LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS CASES - 2017-18 - JUDGE RELLIN

Legal Ethics Introduction 3

Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 3
Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil 173 21
In Re: Al Argosino, 246 SCRA 14 26
In Re: Al Argosino, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997 30
In Re: Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 33
In Re: Dacanay, B.M. NO. 1678, December 17, 2007 65
Catu vs. Rellosa, AC No. 5738, 19 February 2008 67
Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer to Society 71
Canon 1 – Duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws 71
Bongalonta vs. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310 71
Moreno vs. Araneta, A.C. No. 1109, April 27, 2005 74
Abella vs. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, June 18, 2013 78
Canon 2 – Duty to be an efficient lawyer 82
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378 82
Villatuya vs. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012 101
Bar Matter No. 2012, February 10, 2009 106
Canon 3 – Duty of honest and dignified pronouncement of legal service 110
Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003 110
Canon 4 – Duty to support the improvement of the legal system 114
Canon 5 – Duty to keep abreast of legal developments 114
Bar Matter No. 850, October 2, 2001 114
Bar Matter No. 1922, June 3, 2008 122
OCA Circular No. 79-2014 122
Canon 6 – The Canons apply to lawyers in government service 123
PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 151805 (2005) 123
Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer to the Legal Profession 134
Canon 7 – Duty to uphold the dignity of the legal profession 134
In Re: Meling, B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004 134
Rule 139-A, Rules of Court 137
In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 137
Santos vs. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, Jan. 20, 2000 143
Canon 8 – Duty of professional courtesy 148
Linsangan vs. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009 148
Canon 9 – Duty to shun unauthorized practice of law 151
Noe-Lacsamana vs. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, November 23, 2011 151
Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer to the Courts 155
Canon 10 – Duty of candor, fairness, and good faith to the courts 155
Hueysuwan vs. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, Jan. 20, 2004 155
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. CA, G.R. No. 123698, Aug. 5, 1998 157
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 Canon 11 – Duty to give respect to the courts 163
In Re Almacen, GR No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970 163
Wicker vs. Arcangel, G.R. No. 112869, Jan. 29, 1996 183
Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011 188
Canon 12 – Duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice 220
Nunez vs. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 5054, May 29, 2002 220
Santiago vs. Atty. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, Oct. 5, 2004 224
Canon 13 – Duty not to influence judges 228
Lantoria vs. Atty. Bunyi, A.C. No. 1769, June 8, 1992. 228
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.159486-88, November 25, 2003 233
Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer to the Clients 238
Canon 14 – Duty to render legal service to the needy 238
Santiago vs. Fojas, Adm. Case No. 4103, September 7, 1995 238
Canon 15 – Duty of candor, fairness and loyalty to the client 243
Northwestern Univ., Inc. vs. Arquillo, A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005 243
Artezuela vs. Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002 246
PNB vs. Cedo, Adm. Case No. 3701, March 28, 1995 252
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996 255
Canon 16 – Duty to be a trustee of client’s moneys and properties 271
Unity Fishing vs. Atty. Macalino, A.C. No. 4566, December 10, 2004 271
Junio vs. Atty. Grupo, A.C. No. 5020, December 18, 2001 276
Pelmoka vs. Judge Diaz, Jr., A.C. No. 2662-CFI, November 26, 1982 281
Lemoine vs. Balon, Jr. A.C. No. 5829, October 28, 2003 285
Canon 17 – Duty of fidelity to the cause of the client 291
Rosacia vs. Atty. Bulalacao, A.C. No. 3745, October 2, 1995 291
Lorenzana Food Corp. vs. Daria, A.C. No. 2736, May 27, 1991 293
Canon 18 – Duty to serve with competence and due diligence 297
Adarne vs. Aldaba, A.C. No. 801, June 27, 1978 297
Reyes vs. Vitan, A.C. No. 5835, April 15, 2005 300
Canon 19 – Duty to serve only within the bounds of law 303
Gonzales vs. Sabacajan, Adm. Case No. 4380, October 13, 1995 303
Canon 20 – Duty to charge only fair and reasonable fees 305
Leviste vs. CA, G.R. No. L-29184, January 30, 1989 305
Licudan vs. CA, G.R. No. 91958, January 24, 1991 308
Retuya vs. Gorduiz, A.C. No. 1388, March 28, 1980 313
Ramos vs. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004 315
Director of Lands vs. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096 February 27, 1979 318
Canon 21 – Duty to preserve the client’s confidence and secrets 327
Suntay vs. Suntay, Adm. Case No. 1890, August 7, 2002 327
Canon 22 – Duty to withdraw services only for good cause and upon notice 333
Montano vs. IBP, A.M. No. 4215, May 21, 2001 333
Canoy vs. Ortiz, A.C. No. 5485, March 16, 2005 337
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Administrative Liability and Procedure against Lawyers 340
Bengco vs. Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012 340
Zaguirre vs. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003 345
Fortun vs. Quinsayas, G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013 350
Villalon, Jr. vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73751, September 24, 1986 357
Plaza vs. Amamio, A.M. No. P-08-2559, March 19, 2010 360
In re: Maquera, B.M. No. 793, July 30, 2004 365
Rule 139, Rules of Court 369
Rule 139-B, Rules of Court 369
Notarial Practice 369
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended 369
Bautista vs. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6963, February 9, 2006 370

Legal Ethics Introduction

Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of
our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,

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 including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office. cdphil

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and

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 other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney
or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of
the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted inRhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis
ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D.
Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation
of the term "practice of law." cdrep

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that 'They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar' — I am quoting from the provision — 'who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.' "

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies
and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine
Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

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 "MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."

. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less
than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois),
1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called
"associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics
[West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts
. . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.
2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and
a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many
lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the
self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). LibLex

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this
so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney
is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in

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medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift
from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both
effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important
ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of
these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate
law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing
of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating
the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information
flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing
equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional context or a
segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of
futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
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Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado

de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed
of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
LLjur

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990,
p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer
is one who surmounts them." (Business Star,"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

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These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme
for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state
is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities
but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some
cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe,
Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
identifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors
of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

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 [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made. llcd

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not to understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4).
LLpr

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
(p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
10
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986)
and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House
of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re
negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). (Emphasis supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which
in the ultimate analysis issine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule
of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver

11
 Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: 'They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.' (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: prcd

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.
This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide." (emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to
the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law."
(Emphasis supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of
those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is
the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice
of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution.Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use
of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is
what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as

12
evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law,
without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say,
on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can
the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. llcd

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins."

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-
hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what
had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury,
accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his
skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of
the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

13
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J ., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not
appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission
on Appointments — that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed — was
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by
this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only
to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to
prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide
for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification,
that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of " practice of low for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of
the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years." (Art IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63
Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting
theConstitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that
he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounded duty of this
Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,
repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot
be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business
executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a
governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public

14
 as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644, 647.) . . ." (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared,

enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It
states:

"1. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
'practice of law' (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as
to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, `all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-
L.R. 356-359).

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term `practice of law'. (Martin supra).

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN
(10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that
if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion

15
or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of
law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services."

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting his viewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on
the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review. cdrep

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to
choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is
that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be
elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless.
From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one
does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved
in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and
he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does
not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on
his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and
application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service
Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in
or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The
decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."

16
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been
engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and
economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in
his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in
Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved
that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law.
He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote
to grant the petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public
office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law
(with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the
matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how
he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. LLphil

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to
high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave
abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior
qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not
questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching
the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to
the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation
is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or
operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that
in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice
of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is

17
occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention
during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears
that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely
limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated

companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

18
 j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"

(Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice of legal services, he was the one receiving that advice
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice
of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work,
blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful. llcd

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as
having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?.

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied
with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years.".

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but
also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or
other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693;
People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E.
901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes
the practice of law. 'Practicing law' has been defined as 'Practicing as an attorney or
counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or
rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such
advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.'
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex
rel . Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901."
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776).

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently
or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

"Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: 'Very seldom.' In answer to the question as to how
many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-mine years of his
business, he said: 'I have no idea.' When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his
answer was I suppose.' Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that
he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: 'I don't recall exactly
what was said.' When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
19
 instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I don't believe so, that is
not a practice.' Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and
deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: 'I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned.'

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-
estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that

xxx xxx xxx

". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and
act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled 'attorneys in fact;' but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto
for another, without being an attorney at law.' Abb. Law Dict. 'Attorney.' 'A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, 'is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. 'The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care,
skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep
his secrets confided to him as such. . . . His rights are to be justly compensated for his
services.' Bouv. Law Dict. tit. 'Attorney.' The transitive verb 'practice,' as defined by Webster,
means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of
acts, as, to practice gaining; . . . to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory,
to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc. . . . "
(State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we
stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]): cdll

xxx xxx xxx

". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . ." (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of
the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

"1. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA log citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the
use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
20
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the
context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may
possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification
of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has
ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming
the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissents.

||| (Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, [September 3, 1991], 278 PHIL 235-274)

Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil 173

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.]

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as

Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; PRACTICE OF LAW; BEFORE PATENT OFFICE. — Practice of law in the
Philippines includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions
thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT FURTHER EXAMINATION. — A member of the bar, because of his legal
knowledge and training should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination
or other qualification.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the
Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent
Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination
of the scope and application of the patent law and other laws applicable as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved. That part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-
judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decision are under the law taken to the Supreme
Court.

21
 DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J p:

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the
rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It
would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one of the petitioner
Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring
members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office
as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing
applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and
is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body
from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before such
bodies, as in the prosecution of patent cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding
paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application
of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165,
otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which is similar to the United States Patent Law, in
accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as what
prescribed by respondent. . . . ."
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United States of America authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who may practice before the
United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding
tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the
Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so,
specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we
have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines 1 and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice
law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation
and prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and

22
 condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments,
where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney
or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of
the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I.) 179 A. 139, 144).
(Emphasis supplied)
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be conducted and all orders and decisions of the
Director of Patents have to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but
practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it
is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall
not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the
invention thereof by the inventor named in the application for patent, or if it was patented or described in
any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the application
for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year
before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to the patent belongs to the
true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, and Section 12 says that an application
for a patent may be filed only by the inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26
refer to correction of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a
patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is
authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition
for cancellation. Sections 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the
patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time
after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person may apply for the grant
of a license under a particular patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines
is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to
grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the conditions attached by him to the license,
purchase, lease or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production,
the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention
relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the
23
application of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the acts, orders and decisions
of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
". . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other
proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of
the Director."
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and
the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather
to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of
the Head of the Patent Office.
". . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences,
and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the
duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal
fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied). ". . . . The Commissioner has the only original
initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty
to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his
action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the
commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether
there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . ." (60 C. J. S. 460).
(Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold
that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before
the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he
deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the
assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the
drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a
lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required to
submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons
desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit to an examination, even if they are already
members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United
States Patent Law; and that the U. S. Patent Office in its Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office
in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and
scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
"Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of attorneys and a register of agents
are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
"(a) Attorneys at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice
before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United
States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be
admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of
attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx

24
 "(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied
by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish
to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute
and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him
to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and
assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In
order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name
placed either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must
be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed.
The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for
three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office."
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce
may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are
possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise competent to advise and assist applicants or other
persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the
Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend
or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further practice before his office any
person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with
intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective
applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by
word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall
be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the
person so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded by the district court of the United
States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the
said court may by its rules determine." (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78,Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
"SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the
form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this
important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such
authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within
the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
25
 Department Head, make all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section
338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand
that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureaus of Customs and Internal
Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to
enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving
the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus
specially the Bureaus of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or
less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also
require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for
the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence
to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and
pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ., concur.
||| (Philippine Lawyer's Association v. Agrava, G.R. No. L-12426, [February 16, 1959], 105 PHIL 173-184)

In Re: Al Argosino, 246 SCRA 14

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 712. July 13, 1995.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL

BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

Benedicto Malcontento for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE LIMITED TO CITIZENS OF GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER. — The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in those
who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard
as having persuasive effect.

26
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INQUIRY AS TO THE MORAL CHARACTER IS BROADER IN SCOPE THAN IN A DISBARMENT
PROCEEDING. — It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of
those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would
seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the
legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception
would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J p:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into
plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense
of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated
11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional
Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution
dated 14 August 1993. 1He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's
oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's
oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period
did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of
his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in
those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which
we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3

"xxx xxx xxx

This 'upright character' prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's
right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to
other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
27
 character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which
the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or
should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of
least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for
a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is
to aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx" 4

In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210
NW 710:

"It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners, as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of
the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further
argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be
exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a
lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself
therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted
for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license."

In Re Keenan: 6

"The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry
on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those
who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may
aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been
set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only
those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the
standards are allowed to remain in it."

Re Rouss: 7

"Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to
punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning,
is merely a test of fitness."

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

"Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect
the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet
what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required
to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are,
may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest
possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance,
or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to
aid in the administration of justice."

28
 It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning:
". . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
'The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of
this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after
years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the
chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace
instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his
community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.'" 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the
moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
"The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission
to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding."
Re Wells: 11
". . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has
been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the
court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects
honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that
might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment."
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open
to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan,
certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a
"neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of
them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission
to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the
bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence
that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
29
 those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known
Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must,
in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation,
of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) days from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza
and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
||| (In re of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant Argosino, B.M. No. 712
(Resolution), [July 13, 1995], 316 PHIL 43-52)

In Re: Al Argosino, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997

EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 712 . March 19, 1997.]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

SYLLABUS

1.LEGAL ETHICS; POWER OF THE COURT TO REGULATE THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The
practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn
duty of this Court not only to "weed our" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the
law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing
the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

2.ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; LAWYER'S OATH; NOT A MERE CEREMONY OR FORMALITY FOR PRACTICING
LAW; EVERY LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES WEIGH HIS ACTIONS ACCORDING TO THE LAWYER'S OATH AND
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. — After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to
allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following, admonition: In allowing Mr.Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is
persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared
to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be
faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with
the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render
legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

30
 RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J p:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his
oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of
not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment
all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on
the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying
with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the
criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a.He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his
son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but
murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of
confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b.He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of
one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday
1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also
told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.

c.As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his
law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.

d.He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar.
He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It
is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble

31
profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were
totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

". . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible
a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."
1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the
cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find
room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer. cdasia

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer' s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We
are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be
rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the
lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for
everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a
date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

||| (Re: Al Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [March 19, 1997], 336 PHIL 766-771)

32
In Re: Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405

EN BANC

[A.M. No. 93-7-696-0. February 21, 1995.]

IN RE JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO. Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CONTEMPT; DEEMED COMMITTED IN CASE OF ABUSE OF AND
INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIAL RULES AND PROCESSES, GROSS DISRESPECT TO COURTS AND JUDGES
AND IMPROPER CONDUCT DIRECTLY IMPEDING, OBSTRUCTING AND DEGRADING THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE. — Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and
judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. He
has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many
rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and
executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules,
founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he
has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly
overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to
act on his repetitions and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has wasted the time of the
courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who had the bad luck of having to act in one way
or another on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times
to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices promulgating the same, he
has mulishly persisted in ventilating that selfsame theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time,
annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OR DUTY OF THE COURT TO INSTITUTE A CHARGE FOR CONTEMPT AGAINST ITSELF,
WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE FISCAL OR PROSECUTING OFFICER; ESSENTIAL TO THE
PRESERVATION OF ITS DIGNITY AND OF THE RESPECT DUE IT FROM LITIGANT LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC.
— The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit
themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . .(and) this case should be heard
by an impartial and independent body, "is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted, arrogant and
reprehensible assumption of a competence in the field of the law: he again uses up the time of the Court
needlessly by invoking an argument long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic that the
"power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against itself, without the intervention of the
fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from
litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to
file complaints for contempt against them before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice,
courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to perform their functions with dispatch and
absolute independence. The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons
guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is
that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by
himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . . "

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF EXPRESSION, AND TO

PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES; NOT A JUSTIFICATION FOR REPETITIOUS
LITIGATION OF THE SAME CAUSES OR ISSUES, FOR INSULTING LAWYERS, JUDGES, COURT EMPLOYEES AND
FOR ABUSING COURT PROCESSES. — The Constitutional rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to
petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III, 1987
Philippine Constitution) and in accordance with the accountability of public officials invoked by him afford no
33
justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court
employees and other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and
bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

4. ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — The facts and
issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the principles governing finality
of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down definite
postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants — like
Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute
for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR COURTS; JUDICIAL HIERARCHY. — Courts exist in every civilized society for the
settlement of controversies. In every country there is a more or less established hierarchical organization of
courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments and final orders of lower courts. The
judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the
parties — a trial or hearing in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher
tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and legal issues through briefs or
memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the
courts.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARAMOUNT NEED TO END LITIGATION AT SOME POINT. — It is withal of the essence of the
judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for
lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no
further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing
parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment,
indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy
demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon
accorded absolute finality. As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, a
party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer Frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right."

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS OF SUPREME COURT, NOT REVIEWABLE. — The sound, salutary and self-evident
principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not
be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has
spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other
entity, much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or
conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. This, on the
indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle. In an
extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt by a
lawyer to prosecute before the Tanodbayan "members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having
knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in
violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code . . . and for deliberately causing 'undue injury' to respondent .
. . and her co-heirs because of the 'unjust Resolution' promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act . . ." — the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established doctrine:" . . . As
aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto,
'(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great department of government entrusted
exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No
other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust."' It is elementary that "(A)s
has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) 'controlling and
irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional
error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite
time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of
the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion
of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to
controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the

34
parties.' (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317) . . . Indeed, resolutions
of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled
to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of
enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that '(I)t is well settled
that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by
the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully
sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment
or curative legislation, not by judicial decree' is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders,
resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350).
(CitingPrimicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA
1) The Court has consistently stressed that the 'doctrine ofseparation of powers calls for the executive,
legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit' (Tan vs. Macapagal,
43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the
President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from
speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting
the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three
departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287)"

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OF LOWER COURTS NOT REVIEWABLE EVEN BY
SUPREME COURT. — In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law
to a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration)
under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether
questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar rules and
conformably with the hierarchy of courts. Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that
it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through
the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, should
judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals — become final and
executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to
modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher
court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of Government.

9. ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST JUDGE, NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR APPEAL;
PROSCRIBED BY LAW AND LOGIC. — The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a
regrettable increase in the resort to administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or criminal action
— as a substitute for or supplement to appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies
operates as a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a
reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency, administrative complaints are being presented to the Office
of the Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public
prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial
judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court. Many of these complaints set
forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or
interlocutory orders — i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law
or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and
compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of this sort quite
obviously entails a common requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the
decision or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic
premise for a pronouncement of liability.

10. ID.; ID.; EXCLUSIVITY OF SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR CORRECTION OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS. — The
question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed recourses
for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for appeal, may nonetheless

35
simultaneously seek also such administrative or criminal remedies. Given the nature of the judicial function,
the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, the
question submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. Simple
reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have only
intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final
and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing
judge would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an
incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned
disposition is erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal
litigation, a possibility hereafter more fully explored. Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is
not, as already pointed out, within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly
or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review
— by appeal or special civil action — is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be
exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and
procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.
This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and executory. Such
judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or
authority.

11. ID.; ID.; ONLY COURTS AUTHORIZED UNDER FIXED RULES TO DECLARE JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS
ERRONEOUS OR UNJUST. — To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgment or order is
unjust — or was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had
exceeded his jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially
judicial function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the
highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service or any other branch, nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial
order or decision — whether final and executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for
a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to
the courts alone.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRARY RULE RESULTS IN CIRCUITOUSNESS AND LEADS TO ABSURD CONSEQUENCES. —
Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments or
interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the
decisions or interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted by
grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or immorality, or other
wrongdoing. To allow institution of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in
a futile and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences. Assume that a case goes through the whole
gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed
and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed
by the Court of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the
Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the original decision (for
knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that
the Office of the Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary investigation,
not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication that the decisions or
orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an act of supreme
arrogance and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public
prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in question — despite
its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels — and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four
(4) courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of
such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial
Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the
antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness of the judgment in question,
already passed upon and finally resolved by the same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.
36
Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal
action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the
offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction. The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the
case may be modified, and regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative Proceeding that is
availed of as the vehicle to Prosecute the judge for supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.

13. ID.; ID.; PRIMORDIAL REQUISITES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. — This is not to say
that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or
interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that
there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be alsoevidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or
inexcusable negligence; on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order. That final declaration is
ordinarily contained in the Judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial
court in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged. What immediately comes to mind in this
connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal action, as to which — the same being
unappealable — it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or even public-spirited
citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such charges as they might see fit to press that it was
unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even
in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly
unjust character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an
action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment, as having been
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of
due process to the prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court
against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal action
against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.

14. ID.; ID.; JUDGES MUST BE FREE FROM INFLUENCE OR PRESSURE. — Judges must be free to judge, without
pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of
civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of
statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, deliberate
and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are
called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court. As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing
doctrine is that "judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages
for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction." Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with any
subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a
civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good
faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction." Exception to this general rule is found in Article
32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and
liberties of another person — which rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of
the Constitution) — shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not demandable from a
judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to
the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment" or "unjust interlocutory order" for an
essential element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat
already mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final
judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

37
 RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a
fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to
find validation in the proceeding at bench, at least.
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law
books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles
and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for
some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings
in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the
Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has, "with all
the valor of ignorance," 1 been verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the
words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion that his
trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to
represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have been
disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial
proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges
and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to account.
Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic
transactions with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of
his failure to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own
terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit
accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him
or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and when demands were
made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with
those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks refused to let
him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said
banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against
him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order
adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In the
aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora the astounding number of no less than fifty (50)
original or review proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he
has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish,
complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS ROYAL BANK (TRB)
The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank
(TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate
mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned,
respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16,
1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security
a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634.
Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their
respective owners.
Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of
P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22,
1980. 2
Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB
caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale conducted

38
by the sheriff on September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest
bidder, for P73,529.09.
Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the
properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also
have to settle his outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo
demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits commenced by him against the Bank, its
officers and counsel, as aforestated.
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R. CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306
On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for specific
performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-
22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties only
at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying the obligation secured
by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by
Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals — docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by the decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals
held that the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel defendant to
allow redemption of the properties in question."cdasia
Borromeo elevated the case to this Court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By
Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to
sufficiently show that the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is supported by substantial
evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution
dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated January
30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed
entry of judgment and the remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry
of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the Court denied another
motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment, and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court merely
noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals be
overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained . . .."

2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750; CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil
action in the same Cebu City Regional Trial Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues. The
action, against the new TRB Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8750. As
might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18,
1990, 3 on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in the second action — i.e., Borromeo's right to
redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein. cdasia
The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485; CA-G.R. SP No. 28221
In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that that act of consolidation amounted to a
criminal offense, Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank
officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office.
Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto
Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants,
Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario Ortiz and the law firm, HERSINLAW . The
action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino
and Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB
and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in
39
favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants'
motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata (being
identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), and lack
of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that
Court's 16th Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368; CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another civil
action for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and
the HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as
one for "Recovery of Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as
the others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC (Branch 14) 5 on
the ground of litis pendentia. cdasia
The RTC ruled that —
"Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely the
Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli
Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all
of them who are impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely,
the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is
that more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City Prosecutor
Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the
City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely
incidental as apparently they had nothing to do with the questioned transaction in said case.
. . ."

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case
No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent
foreclosure and consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by another
Judge on November 11, 19916 — the Judge who previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but
this Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision
promulgated on march 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez,
etc. and Joaquin T. Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.
5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452
When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith
made that event the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's' attorneys —
Mario Ortiz, Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This action was docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint,
dated October 20, 1987, again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovable above mentioned, and
was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles in TRB's favor
despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On defendants' motion, the trial court8 dismissed the case
on the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek annulment of
defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win
Civil Case No. R-22506."
6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236
Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause
against TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and thus also
venting his ire on) the members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the
Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had
theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW Mario Ortiz) — but also the
Chairman and Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R.
No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of the 8th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the

40
Court of Appeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August 22,
1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendant Justices for —
". . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding evidence and
pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of
signatures, facts or laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due
process and against deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving and
legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendant TRB,
(which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from
the people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY
RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A.
3019, for which defendants must be held liable under said laws."

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by
TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "P100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and
P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of
defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the case.
7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069
It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2) prior
actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers,
Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 10 on the
ground of res judicata — the subject matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No.
83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-
8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356.12
8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344; CA G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928
On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu
(Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 This case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A.
Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an early date for Borromeo's
arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by the
defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion was again found
without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil
action of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.
Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that there
had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for being without
merit.14
Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated
January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of
Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
Resolution dated march 23, 1994. cdasia

a. Clarificatory Communications to Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-
Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a
mere clerk and . . . (failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on MERITS nor
by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15
The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some
patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
Court of Appeals and Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the same issue
he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of
Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually

41
adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as
well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause —
'Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this
Court dated __________,'
thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the resolutions.
This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The
record shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this
Court's Third Division) dealing with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was
also dealt with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989,
and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May, 19, 1989. 18 And
the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was in due course
served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 19
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of ignorance" — to
fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts
on his part to cause criminal prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with
here.
1. I.S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188
On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor
against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch manager), "John Doe and Officers of Traders Royal Bank."
The complaints (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and Falsification
of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto
Jamero, sold properties not owned by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents
negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who
"in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in
light of then prevailing market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.
In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the
complaint observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's mother,
but between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed
properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice
thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed properties was beyond question as
the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of
the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.
a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234
Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal
also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo — involving the same
foreclosed properties and directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former
Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:
a. I.S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for
"Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses." — This case
was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because
based on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by the Bank Manager Ronald
Sy to the lessee of a portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all
rentals to the bank as the new owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there
was no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of
sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited
pecuniarily from the transaction to the prejudice of complainant; and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through
False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." — This case was dismissed by
Resolution dated January 31, 1990.

2. I.S. Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

42
 While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme Court,23
In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru
foreclosure acquired real property together with the improvements thereon which property is located at F.
Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name of TRB." The affidavit was notarized by Atty.
Manuelito B. Inso. cdasia
Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over the
foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant falsehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation
was premature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office
against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsification of public
document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint.
24 It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution, considering that
Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in TRB's file, and thus the
document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order.
3. OMB-VIS-89-00136
This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988 —
sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No.
07015, supra, was made the subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the
Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint — against "Supreme Court Justice
(First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div.)" — was dismissed for lack of merit in a resolution
issued on February 14, 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows:
"It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available under the Rules
of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of this
Office to make a review of Decisions and resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their
competence. The records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the
respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20 of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act states that 'the Office of the
Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body'; and Sec. 21 of the same law provides that the Office
of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary."

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof.
The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in
Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K.
Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the
vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.
A. CIVIL CASES
Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had
obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.
cdasia
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of
the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had
purchased from Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several
conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly
instituted a suit for consolidation of title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be
narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application
for a loan and itself commenced proceedings to foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over
the property.
This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also
against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his
court war with Traders Royal Bank.
43
 1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R. No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273
The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson Lao
in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title
in his favor over the 122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007
of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by
Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's application.
Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding)
denying consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be construed as a sale with
pacto de retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of
P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital
gains and other taxes in connection with the transaction (P10,497.50).
Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure
of his lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a
Decision by the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.
The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page
Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by
Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the
resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which
justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the members."
Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of judgment, Borromeo having failed to
more for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the same was simply noted without action, in a
Resolution dated November 27, 1989. cdasia
Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice, sent
to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta
Y. CARREON and Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively).
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679
Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank,
Borromeo attempted to vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as just stated,
had given him notices of the adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No.
CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and
Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I.
Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of judicial functions, for
allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and
'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."
Summonses were issued to defendants to RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding).
These processes were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat
the matter as an incident in G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En banc on April 25, 1990. By
Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En banc ordered Judge
Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or
otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court." Accordingly,
Judge Ybañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the summonses and dismissing the complaint
in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.
The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and purpose
of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in
this wise:
"This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of
the Court. In several letter-complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeo
had repeatedly alleged that he 'suffered injustices,' because of the disposition of the four (4)
cases he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions,
allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His
44
 invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the
signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not
show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions bear no
certification of the chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which
they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional,
null and void."

xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its
cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is
patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision
appealed from is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is
clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course always
gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 18 SCRA 382, 417 [1987],
"[T]he Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given,
depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . . This is the only way whereby it can act on all
cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. . .

. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states
that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision
is shown, or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution "that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the
Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties
concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of
Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by quoting the resolution
adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All
decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the
Court's action. This was explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v.
Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said — "[M]inute
resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in
the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court,
which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court
or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together with
its findings of facts and legal conclusions. cdasia

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to
require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the
issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions
more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used
in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and
character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the
backlog accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming
to it. . . .."

b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501) 6740; G.R. No. 84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the
UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin

45
Borromeo against administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one of the
cases adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for damages
against a certain Tomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January
12, 1988, the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action and
prematurely (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).
What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18,
1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of
Cebu presided by Hon. Mario Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the
case, in an order dated may 28, 1988. His first and second motions for reconsideration having been
denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Hon. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by
submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund fees; it
also referred him to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually
dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his part to show
any reversible error in the trial court's judgment. His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality,
by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.
Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989
once more remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had nor been signed by any Justice, set
forth no findings of fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him
on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing petitions,
like the petition in the case at bar, which was denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible error in
the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the result of a thorough deliberation
among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial
functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its aubalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the
Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal
conclusions."
Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No.
82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out
that minute resolutions of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-blown
decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial and
routinary function of communicating the Court's action to the parties concerned. cdasia
c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042
What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an
already long series, was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court
Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent him
notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1, 1990, was
docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained
essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 — in
which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure to demonstrate any
reversible error in the challenged judgment — the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific"
resolution of February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been singed only by the
defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to
defendants demanding an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which
they ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only by them and
not by any Justice, and without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton,
malicious and patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock,
embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of no
less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.

46
 On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the
Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against
officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28
Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the
injustices" committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court
ordered expunged from the record (Resolution, July 19, 1990).
2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R. CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897
Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu City
RTC, he filed a complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880
(Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the complaint were
UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager), and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the
action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident
partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was
rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint,
upheld UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in the sum of
P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.
Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ.,
concurring), dismissed his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
Borromeo filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it
for insufficiency in form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for
reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effected on August
1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First Division) said:cdasia
"The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner
himself and Resolved to DENY they same for lack of merit, the motion having been filed
without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apart from being a
reiteration merely of the averments of the Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989 and the
Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims
have already been twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
and then by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling
on the merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and
will be granted only when there is a special and important reason therefor (Section 4, Rule
45); and a petition for review may be dismissed summarily on the ground that 'the appeal is
without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay or the question raised is too
unsubstantial to require consideration' (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are
raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites
prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further
advised that the first sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a
decision, and has no application to a resolution as to which said section pertinently provides
that a resolutiondenying a motion for reconsideration need state only the legal basis
therefor; and that the resolution of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain
and patent signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989
is that the petitioner's arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution denying the
petition for review, and consequently bringing about a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals — had failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals
had indeed been committed and therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusion set
forth in that judgment, and in such a case, there is obviously no point in reproducing and
restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT."

47
 On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the
Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and
ABSURD SELF-SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power which it has
forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of
signatures and facts and law: . . ." and characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of
ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE POWER totally at
variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . .." To the letter Borromeo attached
copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing
UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTES RESOLUTIONS'"; (2) his "Open Letter of Warning"
dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily
Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the record because containing
"false, impertinent and scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the
same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution promulgated on
December 13, 1989.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R. SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the
foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No.
CEB-21880. This was Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, et
al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in
consultation with atty. Deen. cdasia

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding)
dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees
(P5,000.00) and litigation expenses (P1,000.00).
Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP
No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure
to comply with that Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of the Trial
Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the
dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . . order."
Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a
Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for
review by the respondents therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of counsel. On
November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings,
Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure
to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution
contained no findings of fact and law, was denied.
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178
Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the RTC of
Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge
Generoso Juaban. Also impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then Chairman,
First Division), Estrella G. Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant
Clerk of Court of the First Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to
which the case was raffled — caused issuance of summonses which were in due course served on
September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc
Resolution dated October 2, 1989 — in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of
Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them for issuing said summonses.
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for time represented
Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was
"no compatibility" between him and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing pleadings,
papers, etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and declaring that he had "not advised and . . .
(had had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On
48
the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized to the Court and
informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of
the principal defendants therein, namely Judge Genoroso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the Court in
its Resolution dated November 29, 1989.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R. CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248
It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave
rise to another action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of
Borromeo's known as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person
(Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter was not
an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment
was rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the
property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by
Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986. cdasia
Borromeo came up to this Court on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248.
By Resolution of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason
that "a) the petition as well as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; and (b) the
issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." He moved for
reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution dated June 3, 1987.
He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions
through various motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining
that the notice sent to him by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signatures of any Justice — elicited the
following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987,
reading as follows:.
"Dear Mr. Borromeo:
This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the 'actual
resolution with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division' in Case G.R. No.
77243 whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied for
lack of merit.
In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July 6,
1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the
Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing
unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the
exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be
known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains
the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions." It
is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on their case by quoting
the resolution adopted by the Court.
Very truly yours,
JULIETA Y. CARREON
xxx xxx xxx"
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly
without foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB
criminally liable.
1. Case No. OMB-VIS-89-00181
In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the
judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 21880, 30Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's
49
First Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey
Ordoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja,
charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
cdasia
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's
complaints, opining that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits determined
by different courts including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987. That
resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable or complainant to dispute and defiantly
refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this
case. . . .".
2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418
A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated
January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and
others, charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for
supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of
resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a
Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed his complaint for "lack of
merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute
usurpation . . . it cannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones rendering
them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial resolutions." 33
III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY BANK & TRUST COM. (SBTC)
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-21615; CA-G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769
The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the
Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate
sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on may 31, 1979. To secure payment
thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00
on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB,
Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City
RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge
Leonardo Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and
was substituted by the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo
Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendants were
sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in
no case less than P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution
issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at
public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the highest bidder, SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the same
was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo
went to the Court of Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. SP No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition.
Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court on certiorari — his appeal being
docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently
denied with finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history of
recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning
Borromeo's aforesaid contractual commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries
of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo.
cdasia

50
 2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267.
While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of his
own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 —
HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the
suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9267, as one for
"Damages from Denial of Due Process, Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining
Order and Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in
"conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him through excessive attorney's fees," which acts
caused him grave mental and moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe
anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto, presiding)
granted the demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since
plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would be
superfluous to still require defendants to present their own evidence as there is nothing for them to
controvert."
2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458; CA-G.R. CV No. 39047
Noting daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another suit against
the same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34
who had rendered the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was,
according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of
the Laws, Violation of the Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges Cañares
and Jacinto for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB No. 9267)," and contended that
defendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny
him equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had been "caused untold
mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment for which the former are liable
under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata,
immunity of judges from liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for
contempt of court. The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division)
dated April 13, 1993. 35 Said the Court:
"Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in fact,
proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be considered res
judicata under the circumstances."cdasia

xxx xxx xxx

"By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent penchant for
argumentum ad hominem, it is, on the contrary the appellant who precariously treads the
acceptable limits of argumentation and personal advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes
particular note of the irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds them highly
reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Court.
That he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason why his otherwise
contumacious behaviour is presently accorded the patience and leniency it probably does
not deserve. Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, the appellant is,
however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in the future shall accordingly be dealt
with commensurate severity."

IV. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R. CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929
One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent.
This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979,
51
Borromeo was granted a loan of P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the
security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785. 36 Later,
Borromeo obtained a letter credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson
Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations. Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's
obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which a deed of sale was executed
in his favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as
above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of
P240,000.00.
Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu
Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment
was rendered against him by the trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where
his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered judgment
affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's
motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift.
On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution denying his petition for review "for
being factual and for failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible
error in its questioned judgment."
Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him
were unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had taken part in
approving the resolution therein mentioned.
B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528
What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of
date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at
Cebu City (Branch 18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory
that a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust."
Impleaded as defendant in the action was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the
Third Division at the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O.
Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the following pertinent observations:cdasia
". . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has indeed no
jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme
Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff against the herein defendant and
the other personnel of the highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of
plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this humble court to consider and
pass upon to determine their propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse the
judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but
also contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of the
allegations in the complaint clearly shows that all material allegations thereof are directed
against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was allegedly issued by the Third Division
composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made directly against defendant Marcelo B.
Fernan in his personal capacity. That being the case, how could this Court question the
wisdom of the final order or judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according
to the plaintiff himself had issued a resolution denying plaintiff's petition and affirming the
Lower Court's decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such
violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by the
defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have been obtained before this Court.
For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review the acts of a superior court might be
construed to a certain degree as a show of uncommon common sense. Lower courts are
without supervening jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher courts."

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of
sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

52
 A. Complaint Against Lawyers of his Court Adversaries
Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had
appeared for his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the actions above mentioned, and others.
As already mentioned, these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato
Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them, docketed as Administrative
Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment. Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with
their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro as a genuine sale,
although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently depriving complainant of his proprietary
rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's
oath to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged that respondents
Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.
B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers
The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing
but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite
Joaquin Borromeo in Contempt of Court," July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu
City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C.
Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B. Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid
(Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director), and
Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The lawyers made the following observations:cdasia
"It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary with
deferential awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the
courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, has cast
aspersions and shown utter disregard to the authority and name of the courts.

And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that there is a non-lawyer who uses
the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more
especially if their actuations do not conform with his whims and caprices."

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the Constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the
following:
"The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other members
of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and contemptuous. They tend
to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public confidence on the courts. If
unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in
the lose of confidence in the country's judicial system and administration of justice."

". . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal
profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this
Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-free would certainly be
demoralizing to members of the profession who afforded the court with all the respect and
esteem due them."

Subsequently, in the same proceeding, Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged
"refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases
"filed against its members."
C. Decision of the IBP
On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted
to this Court the notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due investigation, as well as
the corresponding records in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP Cebu City Chapter,
representing the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against
all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more cautious and not be
precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers." 37
VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS
53
 Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or
otherwise), "circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court
judgments or directives against him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees,
as well as the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse dispositions — some of which
scurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing
and circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity
to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for
argumentum ad hominem" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . . (which were
found to be ) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the
Courts."
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors,
violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.
Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the
reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University of Texas
for his contributions in upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme
Court persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law,
particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES. . .
." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court. cdasia
He circulated and "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered
INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND
INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING THEM, labelled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while
failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . ."; in the same letter, he specified what he considered
to be some of "the terrible injustices inflicted on me by this Court."
In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have
not been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of
being saviours and defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute
resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the
trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not comply with the Constitution when it should be
the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and captioned,
"Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of
having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and
landgrabbing and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . .
(my) cases, despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws
(during our talk in your house last march 12, 1989);" and that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but
simply want to ram down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."
In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he
mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the
landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' lands." Another flyer has at the center the caricature
of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB,
para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc. Still another "circular"
proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures
violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP
VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38
One other "circular" reads:
SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS !!!
— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS
by : JOAQUIN BORROMEO
NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the
judiciary. Adding, "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance of the
Supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and another "self-
54
exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the
SCRA itself.
It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued UNSIGNED,
UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in patent
violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is precisely through said
TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED
CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that
Narvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that CONSIGNATION IS
NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions,
NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land
grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving the
motion for reconsideration (G.R. No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for the
SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and declare justices and said
clerks 'immune from suit' — despite their failure to file any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not
in fact trampling on the rule of law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No.
82273).cdasia

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for themselves!
NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!!
"IMPEACH NARVASA
º ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS'
VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution
º VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN
ORDERING CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679)
DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO
FILE PLEADINGS, HENCE IN DEFAULT
º CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW IN RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS
NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION,
CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN
RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO
STEAL 3 LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION
º CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF
TWO LAWFUL COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF
TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION
º BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME
AND PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND
FELLOW CORRUPT JUSTICES
º DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES , and even MERE
CLERKS TO BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-
ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and REFUSING TO
ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST
HIMSELF
JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO
55
 Mabolo, Cebu City
Te. 7-56-49.
VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR
A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter, IBP, dated June 21, 1992
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some
members of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President thereupon
addressed a letter to this Court, dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last
quoted, above — " . . . sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other officers . . . in Cebu,"
described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks against the Supreme Court and the
whole justice system" — and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly urged the
Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act.".cdasia
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993
Acting thereon, the Court En banc issued a resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by
Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution
pertinently reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The records of the Court discloses inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of
Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four-page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R.
No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Traders Royal bank [referred to by Borromeo in the
"circular" adverted to by the relator therein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other
cases also filed with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson
Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and
Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter
Atty. Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles applicable to his cases and
dealt with the matters mentioned in his "circular."

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other cases
instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T.Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals, et al.) and G.R. No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson
Lao), as well as the existence of other communications made public by Borromeo reiterating
the arguments already passed upon by the Court in his cases and condemning the Court's
rejection of those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines thru its above named President, and taking account of the related facts on
record, the Court Resolved:

1) to REQUIRE.

(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for contempt against
Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter, Integrated bar of
the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the city Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and
copies of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its annexes; and cdasia

(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice of resolution
and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its annexes, on Joaquin
T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City; and

(2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice and
the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the letter and
its annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof
on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of
Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.

SO ORDERED.
1. Atty. Puno's letter of April 4, 1989
56
 Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the
resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the principles
and established practice relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other
communications and resolutions sent to his by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received by him on
July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R. No.
77243 39 ), the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989, 40
and three Resolutions of this court, notices of which were in due course served on him, to wit: that dated
July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and that
dated June 11, 1994 in G.R. No. 112928. 43
C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993
In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27, 1993
in which he alleged the following:
1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 requiring comment) violates the Constitution which
requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;" hence, "a
certified copy duly signed by the Justices is respectfully requested";
2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves "since
they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard
by an impartial and independent body";
3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu
Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what
particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not
appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those
accused in the 'libelous' circular;"
4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of
speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as
guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of
public officials"; the circular merely states the truth and asks for justice based on the facts
and the law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and
encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements are false and
lies;"
5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with
pertinent facts, evidence and law"; and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and
members of the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense the justice that they are
duty-bound to dispense." cdll
D. Resolution of September 30, 1993
After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain
his side, and be represented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on
September 30, 1993, notice of which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
". . . The return of service filed by sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin
Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator
dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said
Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen
(15) days from notice hereof within which to engage the services or otherwise seek the
assistance of a lawyer and submit such further arguments in addition to or in amplification
of those set out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded."

SO ORDERED.
E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment of October 15, 1992
Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and
allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification
to . . . (said) Comment," viz.:

57
 1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the alleged 'libelous'
remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a VERIFIED
COMPLAINT . . . (failing in which, they should) be cited in contempt of court for making false
charges and wasting the precious time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint;"

2) the allegations in the circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based on the
TRUTH and the LAW, namely:

a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are patent
violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution";

b) "there is no basis nor truth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the Appellate Court's
ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption allegedly due to his failure
to consignate the redemption price, since no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in
many rulings that CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in right of redemption;

c) "this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds and
defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999. prLL

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of November 26, 1993

Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the
failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the
concerned Justices to refute the charges in the alleged 'libelous circular'" and, construing these as "an
admission of the truth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify their
grave injustices as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless and false charges."
VII. THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS
A. Respondent's Liability for Contempt of Court
Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and
judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice.
44 He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to
the many rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the
application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and
quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers,
including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely
tried the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely
unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries,
of the judges and court employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on
his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the
egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices promulgating the same,
45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings, causing much
loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.
1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses
The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should
inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case
should be heard by an impartial and independent body," is still another illustration of an entirely
unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption of competence in the field of law; he again uses up
the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument long since declared and adjudged to be
untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against
itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the preservation of its
dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the
prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempt against them before the
prosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, other courts would be inferior to prosecuting

58
officers and impotent to perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution
of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt
amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing
duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge
may be made by the fiscal, by judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 46
His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP
Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what particular
statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable"; and it does not appear that Atty.
Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous' circular" — is
in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment. cdasia
Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations
claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to
petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and
in accordance with the accountability of public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford
no justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges,
court employees and other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time,
and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.
B. Basic Principles Governing the Judicial Function.
The facts and Issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the
principles governing finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation at some
point, and to lay down definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on
the part of lawyers and litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution
of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review
provided by law from court judgments or orders.
1. Reason for Courts; Judicial Hierarchy
Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is
a more or less established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive system
of review of judgments and final orders of lower courts.
The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation
of evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments
of lower courts by higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and
legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, and is in the very
nature of things, exclusive to the courts.
2. Paramount Need to End Litigation at Some Point
It is withal the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after
the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law
have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be
sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the
conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, to be expected; but, it is not their will, but
the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the
issues must be laid to rest and the court's disposition thereon accorded absolute finality. 47 As observed
by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his
intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack
of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism
that courts are the temples of right."cdasia
3. Judgments of Supreme Court Not Reviewable
The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that
judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch,
department, or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest.
Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or
modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its
59
logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on the indisputable and
unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.
In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving
an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanodbayan "members of the First Division of this Court
collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution' with
deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code . . . and for deliberately causing
'undue injury' to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the 'unjust Resolution' promulgated, in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . ." — the following pronouncements were made in
reaffirmation of established doctrine: 50
". . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the
Court hereby adopts in toto, "'(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has
ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911])
"controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts
demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of
practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which
rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the
opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized
is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to
determine the respective rights of the parties." (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. maritime Bldg.,
Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)cdasia

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court whether en banc or division,
speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation
or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S.
vs. Pons, 34 Phil 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil. 1). The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that '(I)t is well settled that
the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin
fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree' is fully and reciprocally
applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco
Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. CitingPrimicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil.
118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of powers calls for the
executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as
they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that
the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt
on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged
hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way
it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the
three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287)"

4. Final and Executory Judgments of Lower Courts Not Reviewable Even by Supreme Court
In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a
party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration)

60
under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether
questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar rules and
conformably with the hierarchy of courts. 51 Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the
ground that it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may
be had through the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. cdasia
However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to review by higher
tribunals — become final and executory before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too,
become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way
modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other
official, branch or department of Government. 52
C. Administrative, Civil or Criminal Action Against Judge, Not Substitute for Appeal;Proscribed by
Law and Logic
Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase in
the resort to, administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute
for or supplement to appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form
of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to
exercise them. With rising frequency, administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the
Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public
prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against
trial judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.
1. Common Basis of Complaints Against Judges
Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or Justices
rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders which are
allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of
discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and compensable injury to the complainants
(invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common
requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of the
respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for a
pronouncement of liability.
2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for Correction of Judgments and Orders
The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the
prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an
administrative or criminal complaint against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having
opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the
administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such
review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. cdasia
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary
postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial
order or decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil, or criminal prosecution for
unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step, confer
the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts:
the determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions
of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever determination he makes could well
set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility hereafter more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the
power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review
judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or
special civil action — is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in
accordance with a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and

61
procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously
repetitive.
These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra.54
"Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to
"rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case
submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass
judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court
with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court.
Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members
of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also
follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
on the ground that such collective decision is 'unjust' cannot prosper. cdasia

xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a
member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular
exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very
independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. 'For it is a
general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer
to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be
inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.' (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S.
335).

xxx xxx xxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with
deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty
of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the
matter at hand would be todestroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such
collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular
performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of
powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers
mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on
legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the
Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate
exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
may be established by law.

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and
executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable
by any other body or authority.
3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed Rules, to Declare Judgments or Orders Erroneous or Unjust
To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgment or order is unjust — or was
(or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his
jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially judicial
function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the
highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service or any other branch, nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review a
62
judicial order or decision — whether final and executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay
the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That
prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
4. Contrary rule results in Circuitousness and Leads to Absurd Consequences
Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments
or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation
that the decisions or interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are
tainted by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or immorality, or
other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would
also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences. cdasia
Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a
judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial
Court; the latter's judgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally,
the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the
municipal trial court judge who rendered the original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly
unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the
Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary investigation, not only that
the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary implication that the decisions or orders of
the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court Appeals and the Supreme Court who
affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an act of supreme
arrogance and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public
prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in question —
despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels — and thereafter, disagreeing with the
verdict of all four (4) courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial
Court Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court
would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a
Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court of the Court of Appeals would have an
inevitable result: given the antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness
of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the same appellate courts,
would necessarily be sustained.
Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from
filing a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should
convict him of the offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices of the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction.
The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and
regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to
prosecute the judge for supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.
5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative, Criminal Prosecution
This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering
an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the
indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also
evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering
said judgment or order. That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the judgment rendered in the
appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court in the civil or criminal action in question is
challenged. cdasia
What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a
criminal action, as to which — the same being unappealable — it would be unreasonable to deny the State
or the victim of the crime (or even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test the proof
such charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate
design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is that
there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or
63
order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition
in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the
prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the
judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal
action against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an
indispensable requisite.
D. Judges Must be Free from Influence or Pressure
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They
should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they
may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is
sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for
acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing
short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 56 The
error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in
these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court.
As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and
general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the
exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction." 58 Based
onSection 9, Act No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with any subsequent
legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil
action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good
faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."cdasia
Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public
officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in
any manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which
rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the Constitution) — shall be
liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But then again, to the extent
that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment" or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential
element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat
already mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a
final judicial pronouncements of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. Afterword
Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it
took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent
Borromeo in the different rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present
administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the unnecessary work occasioned
by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court,
however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs he suffered,
with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would somehow seep into his understanding and
deter him from further forays along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the
power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately, the
Court's forbearance had no effect on him.
Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness
and impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened
others to just as flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings against the
courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislative and
64
 executive departments, the Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of
personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now
draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court
accordingly serves notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal with
them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive sanctions as
may be appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.
cdasia
WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt
repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that he
may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Court and their
authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of
Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any
of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or
court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.

||| (In re: Borromeo, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 (Resolution), [February 21, 1995], 311 PHIL 441-523)

In Re: Dacanay, B.M. NO. 1678, December 17, 2007

EN BANC

[B.M. NO. 1678. December 17, 2007.]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J p:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of
law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship
to avail of Canada's free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost
his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this
petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

65
 SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer's oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that
it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. 3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions
required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach
by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and
clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character
and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines. 6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational,
moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations; 8 taking the lawyer's oath 9 and signing the roll
of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law — membership in good standing — is a continuing requirement.
This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11
payment of the annual professional tax; 12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar,
loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law
in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
66
9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance withRA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to
have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit
to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant
to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of
Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his
pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with
the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he
may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., is on leave.

