Information magazine

FOCUS ON
risk management June 2010 - Issue no. 2

In this Issue:

- RISK MANAGEMENT

- LOW SULPHUR FUEL

- SHIP MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT

- HEALTH & SAFETY

- CASE STUDIES
 RISK MANAGEMENT
In this second issue of our magazine, it is important to
introduce the basic concepts of risk. You can count this one
as a sort of preface of an interesting thriller book in order to
find the murderer, i.e the undesired event.
We’ll speak about a few elementary notions: hazard, risk,
analysis, HAZID, FMECA, fault tree, MTTF, minimal cut set,
Markov techniques, HAZOP, QRA, CFD, Boolean algebra,
cancerous and mutagen substances, ergonomics, etc.
It’s a joke, don’t worry! Only the bare necessities.
Risk is intrinsic in every human activity, in other words there is
no work without risk. The maritime field is no exception.
Safety must be the basic guidance in each phase of ship life:
design, construction, operation, maintenance, lay up.
In order to guarantee safety to any involved actor (workers,
environment, public and assets) you have to assess and
manage the risk.
Assessment and management, as the words themselves
explain, are different. Thinking in quality jargon,
the assessment is a part of the first step (the planning) of the
overall management process.
Risk assessment, in turn, is the overall process of risk
page 1
analysis and risk evaluation: risk analysis is the identification
of hazard and the risk estimation, whereas risk evaluation is
the judgment, on the basis of risk analysis, of whether a risk
is tolerable.
Summarizing, risk assessment starts with hazard
identification, continues with risk estimation and
evaluation and ends with recommendations for decision-making.
Now that the process is clear (we hope), let’s see two key
definitions: hazard and risk.
Hazard is a potential source of harm to personnel,
environment and assets or to a combination of these, regardless
of how likely or unlikely such an occurrence might be.
Risk (R) is a combination of the probability (P) of an event and
the consequences (C) of the event.
Usually risk is estimated as a product of probability and
consequences. When eliminating the risk at source is
unfeasible, we must reduce the risk of the event. There are
two possible ways: prevention and protection. The first one is
to be preferred. Preventing means decreasing the probability of
the event, protecting means decreasing the consequences of
the event.
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNATIONAL RULES
Resolution MSC 273(85) adopted
the latest amendments to the
International Safety Management
Code in December 2008. Date of
entry into force is 1st July 2010.
Among the modifications to the
wording of the ISM CODE, the one
we deem will have the most
significant impact on the shipping
world is the replacement of the
existing subparagraph 2 of
ISM Code
paragraph 1.2.2 regarding the Since the adoption of the new
Safety Management objectives of amendments, RINA has been
the company. giving assistance to shipowners in
The existing subparagraph is the preparation of a risk assessment
“establish safeguards against all of their fleets which takes into
identified risks” and it will be account all safety and environmental
replaced by: procedures already implemented
“assess all identified risks to its by each company.
ships, personnel and the
environment and establish
appropriate safeguards”.
page 2
RISK MANAGEMENT - FOCUS ON TANKERS

TMSA
Tanker Management and Self-Assessment (TMSA) programme published by the Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF) provides tanker operators with a means to audit and
improve their own operational, safety, quality and environmental management
system. The programme introduces four self-assessment levels – ‘1’ being the lowest and ‘4’
the highest. A company that is currently fully compliant with the letter and spirit of the ISM
Code would be able to rate itself as at least ‘1’.
The programme identifies 12 elements of a management system:
1) management, leadership and accountability;
2) recruitment and management of shore-based personnel;
3) recruitment and management of ship personnel;
4) reliability and maintenance standards;
5) navigational safety;
6) cargo, ballast and mooring operations;
7) management of change;
8) incident investigation and analysis;
9) safety management;
10) environmental management;
11) emergency preparedness and contingency planning; and
12) measurement, analysis and improvement.
Risk assessment constitutes a cornerstone of the TMSA approach. In particular, it is explicitly
required in several of the 12 above elements. The most significant applications are envisaged
in elements 4, 7, 9 and 10.
Element 4 (reliability and maintenance standards) prescribes the identification of critical
equipment, i.e. a risk assessment of the ship.
Element 7 (management of change) requires the identification of potential consequences of a
change together with any necessary mitigation measures in order to ensure that safety and
environmental standards are not compromised.
Element 9 (Safety management) and 10 (Environmental management) require a hazard
identification and risk assessment on board and ashore.

