the crime).
Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Justice WHITE joins, concurring in the judgment:
Nevertheless, we have held that other constitutional amendments create "constitutionally relevant evidence" that
the jury must be able to consider. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) ("The right to testify on one's
own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the Constitution"); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 678-679 (1986) (REHNQUIST, J.) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective
cross-examination" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The category of "constitutionally relevant evidence" is not
limited to capital cases. [***] Due process, of course, requires that the State prove every element of a criminal
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Due process, of course, requires that the
State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
This straightforward proposition has spawned a number of corollary rules, among them the rule that the State may
298
not "us[e] evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,
313 (1985). Accord, Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580 (1986); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1983)
(plurality opinion); Sandstrom, supra, 442 U.S., at 521-523. The Court of Appeals extended these cases--which
themselves are the "logical extension" of Winship, see Rose, supra, 478 U.S., at 580, -one step further. It read them
as standing for the proposition that any instruction that leads "the jury to ignore exculpatory evidence in finding the
defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt" violates due process; it disregarded as meaningless the
distinction between elements of the offense and affirmative defenses. 954 F.2d, at 453.
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice STEVENS joins, dissenting:
This Court consistently has held that the Constitution requires a State to provide notice to its citizens of what
conduct will subject them to criminal penalties and of what those penalties are. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,
429 (1987) (explaining the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, U.S. Const., Art. I, ß 9, cl. 3, ß 10,
cl. 1); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 (1925) (same); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (explaining the
due process requirement that defendants be on notice that their conduct violates the criminal law); Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (same). People can conform their conduct to the dictates of the criminal law
only if they can know what the criminal law has to say about their conduct. Proper warning is a constitutional
imperative. GILMORE v. TAYLOR, 508 U.S. 333 (1993)(2).
Exculpatory: Clearing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt; excusing. Moore v. State, 124 TexCr.R.97.
(Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed. p. 675).
ALEXANDER, Justice (Supreme Court of Mississippi):

It is not a postulate of democracy that the truth shall make men free; rather it is the right to know the truth that
keeps them so. SULLENS v. STATE, 4 So.2d 356 (1941)(1).
Mathew 13:49 So shall it be at the end of the world: the angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from among the just. 13:50 And
shall cast them into the furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth.
They know what they do Lord! And now they are deemed to know what they do for sure. Children, are your mom and dad, at least for
your sake, doing anything to help stop the massive abuse via illegal government corruption by men trying to destroy us and America?
EVIL PREVAILS BECAUSE GOOD MEN DO NOTHING - OR NOT ENOUGH

The quote, "all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing" is generally attributed to the
eighteen century Irish statesman Edmund Burke. TRUJILLO v. The STATE of Wyoming, 44 P.3d 22 (2002)(1).
[Nothing, or not enough. Hence, our children, family and friends have and will needlessly suffer without our help. ]
CHIEF ENEMIES OF FREEDOM + RELYING AS IT DOES ON THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