Leonardo-de Castro, J., took no part.

||| (Re: Dacanay, B.M. NO. 1678, [December 17, 2007], 565 PHIL 165-171)

Catu vs. Rellosa, AC No. 5738, 19 February 2008

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008.]

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J p:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot 1 and the building erected thereon located at
959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested
the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu 2 and Antonio Pastor 3 of one of the units in the building. The
latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila 4 where the parties
reside.

67
 Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.
5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing
of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, 6 claiming
that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina
and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost
objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth
sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of
the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. 7 SEHDIC
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by
Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 — A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7 (b) (2)
of RA 6713: 8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; . . . (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of
law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. 9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. 10

68
 We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who hasleft government service and in
connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 11 we
ruled that Rule 6.03prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." DHcEAa
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.
Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT
SECTION 7 (B) (2) OF RA 6713,
GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF
PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from
engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law
which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, Thatsanggunian members who
are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of

the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving
the local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of
work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not
derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local
officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the
private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus. 13

69
 Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of thesangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the
city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal
mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the
punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang
kabataan for barangays. jurcda
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local
chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote
all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod orsangguniang bayan are required to
hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to
practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no
longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for
any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of thesangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 15 Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands
to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed
to hold regular sessions only twice a month. 16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE
LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY
FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of
the head of the department concerned. 17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition
will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in
the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him
in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise
or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied) cCHETI

70
 As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and
Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis,
men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To
underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
(emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
IAEcCT
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
(emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. 18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of
the lawyer's oath 20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to
all the courts of the land for their information and guidance. SCaITA
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
||| (Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, [February 19, 2008], 569 PHIL 539-551)

Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer to Society

Canon 1 – Duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws

Bongalonta vs. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310

THIRD DIVISION

71
 [CBD Case No. 176 . January 20, 1995.]

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M.

MARTIJA, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTERESTS; NEGATED IN

CASE AT BENCH. — In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally
Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and
unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in
these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address,
the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number, to wit: Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88. After hearing, the IBP Board of
Governors issued its Resolution with the following findings and recommendations: Among the several
documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374,
which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly
appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on said TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta
and her husband was registered and annotated in said title on February 7, 1989; whereas, that in favor of
Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her
husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and abetting a
scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might
obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE BY COUNSEL OF ANOTHER'S IBP RECEIPT NUMBER CONSTITUTES FALSEHOOD.
— As to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the
same IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88," respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be suspended for
using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent
and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed
her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-
Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her
fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and
pleadings of Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer,
deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounden duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he
pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the
Supreme Court. Wherefore, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent
Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence. (pp.
2–4, Resolution). The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. Finding respondent
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE ON THOSE WHO SHOW THAT THEY POSSESS AND
CONTINUE TO POSSESS THE QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY LAW. — It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of
these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has

72
the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

RESOLUTION

MELO, J p:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally
Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust
and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the
execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. cdasia
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7653-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil
action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue
thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under
TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid
criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed Civil Case No. 58650 for collection of
a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps.
Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps.
Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-
parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A
writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was
levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty.
Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
number, to wit: Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-
5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that Civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part
of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:cdasia
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to
be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of
Encumbrances on said TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband
was registered and annotated in said title on February 7, 1989; whereas, that in favor of
Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel
spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.

Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests
and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in
their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88," respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo
deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt
number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National
Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on

73
 February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged
in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt
number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings of Atty. Castillo
and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant
consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays
his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required
by the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of
his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2–4,
Resolution)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other
hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty of committing a falsehood in

violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to
SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the
Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
||| (Bongalonta v. Castillo, CBD Case No. 176 (Resolution), [January 20, 1995], 310 PHIL 320-326)

Moreno vs. Araneta, A.C. No. 1109, April 27, 2005

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005.]

MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of
debts.

The complaint, 1 dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two causes of
action. The first cause of action involved Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 issued by the Land Registration
Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as president of the said corporation, to

74
Moreno, in consideration of the amount of P2,177. The complaint alleged that almost a year later, the warrant
was dishonored.

The second cause of action involved Araneta's nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno
alleged that sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to show to his
associates, with the assurance that he would return the said amount within the shortest possible time. Again in
May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same assurance. Thereafter, since he
failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate amount of P11,000.
Araneta issued two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other
dated 15 July 1972 for P5,000. However, when Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored
and returned to her marked "Account Closed." She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand
letter. Araneta, however, ignored the same.

In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To
accommodate her, he allegedly endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worth P2,177, which he
received from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorney's fees, and gave her an additional P323 in cash. aATCDI

Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two undated checks
in her favor, but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He avers that he gave them to Moreno,
allegedly upon her request, only so she could show the bank where she was working that she "had money
coming to her." Araneta further claims that he warned her that the checks belonged to the unused portion of a
closed account and could not be encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant to issue a check in
the amount of P11,000 to offset the two "borrowed" checks. The respondent offered this check in evidence.

Moreno, however, contended 2 that this check for P11,000 "belonged" to the Philippine Leasing Corporation,
which she managed when her father passed away. She claimed she signed the check in blank sometime in
1969 when she fell seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who was then helping her in the management of the
corporation. She concluded that Araneta falsely filled up the check "in a desperate bid to turn the tables on
her." 3

On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 4

The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine o'clock in the morning, when the complainant
and her counsel appeared. Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon motion, however, of Moreno, and to
give the respondent a chance to defend himself, the hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine
o'clock in the morning. Service of the notice for the new dates of hearing were effected to the respondent
through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973. 5 On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more did not
appear, so the case was called again the following day, 24 January 1973.

In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973 with the
complainant, Moreno, taking the stand. 6 On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the scheduled hearing,
only to ask for a postponement to prepare his defense. 7 No further hearings appear to have been conducted
thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been scheduled on 28 May 1973, however, on said date, Araneta filed a
joint motion for postponement with the conformè of Moreno's lawyer, as he, Araneta, was "earnestly pursuing a
possible clarification of complainant's basic grievance."

Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the case were
forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two days
later, the Commission notified 8 both parties of a hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date
neither of the parties nor the complainant's counsel appeared despite due notice. It appears that notice could
not be served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts were
unknown. An inquiry 9made at his IBP chapter yielded negative results. The Commission reset the hearing to
18 November 1988 at two o'clock in the afternoon. 10 Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus
on the basis of the evidence so far adduced, the case was submitted for resolution on such date. 11

On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report, 12 which reads in
part: cEaDTA

75
 The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may, it is
worthwhile considering. The "stop payment" of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an act
of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent. There was a subpoena issued for the appearance
of Lilia Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged
Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain about why the "stop payment" of the treasury
warrant was done but neither witness appeared (as evidenced by the records) before the
Office of the Solicitor General to testify. At the dorsal portion of Exh. "B," the photocopy of the
Treasury Warrant is a signature which complainant claims to be that of the respondent
beneath which is the word "President" and above the signature are the words Lira, Inc. but an
ocular examination of said signature in relation to the signature on the checks Exhibits "G" and
"H" do not show definitely that they were the signatures of one and the same person, so there
is no basis to form the conclusion that the respondent did sign the treasury warrant as
president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the] same treasury
warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account. There is no
evidence to prove that she saw him sign it.

There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the "stop
payment" or even any written demand by the complainant to the respondent that the payment
of the treasury warrant having been "stopped" he should reimburse her with what he received
as consideration for this check.

Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action.

On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00
and the other for P6,000.00 to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money
was coming her way, when in fact he is presumed to have been aware when he issued said
checks that his account with the bank against which [these] checks were drawn was already
closed, as was discovered from the fact that the checks were dishonored for said reason.

Even disregarding the complainant's evidence and considering the answer of the respondent,
the act of the respondent in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for
P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was
coming her way, when there was none and the respondent knew such fact was an act of
connivance of the respondent with the complainant to make use of these useless commercial
documents to deceive the public. However beneficial it may have been to the complainant,
this act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent and against the exacting standards of
morality and decency required of a member of the Bar.

The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case,
committed by the respondent, belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon
his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue is a necessity which the
respondent lacks.

The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months arising from his irresponsible
conduct as a member of the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the decision of
suspension. AICTcE

The IBP Board of Governors adopted 13 the above report, but increased its recommended period of
suspension from three months to six months.

Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted 14 the
records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. 15 On 8 July
2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report 16 regarding various aspects of the case. The Report
further made mention of a Resolution 17 from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having
been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. The Resolution,
which was attached to the report, states:

L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) — Considering that the motion of
petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta for reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977
76
 which denied the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 18553-R which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
convicting the said petitioner of the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document,
was denied in the resolution dated October 17, 1977 of the Second Division of this Court for
lack of merit, which denial is final, the Court Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S.
Araneta from the practice of law and (b) to require the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE within
ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.

Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been archived on
20 November 1992.

It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondent's last filed pleading dated 28 May
1973, when he sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle matters amicably
between himself and Moreno, and the present, Araneta had been found guilty and convicted by final judgment
of a crime involving moral turpitude, and indefinitely suspended.

We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we disagree with the
penalty sought to be imposed.

Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is irrelevant, because by
his own admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno knowing fully well that the same
were drawn against a closed account. And though Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that
time, the IBP correctly found this act "abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency
required of a member of the Bar," which "belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his
integrity and morality."

Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 18
as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also
an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on
his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of
right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." 19

Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or
she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 20

In Co v. Bernardino 21 and Lao v. Medel, 22 we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one year's suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial
payment of the obligation. 23

In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found guilty by
final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for
which he has been indefinitely suspended. AIECSD

Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 24 It
involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 25

Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves
moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty.

In fact, we have long held 26 that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,
27 "[t]he review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final
but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege

77
bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved
himself unfit to protect the administration of justice." 28

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of
the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Carpio Morales, J., is on leave.

||| (Moreno v. Araneta, A.C. No. 1109, [April 27, 2005], 496 PHIL 788-798)

Abella vs. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, June 18, 2013

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 7332. June 18, 2013.]

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, complainant, vs. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Eduardo A. Abella
(complainant) against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01 and
1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts
On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII-01-0128-99. Finding merit in the complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA)
Ernesto F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May 13, 1999, 2 ordered PT&T to pay complainant P113,100.00
as separation pay and P73,608.00 as backwages. Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LA's Decision to the NLRC.

In a Decision dated September 12, 2001, 3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreon's ruling and instead ordered PT&T to
reinstate complainant to his former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay, including moral damages and attorney's fees. On reconsideration, it modified the amounts
of the aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that complainant was illegally dismissed. 4
Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).

In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision), 5 the CA affirmed the NLRC's ruling with modification,
ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Complainant moved for partial
reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service were not taken into account in the computation of his
separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus, remanded the case to the LA for the
same purpose. 6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final and executory. 7

Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB on
October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had already been assigned to the new LA, herein respondent. After the
lapse of five (5) months, complainant's motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for
Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there was no action on complainant's motion.
Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to respondent's office to personally follow-up the matter.
78
In the process, complainant and respondent exchanged notes on how much the former's monetary awards
should be; however, their computations differed. To complainant's surprise, respondent told him that the
matter could be "easily fixed" and thereafter, asked "how much is mine?" Despite his shock, complainant
offered the amount of P20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it P30,000.00." By force of circumstance,
complainant acceded on the condition that respondent would have to wait until he had already collected from
PT&T. Before complainant could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give the latter
P1,500.00. 8

On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution, 9 directing the sheriff to proceed to the premises
of PT&T and collect the amount of P1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to
quash 10 the said writ which was, however, denied through an Order dated November 22, 2005. 11 Unfazed,
PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash dated December 2, 2005, 12 the contents of which were virtually
identical to the one respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of the said supplemental motion on
December 9, 2005, respondent rendered an Order 13 in open court, recalling the first writ of execution he
issued on November 7, 2005. He confirmed the December 9, 2005 Order through a Certification dated
December 14, 2005 14 and eventually, issued a new writ of execution 15 wherein complainant's monetary
awards were reduced from P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.

Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the NLRC. In a Resolution
dated March 14, 2006, 16 the NLRC annulled respondent's December 9, 2005 Order, stating that respondent
had no authority to modify the CA Decision which was already final and executory. 17

Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman, 18 complainant filed the instant
disbarment complaint 19 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable
resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T.

In his Comment, 20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations, maintaining that he merely
implemented the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of backwages. He also claimed that he
never demanded a single centavo from complainant as it was in fact the latter who offered him the amount of
P50,000.00.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008, 21 IBP Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco
(Commissioner Limpingco) found that respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all
logical, reasonable and grammatical context in order to favor PT&T. 22 He further observed that the
confluence of events in this case shows that respondent deliberately left complainant's efforts to execute the
CA Decision unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a portion of the monetary award thereof.
Notwithstanding their agreement, immoral and illegal as it was, respondent later went as far as turning the
proceedings into some bidding war which eventually resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard,
respondent was found to be guilty of gross immorality and therefore, Commissioner Limpingco recommended
that he be disbarred. 23

On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP Resolution), 24
adopting and approving Commissioner Limpingco's recommendation, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent's violation of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios,
Jr. is hereby DISBARRED. 25

Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01
and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.

The Court's Ruling

79
The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors.

The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:

CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.

CANON 6 — THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN

THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 6.02 — A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer's responsibility to
society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or
proceeding or delaying any man's cause for any corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly
directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. 26 It
is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only
when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. 27

In this light, a lawyer's compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules should be taken into
consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement
to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." 28 This proceeds from the
lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. 29
Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which
tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment. 30

In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to re-compute the monetary awards due to the
complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision which had already been final and executory. When
complainant moved for execution — twice at that — respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It was
only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4, 2005 that the latter speedily issued a
writ of execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005. Based on these incidents, the Court observes
that the sudden dispatch in respondent's action soon after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the
legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort money from the complainant.

The incredulity of respondent's claims is further bolstered by his complete turnaround on the quashal of the
November 7, 2005 writ of execution.

To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&T's initial motion to quash through an Order dated
November 22, 2005 but later reversed such order in open court on the basis of PT&T's supplemental motion to
quash which was a mere rehash of the first motion that was earlier denied. As a result, respondent recalled his
earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing complainant's monetary awards from
P1,470,082.60 to P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.

To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA Decision which did not
provide for the payment of backwages. A plain and cursory reading, however, of the said decision belies the
truthfulness of the foregoing assertion. On point, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

80
 WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated September 12, 2001 and October 8, 2002 are
AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION, ordering petitioner PT&T to pay private respondent
Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in lieu of reinstatement.
31

Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC's rulings dated September 12, 2001 and October 8,
2002 which both explicitly awarded backwages and other unpaid monetary benefits to complainant. 32 The
only modification was with respect to the order of reinstatement as pronounced in both NLRC's rulings which
was changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the strained relations between the parties as well as the
supervening removal of complainant's previous position. 33 In other words, the portion of the NLRC's rulings
which awarded backwages and other monetary benefits subsisted and the modification pertained only to the
CA's award of separation pay in lieu of the NLRC's previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable
as it is, can be easily deduced from the records.

Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding
that the CA's award of separation pay denied complainant's entitlement to any backwages and other
consequential benefits altogether. In his Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Resolution, 34
respondent stated:

From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in directing
PT&T to pay complainant his separation pay ONLY in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly, the Court
did not direct the PT&T to pay him his backwages, and other consequential benefits that were
directed by the NLRC because he could no longer be reinstated to his previous position on the
ground of strained relationship and his previous position had already gone, and no equivalent
position that the PT&T could offer. . . . .

Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. 35
There is nothing in the records that could confound the finding that complainant was illegally dismissed as LA
Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the same. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly
believable that respondent could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in view of the
standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal. In this regard, respondent's defense deserves scant
consideration.

Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and upholds Commissioner
Limpingco's and the IBP Board of Governor's pronouncement of respondent's gross immorality. Likewise, the
Court observes that his infractions constitute gross misconduct.

Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. 36 It
treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community's sense of decency. 37 On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction
of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." 38

In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred:

SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

81
Thus, as respondent's violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his
disbarment should come as a matter of course. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had
already been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., 39
which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court
deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 40 in order to penalize respondent's
transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the
future.

As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a privilege 41 accorded
only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the prestige and opportunity which
the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold its integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is
quintessential that its members continuously and unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect moral uprightness
in their activities, both in their legal practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar holds no
place for the deceitful, immoral and corrupt.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and gross
misconduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P40,000.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.

||| (Abella v. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, [June 18, 2013], 711 PHIL 363-376)

Canon 2 – Duty to be an efficient lawyer

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 553 . June 17, 1993.]

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF. — Practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. In the practice of his profession, a licensed
attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions
to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public
tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law,
in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. When a person participates in a trial and
advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to
their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court,
is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the

82
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.

2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of
law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that
the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law." The contention of respondent that it
merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit: . . . While some of the
services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services
it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court
appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. The aforesaid
conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure,
main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales: . . .

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT; CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES. — Paralegals in the
United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As the concept
of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants,
Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and
limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor. (Illustrations: . . .)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON PARALEGAL. — We have to necessarily and definitely
reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate
from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it
has done. . . . Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled
person into the practice of law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure
of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the
state.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY PARALEGALS;
REASON. — It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the
83
bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. . . .

7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. — Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also
warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude
of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT. — We repeat, the canons of the
profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR SKILL. — The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of
his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; memberships and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." . . . The
use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. — The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish
his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor
may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
84
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET AL. vs. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA (433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d
810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO PUBLICATION OF LEGAL FEES, NOT APPLICABLE; REASONS. — The ruling in the
case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied
upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary
rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements
by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a
written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code
of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state." This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein
respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly with respect to these characteristics of
lawyers: . . . Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face
of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J p:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to
or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed
by law." cdrep

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm

7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

85
 Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251

522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted. cdphil

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance,
but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2
reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association
(PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federation International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended
their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. cdphil

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar
associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitute practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.

86
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed 4 .

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this
(is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical
clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal
Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the

present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In
addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the
Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce, is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man

and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading,

87
but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice. LibLex

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just
Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license. LLpr

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous
marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication
of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also
submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of
the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in
general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled
but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the
Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted
time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission
to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using
a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in
skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and
more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal
practice.

88
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services,
but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may
be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited

outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which
are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable
of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of

the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services. cdrep

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed
to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule
or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also,
law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the
realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Perkinson
to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal
rights and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court
(See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1948 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out
itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice
against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have
been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its
business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned
89
 to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to
wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also

misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the
Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside the court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advises based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given
to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified
persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration
of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at
present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may
decide to take measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may
be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to
do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may
be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
90
under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the
instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services." 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the

impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose
of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it
is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such as act
could become justifiable. LLphil

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents
to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of
Morals should not be done. LLjur

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion International de Abogadas:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not

91
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of
the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service

unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law
. . .. It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law . . .. Our knowledge
of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting
for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
law.

"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that
it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are
they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal problem.

"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then
an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be
trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at
the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body
of industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and
without regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for

which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be
very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work
for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be
the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primary efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give,
92
 does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.

"Another branch of defendant's work is the representation of the employer in

the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator.
This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the
value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation
is not presented by the proofs. cdphil

"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative

agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National
Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before
such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear `in person, or by counsel, or by other representative.' Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. `Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and `other
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal." (Auerbacher v.
Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-
156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal

problem;

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
bar;

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succinctly states the rule of conduct:

"Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation

concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity."

1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A",
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the

93
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute practice of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the
customer buys materials on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is amounts to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem
does not affect this. . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is,
the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to
offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport `to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular
situation — in the publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitute the unlawful practice of law . . .. There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a
divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or
writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing
house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal
contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the
finding that for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in
the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in
the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting
the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with
a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be
affirmed." (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory."
It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate
the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and
other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can
be secret.

94
 2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which
is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law"
has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account. LLjur

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or
may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, inorder to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement
of law. 14

When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and
asks the later to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test
to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law."

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons,

firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
95
 in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852)."

This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),
stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of, such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part
of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)."

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered
nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering,
to wit:

"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use
of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized
legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation
like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they

96
 can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services."
20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to
the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services
it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court
appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into
the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are "specialists" in various fields, can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists."

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of
sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the
residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or
diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich realtive who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos
of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes
and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state
for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained
to deal with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative's will,
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 then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in
court, and gather evidence to support the case." 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important
is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings
it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding. prcd

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein
a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent would wish to draw support for
his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25
The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the
conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the
rights, claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect
of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in
the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can
exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be
its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative
action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards
and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards, or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered, as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration
of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the
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practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal
rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has
been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R. Bavot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent
which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent
of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public.
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as
a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . .
is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code
of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character
and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those
which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be
misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;

99
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For
that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or
to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of
his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch
of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being
taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services
rendered, we find and so hold that the time definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes
the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact
that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition
against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific
services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of
Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general
rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar. LLpr

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is
beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49
Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of
The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
100
an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like
the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services. llcd

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the
Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50after due ascertainment of the
factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse
thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ ., concur.

||| (Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (Resolution), [June 17, 1993])

Villatuya vs. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6622. July 10, 2012.]

MANUEL G. VILLATUYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office of the Bar Confidant, complainant
Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (respondent) with unlawful solicitation of
cases, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross
immorality for marrying two other women while respondent's first marriage was subsisting. 1

In a Resolution 2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file a
Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005. 3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
record. 4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice 5 setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference, complainant
appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be
resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by

nonpayment of fees to complainant,

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

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 3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6
IcaEDC

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his
verified Position Paper, 7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005. 8

Complainant's Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial consultant to
assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter's numerous petitions for corporate
rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he
would be entitled to P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in
addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December
2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were
working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of P900,000 for the 18 Stay
Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total of P4,539,000 from the fees
paid by their clients. 9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of
the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal
services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the
Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, 10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates
11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients. 12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of bigamy
for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification
dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying
that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M.
Lozano, which took place in Dasmariñas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena
Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in
Ermita, Manila. 13 cHDEaC

Respondent's Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an
employee of his law firm — Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office 14 — but of Jesi and Jane Management,
Inc., where the former is a major stockholder. 15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the latter's dismissal of many
rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal
agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his
clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. 17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his law firm
had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the
corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case' such as the
preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this contention, respondent
attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.; 18 and an Affidavit executed by
Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said company. 19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been
retracted by the affiant himself. 20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his
alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the said
Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by
the NSO. 22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting
parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by respondent.
102
The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano
in Dasmariñas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma.
Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September
1987. 24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso,
and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts,
respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status. TcHEaI

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by complainant,
claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing
of the case. 25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents.
26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to
Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan,
Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270. 27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-
3271. 28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in
the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on
different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20
November 2007. 29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend the hearing, 30
respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna,
seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name. 31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2)
Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede
S. Tabalingcos." 32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the
marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still valid. 33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having
committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar
Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his
provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases. 35 cCaEDA

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the
Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for
nullification he had filed with the RTC-Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the administrative case
against him be submitted for resolution. 36

IBP's Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and Recommendation addressing the specific
charges against respondent. 37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the
fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the
proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent's administrative liability. On this matter,
complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent. 38 On the second charge, the Commission
found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal services
and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to
point out exactly the specific provision he violated. 39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It
found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy
twice by marrying two other women while the latter's first marriage was subsisting. 40 Due to the gravity of the
acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the
roll of attorneys. 41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 42 On 01 August 2008,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature.
103
He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution
of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having
entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by
complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of
disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise
moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with
the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts. 43 SEAHcT

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their
Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent's disbarment. 44

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP's dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the rationale
behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former's share in the fees, if
proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share
with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant,
however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David 46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees
collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be
disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant's allegations in this case had not been proven,
the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services through
various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise
the latter's legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations
and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the
specific provision that was breached. aADSIc

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the report to
solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases.
Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting
cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though,
when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's
duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself
to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect
solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law. 48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which
purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure
professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the Complaint is a
letterhead of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal
services. The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent
would render legal services related to the former's loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is

104
considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of
Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.

Rule 15.08 50 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of
law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be
operative in one and not in the other. 51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the
Code.

Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this
allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent
with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they
were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity
to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded by his argument. TEcCHD

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of
a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we
explained in Garrido v. Garrido: 53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire
into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory
proof. 54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into
two marriages while the latter's first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the
second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not
dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He
submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna — one in Biñan and the
other in Calamba — to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or
impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to
prove the former's marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The
documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the
birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is
accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has
not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents. cTCaEA

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to
annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations

105
therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special
contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the
Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondent's regard for
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or
his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code
provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first
marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who
cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his
professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to
be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the
court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the
courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. 57 His acts of committing
bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court. 58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral

conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. aHTEIA

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Velasco, Jr., J., took no part — relationship to a party.

Bersamin and Abad, JJ., are on leave.

||| (Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, [July 10, 2012], 690 PHIL 381-399)

Bar Matter No. 2012, February 10, 2009

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
B.M. No. 2012 February 10, 2009

106
 PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS
RESOLUTION
Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re: Comment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid
Service for Practicing Lawyers, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said Rule and its implementing
regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of general circulation.
February 10, 2009

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE

SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service."
SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society as agents of social change
and to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by the less privileged members of
society and expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free legal service by members of the
bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective administration of justice especially in
cases involving indigent and pauper litigants.
SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to render free
legal aid services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants
where the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other members of the legal
profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of
law and quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the National Labor Relations Commission, National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices, Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing
lawyers" shall exclude:
(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice;
(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

107
(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited legal clinics of law
schools and lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples’ organizations (POs) like the Free
Legal Assistance Group who by the nature of their work already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper
litigants and
(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are employed in the private sector
but do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules of Court and Algura
v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);
(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and administrative in
nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal representation;
(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and in behalf of an indigent or
pauper litigant and the preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall also cover assistance by a practicing
lawyer to indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed mediation and in other modes of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). Services rendered when a practicing lawyer is appointed counsel de oficio shall also be
considered as free legal aid services and credited as compliance under this Rule;
(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization of lawyers in the country;
(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked with
handling legal aid cases;
(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked with disciplining
members of the Bar;
(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines located in the different
geographical areas of the country as defined in Rule 139-A and
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing lawyer rendered free legal aid services.
In the case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding an equivalent or similar position.
The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions,
or a responsible officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited mediator who conducted the court-
annexed mediation proceeding.
SECTION 5. Requirements. -
(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid services to
indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a period of twelve (12) months, with a
minimum of five (5) hours of free legal aid services each month. However, where it is necessary for the
practicing lawyer to render legal aid service for more than five (5) hours in one month, the excess hours may
be credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding periods.
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court for cases where he may render
free legal aid service. He may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire
about cases where he may render free legal aid service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of
the IBP Chapter shall regularly and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court.
The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten (10) days of the last month of
each quarter of the year.
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of Court attesting to
the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a case.
The certificate shall contain the following information:
(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the party or parties in the said case(s) for
whom the service was rendered, the docket number of the said case(s) and the date(s) the service was
rendered.
(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or conducting trial on a particular case in the court
or quasi-judicial body.
(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation, conciliation or any other mode of ADR on a
particular case.
(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading or for postponement of hearing or
conference) or pleading filed on a particular case shall be considered as one (1) hour of service.
The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be retained by the practicing lawyer,
one (1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1) copy to be attached to the lawyer's compliance
report.
(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter within the
court’s jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked with immediately verifying the contents of
108
the certificate with the issuing Clerk of Court by comparing the copy of the certificate attached to the
compliance report with the copy retained by the Clerk of Court.
(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the concerned lawyer. The IBP
Chapter shall also submit the compliance reports to the IBP’s NCLA for recording and documentation. The
submission shall be made within forty-five (45) days after the mandatory submission of compliance reports by
the practicing lawyers.
(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies the number
and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records.
(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(i) and (ii), shall fill up
a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are employed with the government or
incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice or lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in
court.
The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with the payment
of an annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of
the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.
(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iii) shall secure a
certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO to the effect that, during that
year, they have served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or actively participated in the NGO’s or PO’s free
legal aid activities. The certification shall be submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.
(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iv) shall fill up a
form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are neither practicing lawyers nor covered
by Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office
together with the payment of an annual contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support for
the efforts of practicing lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services. Said contribution shall accrue to
a special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.
(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000)
for that year which amount shall also accrue to the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.
SECTION 6. NCLA. -
(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the IBP local chapters for the proper
handling and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing lawyers can represent.
(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with respect to the coordination
with Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of certificates submitted by practicing lawyers.
(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance with this Rule.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by the Clerk of Court and forms
mentioned in Section 5(e) and (g).
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and penalties that will be paid by lawyers
pursuant to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions of this Rule. For this purpose, it shall annually
submit an accounting to the IBP Board of Governors.
The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the Supreme Court in connection with its request for
the release of the subsidy for its legal aid program.
SECTION 7. Penalties. -
(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum prescribed 60 hours
of legal aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through the NCLA, to explain why he was unable to
render the minimum prescribed number of hours. If no explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the
explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors
that the erring lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who is not in good standing. Upon approval of the
NCLA’s recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not in good
standing. Notice thereof shall be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter which submitted the lawyer’s
compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is registered, in case he did not submit a compliance
report. The notice to the lawyer shall include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) penalty which
shall accrue to the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.
(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) months from the receipt of
the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During the said period, the lawyer cannot

109
appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided, however, that the "not in good standing" status
shall subsist even after the lapse of the three-month period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.
(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least three (3) consecutive years shall
be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall
afford the erring lawyer due process in accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. If found administratively liable, the penalty of suspension in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be
imposed upon him.
(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be submitted under this Rule or any contents
thereof shall be administratively charged with falsification and dishonesty and shall be subject to disciplinary
action by the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of criminal charges against the lawyer.
(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any Chairperson of the
Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or by the Director of a legal clinic or
responsible officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an administrative case against the said Clerk of
Court or Chairperson. This is without prejudice to the filing of the criminal and administrative charges against
the malfeasor.
SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). - A lawyer who renders mandatory legal
aid service for the required number of hours in a year for the three year-period covered by a compliance period
under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: two (2) credit units for legal ethics, two (2) credit
units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for alternative dispute resolution, four (4) credit units for
legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and
six (6) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(9), Rule 2
of the Rules on MCLE.
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for at least two
consecutive years within the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall
be credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit for trial and pretrial skills, one
(1) credit unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, two (2)
credit units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and three (3) credit units for such subjects
as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given authority to recommend
implementing regulations in determining who are "practicing lawyers," what constitute "legal aid cases" and
what administrative procedures and financial safeguards which may be necessary and proper in the
implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the various legal chapters in the crafting
of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon approval by the IBP Board of Governors, the said
implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final approval.
SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect on July 1,2009 after they have
been published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Canon 3 – Duty of honest and dignified pronouncement of legal service

Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003.]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003.]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, respondents.
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 SYNOPSIS

For advertising himself in several leading newspapers as an "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," Atty. Rizalino
T. Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services. Respondent admitted
the act imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts.

The practice of law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Although solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession, made in a modest and decorous manner that wood bring
no injury to the lawyer and the bar. Here, for advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist, Atty.
Simbillo undermined not only the stability but also the sanctity of marriage. Thus, for violation of Rules 2.03
and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, Atty.
Simbillo was suspended from the practice of law for one year, with stern warning against repetition of the
same or similar offense.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; PROHIBITION AGAINST SOLICITATION OF

LEGAL BUSINESS. — Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. — A lawyer
shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. — A lawyer
shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

2. ID.; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS BY THE SUPREME COURT, GROUNDS THEREFOR. —
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
attorney for a party without authority to do so.

3. ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PROFESSION, NOT A BUSINESS; ELUCIDATED. — It has been repeatedly
stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money; 2.
A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability; 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

4. ID.; LAWYER ADVERTISING HIMSELF AS MARRIAGE ANNULMENT SPECIALIST UNDERMINES THE

STABILITY AND SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE. — What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.

5. ID.; SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS; PROPER MANNER THEREOF. — The solicitation of legal business
is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to
the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence
111
address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT' OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667." 1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up
the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or
custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is
payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that
similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5,
2000 issue of The Philippine Star. 2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se
are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that
the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition
should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the
Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public
policy and public order as long as it is dignified. 4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 5
On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, 6 finding
respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning
that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002. 7 HESIcT

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002 9

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator
and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the
Court's Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. 10Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its
early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

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We agree with the IBP's Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining of a livelihood should
be a secondary consideration. 14 The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court's indulgence, his
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell. 18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court's
authority. TSHEIc

What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in
our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case, 19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. 20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name
or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in
legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.

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21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal
Clinic, Inc.: 22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only
a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. aDHScI

Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., abroad, on official business.

||| (Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, 157053, [August 19, 2003], 456 PHIL 560-568)

Canon 4 – Duty to support the improvement of the legal system

Canon 5 – Duty to keep abreast of legal developments

Bar Matter No. 850, October 2, 2001

EN BANC
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed

114
and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve,
as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:

Rule 1. PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.

Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the
Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation of
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules.

SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete
every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE
Committee. Of the 36 hours:

(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.

(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.

(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units.

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence
equivalent to nine (9) credit units.

(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.

(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions equivalent to two
(2) credit units.

(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.

Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3)
months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or
readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months
and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.

SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be divided
into three (3) compliance groups, namely:

(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to
Compliance Group 1.

(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2.

(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3.

Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be available to earn
credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.

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SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program. Members
admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate
Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission.

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of
admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance
Group.

(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission, the
member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance.

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission,
the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education activities
equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or
readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in
proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded
up to the next whole number.

Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure
compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in
the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents
required therefor:

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS,

DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED
RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF

ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
NUMBER OF HOURS

1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF

RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION
COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK

LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS
EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED
TECHNICAL
116
REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF

BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or non-participatory.

SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be claimed for:

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house
education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.

(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker, moderator,
coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.

(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit units may be claimed per compliance
period for:

(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, e.g., in the
form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the author member,
which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the members practice or employment.

(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an
education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.

Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE
requirement:

(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of
Executive Departments;

(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of the
judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the
Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;

(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;

117
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;

(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman;

(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least ten (10)
years in accredited law schools;

(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the
Philippine Judicial Academy; and

(l) Governors and Mayors.

SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:

(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.

(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.

SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A member may file a verified request
setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven
expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an extension
of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.

SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member
ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group.

SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be
under oath and supported by documents.

Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF

EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing regulations that may be adopted by the
MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1)
the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2
of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.

SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal education activities must meet the following
standards:

(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.

(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the legal
profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills
or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.

(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.

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(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be distributed to
all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is offered.

(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from interruption
like telephone calls and other distractions.

Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.

SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group may be accredited as a provider for a
term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal
education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for
accreditation shall:

(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;

(b) Contain all information requested in the form;

(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.

SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall agree to the following:

(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at least four
(4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official record of attendance
only if the members signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of
attendance shall contain the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time,
date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the
MCLE COMMITTEE.

(b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of ________ hours of which ______
hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules and
such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date, location, subject
matter and length of the activity.

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activity by THE
MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP staff
Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to each
topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE
COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.

(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than
one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a spurious
certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.

SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years.
119
It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide
satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.

SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be
revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.

Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education activity or accreditation as a provider
requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.

Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card
before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has
complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such
Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after the end of the members
compliance period.

SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or
exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the
provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity.
A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of
Rule 5.

Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-compliance:

(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;

(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within the
prescribed period;

(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days
from receipt of non-compliance notice;

(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;

(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance
with the MCLE requirements.

SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members failing to comply will receive
a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of
notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall contain the following language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:

IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT
DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL
NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS
RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attain the
adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
120
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are
earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.

SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the sixty
(60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be
conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.

SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate against a
member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.

Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member
provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A
member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during
the period the member is on inactive status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the
number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.

SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The termination of listing as a

delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.

Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired
Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine
Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law
professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by the
Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the
Court.

SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may
be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of
Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall
employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other
necessary functions.

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval,
an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.

121
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.

Bar Matter No. 1922, June 3, 2008

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL
PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board
to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate
of Exemption. – The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of
the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation."
Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.

OCA Circular No. 79-2014

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN

COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS, THE
OFFICE OF THE STATE PROSECUTOR,
PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: BAR MATTER NO. 1922 (RE: RECOMMENDATION

OF THE MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION [MCLE] BOARD TO INDICATE
IN ALL PLEADINGS FILED WITH THE COURTS
THE COUNSEL'S MCLE CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLIANCE OR CERTIFICATE OF EXEMPTION)
In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in
the above-cited administrative matter, the Court RESOLVED, upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to:
(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing
the phrase “Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
122
pleadings from the records” and replacing it with “Failure to
disclose the required information would subject the counsel to
appropriate penalty and disciplinary action”; and
(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure
of current MCLE compliance/exemption number in the
pleadings:
(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of
P2,000.00 for the first offense, P3,000.00 for
the second offense and P4,000.00 for the
third offense;
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed
as a delinquent member of the Bar pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850
and its implementing rules and regulations;
and
(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be
discharged from the case and the client/s
shall be allowed to secure the services of a
new counsel with the concomitant right to
demand the return of fees already paid to the
non-compliant lawyer.
This revokes OCA Circular No. 66-2008 dated July 22, 2008, and
any prior circular from the Office of the Court Administrator on this matter
which is contrary to the foregoing is hereby superseded.

For your information, guidance and strict compliance.

26 May 2014

Canon 6 – The Canons apply to lawyers in government service

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 151805 (2005)

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN,
ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL
KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG,
ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED
LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS & RESORT CORP.,
NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS,
INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.

DECISION

123
PUNO, J p:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of
the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of
government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. 1 It was later found by the Central Bank that
GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3
million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the Central
Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. 3 Despite the mega loans,
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation. 4 A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to
28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. 5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President
Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel
Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy
Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel
Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings,
Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents
Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don
Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. 6 In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former President Marcos. HaIESC

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to
nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. 7 After the filing of the parties'
comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 8 and 0096-0099. 9 The
motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General 10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively
intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and
became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central
Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

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On April 22, 1991, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG's motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. 11 It found that the PCGGfailed to prove the existence
of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It further ruled that
respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited
period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986.
The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. 14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second Division to the
Fifth Division. 15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of theSandiganbayan denied the other
PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. 16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April
22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil
Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution
dated December 5, 2001. 17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that
Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and
4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply. 19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall
cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A.
The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other
parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of
the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth
and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties
were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods
and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties — competency, diligence,
loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor — originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from
those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to
govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater.
125
The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many
regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps
in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in
the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness,
competency and reasonable fees. 20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This
concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth
century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other
lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of
mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of
colonial regulations — e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions — persisted in some states.
Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law
started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in
formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did
not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal
ethics. 21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their
practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated
by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth
century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of
duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some
of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely
popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the
re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial
period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations
began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar
associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on
the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. 22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887
Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states' codes, and it was the foundation for the American
Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. 23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure
of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association
adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their
concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government
service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information,
contacts, and influence garnered in government service." 25 These concerns were classified as "adverse-
interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which
the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.
26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply
primarily to former government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the
canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended
one canon and added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers,
Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
representation conflicts." 29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government
126
lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the
government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice
clients. 30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of
which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity. TDcAaH

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in
1933 and 1937, respectively. 31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics. 32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to
study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational
and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States
likewise observed thatCanon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. 33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case of
Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) 35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the
canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the Model Code. 36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards
set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983,
the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement
format," where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new
format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable
standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced
the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to
the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly
with regard to conflicts of interests. 37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless
dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm's
indefinite nature. 38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to
reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21,
1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. 39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 — A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts."

127
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and
later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the
Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict"
sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B.
The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and,
second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter."
The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well
as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act
of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza
while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as
constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz: 40

The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists
that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK
by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. TaCDAH

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Assistant to the
Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference
with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the
liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:

1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board

reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last
examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that
the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may
be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the
liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan.

3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the
foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board.

4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance
reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

128
 The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board
where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating
to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank's
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the

subject memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination

Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing
a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust
Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and

Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the

Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of
the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the
case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising
the Central Bank on the legal procedureto liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under
Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. — Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions,
it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be
the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board
of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be
true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of
the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the
powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and
foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions.

xxx xxx xxx

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public
interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of

129
 the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the
stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to
implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall
designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by
the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert
the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name
of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute
such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts
and assets of such institution. ICTDEa

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of
the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of
the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction
shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond,
which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the
amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which
the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of
the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due
in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a
receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision
of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72,
1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls
within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent
Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved
in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not

130
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc.
No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject “matter” in Civil Case No.
0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied
Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor
does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank
are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was
liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and
officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of thePCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without
saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because
his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different
from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene"
means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall,

or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance
or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same
city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) 41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests
of others. 42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation,
"intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence. 43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings. 44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the
word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils
sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as ". . . drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law." HTCAED

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which
he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the
phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government
lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter
in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules
further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client
in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is aninitiatory pleading, hence, it has
to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note
that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role
of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determiningclaims of creditors against
the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central
Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

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 Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part
of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from
similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in
the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took
account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will
achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already
difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government
will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government
may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that
can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. 45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the
sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules
prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and
cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. 46 Indeed, "to make government service
more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter." 47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be
misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive
the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the
tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary." 48 Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals'
description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to
disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long
been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal
incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case
at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. 50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were
refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to
lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51
The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.
52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can
result in denial of due process. SIHCDA

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work
vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands
by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53
He adds: "Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit
on the ability to quit inhibits official independence." 54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General,
the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor
General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to
refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

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No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise
his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may
extend to all members of his law firm. 55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers
of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as
well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can
lead to untoward results. 57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to
former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the
government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. 58 Notably, the appearance of
impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and some courts
have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists,
and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the
public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers
who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in
the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005
which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no
inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the
contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling
it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered
no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et
al.There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61 The
example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he
or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the
cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post
employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies." 63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably
excessive." 64 He opines ". . . it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who
had just been disloyal to his or her last client — the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm
that law firms want the 'best' government lawyers — the ones who were hardest to beat — not the least
qualified or least vigorous advocates." 65 But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar.
There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK
with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the
interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of
former officials" or their "clout." 66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He
explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee's influence may actually
be the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from
government . . ." 67 More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To
quote him further: ". . . The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather
than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a
lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the
possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of
favoritism." 68

III
The question of fairness
133
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga
opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are
disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet
adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made
after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they
make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that.
Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of
the Rules of Court. TaEIAS

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the
Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.

Carpio Morales, J., please see dissenting opinion.

Callejo, Sr., J., please see my dissenting opinion.

Azcuna, J., took no part. I was former PCGG chairman.

Tinga, J., please see separate opinion.

Chico-Nazario, J., took no part.

||| (Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, [April 12, 2005], 495
PHIL 485-619)

Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer to the Legal Profession

Canon 7 – Duty to uphold the dignity of the legal profession

In Re: Meling, B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE

2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI'A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J p:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has
been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

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On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a
Petition 1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him
the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City,
namely: Criminal Cases Nos. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687
for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.
Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez' wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the
Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have
been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court's Resolution 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer, 3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three
cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated."
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the
word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation 4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to
take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the
cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material
fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." 5

As regards Meling's use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

135
 Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling
is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he
signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is
signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not
entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the
appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling's
membership in the Shari'a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. 7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him
as a member of the Shari'a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. 8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or
regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any
court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge
against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending
criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that. IaDcTC

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant
would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By
concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are
ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.

Meling's concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack
of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a
member of the Shari'a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya, 11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title
"Attorney" by members of the Shari'a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent
therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in
several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private
capacity. The Court declared that:

. . . persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of
administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest
136
official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the
virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the
Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent
grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders
from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron
S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the
Philippine Shari'a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petitionseeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become
moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari'a Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

||| (In re Haron S. Meling, B.M. No. 1154, [June 8, 2004])

Rule 139-A, Rules of Court

In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).

SYNOPSIS

For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
the latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the removal
of respondent's name from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay
membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an
invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an
administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

137
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise
of the police power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed
as a regulatory measure designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration;
that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X,
Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that
the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-
Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated
Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar
and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.

2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A
VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law
is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as
an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. The
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. — The Congress in
enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in
the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively," the Supreme Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing theconstitution of the IBP into a body
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is
the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES REGARDING
ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act
No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court

138
the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.

6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL

FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by
the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. — There is
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer s public responsibilities.

9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE SUPREME
COURT. — The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does
not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.

10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is neither unconstitutional nor
illegal, and a lawyer's stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
notwithstanding due notice, in violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment and striking out
of his name from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J p:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
139
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:

". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the
removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action
taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned."

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted
to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership
fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in
accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:

"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
LLphil

"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known

as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear
or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court."

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and
of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

140
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably
and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.

". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced
in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained
in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable' . . ."

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of
justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public
interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were
prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes,
"Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.

141
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and
all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X
of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . .",

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power
"to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law, " it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme
Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of
the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. prLL

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
is already a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state.10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
142
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation
of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice
of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a
profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the
court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It
has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to
protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power
will not be misused or prostituted. . ."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to
remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. cdll

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez
and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

||| (In re: Edillon, A.C. No. 1928 (Resolution), [August 3, 1978], 174 PHIL 55-68)

Santos vs. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, Jan. 20, 2000

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000.]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

143
 SYNOPSIS

Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a member of the bar, sent a letter-complaint dated February 8, 1997 to this Court. He
alleged that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for a number of years had not indicated the proper Professional Tax
Receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Official Receipt Numbers and data (date and place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated "IBP Rizal 259060," but he had been using this for at least
three years already. This matter was being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies a that
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." In his
comment, Atty. Llamas claimed that since 1992, he publicly made it clear in his Income Tax Return that he had
only a limited practice of law and his principal occupation is farming. And being a senior citizen since 1992, he
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 in the payment of taxes. Thus, he honestly believed
in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only a limited practice, the subsequent payment by
him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. Nonetheless, despite such honest belief, he
was ready to tender such fulfillment on payment.

The Court ruled that respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not
matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4, grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues. Respondent's failure to pay his IBP
dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merited the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law, the Court believed that the penalty of one year suspension from the practice
of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, was appropriate.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP); MEMBERSHIP DUES; PAYMENT IS
REQUIRED TO LIMITED PRACTICE. — Respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues,
and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."

2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7432; SENIOR CITIZENS EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION DUES ARE NOT
INCLUDED THEREIN. — While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption
does not include payment of membership or association dues.

3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED BY

MISREPRESENTATION OF LAWYER TO PUBLIC AND COURTS THAT HE HAS PAID HIS IBP DUES. — By
indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. CANON 10 — A
LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY; MITIGATED BY LAWYER'S ADVANCED AGE, EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO PAY HIS IBP
DUES AND PLEA FOR MORE TEMPERATE APPLICATION OF LAW. — Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues
and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in
view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

144
 DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a
member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the
matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he
only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as
shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997:
(originals available)

Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1,

1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13,

1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257),
Parañaque, MM

Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17,
1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th
Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law." There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially
its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be
done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts). cdtai

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)

2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787,
RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,
1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January
17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature
above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2
dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati,
145
denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of
Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues
was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the
present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice,
after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged: 5

3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997
the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in
good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is
in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing,
were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the
February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed
and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court
Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to
the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge
was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony,
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or
privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is
located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is
legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent
payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he
never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to
show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with
such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for
allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for
him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all good faith, to the contrary.
prLL

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his

146
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondent's suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R.
and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more
particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President
Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has
invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as
an example."

xxx xxx xxx

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since
1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had
only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years
and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this
issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP
dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in
good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a
senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed
sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as
a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and
it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.

147
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the
courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. LLjur

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR,
or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas'
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, [January 20, 2000], 379 PHIL 569-578)

Canon 8 – Duty of professional courtesy

Linsangan vs. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6672. September 4, 2009.]

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J p:

This is a complaint for disbarment 1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services. SEDaAH
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients 2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance 3 and
expeditious collection on their claims. 4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them
and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and
utilize respondent's services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached
"respondent's" calling card: 6
Front
148
 NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE *

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano

Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN

REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of
the said calling card. 7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9
found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10
and other canons 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule
against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule
138 12 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant's
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyer's services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the
public's estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called. 14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
149
 RULE 2.03.A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. HDacIT

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers. 15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. 16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03.A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE
ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN'S CAUSE.

This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty. 18
Complainant presented substantial evidence 19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent's office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals' suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed
to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano's word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03
and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should
not steal another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano's "referrals". Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano's connection to his office. 21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another's legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. THIECD
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 — A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer's fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is
handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client's cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the client's case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of
his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
client's cause. 24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the
exercise of the Court's disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus,
in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

150
 Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist.
The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct. 27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer's name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced. 28

Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance". The phrase was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to
finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby
taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism
degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of
substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04
and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of
this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely. DcTaEH
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
||| (Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 (Resolution), [September 4, 2009], 614 PHIL 327-337)

Canon 9 – Duty to shun unauthorized practice of law

Noe-Lacsamana vs. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, November 23, 2011

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.]

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, complainant, vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE,

respondent.

