Compiled Case Digests For Articles 1015-1023, 1041-1057, New Civil Code of The Philippines

Qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyu
iopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfg
hjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcv
bnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwe
rtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopa
Compiled Case Digests for
sdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklz
Articles 1015-1023, 1041-
1057, New Civil Code of the
xcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmq
Philippines
Submitted to: Judge Grace G. Victoria-Ruiz
wertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuio
pasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghj
klzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbn
mqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwerty
uiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdf
ghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxc
vbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrty
uiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdf
ghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxc
vbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqw
ertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiop
asdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjkl
Submitted by:
ADRIANO, Ernesto III B. (ARTS. 1015, 1041, 1050)
BERNABE, Khristienne Rian C. (ARTS. 1016, 1042,

1051)
DE GUZMAN, Michaela (ARTS. 1017, 1043, 1052)
GALITA, Chloe Anne S. (ARTS. 1018, 1044, 1053)
GUILALAS Christian James S. (ARTS. 1019, 1045,

1054)
MANALASTAS, Jiathron O. (ARTS. 1020, 1046, 1055)
SANTOS, Toni Cassandra B. (ARTS. 1021, 1047, 1056)
TORCULAS, Joyce Liezel Q. (ARTS. 1022, 1048, 1057)
URIAN, Joseph Andrew D. (ARTS. 1023, 1049)
~2~
Table of Contents
Title Page
Article 1015
In the matter of the estate of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ vs. MARGARITA
LOPEZ……………………………………………………………………………………… 5
HEIRS OF ANTERO SOLIVA vs. SEVERINO SOLIVA, et al……………………. 7
Article 1016
In the matter of the estate of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ AND LUZ LOPEZ
DE BUENO, vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ…………………………….
…………………………………………………………11
GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET AL vs. JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL……………………. 13
Article 1017
RAMON DEL ROSARIO vs. CLEMENTE DEL ROSARIO………………………... 15
TORRES vs. LOPEZ……………………………………………………………………... 16
Article 1018
AMPARO S. CRUZ vs. ANGELITO S. CRUZ………………………………………… 18
Article 1019
In the matter of the estate of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ and LUZ LOPEZ
DE BUENO vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ………………………………………………… 20
YNZA vs. RODRIGUEZ………………………………………………………………….. 23
Article 1020
TORRES AND LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. LOPEZ……………………………………... 25
CRUZ vs. CRUZ…………………………………………………………………………… 27
Article 1021
TORRES vs. LOPEZ……………………………………………………………………… 29
BELEN vs. BPI……………………………………………………………………………. 31
Article 1022
PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA TARLAC vs. RIGOR…………………………… .. 34
TORRES AND LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. LOPEZ……………………………………... 36
Article 1023
MATILDE ARAMBURU vs. ANGEL ORTIZ…………………………………………. 38
GIL POLICARPIO vs. JOSE SALAMAT…………………………………………….... 40
Article 1041
AMPARO S. CRUZ et al vs. ANGELITO S. CRUZ, et al……………………………. 41
Article 1042
Intestate Estate of the Late VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO………………... 44
MARIANO RAMOS vs. EUGENIO MARQUEZ………………………………………. 47
Article 1043
DE VERA CERTEZA vs. VILLADOLID………………………………………………... 49
Intestate Estate of the Late VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO………………… 50
Article 1044
MICHAEL GUY vs CA…………………………………………………………………….. 53
HINLO vs. DE LEON……………………………………………………………………… 55
~3~
Article 1045
DOLORESA. IGNACIO vs. FELISA MARTINEZ and JUAN MARTINEZ……..... 57
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS………………………………... 60
Article 1046
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. ABADILLA……………….. 63
PALAD vs. GOVERNOR OF QUEZON PROVINCE…………………………………. 66
Article 1047
RAMOS V. MARQUEZ…………………………………………………………………….. 68
HINLO V. DE LEON…………………………………………………………………......... 71
Article 1048
Article 1049
Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO……………………………. 74
ANTONIO BALTAZAR vs. LORENZO LAXA……………………………………......... 75
Article 1050
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN………………….. 78
AGAPITO HINLO vs. SATURNINA DE LEON……………………………………….. 80
Article 1051
DAMIANA INTO vs. MARIO VALLE, et al………………………………………………83
SIMEONA BARCELONA, et al. vs. HILARION BARCELONA……………….......... 85
Article 1052
LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS……………………………………………………... 87
Article 1053
MARIANO RAMOS vs. EUGENIO MARQUEZ………………………………………… 89
ELOY IMPERIAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS…………………………………………… 91
Article 1054
AGAPITO HINLO vs. SATURNINA DE LEON………………………………………… 93
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO…….. 96
Article 1055
Article 1056
REPUBLIC vs. GUZMAN……………………………………………………………… ….. 99
YUSAY vs. YUSAY GONZALES…………………………………………………….........
102
Article 1057
WENCESLA CACHO vs. JOHN G. UDAN, AND RUSTICO G. UDAN……………. 105
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO…….. 107
~4~
Adriano, Ernesto III B. Student Number 2017-
167488
Article 1015
Applicable
In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez,

deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special administrator,
and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, vs. MARGARITA
LOPEZ,
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926
Facts:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last

will and testament, in the second clause of which he
declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my

property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the

testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared
incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed
under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian.
On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-
mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the
testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924,
thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez
had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no
such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his
death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of
the decedent. The will referred to, and after having been
contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial
determination
Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate

succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the
appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accretion
and in the character of universal heir the will of the
decedent.
Issue:
~5~
Whether or not Luz Lopez de Bueno have better right
on the other half of the estate by accretion
Ruling:
Yes, Our discussion of the legal problem presented

should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect
declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near
relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when
made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final
accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision is
of undoubted application to the situation before us; and the
provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of
Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part,
but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of
guardian and ward existing between the parties.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining

the right of accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that
accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when
the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance
or the same portion thereof without special designation of
shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies
before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is
disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a
will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de
Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation
of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as
heir has predeceased the testator, this person being also
disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at
the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is
therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and
its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not
only the undivided half which she would have received in
conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified
to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was
no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court
declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to

succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the
disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case
under article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that
the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an
interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate
~6~
the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not
a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity
to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case
for accretion rather than for intestate succession.
~7~
167488
Article 1015
Not Applicable
HEIRS OF ANTERO SOLIVA, vs. SEVERINO, JOEL,

GRACE, CENON, JR., RENATO, EDUARDO, HILARIO, all
surnamed SOLIVA, ROGELIO V. ROLEDA, and SANVIC
ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by its Manager,
SANTOS PORAQUE,
G.R. No. 159611 April 22, 2015
Facts:
The Spouses Ceferino (also known as Rufino) Soliva and

Juana Endeza possessed and owned, during their lifetime,
three parcels of land in Calbayog City, specifically:
(1) a 1.436-hectare lot (Parcel 1) under Tax Declaration

(TD) No. 42753;
(2) a 9,447-square meter lot (Parcel 2) under TD No.

24419, (a 1,600-square meter portion of this lot,
however, was owned by Brigida Mancol which the
spouses held for Mancol as her tenants); and
(3) a 5,136-square meter Riceland under TD No. 14298.
At the core of the controversy is a 14,609-square meter

parcel of land (as finally determined by the RTC), situated in
Cagsalaosao, Calbayog City and designated as Parcel 2 in
the Plan of Land.5 The Plan divided Parcel 2 into six (6)
portions, namely:
1. Lot 1 828 square meters
Lot 2-
2. 3,305 square meters
A
Lot 2-
3. 877 square meters
B
4. Lot 3 2,741 square meters
~8~
Ceferino died in 1954, while Juana died in 1972. They
had five children, namely: Dorotea Cenon, Severino,
Victoriano and Antero.
Earlier or on June 22, 1949, Mancol sold to Cenon the

1,600-square meter portion of Parcel 2 As Cenon then lived
in Manila, he left the possession and enjoyment of this
portion to his parents. However, when Ceferino died in 1954,
Cenon took over the administration of the entire estate,
including Parcel 1.
In March 1959, Severino received as his share in their

parents’ estate the 5,136-square meter rice land covered by
TD No. 14298. Severino subsequently sold this lot
On November 13, 1970, Juana sold to Cenon half of

Parcel 2 as her share in the conjugal partnership, through a
Deed of Conditional Sale
On January 21, 1986, Cenon sold to Roleda a 4,092-

square meter portion of Parcel 2.On August 14, 1991, Roleda
subsequently sold the same
Meanwhile, Cenon died in 1987; he was survived by his

children, namely: Joel, Grace, Cenon, Renato, Eduardo and
Hilario.
The RTC disposed of the case the properties within their

respective shares excluding severino from the partition of
Parcel 2 as he had already received his share in their
parents’ inheritance – the 5,136-square meter parcel of
Riceland covered by TD No. 14298. As stated in the 1959
Deed of Absolute Sale between Severino and Fortunato
Calagos, Juana, Cenon, Antero and Victoriano confirmed and
agreed to the "sale of the land as part of the real estatead
judicated and given to Severino x xx as his share in the
inheritance." In fact, this 5,136-square meter parcel of land
far exceeds the portion he would have received as share in
Parcel 2. Hence, he is no longer entitled to participate in its
partition.
Cenon is likewise excluded from the partition of Parcel

2 as he likewise already received his share in their parents’
inheritance. Moreover, the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Cenon and Roleda described the portion which Cenon sold to
the latter as only a portion, not the whole of Parcel 2.
In short, Cenon could validly sell to Roleda only the

1,600-square meter portion which he bought from Mancol.
~9~
When he sold to Roleda 4,092 square meters Parcel 2, he
effectively sold an extra 2,582-square meter portion which
rightfully pertains to the heirs of Ceferino and Juana as pro
indiviso owners. Accordingly, this 2,582-square meter
portion should be treated as his share in their parents’
estate that bars him from further participating in the
partition of the remaining portion of Parcel 2. Antero and the
defendants a quo, except for SEI and Roleda, separately
appealed the RTC’s January 25, 1994 decision with the CA.
CA’s DecisionCeferino had no right whatsoever over the

1,600-square meter portion of Parcel 2; his right covered
only the 13,009-squaremeter portion (14,609-1,600) not
affected by this document. Thus, when he died in 1954, he
transferred to his heirs only the rights which he had over the
13,009-squaremeter portion.
In these lights, Cenon validly acquired ownership over a

total area of 10,706.3 square meters of Parcel 2. As owner,
he had all the right to alienate it, either in its entirety or only
its portion. Accordingly, his sale to Roleda of the 4,092.8-
square meter portion was valid as it falls well within his total
property ownership.
Cenon’s remaining 6,613.5 square meters share of

Parcel 2 shall, in turn, be divided equally among his heirs.
As for Ceferino’s other heirs, they each acquired a pro

indiviso share over the remaining 3,902.7 square meters of
Parcel 2. But, since Severino had already received his share
in 1959, only Victoriano, Antero and Dorotea, as represented
by her heirs Sergio and Romeo, are entitled to participate in
its partition.
Assailing the CA’s decision, Antero argues that the CA

erroneously applied Article 1015 inasmuch as Severino did
not repudiate the share in their parents’ inheritance which
he received in 1959.hence, no accretion of inheritance could
take place. in which case his share shall be added or
incorporated to the share of his co-heirs.Accordingly, Parcel
2 should be divided equally, or in 1/4 share each, among
Ceferino and Juana's
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly applied the concept of

accretion, under Article 1015 of the Civil Code, in distributing
Severino’s supposed share in Parcel 2 in favor of Ceferino’s
other heirs.
~ 10 ~
Ruling:
No,We disagree with Antero’s argument. He obviously

misinterprets the CA’s ruling as he views this "adding" of
share within the terms of Article 1015 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when

two or more persons are called to the same inheritance,
devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one who
renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before
the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his coheirs,
co-devisees, or co-legatees. [Emphases supplied.]
In this regard, the CA said:
However, inasmuch as it is undisputed that Severino is

no longer entitled to any share of parcel 2 since he was
already given a separate parcel of land x xx on 30 April
1959, his supposed share shall be added to those of Juana
Endesa, Victoriano, Cenon, Dorotea and Antero increasing
their respective share to 1,300 square meters each, instead
of 1,084 square meters. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied.]
A careful reading of this CA ruling would show that the

share of Severino was "added" to the shares of Juana,
Victoriano, Cenon, Dorotea and Antero, not pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1015 of the Civil Code. The CA decision,
for one, did not use the term "accretion;" neither did it
mention, in any of its portions, Article 1015, or that the CA
was adding Severino’s supposed share in accordance with
this article.
On the contrary, the CA added Severino’s share to

those of the other heirs because it recognized the fact that
Severino has already received his share of the estate in
1959. Thus, rather than receiving an area of 1,084 square
meters each, the remaining five heirs of Ceferino – Juana,
Cenon, Victoriano, Dorotea and Antero –would each receive
a total area of 1,300.9 square meters of Ceferino’s
inheritance in Parcel 2, as Severino was no longer entitled to
share in its partition.
In effect, the CA simply provided for a clearer and

detailed picture of how this distributable portion of Parcel 2
should be computed and how its partition should be effected.
~ 11 ~
~ 12 ~
Bernabe, Khristienne Rian C. Student Number 2017-
101640
Article 1016

and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
STREET, J.
Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament
declaring Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno as the only and universal heir to all his properties.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will, the testator,
Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of
taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of
his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. Only four days after
the will was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator,
Tomas Rodriguez, died thereafter. Margariat Lopez, a cousin
and nearest relative of the decedent, contested the will
claiming that she is entitled to half of the estate by intestate
estate. The will referred to, and after having been contested,
has been admitted to probate by judicial determination.
Issue:
Whether or not the property to be inherited by Vicente
Lopez is accredited to Luz Lopez de Bueno, who was the
other heir called to the same inheritance
Ruling:
Yes, the property is accredited to Luz Lopez de Bueno.
No testamentary provision shall be valid when made by
a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of
the latter have been approved. This provision is of
undoubted application to the situation before us having the
effect that Vicente F. Lopez is incapacitated to inherit from
his ward, Tomas Rodriguez. Due to this, accretion will then
take place.
It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place
in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more
~ 13 ~
persons are called to the same inheritance or the same
portion thereof without special designation of shares; and
secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the
testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to
receive it.
In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same
inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition
to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased
the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive
the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the
testator's death. This article is therefore also of exact
application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to
the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half
which she would have received in conjunction with her father
if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half
which pertained to him. There was no error whatever,
therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez
de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
~ 14 ~
101640
Article 1016
GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET ALvs. JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-21809
January 31, 1966
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
Facts:
In a duly probated last will and testament of one

Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the naked ownership of a
fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz
while its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio
Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. The children of
Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo turned
out to be fourteen. On the other hand, Teodorica de la Cruz,
the naked owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to the
fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to

one Gil P. Policarpio who used to give them proportionately
the usufruct corresponding to them. During the term of the
lease, however, three of the usufructuaries, and so, upon
their death, both the naked owner and the remaining
usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to the
deceased usufructuaries. Because of these conflicting
claims, the lessee withheld said amount.
Subsequently, the surviving usufructuaries leased the

fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios who, after executing the
contract of lease, came to know of the existing conflicting
claims, and not knowing to whom of the claimants the
shares of the deceased usufructuaries should be paid, said
lessee was also constrained to withhold the corresponding
part of the usufruct of the property. The two lessees then
commenced an action for interpleader against both the
naked owner and surviving usufructuaries to compel them to
interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense

that he is the successor-in-interest of Teodorica de la Cruz
and as such he is entitled to the shares corresponding to the
three deceased usufructuaries inasmuch as the usufruct in
their favor was automatically extinguished by death and
became merged with the naked owner.
~ 15 ~
The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere
to the theory that since the usufructuaries were instituted
simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo, the death of
the three usufructuaries did not extinguish the usufruct,
hence, the surviving usufructuaries are entitled to receive
the shares corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries,
the usufruct to continue until the death of the last
usufructuary.
Issue:
Whether or not the eleven surviving usufructuaries of

the fishpond in question are the ones entitled to the fruits
that would have corresponded to the three deceased
usufructuaries or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat.
Ruling:
It appears that there is accretion among usufructuaries

who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies
before the end of the usufruct.
However, the only exception is if the usufruct is

constituted in a last will and testament and the testator
makes a contrary provision. Here there is none. On the
contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in favor of the
children of her three cousins with the particular injunction
that they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as
they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of
them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving
ones. These provisions of the will are clear. They do not
admit of any other interpretation.
Wherefore, The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby

declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased
usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary, appellees Gil P.
Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to
pay to them the money withheld by them respectively
representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries.
~ 16 ~
De Guzman, Michaela Student No. 10-
167474
Art 1017
Applicable
Ramon Del Rosario v. Clemente Del Rosario
G.R. No. 1027
May 19, 1903
Facts:
The ninth clause of the will of Doña Honorata is as

follows:
"The testatrix bequeaths the sum of 3,000 pesos to her

nephews Enrique Gloria and Ramon del Rosario in equal
parts — that is, 1,500 pesos each."
Don Enrique Gloria died before the testatrix.
Issue:
Whether or not Don Ramon is entitled to the other half of
3,000 pesos when Enrique Gloria died by virtue of Right of
Accretion
Ruling:
Yes, Don Ramon is entitled to the other half of 3,000

pesos
A legacy of a certain sum to two nephews in equal

shares is payable in its entirety to the survivor of them in
case one dies before the testator. This is pursuant to the
provisions of articles 982 and 983 of the Civil Code
Applying this, Don Enrique died first before the

Testatrix. Therefore, the right of accretion exists as to the
other half in favor of the plaintiff, Ramon, and he is entitled
to have it paid to him.
~ 17 ~
167474
Art 1017
Applicable
Torres vs. Lopez
49 Phil 504
November 1, 1926
Facts:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his
last will and testament, in the second clause of which he
declared:

property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter
Luz Lopez de Bueno.
On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will

above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the
thereafter.
Margarita Lopez as the next kin of the deceased

contended that there was a partial intestacy with respect to
the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F.
Lopez, when he died first before the testator. This person
being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had
been alive at the time of the testator's death pursuant to
article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that
legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the
testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to
succeed.
Issue: Whether or not there was a partial intestate or

accretion
Ruling:
There was accretion.
In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of

the court to harmonize its provisions as far as possible,
giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between two
~ 18 ~
provisions the more general is to be considered as being
limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and
983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the
two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate
succession while the latter is more specific, defining the
particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In
case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former
article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in
subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to
intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983
by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It
is true that the same express qualification is not found in
subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in
view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which
the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this
interpretation supplies the only possible means of
harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article
986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that
intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur
when accretion is impossible.
Applying it in this case, the co-heir get the share by

accretion for intestacy takes place only when accretion is
not possible and accretion is possible in the given case.
Accretion take place when one of two joint heirs

called by will to an inheritance without special designation
of shares dies before the testator, the part pertaining to
such heir will, upon the subsequent death of the testator, go
by accretion to the coheir; and the additional circumstance
that the predeceasing heir was, at the time of the making of
the will, disqualified to take, by reason of his being then the
legal guardian of the testator with accounts unsettled, does
not make a case for intestate succession as to his part of
the estate.
~ 19 ~
~ 20 ~
Galita, Chloe Anne S. Student Number 2017-
167510
Article 1018 (Applicable)
AMPARO S. CRUZ v. ANGELITO S. CRUZ
FACTS:
The present action involves a situation where one heir
was able - through the expedient of an extrajudicial
settlement that was written in a language that is not
understood by one of her co-heirs - to secure a share in the
estate of her parents that was greater than that of her
siblings, in violation of the principle in succession that heirs
should inherit in equal shares.
Thus, Antonia - represented in this case by her
surviving heirs - received two lots as against her siblings,
including respondent Concepcion, who respectively received
only one lot each in the subject 940 square-meter property.
This she was able to achieve through the subject 1986 deed
of extrajudicial settlement - which was written in English, a
language that was not known to and understood by
Concepcion given that she finished only Grade 3 elementary
education. With the help of Amparo, Antonia was able to
secure Concepcion's consent and signature without the
benefit of explaining the contents of the subject deed of
extrajudicial settlement. For this reason, Concepcion did not
have adequate knowledge of the contents and ramifications
of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement; she was left
unaware of the sharing arrangement contained therein, and
realized it only when Antonia attempted to subdivide the
subject property in 1998, and the plan of subdivision survey
was shown to Concepcion- which revealed that Antonia
obtained two lots. Consequently, Concepcion filed Civil Case
No. 1380-98 SM on August 17, 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the co-heirs were wrongfully deprived of
their rightful share to the estate of their parents;
HELD:
This is a simple case of exclusion in legal succession,
where co-heirs were effectively deprived of their rightful
share to the estate of their parents who died without a will -
~ 21 ~
by virtue of a defective deed of extrajudicial settlement or
partition which granted a bigger share to one of the heirs
and was prepared in such a wa y that the other heirs
would be effectively deprived of discovering and knowing its
contents.
While it is true that under the law, the children of the
deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares, but in this case, two
of Concepcion's co-heirs renounced their shares in the
subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the
remaining co-heirs, in equal shares as well. Thus, in
accordance with Article 1018,in legal succession, the share
of the person who repudiates the inheritance shall always
accrue to his co-heirs.
~ 22 ~
~ 23 ~
Guilalas, Christian James S. Student Number
2017-167461
Article 1019

and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament,

in the second clause of which he declared:

property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter
Luz Lopez de Bueno.

thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez
had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no
such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his
death. Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of
determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48
Phil., 772).
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that

there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the
half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez
and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita
Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. In
this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil
Code wherein it is declared, among other things, that a will
may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is
disqualified to inherit. Our attention is next invited to article
912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that legal
succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator
and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed.
Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to
~ 24 ~
the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid,
notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named
as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a
consequence Margarita Lopez is entitled to inherit the share
of said disqualified heir.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a right of accretion in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. There is a right of accretion here in favor of Luz

Lopez De Bueno.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining

the right of accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that
accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when
the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance
or the same portion thereof without special designation of
shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies
before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is
disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a
will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de
Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation
of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as
heir has predeceased the testator, this person being also
As to the contention of Margarita, We are the opinion

that this contention is untenable and that the appellee
clearly has the better right. In playing the provisions of the
Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as
far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict
between two provisions the more general is to be considered
as being limited by the more specific. As between articles
912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more
general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic
of intestate succession while the latter is more specific,
defining the particular conditions under which accretion
takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of
~ 25 ~
the former article must be considered limited by the latter.
Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with
respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to
article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of
accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is
not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so
understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above
referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the
general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only
possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In
addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords
independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant
portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.
~ 26 ~
2017-167461
Article 1019
Ynza vs. Rodriguez
Facts:
Dionisio Ynza, of Spanish descent, single, and a

resident of Iloilo City, died on September 3, 1932, leaving a
will. He left extensive properties, real and personal, in the
City of Iloilo and in the Province of Negros Occidental.
In the month of December, 1932, about three months

after the death of the testator and after the will was
probated, one of the children and legatees, Maria Cristina
Ynza who was then residing in Spain, came to the Philippines
with her husband. Inasmuch as she wanted to keep her
residence in Spain, she decided to sell as in fact she sold her
share of one-third of all the estates of Dionisio Ynza, to her
co-legatees Julia Ynza and Jose Ynza, for the sum of
P118,000, thereby leaving Jose and Julia sole co-owners of
said estates. A project of partition (Exhibit B) was submitted
by Jose Ynza as administrator and it was approved by the
court on January 14, 1933 (Exhibit D).
On April 24, 1934, Jose Ynza sold to his co-legatee and

co-owner Julia his one-half share of the estate situated in the
City of Iloilo as a result of which, he remained half co-owner
only of the properties situated in Negros Occidental. said will
Julia left all her properties, real and personal, in the City of
Iloilo to the Sisters Sofia Staub and Claudia Staub with a
proviso that they have under their care her protegee Carmen
Danuya, and that upon her attaining majority she be given
the sum of P5,000 by the executor. Her properties situated
in Negros Occidental were disposed of.
Julia Ynza died without issue in Iloilo on November 22,

1949, leaving a will
That plaintiff Jose Ynza instated an action Abrasia, to

declare himself absolute owner of all the properties left by
Julia Ynza including their products, by virtue of the right of
~ 27 ~
accretion established in the conditional legacy by Dionisio
Ynza under paragraph 5 of his will
Issue:
Whether or not there is proportional sharing of property

received by accretion
Ruling:
None. There is no proportional sharing of property

received by accretion.
It may not be considered as accretion as apparently

contemplated by the testator by his employment of the word
"accrecera." Under the old Civil Code, Article 982 thereof,
there is right of accretion in testamentary succession when
two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or to
the same portion thereof without special designation of
parts, and one of the persons so called die before the
testator or renounces the inheritance or be incapable of
receiving it. In the present case, the three persons called to
the inheritance, namely, Jose, Julia, and Maria Cristina,
survived the testator. However, the condition imposed in
paragraph 5 of the will of Dionisio Ynza might possibly be
regarded as a charge or trust limiting the ownership and
disposition of the 1/3 portion allotted to — each of the
legatees. The intention of the testator might have been as
contended by plaintiff-appellant to prevent the property from
going into the hands of strangers and at the same time
giving a right to the surviving legatee or legatees the right to
receive intact the one- third portion of the legatee who dies
without issue. This right may naturally be renounced or
waived by any of the legatees who stand to benefit by it.
~ 28 ~
~ 29 ~
Manalastas, Jiathron O. Student Number
2017-116749
Article 1020
Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez
Facts:
The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are

these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his
last will and testament, in the second clause of which he
declared:
"I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property,

my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de
Bueno."

thereafter.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that

there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the
half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez
and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita
Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not Luz de Bueno will succeed to the

inheritance of his co-heir
Held:
Yes.
When one of two joint heirs called by will to an

inheritance without special designation of shares dies before
~ 30 ~
the testator, the part pertaining to such heir will, upon the
subsequent death of the testator, go by accretion to the
coheir; and the additional circumstance that the
predeceasing heir was, at the time of the making of the will,
disqualified to take, by reason of his being then the legal
guardian of the testator with accounts unsettled, does not
make a case for intestate succession as to his part of the
estate.
~ 31 ~
2017-116749
Article 1020
Cruz vs. Cruz
Facts:
In an Amended Complaintrespondents Angelito S. Cruz,

Concepcion S. Cruz (Concepcion), and Serafin S. Cruz alleged
that they — together with their siblings, petitioner Amparo S.
Cruz (Amparo) and Antonia Cruz (Antonia) — inherited a 940-
square-meter parcel of land (the subject property) from their
late parents, spouses Felix and Felisa Cruz, which land was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
ON-658, that on July 31, 1986, the parties executed a deed

of extrajudicial settlement of estate covering the subject
property, on the agreement that each heir was to receive an
equal portion of the subject property as mandated by law;
that in 1998, when the subject property was being
subdivided and the subdivision survey plan was shown to
respondents, they discovered that Antonia was allocated two
lots, as against one (1) each for the respondents.
That Antonia’s allocation of two lots contravened the

agreement among the heirs that they would receive equal
shares in the subject property; that Amparo and Antonia
were able to perpetrate the fraud by inducing Concepcion —
who was illiterate — to sign the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate, which was written in the English
language, without previously reading and explaining the
contents thereof to the latter;
That Amparo and Antonia fraudulently took advantage of

Concepcion’s ignorance and mental weakness, deceiving
and cajoling her into signing the deed of extrajudicial
settlement, to her damage and injury; and that Antonia
passed away, but left as her heirs herein petitioners Ernesto
Halili, Alicia H. Florencio, Donald Halili, Editha H. Rivera,
Ernesto Halili, Jr. and JulitoHalili
In their Answer, petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming

that the July 31, 1986 deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate had been voluntarily and freely executed by the
~ 32 ~
parties, free from vitiated consent; that respondents’ cause
of action has prescribed; that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action; and that no earnest efforts toward
compromise have been made.
Issue: Whether or not the action for annulment of the

extrajudicial settlement of estate has prescribed
Held: No. The deed of extrajudicial partition in the case at

bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not
prescribe.
The present action involves a situation where one heir was

able — through the expedient of an extrajudicial settlement
that was written in a language that is not understood by one
of her coheirs — to secure a share in the estate of her
parents that was greater than that of her siblings, in
violation of the principle in succession that heirs should
inherit in equal shares.
of extrajudicial settlement — which was written in English, a
education.
For this reason, Concepcion did not have adequate

knowledge of the contents and ramifications of the subject
deed of extrajudicial settlement
Under the law, “[t]he children of the deceased shall always

inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.”—Under the law, “[t]he children of the
deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.” In this case, two of
Concepcion’s coheirs renounced their shares in the subject
property; their shares therefore accrued to the remaining
coheirs, in equal shares as well.
Article 1020. The heirs to whom the inheritance

accrues shall succeed to all the rights and obligations which
~ 33 ~
the heir who renounced or could not receive it would have
had.
~ 34 ~
Santos, Toni Cassandra B. Student Number 2017-
167463
ARTICLE 1021
TORRES V. LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
FACTS:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the

estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant,
Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession
as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez
de Bueno, claims the same by accretion and in the character
of universal heir the will of the decedent.
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament.

Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator,
Tomas, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care
of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin
Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. Subsequently Vicente and
Tomas. Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of
determination.
Appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial

intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was
intended for Vicente and that this half has descended to the
appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at
law of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Luz Lopez de Bueno has a right over the

one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez by virtue of
accretion
RULING:
~ 35 ~
Yes. Article 982 of the Civil Code defines the right of
accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take
place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or
more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same
portion thereof without special designation of shares; and
testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to
receive it.
In the case at bar, the Court have a will calling Vicente

and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same
inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition
to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased
the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive
the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the
testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact
application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to
the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half
which she would have received in conjunction with her father
if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half
which pertained to him. There was no error whatever,
therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez
de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
The case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an

interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate
the disability to which Vicente was subject was not a general
disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive
the legacy, a consideration which makes a case for accretion
rather than for intestate succession.
~ 36 ~
167463
ARTICLE 1021
BELEN V. BPI
G.R. No. L-14474
October 31, 1960
FACTS:
When Benigno Diaz died, the codicil and together with

his will was admitted to probate. The proceedings for the
administration of the estate of Benigno Diaz were closed in
1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the
administration of the appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands,
as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
Filomena Diaz died leaving two legitimate children.

Onesima filed a petition in special proceedings, contending
that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena
under the codicil should now be divided (equally) only
between herself and Milagros, as the surviving children of
the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other words, of the
seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros to which the court
denied.
Onesima has appealed to this Court, insisting that that

the term "susdescendeinteslegitimos," as used in the codicil,
should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the
degree to the original legatee Filomena. In the present case,
her two daughters, Milagros and Onesima.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "sus descendientes legitimos" refer

to the descendants nearest in degree
RULING:
No. It is suggested that "descendientes legitimos" could

mean the nearest descendant but with the right of
~ 37 ~
representation in favor of the more distant relatives.
Unquestionably, the testator was at liberty to provide a
series of successive substitutions in the order of proximity of
relationship to the original legatee. And he, likewise, was
free to ordain that the more distant descendants should
enjoy the right of representation as in intestate succession.
But to arrive at such conclusion, the Court must declare that
the testator had:
a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right

of accretion among co-heirs and co-legatees, as established
for testamentary successions by Articles 1016 (old Art. 982)
and intended to replace such accretion with representation;
ART. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take

place in a testamentary succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same

inheritance, or to the same portion thereof, pro indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the
testator or renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to
receive it.
XXX
(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986),
that vacancies in the free part should be filed according to
the rules of accretion or substitution (not representation);
and in default of these two, ultimately inherited by the
testator's own heirs intestate:
ART. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of

accretion does not take place, the vacant portion of the
instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall
pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it
with the same charges and obligations.
There is no doubt that, the testator's intention being

the cardinal rule of succession in the absence of compulsory
(forced) heirs, he could have rendered inoperative all the
articles mentioned, if he had so desired. But without any
other supporting circumstances, we deem expression "o a
sus desecendientes legitimos," the testator Benigno Diaz did
intend to circumvent all the legal provisions heretofore
~ 38 ~
quoted. It was incumbent upon appellant to prove such
intention on the part of the testator; yet she has not done so.
The Court conclude that in the absence of other

indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the
instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or
group of legatees, intended all members thereof to
succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846. So that
the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally
divided among her surviving children and grandchidren.
~ 39 ~
Torculas, Joyce Liezel Q. Student Number 2017-
167495
ARTICLE 1022
In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does

not take place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if
no substitute has been designated, shall pass to the legal
heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the same
charges and obligations. (986)
APPLICABLE:
PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA TARLAC vs. RIGOR
G.R. No. L-22036; April 30, 1979
FACTS:
Father Rigor Pascual, a native of Victoria Tarlac, left a
will with named devisees constituting his nearest relatives,
his three (3) sisters namely, Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina
Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao, as well as his
cousin, FortunatoGamalinda. In addition, he devised the 44-
hectares of riclnd in favor of anyone of his nearest male
relatives who shall take the priesthood.
The lower court, in its order, approved the project
partition, directed that that after payment of all obligations
of the estate, the administrator should deliver to the
devisees their respective shares. During the administration
of the estate, no nephew claimed the devise, therefore the
testate proceeding remained pending. Subsequently, about
13 years after the approval of the project of partition, the
parish priest of Victoria filed a petition for the delivery of the
riceland to the church as trustee. The intestate heirs of Fr.
Rigor countered that the bequest be declared inoperative
and that they be adjudged as the person entitled to the said
riceland since no nearest male relative of the testator has
ever studied for the priesthood.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property shall pass to the
legal hiers of the testator.
~ 40 ~
RULING:
Yes. The subject property, specifically the riceland shall
pass to the legal heirs of the testator.
This case is covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil

Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal
succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor
accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs.
In the case at bar, when the testator died, his nearest

leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree
relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao.
Hence, the subject property shall be designated to the
testator’s three sisters.
~ 41 ~
167495
Article 1022
APPLICABLE:
TORRES AND LOPEZ DE BUENO VS. LOPEZ
G.R. NO. 25966. NOVEMBER 1, 1926
FACTS:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last

will and testament, in the second clause of which he
declared: "I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my
property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz
Lopez de Bueno."
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator,

Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of
taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of
his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924,
or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made,
Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez,
died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will
was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final
accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been
presented by him at the time of his death. Margarita Lopez
was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will
referred to, after having been contested, has been admitted
to probate by judicial determination.
The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by

intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while
the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by
accretion and in the character of universal heir under the will
of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether Margarita Lopez being considered as the

nearest heir, has the right to succeed the undivided half of
the inheritance left by the deceased Vicente Lopez.
~ 42 ~
RULING:
No. Margarita Lopez has no right to succeed the

undivided half of the inheritance.
It is there declared, in effect, that accretion takes place

in a testamentary succession, first, when two or more
persons are called to the same inheritance or the same
portion thereof without special designation of shares; and,
testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualified to
receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling
Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to
the same inheritance without special designation of shares.
In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir

has predeceased the testator, this person being also
Furthermore, 986 of the Old Civil Code affords independent
proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only
occur when accretion is impossible.
~ 43 ~
Urian, Joseph Andrew D. Student Number 2017-
167754
Article 1023
POSITIVE
MATILDE ARAMBURU vsANGEL ORTIZ
G.R. No. L-5398 January 7, 1910
FACTS:
The counsel for MatildeAramburu presented a

complaint against Angel Ortiz, and against the heirs of the
late CeferinoAramburufor the recovery of certain money,
judgment was rendered sentencing the defendants,
Ceferino, Josefa, Matilde, Adelaida, Leonor, Encarnacion,
Angel, Jose, Carmen, Alfredo, and Julia, all bearing the
surname of Aramburu, as heirs of said deceased, to pay to
the plaintiff Ortiz the sum of P262,628.19 with the agreed
interest of 8 per cent from the 1st of July, 1903, until full
payment was made.
The court orders the said eleven defendant heirs to pay

the plaintiff the sum of P345,193.31 and the agreed interest
thereon at the rate of 8 per cent from the 1st of July, 1903,
until its payment is completed, and to pay costs of the
proceedings; provided, however, that the five last-named
defendant minors, Angel, Jose, Carmen, Alfredo, and Julia
Aramburu, shall only be obligated to pay said money and
interests to the extent of the property that they respectively
inherited from their father.
MatildeAramburu, was sentenced to pay Ortiz the sum

of P31,381.21, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent from
the 1st of July, 1903, until full payment is made, this being
one-eleventh part of the aforesaid sum of P345,193.31, and
for the purposes of execution of the said judgment, private
property of MatildeAramburu to the value of P57,031.83 was
sold, the sum of P8,331.75 in cash was withdrawn from the
Hongkong Bank, and both these amounts were applied to
the payment of said judgment, with the exception of P54.66
that was withheld for sheriff's fees.
~ 44 ~
It is seen that MatildeAramburu has paid Angel Ortiz by
reason of said judgment P65,308.92. As the eleventh part
corresponding to MatildeAramburu only amounted to
P31,381.21, plus interest thereon from the 1st of July, 1903,
until the time of payment, it appears that the creditor Ortiz
received, and that MatildeAramburu paid an excess of
P25,561.95.
Ortiz refuses to return the same in spite of the

demands made upon him for the reason that the plaintiff
prayed that judgment be entered against the defendant
Ortiz, sentencing him to refund to the plaintiff the sum of
P25,561.95, with the legal interest, since the date of the
filing of the complaint, and the costs.
The eleven defendants assumed the title and

quality of heirs of the late Aramburu, and in all their
business transactions, as they had with Ortiz, which
acts necessarily imply willingness to accept the
inheritance, and constitute the tacit acceptance
defined by article 999 of the Civil Code; an acceptance
which is pure and simple on the part of the heirs who
are of age, and which, according to paragraph 2 of
article 992, must be understood as made under
benefit of inventory on the part of those who are
minors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs are liable to the acknowledged

debt.
RULING:
Yes, according to article 1003 of the code they

thereupon became liable for all the charges of said
inheritance not only with the inherited property but also with
their own
The obligation of heirs who accept an inheritance

encumbered by debts does not arise from the contracts, but
from the law which has established the right to inherit, and
has declared that the obligation to pay an hereditary
indebtedness is in solidum, as whatever may have been the
form in which they accepted the inheritance, and, according
~ 45 ~
to the form of such acceptance, the extent of their
respective liability would differ.
But the creditor is entitled to claim the entire amount of

his credit from any one of the heirs who accepted the
inheritance without benefit of inventory, and also from any
of the others who received the same with benefit to the
extent of their hereditary portion. (Arts. 988, 998, 1003,
1010, 1023, Civil Code.)
In view of the foregoing, and considering that the

judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is
our opinion that the same should be and it is hereby
affirmed with the costs against the petitioner.
~ 46 ~
167754
Article 1023
NEGATIVE
Gil Policarpiovs Jose Salamat
G.R. No. L-21809
FACTS:
In a duly probated last will and testament of Damasa
Crisostomo, she gave the naked ownership of a fishpond
owned by her, to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz while its
usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia
Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. The fishpond is situated at
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
The Children of Antonio Perez, Vicente and Canuto
Lorenzo turned out to be 14. The usufructuaries lease the
fishpond to Policarpio. As the days go by, some of the
usufructuaries died and Jose Salamat became the naked
owner. Salamat claims for the share from the said
usufructuaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Salamat has the right to claim for profits
from the fishpond.
RULING:
No, he possesses no right. The said usufructuaries are
declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased
usufructuaries and, as a corollary, appellees Gil Policarpio
and Batas Riego de Dios are ordered to pay to them the
money withheld by them respectively representing the
shares of the deceased usufructuaries.
There is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted
at the same time when one of them dies before the end of
the usufruct.
~ 47 ~
~ 48 ~
167488
Article 1041
Not Applicable
AMPARO S. CRUZ; ERNESTO HALILI; ALICIA H.