'Where would we really find the principal danger to civil liberty in a republic? Not in the governors as governors,
not in the governed as governed, but in the governed unequipped to function as governors. The chief enemies of
republican freedom are mental sloth, conformity, bigotry, superstition, credulity, monopoly in the market of ideas,
[Main stream media. ] and utter, benighted ignorance. Relying as it does on the consent of the governed,
representative government cannot succeed unless the community receives enough information [of the Law. ] to grasp
public issues and make sensible decisions. ADDERLEY v. FLORIDA, 385 U.S. 39 (1967)(2).
1. Mental sloth = apathy, disinterested, complacent, uninvolved. 2. Conformity = conformist, herd minded. 3. Bigotry = narrow
mindedness, partisan, factional. 4. Superstition. 5. Credulity = gullible, naive, trusting, blind faith with little or no proof at all. 6.
Monopoly in the market of ideas = Government controlled Medias etc. 7. Utter, benighted ignorance (of the Truth of the Law).
MORROW, P. J. (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas): "It [dishonesty] means such want of honesty as would go to
his personal integrity, and would render him unfit to be trusted with official duties." We are inclined to the view that
such definition is too restrictive. "'Dishonesty' denotes an absence of integrity; a disposition to cheat, deceive, or
defraud; deceive and betray." Century Dictionary. [Our servants? ] ALSUP v. STATE, 91 Tex. 224 (1921)(1).
WE ARE SURROUND BY ENEMIES OF FREEDOM AND GOOD MUST CONQUER EVIL
The history of Law and Justice in this country is an autobahn of "usurpation by deception" because the tyrants cannot amend the
Constitution. The objection is the servants broke the law an violated specific provision(s) of the Constitution(s) and thereby deprive you
of your (sovereign private unalienable) rights (to Life, Liberty, property, pursuit of Happiness) etc. This is a fight to save America, our
children, family and friends from the enemies within and without. Do you want to exist in despotism in the Land of the Free? Do you
want that for our children, family and friends? All servants are taught to not give us legal advice or talk about their private
Administrative state engaged in the business of screwing the people or they will lose their jobs. We are all in this together and have to
do something that is enough for Freedommmmmm! Alba bu gra!" (Freedom forever). For what is life without Freedom? Tell the ruling
elite the sons and daughters of America are yours no more. We are AMERICA! We own it. David Colton. "God will raise up friends to
fight our battles for us." Patrick Henry.
WE ARE RULED IN REVERSE
299
1. Statutes of government never cite and apply to We the 'people'. We injure no one, Leave us alone.
2. The governments are overthrown by fraud and replaced by a counterfeit "System" 100% outside the Constitution = Void as
no law.
And those who are ignorant of the Law cannot believe the Federal conspiracy exists precisely because they are ignorant of the Law.
Mr. Justice CAMPBELL dissenting: The fundamental principle of American constitutions, it seems to me, is, that to the
people of the several States belongs the resolution of all questions, whether of regulation, compact, or punitive justice,
arising out of the action of their municipal government upon their citizens, or depending upon their constitutions and
laws, and are judges of the validity of all acts done by their municipal authorities in the exercise of their sovereign
rights, in either case without responsibility or control from any department of the federal government. This I
understand to be the import of the municipal sovereignty of the people within the State. DODGE v. WOOLSEY, 59
U.S. 331 (1855)(2).
COMPTON, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska) :
No specific constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen to take an active part in the ferreting out and
prosecution of crime, but public policy nevertheless favors citizen crime-fighters. [***] It is George Orwell's "Big
Brother" Society come to life. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. 768 P.2d 1123 (1989). [Crime by servants.]
Justice JACKSON (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring and dissenting, each in part:
It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep
the Government from falling into error. AMERICAN COM. v. DOUDS, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)(2). [Same in 473 U.S. 305.]
Recognizing evil is easy, standing against evil is hard, but the wicked thing is to do nothing. Why do most Americans do little or nothing
knowing victims of government abuse abounds? Corruption concedes nothing without a demand based on profound principle, or force.
WHAT ARE "YOU" DOING ABOUT IT?

And it is to government that one goes 'for a redress of grievances,' to use an almost forgotten phrase of the First
Amendment. But it is said that the purpose was 'to cause inconvenience and annoyance.' Since when have we
Americans been expected to bow submissively to authority and speak with awe and reverence to those who
represent us? The constitutional theory is that we the people are the sovereigns, the state and federal officials only
our agents. We who have the final word can speak softly or angrily. We can seek to challenge and annoy, as we
need not stay docile and quiet. COLTEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, 407 U.S. 104 (1972)(2).
As final remarks it is important to remember: Under God, no one as any right to do any wrong to any one. And the object of
being sovereign as a gift from God through the blood of our fore fathers is not merely to enjoy a lush life of Liberty in our pursuit of
Happiness, but a priceless defense, one of "absolute necessity" against a long train of abuse and usurpation ("formidable of Tyrants
only") the precursors to death camps and the horrors of bloody revolution.
The Questions: In the "interests of Justice" upon what "principles of Law" do your statutes of this artificial creature apply
over the sovereign people? Especially injuring no one. Where are the government forms and applications for the People to sign as We
the People of the United States (sovereigns)? I charge obstruction of justice, fraud, unconstitutional "practices" and no sovereign right
to govern much less unjustly, and demand they cease and distist in crimes to bleed us dry and Let us alone!
THE CONSTITUTION IS A LAW FOR RULERS IN WAR - AND IN PEACE: YOUR OATH
Whatever the issue: It's either the Truth or not; the Law or not; and the Government or not.
'The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with
the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.' Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall,
2, 120--121. Robert F. KENNEDY v. MARTINEZ, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)(2). [Same quote in: TERRITORY OF HAWAII, v.
MANKICHI, 190 U.S. 197 (1903)(2); WILSON v. NEW, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) dissent (1); RUPPERT v. CAFFEY U.S Atty., 251 U.S. 264
(1920)(3); DUNCAN v. KAHANAMOKU, Sheriff, 327 U.S. 304, concurring (1946)(3); U.S. v. BARNETT, 376 U.S. 681, dissent (1964)(2).]
Justice DOUGLAS dissenting: Madison said: 'A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance:
And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives.' (To W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822). 9 Writings of Madison 103. U.S. v. CALDWELL, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)(3).
What makes the Law the Law? What makes government Lawful? The critical component is We the People.
Who's judging the judges, prosecuting the prosecutors, policing the police if not We the People?
The First Duty of the Military (all servants) by their Oath to the Constitution of the People is to protect the People.
Just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed. We injure no one leave us alone! I'm out!
DELIVER US FROM EVIL
300
the Lord's Prayer: " 'Our Father, which art in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be
done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors.
And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory
forever. Amen.' George WALLACE v. JAFFREE, 472 U.S. 38 (1984)(2). [On earth as it is in heaven, So help me God.]
Truth will ultimately prevail where there are pains taken to bring it to light. George Washington
From one of the supreme sovereign source of all lawful government power and jurisdiction injuring no one:
God bless America, our Children, family, and friends, and our Honest servants: Peace!
ENDEAV0R TO PERSEVERE - GOOD MUST CONQUER EVIL