page 3
RISK MANAGEMENT - FOCUS ON TANKERS

page 4
 INTERVIEW WITH ANDREA COGLIOLO
What are the latest rules on marine fuel?
The maximum sulphur content of
marine fuels provided by EU Directive
2005/33/EC came into force on 1st
January 2010. The directive prescribes
that ships use marine fuels with
sulphur content not exceeding 0.1% by
mass when at berth in EU ports allowing
sufficient time for the crew to complete
any necessary fuel-changeover operation
as soon as possible after arrival at berth
and as late as possible before
departure.
The rule doesn’t apply to ships that are
at berth for less than two hours or to
ships which switch off all engines and
use shore-side electricity while at berth
in ports.
It’s a big revolution impacting on the
marine field.
Yes, but it is not the only one. I’d like
to recall that Annex VI of Marpol 73/78
requires ships to use marine fuels with
sulphur content not exceeding 4.5% m/m
Low Sulphur Fuel
Andrea COGLIOLO
Head of
and Risk Analysis Sector - RINA Technical Department
andrea.cogliolo@rina.org
and 1.5% m/m in SOx emission control
areas (known as SECA).
California requires vessel operators to
use either marine gas oil (MGO or DMA)
with a sulphur limit of 1.5% or marine
diesel oil (MDO or DMB) with a sulphur
limit of 0.5% or less when ships are in
Californian waters and 24 nautical
miles from the Californian Baseline.
Moreover, both IMO and California have
already approved more and more
restrictive requirements which will
enter in force according to a defined
schedule.
What are the problems tied to the use of
LSF?
The properties of fuels with low sulphur
content are different from the marine
fuels normally used on board. The main
issues are:
- low viscosity
- poor lubricity
- unacceptable or undesirable blend
components
page 5
Machinery, Electrical, Automation
- potential power shortfall
- engine starting problems
- attention to pre-heating control
- correct setting for boiler safety and
combustion control systems
- problem for storage of different fuels
and changeover procedure.
It’s fundamental for shipping
companies to carry out a risk
assessment and implement the
necessary technical solutions
(modification to piping systems and/or
equipment, instruction and training for
the crew, etc).
The European Commission, aware of
difficulties that may be encountered in
complying with Directive 2005/33/EC
requirements, on 21st December 2009
invited the Member States to consider
the existence of an approved retrofit
plan when assessing the degree of
penalties to be applied to non-complying
ships.
INTERVIEW WITH ANDREA COGLIOLO

Low Sulphur Fuel

What support can RINA Services provide?

Our technicians can support shipping companies by
cooperating in the risk assessment phase and, obviously,
by approving the modified drawings (if the fuel piping
system or other class related systems are affected by
modifications).
Moreover, we are ready to approve the retrofit plans
mentioned in the Commission Recommendation of 21
December 2009 on the safe implementation of the use of
low sulphur fuel by ships at berth in Community ports.
The documentation to be submitted is:
contracts with the manufacturer, including foreseen
data for completion of the modification to be carried
out on board
class approved retrofit drawings
fuel changeover procedures
final date of completion of the whole retrofit actions,
including final survey on board.
Finally, RINA has issued the new additional class notation
LSF (Low Sulphur Fuels) that is assigned to new and
existing ships for which the Society has evidence that Low
Sulphur Fuels may be used by some or all on-board fuel oil
consumers to be recorded in the ship’s status, together
with the relevant percentage, in weight, of the fuel sulphur
content (e.g. 1%, 0.5%, 0.1%).
It is to be noted that responsibility for ensuring that the
ship is suitable for safe operation using the fuels required
by the applicable national or international legislation
remains with the operator.