FLORENCIO; DONALD HALILI; EDITHA H. RIVERA;
ERNESTO HALILI, JR.; AND JULITO HALILI, Petitioners,
v.ANGELITO S. CRUZ, CONCEPCION S. CRUZ, SERAFIN
S. CRUZ, AND VICENTE S.
G.R. No. 211153, February 28, 2018
Facts:
Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion S. Cruz and Serafin S. Cruz

alleged that they - together with their siblings, petitioner
Amparo S. Cruz and Antonia Cruz inherited a 940-square-
meter parcel of land from their late parents, spouses Felix
and Felisa Cruz, which land was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. ON-658, that on July 31, 1986, the
parties executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate
covering the subject property, on the agreement that each
heir was to receive an equal portion of the subject property
as mandated by law; that in 1998, when the subject property
was being subdivided and the subdivision survey plan was
shown to respondents, they discovered that Antonia was
allocated two lots, as against one (1) each for the
respondents; that Antonia's allocation of two lots
contravened the agreement among the heirs that they would
receive equal shares in the subject property; that Amparo
and Antonia were able to perpetrate the fraud by inducing
Concepcion - who was illiterate - to sign the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate, which was written in the
English language, without previously reading and explaining
the contents thereof to the latter; that Amparo and Antonia
fraudulently took advantage of Concepcion's ignorance and
mental weakness, deceiving and cajoling her into signing the
deed of extrajudicial settlement, to her damage and injury;
and that Antonia passed away, but left as her heirs herein
petitioners Ernesto Halili, Alicia H. Florencio, Donald Halili,
Editha H. Rivera, Ernesto Halili, Jr. and JulitoHalili, who are in
possession of the two lots allocated to Antonia.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the

case, the the fraud as basis of the Complaint, is not
~ 49 ~
delineated therein with particularity. Under Sec. 5 Rule 8,
fraud must be alleged specifically, not generally.
Nonetheless, apart from such allegations, no clear and
convincing evidence was presented by plaintiffs. For one,
while plaintiff Concepcion Cruz. Enriquez is admittedly only
grade 3 and could hardly understand English as what is
written in the extra-judicial settlement which was not even
allegedly fully explained to her, it appears that she can
absolutely read and write, and understand English albeit not
fully. And as she is deeply interested in her inheritance
share, she is aware of the import and consequences of what
she executed and signed. For the past 10 years, there is no
way she could feign ignorance of the alleged fraud and make
passive reactions or complaint thereof. Being adversely
interested in the property, her apprehensions were purely in
the state of her mind, if not unilateral and afterthought.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The essence of

consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the
contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the
other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the
object and the cause which constitutes the contract. The
area of agreement must extend to all points that the parties
deem material or there is no consent at all.
To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites:

(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free; and (c) it
should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by
error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence;
and spontaneity by fraud.
Here, appellant Concepcion clearly denied any

knowledge of the import and implication of the subject
document she signed, the subject extra-judicial settlement.
She asserted that she does not understand English, the
language in which the terms of the subject document she
signed was written. To quote a part of her testimony,
translated in English, as follows:
Issue:
Whether or not the repudiation of concepcion in the

extra-judicial settlement of his inheritance in the estate of
their parents was his free and voluntary act.
Ruling:
~ 50 ~
No, the extra-judicial settelement was void because the
consent of concepcion was obtain through fraud.
The present action involves a situation where one heir

was able - through the expedient of an extrajudicial
settlement that was written in a language that is not
understood by one of her co-heirs - to secure a share in the
estate of her parents that was greater than that of her
siblings, in violation of the principle in succession that heirs
should inherit in equal shares.
Thus, Antonia - represented in this case by her

surviving heirs - received two lots as against her siblings,
including respondent Concepcion, who respectively received
only one lot each in the subject 940 square-meter property.
of extrajudicial settlement - which was written in English, a
education. With the help of Amparo, Antonia was able to
secure Concepcion's consent and signature without the
benefit of explaining the contents of the subject deed of
extrajudicial settlement. For this reason, Concepcion did not
have adequate knowledge of the contents and ramifications
of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement; she was left
unaware of the sharing arrangement contained therein, and
realized it only when Antonia attempted to subdivide the
subject property in 1998, and the plan of subdivision survey
was shown to Concepcion- which revealed that Antonia
obtained two lots. Consequently, Concepcion filed Civil Case
No. 1380-98 SM on August 17, 1998.
In short, this is a simple case of exclusion in legal

succession, where co-heirs were effectively deprived of their
rightful share to the estate of their parents who died without
a will - by virtue of a defective deed of extrajudicial
settlement or partition which granted a bigger share to one
of the heirs and was prepared in such a way that the other
heirs would be effectively deprived of discovering and
knowing its contents.
~ 51 ~
~ 52 ~
101640
Article 1042
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, vs.

BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-41171
July 23, 1987
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Facts:
Vito Borromeo died without forced heirs but leaving

extensive properties.
The testate proceedings of the forged will supposedly

signed by Vito was converted into an intestate proceedings
and several parties came before the court filing claims or
petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate
of Vito Borromeo. The trial court then issued an order
declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the
intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, namely, Jose
Cuenco Borromeo, Judge Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana
Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera, Salud Borromeo,
Asuncion Borromeo, Marcial Borromeo, Amelinda Borromeo
de Talam, and the heirs of Canuto Borromeo. The court also
ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and
distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9
abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier

claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion praying
that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the
deceased and is entitled to receive a legitime like all other
forced heirs.
Fortunato Borromeo asserted and incorporated a

Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by Pilar N.
Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V.
Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera,
Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V.
Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and
Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate.
After due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five
declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning
~ 53 ~
their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the
same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of Vito Borromeo.
Petitioner now seeks to annul and set aside the trial

court's declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to
5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo. It is further argued by the
petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary
Rights" aside from having been cancelled and revoked by
Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia
Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be
no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has
been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend
to transfer.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand,

contends that there is no need for a person to be first
declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain
of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and
that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He
points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver
document, the signatories to the waiver document were
certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of
their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver
document itself.
Issue:
Whether or not acceptance or repudiation retroacts to

the moment of the death of the decedent
Ruling:
Yes, it does.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary

rights is that "the properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third
persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such
properties have the character of future property, because
the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of
the death of the deceased, by principle established, the heirs
succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death.
More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the

death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of
the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event
~ 54 ~
retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with
article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although
conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion." The heirs, therefore, could waive their
hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the
estate was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of

Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective even
if acceptance or repudiation retroacts to the moment of the
death of the decedent. The circumstances of this case show
that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the
clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights.
~ 55 ~
~ 56 ~
101640
Article 1042
MARIANO RAMOS vs. EUGENIO MARQUEZ

G.R. No. L-4242
April 1, 1908
TORRES, J.
Facts:
Angelina Marquez died and her will was declared void

as it could not be legalized in accordance with the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Eugenio Marquez, on behalf of
his son Delfin Marquez, filed an application for the
administration and partition of the estate of the said
Angelina Marquez, mother of Mariano Ramos, alleging that
Delfin is a son had by him with his wife Florentina Austria,
who in turn is the daughter of Maria Ramos, sister of Mariano
Ramos, and that both the latter were the children of the
aforesaid Angelina Marquez; Delfin, the aforesaid son of the
petitioner, died on the 13th of February of said year. Mariano
Ramos objected to the estate of his mother being divided for
the reason that Eugenio Marquez was not an heir of the
latter.
At the hearing the judge below rendered judgment,

declaring that the property, rights, and actions left by the
late Angelina Marquez should be divided in two equal parts,
one in favor of her son, Mariano Ramos, as heir under the
law and his own right, and the remaining half to Eugenio
Marquez as the sole heir of his deceased son, Delfin
Marquez, who in his turn was the heir to the other half of the
said property, rights, and actions of Angelina Marquez as the
representative of his late mother and grandmother,
Florentina Austria and Maria Ramos.
Issue:
Whether Eugenio Marquez, as the legitimate father and

sole heir of his deceased minor child, Delfin Marquez, is
entitled to inherit in conjunction with the granduncle of his
late son, Mariano Ramos, from the great-mother of his said
son, Angelina Marquez, Mariano's mother
Ruling:
Yes, Eugenio marquez is entitled to inherit.

~ 57 ~
Delfin Marquez having died while still a minor without
having accepted or repudiated the inheritance of his said
great-grandmother, the right thereto was transferred by
action of the law, from the very moment of his death, to his
father, Eugenio Marquez, with the consequent effects
retroactive to the moment of the death of Angelina Marquez;
therefore, upon Eugenio Marquez claiming the share of the
inheritance that should have pertained to his son, if living,
he exercised a right which belonged to him and in which the
law protects him, as stated by the court below in its
judgment.
~ 58 ~
~ 59 ~
167474
Art 1043
Applicable
De Vera Certeza vs. Villadolid
55 OG 3857
December 18, 1958
Facts:
Patricio Bailon, executed on December 31, 1924 a last
will and testament wherein it is declared that he and his wife
has no forced heir. He instituted his wife, Tomasa Raqueno
Bautista, as the sole heir of his estate and appointing her as
his executrix.
On April 2, 1945 Patrio Bailon died. Special proceeding
for the probate of the last will and testament was
commenced by his wife, Tomasa. However about three
months before the final distribution of the estate Tomasa
died. Her death was never reported in the testate
proceeding.
The administrator of Patricio delivered to the heir of
Tomasa the estate. However it was opposed by Villadolid,
the alleged illegitimate son of Patricio. Villadolid contended
that Tomasa died before she was declared by the court as
the heir of the estate and that she had never before
expressed her acceptance of the inheritance. For these
reasons, Tomasa had not acquired right to the estate of the
deceased.
Issue: Whether or not Tomasa had acquired right to the
inheritance even if she had not expressed his acceptance
Ruling:
Yes, Tomasa had acquired right to the inheritance even
if she had not expressed his acceptance.
The condition required under Art. 1043 of the Civil Code
which is reproduced from Art. 991 of the former Civil code
are: The heir must be certain of (1) the death of the
decedent and (2) his right to the inheritance.
The death of Patricio Bailon is established. There can
be no question, as to the right of Tomasa to inherit the
estate of the deceased because she was designated in the
last will and testament as the sole heir to the estate.
Hence, the conditions required under Art 1043 are
present.
~ 60 ~
~ 61 ~
167474
Art 1043
Not Applicable
Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v.

Borromeo
G.R. No. L-55000,
July 23, 1987.
FACTS:
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitimes being an
illegitimate son of the deceased. He presented the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the
Borromeo’s. In the waiver of the 9 heirs relinquished to
Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate.
Petitioner argued that the document entitled " Waiver

of Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from
having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by
Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia
Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be
no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has
been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend
to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to
make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the
person must be certain of the death of the one from whom
he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the
petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to
the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights
were, therefore, uncertain.
This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported

by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs,
devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or
repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an
order for the distribution of the estate.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand,

contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no
need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can
accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that
he must first be certain of the death of the person from
~ 62 ~
whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right
to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the
signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the
signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito
Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the
inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is Waiver of Hereditary Rights
RULING
The circumstances of this case show that the

signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear
and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1)
On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein
they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the
case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all
the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties,
personal and real, including all cash and sums of money in
the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31,
1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the
heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested
lots.
In this document, the respondent recognizes and

concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the
waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver
of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the
respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been
otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the
offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to
them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and
30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an
Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be
distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the
~ 63 ~
trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the
petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed
of Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of
the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her
(Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as
an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito
Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was
P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the
respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a
"Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors
named in the same deed of assignment. The stated
consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of
Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by
Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968,
while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March
24, 1969.
Applying this, there was no valid Waiver of Hereditary

Rights.
~ 64 ~
167510
Article 1044 (Not applicable)
Michael Guy vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly

acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an
estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and
personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for
the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that,
in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the
decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the
estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a
Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their
counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
Filing a motion to dismiss, petitioner and his co-heirs

alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid,
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of
Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating
that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance
received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remedios and her minor children

discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities
by reason of the alleged waiver;
HELD:
Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the

hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not
bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code,
provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his

property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
~ 65 ~
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated
persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate
the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall

belong to the persons designated by the testator to
determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property,
or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030.
(Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the

inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is
because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property
which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the
interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized,
the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void
and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the

intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of
it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and
waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have

possibly waived their successional rights because they are
yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate
children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently
denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would
thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary
rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such
right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of
private respondents must fail.
~ 66 ~
~ 67 ~
167510
Article 1044 Not Applicable
Hinlo vs. De Leon
FACTS:
Esteban Hinlo and his wife NicasiaJamandre owed

RufinoTongoy the sum of P2,300.30, and as security for their
debt gave them a mortgage on a rural property of 30
hectares in area. Esteban Hinlo on May 15,1890 and
NicasiaJamandre on June 17, 1897. Prior to their death, no
suit had been instituted for the recovery of the debt. These
spouses at death left five children, named Agapito,
Honorato, Perfecto, Guagerio, and Encarnacion, the eldest of
whom, Agapito, at the time of his mother's death in 1897,
was but 19 years 3 months and 1 day old. The said
legitimate children of the aforementioned spouses Hinlo and
Jamandre were in possession of the said mortgaged
agricultural land, and when the payment of the debt was
demanded of them, they did not pay it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they are liable to pay the debt
HELD:
ART. 992 (Now 1044). Any person having the free

disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
An inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons

may be accepted in the manner prescribed in number 10 of
article 269. Should the guardian accept by himself, the
acceptance should be considered as made under benefit of
inventory.
In this case, if the parents left other property not

acquired or accepted as an inheritance by these children, no
action can be maintained against the latter with a view of
bringing such property under execution, as they have not
contracted any personal obligation with regard to it, not
having received it as an inheritance. Also, in an identical
case, judgment could only be enforced against them for the
recovery of an amount equal to the value of the said
~ 68 ~
property, if they had acquired or accepted it as an
inheritance, but not a greater amount, it being unlawful to
levy upon their own property in execution of judgment,
inasmuch as, according to law, since they were minors in
1897, they could receive such inherited property in no other
manner than under benefit of inventory, and the benefit of
inventory is for the purpose of avoiding a confusion of the
heir's own property with that of his predecessor in interest
which he has inherited.
If under this substantive provision of the Civil Code under

which the mortgage action of the creditor, RufinoTongoy,
should have been brought, the children of the spouses Hinlo
and Jamandre should only have been called upon to deliver
the mortgaged property. No personal liability whatever
rested upon the said children, as none was transmitted to
them.
~ 69 ~
2017-167461
Article 1045
DOLORESA. IGNACIO vs. FELISA MARTINEZ and JUAN

