Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

China’s ‘Coronavirus
Diplomacy’ – An Assessment
Carlyle A. Thayer
April 6, 2020

Here are our questions with respect to China's 'Coronavirus Diplomacy':

Q1. Do you think China has portrayed to the world that it has now successfully
contained the virus and is therefore winning the coronavirus narrative? Also, is China
in a position to provide leadership and material support to countries, including
European countries and the United States, to deal with their virus situation? What
does China expect to get back from each country?
ANSWER: China now owns and directs the international coronavirus narrative. It is
giving medical equipment and supplies as well as providing experienced specialist
medical advice to nearly ninety countries. China is the largest manufacturing hub for
face masks, gloves and other protective equipment. In contrast, the United States has
to buy ventilators from China.
President Xi Jin-ping has assumed the role of world stateman in calling for regional
and global cooperation to contain COVID-19. China is also playing a multilateral game,
for example, by working through ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea)
and ASEAN itself.
China wants recognition of its role as the first country to contain COVID-19. That is
why its leaders reacted so strongly when President Trump and his advisers described
the COVID-19 as the ‘Wuhan virus’ or the ‘China virus.” Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo’s attempt to insert ‘Wuhan virus’ into the Group of 7 (G7) joint statement
particularly incensed the Chinese. Pompeo was unsuccessful.
China wants to encourage domestic economic activity by reviving its supply chains and
getting restrictions on international travel lifted as soon as possible. China also seeks
to staunch the haemorrhage of foreign investment flowing out of the country. Finally,
an unstated motivation, China wants to contrast its altruism with that of the inward-
looking United States.
Basically, few countries dare criticise China for its mishandling of the coronavirus and
one by one they have begun offering praise to Beijing. China wants recognition of its
role as a global leader.
Q2. Is China’s 'coronavirus diplomacy', as you called it, framing the narrative? Has
China been planning this all along? Or do you think it is just their brilliant ability to turn
a bad situation into a good opportunity to cement Xi Jin-ping’s role as a global leader?
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ANSWER: Chinese officials were initially as blindsided as their foreign counterparts