page 6
SHIP MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT
The support of a class society in the application
of Condition-Based Maintenance
on board commercial ships
Machinery Maintenance according
to Class Rules
The traditional approach to machinery
overhaul on board ship has long been
based on calendar time. Normally, the
rules of IACS Classification societies
envisage the overhaul of class-related
equipment within a 5-year time
window (CMS regime).
This approach is being increasingly
superseded by the introduction of the
PMS, in which the overhauls are
allowed to be based on running hours
instead of calendar time, obviously for
equipment that operates for long
periods. To be granted the PMS,
owners are required to manage their
maintenance with a Computerized
Maintenance Management System
(CMMS) software tool. Experience has
demonstrated that this approach pays
dividends in terms of flexibility and better
organization of maintenance.
Once an owner has switched from CMS
to PMS, a further natural step forward
is the adoption of a Condition-Based
Maintenance (CBM) program.
Until recently, however, this approach
was viewed as too sophisticated for the
merchant marine world.
This was true in the past, when
interpretation of the results of the
measurements was restricted to a few
specialists that had to extract the
useful information through
mathematical process (in the case of
vibrations) or to carry burdensome
equipment (in the case of thermography)
totally unsuitable for the arrangements
of a ship.
These negative points now belong to
the past: expertise is available through
specialized service suppliers and the
equipment is now both handy and
user-friendly. These considerations
have brought RINA to advocate this
approach among owners, and to
introduce a new CBM section in its Rules
(RINA, 2010), along with
dedicated guide (RINA, 2008).
The goal is to provide basic criteria to
support those companies who want to
undertake CBM on ships.
Additionally, if a company decides to
put a group of machinery under CBM,
the relevant ship can be granted
the additional Class notations PMS-CM
(PROP), PMS-CM (CARGO), PMS-CM
(HVAC), PMS-CM (FDS), PMS-CM
(ELE) corresponding to propulsion
machinery, cargo equipment, air
conditioning system, fire detection
system and electrical switchboard
respectively; it can be seen that RINA
is aware of the usefulness of the
approach not only to Class items, but
also to those commercially sensitive
systems (e.g. HVAC on passenger
ships, cargo system on tankers, etc.) that
are not fully covered by Class rules.
a Tekné decided to rely on SPM for an
page 7
Implementation of a Pilot CBM
System on a Tanker Fleet
RINA, with the support of a qualified
CBM service supplier (SPM Instrument
Srl of Italy) has assisted the
implementation of a CBM program
covering on-board machinery of
Tekné-managed Finaval vessels.
The equipment under CBM is
mostly rotating machinery (pumps,
electrical motors, compressors etc.), the
maker of which defines no mandatory
a maintenance schedule, leaving it to
the owner, according to the type of
utilization. Diesel engines were excluded,
as they are maintained under a strict
PMS program set forth by the
manufacturer.
It was decided to adopt vibration
techniques, postponing thermography
to after the consolidation of this first
CBM approach among the dedicated
operators.
Tekné decided to undertake CBM by
regular manual measurements obtained
from portable instruments.
In addition to vibrations, the RINA
rules and guide require the prognostic
information to be completed by
monitoring a series of machine-specific
parameters like temperature, pressure,
current absorption etc., which are
acquired and recorded in the
instrument for graphical processing.
 SHIP MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT
extensive training program for ship and
shore personnel, so as to enable the
crew to perform the measurements and
transfer them to the shore technical
office. A particularly time-consuming but
essential task was the identification of the
measurement points of every item and
the storage of the many transponder
placards for the automatic detection of
machines: this task was carried out by
the crew under SPM indications.
Once the data are acquired by
personnel and transferred to the
dedicated software, the crew in charge
saves them in a back-up safety copy (as
also required by RINA) and creates an
export file ready to be transferred via
e-mail to the shore technical office,
which takes care of the necessary
checks (i.e. acceptability and trend),
and, if relevant, gives the ships
feedback in terms of maintenance
actions to be performed.
Lastly, the data relevant to each piece
of machinery can be progressively
stored in the CMMS software.
The Class-related equipment under
CBM is specified in the PMS manual
page 8
approved by RINA, which will audit the
adequacy and continuity of the CBM in
the yearly surveys.
The main advantage of well-implemented
CBM is of course the prompt detection
of incipient failures, enabling
preventive/corrective maintenance
strategies to be adjusted. So far, on the
ships under CBM, Tekné has
experienced no events so serious as to
challenge the predictive capabilities of
the technique. The vibration amplitude
trend analysis has shown some
anomalies on a few machines, however.
Continued on page 9...
 SHIP MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT

