Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
nd
2 Semester AY 2019-2020
A. COURSE DESCRIPTION
This course provides a brief overview of the academic discipline known as philosophy, a succinct
history of philosophy from Ancient Greece to our modern day, a lexicon of philosophical terms
and concepts, as well as an examination of the sub-disciplines of philosophy and several of the
major philosophies that have shaped our world since the times of the pre-Socratic philosophers.
B. COURSE OBJECTIVES
Week Topics
1 What Is Philosophy?
2-3 Coming to Terms: A Philosophical Lexicon, Part I
4-5 A Manner of Speaking: A Philosophical Lexicon, Part II
6-7 Metaphysics
8 Epistemology
9 MIDTERM EXAMINATION
10 Philosophy of Mind
11 Philosophy of Religion
12 Ethics, Part I
13 Ethics, Part II
14 Logic
15 Social & Political Philosophy
16 Unsolved Problems & Paradoxes in Philosophy
17 An Overview of the Great Philosophers
18 FINAL EXAMINATION
C. COURSE REQUIREMENTS
D. GRADING SYSTEM
Midterm: Semi-Final:
Attendance: 10% Attendance: 10%
Recitation: 20% Recitation: 20%
Quizzes: 15% Quizzes: 15%
Project: 15% Project: 15%
Attitude: 10% Attitude: 10%
Midterm Exam: 30% Final Exam: 30%
Final Grade: Midterm Grade + Semi-Final Grade ÷ 2 = GPA
E. REFERENCES
Abbott, B., 2008. ‘Issues in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Definite Descriptions in English,’ in
J. Gundel & N. Hedberg (eds.), Reference: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bach, K., 1992. ‘Intentions and Demonstrations,’ Analysis, 52(3): 140–146.
–––, 2017. ‘Reference, Intention, and Context: Do Demonstratives Really Refer?,’ in M. de Ponte
and K. Korta (eds.), Reference and Representation in Thought and Language, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Brandom, R., 1994. Making it Explicit, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Burge, T., 1973. ‘Reference and Proper Names,’ Journal of Philosophy, 70(14): 425–439.
Chastain, C., 1975. ‘Reference and Context,’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and
Knowledge (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume VII), Minnesota: University of
Minnesota Press.
Cohen, J. and E. Michaelson, 2013. ‘Indexicality and the Answering Machine
Paradox,’, Philosophy Compass, 8(6): 580–592.
Davidson, D., 1984. ‘Reality Without Reference’ in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Devitt, M., 1997. ‘Meaning and Psychology: A Response to Richard,’ Noûs, 31(1): 115–131.
Dickie, I., 2015. Fixing Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Donnellan , K., 1966. ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions,’ Philosophical Review, 75(3): 281–
304.
–––, 1968. ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again,’ Philosophical Review, 77(2): 203–215.
–––, 1970. ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,’ Synthese, 21(3–4): 335–358.
Evans, G., 1973. ‘The Causal Theory of Names,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volume 47: 187–208.
–––, 1982. The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fara, D. Graff, 2015. ‘Names are Predicates,’ Philosophical Review, 124(1): 59–127.
Field, H., 2001. Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
von Fintel, K., 2004. ‘Would you Believe It? The King of France is Back! (Presuppositions and
Truth-Value Intuitions),’ in A. Bezuidenhout and M. Reimer (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond: An
Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays on Definite and Indefinite Descriptions, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Fodor, J.D., and I. Sag, 1982. ‘Referential and Quantificational Indefinites,’ Linguistics and
Philosophy, 5(3): 355–398.
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