MARTINEZ
Facts:
The plaintiff's ward and the defendants were the

owners in equal parts of the undivided real estate described
in the complaint. Dolores Arce Ignacio, as the guardian of
her minor son, instituted this action for the purpose of
having the property divided real estate described in the
complaint. Dolores Arce Ignacio, as the guardian of her
minor son, instituted this action for the purpose of having
the property divided and the one-third part belonging to the
minor turned over to her. Judgment was also asked against
the defendant, Felisa Martinez, for one-third of the value of
the products of the land during the time the latter had been
in the exclusive possession of the same. The defendant,
Felisa Martinez, alleged that she and her deceased husband
bought Crispulo Martinez' interest in the property in question
in 1908.
That in a document executed by Crispulo Martinez, he

renounced total share that may belong to him, after the
partition of the said property, and assign the said share to
the married couple Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez, or to
their lawful heirs.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that the document does not

have the legal effect of vesting title in the defendant Felisa
and her deceased husband because, "in view of the terms of
this document it has the legal force of a repudiation of
inheritance."
Issue:
~ 70 ~
(1) Whether or not Crispulo Martinez accepted the
inheritance in this case
(2) Whether or not there is repudiation of inheritance in

this case
Ruling:
(1) Yes. Crispulo Martinez accepted the inheritance in

this case.
Neither can an heir renounce or repudiate his

inheritance so as to relieve himself of all liability after he had
accepted the inheritance, without the benefit of an
inventory, and had received the products therefrom as such
heir. Acts of mere conservation or professional
administration do not constitute an acceptance of the
inheritance.
In the instant case, Crispulo Martinez had, by taking

possession of the property, exercising act of dominion over
it, and receiving products therefrom for a period of more
than eight years, accepted the inheritance without the
benefit of an inventory.
(2) No. there is no repudiation in this case.
The trial court was of the opinion that the execution of

the above quoted document was an attempt "to repudiate
an inheritance" and that the document does not produce this
effect because it does not meet the requirements of article
1008 of the Civil Code. In support of this holding the court
relied upon the language used in the fourth paragraph.
Crispulo Martinez stated therein that "in consideration of
these expense, I hereby set forth that I renounce totally the
share that may belong to me and assign the said share to
Luciano Lopez and Felisa Martinez, or to their lawful heirs."
Under the Civil Code, repudiation of the inheritance is an act
entirely voluntary and free, made without consideration. An
heir cannot renounce his inheritance in favor of a designated
heir or heirs, or any other persons. (The substitute referred
to in paragraph 3 of article 1912 is the person designated by
the testator.) Neither can an heir renounce or repudiate his
inheritance so as to relieve himself of all liability after he had
accepted the inheritance, without the benefit of an
~ 71 ~
inventory, and had received the products therefrom as such
heir. Acts of mere conservation or professional
administration do not constitute an acceptance of the
inheritance.
In the instant case, Crispulo Martinez had, by taking

possession of the property, exercising act of dominion over
it, and receiving products therefrom for a period of more
than eight years, accepted the inheritance without the
benefit of an inventory. He "renounced" his interest in favor
of designed persons, one of whom was not an heir of his
deceased parents, and for a valuable consideration. The
word" renounce," used in paragraph 4 of the document does
not, under the terms of the document, constitute must be
considered together. Words, phrases or clauses cannot be
segregated and given a meaning which is contrary to the
terms of the entire document. "The whole contract must be
interpreted or read together in order to arrive at its true
meaning." (Barretto vs. Santa Marina, 26 Phil. Rep., 200.)
It having been clearly shown that Crispulo Martinez

owed, on the 30th day of August, 1908, Luciano Lopez and
Felisa Martinez the sum of P2,500, money loaned him while
he was in school, and he being of mature age, Exhibit No. 2
was, in truth and in law, an assignment by Crispulo of his
interest in the property in question to Felisa Martinez and
her husband in payment of his debt. This act is authorized by
article 1175 of the Civil Code.
~ 72 ~
2017-167461
Aricle 1045
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and
KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother,
REMEDIOS OANES
Facts:
Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and

Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios
Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino
Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly

acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an
estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and
personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for
the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that,
in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the
decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the
estate.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint

Motion to Dismiss, petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that
private respondents' claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of
Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating
that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance
received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
Issue:
~ 73 ~
Whether or not the repudiation of inheritance is valid in
this case
Ruling:
No. the repudiation of inheritance is not valid in this

case.
To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in

clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent
to abandon a right.
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of

hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not
state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely
states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial
assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of
whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the
late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did
not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary
share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a
waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived

the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will
not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code,
provides:

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may

be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards
only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall

belong to the persons designated by the testator to
determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in
their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis
supplied)
~ 74 ~
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is
because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property
which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the
interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized,
the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void
and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the

intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of
it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and
waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have

possibly waived their successional rights because they are
yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate
children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently
denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would
thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary
rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such
right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of
private respondents must fail.
~ 75 ~
~ 76 ~
2017-116749
Article 1046
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla
Facts:
The lands in question were originally owned by one Luis

Palad, a school teacher, who obtained title to the land by
composicióngratuita in 1894. On January 25, 1892, Palad
executed a holographic will partly in Spanish and partly in
Tagalog. Palad died on December 3, 1896, without
descendants, but leaving a widow, the appellant Dorotea
Lopez, to whom he had been married since October 4, 1885.
The will contained a clause in Tagalog which, translated

into English, reads:
"That the coconut land in Colongcolong, which I have put

under cultivation, be used by my wife after my death during
her life or until she marries;
And if the times aforementioned should arrive, I prepare and

donate it to a secondary college to be erected in the capital
of Tayabas;
so this will be delivered by my wife and the executors to the

Ayuntamiento of this town, should there be any, and if not,
to the civil governor of this province in order to cause the
manager thereof to comply with my wishes for the good of
many and the welfare of the town."
After the death of Luis Palad the widow Dorotea Lopez

remained in possession of the land and in the year 1900
married one CalixtoDolendo. On April 20, 1903, the aforesaid
collateral heirs of Luis Palad brought an action against the
widow for the partition of the lands here in question on the
ground that she, by reason of her second marriage, had lost
the right to their exclusive use and possession.
In the same action the municipality of Tayabas

intervened claiming the land under the clause of the Palad
will above quoted.
~ 77 ~
During the pendency of the action an agreement was
arrived at by the parties under which the land which now
constitutes lots Nos. 3464 and 3469 were turned over to the
municipality as its share of the inheritance under the will,
and the remaining portion of the land in controversy and
which now forms lot No. 3470 was left in the possession of
Dorotea Lopez.
On the strength of the agreement the action was

dismissed on November 9, 1904, upon motion by the counsel
for the municipality and concurred in by all the parties,
reserving to the collateral heirs the right to bring another
action.
In regard to lots Nos. 3464 and 3469, claimed by the

appellants Palad and the appellees, the case presents
several problems not directly covered by statutory provisions
or by Spanish or local precedents and, for the solution of
which, we must resort to the underlying principles of the law
on the subject.
It is a well-known rule that testamentary dispositions

must be liberally construed so as to give effect to the
intention of the testator as revealed by the will itself.
Applying this rule of construction it seems evident that by
the clause in question the testator proposed to create a trust
for the benefit of a secondary school to be established in the
town of Tayabas, naming as trustee the ayuntamiento of the
town or if there be no ayuntamiento, then the civil governor
of the Province of Tayabas.
An ayuntamiento corresponds to what in English is

termed a municipal corporation and it may be conceded that
the ordinary municipal government in these Islands falls
short of being such a corporation. But we have provincial
governors who like their predecessors, the civil governors,
are the chief executives of their respective provinces.
Issue:
Whether or not the Provincial governor may accept an

inheritance as a trustee without the approval of the
government
~ 78 ~
Held:
Yes. A provincial governor cannot be regarded as a

public establishment within the meaning of article 748 of the
Civil Code and may therefore accept and receive a
testamentary devise in trust without the previous approval
of the central government.
~ 79 ~
2017-116749
Article 1046
Palad vs. Governor of Quezon Province
Facts:
In their complaint plaintiffs-appellants Miguel Palad, Fe

Palad, Victoria Queano, Jose Palomera, Concepcion
Palomera, Edgardo Obciana, GaloNosce, CelsoZafranco and
Ernesto Zafranco alleged that they are the remaining
immediate heirs and/or successors-in-interest of the
deceased Luis Palad.
That the defendant provincial governor is the trustee

and/or administrator and the defendant municipality of
Tayabas the beneficiary of Lots.
That the purpose of the trusteeship of the aforesaid lots

as constituted by the last will and. testament of the
deceased Luis £alad dated January 25,1892 and duly
protocolized on July 27, 1897, was to erect or establish a
high school in the townof Tayabas out of the income of the
aforesaid two lots for the benefit of the said town of
Tayabas.
That the said trust was duly fulfilled upon the complete
establishment in or about 1932 of a high school now known
as “Luis Palad High School” in the town of Tayabas financed
with the income of said lots and is actually self-supporting,
that the town of Tayabas has been enjoying the income of
the said lots as beneficiary for the last 54 years since
November 9, 1904 up to the present time (when complaint
was filed), while the defendant provincial governor continues
to be the trustee and/or administrator of the two lots in
violation of Article 605 of the Civil Code.
The plaintiffs were already entitled to the reversion of

the two lots in their favor and to the dissolution and/or
termination of the trusteeshipand accordingly prayed for
judgment (1) directing the defendant provincial governor to
submit an accounting of the fruits or income of the two lots
~ 80 ~
from 1932, and to turn over the funds under his trusteeship
to the plaintiffs, (2) terminating or dissolving the trusteeship.
In a decision rendered on December 10, 1924, the

Supreme Court held that the said testamentary disposition in
the holographic will of the late Luis Palad dated January 25,
1892 created a trust for the establishment and maintenance
of a secondary school to be financed with the income of the
two lots aforesaid for the benefit of the inhabitants of the
town of Tayabas.
Issue:
Whether or not the will of Luis Palad is in violation of

prohibition against perpetuities and other provision of Civil
code.
Held:
No. There is no violation of any rule against

perpetuities: the devise does not prohibit the alienation of
the land devised. It does not violate article 670 of the Code:
the making of the will and the continuance or quantity of the
estate of the heir are not left in the discretion of a third
party. The devisee is not uncertain and the devise is
therefore not repugnant to article 750 of the Civil Code. The
provincial governor can hardly be regarded as a public
establishment within the meaning of article 748 and may
therefore receive the inheritance without the previous
approval of the Government.”
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void

any disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the
estate inalienable for more than 20 years, is not violated by
the trust constituted by the late Luis Palad. And even if the
trust herein involved falls within the prohibition of the said
Article 870, the same cannot be given retroactive effect, the
testator having died long before the effectivity of the New
Civil Code.
~ 81 ~
~ 82 ~
167463
ARTICLE 1047
RAMOS V. MARQUEZ
G.R. No. L-4242
April 1, 1908
FACTS:
Angelina Marquez, a resident of Bulacan, died leaving a

will which was probated thereafter and was declared void.
Wherefore it could not be legalized in accordance with the
provisions of section 617 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Eugenio Marquez, on behalf of his son Delfin Marquez,

filed an application for the administration and partition of the
estate of the said Angelina Marquez, mother of Mariano
Ramos, alleging that Delfin is a son had by him with his wife
Florentina Austria, who in turn is the daughter of Maria
Ramos, sister of Mariano Ramos, and that both the latter
were the children of the aforesaid Angelina Marquez.
Subsequently,Delfin, the aforesaid son of the petitioner,
died.
On account of Mariano Ramos having presented the will

of his mother for probate, which will, as already stated, was
declared void, the proceedings instituted in connection with
the partition were suspended until such time as the
commissioners appointed might comply with their duties.
Thus, Mariano Ramos objected to the estate of his mother
being divided for the reason that Eugenio Marquez was not
an heir of the latter.
The trial court declared that the property, rights, and

actions left by the late Angelina Marquez should be divided
in two equal parts, one in favor of her son, Mariano Ramos,
as heir under the law and his own right, and the remaining
half to Eugenio Marquez as the sole heir of his deceased son,
Delfin Marquez, who in his turn was the heir to the other half
of the said property, rights, and actions of Angelina Marquez
as the representative of his late mother and grandmother,
Florentina Austria and Maria Ramos.
~ 83 ~
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugenio Marquez is entitled to inherit

from Angelina Marquez
RULING:
Yes. Taking into consideration that the minor, Delfin

Marquez, succeeded to the rights of his mother, Florentina
Austria, in the manner as the latter succeeded to those of
Maria Ramos, who was in turn a lawful heir of the common
ancestor, Angelina Marquez; and considering also that the
latter's great-grandson, Delfin Marquez, having died when
still a minor, the only person called to the succession is his
legitimate father, Eugenio Marquez; it is unquestionable that
the latter is entitled to claim a share in the inheritance of the
said great-grandmother, transmitted by the action of the law
to her daughter Maria Ramos in the first place, then upon
the death of the latter to Florentina Austria, and finally, after
the death of the latter, to the son she had by the claimant,
Eugenio Marquez.
In this order of succession, Delfin Marquez is correctly

included as being the legitimate son of Florentina Austria,
also the legitimate grandson of Maria Ramos, sister to
Mariano Ramos, the legitimate and great-grandson of
Angelina Marquez. Therefore, if Delfin Marquez were living,
his rights to succeed and to take a share in the inheritance
of his said great-grandmother, Angelina Marquez, would be
unquestionable.
As to the other allegations of the respondent, it should

be taken into account that articles 989, and 1006 of the Civil
Code provide:
ART. 989. The effects of the acceptance and repudiation

shall always retroact to the moment of the death of the
person whose property is inherited.
~ 84 ~
ART. 1006. Upon the death of the heir, without having
accepted or repudiated the inheritance, the rights he may
have had are transmitted to his heirs.
As has been seen, the will said to have been executed

by Angelina Marquez was declared void and was not
probated; therefore, she must be considered as having died
without a will and her succession would be intestate, as
regards her heirs.