....continued from page 8

The implementation of a CBM program on a system is regularly, allowing some incipient anomalies to be detected
beneficial if undertaken seriously from the beginning, and and fixed before getting serious.
maintained throughout the lifetime of the system. RINA, on its part, is ready to accept the adoption of
It is therefore to be viewed as a mid-term investment. condition-based overhauls for the machinery under CBM,
Successful implementation inevitably implies some in lieu of calendar-based or running-hours-based overhauls.
difficulties that have to be solved up front, as for It is RINA’s firm belief that this experience has realistically
example: crew training, selection of equipment to be demonstrated the feasibility of on-board CBM, so far
monitored and the choice of tools (portable or permanent). deemed to be suitable only for onshore or hi-tech
In particular, the selection of equipment is based on its applications.
criticality; the criticality of on-board equipment should be It has paved the way for an increase in the adoption of
evaluated by means of risk assessment techniques CBM in the near future, and RINA will continue to promote
(nowadays quite commonly applied due to legislative and such initiatives among its clients.
commercial obligations) and on the basis of historical
records of preventive and corrective maintenance.
Another essential issue is the build-up of a robust baseline
of measurements for all the equipment involved, which is FORMAL
SHIP SYSTEMS S
instrumental to providing the reference starting point of the SAFETY ASSESSMENT
At owners’ request, other critic
physical parameters against which the trends will be Risk Analysis techniques for the
added to those recommende
verified. On ships, no two identical pieces of equipment detection of critical components
behave the same way: a machine can display apparently
high vibration levels, but this may not constitute an
incipient failure if the vibrations do not change in time.
The correct appraisal of the behavior of each item takes
time (at least some months), but allows customization of
the maintenance strategy: neglecting this fact, and ANALYSIS RESULTS
referring to standard values just to save time, may lead to
erroneous conclusions about the health of an item.
In short, the CBM approach adopted by Tekné is founded
on the proper allocation of resources, expertise and
technology; the early involvement of RINA was
necessary and beneficial to start the initiative, through the
definition of the acceptance criteria of Class-related
CRITICAL COMPONENTS MANAGEMENT
equipment, the equipment selection, etc.
The results of a couple of years’ experience have exceeded
expectations.
The crew members in charge of the CBM tasks on board
have accepted the new approach with great interest and Star-Mach Class Notation
use it regularly with a periodicity that even exceeds RINA
requirements. The shore technical office examines trends RINA assigns an Additional Class Notation - STARMACH - to those vessels w
components of propulsion, electric production and steering gear system
detected by means of typical risk analysis techniques and manag
accordance with tailored maintenance procedures.

page 9
 HEALTH & SAFETY

Health & Safety Risk Assessment

The identification of ship hazards that can
impact on the safety and health of crew and
passengers and the definition of steps to be taken
to improve procedures and reduce detected
possible risks is achieved using risk analysis
techniques, such as Hazard Identification.
A typical application of Health & Safety Risk
analysis is related to the evaluation requested by
Italian national laws for the protection of crew
health.

