&

in TORTS and DAMAGES

Submitted to

Atty. Raymiejella R. Sususco-Viagedor

Submitted by

Denise Lucille Dublado

Krisjan Marie Osabel
Deirdre Jo Marie Taala
Erika Torrefiel
Vivian Tan
 Donaldson, Sim & Co. vs. Smith, Bell & Co.
G.R. No. 411, April 23, 1902

Facts

Luis R. Yangco leased his building (warehouse) to the military government of the
United States in July 1899. This was subleased to Smith and the defendants under an
arrangement. Yangco objected to the occupancy of the defendants and a letter was
addressed to them stating that they failed to show that they had any right to the
occupancy of the building and they were requested to vacate. On April 30, the lease of
Yangco to the government was terminated by mutual consent. Then on May 1, Yangco
leased the buildings to Donaldson and plaintiffs for one year. On the same day,
Donaldson notified the defendants of the lease and requested them to vacate. The
defendants declined and continued occupancy of the warehouses until May 14. An action
to recover damages was filed. The lower court ruled in favor of the defendants, and the
plaintiffs appealed.

Issue

Whether the defendants have failed to perform any duty which they owed to the
plaintiffs

Ruling

Whatever rights the plaintiffs had from the second day of May to the 14 th,
originated and depended upon their contract with Yangco. Not having entered into
possession under their lease, they had acquired no rights in the leased property. Article
1560 of the Civil code which gives the lessee a direct action against a trespasser, is
confined to the case of an actual interference with the lessee’s use of the property. Here
such use by the plaintiffs had not begun when the alleged wrongs were committed.

Article 1902 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the plaintiffs, established the general
principle of liability for damage caused by fault or negligence, but there can be no fault
or negligence where, as in the present case there was no obligation resting upon the
person causing the damage to exercise diligence as respects the injured person.

Failure to establish any legal relation between the parties, giving rise to rights in
the plaintiffs and corresponding duties on the part of the defendants, as respects the
occupancy of the buildings in question is fatal to the plaintiff’s recovery in this action.
Their remedy, if they have any, is against the lessor under Articles 1554 and 1556 of the
Civil Code and not the defendants.
 Honorio Bulao vs. Court of Appeals, RTC Judge
Francisco Villarta and Santiago Belleza
G.R. No. 101983, February 1, 1993
Facts

Santiago Belleza filed a complaint for damages against Honorio Bulao for
constructing a dam which diverted the flow of the water such that the lands of Belleza
dried up and rice plants withered and died. The MTC ordered Bulao to pay P6,000 for
unrealized harvest, P2,625 for unrealized share from the harvest and P2,000 for attorney’s
fees. Bulao argued that the court has no jurisdiction over the case. The National Water
Resources Council has jurisdiction because it involved rights in the utilization of water.

Issue

Whether the private respondent’s complaint in Civil Case 70 is an action for

damages predicated on a quasi-delict

Ruling

The Supreme Court held that the true nature of the action filed must first be
determined. The case at bar is not a case of water rights or appropriation, utilization and
control of water. The case is an action for damages predicated on quasi-delict. A quasi-
delict has the following elements:

1. The damages suffered by the plaintiff;

2. The act or omission of the defendant supposedly constituting
fault or negligence; and
3. The causal connection between the act and damage sustained by
the plaintiff.

All the elements are present in the case. The damage claimed to have been
sustained by Belleza consists of his loss of harvest and consequent loss of income. The act
constituting the fault is the malicious construction of a dam and diversion of the flow of
water. The said acts caused the interruption of water passing through Belleza’s land
towards Bulao’s land, resulting in the destruction of Belleza’s rice plants. The averments
in the complaint plainly make out a case of quasi-delict that may be the basis of an action
for damages.
 Zenaida Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009

Facts

Respondents Emma J. Datuin (Datuin) and Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio) filed
an affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) against
petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio), a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. Datuin and
Sansio claimed that Gregorio delivered insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for
appliances Alvi Marketing bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then indicted for three
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 3,
Manila. The MTC issued a warrant of arrest and she was subsequently arrested by armed
operatives while visiting her family house in Quezon City.