retroactive to the moment of the death of Angelina Marquez.
Therefore, upon Eugenio Marquez claiming the share of the
law protects him.
~ 85 ~
~ 86 ~
167463
ARTICLE 1047
HINLO V. DE LEON
G.R. No. L-4860
January 7, 1911
FACTS:

RufinoTongoy the sum of P2,300.30, and as security for their
debt gave them a mortgage on a rural property of 30
hectares in area. Prior to their death, no suit had been
instituted for the recovery of the debt. These spouses at
death left five children, the eldest of whom, Agapito. The
said legitimate children of the aforementioned spouses Hinlo
and Jamandre were in possession of the said mortgaged
RufinoTongoy sued them for payment and petitioned

for the attachment and sale of the mortgaged property.
During the course of the hearing the plaintiff, RufinoTongoy,
died, the action was continued by his widow, Saturnina de
Leon, as the judicial administratrix of the state of the
deceased. The court rendered judgments against the
defendants, directing them to pay to Saturnina de Leon.
Some work animals, belonging to AgapitoHinlo and

others of the defendants, that had been attached by
Saturnina de Leon, were sold at auction by the sheriff. It was
likewise stated in the return that, as the amount received
from the sale exceeded that of the judgment, other animals
that had been attached were not sold and were returned to
AgapitoHinlo, and that the sheriff also delivered to the latter
P33.93, as surplus over the amount collected on the
judgments.
AgapitoHinlo filed a complaint for the recovery of

possession of the said animals which the latter two parties
had attached and sold contending that the attached animals
were the personal and exclusive property of AgapitoHinlo,
~ 87 ~
and not property left by his deceased parents, nor by the
latter's heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Agapito is liable for the debt incurred by

the decedents
RULING:
No. But not because a person is an heir of another is he

bound to pay the latter's debts; he is only bound to pay them
if he accepts the inheritance; so that the acceptance of the
inheritance is what renders the heir liable for the debts of his
predecessor in interest. The acceptance is either pure and
simple, or under benefit of inventory. (Art. 998.)
Acts of mere preservation, or provincial administration,

do not imply the acceptance of the inheritance, if, at the
same time, the title and character of heir have not been
assumed.

An inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may

be accepted in the manner prescribed in number 10 of
inventory.
From these provisions it is inferred: (1) That without

express acceptance of the inheritance, the children of the
debtor spouses cannot be sued for the payment of the
latter's debts; (2) that, with respect to the mortgaged rural
property, they could, with or without the acceptance of the
inheritance, be sued in order that the mortgage creditor
might collect his credit in rem by bringing a real action
which is inherent in a mortgage right; (3) that the act of
possessing, preserving and administering this rural
mortgaged property was a natural duty of the children on
the death of their parents, in order that the creditor's right
might not be abandoned and prejudiced, but this act of mere
preservation and provisional administration did not imply an
~ 88 ~
acceptance of the inheritance, inasmuch as thereby they
had not assumed the title or capacity of heirs; (4) that the
fact that the said children consented to the judgment in so
far as concerned the sale of the property mortgaged by their
parents does not mean that they also agree to pay all
shortage not covered by the amount realized from such sale,
especially if, besides the mortgaged property, they have not
received, preserved or administered other property of their
parents' estate; (5) that if the parents left other property not
having received it as an inheritance; (6) that, in an identical
~ 89 ~
~ 90 ~
167754
Article 1049
POSITIVE
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo vs Borromeo

G.R. No L-55000 July 23, 1987
FACTS:
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an
illegitimate son of the deceased, by incorporating a Waiver
of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the
Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs relinquished to
Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate.
The Petitioners opposed this Waiver for the reason that
it is without force and effect because there can be no
effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has benn a
valid acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who
intended to transfer the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be
executed without a valid acceptance from the heirs in
question.
RULING:
Yes, the prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of
hereditary rights is that “the properties included in an
existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to
third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed the
deceased by the mere fact of death.”
More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the
death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of
the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event
retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with
Art. 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although
~ 91 ~
conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion.
~ 92 ~
167754
Aricle 1049
POSITIVE
Antonio Baltazarvs Lorenzo Laxa

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made
her last will and testament. The will, executed in the house
of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After
which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament. She then affixed her signature at the end of the
said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4.
Without any children, brothers or sisters, Paciencia
bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa
and his wife Corazon Laza and their children, Lorenzo is
Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son.
Lorenzo treated Paciencia as his own mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will, Paciencia left
for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until
her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained
in the custody of Judge Limpin.
4 years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a
petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate
of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favor.
One of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition
to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio claimed that the properties
subject of Paciencia’sWill belong to NicomedaMangalindan,
his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Also, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state
of being “mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for
executing a will and that the execution of the will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.
~ 93 ~
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of
Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and
resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
The RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and
concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she was no
longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind
to have the testamentary capacity.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC
for a petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authenticity and due execution of the
will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.
2) Whether or not there is a valid acceptance from

Lorenzo Laxa
RULING:
1) Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will
shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down
by law. The signatures of the testatrix, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will.
The attestation clause explicitly states the

requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the

signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic
although they question of her state of mind when she
signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said
act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of

unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree
with the position of the CA that the state of being
~ 94 ~
forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
2) Yes. There was an execution from Lorenzo Laxa for

express acceptance since he was the one to filed for
the petition for the probate of the Will of Paciencia, and
issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
As per Article 1049: Acceptance may be express or
tacit.
An express acceptance must be made in a public or
private document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by
which the intention to accept is necessarily implied,
or which one would have no right to do except in the
capacity of an heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional
administration do not imply an acceptance of the
inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity
of an heir has not been assumed. (999a)
~ 95 ~
167488
Article 1050
Not Applicable
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.DAVID REY

GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA
G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN,
MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH,
G.R. No. 132964 February 18, 2000
Facts:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is

the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman, 3 a naturalized
American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American
citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen
and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land
located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a

Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon
Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the
property belonging to the estate of Simeon. The document of
extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds on 8 December 1971. The taxes due
thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact, Attys. Juan
L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land were
accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman
and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim

Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David
her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of
land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of the Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document
appeared not to have been registered, upon advice of Atty.
Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed another document, a Deed of
Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of
quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass
all her other property in the Philippines. 4
On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of

Attorney where he acknowledged that he became the owner
of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim
executed by Helen on 9 August 1989 and empowering Atty.
~ 96 ~
Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1
February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of
Helen, paid donor's taxes to facilitate the registry of the
parcels of land in the name of David.
Issue:
Whether or not the inheritance was deemed accepted

and cannot be renounce anymore
Ruling:
No,There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen

had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she,
together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December
1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of them
all the property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such
extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered
in her and her son's name in undivided equal share and for
eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of
owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides —
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once

made is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except
when it was made through any of the causes that
vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her

inheritance from Simeon was made through any of the
causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of
the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus,
pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an
instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning
her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2)
quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after
she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and
effect.
~ 97 ~
~ 98 ~
167488
Article 1050
Not Applicable
AGAPITO HINLO, vs. SATURNINA DE LEON,

administratrix of the estate of Rufino Tongoy,
deceased, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-4860 January 7, 1911
Facts:

Rufino Tongoy the sum of P2,300.30, and as security for
their debt gave them a mortgage on a rural property of 30
hectares in area. Esteban Hinlo on May 15,1890, and
NicasiaJamandre on June 17, 1897. Prior to their death, no
suit had been instituted for the recovery of the debt. These
spouses at death left five children, named Agapito,
Honorato, Perfecto, Guagerio, and Encarnacion, the eldest of
whom, Agapito, at the time of his mother's death in 1897,
was but 19 years 3 months and 1 day old. The said
legitimate children of the aforementioned spousesHinlo and
Jamandre were in possession of the said mortgaged
On July 20, 1906, Rufino Tongoy sued them for payment

and petitioned for the attachment and sale of the mortgaged
property. On May 1, 1907, the court rendered judgments
against the defendants, directing them to pay to Saturnina
de Leon, as the administratrix of the state of the deceased
Rufino Tongoy, P2,300.30, with legal interest from the date
of the filing of the complaint and the costs of the suit. On
November 4, 1907, the sheriff sold the mortgage property of
public auction including some work animals, belonging to
AgapitoHinlo and others of the defendants after the sale the
sheriff also delivered to the latter P33.93, as surplus over the
amount collected on the judgments.
Thereafter, AgapitoHinlo against Saturnina de Leon and

the sheriff for the recovery of possession of the said animals
which the latter two parties had attached and sold: that the
attached animals were the personal and exclusive property
~ 99 ~
of AgapitoHinlo, and not property left by his deceased
parents, nor by the latter's heirs;
The judgment was in plaintiff's favor, the court finding

therein that the personal property claimed was the exclusive
and private property of AgapitoHinlo, and sentencing, as a
result of that finding, Saturnina de Leon, as the
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Rufino Tongoy,
to pay to AgapitoHinlo the sum of P2,119.26, hence this
petition
Issue:
Whether or not the inheritance was deemed accepted

for Agapitoto be liable for the incurred obligation of his
parents to the extent of his personal property.
Ruling:
No, Acts of mere preservation, or provincial

administration, do not imply the acceptance of the
inheritance, if, at the same time, the title and character of
heir have not been assumed.
Implied acceptance is one made by acts which

necessarily imply a wish to accept, or acts which no one
should have a right to execute except in the capacity of an
heir.
Not because a person is an heir of another is he bound

to pay the latter's debts; he is only bound to pay them if he
accepts the inheritance; so that the acceptance of the
predecessor in interest.
The provisions of the code it inferred: (1) That without

debtor spouses can not be sued for the payment of the
might collect his credit in rem by bringing a real action which
is inherent in a mortgage right; (3) that the act of
~ 100 ~
If under these substantive provisions of the Civil Code

under which the mortgage action of the creditor, Rufino
Tongoy, should have been brought, the children of the
spouses Hinlo and Jamandre should only have been called
upon to deliver the mortgaged property; no personal liability
whatever rested upon the said children, as none was
transmitted to them; the action brought partaking of the
character of a real action, greater still, in the light of the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, is the evidence of
the illegal nature of the procedure of extending the
mortgage action to cover property which in no wise is shown
to have been left by those debtors, but which appeared by
legitimate and unassailable titles to belong exclusively to
AgapitoHinlo; even if it really had been left by the said
debtors, execution could not have been levied thereon in the
manner that it was, against the legitimate protests of its true
owner and possessor.
~ 101 ~
~ 102 ~
101640
Article 1051
DAMIANA INTO vs. MARIO VALLE, et al.

G.R. NO. 145379
December 9, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
Respondent Luisa vda. de Valle as the surviving spouse

of the late Victorio Valle together with their children, namely,
Mario, Octavio, Alberto, Oliver and Brenda, all surnamed
Valle (respondents), filed a complaint against petitioner and
the Sheriffs for "Declaration of Nullity of Sheriff’s Sale and/or
Recovery of Hereditary Shares, Damages and Attorney’s
fees."
Respondents claim that, Eleanor, daughter of Victorio

and Luisa, for valuable consideration, waived her rights to,
interests in and participation in all properties, real and
personal, which include the six parcels of land sold at public
auction; that in June 1992, respondent Luisa, as
administratrix of the Estate of her husband Victorio Valle,
was served a Sheriff’s Notice of Sale of Real Properties; that
despite their verbal notice to petitioner that the shares of
Eleanor have been conveyed, waived and ceded to
respondents, the Sheriffs proceeded with the public auction;
that the auction sale conducted by the Sheriffs was null and
void for being irregular and illegal as the subject properties
were not validly attached and levied, and, at the time of the
sale, judgment debtor Eleanor had no more rights and
interests on the properties subject of the auction sale.
Petitioner together with the defendant Sheriffs filed a

Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the repudiation made
by Eleanor was invalid as it was not made pursuant to Article
1051 of the Civil Code
The RTC issued an Order that whether or not there was

consideration, there was an act of repudiation and,
therefore, the requirements of the law should have been
observed and dismissed the petition stating that it did not
follow the requirements under Article 1051.
~ 103 ~
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid repudiation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that it cannot resolve this

issue at the first instance due only to the fact that it is not a
trier of facts. The SC stated that such questions may be
determined by the RTC only after a full-blown trial of the
case.
However, the CA ruled that there was a valid

repudiation.
According to the Court of Appeals, the lower court erred

in ruling that Eleanor Valle Siapno’s alleged repudiation of
her inheritance is invalid, having been improperly made. A
close scrutiny of the act of Eleanor, taking into consideration
the statements appearing in her "Waiver of Hereditary
Shares and/or Rights" shows that she did not repudiate her
inheritance, but had actually accepted the same, but had
waived its enjoyment in exchange for valuable consideration
which she had already received and enjoyed. Furthermore,
even if such act may be construed as a repudiation of her
inheritance, the same has been validly made through a
public document pursuant to Article 1051 of the Civil Code,
which states:
"Article 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall be

made in a public or authentic instrument, or by a petition
duly presented to the court having jurisdiction over the
testamentary or intestate proceedings."
It is undeniable that Eleanor’s act was made through a

document duly signed by her and executed before notary
public which sufficiently qualifies the same as a public
document. It must be noted that nowhere in the above
quoted article is it required that in case of the pendency of
testamentary or intestate proceedings, any repudiation of
inheritance must be made exclusively by petition in the
estate court.
~ 104 ~
~ 105 ~
101640
Article 1051
SIMEONA BARCELONA, et al. vs. HILARION

BARCELONA
G.R. No. L-9014
October 31, 1956
MONTEMAYOR, J.
Facts:
Leoncia Barcelona was the lawful wife of one Canuto