SELECTION
cal systems may be
ded by the Society

whose
ms are
ged in

page 10
RCM & RAM
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
RCM is a technique based on the statistical analysis of
the failure and repair data of critical components in order
to optimize the preventive maintenance intervals in
terms of cost.
It is based on tailoring, as far as possible, the actual
preventive maintenance tasks to the frequency and
consequences of failures. It can be performed starting
with a Reliability Availability Maintainability (RAM)
analysis, preferably from the design stage, through the
whole lifetime. The process allows specifications of RAM
requirements to be given to designers and, once the
Reliability Availability Maintainability (RAM)
Three key parameters can be used to gauge the
performance of systems: Reliability, Availability and
Maintainability (RAM).
Reliability quantifies what fails and how often. It is the
measure of the probability that a piece of equipment or
a system will perform a required function under stated
conditions for a defined period of time.
Maintainability is generally defined as the probability that a
piece of equipment or a system will be retained in or
restored to a specified condition within a given period of
time when maintenance is performed in accordance with
prescribed procedures and resources.
Availability identifies the most effective actions available
to keep a system or equipment operational. It is defined
as the probability that a system will be available and
capable of performing its intended function at any
random point in time. It stems from a combination of
reliability and maintainability.
page 11
system is operating, can be applied to optimize
maintenance by selecting the most appropriate strategy,
i.e.:
spare part allocation
condition monitoring
dedicated test and inspection programs
re-design
To diffuse this approach in the shipping field, RINA has
developed the Additional Class Notation STAR-MACH.
(see focus on page 10)
RINA can perform or assist RAM analyses to identify and, if
possible, quantify the systems’ weak spots in relation to the
defined success criteria.
The RAM analysis will also support the designer of
machinery, electrical or automation systems to achieve a
more effective and fault-tolerant design and/or a proper
maintenance policy (e.g., in terms of spares supply), or
to compare the effectiveness of alternative solutions.
If the analysis highlights some critical groups, a revision
of the design is to be carried out.
In general terms, an Availability / Reliability analysis
consists in decomposing the plant into levels (groups,
subgroups) from the highest one to component level;
each active component is assigned its Mean Time To
Failure (MTTF) and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR - the MTTR
only in the case of an availability analysis) value then the
analysis, starting from the components, proceeds
through a bottom up calculation of each level and of the
whole plant.
 CASE STUDY no. 1

Case Study:
Reliability analysis of a sea water cooling
system using the in-house developed
“R&M Fault Tree” software tool

The results illustrate the MTTF allocation among the sea water cooling
system groups. It can be seen that, in this case, the
reliability allocation doesn’t particularly stress critical groups

Sea Water Cooling system: Reliability (MTTF) Allocation MTTF (%) Allocation

Groups MTTF [ Hours ] MTTF [ % ]

Sea Chests 12533 26,58

ME: Hydraulic Pumps 16208 20,55

ME: Heat Exchanger 29223 11,40

Sea Water discharge 34979 9,52

AUX: Hydraulic Pumps 16208 20,55

AUX: Heat Exchanger 29223 11,40

Sea Water Plant 3331

Sea Chests ME: Hydraulic Pumps ME: Heat Exchanger

Sea Water Discharge AUX: Hydraulic Pumps AUX: Heat Exchanger

page 12
HAZARD

Hazard Identification Techniques

Hazard identification (HAZID) studies
are the first step when conducting any
risk assessment, to screen the
hazardous scenarios that deserve
further scrutiny or to provide a
simplified risk picture.
RINA can carry out or assist HAZID
studies by adopting e.g. the following
qualitative techniques, according to
the nature of the analysis:
Hazard and Operability studies
(HAZOP)
Failure Modes, Effects
Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
What-if analysis
HAZID can be applied to any problem probability is also classified into
where safety issues are involved: categories.
technical hazards, environmental
The result is a risk matrix which is
hazards, health and safety in
used for the analysis.
workplaces, etc.; the output of the
study will be basically the prioritization
of the safety-critical issues and
scenarios, areas of further investigation
and high-level recommendations for
risk reduction.
In general the hazard is evaluated
considering its severity and its
occurrence probability.
As can be seen, the Criticality Matrix defines the ALARP
and Severity is usually classified into risk regions.
categories considering for example its The ALARP principle is that the residual risk, due to the
consequence towards people, assets, hazard, shall be “As Low As Reasonably
Practicable”. The risks outside the ALARP region have
environment, reputation; occurrence
to be mitigated

Frequency
Very Remote Remote Low Possible Probable Frequent
Severity

Catastrophic 3 2 2 1 1 1

Major 3 3 2 1 -2 1 1

Significant 3 3 3 2 1 -2 1

Minor 3 3 3 3 2 2

Slight 3 3 3 3 3 2

Negligible 3 3 3 3 3 3

legend:

Green (3) Acceptable Risk

Yellow (2) The Risk has to be reduced to an acceptable value

Orange (1-2) High

Red (1) High: Operations in this risk band must be eliminated

page 13
 CASE STUDY no. 2

Case Study:
FMECA analysis of a sea
water cooling system plant
For each identified Item which can be subjected to failure
in the FMECA worksheet the following are reported:

1. The Item’s failure modes and the failure effect

2. The failure mode’s severity
3. The failure mode’s frequency or occurrence probability
4. The failure mode’s detection probability
5. The Hazard’s risk level based on the criticality matrix
6. Report the suggested corrective action for the critical items

FAILURE MODE CRITICALITY AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMECA) - WORKSHEET

Assessment Ref. N°: 1 Assessed system: Sea Water Cooling System

Assessmentversion N°: 1 Review date: 15 Nov. 08

Assessor:
Reference drawing:
Signed:
QUANTITATIVE

FAILURE EFFECTS
PROBABILITY

PROBABILITY
QUALITATIVE

SEVERITY

FAULURE
ITEM ID CODE DETECTION RECOVERY ALARP NOTES
MODE
LOCAL ON THE SHIP

None: the other is sufficient to High temperature of central Cleanup when possible,
Sea Chest Obstruction None 1 1 2 TOLERABLE
provide SW cooler after isolating the chest

Cleanup when possible,

Sea Chest None: the other is sufficient to
MR002/1-2 Obstruction None 1 1 after isolating the sea 2 TOLERABLE
Strainers provide SW
chest strainer

S.W. If possible, isolate the

Pump for 66 A/B/C Fail to run Startup of the standby pump None 1 1 Bilge alarms failed section by manual 2 TOLERABLE
M/E valves

S.W. If possible, isolate the

Pump for 67 A/B/C Fail to run Startup of the standby pump None 1 1 Bilge alarms failed section by manual 2 TOLERABLE
AUX valves

Significant If possible, isolate the

Crossover Loss of sea water flow to FW If not restored, black-out and
400-MR-01 leakage or 1 4 Bilge alarms failed section by manual 5 TOLERABLE
Header coolers flooding of engine room
rupture valves

Significant
Single line to M/E Loss of sea water flow to M/E Loss of propulsion and flooding Bilge alarms, M/E Close the valves MR033/1
Piping leakage or 1 4 5 TOLERABLE
(200-MR-13) central cooler 71A of engine room instruments, rounds in E.R. upstream of 71A
rupture

Significant
Single line to G/E Black-out and flooding of Bilge alarms, G/E Close the valves MR006/2
Piping leakage or Loss of sea water flow to G/E 1 4 5 TOLERABLE
(125-MR-37/04) engine room instruments, rounds in E.R. upstream of G/E
rupture

Significant If not corrected, eventual Temperature increase of Isolation by closing the

Branch line to non- Loss of sea water and flooding of
Piping leakage or black-out and flooding of 1 3 users, bilge alarms, rounds valves upstream of the 4 TOLERABLE
essential users engine room
rupture engine room in E.R. affected user

Branch line to Significant If not corrected, unavailability Isolation by closing the

Loss of sea water to user and
Piping FRAMO power pack leakage or of cargo system and flooding 1 3 Bilge alarms, rounds in E.R. valves upstream of the 4 TOLERABLE
flooding of engine room
100-MR-54 rupture of engine room 202 exchanger

If not corrected, in the long run

Antifoulung Fails to Corrective maintenance;
Reduction of cleaning efficiency may lead to fouling of the 1 2 Temperature increase 3 TOLERABLE
system operate preventive checks
exchangers on the users

page 14
 RINA: 150 years of service
RINA is one of the oldest classification societies and certification companies in the world. Established in Genoa in 1861 to serve the
marine industry, today it spans the globe as a multinational and multi-faceted company, sharing its knowledge and experience through
a wide range of services which help industries and the community to improve their businesses and quality of life. RINA’s services cover
the environment, energy, transportation, logistics, safety, quality and social responsibility.

RINA Services S.p.A. head office via corsica, 12 16128 genova italy
ph. +39 010.5385.664 fax +39 010.5351.543 marine.services@rina.org
technical services ph. +39 010.5385.667 fax +39 010.5351.000 technical.marine@rina.org

Business AMERICA

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