On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for Deferment of
Arraignment and Reinvestigation. She alleged that she could not have issued the bounced
checks as she did not have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were
drawn. This was certified by the manager of the said bank. Gregorio also alleged that the
signature on the bounced checks were radically and patently different from her own
signature. The MTC granted the motion, and a reinvestigation was conducted.
Subsequently, the MTC ordered the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed.

On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and
Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Part of her
complaint was that as a result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered
helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being distraught. Datuin and Sansio
meanwhile filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Gregorio’s complaint arose from
grounds of compensation arising from malicious prosecution. On October 10, 2000, the
RTC denied this Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was again denied in January 5, 2001. They went to the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the RTC
in denying their motions to dismiss and for reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA
rendered a Decision granting the petition and ordering Gregorio’s damage suit to be
dismissed.

Issue

Whether Sansio and Datuin are liable for damages to Gregorio

Ruling

Yes, they are liable.

It appears that Gregorio's rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy,

and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the
requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse
of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed
to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to
controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not
able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St.,
Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint,
Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city
residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She suffered
embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to
spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering
that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the
public service.

There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other
hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its
vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.

Also, Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorio's complaint is
based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for malicious
prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by
legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing
that the charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her. As
previously mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact
that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her action based on
quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was entitled to moral
damages, considering that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation
on account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.
 Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Spouses Reynaldo and
Maria Luisa Tanjangco, and Spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso
G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008

Facts

Respondent spouses Tanjangco and Cuaso’s lots were adjacent to each other. The
Cuasos constructed their house, the perimeter fence of which encroached the lot of
Tanjangcos. The lot owners were not able to reach to an amicable settlement. Thus, the
Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed
and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for
Recovery of Possession with Damages.

Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against Corinthian, C.B.

Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to
ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to
undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos
also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without
verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and
competence.

The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty,
they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the
Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also beheld answerable for any damages that they
might incur as a result of such construction.

Issue

Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so, whether
such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos

Ruling

Yes, Corinthian is negligent. Its approval of the plan is tainted with negligence.

The instant case is obviously one for tort, as governed by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which provides that “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred. A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a
lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an
unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person,
an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent
person in the actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such
an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more
careful manner.

The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.

By this test, the Court find Corinthian negligent. Indeed, it is clear that Corinthian
failed to exercise the requisite diligence in insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual
of Rules and Regulations, thereby resulting in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos
property.

In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter

wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence
and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos
 Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992

Facts

A stabbing incident caused the death of 3rd year student Carlitos Bautista, while in
the premises of the Philippines School of Business Administration (PSBA) which
prompted the former’s parents to file a suit for damages against PSBA for their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before,
during and after the attack on the victim. His Assailants were not members of the school’s
academic community but were elements from outside the school.

Petitioners sought to have the suit dismissed, since they are presumably sued
under Art 2180 of the New Civil Code which provides that academic institutions such as
themselves are beyond the ambit of the said rule. The RTC denied petitioners’ motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Hence, this petition.

Issue

Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student

Ruling

No, PSBA is not liable.

When an academic institution accepts student for enrollment, there is established

a contract between them, resulting in a bilateral obligation which both parties are bound
to comply with.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation

between the petitioner and the victim, the rules on quasi-delicts do not really govern. A
perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or torts, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this
Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Further, in the case of Air France v. Carroscoso, private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwanted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline.
Said case is an authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. It can be concluded that
should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and is violative of Article
21, then there is a cause to view that act as constituting a quasi-delict.
 In the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing
proper security measure. And even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach contractual obligation only. The negligence of the school
would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only
because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. Thus, a contractual
relation is a condition sine qua non to the school’s liability. The negligence of the school
cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students

against all risks. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of
violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed,
the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious
deed inside school premises. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability
by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence.
 Air France vs. Rafael Carrascoso and Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966

Facts

A civil engineer by profession, Rafael Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48

Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. He then paid for and
was issued a “First class” ticket by Air France from Manila to Rome. During a stopover
in Bangkok, the manager of Air France asked him to vacate his seat because a white man
has a “better right” than him. At first, Carrascoso protested, but, as things got heated up,
he was asked by the other Filipinos on board to give up his seat and transfer in the tourist
class. After the trip, Carrascoso sued Air France for the embarrassment and
inconvenience he suffered.