DECISION

151
CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-
Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the
counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso's deed of sale over
the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment
case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where
Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente
also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela
Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel.
Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25
November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices
specified Dela Rosa as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification
with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
IDTSaC
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few
years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to
continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente's
former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his
signature in the Answer 1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation, 2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that
Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him
since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from
the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente's designated office
address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente's only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former
secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente's staff,
alleging Macasieb's failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-
CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso's case in her affidavit and that there was no mention
that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also
noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmente's office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit
attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in
November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmente's allegation
that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only
due to Dela Rosa's connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente's allegation that his signature on the
Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI
despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente's suspension from the practice of law for not less than five
years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, 3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmente's
suspension to six months. DaESIC
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4 from the NBI stating that the
signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed

152
 that they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168,
the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmente's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in
her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out
to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. 5
The Court further ruled that holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that
purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. 6
The Court explained:
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law. 7 ESCacI

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar,
misrepresented herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is
whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was
able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of
Busmente's staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his
office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were
still sent to Busmente's office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa's practice should have ended
in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente's office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7
December 2004 Order 8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284
showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge
Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been
impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente's claim that
Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmente's office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of
the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen
signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that
Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however,
showed that there were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14
November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also
submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003

153
addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn
his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to
know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmente's allegation
contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that: cEAHSC
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes,
Binondo Manila.

b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by
IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment
docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan,
Metro Manila.

c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-
Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court
records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good
faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to
us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;

e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she
filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO
BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or
hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not
present, to wit:

1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated;

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false; SIDTCa

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the

narration of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in
the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her
whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have
been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she
has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal
assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284
and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that
Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the
recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

154
 Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

Brion, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, [November 23, 2011], 677 PHIL 1-9)

Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer to the Courts

Canon 10 – Duty of candor, fairness, and good faith to the courts

Hueysuwan vs. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, Jan. 20, 2004

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004.]

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO,

respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his
eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer "by manufacturing,
flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order." 1

In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Hueysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other.
They have two children — namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr.,
three years old — both of whom are in complainant's custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of
her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is
pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, "James Benedict C.
Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant's residence in Tanjay City, Negros
Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed
complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted
his motion for temporary child custody. 2Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he
had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent. HEITAD

Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but
respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two
dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of
their children to respondent.

In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in
Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to
him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions,
whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.

155
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen
subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At
the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by
agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate court's resolution/order. 3 In order to diffuse
the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that
he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City
Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.

In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel
where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel
and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.

On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified
petition 4 for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis
of the alleged Court of Appeals' Resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the
Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 5 from the Court of Appeals stating that no
such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently,
the petition was dismissed.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney's oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals' Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privilege granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice
law in the country.

After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in
his disbarment. 6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six
years.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on
and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals
Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and
presented the spurious Resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the
assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance
of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, 7 which he filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used
the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it
could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task
of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel
is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of the
truth. 8 Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. CaDEAT

Rule 10.02 — A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

156
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as
befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 9 The lawyer's arguments whether
written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another. 10 By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well
as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.

Respondent's actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct
and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is
too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to
the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent. TSEcAD

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.

||| (Hueysuwan-Florido v. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, [January 20, 2004], 465 PHIL 1-8)

Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. CA, G.R. No. 123698, Aug. 5, 1998

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998.]

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.

Ruperto G. Martin and Donardo R. Paglinawan for petitioner.

Jose V. Marcella for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner is the transferee of a lot subject of a complaint for quieting of title and declaration of nullity between
private respondents and Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation. A notice of lis pendens was annotated on
Petitioner's title. Judgment was rendered in favor of private respondents. It was affirmed by both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. When a writ of possession/break open order was issued by the trial court,
petitioner opposed the same contending that it was a buyer in good faith and not impleaded as party. The
motion, however, was granted. Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari which
157
rendered judgment dismissing the petition as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration. Its appeal to
this Court was denied and attained finality. When an alias writ of execution was issued subsequently by the
court, petitioner again filed a petition forcertiorari with the Court of Appeals arguing among others that it was
not a party to the case, that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver
possession of the property to the private respondents; and that private respondent's title is being questioned in
another case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on ground of finality of judgment of the lower court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, again this recourse by petitioner. In the meantime
the alias writ of possession and alias writ of execution was duly implemented by the Sheriff. cSITDa

Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties are deemed resolved and
its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end.

Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or
consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As
correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of
taking possession of the subject realty.

The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private
respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is
so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled
in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents'
title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No.
205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted
merely to delay the execution of the judgment.

Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned
Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994
have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March 31, 1995, with
the attached "Turn Over Premises" indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject
property. aCHDST

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; IN A FINAL JUDGMENT, ALL ISSUES ARE DEEMED
RESOLVED. — It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among
the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the
controversy litigated come to an end.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALL NECESSARY AND LOGICAL EFFECTS OR CONSEQUENCES INCLUDED THEREIN. — Placing
private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence
of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly
argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of taking
possession of the subject realty. SEAHID

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY PENDENCY OF ANOTHER ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLES BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC AND PREDECESSOR. — The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by
the Republic against private respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No.
205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will
nullify the said private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed
adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land.
Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the judgment.

4. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; PETITION RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHERE WRIT OF
EXECUTION HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED. — Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and
academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the

158
Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by
the "Sheriff's Return," dated March 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" indicating therein that
private respondents took possession of the subject property.

5. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; BOUND TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO ASSIST IN SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in
the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every
effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules
of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes. ISEHTa

DECISION

MARTINEZ, A.M., J p:

This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing
the execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in
Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in this
second petition for review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues which have already attained
finality. We now write finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled
in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City: 1

". . . litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must
guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy
and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit
litium."

The facts:

The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a
complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and
for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said
corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. cdphil

On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void.

Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs."

The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25,
1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became
final on March 5, 1992. 4

The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which was
granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.

Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely
unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of
the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.

159
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion. Another Order was issued on August 18,
1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of
defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read:

"We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge. cdtai

Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to
be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or
suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on
the transferee." 5

The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993. 6

On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 109076, was
denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7 Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of
Judgment dated October 21, 1993. 8

Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the
trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.

Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's motion was initially granted 9 on August
29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the said
order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge
Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued:

Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari 11 with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguinginter alia: that the judgment cannot
be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in
said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; that
certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution
highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers'
freedom of religion and worship; and that private respondents' title is being questioned in another case.

On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment 12 dismissing the petition for certiorari on
the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled,
thus: Cdpr

"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case
No. 9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and
possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal
maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. . . . Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop
the execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this
Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a
mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party,
will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously,
frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner
Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court)

Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant petition has
already become moot and academic as the property in question was already turned over by the
Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus,
hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.)

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. 13
160
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of arguments
espoused in their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.

The petition must fail.

It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties
before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy
litigated come to an end.

Petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to
surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the
case between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled:

"Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.

"Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to
be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or
suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on
the transferee." 14

The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993.
There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.

Further, petitioner's contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be resolved before
the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.

Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or
consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As
correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of
taking possession of the subject realty. LLpr

Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil
Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the
pendency or Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of
the Philippines against private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject
property. Petitioner argues that the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why
execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of possession of the subject property should be permanently
stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final resolution of the case.

We do not agree.

The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private
respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is
so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled
in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents'
title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No.
205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted
merely to delay the execution of the judgment.

Finally, petitioner's fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution of
the judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the
execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken into account by
the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its
Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:

"The defendant-petitioner are(sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy

because they can still go after the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in
question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of
161
 the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be
placed in possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the
same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the
defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of the
property subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration since they benefited
from the sale of the burial lots." 15

In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit: LLjur

"The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed
by the plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they
can have access to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could
be made by the defendant with the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be
made." 16

Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following
limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:

"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have
been sold to so many persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots
adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the
enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be applied only to the gate
of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question
where the factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the
resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of land within the said memorial park." 17

From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has
been properly addressed.

Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned
Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994
have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriff's Return," 18 dated March 31, 1995,
with the attached "Turn Over Premises" 19indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the
subject property.

A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to
the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on
the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall
have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the
property. This is a mockery of justice. cdrep

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes. 20 In Banogan et al. vs. Cerna, et al., 21 we ruled:

"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious
study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be
permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.

162
||| (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123698, [August 5, 1998], 355 PHIL 369-
380)

Canon 11 – Duty to give respect to the courts

In Re Almacen, GR No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-27654. February 18, 1970.]

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE

RAUL ALMACEN in L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT; MINUTE RESOLUTIONS NOT DECISIONS WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION. — Short resolutions or, in current Court practice, minute "resolutions," are
not decisions within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petitions for review
should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. A petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. And so, there is no
need to fully explain the Court's denial.

2. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE ON SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, MANDATORY. — As a law practitioner
who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a
motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy
of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of
hearing (which admittedly he did not). Since there is lack of notice in this regard, the Court cannot act upon
said motion — for it is nothing but a useless piece of paper. If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court
to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of
the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right.

3. ID.; ID.; COURTS AND JUDGES NOT SACROSANCT; DUTY OF LAWYER THERETO. — Courts and judges are
not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Criticism of the courts is an important part of the
traditional work of the lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. Hence, as
a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right.

4. ID.; ID.; NATURE AND STANDARDS OF CRITICISM TOWARDS THE COURT. — The cardinal condition of all
such criticism directed against the Courts or its judges that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

5. ID.; ID.; DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERS OF THE BAR. — Membership in the Bar imposes upon
a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." The
Rules of Court constantly remind him to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." A lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of

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a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

6. ID.; ID.; PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, WHAT CONSTITUTES. — Post-litigation utterances or publications,

made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate
disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly
constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

7. ID.; ID.; PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF CONTEMPT COVERS PENDING AS WELL AS DECIDED CASES. — To view
the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous
remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof,
is erroneous. The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceedings has terminated has lost much of its
vitality. As expressed by Chief Justice Moran, there may still be contempt by publication even after a case has
been terminated.

8. ID.; ID.; DUTY OF THE COURT, NOT ONLY TO ADMIT BUT ALSO TO DISCIPLINE AND EXCLUDE. — By
constitutional mandate, the Court has the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission
to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from
the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Indeed,
in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power.
It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court.

9. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST A MEMBER OF THE BAR. — Accent should be
laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Courtmotu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.

10. ID.; ID.; NATURE AND EXTENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST A MEMBER OF THE BAR, DISCRETIONARY UPON
COURT. — The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J p:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his
client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by
this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
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same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying
"that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of
the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

". . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession."

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26,
1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

"Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the

tribunal's `unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

"Because of the tribunal's `short-cut justice,' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

"There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, `where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity'.

xxx xxx xxx

"He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns
his living, the present members of the Supreme Court `will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions.'" (Italics supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

". . . our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas
of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity,"

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967.
In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses
so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, 1
in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment
against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on
July 6, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did
not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff
moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To
prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed
on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card.
This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966,
upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected
the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

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But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:

"Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-
appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the
appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1966 (pp. 90-
118, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1966), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time."

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive.
At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this
Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
"Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant-appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

"Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this
case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No.
L-16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May
30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's
motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. case.

"There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.

"In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on
November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in
the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it `without
prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief.' In the main decision in said case
(Rep. vs. Venturanza), the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26,
1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue."

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave
to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on
September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the said date was ordered
expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with
the insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against
this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28. 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he
shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word
came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to
surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending
166
petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;"
that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and
that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct,
this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for
permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open
and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days
from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and
incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his
defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers no apology. Far from being contrite,
Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant
sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

"At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
—

" `Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be
measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet
dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how canst thou say to thy brother,
"Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own
eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt
see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes.

" `Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to
them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in

his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that `he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But
he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court, that they tend to bring the entire court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the
noble profession of law

xxx xxx xxx

"Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but only motivated with
the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of
JUSTICE — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED with all its hardiness

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and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

"Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in
the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.

"Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn
denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the
opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir.
Is this the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — `the
story is current, though nebulous as to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in
the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who
have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity
in the Philippines.'

xxx xxx xxx

"We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We
attack the decision of this Court, not the members. . . . We were provoked. We were
compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you
have not performed your duties with `circumspection, carefulness, confidence and
wisdom', your Respondent rise to claim his God-given right to speak the truth and his
Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

"The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to
us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, `O
Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name', we may dare say, `O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, `O JUSTICE, what
injustices are committed in thy name.'

xxx xxx xxx

"We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but
who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong
public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

"The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also
deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our
cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in
the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons
why our appeal has been DENIED,. not one word was spoken or given . . . We refer to no
human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the impersonal state
of things and nothing more.

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 xxx xxx xxx

"As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST
ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must
end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution, and to uphold
the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter."

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to
this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2
expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do
away with it, to state the facts and law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion
very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for
many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought
never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to withstand critical
scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or Write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

"A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result . . .

"Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing
reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that
the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed
the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last
three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases. respectively, on their merits. For
the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105, 1,189 petitions calling
for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give
reasons, however brief, for refusing to take there cases. The time that would be required
is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at
a particular time make's review undesirable."

Six years ago, in Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the
petitioner's counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

"In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been
raised before; and we held that these `resolutions' are not `decisions' within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

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 "By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered `dismissed'."

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have
had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this
Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this
Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which recites:

"Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary. — A review is not a matter of

right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:

"(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court,
as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision."

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings
and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light
of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was,
therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not
only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the
time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila
Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

"The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by

Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state
the time and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at least
three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank
v. Damasco, L-18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do
not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition."

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he
made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he
took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would
thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know
that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to

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be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of,
not only the courts' rulings but also the manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right
is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, 4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer. 5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because
then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our official
actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the
undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other
public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and
honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to
inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. 9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this
where those who sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as
citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13
For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that

"An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to
him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts." (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487)

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the lawyer. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In articles written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see the
flaws and inconsistencies of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
"No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. . . . To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and
to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained. .
..

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable
for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657, 665).

"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an
able and upright bench." (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the
best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty, to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so

171
far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must
be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct
himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts;" 14and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe
and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be
obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for
their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards
as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar
should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten,
40 Atl. 481)

"We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That
is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is
his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." (Per Justice Sanchez in
Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and
a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications
16 or in the course of a political campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared
that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:

"It would be contrary to every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency

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 and truth or which are not aimed at the destruction of public confidence in the judicial
system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice is
the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise."

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city
officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge
Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went. much
further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.

"The entire publication evidences a desire on the part of the accused to belittle
and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public."

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an
attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial
office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge
"used his judicial office to enable said bank to keep that money." Said the court:

"We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity
of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney
capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.)
585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the
first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:

" 'It may be (although we do not 80 decide) that a libelous publication by

an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the disbarment of its author.'

"Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character
than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re
Collins 81 Pac. 220."

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter
began:

"Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is

protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants."

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins
or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
". . . Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to
submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and reject
of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the
courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity,
cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate
and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the
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 unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public."

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption
and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct,
and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

"A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of
the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with
the administration of justice. . . .

"Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he
possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that
have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and
criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he
will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an
independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil
rights." In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723, 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate
court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such
action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding
that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an
impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:

"We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the
profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of
their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or in proper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to
submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial offices
for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or
would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the
duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable
inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them protected. . . . While we
recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of
the public generally, to criticize the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced
for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial offices in the performance of
their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or
motives are criticized, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of
justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers
of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct."

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

"I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative, and finally concluded, that, as my
clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in
their favor against a widow residing here."

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

". . . the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety
and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case
of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and
174
 who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his
client."

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which
he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily
and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying that:

"The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to
the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. . . .

"The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination as of

prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man
would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to
public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all,
could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or
carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in
such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy, wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court."

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending
action using in respect to the several judges the terms "criminal, corrupt, and wicked conspiracies," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt
deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of
the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should
be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal
letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity
of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeal in which he had been attorney
for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this
paragraph:

"You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than
the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got not undue
advantage. . . . The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short
of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank,
or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate
a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation
before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded
citizen of the state to read it."

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its
opinion as follows:
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 "The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done,
as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this
court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts
done by him due his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so
made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to
gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not
and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor
was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which
any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire
to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult
otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no
redress in any action triable by a jury. `The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication.' 18
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of
this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.

"The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as
we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a
citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this
court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated
his obligation to maintain the respect due to court and judicial officers. `This obligation
is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally for their official acts.' Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355,
20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official
act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home of elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think, entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod, supra. while the court in that case, as has been shown,
fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticize rulings of the court in actions which are
ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. `Is it
in the power of any person,' said the court, `by insulting or assaulting the judge because
of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the
people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil
example of punishing the insult be taking the law in his own hands? . . . No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions.'

"That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,

constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be
imposed, has been directly decided. `An attorney who, after being defeated in a case,
wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting
upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the
court.' Matter of Manheim, 133 App. div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 the same is held in Re
Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared
that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of
New York, in which it was stated, in a reference to his decision: `It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80.' And it was decided that, while
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 such misconduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be `called to
the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney.' `If,' says
the court, `counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as
principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they
may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute.'

"The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect
much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a
letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home,
while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge
in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that
the attorney was rightly disbarred in having `willfully failed to maintain respect due to
him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney.' As
recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case,
we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wail (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22
Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo. 237, 244,
3 Pac. 66, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 361; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

"Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to
him and a suitable warning to others. . . ."

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing
a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had
paralyze him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts
and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only
the judge, but his decisions in general, claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and
unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 669, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising
the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed
disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer
was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared Over a period
of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross
moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he
expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and
legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be
visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise
of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian' of the morals and ethics of the legal
fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such
as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been
disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and
calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.
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A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration
as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that

"It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not,
and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires.
The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,"

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
". . . an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having
proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client . . ."

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a
news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in a local newspaper a statement expressing his regret
"that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so
many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, . . . the only remedy to put an end
to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant
peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and
glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in
then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:

"But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in

the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as
to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to
his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded. In order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration of justice . . .

"To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices,' that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the

178
 members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might
be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like
any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of
other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation."

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

". . . an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be

respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from
office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)"

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where
counsel charged this Court With having "repeatedly fallen" into the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous
"erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice
Sanchez stressed:

"As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of
one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this
Court rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a
sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blind adhere to earlier rulings without
as much as making `any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so
patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed
error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this
Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this court
on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members — and some former members — of this Court to render
justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled
as `so-called' the `rule against splitting of jurisdiction.' "

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need
not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective
mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a
court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to
sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called
upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceedings has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however,
came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the
majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where
the editor of theManila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said

179
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by
Chief Justice Moran. in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that there may still be contempt by publication even
after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:

"A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the

courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring
them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the court to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the
punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first
there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the
contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the
court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed."

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations
now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He
could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said
appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post-
litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967,
we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional
identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary
power inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession and to
preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this
inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective
of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member
whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 ours is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves
unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

"The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent
and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that
the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a
view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court
having the right to admit attorneys to practice — and in this state that power is vested in
this court — has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to
exclude them from practice." 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of
their confidence and respect. So much so that —
". . . whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only
the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost
universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts,
and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a

180
 matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a
just and sound judicial discretion." 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however,
he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his
vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to
drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial
victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not
only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually rakes this Court and its members
with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short cut justice" while at
the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of
his actuations, in a calculated effort to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the
Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures,
virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself.
The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this
character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of
the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity
in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid
and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness,
real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must
possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all
rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
181
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court
as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost
in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it
can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose
rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of
justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it
cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that
even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does
not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they,
acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case.
In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor
and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen
for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total
removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of
course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity
and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be
zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of
some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that
suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we
are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because,
even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude
a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and
effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best
shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall] last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that
he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of
Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.

Fernando, J., did not take part.

||| (In re: Almacen v. Yaptinchay, G.R. No. L-27654 (Resolution), [February 18, 1970], 142 PHIL 353-393)
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Wicker vs. Arcangel, G.R. No. 112869, Jan. 29, 1996

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996.]

KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL,
as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 134, respondent.

Orlando A. Rayos for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DIRECT CONTEMPT; WHEN DEEMED COMMITTED. — What is
involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are
pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to be equivalent to
"misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before
the same" within the meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM INDIRECT CONTEMPT. — In case of indirect or constructive contempt,
the contemnor may be punished only "[a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
accused to be heard by himself or counsel," whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent may be
summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable,
whereas in cases of direct contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are
appealable.

3. ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT; MANIFESTED IN THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE MOTION FOR INHIBITION. — The power to
punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally
should it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. The contempt
power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for
showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court. The Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that
petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the allegations in petitioners' motion for inhibition, leads to no
other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case to whom or to
whose wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated "easing out" the former judge
to make room for such transfer. These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent
judge and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They suggest
that lawyers, if they are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth
is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 154-93, precisely "in the interest of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3),
Art. VIII of the Constitution." This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos.
cdasia

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYERS SHARE RESPONSIBILITY THEREOF. — Atty. Rayos cannot evade responsibility for
the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for
professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there
were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in
the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have materiality to the case." After the respondent judge had favorably responded to
petitioners' "profuse apologies" and indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence,

183
petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that "Respondent
Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where
more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City." If nothing else, this personal attack on the judge
only serves to confirm the "contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence" first evident in
petitioners' motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; JAIL SENTENCE DISPENSED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The jail sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater
reason for doing so considering that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not
appear to have come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in
years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. And at least
Wicker had the grace to admit his mistake. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel was also willing to waive the
imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners' description of him in the instant
petition.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of
respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty
of direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of
P100.00.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain
deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly
fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant
Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by
Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the
inhibition of the respondent judge from the consideration of the case. 1 The motion alleged in pertinent part:

1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able
to maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-
examination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she
was not presented;

2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his
station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in
that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His
Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present;

3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from
the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed
Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos' relief;

4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting
chance for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the
partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-
raffle;

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 5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance
that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately
move for his inhibition.

The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.

Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and contemptuous," respondent judge ordered both
counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be
cited for contempt of court." 2

In a pleading entitled "Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against
Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel," Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not
necessarily express his views because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity, in other
words, just lawyering," for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him that a "young man possibly employed by the
Court" had advised him to have the case re-raffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the
new judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew
who "the judge may be and when he would appear". Wicker's sense of disquiet increased when at the next two
hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the latter's witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all
absent, while the other counsels were present. 3

Finding petitioners' explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993, held
them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of
P100.00.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of
December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners to appear before him on January
7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.

In their petition 4 before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They argue that "when a person,
impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from
hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt."

In his comment, 5 respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this
Court and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was "personally recruited from the South" by Atty. Santos
and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started
holding sessions on October 18, 1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner
Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the
filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing the
execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to "avail themselves of all possible
remedies;" that after holding petitioners in contempt, he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting
himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos' claim that he was just "lawyering" and acting as "the
vehicle or mouthpiece of his client" is untenable because his (Atty. Rayos') duties to the court are more
important than those which he owes to his client; and that by tendering their "profuse apologies" in their
motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their
accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil
Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be
reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed
with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing
the case on the ground that he had a "full grasp of the case."

In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of the
case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court
Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case.

What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are

185
pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to be equivalent to
"misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before
the same" within the meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt. 6

It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor
may be punished only "[a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be
heard by himself or counsel," whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged
in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct
contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable. 7

Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners
are right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have
no ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is
important to determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
petitioners liable for direct contempt.

We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail. 8 The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the
purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the
dignity of the court. 9

Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge
Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the allegations in petitioners' motion for
inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:

2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In
one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set
hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was
not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present;

3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from
the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed
Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos' relief;

leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case,
Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which
necessitated "easing out" the former judge to make room for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted
criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected,
can manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of Judges
Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely "in the
interest of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution." 10 This
is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he
"deliberated" for two months whether or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly
asked him to do.

In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his client
of whom he was merely a "mouthpiece." He was just "lawyering" and "he cannot be gagged," even if the
allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since it was his client who
verified the same.

To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified young man,
whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the
replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed
to come. It would, therefore, appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been
"personally recruited" by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been "eased out" were Atty.
Rayos' and not Wicker's. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.
186
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an
instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause,
and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which
he could not overstep. 11 Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based
on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.

Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on
similar conduct by others" 12 and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
materiality to the case." 13

After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners' "profuse apologies" and indicated that he
would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their
instant petition which prayed in part that "Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former
station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao
City." If nothing else, this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the "contumacious attitude, a
flouting or arrogant belligerence" first evident in petitioners' motion for inhibition belying their protestations of
good faith.

Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel: 14

Numerous cases there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court,
were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of a
case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which
they based their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is
only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to
disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that
movants were held in contempt of court.

It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be
exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater
reason for doing so considering that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not
appear to have come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in
years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may
have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could not point a court employee who was the
source of the same. At least he had the grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and truth of said
information. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on
petitioners until he came upon petitioners' description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot
make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact
that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding City Judges and Regional
Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a 1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.

In Ceniza v. Sebastian, 15 which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the judge "corrupt,"
the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the
trial court for the reason that

Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the
background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was
not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not
indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is
the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to
P500.00.

The same justification also holds true in this case.

187
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for five
(5) days and INCREASING the fine from P100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

||| (Wicker v. Arcangel, G.R. No. 112869, [January 29, 1996], 322 PHIL 476-489)

Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011

EN BANC

[A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011.]

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT

BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors 1 in
response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show
cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the
said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an
allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds
that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested
he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or
tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently
behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the
relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as
citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:
EDSHcT
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

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 Rule 10.02 — A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 — A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 — A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds,
they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in
particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for
a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision's reconsideration.
The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this
plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone's attention from the actual concern of this Court to
determine by respondents' explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the
line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through
improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed
that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement, 2 which
they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court's proper
disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that
freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate
speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents' invocation of
academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who
teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents' own non-observance of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be
ignored nor glossed over by this Court. acHTIC
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents' actuations, it is apropos to revisit the
factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel 3 for
Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely
the following grounds:
I. OUR OWN CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORIES REJECT THIS
HONORABLE COURTS' (SIC) ASSERTION THAT THE EXECUTIVE'S FOREIGN POLICY
PREROGATIVES ARE VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED; PRECISELY, UNDER THE RELEVANT
JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, SUCH PREROGATIVES ARE
PROSCRIBED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS,
INCLUDING THOSE PROVIDED FOR IN THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF
WHICH THE PHILIPPINES IS A PARTY. 4

II. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS CONFUSED DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION WITH THE
BROADER, IF FUNDAMENTAL, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES TO PROTECT THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF ITS CITIZENS — ESPECIALLY WHERE THE RIGHTS ASSERTED ARE SUBJECT OF
ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS AND PERTAIN TO JUS COGENS NORMS. 5

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 On July 19, 2010, 6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and
Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No.
162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT'S JUDGMENT
OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES — AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN
2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE
WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW — AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT
THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT'S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT
PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR
THE PETITION'S CLAIMS. 7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive
plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the
arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition." 8 HEDCAS
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent's article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" 9 (2)
Christian J. Tams' book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law; 10 and (3) Mark Ellis' article
"Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime." 11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of
ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. 12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV
website also on July 19, 2010. 13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque's column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila
Standard Today. 14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors
purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with
Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle's response to the post by
Julian Ku regarding the news report 15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris.
Prof. Criddle responded to Ku's blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper's 16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed
yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-
court/

The motion suggests that the Court's decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations
that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan
Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners' [plagiarism]
allegations until after the motion was filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court's jus cogens discussion is that it
implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are
not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court's
decision is available here:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the
charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr.
Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours: SEcTHA

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.

190
 Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a
question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and
humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article
on rape as an international crime in your esteemed Court's Judgment in the case of Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the
Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI), 19 an
affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp.
27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed
Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross
purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the
appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your
esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by
this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)

Dr. Mark Ellis 20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010
letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the
letter of Justice Del Castillo. 21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak's website 22 and on
Atty. Roque's blog. 23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such
as the GMA News TV 24 and the Sun Star 25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted
at the University of the Philippines College of Law's bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 2010 26 and at
said college's website. 27 DHACES
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
(Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable

Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty

from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary

Your Honors:
191
 We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)
28 members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be
considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)

Marvic M.V.F. Leonen

Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures
of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.)
appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is
reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW

ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND

MISREPRESENTATION

IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who
had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very
personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades
for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan,
got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
TacESD

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views
the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and
misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are
not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without
correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine
Judicial System.

In common parlance, 'plagiarism' is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another

person's work as one's own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst.
It constitutes a taking of someone else's ideas and expressions, including all the effort and
creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making
it appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty,
pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows
dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in
the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a
complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente
merely copied select portions of other legal writers' works and interspersed them into the
decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because
the Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court's and
no longer just the ponente's. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In

192
the absence of any mention of the original writers' names and the publications from which
they came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the
spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a
reference to the 'primary' sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable,
because the original authors' writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing
those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes
together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism
since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original
authors' work of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal
and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with
sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material
relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the
Highest Court of the Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle
and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their
workentitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In
this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery
as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon
the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses
parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual
dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual
fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive. DHSEcI

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State
liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the
role of the injured parties' home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or
damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That
the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the
Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every
solicitude.But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for
almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the
Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized
materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the
Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition,
coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for
even the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme
Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal
systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot
accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all
members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority
and power in a democratic society. Given the Court's recent history and the controversy that
surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass
without sanction as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system.
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino
women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse
and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the
petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

193
 The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that
its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This
necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing
and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be
conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then
at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward
the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the
Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the
Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the
Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely
above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and
professional ethics. aICHEc

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon
them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of
the Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is

unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct
and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire
Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial
system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of
legal precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to
the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of
justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such
as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to
save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente ofVinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position,
without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider
appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it
conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance
to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law
(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008)
and Professor of Law
REGULAR FACULTY
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL
Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD

194
 DAWAY Assistant Professor
Associate Dean and Associate Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
LECTURERS
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA (SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA 29
(Underscoring supplied.)
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments
on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court. 30 We quote Prof. Tams' letter here:ACcISa
Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of

Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-
mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court's Judgment, in the
section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter
shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter
of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University
Press 2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the
Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather
than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it
can be considered an appropriate form of referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment's
cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my
book's central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been
widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the
introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the 'very
mysterious' concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the
concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of
the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of
States" (p. 309).

195
 With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have
been cited to support — as it seemingly has — the opposite approach. More generally, I am
concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court's Judgment has drawn on scholarly
work without properly acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court. ICTacD

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)

Christian J. Tams 31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares' exhibits during the August 26,
2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a
copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty
members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing. 32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the
signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the
UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was
that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual
signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
(Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and
Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his
name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the
total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having
been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the
Court. 33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations
regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators' opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established
fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo's
explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a
contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court.
The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It
reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war. ISaCTE

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. .
...

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately
delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Court'salleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the
supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect. 34 . . . . (Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

196
 While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten
the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of
its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty's less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine
the Court's honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women's claims is not controversial enough,
the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would
not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. 35 . . . . (Citations omitted; emphases and
underscoring supplied.) ATSIED

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B.
Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa
Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O.
Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of Canons 1, 36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his
letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the
Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful
reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement. 38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by
Respondents in Response to the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the
following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents,
excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge
of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T.
Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in
relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to
the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and HSTCcD

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.
197
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents
(Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof.
Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common
compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of
said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the
discharge of the 'solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,' and as
members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them." 39
They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was
involved either as party or counsel" 40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the
Show Cause Resolution's findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment — that respondents indeed are in
contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the Court, and have violated
'Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility." 41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents' alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes 42 and the courts
43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court 44in the issuance of their
Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its
integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was
purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive action." 45 Respondents'
call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure
only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with
strictures enjoining lawyers to 'participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice'" (under Canon 4 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1,
id.). 46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly guard
against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact
in the academe, especially in our law schools." 47 acHCSD
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as
an 'institutional attack' . . . on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs." 48They further clarified that at the
time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to
take any action on the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation." 49 According
to respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said
that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the matter; 50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of
Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and
misrepresentation charges." 51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court's
indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled
them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents' position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and
should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of
respondents' charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines
Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals 52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially
argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and
that they are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common
Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,
53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted
without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the
Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a
2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law" by Michael O'Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice Del

198
Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections. 54
(c) Respondents' belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise
spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues." 55 They identified various published reports
and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism,
specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero; 56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24,
2010; 57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010; 58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on
July 30, 2010; 59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr.
published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010; 60 SIDEaA

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010; 61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan's call for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard
Today on July 31, 2010; 62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del
Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business
Mirror on August 11, 2010; 63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean
of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional
Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines — Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010; 64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010. 65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions and
the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position
that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members
of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy who are
constitutionally protected in the exercise of free speech." 66 In support of this contention, they cited United
States v. Bustos, 67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief
Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections. 69 CSAaDE
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was
also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They
relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national
university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia
v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology 70 which they claimed recognized the
199
extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and communication of
a faculty member's field of study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents' view that had they remained
silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and
credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of students,
professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and pleading; or,
worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and misrepresentation
are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one's conduct." 71
In closing, respondents' Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion
of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez, 72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from
the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a
too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of
independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and
unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional
intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome
of a case. 73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance
stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and

officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause
Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents have: [a]
breached their "obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to
be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, . . . and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed
"violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility." CcaASE

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents
respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before
final judgment be rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the
findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution
(including especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious
intent), and in that connection, that appropriate procedures and
schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the
full and fair opportunity to require the production of and to present
testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues inVinuya v. Executive Secretary
(G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts,
reports and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses who were or could have been called in
In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC). 74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof.

200
Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof.
Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she
adopted the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the
findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement
can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be
punished only after charge and hearing." 75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best
intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign." 76For her part, Prof. Juan-
Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what
motivated her to sign the Statement. SEACTH
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence 77 which in her view
highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such
that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how
lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in
the schools' exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims
the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines and other
universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents'
constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent
danger to public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by
registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances
surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation
among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly
contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a
clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme
advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith. 79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer
has the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; 80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen; 81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d. 82 He claims that he
"never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or should influence,
[the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case" 83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the
farthest thing on respondent's mind when he signed the Statement." 84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to
impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof.
Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused
the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the
same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless
of the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This
uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this
Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another's
work and to pass it off as one's own. 85 (Emphases supplied.) HCaDIS

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been
remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been more
careful." 86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully
complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner
violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
201
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 in relation to his submission of
a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law
Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:
• "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of
Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37)
faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with
the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC.

• "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which
reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty
with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and
physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of
Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from
the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks
before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.

• "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which
presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean's Office in the UP College
of Law that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears
the actual signatures of the thirty-seven original signatories to Restoring
Integrity I above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition,
the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above their
handwritten or typewritten names. 87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant
since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these
two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court. IAETDc
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen
alleged, thus:
2.2. On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on
a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among
the faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff
encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft's signing pages. Thus did the first
printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was
unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court's Decision in Vinuya vs.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the
Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards inA.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonen's staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the
faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean's Office to sign the document or had it
brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other
faculty members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at
that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as
soon as they could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been
circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style
and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own established
202
 practice in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing
pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed draft would appear,
together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus
came into being. 88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-
signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic
considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents." 89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting
statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters." 90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza's name as among the signatories in Restoring
Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a
miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that: CHTcSE
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing
pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the
"(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed
Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his
staff to the inclusion of the Justice's name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring
Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice
Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had
authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed
fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that
time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States
the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not entirely accurate. 91
(Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so
placed full reliance on her account" 92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also
authorized the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to
affix their signatures physically to the document." 93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the
circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza's signature. It would turn out that this
was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean's staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the
phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
as he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say
that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he
could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The
dean's staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity
Statement to him.

2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to
the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time,
Justice Mendoza declined to sign. 94 SaICcT

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received
from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the
time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his
arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At
that time, he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By
then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable

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 Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by
signing the Statement. 95 (Emphases supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit's name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II
when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen's
August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38 members
of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated
to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen's staff in the
reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name
was still included in the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to
Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice
Mendoza.) 96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement
that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the
Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This
purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement's] essential nature as a 'live' public manifesto meant to
continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic . . .
many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting the same text but
with more and more signatories." 97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is
not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an act
when the latter did not in fact so participate" 98 for he "did not misrepresent which members of the faculty
of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed
their desire to be signatories thereto." 99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules
10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the
identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to,
the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the
Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona
for the latter's information and proper disposition with the hope that its points would be duly considered by
the Honorable Court en banc." 100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen
posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character or
motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the
standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 102 cCSHET
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common
Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses
allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving
Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch
(Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the
Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a
visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He
further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the
United States, that '. . .[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials." 103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak
effectively." 104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,
105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended
recipients listen" 106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression,
when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to their
pupils can speak only in timorous whispers." 107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 108 Prof.

204
Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as
to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on
free speech). 109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show
Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."
110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the
material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents' academic freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined as
Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be
disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation to
such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the
witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)? HCSAIa
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny
respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents' collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution,
has interfered with respondents' constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears
that the underlying assumption behind respondents' assertion is the misconception that this Court is
denying them the right to criticize the Court's decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors' dissenting view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its
members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have
expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly
enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances
surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty's Restoring
Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del
Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established
fact, but a truth" 111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely
to determine the truth of such allegations." 112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that
there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. 113 The Show Cause Resolution
made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no
stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court.
The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It
reads:

205
 An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. .
...

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately
delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Court'salleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the
supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect. 114 . . . . (Underscoring ours.) SHaIDE

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents' freedom of expression when
it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten
the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of
its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty's less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine
the Court's honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women's claims is not controversial enough,
the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would
not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. 115 . . . . (Citations omitted; emphases and
underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents' submissions, this Court has
held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference.
In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow
lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez, 116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco
both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for
reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to
the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our
power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial
outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire
to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the
eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider
unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice. 117 (Emphases supplied.) SaHIEA

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The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held
that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in
his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion
were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason
and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can
never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free
exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the
consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows
the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they
will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage
of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with
the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an
atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that
decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration
of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this
country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the
court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not
resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be
proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously. 118 (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority
view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in
a case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore,
do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents' theory,
Salcedo is authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not
only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics,
158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher,80 Ohio St. Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent
which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which
rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
and relief. 119 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his
pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents' Statement goes way beyond
merely ascribing error to the Court. cASIED
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen, 120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an
instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his
client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to
our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of

207
 justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then
vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of
the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer
that:

". . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession." 121

It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that
a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers,
including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts,
whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case
engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view. To quote from
that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on
the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. HcDSaT

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior
toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the
courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to
be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due
to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out
of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally
for their judicial acts." (Bradley v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards
as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar
should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten,
40 Atl. 481)

xxx xxx xxx

208
 In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in
private conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched
in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to disciplinary action. 122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
CacTSI

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto, 123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting

the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the
administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties
have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial
tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice
administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside
coercion or interference. . . . .

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of

the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if
well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence
the court in reversing or modifying its decision. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately
"so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one
party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years,would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of
the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of
justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer
of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on
a very shaky foundation. 124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned
even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson, 125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of
a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative
complaint and held, thus: cCSTHA
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering
justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of
the courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer
cannot criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot
criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the

209
 court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court
explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of
Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxx xxx xxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect
to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxx xxx xxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility,
but freedom with responsibility. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or
tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of
this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or
abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of
disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a
letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19
January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180,
and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and
uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
IcEACH

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor
under his duty of fidelity to his client. . . . . 126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong, 127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for
using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.

Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts.

210
 To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits
of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 129
relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of
the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and
under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition. . . . . 130 (Emphasis supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on
judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales, 131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media
statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks
to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests
is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community. . . . . 132 (Emphases supplied.)

For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that the Statement
presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest. ETIcHa
The Show Cause Resolution does not
interfere with respondents' academic
freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic
freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will
teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action forcontumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a
party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as
teachers.

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 A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous
case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke
academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to
pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court's past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline
cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in
the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of
the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the public's faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano
v. Monsod, 134 lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by
their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members
of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents' proposition in the Common Compliance that
their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration
of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have
fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal
processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar
cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that
law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions
thereof.
The Court's rulings on the submissions
regarding the charge of violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents' main arguments of freedom of expression and academic
freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents' allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of
their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur
this Court to take the correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents' staunch belief that
Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming
in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer's conviction in the righteousness of his cause
there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the
courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such
cases as Salcedo, In re Almacenand Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as the
respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision
therein, in a public statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was
one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino
women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse
and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the
petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

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 xxx xxx xxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the
primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those
who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein. 135
(Emphases and underscoring supplied.) HcTEaA

Whether or not respondents' views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis
was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate
matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly inappropriate, if
not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of
Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary
evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The
ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents' submissions in this administrative case. As
respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure
for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on their own
administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for
effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen." 136 One
wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous,
dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it
can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to
effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full
in the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters
and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would
expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond
the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential
and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the same. These
foreign authors' letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each
other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions
logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents' noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive
action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was
primarily meant for this Court's consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first
before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for
consumption by the general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to
generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in
the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents' colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect
to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement's issuance, were still both
sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point,
respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of
the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court
intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant
lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and
submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true
that the respondents' outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then,
when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents
from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents'
reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they
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are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show
that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary 137 or contempt
138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions
of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who may not
have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in making the
criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are
the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the
same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave
implication on legal education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this
appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort,
the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in
the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and
contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this
Court expounded in Salcedo: HcDSaT
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the
court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which
need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same
conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse
from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the
facts a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was
justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office
should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.)
Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this
case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind,
according to him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such
concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by
following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it
imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves. 139
(Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of
good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters
or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance
compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true
candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came
to sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle
and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the
promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about
by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was
likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the
language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to retract his
position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and
without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court
expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that they
themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing
that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving
them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez's Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of
Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from
these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine
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law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any
nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.
The Court's ruling on Dean Leonen's
Compliance regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a
"dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the
body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the
signature pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e.,Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by
claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and
more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable
because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with theRestoring
Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto." 140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen's implied view that the signatures in the
Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally
submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that
point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the
persons who have signed it, since the Statement's persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation
and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents'
explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted
them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case. IEcaHS
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen's predicament is the fact that he did not
from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and,
instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out,
according to Dean Leonen's account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to
lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean's office gave the dean
inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of
Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when
encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed
document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not
unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks
is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document
for the Court's consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is
the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual
signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this practice with his
submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean
from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen
cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable
for the care of documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately
chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the
reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen's explanations yield the answer. In the course of his
explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officer's claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to
be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only
authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around
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the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported
signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen's proposition, that is precisely
tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when such
person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation when
he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was
a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay
information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to
observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not have
waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before
transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure
some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should
have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures
before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to
nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was
neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary
submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen's Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is
willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his
objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen's professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient
to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as
required under Canon 10.
Respondents' requests for a hearing, for
production/presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in G.R. No.
162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the
Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and
for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the
plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of,
and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The
prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean
Leonen's separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista's Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment
that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing." 141 It is this group of
respondents' premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process. EATCcI
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs
largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority's
purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition
to the Show Cause Resolution.

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 However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and
Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause
Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators. — In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may
refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court
or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the
specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court
deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be
followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute
absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process
where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing
is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy. 142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio 143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 144 (Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court — Br. 81, Romblon — On the
Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law, 145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any
formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical
misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the
Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial
notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus
operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums
they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for

217
 the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into
the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur. HADTEC

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already
established by the facts on record.

xxx xxx xxx

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to
be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on
the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court. 146
(Emphases supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their
reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their
pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically
stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will
necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No.10-7-17-SC on the assumption
that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary
reason for their request for access to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of
the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact,
it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No.10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo,
is a separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the
respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of
the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than
the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which
respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that are
already of public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement
and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various
versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo
could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents
and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen's Compliance he narrated how as early as September
2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010
and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court
would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a
reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement's principles, could foresee the
possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a
matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies respondents' claim that it is necessary for them to
refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause
Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective
compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being
granted a hearing, that is respondents' own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed

218
to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary
cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents' requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented
in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on
any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound
their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is
certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect
and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether
they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves
with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors,
regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong. aSATHE
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his
Compliance to be SATISFACTORY.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo)
D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R.
Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig,
Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found
UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors areREMINDED of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a
member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is EXCUSED from these proceedings.
However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive
to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction
from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents' requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Nachura, J., is on leave.
Brion, J., is on leave. I certify that Mr. Justice Brion left his concurring vote — Corona, C.J.
Del Castillo, J., took no part.
Villarama, Jr., J., pls. see separate opinion.
219
 Sereno, J., I dissent and reserve the right to issue a Separate Opinion.
||| (Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, [March 8, 2011], 660 PHIL 1-130)

Canon 12 – Duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

Nunez vs. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 5054, May 29, 2002

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002.]

SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for complainant, petitioner, vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.

Ananias B. Co, Jr. for complainant.

SYNOPSIS

This is an administrative complaint filed by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-
fact Ananias B. Co, seeking the disbarment of respondent. It appeared that the complainant authorized the
respondent to sell her two parcels of land for a commission. However, after selling the lots he did not turn over
the proceeds of the sale despite complainant's repeated demands. This forced the complainant to file an action
for a sum of money against the respondent and his wife. Thereafter, the court ordered respondent to pay his
obligation to the complainant. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for non-
payment of docket fee. In the satisfaction of the writ of execution issued by the court, the respondent issued
four postdated checks, which were later dishonored because the account had been closed. Again, because
respondent ignored the repeated demands of the complainant to make good the checks, four criminal
complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against him and his wife. Because of the failure of the
respondent to comment on the complaint against him, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP investigating commissioner
concluded that the respondent had no intention to honor the money judgment against him and recommended
that respondent be declared guilty of misconduct and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one
year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.

The Supreme Court concurred with the findings of the IBP that the respondent was guilty of misconduct in his
dealings with complainant. By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent diminished public confidence in the law and lawyers. The penalty of suspension imposed by the
IBP was inadequate. For his deliberate violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12.03 and 12.04 of Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his
dealings with the complainant, respondent deserved a graver penalty. The graver penalty is indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATION THEREOF DIMINISHES

PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN LAW AND LAWYERS; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — There is no need to stretch
one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence that
complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of
her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of
the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his
deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee
despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and energy and agony of the

220
complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already
unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution.
But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay
complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the
account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of
paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did
not pay the obligation. All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule
1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A Lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and lawyers (Busiños v.
Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such
confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v.
Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).

2. ID.; ID.; LAWYERS ARE REQUIRED TO AVOID ANY ACTION THAT WOULD UNDULY DELAY A CASE,
IMPEDE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OR MISUSE COURT PROCESSES; VIOLATION IN CASE AT BAR.
— Respondent's act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment
rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the
checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of
judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold. To further
demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity of
making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his
comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even
bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the
comment. To the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility
amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82
[2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001). Respondent then knowingly and
willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so.

3. ID.; ID.; WHEN DELIBERATELY VIOLATED; PROPER PENALTY. — The penalty of suspension "for at
least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both vague and inadequate. A suspension
may either be indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides, under the circumstances of this case a suspension
for a year is plainly very light and inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable
bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves a grave penalty. That
graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by
her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the
ground of grave misconduct. SIDEaA

From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized
respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent
10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainant's
repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against
respondent and his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052. DaACIH

For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was required to present
ex-parte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its decision (Annex "C" of the Complaint)
221
ordering respondent herein to pay complainant the sum of P16,000 as principal obligation, with interest thereon
at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and
to pay the costs of suit.

Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was
dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias writ
of execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day, thealias writ of execution was issued
(Annex "B" of Complaint). It appears that only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving
P13,800 thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn against
his account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.

Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn
was closed (Annexes "D" and "E" of Complaint). Demands for respondent to make good the checks fell on
deaf ears, thus forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Annexes "F", "G", "H" and "I" of the Complaint).

In the "Joint Affidavit" of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City,
respondent admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of complainant. Allegedly
believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by complainant, he subsequently closed
his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He
was not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary
arrangements with the bank.

We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable action on his
three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled complainant to file on 10
March 2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions
for extension of time to submit the comment "smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member
of the bar and a law dean."

In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent to have waived
the filing of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision within ninety days from notice of the resolution.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Milagros V.
San Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to "honor" the money judgment against him in Civil Case
No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account
against which said checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She
then recommends that respondent be declared "guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant" and be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the
complainant.

In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and
adopted Atty. San Juan's Report and Recommendation.

We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of
Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with
complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondent's grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.

There is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely
abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over
the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to
court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy
therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in
default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because
he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and
agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he
had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of
execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan
not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent
222
closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the
intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22, he did not pay the obligation.

All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent's claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed
all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were
still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their
maturity dates.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997];Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA
622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards
of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).

Respondent's act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment
rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the
checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of
judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the
temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to
file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not
even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of
the comment. To the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility
amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82
[2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).

Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12:04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so.

The penalty of suspension "for at least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both
vague and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides, under the
circumstances of this case a suspension for a year is plainly very light and inadequate. For his deliberate
violation or defiance of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the
complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty. That graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the
practice of law.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuñez the amount of
P13,800 within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution. cCaSHA

This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to respondent's personal record; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the
Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall
also furnish all lower courts with copies of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ.,concur.

||| (Nuñez v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 5054 (Resolution), [May 29, 2002], 432 PHIL 131-139)

223
Santiago vs. Atty. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, Oct. 5, 2004

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6252. October 5, 2004.]

JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with
public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial
Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect
observance thereof.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint 1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty.
Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 2 of the
Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 3 , Canon 5 4 , and Canons 12.07 5 and 12.08 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:

". . . In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing
several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a) make the proper notation
regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the
notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the
notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. IaHSCc

"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and
offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client.
Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several
persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed
him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats." 6

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, 7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified
Answer. 8 He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the
verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits
and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary
public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government
offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors,
did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva
Ecija — some of whom were older practitioners — indicate the affiants' residence certificates on the
documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 9 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not

224
with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said
noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of
their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice."
Complainant charged respondent's clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in
his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice."

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of
their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the
Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a
repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted
Certifications 10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit 11 of the two police officers who had
assisted them. DaEATc

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was
the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the
BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondent's Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o'clock in the afternoon. Notices 12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by
registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was
unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001. 13 The hearing was reset
to July 3, 2001 at two o'clock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply 14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The
latter's Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001. 15 It also received complainant's Letter-Request
16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order 17 dated July 24, 2001,
issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.

The CBD received complainant's Memorandum 18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBP's Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172 19 approving and
adopting the Investigating Commissioner's Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the
Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the
indication of the affiant's residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations
unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation 20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing
the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."