If you want to order a copy of this book; or a personally autographed and numbered "hard cover" copy; my CD on this book; my
accentuated version of this book; or availability to book me for a SEMINAR; like help with your present or past court case (serious
inquiries only) and what I would do to get a case against me dismissed or if forced into court; key questions for the jury; or become a
distributor to SPREAD THE NEWS to HELP FREE THE PEOPLE; my book on THE NO-FAULT DIVORCE SCAM; my booklet of and on
government Forms and Applications SCAM; or notice me of your success etc.; for anything contact me at " supreme-power.org". You
can also order this book from XULON PRESS (866) 909-2665 and from book stores.
PLEASE READ MY DISCLAIMER AGAIN AT VERY THE BEGINNING OF THIS BOOK

I am not a Lawyer etc. Nothing herein is intended to incite anyone into doing anything illegal or wrong; merely to help
spread the Truth! All Bible verses herein are from the King James version. Please send donations to get copies of this book to every
government servant and every American who cannot afford it. You can order several copies of this book so others can get one quickly.
Call up talk radio shows and talk about SURROUNDED BY ENEMIES OF FREEDOM printed by Xulon Press? It undeniably proves we are
being 'needlessly' abused and subjected by illegal government deception; government is illegally acting 100% outside the Constitution;
and we injure no one and have the Constitutional right to be let alone from our servants engaged in crime, who refuse to obey the
Law; refuse to ascertain the whole Truth; refuse to prove lawful power and right of jurisdiction over us; therefore refuse to do Justice
pursuant to the Constitution and the Laws of God. The just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed.
Demand our servants return to the Law of the Constitution and dissolve all of the absurd private companies and for profit corporations
pretending to be the government with deceptively similar names. 'The Law': true Law, the Law based on the whole Truth is the best
and only way to live. We injured no one, LEAVE US ALONE! Fear not: All things are possible with God.
Copyright © 2008 by David Colton
Surrounded By Enemies of Freedom - Good Must Conquer Evil, by David Colton
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN 978-1-60034-707-8. Also prior Common Law copyright. All rights etc. preserved solely by the author.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author. The views expressed in this
book are not necessarily those of the publisher. www.xulonpress.com.
Unless otherwise indicated, Bible quotations are taken from the New King James Bible.
Most cases herein are from Westlaw publishing. I thank West "very much" for your permission to use them. Buy their services.
301

PROOF WE ARE ILLEGALLY RULED BY CRMINALS USING FRAUD - Case Law

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PROOF WE ARE ILLEGALLY RULED BY CRMINALS USING FRAUD - Case Law

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HISTORIC SUPREME COURT DECISIONS -

FABE, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska) PER CURIAM:

RABINOWITZ, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):

TRULY THE 'SOVEREIGNS'

CONNOR, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):

A CRIMINAL CONVICTION WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS "VOID"

THE LAW 'ALONE' DEFINES THE COURT'S 'POWER'

Justice STEVENS (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

A JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS VOID = AS NO LAW

1999: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS ENJOYED AS AN "ABSOLUTE RIGHT" FOR CENTURIES

Super Postulate 7: FRAUD DESTROYS EVERYTHING = VOIDS EVERYTHING

NECESSARY TO 'EXPLICITLY' CITE EVERY CLASS OF "PERSON" THEY INTEND TO INCLUDE

IN LEGAL TERMINOLOGY "PERSON" = OTHER THAN HUMAN BEINGS = ARTIFICIAL PERSONS

FOR CENTURIES THE HIGH FUNCTION OF COURTS IS TO 'ASCERTAIN THE TRUTH'

PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE!