when the coronavirus broke out in Wuhan. They underestimated its nature and
lethality. They also underestimated the extent to which the coronavirus would impact
so swiftly and negatively on both China’s and the global economy. This was a serious
threat as China’s economy was already slowing due to its tariff war with the United
States.
Beijing’s leaders were highly successful in countering the U.S. narrative of putting
the blame on China. It is unlikely that China’s leaders could have foreseen this turn
of events and planned in advance the information warfare campaign they later
unleashed. If authoritarian states and their leaders are good at one thing, it is
conducting a propaganda campaign. China has long had the ‘three warfares’ in its
stable – public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.
Q3. Do you think that the perceived global leadership positions have changed between
China and the U.S. in connection with the coronavirus outbreak – specifically
comparing the attitudes of Xi Jin-ping and Donald Trump as well as the way each
leader managed the outbreak?
ANSWER: Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus, several surveys of Southeast Asian
influencers were carried out. The most extensive survey was conducted by the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore in late 2019. It asked 1,308
respondents who was the most influential political and strategic power in Southeast
Asia. More than half picked China, while only 27 percent nominated the United States.
Of those who picked China a whopping 85% expressed concern about China’s rising
influence.
When asked which country would exert the most leadership in maintaining a rules-
based order and upholding international law, the U.S. ranked second after the
European Union.
Most crucially, when asked to pick whether China or the U.S. would have the most
impact on ASEAN’s future, 54 percent picked the United States while 46 percent said
China. However, when asked to assess U.S. engagement with the region, 77 percent
opined that it had decreased or decreased significantly.
Finally, when asked is the U.S. a reliable strategic partner, 47 percent replied they had
little or no confidence in the United States, while 35 percent has some or full
confidence in the U.S.
If these polls were taken today it is likely that most respondents would change their
evaluation and be much more positive towards China and positive views of the U.S.
would drop.
The U.S. is playing catch up after repeated no shows by President Trump at ASEAN and
ASEAN related summit meetings including the East Asia Summit.
Xi Jin-ping has adopted a proactive outward looking ‘coronavirus diplomacy’. Trump
has pursued an ‘Americas first strategy’ and has had to rely on China as one of its
major suppliers of ventilators and other medical supplies. The U.S. has offered ASEAN
members a grand total of US $18.3 million in public health assistance. Also, the United
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States has only committed itself to provide needed medical equipment once U.S.
needs are met.
In February, China attended two high-level meetings to deal with COVID-19, a
convocation of public health ministers from the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South
Korea) countries and a meeting of foreign ministers from China and ASEAN member
states. In contrast, the U.S. and ASEAN held a High-Level Interagency Video
Conference to Counter COVID-19 at deputy minister level on 1 April. The United States
proposed future video conferences of foreign ministers and ministers responsible for
public health.
Q4. With respect to the South China Sea, has the U.S. lost its position as well as the
battle in this region?
ANSWER: There are two separate issues raised by this question. The first is: has the
U.S. lost it naval predominance? The answer is no the U.S. continues to conduct
freedom of navigation operational patrols, continuous naval presence patrols and
continuous bomber presence overflights. The U.S. Navy recently conducted a live
firing exercise.
However, the outbreak of the coronavirus on the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the
sacking of its skipper is a public relations disaster and an operational setback. It will
be some time before a similar carrier strike group can be assembled for South China
Sea duties.
The second is: can the U.S. enlist its allies and other strategic partners in a coalition to
push back against China? Some point to the emergence of the Quad Plus involving
Australia, India, Japan and the United States with new partners New Zealand, South
Korea and Vietnam as evidence that such a network is emerging. The Quad Plus has
held two virtual meetings both focused solely on cooperation to mitigate the
coronavirus. It is premature to conclude that the Quad represents any meaningful ant-
China strategic network.
In the meantime, China has already consolidated and militarized its seven artificial
islands in the South China Sea. As the July-October 2019 standoff between China and
Vietnam at Vanguard Bank revealed, China is now using these islands as forward
operating bases. This year China conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise and
take offs and landings from the Liaoning aircraft carrier in the northern South China
Sea.
The Philippines’ decision to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement is a body blow to
the United States. When it comes into effect the U.S. will lose access to strategically
located bases close to the South China Sea. China, meanwhile, will keep its Navy, Coast
Guard, Maritime Militia and fishing fleet on permanent deployment.
Q5. How do you think the COVID-19 outbreak will affect Vietnam’s inclination to inch
towards a stronger relationship with the U.S. and become less dependent on China?
Or, will Vietnam’s relationship with China become stronger after this pandemic?
ANSWER: As long as the United States is preoccupied with containing the coronavirus,
the economic irritants in Vietnam’s relations with the United States will remain in
abeyance. Even after the coronavirus is contained, there will be a period of global
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recovery that will command U.S. attention. Vietnam will, of necessity, attempt to gain
Washington’s ear to address Vietnam’s trade imbalance and in the process get the
U.S. to lift its designation of Vietnam as a ‘non-market economy’ and end U.S. tariff
restrictions on shrimp, catfish and steel.
Vietnam is likely to sweeten the pot by a tactical shift towards increasing defence
engagement with the U.S. This may have been signalled by Vietnam’s willingness to
participate in the Quad Plus. This is turn could lead to opening discussions on raising
bilateral relations to a strategic partnership. But the coronavirus fiasco involving the
USS Theodore Roosevelt may result in U.S. reticence to push for another port visit by
a nuclear carrier and long as the coronavirus remains a threat.
China’s recent involvement in the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat will further
inflame anti-China sentiment in Vietnam. It was notable that the U.S. issued a
statement criticizing China. This may be a straw in the wind signalling a gradual step
up in defence engagement.
Having said that, both China and Vietnam have a major interest in seeing the
resumption of economic and commercial ties through the revival of their supply
chains. Maintaining ‘diversified and multilateral relations’ among the major powers
has been the sine qua non of Vietnam’s foreign policy for nearly three decades.
Vietnam wants to give China and the United States equity in Vietnam’s development.
In turn, Vietnam promises not to align with any major power against the other.
Vietnam needs the U.S. to balance China but Vietnam does not want to be trapped
into an anti-China partnership with the U.S. At the same time, Vietnam does not want
to be a supplicant to China.
Q6. How do you explain that some of China’s shipments of medical supplies and
equipment has been returned to China from several countries because of faulty parts
and other defects? In its efforts to exert global leadership during this crisis, how did
China let this happen, and does this affect China’s credibility and undermine its
'coronavirus diplomacy' strategy?
ANSWER: Xi Jin-ping’s high-level proactive ‘coronavirus diplomacy’ has been seriously
undermined by the sale and export of shoddy medical equipment. China will
undoubtedly pivot swiftly to address this problem. The U.S. already has inspectors in
China on the factory floor of companies that manufacture ventilators and other
medical equipment to ensure its quality. U.S. purchases from China mean less for
other nations. This will deflect somewhat from anger over China’s provision of shoddy
medical equipment. South Korea and Taiwan are likely to be the beneficiaries because
of the quality of their goods.

Nonetheless, China will gain from Xi Jin-ping’s efforts to organise a global multilateral
response. Xi extended the hand of cooperation to Donald Trump, after all. China is
now the indispensable global partner for containing COVID-19 and economic recovery
whether on its own or in tandem with the United States. Sino-U.S. cooperation will
serve to elevate Xi as a peer to Donald Trump.
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Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “China’s ‘Coronavirus Diplomacy’ – An

Assessment,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, April 6, 2020. All background
briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.