The other charges — violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07
and 12.08 of the CPR — were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent's Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the
party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such
certification. 21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments
notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a
number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on
which the same is recorded." 22 Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their
commission as notaries public. 23

225
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are
presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements. SEIcAD

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, 24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization

is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be
able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument."

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office.
Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to
exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, 25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed
with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us — and respondent has readily admitted — that he violated the Notarial
Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and
the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits
relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older
notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to
affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes
no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial
procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an
acceptable justification for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondent's clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses' Affidavits relative to
Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainant's brother against the aforementioned
clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary — in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer the oath — to "certify that he has personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do
so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that — as counsel for the affiants
— he was not required to comply with the certification requirement. CaAcSE

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes. 26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of
the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. 27 It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath
to obey the laws. 28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to
adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance
of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.

226
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. 29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed. 30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary
measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit
corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent's clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the
CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Rule 12.08 — A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the
like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in
which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel."

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, 31 except only in certain cases
pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship. 32

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to
their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them.
In contradistinction, advocates are partisans — those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is
difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The
question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients. TIcAaH

"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will
provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer
because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible
reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer's client, they will have an
opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his
own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial
and untruthful."33

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a
cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and
should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case. 34

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his
clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the
benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latter's life and liberty are at stake. 35 It is the
fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are
entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure
that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare
no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present — by all fair and honorable
means — every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would
not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law. 36

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed
out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not

227
have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not
dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during
the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was
merely inquisitorial. 37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-
repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions;
protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and
anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. 38 The
investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. aDATHC

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in
any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective
client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice,"
the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not
supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with
liability. 39 It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible,
considering that the latter's allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the
Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ ., concur.

Carpio Morales, J ., is on leave.

||| (Santiago v. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, [October 5, 2004], 483 PHIL 94-109)

Canon 13 – Duty not to influence judges

Lantoria vs. Atty. Bunyi, A.C. No. 1769, June 8, 1992.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 1769. June 8, 1992.]

CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ERRING LAWYER; MAY
PROCEED NOTWITHSTANDING COMPLAINT'S WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT. — The determination of the
merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the
case, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for
an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.

2. ID.; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; ATTEMPTS TO EXERT PERSONAL INFLUENCE ON THE COURT;
WARRANT SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — We find merit in the recommendation of the
Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding
the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although
228
nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation,
for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer
and an officer of the Court. Respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were
enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows: "3. Attempts
to exert personal influence on the court. Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a
judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to
misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with
the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt
to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge
of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the
only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench and bar." In the new Code of
Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13
and Rule 13.01, which read: "CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 — A lawyer
shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with
judges." Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court
where he had pending civil case.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent
Irineo L. Bunyi, a member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts
of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case
Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by
Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely,
Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.

Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of a farm located in
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said
farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88
sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal
Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia
(who was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The
defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in default.

In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant Lantoria
wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as follows:

"Butuan City
23 April 1974.
Atty. Ireneo Bunye

928 Rizal Avenue

Santa Cruz, Manila.

Dear Atty. Bunye:

xxx xxx xxx

Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the
3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you
mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him.

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 xxx xxx xxx

I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.

My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) CESAR L. LANTORIA
Major Inf PC (ret)
Executive Director" 5
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this wise:

"June 1, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,

At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters
received, which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia.
The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other professional
commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I would say
that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find
myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date as (sic) possible. So also with my
calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of the remaining cases over there. LLphil

Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted
defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once.
However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the preparation of
these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to accept his
suggestions or correction to change or modify them for the better. And to this effect, kindly
relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and please request for
each copy for our hold.

xxx xxx xxx

Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there.
Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.

Brotherly yours,
(SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI" 6
Counsel
It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the
contents of which read as follows:

"928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz

Manila
March 4, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,

This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope addressed
to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he
is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge
and information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of course, if the information comes
from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words about them,
or copies to be furnished me, after he signs them, it could be made thru you personally, to
expedite receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could be
delivered to him at his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. Or, at
Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City.

Thanking you for your kind attention and favor.

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 Truly yours,
(SGD.) ATTY. I. L. BUNYI" 7
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative case
against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and
01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because he (respondent)
was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent
of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.

By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint,
admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself,
that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the
Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be drafted or
prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to him, because he
was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan,
and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending
cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases
involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the
decisions in question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the
understanding between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted
to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong
macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew that
Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were
judgments by default, the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in
default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing
thereof (See first paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)

c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact,
the letter mentioned - subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by
Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);

d) Fourthly, in the same letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the
same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the
cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)"

In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, with the
following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18,
1978, but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January
1979, both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the Solicitor General reported
the following development —

"Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979, sworn to before the
investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or
dismissed on the ground that complainant 'could hardly substantiate' his charges and that he
is 'no longer interested to prosecute' the same. For his part, respondent manifested that he
has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint against him. At the same time, he
presented complainant Lantoria as a witness and elicited testimony to the effect that
complainant no longer has in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic
complaint, and hence, he was not prepared to prove his charges." 10 (emphasis supplied)

In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4
March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of

231
the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he
submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had
previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony
of complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the
complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as respondent Bunyi, in his motion to dismiss filed with the
Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and he affirmed the
existence of the letters.

Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional
conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the
judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in
which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent. llcd

In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future he
would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of
professional ethics.

On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until
further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in
the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next hearing be not set until
after six (6) months when he expected to return from the United States of America where he would visit his
children and at the same time have a medical check-up.

On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for hearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor
General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his
memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he
prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to
influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to the Court
for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions.

We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the instant case
should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the respondent himself
having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the Court,
for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.

With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative
complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's
duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action,
deserves suspension from the practice of law.

The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding
the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although
nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation,
for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer
and an officer of the Court.

Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the
time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:

"3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court.

Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the
personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of
motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the
judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any
device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-
respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of

232
 the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial
personal and official relations between bench and bar." cdphil

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as
shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:

"CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges."

Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he
had pending civil case. 17

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent
and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

||| (Lantoria v. Bunyi, A.C. No. 1769, [June 8, 1992], 285 PHIL 83-93)

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.159486-88, November 25, 2003

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 159486-88. November 25, 2003.]

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO
SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Allan F. Paguia for Pres. J.E. Estrada.

The Solicitor General for respondent, et al.

SYNOPSIS

In the petition for certiorari filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, through his counsel Attorney Allan F. Paguia,
which was dismissed by this Honorable Court, the Court ruled that Atty. Paguia has not limited his discussions
to the merits of his client's case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in
both broadcast and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of
the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party. By his acts, Atty. Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially
dangerous threat to the administration ofj ustice. Thus, the Court ordered Atty. Paguia to show cause, within
ten days from notice, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court. In his compliance, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political
partisanship against the members of the Court.

The Court ruled that Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity,
and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and
pervert the dispensation of justice. The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction,

233
to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has
chosen not to at all take heed. Accordingly, he was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

SYLLABUS

l. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES,

CONSTRUED; TAKING OF AN OATH OF OFFICE BY ANY INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC IS A
TRADITIONAL OFFICIAL FUNCTION OF THE HIGHEST MAGISTRATE. — It should be clear that the phrase
"partisan political activities," in its statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success or the
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an
election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of
the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other
justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from their appearance in such other official
functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the
Legislative Department.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT COUNTENANCE ANY WRONGDOING NOR ALLOW THE
EROSION OF OUR PEOPLE'S FAITH IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. — The Supreme Court does not claim
infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have
constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion
of our people's faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in
the Philippines.

3. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; A LAWYER SHOULD OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR — .Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing
sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

4. ID.; ID.; MEMBERS OF THE BAR ARE PROHIBITED FROM MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE MEDIA ON
A CASE THAT MAY TEND TO AROUSE PUBLIC OPINION FOR OR AGAINST A PARTY. — The attention of Atty.
Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public
opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Court's well-meant
admonition.

5. ID.; ATTORNEYS; SUSPENSION; LAWYER SUSPENDED FOR CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A LAWYER —

Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:

"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et at. The Petition prays —

"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable
Court disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;

234
 "2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set
aside; and

"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before
the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of
the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political
activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the 'EDSA
2 Rally' and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the
Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have
thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo.
The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108)
is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.

"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on
19 May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that 'the appointment of counsels de
officio(sic) be declared functus officio' and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be notified
of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905
pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against
his client be dismissed.

"During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the court
several portions of the book, entitled 'Reforming the Judiciary,' written by Justice Artemio
Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a
motion pleading, among other things, that —

"a) . . . President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the 'truth' of the
statements contained in Justice Artemio Panganiban's book,
'REFORMING THE JUDICIARY,' in relation to the prejudgment committed
by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada in the subject
case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,

"b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio

Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary
Angelo Reyes of the Department of National Defense, Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever
supporting documents they may have in relation to their direct and
indirect participation in the proclamation of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of Justice
Panganiban, including the material events that led to that proclamation
and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra.' (Rollo, pp. 6–7.)

"The 'truth' referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains
to what he claims should have been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:

'The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the
TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:

'a) going to EDSA 2;

'b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President

on the ground of 'permanent disability' even without proof of
compliance with the corresponding constitutional conditions,
e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of his
cabinet; and

'c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of

permanent disability.
235
 'It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts
which are obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada.'
(Petition, Rollo, pp. 13–14.)

"On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as
the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a 'Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon' of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing
of his 'Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon' on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the Special
Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus,
he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
disrespectful language when she blurted out, 'Magmumukha naman kaming gago,' (Rollo, p.
13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even
before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking
in open court that to grant Estrada's motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.)
Prompted by the alleged 'bias and partial attitude' of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney
Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner
received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28
July 2003, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz: DcTaEH

'WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estrada's

'Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon' (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003)
dated July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of merit.' (Rollo, p. 37.)

"and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioner's
motion for disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:

'WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby
DENIES the Motion for Disqualification.' (Rollo, p. 48.)

"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency
in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On the one hand,
petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on
the other hand, he would elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due
process. Attorney Paguia went on to state that —

'The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of
the public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the
act of the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the
justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the
Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the
wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the
name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it
would seem absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a
shield for their UNLAWFUL act.' (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)

"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or

unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction
can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto,
82 Phil. 595.)

"The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question
pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue
on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency,
Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.
236
 "Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his client's case within the
judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for
or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension
and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.

"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the
Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised
form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the
Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney
Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or
indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-
meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders
Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within
ten days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the Court."

On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page
pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship
against the members of the Court.

Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance
of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides —

"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to
party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan
political activities."

Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term "partisan political activities;" the law states:
"The term 'election campaign' or 'partisan political activity' refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which
shall include:

"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.

"(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against

the election of any candidate for public office;

"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose

the election of any candidate; or

"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate."

It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political activities," in its statutory context, relates to acts
designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed
certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming
President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the
Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no
different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation
Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.

237
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court
for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any
wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In
liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.

The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Court’s well-
meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say —

"What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada's right to due process of law? It
renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair
play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada
filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the
other party — GMA — with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had
authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit
the unconstitutionality of their own act?"

Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon
his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED. ADTEaI

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ ., concur.

Carpio, J ., took no part.

||| (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 159486-88, [November 25, 2003], 462 PHIL 135-145)

Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer to the Clients

Canon 14 – Duty to render legal service to the needy

Santiago vs. Fojas, Adm. Case No. 4103, September 7, 1995

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4103. September 7, 1995.]

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and

TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
238
Amado R. Fojas for and in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; OWE FIDELITY TO CLIENT'S CAUSE AND MUST BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN THEM. — It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either
as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take
up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCUSED BY REASONS OF PRESSURE AND LARGE VOLUME OF LEGAL WORK. — In his
motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer
by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his
Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to
question the denial order of the trial court. Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and
pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes
the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he
subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion
in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the
motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other
commitments. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not
comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by
his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued
refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no
showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither
was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious
defense. And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial
court either the impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his
motion to lift that order. Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's
inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCUSED BY THE FACT THAT THE CLIENT'S CAUSE IS A LOSING CAUSE. — The
respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause"
for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter
declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere
afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any
defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid
and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating
the prospects of the case. Then, too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why
he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of
questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of
course, he meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. cdasia
239
 DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be
disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation
of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N.
CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition
[sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney
on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the
performance of his duty and obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid
case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding
high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to
act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us
in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong, Case No. 3526-V-9, Val., Metro Manila,
so that we were deduced [sic] in default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That
he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant
demand for him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to
disclose later that he never answered it after all because according to him he
was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August
17, 1993.

3. That because of Atty. Amado Fojas' neglect and malpractice of law we lost the
Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only
proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his
profession. cdtai

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case
No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was
unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the
complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University
Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus,
"[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to
the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein)
illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the
complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor
case he had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of
merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such
failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law
profession.

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this case
for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the
affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the
President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the
union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.

240
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and
directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res
judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction,
since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental
motion to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case.
Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the
case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a non-extendible period of fifteen days
from notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This
motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition forcertiorari, which was later referred
to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did
not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the
complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of
evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or
corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however,
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel
for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica
Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant
disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which
reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the
plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, 3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4
Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not

241
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure
to do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he] instead, thru
honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .

And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again
"inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as
stated earlier. . . ."
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but was
"deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice"
for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume
and pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent
has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent
explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large
volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and
excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two
distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing
awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial
court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its
previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The
second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty
to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief
that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an
answer even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing
whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it
shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious
defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the
trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his
motion to lift that order.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due
diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03
thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing
cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-
Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere
afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any
defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides:

242
 A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the
case.

Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the trouble
of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the
adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he
meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not
entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the
damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of the
complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. cdlex

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Santiago v. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103, [September 7, 1995], 318 PHIL 79-90)

Canon 15 – Duty of candor, fairness and loyalty to the client

Northwestern Univ., Inc. vs. Arquillo, A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005.]

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS, complainants, vs. Atty. MACARIO
D. ARQUILLO, respondent.

Tan Acut & Lopez for complainants.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTY NOT TO REPRESENT CONFLICTING INTERESTS; THREE SEPARATE
TESTS TO DETERMINE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICT OF INTERESTS. — The Code of Professional Responsibility
requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients'
written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing
parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when,
in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to
oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an
act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one
any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of an attorney's duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; HAVING AGREED TO REPRESENT ONE OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES FIRST, RESPONDENT
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS CONFLICT OF INTERESTS, REGARDLESS OF HIS
ALLEGED BELIEF THAT THEY WERE ON THE SAME SIDE. — Atty. Arquillo's acts cannot be justified by the fact
that, in the end, Castro was proven to be not personally liable for the claims of the dismissed employees.
Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that there was an
obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be
243
denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of the
respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly enounced: "As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had
the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose G. Castro. But under the circumstance, it would be
impossible since [r]espondent is also the counsel of Jose G. Castro. And it appears that it was [r]espondent
who prepared the Motion to Dismiss, which he should be opposing [a]s counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent
had the duty to prove the Complaint wrong. But Respondent cannot do this because he is the counsel for the
complainants. Here lies the inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear. "Thus it has been noted.
'The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the client's claim against the other
and to properly represent the latter in the unrelated action, or, if he can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected
by the defeated client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the successful client. The foregoing considerations
will strongly tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those special elements which make it one of
trust and confidence[.]' (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230, 4th ed.; In re De la Rosa, 21 Phil. 258)"

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN ATTORNEY CANNOT REPRESENT ADVERSE INTERESTS; PROSCRIPTION APPLIES WHEN
CONFLICTING INTERESTS ARISE WITH RESPECT TO THE SAME GENERAL MATTER OR EVEN WHEN THE
ATTORNEY ACTS IN GOOD FAITH. — An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine
grounded on public policy that a lawyer's representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The
proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however
slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Unless all the
affected clients' written consent is given after a full disclosure of all relevant facts, attorneys guilty of
representing conflicting interests shall as a rule be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case stems from a sworn Letter-Complaint 1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Ben A. Nicolas, acting for himself and on behalf of
Northwestern University, Inc. In that Letter-Complaint, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo was charged with deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by representing conflicting interests.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows:

"Herein [c]omplainants, Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A. Nicolas, accuses (sic)
herein [r]espondent, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, of engaging in conflicting interest in a case
before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San
Fernando, La Union.

"Complainant alleges that in a consolidated case, herein [r]espondent appeared and acted as
counsels for both complainants (eight out of the eighteen complainants therein) and
respondent (one out of the ten respondents therein). aAIcEH

"In a consolidation of NLRC Cases [Nos.] 1-05-1086-97, 1-05-1087-97, 1-05-1088-97, 1-05-

1091-97, 1-05-1092-97, 1-05-1097-97, 1-05-1109-97, 1-05-1096-97 ("consolidated cases"),
herein [r]espondent appeared as counsel for complainants therein, Teresita A. Velasco,
Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S. Hernando, Virginio C. Rasos, Bonifacio S. Blas, Ronald A.
Daoang, Luzviminda T. Urcio and Araceli Quimoyog. In the very same consolidated case,
[r]espondent was also the counsel of one of the respondents therein, Jose G. Castro.

"Complainants, as their evidence, submitted the Motion to Dismiss dated August 12, 1997 filed
by Jose G. Castro, represented by his counsel, herein [r]espondent filed before the NLRC of
San Fernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later or on August 28, 1997, [r]espondent filed a
Complainant's Consolidated Position Paper, this time representing some of the complainants
in the very same consolidated case." 2 (Citations omitted)
244
Respondent failed to file his Answer to the Complaint despite a June 24 1998 Order 3 of the IBP-CBD directing
him to do so. Even after receiving five notices, he failed to appear in any of the scheduled hearings.
Consequently, he was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings. Thereafter, the
complainants were ordered to submit their verified position paper with supporting documents, after which the
case was to be deemed submitted for decision. 4 In their Manifestation 5 dated August 30, 2004, they said that
they would no longer file a position paper. They agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their
Letter-Affidavit dated March 16, 1998, together with all the accompanying documents.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his Report, 6 Commissioner Dennis B. Funa found respondent guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule
under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the former recommended the latter's suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-415 dated October 7, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Funa, with the modification that the period of suspension was
increased to two (2) years.

On December 12, 2004, the Resolution and the records of the case were transmitted to this Court for final
action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. On January 20, 2005, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2004-415. The IBP denied the Motion.

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the recommended period of suspension
to one year. CEHcSI

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their
dealings and transactions with their clients. 7 Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting
interests, except with all the concerned clients' written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts. 8

When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which
is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for
an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new
retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called
upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through their professional
connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorney's duty
to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance of that duty. 9

In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counsel for Respondent Jose C. Castro in NLRC Case Nos. I-
05-1083-97 to I-05-1109-97, filed a Motion to Dismiss those cases. Shortly thereafter, a position paper was
filed by Atty. Arquillo as counsel for several complainants in consolidated NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1087-97, I-05-
1088-97, I-05-1091-97, I-05-1092-97, I-05-1096-97, I-05-1097-97, and I-05-1109-97. All the cases in the second
set were included in the first one, for which he had filed the subject Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, in his
position paper for the complainants, Atty. Arquillo protected his other client, Respondent Jose C. Castro, in
these words:

"3. More than lack of valid cause for the dismissal of complainants, respondents, except Atty.
Jose C. Castro and Atty. Ernesto B. Asuncion, should be made accountable for not according
complainants their right to due process." 10

In his two-page Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Arquillo claims that there was no conflict of interest in his
representation of both the respondent and the complainants in the same consolidated cases, because all of
them were allegedly on the same side. Attaching to the Motion the Decision of Labor Arbiter Norma C. Olegario
on the consolidated NLRC cases, Atty. Arquillo theorizes that her judgment absolved Castro of personal
liability for the illegal dismissal of the complainants; this fact allegedly showed that there was no conflict in the
interests of all the parties concerned.

245
This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillo's acts cannot be justified by the fact that, in the end, Castro was
proven to be not personally liable for the claims of the dismissed employees. Having agreed to represent one
of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that there was an obvious conflict of interests,
regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed
employees were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of the respondents. Indeed,
Commissioner Funa correctly enounced:

"As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed
by Jose G. Castro. But under the circumstance, it would be impossible since [r]espondent is
also the counsel of Jose G. Castro. And it appears that it was [r]espondent who prepared the
Motion to Dismiss, which he should be opposing [a]s counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent
hadthe duty to prove the Complaint wrong. But Respondent cannot do this because he is the
counsel for the complainants. Here lies the inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is
very clear.

"Thus it has been noted

'The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the client's
claim against the other and to properly represent the latter in the unrelated action, or, if
he can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the defeated client of disloyalty or
partiality in favor of the successful client. The foregoing considerations will strongly
tend to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those special elements which
make it one of trust and confidence[.]' (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230, 4th ed.; In re De la
Rosa, 21 Phil. 258)" 11

An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a
lawyer's representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It
applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith. 12

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
years. Considering, however, prior rulings in cases also involving attorneys representing conflicting interests,
we reduce the suspension to one (1) year. 13

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a
similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future. SICDAa

SO ORDERED.

Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio
Morales, Callejo Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., is on official leave.

||| (Northwestern University Inc. v. Arquillo, A.C. No. 6632, [August 2, 2005], 503 PHIL 466-473)

Artezuela vs. Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4354. April 22, 2002.]

LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.

Daryll Amante for complainant.

Ricarte B. Maderazo for respondent.

246
 SYNOPSIS

Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia and his co-
defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. 13666. However, the case was dismissed allegedly upon the instance
of the complainant and her husband. Because of the dismissal of the said case, complainant filed a civil case
for damages against respondent which was again dismissed. Consequently, Artezuela filed before the
Supreme Court a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent alleging that the latter neglected his
duties as a lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm.

The Investigating Committee found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interest for preparing
Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint while acting as complainant's counsel. The Board of Governors
of the IBP upheld the findings of the committee with modification only as to the penalty.

The Supreme Court ruled that to be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party
need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the
counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of
record, although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough
that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse
and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the
adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form
of disloyalty.

The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the IBP. Respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS; FULFILLED

WHEN PARTIES WERE GIVEN REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR ARGUMENTS. — In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not
connote full adversarial proceedings, as "actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies." Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit evidence in support of their arguments. cDCEIA

2. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; CONFLICT OF INTEREST; PRESENT WHEN THE COUNSEL OF
ONE PARTY HAD A HAND IN THE PREPARATION OF THE PLEADING OF THE OTHER PARTY. — To be guilty of
representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-record of the
adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his
efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of record — although these circumstances are the
most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the
preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting. interests with that of his
original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most
obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

3. ID.; ID.; PROHIBITED FROM REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTERESTS OR DISCHARGING INCONSISTENT

DUTIES. — An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.
Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.
The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional
ethics.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE; REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY IN

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE BAR. — While the Resolution of the IBP is purely
recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the same. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the
bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented
247
by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.

DECISION

PUNO, J p:

For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the suspension from the practice of
law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that
repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent allegedly represented conflicting
interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. 1

By way of a Motion for Reconsideration, 2 respondent now comes before this Court to challenge the basis of
the IBP's resolution, and prays for its reversal.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of December 24,
1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana St., Mandaue City. At the time
of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by a Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami,
but was registered in the name of his brother-in-law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small
carinderia owned by complainant Lolita Artezuela. 3

The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her small business,
resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial constraints,
stopped sending her two children to college. 4

Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia, Villapez and one
Bernardo Sia. 5 Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to Branch 14 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed, impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and
dropping Sia as a party-defendant. 6 For his services, complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as filing fee. 7
However, the case was dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her
husband. 8

Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for damages against the
respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The
case was dismissed on June 12, 2001. 9

On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to represent her
interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial
conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were present.
Notwithstanding complainant's persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the
case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant's consent. 10

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her
counsel, respondent prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even
printed in respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of
the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent. 11

Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his part as the
complainant's lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was
uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to the complainant and made
known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as counsel. Because of the severed
relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference, decided to grant respondent's manifestation and

248
advised the complainant to secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and instead,
sought the dismissal of the case. 12

Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on August 20,
1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's Answer to the Amended
Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted as counsel of
Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him to prepare Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia,
however, went back to his office and asked respondent's secretary to print the document. Respondent
intimated that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay
the amount of P500,000.00. 13

This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-Visayas Regional
Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the disbarment complaint.

On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He recommended that the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. 14 Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the
other issues.

As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the findings of the
Committee with modification only as to the penalty.

Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent contend that the Investigating Committee did not
conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses against him. He argues that the
Investigating Committee's finding that he represented Echavia is contrary to court records and the
complainant's own testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts doubt on the credibility of the Investigating
Committee to render just and fair recommendations considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the
respondent are counsel-adversaries in another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he questions the
imposition of a six-month suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his
only source of income. 15

After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, this
Court is inclined to uphold the IBP's resolution.

In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings,
as "actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to
propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies." 16 Due process is fulfilled when the
parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.
17

In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the hearings,
prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainant's evidence ex parte and to set the case for
resolution after the parties have submitted their respective memorandum. Hence:

"The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely
December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.

The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing and can no longer tolerate any
further postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996 at
2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character.

In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan Echavia,
also affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the same
and understood the contents thereof." 18

It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine the
complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial after he has squandered his
opportunity to exercise his right.

249
Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the records and the
complainant's own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty. Aviola was Echavia's counsel-
of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification from the clerk of court, 19 and as admitted
by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:

"ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness - ON CROSS)

Q: Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of
Allan Echavia as early as August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time
of this fact when you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is
the counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao?
Is that what you mean?

A: What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case
before Judge Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to
admit that Atty. Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be the one to
coordinate with Allan's case.

Q: So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated by you now?

A: Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the
counsel of record of Allan Echavia." 20

Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-of-record of
Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavia's Answer to the
Amended Complaint.

To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-
record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor
make his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of record — although these circumstances
are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a
hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that
of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the
most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances
of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.

"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all

concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." (Italics supplied)

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest
intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative. 21 The lawyer is an officer of the
court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:

"The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste.
The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice." 22

250
The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his client's cause is
likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently disadvantageous to his client's
cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires disclosure of all facts and consent of all
the parties involved. Thus:

"CANON 15 — All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the same. In
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to
establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the
Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of
disciplinary sanction is justified. 23

A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts with the complainant's
claims. It reads:

"1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as it
pertains to the personal circumstance and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of
the allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph Two (2) , THREE (3),
FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the Complaint
are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations." 24

By way of prayer, Echavia states:

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing

plaintiff's complaint." 25

Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating Committee found the
testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to respondent's bare denial. As pointed out
by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions
in the latter's office, asked him to return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the
Amended Complaint.

The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent did not bother to present his
secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he offered a convenient excuse
— that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.

Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavia's Answer to the Amended
Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the complainant. After he
declined the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who prepared the document and asked his
secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way
favorable to the complainant.

With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find any reason why
Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law. He does not stand to profit at all
by accusing the respondent falsely.

Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education, we can not see how she could
have prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver as complicated as
the present case.

Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an impartial decision,
having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to grant new trial. This is the first
time that respondent questions the membership of Commissioner Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If
251
respondent really believed in good faith that Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should
have asked for the latter's inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of irregularity,
bias or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that would lead us to set it aside.

Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as
such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities. 26 The suspension of the respondent's privilege to practice law may result to financial woes.
But as the guardian of the legal profession, we are constrained to balance this concern with the injury he
caused to the very same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness. IDEHCa

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is affirmed.
Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with a stern warning that a similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez * and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., are on official leave.

||| (Artezuela v. Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, [April 22, 2002], 431 PHIL 135-147)

PNB vs. Cedo, Adm. Case No. 3701, March 28, 1995

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 3701. March 28, 1995.]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant, vs. ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.

SYLLABUS

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; A LAWYER REPRESENTS CONFLICTING INTERESTS WHEN IN
BEHALF OF ONE CLIENT, IT IS HIS DUTY TO CONTEND FOR THAT WHICH DUTY TO ANOTHER CLIENT
REQUIRES HIM TO OPPOSE. — Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to
litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he
formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit: "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."

RESOLUSION

BIDIN, J p:

In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged
respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of
complainant bank, with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
"A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent
during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened. cdphil
252
 Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the
sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He
even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy
authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action
arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of
the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by
complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty,
respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant's Asset Management
Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda
with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between
complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by
the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong
Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not
participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda
spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law
firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled
only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty.
Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to
designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one
clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases independently and individually
receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously
fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy
vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner
Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated.
Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership
deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson,
that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner
Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what
to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction
in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of
record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer. cdll
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm to be true, it is in itself a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client's secrets and confidential
records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and
means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see
the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his
professional services. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in
consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted
to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of
Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court,

253
 the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the
aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the
paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay
Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal
Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo
Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing
Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 [1968]) ruled:
"The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that even
if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired by him as
counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding the ownership
of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute
over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for
physical injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos: LLjur

'Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a

complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of
other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause.'

"Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship
should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry
case. In the same case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:

'Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on
principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice."

The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent
in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as
counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly
handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:

"It is unprofessional to represent interests, except by express conflicting consent of all

concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose."

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the
practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Cdpr
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
254
||| (Philippine National Bank v. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701 (Resolution), [March 28, 1995], 312 PHIL 904-910)

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996.]

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,

ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA,petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996.]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Manuel G. Abello for petitioners.

Roco Bunag Kapunan & Migallos for Raul S. Roco.

Mario E. Ongkiko for Presidential Commission on Good Government.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; BOUNDED BY RULES, ETHICAL CONDUCT AND DUTIES;
RATIONALE. — In the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of
necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good
cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to
his client that distinguishes him from any other professional in society. This conception is entrenched and
embodies centuries of established and stable tradition. Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client
relationships are many and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the
privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a
client were made to choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and
legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt
to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it
amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right
practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be
presumed innocent is at once self-evident. Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal
services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by
limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely
between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange
and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must
invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.

2. ID.; ID.; AS A GENERAL RULE A LAWYER MAY NOT REFUSE TO DIVULGE THE IDENTITY OF HIS CLIENT;
RATIONALE. — As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are
well established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be

255
protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has
been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege
generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his
opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION; WHEN THE CLIENT'S IDENTITY IS PRIVILEGED. — The general rule is, however,
qualified by some important exception. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the
government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the client's name is privileged. Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which
could qualify as exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client
seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be
privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure and the entire transaction. Summarizing
these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when
the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CONSTRUED. — The equal
protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of statutes and
regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all
persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. (Gumabon v. Director of Prisons,
37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges
granted but also as to the liabilities imposed. . . . What is required under this Constitutional guarantee is the
uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
'Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon
in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; COVERED BY THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY. —

The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained calumny hurled against it, is still the noblest of professions. It
exists upon the thesis that, in an orderly society that is opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so occupies, as it
should, an exalted position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time, principles have evolved that would
help ensure its effective ministation. The protection of confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship is one,
and it has since been an accepted firmament in the profession. It allows the lawyer and the client to
institutionalize a unique relationship based on full trust and confidence essential in a justice system that works
on the basis of substantive and procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is not without its pitfalls, and
demands against it may be strong, but these problems are, in the ultimate analysis, no more than mere tests of
vigor that have made and will make that rule endure.

DAVIDE, JR. J., dissenting opinion:

1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; NATURE OF THE RULE OF CONFIDENTIALITY. — The rule
of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for
disqualification of a witness (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the appropriate time,
i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as when, having taken the witness stand, he is
questioned as to such confidential communication or advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to
produce, through subpoenae duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents containing the same
privileged matter.

256
2. ID.; LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; CONTRARY TO THE MAJORITY RULE, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE PHILIPPINE RULE. — Hypothetically admitting the
allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to agree with the majority opinion that
the petitioners are immune from suit or that they have to be excluded as defendants, or that they cannot be
compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their principals, all because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege.
This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The majority seeks to expand the scope of the
Philippine rule on the lawyer-client privilege by copious citations of American jurisprudence which includes in
the privilege the identity of the client under the exceptional situations narrated therein. From the plethora of
cases cited, two facts stand out in bold relief. Firstly, the issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand jury
proceedings on different States, which are primarily proceedings before the filing of the case in court, and we
are not even told what evidentiary rules apply in the said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is invoked
in the court where it was already filed. Secondly, and more important, in the cases cited by the majority, the
lawyers concerned were merely advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for the charges
against their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co-defendants duly charged in court as co-
conspirators in the offenses charged. The cases cited by the majority evidently do not apply to them.

3. ID.; ID.; MAY NOT BE INVOKED AS A SHIELD FOR THE COMMISSION OF CRIME. — I wish to repeat and
underscore the fact that the lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a crime or against the
prosecution of the lawyer therefor. We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an authority that the
lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of a client's identity where the lawyer and
the client are conspirators in the commission of a crime or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are
mandated not to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility) and to employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id). And under the Canons of Professional
Ethics, a lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind that his great trust is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the honor of his profession and the best interest of his
client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact
compliance with the strictest principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These canons strip a lawyer of the lawyer-
client privilege whenever he conspires with the client in the commission of a crime or a fraud.

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:

1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; CAN NEVER BE USED AS A SHIELD TO COMMIT CRIME OR
FRAUD. — The attorney-client privilege can never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud.
Communications to an attorney having for their object the commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature of a
conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances it might
become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require that no such shield from
merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he can safely commit a
crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes." (125
American Law Reports Annotated 516–519 citing People v. Van Alstine, 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594)

2. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT INCLUDE THE RIGHT OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF CLIENT IDENTITY AS A GENERAL RULE;
EXCEPTIONS. — As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure of
client identity. The general rule, however, admits of well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan failed to
recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are accurately summarized in In re Grand Jury Investigation. The
Circuits have embraced various "exceptions" to the general rule that the identity of a client is not within the
protective ambit of an attorney-client privilege. All such exceptions appear to be firmly grounded in the Ninth
Circuit's seminal decision in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d 633 (8th Cir. 1960). 'The name of the client will be
considered privileged matter where the circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is
material only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt on the part of such client of the very
offenses on account of which the attorney was employed.' 'A significant exception to this principle of non-
confidentiality holds that such information may be privileged when the person invoking the privilege is able to
show that a strong possibility exists that disclosure of the information would implicate the client in the very
matter for which legal advice was sought in the first case.' Another exception to the general rule that the
identity of a client is not privileged arises where disclosure of the identity would be tantamount to disclosing
an otherwise protected confidential communication. To the general rule is an exception, firmly embedded as
257
the rule itself. The privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been
disclosed that identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication. The privilege
may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed [not necessarily by
the attorney but by independent sources as well] that identification of the client [or of fees paid] amounts to
disclosure of a confidential communication. Another exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit's en banc
decision of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F, 2D 1026 5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is recognized when
disclosure of the identity of the client would provide the "last link" of evidence.

3. ID.; ID.; PERSON CLAIMING THE PRIVILEGE OR ITS EXCEPTIONS HAS THE OBLIGATION TO PRESENT THE
UNDERLYING FACTS DEMONSTRATING THE EXISTENCE OF THE PRIVILEGE. — The person claiming the
privilege or its exception has the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the
privilege. When these facts can be presented onlyby revealing the very information sought to be protected by
the privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in an in camera hearing.
The hearing can even be in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held that "a well-recognized means for an
attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the general rule, while simultaneously preserving
confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in camera ex-parte hearing. Without the
proofs adduced in these in camera hearings, the Court has no factual basis to determine whether petitioners
fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the
contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of fiduciary duty in
the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law
profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this
instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033),
entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.
Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and
herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion,
Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed
legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business
associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as
incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members
of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust
or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law
firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances.
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in
the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the
office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings. 2

On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good government (hereinafter referred to as
respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which
258
excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant. 3
Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that
he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:

14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro
Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul
Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the
coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other
coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares
and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987.
This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest
stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as
of February, 1984. 5

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their co-defendants are
charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-
ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and
Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed
under their respective names in Annex 'A' of the expanded Amended Complaint as
incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any
proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.

4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of
Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business
purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However,
he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and therefore denies that the
'shares' appearing in his name in Annex 'A' of the expanded Amended Complaint are
his assets. 6

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the
allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991
with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-
defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. 8 The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the
complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings. 9

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private respondent
Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to
wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a
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previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989
executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco,
Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG
against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention
that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to
reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by
respondent PCGG. It held:

xxx xxx xxx

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom
they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has
apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him.
This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and
under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic
v.Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by
Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's
COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the
disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party
defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and
joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul
S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. 12

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
105938, invoking the following grounds:

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA
lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict
application of the law of agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering

petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.

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 1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a
substantial distinction as would make the classification reasonable
under the equal protection clause.

3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in

favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.

III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under
the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from
revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the
identity of the client(s).

2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity
of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other
privileged matters.

IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the
dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and
with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same
grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him
a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him
an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further
argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are
prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers
to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship. cdasia

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the
identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents
it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. 13

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-
defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No.
0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal,'" 14 and he has undertaken to identify
his principal. 15

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose
the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in
street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners — the names
of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its
questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

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 ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom
they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein. (Italics ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera Farms,
Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario
Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the
ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco"; that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third
Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the
name of particular persons, some in blank.

We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers
that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these
corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed
deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank
deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the
nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and
some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim
that some of the shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most
of these corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are
no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation and even
up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits from the
municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal Law
Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the principal things that we
would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves. 16

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their
duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being
used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these
clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should
exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.

II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum
(contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to
the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by
honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato(contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed
makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him.
18But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant,
because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. 19 A lawyer is also
as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an
ordinary agent. 20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office"

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since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be
taken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life
into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential
character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason of necessity and
public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil
which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other professional
in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable tradition. 25 In
Stockton v. Ford, 26 the U.S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that
of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged;
few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and
justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be
watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the
detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. 27

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his
client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons

cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity. 29

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of
judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In
the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy
or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not
permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud
or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

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Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several constitutional
and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights
available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal representation
without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he
might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right
to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of
information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents
against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum of
legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of
disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which
exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the
lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the
answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. 30 Under this premise, the
general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. 31

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to grope in
the dark against unknown forces. 33

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.

In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name
of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the
client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official,
informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had
accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count
the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The
lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury. Reversing the
lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, and
under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.

U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those instances
where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very
criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.

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The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino Gang," a
gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners,
represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.

In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig,
requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of
any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:

A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the
person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such
information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was
sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter
of California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception
applies to this case.

The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client
privilege. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the
law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra Sec.
2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's identity and the nature of his fee
arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications. 36

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar
facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, 37prompted the New York Supreme Court to
allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose
the latter to civil litigation. llcd

In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent
corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against
defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It
turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was
somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a
client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was
involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second
cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity.
The court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him
to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the
attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence
contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against him. 38

xxx xxx xxx.

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or
assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any
other matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And whenever the communication made,
relates to a matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford
presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged from
disclosure. . . .

It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney
in this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and
his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him
as service of the summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court
reserved decision are sustained. 39

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, 40 the lawyer involved was required by a lower court to
disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the court's request

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was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of
properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State Supreme Court.
Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he
represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in
establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such
testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for
certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in the course of such
employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain transactions. We
feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an
attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of
the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit
against his client. 41

3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.

In Baird vs. Korner, 42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayer's returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes understated.
The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird
on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken by the IRS of the
taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85, which had
been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money representing his fee for the advice
given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the
payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and
other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the
attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the
enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil
contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of
clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined
income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability
pending. The court emphasized the exception that a client's name is privileged when so much has been
revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to
possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here
money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not
paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of
the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose — to ascertain which taxpayers
think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or several years.
The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or
interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt
for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be
the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal
crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved
was employed — to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done. 43

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the
general rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the
subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature

266
of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be
confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise
result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal
client confidences. 46

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be no attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly established
in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up
of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others,
the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners'
legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers.
Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very
activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of
Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 47

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney, for
illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities
and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his
attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked
for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act for which the
client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to
evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an
illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second
example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the
first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a
crime. 48 The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the
same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.

In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions no case
has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not
only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made
the basis of a suit against his client." 49"Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal
employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the
relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as

267
privileged communications." 50 Where the communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege,
would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the information known to the
prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would open up other
privileged information which would substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so
inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable
to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of
promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from
attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings 51
and Tillotson v. Boughner. 52 What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general
rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.

There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on
utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a
case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which
exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which
we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an
attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in
the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn
requires them to invoke the privilege.

In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a
case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from
their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients,
information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be
illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be
difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as
information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and
distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of
violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.

The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty, competence,
diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to make decisions have
been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon, 54 the US Second District Court
rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's
former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the
transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship
in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of
causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.

To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller 55 requiring
strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the
end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however, found
that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement
while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the
interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle
of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon 56 famously attributed to Justice Benjamin
Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at
all.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's
loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but
extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57

Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the lawyers
are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess, demanding of her
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votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to accept respondents' position
without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life
— so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But
that is not all. What a subject is this in which we are united — this abstraction called the Law,
wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men
that have been. When I think on this majestic theme by eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the
law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with
sustained and lonely passion — only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is
likened to God.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the circumstances
obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to
possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise
of their duties. LLphil

The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners and
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others
and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3%
of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA
lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the
subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves,
among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions,
etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG
documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed
in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link,
"that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime."

III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private respondent was
dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also
because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require,
which includes . . . the identity of the principal." 59

First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement
made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise made
the same claim not merely out-of-court but also in their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint,
signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering." 60 Being
"similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and
circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from petitioners in the
case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain the
PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of the clients
in question. However, respondents failed to show — and absolutely nothing exists in the records of the case at
bar — that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking
happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is
so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution,
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respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare
assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG,
only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation
and one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal.
These were clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services while all of them
were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned
transactions. 61

To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent court
without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species apart from
the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions based on
real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the
equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of
statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal
norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 62 Those who
fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the
liabilities imposed.

. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all
persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: 'Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding the rest. 63

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as
parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also
constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. 64 it is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing
the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the question of the
identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the
attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks
at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at
this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify and examine
as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not
mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made
their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to
testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to
maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that
their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing
them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this
Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which
we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of
Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.

While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts
which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-
client confidentiality privilege. LibLex

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WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Sandiganbayan is further ordered to execute petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz,
Jose C. Conception, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini as parties-defendants in SB
Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo and Francisco, JJ ., concur.

Vitug, J ., see separate opinion.

Padilla, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.

Davide, Jr. and Puno, JJ ., dissents.

Narvasa, C.J. and Regalado, J., join Justice Davide in his dissent.

Romero, J ., took no part. Related to PCGG Commissioner when Civil Case No. 0033 was filed.

Hermosisima, Jr., J ., took no part. Participated in Sandiganbayan deliberations thereon.

Mendoza, J ., is on leave.

||| (Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 108113, [September 20, 1996], 330 PHIL 678-755)

Canon 16 – Duty to be a trustee of client’s moneys and properties

Unity Fishing vs. Atty. Macalino, A.C. No. 4566, December 10, 2004

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4566. December 10, 2004.]

UNITY FISHING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO G.

MACALINO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J p:

Under consideration is this petition by way of a complaint for disbarment filed by Unity Fishing Development
Corporation against Atty. Danilo Macalino for having violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In its resolution of June 26, 1996, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint within ten (10)
days from notice. 1

On July 26, 1996, respondent filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to file comment, 2
which motion was granted by the Court in its resolution of August 21, 1996. 3

On August 26, 1996, respondent filed another motion for extension, this time for an additional period of fifteen
(15) days. 4 The motion was similarly granted by the Court in its resolution of October 7, 1996. 5

Still, on September 19, 1996, respondent filed a third and "last extension of time to file comment". 6 Again, this
was granted by the Court via its resolution of November 27, 1996. 7

Unfortunately, no comment was ever filed by respondent.

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Hence, and taking note of complainant's "Motion to Conduct Further Proceedings", filed on March 23, 1998, 8
the Court, in its resolution of April 27, 1998, 9 referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
for investigation, report and recommendation.

Acting on the referral, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline designated Atty. Cesar R. Dulay as investigating
commissioner.

It appears, however, that even while the case was already under formal investigation, respondent displayed the
same attitude of lack of concern. As reported by Atty. Dulay:

The Commission issued a notice setting the case for hearing on October 8, 1998, at which
hearing complainant represented by its legal counsel and respondent appeared. Again,
respondent asked for fifteen days from October 8, 1998 to file his Answer. Complainant also
asked the same period within which to file his reply.

On November 5, 1998, respondent filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file answer.

On November 9, 1998, respondent again filed an urgent motion for last extension of time or a
period of fifteen (15) days from November 15, 1998 to file answer, which was granted by the
Commission.

Since the respondent has not filed his answer as required by the Honorable Supreme Court
and the Commission, the case was again set for hearing on November 9, 1999.

On said date, only the counsel for complainant appeared. Respondent was absent. However,
records show the notice sent to him was returned unserved with the annotation "Moved."
Records also show that respondent has not filed his answer and again he was given a last
chance to file his answer within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order dated November 9,
1999 and the hearing of the case was reset to December 9, 1999.

On December 9, 1999, only counsel for complainant appeared and moved that respondent's
right to file answer be deemed waived and that complainant be allowed to file Memorandum
after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 14, 1999, respondent again filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of fifteen (15)
days from December 4, 1999 within which to file his answer.

On January 7, 2000, the complainant filed a Memorandum, a copy of which was furnished to
respondent and which was not controverted by respondent.

All told, respondent filed six (6) motions for extension of time to file Answer and up to this
time, which is almost seven (7) years from the time the Honorable Supreme Court required
respondent to file his answer to the complaint, respondent has not filed any answer, 10

on account of which the investigating commissioner considered the case as "now ready for resolution". 11
Thereafter, the investigating commissioner submitted his Report. Dated January 20, 2003, 12 the Report
recites the factual background of the case and the commissioner's discussion and findings thereon, thus:

"Frabal Fishing and Ice Plant Corporation (hereinafter, Frabal) was the owner of a parcel of
land located along Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila which was leased to
Wheels Distributors, Inc. (hereinafter, Wheels), an authorized dealer of cars and motor
vehicles of various make;

A dispute arose between Frabal and Wheels regarding the terms and conditions of the lease
contract. The dispute eventually led to a lawsuit. Frabal hired the services of respondent Atty.
Danilo G. Macalino as counsel for the purpose of representing its interest in the said lawsuit;

Frabal merged and was absorbed by Petitioner corporation on February 12, 1991, with the
former conveying, assigning and transferring all its business assets and liabilities to the latter,
including all judicial and extra-judicial claims. Hence, Petitioner was substituted in lieu of
Frabal in the former's lawsuit with Wheels;

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As Petitioner's legal counsel, Respondent advised Petitioner to severe all contractual
relationship with Wheels as a step towards eventually evicting the latter from the property
they were occupying;

Hence, upon advice of Respondent, the contract of lease between Frabal and Wheels was
terminated. Respondent likewise advised Petitioner to return the guarantee deposit equivalent
to two (2) months rental or the amount of P50,000.00 to Wheels;

On March 2, 1988, Petitioner prepared Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988
for the amount of P50,000.00. The check was crossed and made payable to the Wheels
Distributors, Inc. (Annex "A").

Respondent volunteered to bring the check to the office of Wheels himself and to make them
accept it. Hence, on March 3, 1988, Respondent sent his representative to Petitioner's office
to get the said check;

Respondent's representative duly received the said check from Petitioner, as proof of which
he signed Check Voucher No. 3-012 (Annex "B");

Thereafter, Respondent represented to Petitioner that he was able to deliver the check to
Wheels Distributors, Inc.;

The suit between Petitioner and Wheels continued for several years. In the meantime,
Petitioner changed counsels, replacing Respondent with someone else;

Finally, sometime in May 1994, the suit ended in amicable settlement. In the process of
negotiating the terms and conditions of the settlement, Wheels informed Petitioner that it
never received therefund (sic) guarantee deposit in the amount of P50,000.00;

Petitioner was shocked to learn this piece of information from Wheels Distributors as all along
Respondent had represented to Petitioner that Wheels has already received the guarantee
deposit of P50,000.00;

Petitioner searched its files for the subject check. After locating the check, Petitioner noted
that at the back of the check was a rubber stamp marking indicating that it was deposited
with the United Savings Bank Head Office on May 13, 1988 to Account No. CA-483-3. United
Savings Bank has since been acquired by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and is
now known as UCPB Savings Bank;

Petitioner checked with Wheels Distributors from whom it later learned that the latter never
maintained an account with the United Savings Bank, now the UCPB Savings Bank;

Petitioner wrote to Respondent on May 19, 1994 to explain why the check in issue never
reached Wheels Distributors and how it was endorsed and encashed despite the fact that it
was a crossed check (Copy of said letter is Annex "C");

Despite receipt of said letter, however, Respondent never responded nor attempted to explain
his side to what strongly appears to be a gross misappropriation of the money for his own
personal use;

Hence, Petitioner was constrained to institute an action for damages against Respondent
Danilo G. Macalino as well as UCPB Savings Bank with the Regional Trial Court of Malabon,
Branch 72 where the same is now docketed as Civil Case No. 2382-MN;

That Respondent misappropriated the amount of P50,000.00 for his own personal use cannot
be denied. An employee of UCPB in the person of Eduardo Estremadura testified in the
aforestated case for damages that Respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was the one
maintaining Account No. CA-483-37 at UCPB, to which the crossed check payable to Wheels
was deposited (TSN, p. 8, Aug. 24, 1995, copy of the TSN is Annex "D");

That Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988 for the amount of P50,000.00 was
deposited to Respondent's account is further shown in United Savings Bank Current Account

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 Deposit Slip accomplished by Respondent when he deposited said check with United Savings
Bank on May 13, 1988 (Copy of said deposit slip is Annex "E").

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:

Respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was given all the opportunity to answer and present his
defenses to the complaint. Regrettably, the records show that despite the orders of the
Supreme Court and this Commission respondent has not taken any step to verify and inquire
as to the status of the complaint against him. Almost three years since the submission of the
complainant's memorandum, respondent has not reacted nor made any move to protect
himself and answer the complaint. Due process consists in being given the opportunity to be
heard and we believe that in this case respondent has been given all the opportunity to be
heard. CSHDTE

On the basis of the above, the investigating commissioner concluded his Report with the following —

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice

of law for two (2) years and be ordered to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00.
Respondent should be warned that a similar offense will merit a more severe penalty. 13

On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2003-341, 14 adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner with a modification as to the penalty, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification as to the
penalty to conform to the evidence, and considering respondent's failure to account for the
funds received by him in trust from complainant in gross violation of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as for respondent's lax, remiss and untroubled attitude in
this case, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and Ordered to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00 with a Warning that a
similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good
faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for
the protection of the client". 15 So it is that the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

The Canon of Professional Ethics is even more explicit when it states:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses
or takes advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

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 Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not
under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him. (par. 11)

Here, we are in full accord with the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent misappropriated the money entrusted to him and which he failed to account for to his client
despite demand therefor.