The RTC awarded damages to the plaintiff which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Air France assailed the decision. According to them, the issuance of a first-class
ticket does not guarantee Carrascoso a seat in the first Class.

Issue

Whether or not Air France is liable to Carrascoso for damages

Ruling

Yes, they are liable.

The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first-class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment just to give way
to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad
faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code states that “any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for
an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have
a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
Analysis of the Cases

In Donaldson, the Court ratiocinated that an action for damages against an

occupant of buildings who unlawfully detains the same will not lie in favor of a lessee of
said buildings who has never entered into possession under his lease, because there is no
privity between the parties. Applying said principle in the case at bar, plaintiff Donaldson
cannot claim for damages against Smith for the alleged illegal occupancy of the latter.
There is no relationship between Donaldson and Smith when the alleged wrongs were
committed. It is true that one can claim for damages arising from fault or negligence of
the other party, however the Supreme Court clarified that but there can be no fault or
negligence, like in the present case, where there was no obligation resting upon the
person causing the damage to exercise diligence as respects the injured person. Thus,
failure to establish any legal relation between the parties, giving rise to rights in the
plaintiffs and corresponding duties on the part of the defendants, as respects the
occupancy of the buildings in question is fatal to the plaintiff’s recovery in this action.

Whereas in Bulao, the petitioner argued that the present case involves water and
water rights and is thus a water dispute. However, it is well-settled that the allegations
of fact set forth in the complaint and not the prayer for relief will determine the nature of
an action. From a reading of the private respondent's complaint in Civil Case 70 that it is
an action for damages predicated on a quasi-delict. All the elements of quasi-delict are
present specifically in paragraphs 5, 7 and 8 thereof. The damage claimed to have been
sustained by private respondent consists of his loss of harvest and consequent loss of
income. The act constituting the fault is the alleged malicious construction of a dam and
diversion of the flow of water by the petitioner. The said acts allegedly caused the
interruption of water passing through petitioner's land towards respondent's lands,
resulting in the destruction of the respondent's rice plants. The averments of the
complaint plainly make out a case of quasi-delict that may be the basis of an action for
damages.

In Gregorio, the complaint, read in its entirety, is based on quasi-delict under

Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious
prosecution. The Court explained that in an action to recover damages for malicious
prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by
legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing
that the charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her. However,
the petitioner did not allege this in her complaint. Her claim for damages was grounded
on the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she was suddenly arrested at
her city residence knowing that she is a public figure. Hence, she must be compensated.

Whereas in Corinthian, the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos was attributed to

petitioner Corinthian’s negligence when it failed to prevent the encroachment of the
Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted.
Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by
claiming that its approval of the Cuasos building plans was only limited to a so-called
table inspection; and not actual site measurement. To accept some such postulate is to
put a premium on negligence. Corinthian was not organized solely for the defendants
Cuasos. It is also the subdivision of the plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos and of all others
who have their dwelling units or abodes therein. It is not just or equitable to relieve
Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all
its members to the end that no new construction can be started unless the plans are
approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees
are paid. Thus, such negligence is obviously one for tort, as governed by Article 2176 of
the Civil Code

In PSBA, there was no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measure.
And even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach
contractual obligation only. The negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a
contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. Thus, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school’s liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the
Civil Code. Thus, the school is not liable for damages.

However, in Air France, private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwanted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. Said case is an
authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. It can be concluded that should the act
which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative to Art 21, then there is a
cause to view that act as constituting a quasi-delict.