Sanchez and they acquired out of their common funds two
parcels of land as well as some jewels. Leoncia diedand the
surviving spouse, Canuto Sanchez, was appointed
administrator of the estate. As he could not afford to pay all
the claims against the estate, Hilarion Barcelona, the eldest
brother of the deceased paid all the total indebtedness.
Canuto Sanchez then sold his share in the conjugal
properties to Hilarion Barcelona. Subsequently, Simeona
Barcelona and Aniceto San Gabriel, who is now deceased
and the father Quirico San Gabriel and Teodora San Gabriel,
renounced their corresponding share in the intestate estate
in favor of Hilarion Barcelona for having shouldered the
claims against the estate. Consequently, Hilarion aBarcelona
commenced to possess actually, openly, publicly,
continuously and under claim of title.
However, Simeona Barcelona, Quirico San Gabriel and
Teodora San Gabriel filed the present action, claiming that in
the settlement of the parties in the aforementioned
proceedings, Canuto Sanchez, because of inability or
unwillingness to meet to total indebtedness of the estate of
his deceased wife, agreed to transfer, as a sort of
compromise and settlement to Hilarion and his co-heirs, the
entire two parcels of land in question; chan and because the
latter was only one who had shouldered the expenses of
litigation and because said Plaintiff did not have the money
with which to reimburse him of their corresponding share
therein, they all agreed that he was to take the possession
and cultivation of the lands until after he would have been
reimbursed of his expenses, in which even partition of the
land was to be made.
Appellants Quirico San Gabriel and Teodora San Gabriel
now invoke the Statute of Frauds, claiming that the
~ 106 ~
conveyance or renunciation should be evidenced by a
written instrument and made in a public instrument.
Issue:
Whether or not the renunciation should be in writing
and in a public instrument
Ruling:
No, it does not have to be in writing.
The rule that it should be in writing is really wise, if not
necessary, for otherwise, thousands and thousands of oral
partitions made among heirs in our rural communities,
involving unregistered properties of relatively small value,
would have to be declared null and void. However,it is of
general knowledge that in the provinces, specially in the
barrios, when a person dies leaving small parcels of land not
included in the Torrens System of registration, either
through ignorance of the law or in order to avoid expenses in
the way of legal services, notarial fees, and fees of
registration, the heirs merely come together, make a list of
the properties included in the estate, pay off small debts and
sums advanced by some of the heirs, specially for expenses
incurred during the last illness of the decedent and for his
funeral, and then proceed to assign to each one his share of
the estate, even taking into account the last instructions and
wishes of the decedent. So far, this practice has been found
to be not only convenient and inexpensive, but even
advisable, and is accepted by the people, and we find no
good reason for disturbing said practice. Now, when valuable
properties, specially those covered by certificates of title, are
involved in the partition, perhaps strict compliance with the
law may be advisable, even necessary.
However, we find and hold that the oral partition or
renunciation of inheritance by Simeona Barcelona for that
portion of the conjugal property belonging to her deceased
sister Leoncia, is valid and binding upon her. Not so with
respect to Quirico and Teodora. If they were minors at the
time of the oral partition, their father, Aniceto San Gabriel,
not being a judicial guardian duly appointed by the court and
lacking judicial authority, could not validly make the
renunciation or consent to the partition on behalf of his
minor children; and if, as insinuated, Quirico and Teodora
were no longer minors at that time, then they cannot be
~ 107 ~
bound by said partition or renunciation for the simple reason
that they did not take part in it.
~ 108 ~
167474
Article 1052
Not applicable
LEVISTE VS COURT OF APPEALS

169 SCRA 580
January 30, 1989
FACTS:
On September 7, 1963 Rosa Del Rosario engaged the
services of the Leviste, a practicing lawyer, to represent her
in the petition for probate of the holographic will of late
Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property
was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that
petitioner’s contigent fee would be 35% of the property that
Del Rosario may receive upon the probate of the will.
Later on, Del Rosario terminated the services of Leviste

due to “conflicting interest.”
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the

Special adminstratix- legatee, filed a “Motion to
WithdrawPetition for Probate” alleging that Del Rosario
waived her rights to the device and that the De Guzman
brother and sister who opposed her petition for probate,
shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent.
Nonetheless, the court disallowed the will, holding that

the legal requirements for its validity was not satisfied.
Leviste appealed the decision of the probate court.

Private respondent opposed such appeal on the ground that
Leviste is not a party in interest.
When Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of

Leviste, he filed a petition for certiorari. He argued that by
virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a
creditor of the latter and that under Art. 1052 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 1052. If the heir repudiates the

inheritance to the prejudice of his own
creditors, the latter may petition the court to
~ 109 ~
authorize them to accept it in the name of
the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the

creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover
the amount of their credits. The excess,
should there be any, shall in no case pertain
to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to
the persons to whom, in accordance with the
rules established in this Code, it may belong.
He argued that he has a right to accept for his client Del

Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the device in her favor
to protect his contigent attorney’s fee
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, Leviste is a creditor of the

repudiating heir
2. Whether or not Art 1052 presupposes that the obligor

is an heir
of the deceased
Ruling:
1. No, Leviste is not a creditor of Del Rosario. The

payment of his fee is contigent and dependent upon the
successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition
for probate court was dismissed by the lower court,
contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to
his fee.
2. Yes, Art 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir

of the deceased.
Rosa Del Rosario is not a legal heir of late Maxima C.

Reselva but only a devisee. Upon the dismissal of her petition
for probate of the decedent’s will, she lost her right to inherit
any part of the decedent’s estate.
~ 110 ~
~ 111 ~
167510
Mariano Ramos Vs. Eugenio Marquez
FACTS:
Eugenio Marquez is the father of Delfin Marquez, and

the latter is the son of Florentina Austria and Eugenio
Marquez. Florentina Austria is the daughter of Maria Ramos
who full sister to Mariano Ramos, and both the latter are the
children of Angelina Marquez.
Angelina Marquez, a resident of Bulacan, died on the

12th of October, 1902, her will being presented to the Court
of First Instance of said province for probate. By an order of
said court it was declared void.
Eugenio Marquez, on behalf of his son Delfin Marquez,

filed an application for the administration and partition of the
estate of the said Angelina Marquez, mother of Mariano
Ramos, alleging that Delfin is a son had by him with his wife
Florentina Austria, who in turn is the daughter of Maria
Ramos, sister of Mariano Ramos, and that both the latter
were the children of the aforesaid Angelina Marquez; Delfin,
the aforesaid son of the petitioner, died on the 13th of
February of said year.
On account of Mariano Ramos having presented the will

of his mother, Angelina, for probate on the 3rd of March,
which will, as already stated, was declared void, the
proceedings instituted in connection with the partition were
suspended until such time as the commissioners appointed
might comply with their duties, and on the 20th of October,
1904, Mariano Ramos objected to the estate of his mother
being divided for the reason that Eugenio Marquez was not
an heir of the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether Eugenio Marquez, as the legitimate father and

sole heir of his deceased minor child, Delfin Marquez, is
entitled to inherit in conjunction with the granduncle of his
late son, Mariano Ramos, from the great-mother of his said
~ 112 ~
son, Angelina Marquez, Mariano's mother, on the assumption
that the latter died intestate
HELD:
ART. 1006. (Now 1053) Upon the death of the heir,

without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, the
rights he may have had are transmitted to his heirs.
As has been seen, the will said to have been executed

by Angelina Marquez was declared void and was not
probated; therefore, she must be considered as having died
without a will and her succession would be intestate, as
regards her heirs.

retroactive to the moment of the death of Angelina Marquez;
therefore, upon Eugenio Marquez claiming the share of the
law protects him, as stated by the court below in its
judgment.
Taking into consideration that the minor, Delfin

Marquez, succeeded to the rights of his mother, Florentina
Austria, in the manner as the latter succeeded to those of
Maria Ramos, who was in turn a lawful heir of the common
ancestor, Angelina Marquez; and considering also that the
latter's great-grandson, Delfin Marquez, having died when
still a minor, the only person called to the succession is his
legitimate father, Eugenio Marquez; it is unquestionable that
the latter is entitled to claim a share in the inheritance of the
said great-grandmother, transmitted by the action of the law
to her daughter Maria Ramos in the first place, then upon
the death of the latter to Florentina Austria, and finally, after
the death of the latter, to the son she had by the claimant,
Eugenio Marquez.
~ 113 ~
~ 114 ~
167510
ELOY IMPERIAL v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of

land covered also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of
Albay. He sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged
natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over
the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots.
Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the
contract’s designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the
transaction was in fact a donation.
Barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a

complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale
on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into
signing the said document. The dispute, however, was
resolved through a compromise agreement, among the
stipulations of which was that in case of Leoncio’s death, it
was agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn
by petitioner to defray burial costs.
When Leoncio died he left only two heirs — the herein

petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an
adopted son, Victor Imperial. Victor was substituted in place
of Leoncio and it was he who moved for execution of
judgment.
Fifteen years thereafter Victor died single and without

issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon,
who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four
years hence, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two
children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a

complaint for annulment of the donation. They alleged
inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment
of Victor’s legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the
entire donation, but only of that portion diminishing the
legitime.
~ 115 ~
ISSUE:
WON the private respondents have the right to question

the donation;
HELD:
Under Article 772 of the Civil Code, now 1153, only

those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to
the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may
ask for the reduction of inofficious donations. . .
As correctly argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on

January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who was entitled to
question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to
contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as
plaintiff in the case and even moved for execution of the
compromise judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the

foregoing acts. It must be remembered that at the time of
the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise
agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely
participated in the execution of the compromise judgment.
He was not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not

countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it
requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under
Article 1051 of Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a

public or authentic instrument, or by petition presented to
the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or
intestate proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in the case upon

the latter’s death, his act of moving for execution of the
compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of
renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not
precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the
reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor’s
heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right
~ 116 ~
to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also
in Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated

the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.

2017-167461
Article 1054
AGAPITO HINLO vs. SATURNINA DE LEON,

administratrix of the estate of Rufino Tongoy,
deceased, ET AL.
Facts:
Esteban Hinlo and his wife Nicasia Jamandre owed

Rufino Tongoy the sum of P2,300.30, and as security for
their debt gave them a mortgage on a rural property of 30
hectares in area. Esteban Hinlo on May 15,1890, and Nicasia
Jamandre on June 17, 1897. Prior to their death, no suit had
been instituted for the recovery of the debt. These spouses
at death left five children. The said legitimate children of the
aforementioned spouses Hinlo and Jamandre were in
possession of the said mortgaged agricultural land, and
when the payment of the debt was demanded of them, they
did not pay it. On July 20, 1906, Rufino Tongoy sued them for
payment and petitioned for the attachment and sale of the
mortgaged property. This suit was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros, and, as during the course of
the hearing the plaintiff, Rufino Tongoy, died, the action was
continued by his widow, Saturnina de Leon, as the judicial
administratrix of the state of the deceased.
On May 1, 1907, the court rendered judgments against

the defendants, directing them to pay to Saturnina de Leon,
as the administratrix of the state of the deceased Rufino
Tongoy, P2,300.30, with legal interest from the date of the
filing of the complaint and the costs of the suit. On
November 4, 1907, the sheriff sold the mortgage property of
public auction, and it was adjudicated to the plaintiff's
lawyer, Jose Felix Martinez.
Issue:
~ 117 ~
whether or not the legitimate children of Hinlo and
Jamandre accepted as inheritance the property left by the
latter
Ruling:
No. They did not accept as inheritance the property.
Not because a person is an heir of another is he bound

to pay the latter's debts; he is only bound to pay them if he
accepts the inheritance; so that the acceptance of the
predecessor in interest. The acceptance is either pure and
simple, or under benefit of inventory. (Art. 998.)
ART. 1003. Through an acceptance, pure and simple, or

without benefit of inventory, the heir shall be liable for all the
charges on the estate, not only with the property of the
same, but also with his own.
ART. 1023. The benefit of inventory produces the following

effects in favor of the heir:
1. The heir shall not be bound to pay the debts and other
charges on the inheritance except in so far as the property
of the same may go.
2. He retains against the estate all the rights and actions

which he may have had against the deceased.
3. His private property shall not be confused for any purpose

whatsoever, to his injury, with the property belonging to the
estate.
ART. 999. Pure and simple acceptances may be express or

implied.
xxx xxx xxx
Implied acceptance is one made by acts which

necessarily imply a wish to accept, or acts which no one
should have a right to execute except in the capacity of an
heir.
Acts of mere preservation, or provincial administration,

do not imply the acceptance of the inheritance, if, at the
~ 118 ~
same time, the title and character of heir have not been
assumed.

An inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may

be accepted in the manner prescribed in number 10 of
inventory.
From these provisions it is inferred: (1) That without

debtor spouses cannot be sued for the payment of the
might collect his credit in rem by bringing a real action which
is inherent in a mortgage right; (3) that the act of
~ 119 ~
If under these substantive provisions of the Civil Code

under which the mortgage action of the creditor, Rufino
Tongoy, should have been brought, the children of the
spouses Hinlo and Jamandre should only have been called
upon to deliver the mortgaged property; no personal liability
whatever rested upon the said children, as none was
transmitted to them.
Guilalas, Christian James S. Student Number2017-

167461
Aricle 1054
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO,

PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P.
BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch II, respondents.
Facts:
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of

Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at
the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Several parties came before the court filing claims or

petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate
of Vito Borromeo.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo prayed that he be

declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and
that in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he
was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced
heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs.
As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was
entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the
~ 120 ~
legitime of an acknowledged natural child. He asserted and
incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31,
1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B.
Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud
Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo,
Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B.
Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. TalamIn the
waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their
shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on
the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that
respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting
the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as
it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the
same is void having been executed before the distribution of
the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and
that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject
matter.
Issue:
Whether or not the above-mentioned heirs has validly

repudiate the inheritance
Ruling:
No. The above-mentioned heirs does not validly

repudiate the inheritance.
For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1)

the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence
thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People
v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The
intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown
clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of
intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to,
voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that
no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible
(67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151,
159).
The circumstances of this case show that the

signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear
and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1)
On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein
~ 121 ~
they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the
case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all
the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties,
personal and real, including all cash and sums of money in
the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31,
1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then
pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the
heirs would waive and concede to them all the contested
lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and
concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the
waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo,
entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver
of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the
respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been
otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the
offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to
them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and
30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an
Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be
distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the
trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the
petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed
of Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of
the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her
(Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as
an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito
Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was
P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the
respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a
"Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors
named in the same deed of assignment. The stated
consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of
Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by
Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968,
while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March
24, 1969.
~ 122 ~
167463
ARTICLE 1056 (FOR)
REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN
G.R. No. 132964
February 18, 2000
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is

the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman and Helen Meyers
Guzman. Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and
David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located
in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial

Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the
estate of Simeon. The parcels of land were accordingly
registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David
Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.
Subsequently, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed

assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not
to have been registered, Helen executed another document,
a Deed of Quitclaim confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim
as well as modifying the document to encompass all her
other property in the Philippines.David executed a Special
Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he became
the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of
Quitclaim and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or
otherwise dispose of the lots.
A certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of

the Solicitor General and furnished it with documents
showing that David's ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the
estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis
thereof, the Government filed before the Regional Trial Court
of MalolosBulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-
~ 123 ~
half (1/2) of David's interest in each of the subject parcels of
land be forfeited in its favor.
Trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two

(2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen Meyers Guzman
had no legal force and effect so that the ownership of the
property subject thereof remained with her. The Government
appealed the dismissal of the petition but the appellate court
affirmed the court a quo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the repudiation made by Helen in favor

of David is valid
RULING:
No. The inexistence of a donation does not render the

repudiation made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is
no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already
accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together
with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing
and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the
property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial
settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and her
son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11)
years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides —
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made

is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was
made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when
an unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her

inheritance from Simeon was made through any of the
causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of
the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus,
pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an
instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning
her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
~ 124 ~
subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2)
quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after
she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and
effect.
The repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the

parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen,
who, although being an American citizen, is qualified by
hereditary succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.
~ 125 ~
167463
ARTICLE 1056 (AGAINST)
YUSAYv. YUSAY GONZALES
G.R. No. L-11378
August 20, 1959
FACTS:
MatasYusay died leaving a legitimate son, appellant

Jose, and Lilia Yusay, an acknowledged natural daughter and
considerable property, especially real property. Jose and Lilia
executed a document wherein she acknowledged having
receive from her brother Jose, 18 parcels of land with a total
area of about 24 hectares as her just and legal share in the
estate of her father, Matias, at the same time declaring any
difference what may later be found shall be considered by
one as a gift to the other. In the same document she said:
I further renounce, waive and relinquish to claim, demand or

ask for any other right inclusive, the right to rescind this
agreement by reason of lesion and such other right that the
law grants me under the circumstances.
Jose and Lilia executed a project of partition, wherein

Lilia again acknowledged having received from Jose 18
parcels as her reasonable, equitable and legal participation
in the estate of her father and that in consideration of Lilia's
relinquishment of her right to further inheritance, Jose
assumed to pay all outstanding debts, accounts and
obligations of her father.
After sometime, Lilia filed a motion for reconsideration

of the order of April 10, 1954, alleging that her signatures on
the said documents, namely, her acknowledgment of having
received 18 parcels of land as her share of the inheritance
and her relinquishment of her right to further participation in
the inheritance; the project of partition, and the petition for
approval of said project of partition respectively, had been
obtained through fraud and false representation; that the
project of partition was unjust and prejudicial to her because
it deprived her about 9/10 of her legal share in the
inheritance; that the estate left by her father consisted of
about 900 hectares, with an assessed value of about
P310,000; that according to law she was entitled to receive
1/3 of said estate or about 300 hectares with an assessed
~ 126 ~
value of not less than P100,000, whereas under the project
of partition she want to receive a share of only about 24
hectares with an assessed value of about P9,680. that is to
say, less than 1/10 of her legal share as an heir; and that in
the project of partition, about 70 parcels of land, consisting
of approximately 400 hectares were omitted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lilia’s acceptance of her inheritance

may be impugned
RULING:
Yes.Considering all the circumstances attending the

case, the Court is inclined to agree with the trial court that
there had been undue influence and fraud in securing Lilia's
signature and approval because she was not made to realize
at the time what rights and interests she had, and equally
important, the vast extent of the estate of her father to
which she was entitled by one-third. As already stated, the
estate left by Matias Yusay was considerable and having in
mind the relatively insignificant portion allotted to Lilia, the
project of partition was unreasonable, even unconscionable.
She was being given only small part of the one-third portion
of the estate to which she had a valid right.
Another reason the Court surmise why she agreed to

the partition and to renounce her right to question or to seek
for an increase of her share, was that she was not a
legitimate child but only an acknowledged natural daughter,
unlike Jose, who was a legitimate son. Therefore, she had
what one may call an inferiority complex. Added to this was
the fact that after the death of her father, she went to live
with Jose and his family. To her this must have been a great
favor because by having her in his home, he was giving her
not only protection but also sort of wiping out the
disadvantage that she had been laboring under as an
illegitimate child, and elevating her social standing. In other
words, by having her in his home, and with his family, Jose
was proclaiming to the world that Lilia was his sister,
daughter of his father, and on the same social plane where
he stood.
~ 127 ~
In view if all these favors, it is understandable why Lilia
was prevailed upon to agree to the project of partition, and
consented to forever renounce the full rights of the law gave
her as an heir.She renounced and relinquished not only the
right to claim any other right of inheritance but also the right
to rescind said agreement. And it is hard to understand how
a person can agree to such full and complete renunciation or
relinquishment of rights if he or she is fully realized the
meaning thereof.
Lilia did not realize at the same time that she was being
deprived of about 9/10 of her hereditary share. Jose did not
show her any inventory of the properties of the estate. He
included in the project of partition only 93 parcels of land
with an area of about 400 hectares, omitting about 92
parcels with an extension of about 505 hectares. In the
course of the hearing, Jose told the court that his father left
less than P100 in the bank, for which reason he did not
include the same in the project of partition. This statement
of Jose was later refuted by the certificate of the manager of
the Philippine National Bank, Iloilo Branch who upon order of
the court issued a certification stating that Matias Yusay had
a demand deposit account with an outstanding balance of
P500 and a savings account with an outstanding balance of
P8,358.46. Therefore, Lilia’s acceptance of her inheritance
may be impugned.
~ 128 ~
~ 129 ~
167495
ARTICLE 1057
Within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the
distribution of the estate in accordance with the Rules of
Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall signify to the
court having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate
the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to

have accepted the inheritance. (n)
APPLICABLE:
WENCESLA CACHO VS. JOHN G. UDAN, AND RUSTICO

G. UDAN
G.R. NO. L-19996; APRIL 30, 1965
FACTS:
On 13 December 1959 one Silvina G. Udan, single, and a

resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a
purported will naming her son, Francisco G. Udan, and one
Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike.
WenceslaoCacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in the

Court of First Instance but was subsequently opposed by
Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the testator. Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance and Urgent Motion
for Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G.
Udan, the appointed heir in the Will.
Francisco G. Udan died. After the death of the latter, John

G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the
testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on
the ground that the will was not attested and executed as
required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to
execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue
influence.
Proponent-appellee, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss Oppositions filed by the Oppositors, and on 20
February 1962 the Honorable Court of First Instance of
~ 130 ~
Zambales issued an Order disallowing these two oppositions
for lack of interest in the estate. On its appeal, the oppositor
argued that although Francisco survive his mother, the latter
did not actually acquire the said property because of his
failure to accept it.
ISSUE:
Whether FrancsicoUdan acquired the said property

absence of express acceptance.
RULING:
Yes. Whether FrancsicoUdan acquired the said property

absence of express acceptance.
Article 1057 of the New Civil Code provides that; Within

thirty days after the court has issued an order for the
distribution of the estate in accordance with the Rules of
Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall signify to the
court having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate
the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed

to have accepted the inheritance.
For the oppositors-appellants it is argued that while

Francisco Udan did survive his mother, and acquired the
rights to the succession from the moment of her death (Art.
777, Civ. Code), still he did not acquire the inheritance until
he accepted it. This argument fails to take into account that
the Code presumes acceptance of an inheritance if the latter
is not repudiated in due time (Civ. Code, Art. 1057, par. 2),
and that repudiation, to be valid, must appear in a public or
authentic instrument, or petition to the court. There is no
document or pleading in the records showing repudiation of
the inheritance by Francisco Udan. Therefore, absence of
express repudiation, FrancsicoUdan shall be considered to
have accepted the property subject of inheritance.
~ 131 ~
167495
Article 1057
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO,

PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERAVS. FORTUNATO
BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-41171; July 23, 1987
FACTS:
Vito Borromeo, a widower, died on March 13, 1952, at

the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in the province of Cebu. All his brothers
and sisters predeceased him. April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera
filed a petition for the probate of a one page document as
the last will and testament, devising all his properties to
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in
equal and undivided shares and designating Junquera as
executor. The testate proceedings was converted into an
intestate proceedings. Several parties came before the court
filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the
intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo

filed a motion to be declared as one of the heirs of the
deceased, alleging that he is an illegitimate son and that he
was omitted in the declaration of heirs. Fortunato filed a
motion for reconsideration changing the basis for his claim
to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a
Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967. In the
waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their
shares in the disputed estate.
Petitioner also contends that the document entitled

"Waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967,
aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29,
1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and
Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there
~ 132 ~
can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there
has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs
intend totransfer.Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were
not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were
declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This
view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article
1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devisees, and
legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within
thirty days after the court has issued an order for the
distribution of the estate.Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on
the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil
Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as
heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Waiver of Hereditary Rights shows

the intention of signatories to relinquish their right as to the
disputed estate.
RULING:
No. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of

hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an
existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to
third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such
properties have the character of future property, because
the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of
the death of the deceased, by principle established in article
657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to
which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of
death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of
the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into
possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in
any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in
accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is
vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
corresponding hereditary portion. The heirs, therefore, could
waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to
partition the estate was issued only in 1969.
~ 133 ~
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For
a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the
existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence
thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The
intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown
clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of
intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to,
voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that
no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to
the waiver document did not have the clear and convincing
intention to relinquish their rights.
~ 134 ~

Compiled Case Digests For Articles 1015-1023, 1041-1057, New Civil Code of The Philippines

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Compiled Case Digests For Articles 1015-1023, 1041-1057, New Civil Code of The Philippines

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyu

ADRIANO, Ernesto III B. (ARTS. 1015, 1041, 1050)

BERNABE, Khristienne Rian C. (ARTS. 1016, 1042,

DE GUZMAN, Michaela (ARTS. 1017, 1043, 1052)

GALITA, Chloe Anne S. (ARTS. 1018, 1044, 1053)

GUILALAS Christian James S. (ARTS. 1019, 1045,

MANALASTAS, Jiathron O. (ARTS. 1020, 1046, 1055)

SANTOS, Toni Cassandra B. (ARTS. 1021, 1047, 1056)

TORCULAS, Joyce Liezel Q. (ARTS. 1022, 1048, 1057)

URIAN, Joseph Andrew D. (ARTS. 1023, 1049)

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez,

G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926

On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last

I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my

Prior to the time of the execution of this will the

Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate

Yes, Our discussion of the legal problem presented

We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining

A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to

HEIRS OF ANTERO SOLIVA, vs. SEVERINO, JOEL,

G.R. No. 159611 April 22, 2015

The Spouses Ceferino (also known as Rufino) Soliva and

(1) a 1.436-hectare lot (Parcel 1) under Tax Declaration

(2) a 9,447-square meter lot (Parcel 2) under TD No.

(3) a 5,136-square meter Riceland under TD No. 14298.

At the core of the controversy is a 14,609-square meter

Earlier or on June 22, 1949, Mancol sold to Cenon the

In March 1959, Severino received as his share in their

On November 13, 1970, Juana sold to Cenon half of

On January 21, 1986, Cenon sold to Roleda a 4,092-

Meanwhile, Cenon died in 1987; he was survived by his

The RTC disposed of the case the properties within their

Cenon is likewise excluded from the partition of Parcel

In short, Cenon could validly sell to Roleda only the

CA’s DecisionCeferino had no right whatsoever over the

In these lights, Cenon validly acquired ownership over a

Cenon’s remaining 6,613.5 square meters share of

As for Ceferino’s other heirs, they each acquired a pro

Assailing the CA’s decision, Antero argues that the CA

Whether the CA correctly applied the concept of

No,We disagree with Antero’s argument. He obviously

Art. 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when

In this regard, the CA said:

However, inasmuch as it is undisputed that Severino is

A careful reading of this CA ruling would show that the

On the contrary, the CA added Severino’s share to

In effect, the CA simply provided for a clearer and

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez,

GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET ALvs. JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL.

In a duly probated last will and testament of one

The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to

Subsequently, the surviving usufructuaries leased the

Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense

Whether or not the eleven surviving usufructuaries of

It appears that there is accretion among usufructuaries

However, the only exception is if the usufruct is

Wherefore, The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby

May 19, 1903

The ninth clause of the will of Doña Honorata is as

"The testatrix bequeaths the sum of 3,000 pesos to her

Don Enrique Gloria died before the testatrix.

Yes, Don Ramon is entitled to the other half of 3,000

A legacy of a certain sum to two nephews in equal