ALLEN, J. (Supreme Court of North Carolina):

SOVEREIGNTY AS THE RIGHT TO GOVERN - It's Global

JURISDICTION IMPLIES SOVEREIGNTY

RABINOWITZ, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):

"ONLY" FULL TERRITORIAL "SOVEREIGNS" ENJOY THE 'POWER' TO "ENFORCE" LAWS

THE ONLY REASON

Universal: 'ALL' JURISDICTION IMPLIES SUPERIORITY OF POWER - Global principle of Law

Wilson, Justice (supreme Court of the United States):

BRADLEY, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):

'ALL' COURTS-JUDGES DERIVE ALL OF THEIR AUTHORITY FROM THE PEOPLE

Universal: ALL HUMAN LAW

MUST BE CLEAR AND "UNQUESTIONABLE" AUTHORITY OF LAW

RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE = TOTAL PERSONAL IMMUNITY FROM GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL

ALL JURISDICTION COMES SOLELY FROM THE LAW

BRICKLEY, Justice (Supreme Court of Michigan) dissenting:

THE LAW ALONE SHALL GOVERN

HANEY, Circuit Judge (9th Circuit Court of Appeals):

DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'RENDER' AND MERE 'ENTRY' OF JUDGMENT-DECREE-ORDER

STATUTES ARE SUPPOSED TO BE "STRICTLY" INTERPRETED

PRECISE LANGUAGE IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT - SUPER IMPORTANT

"VOID" FOR VAGUENESS = VOID FOR INTENTONAL FRAUD TO SUBJECT US

"NO ONE" MAY BE REQUIRED TO "SPECULATE" + "ALL" ARE ENTITLED TO BE INFORMED

Justice MURPHY (Supreme Court of the United States) dissenting:

WAKE UP TO THEIR "TREACHERY" = CONCEAL = FRAUD - TO SUBJECT US TO STEAL USING CODE

"STRICTLY" CONSTRUED AGAINST GOVERNMENT AND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT

CONNOR, Justice (Supreme Court of Alaska):

THE VERY WORDS WOULD BE USED + NO ACT OF CONGRESS IS OF ANY VALIDITY

EACH STATUTE INCORPORATES 'CONSTITUTIONAL' LAW! = 'POSTULATES AND PRINCIPLES' ETC.

GREAT DUTY OF GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN THEIR PURITY

THE PEOPLE - MUST BE UNMISTAKABLY IN THE STATUTE.

HE 'MUST BE ACQUITTED' UNLESS "HE" IS 'PROVEN' TO BE GUILTY OF 'EVERY' ELEMENT

We the People of the United States’ in Order to form a more perfect

MATTHEWS, J. (Supreme Court of the United States):

PROFOUNDLY - THE "ONLY TRUE SOURCE" OF POWER

DAVIDSON, P.J. (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas) concurring:

THE PEOPLE ARE THE MASTERS OF ALL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

'ALL' GOVERNMENTAL POWERS STEM FROM WE THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN PEOPLE

Justice KENNEDY (Supreme Court of the United States) concurring:

PEOPLE MEANS THE SUPREME POWER

THE CREATURE CANNOT RULE ITS SUPREME SOVEREIGN CREATORS

SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE

THE SUPREME POWER CANNOT BE COMPELLED BY COURT PROCESS - OF ITS CREATURE

STRICTLY: A GOVERNMENT 'OF' LAWS - NOT OF MEN

GOVERNMENT OF LAWS - NOT OF MEN

A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS - AND OF PRINCIPLE(S)

THE CONSTITUTION IS THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MIGHTY SOVEREIGN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTION IS SUPERIOR TO ADMINISTRATION NOT ADMINISTRATION TO THE CONSTITUTION

"THIS CONSTITUTION 'SHALL' BE THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND"