PROJECT REPORT ON

RANDHIR SINGH
V/S.
UNION OF INDIA

SERVICE LAW

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Ms. TANMEET KAUR SACHIN KUMAR
SERVICE LAW BALLB (HONS.)
UILS, PU 8 TH SEM
SEC- B, 79/16

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Apart from the efforts of myself, the success of any project depends largely on the encouragement
and guidelines of many others. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the people who
have been instrumental in the successful completion of this project. I would like to show my
greatest appreciation to M/s. Tanmeet Kaur. I can’t say thank you enough for her tremendous
support and help. I feel motivated and encouraged every time I attend her class. Without her
encouragement and guidance this project would not have materialized. The guidance and support
received from all the members who contributed and who are contributing to this project, was vital
for the success of the project. I am grateful for their constant support and help.

Moreover, I would like to acknowledge my family and friends for the guidance and support they
give. The effort is as much is theirs as is mine.

SACHIN KUMAR
BALLB (HONS.)
8TH SEM
79/16

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………...4

EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK…………………………..……5

CASE LAW………...…………………………………….…………6

RANDHIR SINGH V/S UOI……………….…………………………6- 10

BENCH ……………………………………………………………………………….…….6

FACTS……………………………………………………………………….………….……6

ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY PETITIONER……………………………………………7

ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY RESPONDENT………………………………….……….8

JUDGMENT…………………………………………………………………………..……….9

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………….11

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………..12

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 INTRODUCTION

In our system of jurisprudence, we are governed by the constitution. But the constitution is what
the judges say it is. Therefore, judicial precedents are oxygen, which not only activises, but also
concretizes and materializes the citizen’s rights slumbering in the provisions of Directive
Principles of State Policy, enshrined in part IV of the constitution.

The Indian constitution is founded on the bedrock of balance between the Fundamental Rights
and the Directive Principles. The Fundamental Rights are enforceable by the courts, while the
Directive Principles are not, but they are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country
and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws. As a natural or
necessary corollary, it follows that the Directive Principles of “equal pay for equal work” for both
men and women as contained in Article 39 (d) of the constitution, by itself is not enforceable by
the court, but when it is read along with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 and
Article 16 of the constitution of India, then it becomes enforceable by the courts on the ground of
unreasonable discrimination.

Thus, judicial precedents concretized and crystallized through constructive and creative
interpretation have contributed new dimensions and wide horizons to the evaluation and
development of constitutional jurisprudence to the effect that even though the principles of “equal
pay for equal work” is not expressly declared to be fundamental right, yet it attains the status of
fundamental rights, if it is read along with Article 14 and 16 of the constitution. Therefore, judicial
precedents are not only integral, but seminal, fundamental and central to the evaluation and
development of constitutional jurisprudence of the country.

It has been laid down in recent decisions of this court that for the purpose of determining the
reasonableness of the restriction imposed on fundamental rights, the court may legitimately take
into account the Directive Principles and where executive action is taken or legislation enacted for
the purpose of giving effect to a Directive Principles, the restriction imposed by it on a
Fundamental Right may be presumed to be reasonable 1.

1
Jacob M. Puthupurambil & others V. Kerala Water Authority & Others (1991) 1 SCC 28.

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 EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK

The principle of equal pay for equal work is contained in clause (d) of Article 39 of the Indian
Constitution which envisages that the state shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing
that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women. This principle implies that where
all things are equal, that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding
identical posts may not be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because they belong
to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and
the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be
heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the
nomenclature is the same.

In Randhir Singh v. Union of India2 the supreme court held the principle of equal pay for equal
work though not a fundamental right is certainly a constitutional goal and therefore capable of
enforcing through constitutional remedies under article 32 of the constitution. The doctrine of
equal pay for equal work is applicable to persons employed on a daily wager are entitled to the
same wages as other permanent employees in the department employed to do the identical work.

Equal pay for equal work finds it’s placed in the directive principles of state policy and it is an
accompaniment of equality cause enshrined in article 14 and 16 of the constitution of India.
Nevertheless, the abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work cannot be read in article 14.
Reasonable classification based on intelligible criteria, having a nexus to the object sought to be
achieved, is permissible.

Accordingly, it has been held in the State of A.P. and others v. G.Sreenivasa Rao and others3, that
“Equal pay for equal work” does not mean that all the members of the cadre must receive the same
pay packet, irrespective of their seniority, source of recruitment, educational qualifications and
various others incidents of service. It was further held that ordinary grant of higher pay to a junior
would ex-facie be arbitrary, but the equality doctrine cannot be invoked where there is the
justifiable ground of doing so.

2
1982 AIR 879.
3
1989 SCC (2) 290.

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 CASE LAW

Randhir Singh……………………………………………………………………..Petitioner

V/S.

Union of India…………………..…………………………………………………Defendant

BENCH:

REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

SEN, A.P. (J)

ISLAM, BAHARUL (J)

FACTS:

 The petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi Police Force. After his discharge from
the army question of his employment as a driver in Delhi Police Force was considered, he
was asked to appear for a test of proficiency in driving, directed to produce a Civil Heavy
Transport Driving License, selected thereafter as a driver in Delhi Police Force under the
category "Employment of Ex-serviceman in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Constable)."
 He was designated as Constable, because for the purposes of the discipline of the Force
and appointment as driver in the Delhi Police Force he had to be made a member of the
Delhi Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force.
 The scale of pay in the Delhi Police Force is for non-matriculate drivers Rs. 210-270 and
for matriculate drivers 225-308. The scale of pay of a driver in the Railway Protection
Force is Rs. 260-400. The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission
is Rs. 260-300 while the drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade and the Department
of Light House is Rs. 330-480.

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  The petitioner and other driver constables made a representation to the authorities that their
case was omitted to be considered separately by the Third Pay Commission and that their
pay scales should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments. As
their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with success, the petitioner filed an
application for the issue of a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution.
 The Hon’ble court allowed the petition.

ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY PETITIONER:

 The petitioner argued that his scale of pay should at least be the same as the scale of pay
of other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration and that he discharges the same
duties as the rest of the drivers in the other offices; in fact he claimed that he discharges
more onerous duties than the others.
 Further, The Pay Commission, while considering the question of the scales of pay of
drivers, separated the case of constable-drivers on the ground that their case would be
considered along with the cases of other police personnel. The petitioner argued that while
considering the question of the scales of pay of the police personnel, the Pay Commission
failed to consider the drivers as a separate category and ignored the special considerations
which prevailed in the case of drivers in other departments and which should have,
therefore, prevailed in the case of driver-constables also.
 And it was argued further that their duties were no less arduous and their responsibilities
no less heavy than the duties and responsibilities of drivers in other departments. As a
matter of fact their hours of work were long and inconvenient and there was constant
exposure to security risks.
 The petitioner and other driver-constables made a representation to the authorities that their
case was omitted to be considered separately by the Pay Commission and that their scales
of pay should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments. But their
claims for better scales of pay did not meet with any success

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ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY RESPODENT:

 In the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, it was argued that the petitioner was
no more and no less than a constable of the Delhi Police Force and that there was no such
category of Drivers in the Delhi Police Force.
 That there can be no comparison between the different departments of the Government of
India for the purpose of fixation of pay scale. A pay scale has been fixed upon consideration
of various factors. The pay scales of the drivers of the Delhi Police has been fixed after
duly considering all the circumstances.
 The drivers in the other departments are not similarly situated as the petitioner and there
was no question of any hostile discrimination. It was, denied that the drivers have been
treated as a separate class. It was also denied that the designation of the petitioner is ‘N. T.
Driver (Constable)’.
 The respondent side presented the case of Binoy Kumar Mukerjee v. Union of India4,
Makhan Singh v. Union of India & Ors 5. Where reference was made to the observations of
this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India6 describing the principle of equal
pay for equal work as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Art. 14.
 That, equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive
Government and expert bodies and court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
 That, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our
Constitution to be a fundamental right.

JUDGMENT:

The Hon’ble court on the question of the appointment of the petitioner as “constable” in the police
force observed, the investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a
police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.

4
ILR 1973 Delhi 427
5
ILR 1975 Delhi 227
6
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1139

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The Hon’ble court conceded to that, the equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily
for the Executive Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but
observed that, where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same,
persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely
because they belong to different departments.

Further court held that, the principle, "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one
of substance. And stated that, Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India 7 is not itself of any real
assistance to court since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for
different grades of a service. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a
service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being
a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade,
which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably
sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle
of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art. 14 if sought to be
applied to them.

Further court observed that the principle of ’equal pay for equal work’ is not expressly declared
by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art. 39(d)
of the Constitution proclaims ’equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive
Principle of State Policy. ’Equal pay for equal work for both men and women’ means equal pay
for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive principles, as has been pointed
out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter
of interpretation. Art. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there shall be equality of
opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under
the State.

The court clearly stated that, “These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to
everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean
nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality

7
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1139

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clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure
prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with
tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental policy in the matter of grant of
licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the
empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature,
leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like,
mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the
equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The preamble to the
Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a
Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word ’Socialist’ must mean something. Even
if it does not mean ’To each according to his need’, it must at least mean ’equal pay for equal
work’.”

Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Art. 39(d) court was of the view
that the principle ’Equal pay for Equal work’ is deducible from those Article and may be properly
applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification
though these drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.

And regard to case concerned the court held that, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers
in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the
Delhi Administration and the Central Government. Court, therefore, allowed the Writ Petition and
directed the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the drivers-constables of the
Delhi Police Force at least on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The
scale of pay was made effective from 1st January, 1973, the date from which the recommendations
of the Pay Commission were given effect.

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 CONCLUSION

From the analysis of the various decisions of the High Courts and Supreme Court of India, it can
be said that since the independence of country to the late 1980s the court does not lean in favour
of workers point of view. But after landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Randhir Singh vs.
Union of India8 in 1982 which recognized the doctrine of equal pay for equal work in India and
said that doctrine is not a mere demagogic slogan but it is constitutional goal capable of being
achieved through constitutional remedies by enforcement of fundamental right. Article 39(d) of
the constitution proclaims, as a directive principle, the constitutional goal of equal pay for equal
work for both men and women. Article 14 and 16 of the constitution of India guaranteed
respectively the fundamental right to equality before the law and equality of opportunity in the
matter of public employment and Article 32 of the constitution provides remedy for the
enforcement of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court had adopted sociological and sympathetic
towards workers. Now we can say that the attitude of the Supreme Court has changed from strict
interpretation to liberal interpretation i.e. from employers friendly to employees friendly.

8
AIR 1997 SCW 1980.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Narinder Kumar, “Law relating to Government Services and Management of Discipline

Proceedings”, Allahabad Law Agency.
 https://main.sci.gov.in/judgments accessed on 20th March 2020 at 4:30 PM.
 https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/9925.pdf accessed on 20th March 2020 at 4:35 PM.

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