Respondent's failure to rebut complainant's evidence clearly reveals his failure to live up to his duties as a
lawyer in consonance with the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. His repeated failure
without any valid reason to comply with the orders of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint
lends credence to the allegations thereof and manifests his tacit admission of the same. As aptly found by
Commissioner Dulay, the following uncontroverted facts as supported by the annexes of the complaint had
been established:

"1.that Metrobank Check No. MB350288 in the amount of P50,000.00 payable to Wheels
Distributors (Annex 'A' of Petition) was prepared by Frabal Fishing & Ice Plant Corporation
(Annex 'B' Petition) and released to respondent's representative;

2.that the said Metrobank Check No. [MB350288] was deposited to Account No. 0110004833
under Account Name Danilo G. Macalino at the United Savings Bank (Annex "E" of Petition);

3.that on 19 May 1994 complainant wrote a letter to respondent (Annex 'C' of Petition)
advising the latter that the Metrobank Check intended for Wheel Distributors, Inc. was not
received by them (Wheels Distributors) yet it was endorsed and encashed. Respondent was
therefore requested to explain how the particular check was encashed. Respondent received
the letter on May 23, 1994 (Annex 'C-3' of Petition) and the records do not show that
respondent replied to the latter requiring him to explain; and

4.that complainant filed a civil case against UCPB Savings Bank, and Danilo Macalino before
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 2382-MN
(Annex 'D' of Petition) and at the hearing of said case on August 24, 1995, witness Eduardo
Estremadura, a bookkeeper of UCPB Bank positively testified that Danilo G. Macalino was the
maintainer of Account No. CA-483-3 of the UCPB Savings Bank, Legaspi Branch (page 8 & 9
Annex 'D', TSN of hearing of Civil Case No. 2382-MN) and that Check No. 350288 was
deposited to the Account of Danilo G. Macalino under CA-483-3 on May 13, 1988 (page 9 of
Annex 'D', TSN of hearing); and was credited to the account of Danilo G. Macalino (page 12 of
Annex 'D', TSN of hearing of Civil Case No. 2382-MN)" 16 ,

from which established facts, the investigating commissioner made the following conclusions:
"1.that Metrobank Check No. 350288 in the amount of P50,000.00 which was intended for
Wheels Distributors, Inc. was deposited and the amount credited to Account No. 483-3 of
respondent Danilo G. Macalino with the UCPB Savings Bank.

2.that respondent when required by the complainant to explain and account for the amount of
P50,000.00 caused by Metrobank Check No. 350288 which was not intended for him failed to
reply and give any accounting of such funds to complainant". 17

Respondent's wanton failure to make an accounting and to return to his client the amount entrusted to him
upon demand give rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it, in violation of the trust and confidence
reposed on him. His act of holding on to complainant's money without its acquiescence is conduct indicative
of lack of integrity and propriety. 18 A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money
and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client. 19

It is clear, therefore, that respondent, by depositing the check in his own account and subsequently deceiving
his client into believing that he delivered the same to Wheels is undoubtedly guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not merely to himself but to the noble profession to
which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. 20 Like judges, lawyers must not

275
only be clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system remains
undisturbed. 21

What is more, respondent's repeated failures to comply with the orders of the Court requiring him to comment
on the complaint indicate a high degree of irresponsibility on his part.

We have no hesitance, then, in confirming the resolution passed by the IBP Board of Governors suspending
respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year. We could have taken a more drastic action against
respondent, but considering that he has no prior administrative record, it is our sentiment that the
recommended penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and the legal profession.
After all, in Espiritu vs. Cabredo, 22 we imposed the same penalty on an attorney who similarly failed to
account the money received from his client and to restitute it without any reason.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for his failure to immediately return and deliver the funds of his former client upon
demand, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is
likewise ordered to return the sum of P50,000 to complainant within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. HAIaEc

Let copies of the Resolution be entered into respondent's record as an attorney and be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio Morales, JJ ., concur.

Corona, J ., is on leave.

||| (Unity Fishing Development Corp. v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4566, [December 10, 2004], 487 PHIL 234-245)

Junio vs. Atty. Grupo, A.C. No. 5020, December 18, 2001

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5020. December 18, 2001.]

ROSARIO JUNIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO, respondent.

Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Acorda Law Offices for complainant.

SYNOPSIS

A complaint for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Salvador M. Grupo for malpractice and gross
misconduct. Complainant Rosario N. Junio alleged that she engaged the services of respondent then a private
practitioner, for the redemption of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20394 registered
in the name of her parents, spouses Rogelio and Rufina Nietes, and located at Concepcion, Loay, Bohol.
Complainant entrusted to respondent the amount of P25,000.00 in cash to be used in the redemption of the
aforesaid property. Respondent, however, for no valid reason did not redeem the property; as a result of which
the right of redemption was lost and the property was eventually forfeited. Despite repeated demands made by
complainant and without justifiable cause, respondent had continuously refused to refund the money
entrusted to him. In his Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the amount in question for the purpose for which
it was given. After he failed to redeem the property he requested the complainant that he be allowed, in the
meantime, to avail of the money because he had an urgent need for some money a himself to help defray his
children's educational expenses. According to respondent, it was a personal request and a private matter
between respondent and complainant. Respondent also alleged that he executed a promissory note for the
amount.

276
The Supreme Court found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and ordered him suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month and to pay to
respondent, within 30 days from notice, the amount of P25,000.00 with interest at the legal rate, computed
from December 12, 1996. According to the Court, respondent's liability is not for misappropriation or
embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers
from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter's interests are protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice. Respondent's liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any
security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the said amount. His
claim that he could not pay the loan "because circumstances . . . did not allow it" and that, because of the
passage of time, "he somehow forgot about his obligation" only underscored his blatant disregard of his
obligation which reflects on his honesty and candor. HDAaIc

SYLLABUS

LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FORBIDS LAWYERS FROM
BORROWING MONEY FROM THEIR CLIENTS UNLESS THE LATTER'S INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED BY THE
NATURE OF THE CASE OR BY INDEPENDENT ADVICE; CASE A BAR. — It would indeed appear from the records
of the case that respondent was allowed to borrow the money previously entrusted to him by complainant for
the purpose of securing the redemption of the property belonging to complainant's parents. Respondent,
however, did not give adequate security for the loan and subsequently failed to settle his obligation. Although
complainant denied having loaned the money to respondent, the fact is that complainant accepted the
promissory note given her by respondent on December 12, 1996. In effect, complainant consented to and
ratified respondent's use of the money. It is noteworthy that complainant did not attach this promissory note to
her complaint nor explain the circumstances surrounding its execution. She only mentioned it in her demand
letter of March 12, 1998 (Annex B), in which she referred to respondent's undertaking to pay her the
P25,000.00 on or before January 1997. Under the circumstances and in view of complainant's failure to deny
the promissory note, the Court is constrained to give credence to respondent's claims that the money
previously entrusted to him by complainant was later converted into a loan. Respondent's liability is thus not
for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter's interests are
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. In this case, respondent's liability is compounded
by the fact that not only did he not give any security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he
has also refused to pay the said amount. His claim that he could not pay the loan "because circumstances . . .
did not allow it" and that, because of the passage of time, "he somehow forgot about his obligation" only
underscores his blatant disregard of his obligation which reflects on his honesty and candor. A lawyer is bound
to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Salvador M. Grupo for malpractice and gross misconduct.

Complainant Rosario N. Junio alleged that —

3. Sometime in 1995, [she] engaged the services of [respondent], then a private practitioner,
for the redemption of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20394
registered in the name of her parents, spouses Rogelio and Rufina Nietes, and located at
Concepcion, Loay, Bohol.

4. On 21 August 1995, [complainant] entrusted to [respondent] the amount of P25,000.00 in

cash to be used in the redemption of the aforesaid property. Respondent received the said
amount as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt, a copy of which is being hereto attached
as Annex "A".

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 5. Notwithstanding the foregoing and for no valid reason, respondent did not redeem the
property; as a result of which the right of redemption was lost and the property was eventually
forfeited.

6. Because of respondent's failure to redeem the property, complainant had demanded [the]
return of the money which she entrusted to the former for the above-stated purpose.

7. Despite repeated demands made by the complainant and without justifiable cause,
respondent has continuously refused to refund the money entrusted to him. 1

In his Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the amount in question for the purpose for which it was given.
However, he alleged that —

6. The subject land for which the money of complainant was initially intended to be applied
could really not be redeemed anymore . .;

7. Complainant knew the mortgage agreement between her parents and the mortgage-owner
had already expired, and what respondent was trying to do was a sort of [a] desperate, last-
ditch attempt to persuade the said mortgagee to relent and give back the land to the
mortgagors with the tender of redemption; but at this point, the mortgagee simply would not
budge anymore. For one reason or another, he would no longer accept the sum offered;

8. By the time that complainant was to return to Manila, it was already a foregone matter that
respondent's efforts did not succeed. And so, when transaction failed, respondent requested
the complainant that he be allowed, in the meantime, to avail of the money because he had an
urgent need for some money himself to help defray his children's educational expenses. It
was really a personal request, a private matter between respondent and complainant, thus,
respondent executed a promissory note for the amount, a copy of which is probably still in the
possession of the complainant. CSEHcT

9. . . . [T]he family of the complainant and that of the respondent were very close and intimate
with each other. Complainant, as well as two of her sisters, had served respondent's family as
household helpers for many years when they were still in Manila, and during all those times
they were treated with respect, affection, and equality. They were considered practically part
of respondent's own family.

That is why, when complainant requested . . . assistance regarding the problem of the
mortgaged property which complainant wanted to redeem, respondent had no second-
thoughts in extending a lending hand . . . .

Respondent did not ask for any fee. His services were purely gratuitous; his acts [were] on his
own and by his own. It was more than pro bono; it was not even for charity; it was simply an
act of a friend for a friend. It was just lamentably unfortunate that his efforts failed.

xxx xxx xxx

Of course, respondent accepts his fault, because, indeed, there were occasions when
complainant's sisters came to respondent to ask for the payment in behalf of complainant,
and he could not produce the money because the circumstances somehow, did not allow it.
[I]t does not mean that respondent will not pay, or that he is that morally depraved as to
wilfully and deliberately re[nege] in his obligation towards the complainant. 2

Complainant filed a reply denying that respondent informed her of his failure to redeem the property and that
respondent requested her to instead lend the money to him. 3

The case was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. However, while two hearings were set for this purpose, both were postponed at the instance
of respondent. For this reason, on August 28, 2000, complainant asked the Investigating Commissioner 4 to
consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings theretofore filed. Respondent was
required to comment on complainant's motion, but he failed to do so. Consequently, the case was considered
submitted for resolution.

278
In his report, dated January 5, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent liable for violation of
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their
clients unless the latter's interests are "protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice." The
Investigating Commissioner found that respondent failed to pay his client's money. However, in view of
respondent's admission of liability and "plea for magnanimity," the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that respondent be simply reprimanded and ordered to pay the amount of P25,000.00 loan plus interest at the
legal rate.

In its Resolution No. XIV-2001-183, dated April 29, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner's findings. However, it ordered —

[R]espondent . . . suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for the commission of an act
which falls short of the standard of the norm of conduct required of every attorney and . . .
ordered [him] to return to the complainant the amount of P25,000.00 plus interest at the legal
rate from the time the said amount was misappropriated, until full payment; provided that the
total suspension shall be at least one (1) year from the date of said full payment HETDAa

On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that —

(a) there was no actual hearing of the case wherein respondent could have fully
ventilated and defended his position;

(b) the subject Resolution gravely modified the Report and Recommendation of the
Trial Commissioner, Hon. Pedro Magpayo, Jr., . . . such that the resultant
sanctions that are ordered imposed are too leonine, unjust and cruel;

(c) that the factual circumstances attending the matter which gave rise to the
complaint were not rightly or fairly appreciated. 5

He argues that the Court should adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner.
In its resolution of August 15, 2001, the Court resolved to treat respondent's motion for reconsideration as a
petition for review of IBP Resolution No. XIV 2001-183 and required complainant to comment on the petition.

In her comment, complainant states that her primary interest is to recover the amount of P25,000.00 with
interest and that she is leaving it to the Court to decide whether respondent deserves the penalty
recommended by the IBP. 6

The Court resolves to partially grant the petition. In his report and recommendation, Investigating
Commissioner Magpayo, Jr. made the following findings:

In his Answer, the respondent ADMITS all the allegations in paragraph 4 of the complaint
which avers:

4. On 21 August 1995, complainant entrusted to respondent the amount of P25,000.00

in cash to be used in the redemption of the aforesaid property (parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 20394 registered in the name of complainant's parents located at
Concepcion, Loay, Bohol). Respondent received the said amount as evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt (Annex A).

By way of confession and avoidance, the respondent, . . . however, contended that when the
mortgagee refused to accept the sum tendered as the period of redemption had already
expired, he requested the complainant to allow him in the meantime to use the money for his
children's educational expenses[,] to which request the complainant allegedly acceded and
respondent even executed a promissory note (please see 4th par. of Annex "B" of complaint).

Respondent takes further refuge in the intimate and close relationship existing between
himself and the complainant's family on the basis of which his legal services were purely
gratuitous or "simply an act of a friend for a friend" with "no consideration involved."
Unfortunately, his efforts to redeem the foreclosed property, as already stated, did not
279
 produce the desired result because the mortgagee "would not budge anymore" and "would not
accept the sum offered."

Thus, the respondent concluded that there was, strictly speaking, no attorney-client
[relationship] existing between them. Rather, right from the start[,] everything was sort of
personal, he added.

Granting to the respondent the benefit of the doubt, we shall assume that there was in reality
a loan in the amount of P25,000.00. This is likewise confirmed by the execution of a
promissory note on 12 December 1996 by the respondent who "undertook to pay Mrs. Junio
on or before January 1997" (Annex B of complaint). Moreover, the demand letter of 12 March
1998 (Annex B) mentions of "reimbursement of the sum received" and interest of "24% per
annum until fully paid" giving the impression that the funds previously intended to be used for
the repurchase of a certain property (Annex A of complaint) was converted into a loan with the
consent of the complainant who gave way to the request of the respondent "to help defray his
children's educational expenses" (par. 8 of Answer).

Be that as it may, the duty and obligation to repay the loan remains unshaken. Having utilized
the sum to fulfill his "urgent need for some money," it is but just and proper that he return the
amount borrowed together with interest.

Five (5) years had already passed since respondent retained the cash for his own personal
use. But notwithstanding the same and his firm promise "to pay Mrs. Junio on or before
January 1997" he has not demonstrated any volition to settle his obligation to his creditor[,]
although admittedly "there w[ere] occasions when complainant's sister came to respondent to
ask for the payment in behalf of complainant," worse, "the passage of time made respondent
somehow forgot about the obligation."

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice (Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility). This rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his
influence over the client.

This rule is especially significant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an immense
ascendancy over the complainant who, "as well as two of his sisters, had served respondent's
family as household helpers for many years."

Having gained dominance over the complainant by virtue of such long relation of master and
servant, the respondent took advantage of his influence by not returning the money entrusted
to him. Instead, he imposed his will on the complainant and borrowed her funds without giving
adequate security therefor and mindless of the interest of the complainant caIETS

In the light of the foregoing, . . . respondent has committed an act which falls short of the
standard of the norm of conduct required of every attorney. If an ordinary borrower of money
is required by the law to repay the loan failing which he may be subjected to court action, it is
more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves as an example. 7

It would indeed appear from the records of the case that respondent was allowed to borrow the money
previously entrusted to him by complainant for the purpose of securing the redemption of the property
belonging to complainant's parents. Respondent, however, did not give adequate security for the loan and
subsequently failed to settle his obligation. Although complainant denied having loaned the money to
respondent, the fact is that complainant accepted the promissory note given her by respondent on December
12, 1996. In effect, complainant consented to and ratified respondent's use of the money. It is noteworthy that
complainant did not attach this promissory note to her complaint nor explain the circumstances surrounding
its execution. She only mentioned it in her demand letter of March 12, 1998 (Annex B), in which she referred to
respondent's undertaking to pay her the P25,000.00 on or before January 1997. Under the circumstances and
in view of complainant's failure to deny the promissory note, the Court is constrained to give credence to
respondent's claims that the money previously entrusted to him by complainant was later converted into a
loan.

280
Respondent's liability is thus not for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the
latter's interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. In this case, respondent's
liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any security for the payment of the amount
loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the said amount. His claim that he could not pay the loan
"because circumstances . . . did not allow it" and that, because of the passage of time, "he somehow forgot
about his obligation" only underscores his blatant disregard of his obligation which reflects on his honesty and
candor. A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client. 8

Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping redeem the property of
complainant's parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a friend, hence there is no client-attorney relationship
between them. This contention has no merit. As explained in Hilado v. David, 9

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a
person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established . . .

Considering the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation to impose on respondent the
penalty of reprimand and restitution of the amount loaned by him is clearly inadequate. On the other hand, the
penalty of indefinite suspension with restitution imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is too harsh in view of
respondent's apparent lack of intent to defraud complainant and of the fact that this appears to be his first
administrative transgression. It is the penalty imposed in Igual v. Javier 10 which applies to this case. In that
case, this Court ordered the respondent suspended for one month from the practice of law and directed him to
pay the amount given him by his clients within 30 days from notice for his failure to return the money in
question notwithstanding his admission that he did not use the money for the filing of the appellee's brief, as
agreed by them, because of an alleged quarrel with his clients.

Anent petitioner's allegation regarding the lack of hearing during the IBP investigation, suffice it to say that he
waived such right when he failed to comment on petitioner's motion to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings theretofore filed despite due notice to him, not to mention the fact that it was he who
had requested the postponement of the two hearings scheduled by the Investigating Commissioner.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and orders him suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month and to pay to
complainant within 30 days from notice, the amount of P25,000.00 with interest at the legal rate, computed
from December 12, 1996.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena, J., on official business abroad.

||| (Junio v. Grupo, A.C. No. 5020, [December 18, 2001], 423 PHIL 808-818)

Pelmoka vs. Judge Diaz, Jr., A.C. No. 2662-CFI, November 26, 1982

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2662-CFI. November 26, 1982.]

281
FLAVIANO A. PELMOKA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FELIX T. DIAZ, JR., Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch IV, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Charged administratively, respondent CFI Judge was found upon investigation to have failed to protect
complainant attorney's charging lien when respondent allowed the clients of complainant to withdraw their
shares from the cash deposit involved in the civil case without first determining complainant's reasonable fees.

The Supreme Court reprimanded respondent Judge for his failure to protect complainant's right to collect his
professional fees.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER LOWER COURTS; COMPLAINT AGAINST A CFI JUDGE;

FAILURE TO PROTECT A LAWYER'S RIGHT TO COLLECT HIS PROFESSIONAL FEES; PENALTY. — The
respondent CFI Judge should not have allowed the clients of complainant lawyer to withdraw their shares from
the cash deposit without extending ample protection to the latter's claim. True it is that the compromise
agreement stipulates that the parties shall be separately responsible for the payment of the fees for their
respective lawyers; nevertheless, the respondent should not have improvidently allowed the clients of the
complainant to withdraw their shares without first determining his reasonable fees. A lawyer has the right to
claim the fruits of his labor. He has the equitable right to be paid his fees out of the judgment which he has
obtained from a court of justice. For his failure to protect the complainant's charging lien, the respondent is
hereby reprimanded.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT AGAINST A CFI JUDGE, RESPONDENT SHOULD RESOLVE ALLEGATIONS
OF EXORBITANT FEES. — Any allegation of exorbitant or excessive fees should have been resolved by the
respondent Judge on the basis of quantum meruit. Or the respondent could have inquired from the plaintiffs
what they considered as reasonable attorney's fees for the services of complainant, direct the payment of such
"reasonable amount" as partial payment of his attorney's fees, and set for hearing the disputed difference
between the claim of the complainant and the amount considered reasonable by the plaintiffs.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J p:

In a verified complaint dated December 4, 1981, Flaviano A. Pelmoka charged Judge Felix T. Diaz, Jr. of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and Attorneys Facundo T. Bautista and Inocencio B. Garampil, Sr. with
serious misconduct in connection with Civil Case No. 279-G, entitled Eustacio Nepomuceno, et al. vs. Ester
Garampil, et al.

The charge against Judge Diaz is for gross ignorance of the law and judicial proceedings; failure to protect the
complainant's charging lien as one of the lawyers who intervened in the aforementioned civil case; and
partiality, bias prejudice or malicious motive.

This decision concerns Judge Diaz only who was required to file an answer to the complaint. The answer
denies the allegations of the complaint with a prayer that it be dismissed. The complainant filed a reply to the
answer and issues having been joined, it was ascertained that the case could be decided on the basis of the
documentary evidence submitted without resorting to a formal hearing. cdrep

The Rollo of the case reveals, according to Deputy Court Administrator Romeo D. Mendoza, the following:

"Civil Case No. 279-G was a case for partition and reconveyance filed with the CFI of Nueva Ecija, Branch IV,
on March 4, 1972, long before respondent judge was appointed to the Bench. When the respondent judge
inherited the case in 1976, there were many side issues and/or incidents pending to be resolved, among which
were: (a) Motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir of the late Leon Arguelles; and (b) Motion for
appointment of commissioners to partition the properties, both filed by herein complainant. Respondent judge
282
issued an order denying the motion of the plaintiffs for exclusion of defendant Ester Garampil as heir so as to
avoid the piecemeal adjudication of the issues raised in the case. (p. 74.) The motion of the plaintiffs for the
appointment of commissioners was likewise denied by respondent judge for the reason that there was then
pending before the Court of Appeals, an appeal involving the same parties and the same properties whereby
the legality of a Deed of Donation concerning the same properties being litigated, is the very issue to be
resolved. (p. 75.) It was for this reason that respondent judge held in abeyance the trial of Civil Case No. 279-
G pending termination of the appeal before the Court of Appeals. (p. 80.)

"On May 4, 1981, a Motion to set the case for conference among the parties, was filed by defendants
Serranos, Rigors and Garcias who were represented by Atty. Facundo T. Bautista. After a hearing on the
aforesaid motion was held, the defendants moved for the approval of the 'Compromise Agreement' dated July
1, 1981, which was signed by all the parties to the case (except defendant Ester Garampil), as well as by all
the lawyers of the said parties, namely, complainant himself, representing the plaintiffs, Atty. Facundo Bautista,
representing the defendants, and Atty. Inocencio Garampil, representing defendant Ester Garampil. (pp. 89-
94.) The parties agreed that they would partition the properties being litigated in the manner specified in the
'Compromise Agreement' and that they would be separately responsible for the payment of the fees of their
respective lawyers. On September 21, 1981, the respondent judge issued a decision approving the said
compromise agreement on July 1, 1981. (pp. 97-100.)

"Defendant Ester Garampil thereafter filed a motion to deposit in court, the purchase price of a commercial
property in the amount of P250,000.00 in order that the proceeds thereof may be disposed of in accordance
with the approved compromise agreement. Complainant then filed a motion for the payment of his professional
fee in the amount of P57,519.00, (pp. 104-105.) which was later raised to P79,186.00 in two subsequent
motions of the complainant. (pp. 113-119.)

"On October 22, 1981, defendant Ester Garampil filed a motion for the withdrawal of the sum of P20,060.00 (p.
109.) from the amount deposited with the court, representing partial payment of her share in the estate
pursuant to the expressed agreement of the heirs of the deceased contained in the compromise agreement,
which motion was granted by the respondent judge. (p. 110.) The other parties thereafter moved to withdraw
their respective shares in the cash deposit with the court, and on the basis of the said motions, respondent
judge issued the Order dated October 30, 1981, allowing the defendants to withdraw their shares; (p. 120.) and
the Order dated November 20, 1981, granting the request of the other parties for the withdrawal of their
respective shares. (pp. 135-137.)

"In his complaint, complainant charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and judicial
proceedings committed in the following manner: (a) unduly delaying the disposition of Civil Case No. 279-G
when respondent judge denied plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of commissioners to partition the
properties; (b) not resolving plaintiffs' motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as heir of deceased Leon
Arguelles despite early pronouncement of Judge Placido Ramos, respondent judge's predecessor, that Ester
Garampil is not an heir of the deceased; (c) approving the compromise agreement of partition entered into by
all the parties; (d) allowing Ester Garampil to withdraw the amount of P20,000.00 from the cash deposit, with
the court, considering that she is not an heir of the deceased; and (e) ignoring complainant's motion for
payment of his fees out of the money deposited with the court.

"The complainant further alleged that the respondent judge failed to protect his charging lien for his attorney's
fees when he allowed plaintiffs to withdraw their share from the said deposit. He likewise charged respondent
judge with bias and partiality when he allowed all the parties to withdraw their respective shares while the
complainant was not allowed to do the same in so far as his charging lien is concerned.

"Respondent judge, in his Answer dated January 13, 1982, (pp. 62-71.) denied all the charges in the
complaint. The respondent judge alleged that Civil Case No. 279-G was a case for reconveyance and partition
of the estate of deceased Leon Arguelles which had been heard and tried by no less than four (4) judges
before him. When he inherited the case in 1976, there were several side issues and/or incidents pending to be
resolved and while all these side issues were pending before the court a quo, an appeal involving the same
parties and the same properties being litigated, was then pending before the Court of Appeals. It was for this
reason that the respondent judge denied complainant's motion for appointment of a commissioner as well as
his motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir.

"Respondent judge also stated that he allowed the parties, including defendant Ester Garampil who is not a
compulsory heir, to withdraw their respective shares from the cash portion of the estate in order to implement
the compromise agreement entered into by all the parties and their respective lawyers.

283
"With respect to the charge of the complainant that the respondent judge failed to protect his charging lien or
his attorney's fees, the respondent judge explained that he did not grant complainant's motion for payment of
his professional fees because he could not ascertain the exact amount of complainant's just, reasonable and
fair fee, considering that his claim of P79,186.00 was contested by the plaintiffs as being exorbitant."

Deputy Court Administrator Mendoza has assessed the charges against Judge Diaz in the light of the record
as follows: prLL

The respondent judge cannot be faulted for dismissing complainant's motion for appointment of commissioners
as well as his motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir. The respondent judge had to dismiss the
said motions to avoid piecemeal adjudication of the issues raised before him. In fact, respondent judge even
suspended the trial of the case until after the Court of Appeals shall have resolved the issue pending before it
which involved the same parties and the same properties being litigated.

"The respondent judge was likewise justified in granting the motion of the parties to withdraw their respective
shares from the cash portion of the estate. The respondent judge only implemented the compromise
agreement entered into by all the parties and signed by all their respective lawyers including complainant
herein. With respect to complainant's, professional fees, it was specified in the compromise agreement that the
parties would be separately responsible for the payment of the fees of their respective lawyers. Since the
plaintiffs (complainant's clients), refused to pay complainant's claim for attorney's fee in the amount of
P79,186.00 on the ground that the same is exorbitant, the remedy of the complainant is to file a separate
action for recovery of his fees where the parties will be afforded the chance to prove their respective claims
and defenses.

"In the case of Bongco vs. Judge Serapio, (Adm. Matter No. 1804-CAR, Feb. 28, 1980.) this Court held that
where it does not appear from the facts in an administrative complaint that the assailed judicial acts of
respondent judge were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were done in persistent
disregard of well known legal rules, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit."

The assessment is well taken except in respect of the failure of the respondent to protect the complainant's
right to collect his professional fees.

The respondent should not have allowed the clients of the complainant to withdraw their shares from the cash
deposit without extending ample protection to the latter's claim. This error was compounded by his order
allowing even Ester Garampil to withdraw her share when she did not sign the compromise agreement of July
1, 1981.

It was grossly unfair for the respondent to leave the complainant holding an empty bag, so to speak, after he
had rendered his professional services as counsel to the plaintiffs. True it is that the compromise agreement
stipulates that the parties shall be separately responsible for the payment of the fees for their respective
lawyers; nevertheless, the respondent should not have improvidently allowed the clients of the complainant to
withdraw their shares without first determining his reasonable fees. cdphil

A lawyer has the right to claim the fruits of his labor. He has the equitable right to be paid his fees out of the
judgment which he has obtained from a court of justice. Any allegation of exorbitant or excessive fees should
have been resolved by the respondent Judge on the basis of quantum meruit. Or the respondent could have
inquired from the plaintiffs what they considered as reasonable attorney's fees for the services of complainant,
direct the payment of such "reasonable amount" as partial payment of his attorney's fees, and set for hearing
the disputed difference between the claim of the complainant and the amount considered reasonable by the
plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, for his failure to protect the complainant's charging lien, the respondent is hereby reprimanded.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur.

||| (Pelmoka v. Diaz, Jr., A.C. No. 2662-CFI, [November 26, 1982], 204 PHIL 283-289)

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Lemoine vs. Balon, Jr. A.C. No. 5829, October 28, 2003

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5829. October 28, 2003.]

DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant, vs. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent was found guilty by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of misconduct for his failure to turn over
to complainant the proceeds of the latter's insurance claim despite repeated demands. Respondent justified
his act by arguing that he had a lien on complainant's funds for his attorney's fees.

The Supreme Court found respondent guilty of malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the practice of his
profession as a lawyer. A lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to
possess. This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an
accounting of all money or property received for or from the client as well as delivery of the funds or property
to the client when due or upon demand. Respondent breached this rule when after he received the proceeds of
complainant's insurance claim in the amount of P525,000.00, he did not report it to complainant. By
respondent's failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he
committed professional misconduct.

That respondent had a lien on complainant's funds for his attorney's fees did not relieve him of his duty to
account for it. The lawyer's continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agreed with the
amount of attorney's fees to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for
being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees. He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the
proper court to fix the amount of such fees. In respondent's case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring
the matter of his compensation for judicial determination so that his and complainant's sharp disagreement
thereon could have been put to an end.

Consequently, the Court ordered the disbarment of respondent, and to return to complainant the amount of
P525,000.00.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; A LAWYER MUST HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT HE MAY COME TO POSSESS.— [Under] Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Filipino lawyer's principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of
complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess.
This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all
money or property received for or from the client as well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when
due or upon demand. Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainant's
insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-
fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.

2. ID.; ID.; LAWYER'S FAILURE TO PROMPTLY ACCOUNT FOR THE FUNDS HE RECEIVED AND HELD FOR THE
BENEFIT OF HIS CLIENT CONSTITUTES PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT; CASE AT BAR. — By respondent's
failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he committed
professional misconduct. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done on
purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the
release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the
proceeds thereof. A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his

285
duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the client's cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair
name of an honorable profession.

3. ID.; ID.; THE LIEN A LAWYER HAS ON CLIENT'S FUNDS FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES DOES NOT RELIEVE HIM
OF HIS DUTY TO ACCOUNT FOR IT; CASE AT BAR.— That respondent had a lien on complainant's funds for his
attorney's fees did not relieve him of his duty to account for it. The lawyer's continuing exercise of his retaining
lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorney's fees to be charged. In case of
disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not
arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can file, if he still deems it desirable,
the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of such fees.

4. ID.; ID.; INTERCALATION OF RESPONDENT'S NAME ON COMPLAINANT'S CHECK CONSTITUTES

FALSIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT THAT REINFORCES THE GRAVITY OF RESPONDENT'S
MISCONDUCT.—The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional
misconduct. The intercalation of respondent's name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable solely in
favor of complainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance is clearly a brazen act of falsification of a
commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to encash the check.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified complaint 1 against
respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-679, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline to an
Investigator for investigation, report and recommendation.

The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:

In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan
Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered problems in pursuing his
claim which was initially rejected, 2 his friend, a certain Jesus "Jess" Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the
engagement of respondent's services.

By letter 3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel Lemoine," under whose
care complainant could be reached, respondent advised complainant, whom he had not before met, that for his
legal services he was charging "25% of the actual amount being recovered . . . payable upon successful
recovery;" an advance payment of P50,000.00 "to be charged [to complainant] to be deducted from whatever
amount [would] be successfully collected;" P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for each and every
court hearings, conferences outside our law office and meetings before the Office of the Insurance
Commission which will be also charged to our 25% recovery fee;" and legal expenses "such as but not limited
to filing fee, messengerial and postage expenses . . . and other miscellaneous but related expenses," to be
charged to complainant's account which would be reimbursed upon presentation statement of account.

The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorney's fees does not bear complainant's conformity, he not
having agreed therewith.

It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainant's claim, for by letter 4 of December
9, 1998 addressed to it, respondent confirmed his acceptance of its offer to settle the claim of complainant "in
an ex-gratia basis of 75% of his policy coverage which is therefore FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P525,000.00) PESOS."

A day or a few days before December 23, 1998 when complainant left for France, 5 he, on the advice of
respondent, signed an already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney 6authorizing respondent and/or
Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of complainant's claim as well as
to "negotiate, sign, compromise[,] encash and receive payment" from it. The Special Power of Attorney was
later dated December 23, 1998 on which same date Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check No.

286
841172payable to complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the claim. 7 The check was
received by respondent.

In the meantime, complainant returned to the Philippines in early January 1999 but left again on the 24th of the
same month. 8 On inquiry about the status of his claim, Garcia echoed to complainant what respondent had
written him (Garcia) in respondent's letter 9 of March 26, 1999 that the claim was still pending with
Metropolitan Insurance and that it was still subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan Insurance offered to
settle it for P350,000.00 representing fifty percent thereof. In the same letter to Garcia, respondent suggested
the acceptance of the offer of settlement to avoid a protracted litigation.

On December 6, 1999, on complainant's personal visit to the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he was informed
that his claim had long been settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to respondent the year before. 10
Complainant lost no time in going to the law office of respondent who was not around, however, but whom he
was able to talk by telephone during which he demanded that he turn over the proceeds of his claim. 11

Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a December 7, 1999 letter 12 wherein he acknowledged having in
his possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained, however, as attorney's lien pending
complainant's payment of his attorney's fee, equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the entire amount collected. In
the same letter, respondent protested what he branded as the "uncivilized and unprofessional behavior"
complainant "reportedly demonstrated" at respondent's office. Respondent winded up his letter as follows,
quotedverbatim:

We would like to make it clear that we cannot give you the aforesaid amount until and unless
our attorney's fees will be forthwith agreed and settled. In the same manner, should you be
barbaric and uncivilized with your approached, we will not hesitate to make a proper
representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for the authenticity of your visa,
Department of Labor and Employment for your working status, Bureau of Internal Revenue for
your taxation compliance and the National Bureau of Investigation [with] which we have a good
network . . .

While it [is your] prerogative to file a legal action against us, it is also our prerogative to file a
case against you. We will rather suggest if you could request your lawyer to just confer with us
for the peaceful settlement of this matter. (Italics and emphasis supplied)

As despite written demands, 13 respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance claim and to
acknowledge the unreasonableness of the attorney's fees he was demanding, complainant instituted the
administrative action at bar on December 17, 1999.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that "[i]t appears that there was 'irregularity' with the check," it
having been issued payable to him, but "and/or AMADEO BALON" was therein intercalated after his
(complainant's) name. 14

Maintaining that respondent was entitled to only P50,000.00 in attorney's fees, 15 complainant decried
respondent's continued possession of the proceeds of his claim 16 and his misrepresentations that the
recovery thereof was fraught with difficulties. 17

In his Counter-Affidavit 18 of February 18, 2000, respondent asserted that his continued retention of the
proceeds of complainant's claim is in lawful exercise of his lien for unpaid attorney's fees. He expressed
readiness, however, to account for and turn them over once he got paid fifty percent (50%) thereof, he citing
the so called contingent fee billing method of "no cure, no pay" adopted by practicing lawyers in the insurance
industry as the basis of the amount of his attorney's fees, 19 which to him was justified in the absence of an
attorney-client contract between him and complainant, the latter having rejected respondent's letter-proposal
of October 21, 1998. 20

Respondent also highlighted the value of the time and efforts he extended in pursuing complainant's claim and
the expenses he incurred in connection therewith. He went on to assert that his inability to contact
complainant whose whereabouts he did not know prompted him to encash the check and keep the proceeds
thereof in conformity with the Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor. 21

287
During the hearings conducted by the IBP Investigator, complainant echoed his allegations in his Complaint-
Affidavit and stressed that he turned down as unreasonable respondent's proposal in his October 21, 1998
letter that he be paid 25% of the actual amount collected for his legal services. 22 And he presented
documentary evidence, including the March 26, 1999 letter of respondent informing his co-attorney-in-fact
Garcia of the supposedly still unrecovered claim and suggesting acceptance of the purported offer of
Metropolitan Insurance to settle complainant's claim at P350,000.00.

Explaining how his above-mentioned March 26, 1999 letter to Garcia came about, respondent declared that it
was made upon Garcia's request, intended for a certain Joel Ramiscal (Ramiscal) who was said to be Garcia's
business partner. 23

Respondent later submitted a June 13, 2001 Supplement 24 to his Counter-Affidavit reiterating his explanation
that it was on Garcia's express request that he wrote the March 26, 1999 letter, which was directed to the fax
number of Ramiscal. SDAcaT

Additionally, respondent declared that in the first week of May 1999, on the representation of Garcia that he
had talked to complainant about respondent's retention of fifty percent (50%) of the insurance proceeds for
professional fees less expenses, 25 he gave Garcia, on a staggered basis, the total amount of P233,000.00
which, so respondent averred, is the amount of insurance claim complainant is entitled to receive less
attorney's fees and expenses. 26 Thus, respondent claimed that he gave Garcia the amount of P30,000.00 on
May 31, 1999 at Dulcinea Restaurant in Greenbelt, Makati; the amounts of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 and
P30,000.00 on different occasions at his (respondent's) former address through his executive secretary Sally I.
Leonardo; the amount of P20,000.00 at the office of his (respondent's) former employer Commonwealth
Insurance Company through his subordinate Glen V. Roxas; and several other payments at Dulcinea, and at
Manila Intercontinental Hotel's coffee shop sometime in October 1999. 27 Respondent submitted the separate
sworn statements of Leonardo and Roxas. 28

Explaining why no written memorandum of the turn over of various payments to Garcia was made, respondent
alleged that there was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia who is a co-Rotarian and co-attorney-in-
fact and whom he really dealt with regarding complainant's claim. 29

Respondent furthermore declared that he rejected complainant's offer to pay him P50,000.00 for his services,
insisting that since there had been no clear-cut agreement on his professional fees and it was through him that
Metropolitan Insurance favorably reconsidered its initial rejection of complainant's claim, he is entitled to a
contingent fee of 50% of the net proceeds thereof. 30

Finally, respondent declared that he, in connection with his follow-up of the insurance claim, incurred
representation expenses of P35,000.00, entertainment and other representation expenses on various
occasions of P10,000.00, and transportation and gasoline expenses and parking fees of P5,000.00; 31 and that
his retention of complainant's money was justified in light of his apprehension that complainant, being an alien
without a valid working permit in the Philippines, might leave the country anytime without settling his
professional fees. 32

The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and Recommendation 33 of October 26, 2001, found respondent
guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred and directed to immediately turn over to
complainant the sum of P475,000.00 representing the amount of the P525,000.00 insurance claim less
respondent's professional fees of P50,000.00, as proposed by complainant.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, acting on the Investigator's Report, issued
Resolution No. XV-2002-401 34 on August 3, 2002, reading:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondent's dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and grossly
unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent but the noble profession
to which he belongs, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months with the directive to turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five Thousand.

288
 (P525,000.00) Pesos to the complainant without prejudice to respondent's right to claim
attorney's fees which he may collect in the proper forum. (Emphasis supplied)

The records of the case are before this Court for final action.

Respondent, by a Motion for Reconsideration 35 filed with this Court, assails the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation as not supported by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. He prays for the
reopening of the case and its remand to the Investigator so that Garcia can personally appear for his
(respondent's) confrontation.

There is no need for a reopening of the case. The facts material to its resolution are either admitted or
documented.

This Court is in full accord with the findings of the IBP Investigator that respondent violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

RULE 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

RULE 15.06 — A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.

RULE 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

RULE 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.

RULE 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence in him.

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 21.02 — A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Filipino lawyer's principal source of ethical rules, which Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of
complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess.
This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all
money or property received for or from the client 36 as well as delivery of the funds or property to the client
when due or upon demand. 37 Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of
289
complainant's insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his
co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.

In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he, by his letter of March
26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim was still pending and recommend "acceptance
of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00 pesos." His explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on
Garcia's express request is nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not commit
prevarication, documented at that, on the mere request of a friend.

By respondent's failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he
committed professional misconduct. 38 Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was
obviously done on purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in
the dark about the release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of
the use of the proceeds thereof.

A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity,
loyalty and devotion to the client's cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an
honorable profession. 39

That respondent had a lien on complainant's funds for his attorney's fees did not relieve him of his duty to
account for it. 40 The lawyer's continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with
the amount of attorney's fees to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount
for being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees. 41 He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the
proper court to fix the amount of such fees. 42

In respondent's case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his compensation for judicial
determination so that his and complainant's sharp disagreement thereon could have been put to an end.
Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held on to complainant's funds with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the
exercise of an attorney's retaining lien which by no means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify
inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.

Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorney's fees. After he received the check and
after complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already asking for 50%, objection to which
complainant communicated to him. Why respondent had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about
one year when all the while he has been in custody of the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any
rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say the least.

As for respondent's claim in his June 2001, Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he had on several
occasions from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total of P233,000.00 out of the insurance
proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant, this does not persuade, for it is bereft of any written memorandum
thereof. It is difficult to believe that a lawyer like respondent could have entrusted such total amount of money
to Garcia without documenting it, especially at a time when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia were not in
good terms. 43Not only that. As stated earlier, respondent's Counter-Affidavit of February 18, 2000 and his
December 7, 1999 letter to complainant unequivocally contained his express admission that the total amount
of P525,000.00 was in his custody. Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only aggravates his
misconduct. Respondent's claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting allegedly for
him, purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00 are thus highly suspect and merit
no consideration.

The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional misconduct.

The intercalation of respondent's name to the Chinabank check that was issued payable solely in favor of
complainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance 44 is clearly a brazen act of falsification of a
commercial document which respondent resorted to in order to encash the check.

290
Respondent's threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible sanctions from certain
government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good network" reflects lack of character, self-respect,
and justness.

It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of complainant's funds in
the amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that he peddled to conceal, until its discovery
by complainant after about a year, his receipt of the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly
oppressive manner point to his lack of good moral character. Worse, by respondent's turnaround in his
Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to complainant's friend Garcia the amount of
P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims, is all that complainant is entitled to, he in effect has declared that
he has nothing more to turn over to complainant. Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit
complainant's funds, and gives rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them. 45

In fine, by respondent's questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain a member of the noble
profession that is the law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross
misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk
of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines of this Decision.

Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount of P525,000.00 within thirty
(30) days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his attorney's fees
and purported expenses incurred in securing the release thereof from Metropolitan Insurance.

SO ORDERED. ASTcEa

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J ., is on leave.

||| (Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., A.C. No. 5829, [October 28, 2003], 460 PHIL 702-716)

Canon 17 – Duty of fidelity to the cause of the client

Rosacia vs. Atty. Bulalacao, A.C. No. 3745, October 2, 1995

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 3745. October 2, 1995.]

CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO, respondent.

SYLLABUS

LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; LOYALTY TO CLIENT SUBSISTS EVEN AFTER THE TERMINATION OF
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. — The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only
in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as
it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former
client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. It behooves
respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence
and trust in the highest degree. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity
must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of
291
attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the
people. Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as
he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred
more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics,
surely the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and
confidence even after the attorney-client relation is terminated must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer
starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of
conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal
profession as well.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J p:

Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed
a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao.
Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor
C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and
accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. 1 In a
resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
commissioner's report and recommendation. 2
As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows:
"On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B.
Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc.

"On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils.,
Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date (Exh. "3-b").

"On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement
with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the
respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to
handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint
before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf." 3

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing the
employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship. We
agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now
dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act
bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's oath." 4 However, respondent is
pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to
either fine or admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession having
been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was
committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension will deprive his family of its
only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and
the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client relationship
with the employees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in
the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to
henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
cdll

The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice
to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext
that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. 5 It behooves respondent not only to
292
 keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. 6 The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and
trust in the highest degree. 7 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. 8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No
opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the
confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of
the confidence of the people. 9
Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as he was
just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred more than
a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the
precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even
after the attorney-client relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to
establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the
profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal profession as well.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Let this
resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof furnished
to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. LexLibris

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., on official leave.

||| (Rosacia v. Bulalacao, A.C. No. 3745 (Resolution), [October 2, 1995], 319 PHIL 1-5)

Lorenzana Food Corp. vs. Daria, A.C. No. 2736, May 27, 1991

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2736. May 27, 1991.]

LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION represented by Mr. SOLOMON U. LORENZANA, JR., as

its President and General Manager, and/or Mrs. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, as its Vice-President,
petitioners, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO L. DARIA, respondent.

Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr. for petitioners.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. — In an effort to extricate himself from this
charge, the respondent submits that since he was able to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on appeal to set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further
proceedings, then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and academic already. We find this
submission not meritorious. Instead, we agree with the position of the Solicitor General: Respondent's plea is
untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects of
respondent's negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the required
position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps,
would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it
deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In
fact he had to prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should have done earlier. From the
foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
293
DILIGENCE, Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

2. ID.; ID.; A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. — The Solicitor General further found that the respondent
assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the counter-affidavit, submitted in defense of the latter in the
accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC. As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the
San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent investigated
this same charge of estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an
employee of LFC. Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General: . . .
Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the counteraffidavit
was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his (respondent's) name typed on it; that
after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature thereon; that he
instructed San Juan to bring the counteraffidavit to Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and
signature, but San Juan did not obey him; and that San Juan filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the
Provincial Fiscal with his name and signature still on it. It is submitted that, apart from being a mere
afterthought, respondent's explanation is incredible. His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment
on the complaint . . . We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant,
his former client. . . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him
but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him
afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is
distinct from and independent of the former case.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

The respondent lawyer, Atty. Francisco L. Daria, is administratively charged 1 on two counts, to wit:

1. Negligence and

2. Betrayal of his former client's confidences.

A verified complaint dated February 22, 1985 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC, hereinafter), and
received by the Court on February 25, 1985. 2

The Court, on June 10, 1985, resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

After proper proceedings, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation,"
dated February 21, 1990 and received by the Court on February 26, 1990.

From the findings made by the Solicitor General, the pertinent facts may be summarized as follows:

Respondent Francisco L. Daria is charged with negligence and betrayal of his former client's
confidences. The following facts are in connection with the charge of negligence:

Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) on January 8, 1981
as its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six months later (tsn. pp. 6-
7, Dec. 9, 1985). On May 23, 1983, LFC employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and other monetary claims against complainant before the Ministry (now
Department) of Labor and Employment (MOLE). On May 30, 1983, summons was served on
the parties with the requirement that position papers be submitted (Exh. G).

During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973 * (sic) Hanopol and respondent tried to explore the
possibility of an amicable settlement. Since no agreement was reached the hearing was reset
to June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol was supposed to go to his office on that date
respondent failed to appear for the second setting (tsn. pp. 14-15, Dec. 9, 1985). So, the Labor

294
Arbiter was constrained to further reset the hearing to June 23, 1983. Respondent received on
June 23, 1983 the Order for the resetting to June 1983 (Exh. J).

In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor case,
setting the hearing therein also on June 28, 1983 (Exh. H-6). Faced with a conflicting schedule,
respondent decided to move to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case. However, instead
of filing a written motion for postponement, he opted to call, through his secretary, the Office
of the Labor Arbiter to move for postponement (Exh. H-5; tsn. p. 16, Dec. 9, 1985).
Respondent's telephone message apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the
hearing on June 28, 1983, he considered the case submitted for decision on the basis of
Hanopol's complaint and affidavit (Exh. G-1). Respondent had not submitted a position paper.

After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to pay
Hanopol the total sum of P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis of Hanopol's evidence
alone.

Respondent Daria appealed the Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
on August 23, 1983 (Exh. 4), The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings. The case was set for hearing on June 25, 1984 and July 12, 1984 wherein
attempts for an amicable settlement still proved futile. The Labor Arbiter set two more dates
for hearing: July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984 (tsn. pp. 21-22, Dec. 9, 1985).

In the meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his intention
to resign. In the light of this development, management hired Atty. Rogelio Udarbe to take his
place on July 16, 1984, the effective date of his resignation (Exh. 2). Respondent endorsed the
cases of complainant to Atty. Udarbe (tsn. pp. 23-25, Dec. 9, 1985).

During the hearings in the Hanopol case on July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984, no one
appeared for complainant. So, on August 15, 1984, Hanopol filed a "Manifestation and Motion"
praying that the earlier Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 29, 1983 be revived. (Exh. 5)

On September 1, 1984, Atty. Jose Loy, Jr. was hired by complainant LFC vice Atty. Udarbe and
he immediately came across the above-mentioned "Manifestation and Motion". On September
5, 1984, he filed an Opposition (Exh. 6) thereto, and on September 19, 1984, he followed this
up with a position paper for LFC (Exh. 7). However, the Labor Arbiter had already revived his
earlier Decision dated July 29, 1983 in another Decision dated September 4, 1984, thereby
prompting Atty. Loy to appeal the latter Decision (Exh. 3). In a resolution dated May 9, 1985,
the NLRC ordered anew the remand of the case for further proceedings (Exh. 8).

In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client's
confidences, the following facts appear on record:

While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian
Cortes, issued a memorandum dated February 28, 1984 (Exh. C) to its employee, Roberto San
Juan, requiring him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double liquidation and
unliquidated cash advances. Another memorandum dated March 15, 1984 (Exh. D) was
issued this time by complainant's internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to
complainant's president, summing up San Juan's unliquidated advances amounting to
P9,351.15. Respondent was furnished a copy of this memorandum (Exh. D-3). The executive
committee, to which respondent belongs, investigated San Juan on his unliquidated
advances. On account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan under
preventive suspension, per his letter to him dated April 25, 1984 (Exh. E).

On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent a demand
letter to San Juan requiring him to restitute the amount of P9,351.15 (Exh. N-2). Since he
failed to pay the amount demanded, a complaint for estafa was lodged against him before the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal. San Juan thereafter resigned and sought the assistance of
respondent in the preparation of his counteraffidavit in January 1985 (tsn. p. 35, Nov. 5, 1985).
Respondent prepared San Juan's counteraffidavit and signed it (Exh. F). San Juan then
submitted his counteraffidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (tsn. p. 42, Nov. 5, 1985). 3
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 xxx xxx xxx

For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol case which
resulted in complainant LFC's default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted
for negligence. The respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen him in his office to work out a
compromise agreement, on the scheduled day of the second hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not. 4

It is the finding of the Solicitor General that this excuse by the respondent is not borne by the Constancia 5
setting the case for hearing. The Constancia clearly states: "By agreement of the parties, case reset to June 17,
1983 at 2:00 p.m. as previously scheduled." 6 Since it was signed by both Hanopol and the respondent, the
Solicitor General argues that the respondent's explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory. cdll

With regard to his second non-appearance for the hearing on June 2, 1983, the respondent justified his
absence by claiming that he had another hearing on the same date and that he told his secretary to call up the
Office of the Labor Arbiter to have the hearing of the Hanopol case postponed. 7 The Solicitor General avers:

. . . It is submitted that respondent's actuation was not warranted by the circumstances. As it

turned out, the telephone request apparently did not reach the Labor Arbiter, thereby
constraining him to declare complainant in default and render judgment against it. 8

In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he was able to persuade
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and
to remand the case for further proceedings, then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and
academic already. 9 We find this submission not meritorious. Instead, we agree with the position of the
Solicitor General:

Respondent's plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter
cannot obliterate the effects of respondent's negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the
two scheduled hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have
been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of
complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived
successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of
complainant. In fact he had to prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should
have done earlier (Exh. 7). 10

From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: 11

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

The other accusation against the respondent by the Solicitor General was that he had betrayed complainant
LFC's confidences in violation of the then Canon 37 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, to wit:

It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's
employment, and extends as well to his employees and neither of them should accept
employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either
for the private advantages of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though
there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue
employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty
to his former or to his new client.

xxx xxx xxx

Superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the appropriate Canon now is:

CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND

HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
296
The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the
counter-affidavit, 12 submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by
LFC. As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent)
helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still
the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC. prLL

Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General:

. . . Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the
counteraffidavit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his
(respondent's) name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will
delete his name and signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to bring the
counteraffidavit to Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan
did not obey him; and that San Juan filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the Provincial
Fiscal with his name and signature still on it (tsn. pp. 47-51, Dec. 9, 1985).

It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent's explanation is

incredible. His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment on the complaint . . . 13

We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former client.

. . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him
but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to
permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under
the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case. 14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is found guilty of both the charge of negligence, a
transgression of Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and the charge of betrayal of his former client's confidences, in
violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Let this Decision be entered in the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof furnished to all
courts and IBP chapters.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

||| (Lorenzana Food Corp. v. Daria, A.C. No. 2736 (Resolution), [May 27, 1991], 274 PHIL 712-720)

Canon 18 – Duty to serve with competence and due diligence

Adarne vs. Aldaba, A.C. No. 801, June 27, 1978

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 801 . June 27, 1978.]

CESARIO ADARNE, complainant, vs. ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

At the hearing of Civil Case No. 632 for forcible entry before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent
attorney was prevailed upon be complainant to appear for him and his co-defendants and to ask for the
postponement of the trial as their counsels of record had not arrived. Respondent entered a special
appearance and was able to obtain favorable action on a motion to dismiss. On appeal, however, this order
was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. At the hearing of the
case where respondent was again requested by complainant to appear in his behalf, respondent argued that
297
defendants be allowed to file an action for quieting of title to be heard jointly with the pending action for
forcible entry. On the day of the scheduled hearing of both cases, the defendants were declared in default for
non-appearance, a decision was rendered and a writ of execution therefor was issued. Because of this,
respondent was charged with gross negligence, misconduct and malpractice.

The Supreme Court ruled that the judgment by default rendered against complainant cannot be attributed to
respondent attorney as the blamed lies with the former for having engaged the services of several lawyers to
handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given them to appear in his behalf as to
place the responsibility upon the respondent. Finding no convincing proof to warrant the disbarment of
respondent attorney, the administrative complaint filed against him was dismissed.

Administrative complaint dismissed.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; SUBSTITUTION OF, REQUIREMENTS. — The rule followed on matters of
substitution of attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless
there be filed: (1) a written application for such substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written
consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent can not be secured, there must be
filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in the
manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing formalities are complied with, substitution will not be
permitted, and the attorney who properly appeared last in the cause, before such application for substitution,
will be regarded as the attorney of record and will be held responsible for the proper conduct of the cause.

2. ID.; ID.; DUTY TO ACT TO THE BEST OF HIS SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE. — An attorney is not bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the
business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being, he is not answerable for every error or
mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and
knowledge.

3. ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; CONVINCING PROOF NECESSARY. — In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent attorney must be established by convincing proof.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO SUFFICIENT PROOF TO WARRANT DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT ATTORNEY. — There
is no malpractice to warrant the exercise of the court of its disciplinary powers where the respondent lawyer
honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant and agreed to contact his attorney of record to
handle his case after said appearance, so that he (the lawyer) did nothing more about it. And if a judgment by
default is rendered against the complainant, the same cannot be attributed to the respondent. The blame lies
with the complainant for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally
withdrawing the authority he had given to them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the
respondent.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, JR., J p:

Administrative action against the respondent attorney for gross negligence and misconduct, for failure to give
his entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and
exertion of his utmost learning and ability in the prosecution and defense of his client, and for not taking steps
to protect the interests of his client in the face of an adverse decision.

The record shows that sometime in 1958, Raymunda Cumpio and her husband, Rufo Cumpio, filed an action
for forcible entry against herein complainant Cesario Adarne, Aning Arante, and Miguel Inokando with the
Justice of the Peace of Alangalang, Leyte. The case was docketed in the said court as Civil Case No. 96. Atty.
Isauro Marmita represented the defendants who raised the issue of ownership of the land in question. After
298
hearing the parties, the Justice of the Peace dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the
plaintiffs therein appealed to the Court of First Instance of Leyte and the case was assigned to Branch VI of
Carigara, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 556. Resolving the issue interposed by the appellants, the
Judge of the Court of First Instance found that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction over the case
and returned the same to the lower court for trial on the merits. After trial on the merits, the Justice of the
Peace again dismissed the case and the plaintiffs again appealed to the Court of First Instance of Leyte where
the case was docketed anew as Civil Case No. 632. Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso Casimpan filed the
answer for the defendants. 1

At the hearing of the case on August 7, 1961, the herein complainant Cesario Adarne, one of the defendants in
the aforementioned Civil Case No. 632, noting that his attorneys had not yet arrived, prevailed upon the
respondent Atty. Damian Aldaba, who was then present in court to attend the trial of an electoral case, to
appear as counsel for them and ask for the postponement of the trial. The respondent, who is a third degree
cousin of the complainant, agreed, and entered a special appearance. Upon noticing that the plaintiffs and
their counsel were not also present in court, the respondent, instead of asking for a postponement, moved for
the dismissal of the case. His motion was granted and the case was again dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, 2 to which the respondent filed an opposition in behalf of
the defendants, 3 and the motion was denied. 4Whereupon, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After appropriate proceedings, the appellate court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to
the lower court for further proceedings.

At the hearing of the case on October 23, 1964 before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, the respondent was
again prevailed upon by the complainant to appear in his behalf. The respondent entered a "special
appearance" for the complainant and thereafter argued that the interest of justice would best be served if the
defendants were allowed to file an action for quieting of title and the case heard jointly with the action for
forcible entry. Finding merit in the argument, the court ordered the defendant Cesario Adarne to file an action
for quieting of title within one (1) week and the plaintiffs to answer the same within the reglementary period,
after which both cases would be tried jointly. The hearing was deferred until after the filing of the action for
quieting of title. 5

On June 17, 1965, the court declared the defendants in default for their failure to appear at the hearing set for
that day and directed the plaintiffs to present evidence to support their claim. 6 On September 17, 1965, the
court rendered a decision and a writ of execution was issued thereafter. 7

Because of this, Cesario Adarne filed the present complaint against the respondent Atty. Damian V. Aldaba on
August 3, 1967, praying: LLjur

"Dahil dito, isinusumbong ko po ang aking Abogado ng 'Mal Practice' pabaya at pahamak sa
kliente at sinisingil ko po siya ng pinsala katumbas sa sinisingil sa kin ng akin kalaban. O kaya
lakarin niya na mapigil ang decision ng Hukom sa C.F.I. at ulitin ang hearing sa Forcible Entry.
Kung hindi niya magagawa ito, ipinauubaya kona po sa kataas taasan Hukoman ang paglapat
ng parusa. Sapagkat kung hindi po susugpo-in ang masamang gawa na ito ng mga ibang
abogado na nabibili — lala'la' ang sakit na ito sa profession ng mga abogado, at lilikha ng
maraming api at habang naghahari ang pang aapi, lalaganap ang kriminalidad ng walang tigil
at walang katahimikan ang ating Demukrasya, at kung magkakagayon ang mga mamamayan
at — sapilitan sa kumunista sasamba."

The respondent denied that he ever had any agreement with the complainant with respect to the handling of
the latter's case in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Carigara Branch, except for the "special appearance"
that he entered for the complainant on August 7, 1961 and October 23, 1964, in view of the non-availability of
the complainant's lawyers on said dates.

The case referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation, 8 after which a
complaint for the disbarment of the respondent attorney was filed. 9

The judgment by default rendered against the complainant cannot be attributed to the respondent attorney.
The blame lies with the complainant for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case
without formally withdrawing the authority he had given to them to appear in his behalf as to place the
responsibility upon the respondent. To add to the confusion, the complainant had also requested the clerk of

299
court of the Court of First Instance of Leyte that he (complainant) be furnished with summons and subpoena
accorded to him. 10 He also filed a motion by himself, 11 thus implying that he was handling his case
personally.

It appears that there have been three changes made of the attorneys for the complainant in the forcible entry
case. The complainant wad originally represented by Atty. Isauro Marmita who, upon his appointment to the
Department of Labor, engaged Atty. de Veyra to take his place. 12 Than came Atty. Arturo Mirales and later,
Atty. Generoso Casimpan. However, no formalities whatever were observed in those changes such that the
respondent entered a "special appearance" for the complainant in order that he could ask for the dismissal of
the case for the failure of the adverse party to prosecute. The rule followed on matters of substitution of
attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there be filed: (1)
a written application for such substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the
attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent can not be secured, there must be filed with the
application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in the manner
prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing formalities are complied with, substitution will not be permitted,
and the attorney who properly appeared last in the cause, before such application for substitution, will be
regarded as the attorney of record and will be held responsible for the proper conduct of the cause. 13

Besides, the respondent honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a special purpose
and that the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the hearing of
October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more about it. 14 It was neither gross negligence nor omission to
have entertained such belief An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable
degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like
any other human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he
acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.

It is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent attorney must be established by
convincing proof. In the instant case, there is no sufficient proof to warrant the disbarment of the respondent
attorney. Neither is there culpable malpractice to justify his suspension. LexLib

WHEREFORE, the present administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Santos andGuerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernando (Chairman) and Aquino, JJ., took no part.

Antonio, J., concurs in the result.

||| (Adarne v. Aldaba, A.C. No. 801, [June 27, 1978], 173 PHIL 142-148)

Reyes vs. Vitan, A.C. No. 5835, April 15, 2005

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5835. April 15, 2005.]

CARLOS B. REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

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 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence 1 and never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Indeed, it is his sworn
duty not to delay no man for money or malice; and to conduct himself in a proper manner not only to his
client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large. 2
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Carlos Reyes against Atty. Jeremias
Vitan for gross negligence.
The complaint alleges that sometime in June 2001, complainant Carlos Reyes hired the services of
respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan for the purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charge against his
sister-in-law, Estelita Reyes, and the latter's niece, Julieta P. Alegonza; that both women refused to abide
with the Decision of Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Manila, in Civil Case
No. 99-92657 ordering the partition of the properties left by complainant's brother Damaso B. Reyes; and
that respondent, after receiving the amount of P17,000.00, did not take any action on complainant's case.
We referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued several orders to respondent directing him to
file his answer to the complaint, but he failed to do so. He only sent his secretary to represent him during
the proceedings. ACTIcS
On April 18, 2001, 3 IBP Commissioner Navarro submitted to the IBP Board of Governors her Report
and Recommendation quoted as follows:
". . . . After going over the evidence on record, the undersigned noted that respondent
ignored all the Orders issued by this Commission and neither did he comply with any of
those Orders. Respondent even failed to submit the responsive pleadings he himself
requested in his motion and only sent his assistant secretary to represent him in the
scheduled hearings of this case. Up to and until the present, no pleadings was submitted
despite respondent's allegations that he was collating evidence to prove his side of the
case.
It was complainant who submitted the supposed letters of the respondent Estelita
Reyes and Juliet Alegonza but there were no proofs when they sent and when the same
were received by the addressee.
Likewise, the complaint submitted by the complainant was only a format in the
sense that it was not signed by the respondent; the RTC Branch No. was left blank; there
was no Civil Case No. and there was no proof that said pleading was filed which amounts
only to a mere scrap of paper and not a pleading or authenticated document in the legal
parlance.
As it is, nothing had been done by the respondent for the complainant as his client
for the legal fees he collected which was paid by the complainant as reflected in the receipts
issued by the respondent in handwritten forms and signed by him.
Respondent not only violated Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for having neglected a legal matter entrusted to him and did not
inform complainant the status of his case but also disregarded the orders of the
Commission without reasons which amounted to utter disrespect of authority and unethical
conduct in the practice of his profession, thus, should be sanctioned. EICScD
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of his profession for a period of two (2)
years from receipt hereof; and refund to the complainant the amount of P17,000.00 paid to
him for not having extended his legal services to the complainant on a lawyer-client
relationship within six (6) months from receipt hereof."
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-406 adopting and
approving the above Report and Recommendation of IBP Commissioner Navarro.
When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he
agreed to take up the latter's case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established.

301
 From then on, it was expected of him to serve his client, herein complainant, with competence and attend
to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion.
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's case and
subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. More
specifically, Rule 18.03 states:
"Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights. 4 An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability
to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the
client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. EcaDCI
In Santos vs. Lazaro, 5 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above-
quoted, is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that
he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by
his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society. 6
Significantly, respondent also violated his oath as a lawyer, which declares in part, that he will not
delay any man for money or malice and will conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client.
However, the recommended penalty by the IBP is too harsh. Jurisprudence shows that lighter
sanctions have been imposed for violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of the
offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
The facts of Sencio vs. Calvadores 7 bear a striking similarity to the present case. Respondent
lawyer in Sencio did not return the money to complainant despite demand following his failure to file the
case. During the proceedings before the IBP, respondent did not file his answer to the complaint nor
appeared during the hearing notwithstanding his receipt of notices. We found him guilty of violation of the
lawyer's oath, malpractice and gross misconduct and suspended him for six (6) months, and ordered to
return to his client the amount of P12,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the
promulgation of our Resolution until the return of the amount.
In Garcia vs. Manuel, 8 we suspended respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6) months
and ordered him to render an accounting of all monies he received from the complainant. We found him
guilty of gross misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is ordered to return to complainant within five (5) days
from notice the sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annumfrom the date of the promulgation of this
Decision until the full amount shall have been returned. cDCEIA
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for distribution to all courts of the
land, the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondent's personal records as an attorney
and as a member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Corona, Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
||| (Reyes v. Vitan, A.C. No. 5835, [April 15, 2005], 496 PHIL 1-6)

302
Canon 19 – Duty to serve only within the bounds of law

Gonzales vs. Sabacajan, Adm. Case No. 4380, October 13, 1995

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4380. October 13, 1995.]

NICANOR GONZALES and SALUD B. PANTANOSAS, complainants, vs. ATTY. MIGUEL

SABACAJAN, respondent.

SYLLABUS

LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED FOR FAILURE TO EXERCISE
GOOD FAITH AND DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN HANDLING THE LEGAL AFFAIRS OF THEIR CLIENTS. — As a
lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the interests of his
client. The Court finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of lawyers in
handling the legal affairs of their clients. If complainants did have the alleged monetary obligations to his
client, that does not warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since there is no showing in
the records that the same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt. Neither is there any
intimation that there is a court order authorizing him to take and retain custody of said certificates of title.
Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with the laws and principles of
fairness. Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely skirted this
proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the same.

DECISION

REGALADO, J p:

This resolves the administrative case filed by Nicanor Gonzales and Salud B. Pantanosas against
Atty. Miguel Sabacajan on February 14, 1995, 1 the verified complaint wherefore alleges: cdasia
xxx xxx xxx

4. That sometime in October, 1994, complainants were informed by the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City that the complainants' owner's duplicate of title covering their lands,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-91736 and T-91735 were entrusted to the office secretary
of the respondent who in turn entrusted the same to respondent;

5. That respondent admitted and confirmed to the complainants that their titles are in his
custody and has even shown the same (to) the complainant Salud B. Pantanosas but when
demanded (sic) to deliver the said titles to the complainant in a formal demand letter, marked
as ANNEX "A", respondent refused and continues to refuse without any justification to give
their titles (and) when confronted, respondent challenged the complainants to file any case in
any court even in the Honorable Supreme Court;

6. That respondent's dare or challeng(e), is a manifestation of his arrogance taking undue

advantage of his legal profession over the simplicity, innocence and ignorance of the
complainants, one of whom is his blood relative, his aunt, for which complainants shudder
with mental anguish; cdtai

303
 7. That due to his challeng(e), the complainants sent a letter to the Honorable Supreme Court
for enlightenment, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "B", for which the Honorable Supreme
Court required 19 legible copies of a verified complaint;

8. That in spite of repeated demands, request(s) and pleas towards (sic) respondent,
respondent still fail(ed) and stubbornly refused without justification to surrender the said titles
to the rightful owners, the complainants here(in), which act is tantamount to wilful and
malicious defiance of legal and moral obligations emanating from his professional capacity
as a lawyer who had sworn to uphold law and justice, to the prejudice and damage of the
complainants; 2

xxx xxx xxx

On March 22, 1995, the Court required respondent to comment on the foregoing complaint. In his unverified
"Answer" thereto, respondent admitted having met Salud Pantanosas but claims that, to his recollection,
"Nicanor Gonzales/Serdan" has never been to his office. Respondent likewise denied that he challenged
anyone to file a case in any court, much less the Supreme Court. He also claims that he referred complainant
Pantanosas to his client, Mr. Samto M. Uy of Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, for whom he worked out the
segregation of the titles, two of which are the subject of the instant case. 3

Respondent likewise denies complainants' allegation that he is arrogant, in contrast to the innocence,
simplicity and ignorance of said complainants. He contends that the truth of the matter is that complainants
have been charged with a number of criminal and civil complaints before different courts. He also asserts that
he was holding the certificates of title in behalf of his client, Samto M. Uy. 4

Atty. Sabacajan stresses, by way of defense, that "the instant action was chosen precisely to
browbeat him into delivering the Certificates of Title to them without said certificates passing the hands of
Mr. Samto Uy with whom the complainants have some monetary obligations." 5
In its resolution dated June 26, 1995, 6 for internal administrative purposes the Court referred this
case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the corresponding evaluation, report and recommendation.
aisadc
From the foregoing proceedings taken on this matter, the Court finds that respondent admitted
having taken possession of the certificates of title of complainants but refused to surrender the same
despite demands made by the latter. It follows, therefore, that it was incumbent upon him to show that he
was legally justified in doing so. Instead, all he did was to inform this Court that "his obligation to deliver
the certificates to Mr. Samto Uy excludes the delivery of said certificates to anyone else." 7
Respondent attached some certifications to his "Answer" to support his contention that
complainants are notorious characters. However, the certifications indicate that most of the cases stated
therein, especially those involving fraud, have been dismissed. With respect to those still pending, there is
no indication as to the identity of the party who instituted the same, aside from the consideration that the
remedy thereon is judicial in nature. At any rate, these aspersions on the character of complainants have
no bearing on the misconduct of respondent charged in the present case.
Respondent likewise submitted xerox copies of certain certificates of title in an effort to explain
why he kept the certificates of title of complainants, that is, supposedly for the purpose of subdividing the
property. However, an examination of the same does not show any connection thereof to respondent's
claim. In fact, the two sets of certificates of title appear to be entirely different from each other. cdta
As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the
interests of his client. The records do not show that he or his client have availed of said remedies, instead
of merely resorting to unexplained, if not curt, refusals to accommodate the requests of complainants.
Also, he cannot be unaware of the imposable sanctions on a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that
would cause injustice to the adversaries of his client.
The Court accordingly finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required
of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their clients. If complainants did have the alleged monetary
obligations to his client, that does not warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since
there is no showing in the records that the same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt.

304
 Neither is there any intimation that there is a court order authorizing him to take and retain custody of said
certificates of title.
Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with the
laws and principles of fairness. Instead, he unjustly refused to give to complainants their certificates of
titles supposedly to enforce payment of their alleged financial obligations to his client and presumably to
impress the latter of his power to do so. cdasia
Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
unfounded charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely
skirted this proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the same.
On the foregoing considerations, the Court desires and directs that respondent should forthwith
return the certificates of title of complainants. To ensure the same, he should be placed under suspension
until he presents to the Court proof of receipt by complainants of their respective copies of Certificates of
Title Nos. T-91735 and T-91736 or a judicial order or document authorizing or justifying the retention of
possession thereof by respondent or his aforenamed client.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Miguel Sabacajan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until he can
duly show to this Court that the disputed certificates of title have been returned to and the receipt thereof
duly acknowledged by complainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate legal authority justifying
the possession by him or his client of said certificates. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar or any other administrative misconduct will be punished more severely. cdtai
Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the personal records of respondent and have copies
thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

||| (Gonzales v. Sabacajan, A.C. No. 4380, [October 13, 1995], 319 PHIL 381-386)

Canon 20 – Duty to charge only fair and reasonable fees

Leviste vs. CA, G.R. No. L-29184, January 30, 1989

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-29184. January 30, 1989.]

BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE
GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE
GUZMAN, & ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN, respondents.

Benedicto Leviste for and in his own behalf.

Gatchalian, Ignacio & Associates for respondents de Guzman.

SYLLABUS

1.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; REPUDIATION; ARTICLE 1052 OF THE CIVIL CODE DOES NOT APPLY TO COUNSEL
OF A PROSPECTIVE HEIR. — Article 1052 of the Civil Code protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner
is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful
probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the
contingency did not occur.
305
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AMOUNT OF SHARE, MERELY A BASIS FOR COMPUTATION OF CONTINGENT ATTORNEY'S
FEES. — Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late
Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to
inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name. This Court had
ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for contingent attorney's fees) neither
gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs.
Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply abasis for the computation
of said fees."

3.ID.; ID.; NOT EVERY WILL SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. — The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate
of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The law
lays down procedures which should be observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be
probated. Those procedures and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of
the will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.

4.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE; PERSONS INDIRECTLY EXCLUDED THEREIN. — In

Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occasion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may
not interfere in its probate. Thus: ". . . the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not
that thereby the court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the
proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation
thereto." (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.)

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:

The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order
to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.

On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the private
respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the
late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed
to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contingent fee would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property
that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will (Annex "A", p. 59, Rollo).

In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed the following services as Del Rosario's counsel:

(1)Thoroughly researched and studied the law on probate and succession;

(2)Looked for and interviewed witnesses, and took their affidavits;

(3)Filed the petition for probate is Special Proceeding No. 58325;

(4)Made the proper publications;

(5)Presented at the trial the following witnesses:

a)Eleuterio de Jesus

b)Lucita de Jesus

c)Purita L. Llanes

d)Rita Banu

e)Jesus Lulod.

On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his
services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This consisted, according to the letter, in petitioner's moral
306
obligation to protect the interest of his brother-in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other
parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del
Rosario under the will (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo). cdrep

On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional
Services." (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.).

In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court denied his motion on the ground that he had "not filed a
claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's lien." (p. 3, Rollo.)

On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim or Attorney's Fees and Recording of
Attorney's Lien," which was noted in the court's order of December 20, 1965 (Annexes "D" and "E", pp. 63 & 64,
Rollo).

Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner continued to receive copies of
the court's orders, as well as the pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings.
The case was submitted for decision without the respondents' evidence.

On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a "Motion To
Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed
that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties
left by the decedent. (Annex "F", p. 65, Rollo.)

In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being contrary to
public policy (Annex "G", pp. 66-67, Rollo).

Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its
validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified that the will and the testatrix's signature were in the
handwriting of Maxima Reselva.

The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest.

The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a direct and material interest in
the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his
former client, Ms. Del Rosario.

On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for substitution:

The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. No. 41248) praying that the trial
court be ordered to give due course to his appeal and to grant his motion for substitution. llcd

On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance as
the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325
(Annex I, p. 77, Rollo).

Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by certiorari to this Court, assigning the
following errors against the Court of Appeals' resolution:

1.The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner appears not to be the proper party to
appeal the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

2.Assuming the petitioner's right of appeal is doubtful, the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing his petition for mandamus; and

3.The Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 denying the
probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva, said decision being patently
erroneous.

Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario,
he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the Civil Code which provides:

"ART. 1052.If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the
latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.

307
 "The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of
their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but
shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this
Code, it may belong."

he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor (which she
in effect repudiated) to protect his contingent attorney's fees.

The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision
protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his
fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for
probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his
fee.

Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late
Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to
inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name.

This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for contingent
attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or
real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply a
basis for the computation of said fees."

The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as contended
by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is
presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and
requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements were not
followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw
the probate petition was inconsequential. prLL

Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the probate
of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. In
Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occasion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may
not interfere in its probate. Thus:

". . . the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the
court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention
in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be
heard with relation thereto." (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.)

Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held:

"We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that notice of an attorney's
lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It only gives
him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case his client is awarded a certain
sum by the court."

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

||| (Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29184, [January 30, 1989], 251 PHIL 532-538)

Licudan vs. CA, G.R. No. 91958, January 24, 1991

THIRD DIVISION

308
 [G.R. No. 91958. January 24, 1991.]

WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDAN-CAMPOS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO O. DOMALANTA, respondents.

Arnold V . Guerrero & Associates for petitioners.

Teodoro O. Domalanta for and on his behalf as private respondent.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must guard against the charging of
unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers for their services when engaged as counsel. Whether or not the
award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees, is the principal issue.

This petition for review on certiorari assails:

1) The Decision of the public respondent dated September 12, 1989 which dismissed the petitioners' appeal
thereby upholding the reasonableness of the respondent lawyer's lien as attorney's fees over the properties of
his clients; and

2) The Resolution of the public respondent dated January 30, 1990 which denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are as follows:

"The respondent Court, in upholding the entitlement of private respondent-attorney on the

attorney's fees he claimed, decided the question in a manner not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Tribunal.

"The respondent Court, in refusing to review and determine the propriety, reasonableness and
validity of the attorney's fees claimed by the private respondent-attorney, departed from the
usual course of judicial proceedings. LibLex

"The respondent Court, in failing to declare the attorneys fees claimed by the private
respondent-attorney as unconscionable, excessive, unreasonable, immoral and unethical,
decided the question in a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions of this
Honorable Tribunal." (Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 16-17)

The following are the antecedent facts pertinent to the case at bar:

The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-in-law and sister, the now deceased petitioners'
parents, spouses Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan. His services as counsel pertained to two related civil cases
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 for partition and Civil Case No. Q-28655 for a sum of money in connection
with the redemption of the property subject matter of the two cases covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In both cases, the respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor
of his clients.

On August 13, 1979, the respondent lawyer filed a Petition for Attorney's Lien with Notification to his Clients
which substantially alleged that his clients executed two written contracts for professional services in his favor
which provided that:

"a) The undersigned counsel is entitled to own 97.5 square meters of the plaintiffs' share of
the lot in question.

b) The undersigned counsel shall have a usufructuary right for a period of ten (10) years of
plaintiffs' share of the lot in question.
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 c) And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant is for the
undersigned counsel." (Annex "H" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 54)

On September 19, 1979, the trial court handling Civil Case No. Q-12254 ordered the annotation at the back of
TCT No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City of the respondent lawyer's Contract for Professional
Services dated August 30, 1979 signed by petitioner Wifredo Licudan and Aurelio Licudan on his own behalf
and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos. The said trial court's Order, being one of
two Orders being essentially challenged in this petition, is reproduced below:

"Before the court for consideration is a 'Petition for Attorney's Lien filed by Atty. Teodoro D.
Domalanta, counsel for the plaintiff, praying that his attorney's fees be annotated as a lien at
the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
subject matter of this case.

For the protection of the plaintiffs, the court required the plaintiff Aurelio Licudan as well as
his son to appear this morning. Plaintiff Aurelio Licudan together with his son Wilfredo
Licudan, who appears to be intelligent and in fact he speaks (the) English language well,
appeared. Both Aurelio and Wilfredo Licudan manifested that they have freely and voluntarily
signed the Contract for Professional Services, dated August 30, 1979 and notarized before
Notary Public Amado Garrovillas as Doc. No. 32, Page 8, Book No. XIX, Series of 1979.

Considering the manifestation of plaintiff, Aurelio Licudan and Alfredo (sic) Licudan that they
have entered freely and voluntarily in the said contract of professional services, let the same
be annotated at the back of TCT 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, upon payment
of the required legal fees." (CA Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 36-37)

The Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 differs from the earlier contractual provisions in
that it entitled the respondent lawyer to one-third (1/3) of the subject property or 90.5 square meters and
provided for usufructuary rights over the entire lot in question in favor of the respondent lawyer's son, Teodoro
M. Domalanta, Jr. for an agreed consideration. (Annex "J" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 59)

On July 25, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion ex parte to amend the Order dated September 19, 1979
so as to conform with an additional professional fee covering 31 square meters more of the lot for services
rendered in Civil Case No. Q-28655 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 executed by
Aurelio Licudan in favor of the respondent lawyer. prcd

On September 6, 1985, the trial court ordered the respondent lawyer to submit a subdivision plan in conformity
with his attorney's fees contract under which one-third (1/3) of the property or 90.5 square meters was alloted
to him.

On September 23, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the amendment
of the Order dated September 19, 1979 to conform with the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 which
was executed after the annotation of the original attorney's lien of 90.5 square meters.

On September 30, 1985, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the respondent lawyer cannot
collect attorney's fees for other cases in the action for partition.

On October 4, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a second motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
September 6, 1985 explaining that what he sought to be included in the Order dated September 19, 1979 is the
additional attorney's fees for handling the redemption case which was but a mere offshoot of the partition
case and further manifesting that the additional 31 square meters as compensation for the redemption case
must be merged with the 90.5 square meters for the partition case to enable the said respondent lawyer to
comply with the Order dated September 6, 1985 which directed him to submit a subdivision plan as required.

On October 21, 1985, the trial court issued the second Order being assailed in this petition. The said Order
reads:

"Acting on the 'Second Motion for Reconsideration' filed by Atty. Teodoro Domalanta and
finding the same to be justified, let an attorney's lien be annotated in the title of the property
for 31 square meters as attorney's fees of said Atty. Teodoro Domalanta in addition to the
original 90.5 square meters." (CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 37)

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On August 22, 1986, more than ten (10) months after the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985
had become final and executory, the petitioners as substituted heirs of the respondent lawyers' deceased
clients filed a motion to set aside orders on the ground that the award of professional fees covering 121.5
square meters of the 271.5 square meter lot is unconscionable and excessive.

After the respondent lawyer filed his Opposition to the above petitioners' motion, the lower court, on August 29,
1986, finding that the petitioners as substituted plaintiffs are not in full agreement with the respondent lawyer's
claim for attorney's fees, set aside its Orders dated September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985.

On September 16, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration stressing the fact that the
payment of the professional services was pursuant to a contract which could no longer be disturbed or set
aside because it has already been implemented and had since then become final. This motion was denied on
October 3, 1986.

On November 15, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion to set aside the orders dated August 29, 1986
and October 3, 1986 reiterating his position that the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985 have
become final and are already implemented. The respondent lawyer further asked for the modification of the
October 21, 1985 Order to reflect 60.32 square meters instead of 31 square meters only since the stipulation in
the Additional Contract for Professional Services entitled him to 60.32 square meters. cdll

After the petitioners' Opposition to the said motion was filed, the trial court, on February 26, 1987, rendered an
Order with the following dispositive portion:

"WHEREFORE, this Court has no alternative but to set aside its orders of 29 August 1986 and 3
October 1986 and declare its Orders of 19 September 1979 and 21 October 1985 irrevocably
final and executory." (CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34)

On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent lawyer by dismissing the appeal and the
prayed for writ of preliminary injunction. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
petitioners filed the instant petition.

The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power to review and determine
the propriety of the stipulated attorney's fees in favor of the respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent
lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional
Services devised by him after the trial court awarded him attorney's fees for P1,000.00 only instead of
respecting the trust and confidence of the highest level reposed on him considering the close blood and affinal
relationship between him and his clients.

The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won the case but would
lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They would be totally deprived of their house and
lot and the recovered damages considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the respondent
lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150 square meters would also go to
attorney's fees since the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years.

The aforesaid submissions by the petitioners merit our consideration.

It is a well-entrenched rule that attorney's fees may be claimed in the very action in which the services in
question have been rendered or as an incident of the main action. The fees may be properly adjudged after
such litigation is terminated and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. (see Camacho v.
Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 604 [1989]; Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 769 [1989]).

It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of
Professional Responsibility. However, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo (172 SCRA 760
[1989]):

". . . When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence
exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the
compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party.

311
 (Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540 [1923]; Grey v. Insular Lumber Co., 97 Phil. 833
[1955]).

In the case at bar, the respondent lawyer caused the annotation of his attorney's fees lien in the main action for
partition docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 on the basis of a Contract for Professional Services dated August
30, 1979. We find reversible error in the Court of Appeals' holding that:

"When the reasonableness of the appellee's lien as attorney's fees over the properties of his
clients awarded to him by the trial court had not been questioned by the client, and the said
orders had already become final and executory, the same could no longer be disturbed, not
even by the court which rendered them (Tañada v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 419)." (CA
Decision p. 7; Rollo, p. 36)

On the contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated September 19, 1979 and October 21, 1985 cannot
become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always subject to the supervision of the
Court with regard to its reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which reads:

"13. Contingent Fees. —

A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
shouldalways be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." (Emphasis
supplied).

There is no dispute in the instant case that the attorney's fees claimed by the respondent lawyer are in the
nature of a contingent fee. There is nothing irregular about the execution of a written contract for professional
services even after the termination of a case as long as it is based on a previous agreement on contingent fees
by the parties concerned and as long as the said contract does not contain stipulations which are contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. LLphil

Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was apparently voluntarily signed by
the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by
the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested in open court that they gave their free and willing consent
to the said contract, we cannot allow the said contract to stand as the law between the parties involved
considering that the rule that in the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the
parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception -
that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order
(see Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. Pineda, 175 SCRA 416 [1989]; Syjuco v. Court of Appeals,
172 SCRA 111 [1989]).

Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
In determining whether or not the lawyer's fees are fair and reasonable,Rule 20-01 of the same Code
enumerates the factors to be considered in resolving the said issue. They are as follows:

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

c) The importance of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case;

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

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 j) The professional standing of the lawyer."

A similar provision is contained under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which partly states
that:

"SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney . . . A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable."

All that the respondent lawyer handled for his deceased sister and brother-in-law was a simple case of
partition which necessitated no special skill nor any unusual effort in its preparation. The subsequent case for
redemption was admittedly but an offshot of the partition case. Considering the close blood and affinal
relationship between the respondent lawyer and his clients, there is no doubt that Atty. Domalanta took
advantage of the situation to promote his own personal interests instead of protecting the legal interests of his
clients. A careful perusal of the provisions of the contract for professional services in question readily shows
that what the petitioners won was a pyrrhic victory on account of the fact that despite the successful turnout
of the partition case, they are now practically left with nothing of the whole subject lot won in the litigation.
This is because aside from the 121.5 square meters awarded to Atty. Domalanta as attorney's fees, the said
contract for professional services provides that the remaining portion shall pertain to the respondent lawyer's
son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years. There should never be an instance where a lawyer gets as attorney's
fees the entire property involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in litigation to lose
everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. llcd

The respondent lawyer's argument that it is not he but his son Teodoro M. Domalanta, Jr. who is claiming the
usufructuary right over the remaining portion of the subject lot is inaccurate. The records show that the matter
of usufruct is tied up with this case since the basis for the said usufructuary right is the contract for
professional services the reasonableness of which is being questioned in this petition. We find the ten-year
usufruct over the subject lot part and parcel of the attorney's fees being claimed by the respondent lawyer.

In resolving the issue of reasonableness of the attorney's fees, we uphold the time-honoured legal maxim that
a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal
becomes one of rendering service and securing justice, not money-making. For the worst scenario that can
ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom all trust and confidence were
bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy. We find the Contract for Professional Services dated
August 30, 1979, unconscionable and unreasonable. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, in lieu of
the 121.5 square meters awarded to the respondent lawyer and the ten-year usufructuary right over the
remaining portion of 150 square meters by the respondent lawyer's son, is, in the opinion of this Court,
commensurate to the services rendered by Atty. Domalanta.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of
September 12, 1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorney's
fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

||| (Licudan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91958, [January 24, 1991], 271 PHIL 304-316)

Retuya vs. Gorduiz, A.C. No. 1388, March 28, 1980

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 1388. March 28, 1980.]

ANA F. RETUYA, complainant, vs. ATTY. IÑEGO A. GORDUIZ, respondent.

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 DECISION

AQUINO, J p:

This disbarment case is linked to Administrative Case No. 1431-MJ which was filed by Ana F. Retuya against
Municipal Judge Paulo A. Equipilag of Maasin, Leyte and which was decided on July 16, 1979 (Retuya vs.
Equipilag). The facts of that case, which also gave rise to this disbarment case, are as follows: cdphil

"Ana F. Retuya, a widow with four minor children, filed a claim for workmen's compensation
against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the employer of her husband who died in 1968. In a
decision dated December 4, 1970 the Workmen's Compensation Unit at Tacloban City
awarded to Ana the sum of P8,792.10 consisting of (a) P6,000 as compensation benefits, (b)
P2,292.10 for medical and hospitalization expenses, (c) P200 as burial expenses and (d) P300
as attorney's fees of Atty. Iñego Gorduiz (Case No. 9728).

"The employer appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, the employer proposed to
compromise the claim by paying P4,396.05 or only one-half of the total award. Ana accepted
the proposal and directed that the amount be remitted to Fiscal Mamerto Daclan through the
Philippine National Bank's branch at Maasin, Southern Leyte.

"The employer paid the reduced award on November 16, 1972. Ana sent to the employer the
receipt and release signed by her with a covering letter dated December 19, 1972 wherein she
explained that her lawyer, Gorduiz, did not sign the joint motion to dismiss the claim because
he wanted twenty percent of the award as his attorney's fees. She was willing to give him ten
percent.

"After she had cashed the checks for P4,396.05, she was not able to contact Gorduiz and pay
his fee. Then, unexpectedly, in February, 1973, she was served with a warrant of arrest issued
in Criminal Case No. R-2362 of the municipal court of Maasin. To avoid detention, she had to
post bail in the sum of one thousand pesos.

"It turned out that on January 12, 1973 Atty. Gorduiz executed an affidavit stating that Ana had
misappropriated his attorney's fees amounting to three hundred pesos and that he had
demanded payment of the amount from her but she refused to make payment and, instead,
she went to Cebu and stayed there for a long time.

"On the basis of that affidavit, the acting chief of police filed against Ana a complaint for
estafa in the municipal court of Maasin. After posting bail, she filed a motion to quash wherein
she explained that she did not pay the fees of Atty. Gorduiz because he was demanding one
third of the award, that when she did not accede to his demand, he lowered his claim to eight
hundred pesos, and that she bargained for six hundred fifty pesos but he refused to accept
that amount. Ana averred that the estafa case was filed just to harass her.

"Judge Paulo A. Equipilag denied the motion to quash. He granted the motion of Atty. Gorduiz
requiring Ana to produce a copy of the decision awarding her workmen's compensation for
her husband's death.

"The estafa case was not tried. Atty. Erasmo M. Diola, as lawyer of Ana, offered to Atty.
Gorduiz the sum of five hundred pesos as settlement of the case. The offer was accepted.

"On November 22, 1973, the acting chief of police filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
basis of the affidavit of Atty. Gorduiz executed on that date stating that the prosecution
witnesses had allegedly become hostile and that he was no longer interested in further
prosecuting the case. Also, on that same day, Judge Equipilag dismissed the case.

"In spite of the dismissal of the estafa case, Ana F. Retuya felt aggrieved by the proceedings
therein. In a complaint dated July 24, 1974 but filed in this Court on October 30, 1974, she
asked for the disbarment or suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Equipilag. The disbarment
case against Gorduiz was referred to the Solicitor General.

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 "The case against Judge Equipilag was investigated by the Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Southern Leyte."

This Court found that there was no justification for suspending respondent Judge. However, he was
admonished to be more prudent and circumspect in the discharge of his duties so as to obviate the suspicion
that, for an ulterior motive, he was in cahoots with the offended party in a criminal case for the purpose of
using the strong arm of the law against the accused in an oppressive and vindictive manner.

The Solicitor General asked the provincial fiscal of Southern Leyte to investigate the case against Gorduiz. The
fiscal in her report of July 8, 1975 recommended the dismissal of the case.

The Solicitor General, disagreeing with that recommendation, filed in this Court against Gorduiz a complaint
wherein he prayed that Gorduiz be suspended for six months because the latter, in filing the estafa case, had
promoted a groundless suit against his client. LLphil

Ana F. Retuya testified before the investigating Fiscal that in December, 1972 she was willing to pay Gorduiz
six hundred fifty pesos as his attorney's fees but he demanded a bigger amount. He lodged a complaint for
estafa against her and she was arrested. She had to post bail in the sum of one thousand pesos. As already
stated above, the estafa case was later dismissed when Ana paid Gorduiz the sum of five hundred pesos.

In his testimony before the investigating fiscal and this Court's legal officer, respondent Gorduiz denied that he
demanded as attorney's fees an amount higher than three hundred pesos. He explained that he filed the estafa
case because after Ana had received payment of the award, she did not turn over to him the attorney's fees of
three hundred pesos in spite of her promises to pay the same and his demands for payment (Exh. 7 and 8).

Gorduiz declared that Ana filed the disbarment case against him in order that she could evade the payment of
his attorney's fees in the other cases which he had handled for her. It was also possible that someone who had
a score to settle with Gorduiz had instigated the filing of this case against him.

He further declared that he filed the estafa case because he thought that Ana had absconded when she stayed
in Cebu City for a long time (23-24 tsn, June 26, 1979). He claimed that he spent one hundred pesos of his own
money in gathering evidence which was presented in the workmen's compensation case. He had also
advanced around two hundred pesos to cover the expenses in the other cases which he had handled for Ana.

After reflecting on the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that there is justification for
suspending the respondent.

Respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his client for the supposed misappropriation
of his attorney's fees. It is not altogether clear that his client had swindled him and, therefore, there is some
basis for concluding that, contrary to his lawyer's oath, he had filed a groundless suit against her and had
harassed and embarrassed her.

Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics prescribes that "controversies with clients concerning
compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his
right to receive reasonable recompense for his services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to
prevent injustice, imposition or fraud". llcd

WHEREFORE, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months counted from
notice of this decision. A copy of this decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office.

SO ORDERED.

Baredo (Chairman), Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ. concur.

||| (Retuya v. Gorduiz, A.C. No. 1388, [March 28, 1980], 185 PHIL 375-379)

Ramos vs. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004.]

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 FEDERICO N. RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by demanding from his client, complainant
Federico N. Ramos, the delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated property, as payment for his
appearance fees.

The facts as narrated by the complainant are as follows:

Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio Ngaseo's Makati office to
engage his services as counsel in a case 1 involving a piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent
agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and
the cost of meals, transportation and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise
to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees. 2

On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondent's office to inquire about the status of the case.
Respondent informed him that the decision was adverse to them because a congressman exerted pressure
upon the trial judge. Respondent however assured him that they could still appeal the adverse judgment and
asked for the additional amount of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for
research made. 3

Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent of purposely failing to submit a
copy of the summons and copy of the assailed decision. Subsequently, complainant learned that the
respondent filed the notice of appeal 3 days after the lapse of the reglementary period.

On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent asking for the delivery of the
1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as payment for respondent's appearance fee. In the
same letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would not confer with him
and settle the matter within 30 days.

Respondent alleged that sometime in the late 1997, a former client, Federico Ramos and his brother, Dionisio,
went to his Makati office to engage his professional services in connection with a 2-hectare parcel of land
situated in San Carlos, Pangasinan which the complainant's family lost 7 years earlier through an execution
sale in favor of one Alfredo T. Castro. Complainant, who was deaf and could only speak conversational
Tagalog haltingly, was assisted by his brother Dionisio. They came all the way from Pangasinan because no
lawyer in San Carlos City was willing to handle the case. Complainant, through Dionisio, avers that he has
consulted 2 local lawyers but did not engage their services because they were demanding exorbitant fees. One
local lawyer was willing to handle the case for at least one-half of the land involved as his attorney's fee, plus
cash expenses, while the other asked for 1/4 of the land in addition to a large sum of money. Respondent
agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P60,000.00 plus an appearance fee of P3,000.00 per
hearing. Complainant told him that he would consult his siblings on the matter.

Six months later, i.e., in April 1998, complainant, assisted by one Jose Castillo, went to respondent's office to
discuss the legal fees. Complainant, through Castillo, told respondent that he was willing to pay an acceptance
fee of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of which shall be paid upon engagement and the remaining P20,000.00 to be
paid after their treasure hunt operations in Nueva Viscaya were terminated. Further, complainant offered, in
lieu of P3,000.00 per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject matter of the case, if they win, or
from another piece of property, if they lose. In addition, complainant also offered to defray the expenses for
transportation, meals and other incidental expenses. Respondent accepted the complainant's offer.

Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC 2128, he filed a timely notice of
appeal and thereafter moved to be discharged as counsel because he had colon cancer. Complainant, now
assisted by one Johnny Ramos, implored respondent to continue handling the case, with an offer to double the

316
1,000 sq. m. piece of land earlier promised and the remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. Johnny
Ramos made a written commitment and gave respondent's secretary P2,000.00 of the P3,850.00 expenses for
the preparation of the appellant's brief. aTADCE

On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the return of the disputed 2-
hectare land to the complainant and his siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January 18,
2002. Since then complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent, which compelled him to send a demand
letter on January 29, 2003.

On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging his former counsel, respondent
Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m.
parcel of land which was the subject of litigation.

In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the respondent guilty of
grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. 4

On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 the full text of which
reads: 5

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering that respondent have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 for
having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. 6

Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the
delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the
case has been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the
family of the complainant.

Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written contract on
the basis of the principle of quantum meruit. He claims that his acceptance and appearance fees are
reasonable because a Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an acceptance fee of only
P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per court appearance.

Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment
the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their
profession. 7 The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but
also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the
transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the
peculiar control exercised by these persons. 8 It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an
attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the
expense of his client. 9 However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property
takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property. Consequently, where the
property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
attaches.

Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the
actual transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In
Biascan v. Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the
practice of law when he registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the
part of the estate despite pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the subject property. 10 In the
consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting, 11 the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio

317
Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law when he purchased his client's property which was
still the subject of a pending certiorariproceeding.

In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made
a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the
litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the
contemplation of Article 1491. Even assumingarguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical,
respondent's act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003
was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18,
2002. acEHSI

We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution
No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of
suspension for 6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The
power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will
disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. 12 All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and
reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a member of the legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

||| (Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210, [December 9, 2004], 487 PHIL 40-49)

Director of Lands vs. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096 February 27, 1979

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-26096. February 27, 1979.]

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. SILVERETRA ABABA, ET AL., claimants, JUAN
LARRAZABAL, MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ and ANASTACIA CABIGAS,
petitioners-appellants, ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, adverse claimant-appellee.

Juanito Ll. Abao for petitioners-appellants.

Alberto B. Fernandez in his own behalf.

SYNOPSIS

After winning a case for annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and recovery of the parcels of
land subject matter thereof, petitioner Abarquez refused to comply with his contractual obligation to his
counsel to give the latter 1/2 of the property recovered as attorney's fees, and instead offered to sell the whole
parcels of land to the petitioner-spouses Larrazabal. Hence, his counsel, Atty. Fernandez, filed an affidavit of
adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Cebu, annotating his claim on petitioner Abarquez' Transfer
Certificate of Title. Despite said annotation, Abarquez sold 2/3 of the lands to petitioner-spouses Larrazabal.
Subsequently, the latter filed a cancellation proceeding of the adverse claim before the trial court where it was

318
dismissed. The petitioner-spouses appealed from the order of dismissal directly to the Supreme Court
contending among others that a contract for a contingent fee is violative of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and held that a contract for a contingent fee is not
covered by Article 1491 of the New Civil Code since the transfer of 1/2 of the property in litigation takes effect
only after the finality of a favorable judgment and not during the pendency of the litigation of the property in
question; that Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics expressly recognizes contingent fees as an
exception to Canon 10; that the adverse-claimant's contingent fee is valid; and that the registration thereof as
the only remedy open to him, substantially complied with Section 110 of Act 496.

SYLLABUS

Of the Ruling of the Court

1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CONTINGENT FEES; PROHIBITION UNDER ARTICLE 1491, N.C.C. CONSTRUED. —
The prohibition in Article 1491 of the New Civil Code applies only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer by his
client of the property which is the subject of litigation. For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of
the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. The prohibition does
not apply to cases where after completion of litigation the lawyer accepts on account of his fee, an interest in
the assets realized by the litigation. There is a clear distinction between such cases and one in which the
lawyer speculates on the outcome of the matter in which he is employed.

2. ID.; ID.; SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. — Spanish civilists differ in their views on whether or not a contingent fee
contract (quota litis agreement) is covered by Article 1491, with Manresa advancing that it is covered and
Castoln maintaining that it is not covered. The Supreme Court of Spain, in its sentencia of 12 November 1917,
has ruled that Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) does not apply to a
contract for a contingent fee because it is not contrary to morals or to law.

3. ID.; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, NOT INFRINGED BY CONTRACT FOR CONTINGENT FEE. —
Contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines. They are impliedly sanctioned by law and are subject to
the supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR ALLOWANCE. — The reason for allowing compensation for professional services
based on contingent fees is that of a person could not secure counsel by a promise of large fees in case of
success, to be derived from the subject matter of the suit, it would often place the poor in such a condition as to
amount to a practical denial of justice. It not infrequently happens that persons are injured through the
negligence or willful misconduct of others, but by reason of poverty are unable to employ counsel to assert
their rights. In such event their only means of redress lies in gratuitous service, which is rarely given, or in their
ability to find someone who will conduct the case for a contingent fee. That relations of this kind are often
abused by speculative attorneys or that suits of this character are turned into a sort of commercial traffic by the
lawyer does not destroy the beneficial result to one who is so poor to employ counsel.

5. ID.; CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT SUBJECT TO SUPERVISION OF COURTS. — A contingent fee contract is
always subject to the supervision of the courts with respect to the stipulated amount and may be reduced or
nullified. So that in the event that there is any undue influence or fraud in the execution of the contract or that
the fee is excessive, the client is not without remedy because the court will amply protect him.

6. ID.; PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; CONTRACT FOR CONTINGENT FEE IS VALID. — Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics expressly recognizes contingent fees by way of exception to Canon 10. For while Canon 10
prohibits a lawyer from purchasing ". . . any interest in the subject matter of the litigation he is conducting",
Canon 13, on the other hand, allows reasonable contingent fee contract, thus: "A contract for a contingent fee
where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all circumstances of the case, including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness." The distinction is between buying an interest in the litigation as a speculation, which Canon
10 condemns, and agreeing, in a case which the lawyer undertakes primarily in his professional capacity, to
accept his compensation contingent on the outcome.

7. ID.; ID.; NATURE. — Canons of Professional Ethics have already received judicial recognition by being cited
and applied by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its opinion. And they have likewise been considered
319
sources of Legal Ethics. More importantly, the American Bar Association, speaking through Chairman Howe of
the Ethics Committee, opined that "The Canons of Professional Ethics are legislative expressions of
professional opinion." Therefore, the Canons have some binding effect.

8. LAND REGISTRATION; SECTION 110, REGISTRATION OF INTEREST OR ADVERSE CLAIM, ALLOWED. — An

adverse claim may be registered only by whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, if no other provision is made in this
Act (496) for registering the same. A contract for a contingent fee being valid, it vested in the adverse-claimant
an interest or right over the lots in question to the extent of one-half thereof. The interest become vested in
adverse-claimant after the case was won on appeal because only then did the assignment of the one half
portion of the lots in question became effective and binding. Since the interest or claim of counsel in the lots in
question arose long after the original registration, there is no other provision of the Land Registration Act under
which the interest or claim may be registered except as an adverse claim under Section 110 of the Act. The
interest or claim cannot be registered as an attorney's charging lien. There being substantial compliance with
Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is valid. Being valid, its registration should not be
canceled because it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be
canceled.

9. ID.; ID.; EFFECT. — The annotation of an adverse claim is an measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided
for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property
that someone is claiming an interest in the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.

10. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; RULE 138, SECTION 37, SCOPE. — A charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a
contract or for delivery of real property.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J p:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dated March 19, 1966 denying the
petition for the cancellation of an adverse claim registered by the adverse claimant on the transfer certificate
of title of the petitioners.

The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, in
Civil Case No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina Abarquez",
for the annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the
subject matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the
petitioner and so he appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services of his lawyer on a contingent basis,
petitioner, unable to compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal, executed a document on
June 10, 1961 in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect whereby he obliged himself to give to his lawyer or one-half (1/2)
of whatever he might recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper. The contents of the
document as translated are as follows: Cdpr

"AGREEMENT
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

"That I, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ, plaintiff in Case No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, make known through this agreement that for the services rendered by Atty. Alberto B.
Fernandez, who is my lawyer in this case, if the appeal is won up to the Supreme Court, I
promise and will guarantee that I will give to said lawyer one-half (1/2) of what I may recover
from the estate of my father in Lots No. 5600 and 5602 which are located at Bulacao, Pardo,
City of Cebu. That with respect to any money which may be adjudged to me from Agripina
Abarquez, except 'Attorney's Fees', the same shall pertain to me and not to said lawyer.
320
 "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have caused my right thumbmark to be affixed hereto this 10th of
June, 1961, at the City of Cebu.

THUMBMARK
MAXIMO ABARQUEZ"
(p. 5, Petitioner-Appellant's Brief, p. 26, rec.).

The real property sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. R-6573 was actually the share of the petitioner in
Lots 5600 and 5602, which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which were partitioned among
the heirs which included petitioner Maximo Abarquez and his elder sister, Agripina Abarquez, the defendant in
said civil case.

This partition was made pursuant to a project of partition approved by the Court which provided, among others,
that Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 were to be divided into three equal parts, one third of which shall be given to
Maximo Abarquez. However, Agripina Abarquez claimed the share of her brother, stating that the latter
executed an instrument of pacto de retro prior to the partition conveying to her any or all rights in the estate of
their parents. Petitioner discovered later that the claim of his sister over his share was based on an instrument
he was induced to sign prior to the partition, an instrument he believed all along to be a mere acknowledgment
of the receipt of P700.00 which his sister gave to him as a consideration for taking care of their father during
the latter's illness and never an instrument of pacto de retro. Hence, he instituted an action to annul the alleged
instrument of pacto de retro.

The Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 27, 1963 reversed the decision of the lower court
and annulled the deed of pacto de retro. Appellee Agripina Abarquez filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied in a resolution dated January 7, 1964 (p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 13, Rec.) and the judgment
became final and executory on January 22, 1964. cdrep

Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31841 was issued on May 19, 1965 in the name of Maximo
Abarquez, married to Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged share in Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 containing an
area of 4,085 square meters (p. 110, ROA; p. 13, rec.). These parcels of land later became the subject matter of
the adverse claim filed by the claimant.

The case having been resolved and title having been issued to petitioner, adverse claimant waited for
petitioner to comply with his obligation under the document executed by him on June 10, 1961 by delivering
the one-half (1/2) portion of the said parcels of land.

Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land covered
by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. Upon being informed of
the intention of the petitioner, adverse claimant immediately took steps to protect his interest by filing with the
trial court a motion to annotate his attorney's lien on TCT No. 31841 on June 10, 1965 and by notifying the
prospective buyers of his claim over the one-half portion of the parcels of land.

Realizing later that the motion to annotate attorney's lien was a wrong remedy, as it was not within the purview
of Section 37, rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, but before the same was denied by the trial court, adverse
claimant filed an affidavit of adverse claim on July 19, 1966 with the Register of Deeds of Cebu (p. 14, ROA; p.
13, rec.). By virtue of the registration of said affidavit. the adverse claim for one-half (1/2) of the lots covered
by the June 10, 1961 document was annotated on TCT No. 31841.

Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitioner-spouses Maximo Abarquez and Anastacia
Cabigas conveyed by deed of absolute sale on July 29, 1965 two thirds (2/3 of the lands covered by TCT No.
31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. When the new transfer certificate of
title No. 32996 was issued, the annotation of adverse claim on TCT No. 31841 necessarily had to appear on
the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim on TCT No. 32996 became the subject of cancellation
proceedings filed by herein petitioner-spouses on March 7, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (p. 2,
ROA; p. 13, rec.). The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez, filed his opposition to the petition for
cancellation on March 18, 1966 (p. 20, ROA; p. 13, rec.). The trial court resolved the issue on March 19, 1966,
when it declared that:

321
 ". . . the petition to cancel the adverse claim should be denied. The admission by the
petitioners that the lawyers (Attys. Fernandez and Batiguin) are entitled to only one-third of the
lot described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32966 is the best proof of the authority to
maintain said adverse claim" (p. 57, ROA; p. 13 rec.).

Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal to this Court and correspondingly filed the notice
of appeal or April 1, 1966 with the trial court. On April 2, 1966, petitioner-spouses filed the appeal bond and
subsequently filed the record on appeal on April 6, 1966. The records of the case were forwarded to this Court
through the Land Registration Commission of Manila and were received by this Court on May 5, 1966. prLL

Counsel for the petitioner-spouses filed the printed record on appeal on July 12, 1966. Required to file the
appellants' brief, counsel filed one on August 29, 1966 while that of the appellee was filed on October 1, 1966
after having been granted an extension to file his brief.

The case was submitted for decision on December 1, 1966. Counsel for the petitioners filed a motion to
expunge appellees' brief on December 8, 1966 for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, but the
same was denied by this Court in a resolution dated February 13, 1967.

The pivotal issue to be resolved in the instant case is the validity or nullity of the registration of the adverse
claim of Atty. Fernandez, resolution of which in turn hinges on the question of whether or not the contract for a
contingent fee, basis of the interest of Atty. Fernandez, is prohibited by the Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
and Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

Petitioners contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates Article 1491 because it involves an
assignment of a property subject of litigation. That article provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

"xxx xxx xxx

"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession" (emphasis
supplied).

This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment between the lawyer and his
client, of property which is the subject of litigation. As WE have already stated "The prohibition in said article
applies only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer by his client of the property which is the subject of litigation,
In other words, for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property" (Rosario Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-26882,
November 21, 1978). cdphil

Likewise, under American Law, the prohibition does not apply to "cases where after completion of litigation the
lawyer accepts on account of his fee, an interest in the assets realized by the litigation" (Drinker, Henry S.,
Legal Ethics, p. 100 [1953], citing App. A, 280; N.Y. Ciu 714). "There is a clear distinction between such cases
and one in which the lawyer speculates on the outcome of the matter in which he is employed" (Drinker, supra,
p. 100 citing A.B.A. Op. 279).

A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the transfer or assignment of the
property in litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the instant case, the
attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half (1/2) of whatever Maximo Abarquez might recover
from his share in the lots in question, is contingent upon the success of the appeal. Hence, the payment of the
attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of one-half (1/2) of the property in litigation will take place
only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the transfer actually takes effect after the finality of a favorable
judgment rendered on appeal and not during the pendency of the litigation involving the property in question.
Consequently, the contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491.

322
While Spanish civilists differ in their views on the above issue — whether or not a contingent fee contract
(quota litis agreement) is covered by Article 1491 — with Manresa advancing that it is covered, thus:

"Se ha discutido si en la incapacidad de los Procuradores y Abogados esta incluido el pacto

de quota litis. Consiste este, como es sabido, en la estipulacion de que el Abogado o el
Procurador han de hacer suyos una parte alicuota de la cosa que se litiga, si la sentencia es
favorable. Con este concepto a la vista, es para nosortros indudable que el articulo que
comentamos no menciona ese pacto; pero como la incapacidad de los Abogados y
Procuradores se extinede al acto de adquirir por cesion; y la efectividad del pacto de quota
litis implica necesariamente una cesion, estimamos que con solo el num. 5x del articulo 1459
podria pedirse con exito la nulidad de ese pacto tradicionalmente considerado como ilicito.

"xxx xxx xxx

"Debe tenerse tambien en cuenta, respecto del ultimo parrafo del articulo 1459, la sentencia
del Tribunal Supreme de 25 de Enero 1902, que delcara que si bien el procurador no puede
adquirir para si los bienes, en cuanto a los cuales tiene incapacidad, puede adquirirlos para
otra persona en quien no concurra incapacidad alguna" (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil
Español, Tomo X, p. 110 [4a ed., 1931] emphasis supplied).

Castan, maintaining that it is not covered, opines thus:

"C. Prohibiciones impuestas a las personas encargadas, mas o menos directamente, de la

administracion de justicia. — El mismo art 1.459 del Codigo civil prohibe a los Magistrados,
Jueces, individuos del Ministerio fiscal, Secretarios de Tribunales y Juzgados y Oficiales de
Justicia adquirir por compra (aunque sea en subasta publica o judicial por si ni por persona
alguna intermedia), 'Los bienes y derechos que estuviesen en litigio ante el Tribunal en cuya
jurisdiccion on teritorio ejercieran sus respectivas funciones, extendiendo se esta prohibicion
al acto de adquirir por cesion', y siendo tambien extensiva 'A los Abogados y Procuradores
respecto a los bienes y derechos que fueran objeto del un litigio en que intervengan por su
profesion y oficio.'

"El fundamento de esta prohibicion es clarisimo. No solo se trata — dice Manresa — de quitar
la ocasion al fraude; persiguese, ademas, el proposito de rodear a las personas que
intervienen en la administracion de justicia de todos los prestigios que necesitan para ejercer
su ministerio, librando los de toda sospecha, que, aunque fuere infundada, redundaria en
descredito de la institucion.

"Por no dar lugar a recelos de ninguna clase, admite el Codigo (en el apartado penutimo del
art. 1.459) algunos casos en que, por excepcion, no se aplica el principio prohibitivo de que
venimos hablando. Tales son los de que se trate de acciones hereditarias entre coherederos,
de cesion en pago de creditos, o de garantia de los bienes que posean los funcionarios de
justicia.

'Algunos autores (Goyena, Manresa, Valverde) creen que en la prohibicion del

art. 1.459 esta comprendido el pacto de quota litis (o sea el convenio por el cual se
concede al Abogado o Procurador, para el caso de obtener sentencia favorable, una
parte alicuota de la cosa o cantidad que se litiga), porque dicho pacto supone la venta
o cesion de una parte de la cosa o drecho que es objecto del litigio. Pero Mucius
Scaevola oberva, con razon, que en el repetido pacto no hay propiamente caso de
compraventa ni de cesion de derechos, y bastan para estimario nulo otros preceptos
del Codigo como los relativos a la ilicitud de la causa'" (Castan, Derecho Civil Español,
Tomo 4, pp. 68-69, [9a ed., 1956], emphasis supplied).

The Supreme Court of Spain, in its sentencia of 12 November 1917, has ruled that Article 1469 of the Spanish
Civil Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) does not apply to a contract for a contingent fee because it is not
contrary to morals or to law, holding that:

323
 ". . . que no es susceptible de aplicarse el precepto contenido en el nun. 5º del art. 1.459 a un
contrato en el que se restringen los honorarios de un Abogado a un tanto por ciento de lo que
se obtuviera en el litigio, cosa no repudiada por la moral ni por la ley" (Tolentino, Civil Code of
the Philippines, p. 36, Vol. V [1959]; Castan, supra; Manresa, supra).

In the Philippines, among the Filipino commentators, only Justice Capistrano ventured to state his view on the
said issue, thus:

"The incapacity to purchase or acquire by assignment, which the law also extends to lawyers
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession, also covers contracts for professional services
quota litis. Such contracts, however, have been declared valid by the Supreme Court"
(Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 44, Vol. IV [1951]).

Dr. Tolentino merely restated the views of Castan and Manresa as well as the state of jurisprudence in Spain,
as follows:

"Attorneys-at-law — Some writers, like Goyena, Manresa and Valverde, believe that this article
covers quota litis agreements, under which a lawyer is to be given an aliquot part of the
property or amount in litigation if he should win the case for his client. Scaevola and Castan,
however, believe that such a contract does not involve a sale or assignment of rights, but it may
be void under other articles of the Code such as those referring to illicit cause. On the other
hand, the Spanish Supreme Court has held that this article is not applicable to a contract which
limits the fees of a lawyer to a certain percentage of what may be recovered in litigation, as this
is not contrary to morals or to law." (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 35, Vol. V
[1959]; Castan, supra, emphasis supplied).

Petitioners further contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates the Canons of Professional Ethics, this
is likewise without merit. This posture of petitioners overlooked Canon 13 of the Canons which expressly
recognizes contingent fees by way of exception to Canon 10 upon which petitioners relied. For while Canon 10
prohibits a lawyer from purchasing ". . . any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting", Canon 13, on the other hand, allows a reasonable contingent fee contract, thus: "A contract for a
contingent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a
court, as to its reasonableness." As pointed out by an authority on Legal Ethics: LexLib

"Every lawyer is intensely interested in the successful outcome of his case, not only as
affecting his reputation, but also his compensation. Canon 13 specifically permits the lawyer to
contract for a contingent fee which, of itself, negatives the thought that the Canons preclude the
lawyer's having a stake in his litigation. As pointed out by Professor Cheatham on page 170 n.
of his Case Book, there is an inescapable conflict of interest between lawyer and client in the
matter of fees. Nor, despite some statements to the contrary in Committee opinions, is it
believed that, particularly in view of Canon 13, Canon 10 precludes in every case an
arrangement to make the lawyer's fee payable only out of the results of the litigation. The
distinction is between buying an interest in the litigation as a speculation, which Canon 10
condemns, and agreeing, in a case which the lawyer undertakes primarily in his professional
capacity, to accept his compensation contingent on the outcome" (Drinker, Henry S., Legal
Ethics, p. 99, [1953], emphasis supplied).

These Canons of Professional Ethics have already received "judicial recognition by being cited and applied by
the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its opinion" Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 9 [1949]). And they
have likewise been considered sources of Legal Ethics. More importantly, the American Bar Association,
speaking through Chairman Howe of the Ethics Committee, opined that "The Canons of Professional Ethics are
legislative expressions of professional opinion (A.B.A. Op. 37 [1912])" [See footnote 25, Drinker, Legal Ethics, p.
27]. Therefore, the Canons have some binding effect.

Likewise, it must be noted that this Court has already recognized this type of a contract as early as the case of
Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co. (45 Phil. 540 [1923]), where WE held that "contingent fees are not prohibited in
the Philippines, and since impliedly sanctioned by law 'Should be under the supervision of the court in order

324
that clients may be protected from unjust charges' (Canons of Professional Ethics)". The same doctrine was
subsequently reiterated in Grey vs. Insular Lumber Co. (97 Phil. 833 [1955]) and Recto vs. Harden (100 Phil.
427 [1956]).

In the 1967 case of Albano vs. Ramos (20 SCRA 171 [1967]), the attorney was allowed to recover in a separate
action her attorney's fees of one-third (1/3) of the lands and damages recovered as stipulated in the
contingent fee contract. And this Court in the recent case of Rosario Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
(supra), which involved a contingent fee of one-half (1/2) of the property in question, held that "contingent fees
are recognized in this jurisdiction (Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the Philippine
Bar association in 1917 [Appendix B, Revised Rules of Court]), which contingent fees may be a portion of the
property in litigation." LexLib

Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
"especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal
services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the
proceeds of the litigation" (Francisco, Legal Ethics, p. 294 [1949], citing Lipscomb vs. Adams 91 S.W. 1046,
1048 [1906]). Oftentimes, contingent fees are the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress
for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated. Thus:

"The reason for allowing compensation for professional services based on contingent fees is
that if a person could not secure counsel by a promise of large fees in case of success, to be
derived from the subject matter of the suit, it would often place the poor in such a condition as
to amount to a practical denial of justice. It not infrequently happens that person are injured
through the negligence or willful misconduct of others, but by reason of poverty are unable to
employ counsel to assert their rights. In such event their only means of redress lies in
gratuitous service, which is rarely given, or in their ability to find some one who will conduct
the case for a contingent fee. That relations of this kind are often abused by speculative
attorneys or that suits of this character are turned into a sort of commercial traffic by the
lawyer, does not destroy the beneficial result to one who is so poor to employ counsel" (id., at
p. 293, citing Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p. 92, emphasis supplied).

Justice George Malcolm, writing on contingent fees, also stated that:

". . . the system of contingent compensation has the merit of affording to certain classes of
persons the opportunity to procure the prosecution of their claims which otherwise would be
beyond their means. In many cases in the United States and the Philippines, the contingent fee
is socially necessary" (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 55 [1949], italics supplied).

Stressing further the importance of contingent fees, Professor Max Radin of the University of California, said
that:

"The contingent fee certainly increases the possibility that vexatious and unfounded suits will
be brought. On the other hand, it makes possible the enforcement of legitimate claims which
otherwise would be abandoned because of the poverty of the claimants. Of these two
possibilities, the social advantage seems clearly on the side of the contingent fee. It may in
fact be added by way of reply to the first objection that vexatious and unfounded suits have
been brought by men who could and did pay substantial attorney's fees for that purpose"
(Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 587, 589 [1940], emphasis supplied).

Finally, a contingent fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the courts with respect to the
stipulated amount may be reduced or nullified. So that in the event that there is any undue influence or fraud in
the execution of the contract or that the fee is excessive, the client is not without remedy because the court
will amply protect him. As held in the case of Grey vs. Insular Lumber Co., supra, citing the case of Ulanday vs.
Manila Railroad Co., supra: LibLex

"Where it is shown that the contract for a contingent fee was obtained by any undue influence
of the attorney over the client, or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is so

325
 clearly excessive as to amount to extortion, the court will in a proper case protect the
aggrieved party."

In the present case, there is no iota of proof to show that Atty. Fernandez had exerted any undue influence or
had perpetrated fraud on, or had in any manner taken advantage of his client, Maximo Abarquez. And, the
compensation of one-half of the lots in question is not excessive nor unconscionable considering the
contingent nature of the attorney's fees.

With these considerations, WE find that the contract for a contingent fee in question is not violative of the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Consequently, both under the provisions of Article 1491 and Canons 10 and 13
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a contract for a contingent fee is valid.

In resolving now the issue of the validity or nullity for the registration of the adverse claim, Section 110 of the
Land Registration Act (Act 496) should be considered. Under said section, an adverse claim may be registered
only by:

"Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration . . . if no other provision is made in this Act
for registering the same . . ."

The contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty. Fernandez an interest or right over the lots in
question the extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was won
on appeal because only then did the assignment of the one half (1/2) portion of the lots in question became
effective and binding. So that when he filed his affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an existing
one. There was therefore a valid interest in the lots to registered in favor of Atty. Fernandez adverse to Maximo
Abarquez.

Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question arose long after the original
registration which took place many years ago. And, there is no other provision of the Land Registration Act
under which the interest or claim may be registered except as an adverse claim under Section 110 thereof. The
interest or claim cannot be registered as an attorney's charging lien. The lower court was correct in denying the
motion to annotate the attorney's lien. A charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real
property as in the instant case. Said Section provides that: LLphil

"Section 37. An attorney shall have a hen upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his oppossession and may retain the same until his lawful fees
and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments, for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client . . ." (emphasis supplied).

Therefore, as an interest in registered land, the only adequate remedy open to Atty. Fernandez is to register
such interest as an adverse claim. Consequently, there being a substantial compliance with Section 110 of Act
496, the registration of the adverse claim is held to be valid. Being valid, its registration should not be cancelled
because as WE have already stated, "it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration
thereof may be cancelled" (Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Lee Dy Piao, 103 Phil. 867 [1958]).

The one-half (1/2) interest of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question should therefore be respected. Indeed, he
has a better right than petitioner-spouses, Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. They purchased their
two thirds (2/3) interest in the lots in question with the knowledge of the adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez. The
adverse claim was annotated on the old transfer certificate of title and was later annotated on the new transfer
certificate of title issued to them. As held by this Court:

"The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by the Land Registration Act. and serves as a notice and warning to third parties
dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right
than the registered owner thereof" (Sanchez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 332 [1976]; Paz
Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Le Dy Piao, supra].

326
Having purchased the property with the knowledge of the adverse claim, they are therefore in bad faith.
Consequently, they are estopped from questioning the validity of the adverse claim.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING THE PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF
THE ADVERSE CLAIM SHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-
APPELLANTS JUAN LARRAZABAL AND MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

||| (Director of Lands v. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096, [February 27, 1979], 177 PHIL 467-483)

Canon 21 – Duty to preserve the client’s confidence and secrets

Suntay vs. Suntay, Adm. Case No. 1890, August 7, 2002

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1890. August 7, 2002.]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAFAEL G. SUNTAY, respondent.

Agaton Yaranon for complainant.

SYNOPSIS

A complaint for disbarment was filed by the complainant against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G. Suntay.
Complainant alleged that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all his
legal, financial, and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways because of politics,
respondent had been filing complaints and cases against complainant, making use of confidential information
gained while their attorney-client relationship existed. Thereafter, this case was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. After almost four years in 1982, the OSG
submitted its report and recommendation finding respondent guilty as charged. Resolution of this case was
delayed due to several motions filed by the respondent. In 1988, the case was forwarded to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP). Finally in 2001 the IBP recommended that respondent Suntay be suspended from the
practice of law for two years for immoral conduct. The investigating commissioner adopted in toto the report
and recommendation of the OSG. In view of the penalty involved, the case was referred to the Court en banc
for final action.

For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship and for unethical conduct, respondent Suntay was
suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law for two years. After review of the records of this
case, the Court found the IBP recommendation to be well taken. As found by both the OSG and the IBP
investigating commissioner, respondent acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matter
regarding which he had either been previously consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped
complainant to administer as the latter's counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964. DScTaC

SYLLABUS

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION; CONSTRUED. — A lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the attorney-client relation. As his defense,
respondent averred that complainant failed to specify the alleged confidential information used against him.
Such defense is unavailing. As succinctly explained inHilado v. David—Communications between attorney and
client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant,
secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an
327
attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of
other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of
other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent, i.e., to
make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously
fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of
necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is
not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an
unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney's
inaccurate version of the facts that came to him . . . Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the
bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice . . . It is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste . . . [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. cDTCIA

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G. Suntay,
alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all his legal, financial
and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways because of politics and respondent's
overweening political ambitions in 1964, respondent had been filing complaints and cases against
complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship existed, and
otherwise harassing him at every turn.

Complainant enumerated the following cases filed by respondent to harass him: (a) Civil Case No. 4306-M 1
for injunction and damages in 1975, "Carlos Panganiban v. Dr. Federico Suntay," where respondent appeared as
counsel for the plaintiff involving fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer; (b) Civil
Case No. 4726-M, 2 "Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay," in 1970 where respondent appeared as counsel for the
plaintiff to determine the real contract between the parties likewise involving the two (2) fishponds which
respondent had previously helped to administer; (c) Civil Case No. 112764, 3 "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico
Suntay," for damages where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff; and, (d) I.S. No. 77-1523, "Magno
Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan involving complainant's same testimony subject of the complaint for damages in Civil Case
No. 112764.

In addition, complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case against him for violation of PD
No. 296 4 for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan
covered by TCT No. T-15674. Complainant alleged that respondent's possession and examination of the TCT
and the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for complainant provided him with the
information that there used to be two (2) creeks traversing the fishpond, and that since respondent helped in
the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two (2) creeks had disappeared.

Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to Specify His Charges"
alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential information or intelligence" gained by him
while the attorney-client relationship existed but which he allegedly used against complainant when the
relationship terminated. Complainant filed hisComments thereon as required in our Resolution of 26 July 1978.
Thereafter this case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and
recommendation in our Resolution dated 23 October 1978.

328
After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation dated 14 October 1982
enumerating the following findings against respondent, to wit:

The evidence presented by complainant which was largely unrebutted by respondent establish
two counts of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating the confidentiality of
client-lawyer relationship and one count of engaging in unethical conduct.

1. Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan in the case for
false testimony and grave oral defamation filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (I.S. No. 77-1523).

The case stemmed from the testimony given by complainant on December 21, 1976, before
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. When asked why Magno
Dinglasan had testified against him in that case, complainant stated that he once declined the
demand of Magno Dinglasan, a former official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for
P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainant's record in the Bureau.

On account of that testimony, Magno Dinglasan charged complainant on July 29, 1977 with
the crime of false testimony and grave oral defamation (Exhibits G and G-1). During the
preliminary investigation of the case by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan,
respondent acted as counsel for Magno Dinglasan. When the case was dismissed by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and it was elevated to the Ministry of Justice on
appeal, respondent continued to be the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan.

Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who was
then his counsel, about the demand made in 1957 or 1958 by Magno Dinglasan for
P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainant's record in the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Respondent's advice was for complainant to disregard the demand as it was
improper. Later, when Magno Dinglasan reduced the amount to P50,000.00, complainant
again consulted respondent. Respondent likewise advised complainant not to heed the
demand (pp. 61-62, tsn, May 21, 1981).

Respondent's representation of Magno Dinglasan in I.S. No. 77-1523 constitutes malpractice

(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) for respondent was previously the lawyer of
complainant and respondent was consulted by complainant regarding the very matter which
was the subject of the case. By serving as the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan, in I.S. No. 77-1523,
respondent thus represented an interest which conflicted with the interest of his former client.

2. Respondent again committed malpractice when he served as lawyer of Magno Dinglasan in

Civil Case No. 112764 before the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Civil Case No. 112764 was an action for damages filed by Magno Dinglasan against
complainant based, among others, on the same testimony that complainant gave on
December 21, 1976 before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M.

For the same reasons set forth above, respondent's representation of Magno Dinglasan in
Civil Case No. 112764 constitutes malpractice as thereby he represented conflicting interests.

3. In filing a charge against complainant for alleged illegal destruction of dikes, respondent
violated the confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer relationship.

In his capacity as lawyer of complainant from 1956 to 1964, respondent had the following
functions:

"Witness

"A: He was my lawyer from 1956 from the time he passed the bar up to sometime in
1964 and my legal adviser on political matters and legal matters.

"ATTY. AQUINO:

329
 "Q: As your lawyer from 1956 to 1964, will you kindly inform the Honorable Hearing
Officer what was the nature of the work of Atty. Suntay?

"A: He handled my cases on the titling of our properties. He served as my legal counsel
in the Hagonoy Rural Bank of which my family is the majority stockholders. He
used to help me manage my fishpond. He is our legal adviser on legal matters.
He is our confidant. We have no secrets between us. He has complete access
in our papers (tsn, May 21, 1981)

Complainant owned several fishponds in Bulacan, among them, the fishpond covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674. This fishpond was previously traversed by two
creeks, Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang. The existence of the creeks is shown by the
certificate of title and the blue print plan of the fishpond. In the certificate of title, the fishpond
is bounded on the north and northeast by Sapang Caluang and on the west by Sapang Malalim
(please see Exhibit 6).

In a letter dated March 17, 1973, respondent reported the disappearance of the two creeks to
the authorities. The Chief State Prosecutor referred the letter to the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan required the Public Works to
conduct a re-survey. (Exhibit 6).

In 1974, the Ministry of Public Works conducted a relocation survey of the fishpond. The
relocation survey disclosed that there were no more creeks traversing the fishpond. Sapang
Malalim and Sapang Caluang had disappeared.

Respondent was requested to file a formal complaint with supporting affidavits, for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 296. Respondent did so and the complaint was docketed as I.S. No.
74-193. (Exhibit 6)

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that respondent made use of the information he gained
while he was the lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint for the building of illegal
dikes. His possession and examination of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674 and the
blueprint plan provided him the information that there used to be two creeks traversing the
fishpond covered by the title. Since he helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also
came to know that the two creeks had disappeared. Thus, he gained the data which became
the basis of his complaint when he was a lawyer and part administrator of complainant. Under
the circumstances, there is a violation of professional confidence.

4. The evidence also establishes the commission of unethical conduct by respondent for
serving as lawyer of Panganiban and Lopez . . . and for himself filing criminal charges against
complainant which were later dismissed. The cases wherein respondent served as lawyer for
the adversary of complainant or filed by respondent himself against complainant are the
following:

1. Carlos Panganiban v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4306-M, CFI, Branch VII,
Malolos, Bulacan;

2. Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4726-M, CFI, Branch II, Malolos,
Bulacan;

3. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, I.S. No. 77-1523, Office of the Provincial Fiscal
of Bulacan;

4. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 112764, CFI, Branch XX, Manila;
and

5. Rafael G. Suntay and Magno Dinglasan v. Federico C. Suntay, I.S. No. 74-193, Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, for violation of P.D. 296.

While there may be validity to respondent's contention that it is not improper for a lawyer to
file a case against a former client, especially when the professional relationship had ended
several years before, yet under the over-all circumstances of the case at bar it can not be said
330
 that respondent acted ethically. Complainant was not a mere client of respondent. He is an
uncle and a political benefactor. The parties for whom respondent filed cases against
complainant were former friends or associates of complainant whom respondent met when
he was serving as the lawyer and general adviser of complainant. The cases filed by
respondent were about properties which respondent had something to do with as counsel and
administrator of complainant.

xxx xxx xxx

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence establishes
commission by respondent of malpractice for violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer
relationship and engaging in unethical conduct . . . 5

Resolution of this case was delayed despite receipt of the foregoing Report and Recommendation in view of
the Omnibus Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the Solicitor General; Motion to Disqualify Solicitor Rogelio
Dancel to Act on this Case and Motion to Suspend Period to File Answer dated 18 January 1983 filed by
respondent principally accusing handling Solicitor Dancel of having given unwarranted advantage and
preference to the complainant in the investigation of the case.

After several pleadings on the issue were filed by both respondent and Solicitor Rogelio Dancel, the Court in its
Resolution dated 22 August 1983 denied respondent's motion to disqualify Solicitor Dancel and required the
OSG to proceed with the investigation of this case. However, no further proceedings were conducted by the
OSG until the records of the case together with other cases were turned over to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on 19 May 1988.

After almost three (3) years from the time the records of this case were turned over to it, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline submitted to this Court on 11 May 2001 Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 adopting and approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding respondent guilty as charged. The
IBP recommended that respondent Atty. Suntay be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for
immoral conduct. In so recommending the Investigating Commissioner adopted in toto the findings of the OSG
in itsReport and Recommendation dated 14 October 1982. In our Resolution of 5 September 2001 we noted the
foregoing IBP Resolution. However, in view of the penalty involved, this case was referred to the Court En Banc
for final action pursuant to our Resolution dated 18 January 2000, Sec. 2, par. (b), in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC. 6

After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the IBP Recommendation to be well taken. As found
by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay acted as counsel
for clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either been previously consulted by
complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer as the latter's counsel and confidant
from 1956 to 1964. Thus in Civil Cases Nos. 4306-M and 4726-M respondent acted as counsel for estranged
business associates of complainant, namely, Carlos Panganiban and Narciso Lopez, the subject matter of
which were the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer.

On the other hand, I.S. No. 77-1523 for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Civil Case No. 112764 for damages before the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, were filed in behalf of Magno Dinglasan, a former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) official, regarding
whose alleged demand for P150,000.00 from complainant in exchange for the destruction of the latter's record
in the BIR, respondent had previously advised complainant to disregard. Civil Case No. 117624 and I.S. No. 77-
1523 were precisely filed against complainant because the latter had previously testified on the alleged
demand made by Dinglasan. Although respondent denied that there was ever such a demand made by
Dinglasan, the point is that his word on the matter, i.e., whether there was in fact such a demand, would carry
much weight against complainant considering that he was the latter's counsel in 1957 or 1958 when the
alleged demand was made. In addition, respondent initiated the prosecution of complainant in I.S. No. 74-193
for violation of P.D. No. 296 7 for the disappearance of the two (2) creeks, namely, Sapang Malalim and
Sapang Caluang, previously traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674 by
using information obtained while he was in possession of the certificate of title and the blueprint plan of the
property.

As the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 21.01. — A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
331
 a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or

associates or by judicial action.

Rule 21.01. — A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the attorney-client
relation. 8 As his defense to the charges, respondent averred that complainant failed to specify the alleged
confidential information used against him. Such a defense is unavailing to help respondent's cause for as
succinctly explained in Hilado v. David —9

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a

complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and
a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of
other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would
be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication
a condition precedent, i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character
of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not
enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers
upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for
an investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not
in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an
attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court
should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him . . .

Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice . . . It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste . . . [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights
of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, IBP Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 dated 29 April 2001 is adopted and
approved. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship and for unethical conduct, respondent
Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon the finality
hereof.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C. J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago; Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., concur.

||| (Suntay v. Suntay, A.C. No. 1890, [August 7, 2002], 435 PHIL 482-493)

332
Canon 22 – Duty to withdraw services only for good cause and upon notice

Montano vs. IBP, A.M. No. 4215, May 21, 2001

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. 4215. May 21, 2001.]

FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant, vs. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES and

ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J p:

In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complainant Felicisimo M. Montano charged
Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he be "sternly dealt with administratively." The complaint 1 is
summarized as follows: IcCDAS

1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in
collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 37467 wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.

2. The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00, fifty percent (50%) of which was
payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case.
Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney's fee.
CAcIES

3. Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant's brief and contrary to their
agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an
additional payment from complainant. Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.

4. Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent counsel again demanded payment of the remaining
balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdrew his appearance as
complainant's counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity. Returning the case folder to the
complainant, respondent counsel attached a Note dated February 28, 1993, 2 stating:

28 February 1994

Pepe and Del Montano,

For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain, here's your
reward:

Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.

Johnny

Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical standards of the law
profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed motions
praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment.

After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the Resolution of August 1, 1994,
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and
recommended that he be "severely reprimanded." However, in a Resolution 3 by the IBP Board of Governors on
July 26, 1997, it was resolved that the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner meted to

333
respondent be amended to "three (3) months suspension from the practice of law for having been found guilty
of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer."

Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the IBP, alleging that the
latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did not deserve the penalty imposed. The true facts,
according to him, are the following:

1. Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal;

2. Due to the ailment of Atty. Gerona's daughter, he could not prepare and submit
complainant's appellant's brief on time;

3. Complainant went to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his
appellant's brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50%
upon its completion; ITEcAD

4. Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellant's brief ahead of its
deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request
that the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00
only, promising to pay the P3,500.00 "tomorrow" or on "later particular date."
Please take note that, at this juncture, there was already a breach of the
agreement on complainant's part.

5. When that "tomorrow" or on a "later particular date" came, respondent, thru a

messenger, requested the complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but
word was sent that he will again pay "tomorrow" or on a "later date." This
promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of
the brief. Please take note again that it was not the respondent but the
complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet he fails to pay as
promised;

6. Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord,
filed complainant's brief on time; EISCaD

7. After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the
remaining balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made himself scarce. As the
records would show, such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now;

8. Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and
case folder to the complainant, hoping that the latter would see personally the
former about it to settle the matter between them;

9. However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case; IDSETA

10. Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals
because of this case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one
who signed the appellant's brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of
record. Such withdrawal was accordingly granted by the appellate court;

xxx xxx xxx 4

Respondent counsel further averred that complainant's refusal to pay the agreed lawyer's fees, measly as it
was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was "just, ethical and proper."
Respondent counsel concluded that not only was the penalty of suspension harsh for his act of merely trying
to collect payment for his services rendered, but it indirectly would punish his family since he was the sole
breadwinner with children in school and his wife terminally ill with cancer.

In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealca's motion for
reconsideration, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

334
 RESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealca's Motion For Reconsideration of the Board's Decision in the
above-entitled case there being no substantive reason to reverse the finding therein.Moreover,
the motion is improperly laid the remedy of the respondent is to file the appropriate pleading
with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of said Decision
pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139-B. 5

On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present complaint,

(a) notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines amending the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of reprimand to three (3) months suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct
which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer;

(b) complainant's motion praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of
disbarment; TSaEcH

(c) motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution of July 26, 1997;

(d) comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of
the maximum penalty be denied;

(e) comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months suspension
from the practice of law as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. XII-97-154 be raised to a heavier penalty;

(f) comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent be

disbarred; and

(g) rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless. 6

and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report.
In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42 referring the above-
entitled case to Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and recommendation "in view of the Motion for
Reconsideration granted by the Supreme Court."

The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his original recommendation of
the imposition of the penalty of reprimand be maintained, noting that respondent counsel had served the IBP
well as President of the Sorsogon Chapter. 7 Accordingly, on February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors,
issued the following resolution:

RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48

xxx xxx xxx

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for
Reconsideration be granted and that the penalty of REPRIMAND earlier recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner be imposed on Atty. Juan S. Dealca. 8

Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion was denied. 9

On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari in connection with
Administrative Case No. 4215 against the IBP and respondent counsel averring that the IBP Board of
Governors committed grave abuse of discretion when it overturned its earlier resolution and granted
respondent counsel's motion for reconsideration on February 23, 1999. He claimed that the earlier resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration issued on October 25, 1997 had already become final and executory;
hence, any further action or motion subsequent to such final and executory judgment shall be null and void.

335
When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several pleadings filed in the present
complaint, it should be noted that the IBP resolution denying respondent's motion for reconsideration
(Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated October 25, 1997, for some reason, had not yet reached this Court. As of
that date, the only IBP resolution attached to the records of the case was Resolution No. XII-97-54 amending
the administrative sanction from reprimand to three months suspension. Hence, at the time the pleadings were
referred back to the IBP in the same resolution, the Court was not aware that the IBP had already disposed of
the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent counsel.

Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same as granting Atty. Dealca's
motion for reconsideration and as an order for IBP to conduct a re-evaluation of the case. The IBP assumed
that its resolution of October 25, 1997 was already considered by this Court when it referred the case back to
the IBP. It failed to notice that its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was not among those
pleadings and resolution referred back to it.

Hence, on the strength of this Court's resolution which it had inadvertently misconstrued, the IBP conducted a
re-evaluation of the case and came up with the assailed resolution now sought to be reversed. The Court holds
that the error is not attributable to the IBP. It is regrettable that the procedural infirmity alleged by complainant
actually arose from a mere oversight which was attributable to neither party. HSATIC

Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged the services of
respondent lawyer only for the preparation and submission of the appellant's brief and the attorney's fees was
payable upon the completion and submission of the appellant's brief and not upon the termination of the case.

There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant's willingness to pay the attorney's fees. As agreed
upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00 upon acceptance of the case. And while
the remaining balance was not yet due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the completion and submission
of the brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the latter demanded. This,
notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply because of complainant's failure to pay the
remaining balance of P3,500.00, which does not appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by
respondent counsel's note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and
insulting language. 10

Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealca's conduct just and proper?

We find Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to
pay the fees for the services, 11 under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was
unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney's fees. In fact, complainant exerted
honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member
of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that
a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant,
respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.

The Court, however, does not agree with complainant's contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment
should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 12 In the present case,
reprimand is deemed sufficient.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a warning that
repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardoand Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

336
||| (Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 4215 (Resolution), [May 21, 2001], 410 PHIL 201-209)

Canoy vs. Ortiz, A.C. No. 5485, March 16, 2005

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005.]

ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:

There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst
of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his
legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not
mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no
reason to deviate from the norm in this case.

A Complaint 1 dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by Elmer Canoy (Canoy)
accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was
filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City. 2
Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing the complaint
ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents
and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits
to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in
April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to
follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed
way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers. 3 The
dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about the
status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper. aScITE

The Comment 4 filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the Court that since
commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at
considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that for more than ten years, his law office was a
virtual adjunct of the Public Attorney's Office with its steady stream of non-paying clients in the "hundreds or
thousands." 5 At the same time, he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung
municipalities and reaching "the people who need legal advice and assistance." 6 Atty. Ortiz pursued on with
this lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a victory which he generously attributes to the help
"of the same people whom he had helped by way of legal assistance before." 7

Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The lawyer was apparently
confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by way of compromise. He claims having
prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already
issued the order dismissing the case. 8Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the
position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that
after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, "he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local
government official and as a practicing lawyer." Eventually, "his desire to help was beyond physical limitations,"
and he withdrew from his other cases and his "free legal services." 9

According to Atty. Ortiz, "Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all that time, he was free to
visit or call the office and be entertained by the secretary as [he] would normally report to the office in the
afternoon as he had to attend to court trials and report to the Sanggunian office." 10 He states that it was his
337
policy to inform clients that they should be the ones to follow-up their cases with his office, as it would be "too
difficult and a financial burden to attend making follow-ups with hundreds of clients, mostly indigents" with
only two office personnel. 11

Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoy's complaint was without prejudice, thus the
prescriptive period had been tolled. He claims not being able to remember whether he immediately informed
Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though as far as he could recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him
that he had a lawyer to handle the case, thus his office did not insist on refiling the same. 12

The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 13 Canoy eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the complaint, but this was not
favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the investigation of a case shall not be interrupted or
terminated by reason of withdrawal of the charges. 14Eventually, the investigating commissioner concluded
that "clearly, the records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence and diligence
required of him in prosecuting his clients' (sic) claim," and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded. 15
The IBP Commission on Discipline adopted the recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz
be likewise warned that a repetition of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or low-income litigants.
Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the Public Attorney's Office, groups such as the
IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been
at the forefront in the quest to provide legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the
services of lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners who assist in this goal are especially commendable,
owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary
reward. jur2005cda

Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as that of
nonrepresentation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortiz's legal practice may have been, his particular
representation of Canoy in the latter's illegal dismissal case leaves much to be desired. CEIHcT

Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct
displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoy's case.

CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 22 — A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 22.02 — A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information
necessary for the proper handling of the matter. IAaCST

Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to attend to this
legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

338
 Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care
and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence
and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 16

If indeed Atty. Ortiz's schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able to make a
timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of
confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the
developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her
interests are being defended. 17

There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the position paper had
Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file the position paper, or maybe even the
hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the
necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not
be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be
avoided.

That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case, hardly serves to
mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03. 18

Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortiz's election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City,
as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The Code of
Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or
appointed to a public office. 19 Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from
engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors, 20 and in such instance, the attorney-client
relationship is terminated.21 However, city councilors are allowed to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation except during session hours, and in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain
prohibitions which are not relevant to this case. 22 In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to
withdraw his/her services. 23 Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice
of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal,
and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the
case. 24

Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave
complainant in the cold unprotected. 25 Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is
discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason
why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of
another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this
new counsel. aDHCAE

In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had not been filed and that
the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz, much more so considering that
Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his favored clientele. It does not
escape the Court's attention that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequately following up the case with his
office. 26 He cannot now shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire about the status of the case,

339
since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him.
27

The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the penalty
imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of
three months, six months, and even disbarment in aggravated cases. 28 Given the circumstances, the Court
finds the penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of
law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu of an admonition or a reprimand
considering that Atty. Ortiz's undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was compounded
by his failure to inform Canoy of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint.

Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford legal services
deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-
meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be
assured of legal representation. They deserve quality representation as well.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED. aIETCA

Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

||| (Canoy v. Ortiz, A.C. No. 5485, [March 16, 2005], 493 PHIL 553-562)

Administrative Liability and Procedure against Lawyers

Bengco vs. Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6368. June 13, 2012.]

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, complainants, vs. ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO,
respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J p:

This is a complaint 1 for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco
(Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo
Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully]
and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein complainants Fidela G.
Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he
would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are
the acquaintance of complainants herein and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they
will finance and deliver to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would
expedite the titling of the subject land and further by means of other similar deceit like
340
 misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject
land, who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is
the one handling William Gatchalian's business transaction and that he has contracts at
NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver the said
amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from complying with his
obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and
illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and
benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he failed and refused to do
so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and
Violation of Duties and Oath as a lawyer. 2 CIAcSa

In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated December 7, 1998 3 and
June 22, 1999 4 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding
probable cause for the filing of the criminal information 5against both Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat
(Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the
crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment. 6 On September 24, 2004, the respondent filed an undated
Comment, 7 wherein he denied the allegations against him and averred the following:

2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22,
1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of [P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat
whom they contacted and who in turn sought the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy
Magat who received the said money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and respondent. The
arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no
participation of respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in law
practice. 8

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. ACaDTH

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment pursuant to Rule 139-B,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the respondent's undated comment filed with the Court was
not verified. 9

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15) days from March 17,
2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his medical confinement. 10

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion 11 for extension praying for another 20 days,
or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. 12 The respondent failed to appear; thus, the
IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an answer despite
extensions granted. The case was then submitted for report and recommendation. 13

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made the following
findings:

[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help and in
connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by using false pretenses and
deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent
would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who
were the acquaintance of complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the
amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the titling of the subject
341
 land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner of
Plastic City located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer
of the subject land once it has been titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they
have contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation
they knew to be false, fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give and
deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said amount, far from
complying with their obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land,
respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon them
to return the said amount, they failed and refused to do so. TaISEH

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a complaint for
Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and
Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the said court,
it finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa
defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was
transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as
per Order dated 7 December 1998.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga
conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation thereof, Magat was
willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of [P]200,000.00 because according to him
the amount of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent considering that the said
amount was turned over to respondent for expenses incurred in the documentation prior to
the titling of the subject land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for
time to pay back their obligations to the complainants. However, despite extensions of time
granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their
obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of compromise was construed to be an
implied admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason
to disturb the findings of the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed
against respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several
occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which
deserves disciplinary sanction . . . .

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent committed a
crime that import deceit and violation of his attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which he was bound to 'obey the laws of the land.' The
commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in
violation of the attorney's oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for
suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC). ATHCac

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16
April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as
amended, dated 24 March 2004, "A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct" (Section
1, Rule VIII). 14

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

. . . [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS

from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the
Bar.15

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz.:

342
 RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of the amount of [P]200,000.00
within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice with Warning that if he does not return the
amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then he will be meted the penalty of
Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 16

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 of the aforesaid Resolution of
the IBP. The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that the
complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been
dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to
finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with Teresita as
evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement 18 signed by the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the
Investigating Commissioner considered him as in default after having ignored the representative he sent
during the hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount of P225,000.00 not as an offer of
compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to Teresita's declaration that he had to stop
acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission
made by Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by
photocopies of receipts.

In an Order 19 dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to comment within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof. HAEIac

In her Comment, 20 Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative case
because they took into consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding
since it would stain the respondent's reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which
prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order to trace the respondent's
whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution
of the P200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation 21 stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the criminal case
for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa
under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum."
22

In a Letter 23 dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the present action as
she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case 24 dated September 1, 2010
was filed by the complainants. In another Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for
Atty. Bernardo's restitution of the amount of P200,000.00 so she can use the money to buy her medicine and
other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondent's defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that
administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of
the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability
of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward,
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for. 25 CITcSH

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several extensions of time to
file the same, the respondent failed to appear during the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a
lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the court's authority
which can not be countenanced.

343
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our
legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined — whether in their professional or in their private capacity — for any
conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor. 26

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. — A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.

Rule 3.01. — A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted in his
answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of
land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the
fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can
expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by
the complainants in the amount of P495,000.00. IcCDAS

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 27

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against
a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in the
criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the
respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively." 28

In Yu v. Palaña, 29 the Court held that:

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal
case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be
rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when
the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. 30(Citations omitted) ETDAaC

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of Estafa for which he was
meted the penalty of sentenced * to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day ofPrision Mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines
the respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

344
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment commensurate to all his
acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-year-old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.
acAESC

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco
and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of
compliance thereof to the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with
a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Brion, Perez and Sereno, JJ., concur.

||| (Bengco v. Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, [June 13, 2012], 687 PHIL 7-18)

Zaguirre vs. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003.]

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent.

Ariel M. Los Banos for complainant.

SYNOPSIS
At bar is an administrative case for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of Gross
Immoral Conduct. Respondent allegedly had an illicit relationship with a woman other than his wife and
sired a child with her. The respondent did not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant, but
argued that what happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire. He claimed that he did
not use any deception to win her affection.
The Supreme Court held that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below
the standards of morality required of every lawyer. Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with
a woman not his wife and now refused to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized
and promised to support. Clearly, he violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and
should be disciplined accordingly. The fact that complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing
full well his marital status did not absolve respondent of gross immorality for what is in question in a case
like this was respondent's fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It was not dependent whether or
not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him. The Court held that a lawyer
may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Accordingly, it found the
respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and imposed upon him the penalty of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; GROSS IMMORALITY; IMMORAL CONDUCT; DEFINED. — Immoral conduct has
been defined as: ". . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
345
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SIRING A CHILD WITH A WOMAN OTHER THAN HIS WIFE IS A CONDUCT WAY BELOW THE
STANDARDS OF MORALITY REQUIRED OF EVERY LAWYER. — In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano,
Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that: ". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to
the strict standard of conduct demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a
woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these standards." Siring a child with a woman other than his
wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYERS MUST NOT ONLY IN FACT BE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER BUT MUST ALSO BE
SEEN TO BE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER; CASE AT BAR. — Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege
on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a
certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession,
tantamount to self-stultification. This Court has repeatedly held: "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only
in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards." While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he
seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous," and that what
happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust and desire." The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is
appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYER'S FITNESS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION NOT DEPENDENT ON
WHETHER THE OTHER PARTY KNOWINGLY ENGAGED IN AN IMMORAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MARRIED
LAWYER. — Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo that
complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve
him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondent's fitness to be a member of the
legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral
relationship with him.

5. ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS; DEFENSE OF IN PART DELICTO IMMATERIAL THEREIN. — We agree
with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras: "In a
disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a proceeding
to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the
public and the courts."

6. ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS; AN APPLICANT FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR MUST SHOW
THAT HE POSSESSES GOOD MORAL CHARACTER. — The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while
respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that
an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral character,
a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. DHSACT

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IS A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT TO THE
PRACTICE OF LAW. — This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession,
but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession; it is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR IS A PRIVILEGE BURDENED WITH CONDITIONS. — The Court held:
"The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We must
stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice
law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
346
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard." and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya: "The practice
of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance
of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law."

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; STANDARDS OF MORALITY; VIOLATED WHERE A LAWYER REPEATEDLY ENGAGED IN SEXUAL
CONGRESS WITH A WOMAN NOT HIS WIFE AND REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE AND SUPPORT THEIR CHILD. —
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize
and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent
violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

10. ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; NOT TO BE METED OUT IF A LESSER PUNISHMENT COULD BE GIVEN; INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION IMPOSED UPON RESPONDENT IN CASE AT BAR. — As consistently held by this Court,
disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be given. Records show that from the time he
took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in
Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondent's effort to mend his
ways or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court
deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should be meted out than
disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full satisfaction of
the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness
required of every member of the profession.

11. ID.; ID.; A LAWYER MAY BE SUSPENDED OR DISBARRED FOR ANY MISCONDUCT EVEN IF IT PERTAINS TO
HIS PRIVATE ACTIVITIES. — The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the
ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.

The facts as borne by the records are as follows:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). 1 Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing
himself to be single. 2 Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until
1997. 3 During their affair, respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10,
1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. 4 It was only around the first week of May 1997 that
complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted
her about her relationship with respondent. 5 On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer,
executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she
was carrying as his. 6 On December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. 7 By this
time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support. 8

Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but
mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was
already married and with children; 9 complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that
he is already married; 10 the child borne by complainant it not his, because the complainant was seeing other
men at the time they were having an affair. 11 He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10,
1997 but explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the
time that complainant was seeing other men. 12
347
After due haring, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral
conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

xxx xxx xxx

"CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."

xxx xxx xxx

"Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession."

Immoral conduct has been defined as:

". . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency." 13

In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he declared explicitly:

"1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;

"2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;

"3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my own;

"4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal and
medical needs, education, housing, food, clothing and other necessities for living, which I will
give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal age and
capable to live on his/her own;

"5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my child;
however, my failure to sign does not negate the recognition and acknowledgement already
done herein;

"6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I have
full knowledge of the consequence of such acknowledgment and recognition." 14

More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:

"Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and
others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your daughter.

"Here's my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix
amount for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not
more than P1,000." 15

In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that:

". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct
demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than
his lawful wife fails to meet these standards." 16

Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required
of every lawyer. 17

348
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to
support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly
censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification. 18

This Court has repeatedly held:

"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards." 19

While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from
the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous," 20 and that what happened between them was
"nothing but mutual lust and desire." 21 The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible,
amoral attitude of the respondent.

Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo that complainant
entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross
immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondent's fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship
with him.

We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:

"In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because
this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession
of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts." 22

The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations.
Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar
must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar. 23This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession;
24 it is a continuing requirement to the practice of law 25 and therefore admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or
moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a
rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.

The Court held:

"The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard." 26

and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:

"The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards
of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with
the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law." 27

Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize
and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent
violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be given. 28
Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now
349
lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of
respondent's effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession
of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension
should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to
show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he has instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral
integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
29

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and
ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., are on leave.

||| (Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, [March 6, 2003], 446 PHIL 861-872)

Fortun vs. Quinsayas, G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013.]

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN, petitioner, vs. PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA
OQUENDO, DENNIS AYON, NENITA OQUENDO, ESMAEL MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA,
MELINDA QUINTOS DE JESUS, REYNALDO HULOG, REDMOND BATARIO, MALOU
MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA NETWORK, INC. through its news editors Raffy Jimenez
and Victor Sollorano, SOPHIA DEDACE, ABS-CBN CORPORATION through the Head of its
News Group, Maria Ressa, CECILIA VICTORIA OREÑA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,
INC. represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, TETCH TORRES,
PHILIPPINE STAR represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and EDU PUNAY,
respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun (petitioner) against Atty. Prima
Jesusa B. Quinsayas (Atty. Quinsayas), Ma. Gemma Oquendo (Gemma), Dennis Ayon (Ayon), Nenita Oquendo
(Nenita), Esmael Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), Jose Pavia (Pavia), Melinda Quintos De Jesus (De Jesus),
Reynaldo Hulog (Hulog), Redmond Batario (Batario), Malou Mangahas (Mangahas), and Danilo Gozo (Gozo).
Atty. Quinsayas and the other respondents, who are not from the media, are referred to in this case as Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. Petitioner also named as respondents GMA Network, Inc. (GMA Network) through its news
editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace (Dedace), ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN)
through the Head of its News Group Maria Ressa (Ressa), Cecilia Victoria Oreña-Drilon (Drilon), Philippine Daily

350
Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, Tetch Torres (Torres), Philippine
Star (PhilStar) represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu Punay (Punay). Respondents Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. and respondent media groups and personalities are collectively referred to in this case as
respondents.

The Antecedent Facts

On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao vice-mayor
Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and journalists, was on their way to the Commission on
Elections office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatu's Certificate of Candidacy 1 when they were accosted by
a group of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town, some four to ten
kilometers from their destination. 2 The group was taken hostage and brought to a hilly and sparsely-
populated part of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan, Maguindanao. 3 The gruesome aftermath of
the hostage-taking was later discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were systematically killed by
shooting them at close range with automatic weapons, and their bodies and vehicles were dumped in mass
graves and covered with the use of a backhoe. 4 These gruesome killings became known as the Maguindanao
Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30 of them journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder
were filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal Cases
No. Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652, and Q-10-163766. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu
Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the murder cases.

In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before this Court,
docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment case is still pending.

Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website posted an article, written by
Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of Ampatuan lawyer," a portion of which reads:

On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four others filed a 33
page complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they accused of "engaging in every
conceivable chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the proceedings by using and abusing
legal remedies available." 5

On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article, written by Torres, which according to
petitioner also stated details of the disbarment case, as follows: AHacIS

"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to obstruct, impede
and degrade the administration of justice by filing countless causes of action, all in the hope
of burying the principal issue of his client's participation or guilt in the murder of 57 people
that ill-fated day of November 23, 2009," the petitioners said. 6

Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an article, written by Punay, which
gave details of the disbarment allegations, thus:

"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under under the
rules, muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of
the cases, read the complaint.

xxx xxx xxx

"Respondent Attorney Fortun's act of misleading the prosecution and trial court is a
dishonest/deceitful conduct violative of Code of Professional Responsibility," read the
complaint.

"In so doing, he diminished the public confidence in the law and the legal profession,
rendering him unfit to be called a member of the Bar." 7

Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on national television a program
entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre." Drilon, the program's host, asked
questions and allowed Atty. Quinsayas to discuss the disbarment case against petitioner, including its
principal points. Petitioner was allegedly singled out and identified in the program as the lead counsel of the
Ampatuan family.

351
Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint
against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of disbarment
proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and personalities conspired with Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential materials on their respective media platforms. Petitioner
pointed out that Drilon discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in a television program
viewed nationwide.

Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him exposed this Court and
its investigators to outside influence and public interference. Petitioner alleged that opinion writers wrote
about and commented on the disbarment complaint which opened his professional and personal reputation to
attack. He alleged that the purpose of respondents in publishing the disbarment complaint was to malign his
personal and professional reputation, considering the following: (1) the bases of the charges were not new but
were based on incidents that supposedly took place in January 2010; (2) it was timed to coincide with the
anniversary of the Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn for Ampatuan, Jr. and his
counsel and violated the accused's right to presumption of innocence and due process; (3) it was published
following articles written about petitioner's advocacy for the rights of an accused and negated the impact of
these articles on the public; and (4) respondents knew that the charges were baseless as petitioner always
opted for speedy trial and protection of the accused's rights at trial. Petitioner further alleged that in
announcing their "causes of action" in the disbarment case, respondents were only seeking the approval and
sympathy of the public against him and Ampatuan, Jr.

In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that it has no newspaper or any publication where it could have printed
the article. It alleged that it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint on its television station. GMA Network
alleged that the publication had already been done and completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of
the disbarment complaint and thus, the members of the media who reported the news and the media groups
that published it on their website, including GMA Network, did not violate the confidentiality rule. GMA Network
further alleged that Dedace, a field reporter for the judiciary, acted in good faith and without malice when she
forwarded the news to the news desk. GMA News also acted in good faith in posting the news on its website.
GMA Network denied that it conspired with the other respondents in publishing the news. GMA Network
alleged that it posted the disbarment complaint, without any unfair, critical, and untruthful comment, and only
after it was "published" by Atty. Quinsayas, et al. who furnished copies of the disbarment complaint to the
media reporters. GMA Network alleged that it had no intention to malign petitioner's personal and professional
reputation in posting the news about the disbarment complaint on its website. SEcADa

In her Comment, Dedace clarified that she is a field news reporter of GMA Network and not a writer of the GMA
News TV website. Her beat includes the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Department of Justice.
Dedace alleged that on 22 November 2010, she received an advice from fellow field reporter Mark Merueñas
that the lawyer of Mangudadatu would be filing a disbarment case against petitioner. She waited at the
Supreme Court. At around 5:00 p.m., Atty. Quinsayas arrived. Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the petition to
news reporters and Dedace received one. Dedace prepared and sent her news story to GMA Network where it
went to the editor. Dedace alleged that she did not breach the rule on confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings against lawyers when she reported the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner. She
alleged that she acted in good faith and without malice in forwarding her news story to the news desk and that
she had no intention to, and could not, influence or interfere in the proceedings of the disbarment case. She
further alleged that she honestly believed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was
newsworthy and should be reported as news.

PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net website through a syndication but the
latter has its own editors and publish materials that are not found on the broadsheet. It alleged that Philippine
Daily Inquirer, Inc. and Inquirer Interactive, Inc. are two different corporations, with separate legal personalities,
and one may not be held responsible for the acts of the other.

Torres 8 alleged in her Comment that on 17 November 2010, a private prosecutor told her and several other
reporters that a disbarment case would be filed against petitioner. The disbarment case was actually filed on
22 November 2010 when Torres received a copy of the complaint. Since the lead of the story came from a
lawyer, Torres did not consider that writing a story about the filing of the disbarment complaint might amount
to contempt of court. Torres alleged that the writing of the story was an independent act and she did not
conspire with any of the other respondents. Torres maintained that she acted in good faith in writing the news
352
report because the Maguindanao Massacre was a matter of public concern and the allegations in the
disbarment complaint were in connection with petitioner's handling of the case. Torres further asserted that
petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs and character.

In her Comment, Ressa alleged that she was the former head of ABS-CBN's News and Current Affairs Group
and the former Managing Director of ANC. However, she was on terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010 in
advance to the expiration of her contract on 3 January 2011. Ressa alleged that she had no participation in the
production and showing of the broadcast on 23 November 2010. Ressa adopts the answer of her co-
respondents ABS-CBN and Drilon insofar as it was applicable to her case.

ABS-CBN and Drilon filed a joint Comment. ABS-CBN alleged that ABS-CBN News Channel, commonly known
as ANC, is maintained and operated by Sarimanok Network News (SNN) and not by ABS-CBN. SNN, which
produced the program "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre," is a subsidiary of ABS-
CBN but it has its own juridical personality although SNN and ABS-CBN have interlocking directors. ABS-CBN
and Drilon alleged that the presentation and hosting of the program were not malicious as there was no
criminal intent to violate the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. They alleged that the program was
a commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and was not a report solely on the disbarment complaint
against petitioner which took only a few minutes of the one-hour program. They alleged that the program was
not a publication intended to embarrass petitioner who was not even identified as the respondent in the
disbarment complaint. Drilon even cautioned against the revelation of petitioner's name in the program. ABS-
CBN and Drilon further alleged that prior to the broadcast of the program on 23 November 2010, the filing of
the disbarment complaint against petitioner was already the subject of widespread news and already of public
knowledge. They denied petitioner's allegation that they conspired with the other respondents in violating the
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. Finally, they alleged that the contempt charge violates their right
to equal protection because there were other reports and publications of the disbarment complaint but the
publishers were not included in the charge. They also assailed the penalty of imprisonment prayed for by
petitioner as too harsh.

In their joint Comment, respondents Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma alleged that petitioner failed to
prove that they actively participated in disseminating details of the disbarment complaint against him. They
alleged that while they were the ones who filed the disbarment complaint against petitioner, it does not follow
that they were also the ones who caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged that petitioner did not
provide the name of any particular person, dates, days or places to show the alleged confederation in the
dissemination of the disbarment complaint. ISEHTa

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, and Mangahas, in their capacity as members of the Board of Trustees
of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists, Inc. (FFFJ) and Atty. Quinsayas, former counsel for FFFJ, also
filed a joint Comment claiming that the alleged posting and publication of the articles were not established as
a fact. Respondents alleged that petitioner did not submit certified true copies of the articles and he only
offered to submit a digital video disk (DVD) copy of the televised program where Atty. Quinsayas was allegedly
interviewed by Drilon. Respondents alleged that, assuming the articles were published, petitioner failed to
support his allegations that they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint.

In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that on 22 November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. went to
this Court to file the disbarment complaint but they were not able to file it on that day. 9 Atty. Quinsayas, et al.
were able to file the disbarment complaint the following day, or on 23 November 2010. PhilStar and Punay
alleged that their news article, which was about the plan to file a disbarment complaint against petitioner, was
published on 23 November 2010. It came out before the disbarment complaint was actually filed. They alleged
that the news article on the disbarment complaint is a qualified privileged communication. They alleged that
the article was a true, fair, and accurate report on the disbarment complaint. The article was straightforward,
truthful, and accurate, without any comments from the author. They alleged that Punay reported the plan of
Mangudadatu, et al. to file the disbarment complaint against petitioner as it involved public interest and he
perceived it to be a newsworthy subject. They further alleged that assuming the news article is not a privileged
communication, it is covered by the protection of the freedom of expression, speech, and of the press under
the Constitution. They also alleged that the case is a criminal contempt proceeding and intent to commit
contempt of court must be shown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. They further alleged that they did not
commit any contemptible act. They maintained that the news article did not impede, interfere with, or
embarrass the administration of justice. They further claimed that it is improbable, if not impossible, for the
353
article to influence the outcome of the case or sway this Court in making its decision. The article also did not
violate petitioner's right to privacy because petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest
in his doings, affairs, and character.

Pavia died during the pendency of this case 10 and was no longer included in the Comment filed for the FFFJ
Trustees. Gozo resigned as member of the FFFJ Trustees and was no longer represented by the FFFJ counsel
in filing its comment. 11 Gozo did not file a separate comment.

The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings,
warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

The Ruling of this Court

First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt. In People v. Godoy, 12 this
Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or
a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in
failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the
violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an
offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public
justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to
punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are
remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been
held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no
one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of
civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the contempt is
immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court's order is not a
defense in civil contempt. 13

The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner had been
published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent media groups and personalities.
CHTcSE

We shall discuss the defenses and arguments raised by respondents.

GMA Network, Inc.

GMA Network's defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication where the article could be printed; it did
not broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television station; and that the publication was already
completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint to the media.

GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment complaint on its website. It merely said
that it has no publication where the article could be printed and that the news was not televised. Online
posting, however, is already publication considering that it was done on GMA Network's online news website.

Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.

PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a syndication. PDI attached a photocopy
of the syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication agreements between PDI and Inquirer.net, some
articles published in PDI may not appear in Inquirer.net." 14

A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the
Philippines' most widely circulated broadsheet, and a member of the Inquirer Group of Companies." 15 PDI
was not able to fully establish that it has a separate personality from Inquirer.net.
354
 ABS-CBN Corporation
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have interlocking directors, SNN has its own
juridical personality separate from its parent company. ABS-CBN alleged that SNN controls the line-up of
shows of ANC.

We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has an independent and separate
juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company and that any suit against the the latter does not
bind the former and vice-versa. 16 A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from that of other corporations to which it may be connected. 17 Hence, SNN, not ABS-
CBN, should have been made respondent in this case.

Maria Ressa
Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the program about the Maguindanao
Massacre was aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production. Ressa's defense was supported by a
certification from the Human Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN, stating that Ressa went on terminal leave
beginning 30 October 2010. 18 This was not disputed by petitioner.

Sophia Dedace, Tetch Torres, Cecilia Victoria Oreña-Drilon,

and Edu Punay
Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay was that the disbarment complaint
was published without any comment, in good faith and without malice; that petitioner is a public figure; that the
Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of public interest; and that there was no conspiracy on their part in
publishing the disbarment complaint. They also argued that the news reports were part of privileged
communication.

In Drilon's case, she further alleged that the television program was a commemoration of the Maguindanao
Massacre and not solely about the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner. Even as the disbarment
complaint was briefly discussed in her program, petitioner's name was not mentioned at all in the program.

Violation of Confidentiality Rule by Respondent Media Groups

and Personalities
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other
cases.

The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

. . . . The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free
from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and
professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled,
vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without authority. We have ruled that malicious and
unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against
lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature
publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or
both at the discretion of the Court. . . . 19 CHTcSE

In People v. Castelo, 20 the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of privileged
communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:

While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for
both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by
our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the
other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the
press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications
can also be invoked in favor of appellant. 21

355
The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." 22 As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in
nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a
disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the
Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his
involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations
in the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre case.

The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the massacre, 30 were journalists.
It is understandable that any matter related to the Maguindanao Massacre is considered a matter of public
interest and that the personalities involved, including petitioner, are considered as public figure. The Court
explained it, thus:

But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not necessarily
follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For he could; for instance,
if and when he would be involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or
because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The
public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant
and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity
or notoriety. 23 (Boldface in the original)

Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to publish such fact
under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that respondent media groups and personalities merely
acted on a news lead they received when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.

The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to
absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a public
figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of public concern, and because the
event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern, the
media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It would have been different
if the disbarment case against petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to
respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a
legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a
disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of
the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency. Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers must still remain private and confidential until their final determination. 24 Only
the final order of this Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. 25

Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups and personalities acted in bad
faith and that they conspired with one another in their postings and publications of the filing of a disbarment
complaint against him. Respondent media groups and personalities reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint without any comments or remarks but merely as it was — a news item. Petitioner failed to prove that
respondent media groups and personalities acted with malicious intent. Respondent media groups and
personalities made a fair and true news report and appeared to have acted in good faith in publishing and
posting the details of the disbarment complaint. In the televised broadcast of the commemoration of the
Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the disbarment case was briefly discussed but petitioner was not named.
There was also no proof that respondent media groups and personalities posted and published the news to
influence this Court on its action on the disbarment case or to deliberately destroy petitioner's reputation. It
should also be remembered that the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner entered the public domain
without any act on the part of the media. As we will discuss later, the members of the media were given copies
of the disbarment complaint by one of the complainants. IDcAHT

Esmael Mangudadatu, Dennis Ayon,

Nenita and Ma. Gemma Oquendo

356
Respondents, while admitting that they were some of the complainants in the disbarment complaint against
petitioner, alleged that there was no proof that they were the ones who disseminated the disbarment
complaint. Indeed, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma
were the ones who caused the publication of the disbarment complaint against him. There was nothing in the
records that would show that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma distributed or had a hand in the
distribution of the disbarment complaint against petitioner.

Melinda Quintos De Jesus, Reynaldo Hulog,

Redmond Batario, Malou Mangahas, and
Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas
Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas alleged that petitioner was not able to
establish the posting and publication of the articles about the disbarment complaint, and that assuming the
posting and publication had been established, petitioner failed to support his allegation that they actively
disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint. They further alleged that they did not cause the
publication of the news articles and thus, they did not violate the rule on privacy and confidentiality of
disbarment proceedings.

Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other respondents, namely De Jesus,
Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and even Gozo, who did not file his separate comment, had a hand in the
dissemination and publication of the disbarment complaint against him. It would appear that only Atty.
Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint. In its Comment, GMA
Network stated that the publication "had already been done and completed when copies of the complaint for
disbarment were distributed by one of the disbarment complainants, Atty. Prima Quinsayas . . . ." 26 Dedace
also stated in her Comment that "Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun
and she received one[.]" 27

Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant in the
disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is
familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its
confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to
members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court. In Relativo v. De Leon, 28 the Court ruled that
the premature disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation of
the confidentiality rule. 29 In that case, Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a disbarment case, caused the
publication in newspapers of statements regarding the filing and pendency of the disbarment proceedings.
The Court found him guilty of contempt.

Indirect contempt against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine
not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both. 30Atty. Quinsayas acted wrongly in
setting aside the confidentiality rule which every lawyer and member of the legal profession should know.
Hence, we deem it proper to impose on her a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for distributing copies of
the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media and we order her to
pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

||| (Fortun v. Quinsayas, G.R. No. 194578, [February 13, 2013], 703 PHIL 578-600)

Villalon, Jr. vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73751, September 24, 1986

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 73751. September 24, 1986.]

357
 ROMAN R. VILLALON, JR., ROMAN R.C. III, ROMAN F.C. IV, ROMAN A.C. V., JOSE CLARO C.
and ARSENIO ROY C., all surnamed VILLALON, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION), HON. INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN
(PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXIX AT SAN FERNANDO, LA
UNION), CATALINA NEVAL VDA. DE EBUIZA, CHILDREN OF PATROCINIO EBUIZA (JUSTINA,
MARIANO, FELICIDAD, FRANCISCO, EUGENIA, MARIA, MARCIANA, and SIMEON, all
surnamed EBUIZA), respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; MAY BE AVAILED OF TO CONTEST AN

INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. — Certiorari may be availed of to contest an interlocutory order to correct a patent
abuse of discretion by the lower Court in issuing the same, (Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 [1975]). It may
also be applied for when the broader interests of justice so require or when ordinary appeal is not an adequate
remedy open to petitioners, while procedurally correct, would then inadequate and ineffective for purposes of
impeachment. the broader interests of justice would then require that petitioners be given sufficient latitude to
present and prove their impeaching evidence for judicial appreciation.

2. ID.; COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT; CONFIDENTIALITY OF PROCEEDINGS; MAY BE WAIVED BY THE

LAWYER AFFECTED. — While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and confidential except
for the final order which shall be made public, (Section 10, Rule 139), that confidentiality is a privilege/right
which may be waived by the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional
reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary
to public policy, among others, (Article 6, Civil Code).

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

On May 16, 1979, Civil Case No. 2799 for "Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Recovery of Possession and
Damages" was filed by private respondent Catalina NEVAL Vda. de Ebuiza, mother of the other private
respondents all surnamed Ebuiza, against petitioner Atty. Roman R. Villalon, Jr. (briefly, petitioner Villalon) and
his sons, before the then Court of First Instance of La Union (the Trial Court), for the recovery of a parcel of
land located at Urbiztondo, San Juan, La Union.

The property involved was also the subject of a Disbarment Case (Adm. Case No. 1488) previously filed on
July 22, 1975 with this Court by private respondent Francisco EBUIZA, charging petitioner Villalon with
falsification of a deed of absolute sale of that property in his and his sons' favor, but which petitioner Villalon
claimed to have been his contingent fee for the professional services he had rendered to EBUIZA's parents for
successfully handling Civil Case No. 1418 entitled "Paulino Ebuiza, et al. vs. Patrocinio Ebuiza, et al." before the
then Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch II. The Disbarment Case was referred by this Court to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation where testimonial evidence was
received. The case still pends thereat.

In the course of the trial of the Civil Case, petitioners introduced in evidence the testimonies of some of the
private respondents, namely, NEVAL, EBUIZA, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan (NEVAL, et als.), in the Disbarment
Case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies in the Civil Case.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Strike from the records of the Civil Case all matters relating to the
proceedings in the Disbarment Case. Over petitioners' opposition, on September 20, 1985, the Trial Court
issued its questioned Order granting the Motion to Strike. The dispositive portion of said Order reads: LLphil

"WHEREFORE, finding the motion to be well-taken, and as prayed for in the motion, all direct
references to the proceedings in the disbarment case against Atty. Villalon, Jr. are hereby

358
 ordered striking (sic) out from the records and henceforth, further references to such matters
are barred."

The Trial Court opined that the admission of the contested evidence would violate Section 10, Rule 139 of the
Rules of Court providing that "proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential". It maintained
that petitioner Villalon "is not at liberty to waive the privilege of confidentiality" of the proceedings in the
Disbarment Case considering the public interest involved "even if it would serve his interest," and that Section
10, Rule 139 provides no exception.

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on October 17, 1985, petitioners, resorted to a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus before the respondent Appellate Court to nullify the Order of
September 20, 1985 and to require the Trial Court to allow the impeaching evidence to remain in the records of
the Civil Case.

On February 3, 1986, respondent Appellate Court denied due course and dismissed the Petition holding that
"rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial
are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari." Moreover, it
reasoned out that, assuming the Trial Court erred in rejecting petitioners' proffered evidence, their recourse is
to make a formal offer of the evidence under Rule 132, Section 35 of the Rules. The reconsideration of said
ruling sought by petitioners was denied for lack of merit on February 19, 1986.

Petitioners now avail of this Petition for Review on Certiorari praying among others, for the annulment of
respondent Appellate Court's Decision, which sustained the Trial Court Orders of September 20, 1985 and
October 17, 1985, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

We find merit in the Petition.

Petitioners introduced the testimonies of private respondents' witnesses in the Disbarment Case for purposes
of impeaching their credibility in the Civil Case. 1 Petitioners claim that private respondents' witnesses "have
given conflicting testimonies on important factual matters in the disbarment case, which are inconsistent with
their present testimony and which would accordingly cast a doubt on their credibility." 2 That is a defense tool
sanctioned by Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 providing:

"Sec. 15. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be impeached by the party
against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful
acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witnesses, or the record of the
judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.

"Sec. 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a witness
can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with
his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so; allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them."

By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the credibility of their
adverse parties' witnesses by proving that on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent with
the statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are material to the issues in the
Civil Case, The subject matter involved in the disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the deed
of absolute sale in petitioners' favor, is the same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the annulment of the
said deed of absolute sale is sought. prLL

Admittedly, said Order is interlocutory in character. However, since it was issued in patent abuse of discretion,
Certiorari lies. Certiorari may be availed of to contest an interlocutory order to correct a patent abuse of
discretion by the lower Court in issuing the same. 3 It may also be applied for when the broader interests of
justice so require or when ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy, 4 as in this case. The offer of evidence,
suggested by respondent Appellate Court as a remedy open to petitioners, while procedurally correct, would be
inadequate and ineffective for purposes of impeachment. The broader interests of justice would then require

359
that petitioners be given sufficient latitude to present and prove their impeaching evidence for judicial
appreciation.

While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and confidential except for the final order which
shall be made public, 5 that confidentiality is a privilege/right which may be waived by the very lawyer in whom
and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general
principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others. 6 In fact, the
Court also notes that even private respondents' counsel touched on some matters testified to by NEVAL in the
disbarment proceedings and which were the subject of cross examination.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE respondent Appellate Court's Decision dated February 3, 1986,
and Resolution dated February 19, 1986, and directs the Regional Trial Court of La Union, at San Fernando, to
allow the testimonies of private respondents (plaintiffs below), more specifically those of Catalina Neval Vda.
de Ebuiza, Francisco Ebuiza and Justina Ebuiza San Juan, given in Administrative Case No. 1488 and all other
references thereto to remain in the records of Civil Case No. 2799 entitled "Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza,
Plaintiff, versus Roman R. Villalon, Jr., et al., Defendants; Children of Patrocinio Ebuiza: Justina, et al., all
surnamed Ebuiza, Intervenors."

The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., on leave.

||| (Villalon, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73751 (Resolution), [September 24, 1986], 228 PHIL 420-
425)

Plaza vs. Amamio, A.M. No. P-08-2559, March 19, 2010

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. P-08-2559. March 19, 2010.]

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2940-P)

RYAN S. PLAZA, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu, complainant, vs. ATTY.
MARCELINA R. AMAMIO, Clerk of Court, GENOVEVA R. VASQUEZ, Legal Researcher and
FLORAMAY PATALINGHUG, Court Stenographer, all of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
Argao, Cebu, respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J p:

The court and its premises shall be used exclusively for court or judicial functions and not for any
other purpose. As temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must be preserved at all times.
Factual Antecedents
On July 25, 2007, Ryan S. Plaza (Plaza), Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu,
filed a complaint 1 against Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio (Amamio), Clerk of Court; Genoveva R. Vasquez
(Vasquez), Legal Researcher, and Floramay Patalinghug (Patalinghug), Court Stenographer, all of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, for intentional violation of Administrative Circular No.

360
3-92, 2 when they allowed Sara Lee, a private company selling beauty and fashion products, to hold a party
and raffle draw inside the Argao Hall of Justice on July 14, 2007.
The facts as summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) are as follows:
The complainant alleges that sometime in the first week of July 2007, he heard that some of
the personnel of RTC (Branch 26) were planning to hold a Sara Lee party in the Argao Hall of
Justice and that upon learning of the plan, he informed the personnel of the said court about
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 prohibiting the use of the Halls of Justice for residential or
commercial purposes. HICATc

The complainant claims that in the morning of July 14, 2007, a Saturday, the security guard on
duty, Mr. Roger O. Jimenez, telephoned him with the information that there were persons from
Sara Lee who wanted to enter the Argao Hall of Justice to put up the decorations, sound
system and catering equipment for the Sara Lee party. The complainant states that he
directed Mr. Jimenez not to allow the persons to enter the premises. He then called up Atty.
Amamio to inform her of the situation and of the infraction that would be committed should
the Sara Lee party push through. The complainant alleges that Atty. Amamio insisted that she
had authorized the Sara Lee party and raffle draw.

The complainant then recounts the events that transpired as recorded in the security logbook
of the Argao Hall of Justice . . . . In the logbook, Mr. Jimenez wrote that at around 11:05 in the
morning of July 14, 2007, he received a telephone call from Ms. Vasquez approving the use of
the entrance lobby for the raffle draw which she claimed was authorized by Atty. Amamio.
According to the entries in the logbook, the raffle draw started at around 2:00 p.m. and ended
at 5:00 p.m., with fifty-one (51) participants attending the event.

The complainant adds that even the security guards on duty who recorded the Sara Lee event
in the logbook were later subjected to . . . harassment by the respondents who questioned the
guards [as to] why the said event was recorded in the logbook. He claims that Atty. Amamio
even reprimanded the guards . . ., castigating the latter for also jotting down in the logbook
court personnel who were not in uniform.

The complainant stresses that holding the party and raffle draw inside the Argao Hall of
Justice was a clear violation of Administrative Circular 3-92 and had exposed the properties
and records contained within it to risk of damage and loss.

The joint comment (denominated as Compliance) dated August 21, 2007 of respondents
Amamio, Vasquez and Patalinghug "vehemently and strongly RESIST the charges against
them for utter lack of both legal and factual bases . . . ."

The respondents do not deny that they allowed the holding of the Sara Lee raffle draw on July
14, 2007 at the ground floor lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice, but only after respondents
Amamio and Vasquez had fully discussed the matter upon receipt of the letter dated June 4,
2007 of Mrs. Virginia C. Tecson, business manager of the Fuller Life Direct Selling and
Personal Collection, requesting permission to hold the raffle draw of Sara Lee at the Argao
Hall of Justice.

The respondents argue that similar activities had been held before at the Argao Hall of
Justice. They said that during the fiesta of Argao in September 2006, a stage for beauty
pageant was put up right at the entrance of the Argao Hall of Justice. The contestants and
other participants used the ground floor lobby, the stairs and the second floor lobby of the
said building. On January 28, 2007, the Municipality of Argao held a Sinulog parade which
culminated in the town plaza. Since the Argao Hall of Justice fronts the town plaza, some
spectators entered the building and went up the second floor to watch the performance in the
plaza. They add that on the ground floor lobby, several persons, including the barangay
tanods, were taking alcoholic beverages. IcTEaC

The respondents also claim that at the Cebu City Hall of Justice, raffle draws were being
conducted regularly and that the latest, which was held on March 30, 2007, was sponsored by
the very same people from Sara Lee. The respondents contend that the prizes to this raffle
361
 draw, which included a multicab, were displayed on the ground floor lobby of the building for
one week.

According to the respondents, these were all taken into consideration when they decided to
grant the request of Mrs. Tecson. They insist that the proposed raffle draw was a relatively
minor event compared to the abovementioned activities.

The respondents added that since the building which houses the Argao Hall of Justice has
been declared a cultural heritage and is the centerpiece of the said municipality, then the
activity planned by Sara Lee was appropriate in promoting the town of Argao. Respondents
Amamio and Vasquez maintain that it was their honest belief that the building was not to be
used exclusively for court purposes, but also to be shown to visitors who wanted to visit and
see the historical building.

Thus, in her letter dated June 11, 2007, respondent Amamio formally granted the request of
Mrs. Tecson with the specific instructions to use only the ground floor lobby of the building, to
conduct their activity peacefully and orderly, to refrain from causing any damage to the
building and its premises and to clean the premises after the raffle draw.

Since respondent Vasquez could not attend the raffle draw, respondent Amamio claims that
she requested respondent Patalinghug to be at the Argao Hall of Justice on the day of the
raffle draw to make sure that her (Amamio's) instructions would be strictly observed.

Respondent Amamio denies the complainant's allegation that the latter informed the former
about violating Administrative Circular No. 3-92. The said respondent declares that she need
not be informed about the issuance [of said circular] since she had practically read and
studied carefully all circulars that had been issued by the Supreme Court "not only as a dutiful
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, but as a lawyer herself."

The respondents deny that a party was held, saying that only a raffle draw was conducted and
that only softdrinks and finger foods were served to the participants. They also claim that
there was no danger to the building and the records since the raffle draw was merely held at
the ground floor lobby and that those who attended the raffle draw were decent people,
majority of them being women. Neither was there any commercial activity or transaction
which involved the buying and selling of goods for profit. According to the respondents, Mrs.
Tecson's primary reason for requesting the use of the ground floor lobby of the Argao Hall of
Justice was for her staff to experience and to imbibe Argao's rich historical past. TaCDcE

The respondents also deny that they harassed and intimidated the security guards who
recorded the raffle draw in the logbook. Respondents Vasquez and Patalinghug only
inspected the logbook to find out who attended the raffle draw and respondent Amamio
merely called the attention of the guards as to why "even the trivial non-wearing of the office
uniform of some employees were entered when Circular No. 49-2007 dated May 15, 2007
directed the optional wearing of uniforms."

Finally, the three respondents maintain that they had performed their duties to the best of their
abilities, acted with absolute good faith devoid of malice, and had no intention to prejudice the
interests of the Court. They insist that they have never violated any rule, regulation, or law in
the execution of their assigned tasks. 3

On July 27, 2007, the matter was indorsed to Judge Maximo A. Perez, RTC of Argao, Cebu, Branch
26, for appropriate action and investigation. 4
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Judge
In his Report 5 dated August 30, 2007, Judge Perez recommended the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of substantial evidence to substantiate the charge. He found that respondents did not violate A.M
No. 01-9-09-SC 6 which clarified Administrative Circular No. 3-92, for lack of showing that respondents
have used the Argao Hall of Justice for residential, dwelling or sleeping purposes; for lack of proof that
respondents have utilized the Argao Hall of Justice for commercial purposes because there was no buying
and selling of goods for profit on July 14, 2007; and neither was there selling of tickets. Nonetheless,
362
 Judge Perez recommended that the respondents be sternly warned to be more circumspect in complying
with the guidelines for the use of the Hall of Justice.
Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Report and Recommendation, 7 the OCA did not agree with the findings of Judge Perez. On
the contrary, the OCA found that respondents violated Administrative Circular No. 3-92 by allowing the
holding of a raffle draw in the lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that
—
xxx xxx xxx

2. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (Branch 26), Argao, Cebu be
SUSPENDED for one month and one day for simple misconduct with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. AcSCaI

3. Ms. Genoveva R. Vasquez, Legal Researcher and Ms. Floramay Patalinghug, Court
Stenographer, both of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 26), Argao, Cebu be REPRIMANDED for
violation of office rules and regulations with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Our Ruling
We adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

As a preliminary matter, we note that on May 22, 2008, complainant Plaza manifested before the
Court his intention to desist from pursuing the case. He wrote thus:
xxx xxx xxx

At this point in time, I am respectfully informing your office that it is now my intention not to
pursue the matter any more for the reason that the attention of the respective respondents
has also been called . . . by the Executive Judge and besides, the incident has already been
heard before the said judge and I was already satisfied with the outcome/resolution of the
said proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx 8

At this point, we remind herein complainant that the discretion whether to continue with the
proceedings rests exclusively with the Court, notwithstanding the complainant's intention to desist. Our
ruling in Guray v. Judge Bautista 9 is instructive:
This Court looks with disfavor at affidavits of desistance filed by complainants, especially if
done as an afterthought. Contrary to what the parties might have believed, withdrawal of the
complaint does not have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from any administrative
disciplinary sanction. It does not operate to divest this Court of jurisdiction to determine the
truth behind the matter stated in the complaint. The Court's disciplinary authority cannot be
dependent on or frustrated by private arrangements between parties.

An administrative complaint against an official or employee of the judiciary cannot simply be

withdrawn by a complainant who suddenly claims a change of mind. Otherwise, the prompt
and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. . . . 10

Moreover, that the case has been heard by the Investigating Judge does not mean that he may
order its termination. As clearly stated in the Indorsement 11 of the OCA dated July 27, 2007, Judge Perez
was only directed to conduct an investigation and to submit his report thereon to the OCA, for further
evaluation by the latter. Likewise, it is immaterial and irrelevant whether complainant was satisfied with the
outcome of the case. cSIADH
It is undisputed that on July 14, 2007, Sara Lee held a raffle draw at the ground floor lobby of the
Argao Hall of Justice. Ms. Virginia C. Tecson, Sara Lee's Business Manager, wrote a letter addressed to the
Executive Judge of the RTC, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, requesting permission for the holding of a raffle draw
at the Argao Hall of Justice. In their Compliance, 12respondents Amamio and Vasquez admitted that they

363
discussed the said request between themselves, 13 notwithstanding the fact that the said request was
addressed to the Executive Judge. In a letter 14 dated June 11, 2007, respondent Amamio granted the
request of Sara Lee. As correctly noted by the OCA, respondent Amamio exceeded her authority in taking it
upon herself to grant the request of Sara Lee's representative, instead of referring the letter to the
Executive Judge to whom it was addressed anyway. 15
Indeed, the holding of a raffle draw at the Argao Hall of Justice by the staff of Sara Lee degraded
the honor and dignity of the court and exposed the premises, as well as the judicial records to danger of
loss or damage. In Administrative Circular No. 3-92, we have already reminded all judges and court
personnel that "the Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and
operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use . . . ."
As correctly observed by the OCA:
A careful reading of the paragraph shows the Court's categorical statement that the Halls of
Justice are to be used only for court purposes and for no other purpose, despite the use of the
word "may," which the respondents and the investigating judge argue as permissive and not
mandatory. The mention of residential and commercial purposes are used as concrete
examples since such instances actually happened . . . and were in fact the subject of
administrative cases, and are thus enumerated, not to exclude other acts (as clearly indicated
by the word "least of all" prior to the enumeration) but rather to illustrate the general
prohibition. Thus, the argument that the raffle draw event was not residential nor commercial
(despite the erudite distinction made by the respondents as to what is commercial and what
is not) deserves scant consideration. 16

In fact, this reminder in Administrative Circular No. 3-92 was reiterated in Administrative Circular
No. 1-99 17 where we described courts as "temples of justice" and as such, "their dignity and sanctity must,
at all times, be preserved and enhanced." The Court thus exhorted its officials and employees to strive to
inspire public respect for the justice system by, among others, not using "their offices as a residence or for
any other purpose than for court or judicial functions." aSEHDA
On October 23, 2001, the Court also issued A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC, Section 3, Part I of which provides
—
SEC. 3. Use of HOJ.

SEC. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public Attorneys,
Probation and Parole Officers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of Deeds, including their
support personnel.

SEC. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall not be used for
residential, i.e., dwelling or sleeping, or commercial purposes.

SEC. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar beverage, shall not be allowed
in the HOJ.

Finally, we agree with the OCA that the fact the Argao Hall of Justice had been used for similar
activities does not justify the holding of the raffle draw thereat. Thus:
. . . The Argao Hall of Justice is not meant to be used for festivities, and in fact should remain
closed to the public during such occasions. The contention that there was no danger to the
building and the records since the raffle draw was merely held at the ground floor lobby and
that those who attended the raffle draw were decent people, majority of whom are women, is
untenable. Time and again, the Court has always stressed in pertinent issuances and
decisions that courts are temples of justice, the honor and dignity of which must be upheld
and that their use shall not expose judicial records to danger of loss or damage. So strict is
the Court about this that it has declared that the prohibition against the use of Halls of Justice
for purposes other than that for which they have been built extends to their immediate vicinity
including their grounds.

If the building housing the Argao Hall of Justice is such an important historical landmark, all
the more reason why activities, such as Sara Lee raffle draw, should not be held within. At
364
 most, the said Hall of Justice could have been made part of a regular local tour, to be viewed
at designated hours, which viewing shall be confined to certain areas not intrusive to court
operations and records. 18

ACCORDINGLY, we ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court
Administrator. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, is
hereby found GUILTY of simple misconduct and is ordered SUSPENDED for one month and one day with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Ms.
Genoveva R. Vasquez, Legal Researcher and Ms. Floramay Patalinghug, Court Stenographer, both of the
Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, are hereby found GUILTY of violation of office rules and
regulations and are REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely. TcIaHC
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, * Brion and Abad, JJ., concur.

||| (Plaza v. Amamio, A.M. No. P-08-2559, [March 19, 2010], 630 PHIL 181-193)

In re: Maquera, B.M. No. 793, July 30, 2004

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 793 . July 30, 2004.]

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY.
LEON G. MAQUERA

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J p:

May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the
Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court provision
covering this case's central issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an
unsettled case.

In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, 1 the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty.
Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the Decision
rendered by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94, 2 a
disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera.

The Court referred the matter of Maquera's suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for comment in its
Resolution dated November 19, 1996. 3 Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been
admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign
court's action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath.

In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the
Court obtain copies of the record of Maquera's case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District
Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maquera's suspension and are thus insufficient to enable
her to determine whether Maquera's acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise
violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. 4

365
Pursuant to this Court's directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997, 5 the Bar Confidant sent a letter dated
November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting for certified copies of the record of the
disciplinary case against Maquera and of the rules violated by him. 6

The Court received certified copies of the record of Maquera's case from the District Court of Guam on
December 8, 1997. 7

Thereafter, Maquera's case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBP's receipt of the case records. 8

The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline on July 28, 1998. 9 However, the notice was returned unserved because Maquera had already
moved from his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding address. 10

On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and its Resolution No. XVI-
2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he
updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full. 11

The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he
was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in
Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as
a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case. 12

In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a
certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castro's counsel in said
case. Castro's property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction
of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year.
The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid
period. 13

At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro's property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the
amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him. 14

On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera's legal services in the civil case involving
Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the
latter. 15

On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in
satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name. 16

On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty
Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00). 17

On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings regarding Maquera's
alleged misconduct. 18

Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be
sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 19 and 1.8(a) 20 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high
fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with
the requirement in Rule 1.8(a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with
a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed
to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing. 21

The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a period
of two [2] years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return
to Castro the difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs and the amount due him for legal
services rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly
reprimanded. It also recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to
disciplinary action by the Superior Court of Guam. 22

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Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as compensation for
past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral and was not made pursuant to
a prior written agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was made three days following the
alleged termination of the attorney-client relationship between them, and that the property did not constitute
an exorbitant fee for his legal services to Castro. 23

On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered its Decision 24 suspending Maquera from the practice of
law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional Responsibility
Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that the attorney-client relationship between Maquera
and Castro was not yet completely terminated when they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castro's
right of redemption to Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from the
eventual transfer of Castro's property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more than
US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to
US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his
case that he was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business transactions between an
attorney and his client "in a very general sort of way." 25

On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said court
found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of
ethics in the Philippines." 26 However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his
annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.
27

The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction
is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated
February 13, 1992, which states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. ECcaDT

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is
a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).

The Court must therefore determine whether Maquera's acts, namely: acquiring by assignment Castro's right
of redemption over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for him;
exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate Philippine
law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his
suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client's property by exercising the right of
redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls
squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 28 prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is
the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, 29 the prohibition extends to sales in
legal redemption.

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The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy because,
by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client 30 and
unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.

The case of In re: Ruste 31 illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that case, the
attorney acquired his clients' property subject of a case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of
sale executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance of his clients
because they had no money to pay him for his services. The Court ruled that the lawyer's acquisition of the
property of his clients under the circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The
Court held:

. . . Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven
by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latter's behest, as contended
by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a vantage position to
press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so amply protective
of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of
the rights of both". 32

The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquera's acquisition of Castro's right of redemption, his
subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for huge profits were tainted
with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal
services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in payment for
his legal services, and since the property redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of
December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct
for accepting payment for his legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to
US$45,000.00.

Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law in that
jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are
violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession. 33

It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice
of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section
27, 34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. 35 Likewise, the judgment of the Superior
Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a lawyer. 36 More
fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present
testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be
notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent
lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte. 37

The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of
unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent
by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maquera's current and correct
address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges against him
and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through
thisResolution), may be sent to him.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for
non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. 38Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of

368
membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 39

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary
proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
cDTaSH

The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in Guam and to serve
upon him a copy of this Resolution.

In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have
paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maquera's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Chico-Nazario, JJ ., concur.

Corona, J ., is on leave.

||| (In re Atty. Leon G. Maquera, B.M. No. 793, [July 30, 2004], 479 PHIL 322-335)

Rule 139, Rules of Court

Rule 139-B, Rules of Court

Notarial Practice

A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended

February 19, 2008
RE: 2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE -
The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Sub Committee on the Revision of the Rules Governing
Notaries Public, to AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated February 19, 2008.
"A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC-Re: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. – The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of
the Sub Committee on the Revision of the Rules Governing Notaries Public, to AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:
Rule II
DEFINITIONS
xxx
"Sec. 12. Component Evidence of Identity. The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the
identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver’s license, Professional Regulations
Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter’s ID, Barangay
certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card,
Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman’s
book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certification
from the National Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) certification; or
(b) xxxx."
Quisumbing, J., on official leave. Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

369
Bautista vs. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6963, February 9, 2006

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6963. February 9, 2006.]

VICTORINA BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; NOTARY PUBLIC; SHOULD NOT NOTARIZE A DOCUMENT UNLESS
THE PERSONS WHO SIGNED THE SAME ARE THE VERY SAME PERSONS WHO EXECUTED AND
PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE HIM TO ATTEST TO THE CONTENTS AND TRUTH OF WHAT ARE
STATED THEREIN. — A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT OF NOTARIZING DOCUMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF ONE OF THE AFFIANTS IS IN
VIOLATION OF RULE 1.01, CANON 1 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
NOTARIAL LAW. — Respondent's act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the
affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia personally
appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a
certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondent's conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities
considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on
notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his
function as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the law.
3. ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT; CASE THEREOF MAY PROCEED REGARDLESS OF
INTEREST OR LACK OF INTEREST OF THE COMPLAINANT; NATURE OF SUSPENSION OR
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS. — Complainant's desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not
exonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis
of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This
rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
4. ID.; ID.; NOTARIZING DOCUMENT DESPITE NON-APPEARANCE OF ONE OF SIGNATORIES;
IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent
jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos, respondent lawyer was found guilty of notarizing the document despite
the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was
disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from the practice of
law for one year.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

In a Complaint 1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
November 16, 2004, complainant Victorina Bautista 2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as a notary
public and a lawyer.

370
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib na
Salaysay 3 purportedly executed by Donato Salonga and complainant's mother, Basilia de la Cruz. 4 Both
affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo
Lucas and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed
the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961. 5
In his Answer, 6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed any
knowledge about Basilia's death. He alleged that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilia's
presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the
name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that there
was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilia's name was the signature of Pronebo. SaDICE
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation 7 attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance 8 of
complainant which reads in part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, . . . matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas
ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL
BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg.
CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan lamang sa
akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO
at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C.
VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para
sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL
BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner 9 recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for
one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked;
and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a
period of one (1) year. 10
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year and his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for
reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint affidavit was prepared on
January 3, 1998. Respondent's alleged lack of knowledge of Basilia's death does not excuse him. It was his
duty to require the personal appearance of the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature on the
instrument. SEHaTC
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness
of the signature of the affiant. 11
Respondent's act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants is in violation
of Rule 1.01, 12 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law. 13 By affixing his
signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him
and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who
signed the document. Respondent's conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on notarized
documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a
notary public and to comply with the mandates of the law. 14
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia. A member of the
bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants
371
cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal knowledge.
They should swear to the document personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their
representative's name should appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the
only time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for
notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the
ones to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge the document. 15
Complainant's desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the
administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. 16
We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v.
Ramos, 17 respondent lawyer was found guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one
of the signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified from
reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 2 18 of complainant's affidavit of desistance, she
alluded that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang Salaysay 19 dated November 12, 2004 which
was attached to the complaint filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to
personally appear before him in violation of the Notarial Law. This allegation must likewise be investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial
commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment
as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when
his suspension shall take effect.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate the
allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated
November 12, 2004 without requiring the latter's personal appearance.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of
the respondent. DACIHc
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
||| (Bautista v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6963, [February 9, 2006], 517 PHIL 236-242)

372
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